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On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we VACATE our order of September 22, 2017. The application for leave to appeal the September 6, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals is DENIED, because we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On March 7, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the November 17, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), and in light of the prosecutor's concession that defendant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of his prior convictions under MRE 609 was not decided against him on direct appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals opinion and REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals shall consider all of the defendant's claims of error in light of the prosecutor's concession and determine whether he is entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D) under the proper standard, namely reviewing the Wayne Circuit Court's decision to grant the motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion and reviewing its factual findings for clear error. See People v. Swain , 288 Mich.App. 609, 628, 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010) ; People v. McSwain , 259 Mich.App. 654, 681, 676 N.W.2d 236 (2003). The Court of Appeals shall forward its decision on remand to the Clerk of this Court within 60 days of the date of this order. We retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 18, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellees to extend the time for filing their supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before August 17, 2018.

Murphy, J. The prosecution appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order denying its motion to amend the information to reinstate a count of larceny by conversion of $20,000 or more, MCL 750.362 ; MCL 750.356(2)(a), which count the district court had dismissed following defendant's preliminary examination. The district court did bind defendant over to the circuit court on charges of obtaining money by false pretenses in the amount of $20,000 or more but less than $50,000, MCL 750.218(5)(a), and embezzlement by an agent or trustee of $20,000 or more but less than $50,000, MCL 750.174(5)(a). The false pretenses and embezzlement counts are not at issue on appeal. We hold that the circuit court abused its discretion when it denied the prosecution's motion to amend the information because there was sufficient evidence establishing probable cause to believe that defendant committed the offense of larceny by conversion and amendment of the information would not have unfairly surprised or prejudiced defendant. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Our summarization of the case is based on evidence presented by the prosecution at defendant's preliminary examination, which evidence defendant is of course free to challenge at trial. Using funds held in his Individual retirement account (IRA), the complainant-through a trust company acting as custodian of the IRA-loaned $241,000 to Mackinac Advisory Services, LLC (MAS), pursuant to an agreement specifying that the funds were to be used by MAS for the acquisition and rehabilitation of six identified real properties in the Grand Rapids area and that MAS, in return, would pay the complainant $257,870 within 120 days of the loan disbursement. The repayment obligation in the amount of $257,870 was not dependent on the success of the business venture. The agreement was reflected in a direction-of-investment letter signed by the complainant, a promissory note executed by defendant on behalf of MAS, and a mortgage on the properties given by MAS to secure the note, which was also signed by defendant. Defendant held no ownership interest in or employment position with MAS; however, the individual who formed and owned MAS testified that defendant facilitated MAS's transactions as its real estate agent and that defendant was authorized to direct the disbursement of funds on behalf of MAS for purposes of purchasing properties and for construction projects related to the properties. While the details are confusing regarding the particular flow and use of the $241,000 after it was transferred from the complainant's IRA under the loan agreement, we need not concern ourselves with most of these intricacies. Pertinent here is evidence that defendant eventually directed the movement of at least $20,000 of the $241,000 into accounts held by Mackinac Realty Group, a company solely owned and managed by defendant, and that defendant then used those funds to pay for personal items and expenses unassociated with the acquisition and rehabilitation of real estate as contemplated in the underlying agreement. Although some of the IRA money lent to MAS was actually used for its designated purpose, no payment was made to the complainant or his IRA upon expiration of the 120-day period. The complainant did obtain a civil judgment against his financial advisor, who had orchestrated the loan and transaction; against MAS's owner; and against defendant. II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In February 2016, the prosecution charged defendant with larceny by conversion over $20,000, and he was bound over to the circuit court after waiving his right to a preliminary examination. However, the circuit court later granted defendant's motion to dismiss the charge, concluding that the charge was not viable under the caselaw and the factual circumstances. The circuit court next denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, but it did indicate that the prosecution could refile the charge in the future if new evidence came to light supporting the offense of larceny by conversion. The prosecution did not appeal the circuit court's ruling in this Court. Although no new evidence was truly developed, in July 2016, the prosecution filed a three-count complaint, once again charging defendant with larceny by conversion, along with the false pretenses and embezzlement charges. Following a preliminary examination, the district court bound defendant over to the circuit court on the offenses of embezzlement and false pretenses, but not on the crime of larceny by conversion, expressing deference to the circuit court's previous ruling on the charge. In a motion to amend the information, see People v. Goecke , 457 Mich. 442, 455-456, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), the prosecution asked the circuit court to reinstate the charge of larceny by conversion. The circuit court, consistently with its earlier ruling in the initial prosecution of defendant, denied the prosecution's motion, finding that the facts simply did not support a charge of larceny by conversion under the caselaw construing the statutory offense. The prosecution appeals by leave granted. III. ANALYSIS A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend an information. People v. McGee , 258 Mich.App. 683, 686-687, 672 N.W.2d 191 (2003). And a trial court abuses its discretion when it "chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v. Unger , 278 Mich.App. 210, 217, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). "A trial court ... necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." People v. Al-Shara , 311 Mich.App. 560, 566, 876 N.W.2d 826 (2015). "In addition, because the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the defendant is protected by the time-honored principle that the circuit court may not substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate." Goecke , 457 Mich. at 462, 579 N.W.2d 868. Insofar as the circuit court's decision involves the interpretation of a statute, this Court's review is de novo. People v. Chavis , 468 Mich. 84, 91, 658 N.W.2d 469 (2003). B. STATUTORY-CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES With respect to the principles that govern our interpretation of a statute, in People v. Flick , 487 Mich. 1, 10-11, 790 N.W.2d 295 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court observed: The overriding goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature's intent. The touchstone of legislative intent is the statute's language. The words of a statute provide the most reliable indicator of the Legislature's intent and should be interpreted on the basis of their ordinary meaning and the overall context in which they are used. An undefined statutory word or phrase must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or phrase is a "term of art" with a unique legal meaning. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.] And in regard to construing statutory offenses contained in the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq., such as, under MCL 750.362, larceny by conversion, MCL 750.2 provides: The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this act or any of the provisions thereof. All provisions of this act shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law. C. AMENDING AN INFORMATION AND PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS "The court before, during, or after trial may permit the prosecutor to amend the information ... unless the proposed amendment would unfairly surprise or prejudice the defendant." MCR 6.112(H). "Where a preliminary examination is held on the very charge that the prosecution seeks to have reinstated, the defendant is not unfairly surprised or deprived of adequate notice or a sufficient opportunity to defend at trial...." Goecke , 457 Mich. at 462, 579 N.W.2d 868. In Goecke , id. at 469-470, 579 N.W.2d 868, our Supreme Court explained the general nature of a preliminary examination: For purposes of preliminary examination, the proofs adduced must only establish probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. If the district court determines that "probable cause exists to believe both that an offense not cognizable by the district court has been committed and that the defendant committed it," the defendant must be bound over for trial. MCR 6.110(E). Some evidence must be presented regarding each element of the crime or from which those elements may be inferred. It is not, however, the function of the examining magistrate to discharge the accused when the evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt; that is the province of the jury. [Citation omitted.] D. DISCUSSION AND HOLDING The crux of the dispute in this case is whether a person commits the crime of larceny by conversion when the person, as the recipient of a loan, converts the loan proceeds to his or her own use and employs them in a manner that is inconsistent or conflicts with specific restrictions or conditions demanded by the lender in the underlying loan agreement regarding how the loan proceeds are to be used upon disbursement. MCL 750.362 provides: Any person to whom any money, goods or other property, which may be the subject of larceny, shall have been delivered, who shall embezzle or fraudulently convert to his own use, or shall secrete with the intent to embezzle, or fraudulently use such goods, money or other property, or any part thereof, shall be deemed by so doing to have committed the crime of larceny and shall be punished as provided in the first section of this chapter.[ ] In People v. Mason , 247 Mich.App. 64, 72, 634 N.W.2d 382 (2001), this Court recited the following elements of larceny by conversion: (1) the property at issue must have some value, (2) the property belonged to someone other than the defendant, (3) someone delivered the property to the defendant, irrespective of whether that delivery was by legal or illegal means, (4) the defendant embezzled, converted to his own use, or hid the property with the intent to embezzle or fraudulently use it, and (5) at the time the property was embezzled, converted, or hidden, the defendant intended to defraud or cheat the owner permanently of that property. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.] "The purpose of the larceny by conversion statute is to cover one of the situations left unaccounted for by common-law larceny, that is, where a person obtains possession of another's property with lawful intent, but subsequently converts the other's property to his own use." People v. Christenson , 412 Mich. 81, 86, 312 N.W.2d 618 (1981). See also Mason , 247 Mich.App. at 72, 634 N.W.2d 382. Larceny by conversion constitutes "a crime against possession and not against title; one cannot convert his own funds." Christenson , 412 Mich. at 87, 312 N.W.2d 618. Accordingly, when an owner intends to part with his or her title to property as well as possession, a charge of larceny by conversion is not viable. Id. In this case, there is no dispute that the complainant intended to pass possession of the $241,000 in IRA funds to MAS. The question is whether there was an intent to part with title to the money when the loan was disbursed. The principal cases discussed by the parties are Christenson , 412 Mich. 81, 312 N.W.2d 618, People v. Franz , 321 Mich. 379, 32 N.W.2d 533 (1948), Mason , 247 Mich.App. 64, 634 N.W.2d 382, and People v. O'Shea , 149 Mich.App. 268, 385 N.W.2d 768 (1986). In Franz , Mason , and O'Shea , this Court and our Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a charge or conviction of larceny by conversion. "In Franz , ... there was an oral contract whereby the defendant agreed to purchase iron for the complainant who had given to the defendant the sum of $4,080," but "[n]o delivery of iron was made...." O'Shea , 149 Mich.App. at 273, 385 N.W.2d 768 (concisely summarizing the facts in Franz ). In O'Shea itself, id. at 270-272, 385 N.W.2d 768, the complainant and the defendant had entered into a written contract pursuant to which the defendant accepted, and later deposited, a $125 check as a down payment for upholstering fabric; however, neither fabric nor a refund was ever delivered to the complainant. The Mason case involved five transactions, evidenced by written contracts, wherein the defendant failed to refund money that the complainants had given him as down payments on the purchase of mobile homes that were never delivered to the complainants. Mason , 247 Mich.App. at 66-69, 634 N.W.2d 382. These cases stand for the proposition that the offense of larceny by conversion may be committed when a defendant fails to use money delivered by a complainant for an agreed-upon designated purpose in the context of the complainant's purchase of goods or property, with the defendant also failing to refund the money to the complainant. The instant case does not involve a sales or purchase agreement, but rather a loan agreement. However, just as in Franz , Mason , and O'Shea , there was evidence that, pursuant to an agreement, money was delivered by the complainant, the money reached the hands of defendant, that money was designated for a specific purpose or use that was not fulfilled, at least not fully, and the complainant's money was not refunded. We find the following passage from Mason instructive on the issue of intent to pass title: We gather from the O'Shea Court's emphasis on the facts of the case before it as well as the facts of the contrary cases that we must look at the facts surrounding each complainant's transfer of money to Mason to determine whether they each intended to retain title to the money. As in O'Shea , we think it plain under the circumstances of the five cases being appealed, including the contracts for sale, that each complainant intended to retain legal title to the down payment money, though not possession of it, until each complainant received the home each sought to purchase. It would make little sense for each of these complainants to intend to give their hard-earned money to Mason to keep irrespective of whether they ever received the home for which they bargained, especially with no contractual provision to that effect. [ Mason , 247 Mich.App. at 74-75 [634 N.W.2d 382] (emphasis added).] By analogy, we hold that there was evidence that the complainant intended to retain legal title to the loan proceeds, though not possession of the funds, until such time that the loan proceeds were actually used to pay for the acquisition and rehabilitation of the six properties. As reflected in the direction-of-investment letter signed by the complainant and his testimony at the preliminary examination, it was his intent that the money from his IRA that was loaned to MAS and disbursed by or at the behest of defendant was specifically to be used to purchase and rehabilitate the six identified Grand Rapids properties. In Christenson , the case upon which defendant mainly relies, the Supreme Court reversed the defendant's convictions of three counts of larceny by conversion. The defendant in Christenson sold and erected modular homes. He had entered into written contracts with the complainants, who had made progress payments to the defendant under the contracts as he delivered and erected their modular homes. However, certain progress payments were not specifically forwarded to the manufacturer of the modular homes as required by the contracts. Instead, the defendant, who eventually filed for bankruptcy, had used those progress payments to pay other debts. Christenson , 412 Mich. at 85-86, 312 N.W.2d 618. The Court held that there was no evidence that the complainants had intended to retain title to the progress payments made to the defendant, and therefore, title had passed to the defendant, making it impossible for him to have committed the crime of larceny by conversion. Id. at 88, 312 N.W.2d 618. The Court did not stop there and proceeded to state: Even if we were to accept the argument that defendant was not the intended owner of the progress payments and that he was merely a trustee of the funds, we do not find that the element of conversion has been established. The prosecutor contends that conversion is established by the fact that the complainants gave the money to defendant for a specific purpose, i.e., to pay for the home or for site preparation, but defendant did not use it for that purpose. * * * It is clear in this case that defendant used partial payments for work in place to pay debts that were not the specific debts incurred in construction of the work in place. He subsequently was unable to pay the latter debts because of his impending bankruptcy. However, there was no agreement that defendant apply the specific funds he received from complainants for particular work to pay the laborers and materialmen responsible for that work. There was no requirement that defendant establish a separate trust account for each complainant in which he would deposit that particular complainant's funds. It is beyond dispute that defendant had the contractual obligation to pay the debts of the work in place for which he received progress payments from the complainants. However, there was nothing to preclude defendant from paying for those debts with funds other than the identical moneys he received from complainants. The fact that defendant's bankruptcy intervened to preclude such payment does not render defendant guilty of larceny by conversion. [ Id. at 88-90 [312 N.W.2d 618].] The Mason panel, distinguishing Christenson , stated that "[i]n Christenson , the homeowners who made progress payments to the defendant did so because the defendant had, in fact, made progress on the construction project and, therefore, was entitled to this partial payment" under the contracts. Mason , 247 Mich.App. at 76, 634 N.W.2d 382. This Court further observed that the defendant in Christenson would have been guilty of larceny by conversion had he specifically agreed to use the progress payments to pay certain debts, including the one owed to the manufacturer of the modular homes. Id. The Mason panel explained that such would be the case because "[t]he defendant, though in actual possession of the money, never would have obtained legal title to the money under those facts because he could not do with it as he wished, a limitation that generally does not exist for title owners of property ." Id. at 76-77, 634 N.W.2d 382 (emphasis added). Instead, "because the homeowners and the defendant agreed neither that the defendant would use the progress payments only to satisfy the particular debts at issue nor that he would keep the money for that purpose in a special account, the Supreme Court was compelled to reverse the defendant's conviction." Id. at 78-79, 634 N.W.2d 382. The present case is distinguishable from Christenson for the very same reason, i.e., there was evidence of an agreement that did not allow MAS to do whatever it wished with the loan proceeds. Rather, the loan was specifically conditioned on the agreement that it would be used to acquire and rehabilitate the six identified properties. Therefore, title would not have passed unless and until the loan was used for its intended purpose. Because there was evidence that title to at least $20,000 of the $241,000 loan did not pass to MAS or defendant, as it was not used as intended and directed under the loan agreement, and that defendant converted that $20,000 or more to his own use contrary to the loan agreement, there was sufficient evidence establishing probable cause to believe that defendant committed the crime of larceny by conversion. And considering that the preliminary examination was held on the very charge the prosecution sought to have reinstated in its motion to amend the information, we cannot find that defendant would be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by allowing the requested amendment. Goecke , 457 Mich. at 462, 579 N.W.2d 868. Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion by denying the prosecution's motion to amend the information to reinstate the charge of larceny by conversion, mainly because the court committed an error of law relative to its construction of MCL 750.362 and the caselaw interpreting the statute. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting the prosecution's motion to amend the information to reinstate the charge of larceny by conversion. We do not retain jurisdiction. HOEKSTRA, P.J., and K. F. KELLY, J., concurred with MURPHY, J. People v. Spencer , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 9, 2017 (Docket No. 337045). The note and the mortgage documents did indicate that defendant was MAS's CEO, which was untrue, but MAS's owner did not have any qualms about defendant executing the documents on behalf of MAS. The Goecke Court agreed with the argument "that where a district court binds a defendant over on one of two counts, review of the dismissed count is obtainable by a motion to amend the information [filed in the circuit court.]" Goecke , 457 Mich. at 455-456, 579 N.W.2d 868. MCL 750.356(2) provides, in relevant part: (2) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00 or 3 times the value of the property stolen, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine: (a) The property stolen has a value of $20,000.00 or more.

Per Curiam. Plaintiffs, Southfield Education Association (the union) and Velma Smith, appeal as of right an order denying plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition of Count I (violation of MCL 380.1248 ) of plaintiffs' five-count complaint and, instead, granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, the Board of Education of the Southfield Public Schools and Southfield Public Schools, pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) (judgment for opposing party). Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim), the trial court had previously granted summary disposition to defendants on all four other counts: Count II (violation of MCL 380.1249 ), Count III (violation of the teachers' tenure act (TTA), MCL 38.71 et seq . ), Count IV (due process), and Count V (mandamus) We affirm. Defendants employed Smith for 19 years as a tenured technology teacher. Smith is certified and qualified to teach technology, and holds endorsements to teach industrial technology in grades K through 12 and educational technology in grades 6 through 12. Smith taught PLATO, an online remedial education course offered through the Southfield Regional Academic Campus, an alternative high school within defendants' district, during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years. For both academic years, defendants rated Smith's performance as "highly effective." At the end of the 2013-2014 school year, defendants eliminated the PLATO position, and Smith was laid off. In July 2014, defendants posted a part-time technology position at Birney School, a K through 8 school in defendants' district. Defendants admit that Smith was qualified for the position. In fact, she had held the position during the 2010-2011 school year. However, her "effectiveness" was not evaluated under the performance review system implemented before the 2012-2013 school year. Smith applied for the Birney position, but defendants hired an external candidate. That candidate resigned after one year. Defendants reposted the Birney position, claiming that it required endorsements for grades K through 6. On investigation, the union discovered that the class consisted only of students in grades 6 through 8 and that Smith remained qualified for the position. Thereafter, defendants again interviewed Smith for the Birney position, but did not hired her to fill the position. According to plaintiffs, the Birney position remained vacant until defendants hired an external candidate "whose effectiveness was unknown to her former employer." Plaintiffs brought a five-count complaint in the circuit court, alleging (1) that defendants violated MCL 380.1248 of the Revised School Code (RSC), MCL 380.1 et seq ., by failing or refusing to recall Smith, (2) that defendants violated MCL 380.1249 when they failed to comply with their own personnel policies requiring Smith's recall, (3) that defendants violated the TTA when they effectively discontinued Smith's continuous employment as a tenured teacher, (4) that defendants violated Smith's due process right to retain her teaching position and tenure status, and (5) that Smith was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering defendants to reinstate Smith to a full-time technology teaching position. In lieu of filing a responsive pleading, defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (subject-matter jurisdiction) and (C)(8 (failure to state a claim). Relying in part on this Court's decision in Summer v. Southfield Bd. of Ed. , 310 Mich.App. 660, 874 N.W.2d 150 (2015), defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims were facially untenable "because, among other reasons, they are premised on a non-existent legal right. Since 2011, there has been no right to recall for tenured teachers under Michigan law." Defendants also argued that plaintiffs had no private right of action under MCL 380.1249. Therefore, according to defendants, plaintiffs had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted in Counts I, II, III, IV, and V. With respect to Count III, defendants also noted that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim because Smith had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the TTA when she failed to appeal to the State Tenure Commission (STC). Plaintiffs responded that their position was not that defendants were required to recall Smith, but rather that defendants were required to rehire Smith unless there were other candidates who "had an effectiveness rating equal [to] or higher" than Smith's. Because the effectiveness rating of the person hired was unknown, plaintiffs claimed that defendants were required to hire Smith because "there were no other Southfield teachers who could teach that course." Defendants acknowledged that identification of the specific applicants considered for the Birney position would present a factual question, and the trial court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition with respect to Count I. However, the trial court "adopt[ed] defendants' arguments" with respect to Counts II through V and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition on those four counts. After defendants filed an answer to plaintiff's remaining claim, plaintiffs brought a motion for summary disposition of Count I pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). Plaintiffs maintained: Section 1248(b)(1) is unambiguous about a school board's obligation to base its personnel decisions on teacher effectiveness, with the primary goal of retaining effective teachers following a staffing or program reduction. Southfield has not assigned Smith, a highly effective teacher, to any of the positions for which she is certified and highly qualified to teach that became available as soon as July 2014 and as recently as August 31, 2015.[ ] By its conduct, Southfield has failed to retain Smith, a highly effective teacher, in violation of Section 1248 of the Revised School Code. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact that Smith is a highly effective teacher and that Southfield failed to recall Smith to available positions for which she was qualified and certified, Smith is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In opposing plaintiffs' motion and requesting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2), defendants again argued that the Legislature's elimination of recall rights for tenured teachers barred plaintiffs' claim as a matter of law. Defendants also argued, for the first time, that even if the Legislature had not eliminated the statutory basis for plaintiffs' claim, plaintiffs' claim was factually unsupported because (1) Smith was not evaluated as "effective or better when she taught" in the technology position at Birney in the 2010-2011 school year, and (2) the position at issue was different than the one for which Smith was rated "highly effective" during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years. After a second hearing, the trial court adopted defendants' arguments and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition. Finding defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court granted summary disposition of Count I in favor of defendants under MCR 2.116(I)(2). I. VIOLATION OF MCL 380.1248 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants on Count I of their complaint because defendants clearly violated MCL 380.1248, which required defendants to adopt, implement, maintain, and comply with a policy prioritizing retention of effective teachers when recalling a teacher after a layoff or hiring a teacher after a layoff. According to plaintiffs, they were therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We agree in part and disagree in part. We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Adair v. State of Michigan , 470 Mich. 105, 119, 680 N.W.2d 386 (2004). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)"tests the factual support of a plaintiff's claim." Walsh v. Taylor , 263 Mich.App. 618, 621, 689 N.W.2d 506 (2004). Summary disposition is warranted under this rule "if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." West v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). This Court must consider "the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial." Walsh , 263 Mich.App. at 621, 689 N.W.2d 506. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West , 469 Mich. at 183, 665 N.W.2d 468. MCR 2.116(I)(2) provides that "[i]f it appears to the court that the opposing party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in favor of the opposing party." Resolution of this issue requires that the Court engage in statutory interpretation, an issue of law that is also reviewed de novo. Cruz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 466 Mich. 588, 594, 648 N.W.2d 591 (2002). The goal of statutory construction is "to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent." DiBenedetto v. West. Shore Hosp. , 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000). Courts begin by examining the plain language of the statute. Id. When the language is unambiguous, it is presumed "that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." Id. MCL 380.1249 requires all Michigan school district boards and intermediate school district boards and the boards of directors of public school academies to adopt and implement a "performance evaluation system" that assesses teacher effectiveness and performance and provides a detailed set of factors that any school's performance evaluation system must include. Specifically, § 1249 requires that any performance evaluation system must rate its teachers as falling within one of four classes: (1) highly effective; (2) effective; (3) "minimally effective"; or (4) "ineffective." MCL 380.1249(1)(c). MCL 380.1248 requires that school districts focus on retaining effective teachers when making personnel decisions, such as decisions on personnel reductions and staffing after a staff reduction, which includes recalling and hiring personnel. In pertinent part, MCL 380.1248(1) provides: For teachers, as defined in ... MCL 38.71, all of the following apply to policies regarding personnel decisions when conducting a staffing or program reduction or any other personnel determination resulting in the elimination of a position, when conducting a recall from a staffing or program reduction or any other personnel determination resulting in the elimination of a position, or in hiring after a staffing or program reduction or any other personnel determination resulting in the elimination of a position by a school district or intermediate school district: * * * (b) Subject to subdivision (c), the board of a school district or intermediate school district shall ensure that the school district or intermediate school district adopts, implements, maintains, and complies with a policy that provides that all personnel decisions ... are based on retaining effective teachers . The policy shall ensure that a teacher who has been rated as ineffective under the performance evaluation system under section 1249 is not given any preference that would result in that teacher being retained over a teacher who is evaluated as minimally effective, effective, or highly effective under the performance evaluation system under section 1249. Effectiveness shall be measured by the performance evaluation system under section 1249, and the personnel decisions shall be made based on the following factors: (i ) Individual performance shall be the majority factor in making the decision, and shall consist of but is not limited to all of the following: (A) Evidence of student growth, which shall be the predominant factor in assessing an employee's individual performance. (B) The teacher's demonstrated pedagogical skills, including at least a special determination concerning the teacher's knowledge of his or her subject area and the ability to impart that knowledge through planning, delivering rigorous content, checking for and building higher-level understanding, differentiating, and managing a classroom; and consistent preparation to maximize instructional time. (C) The teacher's management of the classroom, manner and efficacy of disciplining pupils, rapport with parents and other teachers, and ability to withstand the strain of teaching. (D) The teacher's attendance and disciplinary record, if any. (ii ) Significant, relevant accomplishments and contributions. This factor shall be based on whether the individual contributes to the overall performance of the school by making clear, significant, relevant contributions above the normal expectations for an individual in his or her peer group and having demonstrated a record of exceptional performance. (iii ) Relevant special training. This factor shall be based on completion of relevant training other than the professional development or continuing education that is required by the employer or by state law, and integration of that training into instruction in a meaningful way. (c) Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, length of service or tenure status shall not be a factor in a personnel decision described in subdivision (a) or (b). However, if that personnel decision involves 2 or more employees and all other factors distinguishing those employees from each other are equal, then length of service or tenure status may be considered as a tiebreaker. [Emphasis added.] On appeal, plaintiffs argue that if a school district recalls or hires teachers after implementing a layoff, MCL 380.1248 requires that the school district's decisions reflect the policy goal of maintaining the employment of teachers with a performance rating of effective. Plaintiffs' argument rests on the mandate in MCL 380.1248(1)(b) that all "policies regarding personnel decisions ... are based on retaining effective teachers." Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature's use of the word "retain" reveals an intent to limit a school district's staffing decisions following a reduction in staffing in order to satisfy the goal of retaining effective teachers. Thus, plaintiffs claim that defendants violated MCL 380.1248 by hiring for the Birney position an external condition, whose effectiveness rating was unknown, instead of retaining Smith, who was rated highly effective. Defendants argue to the contrary. They suggest that three Legislative action-(1) the Legislature's 2011 repeal of the statutory basis for a right to recall under the TTA, (2) the amendment of the Public Employee Relations Act (PERA), MCL 423.201 et seq ., to add layoff and recall policies to the list of prohibited subjects of collective bargaining, and (3) the amendment of the RSC to provide two post-layoff alternatives (recall or hire)-evinced a clear legislative intent to make recalls nonactionable under MCL 380.1248. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' proposed construction of the phrase "retaining effective teachers," as creating a statutory right to be recalled would "require one to ignore the plain right given to districts to hire after layoffs, and the other statutory amendments eviscerating recall rights." In Baumgartner v. Perry Pub. Sch. , 309 Mich.App. 507, 524-531, 872 N.W.2d 837 (2015), this Court considered the import of § 1248 within the context of teacher layoffs. Although the issue in Baumgartner involved jurisdiction, this Court summarized the 2011 tie-barred legislative amendments to the TTA, the RSC, and PERA, which caused a "dramatic shift in the law of teacher layoffs." Id . at 512, 872 N.W.2d 837. The Baumgartner Court explained that the 2011 amendments clearly outlined a teacher's rights and a school district's responsibilities in the event that a layoff became necessary. 2011 PAs 100, 101, 102, and 103 work in tandem to (1) bar teacher layoffs from being a subject of collective-bargaining agreements, thus preventing teachers from challenging layoff decisions before [the Michigan Employment Relations Commission] as an unfair labor practice under PERA, (2) require that layoff decisions be based on teacher effectiveness, not seniority, and (3) make clear that only the courts-not any administrative agency, including the STC-have jurisdiction over layoff-related claims. [ Id. at 524, 872 N.W.2d 837.] 2011 PA 101, effective July 19, 2011, repealed MCL 38.105 of the TTA, which had provided, "For a period of 3 years after the effective date of the termination of the teacher's services, a teacher on continuing tenure whose services are terminated because of a necessary reduction in personnel shall be appointed to the first vacancy in the school district for which the teacher is certified and qualified." In addition, 2011 PA 103, among other things, amended PERA to remove layoffs from the collective bargaining process and to emphasize that the RSC, not PERA or the TTA, governs teacher layoffs. Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 525, 872 N.W.2d 837. 2011 PA 102 amended the RSC and added MCL 380.1248 and MCL 380.1249. "Among other things," Baumgartner noted, the RSC "governs 'the regulation of school teachers and certain other school employees' and emphasizes that local authorities -not state officials -are primarily responsible for the governance of school districts." Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 526, 872 N.W.2d 837, quoting 1976 PA 451, title, as amended by 1995 PA 289 (emphasis in Baumgartner ). The Court explained how 2011 PA 102 fit within the relevant legal framework: 2011 PA 102 is part of this broader legal framework and enacted a comprehensive revision of the Revised School Code's treatment of teacher layoffs through the addition of two new sections, MCL 380.1248 and MCL 380.1249. Section 1249 requires all Michigan school districts and intermediate school districts and the boards of directors of public school academies to adopt a "performance evaluation system" that assesses teacher effectiveness and performance and provides a detailed set of factors that any school district's performance evaluation system must include.... Section 1248 then mandates that all "policies regarding personnel decisions when conducting a staffing or program reduction "-i.e., layoffs -must be conducted on (1) the basis of the performance evaluation system the school district developed in compliance with § 1249; and (2) other specific factors listed in § 1248.... In other words, if layoffs become necessary, § 1248 requires school districts to base their decision of which teachers to lay off on the effectiveness of each teacher. So, after conducting a performance evaluation using the criteria outlined in § 1249, a school district must rank its teachers in order, based on their success (or lack thereof) in the performance evaluation. The teachers who received the lowest performance ranking ("ineffective") will be laid off before those who received higher performance rankings. The statutory mandate anticipates that talented and more effective teachers will be retained, while mediocre and ineffective teachers will be laid off. [ Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 526-528, 872 N.W.2d 837.] Under the clear language of § 1248 and the interpretation of the 2011 amendments set forth in Baumgartner , personnel decisions when conducting a recall from or when hiring after a staffing or program reduction must be made on the basis of (1) the performance evaluation system the school district developed in compliance with § 1249, and (2) other specific factors listed in § 1248. See MCL 380.1248(1)(b)(i ) through (iii ). Similar to the Court's pronouncement in Baumgartner with respect to layoffs, the statutory mandate anticipates that talented and more effective teachers will be recalled or hired, while ineffective teachers will not. A school district must consider the relative effectiveness ratings of candidates for open teaching positions, whether as part of a recall or a new hire after a staffing or program reduction. However, while we agree with plaintiffs' interpretation of § 1248, we cannot agree with plaintiffs' assertion that defendants violated § 1248 when they hired an external candidate for the Birney position. Smith simply could not claim an effectiveness rating related to the available position, and the school district was therefore not required to consider whether she would be relatively more or less effective than any other candidate for the position. Nothing in the language of § 1248 suggests that a teacher's effectiveness evaluation for teaching one subject requires that teacher's recall or rehire to teach a different subject. Indeed, several of the factors on which personnel decisions "shall be based" are position specific. Further, to interpret § 1248 as requiring a school district to recall or rehire a teacher to a specific position for which she may be qualified but has not been proven effective is contrary to the purpose of the 2011 legislative amendments. Again, as we explained in Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 526, 872 N.W.2d 837, the RSC "emphasizes that local authorities -not state officials -are primarily responsible for the governance of school districts." The Legislature has left school districts with the authority to ensure that each available position is matched with the most effective teacher for that particular position. It is not for this Court to place limits on the school district's authority that the Legislature has not. Plaintiffs presented documentary evidence that Smith was certified and qualified for the Birney position. However, while plaintiffs claim that Smith received an effectiveness rating of "highly effective" on her 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 performance evaluations, plaintiffs have offered no evidence to rebut defendants' assertion that Smith's effectiveness rating was received while teaching a class substantially different from the class to be taught in the Birney position. Smith was rated "highly effective" during two school years in which she taught PLATO, an online remediation course requiring individualized, interactive instruction at an alternative high school for credit-deficient students and students at high risk of dropping out. The PLATO position was eliminated, and Smith sought a part-time teaching position at Birney Middle School. Smith was indisputably qualified for the Birney position, having taught the same class during the 2010-2011 school year. However, she did not receive an effectiveness evaluation pursuant to § 1249 for that school year. The Birney position is at a middle school, while the PLATO position required working with high school students. And unlike the PLATO position, the Birney position involved whole classroom instruction, rather than individualized instruction, on various subjects within the field of technology. Smith's effectiveness in that position was therefore a matter of speculation. Plaintiffs cannot show that Smith had obtained an effectiveness rating triggering the school district's obligation under § 1248 to engage in a comparison. Summary disposition in favor of defendants was therefore appropriate. See Libralter Plastics, Inc. v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. , 199 Mich.App. 482, 486, 502 N.W.2d 742 (1993) ("[P]arties opposing a motion for summary disposition must present more than conjecture and speculation to meet their burden of providing evidentiary proof establishing a genuine issue of material fact."). The trial court did not err by granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) in favor of defendants because no genuine issue of material fact existed and, with respect to plaintiffs' claimed violation of § 1248, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. II. VIOLATION OF MCL 380.1249 Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it granted defendants' motion for summary disposition of Count II of plaintiffs' complaint because defendants failed to comply with their own policy of retaining highly effective teachers as required by MCL 380.1249. We disagree. With respect to Count II of plaintiffs' complaint, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). "A motion brought under subrule (C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint solely on the basis of the pleadings." Dalley v. Dykema Gossett PLLC , 287 Mich.App. 296, 304, 788 N.W.2d 679 (2010). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is appropriate when "[t]he opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." MCL 380.1249(1) requires the board of a public school district to "adopt and implement for all teachers and school administrators a rigorous, transparent, and fair performance evaluation system..." MCL 380.1249(1)(d) requires that the evaluations be used, "at a minimum," to inform decisions regarding (1) "[t]he effectiveness of teachers and school administrators, ensuring that they are given ample opportunities for improvement[,]" and (2) "[p]romotion, retention, and development of teachers and school administrators, including providing relevant coaching, instruction support, or professional development." MCL 380.1249(1)(d)(i ) and (ii ). Plaintiffs conceded in their complaint that defendants' performance evaluation system complies with MCL 380.1249. They also conceded that they were not challenging defendants' decision to lay off Smith when her position was eliminated. However, they argue that defendants violated the mandate in § 1249(1) that their "performance rating system [be used] to retain effective teachers such as Plaintiff Smith." In Summer , 310 Mich.App. at 676, 874 N.W.2d 150, this Court explicitly held that there was no private cause of action under § 1249. Relying on Garden City Ed. Ass'n v. Garden City Sch. Dist. , 975 F.Supp.2d 780 (E.D. Mich., 2013), the Court explained: As observed by the Garden City court, it is evident that the Legislature provided a detailed enforcement scheme to ensure compliance with the Revised School Code, including compliance with § 1249. Notably, the plain language of § 1249 includes no reference to a private right of action. "[W]here a statute creates a new right or imposes a new duty unknown to the common law and provides a comprehensive administrative or other enforcement mechanism or otherwise entrusts the responsibility for upholding the law to a public officer, a private right of action will not be inferred." Accordingly, given the extensive enforcement mechanisms already provided in the Revised School Code, we decline to infer a private right of action in MCL 380.1249 and conclude that the trial court properly determined that MCL 380.1249 does not establish a private cause of action under which plaintiff may bring the instant case. [ Summer , 310 Mich. App. at 676, 874 N.W.2d 150 (citation omitted).] This Court held, however, that this did not foreclose a teacher from challenging a school district's failure to adhere to the requirements set forth in § 1249 when that challenge was part of a claim brought under § 1248. Id. at 681, 874 N.W.2d 150. Reasoning that the Legislature specifically intended to allow teachers to challenge layoff decisions that were based on performance evaluations that did not comply with the requirements in § 1249, the Summer Court explained as follows: [B]ased on the specific language of § 1248, the requirement that the school district must use a performance evaluation system in compliance with § 1249 as it evaluates teachers and makes layoff decisions is one of the requirements with regard to which a teacher may assert a private cause of action under § 1248(3). Accordingly, if a school district lays off a teacher because the teacher is deemed ineffective, but the school district measured the teacher's effectiveness using a performance evaluation system that did not comply with § 1249 (e.g., if a school district failed to use a "rigorous, transparent, and fair performance evaluation system," MCL 380.1249(1) ), or made a personnel decision that was not based on the factors delineated in MCL 380.1248(1)(b)(i ) through (iii ), the teacher could assert a cause of action under § 1248(3) based on a violation of § 1248(1)(b).... [ Summer , 310 Mich.App. at 679, 874 N.W.2d 150.] In this case, in light of Summer , plaintiffs' claim under § 1248 in Count I properly alleged a violation of § 1249. However, plaintiffs are not entitled to a separate cause of action under § 1249 as they pleaded in Count II. We are bound by Summer . MCR 7.215(J)(1). Summary disposition of Count II under MCR 2.116(C)(8) was therefore proper. III. VIOLATION OF THE TEACHERS' TENURE ACT AND DUE PROCESS Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred when it granted defendants' motion for summary disposition of Count III of plaintiffs' complaint. According to plaintiffs, defendants violated the TTA by failing or refusing to recall Smith to positions for which she was certified and highly qualified. We disagree. Although the trial court, in its written order, did not explicitly state its statutory basis for granting summary disposition in favor of defendants with respect to Count III of plaintiffs' complaint, defendants requested summary disposition of this count under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of jurisdiction). Defendants argued that the STC had jurisdiction over claims arising under the TTA and that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before they could pursue their claim in the circuit court. The trial court seems to have agreed with defendants' argument that the STC had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim. Explaining its decision to grant defendants' motion for summary disposition of Counts II through V at the first summary disposition hearing, the trial court stated: "(C)(4) pertains only to one count, I think. And it's granted for that reason." "We review a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition based on MCR 2.116(C)(4) de novo to determine if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or if affidavits or other proofs demonstrate there is an issue of material fact." Harris v. Vernier , 242 Mich.App. 306, 309, 617 N.W.2d 764 (2000). Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(4) when "[t]he court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter." Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a case is a question of law that this Court also reviews de novo. Trostel, Ltd. v. Dep't of Treasury , 269 Mich.App. 433, 440, 713 N.W.2d 279 (2006). To the extent the trial court relied on MCR 2.116(C)(4) as its basis for summary disposition, we find that it erred. Plaintiffs allege that Smith, as a tenured teacher, possessed the right to "continuous employment" under MCL 38.91 and that defendant violated the TTA by "failing and/or refusing to recall her to positions for which she is certified and qualified to teach." However, the essence of plaintiffs' argument is that defendants "fail[ed] to comply with Sections 1248 and 1249 of the [RSC] to retain or continue the employment of a highly effective teacher...." In Baumgartner , 309 Mich. App. at 521, 872 N.W.2d 837, this Court stated, [T]he STC's 'jurisdiction and administrative expertise is limited to questions traditionally arising under the [TTA],' and it does not possess jurisdiction over disputes that arise under and are governed by separate legislative acts. (Citation omitted; alteration in original).Therefore, the trial court erroneously determined that it did not have jurisdiction because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. However, "[a] trial court's ruling may be upheld on appeal where the right result issued, albeit for the wrong reason." Gleason v. Dep't of Transp. , 256 Mich.App. 1, 3, 662 N.W.2d 822 (2003). We find reversal of the trial court's decision on Count III of plaintiffs' complaint unnecessary because summary disposition of Count III was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Plaintiffs argue that Smith was deprived of her vested property right to continuous employment without due process of law. Plaintiffs have not argued that defendants' elimination of Smith's teaching position or defendants' decision to lay off Smith was contrary to law or policy. And plaintiffs concede that Smith has no right to mandatory recall. However, plaintiffs suggest that Smith maintained a right to continuous employment under MCL 38.91(1), which provides: After the satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a teacher is considered to be on continuing tenure under this act. A teacher on continuing tenure shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the probationary period has been completed and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act. Continuing tenure is held only in accordance with this act. [Emphasis added.] Because the Legislature left this provision of the TTA subsequently unchanged when it implemented the July 2011 amendments and repealed the statutory right to recall, plaintiffs argue that the Legislature "clearly intended for an effective teacher to maintain her right to continuous employment." Therefore, according to plaintiffs, "[d]efendants cannot fail or refuse to recall Plaintiff Smith without due process of law simply because the statutory right to recall has been eliminated." We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' arguments. Smith has no due process right to recall, and the right of continuous employment for tenured teachers simply does not apply in this case. A public employee who has received tenure through state law has a property interest as defined by state law. Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). A state law that grants a property interest may define the boundaries of that property interest. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). In other words, a state law that creates the interest can define the scope of the interest, how it may be gained, and how it may be taken away. Considering the TTA, our Supreme Court has stated that "the very purpose of the act is to protect tenured teachers from being demoted or discharged unless the board can show just and reasonable cause, and only after written charges are filed and the teacher has been furnished with notice of the date of a hearing." Tomiak v. Hamtramck Sch. Dist. , 426 Mich. 678, 688-689, 397 N.W.2d 770 (1986). Although the TTA initially provided a right of recall to tenured teachers, that right was removed with the repeal of MCL 38.105 by 2011 PA 101. In Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 530, 872 N.W.2d 837, we explained that following the repeal of MCL 38.105, "[t]he 'general purpose' of the TTA no longer includes teacher layoffs, which are now governed by the Revised School Code." A layoff because of a necessary reduction in personnel is not a discharge or demotion. Id . at 529, 872 N.W.2d 837 (noting that it is impossible to equate "discharge" under the TTA with "layoff" because "the two terms are separate and distinct"), citing Tomiak , 426 Mich. at 688, 397 N.W.2d 770. "Thus, by definition, a school that lays off a teacher does not 'demote' that teacher in the context of the TTA." Baumgartner , 309 Mich.App. at 529, 872 N.W.2d 837. With respect to layoffs, it has long been established that Michigan law does not protect a tenured teacher's employment from a bona fide reduction in personnel. Chester v. Harper Woods Sch. Dist. , 87 Mich.App. 235, 244, 273 N.W.2d 916 (1978). Therefore, no process is due a tenured teacher who is laid off unless the reduction in workforce is not bona fide. Plaintiffs have not alleged or argued that the elimination of Smith's position was not bona fide, nor do they suggest that the layoff was a subterfuge to avoid the protections of the TTA. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for due process violations in this case. IV. STANDING ISSUES Next, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by "dismissing [the union] from the action on the ground that the union did not have standing" in this matter. Generally, this Court reviews de novo questions of standing. Barclae v. Zarb , 300 Mich.App. 455, 467, 834 N.W.2d 100 (2013). However, we decline to consider the issue of standing because it is not properly before this Court. In the lower court, defendants challenged the union's standing with respect to plaintiffs' claims under MCL 380.1248, MCL 380.1249, and the TTA in their motion for summary disposition, and again with respect to MCL 380.1248 in their answer in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition. However, defendants did not bring a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) ("The party asserting the claim lacks the legal capacity to sue."). Further, there is no evidence in the record that the trial court dismissed the union as a party for lack of standing. Thus, there is no adverse action by which plaintiffs were aggrieved. In the absence of a ruling by the trial court, this Court has nothing to review. People v. Buie , 491 Mich. 294, 311, 817 N.W.2d 33 (2012). On appeal, defendants acknowledge that the trial court did not squarely address defendants' argument that the union lacked standing to assert claims under MCL 380.1248 and MCL 380.1249, and defendants suggest that this Court should decide the issue because it "involves a straightforward legal issue." Defendants could have raised this issue on cross-appeal, MCR 7.207, but failed to do so. Accordingly, the issue of standing is not properly before this Court. Shipman v. Fontaine Truck Equip. Co. , 184 Mich.App. 706, 714, 459 N.W.2d 30 (1990). V. WRIT OF MANDAMUS Finally, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred when it denied plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus because plaintiffs pleaded the required elements in their complaint. We disagree. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that will only be issued if (1) the party seeking the writ "has a clear legal right to the performance of the duty sought to be compelled," (2) the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform the act requested, (3) the act is ministerial, that is, it does not involve discretion or judgement, and (4) no other legal or equitable remedy exists that might achieve the same result. Barrow v. Detroit Election Comm. , 305 Mich.App. 649, 661-662, 854 N.W.2d 489 (2014) (citation omitted). The burden of proving entitlement to a writ of mandamus is on the plaintiff. Citizens for Protection of Marriage v. Bd. of State Canvassers , 263 Mich.App. 487, 492, 688 N.W.2d 538 (2004). This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's grant or denial of a writ of mandamus. Wilcoxon v. Detroit Election Comm. , 301 Mich.App. 619, 630, 838 N.W.2d 183 (2013). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court "chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Fette v Peters Constr. Co., , 310 Mich.App. 535, 547, 871 N.W.2d 877 (2015). However, whether the first two elements required for issuance of a writ of mandamus are present is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Coal. for a Safer Detroit v. Detroit City Clerk , 295 Mich.App. 362, 367, 820 N.W.2d 208 (2012). Plaintiffs' argument with respect to this issue is cursory at best. Plaintiffs merely announce that they pleaded the elements of a mandamus action and assert that they had no other adequate remedy at law. "A party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim." Nat'l Waterworks, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity & Surety, Ltd. , 275 Mich.App. 256, 265, 739 N.W.2d 121 (2007). "[W]here a party fails to cite any supporting legal authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned." Prince v. MacDonald , 237 Mich.App. 186, 197, 602 N.W.2d 834 (1999). Further, plaintiffs have an adequate legal remedy as reflected in Count I of their complaint-plaintiffs sought Smith's reinstatement to a technology teaching position in the school district pursuant to MCL 380.1248(3). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' request for a writ of mandamus. Affirmed. O'Brien, P.J., and Jansen and Stephens, JJ., concurred. The motion under MCR 2.116(C)(4) pertained to plaintiffs' claim under the TTA (Count III). In the complaint, plaintiffs also alleged violations of MCL 380.1248 for defendants' failure to hire Smith for a full-time technology position at Thompson Academy, another K through 8 school in defendants' district. However, there is no evidence that Smith ever applied for that position, and plaintiffs conceded in the lower court that Smith lacked the required endorsements to qualify for the Thompson position. MCL 38.91(1) was slightly changed as a result of the July 2011 amendments, although its general substance remained intact. Before the 2011 amendments, MCL 38.91(1) provided, "After the satisfactory completion of the probationary period, a teacher shall be employed continuously by the controlling board under which the probationary period has been completed, and shall not be dismissed or demoted except as specified in this act." Although Tomiak concerned the repealed MCL 38.105, that statute addressed layoffs because of a necessary reduction in personnel, and, Tomiak , therefore, is analogous to the present case. 2011 PA 100, effective July 19, 2011, revised the definition of "demote" to eliminate "reduction in personnel."

