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How long can an unmarked vehicle follow someone before discovering an infraction? How many miles is an unmarked vehicle allowed to follow closely behind a car on the interstate in order to find some reason or traffic violation (e.g. illegal lane change)? Isn't there some case law that states an unmarked vehicle can't follow for too long because some traffic infraction is bound to occur?

Until it runs out of gas. With the caveat that I can't prove a negative: No, there is no such statute or case law restricting how long a police or law enforcement vehicle can follow someone on a road. However, law enforcement officers can be subject to investigation and sanction under "stalking" or "harassment" laws, which typically require a pattern of documented misbehavior in the absence of good cause for said behavior.

united-states Speed limits can be enforced by any means (except photo-radar) in most U.S. jurisdictions without notice that it is being used. Those laws are close to being uniform in the U.S. due to federal coordination on federally funded roads, even though state and local laws are what governs them directly. Some U.S. jurisdictions prohibit the issuance of photo-radar speeding tickets without notice before entering the photo-radar picture taking zone. I'd have to research further to see if New York City does. The purpose of the language on the sign is to make drivers more fearful of being caught in circumstances where they don't see someone trying to enforce the law, not to have greater legal effect.

Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.

Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car.

Since there is no search or seizure involved in having a driver's license, requiring a person to update their address is not a violation of the 4th Amendment. It is also not "testifying against oneself in a criminal case", so it does not violate the 5th. As has been repeated many times, driving is a privilege and not a right, meaning that there is no fundamental constitutional right to drive. Strict scrutiny would not render the requirement to have a license unconstitutional, and it certainly would not invalidate the requirement to give a correct address and update that address as necessary. There may be issues regarding a requirement to produce identification, but there is no legal precedent for the idea that an ID law law and a federal "must show" statute would violate the 4th (that is not to say that the courts could not find there is such a basis if the question arises, but it has not yet been found). Since there is no national ID law, one can only conjecture what the outcome of judicial review would be, but if such a law survived strict scrutiny, it would be inconceivable that a portion of the law requiring you to keep your address current would fail such scrutiny. A curiosity search would still be barred.

So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).

One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Transportation, by regulation sets uniform design and signage standards for federally funded highways, which most U.S. state and local governments incorporate, either by restating them or incorporating them by reference for non-federally funded roads. I imagine that most other countries have similar regulations. Nonetheless, this is extremely unlikely to prevail as a defense to the traffic violation of speeding which is usually a strict liability offense to which almost no affirmative defenses, excuses, or justifications may be considered.

What assets can a creditor make you forfeit in the UK? If you owe a lot of money in the UK, what assets can the creditor legally force you to sell to pay off the debts? For example, can they make you sell (or remortgage) your family home? What law is this covered by?

Ultimately, if they force you into bankruptcy, everything, except: tools of your trade household items (clothing, furniture), however, if these are worth significantly more than a replacement then they can be sold and you get given a replacement. Short of this they can: garnishee bank accounts garnishee wages and other income seize and sell personal property acquire liens over real property The cannot force you to borrow money pay them, however, this may be a better option than any of the above, particularly bankruptcy. If you are in such a situation you should seek advice on how to best deal with it. Most creditors are willing to negotiate over amounts and timing: something latter on is better than nothing ever.

You can read about Magnuson Moss here, but it only applies to warranties on goods, not services. As you note, the warranty on the unit is still valid. As for agreeing, it is not unusual that a consumer is not aware what all they are agreeing to when they buy a house. One of those myriad signatures that you put on myriad documents was your agreement to contract terms in the pile of papers that you were handed. If you trace through the entire pile of pieces of paper, you should find something saying that you agree to "all of the attached conditions", which is where you are supposed to say "Wait, what conditions?".

You would likely have to show actual damages. And for example if you had a chance to buy a car worth $11,000 for $10,000 and couldn't because of the bank freezing your account, you'd have to convince a judge that the $1,000 possible profit was actual damage. Next you need to show that the bank explicitly guaranteed that your money would be accessible at any time. And assuming that blocking your account to prevent fraud against you was reasonable, how negligent were they when they couldn't unfreeze your account as quick as you would have liked?

According to Nolo, which is usually a good source of legal information, yes, an HOA generally does have the power to place a lien on your property if you do not pay your HOA dues, and to foreclose the lien (force sale) if it is still not paid. They have a specific page for Nevada explaining procedures and restrictions. You'll also have to read your covenant (CC&R) to see exactly what you agreed to when you bought the property, but Nolo seems to suggest that whatever's in there is likely to be enforceable. In particular, the covenant may state that the HOA's lien can include penalties and collection costs, and the law seems to allow that. There's a note on the Nolo Nevada page that an HOA may not foreclose a lien based only on a fine or penalty, so it's not clear what would happen if you paid only the outstanding dues but not the other charges. Personally, it seems to me excessive to sue over $400. Being on bad terms with your HOA seems likely to cause trouble down the road. Also, if it were me, I'd want to consult a lawyer to get a sense of the chances of winning. The fact that you were out of state and may have missed communications from the HOA or bank seems like it may weaken your case; they might argue that you had a responsibility to check your bank statements and have your mail forwarded. If you lose in court, you might be liable for the court costs in addition to what you currently owe.

Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.

The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.

This (as always) depends on jurisdiction, but usually - No, just taking the money is not legal.. In most jurisdictions, if you have a claim (the rent, in your case) against a debtor , and the debtor does not pay, you are not allowed to take any enforcement action (taking property, coercing the debtor) yourself. Instead, you must obtain a court or administrative judgement confirming your claim. Even then, often only a court officer or the police may actually enforce payment of the debt. This is mostly to protect the debtor from unwarranted enforcement action (such as taking more than you are owed, or collecting a disputed debt). For example, in Germany, to enforce a debt the creditor must first obtain what is called a Vollstreckungstitel or just Titel (title) - an official document confirming that there is an outstanding claim. This is on top of any contracts already existing. A Titel is obtained either through a regular court judgment, or through an abbreviated, administrative process called Mahnverfahren (essentially, you ask the court to send the debtor a letter about your claim, and if the debtor does not file an objection, you get the Titel). Once you have a Titel, the creditor can enforce it any time they choose (with a Titel, the statute of limiation is extended from the usual three years to 30 years). However, actual enforcement must be performed by an officer of the court (Gerichtsvollzieher). Only they may do things such as collecting the debtors property, force open doors and even imprison uncooperative debtors. I don't know the exact situation in the USA, but I believe it is roughly similar. For example, the equivalent of a Vollstreckungstitel is a Writ of execution.

