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On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 28, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of Henderson v. Civil Serv. Comm. (Docket No. 156270) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

On order of the Court, the motion to supplement the application for leave to appeal is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the September 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED as moot in light of the death of the incapacitated individual who was the subject of the guardianship at issue.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 28, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, it appearing to this Court that the case of Henderson v. Civil Serv. Comm. (Docket No. 156270) is pending on appeal before this Court and that the decision in that case may resolve an issue raised in the present application for leave to appeal, we ORDER that the application be held in ABEYANCE pending the decision in that case.

K.F. Kelly, J. Defendants appeal by right and by leave from three separate rulings of the trial court. First, defendants claim that the trial court erred when it declared unconstitutional an exclusion prohibiting individuals who are serving a sentence of imprisonment from bringing actions under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred when it ruled that the exclusion does not apply to trainees under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq ., because those individuals are not serving a sentence of imprisonment. Finally, defendants maintain that the trial court erred when it concluded that governmental immunity does not apply to these civil-rights actions. As explained more fully in this opinion, we hold that the 1999 amendment to the ELCRA, specifically MCL 37.2301(b), as amended by 1999 PA 202, does not pass constitutional muster. Because we conclude that the exclusion is unconstitutional, we need not consider whether the prohibition applies to individuals assigned to youthful-trainee status under HYTA. We further hold that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims. Therefore, finding no error warranting reversal, we affirm. I. BASIC FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY This case was originally brought on behalf of seven unidentified male prisoners who sought relief under the ELCRA. They alleged that while they were under the age of 18, they were housed with adult prisoners who took advantage of their youth to commit sexual and physical abuse and harassment. Plaintiffs further asserted that defendants knew or should have known of the risk to plaintiffs but failed to prevent the abuse and harassment, or aided and abetted it. This case has been heavily litigated in the circuit court and in this Court. Since the case was originally filed on December 9, 2013, there have been multiple applications for leave to appeal in this Court as well as some proceedings in the Court of Claims, and applications for leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. Throughout the course of this litigation, various plaintiffs, claims, and defendants have been added and others have been dismissed. It is a procedural quagmire. Still, the issues on appeal are relatively straightforward and are purely legal. We are first tasked with determining whether the ELCRA, which excludes individuals who are serving a sentence of imprisonment from bringing suit, is constitutional. We conclude that it is not. We must then consider whether defendants can assert governmental immunity. II. ELCRA The Michigan Constitution provides: No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [ Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2.] To that end, MCL 37.2302(a) of the ELCRA provides: Except where permitted by law, a person shall not: (a) Deny an individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation or public service because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, or marital status. In its current form, the ELCRA defines the term "public service" as a public facility, department, agency, board, or commission, owned, operated, or managed by or on behalf of the state, a political subdivision, or an agency thereof or a tax exempt private agency established to provide service to the public, except that public service does not include a state or county correctional facility with respect to actions and decisions regarding an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment . [ MCL 37.2301(b) (emphasis added).] The highlighted language was added in 1999 after this Court's decision in Neal v. Dep't of Corrections (On Rehearing) , 232 Mich. App. 730, 734-737, 592 N.W.2d 370 (1998), which concluded that prisons were not excluded from the definition of "public service." The enacting section of the amendment that added this language provides: This amendatory act is curative and intended to correct any misinterpretation of legislative intent in the court of appeals decision Neal v. Department of Corrections , 232 Mich. App. 730 [592 N.W.2d 370] (1998). This legislation further expresses the original intent of the legislature that an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility is not within the purview of this act. [1999 PA 202, enacting § 1.] At the heart of this appeal is whether the ELCRA, in its postamendment form, is constitutional. "We review de novo constitutional questions such as whether a party was denied due process and equal protection under the law." Lima Twp. v. Bateson , 302 Mich. App. 483, 503, 838 N.W.2d 898 (2013). An issue involving statutory construction is likewise reviewed de novo. Saffian v. Simmons , 477 Mich. 8, 12, 727 N.W.2d 132 (2007). The role of this Court in interpreting statutory language is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words in a statute. The focus of our analysis must be the statute's express language, which offers the most reliable evidence of the Legislature's intent. When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted and the statute is enforced as written. A court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. [ Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 500 Mich. 191, 199, 895 N.W.2d 490 (2017) (quotation marks, citations, and alteration omitted).] As previously stated, this case has a long and protracted history. In 2014, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary disposition, citing the same equal-protection concerns that it later articulated in the order on appeal here. That ruling, along with a ruling regarding the prison litigation reform act (PLRA), MCL 600.5501 et seq ., was the subject of leave applications filed in this Court in Docket Nos. 321013 and 321756. This Court denied leave in both applications, but our Supreme Court remanded for consideration as on leave granted. Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 497 Mich. 882, 854 N.W.2d 718 (2014). That remand resulted in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 312 Mich. App. 97, 878 N.W.2d 293 (2015), in which this Court held that the trial court erred by not granting summary disposition for failure to comply with the disclosure requirement of the PLRA and that plaintiffs could not amend their complaint to cure the defect. Id . at 112-114, 138, 878 N.W.2d 293. This Court also concluded that the challenged ELCRA provisions did not violate defendants' right to equal protection. Id . at 136-139, 878 N.W.2d 293. However, on March 30, 2016, our Supreme Court vacated the equal-protection ruling in this Court's Doe decision because "[i]n light of the Court of Appeals ruling that plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, MCL 600.5501 et seq., it was unnecessary to resolve the remaining issues." Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 499 Mich. 886, 876 N.W.2d 570 (2016). In Doe , 312 Mich. App. 97, 878 N.W.2d 293, both Judge RIORDAN and Judge BECKERING (concurring in part and dissenting in part) provided extensive and lengthy analysis on the constitutionality (or lack thereof) of the ELCRA amendment. Writing for the majority, Judge RIORDAN concluded that prisoners were not similarly situated to nonprisoners and that the Legislature's action in excluding prisoners from the ELCRA was rationally related to its interest in deterring frivolous lawsuits and preserving scarce public resources. Id. at 127-138, 878 N.W.2d 293. Judge BECKERING had a different approach to the case. She emphasized the following terms in Michigan's Equal Protection Clause: No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation. [ Id. at 145, 878 N.W.2d 293 ( BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoting Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2.] Judge BECKERING noted that the use of the singular within the clause demonstrated that it was "unquestionably the intent of the ratifiers that civil rights protections be extended to any and all persons." Id . Under the second sentence, the Legislature was constitutionally mandated to implement protection to any and all persons and lacked authority to exclude anyone. Id . at 146-147, 878 N.W.2d 293. In response to that mandate, the Legislature enacted the ELCRA, which also contains the singular: "a person shall not ... 'deny an individual ....' " Id . at 147, 878 N.W.2d 293 (citation omitted; formatting altered). Judge BECKERING noted that following Neal , 232 Mich. App. 730, the Legislature amended the statute and, in so doing, violated its constitutional mandate. Doe , 312 Mich. App. at 148-149, 878 N.W.2d 293 (BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge BECKERING explained: The parties and the majority frame the issue at hand as one calling for a determination of whether the 1999 amendment to the ELCRA violates equal protection by denying prisoners, as a class, protections under the ELCRA. In my opinion, this focus is directed at the wrong section of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. I believe that the analysis misses a more significant and dispositive issue. That is, whether the Legislature has authority, given the constitutional directive in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 pertaining to all citizens, to carve out a particular class of individuals and exclude them from the protections of the ELCRA. I would hold that the Legislature acted outside of its constitutional authority by removing prisoners from the scope of the ELCRA and thereby denying protection to all. Where the analysis in this case should start, and end, in my opinion, is with the idea that Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 contains more than just the guarantee of equal protection of the laws; it contains a directive to the Legislature to implement legislation that protects the rights of all citizens. * * * ... [T]he Legislature is not permitted, pursuant to the implementation language contained in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2, to define the persons to whom civil rights are guaranteed. The Constitution already answers that question, unequivocally guaranteeing that legislation to protect civil rights must be extended to all, without reservation or limitation. Any implementation language contained in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 should not be construed as giving the Legislature "the authority to circumvent the protections that the section guarantees." See Midland Cogeneration [Venture Ltd. Partnership v. Naftaly , 489 Mich. 83, 95, 803 N.W.2d 674 (2011) ]. If it did, just as the Court cautioned in Midland Cogeneration, the protection of "any person" would "lose [its] strength" and the Legislature would render such protection meaningless. See id. Consequently, I would hold that the 1999 amendment, by eradicating a constitutional guarantee, violates Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. [ Doe , 312 Mich. App. at 149-150, 153-154, 878 N.W.2d 293 ( BECKERING , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (second alteration in original).] Judge BECKERING did not believe that the Legislature was endowed with the discretion to define the meaning of the constitutional mandate by narrowing the scope of protected individuals. Id . at 154, 878 N.W.2d 293. Because the amendment infringed on a constitutional directive, it could not stand. Id . at 151-152, 878 N.W.2d 293. Judge BECKERING surmised that "there is no need to evaluate the exclusion of prisoners from the scope of the ELCRA on equal protection grounds. The analysis of the constitutionality of the 1999 amendment should begin with the directive given to the Legislature in Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 and end with the conclusion that the 1999 amendment is constitutionally infirm because it is contrary to the directive contained in article 1, § 2." Id. at 156. We conclude that the amendment is unconstitutional for the reasons stated by Judge BECKERING in her dissenting opinion and, therefore, we specifically adopt this analysis as our own. The Legislature's amendment of the ELCRA to effectively bar correctional-facility prisoners from bringing ELCRA suits is in direct violation of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution, which makes clear that the mandatory legislation must protect all persons. The amendment violates the constitutional mandate that the Legislature craft laws for the protection of its individual citizens. III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO ELCRA CLAIMS Defendants argue that the trial court erred when it failed to grant their motion for summary disposition. "A trial court may grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the ground that a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law." McLean v. McElhaney , 289 Mich. App. 592, 597, 798 N.W.2d 29 (2010). Such a decision is reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. at 596, 798 N.W.2d 29. Contrary to defendants' assertions, the law is clear that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims. In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 393 n. 60, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013) ("Compare MCL 600.1721 and MCL 600.1701 with other statutes expressly waiving governmental immunity, including the Elliot[t]-Larsen Civil Rights Act ...."); Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186, 195, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002) ("[T]here are other areas outside the [governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq.,] where the Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as the Civil Rights Act."); Diamond v. Witherspoon , 265 Mich. App. 673, 691, 696 N.W.2d 770 (2005) ("The Legislature has allowed specific actions against the government to stand, such as one under the CRA."); Manning v. Hazel Park , 202 Mich. App. 685, 509 N.W.2d 874 (1993) ("Governmental immunity is not a defense to a claim brought under the Civil Rights Act."). Defendants cite Jones v. Bitner , 300 Mich. App. 65, 832 N.W.2d 426 (2013), in support of their position that immunity supersedes and replaces preexisting statutory waivers of immunity. However, the Jones case involved an interplay between the GTLA and the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.621 et seq ., and does not support defendants' argument. Jones simply cannot and does not overrule the established binding precedent that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims. Affirmed. MURPHY, J., concurred with K. F. KELLY, J. O'CONNELL, P.J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Plaintiffs' artfully drafted complaint seeks to hold these state defendants vicariously liable for the criminal actions of third parties while plaintiffs were incarcerated in the state prison system. Plaintiffs' complaint seeks to avoid governmental immunity, seeks to declare 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional, and seeks to wrest money damages from these state defendants. Plaintiffs' primary complaint is that if these state officials had instituted better policies with regard to youthful prisoners, these plaintiffs may not have been victims of crimes by unnamed third parties while incarcerated in the prison system. The basket that plaintiffs place all of their eggs into is Article 3 of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . But Article 3, MCL 37.2301 et seq., does not place any affirmative duties on these state defendants. No Michigan ELCRA case involving Article 3 has ever recognized a cause of action based on an allegation of a failure to discriminate . Allowing plaintiffs to use the ELCRA in this innovative manner places an impossible burden on public-service providers and is antagonistic to current state law. In addition, plaintiffs have numerous other remedies for the relief they are seeking. For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would reverse the summary disposition orders of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND NATURE OF CASE As a result of being convicted of serious criminal offenses, plaintiffs are incarcerated in the state prison system. Plaintiffs' theory of the case is that defendants' former policy of housing youthful offenders with nonyouthful offenders resulted in plaintiffs' abuse, harassment, or other unlawful treatment by other prisoners or correctional staff. Plaintiffs claim that the state's policies, customs, and practices discriminate against youthful offenders by failing to separate youthful offenders from adult offenders. Plaintiffs seek to hold state officials, such as the Governor, wardens, former wardens, directors, former deputy and chief directors, and all state officials associated with the prison system, accountable for failing to institute better policies that may have better protected youthful offenders while serving sentences in the state prison system. Plaintiffs assert that their civil rights were violated; as a result, plaintiffs speculate, or are at least hopeful, that they may be entitled to monetary damages from these state defendants. Plaintiffs have alleged violations of Article 3 of the ELCRA, which prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation or in the delivery of public services, MCL 37.2302(a). Plaintiffs allege four separate violations of Article 3: (1) creating a sexually hostile prison environment, (2) failing to prevent and remedy a sexually hostile prison environment, (3) aiding and abetting violations of the ELCRA, and (4) age discrimination. In three separate orders, the trial court denied the state defendants' request to dismiss this lawsuit. This case presents three significant issues: (1) whether governmental immunity applies to a claim brought under Article 3 of the ELCRA, (2) whether 1999 PA 202 is constitutional, and (3) whether plaintiffs have stated a cognizable cause of action under Article 3. II. THE MAJORITY'S ERRONEOUS AND HISTORICALLY INACCURATE CONCLUSION THAT GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE Plaintiffs and the majority theorize that Article 3 of the ELCRA operates as a waiver of governmental immunity under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq . I respectfully disagree. Nothing in the language of Article 3 provides for a waiver of governmental immunity for state officials acting in their official capacity . Hence, state officials acting in their official capacity retain governmental immunity. The GTLA grants absolute immunity from tort liability to "the elective or highest appointive executive official of all levels of government ... if he or she is acting within the scope of his or her ... executive authority." MCL 691.1407(5) ; Beaudrie v. Henderson , 465 Mich. 124, 139 n. 11, 631 N.W.2d 308 (2001). Other state officials have immunity from tort liability when all of the following conditions are met: (a) The officer [or] employee ... is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority. (b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. (c) The officer's [or] employee's ... conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [ MCL 691.1407(2).] To survive a motion for summary disposition based on governmental immunity, a plaintiff must plead in avoidance of governmental immunity and "allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity." Plunkett v. Dep't of Transp. , 286 Mich. App. 168, 180, 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009). Plaintiffs' complaint hypothesizes that defendants' policies or lack of policies caused the maltreatment of these plaintiffs. Remarkably, plaintiffs do not claim that the named defendants perpetrated any of the alleged abuse or harassment. Rather, the alleged criminal acts were committed by other prisoners or other nonparties. Even taking all of plaintiffs' allegations as true, see McLean v. Dearborn , 302 Mich. App. 68, 72-73, 836 N.W.2d 916 (2013), plaintiffs failed to plead any facts in their complaint that Article 3 of the ELCRA waives immunity for state officials acting in their official capacity when making policy decisions for the state of Michigan. No such waiver exists in the ELCRA or the GTLA. The GTLA provides immunity for the state defendants acting in their official capacity with regard to policy decisions. That should be the end of this issue. Moreover, these state actors cannot be held vicariously liable for the criminal acts of third parties, or in a few instances, criminal acts of unnamed correctional officers who were clearly acting outside the scope of their authority. In Hamed v. Wayne Co. , 490 Mich. 1, 5, 803 N.W.2d 237 (2011), the Supreme Court addressed "whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department may be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under MCL 37.2103(i) based on a criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment." The Supreme Court rejected liability for these state actors, explaining that "permitting liability against defendants under these circumstances would impose too great a burden on public-service providers and on society in general, which is clearly contrary to the Legislature's intent." Id . at 30, 803 N.W.2d 237. In furtherance of preventing the burdensome consequences of holding state actors vicariously liable for the acts of their employees, the Supreme Court warned against artfully pleading a civil rights claim to bypass the GTLA: Artful pleading would also allow a plaintiff to avoid governmental immunity under the [GTLA]. A school district, for example, could not be vicariously liable in tort for a teacher's sexual molestation of a student because the GTLA would bar the claim. However, if the plaintiff styled its claim as [an ELCRA] action, the school district could be vicariously liable under a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment affecting public services. Plaintiff's preferred approach, under which public-service providers would be strictly liable for precisely the same conduct as that for which they would typically be immune, is inherently inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. If the Legislature had intended such a result, it should have clearly abrogated the common-law rule for purposes of [the ELCRA]. [ Id . at 29 n. 74, 803 N.W.2d 237.] Hamed clearly holds that plaintiffs cannot avoid the GTLA by simply alleging a violation of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs, to their innovative credit, have artfully pleaded a cause of action exactly as the Hamed Court cautioned should not be done. I would also note that the GTLA, which grants immunity to state officials acting in their official capacity , MCL 691.1407, as amended by 1986 PA 175, is the later statutory enactment. See Jones v. Bitner , 300 Mich. App. 65, 76, 832 N.W.2d 426 (2013). "It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws." Walen v. Dep't of Corrections , 443 Mich. 240, 248, 505 N.W.2d 519 (1993). "Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there." Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc. , 442 Mich. 201, 210, 501 N.W.2d 76 (1993). If the Legislature intended to waive the historical grant of immunity to state officials acting in their official capacity, it is incumbent on the Legislature to expressly state that such a waiver exists. No such waiver is found in the ELCRA or the GTLA. This Court cannot by dicta infer such a waiver. We are required to follow the GTLA, as the later and the more specific act. If the aforementioned law is not sufficient, I would additionally note that the majority opinion cites three employment cases involving Article 2 of the ELCRA, MCL 37.2201 et seq., for the alleged proposition that governmental immunity is not a defense to a civil rights action. Surprisingly, I concur with this singular, isolated, and irrelevant statement of the law-the GTLA is not an affirmative defense to any cause of action. See Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186, 200-203, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002). Accordingly, plaintiffs must plead in avoidance of the GTLA. I find disturbing the majority's short and incomplete analysis of the law in regards to governmental immunity. The majority opinion makes no attempt to determine whether plaintiffs have pleaded their case in avoidance of governmental immunity, to consider which statute is the latest in time, or to cite any Article 3 cases that have held that governmental immunity is a defense to a civil rights action under Article 3. Plaintiffs have not pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity. Therefore, the state actors acting in their official capacity retain governmental immunity as set forth in the GTLA. III. THE MAJORITY'S MISGUIDED CONCLUSION THAT 1999 PA 202 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL The majority opinion, without any discernable statutory analysis and without any accepted constitutional analysis, declares that the Legislature acted outside the scope of its constitutional authority when it enacted 1999 PA 202 (the amendment). I humbly suggest that it is the majority opinion that has acted outside the scope of its authority, not the Legislature. A. HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION In the words of George Santayana, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Santayana, The Life of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905), p 284. This case and its predecessors, including Neal v. Dep't of Corrections , 230 Mich. App. 202, 583 N.W.2d 249 (1998) ( Neal I ), and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections (On Rehearing) , 232 Mich. App. 730, 592 N.W.2d 370 (1998) ( Neal II ), have a 20-year history. In 1998, this Court decided Neal I , 230 Mich. App. at 209-215, 583 N.W.2d 249, in which a majority held that prisons were not a place of public accommodation or a place of public service as defined by the ELCRA, MCL 37.2301(b). On rehearing, one judge reversed her position, and the majority concluded that prisons are places of public service on the basis of the statutory definition of "public service," MCL 37.2301(b). Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 735-736, 592 N.W.2d 370. In response to a statement in Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 740, 592 N.W.2d 370, that the Legislature did not explicitly exclude prisoners from the ELCRA, the Legislature passed the 1999 amendment to do just that. 1999 PA 202, enacting § 1. If that were not sufficient precedent to uphold the amendment, I note that a 2000 conflict panel of this Court gave the same advice to the Legislature in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 240 Mich. App. 199, 201, 611 N.W.2d 1 (2000), stating that the Legislature should draft the statute to reflect its intent that the statute not apply to prisoners and prisons. When viewed in its correct context, it is obvious that 1999 PA 202 clarified the definition of "public service" found in MCL 37.2301(b). The amendment was not meant to deprive any person of any rights guaranteed under our Constitution; it simply amended the definition of the term "public service." In sum, the Legislature did exactly as two panels of this Court advised it to do. Today, the majority opinion rebukes the Legislature for heeding this Court's advice and declares 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional. Such an action by a panel of this Court is unprecedented in the history of this Court, especially when prisons do not provide a public service as that term is defined in Article 3 of the ELCRA. B. STANDARD OF REVIEW The majority opinion has set forth a constitutional barrier to the 1999 amendment and, unsurprisingly, determined that the legislation cannot surmount that barrier. The majority opinion fails to set forth a standard of review for its analysis of the 1999 amendment. Appellate courts cannot strike down a legislative enactment on the basis of a nonexistent standard of review. A constitutional challenge to the validity of a statute can be brought in one of two ways, by either a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge. "The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute has the burden of proving the law's invalidity." Gillette Commercial Operations North America & Subsidiaries v. Dep't of Treasury , 312 Mich. App. 394, 414-415, 878 N.W.2d 891 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The challenging party must overcome a heavy burden because "[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional, and we have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent." Mayor of Cadillac v. Blackburn , 306 Mich. App. 512, 516, 857 N.W.2d 529 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not address which type of challenge they bring to the 1999 amendment. At best, plaintiffs' allegation could be considered an as-applied challenge, meaning that the claimant has alleged " 'a present infringement or denial of a specific right or of a particular injury in process of actual execution' of government action." Bonner v. City of Brighton , 495 Mich. 209, 223 n. 27, 848 N.W.2d 380 (2014), quoting Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amber Realty Co. , 272 U.S. 365, 395, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). "The practical effect of holding a statute unconstitutional 'as applied' is to prevent its future application in a similar context, but not to render it utterly inoperative." Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists , 506 U.S. 1011, 1012, 113 S.Ct. 633, 121 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1992) ( SCALIA , J., dissenting). C. TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS "The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law." Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Flint Twp. , 253 Mich. App. 538, 551, 656 N.W.2d 215 (2002), citing U.S. Const., Am. XIV ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. "To comply with the Equal Protection Clause ..., defendant is required to exercise equal treatment of similarly situated" individuals. Lear Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 299 Mich. App. 533, 538, 831 N.W.2d 255 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). If the state has a "rational basis" for treating similarly situated individuals differently, the state action will survive a constitutional equal-protection challenge. See Id. at 538-539, 831 N.W.2d 255. The rational-basis test applies only when the equal-protection challenge does not allege a claim based on a suspect classification, or a fundamental right, or an intermediate classification, such as gender. Phillips v. Mirac, Inc. , 470 Mich. 415, 432, 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004). The majority declares that 1999 PA 202 must be struck down because Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 contains a mandate. The constitutional provision upon which the majority relies to strike down the amendment states that the "legislature shall implement this section by appropriate legislation." Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2 (emphasis added.) The majority opinion states that "the Legislature was constitutionally mandated to implement protection to any and all persons and lacked authority to exclude anyone," ante at 735, meaning that if any legislation treats any person differently than any other person, that legislation must be struck down as unconstitutional. Putting aside the question of what, if any, law would pass such a contrived test, I would simply state that the law provides that a party challenging the facial constitutionality of an act "must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [a]ct would be valid . The fact that the [act] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid ...." United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1987) (emphasis added). The primary error of the majority opinion is its adoption of plaintiffs' assertion that prisoners and nonprisoners are similarly situated in all aspects of this case. "Resident inmates are obviously members of the public in a general sense," but "[t]he rights of ... inmates are severely restricted while they are incarcerated." Martin v. Dep't of Corrections , 424 Mich. 553, 565, 384 N.W.2d 392 (1986) ( CAVANAGH , J., dissenting). Prisoners and nonprisoners have never been similarly situated, are not currently similarly situated, and hopefully will never be similarly situated. That a rational basis exists for treating prisoners differently from free citizens is obvious. I conclude that 1999 amendment has a rational basis for its existence. In this regard, I concur with Judge RIORDAN 's analysis in Doe v. Dep't of Corrections , 312 Mich. App. 97, 134, 878 N.W.2d 293 (2015), vacated in part 499 Mich. 886, 876 N.W.2d 570 (2016), that "the deterrence of meritless lawsuits and the preservation of scarce resources through the reduction of costs associated with resolving those lawsuits" reflects a legitimate governmental interest. See id. at 134-136. Prisoners file a disproportionate number of lawsuits, and the cost to the state has skyrocketed. In one instance, a prisoner has filed 5,813 lawsuits and counting. The Legislature recognized that including prisons in the definition of "public service," MCL 37.2301(b), is problematic. Prisoners could sue for the loss of their right to vote or for the loss of their Second Amendment right to carry a gun in prison. Therefore, a rational basis exists for excluding prisons from the definition of "public service" in Article 3 of the ELCRA. Even assuming prisoners are in some respects similarly situated to nonprisoners, the Legislature can make special provisions for prisoners based on their circumstances. In this case, plaintiffs make no allegations that certain prisoners were treated differently than other prisoners. As long as the Legislature does not discriminate within the unique class of individuals known as prisoners, no equal-protection violation occurs. Equal protection is not premised on an underlying independent right to a service or privilege; it prohibits invidious discrimination among potential recipients of benefits or rights after the decision has been made to establish the right. See Arnett v. Kennedy , 416 U.S. 134, 163, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed. 2d 15 (1974). Even if we were to assume that the definition of "public service" in Article 3 of the ELCRA applies to prisons and prisoners, plaintiffs' complaint does not allege any invidious discrimination among potential recipients of any prison services. More importantly, it does not discriminate based upon a prisoner's status as a prisoner, but treats all prisoners the same and has a rational basis for its realistic goal. D. LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE Our Constitution provides that "[n]o person exercising powers of one branch [of government] shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch ...." Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. As I stated in my dissent in Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. AboutParochiaid v. Governor , 216 Mich. App. 126, 135, 548 N.W.2d 909 (1996) ( O'CONNELL , J., dissenting), "the judiciary has no legislative powers, and, thus, it cannot act as a 'super legislature' to sit in review of the policy choices made by coordinate branches of government acting within their respective spheres of authority." It is the Legislature that makes the laws. The Court's job is to interpret the law. In my opinion, the majority has encroached on the sphere of authority reserved to our Legislature, thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The scope or purview of a legislative act is reserved to the Legislature. This case is similar to Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed. 2d 45 (1989), in which the United States Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under [ 42 U.S.C.] 1983." In rejecting the plaintiff's claim that the state and state officers were persons for the purpose of a 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil-rights action, the Supreme Court explained that the language of § 1983 did not signal clear congressional intent to subject the states to liability. Id . at 64-65, 109 S.Ct. 2304. In the present case, the Legislature is simply defining the scope of its own legislative enactment. I simply repeat what the Legislature has stated in the enabling act to the 1999 amendment that prisons are not within the purview of "public service" as defined by Article 3 of the ELCRA. See 1999 PA 202, enacting § 1. The 1999 amendment's purpose was to define the scope of the term "public service," MCL 37.2301(b), consistently with the Legislature's task to define what "appropriate legislation" is, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. Article 3 of the ELCRA only applies to establishments that are "open to the public[.]" See MCL 37.2303. Furthermore, MCL 37.2302 includes the phrase "[e]xcept where permitted by law," thereby providing discretion to the Legislature to decide the scope of Article 3. When read in context, there is nothing unconstitutional in the language of 1999 PA 202. The Legislature's intent was to state that those parts of prisons that do not deal with the public do not fall within the purview of Article 3 of the ELCRA's definition of "public service." The reason is simple-that part of prisons that houses prisoners does not provide a public service as defined in the act. Prisoners do not perform a public service; they do not deal with the public. Additionally, that part of prisons that houses prisoners was not intended to interact with the public. In fact, it is just the opposite; prisoners by their own behaviors are a tremendous burden on society. Hence, prisoners do not fall within the purview of Article 3 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs claim that they are being denied the right of access to the courts. Plaintiffs cite Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238, 290, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972) ( BRENNAN , J., concurring), for the proposition that prisoners retain a fundamental "right of access to the courts." There is no doubt that access to the courts is a fundamental right, but the 1999 amendment's purpose was to define the scope of the term "public service," not to deny anyone access to the courts. This lawsuit is Exhibit One that plaintiffs have not been denied access to the courts. Because the Legislature drafted the ELCRA, it can and should clearly define the scope of its own statutory enactment. Despite this, the majority not only usurps the prerogative that our Constitution grants the Legislature in this context of defining the scope of the amendment but then proceeds to strike down the Legislature's definition of the scope of "public service" in Article 3. IV. PLAINTIFFS' FAILURE TO SET FORTH A COGNIZABLE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER THE ELCRA This case does not require this Court to declare an act of the Legislature unconstitutional. Courts must avoid constitutional issues if a case can be resolved on the basis of statutory interpretation. See English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich. , 263 Mich. App. 449, 455, 688 N.W.2d 523 (2004). I believe this case can be resolved on statutory grounds. There is no need to interfere with the responsibilities of another branch of government. A. WHAT THIS CASE IS NOT ABOUT Before addressing the substance of plaintiffs' allegations, this Court has the responsibility of deciding whether plaintiffs' cause of action is cognizable under Article 3 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' sophisticated complaint is similar to a Gordian knot that must be unwound to fully understand the gravity of the allegations. Before engaging in an analysis of plaintiffs' allegations, for clarification purposes, it may be easier to state what principles are not involved in the present case. First: Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a constitutional tort. Our Supreme Court has defined a constitutional tort as an allegation "that the state, by virtue of custom or policy, has violated a right conferred by the Michigan Constitution ...." Smith v. Dep't of Public Health , 428 Mich. 540, 544, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987), aff'd sub nom Will , 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Plaintiffs do not allege a cause of action under Michigan's Equal Protection Clause, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. It should also be noted that had plaintiffs filed an action under Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2, plaintiffs would not be entitled to money damages. See Sharp v. Lansing , 464 Mich. 792, 800 n. 9, 629 N.W.2d 873 (2001). Our Supreme Court has declined to infer a damages remedy from the Equal Protection Clause because the authority to allow money damages for an equal-protection violation belongs to the Legislature. Lewis v. Michigan , 464 Mich. 781, 786-789, 629 N.W.2d 868 (2001). Second: Plaintiffs' complaint does not allege a cause of action under the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const., Am. XIV. Nor do plaintiffs allege a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Carlton v. Dep't of Corrections , 215 Mich. App. 490, 502-504, 546 N.W.2d 671 (1996). Furthermore, the state and state officials acting in their official capacity cannot be sued for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Will , 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Also, states are immune "from suit in state and federal courts." Ernst v. Rising , 427 F.3d 351, 358 (C.A. 6, 2005). Third: Plaintiffs do not allege that the state defendants committed any traditional torts. To impose tort liability on a state official, the official must be "the proximate cause" of the injury, "meaning the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury." Robinson v. Detroit , 462 Mich. 439, 458-459, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). Plaintiffs do not allege in their complaint that the named defendants, in their official capacity or in their individual capacity, committed any traditional torts. Fourth: Plaintiffs do not allege that this case is an employment action under Article 2 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' complaint does a nice job of attempting to conflate an Article 2 employment cause of action with an Article 3 public service cause of action, but, suffice it to say, no Michigan cases have recognized such a conflated cause of action. The fact that prisons are a hostile environment, or as plaintiffs state, a sexually hostile prison environment, has never been recognized in a published case as an Article 3 cause of action. Fifth: Plaintiffs do not allege that the ELCRA is coextensive with Michigan's equal-protection clause. The ELCRA is best described, in part, as a codification of the equal-protection clause but "broadened to include categories not covered under the constitution, such as age, sex, and marital status." Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 739, 592 N.W.2d 370. For this reason, the trial court's and plaintiffs' citation of Mason v. Granholm , unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, issued January 23, 2007 (Case No. 05-73943), 2007 WL 201008, is misguided. Mason 's conclusion that the 1999 amendment was not curative is also wrong. The amendment's enacting section explicitly provides, in plain English, that the 1999 amendment "is curative and intended to correct any misinterpretation of legislative intent in the court of appeals decision [ Neal II ]." 1999 PA 202, enacting § 1. The enacting section stated that the Legislature's "original intent ... that an individual serving a sentence of imprisonment in a state or county correctional facility is not within the purview of this act." Id . Ironically, if they were co-extensive, plaintiffs would not be entitled to monetary damages. But, if plaintiffs can artfully allege a valid public-service claim under Article 3 of the ELCRA, they would be entitled to monetary damages. See Hamed, 490 Mich. at 29 n. 74, 803 N.W.2d 237. At issue in this case is whether such a cause of action exists under Michigan law and whether plaintiffs' complaint has set forth such a cause of action. B. SEXUALLY HOSTILE PRISON ENVIRONMENT In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants' "acts and omissions constitute sexual harassment and violate Plaintiffs' rights under the ELCRA...." The ELCRA's definition of sexual harassment underscores a fatal flaw in plaintiffs' case. The ELCRA defines sexual harassment as follows: Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the following conditions: (i ) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. (ii ) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing. (iii ) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employment, public accommodations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommodations, public services, educational, or housing environment. [ MCL 37.2103(i).] Nothing in plaintiffs' complaint alleges, either explicitly or implicitly, that a term or condition of plaintiffs' obtaining public services was contingent on them submitting to conduct or communication of a sexual nature. In addition, plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege that these state defendants committed any "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature," MCL 37.2103(i), in the provision of public services. Moreover, the vast majority of hostile-environment civil-rights-act cases involve employment cases under Article 2 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs have not cited a published hostile-environment case that involves a prison setting as it relates to the term "public services" as found in Article 3 of the ELCRA. No such case exists. I conclude that no reason exists to extend hostile-environment cases beyond employment cases. For that reason alone, plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a hostile-environment cause of action under Article 3 of the ELCRA. If plaintiffs are correct, then every single prisoner in the State of Michigan can sue the state for being placed in a sexually hostile-prison environment. I, for one, will not be the first judge to extend the hostile environment line of cases to state prisons. That is a public policy question best left to the Legislature or to the Supreme Court. C. AGE DISCRIMINATION Plaintiffs allege that the state's customs and policies discriminated against youthful offenders, but, when read in context, plaintiffs' actual complaint is that the state defendants should have treated youthful offenders differently from nonyouthful offenders. The difficulty with such a cause of action is that Article 3 of the ELCRA does not impose any affirmative duties on these state defendants to draft new policies. The only duty imposed by Article 3 is that the state shall not discriminate when delivering public services. Plaintiffs' complaint is devoid of any allegations that the state or its officials affirmatively discriminated against these youthful offenders when delivering a public service. In short, plaintiffs want this Court to recognize an Article 3 cause of action for failing to treat prisoners differently. Defendants cannot be liable under Article 3 of the ELCRA just because there may be a better way to achieve a goal or a better way to run a prison. No Michigan caselaw and no statutory language supports the concept that failure to institute different policies, customs, or practices can provide a basis for imposing liability on a governmental agency. See Nawrocki v. Macomb Co. Rd. Comm. , 463 Mich. 143, 184, 615 N.W.2d 702 (2000) (holding that the "highway exception" to governmental immunity does not impose a duty on the state or county road commissions "to install additional traffic signs or signals that might conceivably have made the intersection safer"). While, as in this case, a decision to adopt new policies, customs, or practices may be prudent and advisable, those decisions are best left to the executive or legislative branch. Article 3 of the ELCRA does not provide a cause of action for such a claim. The state defendants did not deny these plaintiffs a public service on the basis of plaintiffs' age or other suspect classification or as a term or condition of getting a specific public service. D. OTHER REMEDIES It is important to note that plaintiffs would not be left without a remedy if this Court determined that their claims did not fall within the scope of Article 3 of the ELCRA. Youthful offenders and other prisoners have remedies under statutory enactments and other provisions of the Michigan Constitution, including the Equal Protection Clause, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 2. The Equal Protection Clause does not carry a damages remedy, however, because the authority to allow money damages for an equal-protection violation belongs to the Legislature. To be candid, the hidden issue in this case is monetary damages. Plaintiffs have filed a claim in federal court, in part, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs' attorney admits that "monetary damages" are not available in federal court because "federal rules bar the collection of damages from the state or state agencies." Hence, plaintiffs filed a duplicate action in state court, alleging a violation of Article 3 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs' only avenue to collect monetary damages against the state or state agencies is to awkwardly attempt to fit their claim into an ELCRA action, but plaintiffs' cause of action does not fit into the strictures of an Article 3 civil-rights violation. Plaintiffs allege egregious acts perpetrated against them by third parties that, if true, are significant and deserve remediation under the law. However, the remedy is not for this Court, based upon a visceral response, to reengineer the law to discard governmental immunity for state actors or to conclude that prisoners and nonprisoners are similarly situated for purposes of an equal-protection argument. V. CONCLUSION In essence, plaintiffs seek money damages against the state for failing to institute better safeguards in prison. But plaintiffs have not pleaded in avoidance of governmental immunity. Furthermore, this case can be decided on statutory grounds. There is no need to declare 1999 PA 202 unconstitutional. Even if I were to decide this case on constitutional grounds, plaintiffs make no claim that they were treated differently than a similarly situated class of prisoners. Prisoners and nonprisoners are not members of the same class for purposes of this lawsuit. Plaintiffs' actual claim is that the state should have discriminated in favor of youthful offenders. That claim is a policy decision for the executive branch or the legislative branch to resolve. Because of the separation-of-powers doctrine, courts should not be involved in the day-to-day operation of the duties or responsibilities of other branches of government. The truth of the matter is that prisons are a dangerous place. No matter what rules, customs, practices, or policies are instituted in state prisons, the state cannot prevent all misdeeds by perpetrators of criminal behavior. The majority's desire to cure all wrongs by eviscerating the doctrine of governmental immunity, while well-intentioned, is fraught with the law of unintended consequences. Depriving governmental officials of governmental immunity when making policy decisions, when making sentencing decisions, and when running the government would certainly cause most of us to rethink the traditional notion of public service. For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs have sued the state defendants in both their individual capacity and in their official capacity, but plaintiffs' complaint does not make any allegations against the individual defendants acting in their individual capacity. Article 2 of the ELCRA only pertains to employee-employer relationships. Article 2 does not apply to this case because plaintiffs are not employees of defendants. I note that in Neal II , the majority took a wrong turn at its discussion of the decision in Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey , 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1998). See Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 735-736, 592 N.W.2d 370. Yeskey , 524 U.S. at 209-210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, held that the definition of a "public entity" in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12131(1)(B), included state prisons and prisoners because the act contained no ambiguous exceptions that "cast the coverage of prisons into doubt." The ELCRA, on the other hand, does have such an exception, including the 1999 amendment as set forth in MCL 37.2301(b), which specifically excludes state or county correctional facilities and individuals serving sentences of imprisonment in those facilities. Hass, Inmate has filed 5,813 lawsuit-and counting < < https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/inmate-has-filed-5813-lawsuits-and-counting/14092317/>> (accessed March 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ZA43-DNGD]. The unintended ramifications of the majority opinion are significant. The majority opinion allows prisoners, who are already the largest group of litigators in the state, to sue all state officials, including prosecutors, judges, the Governor, and all state officials acting in their official capacity, for ordinary decisions that these officials make each day. If a prisoner is not satisfied with a bond determination, a sentencing decision, or a prisoner classification, a prisoner can now sue for an Article 3 civil-rights violation, and the GTLA is inapplicable. Any and all decisions made by prosecutors, state officials, and judges will now be subject to prisoner lawsuits claiming a violation of their civil rights, including all judicial sentencing decisions and all prosecutorial charging decisions. The floodgates are now open. The Sixth Circuit neatly summarized the source and scope of sovereign immunity: From birth, the States and the Federal Government have possessed certain immunities from suit in state and federal courts. For the Federal Government, that immunity flows not from any one provision in the Constitution but is derived by implication from the nature of sovereignty itself. For the States, that immunity flows from the nature of sovereignty itself as well as the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution. The States' immunity from suits in federal court applies to claims against a State by citizens of the same State as well as to claims against a State by citizens of another State. The immunity also applies to actions against state officials sued in their official capacity for money damages. [Ernst , 427 F.3d at 358 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] Although Neal II stated that the ELCRA was coextensive with Michigan's Equal Protection Clause, Neal II quickly corrected itself to describe the ELCRA as a codification of the Equal Protection and Antidiscrimination Clauses that were broadened to include classifications not included in the Constitution. See Neal II , 232 Mich. App. at 739, 592 N.W.2d 370. In this regard, plaintiffs' attorneys are a creative lot. They are attempting to create causes of action that have never previously existed or been recognized by existing law. In my opinion, courts should act as gatekeepers and scrutinize these complaints to determine if the alleged (manufactured) constitutional torts (civil-rights torts) have any basis in law or fact or if they are subsumed by statutory claims. See Mays v. Governor , 323 Mich. App. 1, 916 N.W.2d. 227 (2018), and Boler v. Earley , 865 F.3d 391 (C.A. 6, 2017). In the present case, alleging that prisons are a "sexually hostile prison environment" as a basis for a cause of action against state officials is nonsensical. Prisons house murderers, rapists, pedophiles, and individuals who have established that they cannot conform to society's minimum standards of behavior or accountability. Plaintiffs suggest that we reward all prisoners for their involuntary participation in "a sexually hostile prison environment." No amount of governmental oversight can change prisons into a nonhostile environment . Ron French, Are Teen Prison Rapes a Violation of Civil Rights? A Michigan Court Is About to Decide., Bridge Magazine, November 16, 2017, available at < < http://www.bridgemi.com/children-families/are-teen-prison-rapes-violation-civil-rightsmichigan-court-about-decide>> (accessed March 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/C48X-3XVT]. When the ELCRA was drafted by the Legislature in 1977, its central purpose was to define the term civil-rights as it is applicable to the public. As such, the ELCRA sets the parameters and guidelines for eligible civil-rights claims that were not originally included in the Michigan Constitution. In 1977, and again in 1999, the Legislature decided that prisons and prisoners are not within the scope of an Article 3 cause of action. It must be emphasized that prisoners are not entitled to the same freedoms as nonprisoners. I doubt if any prisoner would refer to his or her jail cell as a "public accommodation" in the same manner that a nonincarcerated individual refers to a stay at a Holiday Inn, or that any prisoner would claim that a prison is performing a public service by incarcerating him or her. I simply note that it is the Legislature that has the responsibility to define the scope of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs can still bring a cause of action under Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the ELCRA. Plaintiffs are not being denied their civil right, as they claim, to bring a cause of action under the ELCRA. The issue in this case is very narrow. Simply stated, prisons and prisoners do not provide a public service as that term is defined by the Legislature in Article 3 of the ELCRA.

Murphy, J. Defendants appeal by leave granted the opinion and order by the trial court rejecting their efforts to avoid resentencing hearings on whether they should again be sentenced to life in prison without parole for murders committed as juveniles, as opposed to being resentenced to a term of years. We affirm. Over 25 years ago, and as based on the verdicts, the three defendants, as juveniles, committed first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, along with other offenses, and were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, as mandated by Michigan law at the time. The crimes were committed in Oakland County, and defendants were tried in the Oakland Circuit Court. The current Oakland County Prosecutor, Jessica R. Cooper (the prosecutor), was the circuit court judge who presided over defendants' trials, two of which were jury trials and one a bench trial, and she later imposed their life-without-parole sentences. In Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory punishment of life in prison absent the possibility of parole for a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the sentencing offense violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. The Miller Court did not indicate whether its decision was to be retroactively applied to closed cases involving juvenile offenders. In light of Miller , the Michigan Legislature enacted MCL 769.25, which provides a procedural framework for sentencing juvenile offenders who have committed offenses punishable by life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; this provision applied to pending and future cases. Anticipating the possibility of Miller 's retroactive application for closed cases, the Legislature also enacted MCL 769.25a, which would be triggered if our Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court were to hold that Miller applied retroactively. And subsequently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L. Ed. 2d 599 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that the rule announced in Miller , which was a new substantive constitutional rule, was retroactive on state collateral review. Accordingly, MCL 769.25a took effect. MCL 769.25a(4) sets forth the governing procedure that is relevant in the instant cases, providing as follows: (a) Within 30 days after the date the supreme court's decision [making Miller retroactive] becomes final, the prosecuting attorney shall provide a list of names to the chief circuit judge of that county of all defendants who are subject to the jurisdiction of that court and who must be resentenced under that decision. (b) Within 180 days after the date the supreme court's decision becomes final, the prosecuting attorney shall file motions for resentencing in all cases in which the prosecuting attorney will be requesting the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. A hearing on the motion shall be conducted as provided in section 25 of this chapter. (c) If the prosecuting attorney does not file a motion under subdivision (b), the court shall sentence the individual to a term of imprisonment for which the maximum term shall be 60 years and the minimum term shall be not less than 25 years or more than 40 years. [Emphasis added.] In compliance with MCL 769.25a(4)(a) and its deadline, the prosecutor's office provided a list to the chief judge of the names of 49 individuals who were subject to the jurisdiction of the court and who had to be resentenced under Montgomery . In compliance with MCL 769.25a(4)(b) and its deadline, the prosecutor's office filed motions for resentencing with respect to 44 of the 49 identified individuals, including the three defendants here, requesting the court to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. More than nine months after the resentencing motions were filed, more than a year after defendants each obtained court-appointed counsel, and well beyond the 180-day window in MCL 769.25a(4)(b), defendants filed motions to disqualify the prosecutor and her entire office, asserting a violation of Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.12. Defendants challenged the failure of the prosecutor to initiate self-imposed recusal in the determination or efforts to have defendants again sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment, premised on a conflict of interest, public policy, and constitutional concerns given that the prosecutor served as the trial and sentencing judge on the three cases. Defendants also pointed to stances unfavorable to juvenile lifers expressed by the prosecutor. Defendants maintained that the prosecutor, as well as her office, were precluded from being involved in the cases and that the prosecutor's motions requesting sentences of life without parole must be struck, which would effectively result in defendants being resentenced to a term of years pursuant to MCL 769.25a(4)(c). While defendants' motions were pending, the prosecutor submitted a request to the Michigan Attorney General, seeking appointment of a special prosecutor to handle the three cases in accordance with MCL 49.160, which request was accepted and approved. The Attorney General, exercising independent judgment, decided not to withdraw the prosecutor's motions for mandatory life sentences and has proceeded as the prosecutorial entity pursuing such sentences. A hearing was conducted on defendants' disqualification motions. In a written opinion and order, the trial court determined that the prosecutor effectively conceded disqualification by making the request to the Attorney General under MCL 49.160 ; therefore, the court found it unnecessary to specifically rule on the issue of disqualification. The trial court still spent considerable time examining and discussing the disqualification issue for purposes of resolving whether the prosecutor's motions for mandatory life imprisonment should be struck or, stated otherwise, whether the disqualification should operate retroactively, eviscerating the timely motions for mandatory life imprisonment and making it impossible for the Attorney General, at this late date, to file motions in compliance with MCL 769.25a(4)(b). For a variety of reasons, the trial court concluded that the prosecutor's motions should not be struck and that the Attorney General had the authority to investigate and reevaluate the prosecutor's motions, including the power to withdraw the motions. Defendants now appeal the court's ruling. We conclude that MCL 49.160 dictates the outcome of these cases. We review de novo issues of statutory construction. People v. Stone , 463 Mich. 558, 561, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001). MCL 49.160 was the procedural mechanism employed in these cases by which the prosecutor recused or disqualified herself and her office from further participation in the cases. The ultimate question is whether the disqualification or recusal requires the striking of the prosecutor's earlier and timely motions to seek sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole relative to the three defendants. MCL 49.160(2) provides, in pertinent part, that "the attorney general may elect to proceed in the matter ...." (Emphasis added.) To "proceed" means to go forward, to continue, to go on, to move along, or to advance. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.); see also People v. Perkins , 473 Mich. 626, 639, 703 N.W.2d 448 (2005) ("We may consult dictionary definitions of terms that are not defined in a statute."). Accordingly, under MCL 49.160(2), when the Attorney General, upon request, intervened in the three cases and took over the prosecutions in regard to sentencing, the Attorney General did so for purposes of going forward or continuing the existing cases, wherein the motions for mandatory life sentences had already been timely filed. The procedural history of the case up to that point in time was not wiped out by the transfer of prosecutorial power from the prosecutor to the Attorney General. Defendants' main concern was the appropriateness of the prosecutor and her office playing any role in making a sentencing decision under MCL 769.25a(4)(b), considering the prosecutor's history as the presiding judge at defendants' trials and sentencing hearings and the statements made by the prosecutor outside of a court setting. However, the subsequent recusal of the prosecutor and her office and the involvement of the Attorney General effectively rendered defendants' concern inconsequential and irrelevant. We reach this conclusion given that the Attorney General, upon accepting the cases, became "vested with all of the powers of the prosecuting attorney ..., including the power to investigate and initiate charges." MCL 49.160(3). And the Attorney General thus had the full authority to withdraw the previously filed motions seeking life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; however, on contemplation of each of the cases and the surrounding circumstances, the Attorney General decided to proceed on the same course as the prosecutor. Defendants, therefore, have received the unbiased review that they demand, and a judge, or perhaps a jury, will later decide defendants' sentences. Had recusal and the acceptance of the cases by the Attorney General occurred during the 180-day period set forth in MCL 769.25a(4)(b), with the Attorney General making the initial determination to seek mandatory life imprisonment consistent with its current position, defendants would be, as they are now, awaiting resentencing hearings. Under the procedural circumstances, defendants have simply not suffered any harm. See In re Osborne , 459 Mich. 360, 368-369, 589 N.W.2d 763 (1999) (describing a situation in which a prosecutor at a termination hearing previously represented a parent subject to the termination proceeding absent objection or notice of the problem by the trial court and holding that "we are not prepared to sweep away the 1996 and 1997 proceedings in the absence of demonstrated harm"). Affirmed. K. F. KELLY, P.J., and RIORDAN, J., concurred with MURPHY, J. MRPC 1.12(a) provides: Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, arbitrator, or law clerk to such a person, unless all parties to the proceeding consent after consultation. MCL 49.160 provides, in part: (1) If the prosecuting attorney of a county determines himself or herself to be disqualified by reason of conflict of interest or is otherwise unable to attend to the duties of the office, he or she shall file with the attorney general a petition stating the conflict or the reason he or she is unable to serve and requesting the appointment of a special prosecuting attorney to perform the duties of the prosecuting attorney in any matter in which the prosecuting attorney is disqualified or until the prosecuting attorney is able to serve. (2) If the attorney general determines that a prosecuting attorney is disqualified or otherwise unable to serve, the attorney general may elect to proceed in the matter or may appoint a prosecuting attorney or assistant prosecuting attorney who consents to the appointment to act as a special prosecuting attorney to perform the duties of the prosecuting attorney in any matter in which the prosecuting attorney is disqualified or until the prosecuting attorney is able to serve.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant are considered, and they are DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellants "requesting the Court take judicial notice of appellant's [sic: appellee's] inconsistent judicial filings and position such that defendant should be judicially estopped from maintaining its argument on accrual in this action" is DENIED.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of appellant to extend the time for filing his reply is GRANTED. The reply submitted on September 5, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of appellee Energy Michigan, Inc., to extend the time for filing its answer is GRANTED. The answer will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before October 5, 2018.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 17, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 19, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to allow out-of-state attorney Mark D. Shepard to temporarily appear and practice in the case before this Court is GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. Bernstein, J., would grant leave to appeal.

On order of the Court, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of this application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs.

Per Curiam. Defendant appeals as of right the opinion and order of the Court of Claims granting plaintiff's motion to transfer the case back to the circuit court, denying as moot defendant's motion for summary disposition, and denying plaintiff's motion for sanctions. Defendant only appeals the order with respect to its granting plaintiff's motion to transfer and denying defendant's motion for summary disposition. We affirm. Plaintiff filed her original complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court on August 31, 2015, alleging that while employed by defendant, she was sexually harassed by her manager in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq . On April 1, 2016, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint alleging sexual harassment and illegal retaliation by defendant in violation of the ELCRA. Both complaints included a jury demand. On May 25, 2017, defendant filed a notice of transfer to the Court of Claims, "effective immediately," pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3). On the same day, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that it was entitled to summary disposition because plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements for filing in the Court of Claims. On June 5, 2017, plaintiff filed an emergency motion to transfer the case back to the circuit court, arguing that the jury-trial exception in MCL 600.6421(1) to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims applied. In response to plaintiff's motion, defendant argued that the jury-trial exception did not apply because plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA against a state defendant. On June 20, 2017, the Court of Claims issued its opinion. The court found that it was "well established in this state's jurisprudence that [plaintiff] enjoys" the right to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA and that Michigan's appellate courts had extended this right "to claims against the state or state agencies." The Court of Claims concluded that because a jury-trial right existed in this case, the circuit court and the Court of Claims had concurrent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court granted plaintiff's motion for transfer to the circuit court and denied as moot defendant's motion for summary disposition. This appeal followed. Defendant argues that the Court of Claims erred by transferring the case back to the circuit court because the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. MCL 600.6419(1) states, in pertinent part, "Except as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive." If an exception does not apply, then the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over this action pursuant to MCL 600.6419(1)(a). The only exception that may apply to the Court of Claims' exclusive jurisdiction is MCL 600.6421(1), which provides as follows: Nothing in this chapter eliminates or creates any right a party may have to a trial by jury, including any right that existed before November 12, 2013. Nothing in this chapter deprives the circuit, district, or probate court of jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law, including a claim against an individual employee of this state for which there is a right to a trial by jury as otherwise provided by law. Except as otherwise provided in this section, if a party has the right to a trial by jury and asserts that right as required by law, the claim may be heard and determined by a circuit, district, or probate court in the appropriate venue. If plaintiff had the right to a jury trial in her case against defendant, defendant does not contest that transfer back to the circuit court was otherwise proper. On appeal, defendant concedes that a right to a jury trial exists under the ELCRA but argues that this right does not extend to state defendants. Defendant contends that because a plaintiff does not have an established right to a jury trial in an action under the ELCRA when the state is the defendant, the Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction. This argument fails because the question is not whether a plaintiff enjoys the right to a jury trial against a state defendant in an action under the ELCRA; plaintiffs already enjoy the right to a jury trial under the ELCRA. The proper inquiry is whether the Legislature waived the state's immunity from jury trial in the ELCRA. A challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims requires interpretation of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6401 et seq., which presents a statutory question that is reviewed de novo. Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev. Auth. , 468 Mich. 763, 767, 664 N.W.2d 185 (2003). The availability of governmental immunity presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers , 292 Mich. App. 574, 578, 808 N.W.2d 578 (2011). "Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that are reviewed de novo." Klooster v. City of Charlevoix , 488 Mich. 289, 295, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011). " 'The State, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and any relinquishment of sovereign immunity must be strictly interpreted.' " Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing) , 420 Mich. 567, 601, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984), quoting Manion v. State Hwy. Comm'r , 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942). In addressing the issue before us, we find instructive our Supreme Court's reasoning in Anzaldua v. Band , 457 Mich. 530, 578 N.W.2d 306 (1998). Anzaldua involved the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq . After finding that a plaintiff had a statutory right to a jury trial in an action under the WPA, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the argument of the defendant Michigan State University (MSU) that "even if a jury right exists generally under the act, MSU is immune from suit before a jury because it is an arm of the state." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 550, 578 N.W.2d 306. Our Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning as follows: Defendant has confused the test we use to determine whether the state is immune from liability with the test used for determining whether the state is immune from suit . As the Court noted in Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing ), the state's sovereign immunity from liability and its immunity from suit are not the same. Defendant MSU and amici curiae argue that the state's sovereign immunity from a trial by jury can be waived only by "express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute." They are incorrect. The quoted language comes from this Court's opinion in Mead v. Public Service Comm. , 303 Mich. 168, 173, 5 N.W.2d 740 (1942). In Mead , we examined portions of the motor vehicle law, 1929 CL 4724. In ruling on Mead , we overturned one of our own prior decisions, Miller v. Manistee Co. Bd. of Rd. Comm'rs , 297 Mich. 487, 298 N.W. 105 (1941). We held that Miller had given the language of the motor vehicle law too broad a construction when it extended liability to the state. Mead , supra at 172-173 [5 N.W.2d 740]. In Miller , the Court had construed the motor vehicle law to waive the state's immunity from liability as the owner of a vehicle. Id . at 490 [298 N.W. 105]. However, the motor vehicle law made only the driver of a vehicle liable. The act provided: "The provisions of this act applicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the highways, shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by this State or any county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision of the State subject to such specific exceptions as are set forth in this act." [ Mead , supra at 172-173 [5 N.W.2d 740], quoting 1929 CL 4724.] In overruling Miller , the Court in Mead explained: It is sufficient to note that the above-quoted portion of the statute by its express terms affects only the duties and liabilities of drivers. It does not enlarge or modify the duties or liabilities of the State as owner of a motor vehicle. [ Id . at 173, 5 N.W.2d 740.] The motor vehicle law did not, by its express terms or by necessary implication, provide liability for the state as an owner. Therefore, we held that the state had not waived its immunity to liability. Id . at 173-174, 5 N.W.2d 740. The Whistleblowers' Protection Act satisfies the Mead test for waiver of immunity from liability. The Legislature expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of "employer." See MCL 15.361(b) ; MSA 17.428(1)(b). Because the state is expressly named in the act, it is within the act's coverage. However, Mead does not provide a test for determining whether a jury right exists against the state. The Court of Appeals dissent cited Mead for the proposition that the state's immunity from suit before a jury could be waived only by express statutory enactment or by necessary inference. [ Anzaldua v. Band , 216 Mich. App. 561, 590, 550 N.W.2d 544 (1996) ] ( O'CONNELL , J., dissenting). However, Mead does not concern the state's immunity from suit. Rather, the state was subject to suit in the Court of Claims, and we held merely that it was immune from liability under the act involved in that case. As we noted above, immunity from suit and immunity from liability are distinct matters. See Ross , supra at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641. Thus, the language from Mead to the effect that the state waives immunity only by express statutory enactment or by necessary inference applies only to the state's immunity from liability. It has no application to the state's immunity from suit, or to immunity from trial before a jury, which is at issue here. The rule for immunity from suit was recognized by this Court in Ross : " 'The State, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and any relinquishment of sovereign immunity [from suit] must be strictly interpreted ....' " Id . at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641, quoting Manion v. State Hwy. Comm'r , 303 Mich. 1, 19-21, 5 N.W.2d 527 (1942). The Legislature created the Court of Claims in 1939, permitting the state to be sued before a judge. Ross , supra at 600, 363 N.W.2d 641. The broad language of the act creating the Court of Claims mandates that suits against the state for money damages are typically brought in that forum. Id . See MCL 600.6419 ; MSA 27A.6419. As Ross makes clear, the Legislature was free when enacting the Whistleblowers' Protection Act to waive the state's immunity from suit. Ross , supra at 601, 363 N.W.2d 641. Section 3 of the act allows suit to be brought in the circuit courts. The statute specifically includes the state among the bodies to be regulated by defining "employers" subject to the act to include the state and its political subdivisions. Nothing in the act suggests that the state is not to be treated the same as a business for purposes of the act's protection of noncivil service employees like the plaintiff. We find it significant that the Legislature chose to subject the state to suit in the circuit court rather than in the Court of Claims. The express language of the act indicates that the Legislature intended to submit the state to the jurisdiction of the circuit court. As indicated above, the court rules govern in civil actions in circuit court. They provide that legal actions for money damages are to be tried by a jury upon request. Hence, it necessarily follows, the Legislature consented that the state may be tried by a jury in Whistleblowers' Protection Act cases. We uphold the result reached by the Court of Appeals on the question whether the case against MSU may be tried by a jury. We find that MSU is subject to a trial by jury under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act as provided by the court rules, generally. Plaintiff is entitled to a jury in her suit against both defendants. [ Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 550-554, 578 N.W.2d 306 (citation omitted; some alterations in original).] The WPA is constructed similarly to the ELCRA, see id . at 545-548, 578 N.W.2d 306, and, therefore, we find our Supreme Court's interpretation of the WPA to be instructive for how the ELCRA should be interpreted. To reiterate, defendant concedes on appeal that a jury-trial right generally exists under the ELCRA. But like MSU in Anzaldua , defendant in this case argues that it is not subject to jury trial because it is an arm of the state. And like MSU's argument in Anzaldua , defendant's argument fails. Pursuant to MCL 37.2202 : (1) An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.[ ] Pursuant to MCL 37.2201(a), " 'Employer' means a person who has 1 or more employees, and includes an agent of that person." MCL 37.2103 provides: As used in this act: * * * (g) "Person" means an individual, agent, association, corporation, joint apprenticeship committee, joint stock company, labor organization, legal representative, mutual company, partnership, receiver, trust, trustee in bankruptcy, unincorporated organization, the state or a political subdivision of the state or an agency of the state , or any other legal or commercial entity. (h) "Political subdivision" means a county, city, village, township, school district, or special district or authority of the state. [Emphasis added.] Based on the foregoing, "[t]he Legislature expressly applied the act to the state by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition" of "person." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 551, 578 N.W.2d 306. Relevant to the case before us, the Legislature defined "employer" as "a person" with one or more employees. MCL 37.2201(a). Therefore, like the WPA, the ELCRA satisfies "the Mead test for waiver of immunity from liability." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 551, 578 N.W.2d 306. This conclusion is well grounded in our caselaw. See Manning v. City of Hazel Park , 202 Mich. App. 685, 699, 509 N.W.2d 874 (1993) ("Concerning the sex and age discrimination claims, defendants do not have a governmental immunity defense because the Civil Rights Act specifically includes state and political subdivisions and their agents as employers covered by the act."); Does 11-18 v. Dep't of Corrections , 323 Mich. App. 479, 490, 917 N.W.2d 730 (2018) ("Contrary to defendants' assertions, the law is clear that governmental immunity does not apply to ELCRA claims."); In re Bradley Estate , 494 Mich. 367, 393 n. 60, 835 N.W.2d 545 (2013). However, this does not resolve whether the Legislature in the ELCRA waived the state's "immunity from suit, or to immunity from trial before a jury, which is at issue here." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 552, 578 N.W.2d 306. A cause of action under the ELCRA is provided in MCL 37.2801, which states as follows: (1) A person alleging a violation of this act may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or damages , or both. (2) An action commenced pursuant to subsection (1) may be brought in the circuit court for the county where the alleged violation occurred, or for the county where the person against whom the civil complaint is filed resides or has his principal place of business. (3) As used in subsection (1), "damages" means damages for injury or loss caused by each violation of this act, including reasonable attorney's fees. [Emphasis added.] When enacting the ELCRA, the Legislature was free to waive the state's immunity from suit. See Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. MCL 37.2202(1) prohibits discrimination by an "employer"; MCL 37.2201(a) defines an "employer" as "a person"; and MCL 37.2103(g) specifically includes the state and its political subdivisions in the definition of a "person." It is therefore clear that the Legislature intended for the state and its political subdivisions to be regulated by and subject to the ELCRA. See Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. MCL 37.2801(2) allows suit under the ELCRA to be brought in circuit court. Nothing in the ELCRA indicates that the state is to be treated differently from any other employer, indicating that "the Legislature chose to subject the state to suit in the circuit court rather than in the Court of Claims." Anzaldua , 457 Mich. at 553, 578 N.W.2d 306. Therefore, based on "[t]he express language of the act ...[,] the Legislature intended to submit the state to the jurisdiction of the circuit court." Id . And the court rules governing civil actions in circuit court allow a party seeking money damages "to be tried by a jury upon request." Id ."Hence, it necessarily follows, the Legislature consented that the state may be tried by a jury in" ELCRA cases. Id . at 553-554, 578 N.W.2d 306. In other words, the Legislature waived the state's immunity from jury trial in actions brought under the ELCRA. Defendant argues that Anzaldua employed improper reasoning and was ultimately wrongly decided. Whatever issues defendant may take with Anzaldua , "it is the Supreme Court's obligation to overrule or modify case law if it becomes obsolete, and until [that] Court takes such action, the Court of Appeals and all lower courts are bound by that authority." State Treasurer v. Sprague , 284 Mich. App. 235, 242, 772 N.W.2d 452 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original); see also People v. Mitchell , 428 Mich. 364, 369-370, 408 N.W.2d 798 (1987). Defendant also contends on appeal that Anzaldua 's"persuasive value" was "undercut" by the enactment of 2013 PA 164 because that act "abrogated the primary rationale for affording plaintiffs a right to [a] jury-the ELCRA's grant of jurisdiction to the circuit courts." This is apparently a reference to MCL 600.6419, which defendant argues "[b]y its plain terms ... superseded MCL 37.2801(2), which granted circuit courts jurisdiction over ELCRA claims." Defendant's argument fatally ignores MCL 600.6421(1). By its plain language, MCL 600.6419 is expressly subject to MCL 600.6421. See MCL 600.6419(1) ("Except as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive."). MCL 600.6421(1) states that "[n]othing in this chapter eliminates ... any right a party may have to a trial by jury ...." Therefore, pursuant to MCL 600.6421(1), the Court of Claims' expanded jurisdiction in MCL 600.6419 cannot be construed to deprive a party of an existing right to a jury trial. Accordingly, because plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial against defendant in her action under the ELCRA, the Court of Claims had concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court by virtue of MCL 600.6421(1). Therefore, the Court of Claims did not err by transferring the case back to the circuit court. Affirmed. SHAPIRO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and O'BRIEN, JJ., concurred. MCL 600.6419(1)(a) states that the Court of Claims has jurisdiction [t]o hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court. This Court has twice held that a plaintiff has the right to a jury trial when proceeding against a state defendant under the ELCRA. See Barbour v. Dep't of Social Servs. , 172 Mich. App. 275, 279-281, 431 N.W.2d 482 (1988) ; Marsh v. Dep't of Civil Serv. , 142 Mich. App. 557, 569-570, 370 N.W.2d 613 (1985). As published decisions of the Court of Appeals, the Court of Claims was required to follow these cases. See MCR 7.215(C)(2) ; People v. Mitchell , 428 Mich. 364, 369-370, 408 N.W.2d 798 (1987) (explaining vertical stare decisis). However, both cases were decided before our Supreme Court's decision in Anzaldua , and neither case expressly addressed whether the Legislature waived the state's immunity from jury trial. Although these cases are not binding on this Court because they were published before November 1, 1990, MCR 7.215(J)(1), they may be persuasive, In re Stillwell Trust , 299 Mich. App. 289, 299 n. 1, 829 N.W.2d 353 (2013). Pursuant to MCL 37.2103(i), "Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment." Because the Court of Claims properly transferred the case back to the circuit court, defendant's argument that plaintiff did not follow the procedures necessary to proceed in the Court of Claims is moot and this Court need not address it. See B P 7 v. Bureau of State Lottery , 231 Mich. App. 356, 359, 586 N.W.2d 117 (1998).

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 22, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE that part of the Court of Appeals judgment addressing the admission of other-acts evidence and we REMAND this case to that court for reconsideration in light of People v. Denson , 500 Mich. 385, 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017), and People v. Golochowicz , 413 Mich. 298, 310-311, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982). The prosecutor sought to admit the other-acts evidence to prove identity. " Golochowicz identifies the requirements of logical relevance when the proponent is utilizing a modus operandi theory to prove identity." People v. VanderVliet , 444 Mich. 52, 66, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993). On remand, the Court of Appeals shall apply Golochowicz to determine whether the other-acts evidence was admissible to prove identity. The Court of Appeals shall consider whether the defendant's other act and the charged offense were sufficiently similar to support this theory of relevance. See Denson , 500 Mich. at 402-404, 902 N.W.2d 306. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendants-appellants to extend the time for filing their supplemental brief is GRANTED. The supplemental brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before August 3, 2018.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's May 16, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's April 3, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the January 16, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 13, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 13, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 17, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's March 27, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 13, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on July 2, 2018, is accepted for filing. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion for the temporary admission of out-of-state attorney Ron M. Landsman to appear and practice in this case under MCR 8.126(A) is GRANTED.

BORRELLO, J. In this interlocutory appeal, defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant is charged with one count of delivery of a controlled substance causing death (fentanyl), MCL 750.317a. Defendant argued in the trial court as well as on appeal that the trial court lacks "jurisdiction." For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of the drug-related death of Nicholas Abraham. On December 12, 2016, Nicholas called William Ingall to tell Ingall that he was coming over because he wanted to get some heroin. Later that night, they traveled together in Nicholas's pickup truck to a house in Detroit to purchase heroin from defendant. Once they arrived in the area, Ingall called defendant's cell phone and informed defendant that he wanted to "get some heroin." Nicholas gave Ingall $100, and he waited in his pickup truck while Ingall left and purchased heroin from defendant inside a nearby house. Ingall gave defendant $100, and defendant gave Ingall heroin that was wrapped up in paper. Subsequently, Ingall returned to Nicholas's truck with the heroin, and they went to a nearby laundromat where they used the heroin. Ingall used approximately $20 worth of the heroin, and Nicholas used approximately $10 worth of the heroin. According to Ingall, the heroin "was really strong," and it "wasn't real bitter like the heroin would be." After Ingall noticed the strength of the heroin, he told Nicholas "to be careful with it." Nicholas dropped Ingall off at Ingall's house and then went home. Nicholas lived in Monroe County with his wife, Michelle Abraham. After getting home at approximately 10:00 p.m. that evening, Nicholas put down two lines of heroin on a table and told Michelle to snort the heroin. Michelle passed out after she used the heroin. When she regained consciousness, she discovered that Nicholas was not breathing and tried unsuccessfully to resuscitate him. Nicholas was pronounced dead during the early morning hours of December 13, 2016. An autopsy was subsequently performed by Dr. Leigh Hlavaty of the Wayne County Medical Examiner's Office, who opined that Nicholas's death was caused by fentanyl toxicity. According to Detective Michael McClain of the Monroe County Sheriff's Office Vice Unit, fentanyl is sometimes used by heroin dealers as "a cutting agent to make the heroin more potent." Defendant was charged with one count of delivery of fentanyl causing death, and he was bound over to the Monroe Circuit Court following his preliminary examination. Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the prosecution's case on the ground that the trial court lacked "jurisdiction." Defendant contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him because the only "act" that he allegedly committed-the delivery of fentanyl-occurred in Wayne County and he did not commit any act in Monroe County given that Nicholas's death was not an "act" committed by defendant. A hearing was held on defendant's motion, and the trial court denied the motion. The trial court ruled that defendant could be tried in either Wayne County or Monroe County because elements of the charged offense occurred in both of those counties. The trial court further reasoned that venue was authorized in Monroe County because a "mortal wound" was inflicted by means of the drug transaction, which resulted in a death in Monroe County. We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal, as well as his motion to stay the proceedings pending resolution of this appeal. As a threshold matter, we note that although defendant has characterized his challenge as one involving the trial court's "jurisdiction," the question presented in this appeal is actually whether venue was properly laid in Monroe County. "Jurisdiction is the power [of a court] to act." People v. Johnson , 427 Mich. 98, 106 n. 7, 398 N.W.2d 219 (1986) (opinion by BOYLE , J.) (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in original). "Michigan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have jurisdiction over felony cases." People v. Lown , 488 Mich. 242, 268, 794 N.W.2d 9 (2011), citing Const. 1963, art. 6, §§ 1 and 13, MCL 600.151, MCL 600.601, and MCL 767.1. However, venue refers to the location, or forum, in which the trial is to be held. See Gross v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 448 Mich. 147, 156, 528 N.W.2d 707 (1995) ; People v. Webbs , 263 Mich. App. 531, 533, 689 N.W.2d 163 (2004). Therefore, defendant's appellate argument that the trial court erred because Monroe County is not a proper county in which to try this case is clearly a venue challenge. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW "A trial court's determination regarding the existence of venue in a criminal prosecution is reviewed de novo." People v. Houthoofd , 487 Mich. 568, 579, 790 N.W.2d 315 (2010). "Venue is a part of every criminal prosecution and must be proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable doubt." Webbs , 263 Mich. App. at 533, 689 N.W.2d 163. "A trial court's ruling addressing a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." People v. Lewis , 302 Mich. App. 338, 341, 839 N.W.2d 37 (2013). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome falling outside the range of principled outcomes." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Issues involving statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 579, 790 N.W.2d 315. "The primary purpose of a court when construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's intent." People v. Rivera , 301 Mich. App. 188, 192, 835 N.W.2d 464 (2013). "We begin by examining the plain language of the statute; where that language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." People v. Williams , 475 Mich. 245, 250, 716 N.W.2d 208 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The words in a statute are interpreted "in light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the statute...." People v. Peltola , 489 Mich. 174, 181, 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011). III. ANALYSIS "The general venue rule is that defendants should be tried in the county where the crime was committed." Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 579, 790 N.W.2d 315. "[E]xcept as the legislature for the furtherance of justice has otherwise provided reasonably and within the requirements of due process, the trial should be by a jury of the county or city where the offense was committed." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Accordingly, to determine the county in which venue is proper, it is necessary to determine the county where the offense was committed. This determination in turn requires an examination of the statute that defendant was charged with violating. The crime of delivery of a controlled substance causing death is defined in MCL 750.317a, which provides as follows: A person who delivers a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance, other than marihuana, to another person in violation of section 7401 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401, that is consumed by that person or any other person and that causes the death of that person or other person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for life or any term of years. In People v. Plunkett , 485 Mich. 50, 60, 780 N.W.2d 280 (2010), our Supreme Court explained that [i]t is clear from the plain language of the statute that MCL 750.317a provides an additional punishment for persons who "deliver[ ]" a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 when that substance is subsequently consumed by "any ... person" and it causes that person's death. It punishes an individual's role in placing the controlled substance in the stream of commerce, even when that individual is not directly linked to the resultant death. Consequently, MCL 750.317a is a general intent crime, and as such does not require the intent that death occur from the controlled substance first delivered in violation of MCL 333.7401. Rather, the general intent required to violate MCL 750.317a is identical to the general intent required to violate MCL 333.7401(2)(a) : the delivery of a schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance. [First emphasis added; other alterations in original.] Thus, MCL 750.317a is properly understood as providing a penalty enhancement when a defendant's criminal act -the delivery of a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 -has the result or effect of causing a death to any other individual. It is also clear, however, that a defendant's criminal act is complete upon the delivery of the controlled substance. Criminal liability has attached at that point. The effects of that completed action merely determine the degree of the penalty that a defendant will face despite the fact that a defendant need not commit any further acts causing the occurrence of any specific result (such as a death by drug overdose). In light of the plain language of the statute, establishing a defendant's violation of MCL 750.317a requires the prosecution to prove (1) the defendant's act of delivering a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 and (2) the effect that a person died as a result of consuming the controlled substance. Establishing an act in violation of MCL 333.7401 with respect to a Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 controlled substance requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant delivered an amount of the controlled substance with knowledge that he was delivering a controlled substance. People v. Collins , 298 Mich. App. 458, 462, 828 N.W.2d 392 (2012). " 'Deliver' or 'delivery' means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from 1 person to another of a controlled substance, whether or not there is an agency relationship." MCL 333.7105(1). Fentanyl is classified as a Schedule 2 substance. MCL 333.7214(b). In this case, the prosecution does not dispute that the alleged drug transaction between Ingall and defendant occurred in Detroit, within Wayne County. Ingall testified at the preliminary examination that while he was in Detroit, he gave defendant $100 in exchange for heroin. Presumably, this heroin was mixed with fentanyl. At that point, defendant's alleged criminal act-delivery of a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 -was complete. Plunkett , 485 Mich. at 60, 780 N.W.2d 280. The fact that Nicholas subsequently died may make defendant subject to prosecution under MCL 750.317a rather than MCL 333.7401, but that is not due to any further act on defendant's part. Plunkett , 485 Mich. at 60, 780 N.,W.2d 280. Because the alleged criminal offense was committed in Wayne County, venue is proper there. Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 579, 790 N.W.2d 315. Defendant did not commit any act in Monroe County. Accordingly, venue could only be proper in Monroe County if it was authorized by an applicable exception to the general rule that venue lies in the county where the crime was committed. Id . The prosecution argues on appeal that two statutes that provide exceptions to the general rule regarding venue authorize venue in Monroe County, where the death occurred. First, the prosecution argues that venue is proper in Monroe County under MCL 762.8, which provides that [w]henever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2 or more acts done in the perpetration of that felony, the felony may be prosecuted in any county where any of those acts were committed or in any county that the defendant intended the felony or acts done in perpetration of the felony to have an effect. In Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 580, 790 N.W.2d 315, our Supreme Court construed the former version of MCL 762.8, which provided as follows: Whenever a felony consists or is the culmination of 2 or more acts done in the perpetration thereof, said felony may be prosecuted in any county in which any 1 of said acts was committed. The Houthoofd Court held that the statute unambiguously stated that "when a felony consists of two or more acts, venue for prosecution of the felony is proper in any county in which any one of the acts was committed" and that the "statute does not contemplate venue for prosecution in places where the effects of the act are felt ...." Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 583-584, 790 N.W.2d 315 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that "it is the act that constitutes the felony-rather than its effects-that gives rise to venue." Id . at 585, 790 N.W.2d 315. The Legislature subsequently amended MCL 762.8 to also authorize venue "in any county that the defendant intended the felony or acts done in perpetration of the felony to have an effect." MCL 762.8, as amended by 2013 PA 128 (emphasis added). In this case, defendant's alleged criminal act of delivering a controlled substance was complete upon concluding the transaction with Ingall, and this act took place entirely within Wayne County. There is no allegation that defendant committed any act in Monroe County. Because the alleged crime-with the exception of the sentencing enhancement for the death of Nicholas-was complete at the point of the sale, Plunkett , 485 Mich. at 60, 780 N.W.2d 280, there was no further act to be committed "in the perpetration of that felony," MCL 762.8. It was only the effect of Nicholas's death that made defendant subject to potential additional punishment under MCL 750.317a. See Plunkett , 485 Mich. at 60, 780 N.W.2d 280. In a prosecution under MCL 750.317a, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant intended for a death to occur, Plunkett , 485 Mich. at 60, 780 N.W.2d 280, and there is no contention in this case that defendant harbored such an intent. Most importantly, there is no allegation or evidence that defendant intended such an effect to occur in Monroe County. MCL 762.8. Although MCL 762.8 was amended to authorize venue in a county where a defendant intended an act to have an effect, there still is no provision authorizing venue in a county where a defendant's act merely happens to have an effect. Therefore, MCL 762.8 does not authorize venue in Monroe County in this case. Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 583-585, 790 N.W.2d 315. Next, the prosecution argues that venue is proper in Monroe County under MCL 762.5, which provides that "[i]f any mortal wound shall be given or other violence or injury shall be inflicted, or any poison shall be administered in 1 county by means whereof death shall ensue in another county, the offense may be prosecuted and punished in either county." In support of this theory of venue, the prosecution relies on our Supreme Court's decision in People v. Southwick , 272 Mich. 258, 261 N.W. 320 (1935). In Southwick , our Supreme Court held that venue was proper in Oakland County for the defendant's manslaughter by abortion charge when the defendant performed an illegal abortion in Jackson County and the victim subsequently died in Oakland County. Id . at 259-260, 262, 261 N.W. 320. Specifically, the amended information in that case stated that the defendant willfully and unlawfully administer[ed] to Aletha Hopps, certain medicines, drugs and substances and ... use[d] certain instruments in and upon the body of the said Aletha Hopps, with intent to procure the miscarriage of the said Aletha Hopps, she the said Aletha Hopps being then and there a pregnant woman, and that the administering of said medicines, drugs and substances and by the use of certain instruments by the said Dr. Charles Southwick as aforesaid not being then and there necessary to preserve the life of said Aletha Hopps. [ Id . at 260, 261 N.W. 320 (quotation marks omitted).] In reaching its conclusion that venue was proper in Oakland County, the Southwick Court relied on 1929 CL 17123, a statute substantively identical to the current version of MCL 762.5. Id . at 262, 261 N.W. 320. The Court reasoned that the statute authorized venue in Oakland County because the "willful injuries were inflicted in Jackson county and death occurred in Oakland county." Id . In this case, the prosecution asks this Court to find that for purposes of MCL 762.5, the alleged delivery constituted a mortal wound or injury such that the delivery of heroin containing fentanyl corresponds with the acts undertaken by the defendant in Southwick . We begin our analysis of this request by noting that neither MCL 762.5 nor our Supreme Court in Southwick defined the terms "wound" or "injury." We typically examine dictionary definitions for terms that are not defined in the statute. People v. Perkins , 473 Mich. 626, 639, 703 N.W.2d 448 (2005). There we find that the term "wound" means "an injury to the body (as from violence, accident, or surgery) that typically involves laceration or breaking of a membrane (as the skin) and usu. damage to underlying tissues." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). The term "injury" is defined as "hurt, damage, or loss sustained." Id . Although controlled substances can certainly have dangerous effects, there is no evidence in the instant case that defendant had any contact with Nicholas or directly transferred a controlled substance to Nicholas. Quite unlike the facts in Southwick , in which the defendant was charged with having administered medicines to the decedent and also having used "certain instruments" upon the decedent that caused her death, the record here establishes that the fentanyl entered Nicholas's body and caused his death as a result of his own actions related to using heroin; there is no evidence that defendant put any drug into Nicholas. Rather, defendant provided Ingall with a controlled substance that ultimately made its way to Nicholas. Therefore, unlike the circumstances in Southwick , there is no factual support here for this Court to conclude that defendant gave Nicholas a mortal wound or otherwise inflicted any injury on him . The prosecution also asks this Court to find that heroin and fentanyl are poisons for purposes of MCL 762.5. The term "poison" is not defined within the statute, nor was this term defined by the Southwick Court. The term is also not defined in the Public Health Code, MCL 333.1101 et seq. ; the Michigan Penal Code, MCL 750.1 et seq. ; or the Code of Criminal Procedure, MCL 760.1 et seq. Turning to a dictionary, a "poison" is "[a]ny substance, either taken internally or applied externally, that is injurious to health or dangerous to life." Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th ed.). Although the amount of fentanyl consumed by Nicholas was "dangerous to life" in this case, that does not mean that fentanyl is a per se poison in all cases. Fentanyl is classified as a Schedule 2 controlled substance, MCL 333.7214(b), in part because it has legitimate medical uses. See MCL 333.7213 (stating that a substance shall be placed in Schedule 2 if it is found, among other things, that the "substance has currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, or currently accepted medical use with severe restrictions"). In contrast, heroin is not used for medical treatment and is accordingly classified as a Schedule 1 controlled substance. See MCL 333.7212(1)(b) (classifying heroin as a Schedule 1 controlled substance); MCL 333.7211 ("The administrator shall place a substance in schedule 1 if it finds that the substance has high potential for abuse and has no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical supervision."). Although heroin may be injurious to a person's health, the evidence in this case showed that Nicholas's death was caused by fentanyl toxicity rather than by heroin. Nonetheless, even accepting the argument that a given controlled substance could be considered a poison in a particular case, that does not mean that MCL 762.5 is automatically satisfied such that this statute may be relied on to establish venue when the crime at issue is delivery of a controlled substance causing death. Examining the term "poison" in context, Peltola , 489 Mich. at 181, 803 N.W.2d 140, we note that this venue statute refers to "any poison shall be ... administered in 1 county ...." MCL 762.5 (emphasis added). This implies an action related to the poisoning. Considering the term "poison" when used as a verb rather than as a noun, we find that "poison" or "poisoning" means "to injure or kill with poison." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.). "Poisoning" has also been defined as "[t]he administering of poison." Stedman's Medical Dictionary (26th ed). Focusing on the use of the word "poison" as a verb is in accordance with the general proposition that for purposes of determining venue, the focus is on the "act that constitutes the felony." Houthoofd , 487 Mich. at 585, 790 N.W.2d 315. In this case, the only criminal act put forth by the prosecution was defendant's alleged delivery of the controlled substance. As previously discussed, defendant's alleged criminal act was complete once the delivery occurred, and that delivery occurred entirely within Wayne County. Defendant has not been charged with any crime related to poisoning anyone. For example, he is not charged with first-degree murder by poisoning, see MCL 750.316(1)(a), or mingling a poison or harmful substance with food, drink, nonprescription medicine, or a pharmaceutical product, see MCL 750.436(1)(a). Moreover, for purposes of establishing venue, the lesson from Southwick is that the mortal wound, injury, or poison must be inflicted on or administered to the victim directly in order for venue to be proper under MCL 762.5 when the death subsequently occurs in a different county. It is not enough to depend on a drug supply chain to link a defendant's act in one county to the death in another county of a victim who had no contact with the defendant in order to rely on MCL 762.5 for establishing venue. In this case, there is no support for the contention that defendant administered anything to Nicholas. In sum, without any evidence that defendant either administered a poison or inflicted a mortal wound to or other violence or injury on Nicholas, MCL 762.5 is inapplicable to this case and does not provide a basis for establishing venue in Monroe County. Therefore, the trial court erred by ruling that venue was proper in Monroe County, the court abused its discretion by and denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. People v. McBurrows , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 13, 2017 (Docket No. 338552). As discussed in this opinion, defendant's argument is actually predicated on the claim that venue was improper in Monroe County. McBurrows , unpub. order. The trial court also properly recognized that defendant's motion actually presented a venue challenge. 1948 CL 762.8. MCL 750.316(1)(a) provides that a person who commits "[m]urder by means of poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premediated killing" is guilty of first-degree murder. MCL 750.436(1)(a) provides that a person shall not [w]illfully mingle a poison or harmful substance with a food, drink, nonprescription medicine, or pharmaceutical product, or willfully place a poison or harmful substance in a spring, well, reservoir, or public water supply, knowing or having reason to know that the food, drink, nonprescription medicine, pharmaceutical product, or water may be ingested or used by a person to his or her injury.