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 28, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 20, 2017 and October 19, 2017 orders of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals orders, and we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals, as on reconsideration granted, for plenary consideration of the plaintiff's argument that MCL 600.2963(8), as applied to his complaint for superintending control, is unconstitutional. We do not retain jurisdiction.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee to file a response to the amicus brief filed by the Elder Law and Disability Rights Section of the State Bar of Michigan and the Michigan Chapter, National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys is GRANTED. The response submitted on August 1, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motions of defendants-appellants to extend the time for filing their replies are GRANTED. The replies will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before August 28, 2018.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellees to file a surreply is GRANTED. The surreply submitted on August 1, 2018, is accepted for filing.

Zahra, J. The Tobacco Products Tax Act (TPTA) requires a manufacturer of a tobacco product to be licensed with the Michigan Department of Treasury before purchasing, possessing, acquiring for resale, or selling that product in Michigan. Criminal liability may arise from the failure to comply with the licensing requirement. The issue presented in this case is whether an individual who combines two different tobacco products to create a new blended product or repackages bulk tobacco into smaller containers with a new label is considered to be a manufacturer of a tobacco product and must have the requisite license. The Court of Appeals held that, in either instance, such a person is a manufacturer. According to that Court, manufacturing simply requires a change from the original state of an object or material into a state that makes it more suitable for its intended use, and a person who changes either the form or delivery method of tobacco constitutes a manufacturer for purposes of the TPTA. Although we agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that an individual combining two different tobacco products to create a blended product, relabeling that new mixture, and making it available for sale to the public is a manufacturer of a tobacco product, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that merely repackaging bulk tobacco into smaller containers renders an individual a manufacturer under the TPTA. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This case is remanded to the Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Defendant Samer A. Shami managed the day-to-day operations of Sam Molasses, a hookah-tobacco retail store located in Dearborn, Michigan, which was owned by Sam Molasses, LLC. Although Sam Molasses, LLC, was licensed with the Michigan Department of Treasury as a secondary wholesaler and an unclassified acquirer of other tobacco products, it is undisputed that neither Sam Molasses, LLC, nor Shami was licensed as a manufacturer of tobacco products during the relevant time. With the assistance of the Michigan State Police, treasury officials conducted an administrative tobacco tax inspection of Sam Molasses on May 1, 2013, during which Shami produced several invoices from various tobacco distributors. When Alisha Nordman, an employee of the treasury's Tobacco Tax Enforcement Unit, discovered that the labels on several plastics tubs of hookah tobacco in the store's inventory did not match those listed on the invoices, Shami informed Nordman that he had mixed two or more flavors of hookah tobacco to create a new "special blend," which was then placed in the plastic tubs and affixed with new labels to reflect the blended product. Michigan State Police Sergeant Stephanie Cleland also observed that labels on plastic tubs describing the flavor of hookah tobacco found inside did not correspond to invoices from the distributors. Sergeant Cleland further questioned Shami about tobacco in the store's inventory that did not match the labels on certain containers. In response, Shami told her that he repackaged bulk hookah tobacco from a particular distributor by taking the clear packets of tobacco out of the boxes, inserting them into silver metal tins, and placing a "360" label on the tins. These tobacco-filled tins were then sold at the store. Shami was subsequently charged with violating the TPTA by possessing, acquiring, transporting, or offering for sale tobacco products with an aggregate wholesale price of $250.00 or more as a manufacturer without a license in violation of MCL 205.423(1) and MCL 205.428(3). Following a preliminary examination, the 19th District Court bound Shami over to the Wayne Circuit Court for trial, ruling that there was probable cause to believe that Shami was a manufacturer of a tobacco product insofar as he transformed "certain articles by blending those articles together to create a distinctive product or new character." Shami thereafter filed a motion to quash, which the circuit court granted. According to the circuit court, "blending two types of hookah tobacco does not constitute manufacturing ...." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Shami was a manufacturer of tobacco products because he manufactured or produced tobacco for purposes of the TPTA when he mixed different flavors of tobacco and repackaged tobacco in tins with his own "360" label before offering it for sale. Shami applied for leave to appeal in this Court. This Court directed the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW To bind a criminal defendant over for trial in the circuit court, the district court must find probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a felony, which requires sufficient evidence of each element of the crime charged, or from which the elements may be inferred, to " 'cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief' " of the defendant's guilt. This Court generally reviews a district court's bindover decision for an abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion if its decision " 'falls outside the range of principled outcomes.' " Insofar as the district court based its ruling on questions of law, however, its ruling is reviewed de novo. Questions of statutory interpretation are similarly reviewed de novo. III. ANALYSIS The Legislature enacted the TPTA in 1993 to, among other things, regulate and license manufacturers of tobacco products, as well as provide penalties for violations of the act. Relevant to the instant matter is MCL 205.423(1), which provides, in part, that "a person shall not purchase, possess, acquire for resale, or sell a tobacco product as a manufacturer ... in this state unless licensed to do so." And under MCL 205.428(3), a person is guilty of a felony if he or she "possesses, acquires, transports, or offers for sale contrary to this act ... tobacco products other than cigarettes with an aggregate wholesale price of $250.00 or more ...." Taken together, these two statutory provisions subject a manufacturer of a tobacco product to criminal liability for possessing, acquiring, transporting, or selling a certain wholesale value of a tobacco product in this state without a license. This, in turn, raises the principal question in this case: who is considered a manufacturer of a tobacco product? The TPTA defines a "manufacturer" as a person who "manufactures or produces a tobacco product." Although the Legislature defines "tobacco product" as "cigarettes, cigars, noncigarette smoking tobacco, or smokeless tobacco," it did not provide a definition for either "manufactures" or "produces." When interpreting a statute, this Court's primary goal is to " 'ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in [the] statute.' " Because the language of a statute provides the most reliable manifestation of the Legislature's intent, this Court begins its interpretation by reviewing the words and phrases of the statute itself. If a statutory word or phrase is not defined in the statute, it must be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or phrase is a legal term of art. This Court has consistently consulted dictionary definitions to give words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. A person can become a "manufacturer" under the TPTA by either "manufactur[ing]" or "produc[ing]" a tobacco product. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary provides several definitions for the verb form of "manufacture," including "to make into a product suitable for use" and "to make from raw materials by hand or by machinery." We agree with Shami that these definitions do not describe the conduct charged here regarding Shami's blending of the tobacco products. The unblended tobacco products were not raw materials, and they were already suitable for use. But a person who "produces" a tobacco product is also a "manufacturer" under MCL 205.422(m)(i ). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines the verb form of "produce" in several different ways. Our selection of the proper definition must be guided by the statutory context in which the term appears. Here, the term "produce" defines the statutory term "manufacturer," and thus the relevant definition is one that corresponds to "manufacturer." Only one definition reflects this context: "to give being, form, or shape to[.]" Because a person cannot give "being, form, or shape" to something that already existed in the same "form or shape," the product produced must take a different form or shape than any of its constituent parts. Thus, an individual "produces" a tobacco product when he or she combines two or more different tobaccos "to give being, form, or shape to" a single, custom tobacco blend that differs from the ingredient tobaccos. Consequently, that individual is a "manufacturer" of a tobacco product under MCL 205.422(m)(i ), and he or she must have a license before purchasing, possessing, acquiring for resale, or selling a tobacco product under MCL 205.423(1). In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that Shami was a manufacturer under MCL 205.422(m)(i ) because he produced a tobacco product. According to Nordman's testimony at the preliminary examination, Shami admitted that he mixed two or more different hookah tobaccos to create a new "special blend." He then relabeled that combination and made it available for sale to the public at Sam Molasses. Having produced a new tobacco product, Shami was required to be licensed as a manufacturer; there is no dispute that Shami had no such license. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in binding Shami over for trial in the Wayne Circuit Court for alleged violations of MCL 205.423(1) and MCL 205.428(3). Because it reached the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons, this portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed. Neither the district court nor the circuit court addressed whether Shami was a manufacturer because he had allegedly repackaged packets of bulk tobacco into tin containers. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals opined that Shami was a manufacturer of a tobacco product on the basis of this conduct, too. Given the same dictionary definitions of "manufacture" and "produce" discussed earlier, the Court of Appeals held that manufacturing "simply requires a change from the original state of an object or material to a state that makes it more suitable for its intended use." Furthermore, given the context of the statute, including the provision concerning the use of a cigarette making machine, the Court of Appeals concluded that "any change in the form or delivery method of tobacco, rather than a specific type or method of change, constitutes manufacturing under the TPTA." Thus, the Court of Appeals held that Shami's repackaging of tobacco into tins and labeling it "360" before offering it for sale amounted to the manufacturing of a new tobacco product. We do not agree. By taking packets of hookah tobacco out of a box from a distributor and placing those packets into tins with new labels, Shami did not manufacture a tobacco product, because the tobacco product itself remained completely unaltered and was suitable for use before being placed in the tins. Nor did Shami produce a tobacco product, because he did not give being, form, or shape to a new tobacco product. Again, the tobacco product was completely unchanged after being placed in the tins. In going beyond the dictionary definitions of "manufactures" and "produces," the Court of Appeals fashioned an overly expansive definition that encompasses conduct not supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of those words. That Court's definition also fails to appreciate that the focus of the inquiry is on the tobacco product itself, not the precise manner or mechanism in which that product is displayed or offered to the public. Accordingly, this portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment is reversed. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in this opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that there was probable cause that Shami unlawfully possessed, acquired, transported, or offered for sale tobacco products as a manufacturer without a license in violation of MCL 205.423(1) and MCL 205.428(3). Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This case is remanded to the Wayne Circuit Court for it to reinstate the bindover decision of the 19th District Court and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, Shami's application for leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the questions should be reviewed by this Court. We do not retain jurisdiction. Stephen J. Markman, C.J., Bridget M. McCormack, David F. Viviano, Richard H. Bernstein, Elizabeth T. Clement, JJ., concur. Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel. MCL 205.421 et seq. MCL 205.423(1). See, e.g., MCL 205.428(3). See MCL 205.422(s) (defining "secondary wholesaler" as "a person who sells a tobacco product for resale, who purchases a tobacco product from a wholesaler or unclassified acquirer licensed under this act, and who maintains an established place of business in this state where a substantial portion of the business is the sale of tobacco products and related merchandise at wholesale, and where at all times a substantial stock of tobacco products and related merchandise is available to retailers for resale"). See MCL 250.422(z) (defining "unclassified acquirer" as "a person, except a transportation company or a purchaser at retail from a retailer licensed under the general sales tax act, 1933 PA 167, MCL 205.51 to 205.78, who imports or acquires a tobacco product from a source other than a wholesaler or secondary wholesaler licensed under this act for use, sale, or distribution," as well as "a person who receives cigars, noncigarette smoking tobacco, or smokeless tobacco directly from a manufacturer licensed under this act or from another source outside this state, which source is not licensed under this act"). Shami was also charged with violating the TPTA by possessing tobacco products without proper invoices in violation of MCL 205.426(1) and by filing false tobacco-tax returns in violation of MCL 205.427(2). The district court dismissed the tax-returns charge but bound Shami over on the improper-invoices charge. The circuit court subsequently granted Shami's motion to quash that charge. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in binding Shami over on the improper-invoices charge. In its order scheduling oral argument on Shami's application for leave to appeal, this Court directed the parties to address only issues pertaining to the manufacturing charge. See People v. Shami , 500 Mich. 1017, 896 N.W.2d 426 (2017). Because we deny Shami's application for leave to appeal in all other respects, the relevant factual background and analysis in this Court's opinion are limited to the manufacturing charge. The district court expressed no opinion as to whether Shami was a manufacturer by repackaging hookah tobacco into tins. Like the district court, the circuit court expressed no opinion as to whether Shami was a manufacturer by repackaging hookah tobacco into tins. People v. Shami , 318 Mich. App. 316, 329, 897 N.W.2d 761 (2016). Shami , 500 Mich. 1017, 896 N.W.2d 426. See MCL 766.13 ("If the magistrate determines at the conclusion of the preliminary examination that a felony has been committed and that there is probable cause for charging the defendant with committing a felony, the magistrate shall forthwith bind the defendant to appear within 14 days for arraignment before the circuit court of that county, or the magistrate may conduct the circuit court arraignment as provided by court rule."); see also MCR 6.110(E) ("If, after considering the evidence, the court determines that probable cause exists to believe both that an offense not cognizable by the district court has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the court must bind the defendant over for trial."). People v. Seewald , 499 Mich. 111, 116, 879 N.W.2d 237 (2016), citing People v. Hill , 433 Mich. 464, 469, 446 N.W.2d 140 (1989). People v. Anderson , 501 Mich. 175, 183, 912 N.W.2d 503 (2018) (Docket No. 155172), 2018 WL 1370641, quoting People v. Yost , 468 Mich. 122, 126, 659 N.W.2d 604 (2003). Seewald , 499 Mich. at 116, 879 N.W.2d 237, citing People v. Stone , 463 Mich. 558, 561, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001). Seewald , 499 Mich. at 116, 879 N.W.2d 237, quoting Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration LLC , 498 Mich. 518, 528, 872 N.W.2d 412 (2015). People v. Hall , 499 Mich. 446, 451-452, 884 N.W.2d 561 (2016), citing People v. Schaefer , 473 Mich. 418, 427, 703 N.W.2d 774 (2005). Hall , 499 Mich. at 452, 884 N.W.2d 561, citing UAW v. Green , 498 Mich. 282, 286, 870 N.W.2d 867 (2015). 1993 PA 327. MCL 205.428(3) provides, in full, "A person who possesses, acquires, transports, or offers for sale contrary to this act 3,000 or more cigarettes, tobacco products other than cigarettes with an aggregate wholesale price of $250.00 or more, 3,000 or more counterfeit cigarettes, 3,000 or more counterfeit cigarette papers, 3,000 or more gray market cigarettes, or 3,000 or more gray market cigarette papers is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both." MCL 205.422(m)(i ). The TPTA also defines a manufacturer as someone "who operates or who permits any other person to operate a cigarette making machine in this state for the purpose of producing, filling, rolling, dispensing, or otherwise generating cigarettes." MCL 205.422(m)(ii ). Because the government is not alleging that Shami's conduct involved a cigarette making machine, at stake in this case is only whether Shami manufactured or produced a tobacco product. MCL 205.422(w). "Noncigarette smoking tobacco" is defined as "tobacco sold in loose or bulk form that is intended for consumption by smoking and includes roll-your-own cigarette tobacco." MCL 205.422(n). Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 500 Mich. 191, 199, 895 N.W.2d 490 (2017), quoting People v. Couzens , 480 Mich. 240, 249, 747 N.W.2d 849 (2008). Spectrum Health Hosps. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503, 515, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012), citing Krohn v. Home-Owners Ins. Co. , 490 Mich. 145, 155, 802 N.W.2d 281 (2011). Hannay v. Dep't of Transp. , 497 Mich. 45, 57, 860 N.W.2d 67 (2014), citing In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 377, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013). Shami does not contend that either "manufactures" or "produces" is a legal term of art that must be construed in accordance with its peculiar and appropriate legal meaning. Spectrum Health , 492 Mich. at 515, 821 N.W.2d 117. MCL 205.422(m)(i ). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). Shami contends that he is not a manufacturer of a tobacco product under the TPTA because the word "manufactures" necessarily requires a transformation of a raw material into a new and different article. Simply blending two identical products into a single product does not fall within the definition of manufacturing, says Shami, because the ingredients of the product have not changed and the final product remains essentially the same. Notably, Shami advances no argument regarding whether an individual "produces" a tobacco product under the TPTA by blending different tobacco products to create a new, custom blend. Spectrum Health , 492 Mich. at 515, 821 N.W.2d 117 (" 'Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used.' ") (citation omitted). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary , def. 5b. Another seemingly related definition provides that "produce" means "to cause to have existence or to happen," with "bring about" listed as a synonym. Id ., def. 5a. However, there are several other definitions for "produce" that do not seem to apply in this context. See, e.g., id ., def. 4 (defining "produce" as "to make available for public exhibition or dissemination: as [ (a):] to provide funding for ... [or (b):] to oversee the making of" in the context of films or music albums). Because the particular definition of "to give being, form, or shape to" is synonymous with "make" and, especially, "manufacture," we believe it is serves as the most appropriate definition for determining the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "produce" in the TPTA. Of course, we must also strive to avoid rendering surplusage the statutory term "manufactures" in MCL 205.422(m)(i ). See Seewald , 499 Mich. at 123, 879 N.W.2d 237. But aside from the obvious differences in these definitions, the present case does not require us to address any further differentiation between the terms "manufactures" and "produces," and so we leave that task for another day. Shami , 318 Mich. App. at 328, 897 N.W.2d 761. Id . at 329, 897 N.W.2d 761. Id . We address two final points. First, Shami argues that the TPTA is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, thereby requiring an average person to guess at what activity falls within the scope of manufacturing tobacco. Because it was cursorily raised for the first time in his application for leave to appeal in this Court, Shami waived this argument. See, e.g., People v. Grant , 445 Mich. 535, 546, 520 N.W.2d 123 (1994) ("[T]he courts of this state have long recognized the importance of preserving issues for the purpose of appellate review. As a general rule, issues that are not properly raised before a trial court cannot be raised on appeal ...."). Second, in the event we determine that his conduct falls within the definition of "manufacturer" under the TPTA, Shami argues that our decision should be applied prospectively rather than retroactively. We disagree. This Court's decisions are generally given full retroactive effect absent "exigent circumstances" that would justify the "extreme measure" of prospective-only application. Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Co. , 479 Mich. 378, 400, 738 N.W.2d 664 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lincoln v. Gen Motors Corp. , 461 Mich. 483, 491, 607 N.W.2d 73 (2000) (" 'Complete prospective application has generally been limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law .' "), quoting Hyde v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents , 426 Mich. 223, 240, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986) (brackets omitted; emphasis added). Because this Court's present decision does not even satisfy the threshold criterion for prospective-only application-namely, that it "clearly establishes a new principle of law," Trentadue , 479 Mich. at 401, 738 N.W.2d 664 -and because this case does not present "exigent circumstances" of the sort warranting the "extreme measure" of prospective-only application, our decision has full retroactive effect.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee to extend the time for filing its brief is GRANTED. The brief submitted on June 8, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing his supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief submitted on June 12, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan Public Employees Service Employees International Union Local 517M to join the brief amicus curiae of the Michigan League for Public Policy is GRANTED. The joint amicus brief submitted on June 13, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $26.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $349.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to extend the time for filing its answer to the applications for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before July 17, 2018.

Per Curiam In these consolidated appeals, the parties appeal by leave granted different portions of an order entered by the trial court vacating part of an arbitration award and remanding the matter to the arbitrator. This case arises out of a divorce proceeding commenced in early 2011 that resulted in the entry of a judgment of divorce in 2012, followed by extensive disputes over implementation details. The parties eventually stipulated to binding arbitration, which, after further contentiousness before the arbitrator, resulted in an award that plaintiff found acceptable but defendant did not. The trial court vacated part of the award and remanded for the arbitrator to consider awarding plaintiff attorney fees "based on need." We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. The parties, Janet L. Eppel and Christopher J. Eppel, were married in 1992, and they had three children, the youngest of whom was born in May 2000. The divorce was contested, but apparently the parties were able to cooperate effectively regarding parenting time, custody, their children's various issues, and payment of expenses. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment of divorce, along with a uniform child support order and a uniform spousal support order. Both orders had attachments describing additional obligations. Relevant to the instant appeal, the spousal support attachment stated, in pertinent part: As and for additional spousal support, the Defendant shall pay 19.5% of Defendant's gross bonuses and/or deferred compensation within 15 days of payment. He shall provide proof as to the gross amounts. This provision applies to bonuses and/or deferred compensation beginning in 2012. Additionally, the Defendant shall pay 19.5% of any and all restricted and performance shares when they vest based upon the market value of the gross vested shares at the vesting date or the first available date after lock-out ends. This additional spousal support obligation shall cease after 84 months, or shall terminate earlier upon the event of Plaintiff's death within 36 months of the entry of the Judgment of Divorce, or Plaintiff's death, remarriage or cohabitation after 36 months from the entry of the Judgment of Divorce. Mr. Eppel is to provide proof of receipt of all bonuses, deferred compensation, restricted and performance shares within 15 days of receipt. The term "lock-out" referenced above refers to the blackout period in which a shareholder is prohibited from purchase or sale of securities under SEC regulations. Defendant draws a distinction between the language used in the spousal support attachment and the attachment to the uniform child support order, which provides, in relevant part, that for additional child support, for 3 children the Defendant shall pay 16.7% of his gross bonuses, deferred compensation, vesting restricted shares and performance shares, the net value of vested options received after 12/31/11 as if they were exercised on the date of vesting or the first available date after lock-out ends, 13.3% for two children of all above-stated categories, and 8.7% for one child. As will be discussed, defendant believes that the child support attachment therefore includes a requirement to pay support based on stock options but that the spousal support attachment does not. The parties engaged in a significant amount of postjudgment conflict over numerous matters, most of which are no longer at issue. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court entered a qualified domestic relations order granting plaintiff half of defendant's interest, as of December 31, 2011, in the "Perrigo Profit Sharing and Investment Plan." Simultaneously, the trial court entered a domestic relations order granting plaintiff half of defendant's interest, also as of December 31, 2011, in the "Perrigo 2005 Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan (As Amended and Restated Effective January 1, 2007)." Perrigo was defendant's employer until some time around September 2013, after which he eventually obtained employment with Allied Specialty Vehicles (ASV). Defendant was terminated from ASV effective September 25, 2015, but remained with that company in a consulting role for another twelve months. Relevant to the instant appeal, a letter so stating set forth, among other things, the following "consulting benefits": You hold 1,150 shares of common stock of the Company (the "Shares"); and pursuant to the provisions of the Company's 2010 Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended (the "Plan") and the Nonqualified Stock Option Agreements between you and the Company dated as of January 20, 2014 (the "Option Agreements"), you own stock options to purchase 3,000 shares of common stock of the Company (the "Options") at a strike price of $354.74 which had the following vesting schedule: • 1,000 Optioned Shares (the "Performance Based Options") shall vest 25% per annum over 4 years. Records indicate 500 Optioned Shares have previously vested. • 1,000 Optioned Shares (the "Performance Based Options") shall vest upon the Company achieving annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) on a Last Twelve Months (LTM) basis of at least $80 million. These Optioned Shares have previously vested. • 1,000 Optioned Shares (the "Performance Based Options") shall vest upon the Company achieving annual earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) on a Last Twelve Months (LTM) basis of at least $90 million. These Optioned Shares have previously vested. Current fair market value of all common stock and Optioned Shares is $594.89. Pursuant to the Shareholders Agreement, ASV may exercise its right to repurchase your shares and vested options. Per mutual agreement, ASV will complete this repurchase no sooner than January 01, 2016 and no later than January 31, 2016. The purchase price for all of your common stock and 2,500 vested Optioned Shares (net of the strike price) is equal to $1,284,489.50, which ASV will pay in cash upon your surrender of the stock and option certificates or instruments, if any. Broadly, the central dispute remaining in this matter is whether plaintiff is entitled to any portion of the ASV stock repurchase pursuant to the spousal support attachment. Without engaging in unnecessary detail, the record discloses a relationship between the parties postdivorce that can best be described as mutually distrustful and antagonistic, with both parties engaging in voluminous motion practice. Relevant to the instant appeal, the parties agreed and entered a stipulation to arbitrate. In pertinent part, the stipulation specifically enumerated six motions that were outstanding as of the date of the stipulation, and it further provided that the arbitrator "shall arbitrate all of the remaining, post judgment issues in the case, except for any determinations of contempt and applicable sanctions, which are specifically reserved for the Court's consideration," although the arbitrator was empowered to make recommendations. The parties continued to file motions on issues ranging from parenting time, to allegations of noncompliance with interim orders from the arbitrator, to efforts to disqualify the judge. One of the motions was styled as an amended version of a motion that had already been submitted to arbitration pursuant to the stipulation. The arbitrator issued his first opinion on May 5, 2016, almost two years after the parties entered the stipulation. The arbitrator's opinion is not a model of clarity, although it is readily apparent that the arbitrator had a great deal with which to contend. The introductory portion enumerated the outstanding motions from the original stipulation, but noted that "the Order also required any other issues excepting those related to contempt and sanctions to be resolved by the Arbitrator as they are brought." It observed that "[p]roofs had to be reopened in 2015 to access information relative to the Defendant's job change and new income numbers for calculation purposes." In relevant part, the arbitrator determined that defendant owed plaintiff a payment of $236,160.00 on the basis of the ASV stock repurchase. Both parties apparently requested that the arbitrator correct certain alleged errors or omissions. The arbitrator issued a response, noting that modification of spousal support was not an arbitrable issue under the stipulation but that the types of income that should be considered compensation to defendant for purposes of calculating that support was a subject of arbitration. Relevant to the instant appeal, the arbitrator conceded that 500 of the repurchased ASV stocks would never vest and that they should be subtracted from the calculations. The arbitrator determined that the only reasonable interpretation of the spousal support attachment was that any subsequent compensation or stock was to be considered income for support purposes and that the ASV stock purchase necessarily had to be considered compensation, although limited only to gains realized from the stock rather than the entire buy-back price. Plaintiff moved in the trial court to confirm the ultimate award, and defendant moved to vacate or modify portions of it. In relevant part, defendant argued that the value of the 2,500 shares of repurchased ASV stock options was properly used to calculate additional child support because the child support attachment explicitly included a percentage "of the net value of vested options," whereas the spousal support attachment did not include stock options for purposes of calculating the support payment. Consequently, according to defendant, including 19.5% of the ASV stock repurchase was an impermissible modification of the uniform spousal support order and the arbitrator exceeded his authority by making the modification because doing so was not required to resolve any of the outstanding motions submitted to arbitration. Defendant also argued that the other 1,150 shares of ASV stock were personal purchases, not even arguably compensation, and the arbitrator erred by requiring him to pay 19.5% of the capital gains from his sale thereof. It appears that the arbitrator's opinion did not clearly distinguish between the two categories of ASV stock. For the most part, the trial court confirmed the arbitration award, and to the extent it did so, those matters are not before this Court on appeal. The trial court also concluded, after holding a hearing, that the Arbitrator exceeded his authority by improperly modifying the Uniform Spousal Support Orders by granting Plaintiff 19.5% of the net profits from the sale of the ASV stock options and, therefore, the Arbitrator's opinion granting plaintiff $117,073.20 is vacated. Further, and for the same reasons, the Arbitrator's Opinion that Defendant should pay Plaintiff as additional spousal support 19.5% of the capital gains from the sale of the ASV common stock in the amount of $35,971.94 should be vacated. The trial court denied the remainder of defendant's request. However, it also remanded to the arbitrator "the issue of attorney fees requested by Plaintiff" limited "to the need of Plaintiff to be reimbursed for attorney fees pursuant to MCR 3.206(C)(2) related to the enforcement proceedings initiated by Plaintiff." Both parties attempted to claim an appeal by right, and we subsequently granted their applications for leave. "This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's decision to enforce, vacate, or modify an arbitration award." Cipriano v. Cipriano , 289 Mich.App. 361, 375, 808 N.W.2d 230 (2010). Under the domestic relations arbitration act (DRAAA), MCL 600.5070 et seq ., "parties to a domestic-relations proceeding may stipulate to submit their disputed issues to binding arbitration," Cipriano , 289 Mich.App. at 367, 808 N.W.2d 230, pursuant to a written contract that defines, dictates, and limits the powers of the arbitrator, id . By default, the trial court is required to enforce the arbitrator's award. MCL 600.5079(1). However, the trial court is required to vacate the award under MCL 600.5080(1) if the trial court finds the award adverse to the best interests of the child or, relevant to the instant matter, under MCL 600.5081(2)(c), if "[t]he arbitrator exceeded his powers." "An arbitrator exceeds his or her powers if the arbitrator acts in contravention of controlling law," Cipriano , 289 Mich.App. at 373, 808 N.W.2d 230, or "exceed[s] the powers that the parties' agreement granted to him," id . The phrase "exceed his powers" is essentially longstanding shorthand for deviating from the contract or controlling law. Washington v. Washington , 283 Mich.App. 667, 672, 770 N.W.2d 908 (2009). "In order for a court to vacate an arbitration award because of an error of law, the error must have been so substantial that, but for the error, the award would have been substantially different." Cipriano , 289 Mich.App. at 368, 808 N.W.2d 230. Any such error must be readily apparent on the face of the award without second-guessing the arbitrator's thought processes, and the arbitrator's findings of fact are immune from review altogether. Washington , 283 Mich.App. at 672, 770 N.W.2d 908. The gravamen of the parties' dispute appears to be whether the arbitrator effectively modified the parties' uniform spousal support order by awarding plaintiff 19.5% of the profits from the sale of defendant's ASV stock, although defendant presumably also would argue that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by addressing a matter not strictly contained within the six motions pending when the parties agreed to arbitrate. The latter is obviously meritless. "Arbitrators exceed their powers whenever they act beyond the material terms of the contract from which they draw their authority or in contravention of controlling law." Miller v. Miller , 474 Mich. 27, 30, 707 N.W.2d 341 (2005). The arbitration stipulation states that the parties agreed to arbitrate the outstanding motions, and in a separate section , directed the arbitrator to "arbitrate all of the remaining, post judgment issues in the case, except for any determinations of contempt and applicable sanctions...." Clearly, this was intended to be relatively open-ended and to bring the entire matter to a conclusion; considering the two years the parties nevertheless contrived to stretch the arbitration proceedings, it defies reason to conclude that the arbitrator was prohibited from addressing later spousal support and income issues as they arose. The former argument is apparently based on the fact that the child support attachment includes the word "options," whereas the spousal support attachment does not. While accurate, both attachments do encompass "restricted and performance shares" upon vesting. The letter from ASV describes 3000 shares (of which 500 will not vest) as "Optioned Shares (the 'Performance Based Options')." We do not understand why those would not be considered "performance shares," nor can we find any coherent argument presented anywhere in the record explaining otherwise. Furthermore, given that the shares were apparently conferred upon defendant as part of his compensation, and he only received liquid value for them upon his termination from ASV, they at least plausibly constitute some form of "deferred compensation," which is also encompassed by the spousal support attachment. Given that review of an arbitrator's decisions is highly deferential, that determining whether the 2,500 shares of ASV stock constitute either deferred compensation or performance shares is clearly within the arbitrator's authority, and that the determination itself is at least partly factual, we find it impossible to reasonably conclude that the arbitrator's decision to award plaintiff 19.5% thereof exceeded his powers. In contrast, the other 1,150 shares were purchased by defendant. Plaintiff's argument is that these shares constitute "gross bonuses and/or deferred compensation" because defendant was only permitted to make those purchases because of his employment. We agree with defendant's argument made in the trial court that it does not constitute either a bonus or compensation merely because defendant's employment afforded him an opportunity to make a personal investment that would have otherwise been unavailable. Defendant bought the stock with his own money, it was not granted to him as either part of a compensation package or as a consequence of meeting a performance goal. In light of the poor comprehensibility of the arbitrator's opinion, we cannot deem the arbitrator's inclusion of the profit from the 1,150 ASV shares to be an unreviewable factual finding. We therefore conclude that the arbitrator completely deviated from the plain language of the spousal support attachment by including the profit from the 1,150 ASV shares. This departure is of such magnitude to constitute a "substantial" error that resulted in a "substantially different" outcome, Cipriano , 289 Mich.App. at 368, 808 N.W.2d 230, and the error is readily apparent on the face of the award, Washington , 283 Mich.App. at 672, 770 N.W.2d 908. Defendant argues that the trial court also erred by remanding the matter to the arbitrator to address plaintiff's request for attorney fees based on her financial need. We agree. As discussed, the arbitrator was authorized to consider all postjudgment issues. However, the arbitrator had already done so and had, in fact, expressly rejected plaintiff's request for attorney fees, noting, among other things, that there was some argument that both parties' acrimony was responsible for the accumulation of attorney fees by both parties. Plaintiff apparently did not object to that rejection. It appears that the only arguments plaintiff made regarding attorney fees to the arbitrator were based on MCR 3.206(C)(2)(b) -that defendant's noncompliance entitled her to the fees. Indeed, our review of the record indicates that plaintiff made that request at least a half-dozen times; it seems that plaintiff routinely added to her numerous motions a request that defendant be required to pay attorney fees associated with the motion, but none of those requests "allege[d] facts sufficient to show that ... the party is unable to bear the expense of the action...." MCR 3.206(C)(2)(a). Clearly, attorney fees were placed before the arbitrator. Equally clearly, at least on the basis of the available record, attorney fees based on need were not, or at least not specifically, argued. Plaintiff claims that she submitted an arbitration summary on July 31, 2015, that cited MCR 3.206(2)(a), but that document is not actually found anywhere in the lower court record. Defendant does provide what purports to be a copy of that document, and if accurate, it simply recites MCR 3.206(2) in its entirety and then proceeds to argue solely that plaintiff incurred expenses because of defendant's violations and misconduct and lack of good faith, clearly constituting an argument under MCR 3.206(2)(b). As a consequence, the record establishes that defendant is correct in asserting that attorney fees based on plaintiff's need were only expressly raised for the first time after the trial court read from the bench its decision to reverse part of the arbitrator's award. Plaintiff argues that attorney fees are only permitted in a divorce action when necessary to permit a party to pursue or defend the action, thus placing attorney fees based on need before the arbitrator by necessary implication. The case cited by plaintiff does say as much. Stoudemire v. Stoudemire , 248 Mich.App. 325, 344, 639 N.W.2d 274 (2001). However, at the time Stoudemire was decided, MCR 3.206(C)only provided for attorney fees based on need. See MCR 3.206(C), as adopted January 28, 1993, 441 Mich cxvii (1993). The court rule was amended in 2003, specifically to add a provision for granting attorney fees solely on the basis of a litigant's improper behavior. See MCR 3.206, as adopted April 1, 2003, 468 Mich. lxxxv. The statement in Stoudemire -and any cases it cited or that have cited it-is no longer based on an accurate understanding of the relevant court rule. Furthermore, presuming the arbitration summary supposedly filed by plaintiff is accurate, plaintiff was actually aware of the current provisions of the court rule and cannot claim surprise. Because plaintiff only argued that attorney fees were appropriate because of defendant's allegedly improper behavior, attorney fees based on need were, by necessary implication, not argued. Plaintiff also accurately notes that MCL 552.13 provides, "In every action brought, ... the court may require either party to ... pay any sums necessary to enable the adverse party to carry on or defend the action, during its pendency." Nevertheless, as discussed, we find no indication in the record that at the time the parties agreed to arbitrate, or thereafter, any outstanding request existed from plaintiff for sums necessary to enable her to carry on the action. Although the arbitrator's opinion was rambling, the arbitrator did explicitly consider attorney fees, and he decided against awarding them. There is no indication that the arbitrator considered plaintiff's need in doing so, but there is also no indication in the arbitrator's response to both parties' requests to correct errors and omissions that plaintiff's need was ever placed at issue. Consequently, need was raised for the first time after the trial court read its decision to vacate part of the award. The trial court's remand to the arbitrator was apparently based on the logic that the arbitrator might have reached a different conclusion about attorney fees if the "big picture" of the award as a whole was altered by the reduction of $153,045.14. While understandable, this decision suffers from the fatal flaw that attorney fees based on need were never before the arbitrator in the first place, so no decision thereon existed to be reconsidered. The trial court's remand was therefore an improper ad hoc submission of an entirely new issue that the parties had not agreed to arbitrate. Consequently, the trial court's order vacating the arbitrator's award granting plaintiff 19.5% of the 1,150 shares of ASV stock is affirmed; the trial court's decision to vacate the portion of the arbitrator's award granting plaintiff 19.5% of the 2,500 shares of ASV stock is reversed; and the trial court's remand to the arbitrator of the issue of attorney fees based on need is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion. We retain jurisdiction. In Docket No. 335653, the parties shall bear their own costs, neither having prevailed in full; in Docket No. 335775, defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A). Markey, P.J., and Hoekstra and Ronayne Krause, JJ., concurred. We could find no copy of this letter in the lower court record, but it appears that it was introduced into evidence before the arbitrator, and we perceive no dispute that the copy provided on appeal is accurate and real. We remind the parties that it is unwise to fail to ensure that evidence about which they might care on appeal is properly included in the lower court's record. We cannot find an original copy of the arbitrator's opinion in the lower court record. Neither request is in the lower court record. Defendant's counsel apparently encountered technical difficulties in submitting a brief to this Court. Prior to the amendment, MCR 3.206(C) provided as follows: (C) Attorney Fees and Expenses (1) A party may, at any time, request that the court order the other party to pay all or part of the attorney fees and expenses related to the action. (2) A party who requests attorney fees and expenses must allege facts sufficient to show that the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, and that the other party is able to pay.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Bernstein, J., would grant leave to appeal.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court the initial partial filing fee of $10.00; submit a copy of this order; and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely files the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $365.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8) appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 2, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 5, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is GRANTED, limited to the issue whether the defendant federal border patrol agents were "public officers" for purposes of the common-law crime of misconduct in office when they assisted-as members of a law enforcement task force that included Michigan State Police and Michigan motor carrier officers-in the execution of a search warrant. The time allowed for oral argument shall be 20 minutes for each side. MCR 7.314(B)(1). The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

Per Curiam. We are asked in this appeal to determine whether a claim based on a theory of unjust enrichment is barred by the doctrine of governmental immunity. We conclude that it is not. This is the second time that this case is before us. See Genesee Co. Drain Comm'r v. Genesee Co. , 309 Mich.App. 317, 869 N.W.2d 635 (2015). That opinion fully sets out the relevant facts of this case. Briefly, plaintiff Jeffrey Wright is the Genesee County Drain Commissioner and, along with other plaintiffs who are no longer parties in the case, he participated in a county health plan through Blue Cross Blue Shield. Premiums were paid both by the county and the participants. Those premiums were set annually and were based on an estimate of the amount that the claims would be for the upcoming year along with the administrative costs of the plan. Unbeknownst to plaintiffs, at the end of each year, Blue Cross would refund to the county the amount by which the premiums exceeded the amount necessary to pay the claims and costs. The instant suit was instituted to recover the portion of the refunds that represented the participants' share of the premiums paid. In the original appeal, we held that plaintiffs' claims alleging intentional torts were barred by governmental immunity and that plaintiffs could not recover under a breach-of-contract claim for any damages that accrued before October 24, 2005 (6 years before the filing of this action). Thereafter, following remand, in addition to the continuation of the drain commissioner's breach-of-contract claim against Genesee County, the trial court permitted the complaint to be amended to add an unjust-enrichment claim. Defendant again moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that governmental immunity barred the unjust-enrichment claim and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment. The trial court concluded that governmental immunity did not bar the unjust-enrichment claim. The trial court allowed the matter to continue, though without explicitly ruling on whether plaintiff properly stated a claim for unjust enrichment. Defendant now appeals. We review de novo both the grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and questions of statutory interpretation. In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 376-377, 835 N.W.2d. 545 (2013). And we look first to Bradley for assistance in answering the question whether a claim based on unjust enrichment constitutes one for "tort liability" that comes under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq . Bradley does not directly answer this question as it involved a claim based upon civil contempt rather than unjust enrichment. But it does provide guidance in determining whether a particular claim falls under the GTLA. Plaintiff's claim based on unjust enrichment is barred only if unjust enrichment imposes "tort liability." The Court in Bradley , 494 Mich. at 384-385, 835 N.W.2d 545, summarized the analysis as follows: Given the foregoing, it is clear that our common law has defined "tort" to be a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court will provide a remedy in the form of compensatory damages. Accordingly, because the word "tort" has "acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning" in our common law, and because the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the common law when enacting legislation, we conclude that the term "tort" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages. Our analysis, however, requires more. MCL 691.1407(1) refers not merely to a "tort," nor to a "tort claim" nor to a "tort action," but to "tort liability. " The term "tort," therefore, describes the type of liability from which a governmental agency is immune. As commonly understood, the word "liability," refers to liableness, i.e., "the state or quality of being liable." To be "liable" means to be "legally responsible[.]" Construing the term "liability" along with the term "tort," it becomes apparent that the Legislature intended "tort liability" to encompass legal responsibility arising from a tort. We therefore hold that "tort liability" as used in MCL 691.1407(1) means all legal responsibility arising from a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages. [Citations omitted; alteration in original.] Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine. Morris Pumps v. Centerline Piping, Inc. , 273 Mich.App. 187, 193, 729 N.W.2d 898 (2006). Under this doctrine, "the law will imply a contract to prevent unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the plaintiff's expense." Id. at 195, 729 N.W.2d 898 (emphasis added). But "a contract will be implied only if there is no express contract covering the same subject matter." Barber v. SMH (US), Inc. , 202 Mich.App. 366, 375, 509 N.W.2d 791 (1993) (emphasis added). In other words, "the law implies a contract to prevent unjust enrichment, which occurs when one party receives a benefit from another the retention of which would be inequitable." Martin v. East Lansing Sch. Dist , 193 Mich.App. 166, 177, 483 N.W.2d 656 (1992) (emphasis added). See also Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 437 Mich. 521, 546, 473 N.W.2d 652 (1991). Further, our Supreme Court has specifically held that an action for breach of implied contract is not barred by the GTLA. Bradley , 494 Mich. at 386, 835 N.W.2d 545. We conclude that a claim based on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment ultimately involves contract liability, not tort liability. It merely involves a situation in which the contract is an implied one imposed by the court in the interests of equity rather than an express contract entered into by the parties. Accordingly, the claim is not barred by the GTLA. Defendant also argues that plaintiff has failed to state a claim under an unjust-enrichment theory. It does not appear that the trial court addressed this issue. Accordingly, we decline to do so on appeal. Defendant is, however, free on remand to renew its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) based on a failure to state a claim for unjust enrichment so that the trial court may address it in the first instance. Affirmed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs. SAWYER, P.J., and SERVITTO and RIORDAN, JJ., concurred. It is not argued that the claim based upon a breach of contract theory is barred by the GTLA. Nor do plaintiffs argue that any of the exceptions to the GTLA for tort liability apply here to the unjust enrichment claim.