The government cannot seize property because a person residing at that property has a tax debt: the debtor has to have a legal interest in the property, which you say you don't have. The government can seize property under the practice of civil forfeiture, which is a legal dispute between law enforcement and property – the simplest way to put it is that the property itself has "done wrong" (is involved in illegal activity). That's not what tax debt is. It is possible for the state to seize property in error, so just because the state makes a mistake somehow does not mean that the state cannot file the paperwork and seize the property if the owners ignore the summons.

What can Jay Nixon do now? Following the Public Defender of Missouri assigning Governor Jay Nixon to a case, what are his options?

Some options: Act as directed Find a replacement Leave the Bar Claim a conflict of interest

Section 11302 of the California Elections Code makes it crystal clear - as soon as an office becomes vacant, the recall election proceeds anyway, unless as of that moment there are not enough signatures to proceed to the vote. So the resignation tactic can only be used to stop a recall election while they are still in the signature-gathering phase - it will not work if they have already gotten enough signatures. California's recall law as it applies to statewide elected officials is, frankly, idiotic (it should be like an impeachment, next officer in line gets the post), but it is designed specifically to stop a shenanigan like you describe. The Lieutenant Governor would become Governor if Newsom resigned, but only subject to the results of the Recall - if Newsom is recalled (despite already having resigned), the person with the plurality on part two of the ballot would become the next Governor.

It occurred to me after that the fence would have been at the edge of the Canadian landowners property and the land between the fence and the border was a road allowance on crown land. This is one possibility, others are: The border post is in the wrong place The fence is in the wrong place Both are in the wrong place The US rancher owns land in Canada as well as the US Obviously the Montana Rancher is using Canadian land, but where is his fence supposed to be? Well, its not so obvious but anyway: Who says he has to have one? I am not aware of a law that requires a person to fence their property. Should it be right on the border? Assuming that is the edge of his land (which it might not be, see above) and assuming he wants to put a fence up (which he might not want to do) and assuming that he wants to put it on the edge of his property (because he could put it inside if he wants to) then yes. Or is there a strip of land there which is national land reserved for border patrol purposes? You don't know, I don't know - if you are really keen land ownership is public information; check with the governments of Alberta and Montana.

The government can’t withdraw The government does not have a right to unilaterally withdraw charges once the case is before the court. All they can do is ask the court to dismiss the case as they have done here. It’s up to the court (judge) to decide whether to grant the motion to dismiss or not. It granted, then the case has gone to completion and the defendant is legally not subject to punishment as they were not convicted of the crime, notwithstanding any previous guilty plea. Now, while it would be unusual for a judge to refuse such a motion it’s not impossible and they might do so if they felt that the interests of justice are better served by completing the trial in the usual way. This is possibly more common in civil litigation where a losing plaintiff might not be permitted to settle if the judge doesn’t feel an innocent defendant is being adequately compensated.

Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what.

Direct civil suits are not the only way to obtain remedies for property violations. Other options: Ask. You can send them a simple letter describing the violation and asking them to compensate you appropriately. Complain to authorities. If they engaged in any behavior that constitutes a crime (e.g., criminal fraud) then the state (via district or state attorneys) is responsible for any criminal prosecution. If the state prosecutes and you are considered a victim, the state generally takes that into account if they are able to prevail against the defender. Even if they didn't commit a crime, but they have a sufficiently outrageous pattern of abusing individuals' civil rights, state attorneys may decide to threaten or take legal action. Seek a "litigation investor." If the size of damages likely to be recovered via lawsuit is high enough, then law firms will sometimes take cases "on contingency," which typically means the plaintiff does not front any money, but gives up a significant share of any winnings. There are also independent litigation investment companies that perform the same function based on a similar calculus, but often for even larger cuts of any winnings.

I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer's instructions?

The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.

Legal restrictions on LLC names for worker cooperatives in WA state Myself and several friends are planning on starting a for profit worker-owned cooperative business that will provide landscaping services in Washington state. Washington is one of a few states in the US that have created business structures specifically for worker cooperatives (see RCW 23.86), as opposed to having co-ops form as partnerships, LLCs, or corporations as in most states. However, we would like to start our co-op as an LLC to simplify our taxes and bookkeeping, reduce our startup fees, and to have more flexibility as far as our management structure. Unfortunately, WA cooperative law prohibits people from using the word "cooperative" unless they form as a cooperative association under RCW 23.86. The regulations for naming LLCs (in RCW 23.95.305) state: (5)(a) The name of a limited liability company: (i) Must contain the words "limited liability company," the words "limited liability" and abbreviation "Co.," or the abbreviation "L.L.C." or "LLC"; and (ii) May not contain any of the following words or phrases: "Cooperative," "partnership," "corporation," "incorporated," or the abbreviations "Corp.," "Ltd.," or "Inc.," or "LP," "L.P.," "LLP," "L.L.P.," "LLLP," "L.L.L.P," or any words or phrases prohibited by any statute of this state. The word "cooperative" is specifically prohibited for LLC names. So obviously if we form as an LLC, then we cannot use the name "XXXX Landscaping Cooperative, LLC". But I was wondering about the legality of calling ourselves "XXXX Landscaping Co-op, LLC", since the word "co-op" is not specified in the list of prohibited words or abbreviations? Obviously, this would be a sort of "loophole" since the law is designed to force all cooperatives into the structure dictated by the state in RCW 23.86, and forbid other businesses from calling themselves cooperatives. But I was wondering if legally, since the word "co-op" is not explicitly prohibited, are we entitled to use that name? If we do have a legal basis for it, how would we approach this matter with the WA Secretary of State's office if they are resistant to the idea? Thanks for your advice!

The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.