Borrello, J. In this automobile-negligence action, plaintiffs, Lindsey Patrick and Christian Patrick, appeal as of right the trial court's order granting defendant Virginia Turkelson's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and dismissing the action with respect to all defendants. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the trial court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND This case arises out of a car accident that occurred on February 12, 2013. Lindsey was driving on a service road as she was leaving a Spectrum Health parking lot when a vehicle driven by Turkelson turned onto the road and struck the driver's side of Lindsey's vehicle. Multiple air bags deployed inside Lindsey's vehicle, and the side curtain air bag above the driver's side door hit Lindsey on the side of her face, her left ear, and the top of her head. Lindsey referred to the deployment of the air bags as an "explosion." After the accident, Spectrum Security arrived at the scene, and Lindsey reported that the sound in both of her ears was "very muffled" and that her left ear was "ringing." Following the accident, Lindsey was examined in the emergency room where she reported experiencing sharp pain in her left ear, ringing in both ears, and a headache. She also reported pain in her left shoulder, lower back, left hip, and left rib cage. Lindsey was subsequently referred to an audiologist, Pam Keenan at McDonald Audiology & Hearing Health Care on February 21, 2013. Keenan noted in her report that Lindsey's primary concern was sudden decrease in hearing and bilateral tinnitus. An audiogram test "revealed hearing to be within normal limits at 250-4000Hz with a slight dip at 6 and 8000Hz." Lindsey's word recognition was "[e]xcellent bilaterally," and her speech recognition was in accordance with her other testing. The record reflects that Lindsey was administered various hearing tests that measured her ability to hear pure tones and speech. Keenan also noted that there was no previous audiogram to provide a comparison. Further testing at a March 19, 2013 visit to McDonald Audiology & Hearing Health Care yielded similar results. According to Lindsey, she was told by the audiologist that the air bag explosion caused the ringing in her ears. On November 11, 2013, Lindsey visited the University of Michigan Health System and was seen by Dr. Katherine Heidenreich, a specialist in otology and neurotology who treats patients with ear disorders and hearing loss. According to Dr. Heidenreich's deposition testimony, Lindsey reported experiencing symptoms of hearing loss and tinnitus. Dr. Heidenreich explained tinnitus as being a "phantom sound that somebody perceives," which is "something that is inside your head that you hear, not from the environment." Dr. Heidenreich further explained that people experiencing tinnitus symptoms may describe the sound as ringing, a tone, or the sound of the ocean. As part of Lindsey's examination that day, Dr. Heidenreich conducted a physical examination, which typically includes examining the patient's ears, nose, oral cavity, oral pharynx, and the cranial nerve function. The exam was "normal." Lindsey was also given an audiogram to test her hearing, and Dr. Heidenreich reviewed these results during the examination as well. Dr. Heidenreich testified that components of an audiogram require a patient to acknowledge whether or not the patient heard a sound that was presented to the patient, and Dr. Heidenreich acknowledged that this kind of testing relied on the patient "subjectively reporting what they heard." However, she testified that the testing also included "more objective components as well such as the movement of the eardrum and the acoustic reflexes." On the basis of the results of the audiogram administered to Lindsey that day, Dr. Heidenreich determined that Lindsey had "a mild high frequency sensorineural hearing loss in both ears but with excellent word recognition scores." Dr. Heidenreich testified that sensorineural hearing loss suggests problems with the inner ear or nerve. With respect to tinnitus, Dr. Heidenreich explained that this is a symptom that is often reported by people experiencing hearing loss and that there typically are not objective measures that can verify the existence of this symptom. Dr. Heidenreich also determined that Lindsey had "an acoustic reflex abnormality." The acoustic reflex"measures the contraction of the stapedius muscle," and abnormalities can be associated with middle-ear bone problems or tumors. According to Dr. Heidenreich, an acoustic reflex abnormality might not cause any symptoms, and this particular finding might not have had any bearing on Lindsey's condition. Dr. Heidenreich testified that peer-reviewed scientific literature includes reports of hearing loss and tinnitus following air bag deployment due to the sound generated. According to Dr. Heidenreich, it is possible for exposure to loud noises to cause hearing loss and tinnitus, even if an individual does not suffer physical trauma. Dr. Heidenreich opined that Lindsey's hearing issues were related to the car accident in light of Lindsey's audiogram results and her history, which included her reports of experiencing an immediate decline in hearing, muffled hearing, and tinnitus right after the car accident in which the air bags deployed. Dr. Heidenreich opined that this history suggested that Lindsey had experienced a negative change in her hearing as compared to her preaccident hearing capabilities and that Lindsey's exposure to the loud sound from the air bags could have caused her symptoms. However, Dr. Heidenreich acknowledged that there was no audiogram for Lindsey from before the accident for comparison and that hearing can deteriorate due to age. Additionally, Dr. Heidenreich indicated that she did not know the cause of the acoustic reflex abnormality. Lindsey testified at her deposition that the pain and muffling in her ears started immediately after the automobile accident and that she did not have any of these symptoms before the automobile accident. At the time of her deposition, she no longer suffered from muffled hearing, but she did still have ringing or tingling in both of her ears. Lindsey indicated that her hearing loss was in her left ear. Lindsey testified that she generally did not have trouble hearing people speaking during normal conversation unless there was a lot of background noise, but she had trouble hearing whispering. Lindsey was told by both the audiologist and Dr. Heidenreich that the sound from the explosion of the air bag deploying near her ear caused her hearing problems. According to Lindsey, her ear issues had a negative impact on her work because she was required to spend a significant amount of time in the car for work and the road noise made the ringing in her ears worse. She also testified that the ringing affected her ability to do her job because it was "distracting" and made her "very irritable." Places with large groups of people or loud sounds also made the ringing worse. Before the accident, Lindsey worked approximately 30 hours a week over the course of three days each week. At the time of her deposition, Lindsey was working one day a week for approximately eight hours because it was "harder to do the driving" and because she had small children. Lindsey also testified during her deposition that before the accident, she had enjoyed outdoor activities such as kayaking, hiking, and bike riding. She also had a busy social life, enjoyed going to concerts, and liked to travel. Since the accident, Lindsey had been to two concerts, and they made the ringing in her ears worse. Lindsey also had not continued hiking or kayaking since the accident because she had tried these activities multiple times and found that it was "too quiet in the woods," which made the ringing more noticeable. Lindsey further testified that her ear problems had affected her ability to take care of her children because she was less patient, more irritable, and more anxious. Lindsey's husband, Christian, testified at his deposition that he and Lindsey had experienced difficulties communicating since the accident because Lindsey would speak either too softly or too loudly. Lindsey would also occasionally tell Christian that she was having trouble hearing him. According to Christian, he sometimes had to ask Lindsey to repeat herself because he had a hard time understanding or hearing her, and she would get frustrated during these interactions because she was having a hard time knowing how loud she was talking. Christian further testified that there were times when Lindsey did not hear questions that their children asked her or misheard a question and responded with an answer that was unresponsive to the actual question. Christian also indicated that Lindsey was "more irritable" than before the car accident. Christian testified that Lindsey had indicated that she could not go on road trips or go to concerts with him because of her hearing issues. He also had to keep music at a quieter volume inside the house. Lindsey could watch television without a problem but going to movies gave her trouble. Lindsey filed this action on July 10, 2015. Lindsey specified in her deposition that her claim of injury resulting from the automobile accident involved her hearing loss and ringing in her ears. Turkelson moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that Lindsey did not suffer a serious impairment of body function and that any injury was not caused by the car accident. Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Home-Owners Insurance Company concurred in Turkelson's motion. The trial court granted Turkelson's motion for summary disposition and dismissed the action in its entirety with respect to all defendants, ruling that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lindsey suffered a serious impairment of body function. Specifically, the trial court concluded that Lindsey had "not shown any objective manifestation of her subjective complaints of tinnitus or otherwise demonstrated any physical basis for those complaints," that her hearing loss was "mild" and was "not a manifestation of or physical basis for tinnitus," and that there was "no indication that plaintiff's general ability to live her normal life is affected by that mild hearing loss." As a result of its determination on the threshold injury issue, the trial court specifically declined to make a ruling regarding Turkelson's causation argument. The trial court also stated that it would not address plaintiffs' countermotion for summary disposition regarding the issue of fault "because summary disposition is proper regardless of fault for the underlying accident." On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that Lindsey's impairment was not objectively manifested and granting summary disposition on the ground that a serious impairment of body function had not been established. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW "This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a summary disposition motion to determine if the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bergman v. Cotanche , 319 Mich.App. 10, 15, 899 N.W.2d 754 (2017). "In making this determination, the Court reviews the entire record to determine whether defendant was entitled to summary disposition." Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). "Courts are liberal in finding a factual dispute sufficient to withstand summary disposition." Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc v. Ragin , 285 Mich.App. 466, 476, 776 N.W.2d 398 (2009). "A motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim." Id . at 474-475, 776 N.W.2d 398. "Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." West v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is reviewed "by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Latham v. Barton Malow Co , 480 Mich. 105, 111, 746 N.W.2d 868 (2008). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." West , 469 Mich. at 183, 665 N.W.2d 468. "[I]t is well settled that the circuit court may not weigh the evidence or make determinations of credibility when deciding a motion for summary disposition." Innovative Adult Foster Care , 285 Mich.App. at 480, 776 N.W.2d 398. Moreover, a court may not "make findings of fact; if the evidence before it is conflicting , summary disposition is improper." Lysogorski v. Bridgeport Charter Twp , 256 Mich.App. 297, 299, 662 N.W.2d 108 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). III. ANALYSIS Tort liability is limited under the Michigan no-fault insurance act. McCormick v. Carrier , 487 Mich. 180, 189, 795 N.W.2d 517 (2010). However, a "person remains subject to tort liability for noneconomic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function , or permanent serious disfigurement." MCL 500.3135(1) (emphasis added). The issue in the instant case is whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Lindsey suffered a serious impairment of body function. The other two types of threshold injuries are not implicated here. The phrase "serious impairment of body function" is defined by statute as "an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life." MCL 500.3135(5). Under McCormick , the test for establishing a serious impairment of body function requires showing "(1) an objectively manifested impairment (2) of an important body function that (3) affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life." McCormick , 487 Mich. at 195, 795 N.W.2d 517. First, an objectively manifested impairment is one "that is evidenced by actual symptoms or conditions that someone other than the injured person would observe or perceive as impairing a body function." Id . at 196, 795 N.W.2d 517. The inquiry focuses on "whether the impairment is objectively manifested, not the injury or its symptoms." Id . at 197, 795 N.W.2d 517. The term "impairment" means "the state of being impaired." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). In turn, "impaired" means the state of (1) "being weakened, diminished, or damaged" or (2) "functioning poorly or inadequately." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although mere subjective complaints of pain and suffering are insufficient to show impairment, evidence of a physical basis for that pain and suffering may be introduced to show that the impairment is objectively manifested. Id . at 198, 795 N.W.2d 517. Medical testimony is generally, but not always, required to make this showing. Id . Second, the important-body-function inquiry is "an inherently subjective" one. Id . at 199, 795 N.W.2d 517. The focus is on whether the body function "has great value, significant, or consequence," and the relationship of that function to the individual's life must be considered. Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Third, the impairment to an important body function affects a person's general ability to lead a normal life if it has "an influence on some of the person's capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living." Id . at 202, 795 N.W.2d 517. This is also a subjective inquiry. Id . The statute does not require the person's ability to lead a normal life to have been destroyed or for the impairment to last a certain period of time. Id . at 202-203, 795 N.W.2d 517. Instead, the statute only requires that the impairment affect the person's ability to live in his or her normal manner of living. Id . at 202, 795 N.W.2d 517. The focus is not on whether a person's normal manner of living itself has been affected, and "there is no quantitative minimum as to the percentage of a person's normal manner of living that must be affected." Id . at 202-203, 795 N.W.2d 517. However, the issue of whether a serious impairment of body function has been incurred is a question of law to be decided by the court only if (1) "[t]here is no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person's injuries" or (2) "[t]here is a factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of the person's injuries, but the dispute is not material to the determination whether the person has suffered a serious impairment of body function...." MCL 500.3135(2)(a). Accordingly, in McCormick , 487 Mich. at 215, 795 N.W.2d 517, our Supreme Court instructed courts applying MCL 500.3135 to begin by determining "whether there is a factual dispute regarding the nature and the extent of the person's injuries and, if so, whether the dispute is material to determining whether the serious impairment of body function threshold is met." When there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the nature and extent of a person's injuries, the threshold question of whether there was a serious impairment of body function is for the jury and may not be decided as a matter of law. Chouman v. Home Owners Ins. Co. , 293 Mich.App. 434, 444, 810 N.W.2d 88 (2011). A. LINDSEY'S HEARING LOSS CONSTITUTES AN OBJECTIVELY MANIFESTED IMPAIRMENT In their motions for summary disposition, defendants argued that Lindsey's hearing loss does not constitute an objectively manifested impairment. The trial court agreed. We disagree. Review of the record evidence submitted in this matter reveals that Lindsey complained of problems related to hearing loss and ringing in her ears immediately following the car accident and that Dr. Heidenreich determined that Lindsey had mild high frequency sensorineural hearing loss in both ears and an acoustic reflex abnormality. Lindsey's hearing loss was documented in the results of audiological evaluations by Keenan and Dr. Heidenreich. Defendants argue, and the trial court seemingly agreed, that because there exists a subjective component to the hearing tests, namely that Lindsey had to indicate when she heard a particular sound, Dr. Heidenreich's conclusions were not evidence of an objectively manifested impairment. Rather, defendants contend, the testing that revealed hearing loss was dependent on the subjective verifications of Lindsey and for that reason, her hearing loss does not constitute an objectively manifested impairment. However, the fact that there was a subjective component to the hearing tests does not negate a finding that Lindsey's hearing loss is an objectively manifested impairment. Furthermore, the record also reveals that in addition to Keenan's and Dr. Heidenreich's findings, Lindsey's husband, Christian, testified that Lindsey had difficulties after the accident with speaking too softly or too loudly, which made it hard for him to understand her. Christian observed Lindsey experiencing frustration over her own lack of awareness about the volume of her voice. Christian also testified that Lindsey sometimes did not hear questions that were asked of her and that Lindsey sometimes responded to questions in a way that showed that she did not accurately hear the question. On the basis of his observations of his wife's actions, Christian testified that Lindsey had difficulty hearing adequately in everyday situations. The evidence of Lindsey's medical evaluations and Christian's testimony supports finding that a question of fact exists as to whether Lindsey's hearing was impaired. This impairment to her hearing was observable by others, which would satisfy the standard for showing an "objectively manifested impairment." McCormick , 487 Mich. at 196-198, 795 N.W.2d 517. "In other words, an 'objectively manifested' impairment is commonly understood as one observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions." Id. at 196, 795 N.W.2d 517. Keenan, Dr. Heidenreich, and Christian testified as to their observations. All three testified that Lindsey suffered a hearing loss. Additionally, Lindsey testified that her hearing was muffled after the accident and that she suffered from tinnitus. Dr. Heidenreich testified that while it is not possible to test for tinnitus, both symptoms Lindsey complained of are consistent with air-bag explosions. Hence, examination of the entirety of the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff plainly reveals that Lindsey's complained of symptoms and conditions were observed and perceived by Keenan and Dr. Heidenreich's testing and that Christian also observed and perceived Lindsey's hearing loss in everyday situations. Consequently, plaintiff has demonstrated, in accordance with McCormick , that there is a physical basis for her complaints. See, id . at 198, 795 N.W.2d 517. Moreover, contrary to its role in deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court weighed the evidence. While testing a person's hearing necessarily involves self-reporting by the person being tested, the record reflects that this testing also includes objective components (such as examining the movement of the eardrum and acoustic reflexes) and that the test is relied on by medical professionals. Both Keenan and Dr. Heidenreich examined Lindsey and considered her audiogram results, and they drew conclusions about the condition of her hearing based on their medical findings. The fact that Dr. Heidenreich used the word "subjective" in describing this self-reporting process does not completely negate the significance of her determinations. Nor does Dr. Heidenreich's description of ringing in the ears as the hearing of a "phantom" sound dispositively affect the analysis: her description illustrates the entire problem that a person with this symptom experiences-hearing a sound that is not heard by anybody else because it is not generated in the external environment. According to Dr. Heidenreich, tinnitus is a symptom commonly experienced by people with hearing loss. The words used by Dr. Heidenreich in her explanations cannot be used out of context to render Lindsey's claimed hearing impairment nonexistent as a matter of law. Yet the trial court essentially focused on these two words, to the exclusion of all the other evidence in the record, as providing dispositive proof that Lindsey's hearing problems were somehow a figment of her imagination. As previously discussed, Lindsey's hearing issues manifested themselves in ways that were observable by Christian and documented by medical professionals, and the record contains evidence of these medical findings. Lindsey clearly was not making unverifiable, subjective complaints of mere pain and suffering. Rather, she provided evidence that, if believed, would establish a physical basis for her complaints. See id . at 198, 795 N.W.2d 517. In sum, an injury is an "objectively manifested impairment" if it is "commonly understood as one observable or perceivable from actual symptoms or conditions." Id . at 196, 795 N.W.2d 517. In this case, Lindsey produced evidence from medical professionals and others that creates questions of fact as to the nature and extent of the impairment she alleges arose from the car accident. The fact that some subjective testing methods are incorporated into these medical findings does not negate a conclusion that her impairment is objectively manifested. Rather, the trial court erred by failing to follow the factors set forth in McCormick when deciding whether Lindsey's impairment is objectively manifested. Additionally, the trial court erred by making its own evaluations regarding the persuasiveness of the medical evidence related to Lindsey's hearing. Innovative Adult Foster Care , 285 Mich.App. at 480, 776 N.W.2d 398. Accordingly, reversal of the trial court's ruling on this issue is warranted. B. HEARING IS AN IMPORTANT BODY FUNCTION "If there is an objectively manifested impairment of body function, the next question is whether the impaired body function is 'important.' " McCormick , 487 Mich. at 198, 795 N.W.2d 517. As stated in McCormick : The relevant definition of the adjective "important" is "[m]arked by or having great value, significance, or consequence."The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982). See also Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (1998), defining "important" in relevant part as "of much or great significance or consequence," "mattering much," or "prominent or large." Whether a body function has great "value," "significance," or "consequence" will vary depending on the person. Therefore, this prong is an inherently subjective inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis, because what may seem to be a trivial body function for most people may be subjectively important to some, depending on the relationship of that function to the person's life. [ McCormick , 487 Mich. at 199, 795 N.W.2d 517.] On appeal, neither party disputes that hearing is a body function that has "great value," especially to someone who enjoys going to concerts like Lindsey did. Neither party raised an issue relative to whether hearing constitutes an important body function, nor did the trial court address this issue. We therefore turn to the third prong in the McCormick factors to determine if a question of fact exists relative to whether Lindsey's hearing loss affects her general ability to lead a normal life. C. QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER LINDSEY'S HEARING LOSS AFFECTS HER GENERAL ABILITY TO LEAD HER NORMAL LIFE As stated in McCormick , id . at 200-201, 795 N.W.2d 517, the test used to determine whether the impairment affects the person's general ability to lead their normal life is as follows: [I]f the injured person has suffered an objectively manifested impairment of body function, and that body function is important to that person, then the court must determine whether the impairment "affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life." The common meaning of this phrase is expressed by the unambiguous statutory language, and its interpretation is aided by reference to a dictionary, reading the phrase within its statutory context, and limited reference to Cassidy [v. McGovern , 415 Mich. 483; 330 N.W.2d 22 (1982).] To begin with, the verb "affect" is defined as "[t]o have an influence on; bring about a change in." The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982). An "ability" is "[t]he quality of being able to do something," id ., and "able" is defined as "having sufficient power, skill, or resources to accomplish an object," Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary , < http://www.merriam-webster.com> (accessed May 27, 2010). The adjective "general" means: 1. Relating to, concerned with, or applicable to the whole or every member of a class or category. 2. Affecting or characteristic of the majority of those involved; prevalent: a general discontent . 3. Being usually the case; true or applicable in most instances but not all. 4. a. Not limited in scope, area, or application: as a general rule . b. Not limited to one class of things: general studies . 5. Involving only the main features of something rather than details or particulars. 6. Highest or superior in rank." [The American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition (1982).] MCL 500.3135(5) defines the phrase "serious impairment of body function" as "an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead his or her normal life." The Legislature also expressly provided that whether a serious impairment of body function has occurred is a "question[ ] of law" for the court to decide unless there is a factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of injury and the dispute is relevant to deciding whether the standard is met. MCL 500.3135(2)(a). See also McCormick , 487 Mich. at 190-191, 795 N.W.2d 517. In this case, the trial court erred by deciding whether a serious impairment has occurred because a factual dispute exists regarding the nature and extent of the injury. Our Supreme Court stated in McCormick , 487 Mich. at 202, 795 N.W.2d 517, that "the plain text of the statute ... demonstrate[s] that the common understanding of to 'affect the person's ability to lead his or her normal life' is to have an influence on some of the person's capacity to live in his or her normal manner of living ... [, which] requires a subjective, person- and fact-specific inquiry that must be decided on a case-by-case basis." In order to make such a determination, we compare the plaintiff's life before and after the incident. There was record evidence to support a finding that Lindsey's symptoms of hearing loss influenced her ability to live in her normal manner of living: she had trouble communicating with her family, and her tinnitus made it difficult to drive for long periods as required by her work, to attend concerts, and to engage in the outdoor activities that she enjoyed before the accident. We also note that the record reveals Lindsey could still hear normal conversation and that some of her hearing issues, such as her complaints of muffled hearing, may have been resolved. Dr. Heidenreich testified that Lindsey reported that her tinnitus was less intrusive when she was concentrating on caring for her young baby. Additionally, although Dr. Heidenreich testified that Lindsey had hearing loss in both ears, Lindsey testified that she noticed the loss of hearing in her left ear. There was also testimony that Lindsey still participated in many of the activities that she enjoyed before the accident, even though she sometimes experienced heightened ringing in her ears afterward. In light of this record evidence, we conclude that there was conflicting evidence directly related to whether Lindsey's claimed injury qualified as a serious impairment of body function. Given this conflicting evidence, there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the nature and extent of the impairment to Lindsey's hearing that was material to the threshold injury determination. The trial court erred by ruling on this question as a matter of law and granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. McCormick , 487 Mich. at 215, 795 N.W.2d 517 ; Chouman , 293 Mich.App. at 444, 810 N.W.2d 88 ; Lysogorski , 256 Mich.App. at 299, 662 N.W.2d 108. Accordingly, reversal is warranted on this issue. D. CAUSATION Although the trial court did not rule on defendants' causation arguments, defendants argue on appeal (1) that a plaintiff must still show under McCormick that the alleged impairment was caused by the motor vehicle accident and (2) that plaintiffs failed to establish that Lindsey suffered an objectively manifested impairment related to her ears that was caused by the car accident. To the extent that defendants' argument implicates the issue of causation, we find it necessary to address this issue because of the possibility that defendants could be entitled to have the trial court's ruling affirmed on alternate grounds if defendants are correct. See Adell Broadcasting Corp. v. Apex Media Sales, Inc. , 269 Mich.App. 6, 12, 708 N.W.2d 778 (2005) (stating that a trial court's ruling granting summary disposition may be affirmed on an alternate ground that was not decided by the trial court if the issue was presented to the trial court). Proximate causation is a required element of a negligence claim. See Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., L.L.C. , 489 Mich. 157, 162, 809 N.W.2d 553 (2011). Causation is an issue that is typically reserved for the trier of fact unless there is no dispute of material fact. Holton v. A+ Ins. Assoc., Inc. , 255 Mich.App. 318, 326, 661 N.W.2d 248 (2003). "To establish proximate cause, the plaintiff must prove the existence of both cause in fact and legal cause." Weymers v. Khera , 454 Mich. 639, 647, 563 N.W.2d 647 (1997). While the term "proximate cause" is also a term of art for the concept of legal causation, Michigan courts have historically used the term proximate cause "both as a broader term referring to factual causation and legal causation together and as a narrower term referring only to legal causation." Ray v. Swager , 501 Mich. 52, 63, 903 N.W.2d 366 (2017). However, in Ray , the Michigan Supreme Court explained that "[a]ll this broader characterization recognizes ... is that a court must find that the defendant's negligence was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries before it can hold that the defendant's negligence was the proximate or legal cause of those injuries." Id . at 63-64, 903 N.W.2d 366 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Ray Court also reiterated that " '[p]roximate cause' has for a hundred years in this state, and elsewhere, been a legal term of art; one's actions cannot be a or the 'proximate cause' without being both a factual and a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries." Id . at 83, 903 N.W.2d 366. Establishing cause in fact requires the plaintiff to "present substantial evidence from which a jury may conclude that more likely than not, but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred." Weymers , 454 Mich. at 647-648, 563 N.W.2d 647 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although causation cannot be established by mere speculation, see id . at 648, 563 N.W.2d 647, a plaintiff's evidence of causation is sufficient at the summary disposition stage to create a question of fact for the jury "if it establishes a logical sequence of cause and effect, notwithstanding the existence of other plausible theories, although other plausible theories may also have evidentiary support," Wilson v. Alpena Co. Rd. Comm. , 263 Mich.App. 141, 150, 687 N.W.2d 380 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "To establish legal cause, the plaintiff must show that it was foreseeable that the defendant's conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and ... [that] the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable." Weymers , 454 Mich. at 648, 563 N.W.2d 647 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Our inquiry "normally involves examining the foreseeability of consequences, and whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for such consequences." Campbell v. Kovich , 273 Mich.App. 227, 232, 731 N.W.2d 112 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The general rule, expressed in terms of damages, and long followed in this State, is that in a tort action, the tort-feasor is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful act, whether foreseeable or not, provided the damages are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act, and are such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated." Sutter v. Biggs , 377 Mich. 80, 86, 139 N.W.2d 684 (1966). When judging the foreseeability of a risk of harm, "[i]t is not necessary that the manner in which a person might suffer injury should be foreseen or anticipated in specific detail." Clumfoot v. St. Clair Tunnel Co. , 221 Mich. 113, 117, 190 N.W. 759 (1922). In other words, "[w]here an act is negligent, to render it the proximate cause, it is not necessary that the one committing it might have foreseen the particular consequence or injury, or the particular manner in which it occurred, if by the exercise of reasonable care it might have been anticipated that some injury might occur." Baker v. Mich. Central R. Co. , 169 Mich. 609, 618-619, 135 N.W. 937 (1912) (opinion by MCALVAY, J.). Similarly, 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 435, p. 449 states: (1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. (2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm. Comment a of 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 435, pp. 449-450 further explains, in pertinent part, as follows: The fact that the actor, at the time of his negligent conduct, neither realized nor should have realized that it might cause harm to another of the particular kind or in the particular manner in which the harm has in fact occurred, is not of itself sufficient to prevent him from being liable for the other's harm if his conduct was negligent toward the other and was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Negligent conduct may result in unforeseeable harm to another, (1) because the actor neither knows nor should know of the situation upon which his negligence operates, or (2) because a second force the operation of which he had no reason to anticipate has been a contributing cause in bringing about the harm. In neither case does the unforeseeable nature of the event necessarily prevent the actor's liability. In this case, the record reflects that there was no audiogram from before the accident to show Lindsey's preaccident hearing capabilities, and Dr. Heidenreich testified that hearing loss can occur as part of the aging process. However, Lindsey testified that she began experiencing hearing problems and ringing in her ears immediately following the accident, and Lindsey further testified that she did not have these issues before the accident. Additionally, Dr. Heidenreich testified that there were studies in peer-reviewed literature showing a connection between the loud sounds of air bag deployment and hearing loss and that exposure to loud sounds could cause hearing loss and tinnitus, even if there has been no physical trauma. Dr. Heidenreich also opined that based on Lindsey's audiogram results and her history of experiencing an immediate negative change in her hearing following the accident, Lindsey's hearing loss and tinnitus were caused by her exposure to the loud sound of the air bags deploying. On the basis of this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that, more likely than not, Lindsey's hearing loss would not have occurred but for the car accident given that Lindsey did not have any problems with her hearing before the accident, she was exposed to the loud sound of the air bags deploying in the accident, and she then experienced sudden and persistent hearing loss immediately following the accident. Therefore, although it is possible that Lindsey's hearing loss was due to aging, plaintiffs presented evidence demonstrating a logical sequence of cause and effect sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding cause in fact. Weymers , 454 Mich. at 647-648, 563 N.W.2d 647 ; Wilson , 263 Mich.App. at 150, 687 N.W.2d 380. Additionally, injuries of various kinds, including injuries involving the head, are obviously a foreseeable result of negligently causing a motor vehicle accident. Although hearing damage may not be the first injury that might be expected to occur in a car accident, it is foreseeable that air bags may deploy during a crash and that a great deal of force and sound will be involved given the velocity at which air bags deploy. Therefore, negligently causing a car accident may be considered a legal cause of hearing damage from the sound of the air bags deploying, even if this particular type of injury was not actually anticipated by Turkelson in the instant case. See Sutter , 377 Mich. at 86-87, 139 N.W.2d 684 ; Baker , 169 Mich. at 618-619, 135 N.W. 937 ; Restatement, p. 449. Therefore, summary disposition also could not have been properly granted on causation grounds because there was a genuine issue of material fact on the current record regarding both the cause in fact and the legal cause of Lindsey's hearing loss. West , 469 Mich. at 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 ; Weymers , 454 Mich. at 647, 563 N.W.2d 647. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiff, having prevailed, may tax costs. MCR 7.219(A). We do not retain jurisdiction. Meter, P.J., and Boonstra, J., concurred with Borrello, J. Christian is Lindsey's husband. He was not involved in the automobile accident that is the subject of this case, and his only claim is for loss of consortium. Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company is not a party to this appeal. Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company insured the vehicle that Lindsey was driving at the time of the accident, and defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest insured Lindsey. Some alterations in original. This method of analysis purposefully differs from that employed by the trial court. The trial court seemed to quantify the impairment, calling it "mild" and "only in one ear," despite the specific instruction in McCormick , id . at 203, 795 N.W.2d 517, that: "there is no quantitative minimum as to the percentage of a person's normal manner of living that must be affected." Although the Clumfoot Court was discussing the concept of foreseeability in the context of examining the duty element of a negligence claim, id . at 116-117, 190 N.W. 759, this Court has recognized that "[t]he question of proximate cause, like duty, depends in part on foreseeability," Ross v. Glaser , 220 Mich.App. 183, 192, 559 N.W.2d 331 (1996). We note that the Restatement, while not binding, is persuasive authority. See Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. , 437 Mich. 627, 652, 473 N.W.2d 268 (1991) (opinion by RILEY, J.); id . at 662, 473 N.W.2d 268 (opinion by BOYLE, J., concurring). Although However, we have located no Michigan cases expressly adopting or rejecting this section of the Restatement, it is in accordance with the jurisprudence of this state as expressed in the rules cited from Sutter , Clumfoot , and Baker . Therefore, we find this principle expressed in the Restatement and accompanying comments to be persuasive.

Per Curiam. Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83 ; assault by strangulation, MCL 750.84(1)(b) ; and domestic violence, MCL 750.81(2). The convictions arose out of an assault against his ex-wife, KR, on March 6, 2016. He was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10. The sentencing guidelines provided a recommended minimum term of imprisonment of between 135 months and 281 months, but the trial court departed from the guidelines and imposed a sentence of 300 to 600 months' imprisonment for the assault-with-intent-to-commit-murder conviction. Defendant was also sentenced to 120 to 180 months' imprisonment for the assault-by-strangulation conviction and to 93 days' imprisonment for the domestic-violence conviction. According to KR's testimony and other evidence, defendant entered KR's bedroom while she was asleep with their youngest child asleep beside her. Defendant placed a pillow over KR's face. He then put a belt around her neck and tightened it; however, KR was able to get her hand between the belt and her neck so she could still breathe. Defendant removed the belt and put it around KR's neck a second time and tightened it, cutting off KR's ability to breathe. There was physical evidence of the strangling, including bruising on KR's neck, and broken blood vessels around her eyes. Defendant raises five claims of error in this appeal-three that challenge his convictions and two that challenge his sentences. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm. I. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE Defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior acts of domestic violence against his first wife. The trial court ruled that the evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27b and MRE 404(b). We agree with defendant that this evidence was improperly admitted, but after a review of the entire record, we are confident that this error was harmless. It is highly unlikely that the evidence affected the outcome of the trial, and its admission did not undermine the reliability of that outcome. See People v. Young , 472 Mich. 130, 141-142, 693 N.W.2d 801 (2005) ; People v. Feezel , 486 Mich. 184, 192, 783 N.W.2d 67 (2010). We will first review the question of admissibility in relation to the statute, MCL 768.27b, and then in relation to the rule, MRE 404(b). A. MCL 768.27b MCL 768.27b provides that in domestic violence cases, evidence of other acts of domestic violence is admissible, even to show propensity, so long as admission of the evidence does not violate MRE 403 and the acts took place no more than 10 years before the charged offense. The statute reads in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in subsection (4), in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any purpose for which it is relevant, if it is not otherwise excluded under Michigan rule of evidence 403. * * * (4) Evidence of an act occurring more than 10 years before the charged offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines that admitting this evidence is in the interest of justice. The prior acts testified to by defendant's first wife occurred at least 16 years before the events for which defendant was charged in this case. Per the language of the statute, those acts that occurred more than 10 years before the charged offense are inadmissible unless their admission "is in the interest of justice." The statute does not define "interest of justice." The prosecution argues that the evidence of prior acts occurring outside the 10-year period was admissible under the interest-of-justice exception because the evidence was probative of defendant's pattern of behavior and it did not violate MRE 403. The difficulty with this standard is that if we read the interest-of-justice exception to apply merely because the evidence is probative of defendant's propensities and it survives MRE 403 review, the 10-year limitation would have no meaning. All evidence admitted under MCL 768.27b, including evidence of acts falling within the 10-year window must be probative and must not violate MRE 403. Thus, to define "interest of justice" by such a standard would mean that evidence of prior acts that occurred more than 10 years before the charged offense would be admissible simply by showing that the evidence would be admissible if it had occurred within the 10-year window. This would render the 10-year limit essentially nugatory, and it is well settled that we must "avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." People v. Peltola , 489 Mich. 174, 181, 803 N.W.2d 140 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, we conclude that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whether the testimony of defendant's first wife fell within the interest-of-justice exception. To avoid rendering the 10-year limit nugatory, the exception should be narrowly construed. Accordingly, we conclude that evidence of prior acts that occurred more than 10 years before the charged offense is admissible under MCL 768.27b only if that evidence is uniquely probative if the jury is likely to be misled without admission of the evidence. In this case, the testimony of defendant's first wife concerning events that occurred at least 16 years before the charged crimes was not uniquely probative. KR's testimony laid out a detailed and compelling picture of defendant as an abusive and violent husband. She described repeated verbal abuse, multiple beatings, and a rape. The older son described threatening and violent behavior as well. The prior bad acts described by defendant's first wife were neither uniquely probative nor were they needed to ensure that the jury was not misled; instead, the acts were consistent with and cumulative to KR's testimony regarding defendant's character and propensity for violence. B. MRE 404 We next consider whether the testimony of defendant's first wife, though not admissible under MCL 768.27b, was nevertheless admissible under MRE 404. MRE 404 differs from MCL 768.27b in several ways that are relevant here. First, there is no temporal limitation in MRE 404. "The remoteness of the other act affects the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility." People v. Brown , 294 Mich. App. 377, 387, 811 N.W.2d 531 (2011). Unlike the statute, MRE 404 contains no bright-line cutoff based on when the other acts took place. Second, while the statute permits evidence to be admitted to show a defendant's propensity or character, MRE 404 does not. The text of the rule begins, "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion...." MRE 404(a). However, MRE 404(b)(1) sets forth a nonexhaustive list of several grounds, other than propensity, for which evidence of other acts may serve as proof "when the same is material." We conclude that the testimony of defendant's prior wife was not admissible under MRE 404(b) because the purpose of the evidence was to show that in this case, defendant acted in conformity with the character shown by the prior acts, i.e. that defendant was threatening, abusive, and violent. The testimony of defendant's first wife demonstrated that defendant was a dangerous man and an incorrigible spouse abuser, but her testimony did not offer probative evidence on a material issue. Putting aside the fact that identity was not at issue, there was no particular pattern or scheme described by his first wife that would have served to identify defendant except to show that abusing and attacking his wives was in the nature of defendant's character. Nor did the evidence have significant, if any, probative value as to intent. Testimony about defendant's abusive treatment of his first wife many years ago tells us little, if anything, about whether defendant had an intent to kill when he strangled KR. By contrast, there is substantial evidence of defendant's intent in KR's testimony describing the actual assault at issue, i.e. that he attempted to smother her with a pillow and twice placed a belt around her neck and tightened it so that she could not breathe. Further, the photographs of KR's bruises and discoloration around her eyes from ocular petechiae were very relevant to intent because they showed that the belt was tightened around her neck for a significant period of time. Finally, defendant's 16-year-old son testified that the day after the assault against his mother, defendant was in a state of anger and repeatedly attacked him. Compared to this sort of evidence, 16-year-old assaults against a different person are barely probative of intent, if at all. And to the degree the prior acts are at all probative, under the facts of this case, they would not survive review under MRE 403 due to the danger of unfair prejudice. C. HARMLESS ERROR As noted, the testimony of defendant's first wife did carry significant potential for unfair prejudice because the jury could conclude that even if defendant was not guilty of the instant charge, he was a bad and dangerous man who should be incarcerated. As the Supreme Court stated in People v. Denson , 500 Mich. 385, 410, 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017) : [O]ther-acts evidence carries with it a high risk of confusion and misuse. When a defendant's subjective character [is used] as proof of conduct on a particular occasion, there is a substantial danger that the jury will overestimate the probative value of the evidence. The risk is severe that the jury will use the evidence precisely for the purpose that it may not be considered, that is, as suggesting that the defendant is a bad person, a convicted criminal, and that if he did it before he probably did it again. [Quotation marks and citations omitted; second alteration in original.] [ ] Given these dangers, the Supreme Court in Denson has instructed that harmless-error analysis should be applied with care and that "the mere presence of some corroborating evidence [of guilt] does not automatically render an error harmless." Id . at 413, 902 N.W.2d 306. Rather, the Court explained that we are "to assess the effect of the error in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence." Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Having done so in this case, we conclude that the properly admitted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that exclusion of the infirm evidence could not have resulted in a different outcome. KR's testimony was compelling and wholly unshaken by cross-examination. Her injuries were documented, visible, and unquestionably caused by strangulation. They were inflicted when defendant and KR were alone except for the presence of a sleeping child, and there is evidence that the assault occurred at a time when defendant was very angry. Moreover, KR's testimony about defendant's prior bad acts over the course of 10 years, which was properly admitted under MCL 768.27b, strongly supported the notion that defendant had a strong propensity toward violence and specifically violence toward KR. Thus, exclusion of the testimony of defendant's first wife would not have spared defendant from the devastating propensity evidence that was properly admitted. Finally, defendant's claim that KR had inflicted these injuries on herself was wholly incredible and would not have been less incredible had the testimony of his first wife been excluded. II. JURY INSTRUCTION ON MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on mitigating circumstances denied him his right to a fair trial and the right to present a defense. We disagree. "A criminal defendant is entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence against him." People v. Riddle , 467 Mich. 116, 124, 649 N.W.2d 30 (2002). "The jury instructions must include all elements of the crime charged, and must not exclude from jury consideration material issues, defenses or theories if there is evidence to support them." People v. Armstrong , 305 Mich. App. 230, 240, 851 N.W.2d 856 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, MCR 2.512(D)(2) requires that the jury be instructed using the Michigan Model Criminal Jury Instructions if "(a) they are applicable, (b) they accurately state the applicable law, and (c) they are requested by a party." Defendant argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the existence of mitigating factors pursuant to M. Crim. J.I. 17.4. Defendant testified that he was suicidal, if not psychotic, on the night of the assault, that he was highly emotional, and that he was under the influence of nonprescribed medication. Accordingly, he argues that had the court given the requested instruction, the jury would have concluded that he was acting out of passion. The trial court properly declined to give the mitigating-circumstances instruction because defendant did not offer evidence that his "emotional excitement" was "caused by something that would cause an ordinary person to act rashly" and because, as the trial court pointed out, this assault "happened over the course of time" not in a sudden impulsive act. Indeed, the testimony showed that defendant was calm when he went into the bedroom. In sum, there was no evidence that defendant acted in the heat of passion, which was caused by something that would create such a state in an ordinary person. See People v. Pouncey , 437 Mich. 382, 389, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991). Accordingly, there was no error. Related to his argument of instructional error, defendant claims that the lack of a mitigation instruction denied him his right to present a defense. We disagree. First, defendant testified that he never assaulted the victim. He acknowledged that he put the belt over the victim's head, but he contended that he never tightened it around her neck. He did not testify that he assaulted the victim because of the stress of the events leading up to the incident. As a result, he has failed to show how the trial court's refusal to include the mitigating-circumstances instruction denied him his constitutional right to present a defense. III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL Defendant also argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that "(1) the performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) a reasonable probability exists that, in the absence of counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." People v. Sabin (On Second Remand) , 242 Mich. App. 656, 659, 620 N.W.2d 19 (2000). "A defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the assistance of his counsel was sound trial strategy, and he must show that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id . Defendant claims that counsel was ineffective when he asked for a police officer's opinion, during cross-examination, on whether defendant had an intent to murder the victim. Defendant's assertion is based on the following exchange between defense counsel and the police officer involved in the investigation of the case: Q . Okay. And on the night in question, between him and [KR], you don't know what his intent is that night, correct? A . I absolutely believe that his intent was to- Q . I didn't ask what you believe. I asked what you know. A . I-based on the evidence and the total-totality of the circumstances, it would show that his intent was to murder [KR] that night. Q . All right. Thank you. Defendant's claim that defense counsel asked for the police officer's opinion is not supported by the record. In fact, defense counsel specifically stated, "I didn't ask you what you believe. I asked what you know." In context, the question was to show that the officer did not have any knowledge of defendant's intent during the assault, which was a legitimate strategy based on the charges and the testimony. People v. Horn , 279 Mich. App. 31, 39, 755 N.W.2d 212 (2008) (holding that "[d]ecisions regarding what evidence to present, whether to call witnesses, and how to question witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy"). This Court "will not second-guess counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor [will it] assess counsel's competence with the benefit of hindsight." Id . Defendant has not shown that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. IV. SENTENCING Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court's improper scoring of Offense Variables (OVs) 3, 4, and 7 altered the advisory sentencing range. We disagree. First, defendant argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 7 at 50 points. MCL 777.37 provides in pertinent part: (1) Offense variable 7 is aggravated physical abuse. Score offense variable 7 by determining which of the following apply and by assigning the number of points attributable to the 1 that has the highest number of points: (a) A victim was treated with sadism, torture, excessive brutality, or similarly egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense ... 50 points (b) No victim was treated with sadism, torture, or excessive brutality, or similarly egregious conduct designed to substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffered during the offense ... 0 points "OV 7 is designed to respond to particularly heinous instances in which the criminal acted to increase [a victim's] fear by a substantial or considerable amount." People v. Glenn , 295 Mich. App. 529, 536, 814 N.W.2d 686 (2012), rev'd on other grounds by People v. Hardy , 494 Mich. 430, 434, 835 N.W.2d 340 (2013). For purposes of OV 7, "excessive brutality means savagery or cruelty beyond even the 'usual' brutality of a crime." Glenn , 295 Mich. App. at 533, 814 N.W.2d 686. Although "all crimes against a person involve the infliction of a certain amount of fear and anxiety," the trial court "may consider conduct inherent in a crime" when scoring OV 7. Hardy , 494 Mich. at 441-442, 835 N.W.2d 340 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "[A] defendant's conduct does not have to be similarly egregious to sadism, torture, or excessive brutality for OV 7 to be scored at 50 points, and ... absent an express statutory prohibition, courts may consider circumstances inherently present in the crime when scoring OV 7." Hardy , 494 Mich. at 443, 835 N.W.2d 340 (quotation marks omitted). Rather, "[t]he relevant inquiries are (1) whether the defendant engaged in conduct beyond the minimum required to commit the offense; and, if so, (2) whether the conduct was intended to make a victim's fear or anxiety greater by a considerable amount." Id . at 443-444, 835 N.W.2d 340. The record supports the trial court's determination that OV 7 should be assigned 50 points. Defendant attempted to strangle or suffocate KR three times over the course of the assault. Further, at the outset of the assault, KR's five-year-old child was asleep next to her. When the child awoke in the middle of the assault, defendant told the child to say goodbye to her mother and that her grandmother would take good care of her. Finally, it appears that defendant intended to rape KR while he was strangling her. Based on this evidence, the trial court properly found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant's conduct was excessively brutal, that it went beyond what was required to complete an assault with the intent to kill KR, and that it was designed to substantially increase KR's fear and anxiety. Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly scored OV 4 at 10 points. "Offense Variable 4 concerns psychological injury to a victim and directs a sentencing court to assess 10 points if '[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim[.]' " People v. McChester , 310 Mich. App. 354, 356, 873 N.W.2d 646 (2015), quoting MCL 777.34(1)(a) (alterations in original). MCL 777.34(2) requires a court to "[s]core 10 points if the serious psychological injury may require professional treatment" but states that "[i]n making this determination, the fact that treatment has not been sought is not conclusive." Here, KR testified in detail about the terror she experienced during the lengthy assault and her fear for the fate of her children, which defendant exploited to increase her suffering. KR testified that she did not call anyone for help that night because she was too afraid to do so. A social worker and police officer both testified that KR appeared too frightened to speak to them when they visited the family home. A second police officer interviewed KR at the police station and testified that KR looked directly at the ground and would not make eye contact. Further, during defendant's sentencing, KR stated that she was in counseling and was working through the situation together with her children. Defendant's Presentence Investigation Report also stated that KR reported that she and her children were in counseling. Because the evidence showed that KR experienced a terrifying ordeal, and actually sought professional counseling after the assault, defendant's claim of error regarding OV 4 fails. Defendant also argues that the trial court improperly scored OV 3 at 25 points. "Offense variable 3 is physical injury to a victim." MCL 777.33(1). OV 3 should be scored at 25 points when "[l]ife threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim." MCL 777.33(1)(c). OV 3 should be scored at 10 points when "[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim." MCL 777.33(1)(d). OV 3 should be scored at 5 points when "[b]odily injury not requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim." MCL 777.33(1)(e). At the sentencing hearing, defendant objected to the scoring of OV 3, arguing that KR only suffered bruising to her neck and that there was no testimony that the injuries that KR suffered were life-threatening. The defense also pointed out that KR did not seek any medical treatment that night or in the following days and that she was able to go to work the next day and was not incapacitated. Therefore, defendant contended that OV 3 should be scored at 5 points, rather than 25. The trial court disagreed, stating that KR's injuries and the cause of those injuries were life-threatening because strangulation can cause death. The trial court was correct that the assault could have ended in KR's death had defendant been able to complete his intended murderous assault. However, OV 3 does not assess whether a defendant's actions were life-threatening; rather, OV 3 assesses whether a victim's injuries were life-threatening. See Peltola , 489 Mich. at 181, 803 N.W.2d 140 (holding that the words in a statute are interpreted "in light of their ordinary meaning and their context within the statute ...."). The issue may be more easily considered in the context of a shooting for which a defendant is charged with assault with intent to murder. If the gunshot resulted in the victim's nearly bleeding to death, the victim suffered a life-threatening injury, and OV 3 should be scored accordingly. Conversely, if the defendant was a poor shot and the victim received only a minor wound that did not place his or her life in danger or permanently incapacitate him or her, OV 3 should not be scored at 25 points. Applying that standard to this case, we conclude that OV 3 was properly scored. The evidence demonstrated that the strangulation continued until KR was near death. She had petechiae around her eyes, a phenomenon that results from an extended period of strangulation and is the result of increasing venous pressure in the head and anoxic injury to the vessels. In addition, KR suffered extensive external and internal bruising to her throat demonstrating an extended period during which her airway was shut down, depriving her brain of oxygen. Finally, the severity of the injury caused KR to lose control of her bowels. This is not to say that the act of strangulation is always enough to score OV 3 at 25 points. However, when the evidence shows that the strangulation was severe enough and continued long enough such that the victim lost consciousness or control over bodily functions-albeit temporarily-it demonstrates that the anoxic injury was severe enough to be life-threatening. Finally, defendant claims that his minimum sentence of 300 months (25 years) was an unreasonable and disproportionate upward departure from his recommended guidelines range. We disagree. "[A] departure sentence may be imposed when the trial court determines that 'the recommended range under the guidelines is disproportionate, in either direction to the seriousness of the crime.' " People v. Steanhouse (On Remand) , 322 Mich. App. 233, 238, 911 N.W.2d 253, 257-58, 2017 WL 6028509 (2017) (citation omitted). "An appellate court must evaluate whether reasons exist to depart from the sentencing guidelines and whether the extent of the departure can satisfy the principle of proportionality." Id. at 239. "The first inquiry in our reasonableness review is whether there were 'circumstances that are not adequately embodied within the variables used to score the guidelines.' " Id. , quoting People v. Milbourn , 435 Mich. 630, 659-660, 461 N.W.2d 1 (1990). Defendant's sentencing guidelines score resulted in a recommended minimum sentence range of 135 to 281 months of imprisonment for his assault with intent to commit murder conviction. However, the trial court sentenced defendant, as a second-offense habitual offender, to 300 to 600 months' imprisonment, a departure of 19 months over the maximum minimum sentence. In support of the upward departure, the trial court cited defendant's history of abusing KR throughout the marriage, which ultimately culminated in the charged offenses that occurred while KR's young child was in the bed next to her. Further, the trial court noted that defendant intended to rape the victim while he was strangling her and that there were three incidents of attempted strangulation during the assault. Finally, the trial court stated that given defendant's lengthy history of domestic violence, it believed that defendant was dangerous, that his abusive conduct was likely to continue, and that he was not a good candidate for rehabilitation. Considering the record and the trial court's statements in support of the sentence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the guidelines when sentencing defendant. Defendant's long history of abusing KR, the presence of a child during the assault, and the damage done to a family of four children were not fully accounted for by the guidelines. We also conclude that the extent of the departure was not disproportionate. The departure was 19 months from a guidelines maximum of 281 months, a proportional increase given the nonguidelines considerations and which, in percentage terms, was an increase of approximately 7%. As a result, the sentencing departure was "proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender." Milbourn , 435 Mich. at 636, 461 N.W.2d 1. Affirmed. MARKEY, P.J., and SHAPIRO and GADOLA, JJ., concurred. At the time of the assault in this case, defendant and KR were divorced but still living together. Defendant also argued before the trial court that KR should not be allowed to testify about defendant's prior bad acts against her; however, he does not raise this on appeal. "The decision whether to admit evidence is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." People v. McDaniel , 469 Mich. 409, 412, 670 N.W.2d 659 (2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when it "chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v. Douglas , 496 Mich. 557, 565, 852 N.W.2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, when "the decision involves a preliminary question of law, [such as] whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility, the question is reviewed de novo." McDaniel , 469 Mich. at 412, 670 N.W.2d 659. Testimony at trial established that petechiae are "little red dots" on the face that represent broken capillaries and blood vessels that hemorrhaged as a result of oxygen and blood flow to the head being cut off. See also, People v. Allen , 429 Mich. 558, 569, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988), in which the Supreme Court described three ways in which the prior-acts evidence may prove prejudicial: First,... jurors may determine that although defendant's guilt in the case before them is in doubt, he is a bad man and should therefore be punished. Second, the character evidence may lead the jury to lower the burden of proof against the defendant, since, even if the guilty verdict is incorrect, no "innocent" man will be forced to endure punishment. Third, the jury may determine that on the basis of his prior actions, the defendant has a propensity to commit crimes, and therefore he probably is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. "This Court reviews de novo claims of instructional error." People v. Martin , 271 Mich. App. 280, 337, 721 N.W.2d 815 (2006). In reviewing instructional-error claims, "this Court examines the instructions as a whole, and even if there are some imperfections, there is no basis for reversal if the instructions adequately protected the defendant's rights by fairly presenting to the jury the issues to be tried."Id . at 337-338, 721 N.W.2d 815 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, we review de novo whether defendant suffered a deprivation of his constitutional right to present a defense. People v. Steele , 283 Mich. App. 472, 480, 769 N.W.2d 256 (2009). Because defendant failed to argue in the trial court that he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense, our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People v. Carines , 460 Mich. 750, 764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). Plain error requires that: "1) [an] error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights." Id . at 763, 597 N.W.2d 130. "The third requirement generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings." Id . M. Crim. J.I. 17.4 provides: (1) The defendant can only be guilty of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder if [he/she] would have been guilty of murder had the person [he/she] assaulted actually died. If the assault took place under circumstances that would have reduced the charge to manslaughter if the person had died, the defendant is not guilty of assault with intent to commit murder. (2) Voluntary manslaughter is different from murder in that for manslaughter, the following things must be true: (3) First, when the defendant acted, [his/her] thinking must have been disturbed by emotional excitement to the point that an ordinary person might have acted on impulse, without thinking twice, from passion instead of judgment. This emotional excitement must have been caused by something that would cause an ordinary person to act rashly or on impulse. The law does not say what things are enough to do this. That is for you to decide. ... (4) Second, the killing itself must have resulted from this emotional excitement. The defendant must have acted before a reasonable time had passed to calm down and before reason took over again. The law does not say how much time is needed. That is for you to decide. The test is whether a reasonable time passed under the circumstances of this case. (5) If you find that the crime would have been manslaughter had the person died, then you must find the defendant not guilty of assault with intent to murder.... [Bracketed material in original.] "Whether a person has been denied effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law." People v. LeBlanc , 465 Mich. 575, 579, 640 N.W.2d 246 (2002). The trial court's "factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo." People v. Matuszak , 263 Mich. App. 42, 48, 687 N.W.2d 342 (2004). However, because defendant failed to move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court's review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v. Sabin (On Second Remand) , 242 Mich. App. 656, 659, 620 N.W.2d 19 (2000). "Issues involving the proper interpretation and application of the legislative sentencing guidelines ... are legal questions that this Court reviews de novo." People v. Ambrose , 317 Mich. App. 556, 560, 895 N.W.2d 198 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court's "factual determinations are reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. "We review a trial court's upward departure from a defendant's calculated guidelines range for reasonableness." People v. Walden , 319 Mich. App. 344, 351, 901 N.W.2d 142 (2017). "[T]he reasonableness of a sentence [is reviewed] for an abuse of the trial court's discretion." Id .

Per Curiam. In these consolidated appeals, appellants the Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE) (Docket No. 330675), Residential Customer Group (RCG) and Michelle Rison (Docket No. 330745), and the Attorney General (Docket No. 330797) appeals a November 19, 2015 order of the Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) approving a return on equity of 10.3% for appellee Consumers Energy Company and authorizing Consumers to continue its smart-meter program. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm. I. FACTS On December 5, 2014, Consumers filed an application to increase its rates for the sale of electricity. Consumers used a projected test year ending May 31, 2016, and stated that without rate relief it would experience an annual revenue deficiency of approximately $166 million. Consumers stated that its need for additional revenue was based on the following factors: (1) the purchase of a 450-megawatt natural gas plant to partially offset the projected capacity shortfall resulting from the retirement of seven coal plants in April 2016, (2) continuing investments in electric generation and distribution assets to comply with legal and environmental requirements, (3) continuing investments in electric generation and distribution assets to provide safe and reliable service, (4) ongoing investments in technology improvements, and (5) increased operating and maintenance expenses to improve reliability of service. Consumers sought approximately $166 million in rate increases and the authorization to produce a return on common equity (ROE) of 10.7%. On June 4, 2015, Consumers self-implemented a rate increase of $110 million above its current rates. Consumers also eliminated a customer credit. The rate increase and the elimination of the credit raised Consumers' retail rates by $166 million. The administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposal for decision (PFD) recommending that Consumers' overall rate of return be set at 6.09%, including an ROE of 10.00%. The ALJ noted that Consumers had requested a rate increase for various purposes, including continuing technology investments in its Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) system, and concluded that recovery of the costs of the projected test year AMI investment should be allowed. On November 19, 2015, the PSC, in a 2-1 decision, issued an order authorizing Consumers to raise its rates. The PSC rejected requests by the Attorney General and RCG to terminate the AMI program, reasoning as follows: The Commission adopts the findings and recommendations of the ALJ. As the ALJ relates, the Commission has thoroughly vetted the underlying cost/benefit analyses and the AMI program itself and will not revisit those issues. See , November 2, 2009 and October 7, 2014 orders in Case No. U-15645; November 4, 2010 order in Case No. U-16191; June 7, 2012 order in Case No. U-16794; and June 28, 2013 order in Case No. U-17087. The AMI program is correctly characterized as a grid modernization program that cannot be replaced by renewable energy or energy efficiency measures. The Commission finds that no party provided evidence showing that conditions have changed such that the current rate base and depreciation treatment of these expenses should be changed. Consumers shall continue to provide cost/benefit analyses as long as the program is still in the implementation phase. The Commission approves Consumers' proposed test year expenditure, minus the contingency expenditure identified by the Staff. The PSC reviewed the evidence and the parties' recommendations regarding Consumers' request for an ROE of 10.7%, noting that Consumers took the position that if the PSC did not approve an ROE of 10.7%, it should not set the rate lower than the current 10.3%. The PSC concluded: The Commission agrees with the utility and finds that the current 10.3% ROE should be continued. While the ALJ provided an excellent analysis of this issue, the Commission finds that the current ROE will best achieve the goals of providing appropriate compensation for risk, ensuring the financial soundness of the business, and maintaining a strong ability to attract capital. Consumers has planned an ambitious capital investment program, much of which is related to environmental and generation expenditures that are unavoidable and are saddled with time requirements. The Commission observes that 10.3% is at the upper point of the Staff's recommended ROE range, and Consumers showed, using the Staff's exhibit, that the average ROE resulting from recently decided cases in Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin was 10.26%. The Commission acknowledges that ROEs, nationally, have shown a steady decline (as they have in Michigan), and agrees with the Attorney General that Michigan's economy has stabilized; but finds that, under present circumstances, it is reasonable to assume that investor expectations may be rising. Consumers' recently-improved credit ratings will help the utility secure the financing required to carry out its goals. Thus, the Commission favors adopting an ROE of 10.30%. The dissenting Commissioner concluded that approving an ROE of 10% was more reasonable given the record. ABATE, RCG and Rison, and the Attorney General appealed the PSC's order. This Court consolidated the appeals for purposes of hearing and decision. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW In In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. to Increase Electric Rates (On Remand) , 316 Mich.App. 231, 236; 891 N.W.2d 871 (2016), we explained that The standard of review for PSC orders is narrow and well defined. Pursuant to MCL 462.25, all rates, fares, charges, classification and joint rates, regulations, practices, and services prescribed by the PSC are presumed, prima facie, to be lawful and reasonable. Mich. Consol. Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 389 Mich. 624, 635-636, 209 N.W.2d 210 (1973). A party aggrieved by an order of the PSC has the burden of proving by clear and satisfactory evidence that the order is unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.26(8). To establish that a PSC order is unlawful, the appellant must show that the PSC failed to follow a mandatory statute or abused its discretion in the exercise of its judgment. In re MCI Telecom. Complaint , 460 Mich. 396, 427, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). An order is unreasonable if it is not supported by the evidence. Associated Truck Lines, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 377 Mich. 259, 279, 140 N.W.2d 515 (1966) [O'HARA, J., dissenting]. A final order of the PSC must be authorized by law and be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28 ; Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 165 Mich.App. 230, 235, 418 N.W.2d 660 (1987). We give due deference to the PSC's administrative expertise and will not substitute our judgment for that of the PSC. Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. No. 2 , 237 Mich.App. 82, 88, 602 N.W.2d 225 (1999). We give respectful consideration to the PSC's construction of a statute that the PSC is empowered to execute, and this Court will not overrule that construction absent cogent reasons. In re Complaint of Rovas against SBC Mich. , 482 Mich. 90, 103, 108; 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008). If the language of a statute is vague or obscure, the PSC's construction serves as an aid in determining the legislative intent and will be given weight if it does not conflict with the language of the statute or the purpose of the Legislature. Id . at 103-104. However, the construction given to a statute by the PSC is not binding on us. Id . at 103. Whether the PSC exceeded the scope of its authority is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. In re Complaint of Pelland Against Ameritech Mich. , 254 Mich.App. 675, 682, 658 N.W.2d 849 (2003). III. ANALYSIS Appellants ABATE and the Attorney General argue that the PSC erred by approving an ROE of 10.3% for Consumers. They assert that the 10.3% ROE approved by the PSC does not have support in the record, that non of the parties advocated for that particular ROE, that the PSC's choice appears to have been a compromise among the ROEs recommended by the parties, and that the PSC provided no rationale for choosing the ROE that it did. We hold that the PSC's order approving an ROE of 10.3% was lawful and reasonable and that the PSC's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The establishment of a reasonable utility rate is not subject to precise computation. What is reasonable "depends upon a comprehensive examination of all factors involved, having in mind the objective sought to be attained in its use." Meridian Twp. v. East Lansing , 342 Mich. 734, 749, 71 N.W.2d 234 (1955). See also id . at 753, 71 N.W.2d 234 (holding that the township failed to meet its burden of showing that the rate charged for water was unreasonable). As long as the PSC chooses a rate that is neither "so low as to be confiscatory nor so high as to be oppressive," the PSC has discretion to set the rate at the level it chooses. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 332 Mich. 7, 26, 50 N.W.2d 826 (1952) (citation omitted). See also id . at 42-43 (holding that the PSC's establishment of reduced telephone rates neither confiscatory nor oppressive). Testimony from witnesses for Consumers and the PSC staff supports the approval of an ROE of 10.3%. Consumers' witness Venkat Dhenuvakonda Rao recommended an ROE range of 10.50% to 10.90% after adjusting for economic conditions; however, his quantitative models produced a range from 8.94% to 10.69 %. PSC staff witness Kirk D. Megginson testified that an ROE in the range of 8.3% to 10.3% would be reasonable. Megginson recommended the adoption of an ROE of 10.0%, but he did not suggest that the adoption of a different rate would be unreasonable. The PSC was entitled to rely on the evidence from these experts, even if other witnesses presented contradictory testimony. In re Application of Consumers Energy to Increase Electric Rates (On Remand) , 316 Mich.App. at 240, 891 N.W.2d 871, citing Great Lakes Steel Div. of Nat'l. Steel Corp. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 130 Mich.App. 470, 481, 344 N.W.2d 321 (1983). Furthermore, the fact that one Commissioner dissented and would have established Consumers' ROE at 10% does not mandate a conclusion that the PSC's decision was unreasonable. See ABATE v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 208 Mich.App. 248, 265, 527 N.W.2d 533 (1994) (explaining that one commissioner's disagreement with the PSC's findings does not require this Court to conclude that the PSC's decision was not supported by the requisite evidence). The PSC noted that the rate of 10.3% was within the PSC staff's recommended range and that it was consistent with ROEs approved in other Midwestern states. The PSC acknowledged that ROEs were trending downward nationally, but it noted that Consumers' credit rating had improved and reasoned that lowering the company's ROE would impede the company's ability to secure financing for future investments. The PSC is required to "consider and give due weight to all lawful elements necessary" to determine an appropriate rate. MCL 460.557(2). In determining rates, the "PSC is not bound by any single formula or method and may make pragmatic adjustments when warranted by the circumstances." Detroit Ed. Co. v.Pub. Serv. Comm. , 221 Mich.App. 370, 375, 562 N.W.2d 224 (1997). The PSC examined the evidence and determined that an ROE of 10.3% was appropriate. The PSC acted consistently with its statutory authority, MCL 460.557(2), and acted within its discretion to determine an appropriate ROE, Detroit Ed. Co. , 221 Mich.App. at 375, 562 N.W.2d 224. Neither ABATE nor the Attorney General has shown that the PSC's order was unlawful or unreasonable. MCL 462.28(8). Next, appellants RCG and Rison argue that the PSC lacked the authority, absent specific statutory guidance, to mandate the installation of smart meters in customers' homes by approving Consumers' smart-meter program and its attendant tariffs on an "opt-out" basis. RCG and Rison specifically argue that in prior uncontested cases, the PSC foreclosed the presentation of evidence concerning health questions and privacy matters related to smart meters and that this defective process prevented the introduction of evidence regarding an alternative "opt-in" approach that would have respected customer choices and concerns. We hold that the PSC did not lack the authority to approve implementation of the smart-meter program and the attendant fees on customers. The PSC has only the authority granted to it by statute. The PSC has broad authority to regulate rates for public utilities, but that authority does not include the power to make management decisions for utilities. Consumers Power Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 460 Mich. 148, 158, 596 N.W.2d 126 (1999) (holding that the PSC lacked the authority to order local utilities to transmit "electricity from a third-party provider's system to an end-user who is not connected to that system"); Union Carbide Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 431 Mich. 135, 148-150, 428 N.W.2d 322 (1988) (holding that the PSC lacked the authority to make management decisions for the utility regarding the operation of its facilities). RCG and Rison correctly point out that the PSC has no statutory authority to enable Consumers to require all its customers to participate in the AMI program and accept a smart meter or to pay fees if they choose to opt out of the AMI program. However, no such statute exists because the decision regarding the type of equipment to deploy as an upgrade to infrastructure can only be described as a management prerogative. Consumers applied for approval of its AMI program; but that fact does not mandate a conclusion that Consumers' decision regarding the type of meters to use is not a management decision. RCG and Rison's suggestion that the PSC could order Consumers to develop an opt-in program is clearly the type of action found invalid in Union Carbide , 431 Mich. at 148-150, 428 N.W.2d 322. RCG and Rison's reliance on Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 269 Mich.App. 473, 713 N.W.2d 290 (2006), is misplaced. In that case, this Court held that the PSC lacked the statutory authority to authorize Consumers to impose an extra charge on all customers-including those who had not agreed to pay premium rates to receive green power-to finance renewable-energy programs. Id. at 481-482, 713 N.W.2d 290. In the instant case, Consumers proposed opt-out fees, calculated on the basis of cost-of-service principles, that would be imposed only on those customers who chose not to participate in the AMI program. The fees were designed to cover the additional costs of providing service to those customers. Accordingly, approval of the opt-out fees was a proper exercise of the PSC's ratemaking authority. MCL 460.6a(1) ; Detroit Edison , 221 Mich.App. at 385, 562 N.W.2d 224. Next, RCG and Rison argue that the PSC's disregard of Consumers' customers' concerns about privacy, data collection, and the transmittal of data violates due-process and Fourth Amendment principles. We hold that the installation of a smart meter on a customer's home does not violate the customer's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because Consumers is not a state actor. We review de novo a question of constitutional law, including whether an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches has been violated. Detroit Edison Co. v. Stenman , 311 Mich.App. 367, 387, 875 N.W.2d 767 (2015). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The Fourth Amendment applies only to governmental actions, and it is not applicable to a search performed by a private actor who is not acting as an agent of the government. People v. McKendrick , 188 Mich.App. 128, 141, 468 N.W.2d 903 (1991). Appellants have not established that the installation of either a transmitting or a nontransmitting AMI meter constitutes a search or, even if it did, that Consumers was acting as an agent of the government. The argument that the installation of a smart meter constituted state action and violated a customer's Fourth Amendment protections was raised and rejected in Stenman , 311 Mich.App. 367, 875 N.W.2d 767. In that case, Detroit Edison filed suit in circuit court against the defendants who had removed a smart meter installed on their property. Id . at 370-371, 875 N.W.2d 767. The defendants filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the smart meter was a surveillance device, the installation of which violated the Fourth Amendment. Id . at 372, 875 N.W.2d 767. The trial court granted partial summary disposition in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 373-374, 875 N.W.2d 767. On appeal, the defendants argued that the installation of a smart meter on their home constituted a warrantless search and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. This Court disagreed, stating: The United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee every person's right to be free from unreasonable searches. U.S. Const., Am. IV ; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 11. However, in order for Fourth Amendment protections to apply, the government must perform a search. Lavigne v. Forshee , 307 Mich.App. 530, 537, 861 N.W.2d 635 (2014) ; see also People v. Taylor , 253 Mich.App. 399, 404, 655 N.W.2d 291 (2002), citing Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). "[T]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only government action and is not applicable to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, conducted by a private person not acting as an agent of the government or with the participation or knowledge of any government official." People v. McKendrick , 188 Mich.App. 128, 141, 468 N.W.2d 903 (1991) ; see also id. at 142-143 [468 N.W.2d 903] (identifying two factors that must be shown in order to conclude that a search is proscribed by the Fourth Amendment). First, defendants have not shown, or even argued, that an illegal search has already been performed through the smart meter that was installed on their property. Instead, their arguments in the lower court and on appeal focus on the potential for smart meters to collect information from the homes of Americans in the future. Further, defendants have failed to establish that plaintiff's installation of smart meters constitutes governmental action for Fourth Amendment purposes. Even if the state and federal governments have advocated or incentivized, as a matter of public policy, the use of smart meters, there is no indication that the government controls the operations of plaintiff, an investor-owned electric utility, or that plaintiff acts as an agent of the state or federal governments. Accordingly, we reject defendants' claim that plaintiff's installation of a smart meter violated their Fourth Amendment rights. [ Stenman , 311 Mich.App. at 387-388, 875 N.W.2d 767 (alteration in original).] RCG and Rison have made no attempt to distinguish Stenman ; in fact, RCG and Rison make no reference to the case. This Court's decision in Stenman controls on this issue, MCR 7.215(C)(2), and mandates rejection of RCG and Rison's argument. Finally, RCG and Rison argue that the PSC's order unlawfully and unreasonably continues surcharges on customers who opt out of the AMI program. Ratemaking is a legislative, rather than a judicial, function. For that reason, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in a strict sense. Nevertheless, factual "issues fully decided in earlier PSC proceedings need not be 'completely relitigated' in later proceedings unless the party wishing to do so establishes by new evidence or a showing of changed circumstances that the earlier result is unreasonable." In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. for Rate Increase , 291 Mich.App. 106, 122, 804 N.W.2d 574 (2010), quoting Pennwalt Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , 166 Mich.App. 1, 9, 420 N.W.2d 156 (1988). RCG and Rison contend that surcharges, including a one-time charge paid by a customer who declines to have a smart meter installed or who requests that a smart meter be removed, as well as a monthly surcharge, are not supported by the requisite evidence and should have been eliminated by the PSC. This issue was recently decided by the PSC in another case on remand from this Court. In In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. , order of the Public Service Commission, entered July 12, 2017 (Case No. U-17087), another matter involving Consumers Energy Company, the PSC entered an order on June 28, 2013, approving opt-out fees for customers who requested a non-transmitting meter. The Attorney General and individual appellant Rison, among others, appealed the PSC's order and challenged the imposition and the amount of the opt-out fees. In Attorney General v. Pub. Serv. Comm. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 30, 2015, 2015 WL 1963051 (Docket Nos. 317434 and 317456), this Court, in Docket No. 317456, remanded the matter to the PSC to conduct a contested-case hearing to examine the opt-out tariff. In an order entered March 29, 2016, in Case No. U-17087, the PSC indicated that on remand it would address the purpose of the opt-out fees, whether the fees constituted reimbursement for the cost of services related to nontransmitting meters, and whether any of the costs were already accounted for in Consumers' base rates. On January 19, 2017, the ALJ issued a PFD, finding that the opt-out fees represented reimbursement for the costs of service and that no expenses related to Consumers' opt-out program were accounted for in Consumers' base rates. The ALJ recommended that the PSC reaffirm its June 28, 2013 decision. On July 12, 2017, the PSC issued an order on remand in Case No. U-17087, adopting the findings and recommendations in the PFD. The PSC found that the opt-out tariffs were cost-based and that Consumers provided an explanation of the cost-of-service principles used to determine those tariffs. Specifically, the PSC stated that [o]pt-out fees represent incremental costs that are incurred solely in order to be able to offer the opt-out program; opt-out customers are protected by the credits from the costs of AMI, and customers who use standard equipment are protected from subsidizing customers who choose non-standard equipment. The amounts collected from opt-out customers are credited to base rate calculations to ensure that there is no double recovery. The Court of Appeals has found that smart meters are standard utility equipment, and that the choice of metering technology is a utility management prerogative. The opt-out tariff collects costs associated with the development and operation of a non-standard metering option. The Commission has previously rejected the RCG's argument regarding the use of self-reads as an alternative to the opt-out program. The Commission has made it a priority to limit estimated and customer self-reading of meters in order to increase the accuracy of meter reading and billing. Commission rules require utilities to read a certain percentage of electric meters. [In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. to Increase Rates , order of the Public Service Commission, entered July 12, 2017 (Case No. U-17087), p 12 (citations omitted).] The PSC ultimately affirmed the opt-out tariffs and credits related to the tariffs originally approved in the June 28, 2013 order in Case No. U-17087. Id . at 16. In the instant case, RCG and Rison are requesting that this Court examine the opt-out fees in a manner similar to that undertaken by the PSC in Case No. U-17087. We decline to do so and defer to the decision on remand issued by the PSC in Case No. U-17087. That decision is based on previous decisions of the PSC and this Court. Appellants seek to reargue the matter yet again but have put forth nothing that would require this Court to conclude that the previous decision as reflected most recently in the order in Case No. U-17087 is unreasonable and should not be followed. See In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. , 291 Mich.App. at 122, 804 N.W.2d 574. Affirmed. Markey, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and Boonstra, JJ., concurred. If the PSC does not issue an order within 180 days after the filing of an application for a rate increase, a utility may self-implement a rate increase up to the amount requested. If the utility does so and the PSC issues an order approving a rate increase lower than that requested, the utility must refund the excess amount collected to its customers. MCL 460.6a(2). An AMI meter measures and records real-time data on power consumption and reports that consumption to the utility on a regular basis. An AMI meter is also known as a "smart meter." See In re Application of Detroit Edison Co. , 296 Mich.App. 101, 114, 817 N.W.2d 630 (2012). The PSC has issued a series of orders approving Consumers' pilot AMI program, In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. , order of the Public Service Commission, entered November 4, 2010 (Case No. U-16191); authorizing Consumers to proceed with Phase 2 of its AMI deployment program In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. , order of the Public Service Commission, entered June 7, 2012 (Case No. U-16794); and granting rate relief for and authorizing continuation of the program, In re Application of Consumers Energy Co. , order of the Public Service Commission, entered July 12, 2017 (Case No. U-17087). In In re Application of Consumers Energy to Increase Electric Rates , 498 Mich. 967, 873 N.W.2d 108 (2016), our Supreme Court reversed the portion of this Court's decision that addressed the Attorney General's claim of appeal in Docket No. 317434 and remanded the case for consideration of the merits of that appeal. This Court thereafter issued a published decision in Docket No. 317434. In re Application of Consumers Energy to Increase Electric Rates (On Remand) , 316 Mich.App. 231, 891 N.W.2d 871 (2016). However, this Court's initial decision in Docket No. 317456 was not affected by the Supreme Court's remand order or this Court's decision on remand. See id . at 234 n. 1, 891 N.W.2d 871.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiffs-appellees to adjourn the case from the October 2018 session of the Court is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to schedule the case for oral argument at a future session of the Court. On further order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Harper Woods Retirees Association, Inc., and the Michigan Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, Inc., to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on August 14, 2018, is accepted for filing.