Per Curiam. This case returns to us after we remanded to the trial court for it to properly articulate its rationale for imposing consecutive sentences. Defendant was convicted of seven drug offenses, five of which were under MCL 333.7401, which provides trial courts the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. MCL 333.7401(3). Originally the trial court ordered all five of defendant's convictions under MCL 333.7401 to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently to the remaining two offenses, and it did so without explanation. In remanding the case, we stated: Review of a discretionary decision requires that the trial court set forth the reasons underlying its decision. See People v. Broden , 428 Mich. 343, 350-351, 408 N.W.2d 789 (1987) (holding that in order to aid the appellate review of whether an abuse of discretion has occurred at sentencing, the trial court is required to articulate on the record reasons for imposing a particular sentence). Further, MCL 333.7401(3) provides discretion to impose "[a ] term of imprisonment ... to run consecutively ...." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, a trial court may not impose multiple consecutive sentences as a single act of discretion nor explain them as such. The decision regarding each consecutive sentence is its own discretionary act and must be separately justified on the record. The statute clearly provides that a discretionary decision must be made as to each sentence and not to them all as a group. Moreover, this is in accordance with the Supreme Court's statements that Michigan has a "clear preference for concurrent sentencing" and that the "[i]mposition of a consecutive sentence is strong medicine." People v. Chambers , 430 Mich. 217, 229, 231, 421 N.W.2d 903 (1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While imposition of more than one consecutive sentence may be justified in an extraordinary case, trial courts must nevertheless articulate their rationale for the imposition of each consecutive sentence so as to allow appellate review. As the Milbourn Court aptly stated, "Discretion, however, is a matter of degree, not an all or nothing proposition." Milbourn , 435 Mich. at 664 [461 N.W.2d 1 (1990) ]. Additionally, we believe that requiring trial courts to justify each consecutive sentence imposed will help ensure that the "strong medicine" of consecutive sentences is reserved for those situations in which so drastic a deviation from the norm is justified. In the instant case, the trial court spoke only in general terms, stating that it took into account defendant's "background, his history, [and] the nature of the offenses involved." Moreover, it did not speak separately regarding each consecutive sentence, each of which represents a separate exercise of discretion. Therefore, the trial court did not give particularized reasons-with reference to the specific offenses and the defendant-to impose each sentence under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv ) consecutively to the other. Remand is therefore necessary so that the trial court can fully articulate its rationale for each consecutive sentence imposed. ... [ People v. Norfleet , 317 Mich.App. 649, 664-666, 897 N.W.2d 195 (2016).] We retained jurisdiction. On remand, the trial court amended its previous sentencing order by only imposing two of the five convictions under MCL 333.7401 to run consecutively to each other and ordered the other five counts to all run concurrently to each other and concurrently to these first two counts. The trial court articulated its rationale for determining that counts 1 and 2 should run consecutively. We affirm. While the facts of this case are more thoroughly detailed in our previous opinion, Norfleet , 317 Mich.App. at 654-657, 897 N.W.2d 195, we briefly reiterate that defendant was convicted after an investigation tied him to several heroin distributions. Specifically, officers had observed a suspected heroin transaction between Alysha Nerg, who was later determined to be one of defendant's associates, and Angela Bembeneck. A subsequent search of Bembeneck's car confirmed the officers' suspicions, and Bembeneck implicated defendant as her heroin supplier. Bembeneck agreed to engage in several controlled buys that involved her calling defendant to place the order and then meeting Nerg to conduct the actual exchange. A search warrant was executed on defendant's home, where drug paraphernalia and the controlled buy funds were located. Defendant's ex-girlfriend also testified to previously picking up cash and making deliveries for defendant, including deliveries to Nerg and her husband. On remand, the trial court stated as follows regarding its rationale for imposing consecutive sentences for Counts 1 and 2: consecutively as follows: And, as the prosecutor states in his brief, some of the considerations for consecutive sentencing are the defendant's extensive criminal history which we reviewed, his extremely violent criminal history which we reviewed, his failure to be rehabilitated, his failure to be gainfully employed, ... his use and manipulation of addicts to sell heroin, his use and manipulation of his 18 year old girlfriend to sell heroin, the length and extensiveness of his heroin dealing, the amount of money he gained from his heroin dealing and the fact that consecutive sentences deter others from committing similar crimes. For all of those reasons the Court deems that an appropriate exercise of discretion to issue a consecutive sentence as to Count I and Count II, that is Count II shall run consecutive to Count Number I. But, if I understand the Court of Appeals position the Court has to go through all of the other counts that were consecutive at the original sentence and describe why they should be consecutive, and I think that that becomes not only repetitive but it seems to me that there should be some different reasons perhaps that would justify a consecutive sentencing as to all the counts that were consecutive at the original sentencing. So, my conclusion then would be that there is substantial circumstances based on history and the nature of the offenses for consecutive sentence in this major controlled substance case as to Count I and Count II but that there are not other reasons or additional reasons why the Court should impose consecutive sentences as to any and all of the remaining counts, so they shall all run concurrently with the Count I and Count II sentences. These statements show that the trial court properly understood the directives of our previous opinion. The trial court ordered Count 1 to be served consecutively to Count 2 and stated its rationale for believing that the strong medicine of a consecutive sentence was appropriate in this case, that being defendant's extensive violent criminal history, multiple failures to rehabilitate, and the manipulation of several less culpable individuals in his ongoing criminal operation. We agree that this combination of facts was sufficient to depart from the heavy presumption in favor of concurrent sentences and to order one of the sentences to be served consecutively to another. The trial court properly recognized that it could not impose multiple consecutive sentences as a single act of discretion and correctly issued a judgment of sentence in which the remaining sentences are all to be served concurrently. Affirmed. Shapiro, P.J., and Hoekstra and Servitto, JJ., concurred. The parties stipulated that the trial court could resentence defendant in the context of the hearing on remand, although it was not a formal resentencing. Independent of the consecutive sentencing issue, we also directed the trial court to follow the Crosby procedure as to the individual minimum terms imposed because the court had scored one offense variable based on judicially-found facts. On remand the trial court stated that it would have imposed the same minimum terms had it been aware that the guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory.

Swartzle, J. In this medical-malpractice suit, plaintiff Rolla Mitchell sued defendant Bernard Mason Smith III, M.D., and the doctor's former employer, defendant Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, PC. Plaintiff claimed that Dr. Smith negligently performed certain post-operative services that permanently injured the phrenic nerve in plaintiff's shoulder. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. One key issue at trial was whether an ultrasound image sought to be introduced by the defense was, in fact, an accurate scan of the ultrasound image taken of plaintiff's shoulder on the day of surgery. The image purported to show that Dr. Smith properly placed the needle and catheter while performing the post-operative services on plaintiff. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge held that defendants had properly authenticated the image and, as a result, plaintiff's counsel was precluded from presenting evidence or argument to the jury that the proffered image was not, in fact, an accurate image of plaintiff's shoulder. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court properly served its gatekeeping role by admitting the ultrasound image as authentic under Michigan Rule of Evidence 901. Yet, authentication under MRE 901 is a threshold matter that goes to the admissibility of evidence, not to the ultimate weight to be given that evidence. By precluding plaintiff's counsel from attacking the genuineness and reliability of the ultrasound image before the jury, the trial judge overstepped his gatekeeping role and, instead, intruded on the jury's role as fact-finder. Given the importance of the ultrasound image to this dispute, we reverse and vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. PLAINTIFF'S SHOULDER SURGERY AND POST-OPERATIVE COMPLICATIONS In May 2011, plaintiff had surgery on his right shoulder at Borgess Medical Center in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Defendant Kalamazoo Anesthesiology provided anesthesiology services for Borgess under contract. Both Dr. Phyllis Lashley and Dr. Smith worked for Kalamazoo Anesthesiology. Dr. Lashley provided anesthesiology services to plaintiff during his surgery, and defendant Dr. Smith provided post-operative services, including performing an "interscalene nerve block and continuous catheter placement" on plaintiff's shoulder. In October 2013, plaintiff sued defendants for malpractice, alleging, among other things, that Kalamazoo Anesthesiology failed to obtain plaintiff's informed consent and that Dr. Smith negligently conducted the procedure. The case proceeded to trial over several days in February 2016. At trial, Dr. Lashley testified that she did not "specifically remember" interacting with plaintiff before or during his surgery, but records showed that she signed his anesthesia pre-evaluation form, and a notation on the form indicated that she discussed the use of an interscalene block with him to manage his pain after the surgery. At trial, Dr. Brian Kiessling explained that an interscalene block was a procedure where the physician uses a needle to administer a local anesthetic around the brachial plexus, which provides anesthesia to the patient for varying periods of time. Dr. Smith testified that he performed the interscalene block and catheter placement on plaintiff after the shoulder surgery. Dr. Smith then attached a pain pump to the catheter to help plaintiff manage his pain. Dr. Smith stated that part of his training included being careful not to puncture the phrenic nerve during the interscalene block. He noted that plaintiff was talking throughout the procedure and that there was no indication that plaintiff had suffered a phrenic nerve injury at that time. Later that day, plaintiff had problems breathing, a common symptom of phrenic nerve injury. He returned to the hospital and sought follow-up medical advice and treatment. Physicians who subsequently treated plaintiff testified that his phrenic nerve was dysfunctional, that this was the cause of his shortness of breath, and that his condition was not likely to improve. B. THE ULTRASOUND IMAGE One crucial factual dispute at trial was whether Dr. Smith properly performed the interscalene block on plaintiff after the shoulder surgery. Plaintiff argued that Dr. Smith breached the standard of care by placing the needle or catheter in such a way as to directly damage his phrenic nerve. Dr. Smith, by contrast, argued that he properly placed the needle and catheter in the interscalene groove near the brachial plexus and that plaintiff was just one of the unfortunate patients-1 in 1,000 or 2,000, in Dr. Smith's estimation-who develop permanent phrenic nerve injury, even with a properly performed interscalene block. The medical records indicated that Dr. Smith used an ultrasound to guide his placement of the needle and catheter during the procedure, and Dr. Smith noted on plaintiff's chart that he printed an image from the scan at the time he performed the procedure. During his deposition, Dr. Smith testified that he did not know what happened to the image after he put it with plaintiff's chart on the day of the procedure. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for the ultrasound image during discovery, but it was not until just before case evaluation that defendants produced what they purported to be a scanned version of the original progress note with an ultrasound image attached to it. Plaintiff's counsel questioned the authenticity of the ultrasound depicted in the image. Among other things, the image showed that the sticker with plaintiff's identifying information on it had been placed over another sticker that attached the ultrasound image to the progress note, and that the sticker was different from others used on the day of plaintiff's procedure. Counsel also noted that the time listed on the ultrasound by a time-stamp (4:16:27) varied from the time of the procedure listed on plaintiff's chart (15:32), suggesting that the ultrasound image was taken 45 minutes after the notes indicated that plaintiff had his procedure. Defendants moved in limine to prevent plaintiff from presenting evidence to the jury about the delay in the disclosure of the digital image and to preclude plaintiff from arguing to the jury that defendants' version might not be a true image of the ultrasound taken during the procedure. On the first day of trial, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury to consider the motion, as well as the predicate question of whether the evidence should be authenticated. At the hearing, Michelle Ritsema testified that she was the Document Imaging Supervisor for Borgess Medical Center. She stated that the center had discovered a digital scan of what it claimed was the original progress note with the ultrasound printout attached to it. The center produced the digital version because the original had apparently been destroyed along with the rest of the physical record per the center's normal record-retention policy. She testified that the digital version had been found in the center's medical records, and human error caused the delay in its disclosure. Regarding the various stickers appearing on the image, Ritsema agreed that the sticker on the progress note was the only thing that connected the image to plaintiff, and she admitted that she did not know who placed the sticker or when it was placed. Ritsema testified that it was normal for a document to have multiple stickers. She also testified, however, that the center does not place stickers on the records, so the sticker in question must have been placed by an employee in the outpatient short-stay department. According to Ritsema, only the first document in a chart would normally have a barcode on it and, therefore, the progress note and attached ultrasound would normally not have a barcode label originating from the center. Ritsema explained, however, that the outpatient short-stay floors print their own labels with barcodes to place on the medical records. Overall, Ritsema did not see anything unusual with the sticker having a barcode. Concerning the time-stamp indicating a different time than when plaintiff's procedure took place, Ritsema testified that she did not have any doubt that the time-stamp reflected the actual time the image was printed. Ritsema noted that the difference between the time-stamp and the time of plaintiff's procedure could have resulted from some kind of incongruence between the system's time and daylight savings time. (It should be noted, however, that the difference is not a whole-number of the hour, but rather approximately 45 minutes, suggesting that confusion created by daylight savings time was not the complete answer.) After taking Ritsema's testimony, defendants argued that allowing plaintiff to present evidence that the ultrasound image was not produced when first requested would cause "confusion, prejudice and false impressions being made to the jury." Moreover, defendants argued that plaintiff should be prohibited from arguing that the image did not depict or pertain to plaintiff. Because there was no evidence that something "nefarious" or "dishonest" occurred with the ultrasound image, defendants argued that any argument to that effect would be a matter of "innuendo and supposition" and would unfairly prejudice the defense. Plaintiff responded that the image was "tainted" by the offending sticker and apparent time disparity, and the image should be excluded from evidence or, if the image was admitted, he should be allowed to attack the image's genuineness and reliability at trial. The trial court determined that, although there appeared to be some "irregularities with respect to this photograph," there was no evidence that defendants improperly destroyed the original or had any role in the failure to disclose it. The trial court found the evidence sufficiently authenticated to be admissible. Moving to whether the probative value of the image was substantially outweighed by any undue prejudice under MRE 403, the trial judge stated that any irregularities in its production and the chain-of-custody did not outweigh its probative value. (The trial judge did not, however, explicitly consider the probative value of plaintiff's evidence calling into question the genuineness and reliability of the image.) The trial court concluded that it would invite a "trial within a trial" involving a nonparty (the center) to allow plaintiff to argue that defendants did something wrong in the handling of the image or that the image was not accurate. Thus, the trial judge precluded plaintiff from offering any evidence tending to show that the image was not an accurate one: "Nor am I going to allow testimony that this particular photograph does not belong or otherwise depict the plaintiff's procedure." During trial, the ultrasound image was a key piece of defendants' case. A defense expert testified that the image represented a "textbook" example for the proper placement of the needle during an interscalene block. And plaintiff's own expert had to concede that the image depicted a proper needle placement. Plaintiff's expert was left to speculate whether Dr. Smith might have improperly placed the needle and catheter before or after the ultrasound image was printed. After receiving this and other evidence permitted at trial, the jury found that defendants were not negligent. The trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendants, and plaintiff appealed. II. ANALYSIS A. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred in several respects with his evidentiary rulings and that those errors prejudiced the trial. We review a trial judge's evidentiary decisions for an abuse of discretion. Elher v. Misra , 499 Mich. 11, 21, 878 N.W.2d 790 (2016). A trial judge abuses his or her discretion when the judge selects an outcome that is outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. We review de novo whether the trial judge properly interpreted and applied the rules of evidence to the facts. Donkers v. Kovach , 277 Mich.App. 366, 369, 745 N.W.2d 154 (2007). B. AUTHENTICATION v. EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF THE ULTRASOUND IMAGE 1. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT ERR IN AUTHENTICATING THE ULTRASOUND IMAGE Plaintiff first argues that the trial judge erred by allowing defendants to introduce the digital image. Plaintiff claims that defendants failed to present sufficient evidence to authenticate the image. He also argues that, to the extent that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by allowing the image into evidence, the trial judge abused his discretion by preventing plaintiff from presenting evidence and arguing to the jury that the image was not what it purported to be. In Michigan, challenges to the authenticity of evidence involve two related, but distinct, questions. The first question is whether the evidence has been authenticated -whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the evidence is what its proponent claims for purposes of admission into evidence. The second question is whether the evidence is actually authentic or genuine -whether the evidence is, in fact, what its proponent claims for purposes of evidentiary weight and reliability. The first question is reserved solely for the trial judge. In the role as evidentiary gatekeeper, the trial judge must make the initial determination of whether the evidence is admissible-a question that depends, among other things, on whether the evidence can be authenticated. See People v. Mitchell , 37 Mich.App. 351, 355, 194 N.W.2d 514 (1971). Under MRE 901(a), to authenticate a piece of evidence, the proponent of that evidence bears the burden of bringing forth "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Our evidentiary rules do not require the proponent to sustain this burden in any particular fashion. See MRE 901(b). Indeed, evidence supporting authentication may be direct or circumstantial and need not be free of all doubt. See Champion v. Champion , 368 Mich. 84, 87-88, 117 N.W.2d 107 (1962) ; Livernash v. De Lorme , 208 Mich. 295, 301, 175 N.W. 177 (1919) ; People v. Burrell , 21 Mich.App. 451, 456-457, 175 N.W.2d 513 (1970). Michigan courts have interpreted MRE 901(a) as requiring the proponent only to make a prima facie showing that a reasonable juror might conclude that the proffered evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. See Mitchell , 37 Mich.App. at 355-356, 194 N.W.2d 514. See also Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure, Practice Desk Book (2d ed.), § 9.2, p. 472 ("[T]he question of admissibility turns on an initial decision by the court that a reasonable juror might find for the proponent on the question."). Once the proponent of the evidence has made the prima facie showing, the evidence is authenticated under MRE 901(a) and may be submitted to the jury. See Mitchell , 37 Mich.App. at 356, 194 N.W.2d 514. At this first stage, the opponent may oppose authentication by arguing that a reasonable juror could not conclude that the proffered evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. Nonetheless, this argument must be made on the basis of the proponent's proffer; the opponent may not present evidence in denial of the genuineness or relevance of the evidence at the authentication stage. See id . Just as the first question-whether the evidence is admissible-is reserved solely to the trial judge, the second question-the weight or reliability (if any) given to the evidence-is reserved solely to the fact-finder, here the jury. When a bona fide dispute regarding the genuineness of evidence is presented, that issue is for the jury, not the trial court. See id . Accordingly, the parties may submit evidence and argument, pro and con, to the jury regarding whether the authenticated evidence is, in fact, genuine and reliable. See id . Federal courts have similarly interpreted FRE 901(a), the counterpart to MRE 901(a) in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Jones , 107 F.3d 1147, 1150 n. 1 (C.A. 6, 1997) ; United States v. McGlory , 968 F.2d 309, 328-339 (C.A. 3, 1992) ; United States v. Sliker , 751 F.2d 477, 488 (C.A. 2, 1984). These and other federal authorities generally hold that a "bona fide dispute as to authenticity or identity is not to be decided by the judge, but rather is to go to the jury." 31A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Evidence Rules (2009), Rule 901, p. 363. "In other words, conflicting evidence on genuineness goes to weight, not admissibility, so long as some reasonable person could believe that the item is what it is claimed to be." Id . With this evidentiary distinction in mind, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in determining that a reasonable jury might conclude that the ultrasound image was an actual depiction of plaintiff's procedure. The image showed a sticker that attached the ultrasound to the underlying progress note, and the sticker included plaintiff's identifying information, the date of the procedure at issue, and the name of the doctor who performed the surgery. Thus, the digital image had distinctive characteristics that tended to permit an inference that it depicted the ultrasound generated on the date at issue. See MRE 901(b)(4). Further, Ritsema testified that the digital scan was made from the original record and was part of plaintiff's medical record. See MRE 901(b)(1) ; MRE 1003. Although plaintiff raised several sound arguments against the image's authenticity, the evidence need not be free from all doubt to be authenticated for purposes of admission, as explained above. 2. THE TRIAL JUDGE DID ERR BY RESTRICTING PLAINTIFF FROM ATTACKING THE GENUINENESS AND RELIABILITY OF THE ULTRASOUND IMAGE As to the second aspect, however, the trial judge erred by precluding plaintiff from arguing to the jury that the purported image was not, in fact, an accurate digital scan of the original, i.e., that the image was not genuine or reliable and therefore had little-to-no probative value. The trial judge's role in examining the genuineness and reliability of the image concluded when he held that the image was admissible. Where a bona fide dispute is presented on the genuineness and reliability of evidence, the jury, as finder of fact, is entitled to hear otherwise admissible evidence regarding that dispute. Furthermore, any potential confusion to the jury related to the chain-of-custody involving a non-defendant could have been cured with an appropriate instruction by the trial judge. By foreclosing plaintiff from presenting any evidence disputing whether the image actually depicted plaintiff's procedure, the trial judge in effect determined that the image was indeed genuine and reliable, even though such questions of evidentiary weight are reserved for the jury. In so ruling, the trial judge erred. With this said, an evidentiary error is not ordinarily grounds for appellate relief, and such relief is appropriate only when the error results in substantial prejudice that denies a fair trial to the aggrieved party. MCR 2.613(A) ; see also MRE 103 ; Lewis v. LeGrow , 258 Mich.App. 175, 200, 670 N.W.2d 675 (2003). Here, the error involved a (arguably the ) crucial piece of evidence. The ultrasound image was the only objective evidence tending to establish whether Dr. Smith properly placed the needle and catheter in plaintiff's shoulder. As noted above, a significant portion of the expert testimony centered on whether the image showed that Dr. Smith performed the procedure within the appropriate standard of care. Importantly, plaintiff's own expert had to concede that the image depicted a proper needle placement, and his expert was left to speculate on how Dr. Smith could have otherwise acted negligently. Thus, the ultrasound image was a key piece of evidence, and evidence as to its genuineness and reliability would have been quite relevant as to the weight (if any) the jury should have placed on the image. By restricting plaintiff from attacking its genuineness and reliability before the jury, the trial judge abused his discretion and substantial justice requires that we reverse and vacate the judgment. Plaintiff raises on appeal several other claims of error. Because we hold that the trial judge abused his discretion with respect to the ultrasound image, we need not address the remaining claims. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we reverse and vacate the judgment in this case. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, and we do not retain jurisdiction. Boonstra, P.J., and Ronayne Krause, J., concurred with Swartzle, J.

Per Curiam. Defendant Conor Lewis rear-ended plaintiff Michelle Wagner. Conor's father (defendant Greg Lewis), Michelle, and Michelle's husband (plaintiff James Wagner), had automobile insurance policies with defendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Michigan. The accident spurred multiple lawsuits. The instant suit involves plaintiffs' first-party claim for uninsured motorist (UM) benefits. Farm Bureau moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs' UM claims were time-barred because plaintiffs failed to comply with the policy's notice and filing provisions. The trial court denied Farm Bureau's motion, concluding that Farm Bureau's policy was ambiguous. Farm Bureau appeals as on leave granted. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On May 17, 2010, Michelle was driving, and a car rear-ended her. Michelle sustained injuries. Michelle and Conor spoke at the scene. Michelle said that Conor stated that he was delivering a pizza for his job at Pizza Hut and indicated that he was insured through Farm Bureau. Greg reported the accident to Farm Bureau. On May 2, 2013, plaintiffs filed a third-party automobile liability claim against Conor, Greg, and Pizza Hut of Kalamazoo. Farm Bureau provided a defense under a reservation of rights, citing language in Greg's policy that Farm Bureau does not provide coverage " 'for liability arising out of the ... operation of a vehicle while it is being used to carry ... property for a fee.' " Farm Bureau later filed a declaratory action, seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Conor or Greg from plaintiffs' third-party claim. Farm Bureau then moved for summary disposition. On June 23, 2014, the trial court granted Farm Bureau's motion. This Court affirmed. On May 12, 2014, plaintiffs notified Farm Bureau of its potential UM or underinsured motorist claim. Farm Bureau sent plaintiffs a letter asserting that the notice was not timely pursuant to the parties' policy, and therefore concluded that plaintiffs would not be eligible for UM coverage. The policy states that Farm Bureau will "pay compensatory damages which [plaintiffs are] legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile ," defines an uninsured automobile, and requires an injured person making a claim to provide proof that the automobile meets this definition. The policy contained a time limit for initiating a UM action, specifically stating that the claimant had three years after the date of the accident to notify Farm Bureau of its UM claim and file suit. However, the policy also stated that failure to perform a duty or give notice would not invalidate a claim if it was not "reasonably possible" to do so and the claimant performed "as soon as reasonably possible." On August 20, 2014, plaintiffs filed the instant suit. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that plaintiffs' UM claim did not accrue until the trial court's June 23, 2014 order declaring that Farm Bureau had no duty to defend or indemnify Conor or Greg, that plaintiffs' third-party action tolled the running of the UM notice and filing provisions, and that plaintiffs' appeal of the June 23, 2014 order further tolled the statutory period of limitations. Additionally, plaintiffs brought a breach-of-contract claim, alleging that Farm Bureau's letter stating that plaintiffs would not be eligible for UM coverage constituted an anticipatory breach of the policy. Farm Bureau moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiffs' UM claims were time-barred pursuant to the policy's unambiguous and enforceable, notice and filing time limitations. Farm Bureau argued that under these provisions, the UM claim accrued on the date of the accident, May 17, 2010, and plaintiffs needed to notify Farm Bureau of their UM claim and file their UM claim within three years, by May 17, 2013; however, plaintiffs did not notify Farm Bureau of their UM claim until May 12, 2014, and did not file their UM claim until August 20, 2014. Further, Farm Bureau argued that it was reasonably possible for plaintiffs to comply with the notice and filing provisions and that the limitations period could not be tolled. Plaintiffs asked the trial court to deny Farm Bureau's motion. Plaintiffs argued that the determination of a vehicle's uninsured status affected the accrual date of a UM claim, that they did not learn that Conor's vehicle was uninsured until more than three years after the accident, and that they complied with the policy as soon as reasonably possible. The trial court denied Farm Bureau's motion. The trial court found the policy to be "inconsistent on its face," and therefore ambiguous, because it "clearly states that a suit against [Farm Bureau] may not be commenced later than three years after the accident" and "also clearly states that the uninsured automobile here did not become an uninsured automobile until Farm Bureau's written denial of coverage had been sustained by final court action." Farm Bureau drafted the policy, and the trial court, therefore, construed the ambiguity against Farm Bureau. Further, the trial court reasoned that the claim accrued and Conor's vehicle became an uninsured automobile on June 23, 2014. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW A court must grant a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) if "dismissal of the action" "is appropriate because of" a "statute of limitations." A trial court must grant a party's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) if the "opposing party has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted." This occurs "when the claims are so unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery." Genesee Co. Drain Comm'r v. Genesee Co. , 309 Mich. App. 317, 324, 869 N.W.2d 635 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A "trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties ... in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id . A trial court must grant the motion if it finds "no genuine issue as to any material fact" and determines that "the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." MCR 2.116(C)(10). We review de novo a trial court's resolution of a motion for summary disposition, conclusion whether an insurance contract is ambiguous, and interpretation of a contract. Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 460 Mich. 348, 353, 596 N.W.2d 190 (1999). III. ANALYSIS Farm Bureau argues that the trial court erred by determining that the parties' UM policy was ambiguous and by denying its motion for summary disposition. We disagree. UM "insurance permits an injured motorist to obtain coverage from his or her own insurance company to the extent that a third-party claim would be permitted against the uninsured at-fault driver." Rory v. Continental Ins. Co. , 473 Mich. 457, 465, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). The UM "policy language governs the coverage....." Scott v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 266 Mich. App. 557, 561, 702 N.W.2d 681 (2005). We read the policy as a whole, giving meaning to each term and giving each term its plain and ordinary meaning. Id . We enforce an unambiguous contract "as written unless the provision would violate law or public policy." Rory , 473 Mich. at 470, 703 N.W.2d 23. A contract is ambiguous if its words can be reasonably understood in different ways or when its provisions irreconcilably conflict. Cole v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 272 Mich. App. 50, 53, 723 N.W.2d 922 (2006). Any "ambiguous language presents a question of fact...." Id . If the parties' intent cannot be determined after considering extrinsic evidence, the court should construe the contract against the drafter. Id . In this case, the parties' UM policy is ambiguous because its provisions irreconcilably conflict. The policy contains a time limit for notifying Farm Bureau of a UM claim and filing suit. It states: Any person seeking Uninsured Motorist Coverage must: * * * b. present to [Farm Bureau] a written notice of the claim for Uninsured Motorist Coverage within three years after the accident occurs." * * * A suit against us for Uninsured Motorist Coverage may not be commenced later than three years after the accident that caused the injuries being claimed. The accident occurred on May 17, 2010. Therefore, the three-year time limit expired on May 17, 2013. However, plaintiffs did not have a UM claim within three years of the accident. The policy states that Farm Bureau will "pay compensatory damages which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile ." The policy defines an uninsured automobile as an auto operated on a public highway: (1) to which no bodily injury liability policy or bond applies: (a) at the time of the accident ; and (b) in at least the minimum amounts required by the Financial Responsibility Laws in the State of Michigan; [or] * * * (3) insured by a company that has issued a written denial of coverage that has been sustained by final court action, or to which we agree in writing[.] The policy required plaintiffs, when making a claim, to either "provide proof(s) affirming that the auto and operator were not covered by a liability policy or bond at the time of the accident " or "provide a final declaratory judgment against the owner and operator of the uninsured automobile establishing that the auto and operator were not covered by a liability policy or bond at the time of the accident [.]" The automobile Conor drove did not become uninsured until June 23, 2014. Plaintiffs filed a third-party claim against Conor and Greg. Farm Bureau made a reservation of rights, sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Conor or Greg, and moved for summary disposition. The trial court granted Farm Bureau's motion on June 23, 2014. This order made the vehicle Conor drove uninsured after the time to notify Farm Bureau of a UM claim and file a UM claim had expired. Because plaintiffs could not notify Farm Bureau of-or file-a UM claim that did not exist, the policy's definition of an uninsured automobile, requirement that plaintiffs provide proof that the automobile meets this definition, and UM notice and filing time limitations irreconcilably conflict. Therefore, the policy is ambiguous, a question of fact existed, and the trial court correctly denied Farm Bureau's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). An additional policy provision highlights this ambiguity and suggests that it is possible to interpret the policy in a manner that would allow a fact-finder to conclude that plaintiffs timely provided notice and timely filed a UM claim. The policy states that [f]ailure to perform any duty or to give any notice required does not invalidate [plaintiffs'] claim if [plaintiffs] show that it was not reasonably possible to perform such duty or give such notice promptly or within such time otherwise specified in this policy, and that [plaintiffs] performed the duty or submitted the notice as soon as reasonably possible. This provision applies "to all parts of this policy." Plaintiffs notified Farm Bureau of their potential UM claim while Farm Bureau's declaratory action was pending. Further factual development and consideration of extrinsic evidence could allow a fact-finder to conclude that plaintiffs submitted notice of their UM claim and filed their UM claim as soon as reasonably possible. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied Farm Bureau's MCR 2.116(C)(8) motion for summary disposition. Additionally, the trial court correctly denied Farm Bureau's MCR 2.116(C)(7) motion because the policy does not unambiguously state that plaintiffs' UM action is time-barred. These provisions create an ambiguous accrual date. A policy sets the date of accrual for a UM claim. See Sallee v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 190 Mich. App. 305, 307-308, 475 N.W.2d 828 (1991). The policy's time limit for notifying Farm Bureau of a UM claim and filing suit states that the claim accrues on the date of the accident but also requires plaintiffs to provide proof that the automobile was uninsured, suggesting that the claim could accrue once an automobile is determined to be uninsured. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly determined an accrual date for plaintiffs' UM claim at the summary-disposition stage. Additionally, the policy creates ambiguity as to whether the UM filing limitations can be tolled. See Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 473 Mich. 562, 564, 582, 702 N.W.2d 539 (2005) ; McDonald v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. , 480 Mich. 191, 200-201, 747 N.W.2d 811 (2008). The policy requires plaintiffs to provide proof that an automobile is uninsured, allows for an automobile to become insured after the UM notice and filing deadlines, and states that the failure to perform a duty will not invalidate a claim if it is not reasonably possible to do so and performance occurs as soon as reasonably possible. Therefore, the policy may toll the UM filing limitation until an automobile's insured status is determined. Farm Bureau did not cite caselaw to support its argument that courts have declared all UM time limits to be unambiguous. Rather, some cited caselaw is inapplicable. The Court in Rory , 473 Mich. at 465-490, 703 N.W.2d 23, analyzed whether a court could disregard a contract provision as unreasonable and whether a policy constituted an unenforceable adhesion contract. The Court in Devillers , 473 Mich. at 586-593, 702 N.W.2d 539, analyzed whether a statute could be judicially tolled. Neither Court analyzed whether a UM policy was unambiguous. Other caselaw Farm Bureau cited is distinguishable. The Court in McDonald , 480 Mich. at 203, 747 N.W.2d 811, only analyzed whether the term "legal action" as used in a UM claim was ambiguous. The Court in Morley v. Auto Club of Mich. , 458 Mich. 459, 464, 468-469, 581 N.W.2d 237 (1998), analyzed whether a UM contract was ambiguous when the trial court found an arbitration clause to be ambiguous. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the ambiguity argument "under these facts" because plaintiffs could have preserved their UM claim by filing a timely demand for arbitration, and plaintiffs submitted a letter demonstrating an understanding of the policy, suggesting it was not ambiguous. Id . at 469, 581 N.W.2d 237. Because we agree with the trial court that Farm Bureau's motion for summary disposition should be denied because the policy is ambiguous, we do not consider plaintiffs' alternative arguments for denying summary disposition. We affirm. TALBOT, C.J., and O'CONNELL and CAMERON, JJ., concurred. The trial court entered an order dismissing all claims against Conor and Greg. All parties to this litigation are insured by Farm Bureau. Wagner v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 500 Mich. 945, 890 N.W.2d 359 (2017). Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. v. Wagner , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 17, 2015 (Docket No. 322738, 2015 WL 7283387). Therefore, plaintiffs' argument that six-year statute of limitations in MCL 600.5807(8) applies to their UM claim is incorrect. Farm Bureau faults plaintiffs for waiting to file their third-party claim until May 2, 2013, 15 days before the UM notice and filing time limit expired. Appellants "may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim." Ambs v. Kalamazoo Co. Rd. Comm. , 255 Mich. App. 637, 650, 662 N.W.2d 424 (2003). Farm Bureau cited no authority requiring plaintiffs to file their third-party claim at an earlier date. Further, Farm Bureau admits in reply that plaintiffs timely filed their third-party suit.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 6, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Viviano, J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with the presiding circuit court judge in this case.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellee to file an answer in excess of the page limitation is GRANTED. The 58-page answer submitted on March 20, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 9, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to extend the time for filing their answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before May 3, 2018.