The real question isn't whether there is a law, but whether you want to keep your job. If you want to do something that you believe will affect your company negatively, and you ask whether it's legal or not, the question alone should show you it's a bad idea. And another question is whether you can be sued, and what it will cost you even if you can win a case, and the answers to that are "yes" and "a lot".

We have no way of knowing when this happened, but it is probably a fact, recorded some time in the past. Utility companies very frequently obtain a right-of-way (easement) which gives them certain rights to your property. Typically, this happened a long time ago when a previous owner agreed. As for gas pipelines, that typically includes "don't plant trees" restrictions. The easement is usually recorded in the county office where deeds are filed. The legal basis is generally "because you agreed, or some previous owner agreed". You can get a copy of the easement to see if "no trees" is actually part of the agreement. If yes, no point in arguing, if not, you could hire a lawyer if they are demanding that they are threatening you. They are allowed to be concerned and to ask you to cut trees regardless, but if it's not required by the terms of the easement, you can say "No, I'd rather keep my tree".

I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.

Yes. It is fairly common for there to be one owner at law, but another person who has a beneficial interest - such as a long-term cohabiting partner. This may arise because the parties set it up that way, or perhaps more often when courts find that there is a "constructive trust" or a "resulting trust". See for example the concurring opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Parties are, of course, free to enter into whatever bargain they wish and, so long as it is clearly expressed and can be proved, the court will give effect to it. But for the rest the state of the legal title will determine the right starting point. The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise than as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts. The resulting court process may find that the beneficial interest exists, or not, and what fraction of the property it represents. It's common to find situations where one party put up most or all of the whole purchase price of a house, which was then registered in both names, and they then disagree about whether it should be split 50-50 or otherwise - that's an example of the beneficial ownership differing in proportion from the (equal) legal ownership. (See Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at paragraph 51 for an explanation of this particular pattern.) The same sort of case arises when a cohabiting partner does not own the house, but still contributes to the mortgage and other bills - then, depending on the facts at hand, there may be a "constructive trust", and the partner is entitled to a share of the sale price of the house even though they are not its legal owner. A "resulting trust" might arise when someone contributed money for the purchase of the property, even though they didn't end up as a registered owner, but the parties acted in other respects as if they were joint owners.

I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.

I can see two points you might be confused about in your question. 1. Works can be in the public domain without having a CC license The Wikipedia statement and the government statement are not inconsistent with each other; just because something isn't available under a Creative Commons license doesn't necessarily mean that it is restricted by copyright. In fact, CC licenses are moot for material in the public domain: When a work is in the public domain, it is free for use by anyone for any purpose without restriction under copyright law. Public domain is the purest form of open/free, since no one owns or controls the material in any way. ... Creative Commons licenses do not affect the status of a work that is in the public domain under applicable law, because our licenses only apply to works that are protected by copyright. So if a work is in the public domain, you can use it for whatever purpose you wish (though see below), without restriction or attribution. This is less restrictive than the various Creative Commons licenses, which require various levels of attribution, non-modification, etc. depending on the license chosen by the creator. 2. Trademark protections are separate from copyright protections Your quote from the government website implies that these logos might be trademarked, even if they're not under copyright; this is entirely possible. Roughly speaking, trademark protections keep other people from trading on your good name & reputation; copyright protections keep other people from directly profiting from your creative endeavors. If another party creates a product that uses a trademark in a way that would create confusion among consumers, the trademark holder can sue for that. Depending on how you use the logos, you might run afoul of these protections. See this Q&A for futher details under US law. (Australian law may differ a bit but I would expect that the general principles are the same.)

This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.

Moved to Colorado, been here 60 days & my license plate expired. What can I do? By law, it seems I can't get residency until 90 days. What can I do? I can't get a plate until I'm a CO resident.

According to the state, If you own or operate a business in Colorado or, are gainfully employed in Colorado, or reside in Colorado for 90 consecutive days you are a resident of Colorado. After becoming a resident of Colorado you must register your vehicle within 90 days or you will be imposed vehicle registration late fees. "Resident" is defined in C.R.S 42-1-102(81). So one solution would be to get a job within the state.

Yes, you can register in Connecticut. Connecticut previously limited voting eligibility to "permanent" residents, but it later changed that to limit it to people with at least year's worth of residency, and then six months' of residency. Under current law, though, a voter need only be a "bona fide" resident of "some town" in Connecticut. This means you need only to have legitimately moved into the city with some actual intent to stay, even if not forever. The deadline is tomorrow, so register now.

I'm assuming you are talking about something like this You didn't specify where you live, but in many places it is illegal to block the sidewalk with a car. I just looked up my local ordinances and it is there. In fact, it is your driveway, but often the land up to and including the sidewalk is considered part of a public easement. Typically you are required by law to maintain any grass in the easement, but if the sidewalk were to fall into disrepair, the local government would fix it. Information on easements can also be found in your local ordinances, here is an example in my area. Should I fight this ticket? You can try, but I doubt you will win. Is there anything I can do to my driveway to allow me to actually use it? I would suggest asking on Lifehacks. And post a link here to your question if you do, I'd be curious to know what they come up with.

You have a third option: Sue the district for violating state or local law. There are lots of recent news stories about people doing just this and winning. The US Constitution Can't Help You: The school district is not violating your constitutional rights by installing lights at the stadium. The only constitutional protection remotely connected to your situation is the "takings clause" of the 5th Amendment. It says, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Unfortunately, the "takings clause" only applies if there is a "taking." A "taking" is generally understood to be exactly that -- you lose your property. The loss can be literal -- the government takes title to your house and turns it into a football field or freeway on-ramp -- or figurative -- the disturbance from the football field or on-ramp is so pervasive that your property becomes worthless. Since having the lights on will not destroy the value of your property, the takings clause does not apply to you. As one Justice said in a related case, the lesson here is simple: "the federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesirable." State or Local Law Might Help You: Even though you don't have a constitutional claim, depending on what state and city you live in, you may have a claim under state or local law. (These might be statutes, regulations, ordinances, or even your state constitution.) For example, in 2010 a group of home owners in Atherton, California who lived near the local high school sued when the school announced plans to install stadium lights. The suit claimed the lights violated local height limits, and that the night games would violate noise ordinances. The suit, plus a savvy pr campaign, got the school to agree to limits on night games. Atherton is not alone. All the way across the country, in Greenwich, Connecticut, neighbors upset about stadium lights sued and got an agreement about the use of lights. A search using high+school+lights+neighbors+sue turns up plenty of other examples. You will have to talk to a local attorney to find out what state or local laws you can use.