Rehearing No. 620 On order of the Court, the motion for rehearing of the Court's June 20, 2018 opinion is considered, and it is DENIED.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys to file a reply to the defendant-appellee's response to its brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The reply submitted on August 15, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Court, the motion for rehearing of the Court's June 21, 2018 opinion is considered, and it is DENIED. The motion to strike the motion for rehearing is DENIED as moot.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief will be accepted for filing if submitted on or before September 21, 2018.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The petition for interim suspension is considered, and it is GRANTED. The Honorable Theresa M. Brennan, Judge of the 53rd District Court, is suspended with pay until further order of this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motions for the temporary admission of out-of-state attorneys Susan D. Solle and Thomas P. Whalley, II, to appear and practice in this case under MCR 8.126(A) are GRANTED.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the February 27, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Oakland Circuit Court abused its discretion by denying Foster's request for any extraordinary fees for time spent consulting with defense expert Gerald Gabriel. Although the defendant ultimately pled no contest and it is not clear how beneficial Gabriel's consultation was to the defense, it was outside the range of principled outcomes for the trial court to deny reimbursement altogether for time Foster spent consulting with Gabriel. As dissenting Judge Gleicher observed, "Foster was obligated to review more than 2,000 pages of financial data and the preliminary examination testimony given by the prosecution's expert," a record that is "outside the realm of most criminal prosecutions." And the trial judge granted the defense $ 12,500 specifically for the purpose of Foster being able to consult with Gabriel. We REMAND this case to the Oakland Circuit Court for further proceedings on extraordinary fees in light of this order. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the motion for immediate consideration is GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the April 17, 2018 orders of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

Per Curiam. Defendant the Department of Treasury (the Department) appeals as of right three opinions and orders issued by the Court of Claims involving plaintiffs Prime Time International Distributing, Inc., MFJ Enterprises, Inc., and Chase Cash & Carry, Inc. The Department and defendant the State Treasurer appeal as of right an opinion and order involving plaintiff Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Spanning from 2015 to 2016, the Michigan State Police Tobacco Tax Unit seized large amounts of tobacco products from plaintiffs for violations of the Tobacco Products Tax Act (TPTA), MCL 205.421 et seq . Each plaintiff timely requested a hearing before the Department pursuant to MCL 205.429(3). The Department concluded that the seizures and forfeitures were proper in each case. Plaintiffs each filed an appeal in the proper circuit court as mandated under MCL 205.429(4). The Department filed a notice of transfer pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) in each action so that the cases could be transferred to the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims issued its first opinion on October 17, 2016, holding that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over Prime Time International Distributing, Inc.'s action. The remaining plaintiffs' actions were likewise transferred back to the circuit court for reasons consistent with the first opinion. Defendants now appeal the Court of Claims' decisions, arguing that the Court of Claims Act (CCA), MCL 600.6401 et seq ., vests the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over these appeals and that they do not fall within the CCA's jurisdictional exception under MCL 600.6419(5). Defendants claim this exception does not apply because (1) the TPTA does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the circuit court and (2) an appeal under the TPTA is actually an original action. The appeals have been consolidated to advance the administration of the appellate process. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo the question whether the trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction. Bank v. Mich. Ed. Ass'n-NEA , 315 Mich.App. 496, 499, 892 N.W.2d 1 (2016). Additionally, "[a] challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims presents a statutory question that is reviewed de novo as a question of law." AFSCME Council 25 v. State Employees' RetirementSys. , 294 Mich.App. 1, 6, 818 N.W.2d 337 (2011). Moreover, this Court "reviews de novo questions of statutory construction, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature." Cheboygan Sportsman Club v. Cheboygan Co. Prosecuting Attorney , 307 Mich.App. 71, 75, 858 N.W.2d 751 (2014). III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND Defendants contend that Court of Claims erred when it held that the circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. We disagree. "The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. If the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language is clear, then judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. A court is required to enforce a clear and unambiguous statute as written." Walters v. Bloomfield Hills Furniture , 228 Mich.App. 160, 163, 577 N.W.2d 206 (1998). Statutes sharing subject matter or a common purpose are in pari materia and "must be read together as a whole." Bloomfield Twp. v. Kane , 302 Mich.App. 170, 176, 839 N.W.2d 505 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, if there is "tension, or even conflict, between sections of a statute," this Court must, "if reasonably possible, construe them both so as to give meaning to each; that is, to harmonize them." O'Connell v. Dir. of Elections , 316 Mich.App. 91, 98, 891 N.W.2d 240 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A. CIRCUIT COURT JURISDICTION Circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction that derive their power from the Michigan Constitution. Id . at 101, 891 N.W.2d 240. The Constitution states that "[t]he circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals except as otherwise provided by law; ... and jurisdiction of other cases and matters as provided by rules of the supreme court." Const. 1963, art. 6, § 13. The Revised Judicature Act (RJA), MCL 600.101 et seq ., provides that "[c]ircuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies..." MCL 600.605. The RJA sets forth the circuit court's jurisdiction with regard to agency decisions as follows: An appeal shall lie from any order, decision, or opinion of any state board, commission, or agency, authorized under the laws of this state to promulgate rules from which an appeal or other judicial review has not otherwise been provided for by law, to the circuit court of the county of which the appellant is a resident or to the circuit court of Ingham county, which court shall have and exercise jurisdiction with respect thereto as in nonjury cases. Such appeals shall be made in accordance with the rules of the supreme court. [ MCL 600.631.] However, the RJA provides an exception to the general jurisdiction of the circuit court "where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state." MCL 600.605. Accordingly, "the circuit court is presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction over a civil action unless Michigan's Constitution or a statute expressly prohibits it from exercising jurisdiction or gives to another court exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit." Teran v. Rittley , 313 Mich.App. 197, 206, 882 N.W.2d 181 (2015). "[W]here this Court must examine certain statutory language to determine whether the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction," this Court has explained, "[t]he language must leave no doubt that the Legislature intended to deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction of a particular subject matter." Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Maurizio , 129 Mich.App. 166, 175, 341 N.W.2d 262 (1983). B. COURT OF CLAIMS JURISDICTION An exception to the general jurisdiction of the circuit court exists when the Court of Claims is given exclusive jurisdiction. See Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev. Auth. , 468 Mich. 763, 774, 664 N.W.2d 185 (2003). The Legislature created the Court of Claims, and thus that tribunal "has limited powers with explicit limits on the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction." Okrie v. Michigan , 306 Mich.App. 445, 448, 857 N.W.2d 254 (2014) (citations omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is subject to Michigan statutory law," and therefore the Court of Claims "does not have extensive and inherent powers akin to those of a constitutional court of general jurisdiction." Id . The CCA states that "[e]xcept as provided in sections 6421 and 6440, the jurisdiction of the court of claims, as conferred upon it by this chapter, is exclusive." MCL 600.6419(1). The Court of Claims has jurisdiction [t]o hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding[ ] another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court. [ MCL 600.6419(1)(a).] However, MCL 600.6419(5) states, "This chapter does not deprive the circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district court and administrative agencies as authorized by law." C. THE TPTA "The TPTA 'is at its heart a revenue statute, designed to assure that tobacco taxes levied in support of Michigan schools are not evaded.' " K & W Wholesale, LLC v. Dep't of Treasury , 318 Mich.App. 605, 611, 899 N.W.2d 432 (2017) (citation omitted). Under the TPTA, a tobacco product held, owned, possessed, transported, or in control of a person in violation of this act, and a vending machine, vehicle, and other tangible personal property containing a tobacco product in violation of this act and any related books and records are contraband and may be seized and confiscated by the department as provided in this section. [ MCL 205.429(1).] The TPTA also provides the procedure for requesting and conducting an administrative hearing. See MCL 205.429(3). In addition, the TPTA provides a procedure for seeking judicial review of the decision following the administrative hearing: If a person is aggrieved by the decision of the department, that person may appeal to the circuit court of the county where the seizure was made to obtain a judicial determination of the lawfulness of the seizure and forfeiture. The action shall be commenced within 20 days after notice of the department's determination is sent to the person or persons claiming an interest in the seized property. The court shall hear the action and determine the issues of fact and law involved in accordance with rules of practice and procedure as in other in rem proceedings. If a judicial determination of the lawfulness of the seizure and forfeiture cannot be made before deterioration of any of the property seized, the court shall order the destruction or sale of the property with public notice as determined by the court and require the proceeds to be deposited with the court until the lawfulness of the seizure and forfeiture is finally adjudicated. [ MCL 205.429(4) (emphasis added).] IV. ANALYSIS Defendants contend, and we agree, that MCL 600.6419 generally vests the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the state or any of its departments. MCL 600.6419(1). Defendants further maintain that because plaintiffs' actions do not meet the CCA's exception to jurisdiction under MCL 600.6419(5), the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over these actions. We disagree. This Court has held that "[a] litigant seeking judicial review of an administrative agency's decision has three potential avenues of relief: (1) the method of review prescribed by the statutes applicable to the particular agency; (2) the method of review prescribed by the [Administrative Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq . ]; or (3) an appeal under MCL 600.631 [.]" Teddy 23, LLC v. Mich. Film Office , 313 Mich.App. 557, 567, 884 N.W.2d 799 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). The TPTA is the applicable statute that prescribes the procedure for judicial review of the Department's decision. It requires an "appeal to the circuit court of the county where the seizure was made...." MCL 205.429(4). However, the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims "against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court ." MCL 600.6419(1)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, there is an inherent tension between the TPTA's jurisdictional provision and the CCA's jurisdictional provisions. To remedy this tension, we look first to the exceptions under the CCA, MCL 600.6419(5), which provides, "This chapter does not deprive the circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the district court and administrative agencies as authorized by law." If MCL 600.6419(5) applies, the Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to hear these actions against the state. Defendants argue that MCL 205.429(4) does not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the circuit court, and for that reason, MCL 600.6419(5) does not apply. In support, defendants rely on the statutory analysis in O'Connell . This argument fails. In O'Connell , we analyzed the relationship between MCL 600.4401 and MCL 600.6419 to determine which court has jurisdiction to decide writs of mandamus. O'Connell , 316 Mich.App. at 102-103, 891 N.W.2d 240. Specifically, we recognized a tension between MCL 600.4401(1), which grants concurrent jurisdiction to decide mandamus actions against a state officer to circuit courts and this Court, and MCL 600.6419(1)(a), which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to decide demands for extraordinary writs against the state or the state's departments or officers, including prerogative and remedial writs. Id . at 103-104, 891 N.W.2d 240. The defendant argued that the CCA provided an exception under MCL 600.6419(6) that would "reserve[ ] for the circuit court 'exclusive' jurisdiction over mandamus actions involving state officers-notwithstanding MCL 600.6419(1)(a)." Id . at 104, 891 N.W.2d 240. We concluded that the exception under the CCA did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on circuit courts. Like MCL 600.6419(5) at issue in the instant case, the exception under MCL 600.6149(6) provides, "This chapter does not deprive the circuit court of exclusive jurisdiction to issue, hear, and determine prerogative and remedial writs consistent with section 13 of article VI of the state constitution of 1963." We held in O'Connell that the Court of Claims had jurisdiction and that the exception under MCL 600.6419(6) did not apply because "the circuit court did not possess exclusive jurisdiction over mandamus actions involving state officers; rather, it shared concurrent jurisdiction with this Court." Id . at 104, 891 N.W.2d 240. Moreover, the Michigan Constitution also grants the Michigan Supreme Court power over prerogative writs. Id . at 105-106, 891 N.W.2d 240. This Court interpreted MCL 600.6419(6) as barring Court of Claims jurisdiction only if the circuit court was granted exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal by means of another statute or the Constitution. Id . at 108, 891 N.W.2d 240. Because the circuit court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over prerogative and remedial writs-it conferred concurrent jurisdiction on this Court and the Michigan Supreme Court- MCL 600.6419(6) did not apply. Id . at 106-108, 891 N.W.2d 240. In this case, the same analysis applies. The question turns on whether MCL 205.429(4) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the circuit court for matters involving appeals from the Department pursuant to the TPTA. The Court of Claims concluded in each of its opinions and orders that the TPTA does confer exclusive jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear such appeals. We agree. The TPTA states, "If a person is aggrieved by the decision of the department, that person may appeal to the circuit court of the county where the seizure was made to obtain a judicial determination of the lawfulness of the seizure and forfeiture." MCL 205.429(4). Unlike MCL 600.4401(1) in O'Connell , the TPTA does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on this Court. The plain and clear language of the statute states that appeals from decisions of the Department are to be made to the circuit court-not in addition to an appellate court, to the Court of Claims, or to any other judicial body. To interpret the statute as defendants suggest, i.e., that appeals under the TPTA must be made to the Court of Claims, would render the jurisdictional provision of the TPTA nugatory, which is an interpretation we must avoid. O'Connell , 316 Mich.App. at 98, 891 N.W.2d 240. We conclude that MCL 600.6419(5) applies, the circuit court has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs' appeals pursuant to the TPTA, and the Court of Claims did not err when it reached the same result. The Department also argues, as it did below, that plaintiffs are not bringing an appeal at all; rather, plaintiffs have filed original actions with the Court of Claims, and therefore MCL 600.6419(5) does not apply. We disagree. An appeal from the Department to the circuit court is governed by Chapter 2 of the Michigan Court Rules, Keweenaw Bay Outfitters & Trading Post v. Dep't of Treasury , 252 Mich. App. 95, 102, 651 N.W.2d 138 (2002), and the Department argues that because the parties are entitled to discovery, motion practice, and a trial, this matter is not an "appeal," but rather an original action. As support, the Department asserts that the rules governing appellate procedure, Chapter 7 of the Michigan Court Rules, are not applicable here. However, the Department has provided no authority for the proposition that an appeal is classified on the basis of which court rules apply. In Keweenaw , we held that the appeal was governed by Chapter 2, but we continued to refer to the claim as an appeal from an agency decision. Moreover, the TPTA, the CCA, and the RJA do not define "appeal." The Supreme Court has defined "appeal" as "the removal of a matter or cause from an inferior to a superior court for the purpose of reviewing, correcting, or reversing the judgment or sentence of the inferior tribunal," and has further stated that, "in its technical and appropriate sense," an appeal is "the taking of a suit or cause and its final determination from one court or jurisdiction after final judgment to another." In re Mfr. Freight Forwarding Co. , 294 Mich. 57, 70, 292 N.W. 678 (1940) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.) defines "appeal" as "a legal proceeding by which a case is brought before a higher court for review of the decision of a lower court." The present action fits any of these definitions. In this case, each plaintiff received a "final determination" from an inferior tribunal-the Department's hearing division-and sought review in another tribunal. Further, the TPTA describes an aggrieved litigant seeking an "appeal" from an adverse determination. MCL 205.429(4). Although the reviewing court will conduct "discovery, motion practice, and trials," Keweenaw Bay Outfitters , 252 Mich.App. at 101-102, 651 N.W.2d 138, in order to resolve the dispute, the procedure does not change the review process into an original action. Affirmed. Beckering, P.J., and O'Brien and Cameron, JJ., concurred. See Prime Time Int'l Distrib., Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued October 17, 2016 (Docket No. 16-000226-MZ). See Chase Cash & Carry, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued November 15, 2016 (Docket Nos. 16-000232-MT and 16-003269-CZ); MFJ Enterprises, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued November 9, 2016(Docket No. 16-000214-MZ); Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Dep't of Treasury , unpublished opinion of the Court of Claims, issued November 9, 2016 (Docket Nos. 16-000064-MZ, 16-000099-MZ, and 16-000100-MZ). In 2013, the Legislature enlarged the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and transferred its locus from the Ingham Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals. See 2013 PA 164; Baynesan v. Wayne State Univ. , 316 Mich.App. 643, 646, 894 N.W.2d 102 (2016). " 'Notwithstanding' means 'in spite of; without being opposed or prevented by[.]' " Gray v. Chrostowski , 298 Mich.App. 769, 778, 828 N.W.2d 435 (2012), quoting Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997). We did note in O'Connell that the circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction "over the remaining categories of extraordinary writs...." Id . at 108, 891 N.W.2d 240. Even if the TPTA did not provide jurisdictional guidance, an appeal from an administrative agency may be made pursuant to the Administrative Procedures MCL 24.201 et seq., or MCL 600.631, but both also mandate an appeal to the circuit court only. Teddy 23, LLC , 313 Mich.App. at 567-568, 884 N.W.2d 799. The Department also claims that because the TPTA does not provide a standard of review upon which the circuit courts can review the Department's decisions, the Legislature intended an action filed with the Court of Claims as a new claim or demand. The Department provided no support for this proposition, and "[t]his Court is not required to search for authority to sustain or reject a position raised by a party without citation of authority." Mettler Walloon, LLC v. Melrose Twp. , 281 Mich.App. 184, 220, 761 N.W.2d 293 (2008).

O'Brien, J. In Docket No. 334157, defendant appeals as of right the trial court's order awarding plaintiff Debra Andreson $1,324,112.68 following a jury trial. In Docket No. 336351, defendant appeals as of right the trial court's order awarding attorney fees and taxable costs to plaintiffs. We ordered these appeals to be consolidated. We reverse in part and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Debra and against defendant in the amount of $200,000. In all other respects, we affirm. On October 11, 2013, plaintiffs were stopped in their vehicle at a red light when their vehicle was struck from behind by a different vehicle being driven at a high rate of speed. Both plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of the collision, and it was uncontested that plaintiffs were not at fault. Plaintiffs were insured by defendant at the time of the accident, and their insurance policy included a provision for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits in the amount of $250,000 per individual, capped at a total of $500,000 per accident. The UIM contract provision required plaintiffs to pursue recovery from the at-fault driver and obtain payment of the maximum policy limits from the at-fault driver's insurance carrier before they could collect UIM coverage from defendant. The contract provision also required plaintiffs to obtain defendant's permission before reaching a settlement with the at-fault driver or the at-fault driver's insurance carrier. Defendant initially declined to grant plaintiffs permission to settle with the at-fault driver's insurance carrier. On February 18, 2015, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against defendant in an attempt to obtain that permission and to obtain UIM benefits due them from defendant. Eventually, defendant granted plaintiffs permission to settle. The parties agree that plaintiffs obtained a settlement of $100,000 from the at-fault driver's insurance carrier-the maximum limit of the driver's policy. The settlement allocated $50,000 to each plaintiff. After the settlement, plaintiffs sought payment from defendant for the difference between the maximum amount of plaintiffs' UIM coverage and the settlement amount obtained from the at-fault driver's insurance carrier. Defendant refused to pay UIM benefits to plaintiffs, arguing that plaintiffs' injuries failed to qualify as threshold injuries. With respect to Debra, defendant alleged that her lower-back injuries arose from a preexisting condition and were not causally related to the October 11, 2013 accident. The case proceeded to trial. The central issues at trial were (1) whether plaintiffs suffered serious impairments of body function as a result of the at-fault driver's negligence and (2) whether Debra's lower-back injuries were causally related to the automobile accident. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the jury from being told about the UIM limits in plaintiff's policy. The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that "[a]ny evidence of the UIM policy limits, if relevant, would be more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403." Testimony at trial indicated that Debra suffered various physical injuries as a result of the automobile accident. Her neurosurgeon, Dr. Christopher Abood, testified that he had served as Debra's treating physician since October 2008 when she first came to him complaining of lower-back pain. Dr. Abood indicated that although Debra was experiencing pain at that time (five years before the automobile accident), the pain was manageable and was not preventing her from working or living her normal life. Dr. Abood did not see Debra for the five-year period between October 2008 and August 2013. During that time, Debra received a series of facet injections from a different doctor to whom Dr. Abood had referred her for treatment. Debra returned to see Dr. Abood on August 22, 2013, indicating that she had fallen on her back in April 2013 and experienced a significant increase in pain and heaviness in both legs that severely limited her ability to walk any distance. Dr. Abood diagnosed the pain as coming from a narrowing of the spinal canal. Dr. Abood next saw Debra on November 11, 2013, one month after the accident at issue. At that time, she was experiencing severe pain in her back and legs. Dr. Abood testified that, in his medical opinion, the increased lower-back pain was not related to her earlier fall. According to Dr. Abood, Debra's "spinal condition was severely aggravated by the automobile accident, causing severe worsening of her back and leg symptoms and pain." Dr. Abood recommended that Debra have back surgery, which he performed on December 11, 2013. At the close of proofs, the trial court found a jury-submissible question of fact regarding whether Debra's injuries met the threshold. The jury ultimately found that they did and awarded her $1,374,112.68 in damages. After trial, plaintiffs' counsel filed a proposed judgment for $1,324,112.68 for Debra, which reflected the jury's special verdict minus $50,000 to reflect the setoff from the earlier settlement. On May 19, 2016, defendant filed an objection to the entry of judgment with respect to Debra, arguing that the judgment in her favor should be limited to $200,000 because her recovery was capped by the $250,000 UIM policy limit minus the $50,000 setoff. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that it was required to enter a judgment consistent with MCR 2.515(B), which provides that "[a]fter a special verdict is returned, the court shall enter judgment in accordance with the jury's findings." Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Debra for $1,324,112.68, which reflected the jury's award minus the $50,000 settlement offset. Defendant moved for remittitur, arguing that the jury's verdict had to be reduced because it was more than the UIM policy limits. The trial court denied defendant's motion. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion for remittitur. We agree. Appellate review of a grant or denial of remittitur is limited to the determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred. Majewski v. Nowicki , 364 Mich. 698, 700, 111 N.W.2d 887 (1961). A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co , 476 Mich. 372, 388, 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006). "Broadly defined, remittitur is the procedural process by which a verdict of the jury is diminished by subtraction." Pippen v. Denison Div. of Abex Corp. , 66 Mich.App. 664, 674, 239 N.W.2d 704 (1976) (emphasis omitted). "As long as the amount awarded is within the range of the evidence, and within the limits of what reasonable minds might deem just compensation for such imponderable items as personal injuries sustained and pain and suffering, the verdict rendered should not be set aside." Id . at 675, 239 N.W.2d 704 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether remittitur is appropriate, a trial court must decide whether the jury award was supported by the evidence. Diamond v. Witherspoon , 265 Mich.App. 673, 693, 696 N.W.2d 770 (2005). This determination must be based on objective criteria relating to the actual conduct of the trial or the evidence presented. Palenkas v. Beaumont Hosp , 432 Mich. 527, 532, 443 N.W.2d 354 (1989). The power of remittitur should be exercised with restraint. Hines v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co , 151 Mich.App. 585, 595, 391 N.W.2d 750 (1985). If the award for economic damages falls reasonably within the range of the evidence and within the limits of what reasonable minds would deem just compensation, the jury award should not be disturbed. Palenkas , supra at 532-533 [443 N.W.2d 354]. [ Silberstein v. Pro-Golf of America, Inc , 278 Mich.App. 446, 462, 750 N.W.2d 615 (2008).] Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for remittitur because the verdict awarded by the jury was in excess of the UIM policy limits. Neither uninsured motorist (UM) coverage nor UIM coverage is required by Michigan law, and therefore "the terms of coverage are controlled by the language of the contract itself, not by statute." Dawson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 293 Mich.App. 563, 568, 810 N.W.2d 106 (2011). As our Supreme Court has explained, "Uninsured motorist coverage is optional-it is not compulsory coverage mandated by the no-fault act," and consequently, "the rights and limitations of such coverage are purely contractual...." Rory v. Continental Ins Co , 473 Mich. 457, 465-466, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). "It is not the province of the judiciary to rewrite contracts to conform to the court's liking, but instead to enforce contracts as written and agreed to by the parties." Dawson , 293 Mich.App. at 569, 810 N.W.2d 106. Prior to trial, the trial court stated that plaintiffs were pursuing a "Breach of Contract claim against Defendant for the refusal to pay UIM protection benefits without explanation." According to the terms of the parties' contract, defendant was only liable for $250,000 for each plaintiff, up to a total of $500,000. All parties agree on appeal that plaintiffs' earlier settlement of $100,000 with the at-fault driver's insurance company entitled defendant to a $50,000 offset with respect to each plaintiff, limiting defendant's liability to $200,000 per plaintiff under plaintiffs' UIM policy provision. In denying defendant's motion for remittitur, the trial court concluded "that the jury's verdict cannot be looked at as being clearly excessive" because "the jury was not made aware of the [UIM coverage] limits at the request of the defendant." Essentially, the trial court found that defendant waived the UIM policy limits by requesting that the policy limits not be disclosed to the jury. However, pursuant to this Court's decision in Tellkamp v. Wolverine Mut Ins Co , 219 Mich.App. 231, 243, 556 N.W.2d 504 (1996), "[a]bsent an express agreement to the contrary," excluding evidence of a policy's limits from the jury's knowledge "does not amount to a waiver of the limits of liability under the contract." In this case, there was no express agreement between the parties to waive the UIM policy limits. Nor did defendant, through its counsel or otherwise, expressly waive the policy limits. Therefore, the trial court could not enter an award for Debra that exceeded the maximum liability agreed to by the parties in their contract, see Dawson , 293 Mich.App. at 569, 810 N.W.2d 106, plus applicable interest and costs, see Tellkamp , 219 Mich.App. at 244, 556 N.W.2d 504. Alternatively, we are persuaded by defendant's argument that the trial court's refusal to reduce the amount of the jury verdict to the maximum policy limits is tantamount to a nullification of the policy limits, effectively creating insurance coverage by estoppel contrary to Kirschner v. Process Design Assoc.., Inc. , 459 Mich. 587, 592 N.W.2d 707 (1999). In insurance cases, "[t]he application of waiver and estoppel is limited, and, usually, the doctrines will not be applied to broaden the coverage of a policy to protect the insured against risks that were not included in the policy or that were expressly excluded from the policy." Id . at 593-594, 592 N.W.2d 707. "This is because an insurance company should not be required to pay for a loss for which it has charged no premium." Id . at 594, 592 N.W.2d 707. Defendant contracted with plaintiffs to insure them up to $500,000 for UIM coverage, and plaintiffs paid premiums to be covered up to that amount. In the absence of defendant's waiver of these limits, the trial court impermissibly required defendant to pay for Debra's loss in excess of the amount that it agreed to cover. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for remittitur and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Debra in the amount of $200,000. Next, defendant argues that it is entitled to a new trial on the basis of the trial court's evidentiary rulings allowing defendant's adjuster, Marcia Vandercook, to testify about (1) regarding the contents of her claims-log notes and (2) whether Debra suffered a serious impairment of body function. We disagree. "The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court." Bartlett v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit , 149 Mich.App. 412, 418, 385 N.W.2d 801 (1986). "A trial court's discretionary decisions concerning whether to admit or exclude evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion." People v. Mardlin , 487 Mich. 609, 614, 790 N.W.2d 607 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Hecht v. Nat'l Heritage Academies, Inc , 499 Mich. 586, 604, 886 N.W.2d 135 (2016). "The decision upon a close evidentiary question by definition ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion." People v. Golochowicz , 413 Mich. 298, 322, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982). Several months before trial, plaintiffs brought a motion to strike defendant's answer and to enter a default against defendant, in part, because defendant refused to produce Vandercook's claims-log notes. The trial court conducted an in camera review of the insurance claims log and found as follows: [T]he adjustor's log is partially privileged and partially discoverable. Specifically, all log notes entered after February 16, 2015 are privileged, and all log notes entered on or before February 16, 2015 are subject to discovery. The week before trial, plaintiffs' counsel served defendant with a subpoena for Vandercook to testify at trial, and defendant moved to quash the subpoena. After a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court ruled that Vandercook could testify regarding a notation she made in her claims log in which she indicated that she thought Debra's injuries had met the serious impairment threshold. In its reasoning, the trial court relied on MRE 701 (lay opinion testimony) and the court's determination that the claims log was not hearsay because it qualified as a business record under MRE 803(6). At trial, plaintiffs called Vandercook to testify during their case-in-chief. Vandercook testified, in pertinent part, that as part of her job with defendant she routinely evaluated the injuries of people insured by defendant and that she did so by relying on each person's medical records and history of medical treatment. She testified that neither she nor a doctor could make a determination whether serious impairment of body function had occurred because only the jury could make that determination. Outside the presence of the jury, defendant objected to Vandercook's testifying about whether Debra suffered a serious impairment, arguing that "[s]he has deferred to the jury on the issue of serious impairment" and that it was not "appropriate opinion testimony from a lay witness, because it actually [called] for a medical expertise, which Ms. Vandercook simply [did] not have." The trial court rejected defendant's argument, reiterating its earlier ruling that the lay opinion testimony was admissible under MRE 701. Vandercook went on to testify that she wrote in her claims log that, given the acute findings in the emergency room and the fact that Debra underwent surgery, there was "enough to support [serious impairment of body function] " regarding the chest, neck, and lower-back injuries suffered by Debra. Vandercook clarified that this note in her claims log "was a preliminary assessment [that she] made based on the records [she] had at that time." On cross-examination, Vandercook testified that her statement in her claims log was based on an assumption that Debra's lower-back surgery was related to the accident. Vandercook testified that although she initially thought Debra had suffered a serious impairment of body function, she changed her mind when she obtained the medical files from Dr. Abood because those records indicated that the lower-back surgery was not related to the accident but was necessitated by a preexisting lower-back injury and degenerative condition. On appeal, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Vandercook's testimony regarding her claims log and by admitting as lay opinion testimony under MRE 701 her initial conclusion that Debra had suffered a threshold injury. Though Vandercook is not a doctor, she testified that she had significant experience in reviewing medical documentation for defendant, she had approved payment of approximately 100 automobile-accident claims, and she had approved payment of those claims after determining that the insured had suffered a serious impairment of body function. MRE 701 provides: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Because Vandercook's testimony was based on her review of medical records in the ordinary course of her employment, the opinion expressed in her claims log was rationally based on her perceptions, and it was helpful to a clear understanding of her trial testimony and to the determination whether Debra suffered a serious impairment of body function. Though this is certainly a close evidentiary decision, our review of this matter is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion, and we cannot conclude on the record before us that the trial court's decision on this close evidentiary decision fell outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See Hecht , 499 Mich. at 604, 886 N.W.2d 135 ; Golochowicz , 413 Mich. at 322, 319 N.W.2d 518. But even if the trial court should not have admitted the adjuster's testimony regarding her claims log and initial conclusions, defendant failed to show that it was more probable than not that the alleged error was outcome-determinative. See Barnett v. Hidalgo , 478 Mich. 151, 172, 732 N.W.2d 472 (2007) ; MCR 2.613(A). On cross-examination, Vandercook detailed the meaning of her note. Vandercook testified that she wrote the note under the assumption that Debra's injuries were related to the accident. She clarified that her initial assessment was made before receiving Debra's medical files from Dr. Abood and that she changed her opinion after reviewing those files. The files showed that Debra had a history of lower-back pain that was severely aggravated two months before the accident at issue. Given Vandercook's explanation, the jury was not left with the impression that the note in her claims log reflected her final assessment of whether Debra's condition resulted from the accident and qualified as a serious impairment of body function, and defendant has failed to otherwise establish that it was more probable than not that the alleged error was outcome-determinative. Defendant also argues that Vandercook's testimony was inadmissible because the existence of a threshold injury is a legal conclusion, and witness testimony regarding a legal conclusion is improper. However, the authority relied on by defendant for this assertion provides that "[t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Downie v. Kent Prod., Inc , 420 Mich. 197, 204-205, 362 N.W.2d 605 (1984), (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The admissibility of such a statement should not be questioned merely because the determination of liability may turn on whether the jury believes or disbelieves that opinion." Id . at 206, 362 N.W.2d 605. Vandercook's claims-log entry, wherein she expressed the opinion that Debra had suffered a serious impairment of body function, was not rendered inadmissible simply because the jury may have believed Vandercook's initial evaluation of the seriousness and extent of Debra's injuries. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, which was based on the allegedly improper admission of Vandercook's testimony, was not an abuse of discretion. Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to plaintiffs under the offer-of-judgment rule in MCR 2.405(D)(1). We disagree. "We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs." Smith v. Khouri , 481 Mich. 519, 526, 751 N.W.2d 472 (2008). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Id . Before trial, the parties participated in case evaluation, which resulted in a nonunanimous award. Defendant filed an offer of judgment for $10,000 with respect to David and $50,000 with respect to Debra. Plaintiffs filed counteroffers of judgment for $150,000 with respect to David and $200,000 with respect to Debra. MCR 2.405. None of the offers of judgment was accepted. The average offer of judgment was $80,000 with respect to David and $125,000 with respect to Debra. Following a four-day jury trial in which verdicts were rendered in favor of both plaintiffs, the trial court entered an award of $179,481.65 for David and $1,324,112.68 for Debra. On July 20, 2016, plaintiffs moved for an award of attorney fees under MCR 2.405(D)(1). Plaintiffs requested $135,650 in attorney fees and $15,465.67 in taxable costs. Defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the trial court should decline to award attorney fees pursuant to the "interest of justice" exception set forth in MCR 2.405(D)(3). MCR 2.405(D) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Imposition of Costs Following Rejection of Offer. If an offer is rejected, costs are payable as follows: (1) If the adjusted verdict is more favorable to the offeror than the average offer, the offeree must pay to the offeror the offeror's actual costs incurred in the prosecution or defense of the action. * * * (3) The court shall determine the actual costs incurred. The court may, in the interest of justice, refuse to award an attorney fee under this rule . [Emphasis added.] On December 14, 2016, the trial court entered an order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for an award of attorney fees and costs, awarding $120,820 in attorney fees and $7,840.67 in taxable costs. The trial court specifically rejected defendant's argument that the trial court should deny plaintiffs' motion based on the interest-of-justice exception set forth in MCR 2.405(D)(3). The trial court reasoned as follows: After review, this Court finds that the interest of justice exception does not apply in the present case because the public policy of litigating the legal issues of first impression in this case do not override the weight of MCR 2.405 in promoting a just, speedy, and economical determination of every action. MCR 1.105. Additionally, the issues of first impression were litigated and decided prior to the Counteroffers of Judgment. The only fee requested for time expended on those issues was 3.80 hours utilized on a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's March 14, 2016 Order Excluding Evidence of the Prior Settlement Amount and the UIM Policy Limits, by Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Nolan, on April 4, 2016 for a total of $2,280.00. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court in an Order dated April 5, 2016. Further, Plaintiffs' requested attorney fees only began to accrue on March 22, 2016, which was 21 days after the Counteroffers of Judgment were filed with the Court; therefore, Defendant had expressly rejected the Counteroffers of Judgment at that time pursuant to MCR 2.405(C) and all requested attorney fees, except the $2,280.00 expended on the Motion for Reconsideration, were actually necessitated by Defendant's refusal to accept the Counteroffers of Judgment. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to their actual fees including attorney fees less the $2,280.00 pursuant to MCR 2.405(D)(1). "The purpose of MCR 2.405 is to encourage parties to settle matters prior to trial." Sanders v. Monical Machinery Co , 163 Mich.App. 689, 693, 415 N.W.2d 276 (1987). In Sanders , this Court stated that MCR 2.405(D)"should, in our opinion, be routinely enforced and attorney fees granted." Id . at 692, 415 N.W.2d 276. Therefore, a grant of attorney fees under MCR 2.405(D)"should be the rule rather than the exception." Butzer v. Camelot Hall Convalescent Centre, Inc. (After Remand) , 201 Mich.App. 275, 278, 505 N.W.2d 862 (1993). "To conclude otherwise would be to expand the 'interest of justice' exception to the point where it would render the rule ineffective." Id . at 278-279, 505 N.W.2d 862. "What constitutes 'in the interest of justice' must be decided on a case-by-case basis." Lamson v. Martin , (After Remand) , 216 Mich.App. 452, 463, 549 N.W.2d 878 (1996). Defendant relies on Luidens v. 63rd Dist. Court , 219 Mich.App. 24, 35, 555 N.W.2d 709 (1996), for the assertion that "a case involving a legal issue of first impression or a case involving an issue of public interest that should be litigated are examples of unusual circumstances in which it might be in the 'interest of justice' not to award attorney fees under MCR 2.405." However, defendant admits in its appellate brief in Docket No. 336351 that "[t]he central issue at trial was whether the Plaintiffs suffered 'threshold injuries' as a result of the at-fault driver's negligence." There was no issue of first impression related to the question of whether either plaintiff suffered a serious impairment of body function. Further, there was no issue of first impression as to the discoverability of the insurance adjuster's claims log, the admissibility of testimony concerning the contents of that claims log, or the admissibility of the adjuster's testimony regarding her initial conclusion that Debra had suffered a serious impairment of body function. The only legal issue that the trial court described as an issue of first impression was the question of whether, in a UIM case, the amount of the UIM policy limits should be admitted into evidence. The trial court resolved that issue in defendant's favor by ruling that the amounts in plaintiffs' UIM policy were not admissible at trial. Therefore, the issue of first impression did not affect the jury's decision that both plaintiffs had suffered a serious impairment of body function, nor did it affect the jury's decision to award plaintiffs damages. Defendant argues that the issue of first impression regarding the admissibility of the UIM policy limits affected the settlement value of the case and therefore affected the offers of judgment. However, at the time the offers and counteroffers of judgment were made, both defendant's counsel and plaintiffs' counsel stated on the record that they believed the maximum amount each plaintiff could recover from defendant pursuant to the UIM policy was $200,000. Therefore, the admissibility of the UIM policy limits clearly did not affect the settlement value of the case for purposes of the offers and counteroffers of judgment. Accordingly, plaintiffs still qualify for an award of attorney fees under MCR 2.405(D)(1), and we affirm the trial court's award of attorney fees to plaintiffs. The trial court's judgment at issue in Docket No. 334157 is reversed in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Debra and against defendant in the amount of $200,000. In all other respects, the orders at issue in Docket Nos. 334157 and 336351 are affirmed. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219 are awarded, neither party having prevailed in full. BECKERING, P.J., and CAMERON, J., concurred with O'BRIEN, J. Plaintiffs' complaint named both Progressive Michigan Insurance Company and Progressive Marathon Insurance Company as defendants. Progressive Marathon was dismissed on June 10, 2015, by stipulation of the parties because the insurance policy in effect on the date of plaintiffs' accident was issued to plaintiffs by Progressive Michigan. Progressive Marathon did not participate in this matter at trial or on appeal. Accordingly, as used in this opinion, "defendant" refers to Progressive Michigan. The trial court also entered an award in favor of David Andreson, which defendant does not challenge on appeal. Andreson v. Progressive Michigan Ins. Co. , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 18, 2017 (Docket Nos. 334157 and 336351). Facet injections involve the injection of a local anesthetic into the joint to temporarily deaden a small nerve. This is a diagnostic procedure designed to determine if a patient would benefit from a rhizotomy, a procedure that permanently deadens the same nerve. On the last day of trial, the trial court granted a directed verdict to David pursuant to MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(i ), finding that there was no factual dispute concerning the nature and extent of his injuries and that he had suffered a serious impairment of body function. Defendant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. We acknowledge that there may be a question regarding whether the trial court's decision to enter an award less than the full jury award was contrary to MCR 2.515(B). However, neither party raised this issue on appeal, and in light of our ruling, it is not relevant to the disposition of this case. We recognize that this portion of Tellkamp is arguably dictum. However, even assuming that it is dictum, we adopt this portion of the Tellkamp panel's reasoning as our own. See Gallagher v. Keefe , 232 Mich.App. 363, 374, 591 N.W.2d 297 (1998). Plaintiffs call our attention to several statements made during the course of trial to support their assertion that defendant waived the UIM policy limits. Some of the statements that plaintiffs highlight were made during the course of trial by a witness who worked for defendant, and others were made by defendant's counsel during opening statements. After reviewing these statements, especially in light of the trial court's ruling that the policy limits were not to be disclosed to the jury, we cannot conclude that the statements amounted to "a voluntary and intentional abandonment of a known right." Quality Prod. & Concepts Co. v. Nagel Precision, Inc. , 469 Mich. 362, 374, 666 N.W.2d 251 (2003). We note that, even after Debra's award is adjusted to reflect the UIM policy limits, she is still entitled to costs pursuant to MCR 2.405(D)(1).

Per Curiam. Defendant, the City of Detroit, appeals as of right an order denying its motion for summary disposition premised on the ground that plaintiff's highway-defect action is barred by governmental immunity because plaintiff, Dwayne Wigfall, failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. On June 9, 2014, plaintiff was riding his motorcycle when he allegedly struck a pothole in the roadway that caused him to fall and sustain personal injuries. On December 2, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Defendant responded with a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that governmental immunity barred this case because plaintiff failed to serve the requisite notice "upon an individual who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the City of Detroit, as required by MCL 691.1404(2)." Defendant acknowledged that, on September 22, 2014, it received notice of the injury and defect that was sent by certified mail to their law department claims division and that additional information had been requested from plaintiff by letter dated December 3, 2014. But, defendant argued, MCL 691.1404(2) required that notice be served on an "individual" who may lawfully be served with civil process and, as set forth in MCR 2.105(G)(2), process on a municipal corporation may only be served on the mayor, city clerk, or city attorney. Here, plaintiff mailed his notice to "City of Detroit Law Department-CLAIMS," and not to a proper individual. Therefore, plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement, and his lawsuit was barred by governmental immunity. Plaintiff responded to defendant's motion, arguing that defendant's city charter states that its law department is headed by the Corporation Counsel. And, plaintiff argued, the Corporation Counsel is also known as the city attorney; therefore, notice was properly sent to defendant's law department. Further, the notice-of-claim form published on the City of Detroit law department's official website indicates that the completed notice of claim form should be mailed to "City of Detroit Law Department, Claims Section." Moreover, plaintiff's counsel's office telephoned the city of Detroit law department to confirm the proper mailing address for providing notice of a claim against the city of Detroit and, as set forth in an affidavit, was told by "Ms. Tyler" in the law department that the proper mailing address for such notices was "City of Detroit Law Department-Attention Claims." Plaintiff further noted that it was undisputed that defendant received the timely notice of claim with all the required information. Thus, plaintiff was in full compliance with the statutory notice provision; or, at minimum, plaintiff was at least in substantial compliance with the statutory notice provision. Plaintiff also argued that if notice was deemed lacking, equitable estoppel should bar defendant from asserting that notice was insufficient because of defendant's actions in instructing plaintiff about how to properly provide notice of a claim and by acknowledging plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, plaintiff's lawsuit was not barred by governmental immunity. Defendant replied to plaintiff's response to defendant's motion for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff's notice was not directed to the mayor, city clerk, or city attorney; therefore, the notice was not in compliance, nor even in substantial compliance, with the statutory notice requirement. Further, defendant was not equitably estopped from asserting that notice was insufficient because plaintiff was never advised to "send statutory notice of a highway defect claim to the claims section." In fact, defendant's ordinance warns that all claims must be "filed in accordance with the general law of the state applicable to the filing of claims against governmental agencies; otherwise no claim for money or damages may be brought against the city." Detroit Ordinances, § 2-4-23. Simply stated, defendant cannot change the legislatively prescribed notice requirements set forth in its charter or ordinance. Plaintiff was required by the statute to serve his notice on an individual who may lawfully be served with civil process directed to defendant, and he failed to do so. At oral argument on defendant's motion, defendant further explained that the claims section on its official website merely provides for "a simplified procedure for resolving legal disputes without the necessity, time and expense of our formal judicial system." In other words, the purpose of the claims section on the website is to allow "redress without court intervention." But the claims section on the website does not, and cannot, supplant the statutory notice requirement when a lawsuit is contemplated. Following oral argument, the trial court took the motion under advisement. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order denying defendant's motion. The court held that plaintiff substantially complied with the statutory notice provision. Alternatively, the court held that defendant was equitably estopped from asserting that notice was insufficient considering the information on defendant's website regarding the provision of notice, as well as the fact that the same information was provided by telephone to plaintiff's counsel's office by an employee of the law department This appeal followed. Defendant argues that governmental immunity barred this action because plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement in MCL 691.1404(2). We agree. We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) require the trial court to accept the complaint's allegations as true, unless contradicted by the movant, and to consider the documentary evidence submitted by the parties. Id. at 119, 597 N.W.2d 817. We also review de novo the applicability of governmental immunity. Herman v. Detroit , 261 Mich.App. 141, 143, 680 N.W.2d 71 (2004). MCL 691.1404 provides, in pertinent part: (1) As a condition to any recovery for injuries sustained by reason of any defective highway, the injured person, within 120 days from the time the injury occurred, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) shall serve a notice on the governmental agency of the occurrence of the injury and the defect. The notice shall specify the exact location and nature of the defect, the injury sustained and the names of the witnesses known at the time by the claimant. (2) The notice may be served upon any individual, either personally, or by certified mail, return receipt requested, who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding. MCR 2.105(G)(2) provides that the individuals who may lawfully be served with civil process on behalf of a municipal corporation are "the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney of a city[.]" Defendant argues that plaintiff did not serve "any individual" with notice of his claim as required under MCL 691.1404(2) ; rather, he sent notice to the claims section of defendant's law department. The city attorney for defendant is "Corporation Counsel" who, at the relevant time, was Melvin Butch Hollowell. Plaintiff did not serve his notice on Hollowell, the mayor, or the city clerk. And, contrary to plaintiff's claim, substantial compliance is insufficient. We agree with defendant. As our Supreme Court held in Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm. , 477 Mich. 197, 219, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007), the "straightforward, clear, unambiguous" language of MCL 691.1404"must be enforced as written." Further, our Supreme Court held that "no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate." McCahan v. Brennan , 492 Mich. 730, 733, 822 N.W.2d 747 (2012). See also Jakupovic v. Hamtramck , 489 Mich. 939, 798 N.W.2d 12 (2011). (stating that the Court of Appeals erred by excusing an error in notice required under MCL 691.1404(1) instead of enforcing the notice requirement as written). Statutory notice provisions required in suits against the state are within the sole province of the Legislature and the judiciary has no authority to amend them; thus, they "must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written." McCahan , 492 Mich. at 732-733, 822 N.W.2d 747. In other words, contrary to plaintiff's argument and the trial court's holding, substantial compliance with the statutory notice provision in MCL 691.1404(2) is not sufficient. Because it is undisputed that plaintiff did not serve his notice on any individual who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against defendant as required under MCL 691.1404(2), plaintiff failed to comply with the statutory notice requirement. See McLean v. Dearborn , 302 Mich.App. 68, 78-79, 836 N.W.2d 916 (2013). Defendant also argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not applicable in this case because neither its website nor its employee advised plaintiff that the required statutory notice could be satisfied by sending notice of the claim to the claims section of the law department. Defendant has no power to change or alter the law in that regard. In fact, defendant argues, its claims ordinance specifically warns that state law must be followed "otherwise no claim for money or damages may be brought against the city." Detroit Ordinances, § 2-4-23. The application of a legal doctrine like equitable estoppel presents a question of law. James v. Alberts , 464 Mich. 12, 14-15, 626 N.W.2d 158 (2001). A trial court's findings of fact supporting its decision are reviewed for clear error. AFSCME v. Bank One, N.A. , 267 Mich.App. 281, 293, 705 N.W.2d 355 (2005). "Estoppel arises where a party, by representations, admissions or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, and the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief, and will be prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the facts." Casey v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 273 Mich.App. 388, 399, 729 N.W.2d 277 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the trial court concluded that equitable estoppel applied and prevented defendant from asserting that notice was insufficient because defendant provided information on its website and over the telephone regarding the provision of notice related to claims. But this holding essentially charges defendant with the duty to provide potential litigants with legal advice related to the interpretation of a statute and court rule. We cannot agree that because plaintiff received incorrect, inapplicable, or misinterpreted legal advice, defendant should be estopped from asserting that the statutory notice requirement was not met. It appears that plaintiff relied on information provided by defendant through its law department that was meant to relate solely to informal claims against defendant. But in any case, plaintiff was not entitled to rely on defendant's interpretation or misinterpretation of the legal requirements set forth in MCL 691.1404 as a justification or excuse for his failure to act in conformity with those requirements. To avoid having his claim barred by governmental immunity, plaintiff was required to fulfill the requirements set forth by our Legislature in MCL 691.1404. One of those requirements was to serve notice "upon any individual ... who may lawfully be served with civil process directed against the governmental agency, anything to the contrary in the charter of any municipal corporation notwithstanding." MCL 691.1404(2). MCR 2.105(G)(2) provides that the individual who may lawfully be served civil process on behalf of a municipal corporation is "the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney of a city[.]" Plaintiff did not serve notice on "the mayor, the city clerk, or the city attorney," allegedly because of the misinformation provided by defendant. The equitable-estoppel doctrine does not excuse that failure to comply with the statutory mandate, and the trial court's decision to the contrary was erroneous. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary disposition should have been granted because plaintiff's action was barred by governmental immunity. Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant's motion for summary disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction. Saad, P.J., and Cavanagh and Cameron, JJ., concurred.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 13, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. We further note that the briefs filed by the parties and the amicus discuss three sentences that were included in the Court of Appeals September 19, 2017 slip opinion but are not included in the advance sheets version of the opinion, which was released after the parties and amicus filed their briefs in this Court. The slip opinion stated: "As Rhea's husband, Robert was an individual entitled to priority consideration. However, Robert was not entitled to consideration unless the probate court considered an independent fiduciary and found him or her unsuitable. Lyneis, as trustee and independent fiduciary, had statutory priority over Robert, despite Robert's marriage to Rhea. MCL 700.5409(1)." These sentences are omitted from the advance sheets version of the Court of Appeals opinion, and are therefore not part of that court's final published opinion.

On March 6, 2018, the Court heard oral argument on the application for leave to appeal the August 2, 2016 judgment of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, the application is again considered. MCR 7.305(H)(1). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REMAND this case to that court for consideration of the other evidentiary challenges raised by plaintiff but not addressed by that court in its initial review of this case. In this case, plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendant committed medical malpractice during surgery by negligently injuring her right hypoglossal nerve. After a trial, the jury found defendant not professionally negligent, and the trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action. Plaintiff appealed, challenging, among other things, the trial court's ruling prohibiting plaintiff from presenting testimony from her expert witness, Dr. Michael Morris, regarding parallels between defendant's recordkeeping in the instant case and his recordkeeping in other cases in which he had been sued for malpractice. In an offer of proof, Dr. Morris opined that in the other cases, like in the instant case, defendant failed to record complications that arose during surgery or related patient complaints. Dr. Morris also opined on the accuracy of defendant's surgical methods and about other instances of defendant's alleged malpractice. The Court of Appeals majority reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial, holding that Dr. Morris' testimony was admissible under MRE 404(b) to demonstrate defendant's scheme, plan, or system of creating medical records that did not accurately reflect his interactions with patients when surgeries resulted in complications. But as the dissenting judge recognized, plaintiff never argued in the trial court that this evidence was admissible for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b). Merchand v. Carpenter , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued August, 2, 2016 (Docket No. 327272), pp. 2-3 n. 3, 2016 WL 4129225 ( O'BRIEN , J., dissenting). The proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing a proper, noncharacter purpose for its admission under MRE 404(b). See People v. Denson , 500 Mich. 385, 398, 902 N.W.2d 306 (2017). Because plaintiff here failed to make a cognizable argument under MRE 404(b) before the trial court, any failure to admit this evidence on that basis would not amount to an abuse of discretion. Rock v. Crocker , 499 Mich. 247, 255, 884 N.W.2d 227 (2016) ("A trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision falls within the range of principled outcomes."). Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment and remand to that court for consideration of the other evidentiary challenges raised by plaintiff but not previously addressed.

Viviano, J. Plaintiffs are financing companies that seek tax refunds under Michigan's bad-debt statute, MCL 205.54i, for taxes paid on vehicles financed through installment contracts. Defendant Department of Treasury (the Department) denied the refund claims on three grounds: (1) MCL 205.54i excludes debts associated with repossessed property, (2) plaintiffs failed to provide RD-108 forms evidencing their refund claims, and (3) the election forms provided by plaintiff Ally Financial Inc. (Ally), by their terms, did not apply to the debts for which Ally sought tax refunds. The Court of Claims and the Court of Appeals affirmed the Department's decision on each of these grounds. We hold that the Court of Appeals erred by upholding the Department's decision on the first and third grounds but agree with the Court of Appeals' decision on the second ground. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals as to the first and third grounds, affirm its decision as to the second ground, and remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs, Ally and Santander Consumer USA Inc. (Santander), are financing companies seeking refunds for bad debts associated with vehicles that plaintiffs financed through installment contracts. Santander's predecessor in interest and Ally entered into financing agreements with various auto dealerships. Under the financing agreements, purchasers would enter into installment contracts with the dealerships under which the dealerships would finance the entire purchase price and the sales tax and remit the tax to the state. The dealerships would then assign the installment contracts to plaintiffs in exchange for the full amount of the purchase price and sales tax. Plaintiffs would obtain the right to collect under the contracts and repossess the vehicles upon default. Over time, some of the vehicle owners defaulted on their installment contracts. When collection efforts failed, plaintiffs deemed a number of these agreements to be worthless and uncollectable. Plaintiffs repossessed and resold many of the vehicles, but the sale price at times would not recoup the entire amount of the outstanding debt. Plaintiffs wrote the outstanding balances off their books as bad debts for federal income tax purposes under 26 USC 166. Plaintiffs also filed refund requests with the Department to recoup under MCL 205.54i the prorated share of the previously paid Michigan sales tax attributable to the bad debts remaining on these accounts. The Department denied plaintiffs' refund requests. First, the Department determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to any refunds for debts associated with repossessed vehicles because MCL 205.54i excludes "repossessed property" from its definition of bad debt. Second, the Department advised plaintiffs that they were required to support their claims with RD-108 forms, which dealers submit to the Secretary of State along with the sales tax due in exchange for a vehicle title and a validated copy of the form. Plaintiffs argued that they generally do not have copies of this form and offered alternative documentation as to the amount of taxes paid. The Department rejected plaintiffs' documentation and insisted that RD-108 forms were required to prove that taxes were actually paid. Finally, the Department concluded that Ally lacked appropriate election forms designating itself, rather than the dealership, as the party entitled to claim the tax refund. Plaintiffs first appealed the Department's decision by requesting an informal conference. The referee at the conference recommended that the refund requests be denied, and the Department followed the recommendation. Plaintiffs appealed this decision in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition to defendants, agreeing that "bad debts" do not include repossessed property and that plaintiff Ally did not have valid election forms. It also upheld the Department's decision to require the RD-108 forms, explaining that the Legislature gave the Department discretion to determine what evidence was required to support a refund claim. The Court of Appeals consolidated plaintiffs' cases on appeal and affirmed. Regarding the proper interpretation of "repossessed property," the Court of Appeals agreed with the Department that MCL 205.54i does not permit refunds on any debts associated with repossessed property. In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to a prior unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals, Daimler Chrysler Servs. of North America, LLC v. Dep't of Treasury . Neither opinion, however, offered a substantive analysis of MCL 205.54i. Instead, the Court of Appeals here concluded summarily that "[t]he Department's interpretation is consistent with the plain and unambiguous language of the bad debt statute." Regarding the Department's decision to require RD-108 forms, the Court of Appeals agreed with the Court of Claims that MCL 205.54i conferred discretion upon the Department to require these forms as evidence of plaintiffs' claims. Finally, the Court upheld the Department's determination that the election forms provided by Ally did not satisfy the statute. Following plaintiffs' appeal in our Court, we ordered arguments on the application, directing the parties to address: (1) whether MCL 205.54i prohibits partial or full tax refunds on bad debt accounts that include repossessed property; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving the Department of Treasury's interpretation of MCL 205.54i respectful consideration in light of MCL 24.232(5) ; (3) how this Court should review the Department's decision to require RD-108 forms pursuant to MCL 205.54i(4) and, under that standard, whether the decision was appropriate; and (4) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ally Financial's election forms did not apply to accounts written off prior to the retailers' execution of the forms.[ ] II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. While we have historically held that tax exemptions and deductions must be construed narrowly in favor of the government, we have also explained "that this requirement does not permit a 'strained construction' that is contrary to the Legislature's intent." III. ANALYSIS MCL 205.54i permits retailers and lenders to seek a refund for sales taxes paid on a "bad debt," as defined by the statute. If lenders such as plaintiffs seek the tax refund, they must provide a written election form, specifying that they, rather than the taxpayer, may claim the refund. The statute further provides that any claim "shall be supported by that evidence required by the department." For the reasons expressed below, we hold that two of the three bases provided by the Department for rejecting plaintiffs' refund claims in this case were erroneous. A. MEANING OF "REPOSSESSED PROPERTY" WITHIN MCL 205.54i Determining the meaning of "repossessed property" under MCL 205.54i requires careful application of our rules of statutory interpretation. When interpreting unambiguous statutory language, "the statute must be enforced as written. No further judicial construction is required or permitted." "[O]ur goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent, focusing first on the statute's plain language." We must "examine the statute as a whole, reading individual words and phrases in the context of the entire legislative scheme." In doing so, we "consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts." The term "repossessed property" in MCL 205.54i is nestled within an intricate tax scheme. Consequently, its context within the GSTA is critical to uncovering its meaning. The starting point is the GSTA, which requires retailers to pay a 6% tax on all sale proceeds. The relevant statute, MCL 205.52(1), provides: Except as provided in section 2a, there is levied upon and there shall be collected from all persons engaged in the business of making sales at retail,[ ] by which ownership of tangible personal property is transferred for consideration, an annual tax for the privilege of engaging in that business equal to 6% of the gross proceeds of the business, plus the penalty and interest if applicable as provided by law, less deductions allowed by this act. The tax is exacted based on the "gross proceeds" of businesses making retail sales. "Gross proceeds" is defined by statute to mean "sales price," which in turn "means the total amount of consideration, including cash, credit, property, and services, for which tangible personal property or services are sold, leased, or rented, valued in money, whether received in money or otherwise ...." Thus, the tax is levied on the monetary value of the consideration a retail seller receives, whether that consideration comes in the form of money or not. By its plain terms, "gross proceeds" encompasses purchases on credit. When the buyer charges on credit, the tax becomes due at the completion of the contract for purchase and not when each installment payment is made. Because the tax is due immediately, a seller may end up paying taxes on credit sales that never result in the actual receipt of any or all of the agreed upon consideration. In such cases, the seller has paid taxes on a buyer's mere promise to pay. The GSTA addresses this situation by creating a framework for sellers to recoup the sales tax paid based on "gross proceeds" that turn out to be worthless. MCL 205.54i(2) provides that "[i]n computing the amount of tax levied under this act for any month, a taxpayer may deduct the amount of bad debts from his or her gross proceeds used for the computation of the tax." The statute provides the following definition of "bad debt" in MCL 205.54i(1)(a) : 'Bad debt' means any portion of a debt that is related to a sale at retail taxable under this act for which gross proceeds are not otherwise deductible or excludable and that is eligible to be claimed, or could be eligible to be claimed if the taxpayer kept accounts on an accrual basis, as a deduction pursuant to section 166 of the internal revenue code, 26 USC 166. Thus a "bad debt" is equal to whatever the seller can deduct from its federal taxes under 26 USC 166, which provides: (a) General rule .- (1) Wholly worthless debts .-There shall be allowed as a deduction any debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year. (2) Partially worthless debts .-When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in part, the Secretary may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess of the part charged off within the taxable year, as a deduction. However, MCL 205.54i(1)(a) provides the following list of specified items that are excluded from the definition of "bad debt": A bad debt shall not include [i] any finance charge, interest, or sales tax on the purchase price, [ii] uncollectible amounts on property that remains in the possession of the taxpayer until the full purchase price is paid, [iii] expenses incurred in attempting to collect any account receivable or any portion of the debt recovered, [iv] any accounts receivable that have been sold to and remain in the possession of a third party for collection, and [v] repossessed property .[ ] In the present case, we have to make sense of the fifth item, "repossessed property." The statute clearly states that "repossessed property" is not part of a "bad debt" for purposes of a sales-tax refund. But what does "repossessed property" mean? Plaintiffs argue that it refers to the value of the repossessed property, while the Department interprets it as referring to the entire value of the account, i.e., the value of the account before the property was repossessed. If "repossessed property" refers to the value of the property, then the uncollectible amount not recouped from the sale of the property would remain a refundable "bad debt." If it refers to the entire account attached to the property, then there would be no "bad debt" to refund. The Department's interpretation would, in effect, impose a sales tax on consideration that later becomes worthless-it would tax uncollectible debt. This is not a reasonable reading of the text of the statute. Rather, by referencing "repossessed property," the exclusion encompasses only what the taxpayer has collected. The text says nothing about the portion of the debt that remains uncollected, if any, after repossession. Nor does the exclusion mention the account attached to the repossessed property. Instead, it merely states "repossessed property," which indicates that only the value of the repossessed property itself is to be excluded. This makes sense in light of the definition of "bad debt" in both our statute and the federal statute it relies on, each of which states that "bad debt" is a portion of a debt. Accordingly, the statutes contemplate that a debt can be divisible. Thus, by including "repossessed property," but not the attached account, the statute indicates that only the portion of the debt related to the value of the repossessed property is excluded. This conclusion is confirmed by examining the other exclusions from "bad debt" listed in MCL 205.54i(1)(a). None of these exclusions indicates that the Legislature intended in this section to impose a sales tax on consideration that becomes worthless. The first and third exclusions represent amounts on which the seller was not required to pay sales tax in the first place-"finance charge[s], interest, or sales tax" and "expenses incurred in attempting to collect" on the debts. So it would make little sense to allow a taxpayer to deduct these amounts as "bad debt." The second and fourth exceptions, on the other hand, represent situations where a seller received full consideration or its equivalent. Under a layaway agreement, addressed by the second exception, the seller remains in possession of the property. When the buyer defaults, the seller receives the full value of the property, which it would not otherwise have retained but for the buyer's default. And the full value of the property is presumably the sales price or close enough that the Legislature chose not to allow a tax refund for any diminution in value. Similarly, when a business sells its accounts receivable, the business in exchange receives what it considers to be the fair value of the accounts from the purchaser of the accounts. In both these scenarios, then, the taxpayer has received the equivalent of full consideration in connection with the sale. Thus, if "repossessed property" referred to the value of the account attached to the property regardless of whether or the extent to which any consideration was actually received, it would be unlike all of the other exclusions by allowing taxation of worthless consideration. Our conclusion here is further supported by the framework set forth in the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). Michigan is currently a member state under the SSUTA, and has therefore agreed to comply with the SSUTA's required provisions. Section 320 of the SSUTA requires member states to enact legislation allowing for bad-debt deductions. That section includes a list of exclusions from the definition of "bad debt" similar to the list contained in MCL 205.54i : Each member state shall use the following to provide a deduction for bad debts to a seller. To the extent a member state provides a bad debt deduction to any other party, the same procedures will apply. Each member state shall: A. Allow a deduction from taxable sales for bad debts. Any deduction taken that is attributed to bad debts shall not include interest. B. Utilize the federal definition of "bad debt" in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166 as the basis for calculating bad debt recovery. However, the amount calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Sec. 166 shall be adjusted to exclude: financing charges or interest; sales or use taxes charged on the purchase price; uncollectable amounts on property that remain in the possession of the seller until the full purchase price is paid; expenses incurred in attempting to collect any debt, and repossessed property.[ ] This section demonstrates that the exclusions are monetary amounts that must be subtracted from "bad debt" based upon the consideration actually received. That the Legislature was focused on this correlation is further illustrated by the fact that both the SSUTA and our statute provide that if taxes on "bad debt" are refunded, but that "bad debt" is subsequently collected, the taxpayer must pay back the refunded taxes. Finally, considering how other jurisdictions handle the present issue also supports our view. Because 23 other states are members of the SSUTA, 23 other states have bad-debt provisions similar to ours. A majority of the states that have addressed this issue have agreed with the interpretation offered above. Again, while these interpretations are not binding on our Court, they further confirm that the plain language of the provision supports interpreting "repossessed property" as the value of the repossessed property. In sum, we hold that the term "repossessed property" encompasses only what a taxpayer has collected-that is, the value of the repossessed property-it does not refer to the entire value of the account before the property was repossessed. B. WHETHER THE DEPARMENT COULD REQUIRE RD-108 FORMS Next, we must consider whether the Department properly denied a portion of plaintiffs' claims on the basis that plaintiffs did not provide validated RD-108 forms. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Department properly exercised its discretion under the bad-debt statute by requiring that plaintiffs provide RD-108 forms evidencing the taxes paid on each vehicle. The bad-debt statute, MCL 205.54i(4), provides: Any claim for a bad debt deduction under this section shall be supported by that evidence required by the department . The department shall review any change in the rate of taxation applicable to any taxable sales by a taxpayer claiming a deduction pursuant to this section and shall ensure that the deduction on any bad debt does not result in the taxpayer claiming the deduction recovering any more or less than the taxes imposed on the sale that constitutes the bad debt.[ ] The Department required plaintiffs to provide validated RD-108 forms supporting their claims for tax refunds. The RD-108 is an application for vehicle title and registration. The Department argues that, because the Secretary of State will only issue a validated RD-108 once sales tax is paid, the validated RD-108 provides the best evidence that the sales tax was paid and of the amount that was paid. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that because the auto dealerships are the parties that originally pay the taxes, the dealerships have possession of the RD-108 forms and, in some cases, may no longer have the forms in their files. Further, while plaintiffs can obtain the forms by request from the Secretary of State, to do so would cost plaintiffs $11 per form. In light of these circumstances, plaintiffs argue that the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously by not accepting plaintiffs' alternative documentation-plaintiffs' own spreadsheets tracking the amount of tax paid on each vehicle. The Department in this case was given discretion by the bad-debt statute to determine the evidence required to support a party's claim for a deduction or refund. When an agency is granted discretion by a statute, the agency's exercise of that discretion will be upheld if supported by a rational basis. Except for the accounts for which plaintiffs produced the RD-108 forms, plaintiffs have provided no evidence that sales taxes were actually paid. Plaintiffs provided their own internal records accounting for the payments, but these records do not show that the taxes were actually remitted. Further, while plaintiffs argue that taxes were clearly paid because the Secretary of State issued the vehicle titles, the fact that a title was issued does not conclusively establish that taxes were paid and does not indicate the amount of taxes paid. As a result, plaintiffs have not shown that the Department's requirement that plaintiffs provide the validated RD-108 forms had no rational basis. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Department properly exercised its discretion under the bad-debt statute by requiring that plaintiffs provide RD-108 forms evidencing the taxes paid on each vehicle. C. WHETHER ALLY PRESENTED VALID ELECTION FORMS Finally, we must consider the Department's determination that Ally did not present valid election forms supporting its refund claims. These forms, like all legal texts, must be interpreted according to their plain language. We conclude that the Department's interpretation is incompatible with the plain language of the election forms. Under MCL 205.54i, two entities can potentially claim a bad-debt refund-the retailer that remitted the sales tax to the Department or the lender holding the account receivable. The statute requires that the party seeking a tax refund for a bad debt must provide the Department with a written election document designating whether the retailer or the lender may claim the refund. MCL 205.54i(3) provides: After September 30, 2009, if a taxpayer who reported the tax and a lender execute and maintain a written election designating which party may claim the deduction, a claimant is entitled to a deduction or refund of the tax related to a sale at retail that was previously reported and paid if all of the following conditions are met: (a) No deduction or refund was previously claimed or allowed on any portion of the account receivable. (b) The account receivable has been found worthless and written off by the taxpayer that made the sale or the lender on or after September 30, 2009. In this case, Ally paid the auto dealerships the entire cost, including sales tax, of the purchased vehicles in exchange for the right to collect under the installment contracts. Ally provided the Department with election forms that were executed by Ally and the dealerships between 2012 and 2014. These election documents contained the following provision designating Ally as the party entitled to claim the tax refund: The Retailer and the Lender agree that the Lender is the party entitled to claim any potential sales tax refunds or deductions under MCL 205.54i as a result of bad debt losses charged off after September 30, 2009, on any and all Accounts currently existing or created in the future which have been assigned from the Retailer to the Lender.[ ] The Department argues that because the forms only apply to accounts "currently existing or created in the future," the forms do not apply to accounts which were written off prior to the execution of the election forms. The question, then, is whether Ally's accounts written off prior to execution of the election documents were "currently existing" accounts. Some background on when and how accounts must be written off is helpful in addressing this issue. In order to claim a bad-debt deduction or refund under the statute, the debt must have been charged off as uncollectible in the records of the entity claiming the deduction or refund. MCL 205.54i(2) provides: In computing the amount of tax levied under this act for any month, a taxpayer may deduct the amount of bad debts from his or her gross proceeds used for the computation of the tax. The amount of gross proceeds deducted must be charged off as uncollectible on the books and records of the taxpayer at the time the debt becomes worthless and deducted on the return for the period during which the bad debt is written off as uncollectible in the claimant's books and records and must be eligible to be deducted for federal income tax purposes.[ ] A write-off is simply an internal recognition by a lender that an account is worthless after attempts at collection have failed. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained, "When a lending institution 'writes off' a 'bad debt,' it is merely indicating that the debt is uncollectible. That is, it is no longer an asset of the institution. A 'write off' does not mean that the institution has forgiven the debt or that the debt is not still owing." Our Legislature has recognized that the debt is still owing-and may be collected-after it is written off and has required taxpayers to repay the amount deducted as bad debt on such amounts. Because written-off accounts still continue to be collectible and are only deemed worthless for tax computation and accounting purposes, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that Ally's previously written-off accounts were not "currently existing" at the time that the election forms were executed. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred by upholding the Department's interpretation of "repossessed property" and by upholding the Department's rejection of Ally's election forms, but we hold that the Court of Appeals properly upheld the Department's decision to require RD-108 forms from plaintiffs. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the Department's denial on the basis that the statute excludes debts associated with repossessed property and that plaintiff Ally's election forms did not apply to the debts at issue. We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to the Department's denial of a portion of plaintiffs' claims on the basis that plaintiffs did not provide validated RD-108 forms. We remand to the Court of Claims for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Stephen J. Markman Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack Richard H. Bernstein Kurtis T. Wilder Elizabeth T. Clement Both plaintiffs' refund requests involved a combination of accounts attached to vehicles that had been repossessed and accounts attached to vehicles that had not been repossessed. Daimler Chrysler Servs. of North America, LLC v. Dep't of Treasury, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 21, 2010 (Docket No. 288347) 2010 WL 199575. Ally Fin., Inc. v. State Treasurer , 317 Mich. App. 316, 337, 894 N.W.2d 673 (2016). Id . at 330-333, 894 N.W.2d 673. Id . at 326-330, 894 N.W.2d 673. Ally Fin., Inc. v. State Treasurer , 500 Mich. 1010, 896 N.W.2d 10 (2017). People v. Pinkney , 501 Mich. 259, 267, 912 N.W.2d 535 (2018). Detroit v. Detroit Commercial College , 322 Mich. 142, 149, 33 N.W.2d 737 (1948). SBC Health Midwest, Inc. v. City of Kentwood , 500 Mich. 65, 71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (2017), quoting Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lansing Twp. , 423 Mich. 661, 664-665; 378 N.W.2d 737 (1985). MCL 205.54i is part of Michigan's General Sales Tax Act (GSTA), MCL 205.51 et seq . MCL 205.54i(3). MCL 205.54i(4). This is not a case in which the Department's decision can be upheld in its entirety because it provided at least one valid basis for denying plaintiffs' claims. Instead, each basis provided by the Department only applied to a portion of the bad-debt accounts held by plaintiffs-i.e., the accounts for which plaintiffs had repossessed the vehicle, the accounts for which plaintiffs did not provide RD-108 forms, and the accounts for which Ally purportedly did not provide valid election forms. Accordingly, it is necessary to address the validity of each basis provided by the Department for rejecting plaintiffs' claims. Madugula v. Taub , 496 Mich. 685, 696, 853 N.W.2d 75 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Id . (quotation marks and citation omitted). Id . Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (St. Paul: Thomson/West, 2012), p. 167. MCL 205.51(b) defines "sale at retail" as "a sale, lease, or rental of tangible personal property for any purpose other than for resale, sublease, or subrent." MCL 205.51(1)(c). MCL 205.51(1)(d). The term "credit" "refers to a charge on account, made upon the sale of the merchandise." Gardner-White Co. v. State Bd. of Tax Administration , 296 Mich. 225, 233, 295 N.W. 624 (1941) (interpreting a prior version of the GSTA). Id . See Menard Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 302 Mich. App. 467, 480, 838 N.W.2d 736 (2013) ("[T]he bad debt provision allows taxpayers to recover overpayment when expected sales proceeds are not received.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Citizens' Acceptance Corp. v. United States , 462 F.2d 751, 756 (C.A. 3, 1972) (noting that the bad debt deduction accounts, in part, for "amounts reported as income but ultimately not collected because they became worthless"). Emphasis added. See Revenue Admin. Bull 2015-27 (noting that a taxpayer "may not claim the bad debt deduction for any amounts represented by the repossessed [property], including the amounts it did not recover in the sale"); Revenue Admin. Bull 1989-61 ("The bad debt deduction for sales tax purposes shall not include any amount represented by the following: ... 6. Sales tax charged on property that is subsequently repossessed.") (quotation marks omitted). We need not reach the issue of whether the bulletins were entitled to "respectful consideration" by the lower courts pursuant to In re Complaint of Rovas Against SBC Mich. , 482 Mich. 90, 93, 754 N.W.2d 259 (2008), in light of MCL 24.232(5) because, as explained below, we find that the Department's interpretation conflicts with the plain language of the bad-debt statute. MCL 205.54i(1)(a). 26 USC 166. " 'If any section [of a law] be intricate, obscure, or doubtful, the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of the other.' " Reading Law , p. 167, quoting Coke, First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England or a Commentary upon Littleton (14th ed, 1791), p. 381a. Retaining the property, which presumably has not diminished in value, may be thought of as roughly analogous to the seller having repossessed real property sold on credit and submitting a winning bid at a subsequent sale of the property for the entire amount of the outstanding debt. Cf. Bank of America, NA v. First American Title Ins. Co. , 499 Mich. 74, 88-89, 878 N.W.2d 816 (2016) (discussing the "full credit bid rule" by which a lender at the foreclosure sale successfully bids the entire remaining debt, thus extinguishing the debt). In that case, no portion of the debt remains owing. Similarly, if a layaway seller retains the item, it has essentially submitted a successful bid on the property for the full amount of the debt (or at least the full amount of the debt that arises from "gross proceeds"). Indeed, a secured party in possession of collateral has a duty to use "reasonable care in the custody and preservation of [the] collateral ...." MCL 440.9207(1). To this end, the secured party can use the collateral "for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value." MCL 440.9207(2)(d). This same point can be seen through the prism of the associated-words canon (noscitur a sociis ). Under this interpretive principle, a statutory term must "be viewed in light of the words surrounding it." Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304, 318, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). The canon applies when words or phrases "are associated in a context suggesting that the words [or phrases] have something in common," and "they should be assigned a permissible meaning that makes them similar." Reading Law , p. 195. Here, the commonality among the other four exclusions is that none imposes a tax on worthless consideration. As noted, the first and third exclusions account for items that never constituted taxable consideration. And the seller in the second and fourth exclusions has received the equivalent of full consideration. Thus, the manifest commonality among the exclusions is that they do not exclude worthless consideration. The SSUTA is a multistate compact designed to reduce the burden on out-of-state businesses of complying with state sales and use taxation. See Galle, Designing Interstate Institutions: The Example of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement , 40 UC Davis L Rev. 1381, 1392-93 (2007). The SSUTA was formed in response to Quill Corp. v. North Dakota , 504 U.S. 298, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992), which held that, under the current state taxation regime, the Commerce Clause requires that states only impose sales and use taxes on businesses that have some physical presence in the state. Designing Interstate Institutions , 40 UC Davis L Rev. at 1389-92. The SSUTA was drafted over a period of two years by a coalition of state legislators, state revenue department administrators, and local government officials. Hellerstein & Swain, Streamlined Sales and Use Tax, ¶ 2.04 (2004). Member states to the SSUTA agree to enact legislation reflecting the provisions set forth in the SSUTA. Designing Interstate Institutions , 40 UC Davis L Rev. at 1393. See the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Administration Act, MCL 205.801 et seq . Our bad-debt statute, enacted by 1982 PA 23, predates the SSUTA, to which our state became a signatory in 2005. And while provisions of the SSUTA that are inconsistent with our law do not have effect and may not be read as invalidating or amending any provision of our law, see MCL 205.811(1) and (5), analogous provisions of the SSUTA that are consistent with our laws are of some use in providing insight into the meaning of our statute. SSUTA, § 320. See MCL 205.54i(2) ("If a consumer or other person pays all or part of a bad debt with respect to which a taxpayer claimed a deduction under this section, the taxpayer is liable for the amount of taxes deducted in connection with that portion of the debt for which payment is received and shall remit these taxes in his or her next payment to the department."); SSUTA, § 320(D) ("[I]f a deduction is taken for a bad debt and the debt is subsequently collected in whole or in part, the tax on the amount so collected must be paid and reported on the return filed for the period in which the collection is made."). Nine states have clarified that only the value of the repossessed property is excluded. See Ind Code 6-2.5-6-9(d)(2) ("The amount of the deduction shall be determined in the manner provided by Section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code for bad debts but shall be adjusted to exclude: ... (E) repossessed property.") and SAC Fin., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue , 24 N.E.3d 541, 546 (Ind. Tax Ct., 2014) ("Subsection (d) requires a taxpayer to exclude amounts that reduce the original sales tax base (i.e. , the value of repossessed property or property still in the seller's possession) and that were not part of the original retail sales tax base (i.e. , interest, financing charges, sales or use tax, and debt collection expenses) from the difference between gross retail income and the amount of the federal bad debt."); Minn. Stat. 289A.40 ("[T]he following are excluded from the calculation of bad debt: ... repossessed property.") and Minn. Admin. R 8130.7400(4) ("In the case of repossessions, an uncollectible debt deduction is allowable only to the extent that the pro rata portion of all payments and credits, attributable to the cash sales price of the merchandise is less than the net contract balance (after excluding unearned insurance and finance charges) at the date of repossession."); Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-2708(2)(j)(i ) ("[T]he amount calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 166 shall be adjusted to exclude: ... repossessed property.") and 316 Neb Admin. Code, R 1-027 ("The sales tax previously remitted by a retailer arising from the sale of property, which is subsequently repossessed, may be allowed as a credit against the retailer's current sales tax liability, but only to the extent of the portion of the purchase price remaining unpaid at the time of repossession."); Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.368(3) ("The amount of any deduction claimed must equal the amount of a deduction that may be claimed pursuant to section 166 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 166, for that sale minus: ... (e) The value of any property sold that has been repossessed by the retailer."); ND Cent Code 57-39.4-21 ("However, the amount calculated pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 166 shall be adjusted to exclude ... repossessed property.") and ND Admin. Code, R 81-04.1-01-20 ("When retailers sell tangible personal property on time payments, and it becomes necessary for the retailer to repossess the tangible personal property, the transaction is handled as follows: 1. If the retailer previously included the total selling price of the tangible personal property in the retailer's gross sales and remitted tax to the tax commissioner but did not collect sales tax from the buyer, the retailer may enter a credit in the amount of the unpaid balance of the original sale."); SD Codified Laws 10-45-30 ("Bad debts do not include ... repossessed property.") and SD Admin. R 64:06:01:09 ("If repossession by the finance company becomes necessary, the retailer may deduct as a bad debt, as provided in SDCL 10-45-30, that portion of the tax previously paid, provided that in liquidation of the repossessed merchandise the retailer has actually suffered a loss and the gross receipts prove to be less than anticipated under the original contract price."); Tenn. Code Ann. 67-4-1030(b) ("A bad debt shall not include ... repossessed property.") and Tenn. Code Ann. 67-6-507(d) ("In the event a dealer ... be required to repossess ... personal property at a time when the balance due on the unpaid purchase price shall exceed five hundred dollars ($500), the dealer shall be entitled to a credit on the sales tax that the dealer shall be required to collect and remit to the commissioner, in an amount equal to the difference between the amount of the sales tax collected and paid at the time of the original purchase and the amount of sales tax that would be owed on that portion of the purchase price that has actually been paid by the purchaser, plus the sales tax on the first five hundred dollars ($500) of the unpaid balance of the purchase price."); Wash. Rev. Code 82.08.037(2) ("For purposes of this section, 'bad debts' does not include: ... (d) Repossessed property.") and Wash. Admin. Code 458-20-196 ("However, 'bad debts' do not include: ... (iv) The value of repossessed property taken in payment of debt."); Wis. Stat. 77.585(1)(a) (" 'Bad debt' does not include ... repossessed property or items.") and Wis. Admin. Code Tax 11-30(2)(f) ("Repossessions . When property, items, or goods on which a receivable exists are repossessed, a bad debt deduction is allowable only to the extent that the seller sustains a net loss of the sales price upon which tax was paid."). Three states have adopted the opposite approach. See NC Gen. Stat. 105-164.13 (setting forth sales tax exemptions without following the format of SSUTA, § 320) and 17 NC Admin. Code, R 7B.3002 ("Retailers shall not deduct from their gross taxable sales the unpaid amounts on repossessed merchandise."); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 5739.121 (" 'Bad debt' does not include ... repossessed property.") and Ohio Admin. Code 5703-9-44(A) ("No amount can be excluded as a bad debt that represents: ... (7) Any uncollectible amount on property repossessed by or on behalf of the vendor."); Utah Code Ann 59-12-107 (" '[B]ad debt' does not include: ... (G) an amount that a seller does not collect on repossessed property."). Eight states appear to have taken no position on the correct interpretation of the "repossessed property" exclusion. See Ga. Code Ann. 48-8-45 ; Iowa Code 423.21 ; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 139.350 ; N.J. Stat. Ann. 54:32B-20.1 ; RI Gen. Laws 44-18.1-21 ; 10-060-33 Vt. Code R 1.9780; W. Va. Code 11-15B-27 ; Wyo. Stat. Ann. 39-15-107. Finally, three states have interpreted the "repossessed property" exclusion in SSUTA, § 320 as excluding only the expenses incurred in repossessing the property. See Ark. Code 26-52-309(b) ; Kan. Stat. Ann. 79-3674(b) ; Okla. Stat., tit. 68, § 1366(B)(4). Emphasis added. MCL 205.54i(4). See Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 198 Mich. App. 363, 381-382, 499 N.W.2d 349 (1993) ("The SBTA gives the Commissioner of Revenue discretion to allow consolidation of tax returns. We will uphold the commissioner's decision not to allow consolidation retroactively, unless there is no rational basis for it. See Clarke-Gravely Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 412 Mich. 484, 489, 315 N.W.2d 517 (1982)."). For example, the vehicle purchase may be exempted from taxation. See MCL 257.815(1) ("Each application for registration ... shall be accompanied by a statement showing the amount of the sales tax due upon the sale of the motor vehicle, ... except if the sale of a motor vehicle is exempt by law from the payment of the sales tax, a tax shall not be paid .") (emphasis added). And, as noted above, plaintiffs are not left without any method of obtaining the refunds because they can obtain these forms from the Secretary of State for a reasonable cost. Reading Law , p. xxvii ("Our legal system must regain a mooring that it has lost: a generally agreed on approach to the interpretation of legal texts. ... We look for meaning in the governing text ...."). MCL 205.54i(1)(e) (" 'Taxpayer' means a person that has remitted sales tax directly to the department on the specific sales at retail transaction for which the bad debt is recognized for federal income tax purposes or, after September 30, 2009, a lender holding the account receivable for which the bad debt is recognized, or would be recognized if the claimant were a corporation, for federal income tax purposes."). MCL 205.54i(3). Emphasis added. MCL 205.54i(2). Emphasis added. Mitchell Bank v. Schanke , 268 Wis.2d 571, 582 n. 7, 2004 WI 13, 676 N.W.2d 849 (2004). See MCL 205.54i(2).