O'Connell, J. This case addressing defendant, Larry Gerald Mead's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches returns to us on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court. Mead appeals as of right his conviction, following a jury trial, of possessing methamphetamine, MCL 333.7403(2)(b)(i ), as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12. The trial court sentenced him to serve 2 to 10 years' imprisonment. Defendant challenged the validity of the search in the trial court. In our prior opinion, we concluded that Mead, a passenger in a vehicle, lacked standing to challenge the search of a container in the vehicle under People v. Labelle , 478 Mich. 891, 732 N.W.2d 114 (2007), and we affirmed Mead's conviction on that basis. However, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated our judgment and remanded for us to consider: (1) whether [the Michigan Supreme Court's] peremptory order in People v. LaBelle [Labelle] , 478 Mich. 891 [732 N.W.2d 114] (2007), is distinguishable; (2) whether the record demonstrates that the police officer reasonably believed that the driver had common authority over the backpack in order for the driver's consent to justify the search, see Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 181, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) ; and (3) whether there are any other grounds upon which the search may be justified.[ ] On remand, we address all three issues, conclude that issue one controls, and affirm. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On the night of May 29, 2014, Rachel Taylor was driving a vehicle, and Mead rode in the front passenger seat. Officer Richard Burkart testified that he stopped the vehicle for an expired license plate. Officer Burkart stated that Mead had a backpack on his lap. According to Officer Burkart, Taylor consented to a search of the vehicle, Officer Burkart asked Taylor and Mead to exit the vehicle, and Mead left the backpack "on the front passenger floorboard." When Officer Burkart searched the vehicle, he opened the backpack and found methamphetamine. Mead admitted that the backpack belonged to him but moved to suppress the evidence found in the backpack. The trial court denied his motion. II. PEOPLE v. LABELLE We conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court's order in Labelle , 478 Mich. at 891-892, 732 N.W.2d 114, is not distinguishable from the present case, and therefore we are required to affirm both defendant's conviction and sentence. The defendant in Labelle was a passenger in a motor vehicle. Id . The LaBelle vehicle's driver violated MCL 257.652(1), and the police stopped the vehicle. Id at 891, 732 N.W.2d 114. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the stop was objectively lawful. Id . After the stop, the driver consented to a search of the vehicle. See id . Police then searched an unlocked backpack that the defendant left in the "passenger compartment of the vehicle." See id at 891-892, 732 N.W.2d 114. The defendant moved to suppress evidence of the contents of the backpack. See id at 892, 732 N.W.2d 114. However, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he search of the backpack was valid," explaining that "[b]ecause the stop of the vehicle was legal, the defendant, a passenger, lacked standing to challenge the subsequent search of the vehicle." Id . Further, "[a]uthority to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle includes any unlocked containers located therein, including the backpack in this case." Id . We cannot distinguish the relevant facts of Mead's case from those underlying the Supreme Court's order in Labelle . Mead was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Taylor. Officer Burkart stopped the vehicle. Mead has not challenged the validity of the stop. After the stop, Taylor consented to a search of the vehicle. Officer Burkart then searched an unlocked backpack in the vehicle's passenger compartment. Therefore, under Labelle , Mead lacked standing to challenge the search, and Officer Burkart had authority to search the backpack. Labelle is binding on this Court. People v. Giovannini , 271 Mich.App. 409, 414, 722 N.W.2d 237 (2006). Because Mead lacks standing to challenge the search, any challenge to the search must fail. See People v. Earl , 297 Mich.App. 104, 107, 822 N.W.2d 271 (2012), aff'd 495 Mich. 33, 845 N.W.2d 721 (2014). III. REASONABLE BELIEF OF COMMON AUTHORITY Notwithstanding the fact that existing Michigan law provides that a passenger in a motor vehicle does not have standing to contest the search of a third party's vehicle, the Supreme Court has directed us to address whether the record in the present case demonstrates that Officer Burkart reasonably believed that Taylor had common authority over the backpack in order for Burkart's consent to justify the search of the backpack. In regard to that issue, the Supreme Court has directed our attention to Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 181, 183-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793. The Rodriguez Court did not address warrantless searches, pursuant to consent, of containers in automobiles. Rather, it addressed "[w]hether a warrantless entry [to an apartment] is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not" possess common authority. Id . at 179, 110 S.Ct. 2793. In doing so, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless entry to another's home does not apply when the police obtained "voluntary consent" from either "the individual whose property is searched," "a third party who possesses common authority over the premises," or a third party whom an officer reasonably believes possesses common authority over the premises. Id . at 181-182, 186-189, 110 S.Ct. 2793. Common authority exists among persons with " 'mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes....' " Id . at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, quoting United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). An officer reasonably believes that a third party possesses common authority over a premises if "the facts available to the officer at the moment" would "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises[.]" Id . at 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (quotations and citations omitted). Multiple federal circuit courts and other state courts have applied Rodriguez 's common-authority framework to evaluate a third party's consent to search a container inside a vehicle. See State v. Harding , 282 P.3d 31, 34-41, 2011 UT 78 (2011) (discussing several of those cases). Those foreign courts have determined that officers violate person's Fourth Amendment rights when searching a bag in a car when officers could not have a reasonable belief that a third party had common authority to consent to the search. Id . In citing caselaw from those courts, the Utah Supreme Court of Utah determined that courts evaluate the reasonableness of an officer's actions by analyzing several factors, such as the type of container searched, any identifying material on the outside of the container, the container's location, the number of containers, the number of passengers, and the passengers' conduct. Id . at 38-39. If Rodriguez and its extension to searches of containers in automobiles as applied in foreign courts were the law in Michigan, an argument that Officer Burkart lacked a reasonable belief that Taylor had common authority over the backpack would have some merit. A backpack is a container used to store personal items, which suggests individual, rather than common, ownership. Harding , 282 P.3d at 38. The relationship between Mead and Taylor suggests that Taylor would not have had authority over Mead's personal items. Mead testified that he met Taylor on the night of the search. Taylor stated on a video of the traffic stop that Mead was in her car because she was dropping Mead off on her way to another destination. Officer Burkart testified that Mead had the backpack on his lap with his arms resting on either side at the time of the stop. The video shows that Officer Burkart searched the backpack while it was placed in the passenger side of the vehicle. Officer Burkart testified that he believed that the backpack belonged to Mead. However, in Michigan, Rodriguez 's common-authority framework does not apply to warrantless searches of containers in automobiles. Caselaw from foreign courts is not binding. Great Lakes Society v. Georgetown Charter Twp. , 281 Mich.App. 396, 414, 761 N.W.2d 371 (2008). No Michigan Court has successfully applied Rodriguez 's common authority framework to warrantless searches, pursuant to consent, of containers in automobiles. To the contrary, this Court applied the framework to the search of the backpack in People v. Labelle , 273 Mich.App. 214, 221-226, 729 N.W.2d 525 (2006), rev'd 478 Mich. 891, 732 N.W.2d 114 (2007), and concluded that the deputy had no consent to search the backpack because it was not reasonable for the deputy to believe that the driver had common authority over the backpack. But the Michigan Supreme Court reversed that judgment, reasoned that "[a]uthority to search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle includes any unlocked containers located therein," and concluded that "[t]he search of the backpack was valid." Labelle , 478 Mich. at 891-892, 732 N.W.2d 114. Police officers in Michigan are trained to follow Michigan law. For example, state statutes allow the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES) to institute and publicize training standards for law enforcement officers. See MCL 28.621 ; MCL 28.611. To facilitate that mandate, the Michigan State Police developed a manual that addresses the issues of search and seizure law most commonly encountered by police officers in Michigan. See Michigan Department of State Police, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure: A Manual for Michigan Police Officers, Third Edition (Dubuque: Kendall Hunt Publishing Co., 2014). The manual cites the Michigan Supreme Court's order in Labelle when discussing the scope of a warrantless search of a container pursuant to consent. Manual , p. 343. Specifically, the manual states that a search's scope "turns on whether it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the consent permits the officer to open a particular closed container" and that the Labelle "court held that when police have authority to search the entire passenger compartment of a vehicle, that authority extends to any unlocked containers within the vehicle." Id . Therefore, because Mead lacks standing to challenge the validity of the search and because current Michigan law does not apply Rodriguez 's common-authority framework to warrantless searches of containers in automobiles, we decline to apply Rodriguez 's common-authority framework to this case. IV. OTHER GROUNDS JUSTIFYING THE SEARCH Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court directed us to consider whether other grounds justified the search of the backpack. We conclude that, under the facts of the case presented to this panel, no other grounds justified the search. Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions "guarantee the right of persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures." People v. Hyde , 285 Mich.App. 428, 438, 775 N.W.2d 833 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). See U.S. Const., Am. IV ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11. "Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are unreasonable per se, subject to several specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." People v. Brown , 279 Mich.App. 116, 131, 755 N.W.2d 664 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A discussion of relevant exceptions follows. A warrantless search of abandoned property does not violate the Fourth Amendment. People v. Rasmussen , 191 Mich.App. 721, 725, 478 N.W.2d 752 (1991). Fourth Amendment protections apply only when a person has an expectation of privacy in the searched property. See id . By definition, a person lacks an expectation of privacy in abandoned property. Id . A person is considered to have abandoned property when "he voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the property at the time of the search." Id . at 726-727, 478 N.W.2d 752. For example, a person abandons a bag when he discards it while running from the police. People v. Lewis , 199 Mich.App. 556, 557-560, 502 N.W.2d 363 (1993). Mead demonstrated a possessory interest in the backpack by holding it on his lap while in the vehicle. He did not abandon the backpack by leaving it inside the vehicle because leaving a bag inside the vehicle in which you are riding does not equate to discarding, leaving behind, or relinquishing ownership in the item. A police officer may conduct a protective or Terry search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle without a warrant "if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons," "limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden." Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). When evaluating the validity of a search, the " 'issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.' " Long , 463 U.S. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469, quoting Terry , 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The protective or Terry search exception does not apply here. At no point did Officer Burkart testify that he had a reasonable belief that Taylor or Mead could gain immediate control of a weapon inside the vehicle or testify that he believed his safety or the safety of others was in danger, and the prosecution did not cite this exception as a basis for the search. An officer may conduct a search incident to arrest without a warrant "whenever there is probable cause to arrest." People v. Nguyen , 305 Mich.App. 740, 756, 854 N.W.2d 223 (2014). To have probable cause for an arrest, the investigating officers "must possess information demonstrating" " 'a probability or substantial chance' " "that an offense has occurred and that the defendant has committed it." Id . at 751, 752, 854 N.W.2d 223, quoting People v. Lyon , 227 Mich.App. 599, 611, 577 N.W.2d 124 (1998). An officer " 'may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.' " People v. Tavernier , 295 Mich.App. 582, 584, 815 N.W.2d 154 (2012), quoting Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). "[T]here is no reason to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest would be found in the vehicle" when police are addressing "civil infractions" or a person "driving without a valid license." Tavernier , 295 Mich.App. at 586, 815 N.W.2d 154. "[J]ustifying the arrest by the search and at the same time the search by the arrest, just will not do." Smith v. Ohio , 494 U.S. 541, 543, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). For example, a "search of a container cannot be justified as being incident to an arrest if probable cause for the contemporaneous arrest was provided by the fruits of that search." People v. Champion , 452 Mich. 92, 116-117, 549 N.W.2d 849 (1996). In this case, Officer Burkart did not search the backpack incident to the arrest of Mead or Taylor. Officer Burkart stopped the vehicle because of an expired license plate. It is unclear how the vehicle could contain evidence of an expired license plate. Officer Burkart repeatedly testified that he had no intent to arrest Taylor for the infraction. Additionally, Officer Burkart testified that Mead and Taylor admitted using narcotics. But he did not testify that drug use was the basis for the stop of the vehicle, that either admitted possessing drugs that night, that either admitted using drugs that night, or that either exhibited signs of being under the influence of narcotics. Upon viewing the video of the traffic stop, it does not appear that Taylor or Mead are within reaching distance of the backpack or passenger compartment of the vehicle at the time of the search. Therefore, Officer Burkart lacked probable cause for a lawful arrest as is required to permit a search incident to arrest. Police may also search a vehicle or a container within a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause that the vehicle or container " 'contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.' " People v. Garvin , 235 Mich.App. 90, 101, 597 N.W.2d 194 (1999), quoting People v. Armendarez , 188 Mich.App. 61, 71-72, 468 N.W.2d 893 (1991). See also People v. Bullock , 440 Mich. 15, 24, 485 N.W.2d 866 (1992). Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates "a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing" and "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Garvin , 235 Mich.App. at 102, 597 N.W.2d 194 (quotation marks, citations, brackets and ellipses omitted). The record in Mead's case does not contain evidence that Officer Burkart had probable cause to search the backpack in the automobile. Again, Officer Burkart testified that Mead and Taylor admitted to using narcotics. But he did not testify that drug use was the basis for the stop of the vehicle, that either admitted possessing or using drugs that night, that he believed the backpack would contain narcotics, or that either exhibited signs of being under the influence of narcotics. And again, the prosecution did not cite this exception as a basis for the search. An inventory search is a "well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Colorado v. Bertine , 479 U.S. 367, 371, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). " [A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." Florida v. Wells , 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). See also People v. Poole , 199 Mich.App. 261, 266, 501 N.W.2d 265 (1993). Rather, the search "protect[s] an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property" and "guard[s] the police from danger." Bertine , 479 U.S. at 372, 107 S.Ct. 738. The search must be conducted reasonably, id . at 374, 107 S.Ct. 738, in good faith, id ., and pursuant to standardized police procedures "designed to produce an inventory," including procedures that "regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches," Wells , 495 U.S. at 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632. See also Poole , 199 Mich.App. at 266, 501 N.W.2d 265. The record lacks evidence as to whether Officer Burkart's search of the backpack fell within the scope of a proper inventory search. Officer Burkart testified that he searches vehicles to "check for valuables or any damage to the vehicle, anything that may be in there" whenever he tows or impounds a vehicle. However, Officer Burkart offered no further explanation of police department policies, did not explain department policy for the search of a container, and did not explain how his search complied with department policy. Therefore, we lack evidence to determine that he conducted a proper inventory search. "The inevitable-discovery rule permits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment if the prosecution establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered through lawful means." People v. Mahdi , 317 Mich.App. 446, 469, 894 N.W.2d 732 (2016). The inevitable-discovery exception does not apply here. On appeal, the prosecution only argues that Taylor consented to the search and that Mead lacked standing to contest the search. The prosecution is correct. Even assuming that the search violated Mead's Fourth Amendment rights, the prosecution advanced no other argument that the police inevitably would have discovered the contents of the backpack. We conclude that no other grounds justified the search. We affirm. Talbot, C.J., and K. F. Kelly, J., concurred with O'Connell, J. People v. Mead , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 13, 2016 (Docket No. 327881), 2016 WL 4804081. People v. Mead , 500 Mich. 967, 892 N.W.2d 379 (2017).

Boonstra, J. Defendant appeals by right his convictions, following a jury trial, of unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b, assault with a dangerous weapon, MCL 750.82, and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2), as a lesser included offense of aggravated domestic violence, MCL 750.81a(2). Defendant was acquitted of an additional charge of assault with a dangerous weapon and a charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 7 to 15 years for the unlawful-imprisonment conviction, 2 to 4 years for the conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon, and 93 days for the domestic-violence conviction. We affirm. I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant's convictions relate to the extended confinement and assault of his girlfriend, MH, in his home. During the period of confinement, defendant choked and kicked MH, attempted to force her to drink alcohol, threatened to rape and kill her, hit her with a handgun and liquor bottle, and held the handgun to her face and chest, and put the handgun in her mouth. MH testified that defendant was armed with both a handgun and a sawed-off shotgun during the incident. She further testified that defendant forced her to unload and reload the magazine of the handgun several times. At some point, defendant tripped while taking off his pants and underwear, and MH was able to grab the handgun and escape to a neighbor's house. Eaton County Sheriff's Deputies arrested defendant and recovered a loaded handgun but could not locate a shotgun. At trial, a forensic scientist testified that DNA taken from saliva found on the handgun contained a mix of donors and could not be conclusively matched. However, DNA taken from blood on a tank top and from blood on a door in defendant's home matched that of MH, and DNA taken from blood on a pillowcase matched that of defendant. MH testified that at times during the incident, defendant spoke in Arabic and made statements related to the Islamic religion. Defendant argued that MH was exaggerating; he described the incident as a "brawl" between defendant and MH that had resulted in injuries to both parties. Outside the view of the jury, defense counsel had MH load the magazine of the handgun that had been found in defendant's home. MH first put the magazine in backwards but eventually succeeded in loading the gun. The trial court instructed the jury that MH had demonstrated that she had the physical strength to load the magazine of the handgun. The jury convicted defendant as described. At sentencing, the trial court scored Offense Variables (OVs) 4 (psychological injury to a victim) and 7 (aggravated physical abuse) at 10 and 50 points respectively. This appeal followed. II. ADMISSION OF DNA EVIDENCE Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court improperly admitted DNA evidence because the prosecution failed to present the required statistical analysis. We disagree. Defendant did not object to the admission of this evidence at trial; we therefore review defendant's challenge to its admission for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Reversal is warranted only if the plain error resulted in the conviction of an innocent defendant or if the error "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant's innocence." Id . (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). In People v. Coy , 243 Mich. App. 283, 294, 620 N.W.2d 888 (2000), this Court concluded that evidence of a potential match between a subject's DNA sample and DNA found on evidence was "inadmissible absent some accompanying interpretive evidence regarding the likelihood of the potential match." That is, "some qualitative or quantitative interpretation must accompany evidence of [a] potential [DNA] match." Id . at 302, 620 N.W.2d 888. The Coy Court reasoned that the scientific evidence of a possible DNA match between a defendant's DNA and DNA found on evidence would not assist the jury, as MRE 702 generally requires, without "some analytic or interpretive evidence concerning the likelihood or significance of a DNA profile match...." Id . at 301, 620 N.W.2d 888. Alternatively, the Court held that evidence of a potential DNA match had "minimal probative value absent accompanying interpretive statistical analysis evidence," id. at 302, 620 N.W.2d 888, and should be excluded in accordance with MRE 403 when weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice, which would result if the jury were to give the DNA evidence undue weight. Id . at 303, 620 N.W.2d 888. In this case, a forensic scientist testified that the DNA profiles on the tank top, and the bedroom door matched MH's DNA profile and excluded defendant as the donor. The forensic scientist further testified that the DNA profile on a pillowcase matched defendant's DNA and excluded MH as a donor. The forensic scientist was not asked at trial to provide any empirical data to define the statistical parameters of a DNA "match." However, her report was admitted into evidence, and it contained the testing methodology used, as well as her conclusions and interpretations of the data. Following each conclusion, and for each item indicating a match with the DNA of either defendant or MH, the report contained language indicating in some fashion that "[i]n the absence of identical twins or close relatives, it can be concluded to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that the DNA profile of the major donor to item [number and description of item tested] and the DNA from [number and description corresponding to either defendant or MH] is from the same individual." We conclude that the forensic scientist's report constitutes "some analytic or interpretive evidence concerning the likelihood or significance of a DNA profile match ...." Id. at 301, 620 N.W.2d 888. We are satisfied that there was no plain error in the admission of this evidence. See Carines , 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. Further, even if the evidence was admitted in error, the admission did not affect defendant's substantial rights. MH described an episode lasting 3 ½ to 4 during which defendant confined her to his house with a handgun and a sawed off shotgun while assaulting her with his hands and feet, a liquor bottle, and the handgun. She told a doctor that she had been struck in the head by a firearm and had been hit on other parts of her body, and she had injuries consistent with her description of the incident. An officer photographed MH's injuries. The same officer photographed defendant, who had a bruise on his arm and scratches on his neck, left elbow, and right wrist. Officers searched defendant's home and found a handgun, which MH identified, as well as an empty liquor bottle, a tank top and a pillowcase with some blood on them, blood on the door, pictures of MH's children, and MH's phone, purse, and car keys. The evidence against defendant was therefore substantial, even apart from the DNA evidence. The DNA evidence merely established that MH's blood was found on items recovered from the bedroom and it therefore served as some corroboration of her testimony. However, the evidence also supported defendant's theory of the case-that there was a "brawl" that resulted in injuries to both parties. And the fact that DNA from saliva on the handgun barrel of the handgun was inconclusive was arguably supported defendant's claim that the handgun was not involved in the incident. For all of these reasons, defendant has not established that admission of the DNA evidence, even if erroneous, affected his substantial rights and requires reversal. See Carines , 460 Mich. at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Defendant also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in several ways. We disagree. Because defendant did not move the trial court for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing regarding his counsel's effectiveness, his claims are unpreserved and our review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v. Unger , 278 Mich. App. 210, 253, 749 N.W.2d 272 (2008). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. Id . at 242, 749 N.W.2d 272. We review the trial court's factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo the constitutional question of whether an attorney's ineffective assistance deprived a defendant of his or her right to counsel. Id . A defendant's right to counsel is guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. U.S. Const., Am. VI ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20. This "right to counsel encompasses the right to the 'effective' assistance of counsel." People v. Cline , 276 Mich. App. 634, 637, 741 N.W.2d 563 (2007). In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient" and (2) "that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense." People v. Taylor , 275 Mich. App. 177, 186, 737 N.W.2d 790 (2007) (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Counsel's performance was deficient if "it fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness." People v. Jordan , 275 Mich. App. 659, 667, 739 N.W.2d 706 (2007). "Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise." People v. Rodgers , 248 Mich. App. 702, 714, 645 N.W.2d 294 (2001). Deficient performance prejudices the defense if "it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel's ineffective assistance, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Jordan , 275 Mich. App. at 667, 739 N.W.2d 706. Defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to admission of the DNA evidence. Defense counsel's decisions are presumed to be sound trial strategy, Taylor , 275 Mich. App. at 186, 737 N.W.2d 790, and we will not substitute our judgment for the judgment of trial counsel with the benefit of hindsight, People v. Matuszak , 263 Mich. App. 42, 58, 687 N.W.2d 342 (2004). In this case, it is likely that defendant's trial counsel did not think it necessary to dispel the notion that his or MH's DNA was found on the items in defendant's home. Defendant did not deny that an altercation with MH had occurred, and he conceded that she (as well as he) had sustained injuries. The presence of their respective DNA on items found in the home would therefore be unsurprising, and challenging the DNA would seem to be of questionable purpose. Instead, defense counsel argued that defendant did not hold the victim captive, did not assault her with a firearm or liquor bottle, and was consequently been overcharged. Further, defendant was able to argue from the DNA evidence that the DNA testing on saliva found on the barrel of the handgun was inconclusive, supporting his defense. Therefore, it may well have been a strategic decision for counsel not to challenge the admission of the DNA evidence. We conclude that counsel's actions were within an objective standard of professional reasonableness. See Jordan , 275 Mich. App. at 667, 739 N.W.2d 706. Further, admission of the DNA evidence did not prejudice defendant because it established that both MH and defendant were injured in the home, which was consistent with defendant's "brawl" theory. Accordingly, even if defense counsel had objected to the admission of the DNA evidence and successfully argued for its exclusion, there is no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. See id . Defendant further argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he elicited testimony from MH about defendant's possession of an illegal sawed-off shotgun. However, MH had already testified during direct examination that defendant was holding a handgun and a shotgun when he entered her room and told her that she could not leave. MH testified that she was familiar with the shotgun because defendant had previously sent her a text message, to which he had attached a picture, indicating that he was going to shoot himself. The picture was admitted into evidence and showed defendant holding the shotgun to his chin. MH was asked during direct examination to describe the shotgun, and she recalled that it had been altered by being sawed off and painted with markings and glow-in-the-dark paint. She also stated that defendant had displayed the shotgun during one of their romantic encounters a couple of weeks before the incident and that she had taken a video of that encounter with her phone. The video was played for the jury. Nonetheless, defense counsel did elicit that defendant's possession of the shotgun was "illegal" and that defendant had told her that possessing it was illegal. This elicitation may well have been strategic. Counsel sought to show that MH was familiar with a unique shotgun and that she knew it had been in the house. Defense counsel argued that the shotgun was not in the home at the time of the assault and that MH had reported that it was there because she had previously seen the shotgun in the home. Establishing that the shotgun was illegal may have supported defendant's theory that MH wanted to get defendant in as much legal trouble as possible by fabricating a story involving an illegal weapon. And defense counsel repeatedly emphasized that the shotgun was not found in the house. This strategy may have been partially successful, inasmuch as the jury acquitted defendant not guilty of a second count of assault with a dangerous weapon (handgun or shotgun) and of one count of felony-firearm, which suggests that the jury did not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the shotgun at the time of the incident. Further, because the video showing defendant with the shotgun had already been played, defense counsel may have simply tried to "get ahead" of the issue whether defendant's possession of such a weapon was illegal, rather than leaving the jury to speculate in ways that may have prejudiced his client. A common defense tactic is to acknowledge incriminating evidence that is strongly supported while denying other elements of the crime. People v. Wise , 134 Mich. App. 82, 97-99, 351 N.W.2d 255 (1984). We conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel's elicitation of testimony regarding the shotgun fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness or that defendant was prejudiced by the questions posed. Jordan , 275 Mich. App. at 667, 739 N.W.2d 706. Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the prosecution's questions concerning his religious beliefs. We disagree. MH testified that during the incident defendant said Islamic prayers and "Muslim things" in Arabic; she also stated that she "hated the fact that he felt he was a bad person" and "the fact that [Muslims had] made him this way." Defendant argues that this testimony was irrelevant and prejudicial. "Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible at trial." People v. Aldrich , 246 Mich. App. 101, 114, 631 N.W.2d 67 (2001) ; see also MRE 402. Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MRE 401. Under this "broad definition," evidence that is useful in shedding light on any material point is admissible. Aldrich , 246 Mich. App. at 114, 631 N.W.2d 67. "The relationship of the elements of the charge, the theories of admissibility, and the defenses asserted governs what is relevant and material." People v. Yost , 278 Mich. App. 341, 403, 749 N.W.2d 753 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Much of the testimony regarding defendant's religion was relevant to demonstrate his state of mind as observed by MH during the time that he was alleged to have unlawfully confined her. MH testified that defendant had become more emotional and upset as they spoke about personal matters. The prosecution's theory of the case was that defendant committed the crimes because he had become upset at recent losses in his life, and MH's testimony reflected defendant's emotional turmoil. MH also testified that she was afraid that defendant's mental state was worsening and that she was in danger of being more severely hurt or killed if she did not attempt to flee. The testimony regarding religion was also not unfairly prejudicial. "[Relevant] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." MRE 403 ; see also Aldrich , 246 Mich. App. at 114, 631 N.W.2d 67. "All relevant evidence is prejudicial; it is only unfairly prejudicial evidence that should be excluded." People v. McGhee , 268 Mich. App. 600, 613-614, 709 N.W.2d 595 (2005). "Unfair prejudice may exist where there is a danger that the evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury or where it would be inequitable to allow use of the evidence." People v. Gipson , 287 Mich. App. 261, 263, 787 N.W.2d 126. (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Evidence that is unfairly prejudicial goes beyond the merits of the case to inject issues broader than the defendant's guilt or innocence, like the "jury's bias, sympathy, anger, or shock." McGhee , 268 Mich. App. at 614, 709 N.W.2d 595. Defendant argues that the jury could have been inflamed by references to the Islamic religion. However, evidence that defendant engaged in prayer and religious practices and was severely emotionally distressed during the commission of the crime was unlikely to inflame the jury to the extent that it could not evaluate the case based on the evidence presented. See McGhee , 268 Mich. App. at 614 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Relatedly, defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution's questions concerning defendant's religious statements on the grounds that the questions were intended to inflame the jury. We disagree. "[T]he test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial." People v. Dobek , 274 Mich. App. 58, 63, 732 N.W.2d 546, (2007). A fair trial for a defendant "can be jeopardized when the prosecutor interjects issues broader than the defendant's guilt or innocence." Id . at 63-64, 732 N.W.2d 546. Prosecutorial comments must be read as a whole and evaluated in context and in light of the arguments of the defense. People v. Thomas , 260 Mich. App. 450, 454, 678 N.W.2d 631 (2004). Here, the prosecution asked MH questions regarding the actions and statements defendant made as he kept MH confined. Most of the statements referring to defendant's religion were relevant and reflected factual descriptions of MH's continued confinement. It does not appear from the record that the prosecution sought to insert religion into the case in order to arouse possible prejudice in the jury, but rather as a factual description of the events. Therefore, an objection by defendant's trial counsel on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct would have been futile. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. In re Archer , 277 Mich. App. 71, 84, 744 N.W.2d 1 (2007). Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the trial court's instructions to the jury after MH demonstrated that she could load ammunition into the magazine of the handgun. The trial court instructed the jury that defense counsel had requested that MH demonstrate outside the presence of the jury her ability to load the handgun's ammunition magazine with eight bullets. The trial court instructed the jury that MH had demonstrated "the physical strength to load the ammunition into the magazine" and that "she was able to put the rounds into the magazine." During the demonstration, MH initially appeared to struggle to load the magazine and only had success after defense counsel informed her that she had been loading the ammunition backwards. Defendant therefore argues that defense counsel should have objected to the court's instruction and should have and requested that the trial court include a statement that MH had required assistance to load the magazine. We disagree. Defense counsel's theory was that MH lacked the strength to load the magazine of the handgun found in defendant's home despite MH's testimony that defendant made her load the magazine during her confinement. Because defense counsel requested the demonstration expressly for the purpose of demonstrating whether MH had the strength to load the magazine, the trial court's instruction to the jury regarding the demonstration was accurate. Even if MH did require a brief verbal prompt while attempting to load the magazine in front of a trial judge and multiple officers of the court, she demonstrated that she had the strength to load the magazine. And the fact that she required such a prompt was not dispositive of whether she had previously loaded the magazine. Given these circumstances, it is doubtful that an objection to the trial court's instruction regarding the demonstration would have been successful. Trial counsel is not required to make futile objections. Archer , 277 Mich. App. at 84, 744 N.W.2d 1. And even if an objection would have been successful, it is doubtful that the exclusion of this evidence would have resulted in a different outcome. Jordan, 275 Mich. App. at 667. Defendant has thus not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's lack of objection. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony characterizing the state of defendant's home. Defendant's mother testified that she had previously observed that defendant's home was "a mess," with dog hair on everything, and a detective described the home on the day of the incident as having "a really bad odor," some broken doors, holes in some walls, and some things painted on a wall. A photograph of two obscene words painted on the master bedroom's wall was admitted. Defendant argues that this evidence was irrelevant. However, defense counsel had objected previously to the relevance of similar testimony from MH. The trial court had allowed the testimony after the prosecution argued that it was relevant to demonstrate the theory that defendant had been losing control of his emotional state and to show his activities immediately preceding the crimes. Any objection to similar testimony from defendant's mother and the detective likely would have been similarly unsuccessful because the testimony was also relevant to the prosecution's theory that defendant's deteriorating emotional state, as evidenced by the neglect and defacement of his home, contributed to his commission of the charged crimes. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. Archer , 277 Mich. App. at 84, 744 N.W.2d 1. IV. SENTENCING Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously scored OVs 4 and 7. We disagree. "Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo." People v. Calloway, 500 Mich. 180, 184; 895 N.W.2d 165 (2017). (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review for clear error the trial court's factual determinations at sentencing. People v. Hardy , 494 Mich. 430, 438, 835 N.W.2d 340 (2013). The trial court must consult the advisory sentencing guidelines and assess the highest number of possible points for each offense variable. People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 392 n. 28, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015). The trial court's determinations must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Osantowski , 481 Mich. 103, 111, 748 N.W.2d 799 (2008). Defendant argues that OV 4 was erroneously scored at 10 points because there was no demonstrated serious psychological injury to MH was demonstrated. OV 4 provides for a "[s]core [of] 10 points if the serious psychological injury may require professional treatment," and "the fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive." MCL 777.34(2). OV 4 is scored at zero points when "[n]o serious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim[.]" MCL 777.34(1)(b). Defendant argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 4 at 10 points because of the nature of the crime rather than on evidence of serious psychological injury. See People v. Lockett , 295 Mich. App. 165, 183, 814 N.W.2d 295 (2012) ("The trial court may not simply assume that someone in the victim's position would have suffered psychological harm...."). In this case, however, the trial court scored OV 4 at 10 points on the basis of MH's fear that she was going to die, the fact that she wanted to look at pictures of her children as she died, and "all of the things that happened that [the court] heard firsthand from [MH] and observed firsthand in the courtroom[.]" The trial court also concluded that MH's victim impact statement confirmed the psychological injury. The victim impact statement indicated that MH had been seeing a therapist through a domestic violence shelter because she was feeling unlovable and disgusting because of the abuse she had endured. She also mentioned nightmares and flashbacks to the day "he decided to take my life" and a daily struggle with emotional stability as a result of the trauma. At trial, MH testified that she cried for the 3 ½ hours she spent confined in the room at gunpoint, and that she thought she was going to die. Further, a neighbor described MH as shaking and crying after she escaped from defendant, a detective stated that MH was upset to the extent that MH had difficulty communicating, the emergency room physician said that she was upset, and another officer stated that he tried to calm MH down while she was crying. Ample evidence supported the trial court's scoring of OV 4. OV 7, MCL 777.37, aggravated physical abuse, is scored at 50 points if "[a] victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality or conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense." It is scored at zero points when there was no victim treated in the manner described. The trial court found that defendant had engaged in sadism or conduct designed to cause additional pain, grief, and anxiety. To support the scoring, the trial court referred to defendant's use of the handgun and his continuous threats to rape and kill MH, causing fear and anxiety that exceeded the conduct necessary to commit the crimes. In determining how many points to assess under OV 7, a trial court should "determine whether the defendant engaged in conduct beyond the minimum necessary to commit the crime, and whether it is more probable than not that such conduct was intended to make the victim's fear or anxiety increase by a considerable amount." Hardy , 494 Mich. at 443, 835 N.W.2d 340. Defendant argues that his conduct was not sufficiently egregious to justify a score of 50 points because MH's conduct demonstrated that she did not find his threats to be credible. While MH initially may not have believed defendant's threats, the record is clear that by the time she made her escape she was convinced that defendant was serious and that her life was at risk. More importantly, OV 7 is scored on the basis of defendant's conduct and his intent, not whether the victim felt sufficiently threatened. See MCL 777.37. Defendant was convicted of assaulting MH, unlawfully imprisoning her, and misdemeanor domestic violence. A conviction for unlawful imprisonment requires that "(1) a defendant must knowingly restrain a person, and (2) the restrained person must be secretly confined." People v. Railer , 288 Mich. App. 213, 217, 792 N.W.2d 776 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). "The elements of felonious assault are (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery." People v. Chambers , 277 Mich. App. 1, 8, 742 N.W.2d 610 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The record contains substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that defendant's prolonged behavior was egregious and sadistic. Defendant's behavior appeared to be designed to keep MH captive emotionally as well as physically and went beyond the elements of his crimes. MH stated that defendant confined her for 3 ½ to four hours, threatened her with guns, and assaulted her with his hands and feet, a liquor bottle, and a handgun. She said that defendant choked and kicked her and then left the room to retrieve his two guns. She stated that defendant told her that she could not leave and that he was going to drink liquor and smoke cigarettes before he killed them both. She reported that defendant threatened to rape her, told her that she should have believed the stories he had told her of bad things he had done to other women, and struck her while she was in the fetal position and not responsive to him. Defendant would not allow MH to stand, pointed the handgun at her head when she resisted, and made her repeatedly load the handgun, telling her that he wanted the bullet that killed him to have her fingerprints. Defendant also forced MH to put the handgun in her mouth. Ample evidence supported the trial court's scoring of OV 7. Affirmed. Markey, P.J., and Ronayne Krause, J., concurred with Boonstra, J. MRE 702 states, "If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Relevant evidence may be excluded if its "probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." MRE 403. We have discussed the difference between "prosecutorial error" and "prosecutorial misconduct." People v. Cooper , 309 Mich. App. 74, 87-88, 867 N.W.2d 452 (2015). Here, defendant's argument that the prosecution deliberately and repeatedly sought to inflame the jury with religious prejudice would appear to be fairly characterized as a claim for prosecutorial misconduct, rather than the "technical or inadvertent" errors that are "more fairly presented as claims of prosecutorial error." Id . ; see also MRPC 8.4. Nonetheless, regardless of "what operative phrase is used," we must look to see whether the prosecution "committed errors during the course of trial that deprived defendant of a fair and impartial trial." Id . (citation omitted). MCL 777.37, as amended by 2002 PA 137, effective April 22, 2002. MCL 777.37 was amended after defendant's offense by 2015 PA 137, effective January 5, 2016, to add "similarly egregious conduct" to the list of factors meriting points under OV 7. "Sadism" means conduct that "subjects a victim to extreme or prolonged pain or humiliation and is inflicted to produce suffering or for the offender's gratification." MCL 777.37(3).

On order of the Court, the requests by the House of Representatives and the Senate for an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369 are considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument for Wednesday, July 17, 2019, at 9:30 a.m. MCR 7.308(B)(3). We invite the House of Representatives and the Senate, and any member of either chamber, to file briefs on the following questions: (1) whether the Court should exercise its discretion to grant the requests to issue an advisory opinion in this matter; (2) whether Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 permits the Legislature to enact an initiative petition into law and then amend that law during the same legislative session; and (3) whether 2018 PA 368 and 2018 PA 369 were enacted in accordance with Const 1963, art. 2, § 9. We respectfully request the Attorney General to submit separate briefs arguing both sides of these questions. Briefs in support of the constitutionality of the enacted legislation shall be filed no later than May 15, 2019. Briefs in opposition to the constitutionality of the enacted legislation shall be filed no later than June 19, 2019. Persons or groups interested in the determination of the questions presented in this matter may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae on either or both sides, in accordance with the briefing schedule set forth above. Motions for permission to file briefs amicus curiae and briefs amicus curiae regarding these two cases should be filed in In re House of Representatives Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2018 PA 368 & 369 (Docket No. 159160) only. The requests by the House of Representatives and the Senate for an advisory opinion remain pending.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to suspend fees is considered and it is GRANTED. As appellant is aware, MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for the appeal to continue, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order as acknowledgement of his responsibility to pay the $ 375.00 filing fee. Failure to do so shall result in the appeal being administratively dismissed. If appellant timely complies with this order, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $ 375.00. That amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Generally, appellant may not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the filing fee in this case is paid in full. MCL 600.2963(8). The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of respondent judge to file a corrected brief in support of the petition is GRANTED. The corrected brief submitted on May 21, 2019, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 10, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the January 25, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals are considered, and they are GRANTED. The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) when the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued, see Henry v. Dow Chemical Co. , 501 Mich. 965, 905 N.W.2d 601 (2018), and Frank v. Linkner , 500 Mich. 133, 894 N.W.2d 574 (2017) ; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the fraudulent concealment exception in MCL 600.5855 applies to the statutory notice period in MCL 600.6431(3) ; (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that under the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq ., there is a "harsh and unreasonable consequences" exception to the notice requirement of MCL 600.6431(3) when a constitutional tort is alleged, compare McCahan v. Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012), and Rusha v. Dep't of Corrections , 307 Mich. App. 300, 859 N.W.2d 735 (2014) ; (4) if there is such an exception, whether it is met by the facts alleged in the plaintiffs' amended complaint; (5) whether the Court of Appeals erred in recognizing a constitutional tort for violation of bodily integrity under Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17, and, if not, whether the plaintiffs properly alleged such a violation, and whether a damages remedy is available for such a violation, see Smith v. Dep't of Public Health , 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987) ; Jones v. Powell , 462 Mich. 329, 612 N.W.2d 423 (2000) ; (6) for purposes of the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, whether the plaintiffs have alleged direct action by defendants against the plaintiffs' property, and a special or unique injury, see Peterman v. Dep't of Natural Resources , 446 Mich. 177, 190, 521 N.W.2d 499 (1994) ; Spiek v. Dep't of Transp. , 456 Mich. 331, 348, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998) ; and (7) for purposes of the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim, the manner in which the class of similarly situated persons should be defined. The total time allowed for oral argument shall be 60 minutes: 30 minutes for plaintiffs, and 30 minutes for defendants, to be divided at their discretion. MCR 7.314(B)(1). Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Motions for permission to file briefs amicus curiae and briefs amicus curiae regarding these cases should be filed in Mays v. Governor (Docket Nos. 157335-7) only and served on the parties in both cases. CLEMENT, J., not participating due to her prior involvement as chief legal counsel for the Governor.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 17, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 3, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. On the Court's own motion, we VACATE the November 1, 2018 order denying the defendant's motion to waive fees. On reconsideration, the motion to waive fees is GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 16, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of Trappers Properties et al . to participate as amicus curiae and to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief will be accepted for filing if submitted within 21 days of the date of this order.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 22, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the applications for leave to appeal the July 17, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals are considered, and they are GRANTED. The time allowed for oral argument shall be 20 minutes for each side. MCR 7.314(B)(1). Persons or groups interested in the determination of the issue presented in this matter may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae. Motions for permission to file briefs amicus curiae and briefs amicus curiae regarding these cases should be filed in Tomra of North America, Inc. v. Department of Treasury (Docket No. 158333) only.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 18, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion to expedite and for other relief is considered, and it is GRANTED in part. We ORDER that the application for leave to appeal the January 24, 2019 judgment of the Court of Appeals be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in Mays v. Governor (Docket Nos. 157335-7, 157340-2), --- Mich. ----, 926 N.W.2d 803 (2019). Clement, J., not participating due to her prior involvement as chief legal counsel for the Governor.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 23, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 3, 2019 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 29, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

By order of April 3, 2019, the Clerk scheduled these cases for oral argument to be held July 17, 2019. The Court respectfully directs the Attorney General to file separate supplemental briefs by 5:00 p.m. on July 10, 2019, addressing both sides of the following questions: (1) whether this Court has jurisdiction to issue an opinion under Const. 1963, art. 3, § 8 after the effective date of legislation, compare In re 2005 PA 71 , 479 Mich. 1, 13, 740 N.W.2d 444 (2007) ("Because the House of Representatives requested an advisory opinion well before [the effective] date, this Court indisputably has jurisdiction under art. 3, § 8 to render an advisory opinion in this matter."), with 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 3368 ( Const. 1963, art. 3, § 8 "empowers the supreme court to furnish advisory opinions ... only as to legislative acts that are already passed and signed by the governor, and before they become effective. ") (emphasis added); and (2) the stare decisis effect of In re 2005 PA 71 on this determination, compare Const. 1963, art. 3, § 8 ("[T]he legislature ... may request the opinion of the supreme court ... as to the constitutionality of legislation ...."), with Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1975 PA 227 (Questions 2-10) , 396 Mich. 465, 477, 242 N.W.2d 3 (1976) ("An advisory opinion is not precedentially binding upon the Court and represents only the opinions of the parties signatory.").

On order of the Chief Justice, Appellant having failed to submit a copy of the May 17, 2019 order and refile a copy of the pleadings as required by the June 4, 2019 order, the Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to close this file.

On order of the Chief Justice, the second motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing its brief is GRANTED. The brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 12, 2019.

On order of the Chief Justice, the joint motion for relief from the December 14, 2018 order and for adjournment of the filing deadline for the formal complaint is GRANTED. The time for the Judicial Tenure Commission to file a formal complaint is extended to June 21, 2019, and the time for the commission to submit its recommendation is extended to January 2, 2020.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 7, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration, as on leave granted, of whether the Parole Board clearly abused its discretion by granting parole. We note that a similar issue was presented in In re Parole of Layman (Docket No. 157104), which we remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated April 3, 2018, and which was decided in In re Parole of Layman , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 20, 2018 (Docket No. 341112). Further, we note that a similar issue is presented in In re Parole of Plunkett (Docket No. 159032), which we remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated June 12, 2019. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Viviano, J. did not participate because he presided in the circuit court as the sentencing judge in the underlying criminal case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. We note that a similar issue was presented in In re Parole of Layman (Docket No. 157104), which we remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated April 3, 2018, and which was decided in In re Parole of Layman , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 20, 2018 (Docket No. 341112). Further, we note that a similar issue is presented in In re Parole of Irwin (Docket No. 158077), which we remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted by order dated June 12, 2019.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, there being no majority in favor of granting leave to appeal or taking other action.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 7, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals opinion holding that the terms "child" and "beneficiary" in MCL 700.1105(c) are not modified by the phrase "and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate," as this holding was unnecessary to resolving this case in light of its conclusion that Petitioner Cathy Deutchman was an "interested person" under MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g) and MCL 700.7603(2). In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to extend the time for filing their answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer submitted on June 13, 2019, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2019 orders of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for an appeal to be filed, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order . By doing this, appellant becomes responsible to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal not being filed in this Court. If appellant timely refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. This amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of petitioner-appellee to extend the time for filing and to exceed the page limitation for its answer is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 13, 2019.