They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority.

I am not from Denver, so it may be different there, but I would think most people would take that to mean the appliance meets UL standards or other safety standards and has been certified. Each governing body, be it a town, county, state, or country, gets to decide who can certify an appliance.

New Jersey has jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-10 provided that at the time the cause of action arose, either party was a bona fide resident of this State, and has continued so to be down to the time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for absolute divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall be commenced for any cause other than adultery, unless one of the parties has been for the 1 year next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this State; (which if you undo the contorted writing, mean one of you must be a resident for a year, except if the cause is adultery). Under this scenario, the wife did not continue to be a resident of NJ, so it is crucial that the husband be a bona fide resident. The problem is that there is no general law defining residency for all legal purposes, instead, residency is defined on a law-by-law basis (or, not defined). 52:14-7 which imposes a residency requirement on state employees says that a person may have at most one principal residence, and the state of a person's principal residence means the state (1) where the person spends the majority of the person's nonworking time, and (2) which is most clearly the center of the person's domestic life, and (3) which is designated as the person's legal address and legal residence for voting. The husband is apparently an NJ resident under (1) and probably (2), and possibly (3). It would not matter whether he was living in that particular house, the question was whether he was living in the state (presumably yes since otherwise you would have said "he moved out of the state"). Voter registration, another measure of residency, requires 30 days living in NJ (and is itself proof of residency). Another way of determining residency is via state income tax. You are a full time resident if New Jersey was not your domicile, but you maintained a permanent home in New Jersey for the entire year and you spent more than 183 days in New Jersey or New Jersey was your domicile for the entire year, as long as it's not the case that You did not spend more than 30 days in New Jersey You did maintain a permanent home outside New Jersey You did not maintain a permanent home in New Jersey Under tax law, the husband is a resident. Failure to get an NJ license is itself against the law, so that would not be a valid argument that the husband is not a resident. Owning a business in another state also does not negate residency.

I assume that the loan was legal, in light of rule changes pertaining to non-borrowing spouses. If so, there is really no recourse other than to repay the loan. This article explains the current options / restrictions in an understandable manner, but of course it is too late to do anything about it. If there was actually fraud or coercion in the loan, or if the elder party was mentally incompetent, there might be some legal recourse, but we don't have any evidence of fraud, coercion or incompetence here.

Is taking notes copyright infringement? If I'm taking notes on a book I'm studying would I technically be infringing copyright if I didn't properly cite the source on the piece of paper the notes are on? I got curious because I was watching a youtube video and someone explained something so well I copied it down verbatim into google docs. Is this breaking copyright? I guess what I don't get about fair use is it says it can be used for study, so does that mean as long as you don't actually use it you're ok? For example you're learning how to speak German and you make notes from your book, this is ok but if you actual speak German then you're using it so fair use doesn't apply? Obviously this isn't how it works so I'm curious as to how it does.

It depends on where you are For example, in USA copyright exists in a literary or artistic work stored in permanent form like a book, a movie, an audio recording, a building etc. In contrast, in Australia there is no requirement for the work to be stored - that means copyright can exist in a spoken lecture. The owner of the copyright (usually, but not necessarily the creator) has the right to choose if and how their work is copied and if and how any derivative works may be made from it. For your example, the book is an original work in which copyright vests with the author(s), your notes are a derivative work in which copyright vests in you. However, you presumably did not have permission to make your derivative work so that makes it prima facie a copyright infringement. Fortunately, in the USA there exists a Fair Use defence and in Commonwealth countries the slightly less permissive Fair Dealing defence (if you are somewhere else you will need to do your own research). Search this site or read the copyright article on Wikipedia to learn about these defences. Long answer short (too late!), taking notes to aid your own study is almost certainly Fair Use/Dealing. So is sharing it with your friends. Publishing it may or may not be depending on all sorts of factors; for example, if you were to write a study guide for say a Harry Potter book for use by English literature students this is probably OK even if it is a for profit activity, because criticism is Fair Use/Dealing. Citing work is not necessary to comply with copyright law. Failing to cite may be academic misconduct but that is not a legal matter; its a matter for your academic institution.

Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.

Bob is not authorized, but he may legally do so (in the US, you don't need specific authorization to perform a non-forbidden act). In creating the manual, Bob would need to avoid reproducing the questions (which are protected by copyright), and just give the answers. Copyright protection for the textbook includes not just the actual words, but also organizational structure, so Bob would need to avoid copying the structure of the exercises. As for "structure of the exercises", textbooks often have exercises for each chapter, with a clear logic to the order and content of chapters. Within the chapter exercises, there is often some rationale to the order of presentation of the dozen exercises, like starting for with simplest concepts presented in the text and moving up the ladder. In a given exercise, there my be subparts, where understanding part 1 leads you to understanding part 2, and so on. In a well-structure textbook, maybe 20% of the creative nature of the book is that artful ordering. Imposing an entirely different order on your solutions avoids copying the author's protected expression.

Q1 and Q2 are definitely not copyright violations. Copyright protects original expression. Your questions are yours; the only things you are using are the names, and copyright doesn't cover them on their own. The quotation in Q3 might conceivably come under copyright. However in practice it is very likely to be fair use (unfortunately nothing is definitely fair use until a court rules on it, but I can't imagine a short quotation in a quiz being an issue).

You cannot safely rely on the US doctrine of Fair Use, except if the rights-holder sues you in US courts. In France, there are limited exceptions to the authors proprietary rights. Under Art. L-122-5, there are some relevant potential exceptions: 3ºa) analyses and short quotations justified by the critical, polemic, educational, scientific or informatory nature of the work in which they are incorporated... 4º. parody, pastiche and caricature, observing the rules of the genre. Your description of the intended use does not fit these criteria. Consulting with a copyright attorney is advised, if you don't want to obtain a license.