Bernstein, J. In these consolidated cases, we consider whether the trial court erred by declining to grant new trials following defendants' motions for relief from judgment. After weighing the evidence presented at the trials along with defendants' claims of newly discovered evidence, we hold that the evidence in the form of testimony given by Charmous Skinner Jr. (Skinner) would make a different result probable on retrial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part and remand these cases to the trial court for new trials. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY These cases arise from the murder of Lisa Kindred. Between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on May 9, 1999, Lisa was shot and killed while in her vehicle with her three children-Decola (newborn), Shelby (2 years old), and Skinner (8 years old). Earlier in the evening, Lisa, her husband (William Kindred), and her three children had gone to see a movie, "Life," at a drive-in theater in Dearborn, Michigan. On their way home, William announced that he wanted to make a stop on the east side of Detroit to talk to his sister's boyfriend, Verlin Miller, about purchasing a motorcycle. Lisa, who was driving, parked their minivan across the street from Miller's home and waited in the van with the children while William went inside. At one point, Lisa went to the door of the house and asked William to come back to the van, but William told her that he would be out shortly, and Lisa returned to the van. Soon afterward, William heard a noise, which turned out to be gunfire, and went to the front door just in time to see both Lisa's van speeding away and a man fleeing on foot. William chased after the fleeing individual but failed to catch him. Having been struck by the gunfire, Lisa drove the van to a nearby gas station, stopped, and then collapsed out of the vehicle. She later died at the hospital. The medical examiner's report revealed that Lisa's death was caused by a single gunshot wound to the chest. The report also revealed that small wounds on her body were consistent with her having been shot through an intervening medium. The driver's window had been shattered, but nothing had been stolen from the van. The children were not harmed, and they were still in the vehicle when the police arrived at the scene. A .22 caliber spent casing was found in the street at the scene of the shooting. Two individuals who were in the same neighborhood at the time of the crime, Antonio Burnette and Raymond Jackson, implicated defendants Justly Johnson and Kendrick Scott in the shooting. All four individuals knew each other from the same neighborhood. Johnson and Scott were tried separately-Johnson by bench trial and Scott by jury trial. Judge Prentis Edwards presided over both trials. Burnette and Jackson testified at both trials. A. JOHNSON'S BENCH TRIAL In both trials, Burnette was the prosecutor's key witness. However, it is difficult to construct a linear time line of events from the night of the shooting according to Burnette's testimony, given the many inconsistencies in his testimony. According to Burnette, he was initially with both defendants the evening before the shooting. Burnette testified that Scott had discussed "planning something" but that Johnson had not said anything. However, when the prosecutor pointed out that Burnette had previously testified at the preliminary examination that both defendants had discussed plans for that evening with him, Burnette agreed that such a conversation had occurred. Burnette also failed to recall whether defendants had mentioned planning to "hit[ ] a lick," which he explained meant robbing someone. The prosecutor refreshed Burnette's memory with his preliminary examination testimony, and Burnette then clarified that defendants had discussed hitting a lick. Burnette then testified that his father picked him up at 10:30 p.m. Burnette claimed that he again met up with both defendants around 2:30 a.m., at which point Johnson told him that Scott had shot a lady because she owed Scott money. However, Burnette also testified that he and Johnson drove around with an individual named Mike at some point in the evening. It is unclear from Burnette's testimony whether this drive took place earlier in the evening, before Burnette's father picked him up and before the shooting, or whether it occurred after Burnette met up again with defendants at 2:30 a.m. Burnette testified that Mike drove Johnson and him around and that Mike eventually dropped them both off when their plans fell through. At one point during his testimony, Burnette stated that he was dropped off at the same gas station that Lisa drove to. Burnette also testified that he saw an ambulance and police vehicles at the gas station, suggesting that this took place after the shooting. However, Burnette's testimony changed several times as to whether Johnson was with him when he saw the ambulance at the gas station. Burnette also testified that, alternatively, he was dropped off elsewhere in Detroit, that he did not return to the gas station, and that he did not see an ambulance there. Burnette further testified that when he met up with both defendants at 2:30 a.m., all three of them were smoking and drinking. Burnette testified that he had consumed 32 bottles of Budweiser and a half pint of Hennessy the day of the shooting, in addition to smoking 10 marijuana cigars. Burnette claimed that, while he was in this state, Johnson told him that Scott had shot a woman because she owed Scott money. Burnette also testified that he had first learned that a woman had been shot when he went to purchase marijuana earlier that evening and saw an ambulance and police officers in the neighborhood. It is unclear from Burnette's testimony whether this was related to his purported sighting of an ambulance and police officers at the gas station, or whether this was a separate incident. In any case, Burnette later contradicted himself yet again by stating that defendants were the ones who first informed him that someone had been shot. Burnette also testified unclearly about whether his knowledge of the victim's name came from defendants or the police. Burnette agreed that, in his police statement, he stated that the woman who owed Scott money was named "Lisa." However, when Burnette was asked whether he knew anyone by that name, he testified that he did not. When he was asked if the police had given him that name, Burnette said that they had. Burnette claimed that he saw both defendants with guns that night, an AK-47 and a .22 caliber rifle, albeit only after his memory was refreshed. Burnette testified that he saw Johnson place a gun in a vehicle and that Scott, sometime around 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. the morning after the shooting, placed the other gun in a different vehicle. Burnette went to sleep in Scott's car, where the police later found him. Burnette was taken in for questioning, and he testified that the police told him that he would be charged with a homicide offense. Turning to Jackson's testimony, Jackson stated that, in the early morning hours on the day of the shooting, he woke up in his grandmother's home after hearing a gunshot. When Jackson eventually went outside to see what had happened, he saw a police car in front of the field next door to his grandmother's house. Jackson testified that when he looked down the street, he saw Scott standing on his girlfriend's porch and saw Scott hand his girlfriend something long and covered in clothing. Jackson testified that he believed this object to be a dog leash. Shortly thereafter, the police took Jackson and Scott downtown for questioning, and Jackson said that he eventually returned home while the police kept Scott at the station. A police officer confirmed that Scott was still in custody when the officer reported to work between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m. that morning. Sometime after Jackson returned to his grandmother's house, Johnson came over. Jackson alleged that Johnson was drunk when they spoke. But Jackson admitted that he, too, had consumed marijuana and three 40-ounce bottles of beer. It is unclear when, and in what time frame, Jackson consumed these substances. Jackson also acknowledged that he sometimes saw and heard things that were not there, that he was recently released from the hospital after being admitted for mental health issues, and that he was taking prescription medications for his mental health conditions when the shooting occurred. In contrast to Burnette's testimony, Jackson testified that Johnson, not Scott, had admitted to "hit[ting] a lick" and that Johnson "messed up and had to shoot." However, Jackson clarified that the phrase "hit a lick" could mean a variety of things, only one of which was to rob someone. Johnson also told Jackson that this occurred in the field next to Jackson's grandmother's home and that Scott was with him. Later, police arrived at Jackson's home and arrested Johnson. Sometime after Johnson's arrest, Jackson was held again at the police station. Jackson claimed that, while he was in custody, Johnson verbally threatened him for what he had told the police. Like Burnette, Jackson's testimony also suffered from some inconsistencies, most notably whether Jackson was threatened by the police. On cross-examination, Jackson testified that the police had not threatened him. However, Jackson later testified that the second time he was at the police station, the police scared him, and he felt that if he did not come forward with "the truth," the police would try to pin the murder on him. Johnson testified on his own behalf, denying any involvement in the shooting. Johnson testified that he met up with Scott and Burnette at Scott's home at around 9:30 p.m. the evening before the shooting. Johnson testified that he and Burnette were then continuously together that evening. Johnson did not testify as to the first purported conversation between him, Scott, and Burnette. Johnson testified that he later drove around with Mike and Burnette and that Johnson and Burnette were ultimately dropped off at the gas station at around 1:00 or 1:15 a.m., where Johnson saw several police cars gathered. From there, Burnette and Johnson returned to Scott's home, and Johnson told Scott that he had seen the police at the gas station. Johnson's girlfriend then picked him up around 2:30 a.m. Johnson confirmed that the next day he went over to Jackson's house, but Johnson denied speaking to Jackson about hitting a lick. Judge Edwards found Johnson guilty of first-degree felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and carrying or possessing a firearm when committing or attempting to commit a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Johnson was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, 20 to 30 years' imprisonment for assault with intent to rob while armed, and a consecutive two-year sentence for the felony-firearm conviction. B. SCOTT'S JURY TRIAL At Scott's trial, Burnette's testimony was more internally consistent but differed in large portions from his testimony at Johnson's bench trial. Burnette again testified that on the night of the shooting, he was with both defendants at Scott's house when defendants mentioned that they were going to hit a lick. Burnette then testified that his father picked him up at 10:30 p.m. and that they were together until around 2:00 a.m., at which point Burnette went back to Scott's house and met up with both defendants. Notably missing from Burnette's testimony was any indication that he had spent time that night driving around with Johnson and Mike. Burnette also did not mention having seen any ambulances or police cars in the neighborhood. As before, Burnette testified that, at Scott's house, all three of the men were drinking and smoking marijuana and that he had personally consumed 32 bottles of Budweiser and a half pint of Hennessy, in addition to smoking 10 marijuana cigars. Burnette testified that Scott told him that "they had shot a lady" because she would not give them any money, while Johnson told him that only Scott "had shot the lady." This time, Burnette claimed he distinctly remembered that this was the first time he learned a lady had been shot, not when he saw police at the gas station. Burnette testified that both defendants told him that the shooting happened at the gas station. Burnette also testified that Scott was the one who told him that the woman's name was "Lisa" and that Johnson told him that Johnson and Scott had an "AK and a rifle." According to Burnette, his conversation with Johnson and Scott lasted until 3:00 a.m. or 4:30 a.m., at which point Johnson left when his girlfriend arrived to pick him up. Consistent with his prior testimony, Burnette claimed that he went to sleep in Scott's car, where he was later awakened by the police. Burnette then gave conflicting testimony regarding whether the police threatened to charge him in connection with Lisa's murder. He first claimed that the police did not threaten him but then admitted that he had previously testified that the police indicated they were going to charge him if he did not state that defendants had killed Lisa. Burnette also testified that people in the neighborhood had threatened him for speaking to the police and testifying. Jackson testified consistently with his testimony at Johnson's trial that he heard a gunshot, went outside to see a police vehicle, saw Scott, and was questioned by the police that evening along with Scott. Jackson further explained that when the police questioned him and Scott after the shooting, Scott told the police that he saw two men walking through his girlfriend's yard and that both men had rifles. Jackson said the police then took him and Scott downtown for further questioning at around 1:15 a.m. Jackson then returned to his grandmother's home, and he was unaware if Scott was also released from custody. Johnson visited the following morning. Jackson testified that he had started drinking before Johnson came over, but Jackson did not mention how much he drank and did not mention that he had ingested any other substances, like prescription medicine or marijuana. Jackson's testimony as to what Johnson said was consistent with his testimony at Johnson's trial. Jackson stated that he went to the police station the following day because the police had told him that he was "hiding something." Scott did not testify or call any witnesses. A .22 caliber rifle was found at Scott's girlfriend's home, but the parties stipulated that the rifle was inoperable. A jury convicted Scott of the same offenses for which Johnson had been convicted, and Judge Edwards imposed the same sentences. C. DIRECT APPEALS AND MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT Both defendants appealed by right. The Court of Appeals affirmed Johnson's convictions. People v. Johnson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 26, 2002 ( Docket No. 228547, 2002 WL 484610 ). The same Court of Appeals panel vacated on double-jeopardy grounds Scott's conviction of assault with intent to rob while armed but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences. People v. Scott , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 26, 2002 ( Docket No. 228548, 2002 WL 483420 ). This Court denied both defendants' applications for leave to appeal. People v. Johnson , 467 Mich. 911 (2002); People v. Scott , 467 Mich. 911, 654 N.W.2d 334 (2002). Johnson thereafter filed three motions for relief from judgment. In his second motion for relief from judgment, Johnson presented, as a claim of newly discovered evidence, Burnette's recantation and an affidavit from Jackson's relative that Jackson lied at the trials. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals and this Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Johnson , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered February 11, 2009 (Docket No. 287529); People v. Johnson , 485 Mich. 893, 772 N.W.2d 365 (2009). Johnson's third motion for relief from judgment presented additional newly discovered evidence, which included police reports regarding domestic violence disputes between William and Lisa. Again, the trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals and this Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Johnson , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 2, 2010 (Docket No. 298189); People v. Johnson , 489 Mich. 990, 800 N.W.2d 74 (2011). Johnson filed his current and fourth motion for relief from judgment in December 2011. In particular, Johnson claimed that there was newly discovered evidence that one of the victim's children, Skinner, could attest that neither defendant was the shooter. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals denied relief. People v. Johnson , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 30, 2013 (Docket No. 311625). Scott filed his first and only motion for relief from judgment in March 2013. Scott raised the same newly discovered evidence claim concerning Skinner, along with the claims of newly discovered evidence that Johnson had made in his previous motions for relief from judgment. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Scott , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 5, 2013 (Docket No. 317915). Both defendants filed applications for leave to appeal in this Court. This Court remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted, directing the Court of Appeals to first remand these cases to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v. Ginther , 390 Mich. 436, 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973), to determine whether defendants were deprived of their right to the effective assistance of counsel and whether defendants were entitled to new trials based on newly discovered evidence. People v. Johnson , 497 Mich. 897, 855 N.W.2d 749 (2014) ; People v. Scott , 497 Mich. 897, 855 N.W.2d 750 (2014). D. EVIDENTIARY HEARING After consolidating the cases, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Skinner testified that he was eight years old at the time his mother was killed. Skinner testified that on the evening in question, he and his family went to a drive-in movie theater, specifically recalling that they saw the movie "Life." When they stopped at Miller's house after the movie, Skinner testified that William went in by himself, while everyone else waited in the car. Skinner was originally sitting in the back seat of the van, but he had moved up to the front passenger seat as they waited for William to return. Skinner remembered that Lisa appeared agitated and that she left the van at one point to briefly speak with William. When she returned to the van and opened the door to get back in, Skinner saw a man behind her. Skinner recalled that the man was African-American and in his mid-thirties, with very short hair, a beard, and a big nose. Skinner testified that the man's face was visible, even though it was dark out, because the dome light of the van had turned on when Lisa opened the door. Skinner stated that the man was standing behind Lisa and off to the side, and he was able to see the man for "[a]bout 25 seconds." When the man was about 6 inches behind her, with the door between him and Lisa, Skinner heard a gunshot, and the driver's-side window shattered. Lisa got into the car and raced to the nearest gas station, where she later collapsed. After his mother's death, Skinner never talked to William or the rest of his family about what he saw that night. He was not interviewed by any police officers, but he testified that if an officer had asked him about what he witnessed that night, he would have told the truth and would have been able to identify the shooter. Some time after the shooting, Skinner moved to Pennsylvania to live with his biological father's family. His family attempted to speak to him about his mother's death, but Skinner refused. He recalled seeing a counselor to talk about his mother, but he did not tell the counselor about what he saw that night. In 2007, the Wisconsin Innocence Project contacted Skinner by telephone, and Skinner indicated that he saw what had happened to his mother. Skinner did not give the Wisconsin Innocence Project a description of the shooter, and the Wisconsin Innocence Project never followed up with Skinner. In 2011, Skinner was contacted by an investigative reporter, who wrote a letter inquiring about his mother's death. Skinner testified that when he received the letter, he was surprised to learn that they were still trying to find out who had killed his mother. Based on this letter and the news articles he read, Skinner got the impression that defendants were wrongly convicted, so he spoke to the reporter, revealing for the first time his account of the shooting and giving the reporter a description of the shooter, noting that he "will never forget the person's face." The Michigan Innocence Clinic subsequently showed Skinner a photo lineup that included pictures of both defendants from the time of the incident, and he was confident that the person who shot his mother was not in the lineup. At the evidentiary hearing, Skinner acknowledged that he had been previously convicted of perjury for falsely testifying in a case in which his friend was charged in connection with a double homicide. But Skinner testified that he would not lie to protect someone he did not know and that he would tell the truth in order to find his mother's killer. Dr. Katherine Rosenblum, who was qualified as an expert in clinical and developmental psychology, also testified at the evidentiary hearing. Rosenblum testified that an eight-year-old child who witnessed a traumatic event would certainly be mature enough to have clear memories of the event. Rosenblum noted that research suggests a "narrowing of attention" in moments of high traumatic stress that leads people to "focus on and remember very clearly particular details ... to the exclusion of some other, more peripheral details." Burnette also testified at the evidentiary hearing, recanting much of what he had testified to at defendants' trials. Burnette asserted that neither defendant confessed to robbing or shooting a woman. Burnette also testified that he did not see either defendant with a gun on the day in question and that he was with Johnson at a relative's home at the time of the shooting. Burnette took back his previous testimony that the police had not threatened him, indicating that he had been afraid that he would be charged with the murder if he did not implicate someone. Burnette also stated that he was not coerced by either defendant or their families into giving his recantation testimony. On cross-examination, the prosecutor cited Burnette's preliminary examination testimony, in which he had testified that he was afraid of defendants, but Burnette denied this, saying he was coached by the police to say he was scared. Though Jackson had died in 2008, his cousin, Lameda Thomas, testified at the evidentiary hearing that Jackson had told her that he had lied on the stand out of fear of prosecution on two separate occasions. Specifically, Thomas testified that Jackson had stated he lied about Johnson telling him he hit a lick and had to shoot. E. TRIAL COURT'S RULING The trial court denied both defendants' motions for relief from judgment, concluding that there was no reasonable probability of a different result if Skinner testified on retrial. Specifically, the trial court found Skinner's testimony to be incredible for several reasons. First, the trial court concluded that Skinner could not have witnessed the shooting because Skinner would have been asleep based on the fact that he was on the way back from seeing the movie, "Life," which was not "Fantasia here or a Mickey Mouse cartoon. ... So we're talking about [a movie about] life imprisonment or whatever ... [s]omething that a child would have nothing to relate to." Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the children, including Skinner, "undoubtedly ... were asleep in the back of the van...." Second, even if Skinner had not been asleep, the trial court found that Skinner "wouldn't have been capable of seeing anybody outside," much less be able to pick out details regarding facial hair. The trial court reasoned that Lisa would have blocked Skinner's vision, as she stood between him and the shooter, and that the dome light would not have shed any light outside the car. Third, the trial court questioned Skinner's overall credibility based on his perjury conviction, stating: "Should we believe him, seeing as how he was in prison for perjury? I mean good grief. Doesn't that go right to the essence of it?" Lastly, the trial court noted that a significant amount of time had passed since the shooting had occurred. The trial court found it relevant that Skinner could not remember the name of his teacher or the school that he attended at the time. The trial court also found it hard to believe that Skinner would be able to remember what the shooter looked like: I bet [Skinner] couldn't remember what his mother looked like today. ... I have difficulty remembering what my father looked like, and it wasn't that long ago or my wife for that matter, which wasn't that long ago. But yet, he remembers what this shooter looked like at the time? I find it almost impossible to believe. With regard to Burnette and Jackson, the trial court stated that "[e]very one of the testimonies that were given during the course of the preliminary examination and the trial[s], and we're talking about four different occasions here, was the same by Mr. Burnett [sic] and by Mr. Jackson." The trial court also noted that both witnesses knew the type of weapon that was used for the killing and both witnesses identified the victim by name. As to Burnette's testimony that he was coached by the police, the trial court found this illogical, reasoning that the police would not be able to predict what would be asked of Burnette. The trial court finally concluded that it could not find "any reasonable probability that there would be a different result in this case, even if Mr. Skinner was allowed to give testimony in regard to this matter, nothing." F. COURT OF APPEALS' RULING The Court of Appeals majority affirmed the trial court's ruling in an unpublished per curiam opinion. People v. Johnson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 31, 2016 ( Docket No. 311625, 2016 WL 3067684 ). Although the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court's factual finding that Skinner had to have been asleep at the time of the shooting, the Court of Appeals nevertheless found that the trial court did not clearly err by finding Skinner's testimony unreliable. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the recantations were not part of this Court's remand order and that the trial court had thus erred by considering these other claims. Even if the recantations could be considered, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly determined that the recantations "seriously lacked any substantive weight." Id . at 10 n. 8. Defendants each filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted leave in both, ordering that the cases be argued together. People v. Johnson , 501 Mich. 914, 902 N.W.2d 883 (2017) ; People v. Scott , 501 Mich. 914, 902 N.W.2d 884 (2017). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v. Cress , 468 Mich. 678, 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 (2003). "An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." People v. Franklin , 500 Mich. 92, 100, 894 N.W.2d 561 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A mere difference in judicial opinion does not establish an abuse of discretion. Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. Waterbury Headers Corp. , 461 Mich. 219, 228, 600 N.W.2d 638 (1999). A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C). Clear error occurs if "the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake." People v. Douglas , 496 Mich. 557, 592, 852 N.W.2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted). MCR 2.613(C) provides that "regard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it ." (Emphasis added.) And "appellate courts need not refrain from scrutinizing a trial court's factual findings, nor may appellate courts tacitly endorse obvious errors under the guise of deference." People v. McSwain , 259 Mich.App. 654, 683, 676 N.W.2d 236 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted). III. ANALYSIS Motions for relief from judgment are governed by MCR 6.500 et seq . MCR 6.508(D)(3) provides that a court may not grant relief to a defendant if the motion alleges grounds for relief that could have been previously raised, unless the defendant demonstrates both good cause for failing to raise such grounds earlier as well as actual prejudice. The newly discovered evidence claim pertaining to Skinner's eyewitness account could not have been raised on appeal from defendants' convictions or in a prior motion for relief from judgment because defendants did not know that Skinner saw the shooting until 2011. Therefore, MCR 6.508(D)(3) does not bar the newly discovered evidence claims regarding Skinner's account. Although Scott's motion was his first motion for relief from judgment, Johnson's motion was a successive motion for relief from judgment, which is also governed by MCR 6.502(G). Generally speaking, "one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. ... A defendant may not appeal the denial or rejection of a successive motion." MCR 6.502(G)(1). However, a defendant may file a successive motion based on "a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion." MCR 6.502(G)(2). The prosecutor does not argue that defendants' claim of newly discovered evidence in the form of Skinner's testimony is procedurally barred, either under MCR 6.502(G) or MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a). In their current motions for relief from judgment, defendants raise the claim of newly discovered evidence in the form of Skinner's testimony. In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: "(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial." Cress , 468 Mich. at 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court of Appeals analyzed the first three Cress factors and concluded that defendants satisfied their burden under each factor. On appeal, the prosecutor does not contest the Court of Appeals' conclusions as to the first three factors of Cress . Thus, the central issue before this Court is the fourth prong of Cress , whether "the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial." Id . A. CREDIBILITY In order to determine whether newly discovered evidence makes a different result probable on retrial, a trial court must first determine whether the evidence is credible. Id . at 692-693, 664 N.W.2d 174. In making this assessment, the trial court should consider all relevant factors tending to either bolster or diminish the veracity of the witness's testimony. See id . at 692-694, 664 N.W.2d 174. A trial court's function is limited when reviewing newly discovered evidence, as it is not the ultimate fact-finder; should a trial court grant a motion for relief from judgment, the case would be remanded for retrial , not dismissal. In other words, a trial court's credibility determination is concerned with whether a reasonable juror could find the testimony credible on retrial. See Connelly v. United States , 271 F.2d 333, 335 (C.A. 8, 1959) ("The trial court has the right to determine the credibility of newly discovered evidence for which a new trial is asked, and if the court is satisfied that, on a new trial, such testimony would not be worthy of belief by the jury , the motion should be denied.") (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). Recently, in People v. Anderson , 501 Mich. 175, 912 N.W.2d 503 (2018), we compared the respective roles of a trial judge presiding over a motion for a new trial and a magistrate presiding over a preliminary examination when rendering credibility determinations. We held that, in the context of a preliminary examination, "[i]f a witness's lack of credibility, when considered together with the other evidence presented during the examination, is so lacking that 'a person of ordinary prudence and caution [would not] conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt,' a magistrate may not bind over the defendant for trial." Id . at 188-189, 912 N.W.2d 503 (citation omitted). See also People v. Lemmon , 456 Mich. 625, 637, 576 N.W.2d 129 (1998) ("As the trier of fact, the jury is the final judge of credibility.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Yaner v. People , 34 Mich. 286, 289 (1876) ("We do not desire to be understood that the magistrate must nicely weigh evidence as a petit jury would, or that he must discharge the accused where there is a conflict of evidence, or where there is a reasonable doubt as to his guilt; all such questions should be left for the jury upon the trial .") (emphasis added). Although Anderson does not control in this context, as we are not now dealing with a preliminary examination, a trial court similarly plays a preliminary gatekeeping role in assessing a defendant's motion for relief from judgment; in both situations, the trial court is contemplating a future trial and the role of a future fact-finder. If a witness's lack of credibility is such that no reasonable juror would consciously entertain a reasonable belief in the witness's veracity, then the trial court should deny a defendant's motion for relief from judgment. However, if a witness is not patently incredible, a trial court's credibility determination must bear in mind what a reasonable juror might make of the testimony, and not what the trial court itself might decide, were it the ultimate fact-finder. In this case, the trial court found that Skinner was not a credible witness. Importantly, the trial court noted that Skinner could not have witnessed the shooting, because the trial court found that Skinner must have been asleep. If Skinner was asleep for the shooting, then there could be no value to Skinner's testimony. As this was a factual determination, we review it for clear error, which exists if "the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake." See Douglas , 496 Mich. at 592, 852 N.W.2d 587 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We, like the Court of Appeals, conclude that the trial court clearly erred by finding that Skinner was asleep during the shooting. Nothing in the record suggested that Skinner had been asleep beyond the trial court's mere speculation that the movie "Life" would certainly put a child to sleep. Even if the trial court were right to assume that Skinner was asleep during the movie, there is nothing to suggest that Skinner could not have woken up afterwards. In fact, Skinner specifically testified that, once William went into the house, he climbed into the front passenger's seat with his mother, indicating that he was awake and did witness the events. Because the trial court's factual finding was not rooted in anything in the record, the trial court clearly erred by finding that Skinner was asleep during the shooting. The trial court also found that Skinner's testimony was not credible even if he had been awake. The trial court particularly questioned Skinner's ability to remember the shooter's face, noting that Skinner could not possibly remember what his own mother looked like, given that the trial judge had difficulty remembering his own father's face or his wife's face, despite them passing more recently than Lisa. To the extent the trial judge supported his credibility determination on the strength of his own memory, the trial court clearly erred. Because the focus is on whether a reasonable juror could credit Skinner's testimony, the trial judge's focus on his own personal gaps in memory was inappropriate. Whether or not a judge has a particularly good or bad memory has no legal relevance to whether a reasonable juror would find that a witness has the ability to recall something, especially when an expert witness has testified in support of that ability. In fact, the trial court failed to acknowledge Rosenblum's expert testimony, which indicated that it would not be impossible for a child of Skinner's age to recall specific details from a traumatic event several years later. The trial court additionally found that Skinner was not credible because Skinner could not have seen the shooter due to the position of Lisa's body. The trial court also considered the effect of Skinner's prior perjury conviction on his credibility. See MRE 609. Although it is appropriate for a trial court to take into account such weaknesses in a witness's testimony, the trial court failed to determine whether a reasonable juror might conclude that Skinner is nonetheless credible with regard to the facts at issue here. The trial court failed to consider whether a reasonable juror could have believed that, depending on the angle of approach, the darkness of the street, and the lighting conditions in the car, Skinner might have been able to make out defining characteristics of the shooter's face. A reasonable juror also could have credited the fact that Skinner lacked any motive to lie in this case. Although Skinner had a prior conviction for perjury, that conviction was obtained under circumstances very different from the case at hand. Indeed, Skinner's testimony corroborated several specific details that took place on the night of the shooting, such as the specific film his family had watched that night, that Lisa had been driving the van, that William had visited a relative's home while Lisa and the others waited in the van, that Lisa momentarily left the car to speak with William, and that the gunshot broke the driver's window. While Skinner's testimony contained some questionable aspects, which the trial court appropriately noted, it also contained some reliable aspects, which the trial court failed to acknowledge. When considering Skinner's testimony in its entirety, it is clear that his testimony is not wholly incredible, as the trial court found, and that a reasonable juror could find his testimony worthy of belief on retrial. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that Skinner's testimony was entirely incredible. B. RESULT ON RETRIAL Because a reasonable juror could have found Skinner's testimony to be credible, we now consider the impact of that testimony in conjunction with the evidence that would be presented on retrial. In examining whether this "new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial," the trial court must consider the evidence that was previously introduced at trial. Cress , 468 Mich. at 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 ; see also People v. Grissom , 492 Mich. 296, 321, 821 N.W.2d 50 (2012) (ordering "the trial court [on remand to] carefully consider the newly discovered evidence in light of the evidence presented at trial ") (emphasis added). The trial court must also consider the evidence that would be admitted at retrial , which in this case includes the recantation testimony. Cress specifically uses the term "retrial," which refers to a new trial. Thus, the evidence that must be taken into consideration when assessing a claim of newly discovered evidence is not simply the evidence presented at the original trial, but also the evidence that would be presented at a new trial. Cress , 468 Mich. at 694, 664 N.W.2d 174 ("[The confessor's] testimony (even presuming he would testify at a new trial ) would not make a different result probable on retrial.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by failing to examine the evidence presented at the original trials and holding that the recantations were beyond the scope of this Court's remand order. In this case, we find that the trial court failed to properly assess the effect of the newly discovered evidence in conjunction with the evidence that was presented at the original trials. Notably, Skinner testified that neither defendant was the shooter. Skinner described the shooter as being in his mid-thirties, and neither defendant was in his thirties at the time of the shooting. Additionally, Skinner stated that the shooter had a large nose and a beard, which the trial court noted was "completely contrary to the physical characteristics of both defendants in this case." Although the trial court had reason to question some aspects of Skinner's testimony, Skinner's testimony is only strengthened when considered in conjunction with the evidence presented at the previous trials. Burnette was the prosecutor's key witness, as he was the only witness who testified that defendants admitted to shooting Lisa, and he was the only witness who testified that he saw defendants with weapons. In considering the value of Burnette's trial testimony, the trial court found "[e]very one of the testimonies that were given during the course of the preliminary examination and the trial[s], and we're talking about four different occasions here, was the same by Mr. Burnett [sic]...." However, the trial court judge who presided over these motions for relief from judgment was not the same judge who presided over the preliminary examination or the original trials. The trial court judge thus was functionally in the same position as an appellate court where the credibility of witnesses at the preliminary examination and the original trials was concerned. Accordingly, the trial court's determination that Burnette's trial testimony was credible need not be afforded any deference by this Court. See MCR 2.613(C) ("[R]egard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it .") (emphasis added). The trial court's finding that Burnette's previous testimony was consistent and compelling is also not supported by the record. To begin with, the prosecutor had to repeatedly refresh Burnette's memory at Johnson's trial with his prior police statement and his testimony at the preliminary examination when Burnette did not initially testify in favor of the prosecutor's position. Burnette was also unable to give a coherent time line as to what happened on the night in question; in reviewing the record, it remains unclear when and if Burnette and Johnson went on a ride with Mike, as multiple different possibilities were suggested at Johnson's trial, yet no mention of this was made at Scott's trial. Burnette's discussion of his ride with Mike alone is confusing and internally inconsistent, as Burnette alternatively testified that Mike dropped both him and Johnson off at the gas station, that Mike dropped him and Johnson off somewhere else entirely, and that Burnette never returned to the gas station. There were also significant inconsistencies between the testimonies Burnette gave at the two different trials. At Johnson's trial, Burnette initially testified that he first learned that there had been a shooting due to the police presence in the neighborhood, but he later suggested that the defendants were the ones who first told him about the shooting. Burnette also did not clarify whether he learned the victim's name from the police or the defendants. Furthermore, Burnette could not recall if only one defendant or both had mentioned "hitting a lick," whether Johnson had confessed that Scott had shot Lisa, and whether he had seen any weapons. At Scott's trial, Burnette instead testified that defendants were the ones who first told him about the shooting, that defendants were the ones who told him the victim's name, and that he saw defendants with guns. Clearly, Burnette's testimonies across both trials were not the same, contrary to the trial court's finding, and there is no larger consistent narrative to rely on in trying to uphold Burnette's prior trial testimonies as credible. Moreover, the trial court failed to note that Burnette's and Jackson's testimonies also conflicted with one another; in order to find one credible, the other would have to be found not credible. Burnette testified that defendants told him around 2:30 a.m. that they shot someone and that he later saw Scott place his gun in a vehicle at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. However, Jackson testified that he and Scott were taken into custody shortly after the shooting at approximately 1:15 a.m., and an officer confirmed that Scott remained at the police station until at least 8:00 or 8:30 a.m. Additionally, Jackson claimed that he and Scott were in police custody at a time when Burnette claimed he spoke with Scott outside of custody. It is thus impossible to fully credit both accounts, as they are incompatible and cannot be reconciled. This is particularly significant because these early morning hours are when Burnette testified that defendants admitted to shooting someone. While Jackson's testimony is not as questionable as Burnette's testimony, Jackson's testimony alone provides scant evidence that defendants committed the crime. Jackson testified that he witnessed Scott hand over an object to Scott's girlfriend after the shooting and that Johnson told him that he had hit a lick and had to shoot. However, he also testified that he believed the object to be a dog leash and that "hitting a lick" could refer to something that happens in a game of dice. Burnette's and Jackson's testimonies were also inconsistent as to whether the police threatened them. At Scott's trial, Burnette testified that the police did not tell him that they believed he was involved in the shooting, but Burnette later agreed that the police told him he would be implicated in the murder if he did not state who did it. At Johnson's trial, Jackson initially testified that the police did not threaten him but later claimed that the police scared him. Jackson stated that he also felt pressured to confess or else he would have been implicated in the crime. More inconsistencies abound: although the trial court stated that both witnesses identified that a .22 caliber rifle was used, the record shows that only Burnette testified to this, as Jackson never identified the object Scott handled as a gun. Moreover, while Burnette testified that Johnson told him that Scott had shot someone, Jackson testified that Johnson was the one who admitted being the shooter. Finally, the trial court also failed to take into account that both witnesses admitted to consuming copious amounts of alcohol and marijuana during the times that defendants purportedly made incriminating statements, which severely undermines the reliability of their assertions. Jackson even admitted to hearing and seeing things that did not exist, which further weighs against his credibility. An examination of the trial testimony alone indicates that defendants' convictions were based on shaky grounds. Consequently, when Skinner's testimony is considered in conjunction with the other evidence presented at the original trials, we find that a different result is reasonably probable on retrial. See People v. Tyner , 497 Mich. 1001, 1001-1002, 861 N.W.2d 622 (2015). While consideration of Skinner's testimony alone would make a different result probable on retrial due to the weaknesses of the prosecutor's witnesses, this Court may also consider the evidence that would be presented at retrial , which in this case includes the recantation testimony. On retrial, we assume that Burnette would be called to testify consistently with his recantation that he was with Johnson the night that Lisa was shot and that neither defendant said anything in regards to the shooting. Additionally, if the prosecutor chose to admit Jackson's testimony from the original trials implicating defendants on retrial, defendants would be able to impeach that testimony with his cousin's testimony that he committed perjury. MRE 804(b)(3) ; MRE 806. In considering the weight of these recantations, the trial court was correct to approach the recantations with suspicion. See People v. Barbara , 400 Mich. 352, 362-363, 255 N.W.2d 171 (1977) ("Where such [newly discovered] evidence, however, takes the form of witnesses' recantation testimony, it has been traditionally regarded as suspect and untrustworthy."); People v. Van Den Dreissche , 233 Mich. 38, 46, 206 N.W. 339 (1925) ("[R]ecanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, given the inherent weakness of Burnette's prior testimony at the trials, his recantation should not be viewed with as much suspicion as generally accorded. In fact, unlike Van Den Dreissche , in which there was no evidence to support the witness's recantation, here, Burnette's recantation was supported by the record. See Van Den Dreissche , 233 Mich. at 41, 206 N.W. 339. Again, Burnette's previous testimony was incoherent at several points, and, notably, Burnette likely did not speak to or see Scott after the shooting because Scott was already in police custody at that point. This provides support that Burnette's previous testimony was not credible and that his recantation is more credible. See Barbara , 400 Mich. at 363-364, 255 N.W.2d 171 ; Grissom , 492 Mich. at 350, 821 N.W.2d 50 ( ZAHRA , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[N]ewly discovered evidence to impeach a witness could potentially make a different result probable on retrial if it directly contradicts material testimony by that witness at trial in a manner that tends to exculpate the defendant."). Without Burnette's testimony, there is scant other evidence to establish that defendants committed the crime. Thus, Burnette's recantation further supports our conclusion that a different result is probable on retrial. While Jackson's trial testimony was not inherently as weak as Burnette's trial testimony, it was also not as material as Burnette's trial testimony. Even if Jackson's recantation is not presented, considering Jackson's previous testimony in light of the other evidence that would be presented at retrial, we believe that defendants have a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. Therefore, we conclude that Skinner's testimony would make a different result probable on retrial. IV. CONCLUSION For the aforementioned reasons, we hold that the newly discovered evidence of Skinner's testimony entitles both defendants to new trials. In balancing the evidence presented at the trials along with Skinner's testimony, the only principled outcome that can be reached is that Skinner's testimony would make a different result probable on retrial. This is further supported when considering the impact of the recantations on Burnette's trial testimony. For these reasons, we reverse the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remand this case to the trial court for new trials. Stephen J. Markman, C.J., Richard H. Bernstein, David F. Viviano, Elizabeth T. Clement, JJ., concur. Zahra, J. (dissenting ). I dissent. The majority grants each defendant a new trial on the basis of new evidence that is, in my view, implausible. The majority fails to provide a reasonable and proper basis to reject the trial court's credibility determination in regard to defendants' newly discovered witness, Charmous Skinner Jr. In finding that Skinner's testimony lacked credibility, the trial court identified three pertinent facts: (1) Skinner was only 8 years old at the time of the murder and his previously undisclosed memory, offered some 16 years later, could not be certain, (2) Skinner's view of the shooting likely would have been obstructed and limited by the existing conditions as well as Skinner's proximity in the car in which he was seated at the time of the shooting, and (3) Skinner's prior perjury conviction. These three findings are more than enough to conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by determining that Skinner's testimony was not credible. Further, I disagree with the majority that the trial court failed to properly assess the effect of the newly discovered evidence in conjunction with the evidence that was presented at the original trials. Judge Prentis Edwards presided over both of defendants' trials and presided over Johnson's three previous motions for relief from judgment. After the retirement of Judge Edwards, the instant postjudgment matters in defendants' cases were transferred to Judge James Callahan. Contrary to the conclusions reached by the majority, Judge Callahan did not position himself "as an appellate court where the credibility of witnesses at the preliminary examination and the original trials was concerned." Rather, Judge Callahan only highlighted that the evidence relied upon by Judge Edwards at defendant Johnson's bench trial was consistent with the district court's findings at the preliminary examination and the evidence supporting the jury's verdict in defendant Scott's trial. Yet, the majority ignores these previous findings and fails to give regard to the special opportunity Judge Edwards and the district judge had to assess and weigh the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before them. The fact is Judge Callahan merely acknowledged that the district judge and Judge Edwards both opined that witnesses Antonio Burnette and Raymond Jackson were credible. And their findings were confirmed by Scott's jury, which rendered a verdict of guilty after a mere 1½ hours of deliberation. Instead, the majority relies on alleged "inconsistencies" during the Johnson bench trial to override the findings of Judge Edwards that supported Johnson's murder conviction. Significantly, Judge Edwards did not rely on a single piece of evidence upon which the majority relies to vacate defendants' convictions. Rather, Judge Edwards, a seasoned trial judge with many years' experience, considered and assessed this evidence and properly dismissed it, attributing it to reluctant witnesses who were trying, in his words, "to minimize the impact that [their testimonies] might have on [Johnson]." Judge Edwards found that these witnesses, particularly Burnette, were fearful and attempted to tailor their testimony to provide Johnson an alibi. Because of this, Judge Edwards rejected this equivocating and inconsistent aspect of the witnesses' testimony, and rightly so. In addition, the majority compounds its error by reviewing the testimony of Burnette and Jackson in Scott's jury trial in light of the so-called inconsistencies between the testimony presented at the preliminary examination and the testimony presented at Johnson's bench trial. The majority does not, however, identify any inconsistencies between these witnesses' testimony presented at the preliminary examination and Scott's jury trial. Thus, the majority has undermined the jury's verdict in the Scott case solely on the basis of the so-called inconsistencies presented at the Johnson trial, which, again, were explained and ultimately rejected by Judge Edwards. As explained more fully in this opinion, I would affirm the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court renders a decision that is outside the range of principled decisions. "A mere difference in judicial opinion does not establish an abuse of discretion." A trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A factual finding is clearly erroneous when "the reviewing court, on the whole record, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." " 'This Court has repeatedly held that a trial judge, in passing on a motion for a new trial, is vested with a large discretion. The wisdom of such rule is obvious. The judge has the advantage of seeing the witnesses on the stand, of listening to their testimony, of noting the attitude of the jury to various matters that may arise during the trial, and is in far better position than is an appellate court to pass on questions of possible prejudice, sympathy, and matters generally that occur in the course of a trial but which do not appear of record.' " II. ANALYSIS For a new trial to be granted on the basis of new evidence, a defendant must show that (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial.[ ] The defendant carries the burden of satisfying all four prongs of this test. Throughout the litigation, the first three prongs of this test have not been disputed, and the focus of this opinion is whether defendant has established that the newly discovered evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. Ordinarily "motions for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence are looked upon with disfavor, and the cases where this court has held that there was an abuse of discretion in denying a motion based on such grounds are few and far between." That is because "[t]he policy of the law is to require of parties care, diligence, and vigilance in securing and presenting evidence" and "[t]he principle of finality is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." In fairness to both parties and the overall justice system, the law requires that parties secure evidence and prepare for trial with the full understanding that, absent very unusual circumstances, the trial will be the one and only opportunity to present their case. It is the obligation of the parties to undertake all reasonable efforts to marshal all the relevant evidence for that trial. Evidence will not ordinarily be allowed in piecemeal. People v. Cress set forth the showing that a defendant must make in order to satisfy the exception to this rule and struck a balance between upholding the finality of judgments and unsettling judgments in the very unusual case in which justice under the law requires a new trial. A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE I disagree with the majority that Judge Callahan clearly erred by concluding that the testimony of Charmous Skinner Jr. was not credible. Consequently, I conclude that Judge Callahan did not abuse his discretion by denying defendants' motions for relief from judgment. The Court of Appeals correctly focused on four reasons upon which Judge Callahan relied to conclude that Skinner was not credible: (1) Skinner was only eight years old at the time of the murder and his memory some 16 years later could not be certain; (2) it would have been incredibly difficult for Skinner to be inside a car at night and see someone outside the vehicle when the only illumination was from the vehicle's interior dome light, especially when considering that both [the victim] and the car door were between [Skinner] and the shooter; (3) Skinner had already been convicted for perjury; and (4) in any event, Skinner likely would have been asleep inside the car at the time of the murder.[ ] The first three of these four reasons support Judge Callahan's opinion such that his conclusion that Skinner was not credible is within the range of principled outcomes. For the first reason, the Court of Appeals correctly stated that "[c]ommon sense dictates that memories can fade and events that occurred such a long time ago would no longer be fresh in the witness's mind." Defense expert Katherine Rosenblum, a clinical and developmental psychology expert, testified to the possibility of a "narrowing of attention" during moments of high traumatic stress. Rosenblum testified that an 8-year-old could remember the face of a perpetrator 16 years later. She testified in general terms, however, and could not testify as to Skinner's memory because she had never actually interviewed him. Rosenblum further conceded that exaggeration of facts is possible with the passage of time. Rosenblum also acknowledged that it was possible that an investigative reporter with whom Skinner had contact could have "planted a seed" in Skinner's mind that the wrong people were convicted. To this point, Skinner acknowledged on cross-examination that, after the reporter contacted him, he read some of the reporter's news articles about the case on the Internet and developed an impression that the police had done a poor job in investigating the case. Thus, it was only after the reporter first contacted Skinner in 2011 and after Skinner's own investigation about the incident that he gave a description of the shooter to the reporter and later to the Michigan Innocence Project (MIP). I agree with the Court of Appeals that Judge Callahan's concern regarding the lengthy passage of time from the murder to the discovery of Skinner's testimony was well-founded. Skinner's claim that he "will never forget the person's face," and his certainty that he could "recognize that man if [he] saw him today," is, at best, an exaggeration of any memory that he did have of the event, and it is more likely that he had no memory of it at all. At minimum, I cannot conclude that Judge Callahan's decision in this regard was clearly erroneous. The majority gives short shrift to the second reason that Judge Callahan found Skinner's testimony incredible and does not expressly rule whether this finding was clearly erroneous. Specifically, Judge Callahan concluded that Skinner's view from inside the van was obstructed and not illuminated. The evidentiary hearing transcript demonstrates that Judge Callahan extensively questioned Skinner regarding his viewpoint and the positioning of his mother with respect to the shooter. Skinner testified that he had climbed into the front passenger seat and that his mother was shot while she was entering the driver's side of the van. He further testified that the shooter stood behind his mother but "a little off to the side." The Court of Appeals panel explained that "when Skinner heard the gunshot, the door window shattered, and [the victim] managed to fully get into the car, close the door, and speed away before eventually dying at the nearby gas station." Judge Callahan reasonably opined that, based on this testimony, the position of Skinner's mother entering the car would have obstructed Skinner's view of the shooter. The Court of Appeals agreed, highlighting that "any view of the shooter from the passenger seat would have been obstructed. Not only was [the victim] positioned between Skinner and the shooter, but the car door was as well." Further, Skinner also testified that, despite the darkness outside the van, he saw the shooter only from the dome light in the car. The Court of Appeals noted that Judge Callahan "correctly was skeptical that an interior dome light would enable one sitting inside the vehicle to see outside the vehicle with any meaningful clarity." Judge Callahan stated: "Anyone who has ever been in a car in the pitch of night, pitch black ... nighttime and turns on a dome light, restricts the light. The light does not shine outside. The light does confine itself to the interior of the van or the car." And, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, "Skinner did not testify that the shooter leaned inside the car or was ever located near the door opening while the door was open, such that he would have been more likely to have been illuminated by the interior light." The Court of Appeals panel reasonably concluded that "with the shooter having to shoot through the door window, it is certain that he was positioned on the other side of the door and not near the door opening, where the light would have been better." In sum, this was a common-sense finding with regard to Skinner's ability to clearly see the shooter's face. Like the Court of Appeals, I cannot conclude that this finding was clearly erroneous. The majority accepts, and I agree, with the third reason upon which Judge Callahan relied to reject Skinner's credibility. "[C]rimes having an element of dishonesty or false statement are directly probative of a witness'[s] truthfulness...." Skinner was not only convicted of a crime of dishonesty, but he was convicted of a crime that is arguably the most relevant to his credibility while under oath-perjury. As the Court of Appeals majority properly concluded, "[T]he fact that [Skinner] had no qualms about violating his oath to tell the truth regarding something as serious as a murder rightfully caused [Judge Callahan] here to be concerned." And I agree with the majority that Judge Callahan improperly speculated when surmising that Skinner was likely asleep at the time of the incident. But I conclude that three of Judge Callahan's proffered reasons clearly call Skinner's credibility into question. Accordingly, I cannot conclude that Judge Callahan abused his discretion by denying defendants a new trial on this basis. Having concluded that defendants are not entitled to relief on their claims of newly discovered evidence under MCR 6.502(G)(2), I would not consider evidence that Johnson presented in previous motions for relief from judgment because "[t]he court may not grant relief to the defendant if the motion ... alleges grounds for relief which were decided against the defendant in a prior ... proceeding under this subchapter...." MCR 6.508(D)(2). But, because the majority disagrees and finds Skinner arguably credible, I will further discuss whether, in my view, the new evidence in conjunction with this previously presented evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. B. THE EFFECTS OF THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WERE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF THE TRIAL EVIDENCE AND PROPERLY REJECTED BY BOTH LOWER COURTS The majority fails to appreciate the trial evidence that led to defendants' convictions and instead focuses on the evidence set forth during defendants' collateral attacks. The prosecution's cases against Scott and Johnson were unquestionably grounded on circumstantial evidence. The evidence also consistently shows that the prosecution's key witnesses-Burnette and Jackson-were intimidated and reluctant to testify against defendants. A comprehensive examination of the evidence presented at defendants' original proceedings is necessary to demonstrate overall consistency. 1. THE PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION At the preliminary examination, Burnette's testimony was straightforward. He testified that on May 8, 1999, at around 6:00 p.m., he saw Scott at a store and they returned to Scott's house. Burnette testified that he was waiting for his father to pick him up. At Scott's house, he saw Johnson. At this point during the testimony, the prosecution attempted to elicit testimony from Burnette that defendants told him they planned to "hit a lick." At first, Burnette said he could not recall. Then, notably, the district court interjected and stated the following: Officers, I want the courtroom all cleared out. I see people cringing and eye movement and I want as clear a conversation as can be. I don't want any suggestions coming from the audience. Now, the only one who ... hasn't been moving around and looking, is that man standing right there, holding his hand, and I will let him stay. Everyone else out. I heard laughter from back there. I have been watching you all on the front, lady in the green going like this, and the woman with the red hair going like this. All of you out. The only one who hasn't been moving around is this man. Afterward, the prosecution confronted Burnette with the statement he made to the police: [The Prosecution ]: You recall what you told the investigators about what [Johnson] and [Scott] were talking about that night, correct? [Burnette ]: Yes. * * * [The Prosecution ]: Do you remember that now? [Burnette ]: Yes. [The Prosecution ]: Can you tell the Judge what they told you that night before your daddy came? [Scott's Attorney ]: We would object to the witness reading from the statement, your Honor. The Court : Well, I'll let him read- He doesn't have the statement. [The Prosecution ]: I've got the statement. [Scott's Attorney ]: He was looking down. I didn't know. The Court : He's looking down to keep from looking at your clients that keep looking at him and touching their face. I don't know if it's a threat, or sign language within the community, or what. [Scott ]: I wasn't doing nothin'. The Court : Oh, you did like this and you did like this. [Scott ]: I have a nervous problem. The Court : And like this and like that. And the one named Stank, he did like this goes like this, glaring at him. I don't know what those looks in the neighborhood mean. It's just like I don't know what lick means.[ ] The prosecution again asked Burnette what defendants told him. Scott's attorney again objected, and the district court overruled the objection. Burnette started to answer, but Scott's attorney interrupted, stating, "I can't hear," which prompted the court to state: Come on, young man. I know you're 16 and this is scary for you, but talk into the mic and tell the truth. That's all the Court wants to hear, is the truth. Now, answer the question. Finally, Burnette replied, "They was [sic] talking about hitting a lick," which he later explained means "[r]obbing somebody." He also mentioned that defendants had asked about his plans that evening, suggesting that he participate, but Burnette declined and mentioned that his father was coming to pick him up. Burnette then testified that he returned to Scott's house at 2:30 a.m. Defendants were at the house. Burnette testified, reluctantly, that Scott told him "a lady had got shot." Burnette further testified that Scott said "[h]e had a phone bill that he had to pay" and "[s]he wouldn't come out of no money." He testified that Scott had a .22 rifle and that Johnson had an AK-47. Burnette then testified that Scott's girlfriend arrived in the morning and that Scott took the weapon with him, that he heard a trunk pop, and that Scott put the gun in the trunk. Similarly, he testified that Johnson's girlfriend arrived with a sheet and that Johnson wrapped up the gun and put it in the trunk. Raymond Jackson testified that he knew Scott and that Scott's girlfriend was his neighbor. He testified that he was awoken on May 9, 1999, by a loud noise. He spoke with his grandmother, put on some clothes, looked outside, and saw Scott hand something to his girlfriend. He went outside. Scott joined him, but the police arrived and took Scott and Jackson downtown for questioning. Later that day, after his interview, Jackson returned home. Johnson stopped over while drinking a 40-ounce beer. Jackson testified that Johnson told him that he and Scott had "hit a lick" and, in Jackson's words, Johnson "implicated" Scott, later explaining that Scott "fucked up and had to shoot." In binding defendants over for trial, the district court expressly stated, "I just want to say both witnesses are very believable." The court noted that Burnette had admitted in open court that he was afraid of defendants yet still testified. The court also opined that Jackson was afraid and pointed out that he was being held in protective custody but was still housed on the same jail floor as defendants. Apparently, one defendant threatened Burnette with violence and the other taunted him by calling out his name the previous night. 2. JOHNSON'S BENCH TRIAL Johnson opted for a bench trial. Unlike the majority, I believe we are bound to accept Judge Edwards's findings, none of which can be claimed to be clearly erroneous, and all of which are consistent with the evidence presented at the preliminary examination. After the bench trial, Judge Edwards opined: The most important evidence that we received as part of the prosecution's case was that from Antonio [Burnette] and Raymond Jackson. Antonio [Burnette], who apparently also is known by the name of Shortie, gave testimony regarding the fact that he was with this defendant and Kendrick Scott earlier in the evening, and that during the time that he was with the two of them there was a discussion regarding hitting a lick. He indicated that one interpretation or one definition of that term or phrase is pulling a holdup, sticking someone up. And he indicated that he was invited to participate in that activity, and apparently he declined. He indicated that around 10:30 p.m. his father picked him up and took him to visit some other relatives, and that at around 2:30 a.m. he returned to that area and again was in contact with this defendant and Kendrick Scott. He indicated that at that time, approximately that time this defendant made a statement indicating that Kendrick Scott had shot someone. The reason for the shooting, apparently that was offered was that she would not give up the money. That would suggest that something happened during the holdup that didn't go as planned, and the person was shot. The statement was made to Antonio, according to his testimony, that Kendrick Scott did the shooting and it was done because the money was not given up. He indicated also that he saw this defendant wrap what appeared to be a long gun in a sheet and later put it in his girlfriend's car. The testimony of Raymond Jackson was somewhat supportive of the testimony given by Antonio [Burnette]. He indicated that he heard the shot outside of his home; he was asleep, he woke up, he went outside. The following day this defendant came to his home and he had [a] conversation with this defendant. And by the way, Raymond Jackson had indicated that he had been drinking. He indicated that when he saw this defendant on that morning, that the defendant appeared to have been drinking also. Raymond Jackson indicated that he been taking some drugs, but he said he did have the conversation with him, and that this defendant said that he had to hit a lick and that he messed up and he had to shoot. He indicated also that he was with Scott, Kendrick Scott at the time that that occurred. Raymond Jackson also told us about the threatening, what he interpreted as being threatening activities of the defendant towards him, threatening remarks that he made after he had been taken down to the lockup at the police station. * * * Eugene Jackson, who is the brother of Raymond Jackson testified. He indicated that Raymond had told him something about defendant hitting a lick, shooting dice; but he also indicated that he had told his brother that he didn't appreciate, and this happened during the course of the trial, that he did not appreciate how he was testifying. And to that Raymond indicated that he was telling the truth. We had the defendant Johnson, Mr. Johnson, Justly Johnson testify. He denied any involvement in the shooting. He denied having anything to drink, taking any type of drugs; denied that he made any statements to Antonio [Burnette] or to Raymond Jackson. He indicated that they're lying. He indicated that he did go to the home of Raymond Jackson and that after he was there, he made a phone call; he was on the phone for 6 to 15 minutes, I believe he said, and that he knew that the police were looking for him, and that he went out and turned himself in to the police. Judge Edwards acknowledged that credibility was the central issue in this case. He found the following in regard to the credibility of Burnette and Raymond Jackson: [A]lthough it seems to me that both were very reluctant, and they did everything that they could do to try to minimize the impact that it might have on this defendant. It appears that they are friendly. It's nothing to suggest that they have any ax to grind, any reason to come into this courtroom and to lie. Testimony of Raymond Jackson, I thought, was very sincere. And in spite of what appears to have been threats from his brother, threats from this defendant, he tried to hedge his testimony in a way that would be favorable to the defense, but he gave what I believed to be very honest and sincere testimony about this defendant's involvement in the offense. The testimony from [Burnette] was not as forth coming. We had some difficulty even in getting him to keep his voice up so that we could hear. He indeed appeared to me to be a very reluctant witness. He did not want to be a part of this, and that's probably accounted for by the fact that he's a good friend. At least at the time that this thing apparently took place, he was a good friend, they were together for a good deal of that evening preceding the shooting and even after the shooting, and the defendant had enough trust in him to confide in him that he was going to hit a lick and later gave information that they did indeed hit a lick, and that someone was shot. Judge Edwards convicted Johnson of felony murder, assault with intent to rob while armed, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The majority erroneously believes that Burnette's prior trial testimonies are not credible because Burnette failed to provide a "consistent narrative" throughout the proceedings. As Burnette began to testify at Johnson's bench trial, it quickly became clear that he would again be a reluctant witness. Contrary to his preliminary examination testimony, Burnette at first denied that Johnson participated in any conversation about "hitting a lick." He also testified that upon returning to Johnson's house at around 2:30 a.m., he and Johnson went to a female's home, got in a car with another person, went to Burnette's sister's house, and found that she was not home, following which Burnette and Johnson returned to Johnson's house. Burnette further testified that after he and Johnson returned to Johnson's house, Scott was there. Burnette testified that there was a conversation and that Johnson said that Scott had shot someone. Burnette denied any indication that Johnson participated in the shooting and stated that he first learned of the shooting when he saw an ambulance and police cars. This testimony was not given at the preliminary examination. But while Burnette's differing testimony may appear at first to be a non sequitur , after reviewing defense counsel's cross-examination and defendant's closing argument, it becomes clear that Burnette's sentiments, for whatever reason, favored Johnson. That is, Johnson would eventually rely on this "new" testimony to argue that he and Burnette were together without Scott at the time of the murder. Eventually, after the prosecution repeatedly refreshed Burnette's memory with his police statement and his testimony at the preliminary examination, Burnette became more forthcoming and the prosecution was by and large able to elicit testimony comparable with that given at the preliminary examination. And sensing the motive for Burnette's inconsistent testimony, the prosecution laid the following foundation to admit his prior statements: [The Prosecution ]: Have you received any communications, also, about anything that was going to endanger you? [Burnette ]: Yes. [The Prosecution ]: Okay. And was that after you had given a statement to the police and until today? [Burnette ]: Yes. [The Prosecution ]: What specifically were you told? [Burnette ]: When I got out of lock-up I was going to get killed. [The Prosecution ]: Does that trouble you? [Burnette ]: Don't bother me. [The Prosecution ]: You're not concerned about it? [Burnette ]: No, I'm just concerned about my family. [The Prosecution ]: Okay. And your family still lives in that same area? [Burnette ]: Yes. Clearly, Burnette's prior statements from the preliminary examination were admissible under MRE 801(d)(1) because he testified at the trial or hearing and was subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and because the statement was "consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive...." The majority fails to acknowledge the obvious "consistent narrative" that explains Burnette's inconsistent testimony, which is that he was under threat during the proceedings. Judge Callahan expressly stated in his opinion that Judge Edwards "indicated that he was impressed by the testimony of both of those individuals [Burnette and Jackson] when confronted with adverse influences that might have affected them from expressions by the defendants as well as communications that were had with Mr. Jackson by his brother." Also, Judge Edwards did not rely on a single piece of evidence that the majority cites as inconsistent. He rejected this evidence, attributing it to the result of reluctant witnesses who were trying, in his words, "to minimize the impact that [their testimonies] might have on [Johnson]." Judge Edwards explained that witnesses Burnette and Jackson had once been friends with defendants. But after being subpoenaed to testify against defendants, these witnesses received death threats before and during the trials. Judge Edwards sifted through the testimony and discounted the arguably equivocal and inconsistent testimony and found persuasive the circumstantial evidence against defendants. This is exactly the type of finding from a seasoned trial judge that deserves deference. The prosecution takes the witnesses as it finds them. The prosecution rarely has the luxury to parade cooperative witnesses with perfect character into court. This is particularly true in cases that originate in high crime areas, where witnesses fear retaliation for cooperating with the police. In this case, Judge Edwards observed these witnesses while they testified. He considered their words and the manner in which they were conveyed. In sum, Judge Edwards clearly understood that these witnesses, particularly Burnette, attempted to tailor their testimony to provide Johnson an alibi. Therefore, even assuming that Skinner was credible, his testimony would not make a different result on retrial probable given the evidence that defendants made threats to Burnette and Jackson in connection with their testimony and given that Judge Edwards found Burnette and Jackson to be credible. It is beyond dispute that it is within the province of the fact-finder to resolve a conflict in the evidence. 3. SCOTT'S JURY TRIAL In addition, the majority compounds its usurpation of Judge Edwards's findings by reviewing the testimony of Burnette and Jackson in Scott's jury trial in light of the so-called inconsistencies between their testimony presented at the preliminary examination and their testimony presented at Johnson's waiver trial. The majority does not identify any so-called inconsistencies between these witnesses' testimony presented at the preliminary examination and Scott's jury trial. And the majority does not acknowledge that the evidence against Scott was far stronger than the evidence presented in Johnson's bench trial. At Scott's trial, Burnette's testimony was concise and given without any apparent reluctance despite the fact that Burnette had continued to receive threats in connection with his involvement. At trial, he recalled additional details; for instance, Burnette testified that Scott knew the victim's first name, that Scott wanted to kidnap her, and that defendants afterward told Burnette the exact location of the shooting. In addition, the prosecution presented testimony from Lillie Harris, William Kindred's sister. Harris was then engaged to Verlin Miller, whose home Kindred had stopped by to discuss purchasing a motorcycle. It was during this conversation that the victim was shot outside the home, and both Kindred and Miller gave chase to a person across a field. Miller at some point called Harris, and she went outside to look for him. Harris testified that at this time a car approached her and that she recognized Scott from the old neighborhood. She testified that Scott called out to her by her nickname, "Peggy," and that she approached the car. Scott then asked her if she saw "two guys run by here with a shotgun." She testified that she was immediately suspicious and that Scott then told her that he saw two guys shoot a lady in a white van, which made her more suspicious. While defense counsel did elicit on cross-examination that she had not mentioned that Scott said anything in her statement to the police, her statement did identify Scott as one of the two people in the car that approached her near the crime scene that evening. The prosecution also presented evidence that a .22 rifle with the name "Snooky" etched into the stock was discovered in the basement ceiling in the home of Faylynn Kenner, who was Scott's girlfriend at the time. The witnesses who knew Scott only referred to him at trial as "Snooky," "Snoop," or "Snoopy." The jury rendered a verdict of guilty after a mere 1½ hours of deliberation. The majority has failed to conduct an independent analysis of Scott's trial and has essentially undermined the jury's verdict by relying solely on the so-called inconsistencies presented at Johnson's bench trial, which, again, were rejected by Judge Edwards. With regard to the credibility of witnesses of concern at Johnson's bench trial, namely Burnette and Jackson, both testified about the continued threats made against them before and during Scott's jury trial and yet testified consistently with their testimony given at the preliminary examination. III. CONCLUSION I agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that defendants' newly discovered evidence is not credible. Even assuming the evidence was credible, I disagree with the majority that this evidence would have made a difference on retrial, particularly in regard to Scott's jury trial in which the evidence, albeit circumstantial, was just short of overwhelming. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals' decision that the trial court did not clearly err by denying defendants' motions for relief from judgment. McCormack, J., did not participate because of her prior involvement in this case as counsel for a party. Wilder, J., did not participate because he was on the Court of Appeals panel that decided defendants' motions for peremptory reversal. Our holding that defendants are entitled to new trials due to their newly discovered evidence claims makes it unnecessary to consider their ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Therefore, we vacate the Court of Appeals' analysis of those issues as moot. Burnette testified at Scott's trial that he was 14 years old when the shooting occurred and was 15 years old at the time of the trial. However, at the evidentiary hearing, Burnette testified that he was born in 1982, which would have made him 16 or 17 years old when the shooting occurred and 17 or 18 years old at the time of the trial. Jackson was 22 years old at the time of the preliminary examination. Johnson was 24 years old at the time of the shooting, and Scott was 20 years old. Jackson's grandmother's house is across the street from Verlin Miller's home. Jackson's brother testified that he was upset with Jackson for testifying against Johnson because Jackson had told his brother that Johnson hit a lick playing dice. This information had not been presented at Johnson's trial. Judge Edwards has since retired, and his successor, Judge James Callahan, presided over Scott's proceeding for motion for relief from judgment and the evidentiary hearing that followed. Both defendants were in their twenties at the time of the shooting. The trial court also noted that Skinner's description of the shooter was "completely contrary to the physical characteristics of both defendants in this case." The preliminary examination was jointly held for both defendants. Thus, the trial court was incorrect to note that there were four occasions when the witnesses previously testified, as there were only three occasions: the joint preliminary examination, and then the separate trials. The trial court also concluded that the domestic violence records would not make a different result probable on retrial. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court erred by considering the domestic violence records because it was outside the scope of this Court's remand order and, in any event, the records would be inadmissible hearsay. Because we conclude that Skinner's testimony, in conjunction with the evidence presented at the original trials, is sufficient to find a different result probable on retrial, it is unnecessary for us to consider whether the domestic violence records would be admissible and what their potential impact would be on retrial. Because this is Scott's first motion for relief from judgment, his claim of newly discovered evidence also includes the witness recantations and the domestic violence records. This Court noted in Anderson that there is some justification for "providing a magistrate with greater authority to examine credibility during a preliminary examination than a judge has in entertaining a motion for a new trial." Anderson , 501 Mich. at 187 n. 4, 912 N.W.2d 503. The prosecutor conceded that the trial court's finding that Skinner was actually asleep at the time of the murder was clearly erroneous because it was speculative and unsupported by the record. For example, when Burnette was asked whether Johnson talked about hitting a lick, Burnette said, "No." And when asked, "Did you tell the court that [Johnson] talked about hitting a lick?", Burnette responded, "I can't recall." The prosecutor then pointed out that Burnette had previously testified at the preliminary examination that Johnson spoke about hitting a lick, and Burnette agreed that this was true. In addition, when asked if Johnson had told Burnette anything, Burnette said, "Not that I can recall." Then, when Burnette was asked, "Did you ever tell the police what [Johnson] said to you at [Scott's] house?", Burnette again said, "I can't recall." Burnette was then asked to refresh his memory with his police statement, and after this, Burnette admitted that he told the police that Johnson said that Scott shot the lady. Furthermore, when asked if he saw either of the defendants with a gun that night, Burnette said, "Not if I can remember." Burnette once again had to have his memory refreshed with his preliminary examination testimony, and once he did, he remembered that he saw defendants with guns. Although this information would arguably be more relevant at Johnson's trial than at Scott's trial, Burnette did testify at Johnson's trial that he was dropped off at the same gas station that Lisa drove to, where he saw an ambulance and police officers and first learned of this shooting. Were this true, this would clearly be relevant at Scott's trial, but it goes unmentioned. "[I]f the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97, 113, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1976). Similarly, in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, when there is little evidence to support a conviction, then "the magnitude of errors necessary for a finding of prejudice will be less than where there is greater evidence of guilt."People v. Trakhtenberg , 493 Mich. 38, 56, 826 N.W.2d 136 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). While Agurs involved whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and Trakhtenberg involved whether the defendant was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), both are instructive because Brady and Strickland require an assessment as to whether the new evidence or ineffective assistance calls into question the validity of a prior conviction. Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 ; Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. While Johnson already raised the recantation evidence in a prior motion for relief from judgment, the recantations may nonetheless be taken into consideration, as conceded by the prosecutor. Though Johnson is barred from raising the recantations as an independent ground for relief, the court rules do not prohibit considering this evidence in the context of the claim Johnson is now raising. This is not in contravention of MCR 6.508(D)(2), as the particular ground for relief that Johnson now raises, which concerns Skinner's testimony, has never been decided against Johnson in a prior proceeding. This is further supported by Cress , which requires a determination of whether "the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial ." Cress , 468 Mich. at 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 (emphasis added). The prosecutor argues that Jackson's recantation would be inadmissible pursuant to MRE 804(b)(3) : "A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." However, the recantation would be admissible because defendant has the right, per MRE 806, to attack the credibility of Jackson's former testimony. MRE 806 ("When a hearsay statement ... has been admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if declarant had testified as a witness."); see also Blackston v. Rapelje , 780 F.3d 340, 352-353 (CA 6, 2015) (holding that a refusal to allow a defendant to impeach unavailable witnesses' prior testimony with the witnesses' later recantations violated the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses). The trial court also concluded that Skinner was, in all likelihood, asleep at the time of the shooting. The prosecutor conceded in the Court of Appeals that this reason was speculative and unsupported by the record, and thus clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this reason has not been disputed before this Court. People v. Cress , 468 Mich. 678, 691, 664 N.W.2d 174 (2003). People v. Rao , 491 Mich. 271, 279, 815 N.W.2d 105 (2012). Cress , 468 Mich. at 691, 664 N.W.2d 174. MCR 2.613(C) ("[R]egard shall be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it."). Bynum v. ESAB Group, Inc. , 467 Mich. 280, 285, 651 N.W.2d 383 (2002). People v. Tyner , 497 Mich. 1001, 1002, 861 N.W.2d 622 (2015), quoting Alder v. Flint City Coach Lines, Inc. , 364 Mich. 29, 38, 110 N.W.2d 606 (1961) ( Carr , J., concurring). Cress , 468 Mich. at 692, 664 N.W.2d 174 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Rao , 491 Mich. at 279-280, 815 N.W.2d 105, quoting Webert v. Maser , 247 Mich. 245, 246, 225 N.W. 635 (1929) (quotation marks omitted). Canfield v. City of Jackson , 112 Mich. 120, 123, 70 N.W. 444 (1897) (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also 39 Am Jur, New Trial, § 156, p. 163 ("Such applications ... are entertained with reluctance and granted with caution ... because of the manifest injustice in allowing a party to allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect in order to defeat an adverse verdict."); 58 Am. Ju.r 2d, New Trial, § 297, pp. 318-319. People v. Maxson , 482 Mich. 385, 398, 759 N.W.2d 817 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Cress , 468 Mich. 678, 664 N.W.2d 174. See MCR 6.431(B) (providing that the trial court "may order a new trial ... because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice"). People v. Johnson , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 31, 2016 (Docket No. 311625), p. 6. As to the remaining reason, see note 1 of this opinion. Johnson , unpub. op. at 680-81. Another aspect that I find troubling with Skinner's testimony is his assertion that he told the Wisconsin Innocence Project (WIP) in 2007 that he could identify the shooter, and yet the WIP did not further inquire. [The Prosecution ]: When the Wisconsin Innocence Project contacted you, what did they say to you? [Skinner ]: "Did you see what happened to your mother?" [The Prosecution ]: And what did you say to them? [Skinner ]: "Yes." [The Prosecution ]: You said "yes"? [Skinner ]: Yeah. [The Prosecution ]: And did they ask you if you could describe the person who did the shooting? [Skinner ]: No. [The Prosecution ]: They didn't ask you that? [Skinner ]: No. [The Prosecution ]: Okay, you told them that you had seen the shooting, correct? [Skinner ]: Yes. [The Prosecution ]: And they didn't ask you if you could identify the person, if you could describe them? [Skinner ]: No, they said they was [sic] going to fly out to Pennsylvania to come meet with me. Never heard from them again. [The Prosecution ]: Do you remember when that was? [Skinner ]: I was-'07. It was 2007. I find this testimony dubious given the substantial amount of investigative work the WIP conducted into this matter. The record contains a rough sketch by Skinner illustrating the respective positions. Johnson , unpub op. at 680-81. Id . at 681. Id . at 680-81. Id . Id . See M Crim. JI 3.5 (5) (providing that the fact-finder "should only accept things the lawyers say that are supported by the evidence or by your own common sense and general knowledge ") (emphasis added). Had Judge Callahan based his credibility determination solely on Skinner's criminal record and not considered that record in the context of the other evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and the trial, I would be more receptive to the majority's view. See People v. Love , 502 Mich. 913, --- S.E.2d ----, 2018 WL 3493944 (2018) (Docket No. 155545 ) ( Zahra , J., dissenting). But that is not the case here. As previously stated, the perjury conviction together with the 16-year lapse of time that allowed for Skinner's memory to fade, Skinner's proximity to the shooter, and the lighting conditions that existed at the time of the shooting combine to strongly support the credibility finding of Judge Callahan. People v. Allen , 429 Mich. 558, 571, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988) ; see also MRE 609(a)(1) ("For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the evidence has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during cross-examination, and ... the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement...."). Johnson , unpub. op. at 681. If there is any doubt that defendants were threatening him, it was later resolved during his cross-examination: The Court : Well, I'm watching [Burnette's] demeanor and it seems like he's scared to death of these two young men that you are representing. [Scott's Attorney ]: That may be true, your Honor. That may be the Court's interpretation. Maybe he's not afraid of these guys. Are you afraid of these men at this time? [Burnette ]: Yes. * * * [Scott's Attorney ]: Terrible answer, your Honor. [The Prosecution ]: Well- The Court : Well, I've been sitting here awhile and I've seen a number of cases, and I can usually call it pretty good. [Scott's Attorney ]: You did a good job that time. Burnette's recantation testimony, greatly relied on by the majority, is simply an extension of Burnette walking back his incriminating testimony that Judge Edwards rejected both at Johnson's bench trial and Johnson's second motion for relief from judgment (presenting new evidence that Burnette had recanted his trial testimony). Further, this Court has long stated that "recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true." People v. Van Den Dreissche , 233 Mich. 38, 46, 206 N.W. 339 (1925) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 3 Wright & Welling, Federal Practice and Procedure (4th.), § 585, pp. 480-482 ("The judicial attitude is that recantation should be 'looked on with the utmost suspicion.' ") (citation omitted). See People v. Henssler , 48 Mich. 49, 51, 11 N.W. 804 (1882).