Gadola, J. In Docket No. 340600, appellant Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE) appeals as of right the final order of appellee Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) in its Case No. U-18197. In Docket No. 340607, appellant Energy Michigan, Inc. (Energy Michigan) appeals as of right the same order of the MPSC. In each of these consolidated cases, appellants contend that the MPSC erred by determining that it is empowered by the Legislature under 2016 PA 341 (Act 341) to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. In Docket No. 340607, Energy Michigan additionally contends that the MPSC's order purports to impose new rules on electric providers in this state without the required compliance with Michigan's Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq . We reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS At the end of 2016, our Legislature enacted new electric utility legislation that included Act 341. That act added, among other statutory sections, MCL 460.6w. These appeals arise from an order issued by the MPSC as part of its implementation of MCL 460.6w. By way of background, Michigan's Legislature previously enacted what was known as the Customer Choice and Electricity Reliability Act, MCL 460.10 et seq., as enacted by 2000 PA 141 and 2000 PA 142, to "further the deregulation of the electric utility industry." In re Application of Detroit Edison Co. for 2012 Cost Recovery Plan , 311 Mich.App. 204, 207 n. 2, 874 N.W.2d 398 (2015). That act permitted customers to buy electricity from alternative electric suppliers instead of limiting customers to purchasing electricity from incumbent utilities, such as appellee Consumers Energy Company (Consumers). Consumers Energy Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 268 Mich.App. 171, 173, 707 N.W.2d 633 (2005). Among the purposes of the act, as amended by Act 341, is the promotion of "financially healthy and competitive utilities in this state." MCL 460.10(b). Also by way of background, the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) is the regional transmission organization responsible for managing the transmission of electric power in a large geographic area that spans portions of Michigan and 14 other states. To accomplish this, MISO combines the transmission facilities of several transmission owners into a single transmission system. In addition to the transmission of electricity, MISO's functions include capacity resource planning. MISO has established ten local resource zones; most of Michigan's lower peninsula is located in MISO's Local Resource Zone 7, while the upper peninsula is located in MISO's Local Resource Zone 2. Each year MISO establishes for each alternative electric supplier in Michigan the "planning reserve margin requirement." MISO also establishes the "local clearing requirement." Under MISO's system, there generally are no geographic limitations on the capacity resources that may be used by a particular supplier to meet its planning reserve margin requirement. That is, MISO does not impose the local clearing requirement on alternative electric suppliers individually but instead applies the local clearing requirement to the zone as a whole. Each individual electricity supplier is not required by MISO to demonstrate that its energy capacity is located within Michigan, as long as the zone as a whole demonstrates that it has sufficient energy generation located within Michigan to meet federal requirements. MISO also serves as a mechanism for suppliers to buy and sell electricity capacity through an auction. This allows for the exchange of capacity resources across energy providers and resource zones. The MISO auction is conducted each year for the purchase and sale of capacity for the upcoming year. The auction allows suppliers to buy and sell electricity capacity and acquire enough capacity to meet their planning reserve margin requirement. The auction also allows each zone as a whole to meet the zone's local clearing requirement. At the end of 2016, our Legislature enacted Act 341, in part adding MCL 460.6w, which imposes resource adequacy requirements on electric service providers in Michigan and imposes certain responsibilities on the MPSC. Under MCL 460.6w(2), the MPSC is required under certain circumstances to establish a "state reliability mechanism." That subsection provides, in relevant part: If, by September 30, 2017, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission does not put into effect a resource adequacy tariff that includes a capacity forward auction or a prevailing state compensation mechanism, then the commission shall establish a state reliability mechanism under subsection (8). MCL 460.6w(2). The parties agree that because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission did not put into effect the MISO-proposed tariff, the MPSC is required by § 6w(2) to establish a state reliability mechanism. A "state reliability mechanism" is defined by the statute as "a plan adopted by the commission in the absence of a prevailing state compensation mechanism to ensure reliability of the electric grid in this state consistent with subsection (8)." MCL 460.6w(12)(h). The state reliability mechanism is to be established consistently with § 6w(8), which provides, in relevant part, that the MPSC shall: (b) Require ... that each alternative electric supplier, cooperative electric utility, or municipally owned electric utility demonstrate to the commission, in a format determined by the commission, that for the planning year beginning 4 years after the beginning of the current planning year, the alternative electric supplier, cooperative electric utility, or municipally owned electric utility owns or has contractual rights to sufficient capacity to meet its capacity obligations as set by the appropriate independent system operator, or commission, as applicable. One or more municipally owned electric utilities may aggregate their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone to meet the requirements of this subdivision. One or more cooperative electric utilities may aggregate their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone to meet the requirements of this subdivision. A cooperative or municipally owned electric utility may meet the requirements of this subdivision through any resource, including a resource acquired through a capacity forward auction, that the appropriate independent system operator allows to qualify for meeting the local clearing requirement. A cooperative or municipally owned electric utility's payment of an auction price related to a capacity deficiency as part of a capacity forward auction conducted by the appropriate independent system operator does not by itself satisfy the resource adequacy requirements of this section unless the appropriate independent system operator can directly tie that provider's payment to a capacity resource that meets the requirements of this subsection. By the seventh business day of February in 2018, an alternative electric supplier shall demonstrate to the commission, in a format determined by the commission, that for the planning year beginning June 1, 2018, and the subsequent 3 planning years, the alternative electric supplier owns or has contractual rights to sufficient capacity to meet its capacity obligations as set by the appropriate independent system operator, or commission, as applicable. If the commission finds an electric provider has failed to demonstrate it can meet a portion or all of its capacity obligation, the commission shall do all of the following: (i ) For alternative electric load, require the payment of a capacity charge that is determined, assessed, and applied in the same manner as under subsection (3) for that portion of the load not covered as set forth in subsections (6) and (7). [ MCL 460.6w(8).] Thus, § 6w(8)(b) requires each alternative electric supplier, cooperative electric utility, and municipally owned electric utility to demonstrate to the MPSC that it has sufficient capacity to meet its "capacity obligations." The statute does not define "capacity obligations," but in § 6w(8)(c), the statute provides that: (c) In order to determine the capacity obligations, [the MPSC shall] request that the appropriate independent system operator provide technical assistance in determining the local clearing requirement and planning reserve margin requirement. If the appropriate independent system operator declines, or has not made a determination by October 1 of that year, the commission shall set any required local clearing requirement and planning reserve margin requirement, consistent with federal reliability requirements. [ MCL 460.6w(8)(c).] Section 6w(8)(b) also provides that municipally owned electric utilities are permitted to "aggregate their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone to meet the requirements of this subdivision" and that cooperative electric utilities are permitted to "aggregate their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone to meet the requirements of this subdivision." Section 6w(8)(b) also permits a cooperative or municipally owned electric utility to "meet the requirements of this subdivision through any resource, including a resource acquired through a capacity forward auction, that [MISO] allows to qualify for meeting the local clearing requirement." Section 6w(8)(b), however, does not include a similar provision for alternative electric suppliers and is, in fact, silent as to whether alternative electric suppliers may aggregate their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone to meet the requirements of the subdivision. MCL 460.6w(3) directs the MPSC to establish a capacity charge that a provider must pay if it fails to satisfy the capacity obligations established under § 6w(8). Section 6w(6), however, directs that a capacity charge shall not be assessed against an alternative electric supplier who demonstrates that it can meet its capacity obligations through owned or contractual rights to any resource that the appropriate independent system operator[ ] allows to meet the capacity obligation of the electric provider. The preceding sentence shall not be applied in any way that conflicts with a federal resource adequacy tariff, when applicable. [ MCL 460.6w(6).] After the enactment of Act 341, the MPSC worked collaboratively in a workgroup process to implement MCL 460.6w. On September 15, 2017, the MPSC issued an order in its Case No. U-18197, imposing new requirements on alternative electric suppliers as part of its implementation of MCL 460.6w. In that order, the MPSC determined that MCL 460.6w authorizes it to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. ABATE and Energy Michigan challenge this interpretation of MCL 460.6w as erroneous, while Consumers supports the decision of the MPSC. Energy Michigan further challenges the new requirements imposed by the MPSC, contending that the requirements did not comply with the APA and were thus improperly implemented. II. ANALYSIS A. RIPENESS As an initial consideration, we address the assertion by the MPSC and Consumers that the issue in these appeals related to the imposition of a local clearing requirement is not yet ripe for resolution by this Court. The MPSC and Consumers contend that the September 15, 2017 order of the MPSC in Case No. U-18197 did not impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers but instead merely announced that the MPSC has the authority to do so. The MPSC and Consumers assert that until the MPSC takes the final step of imposing a specific local clearing requirement on an individual alternative electric supplier, the question whether the MPSC has the authority to do so is not ripe for review. We disagree. The ripeness doctrine requires that an actual injury be sustained by the plaintiff. Van Buren Charter Twp. v. Visteon Corp. , 319 Mich.App. 538, 554, 904 N.W.2d 192 (2017). "The doctrine of ripeness is designed to prevent 'the adjudication of hypothetical or contingent claims before an actual injury has been sustained.' " Huntington Woods v. Detroit , 279 Mich.App. 603, 615, 761 N.W.2d 127 (2008), quoting Mich. Chiropractic Council v. Comm'r of the Office of Fin. and Ins. Servs. , 475 Mich. 363, 371 n. 14, 716 N.W.2d 561 (2006), overruled on other grounds by Lansing Sch. Ed. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Ed, , 487 Mich. 349, 371, 792 N.W.2d 686 (2010). "A claim is not ripe if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may not occur at all." Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary of State , 280 Mich.App. 273, 282, 761 N.W.2d 210 (2008). To determine whether an issue is ripe for review, we assess "whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention." People v. Bosca , 310 Mich.App. 1, 56, 871 N.W.2d 307 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Dep't of Social Servs v. Emmanuel Baptist Preschool , 434 Mich. 380, 412 n. 48, 455 N.W.2d 1 (1990) ( CAVANAGH , J., concurring). In making this assessment, this Court must balance any uncertainty about whether a party will actually suffer future injury against the potential hardship of denying anticipatory relief. People v. Robar , 321 Mich.App. 106, 128, 910 N.W.2d 328 (2017). This Court will find an issue ripe for review when it is a "threshold determination," the resolution of which is not dependent on any further decision by the MPSC. Citizens , 280 Mich.App. at 283, 761 N.W.2d 210 ; see also Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State , 463 Mich. 1009, 625 N.W.2d 377 (2001) (holding that a controversy was ripe for review when it involved a "threshold determination" of whether petitions met constitutional prerequisites and was not dependent on the Board of Canvassers' counting or consideration of petitions). A review of the MPSC's September 15, 2017 order demonstrates that the MPSC has not merely announced that it has the authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers; it has announced its decision to assert that authority, leaving open only the methodology of exercising that authority. In its earlier June 15, 2017 order in Case No. U-18197, and reiterated in its September 15, 2017 order, the MPSC stated that "the Commission finds that a locational requirement is required under Section 6w and that a locational requirement applicable to individual LSEs [load serving entities] is allowed as part of the capacity obligations set forth by the Commission pursuant to Section 6w in order to ensure all providers contribute to long-term resource adequacy in the state." The MPSC's September 15, 2017 order further stated that "a properly designed locational requirement applied to individual load serving entities as part of a demonstration that capacity obligations have been met is consistent with [the] requirements [in the statute, the MISO tariff, and applicable caselaw]." In light of these determinations by the MPSC, the alleged harm in these cases does not rest on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or at all; the decision to apply a locational requirement to individual alternative electric suppliers has already been made. The only variable remaining is the methodology the MPSC will employ. Thus, there is little uncertainty about whether the asserted harm will occur, and we weigh that factor against the potential hardship of denying anticipatory relief. Robar , 321 Mich.App. at 128, 910 N.W.2d 328. We conclude that the harm asserted in these cases warrants judicial intervention. As in Citizens , the decision of the MPSC in its September 15, 2017 order-that it has the authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers-is a "threshold determination" ripe for our consideration given that the resolution of the issue is not dependent on any further decision by the MPSC. Citizens , 280 Mich.App. at 283, 761 N.W.2d 210 ; see also Mich. United Conservation Clubs , 463 Mich. 1009, 625 N.W.2d 377. We therefore hold that the question whether the MPSC erred by determining that it has statutory authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers is ripe for our review. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW When reviewing an order of the MPSC, this Court generally refers to MCL 462.25, which states: All rates, fares, charges, classification and joint rates fixed by the commission and all regulations, practices and services prescribed by the commission shall be in force and shall be prima facie, lawful and reasonable until finally found otherwise in an action brought for the purpose pursuant to the provisions of section 26 of this act, or until changed or modified by the commission as provided for in section 24 of this act. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 269 Mich.App. 473, 479, 713 N.W.2d 290 (2006). In addition, this Court generally notes that as a reviewing court, we give due deference to the administrative expertise of the MPSC. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. No 2 , 237 Mich.App. 82, 88, 602 N.W.2d 225 (1999). In these appeals, however, appellants challenge whether a specific holding of the MPSC in its final order in its Case No. U-18197 exceeds the authority granted to the MPSC by law. To be valid, a final order of the MPSC must be authorized by law and supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28 ; Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 165 Mich.App. 230, 235, 418 N.W.2d 660 (1987). Agencies have the authority to interpret the statutes that they administer and enforce. Clonlara, Inc. v. State Bd of Ed. , 442 Mich. 230, 240, 501 N.W.2d 88 (1993). We respectfully consider an agency's interpretation of a statute the agency is empowered to execute and will not overrule that construction absent cogent reasons. In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich. , 482 Mich. 90, 103, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008). But the construction the MPSC gives to a statute is not binding on the courts. Id . Ultimately, the statutory language itself is controlling, id . at 108, 754 N.W.2d 259, and this Court will neither abandon nor delegate its responsibility to determine legislative intent, Consumers Energy Co., 268 Mich.App. at 174-175, 707 N.W.2d 633. Moreover, we review de novo issues of statutory interpretation, Uniloy Milacron USA Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 296 Mich.App. 93, 96, 815 N.W.2d 811 (2012), including the MPSC's determinations regarding the scope of its own authority, Consumers Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm , 460 Mich. 148, 157, 596 N.W.2d 126 (1999) ; In re Application of Consumers Energy to Increase Electric Rates (On Remand), , 316 Mich.App. 231, 237, 891 N.W.2d 871 (2016). In sum, when considering the construction given to a statute by an agency, our ultimate concern is the proper construction of the plain language of the statute regardless of the agency's interpretation, Rovas , 482 Mich. at 108, 754 N.W.2d 259, and our primary obligation is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent, Coldwater v. Consumers Energy Co. , 500 Mich. 158, 167, 895 N.W.2d 154 (2017). C. MCL 460.6w In its September 15, 2017 order, the MPSC held that MCL 460.6w authorizes it to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. ABATE and Energy Michigan contend that this interpretation of MCL 460.6w is erroneous. We agree with ABATE and Energy Michigan. The MPSC has no common-law powers and possesses only the authority granted to it by the Legislature. Consumers Power Co ., 460 Mich. at 155, 596 N.W.2d 126. In addition, we strictly construe the statutes that confer power on the MPSC, and that power must be conferred by "clear and unmistakable language." Id . at 155-156 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, "powers specifically conferred on an agency cannot be extended by inference; ... no other or greater power was given than that specified." Herrick Dist. Library v. Library of Mich. , 293 Mich.App. 571, 582-583, 810 N.W.2d 110 (2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, when construing the statutes empowering the MPSC, this Court does not weigh the economic or public policy factors underlying the decisions of the MPSC; those concerns are the province of the Legislature. Consumers Power Co. , 460 Mich. at 156, 596 N.W.2d 126. Instead, our concern is the question of law presented to us: what is "the statutory authority of the [MPSC] in the light of the facts before us...." Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 351 Mich. 255, 262; 88 N.W.2d 492 (1958). The MPSC's September 15, 2017 order provides that the order "establishes the format and requirements for electric providers in the state to make demonstrations to the Commission that they have sufficient electric capacity arrangements pursuant to Section 6w of 2016 PA 341 (Act 341)." In that order, the MPSC asserts that it is implementing a law administered by the agency, that it has the authority to impose a methodology on all electric load serving entities active in the state, and specifically states that the Commission finds that a locational requirement is required under Section 6w and that a locational requirement applicable to individual [load serving entities] is allowed as part of the capacity obligations set forth by the Commission pursuant to Section 6w in order to ensure all providers contribute to long-term resource adequacy in the state. In the order, the MPSC reasons that because the statute refers to capacity obligations only in the context of the obligations of individual providers, the statute's local clearing requirement should likewise be understood to apply to individual providers. Quoting its earlier order, the MPSC order provides, in relevant part: As defined in Section 6w(12)(d), "local clearing requirement" means "the amount of capacity resources required to be in the local resource zone in which the electric provider's demand is served to ensure reliability in that zone as determined by the appropriate independent system operator for the local resource zone in which the electric provider's demand is served and by the commission under subsection (8)." As noted above, in requesting assistance from MISO in determining capacity obligations, the Commission is tasked with requesting technical assistance in determining this local clearing requirement. Section 6w(8) also requires individual electric providers to demonstrate to the Commission that they can meet capacity obligations. The Commission is directed to require each electric provider to demonstrate that it "owns or has contractual rights to sufficient capacity to meet its capacity obligations as set by the appropriate independent system operator, or commission, as applicable" four years into the future. These capacity obligations necessarily include a local clearing requirement. It is clear that the statute requires the Commission to create capacity obligations, that these capacity obligations include a locational requirement, and that the Commission, in setting locational capacity obligations, is allowed to require a demonstration by individual electric providers that the resources that they use to meet their capacity obligations meet a local clearing requirement. The Commission acknowledges the inter-relatedness of the MISO and Section 6w capacity demonstration processes, but also points out that these are distinct activities. These activities should be harmonized to the extent practicable, but the fundamental responsibility of the Commission is to meet Michigan's statutory obligations. Thus, the Commission finds that a locational requirement is required under Section 6w and that a locational requirement applicable to individual LSEs is allowed as part of the capacity obligations set forth by the Commission pursuant to Section 6w in order to ensure all providers contribute to long-term resource adequacy in the state. The MPSC and Consumers urge us to read the provisions of MCL 460.6w as bestowing on the MPSC the authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. They reason that § 6w(8)(c) suggests that the "capacity obligations" of alternative electric suppliers are required to be based, in part, on the local clearing requirement. The MPSC and Consumers further reason that because § 6w(8)(b) refers to the capacity obligations with respect to each individual electric provider, it must be inferred that the local clearing requirement was meant to be applied to each alternative electric supplier individually. We cannot follow the urging of the MPSC and Consumers, however, because a review of the statute reveals that no provision of MCL 460.6w clearly and unmistakably authorizes the MPSC to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric providers. We acknowledge that § 6w(8)(b) provides that each electric provider must demonstrate that it owns or has contractual rights to sufficient capacity to meet its capacity obligations as set by the appropriate independent system operator, or the MPSC, as applicable. Section 6w(8)(c) directs that "[i]n order to determine the capacity obligations," the MPSC must "set any required local clearing requirement and planning reserve margin requirement, consistent with federal reliability requirements," and seek technical assistance from MISO in doing so. But although § 6w(8)(c) requires the MPSC to determine the local clearing requirement in order to determine capacity obligations, it does not specifically authorize the MPSC to impose the local clearing requirement on alternative electric suppliers individually. Because the MPSC has only the authority granted to it by the Legislature by "clear and unmistakable language," Consumers Power Co. , 460 Mich. at 155-156, 596 N.W.2d 126 (quotation marks and citation omitted), and because authority cannot be extended by inference, Herrick Dist. Library , 293 Mich.App. at 582-583, 810 N.W.2d 110, we must decline the invitation to infer that the MPSC has any additional authority. Moreover, a review of the entire statute suggests that the MPSC is obligated to apply the local clearing requirement in a manner consistent with MISO. A general principle of statutory construction is that a statute must be read as a whole and that a seemingly ambiguous provision may thereby be clarified in the context of the whole statute. Id . at 583, 810 N.W.2d 110. A review of the statute as a whole reveals that MCL 460.6w(3) directs the MPSC to establish a capacity charge that a provider must pay if it fails to satisfy the capacity obligations as required under § 6w(8). Section 6w(6), however, directs that no capacity charge be assessed against an alternative electric supplier who demonstrates that "it can meet its capacity obligations through owned or contractual rights to any resource that the appropriate independent system operator [MISO] allows to meet the capacity obligation of the electric provider." MCL 460.6w(6). The parties acknowledge that MISO permits an alternative electric supplier to meet its capacity obligations, including the local clearing requirement, by owning or contracting for capacity resources located outside the applicable local resource zone and does not require each alternative electric supplier to demonstrate a proportionate share of the local clearing requirement. Similarly, § 6w(6) constrains the MPSC from assessing any capacity charge in a manner "that conflicts with a federal resource adequacy tariff, when applicable," and § 6w(8)(c) requires that the MPSC set any planning reserve margin or local clearing requirements "consistent with federal reliability requirements." These provisions militate against the MPSC's imposition of any local clearing requirements beyond what MISO has established and instead impose on the MPSC a continuing obligation to observe MISO's general practice of imposing local clearing requirements on a zonal, not an individual, basis. Thus, reading MCL 460.6w as a whole indicates that the MPSC must impose a local clearing requirement on alternative electric suppliers in a manner consistent with MISO-that is, on a zonal basis and not individually. The MPSC notes that § 6w(8)(b) allows cooperative electric utilities to "aggregate [with other cooperative electric utilities] their capacity resources that are located in the same local resource zone" for purposes of satisfying their capacity obligations. The MPSC further notes that municipally owned electric utilities may aggregate their capacity resources with other municipally owned electric utilities. Those entities may resort to "any resource, including a resource acquired through a capacity forward auction, that [MISO] allows to qualify for meeting the local clearing requirement." In its September 15, 2017 order, the MPSC interpreted § 6w(8) as follows: This provision allowing municipally-owned and cooperative electric utilities to aggregate their resources in order [to] meet the requirements of Section 6w(8) clearly implies that these utilities would otherwise be required to meet the requirements on an individual basis. The Commission finds that it would be unreasonable to interpret the statute such that this obligation for individual compliance "for meeting the local clearing requirement" is placed solely on municipally-owned and cooperative utilities under Section 6w. The Commission can find nothing in the law, and no rational basis, to indicate an intent to place a local clearing requirement only on non-profit utilities. Instead, the law is more logically understood to require that all individual utilities be treated similarly in terms of requirements, and that the aggregation option was intended to assist nonprofit utilities (many of which are small) to comply more easily. Thus, this language further supports the Commission's interpretation that a locational requirement is authorized and may be applied to individual electric providers. The MPSC argues that because § 6w(8)(b) is silent as to whether an alternative electric supplier may similarly aggregate its resources, the intent of the statute must be to permit the imposition of a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. Again, however, reaching this conclusion requires the inference that § 6w permits the MPSC to establish a capacity obligation that includes an individual local clearing requirement contrary to that imposed by MISO. Because we must strictly construe the statutes that confer power on the MPSC-power that may not be inferred but instead must be conferred by "clear and unmistakable language"-we conclude that MCL 460.6w does not authorize the MPSC to impose a local clearing requirement upon individual alternative electric suppliers. See Herrick Dist. Library , 293 Mich.App. at 582-583, 810 N.W.2d 110. D. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY We further conclude that, were it necessary to look outside the language of the statute at issue here to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, the order of the MPSC conflicts with the intent of Act 341 as reflected in that act's legislative history. When construing a statute, this Court is required to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Russell v. Detroit , 321 Mich.App. 628, 637, 909 N.W.2d 507 (2017). When statutory language is clear, the intent of the Legislature is clear and we will enforce the statute as written. Id . We look outside the plain words of the statute only when ambiguity within the statute requires it, and we do not use legislative history to cloud clear statutory text. In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit , 468 Mich. 109, 116, 659 N.W.2d 597 (2003). A statute is ambiguous only if it creates an irreconcilable conflict with another statutory provision or if its language is equally susceptible to more than one meaning. Village of Holly v. Holly Twp. , 267 Mich.App. 461, 474, 705 N.W.2d 532 (2005). As discussed, any authority granted by statute to the MPSC must be conferred by "clear and unmistakable language," Consumers Power Co. , 460 Mich. at 155-156, 596 N.W.2d 126, and the "powers specifically conferred on an agency cannot be extended by inference[.]" Herrick Dist. Library , 293 Mich.App. at 582-583, 810 N.W.2d 110 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, because the language of MCL 460.6w is unambiguous, we interpret the plain language as reflecting the intent of the Legislature without the need to consider the legislative history and conclude that MCL 460.6w contains no clear and unmistakable language granting the MPSC authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. The MPSC, however, invites us to interpret the statute as permitting it to assume authority not explicit within the statute. We conclude that even if it were necessary to look beyond the language of the statute to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, the interpretation suggested by the MPSC conflicts with the Legislature's intent when enacting MCL 460.6w as is evident in the legislative history of Act 341. We note that not all legislative history is equally valuable when attempting to ascertain the legislative intent behind statutory language. In re Certified Question , 468 Mich. at 115 n. 5, 659 N.W.2d 597. Our Supreme Court has instructed that "the highest quality [of] legislative history [is] that [which] relates to an action of the Legislature from which a court may draw reasonable inferences about the Legislature's intent," including "actions of the Legislature in considering various alternatives in language in statutory provisions before settling on the language actually enacted." Id . Here, the legislative process leading to the passage of Act 341 lasted for almost 17 months and involved numerous amendments and bill substitutes. Senate Bill 437 was introduced on July 1, 2015. It proposed substantial amendment of the Michigan Public Service Commission Act, 1939 PA 3, and the Customer Choice and Electricity Reliability Act, as enacted by 2000 PAs 141 and 142. The bill ultimately emerged from the Senate as Senate Substitute 7 (S7), with a new provision that imposed on alternative electric suppliers a capacity obligation and a demonstration process; alternative electric suppliers who were required to own or contract for enough capacity resources to meet a percentage of their proportionate share of the local clearing requirement. For example, S7 provided in proposed § 6w(2)(C), in relevant part: An alternative electric supplier ... shall ... demonstrate to the commission, in a format determined by the commission, that for the planning year, ... the alternative electric supplier ... owns or has contractual rights to sufficient dedicated and firm electric capacity to meet the equivalent of 90% of its proportional share of the local clearing requirement ....[ ] This version of the bill passed the Senate and was transmitted to the House. On December 15, 2016, the House adopted H4 in place of S7. H4 removed the specific language requiring individual alternative electric suppliers to meet a percentage of their proportionate share of the local clearing requirement. H4 also added language to proposed § 6w(6) specifying that an alternative electric supplier could meet its overall capacity obligation with any resource that the appropriate independent system operator (MISO) allows to meet the capacity obligation. The Senate thereafter concurred with H4, and the bill was signed into law. The Legislature thereby rejected statutory language imposing the local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers in favor of statutory language adopting the MISO method of not imposing the local clearing requirement on individual electric providers. In its September 15, 2017 order, the MPSC stated: The Commission acknowledges that previous versions of the legislation included a detailed methodology relative to determining the share of a forward locational requirement each provider would have to demonstrate. What changed ... is not that a locational requirement went away entirely, but that an explicit methodology was removed and replaced with provisions that leave decisions on the methodology of how to establish the locational requirement up to the Commission. ... [T]he statute gives the Commission flexibility to determine how best to establish a forward locational requirement and the resources that qualify to meet that requirement. On appeal, the MPSC suggests that "once the Legislature had MISO's ... long-term resource adequacy plan to use as a guide, Legislators no longer felt the need to provide their own different plans for how to allocate [local clearing requirements] and PRMR [the planning reserve margin requirement]," as is apparent from "the addition of requirements that the Commission request MISO's assistance in setting capacity determination and deference to MISO's determinations of what resources would qualify." In sum, the MPSC urges us to read into the statute an implied grant of authority to the MPSC to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers even though (1) such authority is not clearly and unmistakably granted by the statute, (2) such an interpretation is contrary to the directive of § 6w that the local clearing requirement be imposed in accordance with MISO's practices, which do not impose the local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers, and (3) the Legislature rejected language granting such authority to the MPSC, removing it from the final draft of the statute ultimately enacted. We decline the invitation to engage in these interpretive gymnastics and return to our ultimate concern and primary objective when reviewing an agency decision interpreting a statute, which is the proper construction of the plain language of the statute-that is, to properly construe the statute and to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent. Rovas , 482 Mich. at 107-108 ; Coldwater , 500 Mich. at 167, 895 N.W.2d 154. "Where the Legislature has considered certain language and rejected it in favor of other language, the resulting statutory language should not be held to authorize what the Legislature explicitly rejected." Bush v. Shabahang , 484 Mich. 156, 173-174, 772 N.W.2d 272 (2009), quoting In re MCI Telecom. Complaint , 460 Mich. 396, 415, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999) (alteration omitted). We therefore will not interpret the language adopted in MCL 460.6w as authorizing what the Legislature explicitly rejected when enacting that statute. E. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT Energy Michigan also contends that the MPSC, through its September 15, 2017 order, made a series of decisions that are essentially a set of improperly instituted rules. An administrative rule is "an agency regulation, statement, standard, policy, ruling, or instruction of general applicability that implements or applies law enforced or administered by the agency...." MCL 24.207. An agency should resort to formal APA rulemaking when establishing policies that "do not merely interpret or explain the statute or rules from which the agency derives its authority," but rather "establish the substantive standards implementing the program." Faircloth v. Family Independence Agency , 232 Mich.App. 391, 403-404, 591 N.W.2d 314 (1998). Under the APA, a "rule" does not include a "rule or order establishing or fixing rates or tariffs," MCL 24.207(c), a "determination, decision, or order in a contested case," MCL 24.207(f), an "interpretive statement" or "guideline," MCL 24.207(h), or a "decision by an agency to exercise or not to exercise a permissive statutory power, although private rights or interests are affected," MCL 24.207(j). "[I]n order to reflect the APA's preference for policy determinations pursuant to rules, the definition of 'rule' is to be broadly construed, while the exceptions are to be narrowly construed." AFSCME v. Dep't of Mental Health , 452 Mich. 1, 10, 550 N.W.2d 190 (1996). An agency, however, may not avoid the requirements for promulgating rules by issuing its directives under different labels. See id . at 9, 550 N.W.2d 190. Whether an agency policy is invalid because it was not promulgated as a rule under the APA is reviewed de novo by this Court. In re PSC Guidelines for Transactions Between Affiliates , 252 Mich.App. 254, 263, 652 N.W.2d 1 (2002). In Docket No. 340607, Energy Michigan contends that the MPSC, in its September 15, 2017 order, determined that it could impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers and, in essence, enacted rules without complying with the APA. Energy Michigan identifies six such alleged instances, which Energy Michigan notes is not an all-inclusive list: a. Establishment of a formula for determining each electric provider's "total capacity obligation that it will be required to demonstrate that it has owned or contracted resources to satisfy." b. A restriction on the use of the MISO Planning Resource Auction to meet capacity needs, where the Commission states that it "is also allowing electric providers to plan on up to 5% of their portfolio to be acquired through MISO's annual capacity auction" where no such restriction formerly existed. c. Setting of the capacity obligation for the years 2018 to 2021 on the basis of the electric provider's Peak Load Contribution ("PLC") for 2018, without any means to adjust that obligation during the four years, by requiring that "[t]hese PLC determinations will ultimately drive the total amount of capacity obligation that an AES [alternative electric supplier] will be required to meet in its annual demonstration before the Commission." d. Imposing a locational requirement for obtaining capacity on individual electric providers which will be required for the 2019 demonstration, by affirming "the Commission's interpretation that a locational requirement is authorized and may be applied to individual electric providers." e. Asserting authority to reinsert by administrative fiat requirements that were removed from the authorizing statute during the legislative drafting process. f. And ordering that "[t]he Capacity Demonstration Process and Requirements ... are approved" without having developed those requirements through the proper rulemaking process. [Citations omitted.] These allegations of inappropriate rulemaking primarily relate to the MPSC's imposition of a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. Because we determine that the statute does not provide the MPSC with the authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers, we conclude that it is unnecessary to reach the related issue whether the MPSC's determination concerning the local clearing requirement resulted in improperly promulgated rules. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Meter, P.J., and Tukel, J., concurred with Gadola, J. ABATE describes itself as "an interest group of large energy users representing its members before regulatory and governmental bodies and other organizations that affect Michigan's energy pricing, reliability, and terms and conditions of service." ABATE Energy, About ABATE< https://abate-energy.org> (accessed May 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QE6D-DNKD]. Energy Michigan describes itself as a group devoted to the protection and promotion of "alternative and independent power supply, cogeneration, advanced energy industries and their customers ...." Energy Michigan, About Energy Michigan, Inc.< https://energymichigan.org> (accessed May 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LW4E-8UNB]. Energy Michigan intervenes in Michigan Public Service Commission cases affecting those industries. Id. These appeals were consolidated on this Court's own motion. In re Reliability Plans of Electric Utilities for 2017-2021 , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 15, 2017 (Docket Nos. 340600; 340607). A "planning reserve margin requirement" is the amount of capacity equal to the forecasted coincident peak demand that occurs when the appropriate independent system operator footprint peak demand occurs plus a reserve margin that meets an acceptable loss of load expectation as set by the commission or the appropriate independent system operator under subsection (8). [MCL 460.6w(12)(e).] A "local clearing requirement" is the amount of capacity resources required to be in the local resource zone in which the electric provider's demand is served to ensure reliability in that zone as determined by the appropriate independent system operator for the local resource zone in which the electric provider's demand is served and by the commission under subsection (8). [MCL 460.6w(12)(d).] 2016 PA 341, effective April 20, 2017. MCL 460.6w(12)(a) defines the "appropriate independent system operator" as MISO. This decision was made in the context of competing interests between large public utilities, which contend that alternative electric suppliers are not investing in the energy infrastructure of Michigan and therefore are not contributing to long-term energy reliability in the state, and smaller alternative electric suppliers, which provide lower-cost electricity to customers by relying in part on capacity generated outside of Michigan. Large public utilities contend that their costs are higher because of the investment they make in long-term energy production in Michigan, while alternative electric suppliers contend that if they are required to rely almost exclusively on capacity produced within the state, they will be forced to leave the market in Michigan and consumer choice for electricity will effectively be at an end. Actually, the law "is more logically understood" by reference to its own terms. The more logical interpretation of those terms is that the Legislature authorized cooperative or municipally owned electric utilities to aggregate their resources in order to meet the local clearing requirement. We will not infer from the Legislature's failure to impose the local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers, i.e., the Legislature's silence , that it, in fact, intended to impose the local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. Given that "Michigan courts determine the Legislature's intent from its words , not from its silence," Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. , 460 Mich. 243, 261, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999), the better understanding is, as we have articulated it here, that the Legislature's reference to MISO's standards, which allow the local clearing requirement to be met on a zonal basis, and no language imposing the local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers, means that the MPSC is without authority to impose such a requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. Capitalization altered. Energy Michigan's challenges under the APA are tied almost entirely to its challenge to the MPSC's imposition of the local clearing requirement on individual electric suppliers. In its appellate brief replying to the briefing by Consumers Energy, Energy Michigan asserts that "[w]hat Energy Michigan is disputing (setting aside the MPSC's unlawful process for implementing its new rules ...) is whether or not the Commission has the authority to go beyond MISO's zonal LCR [local clearing requirement] and establish a mandatory individual LCR for each electric provider, something that MISO has not done and that is not present in the federal reliability requirements, but would be a new and unique state-level innovation." We agree with Energy Michigan that this is the focus of the parties' dispute and the nearly exclusive focus of the parties' briefing. The challenges under the APA extend beyond the question of the local clearing requirement, but we decline to reach those issues because they are not sufficiently developed in light of the brevity with which all parties treated those challenges.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of conservator and successor trustee Mary Lyneis to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on December 17, 2018, is accepted for filing. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion of appellants to file a response to the amicus brief and the motion of appellee to file a response to the amicus brief and to appellants' response are GRANTED. The responses filed by appellants and appellee on January 29, 2019, and February 1, 2019, respectively, are accepted for filing.

Servitto, J. This case is before us, as on reconsideration granted, People v. Smith , 501 Mich. 851, 899 N.W.2d 407, 2017 WL 3496629 (2017), to determine whether the trial court's order declaring a portion of defendant's plea agreement void was in error and whether the trial court's subsequent order denying the prosecution's motion to vacate defendant's plea constituted an abuse of discretion. This Court previously dismissed the appeal as moot. People v. Smith , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 18, 2017 (Docket No. 332288), 2017 WL 1399983. We now affirm. We stated the relevant facts in our prior decision: In May 2015, defendant was involved in an altercation with his ex-wife. As a result, he was charged with domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2) ; malicious destruction of personal property, MCL 750.377a(1)(a)(i) ; felonious assault, MCL 750.82 ; and [carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) ], MCL 750.227b. On February 11, 2016, the prosecution and defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby defendant would plead guilty to the charge of malicious destruction of property and agreed both to resign his Senate seat and to refrain from holding public office during his five-year probationary period (which included a ten-month jail term). The remaining charges against the defendant would be dismissed. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ruled sua sponte that the provisions of the agreement related to defendant's Senate seat violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers and infringed on the people's right to choose their representatives. Accordingly, the trial court declared those portions of the plea agreement void because they "offend[ ] the Constitution of the State of Michigan, [are] contrary to public policy and compromise[ ] the integrity of th[e] court." In all other respects, the court sentenced defendant in accordance with the plea agreement. The prosecution subsequently moved to vacate defendant's plea. The prosecution argued that in failing to resign, defendant had not complied with the plea agreement and that the prosecution should be permitted to negotiate a new plea deal given the trial court's refusal to enforce the entirety of the original agreement. The trial court denied the prosecution's motion. The trial court acknowledged that while plea agreements are akin to contracts, they must serve the interests of justice. The trial court then held that where the parties had initially indicated that the agreement protected the public and provided for punishment and rehabilitation, enforcement of the agreement without the "offending portion" would serve the interests of justice. [ Smith , unpub. op. 1-2 (alterations in original). ] The trial court added that vacating the plea would harm the interests of justice because [v]acating the plea would violate the fundamental principle that it is the right of the People to elect whom they chose to elect for office by allowing the prosecutor to pressure a member of the legislative branch to resign or face prosecution and likely imprisonment. Vacating the plea would violate the separation of powers set forth in the Michigan [C]onstitution, where only the Senate can discipline or remove one of its members convicted of this type of crime by allowing the prosecutor to pressure a member of the legislative branch to resign and face prosecution and likely imprisonment. Vacating the plea would violate public policy by allowing the prosecutor to dominate the legislative branch of government with the threat of forced resignation. [And] granting the prosecution's motion to vacate this plea would compromise the Court's integrity by involving it in an act that violates public policy and offends the [C]onstitution. On remand, we consider the prosecution's appeal of both the trial court's original order voiding a portion of defendant's plea agreement and its order denying the prosecution's motion to vacate defendant's plea. A trial court's decision whether to set aside an accepted guilty plea is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Strong , 213 Mich.App. 107, 112, 539 N.W.2d 736 (1995). An abuse of discretion "occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v. Lee , 314 Mich.App. 266, 272, 886 N.W.2d 185 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Issues of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. People v. Benton , 294 Mich.App. 191, 195, 817 N.W.2d 599 (2011). On appeal, the prosecution argues that the trial court erred by voiding the portion of the plea agreement requiring defendant to resign his state Senate seat and to refrain from seeking elective or appointed public office during the five-year probationary period. The prosecution further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow the prosecution to withdraw the plea agreement and proceed to trial. The prosecution specifically contends that the plea agreement did not, as the trial court held, violate the separation of powers and that both defendant and the prosecution were entitled to receive the benefit of their end of the negotiated plea agreement. The Michigan Constitution provides for the separation of powers: "The powers of government are divided into three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. No person exercising powers of one branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in this constitution." Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. "While the Constitution provides for three separate branches of government, Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2, the boundaries between these branches need not be 'airtight[.]' " Makowski v. Governor , 495 Mich. 465, 482, 852 N.W.2d 61 (2014) (citations omitted). Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that this constitutional provision does not require " 'that [the separate branches of government] must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct, and have no common link or dependence, the one upon the other, in the slightest degree.' " Kent Co. Prosecutor v. Kent Co. Sheriff (On Rehearing) , 428 Mich. 314, 321-322, 409 N.W.2d 202 (1987), quoting Local 321, State, Co. & Muni. Workers of America v. Dearborn , 311 Mich. 674, 677, 19 N.W.2d 140 (1945), quoting Story, Constitutional Law (4th ed), p 380. Instead, "[t]he true meaning [of the Separation of Powers Clause] is that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of either of the other departments; and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a free Constitution." Kent Co. Prosecutor . 428 Mich. at 322, 409 N.W.2d 202 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Relevant to the instant matter, the Michigan Constitution contains a clause regarding the qualifications of an individual to serve as part of the state Legislature, including the state Senate: Each senator and representative must be a citizen of the United States, at least 21 years of age, and an elector of the district he represents. The removal of his domicile from the district shall be deemed a vacation of the office. No person who has been convicted of subversion or who has within the preceding 20 years been convicted of a felony involving a breach of public trust shall be eligible for either house of the legislature. [ Const. 1963, art. 4, § 7.] The Michigan Constitution identifies additional characteristics that disqualify someone from seeking public office: A person is ineligible for election or appointment to any state or local elective office of this state and ineligible to hold a position in public employment in this state that is policy-making or that has discretionary authority over public assets if, within the immediately preceding 20 years, the person was convicted of a felony involving dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or a breach of the public trust and the conviction was related to the person's official capacity while the person was holding any elective office or position of employment in local, state, or federal government. This requirement is in addition to any other qualification required under this constitution or by law. [ Const 1963, art 11, § 8.] Further, the Michigan Constitution states how a member of the state Senate can be forcibly removed from that position: Each house shall be the sole judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its members, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members elected thereto and serving therein, expel a member. The reasons for such expulsion shall be entered in the journal, with the votes and names of the members voting upon the question. No member shall be expelled a second time for the same cause. [ Const. 1963, art. 4, § 16.] The Michigan Constitution also expressly bars the executive branch of government, to which the prosecution belongs, People v. Conat , 238 Mich.App. 134, 150, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999), from expelling members of the other two branches of government: "[The governor] may remove or suspend from office for gross neglect of duty or for corrupt conduct in office, or for any other misfeasance or malfeasance therein, any elective or appointive state officer, except legislative or judicial, and shall report the reasons for such removal or suspension to the legislature." Const. 1963, art. 5, § 10. The language used in the state Constitution is clear: the Constitution specifically describes when an individual is ineligible to run for elective office, including as a state senator, and also reserves to the Legislature the right to determine when its own members should be expelled. The prosecution argues that the voluntary nature of defendant's decision regarding the plea agreement rendered the agreement constitutional, but such a view would allow the prosecution, a part of the executive branch, to do indirectly an act that the prosecution is specifically prohibited from doing directly. There are no Michigan cases that have addressed this issue. However, at least one federal court has considered a nearly identical issue. In United States v. Richmond , 550 F.Supp. 605, 606 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), the defendant, a member of Congress, entered into a plea agreement requiring that he immediately resign from Congress and withdraw as a candidate for re-election. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that the plea agreement provisions relating to his then current membership in Congress and his then candidacy for re-election were void because the provisions represented an unconstitutional interference by the executive branch of government with the legislative branch of government (a violation of the separation of powers), the provisions interfered with the rights of the defendant's constituents, and the provisions contravened public policy. Id . The imperative that the people are sovereign in a republican form of government "was embodied in the Constitution by prescribing only a limited number of qualifications for congressional office," and by empowering "the houses of Congress to discipline their members and in extreme cases to expel them by a two-thirds vote." Id . at 607. "It was the people of the Congressman's district who were to decide upon his moral and other qualifications, not Congress. A fortiori this inhibition applies to other branches of government." Id . As the Richmond Court explained, "[j]ust as Congress and the states are prohibited from interfering with the choice of the people for congressional office, federal prosecutors may not, directly or indirectly, subvert the people's choice or deny them the opportunity to vote for any candidate." Id . at 608. Similarly, though admittedly not directly on point, the state of Maryland also held that requiring an elected official to refrain from running for public office as a condition of his criminal sentence violated the separation of powers. In Leopold v. State , 216 Md.App. 586, 590,, 88 A.3d 860 (2014), the defendant, who held the elected position of county executive was convicted after a bench trial of two criminal charges. As part of his sentence, specifically as a special condition of probation, the trial court prohibited the defendant from "be[ing] a candidate for any local, state, or federal elected office." Id . (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals struck the special condition of probation because "there exists a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the eligibility and removal of public officials in Maryland," id. at 613, 88 A.3d 860, and "the separation of powers precludes trial courts from interfering in areas where the Legislature left the question of eligibility on who may seek elected office to the County Council and the General Assembly." Id . at 611, 88 A.3d 860 (quotation marks omitted). While the prosecution asserts that forcing an individual out of office is quite different from the voluntary resignation that was to occur in this case, the Richmond Court found it of no matter that the defendant had voluntarily consented to the plea agreement, stating that "[t]he constitutional protections of legislators and candidates exist not for their personal benefit but to safeguard the rights of the people. A member of Congress may not barter away constitutional protections which belong not to him but to his constituents." Richmond , 550 F.Supp. at 609 (citations omitted). Further, public policy considerations are significant when plea negotiations involve elected offices. "Even [arm's-length] negotiated commercial contracts between persons of equal power are void if they offend public policy." Id. . The Richmond court further explained: The possibility of the executive utilizing the threat of prosecution to force the resignation of a congressional representative involves potentially dangerous political consequences. It represents an opportunity for an assault on the composition and integrity of a coordinate branch of government. Taken together, investigative techniques such as those used in the Abscam cases, see United States v. Myers , 688 F.2d 817 (2d Cir.1982), the enormous spectrum of criminal laws that can be violated, the powerful investigative and prosecutorial machine available to the executive, and forced resignations through plea bargaining would provide an intolerable threat to a free and independent Congress. [ Richmond , 550 F.Supp. at 608 ]. We find the reasoning in Richmond persuasive, despite the dissent's position that the case was "wrongly" decided by the federal bench charged with making the decision. It is particularly compelling in light of the substantial similarities between that case and the instant matter. In both the instant case and Richmond , the constitution in question provides a singular manner by which a sitting member can be removed from office. In both cases, the remedy was for two-thirds of the members of the body to which the person had been elected to vote for the member's expulsion. Id. at 607. Indeed, the Michigan Constitution contains an additional clause not considered by the Richmond court that specifically bars the executive branch from removing members of the legislative branch. Const. 1963, art. 5, § 10. Likewise, the Richmond case and the present case both involve constitutional provisions that set out an exhaustive list of requirements and disqualifiers for a person seeking a position in the legislature. In Richmond , there were age, residency, and citizenship requirements, as well as criminal and similar disqualifiers. Similarly, in the present case, the Michigan Constitution contains a list of requirements for a person seeking a state Senate seat, including that the person "be a citizen of the United States, at least 21 years of age, and an elector of the district he represents." Const. 1963, art. 4, § 7. Additionally, the Michigan Constitution lists the types of felonies that disqualify someone from seeking a state Senate seat. Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8 ; Const. 1963, art. 4, § 7. Notably, that list does not include the crime for which defendant was convicted. And in Richmond and in this case, both defendants voluntarily entered into plea agreements with provisions concerning their elected seats. By requiring defendant to resign from his state Senate seat as part of the plea bargain, the prosecution attempted to punish and expel a member of the state Senate, actions that are reserved solely for the Legislature. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 16. Because that authority was assigned to the Legislature alone, the prosecution's offering of that plea-agreement term was an unconstitutional attempt to violate the separation of powers. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. When the prosecution included in the plea bargain the requirement that defendant not seek public office during his five-year probationary period, the prosecution invaded the right of defendant's constituents to "decide upon his moral and other qualifications" when defendant's crimes did not specifically disqualify him under Const. 1963, art. 11, § 8, and Const. 1963, art. 4, § 7. Richmond , 550 F.Supp. at 607. Likewise, if the judiciary were to enter orders with plea conditions like those at issue here, even upon the agreement of the parties, the judiciary would be providing its tacit approval of the terms of the agreement, which would violate the Michigan Constitution. See Richmond , 550 F.Supp. at 609. As the Richmond court held, allowing the prosecution to engage in such negotiations permits the threat of prosecution and the possibility of imprisonment to be used for nefarious purposes. Tacit permission for prosecutors to engage in such negotiations, even if done innocently at the time, could open the door for the executive branch to use its power of prosecution (and the threat of imprisonment) to remove from elected office those officials who do not align with the political preferences of the executive branch. Indeed, in the present case, the dangers of this practice were specifically observed in defendant's response to the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea. In response to the prosecution's motion, defendant argued that while he believed the trial court should not vacate the plea, if it intended to do so, he wanted the opportunity to fulfill the terms of the plea agreement to avoid potential prosecution and imprisonment. As can be seen, the mere possibility of prosecution and prison time resulted in defendant's seeking to abandon his state Senate seat to avoid those possibilities. That is just the issue about which the trial court, defendant, and the Richmond court expressed concern. "Availability of the technique and the possibilities of its abuse cannot be tolerated." Id. . Further, "[t]he prosecutorial practice of dealing in legislative office in negotiations with congressional defendants must be arrested before its potential for abuse is realized." Id . In affirming the trial court's decision to strike those terms from the plea agreement, this Court will ensure that future prosecutors are aware of the unconditional nature of such negotiations and that the possibility that prosecutors will abuse the plea process will be diminished. There is no question that public officials can, and do, voluntarily resign from office for a variety of reasons. For the dissent to suggest that our decision and reasoning necessarily indicate that public officials can never voluntarily resign is nonsensical. An individual's voluntary resignation from public office by that individual's own volition, without a threat of criminal charges being used to compel the resignation, is a drastically different situation than the one before us today. When another branch of government, like the executive branch, uses resignation from public office as a bargaining tool, the public office held sheds its cloak of public service and becomes one of service personal to the officeholder and the other branch of government. It diminishes the nature and purpose of the public office and reduces it to a simple tool used solely to better or worsen an officeholder's position in the criminal justice system. In addition, as the dissent points out, "[a]n elected officeholder should be treated no differently than any other citizen" as it relates to plea negotiations. If resignation from public office is used as a potential plea-negotiation tool, that equality is gone and the executive branch is effectively recognizing a second class of citizens-an elected class with an additional advantage with which to bargain. Moreover, in the present case, the fact that defendant was willing to voluntarily relinquish his state Senate seat and to refrain from seeking public office during probation is entirely irrelevant to the issue presented here. Defendant did not have the constitutional right to use his elected office as a bargaining chip because the constitutional rights associated with his office were not for his individual benefit but for the benefit of the people who elected him. Allowing the prosecution to engage in this type of negotiation (using prosecution and possible imprisonment in exchange for a resignation and a promise not to seek elected office) and then call the agreement "voluntary" falls well within the problem of coercion about which the Richmond court expressed concern. We have the same concern. Therefore, the prosecution's argument in that vein is without merit. The trial court properly determined that the terms of the plea agreement requiring defendant to resign from his state Senate seat and to not seek public office for five years were unconstitutional. The trial court properly struck those portions of the plea agreement before entering the judgment of sentence. That being the case, we must next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea agreement. Pursuant to MCR 6.310(E), "[o]n the prosecutor's motion, the court may vacate a plea if the defendant has failed to comply with the terms of a plea agreement." This Court has held that "the prosecutor has an equal right to withdraw from a plea agreement" because "the people, no less than the defendant, should be able to receive the benefit of the agreed-upon bargain[.]" People v. Siebert , 201 Mich.App. 402, 413, 507 N.W.2d 211 (1993). " 'The authority of a prosecutor to make bargains with defendants has long been recognized as an essential component of the efficient administration of justice.' " People v. Martinez , 307 Mich.App. 641, 651, 861 N.W.2d 905 (2014), quoting People v. Jackson , 192 Mich.App. 10, 14-15, 480 N.W.2d 283 (1991). "In light of the prosecutor's expansive powers and the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the judicial system, agreements between defendants and prosecutors affecting the disposition of criminal charges must be reviewed within the context of their function to serve the administration of criminal justice." Jackson , 192 Mich.App. at 15, 480 N.W.2d 283. "[W]hile analogous to a contract, plea bargains are not governed by the standards of commerce but must comport with the interests of justice in the administration of criminal laws." Martinez , 307 Mich.App. at 651, 861 N.W.2d 905. "In other words, contractual theories will not be applied if to do so would subvert the ends of justice." People v. Swirles (After Remand) , 218 Mich.App. 133, 135, 553 N.W.2d 357 (1996). Consonant with the law just cited, the question this Court must consider is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that permitting the prosecution to withdraw the plea would "subvert the ends of justice." Id. at 135. We find that voiding the portions of the plea agreement that were unconstitutional while accepting the rest of the agreement "serve[d] the administration of criminal justice." Jackson , 192 Mich.App. at 15, 480 N.W.2d 283. As previously discussed, the prosecution's proposition was dangerous. It offered to forgo the prosecution of crimes that could ultimately result in at least two years of imprisonment (given the felony-firearm charge) in exchange for, among other things, defendant's resigning his state Senate seat and refraining from holding public office. Not only was the offer unconstitutional, it also carried with it the possibility of abuse by future prosecutors. It is not hard to extend the scope of the prosecution's actions in this case to include a situation in which a prosecutor might go on a fishing expedition against a political opponent, threaten to charge the opponent with serious felonies, and then provide a "voluntary" escape from the threat by conditioning the escape on the opponent's agreement to give up his or her position in the Legislature and to not run in the future. Allowing the prosecution in the present case to make that offer, reach an agreement, and then simply have another chance at negotiation after the trial court struck the unconstitutional parts of the agreement would send the wrong message. If a prosecutor is aware that using the threat of criminal charges against a member of the legislative branch will only be punished by allowing the prosecutor to go back to the negotiating table after the courts discover the wrongdoing, there will be little impetus to stop the practice. Losing the benefit of the bargain after making such an agreement, however, would send the message that these actions, which involve unconstitutional coercion, are better to be avoided entirely. Given that analysis, it is logical to conclude that the trial court's order refusing to allow the prosecution to vacate the plea was entered in order to "serve the administration of criminal justice." Jackson , 192 Mich.App. at 15, 480 N.W.2d 283. Deciding otherwise would send a clear message to the prosecution that making such an agreement only carries the risk of having to start over with the negotiations. Additionally, in the present case (and it is not hard to see similar circumstances in future cases) defendant was in a much worse bargaining position after the plea was accepted by the trial court. The prosecution then knew that defendant was willing to make a plea, defendant revealed the location of the weapon used during the crime as a condition of the plea, and defendant has since voluntarily resigned his state Senate seat. Permitting the prosecution to go back to the negotiating table with such advantages after it entered an unconstitutional plea agreement would undoubtedly "subvert the ends of justice." Swirles , 218 Mich.App. at 135, 553 N.W.2d 357. Also of importance, defendant was not left entirely unpunished as a result of the trial court's decision. Defendant was still required to serve (and did serve) 10 months in the Wayne County Jail without the possibility of early release and five years of probation, in addition, defendant is required to submit to alcohol and drug treatment with monthly documentation, had to submit to a mental health evaluation and fully comply with treatment, and pay full restitution. This Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the prosecution's motion to vacate the plea. Affirmed. M. J. Kelly, J., concurred with Servitto, J. We note that despite the trial court's rulings, defendant in fact voluntarily resigned from his seat in the Michigan Senate effective April 12, 2016. Although defendant previously argued that the trial court's vacating the portion of the plea agreement requiring him to not seek elected office during his five-year probationary period was not yet ripe for review, it has come to our attention that defendant is currently running for a public office. Moreover, even if he were not, there is an "actual, existing controversy" because the trial court's act of striking certain terms from the plea agreement as unconstitutional, while approving the rest of the agreement, formed a "real and immediate threat" to the prosecution's interest. See, People v. Conat , 238 Mich.App. 134, 145, 605 N.W.2d 49 (1999). The dissent lightly dismisses the potential of prosecutors misusing the office (e.g., referring to "public policy doomsday hyperbole" and "the imaginary specter of prosecutors running amok"). However, we would be remiss if we did not point out that this Court was made aware that in direct response to this case, the Wayne County Prosecutor's office, at least temporarily, instituted a policy of "no plea offers" to all defendants appearing before the trial court judge assigned to the instant matter. This conduct not only raises constitutional implications, it firmly establishes that the executive branch does, in fact, have the ability and potential to use its power in ways that are contrary to public policy.