Here's one way to avoid the issue altogether: Wikipedia, or anyone for that matter, can't copyright information (only its expression). You can reword (automate the process?) the content (ie, w/out doing "independent research") and it's yours! Of course, I'm not a lawyer so consult one of those.

I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.

I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.

What legal ramifications can be imposed for making a item appears as though it has been stolen in transit, and then allowing the vendor to replace it? I once crossed paths with an individual boasting about his technique for getting free stuff. He would go online and search for people selling second-hand "nearly new" gear that was still within their warranty period, contact the seller and ask for model numbers, receipt numbers or other identifying marks claiming he wanted them to do background checks on the item whilst feigning extreme interest in the purchase of whatever it was. He would then take what he had learnt to the manufacturer/vendor and claim his product was broken, and he would like to send it in for repair. Rather than sending the product, as he obviously did not have it, he would send a box that had been cut open/resealed in such a way that it was highly plausible the item was taken in transit by some nefarious person in the hauliers chain of command, when this was discovered at the receiving end he would act outraged and demand action be taken, usually resulting in the vendor sending him a new item in its place. Obviously this whole act seems highly illegal, and probably falls under some form of social engineering scam and is clearly fraud, but what i want to know is what sort of legal ramifications can come about as a result of this scheme? Would it simply be a civil matter that, if discovered, would only be resolved by being taken to court in a civil case, or could the consequences possibly lead to things like jail time? For the sake of this question and the fact it may differ country to country, lets say this event occurred either in the US or the UK (or some similar European nation) as these are the legal systems I am most familiar with

This is fraud. The defrauded party can sue for damages. The state can prosecute: in NSW the penalty is up to 10 years jail (s192E Crimes Act 1900).

Are online stores supposed to state the true “order cost”/value of an order on the package/envelope for the customs? Yes Is it common practice to slash 10x off of the price for the customs to not add various fees? Common? Probably no. Uncommon? Also, probably no. Isn't that illegal? Yes Of course, they can claim it was a mistake if ever found out, but if they do it consistently, that seems difficult... Not to mention there must be electronic proof of how much each order actually cost the customer? Yes Look, robbing banks is illegal but people still rob banks. Similarly, ripping off HM Revenue & Customs is illegal but people still do that too. In fact, far more people do that than rob banks.

These all seem to be issues with how the local post office is handling your mail (and no doubt that of others). I would start by asking to see the person in charge of that office, and asking that person the same questions that you asked here. I am not sure that, under US law, the "envelope information" of your mail is protected in the way that the contents are.

It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.

I am not a lawyer, and none of the following should be seen as legal advice. While it is always best to assume every image has a copyright.... In your scenario... traditionally if you are selling a product, there's generally no harm in using images of that product to assist in the sale. But even then photographer copyrights should be considered. Images of products may not only contain copyrighted material within the photo, but the photo itself is probably also copyrighted by the photographer. Just blankety taking images from other web sites is a poor practice in general and will customarily just get you into trouble. However, many manufacturers or distributors will actually provide resellers with product images. You can check the product manufacturer's web site for a "press" or "media' section. There are often downloads provided in those areas. I don't know hairdressing.. but as an example, General Motors has a special web site known to GM car dealers where the dealers can download high resolution images of the cars and products for ads, etc. I've done work in the past for a GM dealer who provided me with the web site and log in details so I can get product imagery. In addition, few manufacturers will take umbrage that you are using their images to sell their products. They want their products to look as good as possible wherever they may be displayed. In many cases, they may prefer you use supplied images rather than use your own. Customarily you would include a disclaimer in the footer somewhere: The product names, company names and product images used on this web site are for identification purposes only. All trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their respective owners. Note, I am referring to images from the manufacturer's web site, not from competing businesses. If you are building a site for "Bob's Hair Styling" it's unethical to take images from "Kate's Hair Dressing" for your use. Stick to the manufacturer... if selling Paul Mitchell products, check the Paul Mitchell web site for available product images.

Is this legal? Generally yes, unless it unlawfully exceeds the scope of the license. Also, if it is, how can I check if it's permitted by the original store's EULA? Read the whole EULA, focusing on terms related to resale, assignment, and transferability.

Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.

You had bought product A. That constitutes you offering the seller a contract for you to get product A for your money. They keep the money and send product B - and now are in breach of the contract, as that is materially different from the contract both agreed to. Legal recourse is, depending on the customer protection laws, a refund of the payments or getting the correct product A. If you have a right for the Product A depends on exactly how it was advertized and the exact ToS.

Are website operators allowed to detect and block website content based on browser add-ons? In this case, it's about Ad Blocker. I've noticed more and more websites blocking their content based on whether their visitors are using this add-on or not. From their point of view, I understand it's their income from these advertisements getting in danger. From the user's point of view, I understand it's not just some annoying advertisement, but sometimes real danger like Trojans or Viruses. Whoever is right however, is not the question. The question is more related to the invasion of privacy. Is a website owner really allowed to know what kind of add-ons or programs I'm using without my permission? Is such an owner not in fact discriminating based on what a user is using on his/her computer? Even so when the programs or add-ons being used are completely legal?