McCormack, J. The defendants, the Ann Arbor and Clio school districts, each have a policy banning firearms on school property. The plaintiffs, advocacy organizations supporting gun ownership and certain parents of children who attend school in the defendant districts, believe state law preempts these policies by implication. While the Legislature plainly can preempt school districts from adopting policies like the ones at issue if it chooses to, it has not done so here: not only has our Legislature not preempted school districts' regulation of guns by implication, it has expressed its intent not to preempt such regulation. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The defendant school districts adopted policies prohibiting firearms on school property. Each policy contains an exception for individuals with a concealed pistol license (CPL). To be clear, in practice this means CPL holders can carry a concealed weapon on school property under certain limited conditions, but they cannot openly carry one. The plaintiffs filed these lawsuits, seeking a determination that state law preempts by implication the school districts' policies limiting firearms on school grounds. Each district moved for summary disposition. The plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary disposition or for declaratory relief. In the Ann Arbor case, the Washtenaw Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary disposition. In the Clio case, the Genesee Circuit Court denied the defendants' motion for summary disposition and granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs. In published opinions issued the same day and by the same panel, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Washtenaw Circuit Court and reversed the Genesee Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals held that the districts' policies are not field-preempted, applying the analysis from our decision in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977), and that the policies are not conflict-preempted because they do not conflict with any statute. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the school districts are prohibited from adopting policies banning firearms (beyond those permitted by the concealed-weapon licensing exception) because the state has occupied the field of firearms regulation and that the Court of Appeals' decisions in these cases conflict with its opinion in Capital Area Dist. Library v. Mich. Open Carry, Inc. , 298 Mich. App. 220, 826 N.W.2d 736 (2012) ( CADL ). We directed oral argument on the application in each case and ordered that they be argued and submitted together and directed the parties to brief: (1) whether, in light of MCL 123.1102, it is necessary to consider the factors set forth in People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314 [257 N.W.2d 902] (1977), in order to determine whether the school district's policies are preempted; (2) if so, whether the Court of Appeals properly analyzed the Llewellyn factors; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the school district's policies are not preempted. [ 501 Mich. 941, 904 N.W.2d 424 (2017).] II. ANALYSIS Whether the state has preempted a local regulation, which the state can do expressly or by implication-and in that latter case either because the local regulation directly conflicts with state law or because the state has occupied the entire field of regulation in a certain area-is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Detroit v. Ambassador Bridge Co. , 481 Mich. 29, 35, 748 N.W.2d 221 (2008) ; Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming , 495 Mich. 1, 8, 846 N.W.2d 531 (2014). That means that we review it independently, with no required deference to the trial court. Millar v. Constr. Code Auth. , 501 Mich. 233, 237, 912 N.W.2d 521 (2018). The plaintiffs argue that the school districts' policies are preempted by implication. For good reason: There is no indication that any statute preempts the policies expressly. Accordingly, the sole argument in the plaintiffs' applications for leave to appeal in this Court, and their primary argument in their supplemental briefing, is that the districts' policies are field-preempted under our decision in Llewellyn . Field preemption applies if "the state statutory scheme pre-empts the ordinance by occupying the field of regulation which the municipality seeks to enter, to the exclusion of the ordinance, even where there is no direct conflict between the two schemes of regulation." Llewellyn , 401 Mich. at 322, 257 N.W.2d 902. Conflict preemption, by contrast, applies instead if "the ordinance is in direct conflict with the state statutory scheme," id ., such that conformity with both is not possible. The plaintiffs did not advance a conflict-preemption argument in their applications or at oral argument. A. EXPRESS PREEMPTION Under Llewellyn , a court begins the preemption analysis by determining whether state law "expressly provides that the state's authority to regulate in a specified area of the law is to be exclusive...." Id . at 323, 257 N.W.2d 902. As noted, there is no dispute that state law does not expressly preempt school districts' authority to regulate guns. Under MCL 123.1102, "[a] local unit of government shall not ... enact or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or possession of pistols [or] other firearms ... except as otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this state." MCL 123.1101(b) then defines "local unit of government" in the act to mean "a city, village, township, or county." In other words, while MCL 123.1102 expressly preempts regulation of firearms by a city, village, township, or county, it does not apply to school districts, which are left out of the Legislature's list. B. IMPLIED PREEMPTION 1. FIELD PREEMPTION The schools districts' policies are also not impliedly field-preempted. Courts are to consider these factors in determining whether the Legislature has impliedly occupied the field so as to preclude local regulation in a certain area: [P]reemption of a field of regulation may be implied upon an examination of legislative history. Walsh v. River Rouge , 385 Mich. 623, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971). [T]he pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme may support a finding of preemption. Grand Haven v. Grocer's Cooperative Dairy Co. , 330 Mich. 694, 702, 48 N.W.2d 362 (1951) ; In re Lane , 58 Cal. 2d 99, 22 Cal.Rptr. 857, 372 P.2d 897 (1962) ; Montgomery County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, Inc. , 274 Md. 52, 333 A.2d 596 (1975). While the pervasiveness of the state regulatory scheme is not generally sufficient by itself to infer pre-emption, it is a factor which should be considered as evidence of pre-emption. [T]he nature of the regulated subject matter may demand exclusive state regulation to achieve the uniformity necessary to serve the state's purpose or interest. [ Llewellyn , 401 Mich. at 323-324, 257 N.W.2d 902.] The Court of Appeals analyzed these factors and determined that the policies were not field-preempted. But the school districts believe this step isn't needed. They contend that we should consider the exclusion of school districts from MCL 123.1101(b) as a definitive expression of the Legislature's intent not to occupy the field. They cite Judge GLEICHER 's partial dissenting opinion in CADL , 298 Mich. App. at 241-251, 826 N.W.2d 736 (advocating this approach). We agree. In Llewellyn , no statute expressly stated the Legislature's intent to preempt local obscenity regulation, but we found that the state's comprehensive coverage of the field impliedly revealed the Legislature's intent to occupy the field. Llewellyn therefore addressed a different question than the one presented here. Here, an unambiguous statute shows a legislative intent not to occupy the field. Requiring courts to turn to the Llewellyn factors to consider field preemption even when an unambiguous statute establishes legislative intent to regulate the subject matter only partially would be an internally contradictory exercise and contrary to this Court's general rules of statutory interpretation. The Legislature's partial list of local units of government that may not regulate firearms answers, definitively, the field-preemption question. "Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the Legislature's intent and this Court applies the statute as written.... Only where the statutory language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent." People v. Borchard-Ruhland , 460 Mich. 278, 284, 597 N.W.2d 1 (1999). These principles apply with equal force to preemption questions. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) ("The question [of preemption], at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and we accordingly ' "begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." ' ") (citations omitted). A reasonable application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine gets to the same answer: " 'the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of all others.' " People v. Wilson , 500 Mich. 521, 526, 902 N.W.2d 378 (2017). Enactment of an express-preemption statute limited to specific local units of government implies that entities not included are not preempted. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 505 U.S. 504, 517, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) ("Congress' enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted."); id . at 547, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Once there is an express pre-emption provision, in other words, all doctrines of implied pre-emption are eliminated.... The existence of an express pre-emption provision tends to contradict any inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the statute's express language defines."). Thus, when a statute expressly states the Legislature's desire to preempt or not preempt a field, the statute controls and resort to the remaining Llewellyn factors is unnecessary. In this case, because MCL 123.1102 and MCL 123.1101 show the Legislature's intent to preempt some local units of government from regulation but not others, that intent controls. Because those statutes exclude school districts from an otherwise precise list of local units of government prohibited from regulating firearms, the districts' policies are not field-preempted. To the extent that Mich. Coalition for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndale , 256 Mich. App. 401, 414, 662 N.W.2d 864 (2003), cited MCL 123.1102 as supporting the proposition that "state law completely occupies the field of [firearms] regulation," we overrule it. 2. IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION In a secondary argument advanced only in their supplemental briefs, the plaintiffs and their supporting amicus contend that the districts' policies conflict with various statutes, particularly MCL 28.425o and MCL 750.237a, which they read as implying a state-law right to openly carry firearms on school property. We decline to reach this argument because we conclude that the plaintiffs abandoned it by failing to assert it in their applications for leave to appeal. Michigan Gun Owners' Application for Leave to Appeal, p. 7 (stating the sole question presented as "whether a school district is impliedly/field preempted from promulgating firearm rules or regulations"); Michigan Open Carry's Application for Leave to Appeal, p. vi (same); Michigan Gun Owners' Application, p. 20 (asserting that "[a]ppellants acknowledge that the [Ann Arbor Public Schools] policy does not directly contradict with the state statutory scheme"); Michigan Open Carry's Application, p. 12 (stating that "Michigan Open Carry, Inc. does not claim that the school's firearm regulation is statutorily preempted"). See Mitcham v. Detroit , 355 Mich. 182, 203, 94 N.W.2d 388 (1959) (stating that "[f]ailure to brief a question on appeal is tantamount to abandoning it"). And the plaintiffs were perfectly clear at oral argument that they were not advancing a conflict-preemption argument. When asked to elaborate on this separate preemption theory, counsel for both of the plaintiffs balked except to offer a belated attempt to brief the issue. "In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present." Greenlaw v. United States , 554 U.S. 237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008). The plaintiffs decided not to present this issue, and so we decline to reach it. III. CONCLUSION These are straightforward cases. The Legislature has, expressly, restricted some but not all local governments from regulating firearms. Schools in particular are not on the preempted list, quite possibly for reasons not difficult to imagine. In any case, the clarity of the statute that we are bound to respect is entirely inconsistent with the notion that the Legislature plainly intended to occupy the field here. Of course, if the Legislature in its wisdom sees fit to allow open firearms on all school grounds, no matter what local school districts may variously desire, it can say so. Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Viviano, J. (concurring ). I concur fully in the majority opinion. I write, however, to explain why I disagree with the dissent, which concludes that the defendant schools lacked authority to issue the policies here because of a purported conflict with state law. The dissent's reasoning is flawed-its conclusion is premised on a misreading of our statutes and a misunderstanding of our conflict-preemption doctrine. Before addressing the precise issue at the heart of the dissent's analysis, it is well to remember what this case is not about. No party has raised a constitutional challenge to the school policies at issue. And no justice believes that the Legislature has expressly preempted the school districts' policies or impliedly occupied the field of firearms regulation. The issue raised by the dissent is a narrow one: whether the school policies directly conflict with a state law and are therefore preempted by it. In order for a state law to conflict with and preempt a local regulation, the state law must expressly permit something the local regulation prohibits: It has been held that in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits. Accordingly, it has often been held that a municipality cannot lawfully forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, permitted, or required, or authorize what the legislature has expressly forbidden. * * * The mere fact that the state, in the exercise of the police power, has made certain regulations does not prohibit a municipality from exacting additional requirements. So long as there is no conflict between the two ... both will stand. The fact that an ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a statute by requiring more than the statute requires creates no conflict therewith unless the statute limits the requirement for all cases to its own prescription. Thus, where both an ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, and the only difference between them is that the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition under the statute, and the municipality does not attempt to authorize by the ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or required, there is nothing contradictory between the provisions of the statute and the ordinance because of which they cannot coexist and be effective. Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail.[ ] Our caselaw thus stands for the proposition that "what the State law expressly permits an ordinance may not prohibit." The dissent posits that two statutory provisions, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) and 28.425o(1)(a), when read together, give concealed pistol license (CPL) holders the right to openly carry a firearm on school property. Because a school's power to provide for the safety of its students is subject to state law, including these provisions, the dissent concludes that the schools have no authority to ban the open carrying of firearms by CPL holders. Under this reasoning, state law permits what the policies prohibit, and thus it preempts those policies. The dissent misreads our statutes. In order to determine what rights a person has by virtue of holding a CPL, the appropriate place to begin our analysis is the act that was intended to, among other things, "prescribe the rights and responsibilities of individuals who have obtained a license to carry a concealed pistol." MCL 28.421a. A few sections later, in MCL 28.425c(3), the Legislature describes the conduct authorized by a CPL, stating as follows: Subject to [ MCL 28.425o ] and except as otherwise provided by law, a license to carry a concealed pistol issued by the county clerk authorizes the licensee to do all of the following: (a) Carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person anywhere in this state. (b) Carry a pistol in a vehicle, whether concealed or not concealed, anywhere in this state. This provision, by itself, opens a gaping hole in the dissent's theory that, by virtue of their status as licensees, CPL holders have the right to openly carry a firearm on school property. Leaving aside, for the moment, its limiting language, this section authorizes a CPL holder to carry a concealed pistol on or about her person anywhere in the state; but it only authorizes the open carrying of a pistol (i.e., "whether concealed or not concealed") if it is done in a vehicle. Under well-established interpretative principles, by expressly authorizing a licensee to openly carry a pistol in a vehicle, the statute cannot be read as authorizing a right to openly carry a pistol more broadly. Not finding such a right in the place where one might expect it to be (at least, if one accepts the dissent's theory that the right to openly carry a firearm on school property is somehow connected to a person's status as a CPL holder), the dissent looks instead to the Michigan Penal Code as the source of a CPL holder's rights in this regard. In particular, the dissent places great emphasis on MCL 750.237a, which makes it a crime for a person to possess a weapon in a weapon-free school zone unless that person is a CPL holder. However, despite the dissent's protestations, an express right to openly carry a firearm on school property cannot be found in this criminal statute, either. MCL 750.237a must be read in pari materia with MCL 28.425o(1)(a), which provides that, except in narrow circumstances, a CPL holder may not carry a concealed pistol on school property. By its terms, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) pertains only to CPL holders and provides limitations on where they may carry a concealed pistol unless an exemption applies. Unlike MCL 28.425c, MCL 28.425o does not authorize any conduct and makes no reference to unconcealed or open carrying of pistols or any other type of weapon. Thus, it is rather unremarkable that MCL 28.425o does "not prohibit[ ] [a CPL holder] from possessing an openly carried firearm on school property." This omission can hardly be viewed as "expressly permitting" a CPL holder to carry a firearm on school property, for purposes of a conflict-preemption analysis. The most reasonable way to interpret these provisions is that the exemption from criminal liability in MCL 750.237a(5)(c) only applies to the extent that a CPL holder complies with MCL 28.425c(3) and MCL 28.425o(1)(a). In other words, the exemption is subject to the statutes that govern CPL holders and does not extend to conduct not authorized by the CPL statutes, such as openly carrying firearms on school property. MCL 750.237a proscribes conduct-it does not provide any affirmative rights whatsoever to CPL holders or anyone else. And it certainly does not grant broader rights to a CPL holder than the CPL statutes themselves. Even if, despite the foregoing, these statutes could somehow be read as expressly exempting the open carrying of firearms by CPL holders from the criminal prohibition in MCL 750.237a, the dissent's theory has already been rejected by our Court in Detroit v. Qualls . In that case, we addressed a criminal statute that prohibited the storage of fireworks in certain places and amounts, but expressly exempted certain retailers from the limitations. The municipality, however, promulgated an ordinance preventing all retailers from storing more than 100 pounds of fireworks. In this Court, the dissent concluded that the statute, by exempting retailers from the storage limitations, permitted the defendant retailer to store fireworks in excess of the limitations-thus, the ordinance's imposition of a storage limitation was preempted and invalid. The majority disagreed with the conclusion "that the state [statute] impliedly permits what it does not prohibit," or, put differently, we "reject[ed] the rationale ... that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly permits...." Instead, we found no conflict between the statute and the ordinance. Thus, despite an express exemption from criminal liability under a state statute, we found no conflict between that statute and a local ordinance prohibiting the exempted conduct. We also rejected the dissent's reasoning in Miller v. Fabius Twp. In that case, a state statute banned boats pulling water-skiers during the period of "1 hour after sunset to 1 hour prior to sunrise." A local ordinance went further than the statute, banning waterskiing from 4:00 p.m. until 10:00 a.m. the following day. The dissent, employing the same reasoning as the dissent here, read the statute to permit waterskiing during the hours that it was not prohibited, and thus believed the ordinance conflicted with the statute. In rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the ordinance was void because it exceeded the powers granted by the act, we held that the dissent's position was "based on the erroneous assumption that the legislature, in making it unlawful to water ski from 1 hour after sundown to 1 hour before sunrise, was expressing a lawful right to water ski without regulation during the other hours of the day." We could discern no such intent from our review of the statute, and consequently we concluded that the ordinance and the statute did not conflict. In other words, the statute's failure to prohibit conduct did not mean that the conduct was expressly permitted for purposes of a conflict-preemption analysis. The dissent relies on Builders Ass'n v. Detroit to suggest that our conflict-preemption jurisprudence is broader than it truly is. In that case, the Legislature had made it unlawful to conduct business on Sunday but had provided various express exceptions. The ordinance also made the same conduct unlawful but did not allow any of the statutory exceptions. Consequently, it sought to prohibit by criminal sanction what the Legislature had exempted from criminal sanction. We held that the statute and ordinance conflicted. But that is not the case here. The school policies do not criminalize anything, and the Legislature has not expressly exempted open carrying on school property by CPL holders. In any event, we have more recently held that even express exemptions are not enough to create a conflict. The dissent also cites Nat'l Amusement Co. v. Johnson for support. In that case, the Legislature had enacted a statute regulating "endurance contests," making it unlawful to hold such contests " 'except in accordance with the provisions of this act.' " A local ordinance purported to ban all such endurance contests. We held that the ordinance was preempted. The dissent reads this case to mean that "where the Legislature makes conduct unlawful unless certain conditions are satisfied, the Legislature has logically made the conduct lawful when those conditions have been satisfied." But the statutory scheme in Nat'l Amusement was materially different from the one at issue here. In Nat'l Amusement , the statute explicitly stated that it was " '[a]n act to regulate endurance contests,' " and it expressly provided that the contests could occur if certain conditions were met. In other words, unlike the statutes in this case, the legislation in that case provided an affirmative right to engage in the conduct at issue and established the circumstances under which the conduct could be carried out. We called the legislation "regulatory, not prohibitory," and stated that "it would seem clear that the legislature intended to permit continuance of the amusement, subject to statutory conditions." That is not the case here. No one would say that either of the statutes cited by the dissent is designed to provide a framework to enable the open carrying of firearms on school property. The CPL statute makes absolutely no provision for such conduct, and the criminal statute is "prohibitory," proscribing conduct rather than enabling it; moreover, even if the criminal statute affirmatively permits some form of carrying by CPL holders, it is concealed carrying, not open carrying. Because no statute can be read to expressly permit the open carrying of firearms on school property, the policies here do not "attempt[ ] to prohibit what [a] statute permits." In sum, there is no conflict between the school policies and the relevant statutes because those statutes do not address the open carrying of firearms, much less afford an express right to do so; and the policies merely bar individuals from carrying firearms on school property. Consequently, there is no conflict between the statutes and the policies. Richard H. Bernstein Clement, J. (concurring ). I concur in full with the majority opinion. I write separately, however, to note that there is more agreement on this Court than may be apparent from the multitude of opinions in these cases. The majority opinion I join holds that the field of firearms regulation is not expressly preempted by MCL 123.1102 and that the field is not impliedly preempted under our test from People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977). The partial dissent concurs with the majority "insofar as it concludes that the Legislature has not occupied the entire field of firearm regulation for preemption purposes." And the Chief Justice, in dissent, "do[es] not necessarily disagree with either of these specific conclusions...." Consequently, as to the Court's holding that the field of firearms regulation here is not preempted-either expressly, by MCL 123.1102, or impliedly under our Llewellyn test-no member of the Court has expressed any disagreement. What actually divides the Court, then, is the Chief Justice's assertion that we must perform a "threshold inquiry of whether the school districts possessed the authority to adopt these policies in the first place"; in essence, that there is a conflict between the scope of the school districts' regulatory authority and the policies at issue. The Chief Justice concludes that school districts do not possess this authority. But he is the only member of the Court to express that opinion; the partial dissenters express no opinion on the matter, but would simply grant leave to appeal "so that we can further explore this important issue." I, too, express no opinion on the merits of the Chief Justice's argument in dissent; where I part ways with the remaining dissenting justices is that I agree with the majority that we should decline to advance this argument for the parties when they have not only not made it for themselves, but instead-in the words of the partial dissent-"improvidently ceded" this issue during oral argument. I agree with the majority that because plaintiffs expressly and unambiguously abandoned any argument that there is a conflict between the regulations at issue and the scope of the school districts' statutory authority, we should decline to reach that argument now. I believe this is consistent with our concern for "judicial modesty" recently articulated in People v. Arnold , 502 Mich. 438, 481, 918 N.W.2d 164 (2018) (Docket No. 154764), 2018 WL 3483281, slip op. at 37, and the admonition that "appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them," Jefferson v. Upton , 560 U.S. 284, 301, 130 S.Ct. 2217, 176 L.Ed.2d 1032 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Declining to reach an argument the parties themselves have not raised does nothing to prejudice our ability to take it up in the future, in a case in which the issue is properly presented. Wilder, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part ). I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that the Legislature has not occupied the entire field of firearm regulation for preemption purposes. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision not to reach the issue of conflict preemption. Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs abandoned this claim, I would grant full leave so that we can further explore this important issue. Like issue preservation, abandonment has always presented a prudential concern, not an inflexible rule. See Wortman v. R L Coolsaet Constr. Co. , 305 Mich. 176, 179, 9 N.W.2d 50 (1943) ("The right to amend a declaration after all proofs have been taken is a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the court."); MCR 7.305(H)(4) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the Court , an appeal shall be limited to the issues raised in the application for leave to appeal.") (emphasis added); see also MCR 7.316(A)(3) (stating that the Supreme Court can permit the grounds of an appeal to be amended). Thus, rather than flat-out refusing to rule on the issue of conflict preemption, this Court should weigh the extent to which the issue is necessary to a full and proper determination of the applicable law, see Klooster v. City of Charlevoix , 488 Mich. 289, 310, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011), against the risk that the parties involved will not provide the sort of adversarial tenacity that this Court relies on to adjudicate matters effectively. Cf. Castro v. United States , 540 U.S. 375, 386, 124 S.Ct. 786, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) ("Our adversary system is designed around the premise that the parties know what is best for them, and are responsible for advancing the facts and arguments entitling them to relief.") (Scalia, J., concurring in part). In this case, prudence counsels in favor of granting leave on the issue of conflict preemption. Plaintiffs claim that they have a statutory right to carry firearms on school property under certain circumstances, while defendants seek to prevent that from happening. By narrowly addressing only the issue of field preemption, the majority has not settled this statutory dispute. That is, in order to fully resolve the ultimate issue before us-whether state law preempts the respective school policies-it is necessary to determine whether those policies are in conflict with one or more statutes enacted by the Legislature. The majority has provided only partial guidance and left lingering doubts. A full grant with specific instructions to the parties that they address the issue of conflict preemption would resolve this uncertainty. There is also little chance that the parties will not give it their all if asked to brief and argue the issue of conflict preemption in greater depth. Having zealously advocated in the lower courts, both plaintiffs and defendants in these cases are clearly motivated to prevail. Nor can I find any other concern counseling against a grant. There is no need for further factual development, because the issue of conflict preemption presents a matter of pure statutory interpretation. See Packowski v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 951 , 289 Mich. App. 132, 138, 796 N.W.2d 94 (2010). In other words, it is a question of law firmly within our wheelhouse and ripe to resolve. Cf. McNeil v. Charlevoix Co. , 484 Mich. 69, 81 n. 8, 772 N.W.2d 18 (2009) (noting that preservation requirements can be ignored if the issue presents a purely legal question and no further fact-finding is necessary). We should not shy away from tackling it, even if it presents a difficult question. The conflict-preemption issue presented by these cases is one that will surely be relitigated; it is just a question of when. While I take rules regarding issue preservation and abandonment very seriously, believing them to be essential to the functioning of our adversarial system, see Greenlaw v. United States , 554 U.S. 237, 243, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008), on balance the equities favor waiving such requirements under these circumstances. These cases present an important set of legal issues. And yet we have only heard them through arguments on the applications. In my view, that is insufficient. Accordingly, because I believe that this Court should grant the applications in these cases and direct the parties to brief the issue of conflict preemption, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to dismiss the issue as abandoned. Brian K. Zahra Markman, C.J. (dissenting ). I respectfully dissent from this Court's affirmance of the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The majority concludes that MCL 123.1102 does not expressly preempt the school districts' policies and that the school districts' policies are not field-preempted. While I do not necessarily disagree with either of these specific conclusions, I do disagree with the majority's failure to address the threshold inquiry of whether the school districts possessed the authority to adopt these policies in the first place. Because MCL 380.11a(3) provides that school districts have the authority to enact school policies "except as otherwise provided" and because MCL 750.237a"otherwise provide[s]," I respectfully dissent. MCL 750.237a permits individuals licensed by this state to carry a concealed pistol (CPL holders) to openly carry firearms on school property while the school policies at issue here prohibit such conduct. Because school districts do not possess the authority to adopt policies that conflict with state law and the policies at issue here clearly conflict with state law, these policies are plainly invalid. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. NOTE TO THE READER I do not raise any novel theories in this opinion. Instead, I rely on the clear language and logic of the laws at issue. The School Code provides that school districts have the authority to enact policies that "provid[e] for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school ... except as otherwise provided by law...." MCL 380.11a(3)(b). And state law does "otherwise provide": first, by generally prohibiting the possession of firearms on school property, MCL 750.237a(4), and, second, by then expressly exempting CPL holders from this prohibition, MCL 750.237a(5)(c). That is, the second of these provisions necessarily permits CPL holders to possess firearms on school property. Yet the school districts here have attempted to prohibit this. Because they attempt to prohibit what state law permits, their policies are void. It is that simple, and the opinion could end here. However, my position has not prevailed, and therefore I have written considerably more to explain my argument in greater detail and to respond to the majority and concurring opinions. But I do not want the reader to lose sight of the fact that my position is as direct and as uncomplicated as this note suggests. ARGUMENT The present issue, of course, is not whether CPL holders ought to be allowed to openly carry firearms on school property, but rather what is required by the laws of this state. Thus, it is the exercise of this Court's judgment, not its will, that is required. The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton) (Rossiter ed., 1961), at 469. For the following reasons, I conclude that the representatives of the people-those who serve in our Legislature-have clearly and straightforwardly denied school districts the authority to prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property, and this Court lacks the authority to second-guess the wisdom of that decision. (1)"School districts, like townships and counties, are subdivisions of the State...." Van Wert v. Sch. Dist. No. 8 , 100 Mich. 332, 333, 58 N.W. 1119 (1894). "[S]chool districts possess such power as the statutes expressly or by reasonably necessary implication grant to them." Senghas v. L'Anse Creuse Pub. Sch. , 368 Mich. 557, 560, 118 N.W.2d 975 (1962) (emphasis omitted). (2) The Revised School Code, MCL 380.1 et seq ., which is the only statute that defendants cite in support of their authority to enact the school policies at issue, provides, in pertinent part: A general powers school district has all of the rights, powers, and duties expressly stated in this act; may exercise a power implied or incident to a power expressly stated in this act; and, except as otherwise provided by law , may exercise a power incidental or appropriate to the performance of a function related to operation of a public school and the provision of public education services in the interests of public elementary and secondary education in the school district, including, but not limited to, all of the following: * * * (b) Providing for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school or a school sponsored activity or while en route to or from school or a school sponsored activity. [ MCL 380.11a(3) (emphasis added).] Accordingly, general powers school districts, such as defendants, may enact policies "providing for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school" "except as otherwise provided by law." Id . (3) The school policies at issue purport to "provid[e] for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school" by prohibiting even CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property. However, the school districts' authority to enact such policies is limited by the "except as otherwise provided by law" language of the Revised School Code. Therefore, the issue is whether a CPL holder's right to openly carry firearms on school property is "otherwise provided by law," and I conclude that it clearly is. (4) Specifically, it is "otherwise provided by law" by MCL 750.237a, which first states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (5), an individual who possesses a weapon in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a misdemeanor," MCL 750.237a(4), and then sets forth an exception in MCL 750.237a(5)(c) that "[s]ubsection (4) does not apply to ... [a]n individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon." Thus, MCL 750.237a permits an individual licensed to carry a concealed weapon to possess a firearm on school property. (5) However, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) states that "an individual licensed under this act to carry a concealed pistol ... shall not carry a concealed pistol on the premises of ... [a] school or school property except that a parent or legal guardian of a student of the school is not precluded from carrying a concealed pistol while in a vehicle on school property, if he or she is dropping the student off at the school or picking up the student from the school." (Emphasis added.) As a result, when MCL 750.237a and MCL 28.425o are read together, it is clear that while a CPL holder is generally prohibited from possessing a concealed pistol on school property, he or she is not prohibited from possessing an openly carried firearm on school property. Indeed, a CPL license expressly states, "This license allows the licensee to carry a pistol on or about his person anywhere in state, except a licensee shall not carry a concealed pistol [on] ... school property...." (Emphasis added.) See also Michigan State Police, Legal Update No. 86 (2010) < https://www.michigan.gov/documents/msp/MSP_Legal_Update_No._86_2_336854_7.pdf>, at 2-3 (accessed July 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5VLA-CUSR] ("[ MCL 28.425o ] applies to CPL holders carrying a concealed pistol. If the CPL holder is carrying a non-concealed pistol, the statute does not apply.... Therefore, a person with a valid CPL may carry a non-concealed pistol in the areas described in MCL 28.425o...."). (6) Thus, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders. Because the Legislature has permitted by statute the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders, school districts cannot enact policies that conflict with that statute. Such policies fall within the "except as otherwise provided by law" qualification of MCL 380.11a(3). This reasoning is straightforward and requires nothing more than a traditional construction of two legal provisions, MCL 380.11a(3) and MCL 750.237a. (7) Moreover, this reasoning is also consistent with that in cases such as Builders Ass'n v. Detroit , 295 Mich. 272, 294 N.W. 677 (1940), in which this Court held that when a criminal statute creates an exception to a penalty, this logically permits an individual to engage in the conduct that is the subject of the exception. In that case, the Legislature prohibited certain activity (conducting business on Sunday), but provided an exception to that prohibition (for those who observed the Sabbath on Saturday). A Detroit ordinance, however, prohibited even those who observed the Sabbath on Saturday from conducting real estate business on Sunday. This Court held that the ordinance "attempts to prohibit that which the statute permits and is, therefore, void." Id . at 276, 294 N.W. 677 (emphasis added). (8) In MCL 750.237a, by the same token, the Legislature has carved out an express exception (open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders) from an express prohibition (no firearms on school property). By doing so, the Legislature has permitted the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders while the school policies prohibit such activity. Thus, these policies "attempt[ ] to prohibit that which the statute permits and [are], therefore, void." Builders Ass'n , 295 Mich. at 276, 294 N.W. 677. (9) This reasoning is also consistent with that in cases such as Nat'l Amusement Co. v. Johnson , 270 Mich. 613, 259 N.W. 342 (1935), in which this Court held that where the Legislature makes conduct unlawful unless certain conditions are satisfied, the Legislature has logically made the conduct lawful when those conditions have been satisfied. In that case, the Legislature made it unlawful to conduct walkathons unless certain conditions, such as physical examinations of the participants, were conducted. The Grand Rapids ordinance, however, made all walkathons unlawful. This Court held that the Grand Rapids ordinance "attempts to prohibit what the statute permits .... Therefore, the ordinance is void." Id . at 617, 259 N.W. 342 (emphasis added). See also id . ("[It is] clear that the legislature intended to permit continuance of [walkathons], subject to statutory conditions," because "[t]he statute makes it unlawful to conduct a walkathon only in violation of certain conditions" and "[t]his is merely a common legislative manner of saying that it is lawful to conduct it if the regulations are observed.") (emphasis added). (10) In MCL 750.237a, the Legislature has made it unlawful to openly carry firearms on school property unless certain conditions are satisfied, e.g., those set forth in MCL 750.237a(5)(c), namely, being "licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon." By doing so, the Legislature has permitted the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders. Yet, the school policies prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property. That is, the school policies "attempt[ ] to prohibit what the statute permits," and therefore, the school policies are void. Nat'l Amusement Co. , 270 Mich. at 617, 259 N.W. 342. (11) That CPL holders are permitted to openly carry firearms on school property under MCL 750.237a(5)(c) is further reinforced by consideration of MCL 750.237a(5)(f). As with MCL 750.237a(5)(c), MCL 750.237a(5)(f) exempts certain conduct from the general prohibition of the possession of firearms on school property. Specifically, MCL 750.237a(5) provides: Subsection (4) does not apply to any of the following: * * * (c) An individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon. * * * (f) An individual who is 18 years of age or older who is not a student at the school and who possesses a firearm on school property while transporting a student to or from the school if any of the following apply: (i ) The individual is carrying an antique firearm, completely unloaded, in a wrapper or container in the trunk of a vehicle while en route to or from a hunting or target shooting area or function involving the exhibition, demonstration or sale of antique firearms. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that a person who engages in the conduct identified in MCL 750.237a(5)(f)(i ), such as a parent who has an unloaded antique shotgun locked in the trunk and is picking up his or her child from school after an antique gun show, simply cannot be excluded from school property. The Legislature could not have been more clear in providing that such conduct is permitted . Indeed, an amicus brief filed in support of the school district by the Negligence Section of the State Bar of Michigan acknowledges that a school district cannot exclude from school property those who fall within this protection. However, if a school cannot exclude persons who fall within the protections of MCL 750.237a(5)(f), there are no conceivable grounds for excluding persons who fall within the protections of MCL 750.237a(5)(c). The first principle of statutory interpretation establishes that subsections (5)(a), (5)(b), (5)(c), (5)(d), (5)(e), and (5)(f) each set forth conduct protected by the Legislature that cannot be prohibited by school districts. If any one of these legislative exceptions, including (5)(c) (the CPL holders exception), can be nullified by schools, then any or all of the other exceptions can also be nullified. (12) Furthermore, MCL 750.237a is more specific to the possession of weapons on school property by CPL holders than MCL 380.11a (or any other statute in the Revised School Code), so MCL 750.237a controls over MCL 380.11a for that reason as well. Ligons v. Crittenton Hosp. , 490 Mich. 61, 83-84, 803 N.W.2d 271 (2011) ("These specific statutes governing medical malpractice actions, which apply to the more narrow realm of circumstances, prevail over the more general rules applicable to all civil actions.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). For these reasons, I believe that Michigan law clearly permits the open carry of firearms on school property by CPL holders and that school districts cannot enact policies that conflict with that law. This is because school districts can only enact security policies "except as otherwise provided by law ," and MCL 750.237a(5)(c)"otherwise provide [s ] by law ." Therefore, I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. RESPONSE TO MAJORITY (1) The majority fails to address whether the school policies at issue here conflict with MCL 750.237a because this was a "secondary argument advanced only in [plaintiffs'] supplemental briefs[.]" Although plaintiffs may not have principally relied on this particular argument throughout these proceedings, all parties agree that the dispositive issue is whether the school district's policy is valid or void, i.e., whether schools can prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property. See, e.g., Michigan Gun Owners' Application for Leave to Appeal, p. 10 ("On April 27, 2015 ... Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a Declaratory Judgment in an effort to establish conclusively that the AAPS policy implementation was unlawful as it affects lawful firearm possession."); Michigan Open Carry's Application for Leave to Appeal, p. 3 ("On March 5, MOC and Mr. Herman brought their suit in the Genesee County Circuit Court for declaratory relief in an effort to conclusively establish that the CASD policy was unlawful as it interferes with lawful firearm possession."); Ann Arbor Public Schools' Answer, p. 4 ("The District's policies prohibiting the possession of firearms on school property are permissible ... because the District has the authority to enact such policies...."); Clio Area Schools' Answer, p. v. ("Plaintiffs-open carry gun advocates-filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that would allow them to openly carry guns in schools operated by the Clio Area School District.") See also, as an illustrative reportorial description of the case, Gershman, Michigan High Court Takes Up School Gun Ban , Wall Street Journal (April 11, 2018) < https://www.wsj.com/articles/michigan-high-court-takes-up-school-gun-ban-1523454482> (accessed July 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EXY3-F678] ("Michigan's highest court on Wednesday heard arguments on whether the right to openly carry firearms extends to school grounds."). (2) Plaintiffs predominantly argue that the school districts' policies are void because they are preempted by state law via field preemption. I would instead hold that the school districts' policies are void because the districts do not have the authority to adopt a policy when a contrary policy is "otherwise provided by law," MCL 380.11a(3), and MCL 750.237a(5)(c)"otherwise provide[s] by law." In other words, plaintiffs argue in support of the right result but predominantly rely on the wrong reasoning. This Court frequently affirms lower court decisions on exactly that basis, that they have "reached the right result for the wrong reason." See, e.g., People v. Brownridge , 459 Mich. 456, 462, 591 N.W.2d 26 (1999). Similarly, nothing precludes this Court from concluding that although plaintiffs predominantly relied on the wrong reasons, they consistently argued in support of the right result. It is of no consequence that plaintiffs have not consistently argued in support of any particular reasoning. We resolve cases and controversies; we do not sit in judgment of the work of attorneys. (3) Plaintiffs have cited and called to the attention of this Court and the lower courts the two statutes I view as dispositive: MCL 380.11a(3) and MCL 750.237a. Given that I conclude it is unnecessary to look beyond these statutes, this opinion does nothing out of the ordinary in relying upon these statutes and reaching the conclusion, exclusively on the basis of these statutes, that the school districts' policies are clearly void. (4) Moreover, even if the issue articulated here had been unpreserved (and it was not; it was only the precise argument that was purportedly unpreserved), it is well established that "this Court may review an unpreserved issue if it is one of law and the facts necessary for resolution of the issue have been presented[.]" McNeil v. Charlevoix Co. , 484 Mich. 69, 81 n. 8, 772 N.W.2d 18 (2009). The question whether the school districts possess the authority to adopt the policies at issue "presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law for which the facts necessary for its resolution are sufficiently present to permit this Court's review." Id . See also People v. Temelkoski , 501 Mich. 960, 905 N.W.2d 593 (2018), decided earlier this year on the basis of what was an entirely unpreserved argument. (5) That is, even if the precise issue had been unpreserved (and once again it was only the precise argument that was purportedly unpreserved), "the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when ' "necessary to a proper determination of a case...." ' " Klooster v. City of Charlevoix , 488 Mich. 289, 310, 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011) (citations omitted). See also People v. Rao , 491 Mich. 271, 289 n. 4, 815 N.W.2d 105 (2012) ("[W]hile an appellate court will not ordinarily review an issue that has been abandoned or waived, such review is allowed when it is 'necessary to a proper determination of a case....' ") (citation omitted); Walters v. Nadell , 481 Mich. 377, 387, 751 N.W.2d 431 (2008) ("[T]his Court has [the] inherent power to review an issue not raised in the trial court to prevent a miscarriage of justice...."). And here, consideration of the school districts' authority under the Revised School Code to adopt the policies in dispute is indeed "necessary to a proper determination" of this case. It is a serious "miscarriage of justice" for this Court to hold that the school districts' policies are valid, and allow that opinion to inform the rights of nearly 600 school districts and more than 600,000 CPL holders throughout this state, as well as to have that opinion define the law for the 10 million people of Michigan, when the majority opinion does not even consider the dispositive statutes. Even more fundamentally, it is a serious "miscarriage of justice" to fail to consider a supposedly "unpreserved" argument when that argument implicates the threshold inquiry in this case: whether the school districts possess the authority under the Revised School Code to adopt their policies in the first place . It is a question that must be addressed by the courts before the issue of field preemption can even be considered. (6) The decision of an individual litigant not to pursue an available line of argument, or even to relinquish an available issue, cannot impose on this Court an obligation to operate upon erroneous premises or to fail to take into account relevant statutes. MCL 380.11a(3) and MCL 750.237a have been called to the attention of this Court by the parties and they are controlling: the school districts have no authority to adopt the policies that have exclusively defined the present controversy at every stage of this litigation. (7) Indeed, in Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186, 206-207, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002), this Court was in a similar situation to the present one, and we correctly held that "[w]e absolutely oppose the dissenters' apparent position that although a controlling legal issue is squarely before this Court, in this case preemption by state law, the parties' failure or refusal to offer correct solutions to the issue limits this Court's ability to probe for and provide the correct solution." As we further explained, "addressing a controlling legal issue despite the failure of the parties to properly frame the issue is a well understood judicial principle" because "no one can seriously question the right of this Court to set forth the law as clearly as it can, irrespective whether the parties assist the Court in fulfilling its constitutional function." Id . at 207, 209, 649 N.W.2d 47. "The jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions." Id . at 209, 649 N.W.2d 47. RESPONSE TO JUSTICE VIVIANO'S CONCURRENCE (1) The concurrence asserts that pursuant to the "conflict preemption" doctrine, "[i]n order for a state law to conflict with and preempt a local regulation, the state law must expressly permit something the local regulation prohibits." To begin with, the question at issue here is not exactly one of conflict preemption. Instead, the more precise question is whether the school districts' policies are void because they exceed the powers granted to school districts by the Revised School Code. It is a question of governmental authority. As discussed earlier, the Code provides that school districts may enact policies "[p]roviding for the safety and welfare of pupils while at school" "except as otherwise provided by law...." MCL 380.11a(3)(b). The Revised School Code does not say "except as otherwise expressly provided by law," but simply "except as otherwise provided by law." Therefore, the precise question is whether there is state law that provides for something other than what the school districts' policies provide for-whether state law and the school district policies are in conflict. As I have explained at length, they are in conflict and state law prevails. (2) Furthermore, I am not at all convinced that "conflict preemption" somehow obligates state law to expressly permit what school district policies prohibit and why it is not enough that a reasonable reading of the law identifies a conflict. Nonetheless, it is well established that there are two types of preemption, express and implied, and there are two types of implied preemption, conflict and field. That is, conflict preemption is a form of implied preemption; indeed, even the majority refers to conflict preemption as "implied conflict preemption." Given this, it would be extremely odd if implied conflict preemption somehow required an express conflict, and it does not. (3) Moreover, although the concurrence is correct that there are cases that cite 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, p. 408, as stating that "a municipality cannot lawfully forbid what the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, permitted, or required" (emphasis added), I am unaware of even a single case in Michigan that has ever held that a municipality or other subdivision of the state can forbid what the Legislature has permitted (either expressly or by implication). Instead, it is remarkably well established that " 'in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits.' " Rental Prop. Owners Ass'n of Kent Co. v. Grand Rapids , 455 Mich. 246, 262, 566 N.W.2d 514 (1997), despite quoting 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, p. 408 (emphasis omitted); see also Detroit v. Qualls , 434 Mich. 340, 362, 454 N.W.2d 374 (1990) ; Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming , 495 Mich. 1, 20, 846 N.W.2d 531 (2014) ; People v. Llewellyn , 401 Mich. 314, 322 n. 4, 257 N.W.2d 902 (1977) ; Walsh v. River Rouge , 385 Mich. 623, 637, 189 N.W.2d 318 (1971) ; Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd. , 366 Mich. 250, 256, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962) ; Grand Haven v. Grocer's Coop. Dairy Co. , 330 Mich. 694, 698, 48 N.W.2d 362 (1951) ; People v. McDaniel , 303 Mich. 90, 93, 5 N.W.2d 667 (1942) ; Builders Ass'n , 295 Mich. at 277, 294 N.W. 677 ; Nat'l Amusement Co. , 270 Mich. at 617, 259 N.W. 342. (4) Furthermore, even assuming that an express conflict is required-a proposition nowhere evident in actual Michigan judicial decisions-there is an even clearer demonstration of a conflict in the instant case between the school districts' policies and MCL 750.237a(5)(c) than an express conflict: a logical conflict. As discussed earlier, MCL 750.237a(4) states, "Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual who possesses a weapon in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a misdemeanor," and MCL 750.237a(5)(c) states, "Subsection (4) does not apply to ... [a]n individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon." In other words, as a general proposition, people cannot possess a firearm on school property; however, CPL holders are excepted from this prohibition. I really am not sure how the Legislature could have communicated its intentions any more clearly. Yet the school districts' policies here prohibit CPL holders from possessing firearms on school property. In other words, the school districts seek to prohibit what the state through MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits. (5) I agree with the concurrence to the extent that it asserts: (a) " MCL 750.237a must be read in pari materia with MCL 28.425o(1)(a)," (b) MCL 28.425o(1)(a)"provides that, except in narrow circumstances, a CPL holder may not carry a concealed pistol on school property," (c) MCL 28.425o"makes no reference to unconcealed or open carrying of pistols," and (d) "the exemption from criminal liability in MCL 750.237a(5)(c) only applies to the extent that a CPL holder complies with ... MCL 28.425o(1)(a)." However, I disagree with what the concurrence apparently believes follows from these propositions, to wit, that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) does not permit a CPL holder to possess an openly carried firearm on school property. As discussed earlier, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) permits a CPL holder to possess a firearm on school property, while MCL 28.425o(1)(a) prohibits a CPL holder from possessing a concealed firearm on school property. Reading these two statutes together in altogether conventional ways, it is clear that while a CPL holder cannot possess a concealed firearm on school property, he or she can possess an openly carried firearm on school property. Contrary to the concurrence's implication, I do not rely upon the Legislature's silence in any way to justify this conclusion, but rather on the explicit language of MCL 750.237a(5)(c) and MCL 28.425o(1)(a). (6) The concurrence asserts that " MCL 750.237a proscribes conduct-it does not provide any affirmative rights whatsoever to CPL holders...." This is really the heart of the disagreement between myself and the concurrence. By this assertion, the concurrence seeks to transform the statutory conflict here into a metaphysical question. That is, notwithstanding that state law is explicit in excepting a class of persons from statutory prohibitions concerning the possession of firearms on school property, the concurrence asserts that this merely serves to relieve such persons of criminal sanctions for carrying firearms on school property rather than actually permitting them to carry firearms. This is a wonderfully fine distinction, but one that is unsupported by the language of the law (the subject of state law is the actual "possession" and "carrying" of firearms in particular venues), unsupported by the logic of the law ( MCL 750.237a(5)(c) serves to nullify the prohibitions of MCL 750.237a(4) ), unsupported by ordinary understandings of the people (that someone is exempt from a prohibition is the equivalent of stating that he or she has a right to do what would otherwise be prohibited), and unsupported by common understandings of legislative intentions (what conceivable purpose is served by large numbers of state laws whose only apparent consequence from the viewpoint of the concurrence is to render conduct lawful while not actually permitting that conduct?). As discussed earlier, this straightforward proposition is also supported by our caselaw. Builders Ass'n , 295 Mich. at 276, 294 N.W. 677 ; Nat'l Amusement Co. , 270 Mich. at 617, 259 N.W. 342. The law is designed to communicate in a reasonably clear and practical manner the day-to-day rights and responsibilities of the people, and the Legislature has done exactly that in this instance, which ought not to be obscured or confused. (7) The concurrence relies on Qualls , 434 Mich. at 363-364, 454 N.W.2d 374, because it " 'reject[ed] the rationale ... that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly permits[.]' " The statute in that case stated that " '[t]he storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as follows....' " Qualls , 434 Mich. at 370 n. 3, 454 N.W.2d 374 ( LEVIN , J., dissenting), quoting former MCL 750.243d, repealed by 2011 PA 256 (emphasis omitted). The statute then set forth several requirements regarding the storage of fireworks, including weight restrictions. The ordinance at issue stated that " '[t]he storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to a gross weight of less than one hundred (100) pounds....' " Id . at 369 n. 1, 454 N.W.2d 374 (emphasis omitted). This Court held that the ordinance did not conflict with the statute because the statute was silent regarding how many pounds of fireworks a retailer could store. However, the majority did not even quote, let alone analyze, the actual language of the statute. That is, the majority concluded that the statute and the ordinance did not conflict, but it did so without examining the actual language of the statute. The issue was whether the statute and the ordinance could be harmonized, and the majority somehow concluded that those provisions could be harmonized without even bothering to examine the actual language of one of those provisions, indeed, the controlling provision. In other words, in a case in which the heart of the issue was one of statutory interpretation, the majority failed to interpret the actual words of the statute in dispute. Instead, it appears that the majority simply relied on an Attorney General opinion that concluded that a previous version of the statute allowed a retailer to maintain on the premises a "reasonable amount" of fireworks. Id . at 363, 454 N.W.2d 374 ; OAG, 1979-1980, No. 5536, p. 335, at 337 (August 9, 1979). From this the majority concluded that the statute did not conflict with the ordinance. The majority also did not cite, let alone discuss, Home Builders Ass'n , 295 Mich. at 276, 294 N.W. 677, or Nat'l Amusement Co. , 270 Mich. at 617, 259 N.W. 342, two cases that, as discussed earlier, stand for the opposite proposition: that which the Legislature explicitly excludes from prohibition, it impliedly permits. (8 ) Far more importantly, however, than either Qualls , Home Builders , or Nat'l Amusement is that the analysis of the concurrence is simply incompatible with first principles of logic . When a statute prohibits conduct and then excludes some class of persons from that prohibition, the only logical conclusion is that such class of persons is permitted to engage in the otherwise prohibited conduct. This is not an issue in which we look to precedent, but to the premises by which reasonable meaning is given to the law, to the premises by which the people are communicated their rights and responsibilities. As a matter of rudimentary logic, if something is explicitly not prohibited, it is permitted. I can imagine the question on a middle-school worksheet: the opposite of "not prohibited" is ______? Answer: permitted. It is quite that simple. The law is binary in this regard; conduct is either prohibited or it is not; there is not some Alice-in-Wonderland third realm of the law in which conduct is neither prohibited nor permitted. That is what not what legislatures intend by their enactments, and it is not what the people comprehend in these enactments; not one Michigan citizen in a hundred would look to the relevant statutes in this case, read the prohibition on firearms in school zones and then read of the exception for CPL holders, and not conclude-altogether reasonably-that if he or she is a CPL holder, he or she is permitted to do what is prohibited to others. There are countless laws of this state predicated on exactly this same logic and this same commonsense understanding of language. See note 6 of this opinion. To adopt the position of the concurrence-"that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it [also does not] impliedly permit"-is to engage in gamesmanship with the citizenry, to mislead them in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, to play "gotcha" by holding people accountable to the law in indeterminate ways when they "confuse" relief from prohibition as the equivalent of permission. If an explicit legal exemption from a general prohibition does not mean that the otherwise prohibited conduct is permitted, what does it mean? What legal consequences are faced by persons who assume that such conduct is permitted and who engage in that conduct? The approach advocated by the concurrence would lead to misunderstanding and uncertainty on the part of a law-abiding people seeking to discern from the prescriptions, and proscriptions, of their law what they can and cannot do. CONCLUSION In summary, MCL 380.11a(3) authorizes school districts to enact school policies "except as otherwise provided by law," and MCL 750.237a"otherwise provide[s] by law." That is, MCL 750.237a authorizes CPL holders to openly carry firearms on school property while the school policies at issue here prohibit this conduct. Because school districts do not have the authority to enact school policies that conflict with state law, the school policies at issue here are invalid. When there is an enactment of the Legislature that provides that a person "may" do something and a subordinate public body provides that he or she "may not" do that same thing, there is a textual, a logical, a legal, and a practical conflict, and the former provision of law prevails; it is that simple. Therefore, I would reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals. The exception to the districts' policies for concealed carry under those limited conditions is to ensure alignment with state law, specifically MCL 28.425o. To the extent that the plaintiffs suggest that the Legislature made a mistake in omitting school districts from MCL 123.1101 and that allowing a school district (but not a statutorily defined local unit of government) to impose firearm restrictions would lead to absurd results and defeat the stated intent of the Legislature, we note that when statutory language is unambiguous, the Court presumes that the Legislature "intended the meaning clearly expressed-no further judicial construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written." DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp. , 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000). And we see nothing absurd in the Legislature choosing to allow local school districts to make decisions that best suit their localities, leaving the door open to local prohibitions of firearms in schools in particular. Schools are distinct in many ways. What is more, what's good policy for Ann Arbor and Clio might not be good policy for Cadillac and Escanaba. We see nothing absurd about letting each school district, through its elected representatives, determine its own policy. And the plaintiffs' argument that the Legislature simply made a mistake is also not compelling given that the Legislature has shown that it is perfectly capable of defining "local unit of government" broadly and to include school districts when it wants to do so. See, e.g., MCL 15.501(d). While of course not binding on this Court, the Court of Appeals has also held that resort to the remaining Llewellyn factors is unnecessary when a statute shows the Legislature's intent not to occupy the field. See, e.g., Gmoser's Septic Serv., LLC v. East Bay Charter Twp. , 299 Mich. App. 504, 513, 831 N.W.2d 881 (2013) (concluding that although the Llewellyn factors favored a finding that the Legislature preempted the field, "this is not a typical case" because the Legislature by statute had "specifically limited the preemptive effect of its statutory scheme" and finding no field preemption); Granger Land Dev. Co. v. Clinton Co. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 135 Mich. App. 154, 159, 351 N.W.2d 908 (1984) ("Where a statute contains a provision for limited pre-emption (as in the present case), a court may not imply total pre-emption from the statutory history, the pervasiveness of the regulatory scheme, or the need for uniformity arising from the nature of the regulated subject matter. Section 30(4) provides for limited pre-emption; it also implicitly precludes a holding of total pre-emption."). See also CADL , 298 Mich. App. at 251 n. 5, 826 N.W.2d 736 ( Gleicher , J., dissenting) (stating that "[w]hen a statute explicitly defines the field of its reach, use of the implied field-preemption doctrine described in Llewellyn violates the canons of statutory construction and any application of Llewellyn is unjustified"). We therefore need not reach the question whether the Court of Appeals in CADL or this case properly analyzed the remaining Llewellyn factors or whether those decisions are inconsistent in their analysis of those factors. Nor need we address the holding in CADL that MCL 123.1102 preempted the library's policy in that case because two entities covered by the statute created the district library that promulgated the policy. The dissent reframes this argument as a "threshold" issue of whether the school districts have the authority to adopt the policies at issue in the first place. But there is no such animal as "threshold preemption"-under the dissent's analysis, the districts lack that authority only if their policies conflict with state law , i.e. if they are conflict-preempted. And field preemption precludes all local regulation of a subject matter, while conflict preemption only precludes local regulation to the extent it conflicts with state law. Thus, it is difficult to understand the basis for the dissent's conclusion that its analysis involves "a question that must be addressed by the courts before the issue of field preemption can even be considered." See, e.g., Rental Prop. Owners Ass'n of Kent Co. v. Grand Rapids , 455 Mich. 246, 256-263, 566 N.W.2d 514 (1997) (resolving first whether a local ordinance was field-preempted before analyzing whether it was conflict-preempted by a state statute). In other words, this Court's typical analysis of such issues proceeds exactly as we have done here. It is therefore telling that however "logical" the dissent calls its order-of-operations approach, it has no basis in our law . And as correctly framed, the urgency of the dissent's plea that we must reach the conflict-preemption issue notwithstanding plaintiffs' abandonment of it loses much of its force. This argument is perfunctory and interwoven with the plaintiffs' argument that the districts' policies are field-preempted. See, e.g., Michigan Gun Owners' Supplemental Brief at 17 (asserting that Ann Arbor's policy is "expressly and impliedly preempted by Michigan firearms regulations" just after citing the Llewellyn test for field preemption and as part of its discussion of the first Llewellyn factor). See Michigan Supreme Court, Oral Arguments in Michigan Gun Owners, Inc v. Ann Arbor Public Schools< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rvGL1daiFGQ> at 6:12 to 6:29 (accessed July 10, 2018): Justice McCormack : But that's a-that's a different kind of preemption, that's conflict preemption, not field preemption. Mr. Makowski : Right. And we've not briefed that issue . If the Court would like me to brief the issue of conflict preemption, I certainly can as a supplement. Justice McCormack : Well that-I mean, is it an issue you've raised and pleaded throughout your litigation? Mr. Makowski : I have not. [Emphasis added.] Indeed, if anything, the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed such an argument even when presented with the opportunity to embrace it. See id . at 5:15 to 5:29; see also Michigan Supreme Court, Oral Arguments in Michigan Open Carry, Inc. v. Clio Area School District< https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ln1bsBx2F8A> at 14:36 to 14:49 (accessed July 10, 2018). Perhaps if the plaintiffs had articulated the dissent's theory, we would have found it appropriate to resolve it. But they didn't. (Maybe they didn't for the reasons in Justice Viviano 's concurring opinion.) And whatever the propriety of the Court's decision in Mack v. Detroit , 467 Mich. 186, 649 N.W.2d 47 (2002), to resolve that case on an issue not raised in the defendant's briefing, at least it was raised at oral argument and not expressly disclaimed. That significantly distinguishes this case from Mack and exposes the dissent's judicial overreach: The dissent is ready to say point, game, match for the plaintiffs on an argument almost entirely of its own construction. There are plenty of considerations counseling against the dissent's position that it is "of no consequence" that the plaintiffs have not made the dissent's argument. If it is truly "of no consequence," best we ditch the adversarial system of law today, as under the dissent's approach we the Court will always know not only the better answer than any supplied by the parties but even the better questions than those asked by the parties. Finally, the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part would grant leave to appeal and direct the parties to brief this issue. It is difficult to take that suggestion very seriously. The concurrence/dissent wants to have it both ways: we should grant leave because these cases "present an important set of legal issues" while purporting to "take rules regarding issue preservation and abandonment very seriously...." If ever we "take rules regarding issue preservation and abandonment very seriously," it should be here. Granting leave to appeal under the circumstances presented would send a message that we should and do decline to send: Abandon an issue in your application for leave to appeal? And definitively distance yourself from that legal theory at oral argument? Worry not! The Court will revive the theory for you and give you free rein to try again after hearing oral argument on that application. I agree with the majority's decision not to reach this issue, since the parties chose not to pursue this theory in our Court even when given the opportunity to do so. I write simply to point out some of the inherent flaws in the dissent's reasoning, and also to explain why I disagree with the partial concurrence that we should grant leave to address the issue. Indeed, the majority and concurring justices hold to the contrary, and the dissenting justice states that he "do[es] not necessarily disagree with" this conclusion. Rental Prop. Owners Ass'n of Kent Co. v. Grand Rapids , 455 Mich. 246, 262, 566 N.W.2d 514 (1997) (emphasis altered), quoting 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, pp. 408-409 ; see also Detroit v. Qualls , 434 Mich. 340, 362, 454 N.W.2d 374 (1990) ; Miller v. Fabius Twp. Bd. , 366 Mich. 250, 256-257, 114 N.W.2d 205 (1962). Miller , 366 Mich. at 258, 114 N.W.2d 205, citing City of Howell v. Kaal , 341 Mich. 585, 590-591, 67 N.W.2d 704 (1954). MCL 380.11a(3)(b) (permitting the schools to regulate for the safety of pupils "except as otherwise provided by law"). See Bradley v. Saranac Community Schs. Bd. of Ed. , 455 Mich. 285, 298, 565 N.W.2d 650 (1997) ("This Court recognizes the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius ; that the express mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things."). This is not to say, of course, that the statute prohibits the open carrying of pistols except as provided in MCL 28.425c(3)(b). Instead, my point is more modest-it is only that, for purposes of conflict-preemption analysis, this particular statutory provision cannot be read as expressing a lawful right for CPL holders to openly carry firearms anywhere in the state. Nor could I locate any other statute regulating the open carrying of a firearm in our state. This is not surprising, however, since the "vast majority of ... [state] statutes deal with concealed carry; while open carry is sometimes permitted in these states, nearly all of the laws focus on the right to carry a concealed weapon." Note, Open Carry For All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment , 123 Yale L J 1486, 1497 (2014). The focus on concealed carrying stems from the fact that concealed carrying was long viewed with greater suspicion than the open carrying of weapons and thus as being in more need of regulation; accordingly, courts have struck down open-carry bans on constitutional grounds. Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the Constitutional Case for Gun Control , 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1187, 1210 (2015) (noting that in the nineteenth century, "[a]lthough laws prohibiting open-carry were more often than not invalidated, concealed-carry bans were generally upheld against constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment or state-law analogues"); Open Carry for All , 123 Yale L. J. at 1500 ("[A] clear pattern emerges from [nineteenth-century caselaw in which] ... states were allowed to ban the concealed carry of weapons but not their open carry. This was not an arbitrary choice-instead, the dichotomy between open and concealed carry underscored antebellum understandings of permissible self-defense and public safety."). In any event, I certainly do not mean to suggest that our citizens only have a right to openly carry a firearm if a statute expressly authorizes them to do so. Instead, our citizens have broad rights to bear firearms that are protected by the Second Amendment. U.S. Const, Am II ; see also Dist. of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 610-614, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (noting caselaw upholding a constitutional right to openly carry firearms). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, however, those rights are subject to certain restrictions. See Heller , 554 U.S. at 626, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (recognizing a broad right to bear firearms while noting that the Court was not "cast[ing] doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms ... in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings"). The relevant subsections of MCL 750.237a state, in relevant part: (4) Except as provided in subsection (5), an individual who possesses a weapon in a weapon free school zone is guilty of a misdemeanor.... * * * (5) Subsection (4) does not apply to any of the following: * * * (c) An individual licensed by this state or another state to carry a concealed weapon. See Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 496 Mich. 642, 652, 852 N.W.2d 865 (2014) (opinion by Viviano , J.) ("[I]n the construction of a particular statute, or in the interpretation of its provisions, all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in connection with it, as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times, and contain no reference to one another."). Notably, MCL 28.425o(1)(a) makes explicit reference to MCL 750.237a. See MCL 28.425o(1)(a) ("As used in this section, 'school' and 'school property' mean those terms as defined in ... MCL 750.237a."). MCL 28.425o provides, in pertinent part: (1) Subject to subsection (5), an individual licensed under this act to carry a concealed pistol, or who is exempt from licensure under section 12a(h), shall not carry a concealed pistol on the premises of any of the following: (a) A school or school property except that a parent or legal guardian of a student of the school is not precluded from carrying a concealed pistol while in a vehicle on school property, if he or she is dropping the student off at the school or picking up the student from the school. Post at 775 ( Markman , C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). At various points and in various ways, the dissent asserts that "if something is explicitly not prohibited, it is permitted." Post at 784. There is a sense in which this is true, although the dissent's resort to principles of logic is open to some question. See, e.g., Aldisert, Logic For Lawyers: A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking (South Bend: National Institute for Trial Advocacy, 1997), pp. 158-163. But the sense in which it is not true is the sense that matters for purposes of a conflict-preemption analysis, and that analysis is dictated by our precedents, not by a middle-school primer. As noted above, the conduct authorized by MCL 28.425c(3) is expressly limited by MCL 28.425o. See MCL 28.425c(3). The dissent believes that the Legislature has "clearly and straightforwardly denied school districts the authority to prohibit CPL holders from openly carrying firearms on school property," post at 774, and indeed cannot even conceive of "how the Legislature could have communicated its intentions any more clearly," post at 780-81. One obvious way would be for the Legislature to add school districts to the list of local government entities covered by the express preemption statute, see MCL 123.1101 and MCL 123.1102, something it is already considering. See 2017 SB 586. Alternatively, the Legislature could pass a regulatory law that expressly permits the open carrying of a firearm on school property. Qualls , 434 Mich. at 361, 454 N.W.2d 374 ; see also former MCL 750.243d ("The storage of fireworks at the site of a wholesaler, dealer, or jobber, except for a retailer who has goods on hand for sale to the public in a supervised display area, shall be as follows...."), 1968 PA 358, as amended by 1980 PA 422; repealed by 2011 PA 256. Qualls , 434 Mich. at 369 n. 1, 454 N.W.2d 374 ( Levin , J., dissenting) (" 'Retail sales. The storage of fireworks in a place of retail sales shall be limited to a gross weight of less than one hundred (100) pounds....' "), quoting Detroit Municipal Code, § 19-3-70 (emphasis omitted). Qualls , 434 Mich. at 376, 454 N.W.2d 374 ( Levin , J., dissenting). Id . at 361, 454 N.W.2d 374 (opinion of the Court). Id . at 363-364, 454 N.W.2d 374. Id . at 364, 454 N.W.2d 374. The dissent does not know quite how to get around the holding in Qualls . It first tries to ignore Qualls . Post at 780 ("I am unaware of even a single case in Michigan that has ever held that a municipality or other subdivision of the state can forbid what the Legislature has permitted (either expressly or by implication)."). Then, in a footnote, the dissent attempts to distinguish it with the bewildering assertion that since "this Court concluded that the Legislature did not permit the conduct in dispute," Qualls "thus does not stand for the proposition that a municipality can forbid what the Legislature has permitted." Post at 780 n. 2. Of course, this Court concluded that the Legislature did not permit the conduct in dispute precisely because it rejected the dissent's major premise in this case, i.e., that an express exemption in a criminal statute is an implied grant of permission for an individual to engage in the exempted activity that is not subject to local regulation. Qualls , 434 Mich. at 363-364, 454 N.W.2d 374 (opinion of the Court) ("Therefore, we reject the rationale employed by the dissent that that which the Legislature does not prohibit, it impliedly permits...."). Finally, the dissent disparages Qualls and is apparently of the belief that it should be overruled. See post at 783 ("[T]he [Qualls ] majority did not even quote, let alone analyze, the actual language of the statute.... In other words, in a case in which the heart of the issue was one of statutory interpretation, the majority failed to interpret the actual words of the statute in dispute."). I take no position on whether Qualls was correctly decided because no party has asked us to overrule it. Instead, at this juncture, I would simply treat it as a binding and controlling precedent of our Court. In the analogous context of federal preemption law, "[i]t is the rule that exceptions to broad prohibitory statutes generally have no preemptive effect. ... The Supreme Court has reasoned that a finding of preemption in this context is not only 'inappropriate,' but 'illogical.' " Malabed v. North Slope Borough , 335 F.3d 864, 872 (CA 9, 2003), quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland , 437 U.S. 117, 132, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). Miller , 366 Mich. at 255, 114 N.W.2d 205 (quotation marks omitted). Id . at 252, 114 N.W.2d 205. Id . at 260, 114 N.W.2d 205 ( Souris , J., dissenting). Id . at 259, 114 N.W.2d 205 (opinion of the Court). Id . Builders Ass'n v. Detroit , 295 Mich. 272, 294 N.W. 677 (1940). Id . at 275, 294 N.W. 677. Id . at 273-274, 294 N.W. 677. Id . at 276-277, 294 N.W. 677. See Qualls , 434 Mich. at 364, 454 N.W.2d 374, discussed above. Nat'l Amusement , 270 Mich. at 614-615, 259 N.W. 342, quoting 1933 PA 65. Id . at 614, 259 N.W. 342. Id . at 617, 259 N.W. 342. Post at 775-76. Nat'l Amusement , 270 Mich. at 614-615, 259 N.W. 342, quoting 1933 PA 65. Id . at 617, 259 N.W. 342. MCL 28.425c(3)(a) ; MCL 28.425o. MCL 750.237a. Nat'l Amusement , 270 Mich. at 617, 259 N.W. 342 ; see also Qualls , 434 Mich. at 364, 454 N.W.2d 374. It is very common, if not routine, for one or more members of this Court to inform counsel during oral argument that the outcome of the specific case being argued by counsel is less important to the Court than the next hundred cases raising related issues that will be governed by the outcome of this case. Because it is imperative that we, as the Court of last resort for Michigan, timely and clearly expound on the significant jurisprudential issues of our state, we should fully resolve this case, which presents issues of vital importance to the people. Notwithstanding counsel's exchange with Justice McCormack during oral argument in which he improvidently ceded the conflict-preemption issue, the importance of the next hundred cases counsels that this Court should exercise its discretion to grant leave to appeal and direct the parties to specifically brief the conflict-preemption question. This much is also clear from our recent practice. See, e.g., People v. Cowan , 501 Mich. 900, 902 N.W.2d 418 (2017) (remanding to the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing into the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel despite the defendant's not clearly raising the issue below); People v. Temelkoski , 498 Mich. 942, 872 N.W.2d 219 (2015) (requesting that the parties address additional issues not initially raised in the application). Contrary to the majority's assertion, whether a school district possesses the authority to adopt a particular policy is properly described as a "threshold" inquiry. If the district lacks such authority in the first place, there is no need to address further whether the state has or has not occupied the field of regulation in a particular realm. A district only possesses authority granted by statute, and in order to determine whether it possesses a particular authority, we must first look to the statute that purports to grant that authority, in this case the Revised School Code. If the authority is lacking, that is the end of the analysis. Yet, the majority concludes that the school district policies at issue are valid without any reference to the code. How can the majority possibly know whether these policies are valid without first assessing whether the code grants a district the authority to enact them? Because the code provides that a district may enact policies "providing for the safety and welfare" of students "except as otherwise provided by law," MCL 380.11a(3), an altogether logical continuation of the "threshold" inquiry is whether there is any law that "otherwise provides." And this is where MCL 750.237a comes into play; it is exactly a law that "otherwise provides." Thus, the present inquiry does not constitute a "threshold" inquiry only if, as the majority has done, it is assumed entirely without analysis that school districts possess the legal authority to enact the policies in dispute in the first place. The concurring justice might believe that Qualls stands for this proposition, but in that case, as discussed later, this Court concluded that the Legislature did not permit the conduct in dispute and thus does not stand for the proposition that a municipality can forbid what the Legislature has permitted. The concurrence asserts that MCL 28.425c(3)"opens a gaping hole in [my] theory...." MCL 28.425c(3) provides generally that a CPL holder can "carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person anywhere in this state" and can "carry a pistol in a vehicle , whether concealed or not concealed, anywhere in this state." (Emphasis added.) However, the issue in this case pertains specifically to the possession of firearms on school property; MCL 750.237a and MCL 28.425o(1)(a) pertain specifically to the possession of firearms on school property; and it is well established that "a specific statutory provision controls over a related but more general statutory provision," DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 491 Mich. 359, 367 n. 22, 817 N.W.2d 504 (2012) -hence my reliance on the two statutes that specifically pertain to the possession of firearms on school property rather than the more general statute that does not specifically pertain to the possession of firearms on school property and indeed notes that its general terms are "subject to" other provisions of the law, including explicitly MCL 28.425o. The concurrence concludes that "by expressly authorizing a licensee to openly carry a pistol in a vehicle, [MCL 28.425c(3) ] cannot be read as authorizing a right to openly carry a pistol more broadly." I agree and that is exactly why I do not rely on MCL 28.425c(3) as authorizing such a right. Rather, I rely on MCL 750.237a(5)(c) as authorizing such a right, at least on school property, and, as recognized even by the concurrence, MCL 28.425c(3) does not "prohibit [ ] the open carrying of pistols...." That is, I do not conclude that the Legislature, by failing to prohibit the open carrying of a firearm on school property in MCL 28.425o(1)(a), was expressly establishing a right to openly carry a firearm on school property. Instead, I conclude that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) establishes the right of a CPL holder to possess an openly carried firearm on school property and that MCL 28.425o(1)(a) does not compromise that authority. Thus, again, it is not the silence of MCL 28.425o(1)(a) that creates the right, but the authorization of MCL 750.237a(5)(c) that does so. Indeed, if MCL 750.237a(5)(c) does not mean that CPL holders can possess openly carried firearms on school property, I am unsure what it does mean. Indeed, I am unsure what practical meaning, if any, the concurrence itself ascribes to MCL 750.237a(5)(c). Given that MCL 28.425o(1)(a) indisputably controls under what circumstances a CPL holder can possess a concealed firearm on school property, the concurrence obviously does not believe that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) controls in this regard. Therefore, if, as the concurrence asserts, MCL 750.237a(5)(c) also does not control in regard to whether a CPL holder can possess an openly carried firearm on school property, when does it control? It seems that MCL 750.237a(5)(c) is rendered superfluous under the reasoning of the concurrence, contrary to the well-established rule that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 427-428, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Many examples of this type of legislation can be found in the Penal Code. For example, MCL 750.234e(1) provides that "a person shall not willfully and knowingly brandish a firearm in public," but MCL 750.234e(2)(a) provides that "[s]ubsection (1) does not apply to ... [a] peace officer lawfully performing his or her duties as a peace officer." I would imagine that everybody would agree that MCL 750.234e works to permit a peace officer, lawfully performing his or her duties as a peace officer, to brandish a firearm in public. In addition, MCL 750.449a provides that "a person who engages or offers to engage the services of another person, not his or her spouse, for the purpose of prostitution, lewdness, or assignation, by the payment in money or other forms of consideration, is guilty of a misdemeanor," but MCL 750.451a provides that MCL 750.449a does "not apply to a law enforcement officer while in the performance of the officer's duties as a law enforcement officer." Again, I would imagine that everybody would agree that MCL 750.451a works to permit a law enforcement officer, while in the performance of the officer's duties as a law enforcement officer, to solicit a prostitute. Indeed, this understanding is clearly supported by MCL 750.451b, which provides that "[s]ection 451a does not apply to a law enforcement officer if the officer engages in sexual penetration ... while in the course of his or her duties." In other words, if MCL 750.451a did not permit a police officer to engage in the solicitation of a prostitute, there would have been no need for the Legislature to enact MCL 750.451b as an exception to that otherwise permitted conduct. See also MCL 750.33 ; MCL 750.45 ; MCL 750.141a ; MCL 750.160a ; MCL 750.195 ; MCL 750.197 ; MCL 750.200 ; MCL 750.224 ; MCL 750.224b ; MCL 750.224c ; MCL 750.224e ; MCL 750.224f ; MCL 750.227b ; MCL 750.227f ; MCL 750.227(2) and MCL 750.231a ; MCL 750.233 ; MCL 750.234 ; MCL 750.234a ; MCL 750.234d ; MCL 750.235 ; MCL 750.282(1)(c) ; MCL 750.329 ; MCL 750.410b(1) ; MCL 750.411w ; MCL 750.415(6) ; MCL 750.473 ; MCL 750.508 ; MCL 750.539k ; MCL 750.539l ; MCL 750.552. The concurrence purports to distinguish Builders Ass'n on the basis that the "school policies do not criminalize anything," whereas the ordinance at issue in Builders Ass'n did attempt to criminalize conduct the Legislature expressly exempted from criminal penalty. However, this is a distinction without significance. It is well established that "in determining whether the provisions of a municipal ordinance conflict with a statute covering the same subject, the test is whether the ordinance prohibits an act which the statute permits, or permits an act which the statute prohibits."Rental Prop. Owners Ass'n of Kent Co. , 455 Mich. at 262, 566 N.W.2d 514, quoting 56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal Corporations, § 374, p. 408 (emphasis omitted). Because the school districts' policies attempt to prohibit an act that the statute permits, the school policies are void. It does not matter that the schools are not attempting to criminalize the conduct; all that matters is that the schools are attempting to prohibit the conduct. The concurrence purports to distinguish Nat'l Amusement Co. on the basis that the statute at issue here prohibits conduct, whereas the statute at issue in Nat'l Amusement Co. "provided an affirmative right to engage in the conduct at issue and established the circumstances under which the conduct could be carried out." However, this is also a distinction without significance. Although the statute at issue here is generally prohibitory, by creating an exception to a prohibition, it also "provided an affirmative right to engage in the conduct at issue and established the circumstances under which the conduct could be carried out." That is, it provides that a person can possess an openly carried firearm on school property as long as that person is a CPL holder. The concurrence also cites Miller , 366 Mich. 250, 114 N.W.2d 205, in support of its position. However, Miller is significantly distinguishable. Miller involved a state statute that prohibited waterskiing from one hour after sundown to one hour before sunrise and an ordinance that prohibited waterskiing on a specific lake after 4:00 p.m. until the following day at 10:00 a.m. In short, the ordinance did not conflict with the statute because the ordinance simply broadened the prohibition contained in the statute; there was no direct conflict between the two. Miller did not involve a statute such as the one at issue here that includes an express exception to a prohibition. While an ordinance may broaden prohibitions contained in a statute, an ordinance cannot prohibit what a statute permits. Furthermore, matters of logic, as with a judge's personal sense of judicial philosophy or jurisprudence, such as his or her view of appropriate tools of statutory and constitutional interpretation, are not binding in the same sense as legal holdings.