Per Curiam. Plaintiff, Gary Nitzkin, appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order affirming the district court's orders granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Guardian Alarm Company of Michigan and Robert Craig, also known as Law Offices of Robert M. Craig & Associates. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. BASIC FACTS In October 2015, Nitzkin received a collection letter with the letterhead of the "Law Offices of Robert M. Craig & Associates." The letter indicated that he owed Guardian $25.16, and it stated: My client, Guardian Alarm Company, has turned the above account over to me for collection. Unless the validity of this debt is disputed in writing within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notice, this debt will be assumed to be valid by Guardian Alarm. If this debt is disputed, or any portion thereof, you may receive a verification of the debt or a copy of any court judgment against you by notifying the undersigned in writing at the above address of the disputed amount and requesting a verification of the debt. If the debt is owed to a creditor different than the original creditor, you may obtain the name and address of the original creditor by making a written request within thirty (30) days of receipt of this notification. Certainly, you can see the benefit of settling this dispute in an amicable manner. We do not feel it was your intention to allow this matter to escalate to the current situation. Let's work together to resolve this matter to everyone's satisfaction. This letter is being sent to you with the intent to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. The letter was purportedly written by "Joan Green," who was identified on the letter as a legal assistant. Nitzkin, a debt-collection lawyer, believed that the letter was sent in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 USC 1692 et seq ., and he filed a complaint against Guardian, Craig, and Green alleging several violations of the Act. Following discovery, Guardian moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that because it was not a "debt collector" as that term is defined by the FDCPA, it was not subject to the requirements of the FDCPA. Craig also moved for summary disposition. Like Guardian, he asserted that he was not a "debt collector," so he could not violate the FDCPA. Alternatively, he contended that even if he had violated the FDCPA, his violation was excused under the Act's "bona fide error" provision. The district court granted Guardian's motion for summary disposition, concluding that Guardian was a creditor, not a debt collector. And, although it concluded that Craig was a debt collector, the court stated that any violation of the FDCPA was excused because there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the bona-fide-error defense was applicable. Nitzkin appealed in the circuit court, which affirmed the district court and dismissed Nitzkin's appeal. II. REVIEW BY CIRCUIT COURT A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Nitzkin first argues that the circuit court applied the wrong standard of review when it evaluated his appeal. Whether a court applied the correct standard of review is a question of law, which we review de novo on appeal. See Pierron v. Pierron , 282 Mich. App. 222, 243, 765 N.W.2d 345 (2009). B. ANALYSIS The circuit court in this case stated near the end of its oral ruling that it was "satisfied" that the district court did not abuse its discretion when granting summary disposition to Guardian and Craig. Challenges to a court's decision to grant or deny summary disposition are reviewed de novo. Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Gates Performance Engineering, Inc. , 285 Mich. App. 362, 369, 775 N.W.2d 618 (2009). The mere fact that the court recited the wrong standard is not dispositive, however. When it began its ruling, the court stated that it was conducting a de novo review. It also noted that its review of the case and the briefs led it to its conclusion that summary disposition had been properly granted in Guardian's and Craig's favor. Thus, although the court inadvertently recited the wrong standard at the conclusion of its ruling, given that it started with the correct standard and indicated that it had, in fact, conducted a de novo review of the case, we discern no error requiring reversal. III. SUMMARY DISPOSITION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW Nitzkin argues that the circuit court erred by affirming the district court orders granting summary disposition in favor of Craig and Guardian. He also asserts that the district court erred by not granting summary disposition in his favor under MCR 2.116(I). We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg. Co., Inc. , 285 Mich. App. at 369, 775 N.W.2d 618. B. ANALYSIS 1. APPLICABILITY TO THE FDCPA TO GUARDIAN AND CRAIG The FDCPA does not apply to every attempt by a creditor to collect a debt from a debtor. Instead, it applies when a "debt collector" is attempting to collect a debt from a "consumer." This is made clear in 15 USC 1692, wherein Congress explains that the purpose of the FDCPA is "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors , to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." (Emphasis added.) "To further these ends, the FDCPA 'establishes certain rights for consumers whose debts are placed in the hands of professional debt collectors for collection.' " Vincent v. The Money Store , 736 F.3d 88, 96 (C.A. 2, 2013), quoting DeSantis v.Computer Credit, Inc. , 269 F.3d 159 (C.A. 2, 2001). Thus, because the FDCPA regulates the conduct of "debt collectors" as that term is defined by the FDCPA, our first inquiry is whether Guardian and Craig are "debt collectors" under the Act. As relevant to the claim against Guardian, the term "debt collector" is defined by 15 USC 1692a(6) as follows: The term "debt collector" means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include- * * * (F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i ) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii ) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii ) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv ) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor. [Emphasis added.] Under this definition, Guardian is a "debt collector" if (1) it is a creditor, (2) collecting its own debts, (3) while using any name other than its own that indicates a third party is collecting or attempting to collect the debt, and (4) none of the exclusions in § 1692a(6)(F) applies. See also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc. , 817 F.3d 131, 136 (C.A. 4, 2016) (noting that the definition of "debt collector" includes "a person who collects its own debts , using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector."). The term "creditor" is defined by 15 USC 1692a(4), which provides that a creditor is "any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed...." In this case, it is undisputed that Guardian extended credit to Nitzkin and that the extension of credit created a debt. So the first requirement of the above definition of a debt collector is met. With regard to the second and third requirements, the letter and Craig's deposition testimony make it clear that Guardian was collecting a debt owed to it while using the name of another. At the outset, the letter was sent to collect a debt owed to Guardian. Further, the letterhead indicated that the letter was sent from the "Law Offices of Robert M. Craig & Associates" and was signed by Joan Green, a legal assistant. Craig testified at his deposition that at all times relevant to this lawsuit, he worked as general or in-house counsel for Guardian. He explained that Guardian signed his paycheck, which was made payable to him as an individual. He also stated that the "Law Offices of Robert M. Craig & Associates" was not a separate legal entity as it was just a name he used to do business while employed by Guardian. Although Guardian's name appeared on the letter, the letter referred to Guardian as a "client" of the Law Office or Green, which suggests a separation of identity. Further, the letter stated that Nitzkin's account with Guardian was "turned ... over" to the Law Offices/Green, which again suggests that Guardian and the individual attempting to collect the debt were different entities. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to Nitzkin, the nonmoving party, Guardian attempted to collect a debt owed to it while using the name of another. The second and third requirements are, therefore, satisfied. Finally, the fourth requirement is that the exclusion in § 1692a(6)(F) does not apply. Here, there is no evidence or suggestion that any of the situations set forth in that provision apply. Despite Guardian's meeting the definition of "debt collector" in 15 USC 1692a(6), the district court relied on a statement in Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB , 681 F.3d 355, 359 (C.A. 6, 2012) for the proposition that the terms "creditor" and "debt collector" are mutually exclusive. The court then concluded that because Guardian satisfied the definition of "creditor" in 15 USC 1692a(4), it could not also be a "debt collector" under 15 USC 1692a(6). However, in context, the Bridge Court explained that "as to a specific debt, one cannot be both a 'creditor' and a 'debt collector,' as defined in the FDCPA, because those terms are mutually exclusive." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, because the more specific statutory language in § 1692a(6) applies, Guardian is properly considered a debt collector, not a creditor, when evaluating the specific debt at issue. To hold otherwise would be to render nugatory the provision in § 1692a(6) that expressly provides that a creditor is a debt collector under specific circumstances. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 466 Mich. 142, 146, 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002) (stating that we must interpret statutory language so as to avoid rendering any portion of that statutory surplusage or nugatory). See also Maguire v. Citicorp. Retail Servs., Inc. , 147 F.3d 232, 235 (C.A. 2, 1998) ("As a general matter, creditors are not subject to the FDCPA. However, a creditor becomes subject to the FDCPA if the creditor in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the district court erred by granting summary disposition to Guardian on the basis that Guardian was not a debt collector under the FDCPA. We also reject Craig's contention that he is not properly considered a debt collector under the FDCPA. Although Craig was an employee of Guardian at the time the October 2015 letter was sent, and even though Craig testified that he did not personally attempt to collect the $25.16 debt from Nitzkin, Craig testified that he was partially involved in collecting debts for Guardian. He explained that as part of his work at Guardian, he acquired a form collection letter from a lawyer "who [did] nothing but collections" and that he approved that letter to be used to collect debts from individuals who owed between $250 and $500 to Guardian. When shown a copy of the October 2015 letter sent to Nitzkin, he agreed that the letter appeared to match the paragraphs in the form collection letter that he had approved for use by Guardian to collect debts. Therefore, when the October 2015 collection letter was sent, it was sent by Craig's "law office" on a form that he approved in order to collect a debt owed to Guardian. This satisfies the definition of "debt collector" because Craig is someone who regularly, albeit indirectly, attempted to collect a debt owed or due to another. See 15 USC 1692a(6). Craig argues, however, that despite meeting the general definition in 15 USC 1692a(6), he is excluded from the definition of "debt collector" by 15 USC 1692a(6)(A) and (B), which provide that a person is not a debt collector if that person is: (A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor; (B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts[.] However, Subdivision (A) is inapplicable because, although Craig was employed by Guardian, he was not collecting a debt for Guardian using Guardian's name. In addition, Subdivision (B) is inapplicable because, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has observed, 15 USC 1692a(6)(B) refers to artificial persons, because "[n]atural persons are not related or affiliated in those ways." Anarion Investments LLC v. Carrington Mtg. Servs., LLC , 794 F.3d 568, 569 (C.A. 6, 2015). See also Cruz v. Int'l Collection Corp. , 673 F.3d 991, 999 (C.A. 9, 2012) (explaining that the employee of a debt collector may be held liable for violations of the FDCPA if the employee independently meets the definition of the term "debt collector"), and Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, LP , 225 F.3d 379, 404 (C.A. 3, 2000) (stating that "vicarious liability under the FDCPA will be imposed for an attorney's violations of the FDCPA if both the attorney and the client are debt collectors") (quotations marks and citations omitted). Thus, contrary to Craig's argument on appeal, the district court properly determined that Craig is a debt collector. 2. BONA FIDE ERROR Nitzkin argues that the district court erred by granting summary disposition to Craig on the basis that even if he violated the FDCPA, his violations were excused under the "bona fide error" provision in 15 USC 1692k(c). That provision precludes liability "if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." 15 USC 1692k(c). Stated differently, the debt collector must show (1) that its violation resulted from unintentional conduct, Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA , 559 U.S. 573, 584, 130 S.Ct. 1605, 176 L.Ed.2d 519 (2010) ; (2) that the violation resulted from a "bona fide error," i.e. from a "clerical or factual mistake[ ]," id . at 587, 130 S.Ct. 1605 ; and (3) that the debt collector maintained "procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such [clerical or factual] error[s]," id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Craig argues that any violations he committed were unintentional because he was wholly uninvolved in sending the collection letter to Nitzkin. He testified that he did not draft the letter, did not approve it, and would not have approved it if it had been shown to him before being sent to Nitzkin. He further testified that the "policy" of Guardian was to not send the collection letter for debts under $250, so the letter in this case ought to have never been sent in the first place. However, Craig has not shown that his alleged violation resulted from a bona fide error, i.e., a clerical or factual mistake. See id . at 587, 130 S.Ct. 1605. Although there is testimony that sending the October 2015 letter violated Guardian's debt-collection policy, Craig has not explained how intentionally sending a letter is a clerical or factual mistake. Moreover, Craig has failed to show that he or Guardian maintained "procedures reasonably adapted to avoid" errors that would result in this type of violation. Indeed, he only testified that there were "policies" against sending collection letters to collect debts less than $250, but he offered no testimony about what steps were taken to ensure that those procedures would prevent the type of error that allegedly occurred in this case. In Leeb v. Nationwide Credit Corp. , 806 F.3d 895, 900 (C.A. 7, 2015), the Seventh Circuit rejected a similar argument, reasoning: Nationwide next argues that it maintained adequate procedures because sending the January 5 letter was against its "policy." But Jerman instructs that "procedures" are "processes that have mechanical or other such regular orderly steps...." [ Jerman , 559 U.S. at 587, 130 S.Ct. 1605] (internal quotation marks omitted). Nationwide does not argue that its "policy" told its employee what she should have done, much less that the policy gave her any "mechanical" or "regular orderly" steps to follow. Following Jerman's instruction, we reject the argument that a thinly specified "policy," allegedly barring some action but saying nothing about what action to take, is an adequate "procedure" under § 1692k(c). We agree with the reasoning in Leeb and conclude that Craig has failed to show that his alleged FDCPA violation should be excused under § 1692k(c). Consequently, the district court erred by granting summary disposition to Craig on the basis that the bona-fide-error defense excused any violation of the FDCPA that he might have committed. 3. DAMAGES Craig and Guardian both suggest that we should affirm the district court's orders granting them summary disposition because Nitzkin has no actual damages. However, a consumer filing suit under the FDCPA need not establish that he or she suffered actual damages. As explained in Wise v. Zwicker & Assoc., PC , 780 F.3d 710, 713 (C.A. 6, 2015), "[u]nder the FDCPA, a plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent to establish liability, nor must he show actual damages, which places the risk of penalties on the debt collector that engages in activities which are not entirely lawful, rather than exposing consumers to unlawful debt-collector behavior without a possibility for relief." (Quotation marks and citation omitted). Still, we note that [w]hen an alleged violation is trivial, the "actual damage[s]" sustained, § 1692k(a)(1), will likely be de minimis or even zero. The Act sets a cap on "additional" damages, § 1692k(a)(2), and vests courts with discretion to adjust such damages where a violation is based on a good-faith error, § 1692k(b).... The statute does contemplate an award of costs and "a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court" in the case of "any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability." § 1692k(a)(3). But courts have discretion in calculating reasonable attorney's fees under this statute, and § 1692k(a)(3) authorizes courts to award attorney's fees to the defendant if a plaintiff's suit "was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment." [ Jerman , 559 U.S. at 597-599, 130 S.Ct. 1605.] 4. MCR 2.116(I) Finally, Nitzkin contends that the district court erred by denying his motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I). Although the district court did not address this issue, it was raised before the district court and is an issue of law for which all the necessary facts are present. See Poch v. Anderson , 229 Mich. App. 40, 52, 580 N.W.2d 456 (1998). When evaluating whether the FDCPA has been violated, "the conduct is viewed through the eyes of the 'least sophisticated consumer.' " Currier v. First Resolution Investment Corp. , 762 F.3d 529, 533 (C.A. 6, 2014). "This standard recognizes that the FDCPA protects the gullible and the shrewd alike while simultaneously presuming a basic level of reasonableness and understanding on the part of the debtor, thus preventing liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of debt collection notices." Id . Nitzkin contends that the collection letter he received violated the notice provision in 15 USC 1692g(a), which provides in relevant part: Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing- * * * (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector[.] Nitzkin contends that § 1692g(a)(3) was violated because the letter stated that he had to dispute the debt "in writing within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice" or the debt would be assumed valid. In Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc. , 741 F.3d 487, 488-489 (C.A. 4, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was asked to determine whether a debt collector violated § 1692g(a)(3) by requiring a consumer to dispute a debt in writing. The Clark Court noted that the federal circuit courts were split on the issue: The Third Circuit has held that section 1692g(a)(3) must be read to include a writing requirement, finding any other reading contrary to the purposes of the FDCPA. See Graziano v. Harrison , 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir.1991). In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits have found that the plain text of section 1692g(a)(3) permits oral disputes, and that such a reading results in a logical, bifurcated scheme of consumer rights. See Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC , 717 F.3d 282 (2d Cir.2013) ; Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc. , 430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir.2005). [ Clark , 741 F.3d at 490.] The Clark Court then reasoned: In line with the Second and Ninth Circuits, we find that the FDCPA clearly defines communications between a debt collector and consumers. Sections 1692g(a)(4), 1692g(a)(5), and 1692g(b) explicitly require written communication, whereas section 1692g(a)(3) plainly does not. [The debt collector] asks that we disregard the statutory text to read into it words that are not there. We decline to do so. "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). [ Id . at 490-491.] We agree with the Clark Court that the statutory language indicates that Congress intended a consumer to be able to orally dispute a debt under § 1692g(a)(3). Accordingly, because the October 2015 collection letter expressly required Nitzkin to dispute the validity of the debt in writing, it violated § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA. Nitzkin next argues that the October 2015 collection letter violates § 1692g(a)(4) of the FDCPA, which provides that notice to the consumer must include a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector[.] Nitzkin contends that this section is violated because the letter states: "If this debt is disputed, or any portion thereof, you may receive a verification of the debt or a copy of any court judgment against you by notifying the undersigned in writing at the above address of the disputed amount and requesting a verification of the debt." He argues that this is insufficient notice under § 1692g(a)(4) because it does not state that, in order to receive verification, the consumer must notify the debt collector in writing within 30 days . Although the 30-day deadline is set forth in the sentences before and after the challenged sentence, the least sophisticated consumer could arguably conclude that the 30-day deadline applies only to the rights set forth in the other sentences. Alternatively, because that is the only deadline stated in the letter, a consumer could also determine that everything it does must be done within the 30-day deadline, especially given that the 30-day deadline is twice stated in the letter. Although one of those interpretations would, technically, lead to compliance with § 1692g(a)(5), to the extent that the letter could be interpreted as permitting a consumer to request verification either with or without regard to the 30-day deadline, the collection letter violates the FDCPA. See Russell v. Equifax ARS , 74 F.3d 30, 35 (C.A. 2, 1996) ("[A] collection notice is deceptive when it can be reasonably read to have two or more different meanings, one of which is inaccurate."). Finally, Nitzkin argues that the collection letter violates § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA, which provides: A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: * * * (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. Nitzkin asserts that the October 2015 letter threatened to file a lawsuit because it stated: "Certainly, you can see the benefit of settling this dispute in an amicable manner." Nitzkin points out that, although the letter threatens to take legal action, Craig testified that neither he nor Guardian would file a lawsuit over a $25.16 debt. We conclude, however, that the vague language in the letter would not lead the least sophisticated consumer to believe that his failure to settle a $25.16 debt would cause the debt collector to file suit against him. Accordingly, we conclude that Nitzkin has not established that Guardian and Craig violated § 1692g(a)(5). Nevertheless, because Nitzkin established that there is no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Guardian and Craig violated at least some provisions of the FDCPA, we direct the district court to enter an order granting Nitzkin summary disposition on his claims against Craig and Guardian. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated in this opinion, we reverse the circuit court's order affirming the grants of summary disposition to Guardian and Craig and remand to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court is directed to enter an order of summary disposition in Nitzkin's favor against Craig and Guardian. The court shall independently address the issue of damages. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. Nitzkin may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219(A). BECKERING, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and O'BRIEN, JJ., concurred. Nitzkin v. Craig , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered August 30, 2017 (Docket No. 337744). Craig initially failed to respond to the complaint, and a default was entered against him. The district court, however, granted Craig's motion to have the default set aside. The default and the district court's decision to set it aside have not been challenged on appeal. Green has been dismissed from the case and is no longer a party. "While the decisions of federal circuit courts are not binding, they may be persuasive." Glenn v. TPI Petroleum, Inc. , 305 Mich. App. 698, 716 n. 5, 854 N.W.2d 509 (2014). In Leeb , the Seventh Circuit noted that "[d]etermining whether a debt collector's 'procedures' are 'reasonably adapted' to avoid errors is [sic] 'is a uniquely fact-bound inquiry susceptible of few broad, generally applicable rules of law.' " Leeb , 806 F.3d at 900 n. 3 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree. Accordingly, we only hold that, on the particular facts currently before this Court, Craig has failed to meet his burden under § 1692k(c). Given our resolution, we decline to address Nitzkin's argument that Craig waived the bona-fide-error defense by failing to properly raise it as an affirmative defense under MCR 2.111(F).

Borrello, P.J. Intervenor-appellant, the Michigan Parole Board (the Board), appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order reversing the Board's grant of parole to defendant, Ronald Neil Spears. The circuit court's order was entered after appellee, the Monroe County prosecutor (the prosecutor), appealed by leave granted the Board's grant of parole to defendant in the circuit court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for entry of an order reinstating parole. I. BACKGROUND This appeal arises from defendant's 2006 plea of nolo contendere to one count of malicious destruction of a building between $1,000 and $20,000, MCL 750.380(3)(a). Defendant was sentenced, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 92 to 450 months' imprisonment for his conviction. The Board initially granted defendant parole in 2014; however, the Board rescinded its grant of parole after the prosecutor sought leave to appeal the Board's decision in the circuit court. The Board granted defendant parole again in early 2016; however, following an appeal by the prosecutor, the circuit court ruled that the Board violated its duty to consider all relevant facts before granting defendant parole because the Board failed "to prepare a current and meaningful transition accountability plan," otherwise known as a "TAP," and therefore, the circuit court reversed the Board's grant of parole. In 2017, the Board again granted parole to defendant, and again, the prosecutor sought leave to appeal the Board's grant of parole. The circuit court granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal and ultimately entered an order reversing the Board's grant of parole to defendant. In its order, the circuit court took issue with defendant's "2014 TAP" because it was "almost identical" to defendant's "2013 TAP," which the circuit court had previously held was "neither current nor robust" when the circuit court reversed the Board's 2016 grant of parole to defendant. The circuit court went on to explain that in its 2016 order, it reversed the Board's grant of parole to defendant because the Board had "violated Michigan Administrative Code, Rule 791.7715(1)(2) [sic], [by] failing to consider a proper TAP ...." Therefore, the circuit court ruled that "[t]he matter before [it] [was] for all intents and purposes identical to that which was ruled upon by [the circuit court]" in 2016, and that the Board had "failed to consider a current and meaningful TAP despite the requirements of In re Heger [sic] and public acts [sic] 245 of 208 [sic]." The Board then sought leave to appeal in this Court, which, as previously indicated, was granted. II. ANALYSIS On appeal, the Board argues that the circuit court erred when it made de novo findings of fact, specifically, that defendant's 2014 TAP was "insufficient" without specifying any particularized defects in that document. Further, the Board contends that defendant's 2014 TAP identifies needs and goals that were taken from "the COMPAS instrument," otherwise known as a Corrections Offender Management Program for Alternative Sanctions report, and that defendant's program recommendations and completed programs are tasks that are detailed on defendant's CSX-175 form, a form that is also designated as "the 'Program Classification Report (TAP).' " Moreover, the Board contends that the circuit court failed to articulate a standard by which a TAP could be determined to be "meaningful." And, the Board further argues, despite the circuit court's characterization that the 2014 TAP was not current, the 2014 TAP was updated with the relevant "programming information." Therefore, the Board concludes, the circuit court erred when it held that the Board had violated Mich. Admin. Code, R 791.7715(2)(c)(iii). The prosecutor contends that the circuit court acted properly when it reversed the Board's grant of parole because, among other reasons, the Board violated its duty to consider all relevant facts and circumstances when it failed to "consider a current and meaningful" TAP. The prosecutor also argues that a CSX-175 form is not a TAP and that even if this Court were to consider it as such, then that form is not a current, meaningful, or robust TAP that meets the requirements as set forth by this Court in In re Parole of Elias , 294 Mich. App. 507, 538, 811 N.W.2d 541 (2011). "Judicial review of the Board's decision to grant parole is limited to the abuse-of-discretion standard." Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Id. "Either the prosecutor or the victim of an offense may appeal in the circuit court when the Board grants a prisoner parole." Id. , citing MCL 791.234(11) and Morales v. Parole Bd. , 260 Mich. App. 29, 35, 676 N.W.2d 221 (2003). The prosecutor, as the challenging party, "has the burden to show either that the Board's decision was 'a clear abuse of discretion' or was 'in violation of the Michigan Constitution, a statute, an administrative rule, or a written agency regulation.' " Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 538, 811 N.W.2d 541, quoting MCR 7.104(D)(5). Additionally, "a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Board." Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 538-539, 811 N.W.2d 541. Generally, " 'matters of parole lie solely within the broad discretion of the [Board] ....' " Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 521, 811 N.W.2d 541, quoting Jones v. Dep't of Corrections , 468 Mich. 646, 652, 664 N.W.2d 717 (2003) (alteration in original). The Board should consider a prisoner's sentencing offense when determining whether to grant parole to a prisoner, but "the Board must also look to the prisoner's rehabilitation and evolution throughout his or her incarceration." Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 544, 811 N.W.2d 541. However, "the Legislature has clearly imposed certain statutory restrictions on the Board's exercise of its discretion." Id. at 521-522, 811 N.W.2d 541. "Statutorily mandated parole guidelines form the backbone of the parole-decision process." Id . at 512, 811 N.W.2d 541. Caselaw derived from statutory authority holds that the Board may not "grant parole unless it 'has satisfactory evidence that arrangements have been made for ... employment ..., for the prisoner's education, or for the prisoner's care if the prisoner is mentally or physically ill or incapacitated.' " Id. at 522, quoting MCL 791.233(1)(e). Further, " '[a] prisoner shall not be given liberty on parole until the board has reasonable assurance, after consideration of all of the facts and circumstances, including the prisoner's mental and social attitude, that the prisoner will not become a menace to society or to the public safety.' " Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 522, 811 N.W.2d 541, quoting MCL 791.233(1)(a) (alteration in original). "The [Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC) ] regulations further direct the Board to consider 'all relevant facts and circumstances, including the prisoner's probability of parole as determined by the parole guidelines ....' " In re Parole of Haeger , 294 Mich. App. 549, 554, 813 N.W.2d 313 (2011), quoting Mich. Admin. Code, R 791.7715(1). " Mich. Admin. Code, R 791.7715(2)(c)(iii) provides that the Board may consider a prisoner's 'readiness for release' as evinced by his or her '[d]evelopment of a suitable and realistic parole plan.' " Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 576, 813 N.W.2d 313, quoting Mich. Admin. Code, R 791.7715(2)(c)(iii) (alteration in original). At the time this Court decided Haeger we noted that "the DOC recently implemented the Michigan Prisoner ReEntry Initiative (MPRI), which [was] designed to promote public safety and reduce the likelihood of parolee recidivism" and to improve "decision making at critical decision points," including "when the Board is considering whether to release a prisoner from incarceration on parole." Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 555, 813 N.W.2d 313, quoting Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 519, 811 N.W.2d 541, and DOC Policy Directive 03.02.100, ¶ C, p. 1 (quotation marks omitted). Thus: Under the MPRI, the DOC and the Board are now required to prepare and consider additional reports, in particular the transition accountability plan TAP [sic]. The TAP "succinctly describe[s] ... exactly what is expected for offender success." The MPRI Model: Policy Statements and Recommendations, Michigan Prisoner ReEntry Initiative, January 2006, p. 5. A DOC staff member "must formulate a TAP with each prisoner, mostly to assist the prisoner's reentry into society, but also to assist the Board in rendering its parole decision." Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 519-520, 811 N.W.2d 541. The TAP analyzes the prisoner's risk factors, sets goals to decrease those risks, and establishes a plan for the prisoner to reach his or her goals. Id . [ Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 555, 813 N.W.2d 313 (citation omitted; third alteration in original).] This Court explained in Haeger that the DOC had "used TAPs to assist prisoners in reaching this goal" since 2005 and that "the development of TAPs is 'the lynchpin' of the MPRI model." Id. at 576-577, 813 N.W.2d 313. Moreover, this Court explained: In the 2008 appropriations act for the DOC, 2008 PA 245, § 403(8), the Legislature made the DOC's 2009 appropriation contingent on the imposition of a TAP requirement, stating that the DOC "shall ensure that each prisoner develops a [TAP] at intake in order to successfully reenter the community after release from prison. Each prisoner's [TAP] shall be reviewed at least once each year to assure adequate progress." [ Id . at 577, 813 N.W.2d 313 (alterations in original).] In Elias , this Court observed that a TAP has four elements: • Needs are criminogenic factors that contribute to risk and are individually assessed using the COMPAS risk assessment instrument. • Goals are designed to mitigate each criminogenic need. • Tasks are developed with each offender to meet the goals defined in the plan. • Activities are created with each offender to break each task down into manageable steps. [ Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 520, 811 N.W.2d 541 (citation omitted).] As of May 2016, the DOC has transitioned from the MPRI model to "The Michigan Offender Success Model," which requires a "Case Plan" for each prisoner and a TAP that "integrates the prisoner's transition from prison to the community by developing phases in the transition process." According to defendant's DOC records, a "Manager Version" overview of defendant's 2013 to 2014 "TAP/Case Plan" identified defendant's "Risk Inventory," "Client Strengths," "Client Interests," "Client Needs Summary," and "TAP/Case Plan Goals, Tasks and Activities." Specifically, under defendant's "TAP/Case Plan Goals," defendant was assigned various goals related to his "Client Needs," including maintaining sobriety, developing prosocial relationship activities within his community, and seeking mental health counseling. A second record, listed on a form titled "Program Classification Report" with the designation of CSX-175, showed a "TAP Update" pertaining to defendant starting a "WorkKeys Career" program on October 11, 2016, and under another "TAP Update" that defendant had completed a program called "VPP Moderate" between July 2015 and October 2015. Review of the record in this case reveals that before the Board voted on whether defendant should be granted parole, defendant underwent an evaluation conducted by a "Qualified Mental Health Professional," and the evaluation indicated that defendant did not "express homicidal ideation." Similarly, the DOC prepared plans regarding defendant's potential parole release that included identifying a specific residence for defendant and how defendant's mental health needs would be addressed. Ultimately, the Board granted defendant parole in 2017. However, the circuit court reversed the Board's grant of parole to defendant because, among other reasons, the Board had "failed to consider a current and meaningful TAP despite the requirements of [ Haeger ] and [2008 PA 245]." In its opinion, the circuit court failed to explain what exactly constituted a "meaningful" TAP, focusing instead on how defendant's 2014 TAP was "almost identical" to a 2013 TAP that had been prepared for defendant and that the circuit court had previously held to be "neither current nor robust." Hence, by classifying the TAP as "neither current nor robust," the circuit court seemingly created its own standards not set forth in statute or adopted by this Court in Haeger . By contrast, in Haeger , this Court explained that once the Board had rendered a decision regarding a defendant's parole, the Board "must issue in writing a sufficient explanation for its decision to allow meaningful appellate review and to inform the prisoner of specific recommendations for corrective action if necessary to facilitate release." Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 556, 813 N.W.2d 313 (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added). Accordingly, in Haeger , this Court held that the Board's grant of parole to the defendant was "in violation of controlling administrative rules and agency regulations" because the defendant's file lacked "case summary reports produced following Board interviews, any reports produced following in-reach services, or any TAP that may have been developed with [the defendant]," and "the Board or the DOC, or both, failed to maintain careful records documenting [the defendant's] participation in services and completion of steps necessary for parole." Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 578, 581, 813 N.W.2d 313. Therefore, this Court did not provide objective criteria for what constituted a "meaningful" TAP in Haeger ; rather, it concluded that the Board abused its discretion when it granted parole to a defendant in the absence of a TAP and other important records that the Board was required to consider before granting or denying that defendant parole. See id. at 581, 813 N.W.2d 313. Hence, pursuant to our decision in Haeger , review of the Board's decision should not focus on whether the TAP is current or robust; rather, review should begin by determining whether the Board reviewed a TAP that was prepared for this defendant. In this case, the record clearly reveals that the Board demonstrated that a TAP was prepared for this defendant. Hence, we cannot find a basis for the circuit court to have concluded that the Board had failed to consider defendant's readiness for release based on defendant's "suitable and realistic parole plan." Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 576, 813 N.W.2d 313, quoting Mich. Admin. Code, R. 791.7715(2)(c)(iii). While we note that the circuit court observed the similarity between defendant's 2013 TAP and 2014 TAP, the circuit court merely declared that those documents were insufficient without providing any further explanation. Further, the circuit court seemingly ignored defendant's Program Classification Report, concluding without explanation that defendant's TAP could only be encompassed on a single form or document. That form specifically recorded multiple fields with the designation of "TAP Update," with the most recent update showing that defendant began a "WorkKeys Career" program as recently as October 2016. Thus, even if we were to conclude that defendant's document entitled "2014 TAP" was somehow deficient because it only provided defendant's "Needs" and "Goals," we cannot ignore that the Board provided ample documentation of defendant's TAP-related "Tasks" and "Activities" on defendant's Program Classification Report. Hence the circuit court should have considered and addressed defendant's Program Classification Report before reaching its conclusions. Failure to do so was tantamount to ignoring a significant portion of the record. The circuit court also held that the Board had failed to consider a "current" TAP per the requirements of 2008 PA 245, which was an appropriations act encompassing the fiscal year ending in 2009 for the DOC. 2008 PA 245, § 403(8) provides, in relevant part: The department shall ensure that each prisoner develops a transition accountability plan at intake in order to successfully reenter the community after release from prison. Each prisoner's transition accountability plan shall be reviewed at least once each year to assure adequate progress. This Court considered the text of 2008 PA 245, § 403(8) in Haeger in the broader context of a discussion regarding how the DOC had used TAPs since 2005 and how TAPs were central to the MPRI model. Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 576-577, 813 N.W.2d 313. This Court relied on Mich. Admin. Code, R. 791.7715(2)(c)(iii), with regard to the Board being able to consider a prisoner's development " 'of a suitable and realistic parole plan' " when it evaluated whether that prisoner was ready for parole. Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 576, 813 N.W.2d 313, quoting Mich. Admin. Code, R. 791.7715(2)(c)(iii). Therefore, in Haeger , this Court merely noted the specific conditions imposed as part of the appropriations act to help underscore the ubiquitous nature of TAPs in order to highlight the importance of the absence of a TAP in the defendant's records. Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 576-577, 581, 813 N.W.2d 313. Accordingly, it was error for the circuit court to have relied on 2008 PA 245, § 403(8) to reach its conclusion that defendant's TAP was not "current," because, as demonstrated by defendant's Program Classification Report, defendant's TAP was updated as recently as October 2016, which was only seven months before the Board voted to grant defendant parole. Regardless of whether we would have concluded that defendant's 2014 TAP was deficient, the circuit court erred to the extent it held that this Court has set forth standards relative to a defendant's TAP. The closest this Court has come to articulating any standard relating to a TAP for a potential parolee is that a TAP, among other relevant documents, must be considered by the Board before granting or denying parole. Haeger , 294 Mich. App. at 581, 813 N.W.2d 313. Additionally, unlike the facts before this Court in Haeger , this case does not present us with a situation in which defendant's TAP was absent from the record or in which the Board contended that an essentially blank form constituted defendant's TAP. Rather, the entirety of defendant's TAP was recounted across multiple forms, and the Board specifically directed the circuit court to those relevant records. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it held that the Board had abused its discretion by failing to consider a "meaningful" TAP. In reaching our conclusions we are mindful of the prosecutor's arguments that defendant's 2014 TAP and Program Classification Report suffer from infirmities due to the absence of signatures on those records from either defendant or his "Case Manager." However, the prosecutor fails to explain a statutory basis or cite caselaw to inform this Court why those irregularities should warrant concern or be afforded any weight when reviewing the Board's decision to grant defendant parole. The prosecutor merely asserts that these defects demonstrate that the Board failed to review defendant's TAP before it granted him parole. Yet that inference is entirely undone by the fact that in defendant's June 1, 2017 Case Summary Report, the Board specifically noted that defendant completed "VPP" with "gains in all treatment targets." As discussed earlier, defendant's Program Classification Report specifically listed defendant's completion of a program called "VPP Moderate" between July 2015 and October 2015. Therefore, the circuit court, by injecting its own criteria into defendant's TAP, effectively substituted its judgment for that of the Board's when it reversed the Board's grant of parole to defendant. Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address the Board's other contentions on appeal. See Agnone v. Home-Owners Ins. Co. , 310 Mich. App. 522, 534 n. 8, 871 N.W.2d 732 (2015) (explaining that given the resolution of the issue and this Court's reversal of the trial court's grant of summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, this Court did not need to address the defendant's remaining claims of error). Reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the order granting parole. We do not retain jurisdiction. SAWYER and JANSEN, JJ., concurred with BORRELLO, P.J. In re Parole of Spears , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 21, 2017 (Docket No. 340914). In re Parole of Haeger , 294 Mich. App. 549, 813 N.W.2d 313 (2011). The court rule cited in Elias was subsequently renumbered. The content of that court rule may now be found at MCR 7.118(H)(3). Michigan Department of Corrections, The Michigan Offender Success Model , < < http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/Michigan_Prisoner_Reentry_Model_05.2012._454416_7.pdf>> (accessed March 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QVJ3-DWU6]. We note in reaching this conclusion the prosecutor's contention, as previously explained, that the circuit court did not err because defendant's Program Classification Report on the CSX-175 form is not a TAP, and that even if this Court construes that record as a TAP, then it is not a "current, meaningful or robust TAP that meets the requirements of In re Elias ." As the party appealing the Board's grant of parole to defendant, it is the prosecutor's burden to demonstrate how the Board clearly abused its discretion. Elias , 294 Mich. App. at 538, 811 N.W.2d 541. Yet, beyond recounting this Court's observations about the characteristics and elements of a TAP in Elias , the prosecutor has failed to elaborate what would constitute a "meaningful" or "robust" TAP. Moreover, the prosecutor has also, without explanation, arrived at the conclusion that a TAP must consist of an all-encompassing individual document. Hence, the prosecutor's arguments fail for the same reasons as stated earlier.