You've really got two questions here: 1) "Is it an invasion of privacy to know that I'm using an ad blocker?", and 2) "Is it discrimination to refuse service based on what software I'm running?". Taking them in order: Because of how HTTP/HTML works, there are essentially two ways for a server operator to know what software you are running. Your browser announces that it's running something. This usually takes the form of a modified User-Agent header. I'm not aware of any privacy laws that consider "Person A told me something" to be an invasion of Person A's privacy. They guess it based on the actions your browser takes. For example, if the website gets a request for a page, and the site's ad network does not get a matching request for an ad, the server deduces that the user is running an ad blocker. Since this is based on things that the server operator could reasonably be expected to be informed of, it isn't an invasion of privacy under any law I'm aware of. Is it discrimination? Yes. But not all discrimination is illegal. In general, only discrimination based on protected categories (race, sex, etc.) is prohibited, and I can't imagine a jurisdiction making "choice of browser add-ons" to be one of those categories, not least because it's something the person being discriminated against can easily change.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

This sounds a bit far-fetched. There are laws against circumventing copy protection measures (DRM) but not against aimbotting (to the best of my knowledge). Thus, you cannot reasonably believe that a click-assist functionality would be used to break laws. It could definitely be used to break private contracts such as an EULA, but you are not a party to that contract and are not bound by its terms. Of course, when you use such click-assist tech in an online game, you might be breaking your contract with the game vendor or server provider. But this doesn't imply that a click-assist would be forbidden outside of that context. Note that assistive technologies sometimes have exceptions from laws, e.g. a permission to circumvent DRM if necessary for accessibility. In the US, the Librarian of Congress adopts exceptions for a duration of three years. While none of the current exceptions match your specific scenario involving video-games, it can be permissible to break DRM on e-books or videos for certain accessibility enhancements.

That depends what is meant by "not allow". Such a blog author could certainly include a statement that the blog was intended only for female readers. That would not be enforceable. She could include a ToS provision requiring a user to agree to such a restriction. That might be enforceable in theory, but it would be a lot of work to try to enforce, as a blog author does not normally know who her readers are. Such an author could have the blog require registration and log-in, and as part of the registration process require registrants to provide evidence that they are females. That might work to keep (at least most) males from directly reading the blog. If we suppose that the author had such a registration process, and someone brought suit under a federal or state anti-discrimination law, what would happen? Such laws usually only apply to "places of public accommodation". Such laws have mostly been employed to address discrimination in hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores, and similar places. I am not aware of any case declaring a blog or any similar online service a "public accommodation". Such a finding would be needed for a suit in such a case to be won by the plaintiff. There are also specific laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and education. But those would not apply to this sort of case. So I am inclined to doubt that any such restriction, if imposed by a blog author, would be found to violate US anti-discrimination law.

The purpose of the button is not to put liability on you, but to shield the website from liability. The website does not want you looking up information about drugs, deciding that a particular drug is right for you, causing yourself harm and then blaming the website. You may have acted unlawfully but you would have no liability because no injury (financial or otherwise) has been caused to the website. Clicking the button is an assertion that one is a medical professional. This is a false statement, so the website could sue you for the tort of deceit, but there is no injury, which is one of the elements of deceit. The website would not even get nominal damages. The button may also constitute a contract. In exchange for access to a website, you warrant that you are a medical professional. You are not, which is a breach of the contract. However, the damages are nil. Conceivably, if you passed the information on to someone else who misused it, there may be some injury to the website, and then you would have to compensate the website for that injury under one or both of the heads of liability described above. In terms of criminal liability, it is rarely an offence to make a false statement to a private body without some other aggravating element. For example, in Australia, it is an offence to make a false statement for financial gain, or to make a false statement to a government official (regardless of whether there is financial gain etc). But simply making a false statement is not by itself a crime. You may breach a computer law. The United States Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is pretty broad. Obtaining information from a computer without authority is an offence: 18 USC s 1030(a)(2)(C). The only exception is if the web server is in the same state as you and somehow nobody from outside the state can access it: see definition of 'protected computer' in 18 USC s 1030(e)(2).

What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.

You haven't specified a jurisdiction. In the United Kingdom† this is a clear violation of section 3 of The Computer Misuse Act 1990 (1) A person is guilty of an offence if—     (a) he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer;     (b) at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and     (c) either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2) This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act—     (a) to impair the operation of any computer;     (b) to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer; [F2or]     (c) to impair the operation of any such program or the reliability of any such data; [F3or     (d) to enable any of the things mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (c) above to be done.]] Deleting the data is unauthorized (3.1.a) The ethical hacker knows it is unauthorized (3.1.b) Deleting the data prevents access to the data (3.2.b and hence 3.1.c) † This is one of the few Acts that apply to the whole of the UK.

It might possibly be illegal. For criminal law, usually you need to obey the laws of three countries: The country you are a national of (by personality principle) The country from where you make the sale (by territoriality principle) The country that hosts the attacked interest (by territoriality principle) Then it depends on the jurisdiction (and other factors) whether the sale is legal or not. I'll use the example of my country, Czech Republic. There is a crime called "Unauthorized access to a computer system or data storage device". For example, you commit this crime by exploiting a vulnerability in a web application and copying the web owner's data on your computer. It is also codified that whoever wilfully facilitates the committing of a crime by providing the criminal with resources (such as the exploit) is considered to have also committed the crime. For this to apply, you must have known or expected that the exploit will be used to commit a crime. The courts would decide this.

On what grounds can a government delegalise the use of specific software and is that compliant with international laws? As I read in the "Government use" section in the VPN blocking article on Wikipedia. It seems that Iran and China (used to) block access to use VPN software. I'd like to widen the scope of the question and apply it on any type of software, not specifically VPN or encryption software. On what grounds can a government delegalise the use of specific software? And is delegalization of (specific) software compliant with international laws (human rights)?

Governments have power to do whatever their constitutions (written or unwritten) allow them to do. For example, the constitution of Australia provides: The federal Parliament can make laws only on certain matters. These include: ... post and telecommunications; ... The telecommunications power covers VPN and any software that uses the Internet for delivery or communication (i.e. virtually all modern software). In addition the federal government has power over inter-state and international trade (any software that crosses state or international borders) and corporations (any software made, sold or used by companies). If they want to ban a piece of software they have pretty strong constitutional power to do so.