Bernstein, J. These consolidated cases arise from two separate incidents where plaintiffs were individually stopped and questioned by Grand Rapids Police Department (GRPD) officers. During these stops, plaintiffs' photographs and fingerprints were taken in accordance with the GRPD's "photograph and print" (P&P) procedures. Alleging that the P&Ps violated their constitutional rights, plaintiffs filed separate civil lawsuits in the Kent Circuit Court against the city of Grand Rapids (the City), as well as against the individual police officers involved. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of all defendants in both cases. Plaintiffs each appealed by right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in separate opinions. Relevant to this appeal, both opinions affirmed summary disposition for the City on plaintiffs' municipal-liability claims on the basis that a policy that does not direct or require police officers to take a specific action cannot give rise to municipal liability under 42 USC 1983. We disagree with the Court of Appeals and hold that a policy or custom that authorizes, but does not require, police officers to engage in specific conduct may form the basis for municipal liability. Additionally, when an officer engages in the specifically authorized conduct, the policy or custom itself is the moving force behind an alleged constitutional injury arising from the officer's actions. Accordingly, we reverse in part the judgments of the Court of Appeals, and we remand these cases to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The P&Ps giving rise to these lawsuits took place during two separate incidents. At the time of the incidents, each GRPD patrol officer was assigned as a part of their standard equipment a camera, a fingerprinting kit, and GRPD "print cards" for storing an individual's copied fingerprints. Generally speaking, a P&P involved an officer's use of this equipment to take a person's photograph and fingerprints whenever an officer deemed the P&P necessary given the facts and circumstances. After a P&P was completed, the photographs were uploaded to a digital log. Completed print cards were collected and submitted to the Latent Print Unit. Latent print examiners then checked all the submitted fingerprints against the Kent County Correctional Facility database and the Automated Fingerprint Identification System. After being processed, the cards were filed and stored in a box according to their respective year. The first incident giving rise to these lawsuits involved the field interrogation of plaintiff Denishio Johnson. On August 15, 2011, the GRPD received a tip that a young black male, later identified as Johnson, had been observed walking through an athletic club's parking lot and peering into vehicles. Officer Elliott Bargas responded to the tip and initiated contact with Johnson. Johnson, who had no identification, told Bargas that he was 15 years old, that he lived nearby, and that he used the parking lot as a shortcut. Bargas was skeptical of Johnson's story, and being aware of several prior thefts in and near the parking lot, he decided to perform a P&P to see if any witnesses or evidence would tie Johnson to those crimes. After Johnson's mother arrived and verified his name and age, Johnson was released. At some point during this process, Captain Curtis VanderKooi arrived and approved Bargas's actions. Johnson was never charged with a crime. The second event occurred on May 31, 2012, after VanderKooi observed Keyon Harrison, a young black male, walk up to another boy and hand him what VanderKooi believed was a large model train engine. Suspicious of the hand-off, VanderKooi followed Harrison to a park. After initiating contact, VanderKooi identified himself and questioned Harrison. Harrison, who had no identification, told VanderKooi that he had been returning the train engine, which he had used for a school project. VanderKooi, still suspicious, radioed in a request for another officer to come take Harrison's photograph. Sergeant Stephen LaBrecque arrived a short time later and performed a P&P on Harrison, despite being asked to take only a photograph. Harrison was released after his story was confirmed, and he was never charged with a crime. Johnson and Harrison subsequently filed separate lawsuits in the Kent Circuit Court, and the cases were assigned to the same judge. Plaintiffs argued, in part, that the officers and the City were liable pursuant to 42 USC 1983 for violating plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights when the officers performed P&Ps without probable cause, lawful authority, or lawful consent. Both plaintiffs also initially claimed that race was a factor in the officers' decisions to perform P&Ps, though Johnson later dropped that claim. In two separate opinions, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the City pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and in favor of the officers pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (10), and (I)(2). Plaintiffs individually appealed by right in the Court of Appeals. In two separate opinions relying on the same legal analysis, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgments regarding plaintiffs' municipal-liability claims. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the City could not be held liable because plaintiffs did not demonstrate that any of the alleged constitutional violations resulted from a municipal policy or a custom so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law. Johnson , 319 Mich.App. at 626-628, 903 N.W.2d 843. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether the P&Ps actually violated either plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs filed a joint application for leave to appeal in this Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' ruling on the City's liability under 42 USC 1983. They argued that the record demonstrated that the City had a policy or custom of performing P&Ps without probable cause during investigatory stops pursuant to Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 2d 889 (1968), which may be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and that execution of that policy or custom violated their Fourth Amendment rights. We scheduled oral argument on the application and instructed the parties to address "whether any alleged violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights [was] the result of a policy or custom instituted or executed by the defendant City of Grand Rapids." Johnson v. VanderKooi , 501 Mich. 954, 954-955, 905 N.W.2d 233 (2018). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Maiden v. Rozwood , 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Id . at 120, 597 N.W.2d 817. When reviewing such a motion, "a trial court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties ... in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Id . A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record "leave[s] open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Shallal v. Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co , 455 Mich. 604, 609, 566 N.W.2d 571 (1997) (quotation marks and citations omitted). III. ANALYSIS The issue presented is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged violations of plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were caused by a policy or custom of the City. Plaintiffs' cause of action arises from 42 USC 1983, which provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... It is undisputed that a local municipality constitutes a "person" to which 42 USC 1983 applies. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978). Establishing municipal liability under 42 USC 1983 requires proof that: (1) a plaintiff's federal constitutional or statutory rights were violated and (2) the violation was caused by a policy or custom of the municipality. Id . For the purposes of this appeal, we assume that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the P&Ps performed by the GRPD officers and focus solely on the second prong of the analysis. Collins v. Harker Hts, Texas , 503 U.S. 115, 121-122, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed. 2d 261 (1992) (holding that whether a legal violation occurred and whether a municipality might be liable for that violation are separate legal inquiries). A constitutional violation is attributable to a municipality if "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Monell , 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Liability may also be based on a "governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels," id . at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, if the "relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force of law," Bd of the Co. Comm'rs of Bryan Co., Oklahoma v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1997). However, liability may not be based on a respondeat superior theory. Id . at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382 ; Jackson v. Detroit , 449 Mich. 420, 433, 537 N.W.2d 151 (1995). If the claim is premised on a municipal action that is itself alleged to be unlawful, such as the adoption of the policy at issue in Monell , no independent assessment of municipal culpability is necessary. Brown , 520 U.S. at 404-405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. If, however, a plaintiff does not claim "that the municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights," then it must be shown that the municipality acted with deliberate indifference to the obvious risk that the failure to take a different course of action would cause the specific kind of injury alleged. Id . at 406, 117 S.Ct. 1382 ; City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed. 2d 412 (1989). Under either theory of liability, a plaintiff must also establish "an affirmative link between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation alleged." Jackson , 449 Mich. at 433, 537 N.W.2d 151. Stated differently, the policy or custom must be the "moving force" behind the alleged constitutional violation. Id ., citing Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Accordingly, to survive summary disposition, a plaintiff must first identify and connect a policy or custom to the municipality, and then point to facts in the record demonstrating that implementation or execution of that policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation. A. MUNICIPAL POLICY OR CUSTOM The first question is whether there existed a policy or custom that was attributable to the City. While the policy in Monell was memorialized in writing, this is not a prerequisite for a finding of municipal liability. An " 'official policy' often refers to formal rules or understandings-often but not always committed to writing -that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time." Pembaur v. Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 480-481, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed. 2d 452 (1986) (emphasis added). Governmental customs may also give rise to liability. A "permanent and well settled" practice of governmental officials or employees may "constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1970). Thus, accepted, though unwritten, practices of executing governmental policy may give rise to liability for the purposes of Monell . The use of municipal resources to develop and implement practices and procedures can be evidence supporting the existence of an official policy. For example, in O'Brien v. Grand Rapids , 23 F.3d 990 (C.A. 6, 1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that an official policy arose from the development of a critical incident response plan that was silent as to the need for search warrants during such incidents. The defendants had hired an outside expert as a consultant to train police staff and used the expert's philosophy and teachings to develop a procedure manual. Id . at 1002 (opinion by Joiner, J.). As a result, the defendants adopted into practice the notion that search warrants were unnecessary when responding to a critical incident. Id . The Sixth Circuit ruled that the commitment of money and personnel, coupled with the consistent conduct of the police officers in executing the practice, conclusively established the existence of an official policy that search warrants were unnecessary during critical incidents. Id . at 1003-1005. We also believe that a municipality may be held liable for unlawful actions that it sanctioned or authorized, as well as for those that it specifically ordered. This conclusion is consistent with the controlling caselaw. In Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 471, 106 S.Ct. 1292, the question was whether a single verbal order from a prosecutor, who was vested with final decisionmaking authority, could constitute an official municipal policy. The Supreme Court observed that Monell had reasoned that "recovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts 'of the municipality'-that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered ." Id . at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (emphasis added). Therefore, rather than focus on whether the prosecutor's order was a mandatory directive, the Supreme Court stressed in Pembaur that liability could arise from the unconstitutional conduct of an employee only if that conduct was tied to a decision of the municipality. Id . at 482-483, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that liability attaches to a municipality only when "a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question." Id . at 483-484, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Once a municipality deliberately adopts a course of action, it may be held liable for its employee's violation of the law arising from the execution of that course of action. Ordering municipal employees to engage in specific unconstitutional conduct, as occurred in Pembaur and Monell , will clearly lead to a finding of liability. However, a municipality may also deliberately choose to authorize multiple courses of action. For example, a policy could state: if X, one must then do A, B, or C. Even if only one of those options constitutes unconstitutional conduct, municipal liability could still result, because the mere act of sanctioning or authorizing the unconstitutional option was a deliberate choice on the part of the municipality. Moreover, a policy need not be written in mandatory terms in order to conclude that a municipality has acted. A policy may be framed in permissive language: if X, one may then do A, B, or C. An employee pursuing any of these options would still be taking an action linked to a deliberate choice of the municipality, even if no single option was mandated. The Court of Appeals in this case concluded that a municipality may not be held liable unless its policy or custom specifically directed its employees to violate a person's constitutional rights. We disagree. Authorizing or sanctioning specific conduct is also a deliberate choice of a municipality that may give rise to liability. To hold otherwise would allow a municipality to escape liability merely by reframing an obligatory policy in permissive or discretionary terms. At a practical level, it would let municipalities avoid liability for the use of unconstitutional police tactics by adopting the tactics, but stating that they are not mandatory. This would elevate form over substance in a manner that would ignore the culpability attributable to a municipality as a result of its authorization of the tactics in the first instance. Cf. Monell , 436 U.S. at 691-692, 98 S.Ct. 2018. We do not believe that 42 USC 1983 and the controlling caselaw permit such a loophole. Accordingly, we hold that a policy or custom that authorizes municipal employees to perform their duties in a particular manner represents a deliberate decision of the municipality and an employee's performance of his or her duties in the manner authorized may be considered acts of the municipality. B. CAUSATION Once a municipal policy or custom has been identified, a plaintiff must then show that the policy or custom was also the "moving force" behind the action that gave rise to the alleged constitutional violation. Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In other words, the policy or custom must be the cause of the violation. The causation element of claims made under 42 USC 1983 should generally "be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions." Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611. Accordingly, "[t]raditional tort concepts of causation" inform our analysis. Powers v. Hamilton Co. Pub. Defender Comm. , 501 F.3d 592, 608 (C.A. 6, 2007). As in a tort action, determining whether causation can be established requires a two-pronged inquiry. A plaintiff must show cause in fact and proximate causation, also known as legal causation. Skinner v. Square D Co. , 445 Mich. 153, 162-163, 516 N.W.2d 475 (1994). The cause in fact element requires proof that " 'but for' the defendant's actions, the plaintiff's injury would not have occurred." Id . at 163, 516 N.W.2d 475. Determining proximate causation requires an examination of the foreseeability of consequences and of whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for the consequences of the defendant's conduct. Id . Thus, to establish a genuine issue of material fact, a plaintiff must point to facts from which a person could reasonably infer that the municipality's policy or custom was the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc. , 698 F.3d 1128, 1146 (C.A. 9, 2012) ("Under Monell , a plaintiff must also show that the policy at issue was the 'actionable cause' of the constitutional violation, which requires showing both but for and proximate causation."), quoting Harper v. Los Angeles , 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (C.A. 9, 2008) ; Bielevicz v. Dubinon , 915 F.2d 845, 850 (C.A. 3, 1990) ("A plaintiff bears the additional burden of proving that the municipal practice was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered."). Evidence "that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law" establishes that "the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury...." Brown , 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Stated differently, when an employee acts in accordance with a policy or custom that itself authorizes unconstitutional conduct, the policy or custom is the cause of the constitutional injury. It follows that a municipal employee's actions also flow directly from the municipality when those actions are carried out in the manner that the municipality has previously authorized. Accordingly, a municipal policy or custom is the cause in fact and proximate cause of a constitutional violation if the municipality authorizes , but does not necessarily require, the specific conduct that constitutes the violation and its employee acted pursuant to that authorization. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, federal caselaw suggests that a policy or custom that gives municipal employees some discretion does not per se sever the causal link. For example, in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't , 8 F.3d 358, 364 (C.A. 6, 1993), the defendants' deadly force policy did not require police officers to use deadly force to stop fleeing suspects. However, the deadly force policy was still found to be the "moving force" behind an officer's actions when the officer had been taught that it was "proper to shoot a fleeing burglary suspect in order to prevent escape" and the officer had acted pursuant to that policy. Id . at 364-365. Similarly, in O'Brien , 23 F.3d at 1001, officers maintained the ultimate discretion to determine when a search warrant was necessary in a specific instance. However, when officers followed "the routine practice of not securing warrants during the management of critical incidents," it could be inferred that the policy giving rise to the practice was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Id . at 1004 (opinion by Joiner, J.). In Chew v. Gates , 27 F.3d 1432, 1444 (C.A. 9, 1994), the defendants had a policy authorizing the use of dogs to find and seize all concealed suspects. The officer in Chew released a dog because the officer had been informed that he was authorized to do so under the circumstances. Id . at 1445. The officer's exercise of discretion in releasing the dog did not break the causal chain where city policy had authorized him to do so. Id . at 1446. As previously stated, when a municipality has approved of specific discretionary employee conduct and an employee acts accordingly, those actions are attributable to the municipality. It follows that, when a policy or custom authorizes specific tactics and the municipality instructs its employees regarding the use of those tactics, then that policy or custom is the cause in fact of an employee's subsequent use of those tactics. And when the tactics themselves are illegal, subsequent violations of the law arising from an employee's use of the tactics are foreseeable and flow directly from the municipality's policy or custom. Accordingly, if a policy or custom authorizes the use of a specific tactic and a police officer acts in accordance with that authorization, then the policy or custom is the cause in fact and the proximate cause of a constitutional violation arising from the use of that tactic. IV. APPLICATION Turning to the cases before us, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that plaintiffs failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of a municipal policy or custom and with regard to causation. A. MUNICIPAL POLICY OR CUSTOM We begin by noting that the City conceded during oral arguments that there is a custom within the GRPD of performing P&Ps during field interrogations and stops. The City's briefs also contain numerous references to its "P&P Custom." On the basis of these concessions alone, we conclude that the City has a practice of performing P&Ps during field interrogations and stops and that the practice legally constitutes a governmental custom within the meaning of Monell . Additionally, the City's response to a request for admission described its P&P practices as follows: ... Defendant City admits that officers taking photos and thumbprints of individuals is a custom or practice of the City of Grand Rapids and has been for decades. The custom or practice has changed over those years with the evolution of technology. ... A photograph and print might be taken of an individual when the individual does not have identification on them and the officer is in the course of writing a civil infraction or appearance ticket. A photograph and print might be taken in the course of a field interrogation or a stop if appropriate based on the facts and circumstance of that incident . [Emphasis added.] Facts admitted in response to a request for admission are "conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of an admission." MCR 2.312(D). It is also undisputed that GRPD officers are not required to make a probable cause determination before performing a P&P. Thus, the City's admission conclusively established both the existence and the City's knowledge of a longstanding "custom or practice" of performing P&Ps "in the course of a field interrogation or a stop if appropriate based on the facts and circumstances of that incident." Even without the City's concessions, we find that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, is sufficient for reasonable minds to differ as to the existence of an official policy authorizing the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. First, the GRPD's Officer Training Tasks manual indicates the existence of an official policy. The manual states that P&Ps are mandatory for the issuance of a citation for driving without a license or with a suspended license if the subject has no identification. Outside of the traffic citation context, the manual lists a P&P as something to be included in a field interrogation report and lists "[p]icture and print procedures" under the heading "TRAINING CONSIDERATIONS" without further explanation. Also in the record are slides from a GRPD training presentation showing a model field interrogation report, which includes a photograph and a fingerprint card, to record the results of a P&P. Other slides contain hypothetical examples where a P&P was performed on individuals that officers suspected of criminal activity, though the officers lacked enough information to support an arrest. This suggests that officers were specifically instructed that it was permissible to perform a P&P during field interrogations when there was not probable cause to make an arrest. Deposition testimony further suggests the existence of an official policy. VanderKooi testified at his deposition that the P&P procedures have been in place since he joined the GRPD in 1980. When asked what GRPD policies authorize a P&P, VanderKooi explained that the GRPD's field interrogation procedures "state[ ] that you can take a P and P, meaning photograph and print, under circumstances where you're engaged in a contact or stop or detained somebody[;] ... it outlines the guidelines for taking pictures and prints, as well as writing police reports." He also testified that taking a person's fingerprints is "a common investigative tactic to either incriminate or eliminate" suspicion. In Johnson's case, Bargas testified that the P&P he performed was in accordance with GRPD policy. In Harrison's case, LaBrecque testified that he was called to the location specifically to perform a P&P, which he did, despite the fact that VanderKooi apparently requested only Harrison's photograph. The officers' testimony demonstrates that they treated the GRPD's P&P procedure as an official policy. The existence of an official policy is additionally supported by the reasonable inference that public resources were used both to develop the training materials discussed earlier and also to train officers. The GRPD is the law enforcement branch of the City, and it is funded by tax revenue that the City allocates for law enforcement purposes. Thus, the GRPD's training materials regarding its P&P procedures were funded by money from the City's coffers. This is analogous to the use of municipal resources in O'Brien , 23 F.3d at 1005 (opinion by Joiner, J.), to hire an outside consultant, hold training sessions, and develop written manuals for a critical incident response plan. Although developing the P&P procedures may have required fewer resources than the response plan in O'Brien , the City nonetheless dedicated money and personnel to develop and implement the P&P procedure, and therefore, a reasonable person could infer that the City made a deliberate choice to authorize the use of P&Ps during field interrogations. The evidence thus supports plaintiffs' theory that there was an official P&P policy, i.e., a "fixed plan[ ] of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time." Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 480-481, 106 S.Ct. 1292. That the City may not have outlined in its training materials what specific facts and circumstances justify performing a P&P does not preclude a juror from inferring that the custom has, over time, evolved into an official policy within the meaning of Monell . Therefore, even without the City's concession, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of an official municipal policy. B. CAUSATION As the party opposing summary disposition, plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that reasonable minds could differ about whether the P&P policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Plaintiffs argued that performing a P&P without first making a probable cause determination violated their constitutional rights. According to plaintiffs, the City's policy is to authorize and train GRPD officers to perform a P&P without first establishing probable cause. In other words, plaintiffs allege that an affirmative municipal action, the execution of the alleged P&P policy, violates federal law. As stated in Brown , 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382, proof "that the action taken or directed by the municipality ... itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury" complained of. Thus, if the City's policy or custom is unconstitutional, Brown states that causation can be inferred. The constitutionality of the City's policy or custom has yet to be determined. However, we find that the tort concepts of cause in fact and proximate causation demonstrate that the evidence permits a reasonable inference that the City's P&P policy or custom was the moving force behind the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. First, the City appears to have conceded that the policy or custom was the cause in fact of any alleged constitutional violations. Additionally, circumstantial evidence indicates as much. See Skinner , 445 Mich. 164 ("[A] plaintiff's circumstantial proof must facilitate reasonable inferences of causation, not mere speculation."). Bargas agreed that when he performed a P&P on Johnson, it was in accordance with GRPD policies. VanderKooi testified that he wanted a P&P of Harrison to preserve Harrison's identity, which is a primary reason the P&P tactic is used during field interrogations. The training slides and the GRPD manual previously discussed indicate that officers were instructed to use P&Ps during field interrogations. Additionally, the City has not argued that the officers in these cases were acting contrary to their training or GRPD policies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we think it more reasonable to infer that the officers performed the P&Ps in accordance with their prior training than to infer that the officers acted spontaneously. Thus, a reasonable person could infer that the City's P&P policy or custom was the cause in fact of the alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Turning to proximate causation, we must consider whether the injury alleged was a foreseeable consequence of the City's policy or custom. See id . at 163, 516 N.W.2d 475. More specifically, was it reasonably foreseeable that performing a P&P in accordance with the alleged policy or custom would result in a Fourth Amendment violation? We have no difficulty concluding that the answer is yes. No party has argued that the officers here did anything other than follow the City's P&P policy or custom. The record shows that GRPD officers were, at a minimum, authorized and trained to perform P&Ps during any field interrogation or stop in which an officer believed a P&P was appropriate. It is reasonably foreseeable that when a police department authorizes and trains its officers to use a specific investigative tactic, the officers will follow that training. While the City suggests that officers must consider the facts and circumstances of each encounter, there is no indication that the officers were instructed that probable cause of criminal conduct was a prerequisite to performing a P&P. The potential problem for the City is that performing a P&P without probable cause might violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. U.S. Const., Am IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."). If the nonconsensual fingerprinting of a person without probable cause is unconstitutional, then the execution of the P&P policy authorizing such conduct would result in a constitutional violation. This is sufficient to show that reasonable minds could differ as to proximate causation. V. RESPONSE TO THE CONCURRENCE The concurring opinion argues that whenever a 42 USC 1983 plaintiff alleges that that the execution of a facially lawful policy or custom caused his or her injury the claim must be reviewed pursuant to the deliberate indifference standard. We find it unnecessary to adopt or reject that interpretation of the controlling Supreme Court cases. Rather, we think it sufficient for a reviewing court to determine whether the plaintiff claims that the alleged injury was caused by a municipal action that itself directed or authorized the violation of a federally protected right or whether the plaintiff claims that a municipality's inaction or omission caused municipal employees to violate the plaintiff's rights. We agree with the concurrence that if the theory of liability is premised on some variant of the latter, then the plaintiff must also show deliberate indifference to prevail. No one disputes that we are bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court on matters of federal law. Abela v. Gen Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 603, 606, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004). The United States Supreme Court held in Canton , 489 U.S. at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, "that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." The Supreme Court acknowledged that the training program in Canton was lawful, and the Court's analysis focused on the narrow issue of whether a policy of inaction (i.e., the failure to train) could serve as a basis for liability. The phrases "facially constitutional" or "facially lawful" are noticeably absent from that opinion. And in Brown , 520 U.S. at 415-416, 117 S.Ct. 1382, the Supreme Court held that the county was not liable for the sheriff's isolated decision to hire a deputy without adequate screening, because the respondent had not shown that the sheriff's decision "reflected a conscious disregard for a high risk that [the deputy] would use excessive force in violation of respondent's federally protected right." The Brown Court, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382, added the "facially lawful" language to its restatement of Canton 's holding, but it did not expressly rule that the deliberate indifference standard applies in every case in which a plaintiff argues that the execution of a facially lawful policy or custom caused his or her injury. Instead, the Supreme Court merely said that "[c]laims not involving an allegation that the municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, present much more difficult problems of proof," and that such claims require a showing of deliberate indifference. Id . at 406-407, 117 S.Ct. 1382. See also Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 60-61, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed. 2d 417 (2011) (evaluating under the deliberate indifference standard a theory of liability based on a municipality's decision not to provide training on a specific topic to certain employees). When a theory of liability is based on the absence of governmental action, it makes sense to more critically scrutinize claims of governmental culpability for that absence. But the Supreme Court has never explicitly required such critical scrutiny when the government specifically and affirmatively authorized, but did not require, its employees to engage in allegedly unlawful conduct. In this case, we have an allegation that a municipal action did authorize a deprivation of federal rights. Plaintiffs aver that a policy or custom affirmatively authorized the use of a specific investigative tactic during field interrogations and that GRPD officers were trained to believe that it was appropriate to use this tactic in the absence of probable cause. Under plaintiffs' theory, the municipality affirmatively authorized the precise conduct alleged to be unlawful and implemented its policy through the GRPD's training of officers to use a P&P in the manner that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Thus, whether plaintiffs specifically claim that the P&P policy is itself facially unconstitutional is beside the point for the purposes of determining whether the Court of Appeals erred, because the policy or custom identified by plaintiffs represents a municipal action that itself "authorized" allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See Brown , 520 U.S. at 406-407, 117 S.Ct. 1382. "Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward." Brown , 520 U.S. at 404-405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. "[T]he conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality ... itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains." Id . at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Thus, this is a "straightforward" case more akin to Monell and Pembaur than Brown or Canton . See id . at 404-405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. We took this case to decide only whether any alleged violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights was the result of a policy or custom instituted or executed by the City. Having concluded that the Court of Appeals erred by ruling against plaintiffs on this issue, it is unnecessary at this time for us to reach the additional issue addressed by the concurring opinion. VI. CONCLUSION In summary, we hold that it has been conclusively established by the City's concession that there exists a custom of performing a P&P during a field interrogation when an officer deems it appropriate. We further hold that, even without the City's concession as to the existence of a custom, the City's admissions, the officers' testimony, the GRPD manual, and the training materials, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City's custom has become an official policy. Genuine issues of material fact also remain concerning causation. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's order granting summary disposition based on the Court's conclusion that the alleged constitutional violations were not the result of a policy or custom of the City. We express no opinion with regard to whether plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Therefore, we reverse Part III of the Court of Appeals' opinion in both cases. We remand these cases to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the P&Ps at issue here violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Richard H. Bernstein, Bridget M. McCormack, David F. Viviano, Elizabeth T. Clement, JJ., concur. Wilder, J. (concurring in judgment ). I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to fully explain the basis of my concurrence, including my understanding of the majority's holdings and the inquiry facing the Court of Appeals on remand. In my judgment, the majority opinion gives insufficient guidance to the bench and the bar concerning the state of the law governing municipal liability. I believe that we owe future § 1983 plaintiffs, who have suffered harm at the hands of a local government unit, and defendants, who need to understand the legal requirements governing their behavior, a thorough understanding of what they must demonstrate in order to prevail. At the same time, we are also obligated to give the clearest guidance possible to lower courts, so that they may adjudicate such claims as fairly as possible. I This case involves the proper application of § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, now codified as 42 USC 1983. Section 1983 states, in part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... The United States Supreme Court has long held that this statute provides a cause of action for those claiming the deprivation of a federal right by a "person" acting under the authority of state law. Monroe v. Pape , 365 U.S. 167, 171-187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed. 2d 492 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978). In Monell , the Court held that a local unit of government was a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and, as such, could be sued under the statute. Monell , 436 U.S. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Yet the Court also ruled that the law's text and history compelled the further conclusion that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort." Id . at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018. In other words, there was no respondeat superior liability under § 1983 ; a municipality could not be held to account solely because it employed a tortfeasor. Id . In order to distinguish between an injury exacted solely by an employee and one attributable to the municipality, the Court concluded that "it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id . at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Monell admittedly sketched the contours of municipal liability broadly. Id . at 695, 98 S.Ct. 2018. And it was not until later that the Court refined the scope of municipal liability in Pembaur v. Cincinnati , 475 U.S. 469, 471, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed. 2d 452 (1986). There, the Court examined whether a conscious decision by a municipal policymaker on a single occasion could constitute an official policy for the purposes of Monell liability. The Court answered yes, making it clear that Monell was, after all, a case about the allocation of responsibility. Id . at 475, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Monell 's "policy or custom" requirement was "intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Id . at 479-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. As a logical corollary, liability could attach on the basis of a policymaker's single decision. All that mattered was that the decision was made by an official " 'whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to represent official policy.' " Id . at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, quoting Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. This was true regardless of whether the policymaker's decision "officially sanctioned" or otherwise "ordered" the conduct. Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292. In either case, the policymaker's decision represented "a deliberate choice" on behalf of the municipality to follow a particular course of action. Id . at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (opinion of Brennan, J.). Monell and Pembaur make it clear that "municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Id . at 479-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (opinion of the Court). Furthermore, liability premised on anything less than " 'acts or edicts [that] may fairly be said to represent official policy' " amounts to legal responsibility premised solely on a respondeat superior theory. Id . at 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, quoting Monell , 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. But since municipalities can only act through living persons, identifying conduct properly attributable to the municipality, in contrast to conduct that is actually the fault of an employee, presents a hard conceptual problem. Monell and Pembaur were, in fact, easy cases. They involved deliberate, unlawful action on behalf of municipal policymakers. Monell represents the situation in which local government officials have chosen to promulgate and implement an unconstitutional directive. In that type of case, the connection between culpable municipal conduct and eventual injury is relatively clear, even though municipal employees are usually responsible for carrying out the unlawful order. Similarly, Pembaur embodies the situation in which a municipal policymaker has, himself or herself, chosen to violate federal law. The implementation of this unlawful decision is subsumed by the initial choice to pursue that course of action. So again, the connection between culpable municipal conduct and eventual injury is readily apparent. In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 380, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed. 2d 412 (1989), the United States Supreme Court addressed a harder question: whether a municipality could be liable based on its failure to act rather than its affirmative conduct. More specifically, Canton asked whether a failure to adequately train municipal employees could ever form the basis of Monell liability. Canton explained that a municipal policy did not have to be unconstitutional, in and of itself, to implicate Monell . Id . at 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197. But the fact that an employee happened to apply a lawful policy in an unconstitutional manner could not, without more, give rise to municipal liability. Id ."[F]or liability would then rest [solely] on [a] respondeat superior" theory. Id . Accordingly, in the absence of apparent deliberate conduct, there had to be a degree of fault sufficient to infer that the municipality's inaction represented a conscious decision. Id . at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Reviewing a range of options, the Court held that inadequate training "may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of [those affected]." Id . at 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197. In the Court's view, this was consistent with the underlying thrust of Monell that "[o]nly where a failure to [act] reflects a 'deliberate' or 'conscious' choice by a municipality ... can a city be liable." Id . at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197. Canton 's deliberate indifference standard was interpreted by lower federal courts to apply whenever a plaintiff alleged that a federal right was violated pursuant to a policy that was facially lawful. Gonzalez v. Ysleta Independent School Dist. , 996 F.2d 745, 757-758 (C.A. 5, 1993) (reviewing decisions from various federal circuits concluding that Canton applied whenever a plaintiff claimed that a facially constitutional policy was applied unlawfully by a municipal employee). This is understandable. If Monell and Pembaur were easy cases because the line between culpable municipal conduct and injury was clear, an allegation that a municipality has failed to prevent its employees from unlawfully executing an otherwise valid policy presents no such obvious line of accountability. For Monell purposes, the important question remains whether such a failure to act may constitute a deliberate attempt to commit a constitutional injury. On one side of that line lies municipal liability; on the other lies vicarious liability for the acts of employees. When viewed in this light, Canton 's deliberate indifference standard is simply the functional equivalent of the culpable conduct that setting an unlawful policy presupposes. It is clear from this that a municipality can only be liable for failing to prevent its employees from unconstitutionally implementing a constitutional policy if the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm that would follow. That is, only under these circumstances is the failure to act synonymous with a "deliberate," or "conscious," unlawful choice on behalf of the municipality. The United States Supreme Court later confirmed this understanding of Canton . In Bd of the Co. Comm'rs of Bryan Co., Oklahoma v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 402, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed. 2d 626 (1997), the Court addressed the question of whether a single hiring decision by a policymaker could be a "policy" that triggered municipal liability. The Court held that it could, in limited circumstances. And in coming to that conclusion, the Court summarized the import of its Monell jurisprudence: Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward. ... [P]roof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. ... * * * [But c]laims not involving an allegation that the municipal action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights, present much more difficult problems of proof. That a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation of federal rights at the hands of a municipal employee will not alone permit an inference of municipal culpability and causation; the plaintiff will simply have shown that the employee acted culpably. We recognized these difficulties in Canton v.Harris .... [A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with "deliberate indifference" as to its known or obvious consequences. A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice. [ Id . at 404-405, 406-407, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (citations omitted).] According to the Brown Court, this legal framework reflected the rigorous standards of culpability and causation necessary to prevent municipal liability from collapsing into respondeat superior. Id . at 410, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Anything less would ignore what was recognized in Monell and repeatedly affirmed: "Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless deliberate action attributable to the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights." Id . at 415, 117 S.Ct. 1382. This Court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on matters of federal law. Abela v. Gen Motors Corp , 469 Mich. 603, 606, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004). And municipal liability under § 1983, a federal statute, undoubtedly constitutes such a matter. Accordingly, I believe that this Court is compelled to conclude the following: if a § 1983 plaintiff alleges that a municipal policy or custom is facially unlawful , he or she need only show that the policy existed and that its implementation caused the violation of his or her federal rights. But if a § 1983 plaintiff alleges that a municipal policy or custom is facially lawful , he or she must show not only that the policy existed and that its execution caused the violation of his or her federal rights, but also that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the unlawful way in which that policy was implemented. Only then can it be said that a municipality has made a "deliberate or conscious choice" to direct or sanction unconstitutional conduct. Pembaur , 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (opinion of Brennan, J.). In this case, plaintiffs have gone to some length to argue in their briefing and during oral argument that the deliberate indifference standard does not apply to this particular controversy. Therefore, because I agree with the majority that plaintiffs claim that the Grand Rapids Police Department had a policy or custom of completing "P&Ps" during field interrogations without probable cause and that this policy caused the violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, in my view, under the principles just discussed, plaintiffs must eventually show not only that the complained-of municipal policy existed and that its execution by Grand Rapids Police Department officers caused their constitutional injuries, but also that the policy or custom was facially unconstitutional. II The majority suggests that in this case it is unnecessary to address whether the policy itself is facially unconstitutional: because the policy authorizes the allegedly unconstitutional conduct, the alleged constitutional violation was the result of the municipality's actions rather than a failure to train its employees. However, with respect, this is a meaningless distinction. An allegation that an employee unconstitutionally applied a facially constitutional policy is the logical equivalent of an allegation that the municipality failed to adequately train its employees in how to constitutionally apply that policy. In either case, the municipality is being held liable because of its failure to ensure that its policy is applied constitutionally. Indeed, if the municipality appropriately trained its employees as to the constitutional manner in which to apply the policy, the municipality would indisputably not be liable if an employee nonetheless applied the policy in an unconstitutional manner. III Today, the majority holds (1) that "a policy or custom that authorizes municipal employees to perform their duties in a particular manner represents a deliberate decision of the municipality and an employee's performance of his or her duties in the manner authorized may be considered acts of the municipality," ante at 794, and (2) that "if a policy or custom authorizes the use of a specific tactic and a police officer acts in accordance with that authorization, then the policy or custom is the cause in fact and the proximate cause of a constitutional violation arising from the use of that tactic," ante at 796. I concur in the judgment of the majority opinion insofar as it concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning the existence of a municipal "policy or custom" and whether that "policy or custom" caused the constitutional violations alleged. Additionally, because plaintiffs do not allege deliberate indifference by the city of Grand Rapids, I would specifically direct the Court of Appeals to decide on remand whether the complained-of "policy or custom" was facially unconstitutional. Only by prevailing on that issue can plaintiffs demonstrate that the municipality is actually liable for their alleged injuries. In other words, only then will the connection between culpable municipal conduct and harm be sufficiently firm to implicate Monell liability. Stephen J. Markman, C.J., Kurtis T. Wilder, Brian K. Zahra, JJ., agree. See Johnson v. VanderKooi , 319 Mich.App. 589, 903 N.W.2d 843 (2017) ; Harrison v. VanderKooi , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 23, 2017 (Docket No. 330537). MCR 2.116(C)(10) allows a party to move the court for judgment on all or part of a claim when, "[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law." In both cases, the Court of Appeals also affirmed that the individual officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the motion to strike each plaintiff's proposed expert witness was properly granted. The Court of Appeals further held that the P&Ps did not violate plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment rights. Johnson , 319 Mich.App. at 618-620, 903 N.W.2d 843 ; Harrison , unpub. op. at 5. And in Harrison , unpub. op. at 9-11, the panel affirmed that the record did not support Harrison's equal-protection claim. These issues were not presented in plaintiffs' joint application for leave to appeal in this Court. "[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Terry , 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In Monell , 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, the United States Supreme Court wrote: Congress included customs and usages [in 42 USC 1983 ] because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices of state officials.... Although not authorized by written law, such practices of state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law. [Quoting Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 167-168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1970).] Several federal courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Mobley v. Detroit , 938 F.Supp.2d 669, 684 (E.D. Mich., 2012) (finding the defendant liable based on its unwritten operating procedure of detaining, searching, and prosecuting individuals at unlicensed bars without individualized probable cause); Hunter v. Co. of Sacramento , 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (C.A. 9, 2011) (holding that a jury instruction defining a custom as "any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant" was consistent with Monell ); O'Brien v. Grand Rapids , 23 F.3d 990, 1004-1005 (C.A. 6, 1994) (finding illegal a municipal policy allowing the warrantless entry of homes during the management of critical incidents). Although caselaw from the federal circuits and federal district courts is not binding on this Court, it may be considered for its persuasive value. Abela v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 469 Mich. 603, 606, 677 N.W.2d 325 (2004). Although his opinion was not the lead opinion, Judge Joiner wrote for the majority in O'Brien with regard to the city's liability. This conclusion is consistent with the Sixth Circuit's application of Monell and its progeny in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't , 8 F.3d 358 (C.A. 6, 1993). In Garner , the defendants had a written policy that authorized, but did not require, the use of deadly force to stop certain nonviolent fleeing suspects. Id . at 364. Because the defendants could have adopted a more restrictive deadly force policy, their authorization of the use of deadly force to apprehend some nonviolent suspects was "a deliberate choice from among various alternatives," which made that authorization a policy with the force of law. Id . Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said that if a city "impliedly or tacitly authorized, approved or encouraged harassment" of the plaintiff by the police, then "it promulgated an official policy within the meaning of Monell ." Turpin v. Mailet , 619 F.2d 196, 201 (C.A. 2, 1980). This standard has been consistently applied by federal circuit courts. In Garner , 8 F.3d at 364-365, for example, police officers were authorized, but not required, to shoot nonviolent fleeing suspects by the department's deadly force policy. The Sixth Circuit found that when an officer acted pursuant to that authorization and training, the policy was the cause of the decision to use such force as a matter of law. Id . at 365. In O'Brien , 23 F.3d at 1005 (opinion by Joiner, J.), the Sixth Circuit held that causation was established by the execution of the city's critical incident response plan, which implicitly authorized warrantless entries into homes during critical incidents. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has similarly stated, "[w]hen employees take actions specifically authorized by policy or custom, their actions can be fairly said to be the municipality's." Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Serv Dist. , 506 F.3d 1281, 1284 (C.A. 10, 2007). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has gone so far as to say that independent proof of causation is unnecessary when the conduct authorized is itself unconstitutional. See Spell v. McDaniel , 824 F.2d 1380, 1387 (C.A. 4, 1987) ("When a municipal 'policy or custom' is itself unconstitutional, i.e., when it directly commands or authorizes constitutional violations, see, e.g. , Monell , ... the causal connection between policy and violation is manifest and does not require independent proof."). The City stated the following in its supplemental brief filed in this Court: The City may freely concede that in the absence of the Field Interrogation P&P Custom, Appellants would not have had their pictures or prints taken during their respective investigatory stops. But ... even if having their pictures and prints taken during a lawful stop somehow violated their constitutional rights, the Custom itself was not the moving force behind those violations. Indeed, the Supreme Court was silent as to whether Canton or Brown created such a rule in its more recent decision in Connick v. Thompson , 563 U.S. 51, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 ; 179 L.Ed. 2d (2011), which also involved a municipal liability claim premised on an alleged failure to train government employees. The concurrence cites decisions in which Canton and Brown have been interpreted as requiring application of the deliberate indifference standard in 42 USC 1983 cases involving an alleged injury arising from the execution of a facially lawful policy or custom. At least one federal circuit court has declined to adopt this interpretation. See Christensen v. Park City Muni Corp. , 554 F.3d 1271, 1280 (C.A. 10, 2009) ("If a governmental entity makes and enforces a law that is unconstitutional as applied, it may be subject to liability under § 1983."). It also appears, for reasons that are not readily apparent, that several other federal appellate courts have not addressed the issue or have not found it necessary to expand on Canton and Brown in the manner that is suggested by the concurrence. See, e.g., Cash v. Co. of Erie , 654 F.3d 324, 333-334 (C.A. 2, 2011) ; Jenkins v. Bartlett , 487 F.3d 482, 492 (C.A. 7, 2007) ; Young v. Providence , 404 F.3d 4, 25-28 (C.A. 1, 2005) ; Daskalea v. District of Columbia , 343 U.S. App. DC 261, 269, 227 F.3d 433 (2000). Beyond our belief that it is not necessary at this time to adopt or reject the concurring opinion's interpretation of Canton and Brown , we offer no further opinion as to the merits of the concurrence's position on that issue. As the concurrence acknowledges, in this Court, plaintiffs have declined to argue in the alternative that the GRPD officers inflicted the alleged constitutional injury because of some policy or custom of inaction or omission on the part of the City. Our opinion should not be read as implying that whether the policy or custom identified by plaintiffs is facially constitutional or facially unconstitutional is irrelevant to this case as a whole. The Court of Appeals has yet to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred, much less whether the City's policy or custom is facially unconstitutional, because it erroneously concluded that no such policy or custom existed. The concurring justices appear eager to indicate how they would decide certain issues that could arise on remand, and what law they would adopt in such circumstances. We merely prefer to wait until those issues are properly presented to us before we opine on the subject further. Justice Brennan authored the opinion of the Court in Pembaur , but only three justices joined Part II(B) of that opinion, id . at 481-484, 106 S.Ct. 1292. Although not binding on this Court, a number of federal appellate courts have since held that a municipality cannot be deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's constitutional rights if those rights were not clearly established when the policy or custom was promulgated. See, e.g., Arrington-Bey v. City of Bedford Hts, Ohio , 858 F.3d 988, 994 (C.A. 6, 2017) (" '[A] municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established.' "), quoting Hagans v. Franklin Co. Sheriff's Office , 695 F.3d 505, 511 (C.A. 6, 2012) ; Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota , 486 F.3d 385, 393 (C.A. 8, 2007) (en banc) ("[W]e agree with the Second Circuit and several district courts that a municipal policymaker cannot exhibit fault rising to the level of deliberate indifference to a constitutional right when that right has not yet been clearly established."), citing Townes v. City of New York , 176 F.3d 138, 143-144 (C.A. 2, 1999) ; Gonzalez v. Ysleta Independent School Dist. , 996 F.2d 745, 759-760 (C.A. 5, 1993) (stating that a "municipality only can be held liable for a constitutional violation caused by a municipality that manifests at least deliberate indifference to constitutional rights" and that "it may well be ... that to be deliberately indifferent to rights requires that those rights be clearly established") (quotation marks and citations omitted); Williamson v. City of Virginia Beach, Virginia , 786F.Supp.1238, 1264-1265 (ED Va, 1992) ("[Even if] the constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff did exist, the conclusion that they were not clearly established negates the proposition that the city acted with deliberate indifference."), aff'd 991 F.2d 793 (C.A. 4, 1993) (Table). A law is facially unconstitutional if "no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." United States v. Salerno , 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed. 2d 697 (1987). Although it does not control this Court's decision, this understanding of municipal liability under § 1983 is supported by an overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Szabla v. City of Brooklyn Park, Minnesota , 486 F.3d 385, 390 (C.A. 8, 2007) (en banc) ("Where a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a 'policy' by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by policymakers."); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle , 622 F.3d 248, 264 (C.A. 3, 2010) ("[I]n order to be held liable for a facially valid policy, [a] municipality must have acted with deliberate indifference."); Gregory v. City of Louisville , 444 F.3d 725, 752 (C.A. 6, 2006) ("Where the identified policy is itself facially lawful, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); American Federation of Labor & Congress of Indus Organizations v. City of Miami, FL , 637 F.3d 1178, 1187 (C.A. 11, 2011) ("If a facially-lawful municipal action is alleged to have caused a municipal employee to violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights, the plaintiff must establish that the municipal action was taken with 'deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. As none of the policies in question here are facially unconstitutional, this presents the plaintiffs with a difficult task.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Burge v. St. Tammany Parish , 336 F.3d 363, 370 (C.A. 5, 2003) ("Where ... an alleged policy or custom is facially innocuous, establishing the requisite official knowledge requires that a plaintiff establish that an official policy was promulgated with deliberate indifference to the 'known or obvious consequences' that constitutional violations would result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Gibson v. Co of Washoe, Nevada , 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (C.A. 9, 2002) ("[A] plaintiff can allege that through its omissions the municipality is responsible for a constitutional violation committed by one of its employees, even though the municipality's policies were facially constitutional, the municipality did not direct the employee to take the unconstitutional action, and the municipality did not have the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation. However, because Monell held that a municipality may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior, a plaintiff must show that the municipality's deliberate indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the employee to commit the constitutional violation.") (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Co. of Los Angeles , 833 F.3d 1060 (C.A. 9, 2016) ; Elkins v. McKenzie , 865 So.2d 1065, 1074 (Miss, 2003) ("While an unconstitutional official policy renders a municipality culpable under § 1983, even a facially innocuous policy will support liability if it was promulgated with deliberate indifference to the known or obvious consequences that constitutional violations would result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted); Peak Alarm Co, Inc v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 243 P.3d 1221, 1247 (Utah, 2010) ("A plaintiff may attack a municipal policy or custom in two ways. A plaintiff may attempt a facial attack on the local government's policy, alleging the policy itself is a violation of federal law. Alternatively, a plaintiff may saddle a municipality with § 1983 liability despite facially valid policies and customs by demonstrating 'deliberate indifference' on the part of the local government.") (citations omitted); Democracy Coalition v. City of Austin , 141 S.W.3d 282, 290 (Tex. App., 2004) ("To subject a municipality to section 1983 liability, a 'policy' must either be per se unconstitutional ('facially unconstitutional') or promulgated in deliberate indifference to the 'known or obvious consequences' that constitutional violations would result (a 'facially innocuous policy').") (citation omitted). But see Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp. , 554 F.3d 1271, 1280 (C.A. 10, 2009) ("If a governmental entity makes and enforces a law that is unconstitutional as applied, it may be subject to liability under § 1983."). Plaintiffs stated in their appellate brief that the municipality's failure to act was not at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' reply brief stated that the deliberate indifference standard was inapplicable. And in oral argument, plaintiffs explicitly disavowed the need to demonstrate deliberate indifference. "P&P" means "photograph and print." It refers to the process, performed in the field, of photographing and fingerprinting individuals who have been detained by police officers. Recognizing that my view of the law of municipal liability is in accordance with a wide range of jurisdictions, see note 4 of this opinion, the majority notes that "several other federal appellate courts have not addressed the issue or have not found it necessary to expand on Canton and Brown in the manner that is suggested by the concurrence." Ante at 800 n. 12. But with the exception of Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp. , 554 F.3d 1271, 1278-1280 (C.A. 10, 2009), all of the cases cited by the majority addressed situations in which a plaintiff specifically alleged that the municipality was deliberately indifferent; none of these cases addressed whether, in the absence of a showing of deliberate indifference, a municipality may be held liable because of the unconstitutional application of a facially lawful policy by municipal employees. See Cash v. Co. of Erie , 654 F.3d 324, 332-339 (C.A. 2, 2011) (identifying sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that a sheriff acted with deliberate indifference); Jenkins v. Bartlett , 487 F.3d 482, 492-493 (C.A. 7, 2007) (finding no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a constitutional violation and as to whether the municipality was deliberately indifferent); Young v. Providence , 404 F.3d 4, 26-31 (C.A. 1, 2005) (finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the training program was deficient and whether the municipality was deliberately indifferent); Daskalea v. District of Columbia , 343 U.S. App. DC 261, 269, 227 F.3d 433 (2000) (concluding that "the jury had more than sufficient evidence upon which to base its finding of deliberate indifference"). The majority insinuates that I am going further than necessary by addressing whether plaintiffs must show that the policy or custom at issue was facially unconstitutional in order to recover from defendant. See ante at 801 n. 14. The fundamental issue in this case is under what circumstances a municipality may be held liable for alleged constitutional violations perpetrated by its employees while acting in accordance with a municipal policy or custom. The majority opinion insinuates that if plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated, their claims against the municipality may proceed, regardless of whether the complained-of policy or custom was facially unconstitutional. For the reasons stated in this opinion, I conclude that a municipality may only be held liable for violating an individual's constitutional rights as a result of executing a policy or custom of the municipality if the policy or custom is facially unconstitutional or if the policy or custom was enacted with deliberate indifference. This is a pure issue of law that is necessary to the disposition of this case and was briefed by both parties. Accordingly, I believe it is entirely appropriate to explain why I disagree with the majority's insinuation and to describe the analysis that the Court of Appeals should undertake on remand.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the April 24, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Appellant is not required to pay an initial partial fee. However, for the appeal to continue, within 21 days of the date of this order, appellant shall submit a copy of this order and refile the copy of the pleadings returned with this order as acknowledgement of his responsibility to pay the $375.00 filing fee. Failure to do so shall result in the appeal being administratively dismissed. If appellant timely complies with this order, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $375.00. That amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal in this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return a copy of appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to waive fees is considered and it is DENIED because MCL 600.2963 requires that a prisoner pursuing a civil action be liable for filing fees. Within 21 days of the certification of this order, plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of the Court an initial partial filing fee of $81.00, which is 50 percent of his average monthly deposits for the past twelve months. Appellant must also submit a copy of this order with the payment and must refile the pleadings that are being returned with this order as acknowledgement of his responsibility to pay the balance of the filing fee. Failure to comply with this order shall result in the appeal being administratively dismissed. If plaintiff timely pays the partial fee and refiles the pleadings, monthly payments shall be made to the Department of Corrections in the amount of 50 percent of the deposits made to appellant's account until the payments equal the balance due of $294.00. That amount shall then be remitted to this Court. Pursuant to MCL 600.2963(8), appellant shall not file a new civil action or appeal with this Court until the entry fee in this case is paid in full. The Clerk of the Court shall furnish two copies of this order to appellant and return the appellant's pleadings with this order.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce to file a brief amicus curiae is GRANTED. The amicus brief submitted on October 26, 2018, is accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the separate motions of Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc., and DTE Electric Company to file briefs amicus curiae are GRANTED. The amicus briefs submitted by those entities on November 5, 2018, and November 8, 2018, respectively, are accepted for filing.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion to extend the time for filing a response to the petition of the Attorney Grievance Commission is GRANTED. The response will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before December 3, 2018.

Per Curiam. This foreclosure action is before the Court on remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for consideration as on leave granted of "whether MCL 211.78k(7) requires payment of the full amount due for all tax parcels listed in a judgment of foreclosure as a condition of appeal where the taxpayer does not seek to challenge the foreclosures for all of the parcels." In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer For Foreclosure , 500 Mich. 902, 887 N.W.2d 633 (2016). We conclude that it does not. I. BACKGROUND Respondent challenged petitioner's June 13, 2014 prayer for the tax foreclosure of six of seven property tax parcels comprising 12 acres at 489 North Shore Drive, Benton Harbor, Michigan for unpaid taxes for tax years 2008 through 2012. On November 3, 2014, respondent filed objections to the foreclosure of those parcels. All seven of the North Shore properties were removed from the annual petition for foreclosure. Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition on the respondent's objections. The circuit court granted petitioner's MCR 2.116(C)(4) motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the court agreed that the Tax Tribunal had exclusive and original jurisdiction to make the factual findings necessary to resolve respondent's objections. A judgment of foreclosure regarding all the North Shore properties was entered on May 20, 2015. The court stayed enforcement of the judgment until (a) the Michigan Court of Appeals has reversed, modified, or affirmed the same, and the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision has become final; or (b) until the period by which New Products Corporation may file a claim of appeal has expired without any such claim of appeal having been filed, whichever occurs first. If an appeal is timely filed, the 21-day period for payment of all forfeited delinquent property taxes, interest, penalties and fees shall begin upon expiration of the stay. Respondent appealed as of right the circuit court's May 2015 judgment of foreclosure and the underlying grant of petitioner's motions for summary disposition. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion for partial peremptory reversal, arguing that the circuit court's stay of enforcement of the judgment allowed respondent to file a claim of appeal without having paid the full amount owed on the judgment of foreclosure as required under MCL 211.78k. In lieu of granting the motion, this Court vacated the May 2015 judgment of foreclosure: The trial court committed manifest error. MCL 211.78k(7) specifically and unambiguously provides for an appeal of right from a judgment of foreclosure entered under this statutory foreclosure scheme, provided the appellant pays to the county treasurer the amount due on the property within 21 days after entry of the judgment. When granting the right to appeal, the Legislature possesses the "unquestioned authority" to impose as a "jurisdictional condition precedent" to an appeal the condition of payment of the amount of a delinquent tax decree and this condition precedent "may be neither waived by counsel nor dispensed with by court." In re Petition of Auditor General , 252 Mich. 367, 368-369, 233 N.W. 348 (1930). We REMAND this matter to the trial court for entry of a new judgment of foreclosure that does not include a provision that relieves New Products Corporation of its statutory obligation to pay the amount owed under the judgment as a condition to appealing. The May 20, 2015 order having been vacated, plaintiff's appeal and defendant's cross appeal are DISMISSED as MOOT. The parties may appeal from the new judgment in accordance with MCL 211.78k(7) and the applicable court rules. This order has immediate effect. MCR 7.2 l. 5(F)(2). [In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer for Foreclosure , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 10, 2015 (Docket No. 327688).] On remand, the circuit court entered a July 27, 2015 amended judgment of foreclosure stating: [T]his Amended judgment is stayed until the period by which New Products Corporation may file a claim of appeal from this amended judgment has expired without any such claim of appeal having been filed. If an appeal is filed as to any particular parcel(s), then this Amended Judgment shall be stayed as to the parcel(s) under appeal until the Michigan Court of Appeals has reversed, modified or affirmed the same, and the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision has become final, provided that New Products Corporation complies with MCL 211.78k(7). On August 14, 2015, respondent paid $35,436.87 to redeem five of the seven parcels and filed a claim of appeal from the amended judgment initiating this appeal. Petitioner again filed a motion to dismiss with this Court, arguing that respondent had not paid the full amount due under the judgment as required under MCL 211.78k. This Court granted respondent's motion to dismiss, explaining: [T]he motion to dismiss this appeal is GRANTED because appellant has failed to pay the amount determined to be due to the county treasurer under the July 27, 2015 amended judgment of foreclosure as required by the plain language of MCL 211.78k(7) for it to pursue this appeal. We must apply this requirement of MCL 211.78k(7) in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning which requires payment of the full amount due under the judgment as a condition for an appeal, not merely a partial payment. See Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Michigan , 492 Mich. 503, 515, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012) (regarding requirement to apply statutory language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning). In this regard, that MCL 211.78k(7) requires payment of "the amount" determined to be due under the judgment reflects that only one amount is contemplated which can only be the one amount, i.e., the full amount, due under the judgment. See Robinson v. Detroit , 462 Mich. 439, 461-462, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000) (discussing meaning of definite article "the"). Because dismissal is required due to appellant's failure to pay the amount determined to be due under the judgment appealed from we do not need to reach the other issues raised by the parties. [In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer for Foreclosure , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 2, 2016 (Docket No. 330795).] Respondent filed an application for leave to appeal and a motion for immediate consideration with our Supreme Court on June 1, 2016. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court issued the following order: Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we vacate that part of the Court of Appeals order granting the motion to dismiss the appeal, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for plenary consideration as on leave granted of whether MCL 211.78k(7) requires payment of the full amount due for all tax parcels listed in a judgment of foreclosure as a condition of appeal where the taxpayer does not seek to challenge the foreclosures for all of the parcels. If the Court of Appeals concludes that MCL 211.78k(7) does not impose such a requirement, it shall reinstate the appeal and proceed in accordance with MCR 7.204. [In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer for Foreclosure , 500 Mich. at 902, 892 N.W.2d 363 (2017)]. On remand, this Court entered an order permitting the parties to file briefs addressing only the threshold question in the Supreme Court's order. Thereafter, this Court issued the following order that, in part, defined the scope of the current appeal: On its own motion, the Court orders that, on further consideration of the December 7, 2016 Michigan Supreme Court order in this matter, this appeal is REINSTATED so that this matter may receive plenary consideration by a case call panel of this Court. Thus, the motion to dismiss this appeal is DENIED without prejudice to the parties addressing in their briefs on appeal for the case call panel the jurisdictional issue of whether MCL 211.78k(7) requires payment of the full amount due for all tax parcels listed in a judgment of foreclosure as a condition of appeal where the taxpayer does not seek to challenge the foreclosures for all of the parcels and any other issue that the parties may consider relevant to this Court's jurisdiction. [In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer for Foreclosure , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 9, 2017 (Docket No. 330795).] II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION A. STANDARD OF REVIEW "Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo." New Props., Inc. v. George D. Newpower, Jr., Inc. , 282 Mich. App. 120, 138, 762 N.W.2d 178 (2009). "When interpreting the meaning of a statute, our primary goal is to discern the intent of the Legislature by first examining the plain language of the statute." Driver v. Naini , 490 Mich. 239, 246-247, 802 N.W.2d 311, (2011). "[W]e consider both the plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as 'its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.' " Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Ward , 460 Mich. 230, 237, 596 N.W.2d 119 (1999), quoting Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137, 145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). "If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further judicial construction is permitted." Whitman v. City of Burton , 493 Mich. 303, 311, 831 N.W.2d 223 (2013). "Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co. , 466 Mich. 142, 146, 644 N.W.2d 715 (2002). "Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act." Twentieth Century Fox Home Entertainment, Inc. v. Dep't of Treasury , 270 Mich. App. 539, 544, 716 N.W.2d 598 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). B. ANALYSIS A person claiming an interest in a foreclosed property may elect to redeem the property after entry of final judgment, MCL 211.78k(5) , allow its foreclosure by the taxing unit, MCL 211.78k(6) , or appeal the judgment in the Court of Appeals, MCL 211.78k(7). With regard to appealing a foreclosure judgment, MCL 211.78k(7) provides: The foreclosing governmental unit or a person claiming to have a property interest under section 78i in property foreclosed under this section may appeal the circuit court's order or the circuit court's judgment foreclosing property to the court of appeals. An appeal under this subsection is limited to the record of the proceedings in the circuit court under this section and shall not be de novo. The circuit court's judgment foreclosing property shall be stayed until the court of appeals has reversed, modified, or affirmed that judgment. If an appeal under this subsection stays the circuit court's judgment foreclosing property, the circuit court's judgment is stayed only as to the property that is the subject of that appeal and the circuit court's judgment foreclosing other property that is not the subject of that appeal is not stayed. To appeal the circuit court's judgment foreclosing property, a person appealing the judgment shall pay to the county treasurer the amount determined to be due to the county treasurer under the judgment on or before the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or in a contested case within 21 days of the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, together with a notice of appeal. If the circuit court's judgment foreclosing the property is affirmed on appeal, the amount determined to be due shall be refunded to the person who appealed the judgment. If the circuit court's judgment foreclosing the property is reversed or modified on appeal, the county treasurer shall refund the amount determined to be due to the person who appealed the judgment, if any, and retain the balance in accordance with the order of the court of appeals. [Emphasis added.] The italicized language is at issue here. According to MCL 211.78k(7), when a person claiming to have a property interest in the foreclosed property appeals the foreclosure judgment the "judgment is stayed only as to the property that is the subject of that appeal." The statute states that "the circuit court's judgment foreclosing other property that is not the subject of that appeal is not stayed." Id. In that regard under MCL 211.78k(5) and (6), the property for which a stay is not issued continues through the foreclosure process by the interested person redeeming the property or allowing the foreclosure to proceed. However, the portion of the original judgment amount applicable to the property subject to the stay of execution follows the appellate process. MCL 211.78k(5), (6). The process for perfecting that appeal is discussed in the next section of the statute, MCL 211.78k(7), which provides that ''[t]o appeal the circuit court's judgment foreclosing property, a person appealing the judgment shall'': 1) ''pay to the county treasurer the amount determined to be due to the county treasurer under the judgment'' 2) ''on or before the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or'' 3) ''in a contested case within 21 days of the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section,'' 4) ''together with a notice of appeal.'' This Court's March 2016 order dismissing respondent's appeal did so by emphasizing the definite article "the" before the singular noun "amount" to conclude that "the amount determined to be due to the county treasurer under the judgment" meant the full amount due under the judgment. MCL 211.78k(7) (emphasis added). Nowhere in MCL 211.78k(7) is there a reference to the "full amount," however. Instead, MCL 211.78k(7) differentiates property subject to the stay or "the subject of that appeal" from "other property that is not the subject of that appeal" and "is not stayed." As a result, the part of the judgment that proceeds to appeal is the part that was appealed and stayed for the purpose of the appeal. It is true that "[w]here the Legislature wishes to refer to a particular item, not a general item, it uses the word 'the,' rather than 'a' or 'an.' " Barrow v. Detroit Election Comm. , 301 Mich. App. 404, 414, 836 N.W.2d 498 (2013). In this case, the statutory language providing that "a person appealing the judgment shall pay to the county treasurer the amount determined to be due under the judgment" connotes the specific amount determined due by the treasurer for the particular property under foreclosure that is being appealed. MCL 211.78k(7). Accordingly, MCL 211.78k(7) does not require a person to pay the full amount due for all tax parcels listed in an original judgment of foreclosure as a condition of appeal when the person does not seek to challenge the foreclosures for all of the parcels. The appeal before this Court concerns Parcel 00-8 for which the respondent has made no payments. The Supreme Court pointedly asked us to resolve whether payment of the entire judgment amount was required to maintain an appeal of one of the parcels included in the judgment. Our answer is simply that the payment of the amount owed for parcels that are the subject of the appeal must be paid in their entirety. That being said, respondent is still required to pay the amount due under the amended judgment of foreclosure for Parcel 00-8 to appeal issues related to the foreclosure of that property in this Court. After the circuit court entered the amended judgment, respondent redeemed five parcels by paying the amount due under the amended judgment for those parcels and allowed one parcel to be foreclosed. This left one parcel, Parcel 00-8, as the subject of appeal. Respondent did not pay the amount due for Parcel 00-8, and argues that it was not required to do so. Its reason for not paying the $483,803.75 in taxes due on Parcel 00-8 has no statutory support in either MCL 211.78k or otherwise. Respondent asserts it "did not pay, and was not legally required to pay, the $483,803.75 claimed to be due for Parcel No. 00-8, because there was never any separate property tax assessment for the Walter Miller Property." While this may be true and a valid reason to appeal the judgment, we lack jurisdiction to consider the legal argument because, again, respondent has not paid the amount due for this parcel, which is a condition of appeal. Respondent's additional argument for not paying the amount due for Parcel 00-8 as a condition of appeal is that payment of the $483,803.75 due under the judgment of foreclosure for this parcel would create a hardship. But there is no hardship exception in MCL 211.78k that would allow respondent to circumvent the requirements for perfecting his appeal. Because the appeal is not perfected, we decline to discuss the merits of respondent's additional arguments regarding jurisdiction and standing. Respondent's appeal is dismissed. Hoekstra, P.J., and Stephens and Shapiro, JJ., concurred. Tax Parcel Nos.: 11-54-0018-0021-02-9; 11-54-0018-0021-01-1; 11-54-0018-0025-00-8 (Parcel 00-8); 11-54-0018-0025-02-4; 11-54-0018-0025-01-6; 11-54-0018-0025-03-2; and 11-54-0018-0024-00-1. Respondent does not challenge the foreclosure of Tax Parcel No. 11-54-0018-0025-02-4 and has allowed the foreclosure process to proceed regarding that parcel only. The court also held that respondent lacked standing to assert the notice rights of third parties Modern Plastics and the Walter Miller Trust. Respondent asserts that Parcel 00-8 was not properly assessed because the assessment includes real estate owned by two different owners, Modern Plastics and the Walter Miller Trust. In August 2014, the trust quit claimed its interest in Parcel 00-8 to respondent. MCL 211.78k(5)(b) requires the circuit court's judgment to specify [t]hat fee simple title to property foreclosed by the judgment will vest absolutely in the foreclosing governmental unit, except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (c) and (e), without any further rights of redemption, if all forfeited delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees are not paid on or before the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or in a contested case within 21 days of the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section. MCL 211.78k(6) provides in pertinent part: [F]ee simple title to property set forth in a petition for foreclosure filed under section 78h on which forfeited delinquent taxes, interest, penalties, and fees are not paid on or before the March 31 immediately succeeding the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, or in a contested case within 21 days of the entry of a judgment foreclosing the property under this section, shall vest absolutely in the foreclosing governmental unit, and the foreclosing governmental unit shall have absolute title to the property.... In re Petition of Berrien Co. Treasurer for Foreclosure , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals , entered March 2, 2016 (Docket No. 330795). Respondent challenged the property descriptions for these parcels as overlapping, resulting in double taxation, gaps in the property, and erroneous assessments. Respondent claims it paid the amounts due for the five parcels under protest. It abandoned any argument regarding these parcels on appeal, however, because its focus is only on Parcel 00-8.

By order of September 12, 2017, the application for leave to appeal the January 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals and the application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant were held in abeyance pending the decision in Bazzi v. Sentinel Ins. Co. (Docket No. 154442). On order of the Court, the case having been decided on July 18, 2018, 502 Mich. 390, 919 N.W.2d 20 (2018), the applications are again considered. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we VACATE the Court of Appeals opinion only to the extent it held that Farm Bureau was automatically entitled to rescission as a matter of law, and we REMAND this case to the Kent Circuit Court to determine whether rescission is available as an equitable remedy as between Farm Bureau and Robynn Rueckert. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motion to hear cross-appeal is DENIED. We do not retain jurisdiction. In Bazzi v. Sentinel Ins. Co. , 502 Mich. 390, 919 N.W.2d 20 (2018), this Court explained that "[w]hen a plaintiff is seeking rescission, 'the trial court must balance the equities to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief he or she seeks.' " Id . at 410, 919 N.W.2d 20, quoting Johnson v. QFD, Inc. , 292 Mich. App. 359, 370 n. 3, 807 N.W.2d 719 (2011). Furthermore, this Court explained, "[j]ust as the intervening interest of an innocent third party does not altogether bar rescission as an equitable remedy, neither does fraud in the application for insurance imbue an insurer with an absolute right to rescission of the policy with respect to third parties." Id . at 411, 919 N.W.2d 20. Accordingly, consistent with Bazzi , I concur with the instant order remanding this case to the trial court "to determine whether rescission is available as an equitable remedy as between Farm Bureau and Robynn Rueckert" while denying leave to appeal in all other respects. I write separately only to discuss what I view as the need to establish a coherent and workable standard by which the trial court is to exercise its equitable discretion in "innocent-third-party cases." What follows represents the perspective of one Justice in this regard. In the absence of such a standard-- not only, I would emphasize, in innocent-third-party cases but in every other type of civil and criminal case as well-- outcomes may be based solely upon the subjective determinations and the unconstrained exercises of discretion of the trial judge, and that is not the rule of law but the rule of judges. There must always be some clear standard, some ultimate inquiry by which the court must assess the evidence and determine whether it does or does not satisfy the standard. There must, in other words, be an applicable legal rule, and that is no less true in matters of equity than in any other realm in which the "judicial power" of our Michigan Constitution is exercised. Such rules, such standards, not only guide the trial court, but they also guide the parties in comprehending their rights and responsibilities and in marshalling their arguments, and the appellate court in meaningfully reviewing the trial court's judgments. See Warda v. City Council of City of Flushing , 472 Mich. 326, 339-340, 696 N.W.2d 671 (2005) ("Absent a comprehensible standard, judicial review cannot be undertaken in pursuit of the rule of law, but only in pursuit of the personal preferences of individual judges. The latter pursuit falls outside the 'judicial power' in Michigan."); Harmelin v. Michigan , 501 U.S. 957, 1007, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[B]road and unreviewed discretion exercised by sentencing judges leads to the perception that no clear standards are being applied, and that the rule of law is imperiled by sentences imposed for no discernible reason other than the subjective reactions of the sentencing judge."). Here, absent any principled standard, "it would seem that the uncertainty associated with subjecting insurers and insureds to the whims of individual judges and their various conceptions of 'equity' would increase overall insurance costs because insurers would no longer be able to estimate accurately actuarial risk." Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 473 Mich. 562, 589 n. 62, 702 N.W.2d 539 (2005). In light of such concerns, I offer the following brief discussion grounded within our caselaw to guide the trial court's exercise of equitable discretion in cases involving innocent third parties. This discussion does not purport to establish mechanical principles for application but merely reasonably limited standards by which trial courts may assess the evidence and render their best legal determinations concerning the extent to which such standards have been satisfied. The ultimate issue in innocent-third-party cases, in particular those that concern both an innocent third party and an innocent insurer, pertains to which of these parties should bear the ultimate burden of the insured's fraud. This essentially entails a determination as to which of the two parties is truly more or less "innocent," such that its interests should, or should not, prevail on the matter of rescission. This, in short, sets forth the legal standard -- what are the respective or comparative levels of genuine "innocence" of the two parties? This certainly will not always be an easy, or even a comfortable, determination-- choosing among innocent parties-- but nonetheless it is the determination necessitated by the circumstances of this class of cases and by Bazzi . Both parties are presumed to be fully "innocent," and this deserves to be recognized as a starting point for analysis; indeed, the array of relevant factors to be subsequently considered are largely of a character that inform to the best of the law's ability the court's exercise of judgment concerning the "equitable" relationship between the innocent parties and between the innocent parties and the responsible party. If the insurer is ultimately deemed more "innocent," the trial court should grant rescission; if the innocent third party is deemed more "innocent," then the trial court should decline to grant rescission with respect to the third party. And it is certainly possible to imagine instances in which there will be judicial determinations falling in the middle, i.e., that neither party is more or less "innocent" than the other party. In this regard, because the burden of establishing a right to rescission lies with the party seeking rescission, Gardner v. Thomas R. Sharp & Sons , 279 Mich. 467, 469, 272 N.W. 871 (1937), the defrauded insurer bears the burden of establishing that rescission is warranted. Thus, where neither party is more or less "innocent" than the other, it would seem to be the case that the insurer has failed to satisfy its burden of proof and rescission would not be warranted with respect to the third party. In resolving the ultimate issue in innocent-third-party cases, courts should consider the following nonexclusive list of factors, as applicable to the case at hand: First, the extent to which the insurer, in fact, investigated or could have investigated the subject matter of the fraud before the innocent third party was injured, which may have led to a determination by the insurer that the insurance policy had been procured on a fraudulent basis. If the insurer could have with reasonable effort obtained information indicating that the insured had committed fraud in procuring the insurance policy, equity may weigh against rescission because the insurer may be deemed to have acted without adequate professional diligence in issuing and maintaining the policy. Second, the specific relationship between the innocent third party and the fraudulent insured. If the innocent third party possessed some knowledge of the fraud-- perhaps because of a familial or other relationship-- equity may weigh in favor of rescission because that individual is seeking to recover from the insurer despite knowledge of the fraud. Third, the precise nature of the innocent third party's conduct in the injury-causing event. Where the innocent third party acted recklessly or even negligently in the course of the injury-causing event, equity may weigh in favor of rescission because the innocent third party could have avoided the injury by acting more prudently. Fourth, whether the innocent third party possesses an alternative avenue for recovery absent enforcement of the insurance policy. Such an avenue for recovery may include, for example, the assigned claims plan or health insurance. Where the innocent third party possesses an alternative means of recovery, equity may weigh in favor of rescission because the insurer need not suffer loss because of the fraud. Fifth, whether enforcement of the insurance policy would merely relieve the fraudulent insured of what would otherwise be the insured's personal liability to the innocent third party. That is, whether enforcement of the insurance policy would subject the insurer to coverage for tort liability for an at-fault insured. In such a case, equity may weigh in favor of rescission because enforcement of the policy would transfer liability to the innocent third party from the insured who committed the fraud to the insurer that did not commit wrongdoing. In few cases will all of these factors be applicable; in some cases, none will be applicable; and in other cases, additional factors may be applicable. Furthermore, these and other factors should not be so rigidly or mechanically applied by merely "counting them" in terms of favoring one or the other side such that the ultimate decision-making standard is obscured, concerning the respective levels of "innocence" of the insurer and the innocent third party. In sum, I believe that trial courts must consider factors such as these in deciding innocent-third-party cases and that appellate courts should assess the trial court's exercise of equitable discretion against factors such as these, as well as, most importantly, against the proper legal standard. Pursuant to their constitutional exercise of the "judicial power," no court of this state properly has free rein to unchecked or standardless exercises of "discretion"; rather, courts must restrict themselves to the application of the law, and equity, and their accompanying obligations. The factors identified here, and others that are similarly relevant to the standard set forth herein, will further our state's rule of law and afford reasonable protection to both innocent third parties and defrauded insurers against entirely arbitrary legal outcomes. I acknowledge that this case may concern an alleged innocent misrepresentation, not necessarily a fraudulent misrepresentation. And Bazzi concerned an insurance policy that was procured in a "fraudulent manner." Bazzi , 502 Mich. at 412, 919 N.W.2d 20. Bazzi , however, should not be understood as limited to cases concerning a fraudulent misrepresentation. As the Court of Appeals observed here, " 'actionable fraud' is not the only kind of 'fraud or misrepresentation' " that may warrant rescission "if the contract had been procured thereby." Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co. of Mich. v. ACE American Ins. Co. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 19, 2017 (Docket No. 329585), p. 4. "Michigan's contract law recognizes several interrelated but distinct common-law doctrines-loosely aggregated under the rubric of 'fraud'-that may entitle a party to a legal or equitable remedy if a contract is obtained as a result of fraud or misrepresentation." Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten , 491 Mich. 547, 555, 817 N.W.2d 562 (2012) (emphasis added). "These doctrines include actionable fraud, also known as fraudulent misrepresentation; innocent misrepresentation; and silent fraud, also known as fraudulent concealment." Id . Accordingly, even if this case concerns an innocent misrepresentation, Bazzi would still be applicable. For the purposes of this discussion, I use the term "fraud" to broadly refer to cases concerning fraudulent misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment. See note one of this statement. See, e.g., Deitz v. Deitz , 298 Mich. 253, 258, 298 N.W. 522 (1941) ("The law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). See, e.g., Kent v. Klein , 352 Mich. 652, 656, 91 N.W.2d 11 (1958) ("[C]hancery will not permit one to enrich himself at the expense of another by closing his eyes to what is clear to the rest of mankind. Equity, to paraphrase, regards that as seen which ought to be seen, and, having so seen, as done that which ought to be done."). See, e.g., Andreae v. Wolgin , 257 Mich. 572, 579, 241 N.W. 876 (1932) ("An estoppel resting wholly on equity cannot be used to shift a loss from one careless person to another when the loss could not have happened without the earlier negligence of plaintiff, and the later negligence of defendant at most only contributed to the result.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). See, e.g., Doering v. Baker , 277 Mich. 683, 688, 270 N.W. 185 (1936), quoting 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed.), p. 704 ("[E]quity 'will not suffer a wrong to go without a remedy.' "). See also Belcher v. Aetna Cas & Surety Co. , 409 Mich. 231, 251, 293 N.W.2d 594 (1980) ("[B]efore recovery of benefits may be obtained through an assigned claims plan, it must be determined that no personal protection insurance is 'applicable to the injury'."). See, e.g., Titan Ins. Co. , 491 Mich. at 568-569, 817 N.W.2d 562 ("The no-fault act seeks to protect third parties in a variety of ways, including through tort actions, but it states nothing about altering the common law that enables insurers to obtain traditional forms of relief when they have been the victims of fraud.").

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 15, 2018 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 18, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 18, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellants shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether "the happening of the event giving rise to [appellants'] cause of action" for the deprivation of property without due process occurred when the appellee issued its allegedly wrongful notice of redetermination, or when the appellee actually seized the appellants' property. MCL 600.6431(3) ; MCL 600.5827 ; cf. Frank v. Linkner , 500 Mich. 133, 149-153, 894 N.W.2d 574 (2017). In addition to the brief, the appellants shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellants' brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellants. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellants within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Michigan League for Public Policy is invited to file a brief amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issue presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of plaintiff-appellant to extend the time for filing its brief is GRANTED. The brief will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 13, 2018.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's April 13, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.

Meter, J. In Docket No. 338258, Immaculate Heart of Mary, Senator Phil Pavlov, Senator Patrick Colbeck, Representative Tim Kelly, Representative Kim LaSata, Stephen Sanford, Jennifer Sanford, Nathaniel Chol, Rochiel Atem, Andrew Lauppe, Carrie Lauppe, Stephen Sweetland, and Bernadine Sweetland (collectively, Immaculate Heart et al.) moved to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs. In Docket No. 338259, the Michigan Catholic Conference (MCC) and the Michigan Association of Non-Public Schools (MANS) moved intervene as defendants in the same lawsuit filed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint named the state of Michigan, the Governor, the Department of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction as defendants. The Court of Claims denied the motions to intervene. Thereafter, Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS filed applications for leave to appeal, and this Court granted the applications and consolidated the appeals. Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. About Parochiaid v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 11, 2017 (Docket No. 338258); Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. About Parochiaid v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 11, 2017 (Docket No. 338259). Thus, Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS now appeal by leave granted. We conclude that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS, and therefore we affirm the decision of the Court of Claims to deny the motions to intervene. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 21, 2017. The complaint asserted that although Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, prohibits public funds from being used to aid private, denominational, or other nonpublic schools, § 152b of 2016 PA 249, which was signed into law on June 27, 2016, appropriated $2.5 million to reimburse nonpublic schools for the cost of compliance with various statutes and regulations. The complaint further asserted that although Const. 1963, art. 4, § 30, requires approval from two-thirds of both the Senate and House of Representatives in order to appropriate public money for private purposes, 2016 PA 249 did not pass through the Senate by a two-thirds vote. The complaint sought a declaration that the appropriation of funds under § 152b was unconstitutional under Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, and Const. 1963, art. 4, § 30 ; a writ of mandamus prohibiting the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Michigan Department of Education from disbursing funds under § 152b; and injunctive relief preventing public funds from going to nonpublic schools. On March 28, 2017, the MCC and MANS moved to intervene as parties in interest under MCR 2.209. The MCC and MANS indicated that, as organizations, they have fought to protect the rights of students enrolled in Michigan's nonpublic schools. In part, the MCC and MANS asserted that § 152b properly permits nonpublic schools to seek reimbursement for compliance with various state-mandated health, safety, and welfare requirements. The MCC and MANS argued that they had the right to intervene because they filed a timely application, that they had an interest in the subject of the action that would be affected by the outcome of the action, and that their interests may not be adequately represented by the named parties. The MCC and MANS explained that they and their members would incur loss if § 152b were found unconstitutional, that they would provide a unique perspective to the case because they had firsthand knowledge of how funds are used and of school operations, and that "no party currently involved in this litigation stands to lose in the way that Intervenors' members and students do." In the alternative, the MCC and MANS argued that they should be allowed to intervene on a permissive basis because they filed a timely application, their defense involved a common question of law with the proceeding, and their participation would not cause prejudice or delay. In April 2017, Immaculate Heart et al. moved to intervene as parties in interest under MCR 2.209. Immaculate Heart et al. attached a proposed answer to their motion, and the proposed answer asserted that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was added by Proposal C, the adoption of which was "the direct result of a smear campaign against the Catholic Church and Catholic schools, orchestrated by the Council Against Parochiaid and its allies." The proposed answer further asserted that § 152b of 2016 PA 249 was valid because Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Immaculate Heart et al. filed a brief in support of their motion and argued that they could intervene as of right because their application was timely, they had an interest in the action, and the named parties would not adequately represent their interests. Immaculate Heart et al. further argued that the state defendants could not take the legal position that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional. In the alternative, Immaculate Heart et al. argued that they should be allowed to intervene on a permissive basis because they filed a timely application, their defense involved a common question of law with the proceeding, and their participation would not cause prejudice or delay. On April 11, 2017, the MCC and MANS filed a proposed answer, which asserted their position outlined in their motion to intervene. The proposed answer also alleged that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, that some or all plaintiffs lacked standing, and that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution if interpreted in the way plaintiffs asserted. On May 2, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying both motions to intervene. The trial court concluded that the MCC and MANS established a basis to intervene under MCR 2.209 ; however, the trial court noted that it must deny the motion to intervene if it lacked jurisdiction to decide the proposed intervenors' rights. The trial court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over nonstate actors as defendants under MCL 600.6419(1)(a) and held that it must deny the motions to intervene. As part of its jurisdictional discussion, the trial court noted that if not for the jurisdictional issue, "the motion to intervene as defendants by Immaculate Heart of Mary et al . would be redundant and their proposed interest would be adequately represented by MCC and MANS." The trial court further noted that "to the extent the state legislators could be considered to have sought intervention in their roles as state legislators, the [c]ourt would be disinclined to find that their interests were not already adequately represented by the named state Defendants and the Attorney General." Immaculate Heart et al. now appeal by leave granted in Docket No. 338258, and the MCC and MANS now appeal by leave granted in Docket No. 338259. On May 22, 2017, this Court issued an order staying the proceedings in part. Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 22, 2017 (Docket No. 338258). Appellants contend that the Court of Claims erred in ruling that it could not grant the motions to intervene because of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. "Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Bank v. Mich. Ed. Ass'n-NEA , 315 Mich.App. 496, 499, 892 N.W.2d 1 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature." Id ."That intent is clear if the statutory language is unambiguous, and the statute must then be enforced as written." Weakland v. Toledo Engineering Co. , Inc. , 467 Mich. 344, 347, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003), amended on other grounds 468 Mich. 1216, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that all appellants would be allowed to intervene if solely the intervention court rule, MCR 2.209, were under consideration. MCR 2.209 states: (A) Intervention of Right. On timely application a person has a right to intervene in an action: (1) when a Michigan statute or court rule confers an unconditional right to intervene; (2) by stipulation of all the parties; or (3) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (B) Permissive Intervention. On timely application a person may intervene in an action (1) when a Michigan statute or court rule confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. (C) Procedure. A person seeking to intervene must apply to the court by motion and give notice in writing to all parties under MCR 2.107. The motion must (1) state the grounds for intervention, and (2) be accompanied by a pleading stating the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. (D) Notice to Attorney General. When the validity of a Michigan statute or a rule or regulation included in the Michigan Administrative Code is in question in an action to which the state or an officer or agency of the state is not a party, the court may require that notice be given to the Attorney General, specifying the pertinent statute, rule, or regulation. Notwithstanding this court rule, existing statutory and common law-most notably MCL 600.6419(1) and Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008) -demonstrates that appellants could not, in fact, intervene in plaintiffs' lawsuit because the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against nonstate actors. "[A] judgment entered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is void, [and] subject-matter jurisdiction is established by the pleadings and exists when the proceeding is of a class the court is authorized to adjudicate and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous." Clohset v. No Name Corp. (On Remand) , 302 Mich.App. 550, 561, 840 N.W.2d 375 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, "[a] court's subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by reference to the allegations listed in the complaint," and "[i]f it is apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged is within the class of cases with regard to which the court has the power to act, then subject-matter jurisdiction exists." Grubb Creek Action Comm. v. Shiawassee Co. Drain Comm'r , 218 Mich.App. 665, 668, 554 N.W.2d 612 (1996). "[T]he [l]ack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time and the parties to an action cannot confer jurisdiction by their conduct or action nor can they waive the defense by not raising it." Hillsdale Co. Senior Servs. , Inc. v. Hillsdale Co. , 494 Mich. 46, 51 n. 3, 832 N.W.2d 728 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in Hillsdale ). Concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, MCL 600.6419(1) provides, in part: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court has the following power and jurisdiction: (a) To hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court. "The Court of Claims is a court of legislative creation. Its statutory powers are explicit and limited." Feliciano v. Dep't of Natural Resources , 97 Mich.App. 101, 109, 293 N.W.2d 732 (1980). "[T]he Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction which does not possess the broad and inherent powers of a constitutional court." Meda v. City of Howell , 110 Mich.App. 179, 183, 312 N.W.2d 202 (1981). "Therefore, the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear actions against persons who, although public officials, are being sued in their individual capacities." Id ."Where a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, any action with respect to such a cause, other than dismissal, is absolutely void." Id . In Meda , the Court stated that "the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over defendants in their individual capacities...." Id . (emphasis added). In Estes , 481 Mich. at 583-584, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008), the Michigan Supreme Court discussed jurisdiction and a motion to intervene under MCR 2.209(A)(3) : Plaintiff's motion to intervene was based on MCR 2.209(A)(3), which allows an intervention of right in cases in which the intervenor's interests are not adequately represented by the parties. The court rule would otherwise have applied in the divorce because neither of the Tituses adequately represented plaintiff's interest as a potential creditor. However, the rule did not apply because the creditor sought to intervene in a divorce action in which the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights . Court rules cannot establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law. In Yedinak v. Yedinak , [383 Mich. 409, 175 N.W.2d 706 (1970),] we addressed this same issue in the context of the court rules of permissive and necessary joinder. The majority in Yedinak found that nothing in these rules gave the divorce courts "power to disregard statutory provisions pertaining to divorce and to litigate the rights of others than the husband and wife." The same reasoning applies here. The divorce court properly denied plaintiff's motion to intervene in the divorce proceedings, and plaintiff correctly concluded that an appeal from the denial order would have been futile. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] MCL 600.6419, which specifically outlines the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, contains a requirement that the action be "against the state or any of its departments or officers...." Indeed the very essence of the Court of Claims is to hear claims against the state. Thus, the nature of a defendant as a private individual necessarily relates to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Meda , 110 Mich.App. at 183, 312 N.W.2d 202 ; see also Haider v. Mich. Technological Univ. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 1997 (Docket No. 183350), 1997 WL 33347843, p. 3 (holding that "[b]ecause the individual defendants are not executive officers, the Court of Claims did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over" claims against them). It is true that MCL 600.6422(1) indicates that "[p]ractice and procedure in the court of claims shall be in accordance with the statutes and court rules prescribing practice in the circuit courts of this state, except as otherwise provided in this section." The MCC and MANS therefore argue that MCR 2.209 is the proper authority for determining whether they may intervene. This argument is misguided, however, in light of the clear guidance of Estes . Again, in Estes , 481 Mich. at 583, 751 N.W.2d 493, the Supreme Court stated that MCR 2.209"would otherwise have applied" but that it did not, in fact, apply because "the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights." Just as the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights" in Estes , the Court of Claims does not have statutory jurisdiction to "decide the [potential intervenors' rights as defendants in the present case. The Court of Claims correctly held that given the nature of the proceedings, MCR 2.209 is inapplicable because the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against appellants as defendants. Immaculate Heart et al. argues that the state legislators were seeking to intervene in their official capacities and thus cannot be barred from intervening by MCL 600.6419 and Estes . MCL 600.6419(7) defines the phrase "the state or any of its departments or officers" as this state or any state governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state, or an officer, employee, or volunteer of this state or any governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of this state, acting, or who reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of his or her duties. The Court of Claims opined that the state legislators were "seeking to intervene in capacities outside of their state governmental roles." On appeal, Immaculate Heart et al. argue that the state legislators were seeking to intervene as legislators, i.e., in the capacity of their governmental roles, by arguing that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, is unconstitutional. We conclude that both positions misconstrue the definition outlined in MCL 600.6419(7), as used in MCL 600.6419(1)(a). MCL 600.6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any ... demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief ... against the state or any of its departments or officers...." MCL 600.6419(7) defines the phrase "the state or any of its departments or officers" to include "an officer, employee, or volunteer of ... any ... legislative ... body ... of this state, acting, or who reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function...." Thus, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any ... demand for ... equitable[ ] or declaratory relief ... against" "an officer ... [who is] acting ... within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function...." When read in the context of a claim against the state's officers, it is clear that for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction, the officer must have been acting, or reasonably believed he or she was acting, within the scope of his or her authority at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, not at the time he or she moved to intervene or become a part of the action. Plaintiffs are raising no claims against any of the state legislators for allegedly wrongful conduct during which they were acting, or reasonably believed that they were acting, within the scope of their "authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of [their] duties." There were, simply, no claims or demands against the state legislators for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction over. Affirmed. Hoekstra, P.J., and K. F. Kelly, J., concurred with Meter, J. According to the briefs, the individuals who are not state legislators are parents who "have children who attend private religious schools, have children who attend public schools but wish to send those children to private religious schools, or both." In addition, "[p]roposed intervening defendant Representative Tim Kelly voted in support of 2016 PA 249, and he, along with Senator Phil Pavlov, Senator Patrick Colbeck, and Representative Kim LaSata, seek to enforce the policy the legislation [sic] enacted in Section 152b." This Court subsequently granted a motion for partial relief from stay, allowing "plaintiffs to make a filing(s) in the Court of Claims in accordance with the verification requirements of MCL 600.6431." Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 21, 2017 (Docket Nos. 338258 and 338259). "Although cases decided before November 1, 1990, are not binding precedent, MCR 7.215(J)(1), they nevertheless can be considered persuasive authority[.]" In re Stillwell Trust , 299 Mich.App. 289, 299 n. 1, 829 N.W.2d 353 (2013). Unpublished opinions are not binding but may be used as guides. See Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. Berkley , 259 Mich.App. 1, 20 n. 16, 672 N.W.2d 351 (2003). Appellants note that Court of Claims cases exist in which no party evidently objected, on jurisdictional grounds, to intervention by nonstate parties. The existence of these cases does not mandate reversal in the present case, in which the jurisdictional issue is squarely before us. It is tempting to conclude that because Representative Tim Kelly voted in favor of 2016 PA 249, MCL 600.6419 encompasses him. However, we must construe MCL 600.6419 as written, Weakland , 467 Mich. at 347, 656 N.W.2d 175, and plaintiffs are not making a claim against him for that vote. In other words, plaintiffs are not alleging wrongful conduct on the part of individual legislators but are seeking a declaration that the vote as a whole is necessarily limited by the Michigan Constitution and that the state, the Governor, the Department of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction must not enforce it.