Gadola, J. At issue in these consolidated appeals are the charges brought against each defendant for three counts of conducting a gambling operation without a license, MCL 432.218(1)(a), and three counts of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(e). After conducting a preliminary examination, the district court found that probable cause existed to bind over defendants, Bruce H. Zitka and Susan Hernandez-Zitka, to the circuit court. The circuit court, however, entered orders granting defendants' motions to quash the amended information and dismissing all charges. The prosecution appeals as of right, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Defendants own and operate three Internet lounges located in Muskegon County: The Landing Strip, The Lucky Mouse, and Fast Lane. At these establishments, customers can open accounts to wager on and play games online, including slot and lottery-type games. On April 14, 2015, the Michigan Gaming Control Board (MGCB) began an investigation to determine whether illegal gambling activities were taking place at the lounges. The MGCB interrupted this investigation, however, when the Norton Shores Police Department began its own independent investigation of allegations that unlawful gambling activities were taking place at The Landing Strip. The city attorney for Norton Shores subsequently filed in the Muskegon Circuit Court a civil-nuisance-abatement action against The Landing Strip under the local zoning code. The parties ultimately agreed to dismissal of that case, and the court entered a stipulated order of dismissal on January 28, 2016, stating in part, "Defendants agree to operate the Landing Strip LLC without violation of any applicable gambling laws or ordinances as it is currently operating ." (Emphasis added.) Following the conclusion of the civil lawsuit, the MGCB resumed its investigation of the three lounges in February 2016. As a result of this investigation, defendants were each charged with three counts of conducting a gambling operation without a license, MCL 432.218(1)(a), and three counts of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(e). The amended information alleges an offense period extending from February 1, 2016, through October 31, 2016. The district court conducted a two-day preliminary examination and, on January 27, 2017, issued an opinion and order determining that probable cause supported the charges and binding over the cases to the Ingham Circuit Court. In reaching this conclusion, the district court determined that the offense of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(e), is a specific-intent crime, while conducting a gambling operation without a license, MCL 432.218(1)(a), constitutes a general intent crime. With respect to the Muskegon County Circuit Court's stipulated order of dismissal, the district court was "not persuaded that the ... [order], in a civil proceeding, is particularly helpful here in relation to the probable cause standard." In the Ingham Circuit Court, defendants filed identical motions to quash, arguing that the district court erred by determining that the offense of conducting a gambling operation without a license was a general-intent crime as opposed to a specific-intent crime. Defendants further asserted that because the stipulated order dismissing the civil case reflected a judicial determination that defendants were operating legally, defendants were acting under a mistake of law that negated the mens rea elements of both offenses. The circuit court granted defendants' motions to quash and stated on the record as follows: My opinion is based upon the fact that the Attorney General of this state, in part, has the authority to intervene in any litigation that they want to that would be something that relates to state law, I believe they could have gone back to the circuit judge in this case and asked to intervene and have this reargued in some fashion as to its applicability. This appears to be a situation where apparently the Attorney General's office and their other agencies were so aggrieved by these poor people that they felt it necessary to investigate for months and months as to whether they existed. They could have walked right in and seen. But in my opinion, when a circuit judge of-is it Muskegon? * * * ...[The Muskegon Circuit Court judge] has the right to make these rulings and put these rulings in effect. But as I have seen in my cases, I have been chastised. I have been appealed. I have even had people come in here and consent to things and your office appealed that because the consent was wrong. I am just amazed. These cases are dismissed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A trial court's decision regarding a motion to quash an information is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Miller , 288 Mich. App. 207, 209, 795 N.W.2d 156 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision "falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes," People v. Waterstone , 296 Mich. App. 121, 131-132, 818 N.W.2d 432 (2012), and "[a] trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law," People v. Duncan , 494 Mich. 713, 723, 835 N.W.2d 399 (2013). "To the extent that a lower court's decision on a motion to quash the information is based on an interpretation of the law, appellate review of the interpretation is de novo." Miller , 288 Mich. App. at 209, 795 N.W.2d 156. III. DISCUSSION A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL The prosecution contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by determining that the charges brought against defendants were barred pursuant to collateral estoppel in light of the stipulated order of dismissal in the civil case. We agree. The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent proceeding when that issue has previously been the subject of a final judgment in an earlier proceeding. Porter v. Royal Oak , 214 Mich. App. 478, 485, 542 N.W.2d 905 (1995). Collateral estoppel applies when the following three conditions are satisfied: "(1) a question of fact essential to the judgment must have been actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment; (2) the same parties must have had a full [and fair] opportunity to litigate the issue; and (3) there must be mutuality of estoppel." Monat v. State Farm Ins. Co. , 469 Mich. 679, 682-684, 677 N.W.2d 843 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). Mutuality of estoppel requires that the party seeking to invoke the doctrine establish that his or her adversary was either a party to, or in privy with a party to, the previous action. Id . at 684, 677 N.W.2d 843. In the vast majority of cases, parties seek to apply collateral estoppel in the context of two civil proceedings. However, our Supreme Court has recognized the concept of "cross-over estoppel," i.e., "the application of collateral estoppel in the civil-to-criminal context." People v. Trakhtenberg , 493 Mich. 38, 48, 826 N.W.2d 136 (2012), citing People v. Gates , 434 Mich. 146, 155, 452 N.W.2d 627 (1990). Yet, in light of the fundamental procedural differences in the civil versus criminal contexts, the Supreme Court has advised exercising caution in applying cross-over estoppel. See Trakhtenberg 493 Mich. at 48, 826 N.W.2d 136 ("[W]e must hesitate to apply collateral estoppel in the reverse situation-when the government seeks to apply collateral estoppel to preclude a criminal defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of a prior civil judgment that defense counsel did not commit malpractice."); Gates , 434 Mich. at 157, 452 N.W.2d 627 ("[S]uch procedural differences raise serious doubt about the soundness of applying 'cross-over estoppel' in situations such as this case presents."). The first prong of the collateral estoppel analysis requires that the ultimate issue to be determined in the subsequent action be the same as that involved in the first action. Rental Props. Owners Ass'n of Kent Co. v. Kent Co.Treasurer , 308 Mich. App. 498, 529, 866 N.W.2d 817 (2014). Specifically, the common ultimate issues "must be identical, and not merely similar," and additionally "must have been both actually and necessarily litigated." Id . In order for an issue to be "actually litigated," it must have been submitted to and determined by the trier of fact. Id. , citing VanDeventer v. Mich. Nat'l Bank , 172 Mich. App. 456, 463, 432 N.W.2d 338 (1988). Under the present circumstances, the previous civil litigation initiated by the Norton Shores city attorney in the Muskegon Circuit Court concerned defendants' compliance with local zoning laws in operating The Landing Strip. Accordingly, the legality of defendants' operations under the state criminal laws was not at issue, nor was their operation of The Lucky Mouse or Fast Lane. Further, no issue in the civil litigation was submitted to or determined by the factfinder; rather, the parties negotiated and stipulated to dismissal of the action. The stipulated order stated, in part, that "[d]efendants agree to operate the Landing Strip LLC without violation of any applicable gambling laws or ordinances as it is currently operating ." (Emphasis added). But because the scope of the civil action was limited to defendants' compliance with local ordinances in their operation of The Landing Strip, the interpretation of this provision must be similarly confined. Accordingly, we conclude that the issue whether defendants violated state criminal laws by conducting an unlicensed gambling operation was not actually litigated in the civil proceeding. For collateral estoppel to apply, it is also required that the same parties, or parties in privy, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Monat , 469 Mich. at 682-683, 677 N.W.2d 843. "A party is one who was directly interested in the subject matter and had a right to defend or to control the proceedings and to appeal from the judgment, while a privy is one who, after the judgment, has an interest in the matter affected by the judgment through one of the parties ...." Rental Props. Owners Ass'n , 308 Mich. App. at 529-530, 866 N.W.2d 817. The circuit court correctly noted that the state attorney general is authorized to intervene in any state court action "whenever such intervention is necessary in order to protect any right or interest of the state, or of the people of the state." MCL 14.101. However, in the civil action in the Muskegon Circuit Court, the state had no protectable interest. The case involved a city zoning ordinance, a matter of solely local concern, and there was no coordination between the city attorney's office and the attorney general's office or the MGCB in the civil nuisance action. See In re Certified Question , 465 Mich. 537, 545, 638 N.W.2d 409 (2002) ("Just as the authority of counties to sue in matters of local interest cannot be used to undermine the authority of the state to sue in matters of state interest, the authority of the state to sue in matters of state interest cannot be used to undermine the authority of political subdivisions to sue in matters solely of local interest."). Accordingly, the prosecution was neither a party to nor a party in privy to the civil action. Further, our Supreme Court has declined to apply collateral estoppel in instances when the purposes of the two proceedings are "so fundamentally different that application ... of collateral estoppel would be contrary to sound public policy." See Gates , 434 Mich. at 161, 452 N.W.2d 627. For example, in Gates , the Supreme Court declined to hold that a prior determination of no jurisdiction in a child protective proceeding operated to collaterally estop subsequent criminal charges. Id . at 162, 452 N.W.2d 627. Likewise, in People v. Windsor , 207 Mich. App. 221, 223, 523 N.W.2d 881 (1994), this Court declined to apply a determination of no wrongdoing reached by the Michigan Employment Security Commission to collaterally estop a criminal action involving the same defendant. We therefore conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting the motion to quash and by dismissing the cases on the basis of collateral estoppel. B. MENS REA The prosecution next contends that conducting an unlicensed gambling operation, MCL 432.218(1)(a), is a strict-liability offense as opposed to a general-intent offense as determined by the district court. This argument is relevant to the grounds underlying defendants' motion to quash. The essence of defendants' argument in that motion was that-like the offense of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(e) -conducting an unlicensed gambling operation is a specific-intent offense and that defendants' mens rea for both charges was negated by a mistake of law. Because the circuit court did not rule on the merits of this position, it is unpreserved. See People v. Metamora Water Serv., Inc. , 276 Mich. App. 376, 382, 741 N.W.2d 61 (2007) ("For an issue to be preserved for appellate review, it must be raised, addressed, and decided by the lower court."). Nonetheless, if an issue is raised before the trial court and is pursued on appeal, this Court is not foreclosed from reviewing it even if it was not decided by the trial court. Loutts v. Loutts , 298 Mich. App. 21, 23-24, 826 N.W.2d 152 (2012). To determine the intent element required to commit a criminal offense, this Court must evaluate the mental state set forth in the relevant statute. People v. Fennell , 260 Mich. App. 261, 266, 677 N.W.2d 66 (2004). "A crime requiring a particular criminal intent beyond the act done is generally considered a specific intent crime; whereas, a general intent crime merely requires 'the intent to perform the physical act itself.' " Id ., quoting People v. Disimone , 251 Mich. App. 605, 610, 650 N.W.2d 436 (2002). In relevant part, the statute at issue in this case, MCL 432.218, provides: (1) A person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $100,00.00, or both, and shall be barred from receiving or maintaining a license for doing any of the following: (a) Conducting a gambling operation where wagering is used or to be used without a license issued by the [MGCB]. This language does not expressly indicate a degree of intent, nor does the statute further define the term "conducting." Therefore, the mens rea required to violate MCL 432.218(1)(a) is a matter of statutory interpretation. When interpreting the meaning of a statute, the Court's primary goal is "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." People v. Thomas , 263 Mich. App. 70, 73, 687 N.W.2d 598 (2004) (quotation marks and citations omitted). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as written in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. Herman v. Berrien Co. , 481 Mich. 352, 366, 750 N.W.2d 570 (2008). "However, if a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, judicial construction is proper to determine legislative intent. Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act." Thomas , 263 Mich. App. at 73, 687 N.W.2d 598 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Though MCL 432.218(1)(a) is silent with respect to intent, there is no clear indication that the Legislature sought to discard the mens rea requirement. See People v. Kowalski , 489 Mich. 488, 499, 803 N.W.2d 200 (2011). "[C]ourts will infer an element of criminal intent when an offense is silent regarding mens rea unless the statute contains an express or implied indication that the legislative body intended that strict criminal liability be imposed." People v. Likine , 492 Mich. 367, 391-392, 823 N.W.2d 50 (2012) (quotation marks and citations omitted). For example, in Likine , our Supreme Court construed the statute as imposing strict liability because the Legislature had amended the statute to eliminate the terms "refus[al] or neglect," words which implied an element of intent. Id . at 392, 823 N.W.2d 50 (alteration in original). In contrast, the Supreme Court confronted in Kowalski a criminal statute that incorporated the element of "encouraging." Kowalski , 489 Mich. at 499, 803 N.W.2d 200. The Supreme Court determined that although the statute was silent with respect to mens rea , it nonetheless had a mens rea element, that being "the intent to do the physical act of encouraging." Id . at 500, 803 N.W.2d 200. Further, by completing an act, an accused "is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his [actions] ...." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). MCL 432.218(1)(a) does not contain an express or implied indication that the Legislature intended that strict criminal liability be imposed. As in Kowalski , the statute's use of the term "conducting" evidences an intention that the mens rea element of MCL 432.218(1)(a) be the intent to perform the act of "conducting." Although the prosecution correctly argues that "the presumption in favor of imposing criminal intent as an element does not invariably apply to public-welfare or regulatory offenses," People v. Janes , 302 Mich. App. 34, 47, 836 N.W.2d 883 (2013), citing Staples v. United States , 511 U.S. 600, 606, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994), there is no evidence here that the Legislature intended that strict criminal liability be imposed. Indeed, by attaching a specific-intent element to other subdivisions of MCL 432.218(1), the Legislature demonstrated that its objective was not to impose strict liability for violations of MCL 432.218(1). See MCL 432.218(1)(c) through (e). The language of MCL 432.218(1)(a) is consistent with that of a general-intent crime as opposed to a specific-intent crime. As noted, Subdivisions (c) through (e) of MCL MCL 432.218(1) include express elements of specific intent, such as "knowingly" and "willfully," thus requiring criminal intent beyond the physical act done. See People v. Gould , 225 Mich. App. 79, 85, 570 N.W.2d 140 (1997) ("[S]pecific intent crimes would be limited only to those crimes which are required to be committed either 'purposefully' or 'knowingly'....)" quoting People v. Lerma , 66 Mich.App. 566, 569, 239 N.W.2d 424 (1976) (quotation marks omitted). The statutory scheme as a whole evinces the Legislature's awareness of language that can be used to heighten a crime's mens rea element to that of a specific-intent crime. However, with respect to MCL 432.218(1)(a), the Legislature chose to use language consistent with a general-intent crime. C. MISTAKE OF LAW Finally, defendants argued in their motion to quash that they were operating under a mistake of law, negating the specific intent they claimed was required under the offenses charged. Specifically, they maintain that they relied on the Norton Shores city attorney's agreement in the stipulated order of dismissal that The Landing Strip would be operated in compliance with any gambling laws or ordinances "as it [was] currently operating." While defendants characterize this argument as a mistake-of-law defense, the prosecution contends it is properly viewed as a theory of entrapment by estoppel. Under either of these two fundamentally similar analyses, we conclude that defendants' argument fails. This Court has held that a defense of entrapment by estoppel applies when the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) a government official (2) told the defendant that certain criminal conduct was legal, (3) the defendant actually relied on the government official's statements, (4) and the defendant's reliance was in good faith and reasonable in light of the identity of the government official, the point of law represented, and the substance of the official's statement. [ People v. Woods , 241 Mich. App. 545, 558, 616 N.W.2d 211 (2000), quoting United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc. , 127 F.3d 299, 313 (C.A. 3 1997) (quotation marks omitted).] Similarly, defendants cite federal caselaw describing the mistake-of-law defense: " 'In order to assert a defense of a mistake of law based upon a good faith reliance on the representations of public officials, the Appellants must demonstrate that they received communications from public officials in a situation in which reliance would have been justified.' " United States v. Stagman , 446 F.2d 489, 491 (C.A. 6, 1971), quoting United States v. Gebhart , 441 F.2d 1261, 1263 (C.A. 6, 1971). Initially, we note that defendants' mistake-of-law argument has no effect on the charges brought under MCL 432.218(1)(a) because we have determined this is a general-intent offense. Defendants therefore need not have intended to violate the law but rather simply have intended to perform the act of "conducting" an unlicensed gambling operation. See People v. Beaudin , 417 Mich. 570, 573-574, 339 N.W.2d 461 (1983). Accordingly, defendants' alleged belief that they were operating their establishments in compliance with the law is immaterial to a determination of whether they committed this offense. Defendants' argument is equally unavailing with respect to the specific-intent charges brought under MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(e). Entrapment by estoppel and mistake-of-law defenses both require that the alleged reliance on a public official's representation be "reasonable" or "justified." Defendants are unable to meet this requirement. They claim reliance on the Norton Shores city attorney's agreement in the stipulated order that operations at The Landing Strip were in compliance with applicable gambling laws and ordinances. It cannot be said that a statement by a city attorney in a civil suit involving a local ordinance could be authoritative on a matter of criminal state law such that reliance on it was reasonable. The statement was not made by the attorney general's office, by the MGCB, or by a county prosecutor. Rather, it was made pursuant to a stipulated agreement regarding a civil suit made by an entity with limited authority. Additionally, the civil case involved only The Landing Strip and not the other two businesses involved in the present criminal actions. Although defendants imply that all three establishments operated in the same manner, it does not appear that all were within the city limits of Norton Shores or that the city attorney would have possessed knowledge regarding the operations in the other two establishments. For these reasons, we conclude that neither a mistake-of-law nor an entrapment-by-estoppel defense is applicable. Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Meter, P.J., and Tukel, J., concurred with Gadola, J. Although this provision of the stipulated order was referred to in the Ingham Circuit Court in the present action and in the parties' briefs on appeal, the Muskegon Circuit Court record is not part of the record before this Court. However, the parties do not dispute the nature of the civil case or the contents of the relevant provision of the stipulated order. In re Certified Question involved the interpretation of MCL 14.28, which grants the attorney general the authority to represent and intervene in actions on behalf of the state, as supplemented by the authority granted in MCL 14.101.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee CVS Caremark to extend the time for filing its answer to the application for leave to appeal in No. 159055 is GRANTED. The answer submitted on April 11, 2019, is accepted as timely filed.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan Lake & Stream Associations, Inc., to file a brief amicus curiae in support of the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on April 12, 2019, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the recommendation of the Judicial Tenure Commission having been filed, together with the record as required by MCR 9.223, it is ORDERED that if a petition under MCR 9.224 is filed, oral argument on the petition and the response thereto will be heard on Wednesday, June 19, 2019, at 9:30 a.m.

Per Curiam. Will contestant Lanora Jones appeals as of right the order of the Berrien County Probate Court recognizing an electronic document as the valid will of her son, Duane Francis Horton II. Because the trial court did not err by concluding that Guardianship and Alternatives, Inc. (GAI) established by clear and convincing evidence that decedent intended his electronic note to constitute his will, we affirm. The decedent, Duane Francis Horton II, committed suicide in December 2015 at the age of 21. Before he committed suicide, decedent left an undated, handwritten journal entry. There is no dispute that the journal entry is in decedent's handwriting. The journal entry stated: I am truly sorry about this ... My final note, my farewell is on my phone. The app should be open. If not look on evernote, "Last Note[.]" The journal entry also provided an e-mail address and password for Evernote. The "farewell" or "last note" referred to in decedent's journal entry was a typed document that existed only in electronic form. Decedent's full name was typed at the end of the document. No portion of the document was in decedent's handwriting. The document contained apologies and personal sentiments directed to specific individuals, religious comments, requests relating to his funeral arrangements, and many self-deprecating comments. The document also contained one full paragraph regarding the distribution of decedent's property after his death: Have my uncle go through my stuff, pick out the stuff that belonged to my dad and/or grandma, and take it. If there is something he doesn't want, feel free to keep it and do with it what you will. My guns (aside from the shotgun that belonged to my dad) are your's to do with what you will. Make sure my car goes to Jody if at all possible. If at all possible, make sure that my trust fund goes to my half-sister Shella, and only her. Not my mother. All of my other stuff is you're do whatever you want with. I do ask that anything you well, you give 10% of the money to the church, 50% to my sister Shella, and the remaining 40% is your's to do whatever you want with. In addition, in a paragraph addressed directly to decedent's uncle, the note contained the following statement: "Anything that I have that belonged to either Dad, or Grandma, is your's to claim and do whatever you want with. If there is anything that you don't want, please make sure Shane and Kara McLean get it." In a paragraph addressed to his half-sister, Shella, decedent also stated that "all" of his "money" was hers. During decedent's lifetime, he was subject to a conservatorship, and GAI served as his court-appointed conservator. GAI filed a petition for probate and appointment of a personal representative, nominating itself to serve as the personal representative of decedent's estate. GAI maintained that decedent's electronic "farewell" note qualified as decedent's will. Jones filed a competing petition for probate and appointment of a personal representative in which she nominated herself to serve as the personal representative of decedent's estate. In that petition, Jones alleged that decedent died intestate and that she was decedent's sole heir. After an evidentiary hearing involving testimony from several witnesses, the probate court concluded that GAI presented clear and convincing evidence that decedent's electronic note was intended by decedent to constitute his will. Therefore, the probate court recognized the document as a valid will under MCL 700.2503. Jones now appeals as of right. On appeal, Jones argues that the probate court erred by recognizing decedent's electronic note as a will under MCL 700.2503. Jones characterizes decedent's note as an attempt to make a holographic will under MCL 700.2502(2), and Jones asserts that, while MCL 700.2503 allows a court to overlook minor, technical deficiencies in a will, it cannot be used to create a will when the document in question meets none of the requirements for a holographic will. Alternatively, as a factual matter, Jones argues that GAI failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that decedent intended the electronic note in this case to constitute his will as required by MCL 700.2503. We disagree. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION We review de novo the interpretation of statutes. In re Reisman Estate , 266 Mich. App. 522, 526, 702 N.W.2d 658 (2005). The interpretation of the language used in a will is also reviewed de novo as a question of law. In re Bem Estate , 247 Mich. App. 427, 433, 637 N.W.2d 506 (2001). "We review the probate court's factual findings for clear error." In re Koehler Estate , 314 Mich. App. 667, 673-674, 888 N.W.2d 432 (2016). "A finding is clearly erroneous when a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, even if there is evidence to support the finding." Id . at 674, 888 N.W.2d 432 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Regarding issues of statutory construction, our Supreme Court has explained: The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute's language. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. [ Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare Sys. , 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001) (citations omitted).] II. ANALYSIS "The right to make a disposition of property by means of a will is entirely statutory." In re Flury Estate , 218 Mich. App. 211, 215, 554 N.W.2d 39 (1996), mod. on other grounds 456 Mich. 869, 568 N.W.2d 832 (1997). The Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq ., governs wills in Michigan. The provisions in EPIC must "be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies," MCL 700.1201, including to "discover and make effective a decedent's intent in distribution of the decedent's property," MCL 700.1201(b). In a contested will case, the proponent of a will bears "the burden of establishing prima facie proof of due execution ...." MCL 700.3407(1)(b). Generally, to be valid, a will must be executed in compliance with MCL 700.2502, which provides: (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) and in sections 2503, 2506, and 2513, a will is valid only if it is all of the following: (a) In writing. (b) Signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other individual in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction. (c) Signed by at least 2 individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable time after he or she witnessed either the signing of the will as described in subdivision (b) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will. (2) A will that does not comply with subsection (1) is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if it is dated, and if the testator's signature and the document's material portions are in the testator's handwriting. (3) Intent that the document constitutes a testator's will can be established by extrinsic evidence, including, for a holographic will, portions of the document that are not in the testator's handwriting. As set forth in MCL 700.2502(1), there are specific formalities that are generally required to execute a valid will. However, as expressly stated in MCL 700.2502(1), there are several exceptions to these formalities, including less formal holographic wills allowed under MCL 700.2502(2) and the exception created by MCL 700.2503. MCL 700.2503 states: Although a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with section 2502, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute any of the following: (a) The decedent's will. (b) A partial or complete revocation of the decedent's will. (c) An addition to or an alteration of the decedent's will. (d) A partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the decedent's will. "The plain language of MCL 700.2503 establishes that it permits the probate of a will that does not meet the requirements of MCL 700.2502." In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. 705, 711, 895 N.W.2d 564 (2016). Indeed, other than requiring "a document or writing added upon a document," there are no particular formalities necessary to create a valid will under MCL 700.2503. Essentially, under MCL 700.2503, any document or writing can constitute a valid will provided that "the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute" the decedent's will. MCL 700.2503. In considering the decedent's intent, "EPIC permits the admission of extrinsic evidence in order to determine whether the decedent intended a document to constitute his or her will." In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. at 709, 895 N.W.2d 564. See also MCL 700.2502(3). In this case, it is undisputed that decedent's typed, electronic note, which was unwitnessed and undated, does not meet either the formal requirements for a will under MCL 700.2502(1) or the requirements of a holographic will under MCL 700.2502(2). Instead, the validity of the will in this case turns on the applicability of MCL 700.2503 and whether the trial court erred by concluding that GAI presented clear and convincing evidence that decedent intended the electronic document to constitute his will. To properly analyze this question, we must first briefly address Jones's characterization of decedent's note as a failed holographic will. In particular, contrary to Jones's attempt to conflate MCL 700.2503 and the holographic-will provision, MCL 700.2503 is an independent exception to the formalities required under MCL 700.2502(1), and MCL 700.2503 does not require a decedent to satisfy-or attempt to satisfy-any of the requirements for a holographic will under MCL 700.2502(2). To require a testator to meet any specific formalities notwithstanding MCL 700.2503"would render MCL 700.2503 inapplicable to the testamentary formalities in MCL 700.2502, which is contrary to the plain language of the statute." In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. at 711, 895 N.W.2d 564. Instead, under MCL 700.2503, while the proposed will must be a document or writing, there are no specific formalities required for execution of the document, and any document or writing can constitute a will, provided that the proponent of the will presents clear and convincing evidence to establish that the decedent intended the document to constitute his or her will. See MCL 700.2503(a). Turning to the facts of this case, we find no error in the probate court's determination that decedent intended for the electronic document in question to constitute his will. See MCL 700.2503(a). In basic terms, "[a] will is said to be a declaration of a man's mind as to the manner in which he would have his property or estate disposed of after his death." Byrne v. Hume , 84 Mich. 185, 192, 47 N.W. 679 (1890). A will need not be written in a particular form or use any particular words; for example, a letter or other document, such as a deed, can constitute a will. See, e.g., In re Merritt's Estate , 286 Mich. 83, 89, 281 N.W. 546 (1938) ; In re Dowell's Estate , 152 Mich. 194, 196, 115 N.W. 972 (1908) ; In re High , 2 Doug 515, 521 (1847). However, in order for a document to be considered a will it must evince testamentary intent, meaning that it must operate to transfer property "only upon and by reason of the death of the maker ...." In re Boucher's Estate , 329 Mich. 569, 571, 46 N.W.2d 577 (1951). Moreover, the document must be final in nature; that is, "[m]ere drafts" or "a mere unexecuted intention to leave by will is of no effect." In re Cosgrove's Estate , 290 Mich. 258, 262, 287 N.W. 456 (1939) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, in deciding whether a person intends a document to constitute a will, the question is whether the person intended the document to govern the posthumous distribution of his or her property. See In re Fowle's Estate , 292 Mich. 500, 504, 290 N.W. 883 (1940). As noted, whether the decedent intended a document to constitute a will may be shown by extrinsic evidence. In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. at 709, 895 N.W.2d 564 ; MCL 700.2502(3). In this case, to determine whether decedent intended his farewell note to constitute a will, the probate court considered the contents of the electronic document as well as extrinsic evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding decedent's death and the discovery of his suicide note as described by witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. After detailing the evidence presented and assessing witness credibility, the probate court concluded that the evidence "was unrebutted that the deceased hand wrote a note directing the reader to his cell phone with specific instructions as to how to access a document he had written electronically in anticipation of his imminent death by his own hands." Regarding the language of the document itself, the probate court determined that the document unequivocally set forth decedent's wishes regarding the disposition of his property. Finding that decedent clearly and unambiguously expressed his testamentary intent in the electronic document in anticipation of his impending death, the probate court concluded that decedent intended the electronic document to constitute his will. Reviewing the language of the document de novo, In re Bem Estate , 247 Mich. App. at 433, 637 N.W.2d 506, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the document expresses decedent's testamentary intent. On the face of the document, it is apparent that the document was written with decedent's death in mind; indeed, the document is clearly intended to be read after decedent's death. The note contains apologies and explanations for his suicide, comments relating to decedent's views on God and the afterlife, final farewells and advice to loved ones and friends, and it contains requests regarding his funeral. In what is clearly a final note to be read upon decedent's death, the document then clearly dictates the distribution of his property after his death. Cf. In re High , 2 Doug at 517-519, 521 (finding that a letter offering parting words to family members, discussing hopes for salvation, and disposing of property after death was a will); In re Fowle's Estate , 292 Mich. at 504, 290 N.W. 883 (concluding that an instrument disposing of property and making provision for burial was a will). Specifically, decedent was clear that he did not want his mother to receive the remains of the trust fund. Decedent stated that the money in his trust fund was for his half-sister and that he wanted his uncle to receive any of his personal belongings that came from his father and grandmother. He left his car to "Jody." All of decedent's "other stuff" was left to the couple with whom decedent had been living. In short, the note is "distinctly testamentary in character," In re Fowle's Estate , 292 Mich. at 503, 290 N.W. 883, and the document itself provides support for the conclusion that decedent intended for the note to constitute his will. Extrinsic evidence may also be used to discern a decedent's intent, In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. at 709, 895 N.W.2d 564, and considering the evidence presented at the hearing, we see no clear error in the probate court's findings of fact regarding the circumstances surrounding decedent's death and decedent's intent for the electronic note to constitute his will. In this regard, as detailed by the probate court, the evidence showed that decedent's handwritten journal entry directed the reader to an electronic, final "farewell." Decedent left his journal and his phone containing the electronic note in his room; he then left the home and committed suicide. Given the surrounding circumstances, although the note was undated, the probate court reasonably concluded that the electronic note was written "in anticipation of [decedent's] imminent death by his own hands." The fact that decedent wrote a note providing for disposition of his property in anticipation of his impending death supports the conclusion that it was a final document to govern the disposition of decedent's property after his death. Cf. In re High , 2 Doug at 517-519, 521. Moreover, the evidence showed that decedent had, at best, a strained relationship with his mother, and the probate court reasoned that Jones's testimony regarding her strained relationship with decedent "actually provides an understanding of the intent of [decedent] when he drafted the cell phone document." In other words, the nature of decedent's relationship with his mother, when read in conjunction with his clear directive that none of his money go to his mother, supports the conclusion that decedent intended for the electronic note to govern the posthumous distribution of his property to ensure that his mother, who would otherwise be his heir, did not inherit from him. We see no clear error in the probate court's factual findings, In re Koehler Estate , 314 Mich. App. at 673-674, 888 N.W.2d 432, and the extrinsic evidence in this case strongly supports the conclusion that decedent intended the electronic note to constitute his will. Overall, considering both the document itself and the extrinsic evidence submitted at the hearing, the probate court did not err by concluding that GAI presented clear and convincing evidence that decedent intended the electronic note to constitute his will, and thus, the document constitutes a valid will under MCL 700.2503. Affirmed. Having prevailed in full, GAI may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219. Hoekstra, P.J., and Murphy and Markey, JJ., concurred. MCL 700.2502(1) also recognizes exceptions as set forth in MCL 700.2506 and MCL 700.2513. These provisions do not apply in this case. That is not to say that formalities, or lack thereof, are irrelevant in a will contest involving MCL 700.2503. Formalities are considered indicative of intent. 1 Restatement Property, 3d, Will and Other Donative Transfers, § 3.3, comment a . Consequently, an adherence to some formalities, or conversely the extent of the departure from formalities, can be considered when determining whether a document was intended to be a will. See Uniform Probate Code, § 2-503, comment (1997) ("The larger the departure from Section 2-502 formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the court that the instrument reflects the testator's intent."). Jones argues on appeal that the holographic-will statute will be rendered meaningless if MCL 700.2503 can be used to circumvent the necessity of all requirements for a formal will under MCL 700.2502(1) as well as all requirements for a holographic will under MCL 700.2502 (2). Contrary to this argument, the requirements for a holographic will under MCL 700.2502(2), like the more formal requirements for a will under MCL 700.2502(1), remain a viable-and perhaps more straightforward-means for expressing intent to create a will. See Restatement, § 3.3, comment a. MCL 700.2503 simply makes plain that other evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrating intent to adopt a will should not be ignored simply because the decedent failed to comply with formalities. See Restatement, § 3.3, comment b. On appeal, Jones argues that the probate court erred when it accepted a copy of the purported will into evidence as opposed to requiring an original of the document. However, Jones waived this argument in the probate court by expressly stating that she had no objections to the admission of the copy of the document into evidence. See Landin v. Healthsource Saginaw, Inc. , 305 Mich. App. 519, 545, 854 N.W.2d 152 (2014). "A party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error." The Cadle Co. v. City of Kentwood , 285 Mich. App. 240, 255, 776 N.W.2d 145 (2009). Therefore, we decline to address this issue. Jones argues that GAI did not present testimony that anyone saw decedent type the suicide note and that, because it was merely in electronic form, someone else could have typed or altered the suicide note. The probate court rejected Jones's argument that the document had been written or altered by someone other than decedent as mere speculation without supporting evidence. Jones does not dispute that the handwritten journal entry was in decedent's handwriting. That journal entry directed its finder to decedent's cell phone. One of the individuals who found and read the electronic note on decedent's cell phone identified the contents of the note at the hearing. She indicated that she "know[s]" what the notes "says" and that she would "[a]bsolutely" recognize if the note had been changed. The probate court expressly found this witness's testimony to be credible. Deferring to the trial court's assessment of credibility, In re Erickson Estate , 202 Mich. App. 329, 331, 508 N.W.2d 181 (1993), we conclude that the evidence shows that decedent wrote the electronic note and that it was not altered by anyone else. Contrary to Jones's arguments, the probate court did not clearly err by concluding that the electronic note was written by decedent. On appeal, Jones argues that decedent's suicide note contains precatory language, and, relying on Crisp v. Anderson , 204 Mich. 35, 39, 169 N.W. 855 (1918), Jones argues that language such as "if at all possible" is insufficient to demonstrate testamentary intent. The probate court rejected this argument, correctly recognizing that decedent used unequivocal language when he used the phrase "not my mother" and when he stated to his half-sister that "all of my money ... is yours." Decedent also clearly stated that anything belonging to his grandmother or father was to be given to his uncle, that his car was for "Jody," and that all decedent's "other stuff" was for the couple with whom he had been living. In short, contrary to Jones's argument, decedent clearly provided for the disposition of his property following his death. In disputing the note's validity as a will, Jones specifically emphasizes that the electronic note does not contain a handwritten signature, and Jones asserts that the document should simply be viewed as an informal "note" rather than a "will." However, as discussed, the formalities of MCL 700.2502 are not required for a valid will under MCL 700.2503. See In re Attia Estate , 317 Mich. App. at 711, 895 N.W.2d 564. Moreover, we observe that, although the electronic note does not contain a handwritten signature, decedent ended the document with the more formal use of his full name-"Duane F. Horton II"-which added an element of solemnity to the document, supporting the conclusion that the document was intended as more than a casual note.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 17, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 2, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 3, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 8, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellees to extend the time for filing their answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 11, 2019.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of respondent-appellant to exceed the page limitation for his application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The 83-page application submitted on April 25, 2019, is accepted for filing.