As you, the data controller, are from the EU, all your processing activities must comply with the GDPR, regardless of where the users are from. Since the EU–US Privacy Shield was invalidated in the 2020 Schrems II decision, it is no longer straightforward to use US-based services as your data processors. You have a variety of options to consider. Accept the ~77ms latency from an EU data center. This is the easiest solution from a compliance perspective. Depending on the application, this really might not be a problem. Use services based in a nearby country that is covered by an EU adequacy decision, such as Canada. E.g. the AWS Canada-Central region near Montreal is about 10ms away from NYC. Digital Ocean's Toronto region is about 20ms away. I would choose this approach if you're very concerned about latency and want GDPR compliance with reasonable effort. Handle non-EU data processing activities through a non-EU subsidiary entity. However, that entity would have to actually determine the purposes and means of processing. Setting up a non-EU office with non-EU staff would be costly. You couldn't work remotely for that entity from within the EU without defeating its purpose. Sign standard contractual clauses (SCCs) that serve as a legal basis for data processing activities in the US, after performing an analysis that indicates that the specific concerns as in the Schrems II case do not apply in your case, and potentially after identifying and implementing measures such as end-to-end encryption as explained by the EDPB Recommendations 01/2020 on supplementary transfer measures. Most companies end up relying on SCCs, since otherwise the use of US-based services is impossible. But it's doubtful whether the necessary analysis has been properly performed. The supplementary measures suggested by the EDPB are sometimes feasible in specific use cases (e.g. encrypted backups), but are generally impossible to fulfill for typical cloud services. So even though this is a popular option, it comes with substantial risk for your compliance efforts.

It really depends on what "services" you are providing, but generally speaking you would be in violation of the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). These regulations are spelled out in 31 CFR §560.205 and 560.420 and apply to US citizens and residents wherever located. Specifically, the action that is prohibited is the "exportation, reexportation, sale or supply of goods, technology, or services to Iran. Here "Services" is broadly construed to mean anything of value even if no money is exchanged, including providing technical assistance to an Iranian national or Iranian institution. See See § 560.204; §560.410. The civil penalty for violation of these sanctions would be $250,000 or an amount "equal to twice the amount that is the basis of the violation". Criminal penalties may include fines up to $1 million and 20 years in prison. Now there are some exempt transactions outlined by § 560.210 (c) which may be applicable here, however it would be up to you to prove that these are "information or informational materials" as defined by § 560.315. For more information, 31 CFR Part 560, Subpart B refers to the prohibited transactions with Iran. Since you are not specifically spelling out what services you intend to provide, it is difficult to say for sure you would be in violation of them. It should be noted though that the US Government uses publicly funded money to run a proxy server through which Iranians can access otherwise blocked websites such as social media in Iran.

You seem to have a solid understanding of the ePrivacy implications, but lack a fundamental insight: your organization does not have a right to achieve its mission or a right to disseminate unwanted marketing. But other people do have a right to not be subject to excessive marketing. Of course, reality is more complex, so it's probably not entirely impossible to do marketing. In your point 1, you note that some EU/EEA/UK countries distinguish ePrivacy protections between consumer and business subscribers. You can research the exact rules in the potential customer's country. This may allow you to email corporate/business accounts. I would strongly advise against messaging via Linkedin if there is a chance that the person is using that account for personal purposes like networking or hunting jobs, not just for conducting official company business. ePrivacy has markedly different rules for email marketing vs phone marketing. Whereas there are pretty strict rules for electronic messages and robocalls, manual cold calling can be OK from an ePrivacy perspective. However, many EU/EEA/UK countries have rules that go beyond ePrivacy, and may have a kind of do-not-call registry that you must respect. Of course manual calls take more effort than spamming emails, but recall the above point that you don't have a right to spam other people. Phone calls are probably the most appropriate approach when the company lists individuals' phone numbers on its website. This will at least give you a few seconds of attention with a real human, more than you can expect from an email that is likely to be caught by spam filters. Marketing via physical mail tends to have very lax rules. Note that every company/business that has a website will have to disclose its contact details including an address there, so this information is easy to acquire. However, chances are low that anyone would seriously engage with that marketing. You can consider alternatives to direct marketing, so that interested companies eventually come to you. Things like press releases, writing guest articles in industry publications, speaking at relevant conferences, working on search engine optimization, buying ads. On the GPDR aspects: GDPR and ePrivacy overlap, and it is necessary to comply with both sets of rules (GDPR likely applies here via Art 3(2)(a)). But where they potentially contradict each other, ePrivacy as the more specific law has precedence. For example, ePrivacy overrides the default GDPR legal basis rules when it comes to email marketing to existing customers (opt-out basis, no consent needed) or to using cookies (needs consent unless strictly necessary). Information that relates to corporations is not personal data, but information that relates to individual employees or to sole proprietors would typically be personal data. Since you are unlikely to obtain consent for using this data, you would need an alternative GDPR legal basis such as a "legitimate interest". Relying on a legitimate interest requires that you conduct a balancing test, weighing your interests like marketing against the recipient's interests, rights, and freedoms. Core question in this context is whether the data subject can reasonably expect their personal data to be used like this, taking into account the nature of their relationship with you. Since there is no pre-existing relationship, claims of a legitimate interest are weak to start with. However, it may be possible to argue that when a company makes employee contact details available via its website (not LinkedIn!) then relevant marketing can be reasonably expected. I would rather not rely on such arguments, though.

No Governments have sovereign power. Subject to constitutional and legislative constraints, governments can change laws as they wish. That includes legislative changes and administrative policies. Most governments tend not to use this power arbitrarily because it tends to make investors wary - economists call this sovereign risk. Like any other risk, the higher it is, the greater return an investor expects - countries with high sovereign risk get less foreign investment and pay more for it. Further, most governments don’t make laws that are retrospective but unless there is a constitutional prohibition (like there is in the United States, for example), they can. So Ireland could not only change the rules going forward, they could change the rules that applied in the past (assuming the Irish constitution doesn’t prohibit this, which I don’t know enough about). If Ireland were to change this law, it’s likely there would be plenty of forward notice. The arrangement you spell out between mother and son is not enforceable unless it’s a contract and the presumption is that such familial agreements are not contracts. Such a presumption can be overcome by an explicit declaration by the mother and the son that they intend for it to be legally binding, preferably in writing. Now, governments can and do enter contracts which are enforceable by the courts but that is a one-on-one relationship between a government and a contractor; not a decree that must be followed by everyone. Unless, of course, they are the sort of government that doesn’t follow their own laws - I’m sure you can think of some - but they are huge sovereign risk.