Meter, J. In Docket No. 338258, Immaculate Heart of Mary, Senator Phil Pavlov, Senator Patrick Colbeck, Representative Tim Kelly, Representative Kim LaSata, Stephen Sanford, Jennifer Sanford, Nathaniel Chol, Rochiel Atem, Andrew Lauppe, Carrie Lauppe, Stephen Sweetland, and Bernadine Sweetland (collectively, Immaculate Heart et al.) moved to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit filed by plaintiffs. In Docket No. 338259, the Michigan Catholic Conference (MCC) and the Michigan Association of Non-Public Schools (MANS) moved intervene as defendants in the same lawsuit filed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs' complaint named the state of Michigan, the Governor, the Department of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction as defendants. The Court of Claims denied the motions to intervene. Thereafter, Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS filed applications for leave to appeal, and this Court granted the applications and consolidated the appeals. Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. About Parochiaid v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 11, 2017 (Docket No. 338258); Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. About Parochiaid v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 11, 2017 (Docket No. 338259). Thus, Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS now appeal by leave granted. We conclude that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against Immaculate Heart et al. and the MCC and MANS, and therefore we affirm the decision of the Court of Claims to deny the motions to intervene. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on March 21, 2017. The complaint asserted that although Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, prohibits public funds from being used to aid private, denominational, or other nonpublic schools, § 152b of 2016 PA 249, which was signed into law on June 27, 2016, appropriated $2.5 million to reimburse nonpublic schools for the cost of compliance with various statutes and regulations. The complaint further asserted that although Const. 1963, art. 4, § 30, requires approval from two-thirds of both the Senate and House of Representatives in order to appropriate public money for private purposes, 2016 PA 249 did not pass through the Senate by a two-thirds vote. The complaint sought a declaration that the appropriation of funds under § 152b was unconstitutional under Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, and Const. 1963, art. 4, § 30 ; a writ of mandamus prohibiting the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the Michigan Department of Education from disbursing funds under § 152b; and injunctive relief preventing public funds from going to nonpublic schools. On March 28, 2017, the MCC and MANS moved to intervene as parties in interest under MCR 2.209. The MCC and MANS indicated that, as organizations, they have fought to protect the rights of students enrolled in Michigan's nonpublic schools. In part, the MCC and MANS asserted that § 152b properly permits nonpublic schools to seek reimbursement for compliance with various state-mandated health, safety, and welfare requirements. The MCC and MANS argued that they had the right to intervene because they filed a timely application, that they had an interest in the subject of the action that would be affected by the outcome of the action, and that their interests may not be adequately represented by the named parties. The MCC and MANS explained that they and their members would incur loss if § 152b were found unconstitutional, that they would provide a unique perspective to the case because they had firsthand knowledge of how funds are used and of school operations, and that "no party currently involved in this litigation stands to lose in the way that Intervenors' members and students do." In the alternative, the MCC and MANS argued that they should be allowed to intervene on a permissive basis because they filed a timely application, their defense involved a common question of law with the proceeding, and their participation would not cause prejudice or delay. In April 2017, Immaculate Heart et al. moved to intervene as parties in interest under MCR 2.209. Immaculate Heart et al. attached a proposed answer to their motion, and the proposed answer asserted that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was added by Proposal C, the adoption of which was "the direct result of a smear campaign against the Catholic Church and Catholic schools, orchestrated by the Council Against Parochiaid and its allies." The proposed answer further asserted that § 152b of 2016 PA 249 was valid because Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Immaculate Heart et al. filed a brief in support of their motion and argued that they could intervene as of right because their application was timely, they had an interest in the action, and the named parties would not adequately represent their interests. Immaculate Heart et al. further argued that the state defendants could not take the legal position that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional. In the alternative, Immaculate Heart et al. argued that they should be allowed to intervene on a permissive basis because they filed a timely application, their defense involved a common question of law with the proceeding, and their participation would not cause prejudice or delay. On April 11, 2017, the MCC and MANS filed a proposed answer, which asserted their position outlined in their motion to intervene. The proposed answer also alleged that plaintiffs failed to state a claim, that some or all plaintiffs lacked standing, and that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution if interpreted in the way plaintiffs asserted. On May 2, 2017, the trial court issued an opinion and order denying both motions to intervene. The trial court concluded that the MCC and MANS established a basis to intervene under MCR 2.209 ; however, the trial court noted that it must deny the motion to intervene if it lacked jurisdiction to decide the proposed intervenors' rights. The trial court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over nonstate actors as defendants under MCL 600.6419(1)(a) and held that it must deny the motions to intervene. As part of its jurisdictional discussion, the trial court noted that if not for the jurisdictional issue, "the motion to intervene as defendants by Immaculate Heart of Mary et al . would be redundant and their proposed interest would be adequately represented by MCC and MANS." The trial court further noted that "to the extent the state legislators could be considered to have sought intervention in their roles as state legislators, the [c]ourt would be disinclined to find that their interests were not already adequately represented by the named state Defendants and the Attorney General." Immaculate Heart et al. now appeal by leave granted in Docket No. 338258, and the MCC and MANS now appeal by leave granted in Docket No. 338259. On May 22, 2017, this Court issued an order staying the proceedings in part. Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 22, 2017 (Docket No. 338258). Appellants contend that the Court of Claims erred in ruling that it could not grant the motions to intervene because of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. "Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Bank v. Mich. Ed. Ass'n-NEA , 315 Mich.App. 496, 499, 892 N.W.2d 1 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the Legislature." Id . "That intent is clear if the statutory language is unambiguous, and the statute must then be enforced as written." Weakland v. Toledo Engineering Co. , Inc. , 467 Mich. 344, 347, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003), amended on other grounds 468 Mich. 1216, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003). For purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that all appellants would be allowed to intervene if solely the intervention court rule, MCR 2.209, were under consideration. MCR 2.209 states: (A) Intervention of Right. On timely application a person has a right to intervene in an action: (1) when a Michigan statute or court rule confers an unconditional right to intervene; (2) by stipulation of all the parties; or (3) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties. (B) Permissive Intervention. On timely application a person may intervene in an action (1) when a Michigan statute or court rule confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. (C) Procedure. A person seeking to intervene must apply to the court by motion and give notice in writing to all parties under MCR 2.107. The motion must (1) state the grounds for intervention, and (2) be accompanied by a pleading stating the claim or defense for which intervention is sought. (D) Notice to Attorney General. When the validity of a Michigan statute or a rule or regulation included in the Michigan Administrative Code is in question in an action to which the state or an officer or agency of the state is not a party, the court may require that notice be given to the Attorney General, specifying the pertinent statute, rule, or regulation. Notwithstanding this court rule, existing statutory and common law-most notably MCL 600.6419(1) and Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008) -demonstrates that appellants could not, in fact, intervene in plaintiffs' lawsuit because the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against nonstate actors. "[A] judgment entered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction is void, [and] subject-matter jurisdiction is established by the pleadings and exists when the proceeding is of a class the court is authorized to adjudicate and the claim stated in the complaint is not clearly frivolous." Clohset v. No Name Corp. (On Remand) , 302 Mich.App. 550, 561, 840 N.W.2d 375 (2013) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, "[a] court's subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only by reference to the allegations listed in the complaint," and "[i]f it is apparent from the allegations that the matter alleged is within the class of cases with regard to which the court has the power to act, then subject-matter jurisdiction exists." Grubb Creek Action Comm. v. Shiawassee Co. Drain Comm'r , 218 Mich.App. 665, 668, 554 N.W.2d 612 (1996). "[T]he [l]ack of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be raised at any time and the parties to an action cannot confer jurisdiction by their conduct or action nor can they waive the defense by not raising it." Hillsdale Co. Senior Servs. , Inc. v. Hillsdale Co. , 494 Mich. 46, 51 n. 3, 832 N.W.2d 728 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in Hillsdale ). Concerning the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, MCL 600.6419(1) provides, in part: Except as otherwise provided in this section, the court has the following power and jurisdiction: (a) To hear and determine any claim or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or any of its departments or officers notwithstanding another law that confers jurisdiction of the case in the circuit court. "The Court of Claims is a court of legislative creation. Its statutory powers are explicit and limited." Feliciano v. Dep't of Natural Resources , 97 Mich.App. 101, 109, 293 N.W.2d 732 (1980). "[T]he Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction which does not possess the broad and inherent powers of a constitutional court." Meda v. City of Howell , 110 Mich.App. 179, 183, 312 N.W.2d 202 (1981). "Therefore, the Court of Claims lacks jurisdiction to hear actions against persons who, although public officials, are being sued in their individual capacities." Id . "Where a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of a suit, any action with respect to such a cause, other than dismissal, is absolutely void." Id . In Meda , the Court stated that "the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over defendants in their individual capacities...." Id . (emphasis added). In Estes , 481 Mich. at 583-584, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008), the Michigan Supreme Court discussed jurisdiction and a motion to intervene under MCR 2.209(A)(3) : Plaintiff's motion to intervene was based on MCR 2.209(A)(3), which allows an intervention of right in cases in which the intervenor's interests are not adequately represented by the parties. The court rule would otherwise have applied in the divorce because neither of the Tituses adequately represented plaintiff's interest as a potential creditor. However, the rule did not apply because the creditor sought to intervene in a divorce action in which the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights . Court rules cannot establish, abrogate, or modify the substantive law. In Yedinak v. Yedinak , [383 Mich. 409, 175 N.W.2d 706 (1970),] we addressed this same issue in the context of the court rules of permissive and necessary joinder. The majority in Yedinak found that nothing in these rules gave the divorce courts "power to disregard statutory provisions pertaining to divorce and to litigate the rights of others than the husband and wife." The same reasoning applies here. The divorce court properly denied plaintiff's motion to intervene in the divorce proceedings, and plaintiff correctly concluded that an appeal from the denial order would have been futile. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.] MCL 600.6419, which specifically outlines the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, contains a requirement that the action be "against the state or any of its departments or officers...." Indeed the very essence of the Court of Claims is to hear claims against the state. Thus, the nature of a defendant as a private individual necessarily relates to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. See, e.g., Meda , 110 Mich.App. at 183, 312 N.W.2d 202 ; see also Haider v. Mich. Technological Univ. , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 1997 (Docket No. 183350), 1997 WL 33347843, p. 3 (holding that "[b]ecause the individual defendants are not executive officers, the Court of Claims did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over" claims against them). It is true that MCL 600.6422(1) indicates that "[p]ractice and procedure in the court of claims shall be in accordance with the statutes and court rules prescribing practice in the circuit courts of this state, except as otherwise provided in this section." The MCC and MANS therefore argue that MCR 2.209 is the proper authority for determining whether they may intervene. This argument is misguided, however, in light of the clear guidance of Estes . Again, in Estes , 481 Mich. at 583, 751 N.W.2d 493, the Supreme Court stated that MCR 2.209 "would otherwise have applied" but that it did not, in fact, apply because "the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights." Just as the court did not have statutory jurisdiction to decide the intervenor's rights" in Estes , the Court of Claims does not have statutory jurisdiction to "decide the [potential intervenors' rights as defendants in the present case. The Court of Claims correctly held that given the nature of the proceedings, MCR 2.209 is inapplicable because the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against appellants as defendants. Immaculate Heart et al. argues that the state legislators were seeking to intervene in their official capacities and thus cannot be barred from intervening by MCL 600.6419 and Estes . MCL 600.6419(7) defines the phrase "the state or any of its departments or officers" as this state or any state governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of the state, or an officer, employee, or volunteer of this state or any governing, legislative, or judicial body, department, commission, board, institution, arm, or agency of this state, acting, or who reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of his or her duties. The Court of Claims opined that the state legislators were "seeking to intervene in capacities outside of their state governmental roles." On appeal, Immaculate Heart et al. argue that the state legislators were seeking to intervene as legislators, i.e., in the capacity of their governmental roles, by arguing that Const. 1963, art. 8, § 2, ¶ 2, is unconstitutional. We conclude that both positions misconstrue the definition outlined in MCL 600.6419(7), as used in MCL 600.6419(1)(a). MCL 600.6419(1)(a) gives the Court of Claims jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any ... demand for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief ... against the state or any of its departments or officers...." MCL 600.6419(7) defines the phrase "the state or any of its departments or officers" to include "an officer, employee, or volunteer of ... any ... legislative ... body ... of this state, acting, or who reasonably believes that he or she is acting, within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function...." Thus, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction "[t]o hear and determine any ... demand for ... equitable[ ] or declaratory relief ... against" "an officer ... [who is] acting ... within the scope of his or her authority while engaged in or discharging a government function...." When read in the context of a claim against the state's officers, it is clear that for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction, the officer must have been acting, or reasonably believed he or she was acting, within the scope of his or her authority at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct, not at the time he or she moved to intervene or become a part of the action. Plaintiffs are raising no claims against any of the state legislators for allegedly wrongful conduct during which they were acting, or reasonably believed that they were acting, within the scope of their "authority while engaged in or discharging a government function in the course of [their] duties." There were, simply, no claims or demands against the state legislators for the Court of Claims to have jurisdiction over. Affirmed. Hoekstra, P.J., and K. F. Kelly, J., concurred with Meter, J. According to the briefs, the individuals who are not state legislators are parents who "have children who attend private religious schools, have children who attend public schools but wish to send those children to private religious schools, or both." In addition, "[p]roposed intervening defendant Representative Tim Kelly voted in support of 2016 PA 249, and he, along with Senator Phil Pavlov, Senator Patrick Colbeck, and Representative Kim LaSata, seek to enforce the policy the legislation [sic] enacted in Section 152b." This Court subsequently granted a motion for partial relief from stay, allowing "plaintiffs to make a filing(s) in the Court of Claims in accordance with the verification requirements of MCL 600.6431." Council of Organizations & Others for Ed. v. Michigan , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 21, 2017 (Docket Nos. 338258 and 338259). "Although cases decided before November 1, 1990, are not binding precedent, MCR 7.215(J)(1), they nevertheless can be considered persuasive authority[.]" In re Stillwell Trust , 299 Mich.App. 289, 299 n. 1, 829 N.W.2d 353 (2013). Unpublished opinions are not binding but may be used as guides. See Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. Berkley , 259 Mich.App. 1, 20 n. 16, 672 N.W.2d 351 (2003). Appellants note that Court of Claims cases exist in which no party evidently objected, on jurisdictional grounds, to intervention by nonstate parties. The existence of these cases does not mandate reversal in the present case, in which the jurisdictional issue is squarely before us. It is tempting to conclude that because Representative Tim Kelly voted in favor of 2016 PA 249, MCL 600.6419 encompasses him. However, we must construe MCL 600.6419 as written, Weakland , 467 Mich. at 347, 656 N.W.2d 175, and plaintiffs are not making a claim against him for that vote. In other words, plaintiffs are not alleging wrongful conduct on the part of individual legislators but are seeking a declaration that the vote as a whole is necessarily limited by the Michigan Constitution and that the state, the Governor, the Department of Education, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction must not enforce it.

Per Curiam. In this action to enforce a judgment of divorce, the trial court granted summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the conclusion that plaintiff's claim was time-barred by MCL 600.5809(3). Plaintiff filed a delayed application for leave to appeal, which we granted. Because plaintiff's claim accrued when the marital home sold in 2009, his 2015 motion to enforce the terms of the judgment of divorce in 2015 was not time-barred. Consequently, we reverse the dismissal of plaintiff's claim and remand for further proceedings. The parties married in 1996, and their judgment of divorce entered on July 24, 2003. At the time of their divorce, the parties owned a mobile home together in Adrian, Michigan. With regard to this marital home, the judgment of divorce stated: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff and Defendant shall continue to own the marital home ... as tenants in common. The house is to be continuously offered for sale until sold. Defendant shall make the house and lot payments as long as she resides in the home. At such time as Defendant moves or the house is sold, the indebtedness or profit shall be shared equally. Defendant moved out of the home in September 2007. On October 7, 2009, following a motion by defendant to enforce the judgment of divorce, the trial court entered an order against plaintiff, requiring him to pay defendant the sum of $5,927, which represented plaintiff's share of the mobile home and lot rental payments for the time period after defendant vacated the property. In this order, the trial court also stated that "all other orders not in direct conflict herein shall remain in full force and effect." The mobile home eventually sold on October 21, 2009, but, the sale did not cover the balance owing on the loan. After the sale, the parties had a deficiency of $37,998.35. According to plaintiff, between the time of the sale and January 2015, he paid $24,543.24 toward the outstanding balance on the loan, while defendant paid nothing. On May 4, 2015, plaintiff moved to enforce the judgment of divorce. In particular, plaintiff argued that under the terms of the judgment of divorce, defendant bore equal responsibility for the outstanding indebtedness on the loan balance following the sale of the property. Plaintiff requested an order specifying that defendant and plaintiff were each responsible for $18,999.17. He also sought payment from defendant for the amount he had paid in excess of his liability, an amount totaling $5,544.06. Defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's motion, and she also moved for summary disposition. Defendant asserted that plaintiff's motion to enforce the judgment of divorce was time- barred by the 10-year period of limitations provided in MCL 600.5809(3) because the judgment of divorce entered in 2003 and plaintiff did not bring his motion to enforce the judgment until 2015. According to defendant, within the 10-year time period, plaintiff should have sought to extend the divorce judgment by seeking a new judgment or decree under MCL 600.5809(3) within the 10-year time period, but plaintiff failed to do so. In response to defendant's motion for summary disposition, plaintiff argued that his claim against defendant for half of the indebtedness on the home accrued when the home sold in 2009, meaning that the 10-year period of limitations would not expire until 2019 and that his claim was timely filed in 2015. Alternatively, plaintiff contended that the motion to enforce the judgment filed by defendant in 2009 "effectively reset the clock on the statute of limitations" such that plaintiff's claim in 2015 was timely under the "renewed" judgment of divorce. Following a hearing, the trial court granted summary disposition to defendant, concluding that plaintiff's claim was time-barred by the 10-year limitations period set forth in MCL 600.5809(3) because the judgment of divorce entered in 2003 and plaintiff did not seek to enforce the judgment until 2015. Plaintiff then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in this Court, which we granted. The only issue before us is whether plaintiff's motion to enforce the judgment of divorce was timely. The parties agree that plaintiff's claim is subject to the 10-year period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5809(3), but they disagree about when the limitations period began to run. Plaintiff argues that his claim accrued, and thus the limitations period began to run, when the home sold in 2009, making his motion to enforce the judgment in 2015 timely. In contrast, defendant contends that the limitations period began to run when the divorce judgment was rendered in 2003 and that, in the absence of an action for a new judgment, the limitations period expired in 2013, meaning that plaintiff's claim in 2015 was untimely. We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp. , 292 Mich.App. 626, 629, 808 N.W.2d 804 (2011). If a claim is time-barred, summary disposition is properly granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Prins v. Mich. State Police , 291 Mich.App. 586, 589, 805 N.W.2d 619 (2011). When the underlying facts are not disputed, whether a claim is time-barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Titan Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch. , 241 Mich.App. 258, 260, 615 N.W.2d 774 (2000). Likewise, we also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. White v. Taylor Distrib. Co., Inc. , 275 Mich.App. 615, 620, 739 N.W.2d 132 (2007). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language of the statute. Driver v. Naini , 490 Mich. 239, 246-247; 802 N.W.2d 311 (2011). "We read the statutory language in context and as a whole, considering the plain and ordinary meaning of every word." Hamed v. Wayne Co. , 490 Mich. 1, 8, 803 N.W.2d 237 (2011). "When the language is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the statute as written and judicial construction is not permitted." Driver , 490 Mich. at 247, 802 N.W.2d 311. Statutes of limitations are contained in Chapter 58 of the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.5801 et seq . Peabody v. DiMeglio , 306 Mich.App. 397, 404, 856 N.W.2d 245 (2014). At issue in this case is the statute of limitations governing the enforcement of a judgment as set forth in MCL 600.5809, which states: (1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to enforce a noncontractual money obligation unless, after the claim first accrued to the person or to someone through whom he or she claims, the person commences the action within the applicable period of time prescribed by this section. * * * (3) Except as provided in subsection (4), the period of limitations is 10 years for an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of this state, or in a court of record of the United States or of another state of the United States, from the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree .... Within the applicable period of limitations prescribed by this subsection, an action may be brought upon the judgment or decree for a new judgment or decree. The new judgment or decree is subject to this subsection. [Emphasis added.] In terms of when a claim accrues, under MCL 600.5827 : Except as otherwise expressly provided, the period of limitations runs from the time the claim accrues. The claim accrues at the time provided in [ MCL 600.5829 to MCL 600.5838], and in cases not covered by these sections the claim accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results. [Emphasis added.] Relying on these provisions, this Court has previously determined that claims relating to a property settlement contained in a judgment of divorce, including claims relating to the disposition of real property, are subject to the 10-year period of limitations set forth in MCL 600.5809(3). See Peabody , 306 Mich.App. at 406, 856 N.W.2d 245 ; Gabler v. Woditsch , 143 Mich.App. 709, 711, 372 N.W.2d 647 (1985). Further, on facts analogous to the situation presented in this case, we have also concluded that the 10-year period of limitations for a claim relating to a property settlement in a judgment of divorce begins to run at the time the claim accrues and that the claim accrues when the money owing under the property settlement comes due. For example, in Gabler , the parties' 1968 judgment of divorce provided that the wife would receive the marital home, that she would pay the husband for his half of the equity in the house, and that the balance of this payment to the husband would come due when the parties' third eldest child turned 18 on July 27, 1975. Gabler , 143 Mich.App. at 710, 372 N.W.2d 647. On these facts, this Court held that the husband's cause of action to enforce this provision accrued when the balance came due in 1975 and that his complaint, filed in June 1983, was timely filed within the applicable 10-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5809(3). Gabler , 143 Mich.App. at 711, 372 N.W.2d 647. Likewise, in Peabody , the parties divorced in 1995, and their judgment of divorce contained a provision stating that if a house belonging to the parties was sold, all net proceeds would be divided equally between the parties. Peabody , 306 Mich.App. at 401, 856 N.W.2d 245. The property sold in 2004, and we concluded that the wife's cause of action accrued in 2004, "when the property was sold and the [husband] failed to pay [the wife] half of the proceeds." Id. at 407, 856 N.W.2d 245. Thus, we determined that the wife's complaint in 2012 was timely under MCL 600.5809(3). Peabody , 306 Mich.App. at 407, 856 N.W.2d 245. Following the reasoning of Peabody and Gabler , plaintiff's claim in this case was timely filed. Although the judgment of divorce entered in 2003, plaintiff's claim did not accrue until 2009 when the home sold and defendant failed to pay her half of the outstanding indebtedness on the home loan. Because the claim accrued in 2009, plaintiff's motion in 2015 to enforce the judgment was timely filed within the 10-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5809(3). See Peabody , 306 Mich.App. at 407, 856 N.W.2d 245 ; Gabler , 143 Mich.App. at 711, 372 N.W.2d 647. In contrast to this conclusion, defendant emphasizes that MCL 600.5809(3) states that "the period of limitations is 10 years for an action founded upon a judgment or decree rendered in a court of record of this state ... from the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree ," (Emphasis added). Thus, in defendant's view, the period of limitations began to run in 2003, and it expired in 2013. According to defendant, under MCL 600.5809(3), plaintiff should have brought an action on the judgment for a "new judgment," and because he did not do so before 2013, his claim in 2015 was untimely. Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive. First of all, her arguments are contrary to our application of MCL 600.5809(3) in both Peabody and Gabler . Second, defendant's construction of the statute fails to read MCL 600.5809 as a whole. While MCL 600.5809(3) indicates that the limitations period is 10 years "from the time of the rendition of the judgment," MCL 600.5809(1) makes plain that a person cannot bring a claim to enforce an noncontractual money obligation until after the claim accrues. There is potentially some tension between these provisions; but, when they are read together, it is apparent that until the claim accrues as specified in MCL 600.5809(1), there is no "action founded upon a judgment or decree" within the meaning of MCL 600.5809(3). Thus the limitations period in MCL 600.5809(3) cannot begin to run until the claim accrues. In other words, when a judgment provides for payment at some future point, the period of limitations under MCL 600.5809(3), when read in conjunction with MCL 600.5809(1), begins to run when the payment required by the judgment comes due. See Rybinski v. Rybinski , 333 Mich. 592, 596, 53 N.W.2d 386 (1952). Likewise, it was not necessary for plaintiff to seek a renewed judgment under MCL 600.5809(3), because, as we have discussed, until the home sold in 2009, there was no money owing to plaintiff, the period of limitations had not begun to run, and there was no reason to renew the judgment. Defendant's arguments are without merit. In sum, the 10-year period of limitations did not begin to run until the home sold in 2009, meaning that plaintiff's motion in 2015 to enforce the judgment was timely.. Peabody , 306 Mich.App. at 407, 856 N.W.2d 245 ; Gabler , 143 Mich.App. at 711, 372 N.W.2d 647. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary disposition to defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(7),and we remand for consideration of the merits of plaintiff's motion to enforce the judgment. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. Shapiro, P.J., and Hoekstra and M.J. Kelly, JJ., concurred. O'Leary v. O'Leary , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 12, 2015 (Docket No. 333519). Subsection (4) concerns actions to enforce support orders under the Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act, MCL 552.601 et seq .

On order of the Chief Justice, the stipulation signed by counsel for the parties agreeing to the dismissal of the application for leave to appeal is considered, and the application for leave to appeal is DISMISSED with prejudice and without costs to any party.

On order of the Chief Justice, the motion of defendant-appellee to file a response to the amicus brief filed by the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, Inc., is GRANTED. The response submitted on July 23, 2018, is accepted for filing.

Sawyer, J. We are faced with the question whether an "insured premises" under a homeowner's policy includes property regularly used with permission, but not owned or resided on, by an insured when the policy's definition of "insured premises" includes "any premises used" by an insured "in connection with" the insured's "residence premises." We conclude that it does not. The basic facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. Brandon Dickert was killed while riding on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) operated by Bailey Bischer and owned by Bailey's parents, Barbara and Gary Bischer. Dickert's estate filed suit against the Bischers, alleging negligence. The Bischers were insured under a homeowner's policy issued by plaintiff. Plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that it was not obligated to indemnify or defend the suit. At issue is the following exclusion under the policy, as well as the exception to the exclusion: We do not cover: * * * 6. bodily injury or property damage arising out of: A. the ownership, maintenance, occupancy, use, renting, loaning, loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer; B. the entrustment by you of a motorized land vehicle to any person. This exclusion does not apply to : A. a motorized land vehicle in dead storage or used exclusively on an insured premises ; B. any motorized land vehicle which is designed principally for recreational use off public roads, not subject to motor vehicle registration, licensing or permits, and owned by you , but only while the vehicle is on the insured premises . [Italics added.] It is not disputed that under the policy the ATV is a "motorized land vehicle" that is designed "for recreational use off public roads ...." Thus, the exception under ¶ B would apply if the ATV was being operated on the insured premises. That becomes the essential question in this case. The accident did not occur on the Bischers' property. Rather, Bailey and Brandon were riding on trails on a neighboring property. According to Gary Bischer's deposition testimony, the Bischers own 18 acres with a large wooded area. Trails wind through the property, as well as through the property of other neighbors. According to the deposition testimony, the residents routinely used the trails on each other's properties. The accident occurred on the property of a neighbor located across the street from the Bischers' residence. Thus, to resolve this case we must turn to the policy's definition of "insured premises." The definition, in relevant part, is as follows: "INSURED PREMISES " means: 1. the residence premises ; 2. that part of any other premises, other structures and grounds used by you as a residence and which is specifically named in the Declarations or acquired by you during the policy period for your use as a residence, but only for a period of 90 days from the date you acquire the property; [or] 3. any premises used by you in connection with a premises included in 1. and 2. above [.] [Italics added.] Furthermore, "residence premises" is defined as "the one or two family dwelling used as a private residence by you , other structures and land located at the address named on the Declarations." (Italics added). Accordingly, coverage exists under the policy for this accident if the accident occurred on premises used "in connection with" the residence premises; otherwise, the exclusion will applies. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition. Plaintiff maintained that there was no coverage because the accident did not occur on the Bischers' property. Defendants argued that because the trails were routinely used by all the neighbors, the accident site was used in connection with the residence premises and, therefore, the site was part of the "insured premises." The trial court agreed with defendants and granted summary disposition in their favor. Plaintiff now appeals. The standard of review for this case was summarized by the Supreme Court in DeFrain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. : A trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. In reviewing the motion, we view the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In addition, the proper interpretation of contracts and the legal effect of contractual provisions are questions of law subject to review de novo. We construe an insurance policy in the same manner as any other species of contract, giving its terms their "ordinary and plain meaning if such would be apparent to a reader of the instrument." [Citation omitted.] While there are a number of published cases in other jurisdictions interpreting similar policy provisions, there do not appear to be any published cases in Michigan that do so. As for the decisions in other jurisdictions, as the Connecticut Supreme Court observed in Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King , "courts in other jurisdictions have adopted divergent criteria-including 'repeated use,' 'integral use,' 'property ownership and legal right to use,' 'foreseeable use' and 'actual use'-to determine whether a location is used in connection with the residence premises." (Citations omitted.) Defendants would have us focus more on the "repeated use" with "implied permission" from the neighbors of the trails. Defendants maintain that plaintiff's focus on whether there was "ownership and legal right to use" reads language into the policy that is not there. But defendants' proposed interpretation ignores the effect of the word "connection" in the language. That is, the mere fact of "repeated use" does not take into account whether there truly is a connection between the residence premises and the location of the accident. The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Coppa , concluded that there was no use in connection with the residence premises when an ATV accident occurred in a neighbor's hayfield. The Court concluded as follows: When examining all the provisions of the policy together, and in particular the nine specifications included in the definition of the "insured location," we are compelled to conclude that "insured location" was not meant to describe adjacent, non-owned land on which an ATV might be used. The hayfield is not part of the residence premises and is not "used in connection with" such premises as are approaches or easements of ingress to or egress from the property. It is not reasonable to expect that every field or pathway in the neighborhood leading to the insureds' residence is property "used in connection with" the residence. We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that coverage was precluded under the policy. Similarly, the court in Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co. , an ATV was being operated in a field located 15 miles from the residence premises, and the Georgia Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the field was used "in connection with" the residence premises: Moreover, the Masons' argument that they were using the field "in connection with" their home because they were holding their daughter's birthday party at the field so family members and guests could do activities that they were unable to do at the house is unavailing. Applying that logic would extend the policy's definition of "insured premises" to cover almost any family outing or celebration at almost any location-a friend's pool, a neighborhood school, a public or private lake or park, etc.-regardless of the distance from or any actual connection with the insureds' residence. Further, if the policy were construed as suggested, insurers would be subjected to virtually endless liability, liability for which neither it nor the insureds could have reasonably expected or intended to be covered by the insurance policy. Under such circumstances, how could any insurer possibly draft a policy that would anticipate each and every hobby, interest or future travel decision of each and every insured, weigh the risks thereof, and set premiums accordingly? In reaching this analysis, the Mason court also analyzed earlier decisions that presented even closer connections and still rejected the argument that the property was used in connection with the residence premises. For example, one of the cases included an insured using an adjacent property for storing items, burning garbage, and other chores. In Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Wynn , the court found no connection with the residence premises in a case involving an ATV accident on a beach the insured frequently used near the residence premises. The court concluded: It is not reasonable that the meaning of the language "used in connection with [the residence]," and hence the ambit of the "insured location," should vary depending on the fortuity of an insured's regular use of a field, trail, or recreational area, public or private, in the neighborhood of his residence. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shofner, 573 So.2d at 48, 49-50 [ (1990) ] (operation of vehicle on public street one block away from residence constitutes "being used away from an insured premises"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gutenkauf, 103 Ill.App.3d 889, 892-893, 59 Ill.Dec. 525, 431 N.E.2d 1282 (1981) (declining, as arbitrary and not susceptible to limitation, construction of "insured premises" to include area of lake ten to fifteen feet from shore); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Coppa, 494 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn.Ct.App.1993). Such a construction would require knowledge by an insurer of not only the insured's property but also of neighboring property and the insured's hobbies and interests. Rather, the term "insured location" is intended and appropriately understood to be limited to the residence and premises integral to its use as a residence. The beach is not integral to the use of 83 Lakeshore Drive as a residence. Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment for the insurer. [Alteration in original.] Ultimately, we need not determine what does constitute a sufficient connection with the residence premises. We need only resolve the instant dispute. We might reach a different result had the accident occurred in the common area of a residential development where the property owners, by virtue of that ownership, had the right to use the common areas. Or perhaps coverage would apply if the accident had happened on a driveway located on a neighbor's property but for which the insured had a driveway easement. Or coverage might apply when the adjoining property was also owned by the insured. None of these situations is present here. Accordingly, we simply conclude that a neighboring property is not used "in connection with" the residence premises merely because the neighboring property is regularly used by an insured with implied permission from the neighboring property owner. To hold otherwise would open up an insurer's liability for a variety of situations-such as an injury caused by ATV use in a large public park located near an insured's land or on the shoulders of public roads miles from a residence-that would expand the risk assumed by an insurer when drafting and approving the "in connection with" language. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying plaintiff's motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition to defendants. The ATV accident did not occur on the "insured premises." Therefore, plaintiff had no duty to indemnify or defend the Bischers, and plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition. Reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter summary disposition in favor of plaintiff. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff may tax costs. Meter, P.J., concurred with Sawyer, J. Apparently there is one neighbor that does not allow access to his property, but that fact is not relevant here. 491 Mich. 359, 366-367, 817 N.W.2d 504 (2012). 304 Conn. 179, 191-192, 39 A.3d 712 (2012). 494 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. App. 1993). Id . at 506. 298 Ga. App. 308, 314, 680 S.E.2d 168 (2009). Id. 60 Mass. App. Ct. 824, 806 N.E.2d 447 (2004). See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fontneau , 70 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 558-560, 875 N.E.2d 508 (2007), approving the analysis in Wynn , 60 Mass.App. at 829-830, and distinguishing the facts in Wynn from the facts in Fontneau.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 21, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 16, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.305(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 16, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 29, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. Viviano, J., not participating due to a familial relationship with the presiding circuit court judge in this case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 15, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

Per Curiam. The prosecution appeals by leave granted a November 22, 2016 order granting defendant's second motion for relief from judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. On November 10, 2004, defendant was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f. On December 13, 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant, a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.10, to 40 to 60 years' imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, life imprisonment for each AWIM conviction, 2 years' imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, and 2 to 7½ years' imprisonment for the felon-in-possession conviction. The trial court's sentence for second-degree murder represented a 12-month upward departure from the applicable guidelines range. On January 7, 2005, defendant appealed as of right his convictions and sentences on a number of grounds. Relevant here, defendant challenged the propriety of the trial court's upward departure from the sentencing guidelines range for second-degree murder without stating on the record "substantial and compelling reasons" for the departure as required under MCL 769.34(3). In a June 13, 2006 unpublished opinion, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions, but agreed that "the trial court did not satisfy MCL 769.34(3) when imposing a sentence outside the prescribed sentencing guidelines range." People v. Washington , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 13, 2006 (Docket No. 260155), p. 8, 2006 WL 1626910. This Court remanded for resentencing, directing the trial court to reconsider the propriety of its sentence and articulate substantial and compelling reasons for any departure as required by MCL 769.34(3). Id . at 8-9. On August 8, 2006, defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court. On October 4, 2006, while the application was still pending, the trial court resentenced defendant pursuant to this Court's June 13, 2006 opinion and remand, imposing identical sentences and offering a number of justifications for the departure. The Supreme Court denied defendant's application for leave to appeal on December 28, 2006. People v. Washington , 477 Mich. 973, 725 N.W.2d 20 (2006). On December 4, 2006, about three weeks before the Supreme Court denied defendant's initial application, defendant filed in this Court a delayed application for leave to appeal the resentencing order, again arguing that the trial court failed to articulate on the record the required "substantial and compelling reasons" for the upward departure from defendant's sentencing guidelines for second-degree murder. This Court denied defendant's application "for lack of merit." People v. Washington , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 4, 2007 (Docket No. 274768). Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court on June 28, 2007, which that Court denied. People v. Washington , 480 Mich. 891, 738 N.W.2d 734 (2007). Several months later, on March 25, 2008, defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court pursuant to MCR 6.502, raising claims of (1) insufficient evidence, (2) denial of his right to present an insanity defense, (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and (4) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. On July 9, 2008, the trial court denied defendant's motion under MCR 6.508(D)(3) for failure to demonstrate good cause for not raising the issues in a prior appeal and failure to show actual prejudice. This Court denied defendant's July 8, 2009 delayed application for leave to appeal the trial court's decision, People v. Washington , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 19, 2009 (Docket No. 292891), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied defendant leave to appeal this Court's denial, People v. Washington , 486 Mich. 1042, 783 N.W.2d 335 (2010). On June 22, 2016, after exhausting all available postconviction relief, defendant filed his second motion for relief from judgment-the motion giving rise to the instant appeal. Defendant challenged his sentences on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the trial court's October 4, 2006 order after resentencing was invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant while his application remained pending before the Michigan Supreme Court. In response, the prosecution argued that defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment was clearly barred by MCR 6.502(G), which prohibits successive motions for relief from judgment unless there has been a retroactive change in the law or new evidence has been discovered. In a November 22, 2016 written order and opinion, the trial court indicated its agreement with the prosecution's argument but noted that the prosecution had failed to address the jurisdictional issue, which "may be raised at any time." The trial court concluded that under MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a), MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a), and relevant caselaw, it had lacked jurisdiction to enter the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence. The trial court granted defendant's motion, vacated defendant's sentences, and ordered resentencing. The instant appeal followed. The prosecution argues that the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion for relief from judgment because MCR 6.502(G)(1) unequivocally bars successive motions for relief from judgment absent application of an explicit exception. We agree in part. "We review a trial court's decision on a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion...." People v. Swain , 288 Mich. App. 609, 628, 794 N.W.2d 92 (2010). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, or when the trial court makes an error of law. Id. at 628-629, 794 N.W.2d 92. The proper interpretation and application of court rules are questions of law reviewed de novo. People v. Buie , 285 Mich. App. 401, 416, 775 N.W.2d 817 (2009). Motions for relief from judgment are governed by MCR 6.500 et seq . Swain , 288 Mich. App. at 629, 794 N.W.2d 92. MCR 6.502(G)(1) provides, in pertinent part: Except as provided in subrule (G)(2) ... one and only one motion for relief from judgment may be filed with regard to a conviction. The court shall return without filing any successive motions for relief from judgment. MCR 6.502(G)(2) provides two exceptions to the general rule against successive motions for relief from judgment, allowing a "second or subsequent motion based on a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judgment or a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion." Any successive motion that does not assert one of these two exceptions must be returned to the defendant and not filed in the court. Swain , 288 Mich. App. at 631, 794 N.W.2d 92, citing MCR 6.502(G)(1). This Court in Swain , 288 Mich. App. at 632, 794 N.W.2d 92, explicitly held that " MCR 6.502(G)(2) provides the only two exceptions to the prohibition of successive motions." Swain is binding on this Court, as it is on the trial court, MCR 7.215(C)(2), and we discern no ambiguity in the language of MCR 6.502(G) to warrant reconsideration of the issue. Defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment was predicated on a claimed "jurisdictional defect" that invalidated the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence. Defendant's successive motion for relief from judgment did not involve a retroactive change in the law or newly discovered evidence. Regardless of the merits of defendant's claim of error, the trial court lacked authority to grant defendant's motion under MCR 6.502. However, a motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.502 is merely a procedural vehicle, and our determination that relief under MCR 6.502 was unavailable to defendant does not end our inquiry. We agree that the prosecution has failed to address the substantive issue in defendant's motion for relief from judgment, which, while brought pursuant to an inapplicable court rule, nevertheless constitutes an important and reviewable claim of error. It is indisputable that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resentence defendant when it entered the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence. MCR 7.305(C) states, in pertinent part: (6) Effect of Appeal on Decision Remanding Case . If a party appeals a decision that remands for further proceedings as provided in subrule (C)(5)(a), the following provisions apply: (a) If the Court of Appeals decision is a judgment under MCR 7.215(E)(1),[ ]an application for leave to appeal stays proceedings on remand unless the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court orders otherwise . [emphasis added.] Similarly, MCR 7.215(F)(1)(a) provides that a "Court of Appeals judgment is effective after the expiration of the time for filing an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, or, if such an application is filed, after the disposition of the case by the Supreme Court[.]" Neither this Court nor our Supreme Court ordered otherwise, and under the court rules, this Court's June 13, 2006 resentencing order was not effective until after the Supreme Court entered its December 28, 2006 order denying leave to appeal. However, the trial court conducted the resentencing hearing on October 4, 2006, while the application for leave to appeal was still pending and while, pursuant to MCR 7.305(C)(6)(a), the lower court proceedings were stayed. Our Supreme Court considered a similar set of circumstances in People v. Swafford , 483 Mich. 1, 6 n 5, 762 N.W.2d 902 (2009). The Swafford Court noted that, consistent with the aforementioned court rules, the defendant's timely application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court a judgment of the Court of Appeals stayed the proceedings on remand and divested the trial court of jurisdiction during the pendency of the application. Id at 7 n. 5, 762 N.W.2d 902. Thus, in Swafford , the Court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a new trial while leave was pending in the Supreme Court, the proceedings were stayed, and this Court's judgment was not yet effective. Id . Although the prosecution argues otherwise, the trial court's entry of the judgment of sentence without jurisdiction was not merely procedural error. "The term jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to act and the authority a court has to hear and determine a case." People v. Clement , 254 Mich. App. 387, 394, 657 N.W.2d 172 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Jurisdiction of the subject matter of a judicial proceeding is an absolute requirement." In re AMB , 248 Mich. App. 144, 166, 640 N.W.2d 262 (2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, its acts and proceedings are of no force and validity; they are a mere nullity and are void." Clement , 254 Mich. App. at 394, 657 N.W.2d 172 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold a resentencing hearing and to enter the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence, the resentencing hearing and the resultant judgment of sentence lack force and authority and are considered void. "Jurisdictional defects may be raised at any time." People v. Martinez , 211 Mich. App. 147, 149, 535 N.W.2d 236 (1995) ; see also Smith v. Smith , 218 Mich. App. 727, 729-730, 555 N.W.2d 271 (1996) ("[A] challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even if raised for the first time on appeal."). "Subject-matter jurisdiction is so critical to a court's authority that a court has an independent obligation to take notice when it lacks such jurisdiction, even when the parties do not raise the issue." AMB , 248 Mich. App. at 166-167, 640 N.W.2d 262 ; see also Clement , 254 Mich. App. at 394, 657 N.W.2d 172 (explaining that a court is bound to notice the limits of its authority and to recognize sua sponte its lack of jurisdiction). Even though the issue in this case was raised in an improperly supported motion, the trial court clearly had the power to consider the jurisdictional issue brought to its attention. The prosecution suggests that the prohibition of successive motions for relief from judgment and the principle that subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time create a conflict in the law. However, at least in the case before us, any such conflict is illusory. Despite the prosecution's argument to the contrary, the trial court's ruling did not improperly carve out a third exception to MCR 6.502(G)(1). Instead, the trial court exercised its inherent power to "recognize its lack of jurisdiction or any pertinent boundaries on its proper exercise." Clement , 254 Mich. App. at 394, 657 N.W.2d 172 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court properly recognized that its October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence was a nullity, and its compliance with this Court's June 13, 2006 remand for resentencing was incomplete. Under MCL 600.611, "[c]ircuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit courts' jurisdiction and judgments." Therefore, the trial court did not err when it vacated the October 4, 2006 judgment of sentence and ordered a resentencing hearing. And while, as previously discussed, the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion for relief from judgment in contravention of MCR 6.502, "[a] trial court's ruling may be upheld on appeal where the right result issued, albeit for the wrong reason." Gleason v. Dep't of Transp. , 256 Mich. App. 1, 3, 662 N.W.2d 822 (2003). Affirmed. O'Brien, P.J., and Jansen and Stephens, JJ., concurred. People v. Washington , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 24, 2017 (Docket No. 336050, 2017 WL 345107 ). Defendant's issues on appeal included ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to raise an insanity defense and failure to file a motion for a new trial based on the assertion that defendant's convictions were against the great weight of the evidence, violation of a sequestration order by the prosecution's witnesses, and prosecutorial misconduct. On the date of defendant's sentencing, MCL 769.34(3) required that: "[a] court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under the sentencing guidelines ... if the court has a substantial and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for departure."MCL 769.34(3) was later struck down in People v. Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 391-392, 870 N.W.2d 502 (2015), and the substantial and compelling reason requirement was replaced with a requirement that a departure be reasonable. Defendant also requested that, on resentencing, the trial court determine the applicable guidelines range for both defendant's second-degree murder conviction and his AWIM convictions and take them into account pursuant to Lockridge , 498 Mich. 358, 870 N.W.2d 502. The trial court concluded that defendant was not entitled to any relief under Lockridge because the rule articulated in that case does not retroactively apply to sentences on collateral review. Defendant does not challenge this decision on appeal. "Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo." Hillsdale Co. Sr. Servs., Inc. v. Hillsdale Co. , 494 Mich. 46, 51, 832 N.W.2d 728 (2013). There is no dispute that this Court's June 13, 2006 unpublished opinion remanding the case for resentencing in the trial court was a "judgment" under MCR 7.215(E)(1), which states: "When the Court of Appeals disposes of an original action or an appeal, whether taken as of right, by leave granted, or by order in lieu of leave being granted, its opinion or order is its judgment."

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 1, 2018 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. The motions to consolidate, to compel response, and to invoke judicial notice are DENIED.

Per Curiam. In this consolidated appeal involving a custody dispute, plaintiff appeals by leave granted the trial court's order to begin family therapy and reunification between defendant and the parties' two minor children. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1994 and had three children during the course of their marriage. On July 21, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and shortly after, she requested that the trial court order defendant to undergo a psychological evaluation. The trial court then ordered both parties to submit to a psychological evaluation with a psychologist. The assessment of defendant was largely negative. On February 19, 2009, the trial court ordered defendant to vacate the marital home, allowing supervised parenting time until further order of the court. On May 6, 2009, the parties signed a consent judgment of divorce that granted plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the two minor children. Defendant was granted supervised parenting time, but at some point in 2009, plaintiff obtained a personal protection order (PPO) against defendant. She obtained a second PPO in 2010. Around that time, defendant joined the Army and was eventually deployed overseas. He returned in December 2011 and began living in Texas. Upon his return, he attempted to arrange supervised parenting time with the minor children, but claimed that plaintiff prevented contact with the children. In 2012, defendant was found in violation of the 2010 PPO by visiting one of the children at her school, and defendant's parenting time was suspended until further order of the court. In 2013, defendant requested unsupervised parenting time, claiming that he had been attending regular therapy with two different counselors in Texas. Plaintiff argued that any parenting time with defendant would not be in the best interests of the children, considering defendant's history of psychological problems. She insisted that defendant submit to another independent psychological evaluation. After a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court ordered defendant to submit to a second evaluation with a Michigan-based psychologist agreed on by the parties. On November 26, 2014, which was 18 months after the trial court entered its order, Dr. Jackson E. Turner evaluated defendant in Michigan without plaintiff's approval. It appears from the record that defendant moved from Texas back to Michigan at some point during this time. Turner concluded that defendant was capable and ready to interact positively with the children and recommended that the process of reunification begin with gradual steps leading to one-on-one parenting time. Plaintiff argued that the evaluation from Turner should not be considered because the trial court's order required that the parties agree on a psychologist. The trial court expressed its concern that the minor children were not involved with Turner's evaluation, and it ordered another psychological evaluation to be performed by Dr. James N. Bow, requiring that Bow work with all members of the family in order to get a more expansive view of the situation. Bow diagnosed defendant with persecutory type delusion disorder, concluding that defendant's prognosis was poor and that defendant would likely never be entirely free of the condition. He recommended that defendant engage in therapy, focusing on a number of specified concerns. Accordingly, the trial court ordered defendant to participate in therapy with Dr. John Cotter, a treating psychologist. On September 23, 2015, Cotter began treating defendant with a focus on the concerns identified by Bow. On December 23, 2015, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion to move to California with the children. By January 29, 2016, defendant had completed 12 sessions with Cotter. Thereafter, Cotter recommended that the trial court begin the reunification process between defendant and the children. After a hearing on defendant's motion to adopt Cotter's recommendation, the trial court ordered defendant to undergo a reevaluation with Bow, but Bow refused to reevaluate defendant, claiming it would amount to a conflict of interest. Defendant then asked the trial court to modify its previous order and allow Cotter to conduct the reevaluation, but plaintiff argued that a different psychologist should perform the reevaluation. The trial court heard arguments on May 4, 2016, and it ordered Cotter to review all the psychological evaluations, to have Cotter and defendant discuss what the children had said about defendant, to address the other issues with defendant, and then to inform the trial court regarding defendant's progress with his mental health. From March 23, 2016 to September 15, 2016, defendant visited Cotter 20 more times. The trial court held a hearing on September 15, 2016, and Cotter testified as a fact witness. According to the trial court, the purpose of the hearing was to evaluate whether Bow's recommendations for treatment had been followed, whether defendant was making progress, and whether it would be appropriate at that time to initiate the reunification process. After three days of direct and cross-examination of Cotter, the trial court had the parties submit closing arguments via briefing regarding whether defendant had sufficiently improved to begin the first step of Cotter's plan for reunification. Plaintiff argued that the reunification process should not begin until the trial court conducted a full evidentiary hearing. The trial court entered an opinion and order on January 19, 2017, holding that defendant had "satisfactorily complied with substantial hoops, ordered at both [p]laintiff's request and the court's own caution, to demonstrate a reunification process should begin." The trial court ordered the following: (1) the minor children shall participate with a therapist in California for a minimum of four sessions within 45 days, (2) after the children's therapy, and within 60 days, a reunification videoconference must be conducted between defendant, the children, the therapist in California, and Cotter, (3) after the first reunification conference, the frequency, duration, and method of continued contact will be at the therapists' discretion, and (4) after six months, the Friend of the Court will review the matter in order to determine if, at that time, a motion to change parenting time should be entertained. The trial court made clear that it was not changing parenting time, concluding "that therapeutic contact does not constitute a 'change' in parenting time as [d]efendant will not be having any 'parenting time,' supervised or otherwise, at this juncture and through this medium." Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed clear legal error by ordering the minor children and defendant to engage in family therapy with therapists, all by way of videoconference, as part of the reunification process without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Because the order in question did not modify parenting time, we disagree. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW This Court applies " 'three standards of review in custody cases.' " Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer , 259 Mich. App. 499, 507, 675 N.W.2d 847 (2003), quoting Phillips v. Jordan , 241 Mich. App. 17, 20, 614 N.W.2d 183 (2000). "Findings of fact ... are reviewed under the 'great weight of the evidence' standard." Dailey v. Kloenhamer , 291 Mich. App. 660, 664, 811 N.W.2d 501 (2011) (citation omitted). In other words, "a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless they clearly preponderate in the opposite direction." Fletcher v. Fletcher , 447 Mich. 871, 878, 526 N.W.2d 889 (1994) (quotation marks omitted). Meanwhile, "[d]iscretionary rulings ... are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Dailey , 291 Mich. App. at 664, 811 N.W.2d 501. "In child custody cases, an abuse of discretion occurs if the result [is] so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias." Maier v. Maier , 311 Mich. App. 218, 221, 874 N.W.2d 725 (2015), (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). "Lastly, the custody act provides that questions of law are reviewed for 'clear legal error.' " Fletcher , 447 Mich. at 881, 526 N.W.2d 889, quoting MCL 722.28. A trial court commits clear legal error when it "incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the law...." Id . In sum, "in child-custody disputes, 'all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue.' " Dailey , 291 Mich. App. at 664, 811 N.W.2d 501, quoting MCL 722.28. III. ANALYSIS Pursuant to MCL 722.27a(1), "[p]arenting time shall be granted in accordance with the best interests of the child." With regard to the best interests of children, MCL 722.27a(1) requires that this Court presume that it would be "in the best interests of a child for the child to have a strong relationship with both of his or her parents." The right to parenting time, however, is not absolute. See Rozek v. Rozek , 203 Mich. App. 193, 194, 511 N.W.2d 693 (1993). The primary issue presented in this case is whether the trial court's order modified a parenting-time order. If it did, then the trial court made a clear error of law by entering the order without first holding an evidentiary hearing regarding the contested best interests of the children. See Shade v. Wright , 291 Mich. App. 17, 31-32, 805 N.W.2d 1 (2010). We hold that the trial court order was not an order modifying parenting time, and therefore a full evidentiary hearing was not required. It is important to note that the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., provides the trial court with broad power to enter orders in custody and parenting-time disputes. Blaskowski v. Blaskowski , 115 Mich. App. 1, 7-8, 320 N.W.2d 268 (1982) ("The trial court is granted extremely broad powers in custody cases."). Indeed, "[i]f a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court ... the court may ... [t]ake any other action considered to be necessary in a particular child custody dispute." MCL 722.27(1)(e). We conclude that the trial court order did not affect parenting time. We have defined parenting time as "the time a child spends with each parent." Lieberman v. Orr , 319 Mich. App. 68, 80, 900 N.W.2d 130 (2017). Although this is a broad definition, we cannot conclude that the contact ordered between defendant and the children constitutes "parenting time." More precisely, a court-ordered videoconference between defendant, the children, a California therapist, and a Michigan therapist (Cotter) does not constitute the "parenting time" envisioned under the Child Custody Act. This is particularly true because the trial court ordered the therapists, rather than defendant, to direct and control the video conference sessions. According to the court order, the therapists will determine whether there should be further video interaction between defendant and the children beyond the initial videoconference, and the therapist will control the frequency, duration, and method of each continued contact. In fact, either therapist can end further contact after a single session. The videoconferences will last no longer than six months, when the Friend of the Court will make a recommendation to the trial court whether a hearing to change parenting time is warranted. Overall, the trial court's decision did not amount to clear legal error because the order does not affect parenting time and was a proper exercise of the trial court's broad power over the parenting dispute. The trial court's intent to not alter parenting time is clear from the order. The trial court repeatedly and explicitly stated that the order does not modify the last parenting time order, which suspended defendant's parenting-time since 2012. The trial court also held that it would only consider a modification of parenting time after the children and defendant had been involved in family therapy for up to six months. The trial court would then entertain a motion for a change of parenting time only after the Friend of the Court reviewed the matter and submitted a positive recommendation. Only then would the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a change of parenting time is merited. The order was clear to not change parenting time, and we cannot conclude that the trial court committed clear legal error when it entered its order without holding an evidentiary hearing on the contested best interests of the children. Because the order did not modify parenting time, the various procedural requirements necessitated under the Child Custody Act when parenting time is modified are inapplicable in the present case. Instead, the trial court entered the order pursuant to its broad statutory power in custody cases. MCL 722.27(1)(e). Because plaintiff's entire argument on appeal relies on the fact that the order modified parenting time, her appeal is without merit. Additionally, contrary to plaintiff's argument on appeal, the trial court did abide by the most general requirements of due process. "Due process is a flexible concept, the essence of which requires fundamental fairness." Al-Maliki v. LaGrant , 286 Mich. App. 483, 485, 781 N.W.2d 853 (2009). "At a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner." Spranger v. City of Warren , 308 Mich. App. 477, 483, 865 N.W.2d 52 (2014). While plaintiff argues that she was denied her due-process rights when the trial court refused to allow her to present her own evidence, the record reveals that plaintiff had notice of the hearing and was provided with an opportunity to be heard. See id . Indeed, the trial court held a three-day hearing accepting the testimony of Cotter. Much of that hearing consisted of plaintiff's cross-examination of the witness. Although plaintiff's purported evidence was repeatedly ruled inadmissible, plaintiff was still permitted to cross-examine Cotter on the content of that evidence by asking how Cotter dealt with the allegations during therapy. Further, the trial court made clear on the record that it had a copy of, and had considered, the prior psychological evaluation performed in the case. Therefore, because the order appealed was not an order modifying parenting time, the strict procedural requirements of MCL 722.27(1)(c) were not required and the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate principles of due process by entering the order after taking testimony from Cotter. See Al-Maliki , 286 Mich. App. at 485, 781 N.W.2d 853. Indeed, there is no basis to hold that the trial court's decision to have defendant and the children engage in family therapy was "so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidence[d] not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias." Maier , 311 Mich. App. at 221, 874 N.W.2d 725 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court stated in its order that it would not consider a change to parenting time for at least six months, and then only upon a recommendation from the Friend of the Court. If the trial court considers a change to parenting time at that point, it will be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to address plaintiff's concerns and accept additional evidence regarding the best interests of the children. Until then, however, the trial court did not err by entering the order appealed pursuant to its broad statutory power to do so. MCL 722.27(1)(e). Affirmed. Jansen, P.J., and Cavanaugh and Cameron, JJ., concurred. Ludwig v. Ludwig , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 13, 2017 (Docket No. 336938). We acknowledge that plaintiff filed an appeal as of right regarding the identical issue presented herein in Docket No. 336978. This Court previously directed the parties to address whether this Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal as of right pursuant to MCR 7.202(6)(a)(iii ) in their briefs on appeal. Ludwig v. Ludwig , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 6, 2017 (Docket No. 336978) ( O'Connell , J., would have denied the motion for reconsideration). However, because this Court later granted plaintiff's application for leave to appeal the same order, we need not consider whether we now have jurisdiction as of right. See MCR 7.203(B)(1) ("The court may grant leave to appeal from: (1) a judgment or order of the circuit court and court of claims that is not a final judgment appealable of right[.]"); see also In re Investigative Subpoena re Morton Homicide , 258 Mich. App. 507, 508 n. 2, 671 N.W.2d 570 (2003). The oldest child was not subject to the trial court's order because she was over 18 years old and was no longer within the trial court's jurisdiction. The results of plaintiff's psychological evaluation are not in the record.

Per Curiam. These consolidated appeals arise from the same medical malpractice case. In Docket No. 333849, Leana M. Cox (plaintiff), formerly known as Leana M. Taravella, individually and as next friend of Angelina A. Cox (Angelina), a minor, appeals by leave granted a June 6, 2016 opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants Tracey McGregor, R.N., and Port Huron Hospital pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). In Docket No. 333994, plaintiff appeals by leave granted a July 6, 2016 order denying plaintiff's motion for leave to name a new nursing expert and to file an amended affidavit of merit. The appeals were consolidated. Cox v. Hartman , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 20, 2017 (Docket No. 333849); Cox v. Hartman , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 20, 2017 (Docket No. 333994). We affirm in both appeals. This case arises out of alleged malpractice on the part of defendant Eric J. Hartman, M.D., and McGregor, a registered nurse, related to the birth of plaintiff's daughter, Angelina, on April 26, 2010, at Port Huron Hospital. Hartman delivered Angelina, and McGregor assisted in the delivery. Hartman was an owner and employee of defendant Blue Water Obstetrics and Gynecology Professional Corporation, doing business as Blue Water OB GYN, PC (Blue Water). McGregor was an employee of Port Huron Hospital. Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action alleging negligence on the part of Hartman and vicarious liability of Blue Water for Hartman's negligence. Plaintiff also asserted a claim of professional negligence against McGregor. Plaintiff further alleged that Port Huron Hospital was vicariously liable for the negligence of McGregor. After discovery, McGregor and Port Huron Hospital (hereinafter referred to collectively as defendants, given that Hartman and Blue Water are not involved in these appeals) moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). As relevant to these appeals, defendants argued that plaintiff's proposed nursing expert, Claudia A. Beckmann, was not qualified to offer standard-of-care testimony against McGregor pursuant to MCL 600.2169(1) and that defendants were thus entitled to summary disposition with respect to plaintiff's nursing malpractice claim. Defendants argued that, during the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, Beckmann did not devote the majority of her professional time to the active clinical practice or teaching of labor and delivery nursing, or even nursing more generally. Instead, Beckmann devoted the majority of her professional time to instructing students in a nurse practitioner graduate program at Rutgers University. In response to defendants' motion, plaintiff contended that Beckmann was qualified to testify as an expert witness on the standard of care for a registered nurse. Plaintiff argued that Beckmann devoted the majority of her professional time in the year preceding the alleged malpractice to instructing students in the nursing profession. In particular, plaintiff suggested that, by teaching nurse practitioner students, Beckmann was providing instruction in the same profession in which McGregor was licensed. The trial court ultimately agreed with defendants' argument and granted summary disposition to defendants on the nursing malpractice claim. Plaintiff then moved for leave to name a new nursing expert and to amend the affidavit of merit regarding the nursing malpractice claim; the trial court denied plaintiff's motion. These appeals followed. Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred by determining that Beckmann was unqualified to testify as an expert witness concerning the standard of care applicable to McGregor and that the court erred by granting summary disposition to defendants. We disagree. A trial court's ruling regarding the qualification of a proposed expert witness to testify is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Woodard v. Custer , 476 Mich. 545, 557, 719 N.W.2d 842 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Id . This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. Sturgis Bank & Trust Co. v. Hillsdale Community Health Ctr. , 268 Mich. App. 484, 489, 708 N.W.2d 453 (2005). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The first step is to examine the plain language of the statute itself. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, appellate courts presume that the Legislature intended the meaning plainly expressed, and further judicial construction is not permitted. [ McElhaney ex rel. McElhaney v. Harper-Hutzel Hosp. , 269 Mich. App. 488, 493, 711 N.W.2d 795 (2006) (citations omitted).] "When a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls." Haynes v. Neshewat , 477 Mich. 29, 35, 729 N.W.2d 488 (2007). Court rules are interpreted in the same manner as statutes. In re KH , 469 Mich. 621, 628, 677 N.W.2d 800 (2004). If the language of a court rule is unambiguous, it must be enforced as written. Id . A trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Recca , 492 Mich. 169, 173, 821 N.W.2d 520 (2012). In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial. Summary disposition is appropriate if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. [ Bank of America, NA v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. Co. , 316 Mich. App. 480, 488, 892 N.W.2d 467 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] "The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action bears the burden of proving: (1) the applicable standard of care, (2) breach of that standard by defendant, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury. Failure to prove any one of these elements is fatal." Cox ex rel. Cox v. Flint Bd. of Hosp. Managers , 467 Mich. 1, 10, 651 N.W.2d 356 (2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although nurses do not engage in the practice of medicine, the Legislature has made malpractice actions available against any licensed healthcare professional, including nurses. Id . at 19-20, 651 N.W.2d 356, citing MCL 600.5838a ; see also Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 490, 708 N.W.2d 453. In general, expert testimony is necessary in a malpractice action to establish the applicable standard of care and the defendant's breach of that standard. Elher v. Misra , 499 Mich. 11, 21, 878 N.W.2d 790 (2016) ; see also Gay v. Select Specialty Hosp. , 295 Mich. App. 284, 292, 813 N.W.2d 354 (2012) (noting that a plaintiff alleging nursing malpractice was required to present evidence concerning the applicable standard of care and that the plaintiff "could do so only through an expert's testimony"). "The proponent of the evidence has the burden of establishing its relevance and admissibility." Elher , 499 Mich. at 22, 878 N.W.2d 790 ; see also Gay , 295 Mich. App. at 293, 813 N.W.2d 354 (explaining that "the party proposing to call an expert bears the burden to show that his or her expert meets [the requisite statutory] qualifications"). MCL 600.2169(1) provides, in relevant part: (1) In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria: * * * (b) Subject to subdivision (c) [which is not relevant here], during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority of his or her professional time to either or both of the following: (i ) The active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is licensed and, if that party is a specialist, the active clinical practice of that specialty. (ii ) The instruction of students in an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same health profession in which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is licensed and, if that party is a specialist, an accredited health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program in the same specialty. A majority means more than 50%. Kiefer v. Markley , 283 Mich. App. 555, 559, 769 N.W.2d 271 (2009). MCL 600.2169(1)(b)"makes no qualification of its applicability and, therefore, must be considered to apply generally to all malpractice actions, including those initiated against nonphysicians." McElhaney , 269 Mich. App. at 494, 711 N.W.2d 795. Therefore, plaintiff's proposed expert witness on the standard of care, Beckmann, must have devoted a majority of her professional time in the year immediately preceding April 26, 2010, the date of the alleged malpractice, to the active clinical practice of, or the instruction of students in, the same health profession in which McGregor was licensed, i.e., that of a registered nurse. Beckmann's deposition testimony establishes that she devoted a majority of her professional time in the year immediately preceding April 26, 2010, to the practice of, or the instruction of students in, the health profession of a nurse practitioner, which, as explained later in this opinion, is different from the health profession of a registered nurse. According to Beckmann's curriculum vitae, she has, among other degrees, a post-master's certificate as a women's health nurse practitioner. Beckmann testified that, during the relevant period, she was the coordinator of the women's health nurse practitioner graduate program in the college of nursing at Rutgers University; in this position, she instructed nurse practitioner students. The nurse practitioner courses that she taught lasted the entire semester. Beckmann lectured nurse practitioner students in an academic setting and provided clinical training to nurse practitioner students. Beckmann also gave labor and delivery lectures in an undergraduate maternity nursing program, but this lecturing comprised a smaller percentage of her professional time than the time devoted to instructing nurse practitioner students; she spent only about six hours each semester lecturing undergraduate nursing students. Beckmann spent a couple days each semester filling in clinically for faculty members who were teaching a course. The percentage of her professional time lecturing on labor and delivery to undergraduate nursing students and performing hands-on clinical work was less than 50%. It is clear from Beckmann's deposition testimony that, in the year immediately preceding April 26, 2010, she devoted a majority of her professional time to the practice of, or the instruction of students in, the health profession of a nurse practitioner. It is therefore necessary to determine whether a nurse practitioner has the same health profession as a registered nurse. Our Supreme Court has looked to the definition of "health profession" contained in MCL 333.16105(2), a provision of the Public Health Code (PHC), MCL 333.1101 et seq., when interpreting MCL 600.2169(1)(b). See Bates v. Gilbert , 479 Mich. 451, 459, 736 N.W.2d 566 (2007). MCL 333.16105(2) defines a "health profession" as "a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment performed by an individual acting pursuant to a license or registration issued under this article." (Emphasis added.) The PHC defines a "registration" as "an authorization only for the use of a designated title which use would otherwise be prohibited under this article. Registration includes specialty certification of a licensee and a health profession specialty field license." MCL 333.16108(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the statutory definition of "health profession" indicates that a health profession may be determined by reference to a license or a registration, and a registration includes a specialty certification. The PHC defines a "registered professional nurse" or "r.n." as "an individual who is licensed under this part to engage in the practice of nursing which scope of practice includes the teaching, direction, and supervision of less skilled personnel in the performance of delegated nursing activities." MCL 333.17201(e). The "practice of nursing" is defined as the systematic application of substantial specialized knowledge and skill, derived from the biological, physical, and behavioral sciences, to the care, treatment, counsel, and health teaching of individuals who are experiencing changes in the normal health processes or who require assistance in the maintenance of health and the prevention or management of illness, injury, or disability. [ MCL 333.17201(c).] A "certified nurse practitioner" is "an individual who is licensed as a registered professional nurse under part 172 who has been granted a specialty certification as a nurse practitioner by the Michigan board of nursing under section 17210." MCL 333.2701(c). See also Cox , 467 Mich. at 9 n. 10, 651 N.W.2d 356 (noting that a "nurse practitioner" "is a specialized term used in nursing that refers to a registered nurse who receives advanced training and is qualified to undertake some of the duties and responsibilities formerly assumed only by a physician"). MCL 333.17210(1) provides: (1) The Michigan board of nursing may grant a specialty certification to a registered professional nurse who has advanced training beyond that required for initial licensure, who has demonstrated competency through examination or other evaluative processes, and who practices in 1 of the following health profession specialty fields: (a) Nurse midwifery. (b) Nurse anesthetist. (c) Nurse practitioner . (d) Subject to subsection (2) [not relevant here], clinical nurse specialist. [Emphasis added.] At the time of the alleged malpractice, McGregor was practicing the health profession of nursing pursuant to her license as a registered nurse. In the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, Beckmann devoted the majority of her professional time to instructing or practicing in the health profession of a nurse practitioner pursuant to her registration or specialty certification as a nurse practitioner. The health profession of a nurse and the health profession of a nurse practitioner are different, as reflected in the fact that the former is practiced pursuant to a license while the latter is practiced pursuant to a registration or specialty certification. Because Beckmann did not spend the majority of her professional time in the year preceding the alleged malpractice practicing or teaching the health profession of a nurse, as opposed to the health profession of a nurse practitioner, she did not satisfy the statutory criteria to testify concerning the standard of care applicable to McGregor, a registered nurse. Beckmann's testimony was therefore properly excluded. We find support for this reasoning in Woodard . In Hamilton v. Kulgowski , which was a companion case to Woodard , the defendant physician was board-certified in general internal medicine and specialized in general internal medicine. Woodard , 476 Mich. at 556, 719 N.W.2d 842. The plaintiff's proposed expert witness was board-certified in general internal medicine but devoted a majority of his professional time to the treatment of infectious diseases, which is a subspecialty of internal medicine. Id . The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the defendant physician, reasoning that the plaintiff's proposed expert witness was not qualified given that he specialized in infectious diseases and did not devote a majority of his professional time to practicing or teaching general internal medicine. Id . Our Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly granted a directed verdict to the defendant physician. Id . at 579, 719 N.W.2d 842. Our Supreme Court explained: The defendant physician specializes in general internal medicine and was practicing general internal medicine at the time of the alleged malpractice. During the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, plaintiff's proposed expert witness did not devote a majority of his time to practicing or teaching general internal medicine. Instead, he devoted a majority of his professional time to treating infectious diseases. As he himself acknowledged, he is "not sure what the average internist sees day in and day out." Therefore, plaintiff's proposed expert witness does not satisfy the same practice/instruction requirement of § 2169(1)(b). For this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that plaintiff's proposed expert witness is not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of practice or care under § 2169(1). Because plaintiff failed to present an expert qualified under § 2169(1) to testify with regard to the appropriate standard of practice or care, the trial court properly granted a directed verdict in favor of defendant. [ Id . at 577-578, 719 N.W.2d 842.] We find this reasoning in Woodard applicable in the analogous context of nursing and supportive of our analysis. Given that Beckmann did not spend a majority of her professional time in the relevant time period practicing or teaching the health profession of nursing, she was not qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care under MCL 600.2169(1)(b). "On a motion for summary disposition, the existence of a disputed fact may only be established by admissible evidence." McElhaney , 269 Mich. App. at 497, 711 N.W.2d 795. Beckmann's testimony was not admissible to establish the standard of care applicable to McGregor, plaintiff presented no other expert witnesses concerning the standard of care applicable to McGregor, and plaintiff thus failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the applicable standard of care and the breach of that standard. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendants. See id . at 497-498, 711 N.W.2d 795 (holding that when the testimony of the plaintiff's proposed expert witness was not admissible under MCL 600.2169(1)(b) to establish the standard of care, the defendant was entitled to summary disposition because the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the standard of care and the breach of that standard). Plaintiff argues that, in its opinion and order granting summary disposition to defendants, the trial court violated MCR 7.215(C)(1) by citing and relying on an unpublished opinion for a proposition of law for which there was published authority, i.e., Sturgis and McElhaney . We disagree. MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides: An unpublished opinion is not precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis. Unpublished opinions should not be cited for propositions of law for which there is published authority. If a party cites an unpublished opinion, the party shall explain the reason for citing it and how it is relevant to the issues presented. A party who cites an unpublished opinion must provide a copy of the opinion to the court and to opposing parties with the brief or other paper in which the citation appears. Although MCR 7.215(C)(1) provides that unpublished opinions are not binding under the rule of stare decisis, a court may nonetheless consider such opinions for their instructive or persuasive value. Paris Meadows, LLC v. City of Kentwood , 287 Mich. App. 136, 145 n. 3, 783 N.W.2d 133 (2010). MCR 7.215(C)(1) requires a party to explain the reason for citing an unpublished opinion and how it is relevant to the issues presented, but the court rule does not impose this requirement on a trial court. In any event, the trial court more than adequately explained why it was citing an unpublished opinion. The trial court stated, "Although unpublished, because of the nearly identical factual situation; the straightforward, logical analysis that takes every word of MCL 600.2169(1)(b) into account; and the reliance on a rational interpretation of binding precedent, this Court finds the analysis, reasoning, and holding in [the unpublished opinion cited by the trial court] to be extremely persuasive." Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's argument, there is no published authority addressing the precise issue presented in this case. Plaintiff's reliance on Sturgis and McElhaney is misplaced. In Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 486-487, 708 N.W.2d 453, the plaintiff sued the defendant-hospital for the alleged negligence of its nursing staff. Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d(1), the plaintiff attached to its complaint affidavits of merit from a registered nurse and a nurse practitioner. Id . at 487, 708 N.W.2d 453. The defendant agreed that the nurse and the nurse practitioner who signed the affidavits of merit were employed in the same health profession as the nurses who allegedly committed the malpractice but argued that the proposed experts were not qualified to aver with respect to the proximate cause of the injury. Id . This Court held that the affidavits were sufficient. Id . at 489, 708 N.W.2d 453. This Court stated that MCL 600.2169(1)"only requires that the affiants, the nurse and the nurse practitioner, practice or teach in the same health profession as those who committed the alleged malpractice, i.e., defendant's nurses. Either the nurse's affidavit or the nurse practitioner's affidavit sufficed." Id . at 492, 708 N.W.2d 453. This Court found support for its decision in Grossman v. Brown , 470 Mich. 593, 685 N.W.2d 198 (2004), in which "our Supreme Court noted the need for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to obtain a medical expert at two different stages of the litigation, i.e., at the time the complaint is filed and at the time of trial, [and] recognized the differing features of [ MCL 600.2912d(1) (governing affidavits of merit) ] and [ MCL 600.2169 (governing testimony at trial) ]" Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 493-494, 708 N.W.2d 453. At the affidavit-of-merit stage, the plaintiff's attorney need only hold a reasonable belief that the expert signing the affidavit of merit satisfies the requirements for an expert witness under MCL 600.2169. See Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 490-491, 708 N.W.2d 453, citing MCL 600.2912d(1). The Sturgis Court quoted the following language from Grossman : "The Legislature's rationale for this disparity is, without doubt, traceable to the fact that until a civil action is underway, no discovery is available. See MCR 2.302(A)(1). Thus, the Legislature apparently chose to recognize that at the first stage, in which the lawsuit is about to be filed, the plaintiff's attorney only has available publicly accessible resources to determine the defendant's board certifications and specialization. At this stage, the plaintiff's attorney need only have a reasonable belief that the expert satisfies the requirements of MCL 600.2169. See MCL 600.2912d(1). However, by the time the plaintiff's expert witness testifies at trial, the plaintiff's attorney has had the benefit of discovery to better ascertain the qualifications of the defendant's physician, and, thus, the plaintiff's attorney's reasonable belief regarding the requirements of MCL 600.2169 does not control whether the expert may testify." [ Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 494, 708 N.W.2d 453, quoting Grossman , 470 Mich. at 599, 685 N.W.2d 198.] The Sturgis Court also quoted language from Grossman noting that what satisfies the statutory standard at the affidavit-of-merit stage might not satisfy the requirements for admission of expert testimony at trial. Sturgis , 268 Mich. App. at 494, 708 N.W.2d 453, citing Grossman , 470 Mich. at 600, 685 N.W.2d 198. See also Jones v. Botsford Continuing Care Corp. , 310 Mich. App. 192, 199-201, 871 N.W.2d 15 (2015) (discussing the differing statutory standards governing, respectively, the admission of an expert's standard-of-care testimony at trial and the adequacy of an expert's affidavit of merit). Sturgis is therefore distinguishable from the present case in numerous respects. The dispute in Sturgis concerned whether the proposed experts were qualified at the affidavit-of-merit stage to aver with respect to proximate cause , whereas the present case concerns the admissibility of the proposed expert's testimony at trial concerning the standard of care . As explained earlier, the standard at the affidavit-of-merit stage is more lenient than the standard for admissibility of expert testimony at trial. Further, the defendant in Sturgis conceded that the nurse and the nurse practitioner who signed the affidavits of merit were employed in the same health profession as the nurses who allegedly committed the malpractice, and this Court had no occasion to examine the validity of that concession. Most importantly, plaintiff fails to recognize that it is not the mere fact that Beckmann is a nurse practitioner that precludes her testimony in this case; it is the fact that she did not devote a majority of her professional time to the practice or instruction of the health profession of nursing that renders her unqualified. Given that a nurse practitioner is licensed as a registered nurse but possesses an additional specialty certification as a nurse practitioner, it is possible that a nurse practitioner could qualify to testify regarding the standard of care against a registered nurse if the nurse practitioner devoted a majority of her professional time to instructing or practicing in the health profession of nursing during the relevant period. Therefore, plaintiff's argument that Sturgis controls this case is unavailing. Plaintiff's reliance on McElhaney is likewise misplaced. In McElhaney , 269 Mich. App. at 496, 711 N.W.2d 795, this Court held that the plaintiff's proposed expert witnesses, who were obstetricians and gynecologists, were not qualified under MCL 600.2169(1)(b) to testify regarding the standard of care applicable to a nurse midwife. This Court concluded that "because nurse midwives are separately licensed professionals who practice nursing with specialty certification in the practice of nurse midwifery, obstetricians/gynecologists may not testify about their standard of practice or care." Id . at 497, 711 N.W.2d 795. We find nothing in McElhaney that addresses the precise issue presented here, i.e., whether a nurse practitioner who spends the majority of her time practicing or teaching pursuant to her specialty certification as a nurse practitioner is engaged in the same health profession as a registered nurse who practices pursuant to her license as a registered nurse. Further, plaintiff's citation of a Georgia case, Dempsey v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., Inc. , 330 Ga. App. 469, 765 S.E.2d 525 (2014), is unavailing. This Court is not bound by the decisions of the courts of other states, although such decisions may be considered as persuasive. K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Environmental Quality , 267 Mich. App. 523, 559 n. 38, 705 N.W.2d 365 (2005). In Dempsey , a Georgia appellate court determined that a nurse midwife was qualified under Georgia statutes to testify as an expert against registered nurses because the nurse midwife was a member of the same profession as the registered nurses. Dempsey , 330 Ga. App. at 469-474, 765 S.E.2d 525. Because the present case turns on the interpretation of Michigan statutes rather than the Georgia statutes at issue in Dempsey , we do not find Dempsey to be persuasive. We also note that in Jones , 310 Mich. App. at 203-204, 871 N.W.2d 15, this Court stated that the plaintiff's counsel could have reasonably believed at the affidavit-of-merit stage that a registered nurse was qualified to offer standard-of-care testimony against a licensed practical nurse, which this Court noted is a health profession subfield of the practice of nursing. This Court declined to decide, however, whether a registered nurse could ultimately offer standard of care testimony against a licensed practical nurse at trial. Id . at 203, 871 N.W.2d 15. Moreover, this Court emphasized that neither a registered nurse nor a licensed practical nurse has any specialty training. Id . at 205, 871 N.W.2d 15. This Court explained, "Unlike a nurse midwife or a nurse practitioner, neither [a registered nurse] nor [a licensed practical nurse] is within a 'health profession specialty field.' MCL 333.16105(3)." Id . at 205 n. 5, 871 N.W.2d 15. Hence, the reasoning in Jones is not inconsistent with our analysis. Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to add an expert witness. We disagree. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision whether to allow a party to add an expert witness. Tisbury v. Armstrong , 194 Mich. App. 19, 20, 486 N.W.2d 51 (1992). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes. Woodard , 476 Mich. at 557, 719 N.W.2d 842. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff's motion to add an expert witness was untimely. We disagree. Plaintiff did not move to add a new expert until June 10, 2016, which was four days after the trial court had entered its June 6, 2016 order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. In an analogous context, this Court has held that a motion to amend a complaint was untimely when the motion was filed after summary disposition had already been granted to the defendant. See Wormsbacher v. Phillip R. Seaver Title Co., Inc. , 284 Mich. App. 1, 9-10, 772 N.W.2d 827 (2009), citing Amburgey v. Sauder , 238 Mich. App. 228, 247-248, 605 N.W.2d 84 (1999). In this case, plaintiff could have sought to add a new expert witness much earlier because plaintiff was on notice that there was at least a question concerning Beckmann's qualification to testify. At Beckmann's deposition in August 2015, it became clear that Beckmann devoted a majority of her professional time in the year preceding the alleged malpractice to instructing or practicing as a nurse practitioner rather than a registered nurse. In November 2015, defendants moved for summary disposition on the basis of Beckmann's lack of qualification to testify; by this point, plaintiff was plainly on notice that Beckmann's qualification as an expert witness was in question. Although the trial court initially ruled in plaintiff's favor on the summary disposition issue on February 2, 2016, the trial court granted reconsideration of its decision on March 31, 2016, allowing the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue. Hence, plaintiff's suggestion that she could not have known that she needed to obtain an expert other than Beckmann until the trial court actually granted summary disposition on June 6, 2016, lacks merit. In opposing defendant's motion for summary disposition, plaintiff chose to rely entirely on Beckmann as an expert rather than seek to add another expert at that time; this was plaintiff's choice. The trial court then granted summary disposition to defendants because Beckmann was unqualified and plaintiff had presented no other expert to testify concerning the standard of care. The trial court did not err by concluding that plaintiff's motion was untimely. Plaintiff argues that MCR 2.604(A) granted the trial court authority to revise the order granting summary disposition because a final judgment had not yet been entered (given that plaintiff still had claims pending against Hartman and Blue Water). MCR 2.604(A) states, in pertinent part: Except as provided in subrule (B) [not applicable here], an order or other form of decision adjudicating fewer than all the claims, or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties, does not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order is subject to revision before entry of final judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Plaintiff's argument lacks merit. The trial court did not state that it lacked authority to revise the order granting summary disposition to defendants. Instead, the trial court ruled that plaintiff's motion to add a new expert witness was untimely. To the extent that plaintiff fails to address the basis of the trial court's decision, plaintiff has abandoned her argument on this issue. See AK Steel Holding Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 314 Mich. App. 453, 474 n. 10, 887 N.W.2d 209 (2016). MCR 2.604(A) does not require a trial court to consider an untimely motion. Also, plaintiff's motion sought to add a new expert witness, not to revise an order (although plaintiff presumably would have sought to set aside the order granting summary disposition if her motion to add a new expert witness had been granted). Plaintiff's reliance on MCR 2.604(A) is thus misplaced. In any event, the trial court's decision was not premised solely on the untimeliness of the motion. After concluding that the motion was untimely, the trial court went on to state that even if the motion was properly before the court, the court would deny the motion given the prejudice to defendants. The trial court's decision fell within the range of principled outcomes. MCR 2.401(I)(1) provides that parties must file and serve witness lists no later than the time directed by the trial court. "The court may order that any witness not listed in accordance with this rule will be prohibited from testifying at trial except upon good cause shown." MCR 2.401(I)(2). The trial court's scheduling order required plaintiff to file and serve her witness lists by March 6, 2015. Hence, plaintiff's June 10, 2016 motion to add a new expert witness was filed more than one year and three months after the due date for filing and serving witness lists. It was thus plaintiff's burden to demonstrate good cause for the late addition of a new expert witness. The denial of a late motion to add a witness "is proper where the movant fails to provide an adequate explanation and show that diligent efforts were made to secure the presence of the witness." Tisbury , 194 Mich. App. at 20, 486 N.W.2d 51. A court should consider whether prejudice would result from granting a motion to add an expert witness. Id . at 21, 486 N.W.2d 51 ; Levinson v. Sklar , 181 Mich. App. 693, 698-699, 449 N.W.2d 682 (1989). As the trial court noted, plaintiff did not act diligently in pursuing this case. At one point in the case, the trial court had to enter an order requiring plaintiff's counsel to specify in writing whether plaintiff would use various listed experts, including Beckmann, and compelling plaintiff's counsel to cooperate in scheduling the depositions of expert witnesses. Plaintiff notes that she did not file a written response opposing defendants' motion to compel, that Beckmann's deposition was scheduled by the parties before the court entered its order on the motion to compel, and that the order granting the motion to compel resulted from an agreement of the parties, but it appears this agreement was reached only after the parties' attorneys came to court for the hearing on the motion to compel. Further, as discussed earlier, plaintiff's motion to add an expert witness was not filed until after the trial court had already granted summary disposition to defendants, even though plaintiff's counsel was on notice much earlier that Beckmann's qualification as an expert witness was at the very least in dispute. Even on the date of the hearing on plaintiff's motion to add a new expert witness, plaintiff's counsel still had not retained a new expert witness and had not provided any notice of the identity of any new expert witness to defendants, despite the fact that trial was scheduled to occur on September 7, 2016, which was less than three months away at the time of the motion hearing. The case had been pending for one year and 10 months by the time plaintiff filed the motion to add a new expert witness. Given the lateness of plaintiff's motion, the trial court reasonably concluded that defendants would be prejudiced in preparing for trial if the motion was granted. Overall, the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to add a new expert witness fell within the range of principled outcomes. Plaintiff also contends that she should be permitted to file an "amended" affidavit of merit signed by a new expert witness pursuant to MCR 2.112(L)(2)(b), which provides: [A]ll challenges to an affidavit of merit or affidavit of meritorious defense, including challenges to the qualifications of the signer, must be made by motion, filed pursuant to MCR 2.119, within 63 days of service of the affidavit on the opposing party. An affidavit of merit or meritorious defense may be amended in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in MCR 2.118 and MCL 600.2301. Plaintiff fails to explain how an affidavit of merit signed by a new expert witness, i.e., a different affiant than Beckmann, who had signed the prior affidavit of merit, would constitute an "amended" affidavit of merit under MCR 2.112(L)(2)(b). See Jones , 310 Mich. App. at 224, 871 N.W.2d 15 ( DONOFRIO , P. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning "whether plaintiff's current desire to substitute the prior affidavits of merit with entirely new ones signed by different affiants qualifies as amending the prior affidavits"). In any event, summary disposition was not granted to defendants on the basis of any deficiencies in the affidavit of merit; instead, summary disposition was granted because plaintiff failed to present a standard-of-care expert who was qualified to testify at trial. Therefore, amendment of the affidavit of merit would not affect or undermine the rationale or basis on which summary disposition was granted to defendants, nor would it alter the fact that, for the reasons explained earlier, the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to add a new expert witness to testify at trial fell within the range of principled outcomes. Affirmed. Jansen, P.J., and Cavanaugh and Cameron, JJ., concurred. See Cox v. Hartman , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 20, 2017 (Docket No. 333849). See Cox v. Hartman , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 20, 2017 (Docket No. 333994). Plaintiff asserted additional claims that are not relevant to these appeals. An exception to the requirement of expert testimony "exists when the professional's breach of the standard of care is so obvious that it is within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layperson." Elher , 499 Mich. at 21-22, 878 N.W.2d 790. Plaintiff does not argue that this exception applies, nor do we discern any basis to conclude that plaintiff's allegations of nursing malpractice fall within the common knowledge and experience of an ordinary layperson. In his initial questioning of Beckmann, defense counsel mistakenly asked about the period of April 2008 to April 2009 rather than the period of April 2009 to April 2010, but defense counsel noted his mistake later in the deposition, and Beckmann then confirmed that all of her answers to the questions concerning how she spent her professional time during the period of April 2008 to April 2009 would be identical for the period of April 2009 to April 2010. In an affidavit appended to plaintiff's response to defendants' motion for summary disposition, Beckmann asserted in conclusory terms that she devoted more than 50% of her time in the year preceding April 26, 2010, to the instruction of students in the health profession of nursing. "However, a witness is bound by his or her deposition testimony, and that testimony cannot be contradicted by affidavit in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary disposition." Casey v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 273 Mich. App. 388, 396, 729 N.W.2d 277 (2006). As discussed, Beckmann's deposition testimony established that she spent a majority of her professional time during the relevant period practicing or instructing as a nurse practitioner, and as explained later, the health profession of a registered nurse is different from the health profession of a nurse practitioner. Therefore, despite the conclusory assertions in Beckmann's affidavit, this Court is required to accept as binding Beckmann's deposition testimony. Id .