Per Curiam. In an order dated June 8, 2018, the Michigan Supreme Court vacated Part II of this Court's prior opinion in this case, In re Brody Living Trust , 321 Mich. App. 304, 910 N.W.2d 348 (2017) ( Brody I ), and remanded this case to this Court for reconsideration "of its standing analysis." In re Brody Living Trust , 501 Mich. 1094, 912 N.W.2d 175 (2018) ( Brody II ). Our Supreme Court directed this Court to "consider whether the terms 'child' and 'beneficiary' in MCL 700.1105 are modified by the phrase 'and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate.' If so, then [this Court] shall consider whether Cathy Deutchman is an 'interested person' under this reading of the statute." Brody II , 501 Mich. at 1094, 912 N.W.2d at 175. Additionally, our Supreme Court instructed that this Court may consider the arguments made in the Supreme Court by the Probate and Estate Planning Section of the State Bar of Michigan regarding whether Cathy has standing "in light of MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g) and MCL 700.7603(2) and is a present (not contingent) beneficiary of the trust." Id . We again affirm our prior conclusion that the trial court did not err by concluding that Cathy had standing as a petitioner in this action. This case arose out of a family dispute involving the Rhea Brody Living Trust. Rhea's husband, Robert Brody, originally appealed the order granting partial summary disposition in favor of Rhea and Robert's daughter, Cathy. As this Court originally articulated in Brody I , "the order resolved claims relating to two family businesses, Brody Realty No I, LLC, and Macomb Corporation, declared Rhea Brody disabled pursuant to the terms of the trust, and removed Robert as successor trustee of the trust." Brody I , 321 Mich. App. at 308, 910 N.W.2d 348. The convoluted factual background of this case can best be boiled down to the fact that Rhea became mentally incapacitated as a result of dementia, and Robert, who is also a beneficiary of the trust, began acting as successor trustee. Allegations were made that Robert took actions that were detrimental to the trust, contrary to Rhea's intent, and favored Jay Brody and his heirs to the detriment of Cathy and her heirs. In their original appeal to this Court, Robert and Jay argued that Cathy "did not have standing (i.e., she was not a proper party) to request adjudication of the issues in her petition, including Robert's removal as trustee of the Rhea Trust and reversal of actions taken by Robert as trustee." Id. at 314, 910 N.W.2d 348. Previously, we concluded that Cathy did have standing under MCL 700.7201 as an "interested person," which is defined in MCL 700.1105(c), because, [t]here is no dispute that Cathy is Rhea's child. In addition, Cathy is a "beneficiary." Under MCL 700.1103(d)(i), a beneficiary includes a "trust beneficiary," defined in MCL 700.1103(d)(i) as a person with "a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent." The term "beneficial interest" is defines as follows: "A right or expectancy in something (such as a trust or an estate), as opposed to legal title to that thing. For example, a person with a beneficial interest in a trust receives income from the trust but does not hold legal title to the trust property." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.), p. 934. The plain language of the trust indicates that Cathy has a future (upon Rhea's death), contingent (assuming no revocation or amendment) interest in the trust property. See Restatement Trusts, 1st, § 56, illustration 7, p. 172 (an intervivos trust in which the death of a settlor is a condition precedent establishes a "contingent equitable interest in remainder"). Specifically, Cathy will receive Rhea's clothing and jewelry. In addition, if Robert predeceases Rhea, then a subtrust composed of 50% of the Rhea Trust's remaining assets is created for Cathy. If Rhea predeceases Robert, then a marital trust and a family trust are created, and under the marital trust, Rhea's descendants are each entitled to net income distributions and any principal necessary for education, health, support, and maintenance. [ Brody I , 321 Mich. App. at 317-318, 910 N.W.2d 348.] We have been directed by our Supreme Court to reexamine our original standing analysis. In particular, our Supreme Court indicated that this Court "should consider whether the terms 'child' and 'beneficiary' in MCL 700.1105 [ (c) ] are modified by the phrase 'and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate.' " Brody II , 501 Mich. at 1094, 912 N.W.2d at 175. Our Supreme Court further instructed that if this Court answers that question in the affirmative, this Court should then consider whether Cathy qualifies as an "interested person" under such an interpretation of MCL 700.1105(c). Id . Finally, our Supreme Court noted that this Court "may also consider" the arguments in an amicus curiae brief submitted in our Supreme Court by the Probate and Estate Planning Section (the Probate Section) of the State Bar of Michigan. Because we find the Probate Section's arguments persuasive, we will consider them first, in the interest of clarity. Given the broad scope of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq. , which codifies several complex areas of law, the act contains many statutory definitions. Such definitions are not consolidated in any one portion of EPIC, are not universally applicable, sometimes overlap or supersede other definitions within the act, and often contain terms or phrases that are also statutorily defined. See, e.g., MCL 700.1102 ("The definitions contained in this part apply throughout this act unless the context requires otherwise or unless a term defined elsewhere in this act is applicable to a specific article, part, or section."). Accordingly, as a foundational matter, several relevant statutory definitions must be set forth before approaching the principal analysis. Under MCL 700.7103(l )(i), the term "trust beneficiary" is defined, in relevant part, as a person who "has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent." On the other hand, the phrase "qualified trust beneficiary" is defined under MCL 700.7103(g), in pertinent part, as: a trust beneficiary to whom 1 or more of the following apply on the date the trust beneficiary's qualification is determined: (i ) The trust beneficiary is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal. * * * (iii ) The trust beneficiary would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if the trust terminated on that date. [Emphasis added.] In turn, "distributee" is defined at MCL 700.1103(o), in relevant part, as "a person that receives ... trust property from the trustee other than as a creditor or purchaser." The phrase "permissible distributee" is not defined within EPIC, and we are unable to locate any previous authority construing that term. However, in context, the plain meaning seems apparent without resorting to dictionary definitions. See Bloomfield Twp. v. Kane , 302 Mich. App. 170, 175, 839 N.W.2d 505 (2013) ("[R]ecourse to dictionary definitions is unnecessary when the Legislature's intent can be determined from reading the statute itself.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude that the plain meaning expressed is that a "permissible distributee" is a person who is permitted , not entitled, to receive trust property from the trustee other than as a creditor or purchaser. In its brief, the Probate Section posits that this Court reached the correct outcome concerning standing in Brody I but did so for the wrong reasons. Specifically, the Probate Section contends that this Court made the following errors: • Disregard[ed] the second sentence of MCL 700.1105(c) and its reference to the importance of considering both "the particular purposes of, and matter[s] involved in, [the] proceeding" and the "supreme court rules." • Overlooking MCR 5.125 entirely. • Overlook[ed] MCL 700.7603(1) and (2) entirely. • Fail[ed] to consider whether Cathy was "a person entitled to be reasonably informed, as referred to in MCL 700.7603(2)," for purposes of MCR 5.125(C)(33). • Determin[ed] that Cathy was an "interested person" based solely on the fact that she qualified for two of the categories included in the first sentence of MCL 700.1105(c) ("child" and "beneficiary")[.] The Probate Section also argues that Brody I will have unintended downstream consequences. According to the Probate Section, this Court's determination that a "child" or a "beneficiary" is always an interested person with standing to commence trust proceedings before the probate court is an erroneous construction of EPIC and the Michigan Trust Code that can be expected to interfere seriously with the administration of private citizens' estate planning and trust administration. In light of this published decision, "children" and "beneficiaries" (who would not otherwise qualify as "interested persons" under MCL 700.1105(c), MCR 5.125, and MCL 700.7603(2) ) can be expected to rely on [ Brody I ] to pursue trust-related litigation which would not have been permitted prior to [that] decision.[ ] The second sentence of MCL 700.1105(c) provides, "Identification of interested persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, a proceeding, and by the supreme court rules ." (Emphasis added.) Within Subchapter 5.100 of our court rules, which sets forth rules of pleading and practice that apply in probate court, our Supreme Court has promulgated MCR 5.125, which is captioned, "Interested Persons Defined." In pertinent part, MCR 5.125 provides: (B) Special Conditions for Interested Persons. * * * (2) Devisee. Only a devisee whose devise remains unsatisfied, or a trust beneficiary whose beneficial interest remains unsatisfied , need be notified of specific proceedings under subrule (C). * * * (C) Specific Proceedings. Subject to subrules (A) and (B) and MCR 5.105(E),[ ] the following provisions apply. When a single petition requests multiple forms of relief, the petitioner must give notice to all persons interested in each type of relief: * * * (33) Subject to the provisions of Part 3 of Article VII of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code,[ ]the persons interested in a proceeding affecting a trust other than those already covered by subrules (C)(6), (C)(28), and (C)(32)[ ] are: (a) the qualified trust beneficiaries affected by the relief requested, * * * (d) in a proceeding to appoint a trustee, the proposed trustee, * * * (g) if the petitioner has a reasonable basis to believe the settlor is an incapacitated individual, those persons who are entitled to be reasonably informed, as referred to in MCL 700.7603(2). (D) The court shall make a specific determination of the interested persons if they are not defined by statute or court rule. [Emphasis added.] Read in concert, MCL 700.1105(c) and MCR 5.125 demonstrate that the interested-person inquiry is decidedly flexible and fact-specific. The identity of the interested persons can change not only over time but also depends on the nature of the proceedings and the relief requested. Moreover, MCR 5.125(D) unambiguously provides that there may be circumstances in which a probate court must determine whether an individual-one who does not qualify as an interested person under any of the statutory definitions or under the other subparts of MCR 5.125 -nevertheless qualifies as an interested person under the facts presented in the given case. In this case, Cathy petitioned for several distinct forms of relief: (1) Robert's removal as successor trustee with Cathy's appointment in his stead, or the appointment of an independent trustee to manage the trust's real estate interests; (2) delivery of all trust records to the new successor trustee along with a full accounting; (3) partial supervision of the trust during the pendency of this action; (4) the rescission of all allegedly improper acts taken by Robert as successor trustee following Rhea's disability, with the funds from such rescinded transactions held in a constructive trust; (5) an order enjoining Robert from committing any future breaches of trust; (6) Robert's removal as manager of Brody Realty, which is owned by the trust; (7) an award of damages to the trust and Brody Realty; (8) surcharge of Robert and Jay for Cathy's attorney fees in this action; and (9) an order enjoining Robert and Jay from wasting or dissipating trust assets. With regard to each of those items of relief requested, we agree with the Probate Section that Cathy qualified as an interested person under MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g) ("if the petitioner has a reasonable basis to believe the settlor is an incapacitated individual, those persons who are entitled to be reasonably informed, as referred to in MCL 700.7603(2)"). MCL 700.7603(2) provides: If the trustee reasonably believes that the settlor of a revocable trust is an incapacitated individual,[ ] the trustee shall keep the settlor's designated agent or, if there is no designated agent or if the sole agent is a trustee, each beneficiary who, if the settlor were then deceased, would be a qualified trust beneficiary informed of the existence of the trust and reasonably informed of its administration. [Emphasis added.] In this case, there is no dispute that when Robert-who was acting as Rhea's agent under a durable power of attorney-formally accepted his role as successor trustee in May 2013, he had reason to believe that Rhea was an "incapacitated individual" as a result of her dementia. Nor is there any evidence that she was no longer an incapacitated individual at the time that Cathy instituted these proceedings. Moreover, had Rhea been deceased at that time, Cathy would have been a "qualified trust beneficiary" under MCL 700.7103(g)(i ) ("The trust beneficiary is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal."). Under such circumstances, Cathy would also have been entitled to the specific gift of Rhea's jewelry and clothing, and Cathy would also have been entitled to receive a portion of the trust's net income. Therefore, Cathy would qualify as a "distributee" under MCL 700.1103(o). And because she would qualify as a distributee of both trust income and principal in the event of Rhea's death, she would also become a "qualified trust beneficiary" under those circumstances. As a result, Cathy would be entitled to be reasonably informed of the trust and its administration under MCL 700.7603(2), which means she would qualify as an interested person under the definition set forth in MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g). Consequently, the Probate Section is correct that Cathy qualifies as an interested person in this matter under MCR 5.125(C)(33)(g) and MCL 700.1105(c). As an interested person, she had standing to institute these proceedings. See In re Rottenberg Living Trust , 300 Mich. App. 339, 355, 833 N.W.2d 384 (2013) (holding, in the context of trust litigation, that an "interested person" had "statutory standing ... to invoke the probate court's jurisdiction with respect to the administration of [the trust at issue]"). Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the construction of MCL 700.1105(c) announced in Brody I was erroneous, the proper conclusion regarding Cathy's standing was nevertheless reached. In light of the foregoing analysis, we would ordinarily decline to address whether the phrase "and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate" in MCL 700.1105(c) modifies the terms "child" and "beneficiary" because the issue would be moot. See Garrett v. Washington , 314 Mich. App. 436, 449, 886 N.W.2d 762 (2016) ("A matter is moot if this Court's ruling cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy.") (quotation marks and citations omitted). However, given the circumstances at bar, we will nevertheless address and decide the issue. See Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 316 Mich. App. 346, 352, 891 N.W.2d 880 (2016), in which this Court articulated that the "rule of mandate" reflects "the well-accepted principle in our jurisprudence that a lower court must strictly comply with, and may not exceed the scope of, a remand order." The Supreme Court's remand instructions indicated that this Court "should consider" this issue, and when viewed in context, the Supreme Court's use of "should" does not seem permissive. We conclude that the proposed construction of MCL 700.1105(c) would erroneously restrict the flexible meaning of "interested person" that is conveyed by the statutory language. In pertinent part, the portion of MCL 700.1105(c) that is at issue-the first of its two sentences-provides: "Interested person" ... includes, but is not limited to, the incumbent fiduciary; an heir, devisee, child , spouse, creditor, and beneficiary and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected individual; a person that has priority for appointment as personal representative; and a fiduciary representing an interested person. [Emphasis added.] Such language must not be construed in a vacuum, heedless of context. See Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304, 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002) (noting that potential ambiguities in statutory language may be resolved by contextual considerations). As noted earlier, the second sentence of MCL 700.1105(c) expressly states that the "[i]dentification of interested persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, a proceeding, and by the supreme court rules." Moreover, in MCR 5.125(D), our Supreme Court has taken a decidedly flexible approach as well. In light of the several broad legal areas that EPIC covers, such an approach is prudent. It would be unduly restrictive to conclude that the terms "child" and "beneficiary" in MCL 700.1105(c) are necessarily modified-in every case-by the phrase "any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate ...." Doing so would directly contravene the legislative intent expressed by the second sentence of MCL 700.1105(c), which demonstrates that the Legislature wished to leave the fact-specific inquiry of who qualifies as an interested person in a given probate proceeding to the sound discretion of the probate court. That same conclusion is also supported by fundamental principles of grammar, including the last-antecedent rule. "Because the Legislature is presumed to know the rules of grammar, ...statutory language must be read within its grammatical context unless something else was clearly intended ...." Niles Twp. v. Berrien Co. Bd. of Comm'rs , 261 Mich. App. 308, 315, 683 N.W.2d 148 (2004). "Proper syntax provides that commas usually set off words, phrases, and other sentence elements that are parenthetical or independent." Dale v. Beta-C, Inc. , 227 Mich. App. 57, 69, 574 N.W.2d 697 (1997). Moreover, "[i]t is a general rule of grammar and of statutory construction that a modifying word or clause is confined solely to the last antecedent, unless a contrary intention appears." Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward , 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999). The "last antecedent" of a given term or phrase is " 'the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence ....' " People v. English , 317 Mich. App. 607, 614, 897 N.W.2d 184 (2016) (opinion by WILDER , P.J.), quoting 2A Singer & Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (7th ed.), § 47:33, pp. 494-497. In this instance, the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent of the phrase "and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate" is the word "beneficiary." Moreover, from a grammatical standpoint, the word "beneficiary" appears in the same dependent clause as the phrase in question, separated from the rest of the sentence by commas or semicolons. Therefore, lacking any clear evidence of a contrary legislative intent-and we find none-it would be inappropriate to construe the phrase "and any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate" as modifying the word "child." On the contrary, in grammatical context, the phrase in question seems to represent an independent catchall category, not adjectival language that was meant to modify the terms preceding it. Under the canon of construction ejusdem generis , when "general words follow a designation of particular subjects, the meaning of the general words will ordinarily be presumed to be and construed as restricted by the particular designation and as including only those things of the same kind, class, character or nature as those specifically enumerated." Benedict v. Dep't of Treasury , 236 Mich. App. 559, 564, 601 N.W.2d 151 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, "[w]hen construing a catch-all phrase, courts will interpret it to include only those things of the same type as the preceding specific list." Sebring v. City of Berkley , 247 Mich. App. 666, 674, 637 N.W.2d 552 (2001). In other words, if anything, the terms "child" and "beneficiary" should be construed as modifying the meaning of the catchall phrase "any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate," not the other way around. For those reasons, we reject the proposed construction of MCL 700.1105(c) under which the phrase "any other person that has a property right in or claim against a trust estate" would be construed as modifying the preceding terms "child" and "beneficiary." In light of the second sentence of MCL 700.1105(c), it seems that whether a "child" or a "beneficiary" is interested in a given trust proceeding is dependent on the particular purposes of, and matters involved in, the proceeding-under the facts as they exist at the time that standing is determined-not whether the given "child" or "beneficiary" has a property right in or claim against the trust estate. We again affirm our prior conclusion that the trial court did not err by concluding that Cathy had standing as a petitioner in this action. O'Brien, P.J., Murray, C.J., and Jansen, J., concurred. Jay is the son of Rhea and Robert. We note that the arguments raised by the Probate Section were not previously raised by the parties in this Court. In other words, the practical concern of the Probate Section is that Brody I 's construction of MCL 700.1105(c) will undercut several of the characteristics that make revocable grantor trusts desirable as an estate planning tool. The Probate Section is concerned that grantor-settlors who use revocable grantor trusts (or "living" trusts) solely as an estate planning mechanism-seeking to avoid probate, to minimize tax liabilities, and to keep private financial affairs from becoming a matter of public record-will suddenly have to answer to beneficiaries, during the grantor-settlors' lifetimes, for the management of "trust" assets that, for all practical purposes, still belong to the grantor-settlors and are funded into the "trust" only to avoid the need to probate un funded assets (via a pour-over will) after death. Because MCR 5.105(E) concerns "unborn or unascertained interested persons not represented by a fiduciary or guardian ad litem," it is not relevant in this case. Part 3 of Article VII of EPIC concerns the representation of parties involved in the proceeding. Those listed subrules are not seemingly relevant here. Subrule (C)(6) involves proceedings "for examination or approval of an account of a fiduciary," Subrule (C)(28) concerns petitions "for approval of a trust under MCR 2.420," and Subrule (C)(32) addresses "modification or termination of a noncharitable irrevocable trust[.]" MCL 700.1105(a) provides: "Incapacitated individual" means an individual who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause, not including minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate informed decisions.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The petition for interim suspension is considered, and it is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of a petition for interim suspension by the Judicial Tenure Commission. Section 30(2) of Article 6 of the 1963 Constitution provides that the Court may take certain disciplinary actions against a judge only "[o]n recommendation of the judicial tenure commission ...." In In re Hathaway , 464 Mich. 672, 683, 630 N.W.2d 850 (2001), we noted that when the "commission comes to this Court with a recommendation for discipline, it invokes the Court's jurisdiction under Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30 (2) ...." (Emphasis added.) It is the invocation of this Court's jurisdiction by the commission that gives the Court authority to act. Id . Further, MCR 9.219(A)(1) provides only that "the commission may petition the Supreme Court" for an order suspending a judge until final adjudication of the complaint. The petition before the Court was not filed on behalf of the commission. Rather, the petition was filed by the Judicial Tenure Commission "Deputy Executive Director, with the permission of the Commission ...." Indeed, the commission's January 9, 2019 order "expresse[d] no opinion regarding ... the substance and/or merits of the Examiner's motion for interim suspension ...." Accordingly, there is no recommendation or petition from the commission before the Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing its reply is GRANTED. The reply will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before January 22, 2019.

Gleicher, P.J. The issue presented is whether the probate court erred by appointing a public guardian and conservator for Harold Gerstler, bypassing Gerstler's daughter, Angelee Gerstler. The Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC), MCL 700.1101 et seq ., establishes an order of priority that must be followed when a probate court selects a guardian and conservator for a protected person. MCL 700.5313 ; MCL 700.5409. Angelee was at the top of the list, and no evidence suggests that she was incompetent to serve or otherwise unsuitable for the position. The probate court failed to make any factual findings in this regard, however, and refused to apply the statutory priority framework. We vacate the guardianship and conservatorship orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I Harold Gerstler is 75 years old and suffers from dementia. He and his wife, Penni, lived for many years in Texas while Harold worked as a mechanical engineer for a steel company. He and Penni retired to California. Angelee Gerstler is Harold's adult daughter and only surviving child. Angelee lives in a home in Texas that Harold and Penni helped her purchase. There is no dispute about Harold's current need for a guardian and conservator. Janice Rowland is Harold's sister and a resident of Allegan County, Michigan. Before the events giving rise to this case, Harold had no ties to Michigan other than the presence of Rowland and another sister. In May 2013, Harold and Penni signed California "statutory durable powers of attorney" granting Angelee the power to carry out real estate transactions on their behalf. Two years later, Harold signed another California statutory durable power of attorney empowering Angelee to engage in his real estate transactions and "banking and other financial institution transactions." In early 2016, a neurologist determined that Harold suffered from Alzheimer's disease. Penni died that same year, on October 4, 2016. Shortly before Penni's death, Rowland brought Harold to Michigan. The circumstances surrounding this trip are unclear. On October 11, 2016, one week after Penni died, Rowland persuaded Harold to sign a power of attorney in Rowland's favor. That document enabled Rowland to control Harold's finances and estate. A short time later, Rowland sent Angelee this text message: Angie, this is your Aunt Janice' [sic]. As you may know by now, I have durable and medical power of attorney for your dad's money and estate. I want you to be comfortable with this, knowing that this is not for my benefit. This is for your dad's care. The money transfer from Texas to his Raymond James account here will be completed by the end of today. I need to put you down as beneficiary and therefore I need your Social Security number. I have your phone number and address already. I have a meeting with the Financial people tomorrow and would like to finish the paperwork. Please give me a call.... [Emphasis added.] Apparently, Angelee balked at these demands. On November 7, 2016, Rowland filed in California a "Request for Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Order[ ]," asserting that Angelee was engaged in "financial abuse," "talked [Harold] into giving her money," and attempted to "coerce" Harold to move to Texas. For good measure, Rowland alleged in an attachment that Angelee "has 5 children (4 are illegitimate) by different fathers"; that one was "give[n] to the father," a second "given up for adoption," and another "taken" by child services because of Angelee's "drug use"; and that Angelee "is currently unemployed by choice." There is no proof of any of these allegations in the record, which includes multiple pages of California social services reports and several guardian ad litem reports authored in Michigan. We recount them only because Rowland's troubling accusations help explain the decisions initially made by the probate court. Rowland's request for a California restraining order is notable for two additional reasons. First, it fails to mention that Harold had twice granted Angelee powers of attorney before Harold's dementia diagnosis, specifically authorizing Angelee to make financial and real estate transfers on his behalf. Second, the form Rowland filled out in support of her request for a restraining order includes Angelee's correct address on Rolling Forest Lane in Hockley, Texas. Predictably and appropriately, California launched an investigation into Rowland's charges. Ultimately, the allegations were found "unsubstantiated," but that determination came long after the Allegan Probate Court's wheels had firmly turned in Rowland's direction. On November 22, 2016, Rowland filed a petition in the Allegan Probate Court, seeking appointment as Harold's guardian. The petition identified Angelee as Harold's daughter, but listed her address as "17600 Badtke Road" in Hockley, Texas, and her telephone number as "unknown." Angelee did not receive this petition, as the address Rowland identified belongs to an industrial facility. Rowland averred that the emergency appointment of a temporary guardian was necessary so that Harold's investments could be transferred to an Edward D. Jones account in Douglas, Michigan. She announced her intention to sell Harold's California property under the power of attorney he had granted her, but acknowledged that Edward D. Jones's legal department questioned Harold's mental capacity and required a guardianship before effectuating any transfers. Rowland's petition for conservatorship rehashed the same information and misinformation. The probate court appointed Kenneth Prins as Harold's guardian ad litem and conducted an emergency hearing on December 9, 2016. Rowland, Prins, and Michael McClellan, a representative of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, attended the hearing. Prins testified that according to Rowland, Angelee persuaded Harold to give her at least $73,000 in addition to monthly checks of approximately $1,500. Harold had an estate worth $660,000, Rowland advised, consisting of a Texas Wells Fargo account and a California home. Prins relayed the "concern" of "family members" that Angelee "is going to try to get this money and take custody of the dad and take conservatorship and take the money and then basically, run." Relying solely on information provided by Rowland, Prins testified that Angelee "has had a very difficult life" that "[a]ll five [of her] children were taken away from her through adoption or Child Protective Services." Prins reiterated Rowland's claim that Angelee "does have a drug problem, a prescription drug problem, in the past, so that's why we [are] here today." After expressing that Angelee is "a little bit untrustworthy from what I hear," Prins told the court that Rowland took "very good care" of Harold. Prins added that he had talked to Harold, who "wouldn't mind living" in Michigan but preferred warm weather. Harold told Prins that "if I do go to Texas ... my daughter says she wants $93,000 to pay off the house, and she can have it...." According to Prins, Harold was "just not thinking straight[.]" McClellan advised that his counterparts in California were still investigating Rowland's allegations. He and Prins recommended the appointment of a temporary guardian. Rowland explained that Harold had lived and worked in Texas, then retired to California with his wife. She described that he developed dementia symptoms three years previously and currently was unable to recognize and understand common, everyday things. Rowland went to California and decided "to take charge" after Penni died. She obtained Harold's power of attorney and arranged with an Edward D. Jones agent to bring Harold's money from Texas to Michigan. The probate court appointed Rowland as Harold's temporary guardian but opted for a public conservator, Kimberly Milbocker, "until we get this sorted out." The court appointed Jeremy Baier to serve as Harold's attorney. Prins filed a guardian ad litem report three days later. For the most part, his report recapitulated the information he provided at the emergency hearing. He added that he had since spoken with Angelee and learned her correct phone number and address. Angelee told him that her father bought the house in which she lived in Texas, the home was ready for Harold to live in, and that she wanted to be her father's guardian and conservator. Nevertheless, Prins recommended that the trial court appoint Rowland as Harold's guardian and conservator. At a December 16, 2016 hearing, Prins advised that both Rowland and Angelee desired appointment as Harold's guardian and conservator. He verified that Rowland went to California and brought Harold back to her home in Fennville, Michigan, where Harold then resided, and that Angelee had a place for him to live in Texas. Harold told Prins that he wanted to give Angelee $99,000 to pay off the debt on the Texas home and that he disliked winter weather and wanted to live in Texas during the winter and with Rowland during the summer. Prins testified that he knew that Rowland would provide Harold excellent care. After admitting that he "didn't know Angie very well," Prins recommended that Rowland serve as Harold's guardian and conservator. Baier, Harold's attorney, testified that Harold would "much rather be in Texas," as he felt "more comfortable there...." He recommended that Angelee serve as Harold's guardian, but was "not fully convinced" that she should also be his conservator. "[I]t may be in [Harold's] better interests," Baier suggested, "to have a public conservator." McClellan told the court that he had communicated with California Adult Protective Services (APS), which questioned how Harold came to Michigan and whether he did so by his own choosing. McClellan also interviewed Harold, who indicated that he planned to go with Angelee to Texas. However, McClellan claimed, APS substantiated that Angelee had financially exploited Harold and that Harold had given Angelee checks and large sums of money. McClellan expressed concern regarding appointing Angelee as the conservator, but he had no opinion regarding the guardianship appointment. Milbocker suggested that the money transferred to Angelee might be considered during a "look-back period'' if Harold ever needed long-term care benefits, and she speculated that the residence in Texas might be construed as a second home. She recommended that the conservatorship be awarded to someone other than Angelee. Rowland urged the court to appoint her as both Harold's guardian and conservator. She claimed that she brought Harold to Michigan because she needed to secure his money in an Edward D. Jones investment account. Harold executed the powers of attorney only three or four days after his wife died, Rowland admitted. Rowland maintained that she did not trust Angelee and that Angelee could not provide Harold needed care. Angelee asserted that Rowland fraudulently obtained the power of attorney five days after her mother's death and then filed an abuse case in California that required her to go to California to defend herself. Angelee explained that the house in Texas belonged to Harold, that she paid him rent and the mortgage, and that Harold bought it with the understanding that she would care for him in that home. Her father always intended to return to Texas, Angelee declared. She affirmed her love for Harold and lamented that Rowland took him away. The court reaffirmed Harold's need for a guardian and a conservator and opined that an independent person should manage Harold's finances. In light of the circumstances surrounding Harold's grant of powers of attorney to Rowland and the fact that he had dementia at that time, the court suspended them. Because Rowland and Angelee could not work together, the trial court appointed Milbocker as Harold's guardian and conservator. Milbocker thereafter approved a plan to have Harold visit Angelee in Texas to finish out the winter months. In April 2017, Milbocker filed a petition to modify Harold's guardianship and conservatorship by permitting her resignation. Milbocker's petition prompted Angelee to file her own petitions for appointment as Harold's guardian and conservator. In a lengthy probate court submission, Angelee described the gradual onset of Harold's dementia and contended that he lacked the capacity to execute the power of attorney in favor of Rowland. The petition chronicled Angelee's contacts with Rowland before Rowland filed the Michigan petition, demonstrating Rowland's awareness of Angelee's correct address and telephone number. Angelee charged that Rowland had knowingly misrepresented Angelee's address in the initial petition to deny her timely notice of the proceedings. Angelee also took issue with much of the evidence introduced through Prins at the earlier hearings. She supplied the court with copies of the powers of attorney that Harold signed in 2013 and 2015 and other documents refuting Rowland's claims. No evidence supported that Angelee financially abused Harold, the petition averred. Therefore, as Harold's only adult child and his sole heir, no good cause existed to prevent her from being appointed Harold's guardian and conservator. Angelee also sought an accounting of Rowland's handling of Harold's assets, personal property, and financial affairs. Angelee accused Rowland of impropriety and breaches of fiduciary duties. Rowland responded by denying Angelee's allegation that Rowland had acted improperly. She asserted that she had four different addresses for Angelee and did not know Angelee's current address so she mailed her petitions to one of the addresses. She admitted that she obtained an invalid power of attorney from Harold as he lacked the capacity at the time to make such a grant. Rowland argued that Angelee had no right to an accounting because the transfers of Harold's assets occurred at Milbocker's direction. During the subsequent hearing, Angelee's counsel contended that she had priority for appointment and sought to prove that all of the money transfers condemned by Rowland had been proper. He emphasized that no evidence supported that Angelee was unqualified to be Harold's guardian or conservator. Milbocker testified that Harold had received good care in Michigan and in Texas, and she expressed no concerns about either placement. She reported that California had reopened the adult protective services case and concluded that none of the allegations against Angelee could be substantiated. Milbocker, too, believed that Harold's transfers to Angelee reflected no wrongdoing on her part. In a report prepared two days later, Milbocker advised the court that "[t]he [Texas] home was obtained in August 2015, prior to any documented knowledge of Harold's dementia, that I have been able to find within his physician evaluations and documentation in California. Angelee has maintained the mortgage payments with Harold maintaining the cost of home insurance and property taxes." Milbocker expressed at the hearing that either Angelee or Rowland could serve as Harold's guardian. The probate court opined that Angelee had failed to identify any problems with having a public guardian and maintaining the status quo. In the court's view, the arrangement had worked well. "[T]he focus here is not the rights of either the sister or the daughter," the court ruled; "the focus here is Mr. Gerstler himself. What's in his best interest ... for him right now, no matter what the history is...." Because Harold seemed happy and was able to see his sisters and Angelee, and "despite any presumption or priority as far as relatives," the court determined that the best arrangement for Harold was to maintain an independent public guardian and conservator. The court appointed Tammy Dykstra as successor guardian and conservator per Milbocker's recommendation. A few days later, Milbocker filed a final report clarifying certain facts for the court's records. Milbocker noted that "Harold has verbalized a desire to take care of his only daughter stating 'Of course, I want to help her.' " In a private conversation with Milbocker, Harold expressed "guilt for the extensive time spent on caring for Angelee's [deceased] brothers [who suffered from muscular dystrophy ] and a neglect of Angelee which he believed led to her previous problems of substance abuse." Milbocker noted that Angelee had taken an unannounced drug test at Milbocker's request and that Angelee had passed the test. Milbocker's report also clarified that Rowland received $72 per day for Harold's personal care and $800 per month for Harold's room and board. She noted that Rowland did not cooperate with Angelee to enable her to visit Harold despite Milbocker's attempts to intervene and that APS never substantiated any malfeasance by Angelee regarding use or abuse of Harold's funds. She advised that she and APS reviewed transactions and receipts respecting all funds given to Angelee and found only a minimal discrepancy that raised no concern. Harold told her he desired to help Angelee, and the Texas home was purchased in 2015 before any documentation of Harold's dementia. Angelee paid the mortgage, and Harold had paid the insurance and taxes. Milbocker advised that when Harold first traveled to Texas he lived in an assisted living facility briefly, did not like it, and moved into Angelee's Texas home with Milbocker's knowledge. Rowland called the police and claimed that Angelee kidnapped Harold even though the assisted living facility had discharged Harold to live with Angelee. While in Texas, Harold had a comfortable stay. Angelee communicated with Milbocker consistently. The probate court denied Angelee's motion for reconsideration, and she now appeals. II This Court has recently summarized the standard of review applicable to this case as follows: We review the probate court's dispositional rulings for an abuse of discretion. A probate court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. We review the probate court's findings of fact for clear error. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. We review de novo any statutory or constitutional interpretation by the probate court. [ In re Redd Guardianship , 321 Mich.App. 398, 403-404, 909 N.W.2d 289 (2017) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] We conclude that the probate court abused its discretion by appointing Dykstra as Harold's successor guardian and conservator because the court failed to make any factual findings relevant to the statutory framework that governs this case and otherwise neglected to apply the law governing guardianship and conservatorship appointments. III MCL 700.5313 addresses the appointment of a guardian of a legally incapacitated person. The statute provides for orders of priority and preference as follows: (2) In appointing a guardian under this section, the court shall appoint a person, if suitable and willing to serve, in the following order of priority: (a) A person previously appointed, qualified, and serving in good standing as guardian for the legally incapacitated individual in another state. (b) A person the individual subject to the petition chooses to serve as guardian. (c) A person nominated as guardian in a durable power of attorney or other writing by the individual subject to the petition. (d) A person named by the individual as a patient advocate or attorney in fact in a durable power of attorney. (3) If there is no person chosen, nominated, or named under subsection (2), or if none of the persons listed in subsection (2) are suitable or willing to serve, the court may appoint as a guardian an individual who is related to the individual who is the subject of the petition in the following order of preference: (a) The legally incapacitated individual's spouse. This subdivision shall be considered to include a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a deceased spouse. (b) An adult child of the legally incapacitated individual . (c) A parent of the legally incapacitated individual. This subdivision shall be considered to include a person nominated by will or other writing signed by a deceased parent. (d) A relative of the legally incapacitated individual with whom the individual has resided for more than 6 months before the filing of the petition. (e) A person nominated by a person who is caring for the legally incapacitated individual or paying benefits to the legally incapacitated individual. (4) If none of the persons as designated or listed in subsection (2) or (3) are suitable or willing to serve, the court may appoint any competent person who is suitable and willing to serve, including a professional guardian as provided in [ MCL 700.5106 ]. [Emphasis added.] With respect to the appointment of a conservator, MCL 700.5409 provides as follows: (1) The court may appoint an individual, a corporation authorized to exercise fiduciary powers, or a professional conservator described in [ MCL 700.5106 ] to serve as conservator of a protected individual's estate. The following are entitled to consideration for appointment in the following order of priority: (a) A conservator, guardian of property, or similar fiduciary appointed or recognized by the appropriate court of another jurisdiction in which the protected individual resides. (b) An individual or corporation nominated by the protected individual if he or she is 14 years of age or older and of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice, including a nomination made in a durable power of attorney. (c) The protected individual's spouse. (d) An adult child of the protected individual . (e) A parent of the protected individual or a person nominated by the will of a deceased parent. (f) A relative of the protected individual with whom he or she has resided for more than 6 months before the petition is filed. (g) A person nominated by the person who is caring for or paying benefits to the protected individual. (h) If none of the persons listed in subdivisions (a) to (g) are suitable and willing to serve, any person that the court determines is suitable and willing to serve . (2) A person named in subsection (1)(a), (c), (d), (e), or (f) may designate in writing a substitute to serve instead, and that designation transfers the priority to the substitute. If persons have equal priority, the court shall select the person the court considers best qualified to serve. Acting in the protected individual's best interest, the court may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower priority or no priority . [Emphasis added.] MCL 700.5106 addresses the appointment of a professional guardian or a professional conservator in relevant part as follows: (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the court may appoint or approve a professional guardian or professional conservator, as appropriate, as a guardian or conservator under this act, or as a plenary guardian or partial guardian as those terms are defined in ... MCL 330.1600. (2) The court shall only appoint a professional guardian or professional conservator as authorized under subsection (1) if the court finds on the record all of the following : (a) The appointment of the professional guardian or professional conservator is in the ward's, developmentally disabled individual's, incapacitated individual's, or protected individual's best interests. (b) There is no other person that is competent, suitable, and willing to serve in that fiduciary capacity in accordance with [ MCL 700.5212, MCL 700.5313, or MCL 700.5409 ]. [Emphasis added.] In short, MCL 700.5106(2) provides that, before appointing a professional guardian or a professional conservator, a probate court must find that the appointment of a professional fiduciary is in the incapacitated person's best interests and that there is no other person who is competent, suitable, and willing to serve in that fiduciary capacity in accordance with, as relevant here, MCL 700.5313 or MCL 700.5409. MCL 700.5313(4) similarly allows appointment of a professional guardian only if none of the persons listed in MCL 700.5313(2) or (3) are suitable or willing to serve. With respect to the appointment of a conservator, MCL 700.5409(2) likewise allows for departure from the statutory order of priority in the best interests of the protected individual, and MCL 700.5409(1)(h) allows appointment of any person that is suitable and willing to serve if none of the persons listed in MCL 700.5409(1)(a) through (g) are suitable and willing to serve. This Court has explained the meaning of suitability in the context of a guardianship by holding that "a 'suitable' guardian is one who is qualified and able to provide for the ward's care, custody, and control." Redd , 321 Mich.App. at 408, 909 N.W.2d 289. Here, Angelee claimed priority as Harold's sole surviving adult child, and there is no dispute that Angelee holds the highest position of priority or preference for appointment as Harold's guardian and conservator under the statutory provisions set forth above. Yet the trial court instead appointed Dykstra, a professional guardian and conservator. In order to appoint a professional fiduciary such as Dykstra, the trial court was required to find that the appointment of such a professional served Harold's best interests and that no other person was competent, suitable, and willing to serve in that fiduciary capacity in accordance with the governing statutory provisions. MCL 700.5106(2). The trial court made terse findings regarding Harold's best interests by stating that "perfect harmony" had been achieved by the appointment of the previous professional guardian and conservator, Kimberly Milbocker, and that Harold was "happy" in the existing arrangement because he was traveling back and forth between Texas and Michigan in order to see both Angelee and his sisters. According to the court, this arrangement was "working ... because we've an independent third party that's keeping track." The court also noted that if Harold ever needed Medicaid or other benefits, a clear record from an independent third party would exist and there would be no need to "prov[e] the nuances that might be there as far as making it work." The court emphasized that its "main focus is [Harold's] welfare. And I do find, despite any presumption or priority as far as relatives, the best resource, the best answer for him at this point is independent." The court again stated that Harold presently "likes what's happening, he likes what's taking place, it's working, and so the best way to accomplish as pointed out by [Harold's court-appointed attorney] is to have a public guardian and conservator and we're lucky to have another one." While the probate court's focus on Harold's welfare is commendable, the court missed a critical step in its analysis. When Milbocker resigned as Harold's guardian and conservator, Angelee petitioned to be appointed to fill those roles. At that juncture, the probate court was required to reconsult the statutory framework before appointing another public administrator. The court never articulated any findings regarding Angelee's competence and suitability to serve. Absent those findings, the court erred by appointing Dykstra. Neither MCL 700.5313 nor MCL 700.5409 indicates the standard of proof applicable to a probate court's determination of whether to depart from the statutory priority and appoint a public administrator as guardian and conservator. This Court has noted in the analogous context (a petition for removal of a guardian) that when a standard of proof is undescribed, the default preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies in determining a person's suitability. See Redd , 321 Mich.App. at 408-410, 909 N.W.2d 289. By using the mandatory term "shall," MCL 700.5106(2)requires that, in order to appoint a professional guardian or professional conservator, the probate court must find that the appointment of such a professional is in the incapacitated person's best interests and that no other person in priority under the applicable statutes for appointment of guardians and conservators is competent, suitable, and willing to serve in that fiduciary capacity. See Redd , 321 Mich.App. at 409, 909 N.W.2d 289 (noting that the use of the word "shall" "indicates a mandatory and imperative directive") (quotation marks and citation omitted). It follows that to depart from the statutory priority provisions and appoint a public guardian and public conservator, the probate court was tasked with finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Angelee was not competent and suitable to serve in that fiduciary capacity. That analysis was not done. Alternatively stated, the probate court failed to make any determination of whether Angelee was competent, suitable, and willing to serve as Harold's guardian and conservator. Absent this requisite finding, the court abused its discretion by appointing a professional fiduciary in lieu of appointing Angelee, who held the position of statutory priority or preference for appointment. On remand, the probate court must reconsider the appointment of a new guardian and conservator in conformity with EPIC. The court must make specific findings of fact regarding Angelee's competence, suitability, and willingness to serve in those capacities. Relevant facts that should enter into the court's analysis include Angelee's history of satisfactory care for her father and that, unlike Rowland, Angelee does not charge her father for rent or any of his living expenses. Should Rowland provide evidence in the remand proceedings, we direct the court to weigh her credibility carefully in light of the incorrect information she provided in her initial petition regarding Angelee's address and telephone number and her conduct in obtaining Harold's power of attorney despite her awareness that he was incompetent to give it. Given our determination that further proceedings are required, we need not consider Angelee's remaining issues on appeal. We vacate the guardianship and conservatorship orders and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. M. J. Kelly and Cameron, JJ., concurred with Gleicher, P.J. While we understand that a court hearing Rowland's unproven charges about Angelee may have harbored justifiable concerns about Angelee's suitability to serve as Harold's guardian or conservator, we are far less sanguine about the performance of Kenneth Prins, who was appointed by the probate court as Harold's guardian ad litem. As we discuss later in this opinion, Prins recounted Rowland's allegations to the court without bothering to verify them, poisoning the probate waters. As a result, Angelee entered the litigation at a significant and undeserved disadvantage. In our view, Prins acted as Rowland's advocate rather than Harold's. The APS report also observed that Harold "never expressed any concerns against Angelee and did not appear to be fearful or intimidated by Angelee." Again, MCL 700.5106(2) states that "[t]he court shall only appoint a professional guardian or professional conservator ... if the court finds on the record all of the following...."

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 24, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 20, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellant to extend the time for filing its reply is GRANTED. The reply submitted on November 29, 2018, is accepted as timely filed.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 1, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted, and we DIRECT that court to decide this case on an expedited basis.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to extend the time for filing their answer to the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before January 22, 2019.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 5, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 26, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for the appeal to continue, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order as acknowledgement of his responsibility to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to do so shall result in the appeal being administratively dismissed. If appellant timely complies with this order, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. That amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 21, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 24, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 4, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

The Judicial Tenure Commission has issued a Decision and Recommendation, to which the respondent, Honorable Joseph S. Filip, 12th District Court Judge, consents. It is accompanied by a settlement agreement, in which the respondent waived his rights, stipulated to findings of fact and conclusions of law, and consented to a sanction of public censure. In resolving this matter, we are mindful of the standards set forth in In re Brown , 461 Mich. 1291, 1292-1293, 625 N.W.2d 744 (2000) : Everything else being equal: (1) misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct; (2) misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench; (3) misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety; (4) misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does; (5) misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated; (6) misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery; (7) misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship. In the present case, those standards are being applied in the context of the following stipulated findings of fact of the Judicial Tenure Commission, which, following our de novo review, we adopt as our own: 1. Respondent presided over a preliminary examination in the case of People v. Rama Tyson , case number 1705024FY, on July 14, 2017. 2. The prosecution was represented by Assistant Prosecuting Attorney (APA) Jeremiah Smith and the defendant was represented by Mr. Sheldon Halpern and Ms. Suzanna Kostovski. 3. At the conclusion of the testimony and arguments of counsel on July 14, respondent asked the parties to brief issues regarding the sufficiency of the evidence as to count 2, maintaining a drug house, and as to the execution of the search warrant. 4. On July 25, 2017, respondent sent the following email to APA Smith: From : Joe Filip Sent : Tuesday, July 25, 2017 2:17 PM To : Jeremiah Smith Subject : Rama Tyson - Maintaining Read: People v. Tarone Washington, COA No. 330345; Unpublished July 6, 2014 5. The Washington case cited in respondent's email was relevant to the issue respondent had asked the parties to brief as to count 2, maintaining a drug house. 6. Respondent did not in any way inform either of the defendant's counsel of the Washington case. 7. Respondent did not provide a copy of his email to Mr. Smith to either of defendant's counsel. 8. Respondent presided over People v. Kathleen Adkins , case numbers 16262SD and 17016SD. 9. The prosecution was represented by APA Smith and the defendant was represented by attorney Michael Dungan. 10. On June 28, 2017, respondent sent the following email to APA Smith: From : Joe Filip Sent : Wednesday, June 28, 2017 7:52 AM To : Jeremiah Smith Subject : Adkins OWIs Take a read of People v. Solmonson, 261 MA 657 (2004), cited in People Rassoull Omari Janes, COA Unpublished June 15, 2017 (I have a copy). Perhaps Jerry Schrotenboer may have some thoughts as well. 11. The cases cited in respondent's email were relevant to an issue in the case. 12. Respondent did not in any way inform the defendant's counsel of these cases. 13. Respondent did not provide a copy of his email to Mr. Smith to defendant's counsel. 14. APA Smith informed his supervisor, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Kati Rezmierski, of respondent's email in the Tyson case. Chief APA Rezmierski provided a copy to Tyson defense counsel. 15. APA Smith provided Adkins defense counsel with a copy of the email respondent sent him pertaining to the Adkins case. 16. On September 8, 2017, respondent held a hearing on defense counsel Mr. Halpern's motion to disqualify respondent in the case of People v. Rama Tyson .... 17. During the course of the September 8 hearing, respondent expressed his displeasure that APA Smith and Chief APA Rezmierski had alerted defense counsel to the ex parte communications. Respondent stated that APA Smith "handled himself in in [sic] a completely unprofessional manner, never notified me of his concerns..." (Transcript p. 3). Respondent also stated "... Mr. Smith is a fool that I suffered." (Transcript p. 8). Respondent also twice referred to Chief APA Rezmierski as a "cancer" in the prosecuting attorney's office. (Transcript p. 9). The standards in Brown are also being applied to the Judicial Tenure Commission's legal conclusions to which the respondent stipulated and which we adopt as our own. The Commission concludes, and we agree, that the respondent's conduct constitutes: a. Misconduct in office, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30 and MCR 9.205 ; b. Conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article 6, Section 30, and MCR 9.205 ; c. Failure to establish, maintain, enforce and personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved, contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1 ; d. Irresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A; e. Conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A; f. Failure to respect and observe the law and to conduct himself at all times in a manner which would enhance the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, contrary to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2B; g. Conduct which exposes the legal profession or the courts to obloquy, contempt, censure, or reproach, in violation of MCR 9.104(2) ; h. Lack of personal responsibility for his own behavior and for the proper conduct and administration of the court in which he presides, contrary to MCR 9.205(A) ; i. Conduct that violates the standards or rules of professional responsibility adopted by the Supreme Court, contrary to MCR 9.104(4) ; j. Participation in ex parte communications, and consideration of them outside the presence of all parties concerning pending or impending proceedings, in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(4); k. Conduct in violation of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2B which states in part, "Without regard to a person's race, gender, or other protected personal characteristic, a judge should treat every person fairly, with courtesy and respect,"; and, l. Conduct in violation of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3A(3) which states that a judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to attorneys and others. After review of the Judicial Tenure Commission's decision and recommendation, the settlement agreement, the standards set forth in Brown , and the above findings and conclusions, we ORDER that the Honorable Joseph S. Filip be publicly censured. This order stands as our public censure. BERNSTEIN , J., would remand to the Judicial Tenure Commission for further explication.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 9, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The request for default judgment is DENIED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the cases of People v. Betts (Docket No. 148981) and People v. Snyder (Docket No. 153696) are pending on appeal before this Court and that the decisions in those cases may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decisions in those cases.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of People v. Dixon-Bey (Docket No. 156746) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to substitute Denise Tindle, Personal Representative of the Estate of Roselyn Ford, as the plaintiff-appellant in MSC No. 156134 is GRANTED. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion of amici curiae National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., to share ten minutes of plaintiffs-appellants' oral argument time is GRANTED.