Per Curiam. Defendant, Danny D. Verbrugge, appeals as of right the trial court's order denying his motion for a de novo review of his motion seeking custody of his daughter, LV. For the reasons stated below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS LV was born to defendant and plaintiff, Natassia T. Sims, on October 15, 2012. The parties were unmarried, but on the day of LV's birth, the parties signed an affidavit of parentage (AOP) indicating that defendant was LV's biological father. The parties subsequently ended their relationship but were able to make arrangements for defendant to visit LV without judicial involvement. In April 2013, the Kent County Prosecuting Attorney filed a complaint for support, seeking an order requiring defendant to pay child support. The trial court eventually entered a default judgment against defendant, ordering him to pay child support and stating that plaintiff had physical custody of LV. The parties resided a short distance from one another until May 2015, when plaintiff and LV moved an hour's drive away. Defendant later moved in the trial court to enter an order regarding parenting time, alleging that since the move, he had been unable to see LV as frequently as when the parties had lived closer to one another. The trial court entered an order providing a parenting-time schedule and, in August 2015, the parties stipulated another arrangement. In November 2016, plaintiff notified defendant that she intended to sell her Michigan home and move to Colorado with LV. In response, defendant filed a motion seeking joint legal custody and primary or joint physical custody, alleging that this would be in LV's best interests. According to the referee, pursuant to MCL 722.1 and MCL 722.2, plaintiff had legal custody of LV as the mother of an illegitimate child. Defendant sought de novo review of this ruling pursuant to MCR 3.215(E)(4). The trial court agreed with the referee's conclusion and denied defendant's motion, holding that plaintiff had sole legal custody of LV and that defendant had not fulfilled his statutory burden under MCL 722.27(1)(c) to seek a modification or amendment of the custody order. II. ANALYSIS Defendant now appeals, arguing that plaintiff did not have sole legal custody of LV because the execution of the AOP gave the parties joint legal custody. We disagree that the parties had joint legal custody by executing the AOP but hold that defendant is entitled to a hearing upon remand for a determination as to legal custody. When this Court reviews matters concerning child custody, it reviews the trial court's findings of fact under the great weight of the evidence standard, which requires that a trial court's findings of fact "be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction." Thompson v. Thompson , 261 Mich. App. 353, 358, 683 N.W.2d 250 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, this Court reviews the trial court's discretionary rulings for an abuse of discretion and questions of law for clear legal error. Id. When interpreting statutes, this Court's fundamental "obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute." Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc. , 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). If the statute's language is unambiguous, judicial construction is not permitted. Shinholster v. Annapolis Hosp. , 471 Mich. 540, 549, 685 N.W.2d 275 (2004). Further, this Court "must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." Koontz , 466 Mich. at 312, 645 N.W.2d 34. This Court must also read the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., the Paternity Act, MCL 722.711 et seq., and the Child Custody Act, MCL 722.21 et seq., in pari materia , construing them together and interpreting their provisions so that they do not conflict. Sinicropi v. Mazurek , 273 Mich. App. 149, 156-157, 729 N.W.2d 256 (2006). The Acknowledgment of Parentage Act provides that a man can be considered the father of a child born out of wedlock as follows: If a child is born out of wedlock, a man is considered to be the natural father of that child if the man joins with the mother of the child and acknowledges that child as his child by completing a form that is an acknowledgment of parentage. [ MCL 722.1003(1).] Once the parties complete such an act, the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act provides as follows: An acknowledgment signed under this act establishes paternity, and the acknowledgment may be the basis for court ordered child support, custody, or parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity act, Act No. 205 of the Public Acts of 1956, being sections 722.711 to 722.730 of the Michigan Compiled Laws. The child who is the subject of the acknowledgment shall bear the same relationship to the mother and the man signing as the father as a child born or conceived during a marriage and shall have the identical status, rights, and duties of a child born in lawful wedlock effective from birth. [ MCL 722.1004.] Further, "[a]lthough MCL 722.1004 affords the child the full rights of a child born in wedlock, the statute does not grant a putative father who acknowledges paternity the same legal rights as a father whose child is born in wedlock." Eldred v. Ziny , 246 Mich. App. 142, 149, 631 N.W.2d 748 (2001). Insofar as custody is concerned, MCL 722.1006 provides as follows: After a mother and father sign an acknowledgment of parentage, the mother has initial custody of the minor child, without prejudice to the determination of either parent's custodial rights, until otherwise determined by the court or otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing and acknowledged by the court. This grant of initial custody to the mother shall not, by itself, affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding to seek a court order for custody or parenting time. As described by our Supreme Court, this portion of the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act "effectively conditions the parents' ability to execute an AOP on their willingness to allow the mother to be granted 'initial custody of the minor child ....' " Foster v. Wolkowitz , 486 Mich. 356, 366, 785 N.W.2d 59 (2010), quoting MCL 722.1006. The "initial custody" enjoyed by a mother includes legal custody. See Ziny , 246 Mich. App. at 144, 146-147, 631 N.W.2d 748 (explaining that "pursuant to the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, the mother ... had legal custody of [the child]" because the natural parents had signed an AOP). In Foster , 486 Mich. at 366, 785 N.W.2d 59, the Court specified that, although the mother receives initial custody of the child through the execution of an AOP, this initial custody is not a judicial determination. The Court reasoned that "[e]quating an AOP to a judicial determination would necessarily be prejudicial to the father" because, if this was the case, the child would have an established custodial environment and, as a result, the father would face a heightened standard of scrutiny when seeking custody of the child. Id. at 366 n. 19, 785 N.W.2d 59. This would be in direct conflict with the MCL 722.1006 statement that the grant of initial custody "shall not, by itself, affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding to seek a court order for custody or parenting time." Id. at 366, 785 N.W.2d 59 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). While the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act "establishes paternity, establishes the rights of the child, and supplies a basis for court ordered child support, custody, or parenting time without further adjudication under the paternity act," the Child Custody Act, provides "the exclusive means of pursuing child custody rights." Ziny , 246 Mich. App. at 148, 631 N.W.2d 748 (quotation marks and citation omitted). MCL 722.27(1) of the Child Custody Act provides, in pertinent part, that the trial court may resolve custody disputes as follows: If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following: (a) Award the custody of the child to 1 or more of the parties involved or to others and provide for payment of support for the child, until the child reaches 18 years of age. Subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605b, the court may also order support as provided in this section for a child after he or she reaches 18 years of age. The court may require that support payments shall be made through the friend of the court, court clerk, or state disbursement unit. (b) Provide for reasonable parenting time of the child by the parties involved, by the maternal or paternal grandparents, or by others, by general or specific terms and conditions. Parenting time of the child by the parents is governed by section 7a. (c) Subject to subsection (3), modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age and, subject to section 5b of the support and parenting time enforcement act, 1982 PA 295, MCL 552.605b, until the child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. If a motion for change of custody is filed while a parent is active duty, the court shall not consider a parent's absence due to that active duty status in a best interest of the child determination. To demonstrate proper cause to modify or amend a previous order, a movant must demonstrate that "one or more appropriate grounds that have or could have a significant effect on the child's life to the extent that a reevaluation of the child's custodial situation should be undertaken." Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer , 259 Mich. App. 499, 511, 675 N.W.2d 847 (2003). While "[t]here is no hard or fast rule" as to what grounds could fulfill this requirement, the trial court may rely on the best-interest factors enumerated in MCL 722.23 to aid in this determination. Id. at 511-512, 675 N.W.2d 847. Similarly, to demonstrate a change in circumstances sufficient to justify the modification or amendment of a previous order, a movant must demonstrate that "since the entry of the last custody order, the conditions surrounding custody of the child, which have or could have a significant effect on the child's well-being, have materially changed." Id. at 513, 675 N.W.2d 847. Once the trial court has found by a preponderance of the evidence that proper cause or a sufficient change in circumstances exists, the trial court may then engage in a best-interest determination. Id. at 512, 675 N.W.2d 847. When the movant seeks to change the child's custodial environment, the best-interest determination must be based on clear and convincing evidence. MCL 722.27(1)(c). In the present case, the parties executed an AOP on October 15, 2012-the day LV was born-that properly identified defendant as LV's father. By operation of the Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, upon execution of the AOP, plaintiff automatically received initial legal and physical custody of LV. See MCL 722.1006 ; Ziny , 246 Mich. App. at 146-147, 631 N.W.2d 748. Later, the trial court ordered defendant to pay child support and ruled that plaintiff had sole physical custody of LV. Although the trial court's order was silent as to legal custody, plaintiff retained initial legal custody of LV until challenged. To the extent that defendant challenged the physical custody of LV, the trial court had already entered an order regarding her physical custody, and the trial court properly required defendant to demonstrate proper cause or a change in circumstances to justify a hearing. See MCL 722.27(1)(c). However, the trial court erred by requiring defendant to demonstrate proper cause or a change in circumstances when he moved for a change in LV's legal custody. A person is only required to demonstrate proper cause or a change in circumstances when that person seeks to "modify or amend [the trial court's] previous judgments or orders." MCL 722.27(1)(c). Here, however, there was no previous judgment or order concerning legal custody, for although plaintiff enjoyed initial legal custody of LV, it was granted by operation of law, not a judicial determination. See Foster , 486 Mich. at 366, 785 N.W.2d 59. Courts cannot treat the legal custody granted by signing an AOP the same as a judicial determination because, as stated earlier, MCL 722.1006 provides that the grant of initial custody through the execution of an AOP "shall not, by itself, affect the rights of either parent in a proceeding to seek a court order for custody or parenting time." Because the parties' AOP was not a judicial determination, no existing judgment or order regarding legal custody existed. See Foster , 486 Mich. at 366 n. 19, 785 N.W.2d 59 ; MCL 722.1006. Accordingly, by requiring defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence proper cause or a change in circumstances-the standard required to modify or amend an existing judgment or order-the trial court erred, imposing a higher burden on defendant in violation of MCL 722.1006. To the extent that the trial court reasoned that under MCL 722.1 and MCL 722.2 plaintiff had sole legal custody of LV as a result of LV being an illegitimate child, we note that this interpretation is at odds with the MCL 722.1004 mandate that a child who is the subject of an AOP is treated as a child born in wedlock and not as illegitimate. See Sinicropi , 273 Mich. App. at 156-157, 729 N.W.2d 256 (providing that we must interpret statutes regarding the same subject matter harmoniously). Moreover, this Court is bound to follow the opinions of our Supreme Court, see State Treasurer v. Sprague , 284 Mich. App. 235, 242, 772 N.W.2d 452 (2009), not the unpublished opinion of this Court that defendant cited. Accordingly, the Court's discussion in Foster concerning AOPs and initial custody determinations is controlling. The trial court erred by subjecting defendant's motion for legal custody to the standards of MCL 722.27(1)(c). We reverse the portion of the trial court's order regarding legal custody and remand. Upon remand, the trial court should consider whether defendant is entitled to legal custody of LV. This evaluation should be treated as an initial evaluation of custody without a prior existing order. Regarding LV's physical custody, however, a previous order existed, and the trial court did not err by requiring defendant to demonstrate proper cause or a change in circumstances to justify reconsideration of the order. On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff's indication that she may move to Colorado and the listing of her house for sale constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to satisfy MCL 722.27(1)(c). This argument rests completely on contingent future events, not a change in circumstances that already occurred. Therefore, the trial court did not err by choosing not to hear defendant's argument as to a change in physical custody, and we affirm this portion of the trial court's ruling. See MCL 722.27(1)(c) ; Vodvarka , 259 Mich. App. at 511-512, 675 N.W.2d 847. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. No costs to either party, neither having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219(A). Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ., concurred. MCL 722.1 provides as follows: As used in this act: (a) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years. (b) "Parents" means natural parents, if married prior or subsequent to the minor's birth; adopting parents, if the minor has been legally adopted; or the mother, if the minor is illegitimate. (c) "Emancipation" means termination of the rights of the parents to the custody, control, services and earnings of a minor. MCL 722.2 provides as follows: Unless otherwise ordered by a court order, the parents of an unemancipated minor are equally entitled to the custody, control, services and earnings of the minor, but if 1 parent provides, to the exclusion of the other parent, for the maintenance and support of the minor, that parent has the paramount right to control the services and earnings of the minor. A child born out of wedlock is "a child begotten and born to a woman who was not married from the conception to the date of the birth of the child, or a child that the court has determined to be a child born or conceived during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage." MCL 722.711(a). We further note that plaintiff has since filed a motion in the trial court seeking to change her domicile, apparently having solidified her plans to move to Colorado. Because such a move is now imminent and no longer contingent, it undoubtedly constitutes a change of circumstances under MCL 722.27(1)(c), and defendant will have the opportunity to have the trial court reevaluate physical custody in the trial court. See Vodvarka , 259 Mich. App. at 513, 675 N.W.2d 847 (stating that a change of circumstances exists when the change in circumstances could have a significant effect on the child's well-being).

Per Curiam. Defendant, Crystal Automation Systems, Inc., a provider of phone and internet services to residents living in and around plaintiff, the village of Edmore, a Michigan municipal corporation in Montcalm County, appeals as of right the trial court's Order for Entry of Default Judgment, Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside Default and Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment. Defendant contends that the trial court committed error requiring reversal when it entered a default judgment against defendant, refused to set aside an improperly entered default, and granted plaintiff partial summary disposition on the basis of an incorrectly construed and interpreted lease agreement (the Lease) between the parties. We agree and reverse each of the trial court's orders and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Since April 2003, defendant has rented space on and near plaintiff's water tower for its antennas and equipment. During 2015, plaintiff contracted with Utility Service Co., Inc. (USC) to repaint and maintain its water tower. USC told plaintiff that before USC commenced the work, all tenants of the water tower had to remove their equipment. For that reason, plaintiff ordered defendant to remove all of its equipment on and from around the water tower and threatened defendant that if it did not do so, plaintiff would remove the equipment and charge defendant for doing so. Defendant objected to plaintiff's demand on the ground that the Lease did not permit plaintiff to order defendant to vacate the premises. Defendant also advised plaintiff that if plaintiff removed the equipment, local residents' phone, 911, and Internet services would be interrupted in violation of the law. Shortly after receiving defendant's objection, plaintiff informed defendant that it would delay the project until spring of 2016. During the interim period, defendant attempted to work out an alternative arrangement with plaintiff that would allow defendant to provide its customers with uninterrupted services while plaintiff repainted the water tower. Plaintiff's manager represented to defendant that it could erect a new tower on a different piece of property owned by plaintiff, but plaintiff ultimately decided it did not want to provide that option to defendant. Defendant also offered to move its equipment to allow USC to work around it, but plaintiff refused that offer. Then, on March 3, 2016, plaintiff's counsel ordered defendant to remove its equipment from on and around the water tower by May 1, 2016. Plaintiff sued defendant on March 18, 2016, alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief to force defendant to remove its equipment and to terminate the Lease. The Lease signed by the parties granted defendant an initial five-year term with three additional automatically renewable five-year terms unless defendant notified plaintiff before the end of the initial term of its intent not to extend the Lease. The Lease also granted defendant the right to terminate the agreement upon 30 days' notice in specified circumstances, but the Lease did not give plaintiff the right to terminate the contract. The Lease also contained the following provisions: 7. Maintenance: * * * D. In the event the Landlord or any other Tenant undertakes painting, construction or other alterations on the premises, Tenant shall take reasonable measures as [sic] Tenant's cost to cover Tenant's equipment, personal property or antenna facilities and protect such from paint and debris fallout which may occur during painting, construction or alteration process. * * * 10. Interference: Tenant's installation, operation, and maintenance of its transmission facilities shall not damage or interfere in any way with the Landlord's water tower operations or related repair and maintenance activities or with such activities of other Tenants of the water tower. Landlord, at all times during this Lease, reserves the right to take any action it deems necessary, in its sole discretion, to repair, to maintain, alter or improve the premises in connection with the tower operations as may be necessary, including leasing parts of the water tower and surrounding ground space to others. * * * 12. Indemnity: * * * B. Tenant's Indemnification: Any and all liability, obligation, damages, penalties, claims, liens, costs, charges, losses and expenses (including, without limitation, reasonable fees and expenses of attorney's [sic], expert witnesses and consultants), which may be imposed upon, incurred by or be asserted against the Landlord, its agents or employees, by reason of any act or omission of Tenant, its personnel, employees, agents, contractors or subcontractors, resulting in personal injury, bodily, [sic] injury, sickness, disease or death to any person or damage to, loss of or destruction of tangible or intangible property, copyright, patent, service mark or any other right of way [sic] person, firm, or corporation, which may arise out of or be in any way connected with the construction, installation, operation, maintenance, use or condition of the premises or Tenant's antenna facilities or the Tenant's failure to comply with any federal, state or local stature [sic], ordinance or regulation. On March 22, 2016, plaintiff served its complaint on defendant along with an ex parte motion for a preliminary injunction, which sought an order that defendant vacate the water tower. Without delay, on March 23, 2016, defendant opposed plaintiff's motion by arguing that the Lease did not grant plaintiff the right to evict defendant from the water tower. Plaintiff filed a reply in which it requested that the trial court order defendant to remove its equipment by May 1, 2016, or allow plaintiff to do so at defendant's expense, and enter judgment against defendant. The parties appeared the next day for a hearing, and a conference was held off the record where it was agreed that, rather than having the trial court hear and decide the motion for injunctive relief, plaintiff would file a motion for partial summary disposition, defendant would respond, and the trial court would hear the motion, all on an expedited basis so that the hearing on the motion could happen on April 15, 2016. The trial court later entered an order requiring plaintiff to file its motion by April 1 and defendant to respond by April 12. The order also stated that the parties could file their pleadings by e-mail with the original sent by first-class mail. Consistently with the order, on April 1, 2016, plaintiff moved for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). Plaintiff argued that because the Lease unambiguously required defendant to vacate the premises if in plaintiff's sole discretion it ordered defendant to do so for maintenance and repair of the water tower, defendant's refusal to vacate upon demand breached the Lease. In its timely response, defendant denied that plaintiff was entitled to force defendant to vacate its leasehold and argued that plaintiff's conduct violated defendant's right to quiet enjoyment of the premises and effectively nullified the purpose of the Lease. Late on the afternoon of April 14, 2016, defendant also filed its answer, affirmative defenses, and jury demand by e-mail and the original by first-class mail. That same afternoon, however, plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against defendant for failure to timely file its answer. The clerk entered the default, and plaintiff served defendant the default by mail. The very next day, at the hearing on plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition, plaintiff's counsel announced that a default had been entered against defendant and that plaintiff's motion was essentially unopposed because, under MCR 2.603(A)(3), defendant was precluded from responding to plaintiff's motion after the entry of the default. Defendant argued that it had opposed plaintiff's motion and requested that the trial court set aside the default. The trial court told defendant that it would prefer having defendant file a motion to set aside the default, having the parties brief the issue, and having the motion heard on an expedited basis. The trial court then adopted the arguments made by plaintiff in its briefs and granted plaintiff summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). On April 22, 2016, defendant moved to vacate or set aside the default, arguing, in part, that the default was improperly entered because defendant had defended the action vigorously from the start. Defendant asserted that plaintiff would suffer no prejudice if the default were set aside and explained that good cause existed to set aside the default because defendant had a meritorious defense. According to defendant, the numerous factors articulated in Shawl v. Spence Bros., Inc ., 280 Mich. App. 213, 238-239, 760 N.W.2d 674 (2008), all weighed in favor of finding good cause to set aside the default. Defendant further argued that under the terms of the Lease, it was not liable to plaintiff. Defendant filed an affidavit of meritorious defense in which defendant's president denied that the Lease gave plaintiff the right to evict defendant from the water tower and denied that plaintiff could terminate the Lease but stated that defendant had nevertheless removed all of its equipment as previously ordered by the court. On April 26, 2016, before responding to defendant's motion to set aside the default entered by the clerk, plaintiff moved for entry of a default judgment. Plaintiff argued that a default judgment should be entered because (1) defendant was properly defaulted and (2) defendant had materially breached the Lease by refusing to vacate the water tower, which entitled plaintiff to terminate the Lease. Plaintiff contended that it was entitled to recover damages and attorney fees from defendant under the Lease. Plaintiff subsequently opposed defendant's motion to set aside the default, arguing that defendant's failure to timely file its answer justified the clerk's entry of the default. Plaintiff contended that defendant did not "otherwise defend" the lawsuit because defendant had not filed its own motion. Good cause to set aside the default also did not exist because, according to plaintiff, no substantial defect or irregularity occurred, no excuse existed for defendant's tardy filing, and the totality of the circumstances favored entering the default against defendant. Plaintiff also argued that defendant had no valid defense because the trial court had already granted plaintiff partial summary disposition. In opposition to plaintiff's motion for default judgment, defendant argued that ¶ 12(B) of the Lease did not apply to the claims asserted because the paragraph specified defendant's obligation to indemnify plaintiff for claims made by third persons but did not permit plaintiff to recover attorney fees in a dispute with defendant over the terms of the Lease. Defendant also argued that plaintiff had no right to terminate the Lease. Three days later, the trial court heard defendant's motion to set aside the default and plaintiff's motion for default judgment. The trial court considered the factors set forth in Shawl and found that all the factors weighed against a finding of good cause. The trial court also held that defendant had no meritorious defense and, therefore, denied defendant's motion to set aside the default. The trial court then adopted plaintiff's brief as its rationale for entry of a default judgment. Without explanation, the trial court found that defendant had materially breached the Lease and, therefore, ruled that the Lease was terminated. The trial court also found that, under ¶ 12(B), the parties contemplated reasonable costs and attorney fees and that costs and attorney fees would be assessed against defendant. The trial court later entered an order denying defendant's motion to set aside the default and granting plaintiff's motion for default judgment, which terminated the Lease effective May 1, 2016, and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and the damages plaintiff had incurred in removing defendant's equipment from the water tower. II. ANALYSIS A. DEFAULT We first turn to defendant's argument that the trial court erred by not setting aside the default because the default was improperly entered. We agree with defendant that it "otherwise defended" under MCR 2.603(A)(1) by defending against plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief and partial summary disposition and that, as a result, the trial court abused its discretion by not setting aside the default and default judgment. Generally, this Court will not set aside a default that has been properly entered. Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. Waterbury Headers Corp ., 461 Mich. 219, 229, 600 N.W.2d 638 (1999). In part, this is because the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to review of the trial court's decision, Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Ristich , 292 Mich. App. 376, 389, 808 N.W.2d 511 (2011). The trial court abused its discretion by not finding that good cause existed to set aside the default and default judgment given that the default was not properly entered. Pursuant to MCR 2.603(D)(1), "[a] motion to set aside a default or a default judgment, except when grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed." In that regard, a default will not be set aside unless the defaulting party demonstrates both "good cause" and a "meritorious defense." Barclay v. Crown Bldg. & Dev., Inc ., 241 Mich. App. 639, 653, 617 N.W.2d 373 (2000). In Shawl , 280 Mich. App. at 238-239, 760 N.W.2d 674, this Court directed: In determining whether a party has shown good cause, the trial court should consider the following factors: (1) whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline to file; (2) if the party simply missed the deadline to file, how long after the deadline the filing occurred; (3) the duration between entry of the default judgment and the filing of the motion to set aside the judgment; (4) whether there was defective process or notice; (5) the circumstances behind the failure to file or file timely; (6) whether the failure was knowing or intentional; (7) the size of the judgment and the amount of costs due under MCR 2.603(D)(4) ; (8) whether the default judgment results in an ongoing liability (as with paternity or child support); and (9) if an insurer is involved, whether internal policies of the company were followed. * * * Neither of these lists is intended to be exhaustive or exclusive. Additionally, as with the factors provided in other contexts, the trial court should consider only relevant factors, and it is within the trial court's discretion to determine how much weight any single factor should receive. We first conclude that although defendant "simply missed the deadline" to file its answer and affirmative defenses by two days, the default was nevertheless improperly entered because defendants "otherwise defended" this case from the start. Under MCR 2.603(A)(1), "[i]f a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the default of that party." (Emphasis added.) This Court has made clear that the highlighted portion of MCR 2.603(A)(1) means that a party must not be defaulted if the party has otherwise defended the action by taking some defensive action in the case. In Marposs Corp. v. Autocam Corp. , 183 Mich. App. 166, 168, 454 N.W.2d 194 (1990), the defendant filed motions for summary disposition and a change of venue. The trial court denied both motions. Id. The defendant sought leave to appeal the trial court's denial of its motion for a change of venue but not the denial of its motion for summary disposition. Id. The defendant did not file an answer and a default was entered. Id. Although the defendant had failed to file a responsive pleading under MCR 2.108(A)(1), this Court held that the trial court erred by concluding that the defendant had defaulted because the defendant otherwise defended had itself under MCR 2.603(A)(1). Id. at 170, 454 N.W.2d 194. Here, from the start of this case, defendant defended itself by vigorously opposing plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief and partial summary disposition. Specifically, defendant (1) filed a brief opposing plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief with supporting affidavits, (2) appeared with counsel at the hearing on plaintiff's motion, (3) argued against the forced removal of its equipment because the Lease did not authorize plaintiff to demand that action from defendant, (4) defended against plaintiff's motion for summary disposition, and (5) appeared with counsel at the hearing on plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. There can be no doubt that defendant "otherwise defended" this lawsuit because each pleading it filed in this short time span contained defenses to plaintiff's claims and requests for relief. Compare Id . at 168-170, 454 N.W.2d 194, with Huntington Nat'l Bank , 292 Mich. App. at 388, 808 N.W.2d 511. Consequently, good cause existed to set aside the default and default judgment because the default was improperly entered, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. Though the foregoing conclusion is enough to move on to the meritorious-defense issue, we still point out that the record establishes that the Shawl factors warranted a finding of good cause. Factors (1) through (3) weighed in favor of finding good cause. Although defendant missed the April 12, 2016 deadline for filing its answer, defendant filed its answer and affirmative defenses by e-mail and mailed the originals to the trial court two days late. Further, the court clerk entered the mailed copy as filed on April 18, 2016, just six days after the deadline. Defendant did not completely fail to defend the action, nor did defendant fail to file an answer. Moreover, defendant vigorously defended against plaintiff's claims from the commencement of the case. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly found that defendant completely failed to answer or take any action and wrongly ruled that factors (1) and (2) weighed against finding good cause, when clearly both factors weighed in defendant's favor. Respecting factor (3), on April 15, 2016, when defendant learned that a default had been entered late afternoon on April 14, 2016, defense counsel moved in open court to have the default set aside. The trial court refused to take immediate action and instead required defendant to file a motion to set aside the default. Defendant promptly filed its motion to set aside the default on April 22, 2016, only eight days after entry of the default. The trial court should have found that the short duration between entry of the default and defendant's action favored finding good cause for setting aside the default because, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, defendant actually took prompt action to get the default set aside. Factor (5) weighed against finding good cause because defendant had missed the deadline to file its answer. Defense counsel failed to properly calendar the deadline and filed the answer late. Such negligence was not excusable. Nevertheless, the record reflects that defense counsel's failure to timely file defendant's answer was not intentional. Therefore, Factor (6) weighed in favor of finding good cause. The trial court incorrectly concluded that Factor (6) absolutely weighed against finding good cause. Factor (7) also weighed in favor of finding good cause. The trial court focused only on the monetary amount of a potential judgment and held that the minimal amount of damages at stake required finding that Factor (7) weighed against good cause. The trial court, however, completely disregarded the fact that the judgment sought by plaintiff included the eviction of defendant and termination of the Lease. The severity of the potential judgment's impact on defendant should have been considered. When that impact is considered, Factor (7) weighs in favor of finding good cause. The trial court's analysis of Factor (7) was critically flawed. Factor (8) also weighed in favor of finding good cause because nothing in the record establishes that there was a risk of ongoing liability in this case. There was no potential for ongoing liability like that of a paternity or child support case. The trial court, therefore, erroneously ruled this factor weighed against finding good cause. Again, for all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by holding that good cause did not exist to set aside the default. In addition to good cause, defendant was required to establish a meritorious defense to warrant setting aside the default. MCR 2.603(D)(1). Under Shawl , 280 Mich. App. at 238, 760 N.W.2d 674, the trial court was required to consider whether the affidavit of meritorious defense contained evidence that: (1) the plaintiff cannot prove or defendant can disprove an element of the claim or a statutory requirement; (2) a ground for summary disposition exists under MCR 2.116(C)(2), (3), (5), (6), (7) or (8) ; or (3) the plaintiff's claim rests on evidence that is inadmissible. The trial court held that defendant failed to establish a meritorious defense on the basis that defendant had no defense under the Lease to plaintiff's claims. Because the trial court incorrectly construed and interpreted the Lease terms, it also incorrectly held that defendant had no defense and refused to set aside the default. As explained below, the Lease provided a defense to defendant because the Lease did not grant plaintiff the right to order defendant to remove its equipment or the right to terminate the Lease if defendant refused. The trial court's original error (explained more below) in granting plaintiff's motion for partial summary disposition led to its erroneous conclusion that defendant lacked any defense. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling resulted in an outcome that fell outside the range of principled outcomes. Barnett v. Hidalgo , 478 Mich. 151, 158, 732 N.W.2d 472 (2007). Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside the default because defendant established good cause for setting aside the default and defendant had a meritorious defense to plaintiff's claims. B. SUMMARY DISPOSITION We next turn our attention to defendant's argument that the trial court erred by granting plaintiff summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) may be granted only if the defendant failed to plead a valid defense to a claim. Dimondale v. Grable , 240 Mich. App. 553, 564, 618 N.W.2d 23 (2000). As explained in Dimondale , [a] motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9) tests the sufficiency of a defendant's pleadings by accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true. If the defenses are so clearly untenable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly deny plaintiff's right to recovery, then summary disposition under this rule is proper. [ Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).] The trial court "may look only to the parties' pleadings in deciding a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(9)." Id. at 565, 618 N.W.2d 23,citing MCR 2.116(G)(5). Under MCR 2.110(A), "pleadings" "include only a complaint, a cross-claim, a counterclaim, a third-party complaint, an answer to any of these, and a reply to an answer. A motion for summary disposition is not a responsive pleading under MCR 2.110(A)." Diamondale , 240 Mich.App. at 565, 618 N.W.2d 23. (citations omitted). A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support of a plaintiff's claim and is reviewed by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Latham v. Barton Malow Co ., 480 Mich. 105, 111, 746 N.W.2d 868 (2008) (quotation marks omitted). Summary disposition is proper if there is "no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. A genuine issue of material fact exists when "reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., LLP , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). This Court considers only the evidence that was properly presented to the trial court in deciding the motion. Peña v. Ingham Co. Rd. Comm. , 255 Mich. App. 299, 310, 660 N.W.2d 351 (2003). As a general rule, summary disposition is premature if granted before discovery is complete on a disputed issue. Dimondale , 240 Mich. App. at 566, 618 N.W.2d 23. "However, summary disposition may be proper before discovery is complete where further discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering factual support for the position of the party opposing the motion." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The resolution of this appeal involves the construction and interpretation of the terms of the Lease. "The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to determine and enforce the parties' intent." Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak , 243 Mich. App. 57, 63, 620 N.W.2d 663 (2000). "To do so, this Court reads the agreement as a whole and attempts to apply the plain language of the contract itself." Id. The language of a contract is to be given its ordinary, plain meaning; technical, constrained constructions should be avoided. Bianchi v. Auto. Club of Mich. , 437 Mich. 65, 71 n. 1, 467 N.W.2d 17 (1991). The construction of the terms of a contract is generally a question of law for the court; however, where a contract's meaning is ambiguous, the question of interpretation should be submitted to the fact-finder. D'Avanzo v. Wise & Marsac, P.C. , 223 Mich. App. 314, 319, 565 N.W.2d 915 (1997). A contract is ambiguous when its words can reasonably be understood in different ways. Id. Inartfully worded or clumsily arranged contract terms do not render a contract ambiguous if it fairly admits of one interpretation. Mich. Twp Participating Plan v. Pavolich , 232 Mich. App. 378, 382, 591 N.W.2d 325 (1998). If the language of the Lease was unambiguous, the trial court was required to enforce it as written, In re Smith Trust , 480 Mich. 19, 24, 745 N.W.2d 754 (2008), because a court may not substitute its judgment for the intent of the parties and remake the contract into something the parties never intended, Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich. Muni. Liability & Prop. Pool , 473 Mich. 188, 199-200, 702 N.W.2d 106 (2005). Parties are free to contract as they see fit, and courts must enforce contracts as written unless they are in violation of law or public policy. Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 469 Mich. 41, 51, 664 N.W.2d 776 (2003). Contracts must be construed as a whole, giving effect to all provisions. Royal Prop. Group, LLC v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc. , 267 Mich. App. 708, 715, 706 N.W.2d 426 (2005). Courts must avoid interpretations that would render any part of a contract surplusage or nugatory and must also, if possible, seek an interpretation that harmonizes potentially conflicting terms. Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Cherryland Mall Ltd. Partnership , 295 Mich. App. 99, 111, 812 N.W.2d 799 (2011), remanded for reconsideration on other grounds by 493 Mich. 859, 820 N.W.2d 901 (2012). Further, where a contract contains specific and general terms, the specific terms normally control over the general terms. Royal Prop. Group, LLC , 267 Mich. App. at 719, 706 N.W.2d 426. Here, ¶ 2 of the Lease granted defendant space on plaintiff's water tower and near the water tower's base for an initial five-year lease term with three additional automatically renewable five-year terms unless defendant notified plaintiff before the end of the initial term of its intent not to extend the Lease. Paragraph 19 of the Lease granted defendant the right to terminate the agreement upon 30 days' notice in specified circumstances. The Lease did not grant plaintiff the right to terminate the agreement, nor did it expressly state that plaintiff could order defendant to remove its equipment from the leased premises. Paragraph 7(D) of the Lease specifically addressed what was required of defendant if plaintiff decided to paint the water tower. Specifically, that paragraph provides that when plaintiff undertook to paint the water tower defendant had to take "reasonable measures" at its cost to protect its equipment from harm. It does not state that plaintiff could request or order defendant to vacate the premises. However, language in ¶ 10 intersects with that in ¶ 7(D). Pursuant to ¶ 10, defendant could not interfere with plaintiff's operation, repair, or maintenance of the water tower and provided plaintiff the right to take any action it deemed necessary in its sole discretion to repair, maintain, alter, or improve the water tower. However, ¶¶ 2, 7(D), 10, and 19, must be read together. And, when properly read together, we hold that there was no contractual language in which the parties agreed that plaintiff could order defendant to completely remove its equipment and terminate the Lease when plaintiff deemed painting or maintenance necessary. Rather, a specific procedure was set forth by the parties within ¶ 7(D) in the event plaintiff needed to paint the water tower. Plaintiff unilaterally determined that procedure would not suffice and ordered defendant to remove its property. When defendant opposed this remedy, the trial court ordered the material removed and terminated the Lease. However, construing and interpreting the Lease to provide plaintiff the unfettered right to order defendant to remove all of its equipment and cease its use of the water tower is inconsistent with ¶ 19, which gives defendant, not plaintiff, the ability to end the Lease early. The trial court's interpretation is also inconsistent with the very purpose of the Lease-defendant's right to uninterrupted use of the water tower for defendant's business in return for its payment of the rent. The trial court's decision deprived defendant of its benefit of the bargain and created a remedy that did not exist under the Lease. See United Coin Meter Co. of Mich. v. Lasala , 98 Mich. App. 238, 242, 296 N.W.2d 221 (1980). The trial court's orders are reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This Court does not retain jurisdiction. Defendant may tax costs, having prevailed in full. MCR 7.219(A). Murray, P.J., and Sawyer and Markey, JJ., concurred. In making its argument, plaintiff cites the prior, more deferential, abuse-of-discretion standard that no longer applies. See Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co. , 476 Mich. 372, 388; 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006).

On order of the Chief Justice, the separate motions of defendants-appellees to extend the time for filing their answers to the application for leave to appeal are GRANTED. The answers will be accepted as timely filed if submitted on or before June 7, 2018.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the May 11, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). The appellants shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing whether, to be eligible to receive personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, they were required to register, in Michigan, the vehicle involved in the accident, and were thus obligated to maintain security for the payment of PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3101 or be precluded from receiving such benefits by MCL 500.3113(b). In addition to the brief, the appellants shall electronically file an appendix conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellants' brief. The appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use of the appendix filed by the appellants. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellants within 14 days of being served with the appellee's brief. The parties should not submit mere restatements of their application papers. The Coalition Protecting Auto No-Fault, the Insurance Alliance of Michigan, the Negligence Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan, and the Michigan Association for Justice are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

K. F. Kelly, J. Plaintiffs appeal by right an order denying their request for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to preclude defendant from renting out a lake house for transient, short-term use, arguing that such use violated a restrictive covenant. The trial court found that the restrictive covenant was ambiguous and that, as a result, the law required free use of the property, including transient, short-term rentals. Finding no such ambiguity, we reverse. I. BASIC FACTS Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for breach of the restrictive covenant and nuisance against defendant, their neighboring property owner, who rented out a lake house for transient, short-term use. Plaintiffs alleged that the rentals violated the deed restrictions limiting defendant's use of the premises to "private occupancy" and prohibiting "commercial use" of the premises. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of an order enjoining any further rental activity and abating the purported nuisance. No trial was conducted, nor does it appear that any hearing took place. Instead, the parties submitted the following stipulated facts to the trial court for resolution: 6. Plaintiffs are owners of real property located in Caledonia Township, Alcona County, Michigan described as follows: Lot 4 of Doctor's Point, a subdivision recorded in Liber 1 of Plats, Page 47, Alcona County Records, commonly known as 6351 Oak Street, Hubbard Lake, Michigan 49747 ...." 7. Defendant Peasley, as Trustee of the Cecilia L. Kaurich Trust, is the owner of real property located in Caledonia Township, Alcona County, Michigan described as follows: Lot 1 and part of Lot 2 of Doctor's Point, a subdivision recorded in Liber 1 of Plats, Page 47, Alcona County Records, commonly known as 653 Oak Street, Hubbard Lake, Michigan 49747 ...." 8. The subject cottage is a two-story structure with 150 feet of frontage on Hubbard Lake. It is approximately 2000 square feet in size and contains four bedrooms. 9. Defendant Peasley has owned the cottage since 2009 and Defendant has been renting it during the summer season each year since then. 10. Defendant advertises its rental availability on-line through a national website, www.homeaway.com, which also serves as the medium for payment. 11. All rental agreements are between Defendant Peasley and a single responsible signatory. 12. The renter must be at least 26 years old, and the rental is limited to 10 guests with no pets allowed. 13. The year 2016, which is typical of the rental history, shows 64 days booked over the four-month period of May through August. No dates have yet been booked in September. 14. Defendants have rented and continue to rent the Peasley Property on a short-term basis, for a minimum of two (2) nights to seven (7) nights for each rental, with prices ranging from $150.00-$225.00 per night to $850.00-$1,700.00 per week depending upon the season, Spring May 19-May 21, 2016; Summer May 22-September 2016. 15. The Defendant's calendar for 2016 reflects rentals for 10 different families and one business group. (Leadership. Retreat). The rentals average six (6) days in length. 16. There is no rental or business office maintained on site, no bed and breakfast service, and no other services provided while renters [are] on site[,] such as housekeeping or linen. 17. Title to Eager Property and Peasley Property originated from a common Grantor who burdened Lots 1-9 of Doctor's Point Subdivision with the same restrictive covenants which are the subject matter of this proceeding. 18. Among the covenants and restrictions placed under the chain of title of each of these parties' [sic] by warranty deed dated February 26, 1946, recorded [sic] March 18, 1946 at Liber 78, Page 432, Alcona County Records are the following: "... the premises shall be used for private occupancy only; ...that no commodity shall be sold or offered for the sale upon the premises and no commercial use made thereof; ..." In pertinent part, the restrictive covenant provided: that the premises shall be used for private occupancy only; that no building to be erected on said lands shall be used for purposes otherwise than as a private dwelling and such buildings as garage, ice-house, or other structures usually appurtenant to summer resort dwellings are to be at the rear of said dwellings; that such dwellings shall face the lake unless otherwise specified; that no commodities shall be sold or offered for sale upon said premises and no commercial use made thereof .... The court recited the stipulated facts and acknowledged the parties' arguments but then inexplicably denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. II. ANALYSIS "The interpretation of restrictive covenants is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo." Johnson Family Ltd. Partnership. v. White Pine Wireless, LLC , 281 Mich. App. 364, 389, 761 N.W.2d 353 (2008), citing Terrien v. Zwit , 467 Mich. 56, 60-61, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002). Our Supreme Court has confirmed that restrictive covenants are contracts with a particular value: Because of this Court's regard for parties' freedom to contract, we have consistently supported the right of property owners to create and enforce covenants affecting their own property. Such deed restrictions generally constitute a property right of distinct worth. Deed restrictions preserve not only monetary value, but aesthetic characteristics considered to be essential constituents of a family environment. If a deed restriction is unambiguous, we will enforce that deed restriction as written unless the restriction contravenes law or public policy, or has been waived by acquiescence to prior violations, because enforcement of such restrictions grants the people of Michigan the freedom freely to arrange their affairs by the formation of contracts to determine the use of land. Such contracts allow the parties to preserve desired aesthetic or other characteristics in a neighborhood, which the parties may consider valuable for raising a family, conserving monetary value, or other reasons particular to the parties. [ Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Birmingham , 479 Mich. 206, 214, 737 N.W.2d 670 (2007) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).] In terms of restrictive covenants, our Supreme Court has recognized "two essential principles, which at times can appear inconsistent. The first is that owners of land have broad freedom to make legal use of their property. The second is that courts must normally enforce unwaived restrictions on which the owners of other similarly burdened property have relied." O'Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc. , 459 Mich. 335, 343, 591 N.W.2d 216 (1999). These types of cases are, therefore, decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. "In construing restrictive covenants, the overriding goal is to ascertain the intent of the parties. Where the restrictions are unambiguous, they must be enforced as written." Johnson , 281 Mich. App. at 389, 761 N.W.2d 353 (citations omitted). "[T]he language employed in stating the restriction is to be taken in its ordinary and generally understood or popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement, nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." Borowski v. Welch , 117 Mich. App. 712, 716-717, 324 N.W.2d 144 (1982). Our Supreme Court has cautioned against judicial overstepping when interpreting restrictive covenants: The dissent justifies its amending from the bench by asserting that "[t]he absence of a definition in the restrictive covenants" of the terms "commercial, industrial, or business enterprises" leaves these terms ambiguous, and thus "opens the terms to judicial interpretation." We find this to be a remarkable proposition of law, namely, that the lack of an explicit internal definition of a term somehow equates to ambiguity-an ambiguity that apparently, in this case, allows a court free rein to conclude that a contract means whatever the court wants it to mean. Under the dissent's approach, any word that is not specifically defined within a contract becomes magically ambiguous. If that were the test for determining whether a term is ambiguous, then virtually all contracts would be rife with ambiguity and, therefore, subject to what the dissent in "words mean whatever I say they mean" fashion describes as "judicial interpretation." However, fortunately for the ability of millions of Michigan citizens to structure their own personal and business affairs, this is not the test. As this Court has repeatedly stated, the fact that a contract does not define a relevant term does not render the contract ambiguous. Rather, if a term is not defined in a contract, we will interpret such term in accordance with its "commonly used meaning." [ Terrien , 467 Mich. at 75-76, 648 N.W.2d 602 (citations omitted).] The terms "private occupancy only" and "a private dwelling," coupled with the prohibition against "commercial use" in the restrictive covenant are clear and unambiguous, and defendant is prohibited from renting the property on a transient, short-term basis. A. THE TERMS "PRIVATE OCCUPANCY ONLY" AND "A PRIVATE DWELLING" In Phillips v. Lawler , 259 Mich. 567, 570-571, 244 N.W. 165 (1932), the building restriction at issue provided that " '[n]o building nor structure shall be used, built or maintained thereon for any purpose except for a private residence and a private garage either in connection with the residence or built separately therefrom.' " Our Supreme Court concluded that a city's zoning ordinance could not impair the right of the parties to enter into such a contract. The Court concluded that: "[i]n building restriction cases involving covenants, the term 'private dwelling house' means a building designed as a single dwelling to be used by one family ." Id . at 571, 244 N.W. 165 (emphasis added), citing Schadt v. Brill , 173 Mich. 647, 139 N.W. 878 (1913), Kingston v. Busch , 176 Mich. 566, 142 N.W. 754 (1913), De Galan v. Barak , 223 Mich. 378, 193 N.W. 812 (1923), and Seeley v. Phi Sigma Delta House Corp. , 245 Mich. 252, 222 N.W. 180 (1928). In Seeley , our Supreme Court concluded that a building restriction permitting " 'one single private dwelling house' " prohibited erecting a building for use as a college fraternity: "We hold that a restrictive covenant running with land, limiting use thereof to 'one single private dwelling house,' means one house, for a single family, living in a private state, and prohibits a college fraternity, or chapter house, intended to provide board and rooms for part of the members and a gathering place for fraternity purposes for all members." Seeley , 245 Mich. at 256, 222 N.W. 180. The Court first noted that "[t]he language employed in stating the restriction is to be taken in its ordinary and generally understood or popular sense, and is not to be subjected to technical refinement, nor the words torn from their association and their separate meanings sought in a lexicon." Id . at 253, 222 N.W. 180. The Court's focus was on the purpose of the language: "The term as a connected whole was employed for a purpose and if such purpose is manifest, and the words to accomplish it apt, we need only make application thereof to the facts established by the evidence." Id . at 253-254, 222 N.W. 180. In Seeley , "[t]he restriction was imposed by an owner when he sold lots in a residential district, and the purpose was to preserve such character with its assurance of privacy and quiet enjoyment for the reciprocal benefit of all purchasers of lots." Id . at 254, 222 N.W. 180. Therefore, although the term "dwelling house" was capable of multiple meanings, it assumed "concrete meaning" when accorded with the purpose behind the restriction. Id. The Seeley Court confirmed that "[i]n building restriction cases involving covenants, the term 'private dwelling house' means a building designed as a single dwelling to be used by one family." A college fraternity whose "relation is purely artificial, is a business proposition, and more nearly approximates the character of a club, boarding house, or apartment house, with added recreational privileges," was not a family. Id . at 255, 222 N.W. 180. Here, the covenant provides that "the premises shall be used for private occupancy only" and that "no building to be erected on said lands shall be used for purposes otherwise than as a private dwelling...." Phillips and Seeley confirm that transient use of the property as a short-term rental violates the covenant. There is no reason to treat "private occupancy" in this case any differently than "private residence" in Phillips or "single private dwelling house" in Seeley . In O'Connor , 459 Mich. at 3376, 591 N.W.2d 216 (1999), the use and character restrictions provided: "No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than for the purpose of one single dwelling not to exceed two stories in height." The O'Connor Court concluded that interval use-or time-sharing-violated this restriction. It reviewed Wood v. Blancke , 304 Mich. 283, 8 N.W.2d 67 (1943), which involved a dispute over language that restricted use to "residence purposes only" and whether such language prevented an owner from raising racing pigeons on the property. O'Connor , 459 Mich. at 341, 591 N.W.2d 216. The O'Connor Court reiterated that the term "residence" involved an inquiry beyond what structures were permitted on the property: "Restrictive covenants in deeds are construed strictly against grantors and those claiming the right to enforce them, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the free use of property. Notwithstanding this rule of construction, covenants restricting the erection of any building except for dwelling house purposes have been held to apply to the use as well as to the character of the building; and in strictly residential neighborhoods, where there has always been compliance with the restrictive covenants in the deeds, nullification of the restrictions has been deemed a great injustice to the owners of property. It is the policy of the courts of this State to protect property owners who have not themselves violated restrictions in the enjoyment of their homes and holdings. ... "Restrictions for residence purposes, if clearly established by proper instruments, are favored by definite public policy. The courts have long and vigorously enforced them by specific mandate. This court has expressly recognized that the right of privacy for homes is a valuable right." [ Id. at 341-342, 591 N.W.2d 216, quoting Wood , 304 Mich. at 287-288, 8 N.W.2d 67, in turn quoting Johnstone v. Detroit , G. H. & M. R. Co., 245 Mich. 65, 74; 222 N.W. 325 (1928) (citations omitted).] The O'Connor Court recognized that the issue of whether interval ownership. violated the restrictive covenant was one of first impression and turned its attention to Wood's imperative " 'that the usual, ordinary and incidental use of property as a place of abode does not violate the covenant restricting such use to "residential purposes only," but that an unusual and extraordinary use may constitute a violation ....' " O'Connor , 459 Mich. at 345, 591 N.W.2d 216, quoting Wood , 304 Mich. at 288-289, 8 N.W.2d 67. The Court then turned to the term "residential purpose": [A] residence most narrowly defined can be a place which would be one place where a person lives as their permanent home, and by that standard people could have only one residence, or the summer cottage could not be a residence, the summer home at Shanty Creek could not be a residence if the principal residence, the place where they permanently reside, their domicile is in some other location, but I think residential purposes for these uses is a little broader than that. It is a place where someone lives, and has a permanent presence, if you will, as a resident, whether they are physically there or not. Their belongings are there. They store their golf clubs, their ski equipment, the old radio, whatever they want. It is another residence for them, and it has a permanence to it, and a continuity of presence, if you will, that makes it a residence. [ O'Connor , 459 Mich. at 345, 591 N.W.2d 216 (quotation marks omitted).] However, interval or time-sharing use did not constitute residential use: The people who occupy it, or who have these weekly interests in this property, they have the right to occupy it for one week each year, but they don't have any rights, any occupancy right, other than that one week. They don't have the right to come whenever they want to, for example, or to leave belongings there because the next resident, who is a one-fiftieth or one forty-eighth co-owner has a right to occupy the place, too, and the weekly owner has no right to be at the residence at any time other than during their one week that they have purchased. That is not a residence. That is too temporary. There is no permanence to the presence, either psychologically or physically at that location, and so I deem that the division of the home into one-week timeshare intervals as not being for residential purposes as that term is used in these building and use restrictions.... [ Id . at 346, 591 N.W.2d 216.] The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had waived the use restriction because they had allowed short-term rentals. The O'Connor Court disagreed: With regard to whether plaintiffs waived the use restriction by allowing short-term rentals, we agree with the circuit court that such an alternative use is different in character and does not amount to a waiver of enforcement against interval ownership. Further, defendants have not demonstrated that the occasional rentals have altered the character of the Valley View subdivision to an extent that would defeat the original purpose of the restrictions. [ Id .] Defendant argues that O'Connor "cautions against rigid definitions when interpreting covenants," but, like the Court in Torch Lake Protection Alliance v. Ackermann , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued November 30, 2004 (Docket No. 246879) 2004 WL 2726072, we conclude that defendant's attempt to distinguish the short-term rentals from the interval ownership. activity in O'Connor is unavailing because the case before us does not present a question of waiver. In Torch Lake , the trial court concluded that rental use of property violated deed restrictions providing that the property "shall be used for private residence purposes only" and not used for any commercial purpose. Id . at 1-2. The Court found these terms to be unambiguous: The trial court found, and we agree, that the residential use and business prohibition covenants in defendants' deed are not ambiguous, and no genuine issue of material fact was shown with respect to defendants' violation of those covenants. The trial court's reasoning is clear and cogent: Mr. Crumb when he laid out these parcels and put these covenants in place, ... he did attempt to make as clear as this Court believes any human can, is that the property was to have a private residential purpose; it may be that subsumed within the notion of private residential purpose would be the occasional use of one's property by another, it's certainly not uncommon people swap. their homes with friends, they have friends come and visit, they have overnight guests, guests for retractive [sic] periods of time, often people take care of aging parents, family members need to be nursed during a period of illness; I suspect in the vast majority of those occasions no money ever changes hands.... [B]ut perhaps the best writer to ever serve on the Michigan Supreme Court was Justice Volker.... Justice Volker wrote about the inherent ambiguity of language and the ability of lawyers to make almost any argument about any set of words that man could be constrained to put together; ... I think the point is often the more detail one provides it simply provides more opportunity to try to insert ambiguity where none was intended. If there was one core facet associated with these deed restrictions, it is that they restrict property to a private residential purpose. Has that purpose outlived its meaning? Is this an isolated pocket of residential property surrounded by encroaching motels or businesses? ... This is extraordinary property, it is a precious resource and it is largely residential. There are some commercial establishments, marines, [sic] restaurants, motels, on various parts of the lake, but the property at issue here is private residential property, and it is not surrounded by or being encroached upon by motels or hotels or gas stations. The character of the neighborhood is not changed. The covenants have not outgrown their purpose, which is to preserve a private residential purpose. * * * But, to the extent we have clear precedent in O'Connor v. Resort Owners with regard to what is a residence and what is not, there is no question that rentals are in excess of $50,000 during the height of the season. [ Id . at 3-4 (alterations in original).] Citing Wood , the Court acknowledged that "incidental uses to a prescribed residential use may not violate the covenant if it is casual, infrequent, or unobstructive, and causes neither appreciable damage to neighboring property nor inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort to neighboring residents." Id . at 4. The Court then considered the O'Connor Court's consideration of what constituted a "residential purpose." Id. Because the defendants failed to present admissible evidence to support their claim that their rental use did not exceed an incidental use of property for "private residence purposes only," the Torch Lake Court held that the trial court properly concluded that the use violated the deed restrictions. The Torch Lake case is on point with the case at bar, and we adopt the Court's analysis as our own. We reject defendant's tortured attempt at reading an ambiguity into the restrictive covenant that simply does not exist. Defendant's transient, short-term rental usage violates the restrictive covenant requiring "private occupancy only" and "private dwelling." Defendant, who lives in a neighboring county, does not reside at the property. She rents the property to a variety of groups, including tourists, hunters, and business groups. Those using the property for transient, short-term rental have no right to leave their belongings on the property. Rentals are available throughout the year and are advertised on at least one worldwide rental website. This use is not limited to one single family for "private occupancy only" and a "private dwelling," but is far more expansive and clearly violates the deed restrictions. B. THE TERM "COMMERCIAL USE" In denying plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, the trial court focused primarily on the term "private dwelling" and spent little time discussing whether defendant's actions amounted to "commercial use" of the property. We conclude that, even if the short-term rentals did not specifically violate the deed restrictions limiting the property to "private occupancy only" and "private dwelling," the rentals most assuredly violated the restrictive covenant barring "commercial use" of the property. In Terrien , our Supreme Court noted: The operation of a "family day care home" for profit is a commercial or business use of one's property. We find this to be in accord with both the common and the legal meanings of the terms "commercial" and "business." "Commercial" is commonly defined as "able or likely to yield a profit." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991). "Commercial use" is defined in legal parlance as "use in connection with or for furtherance of a profit-making enterprise." Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.). "Commercial activity" is defined in legal parlance as "any type of business or activity which is carried on for a profit." Id . [ Terrien , 467 Mich. at 63-64, 648 N.W.2d 602.] We conclude that, under the definitions set forth in Terrien , the act of renting property to another for short-term use is a commercial use, even if the activity is residential in nature. We specifically adopt this Court's reasoning in Enchanted Forest Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Schilling , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March 11, 2010 (Docket No. 287614) 2010 WL 866148. The defendants in Enchanted Forest "occasionally rented out their property, typically for periods of one week or less, for a rental fee." Id . at 3. The rentals were not as frequent as those in the case at bar; the records in Enchanted Forest revealed "that the property was rented for 33 days in 2005, 29 days in 2006, 34 days in 2007, and 31 days between January 1 and March 31, 2008." Id . This Court concluded that such short-term rentals violated the restrictive covenants prohibiting commercial use of the property: There is no dispute that defendants contracted with an agency to advertise their property as a vacation rental and did, in fact, rent the property for a fee. Although the financial documentation submitted by defendants shows that defendants did not make a profit when renting their property, this is not dispositive of whether the commercial purpose prohibition was violated. Defendants clearly indicated that they rented out the property to transient guests. Use of the property to provide temporary housing to transient guests is a commercial purpose, as that term is commonly understood. The trial court properly granted summary disposition in favor of the EFPOA on the basis of Article XI of the deed restrictions. [ Id. at 8.] "Commercial use," which is clearly prohibited in the restrictive covenant, includes short-term rentals even without resorting to technical refinement of what constitutes "private occupancy" or "private dwelling." That defendant and her renters may use the property as a private dwelling is not dispositive. Short-term rentals still violate the restrictive covenant barring commercial use of the property. Because defendant's commercial use of the home was in clear violation of the unambiguous restrictive covenant, the trial court should have granted plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. Reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a judgment granting plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiffs may tax costs as the prevailing party. MCR 7.219. Defendants Jeffrey and Sandra Cavanaugh reached a settlement agreement with plaintiffs early on in the litigation. This appeal solely concerns defendant Peasley's lake house, which she owns, not as a resident, but rather in her capacity as a trustee, and we shall refer to her hereafter as "defendant" for purposes of this opinion. We have not been asked to address-nor do we comment on-long-term rentals of private dwellings for residential use and whether such use is commercial in nature. The scope of this opinion addresses only short-term, transient rentals. "Although unpublished opinions of this Court are not binding precedent, they may, however, be considered instructive or persuasive." Paris Meadows, LLC v. City of Kentwood , 287 Mich. App. 136, 145 n. 3, 783 N.W.2d 133 (2010) (citations omitted).

Per Curiam. In these consolidated cases, Auto-Owners Insurance Company (Auto-Owners") and the City of Adrian (the City) appeal by leave granted the trial court's order denying their respective motions for summary disposition. Auto-Owners sought summary disposition regarding its claims for indemnification from appellees, Campbell-Durocher Group Painting and General Contracting, LLC (Campbell-Durocher), Jack Campbell, and Carrie Campbell. The City sought summary disposition of the Campbells' claims for breach of contract. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we affirm the trial court's denial of the City's motion, reverse the trial court's denial of Auto-Owners' motion, and remand for further proceedings. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY These appeals arise from a restoration project in the City that went awry. The City received a grant to fund a historic-façade-restoration project (the project), involving five downtown buildings. Campbell-Durocher was the successful bidder and was named general contractor for the project, and a building contract between the City and Campbell-Durocher was entered into on August 12, 2009. Pursuant to the requirements of MCL 129.201 et seq. , a public works bonding act, Campbell-Durocher provided payment and performance bonds with itself as principal and Auto-Owners as surety. In relation to the bonds, an indemnity agreement was entered into by Campbell-Durocher and Auto-Owners. According to the building contract, the agreement was scheduled to expire on December 19, 2009. The project was not completed by that date. However, several change orders were approved by the parties that provided for completion dates well beyond December 19, 2009. Notably, before the contract expired, a change order relating to storefront windows and doors was signed that required substantial completion by May 13, 2010. Due to various issues related to the windows and doors, the project was still not completed by the date specified in the change order. On August 24, 2010, the City ordered Campbell-Durocher off the job site. In correspondence dated August 26, 2010, the City stated, "The City of Adrian has terminated the contract with Campbell-Durocher Group as of August 24, 2010." As reasons for this decision, the City noted that Campbell-Durocher failed to complete the project on schedule, failed to pay a supplier, and failed to offer an acceptable solution to the storefront window and door issue. As a result of the noncompletion of the project, the City filed a written bond claim with Auto-Owners. On September 21, 2011, Auto-Owners settled the City's bond claim for approximately $127,000. Auto-Owners also paid a bond claim of approximately $62,000 to ABC Supply Company, an unpaid supplier for the project. The project resulted in the three lawsuits underlying this appeal, which were consolidated in the trial court. Other entities were named in the complaints, but they do not factor in this appeal. Relevant to this appeal, Auto-Owners sought reimbursement from the Campbells for amounts paid on the bond, totaling $189,277.64, as well as other costs incurred by Auto-Owners, including attorney fees. Also relevant to this appeal, the Campbells alleged that the City breached the building contract by failing to pay approximately $60,000 for work performed by the Campbells and by terminating the contract in August 2010 without providing 90 days' notice as required under 2.2 of the contract. Several motions for summary disposition were filed by various parties, including the motions by the City and Auto-Owners that are at issue in this appeal. The City moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), contending that the building contract terminated on December 19, 2009, or, at the latest, on May 13, 2010. On the basis of its assertion that the contract had expired, the City argued that it did not breach the contract by terminating the Campbells in August 2010 without providing 90 days' notice. In comparison, relying on MCR 2.116(C)(9) (failure to state a valid defense) and (C)(10), Auto-Owners argued that summary disposition was proper because the unambiguous terms of the indemnification agreement entitled Auto-Owners to indemnification from the Campbells for all "bond losses." The trial court denied the City's and Auto-Owners' motions, stating, without any elaboration, "that there are still issues of fact and law that need to be brought before this Court." The City and Auto-Owners moved for reconsideration, and the trial court denied the motion. The City filed applications for leave to appeal in this Court in each of the three lawsuits (Docket Nos. 331389, 331802, and 331803), and Auto-Owners filed an application for leave to appeal in its action for indemnification (Docket No. 331384). This Court granted the applications and consolidated the appeals. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. Spiek v. Dep't of Transp. , 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). While the parties cited MCR 2.116(C)(8), (C)(9), and (C)(10), they relied on evidence outside the pleadings. Consequently, we will review their motions under MCR 2.116(C)(10). MCR 2.116(G)(5) ; Silberstein v. Pro-Golf of America, Inc. , 278 Mich. App. 446, 457, 750 N.W.2d 615 (2008). "Summary disposition is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 183, 665 N.W.2d 468 (2003). A genuine issue of material fact exists "when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., LLP , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). III. AUTO-OWNERS' APPEAL On appeal, Auto-Owners argues that the trial court erred when it denied summary disposition on Auto-Owners' contractual indemnification claim. According to Auto-Owners, the express terms of the indemnity agreement required the Campbells to indemnify Auto-Owners for all losses incurred by reason of the execution of the bonds. Auto-Owners asserts that its payment of the bond claims is prima facie evidence of the Campbells' liability and that the Campbells have failed to offer any evidence that Auto-Owners paid the bond claims in bad faith. An indemnity contract is interpreted in accordance with the rules of construction that govern any other type of contract. Ajax Paving Indus., Inc. v. Vanopdenbosch Const. Co. , 289 Mich. App. 639, 644, 797 N.W.2d 704 (2010). Accordingly, "[u]nder ordinary contract principles, if contractual language is clear, construction of the contract is a question of law for the court." Meagher v. Wayne State Univ. , 222 Mich. App. 700, 721, 565 N.W.2d 401 (1997). This Court's main goal in the interpretation of contracts is to honor the intent of the parties. The words used in the contract are the best evidence [of] the parties' intent. When contract language is clear, unambiguous, and has a definite meaning, courts do not have the ability to write a different contract for the parties, or to consider extrinsic testimony to determine the parties' intent. [ Kyocera Corp. v. Hemlock Semiconductor, LLC , 313 Mich. App. 437, 446, 886 N.W.2d 445 (2015) quotation marks and citations omitted).] "A contract of indemnity should be construed so as to cover all losses, damages, or liabilities to which it reasonably appears to have been the intention of the parties that it should apply ...." Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Roehm , 215 Mich. 586, 592, 184 N.W. 414 (1921) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In this case, the indemnity agreement specifically obligated the Campbells to indemnify [Auto-Owners] against all loss, costs, damages, expenses and attorneys fees whatever, and any and all liability therefor, sustained or incurred by [Auto-Owners] by reason of executing of said bond or bonds, or any of them, in making any investigation on account thereof, in prosecuting or defending any action brought in connection therewith, in obtaining a release therefrom, and in enforcing any of the agreements herein contained[.] The foregoing language unambiguously required the Campbells to indemnify Auto-Owners for all liability and expenses sustained by reason of the execution of the bonds. In contesting Auto-Owners' entitlement to reimbursement, the Campbells do not appear to dispute that the indemnity agreement, in general, obligated them to reimburse Auto-Owners for costs incurred pursuant to the bonds. Instead, the Campbells contest whether Auto-Owners properly settled the bond claims. Specifically, they argue that Auto-Owners is not entitled to reimbursement because Auto-Owners acted in bad faith by failing to conduct an investigation into the bond claims. According to the Campbells, had Auto-Owners investigated and consulted with the Campbells, it would have discovered that the City was not entitled to payment on its bond clainms because the City had breached the building contract. Relevant to the Campbells' arguments, the indemnity agreement contained several pertinent clauses involving Auto-Owners' right to pay claims and to seek reimbursement from the Campbells. Specifically, the indemnity agreement provided that Auto-Owners shall have the right, and is hereby authorized but not required ... [t]o adjust, settle or compromise any claim, demand, suit, or judgment upon said bond or bonds, or any of them, unless the undersigned shall request [Auto-Owners] to litigate such claim or demand, or to defend such suit, or to appeal from such judgment, and shall deposit with [Auto-Owners], at the time of such request, cash or collateral satisfactory to it in kind and amount, to be used in paying any judgment or judgments rendered or that may be rendered, with interest, costs and attorneys' fees[.] Additionally, the agreement specified that the extent of the Campbells' liability under the indemnity agreement: shall extend to, and include, the full amount of any and all sums paid by [Auto-Owners] in settlement or compromise of any claims, demands, suits, and judgments upon said bond or bonds, or any of them, on good faith, under the belief that it was liable therefor, whether liable or not, as well as of any and all disbursements on account of costs, expenses and attorney's fees, as aforesaid, which may be made under the belief that such were necessary, whether necessary or not[.] Further, in the event that Auto-Owners paid a claim, the agreement contained a clause specifying that "the voucher or vouchers or other evidence of such payment, settlement or compromise shall be prima facie evidence of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned, in any claim or suit hereunder, and in any and all matters arising between the undersigned and [Auto-Owners.]" Read as a whole, these provisions make plain that Auto-Owners had the discretion to adjust, settle, or compromise any claim on the bonds. Further, under the plain terms of the agreement, the Campbells were required to reimburse Auto-Owners without regard to whether Auto-Owners was ultimately correct in paying the bond claims, provided that Auto-Owners acted in good faith. The phrase "good faith" has typically been understood "as a standard measuring the state of mind, perceptions, honest beliefs, and intentions of the parties." Miller v. Riverwood Recreation Ctr., Inc. , 215 Mich. App. 561, 570, 546 N.W.2d 684 (1996). "Good faith" refers to " 'an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage,' " Id . at 571, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 693. "Bad faith" refers to an "arbitrary, reckless, indifferent, or intentional disregard of the interests of the person owed a duty," involving something more than honest errors of judgment. Miller , 215 Mich.App. at 571, 546 N.W.2d 684 (quotation marks and citations omitted) (defining "bad faith" in the context of insurance). See also Great American Ins. Co. v. E. L. Bailey & Co., Inc. , 841 F.3d 439, 446 (C.A.6 2016). Notably, under the terms of their agreement, evidence that Auto-Owners paid a claim is prima facie evidence of the Campbells' liability and the extent of that liability. The phrase "prima facie evidence" refers to "evidence which, if not rebutted, is sufficient by itself to establish the truth of a legal conclusion asserted by a party." American Cas. Co. v. Costello , 174 Mich. App. 1, 7, 435 N.W.2d 760 (1989). The admission of prima facie evidence shifts the burden of proceeding so that the opposing party must come forward with evidence to rebut or contradict that party's liability. P.R. Post Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co. , 403 Mich. 543, 552, 271 N.W.2d 521 (1978). More specifically, in the context of indemnifying a surety, when payment of a bond claim serves as prima facie evidence of liability, the indemnitor disputing liability has the burden of proving that the surety acted in bad faith or otherwise violated the indemnity agreement. See Gray Ins. Co. v. Terry , 606 Fed.Appx. 188, 191 (C.A.5 2015) ; Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of America v. Winmark Homes, Inc. , 518 Fed.Appx. 899, 903 (C.A.11 2013) ; Fallon Elec. Co., Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. , 121 F.3d 125, 128-129 (C.A.3 1997). Such clauses are enforceable. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Bloomfield , 401 F.2d 357, 362 (C.A.6 1968). In this case, Auto-Owners presented proof that it paid the City and ABC Supply Company, and these payments constituted prima facie evidence of the Campbells' liability and the extent of that liability under the indemnity agreement. Therefore, if the Campbells wished to contest their liability, they bore the burden of proving that Auto-Owners failed to act in good faith or otherwise violated the indemnity agreement. Given that the Campbells bore this burden, in responding to Auto-Owners' motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the Campbells could not simply "rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but [had to] go beyond the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact [existed]." Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co. , 451 Mich. 358, 362, 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996). The Campbells have not presented specific facts showing that a question of fact existed with regard to whether Auto-Owners acted in bad faith. At best, the Campbells have established that Auto-Owners exercised business judgment with which the Campbells disagreed. For instance, contrary to the Campbells' assertion that Auto-Owners paid the claims without investigating or consulting with the Campbells, Auto-Owners, by correspondence dated November 24, 2010, reiterated that bond claims had been made and advised the Campbells that they were personally responsible for fully indemnifying Auto-Owners for costs and expenses related to the losses in connection with the bonded project. Auto-Owners also expressly requested that the Campbells "[p]lease contact the undersigned as to how you intend to address this matter which appears to be well in excess of $100,000," and further specified that "your immediate attention in this matter is essential." There is no evidence that the Campbells contacted Auto-Owners regarding the bond claims. Also noteworthy, Jack Campbell admitted that ABC Supply Company was owed monies on the project. In addition, the City provided documentation to Auto-Owners in support of the City's bond claim-a punch list itemizing the outstanding items yet to be completed and the related costs. Although the Campbells make the bald assertion that the bond claims were settled by Auto-Owners in bad faith and that therefore an issue of fact existed about the good faith of Auto-Owners' payments, the Campbells did not come forward with any evidence to create a genuine issue of fact in this regard. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied Auto-Owners' motion for summary disposition. IV. THE CITY'S APPEAL The Campbells' complaint alleged that the original contract required payment for its services in the amount of $224,920, but that as a result of the change orders, $391,155.27 was the amount owed. The Campbells acknowledged that they were paid $331,531.30, but alleged in their complaint that $59,623.97 was still due. The Campbells also alleged that the City breached § 2.2 of the contract by failing to give 90 days' written notice prior to termination. According to the Campbells, because they were not given this notice, they were not allowed to complete the project and they are entitled to the damages resulting from this termination without notice. The City's sole argument in its motion for summary disposition was that the City did not breach the contract by terminating the Campbells without notice in August 2010 because the contract had long expired, and thus the City was not bound by the 90-day notice provision. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, fairly read, the Campbells' complaint sought payment for $59,623.97 worth of work that they allegedly completed before they were terminated in August 2010. Whether the 90-day provision applied is not dispositive of whether the Campbells were entitled to payment for supplies and work actually performed before termination. Second, to the extent that the Campbells sought damages resulting from termination without 90 days' notice, it appears that a question of fact remained as to whether this provision was in effect in August 2010. In particular, the original contract provided for an expiration date of December 19, 2009, and a change order modified this expiration date by providing a substantial completion date of May 13, 2010. However, the Campbells maintain that there was an implied contract to extend the agreement beyond the May 2010 completion date. After an agreement has expired, an implied contract may arise when the parties continue to perform as before and their conduct demonstrates a mutual assent to a new agreement with their rights and obligations measured as provided in the expired contract. 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 576. A contract is implied in fact where the intention as to it is not manifested by direct or explicit words between the parties, but is to be gathered by implication or proper deduction from the conduct of the parties, language used or things done by them, or other pertinent circumstances attending the transaction. The existence of an implied contract, of necessity turning on inferences drawn from given circumstances, usually involves a question of fact, unless no essential facts are in dispute. [ Erickson v. Goodell Oil Co., Inc. , 384 Mich. 207, 212, 180 N.W.2d 798 (1970) (citation omitted).] In this case, there is evidence that, even after May 13, 2010, the Campbells and the City continued to do business together with the Campbells continuing to act as general contractor for the project. For instance, there is correspondence to the Campbells, dated after May 2010, discussing the windows, scheduling, and items yet to be completed. Even the City's termination letter to the Campbells, terminating "the contract" as of August 24, 2010, could be read to support the proposition that the parties were still mutually operating under the terms of the written agreement, which would have included the 90-day notice provision. Considering the foregoing, questions of fact existed with respect to whether the 90-day notice provision was in effect and whether the Campbells were entitled to additional compensation for services rendered. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it denied the City's motion for summary disposition regarding the Campbells' breach-of contract claim. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Shariro, P.J., and Hoekstra and M. J. Kelly, JJ., concurred When appropriate, Campbell-Durocher, Jack Campbell, and Carrie Campbell will be referred to collectively as "the Campbells." The Campbells' breach-of-contract claim against the City is at issue in all three cases. In one of the cases, the Campbells filed a breach-of-contract claim against the City. In the other two cases, the Campbells filed third-party complaints against the City for breach of contract. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Campbell-Durocher Group , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 2, 2016 (Docket Nos. 331384 and 331802); Campbell-Durocher Group v. City of Adrian , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 2, 2016 (Docket No. 331389); Pullum Window Corp. v. Campbell , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 2, 2016 (Docket No. 331803). While the Campbells could have requested that Auto-Owners litigate a claim, under the indemnity agreement, the Campbells would have had to make a request and they would have been required to deposit cash or collateral with Auto-Owners. The Campbells were notified that the City had made a bond claim, but, there is no evidence that the Campbells requested that Auto-Owners litigate the bond claim or that the Campbells deposited cash or collateral with Auto-Owners. Auto-Owners therefore had discretion, under the indemnity agreement to pay the claim.

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's February 20, 2018 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously. Viviano, J., not participating due to a familial relationship with the presiding circuit court judge in this case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 23, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the August 8, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 12, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 19, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 26, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. VIVIANO , J., did not participate due to a familial relationship with the presiding circuit court judge in this case.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the November 21, 2017 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 11, 2017 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.