An EULA, or "End User License Agreement", is a contract between the software user and the software publisher. It usually protects the interest of the software publisher, e.g. you can only use it on one computer; you may not alter it or distribute it without written agreement etc. In this case, the EULA specifies that: The software may be harmful to the user's computer The user's personal data may be sent to third parties The software may used to aid or perform illegal activities The software publisher is not responsible for any damage caused by using this software First thing first, is this a valid contract? Let's take a look at the essential elements of a contract: Offer and Acceptance Intention Consideration Capacity Consent Legality Possibility of performance The Legality element specifies that the contract must not be something disapproved by law. Botnets are used for attacking other computers, i.e. an unlawful act. Installing botnets may violate the Section 3A of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 in the UK. Sharing user's personal data may also violate data privacy laws. Let us, for the moment, assume the contract is valid. Item number 4 still causes a problem: an overly broad liability waiver. While liability waivers are common and normal, one can argue that the said waiver in this case seems to cover intentional or reckless acts. Such items in a contract are deemed as unenforceable. Parental control systems and remote observation systems are different. They can be used legally, and this legal use is common. Thus, distribution of these systems is legal. Needless to say, it is very difficult to argue that virus and botnets share the same. Of course, one can still use a remote observation system in an illegal way. In this case, the software user is liable, but the software publisher is not liable because the user's behavior is beyond their control.

IANAL, just a programmer with an interest in legal rules. Due to the very permissive nature of the MIT license, no, it does not appear that anything illegal has been done. Specifically, the section to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software (emphasis mine) grants everyone the right to modify your code and share those modifications, provided one includes the license. Since this person has included your license (including your copyright notice), they have followed the conditions of the license and are able to share your stuff. Legally. Ethically, I still think its ****. This might be a good starting point in selecting a license (note the Modification column). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_free_and_open-source_software_licenses The CC-BY-SA license family, as mentioned by Ron Beyer in comments is on this list, for example. TL;DR: You unfortunately granted a more permissive license than what you wanted/needed to. This was a BadThing(TM), analogous to giving too broad of access rights to a method or class. Determine your desired permissions, then select a license that matches what you'd like to grant.

This is a super complex question and no one really knows the answer yet. Orin Kerr is probably the leading scholar on this question, and he generally argues that forced decryption of one's own device is not a Fifth Amendment violation. As I understand it (and oversimplifying by a lot), one key piece of his position is that requiring you to put in your password is a statement about your knowledge of the password itself, not about the contents of the machine into which you are entering it. And because your knowledge of the password for your own devices is presumed, an exception for "foregone conclusions" would leave this compulsion unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. You can read one of his explanations here. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with that approach, but a California judge recently reached a conclusion similar to Kerr's. This will probably by a question for SCOTUS before too long.

How do i refer to a trademark I don't own without infringing on it? Say, for example, I have created a product which is compatible with a specific existing technology. Like an Apple iPhone case. I would like to tell the user that my new case can be used with their apple device. How do name my device such that it doesn't infringe on the apple trademark but still tells the user what it is? For example, can I name my case as an "Apple iPhone Case", or would that be trademark infringement? If not, what is allowed?

This is known as nominative fair use. The leading case in the US is New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). The International Trademark Association (ITA) summarizes: Nominative fair use generally is permissible as long as (1) the product or service in question is not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so much of the mark is used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service and (3) use of the mark does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. The ITA uses iPhone cases as an example of allowable nominative use: Use of “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6. Here is an example of that by J.Crew.

Well, actually, fair use is maximally relevant. Copyright means, put simply, DO NOT COPY. Citing or not is irrelevant (plagiarism is a whole other non-legal kettle of fish). Technically, what you describe is violation of copyright. However, under section 107 of Title 17 (the copyright law), you could attempt to defend yourself against an infringement suit on the basis that your action was "fair use". See this LSE q&a for the essentials of fair use.

Admission of copying proves one of the elements that the plaintiffs would normally need to prove in an infringement suit, making a law suit less risky from their perspective. This may very well invite lawsuits that would otherwise not be filed. But, this is pure speculation. Your legal rights are the same, independent of how much you choose to reveal in advance of a lawsuit. If your copying doesn't amount to a substantial taking, then it isn't infringement, whether you admit to copying or not.

NO The Names of actual people can neither be trademarked nor can a name have a valid copyrighted. There is no valid market class for names of people, making it impossible to register a trademark in that category. As a result, neither copyright nor trademark will prevent someone from attempting to name a kid "Nintendo" or "Sony Music". While you could try to name your kid Nintendo, unless you are in the US, most countries like germany or japan do safeguard what you can name a child. Those countries will deny your name as endangering the (mental) health of the child or in other way making the child a target for mockery. Compare to names in all lowercase, line breaks, and infinitely long names.

I don't think so. While JSON stands for "JavaScript Object Notation", it doesn't say that. So the term "JSON" isn't infringing on a trademark for "JavaScript". To sue somebody because of an alleged trademark infringement, one needs to prove that the offender abused a trade name of the suing company in a way to make the public believe the offending company was related to the suing company. Nobody is even trying that by just using a file format. The file structure itself was developed as an open standard, so they can't claim any rights on that. I have not heard about a company claiming rights in file structures recently, because the data is considered the property of the user, not of the company that wrote the program it was created with. And users are often no longer accepting file formats that can only be read by a specific (expensive) application from a particular company. They want to be flexible to change their vendor and keep the data.

Generally speaking pop-culture references, like literary references, are neither trademark infringement nor copyright infringement. Trademarks Often a referenced item is in fact not a trademark. Most character names, for example, are not protectable as trademarks, because they are not used to identify the product or service, nor to advertise the product or service for sale. Similarly many pop-culture references which are associated with various groups, events, or products are not being used to identify or promote those things, and so are not protectable as trademarks. Even when a reference is (or includes) a trademarked phrase, it is unlikely to be trademark infringement. As long as the user of the trademarked term or phrase is not using it so as to identify the product or service where it is used, is not using it to advertise or promote that product or service, is not using it in such a way as to cause confusion by reasonable people on what the source of the product or service is, and is not using it so as to falsely state or imply that the product ore service is endorsed, sponsore, or approved by the owner of the trademark, then the use is not in fringement. One may use a trademark to identify a related product or service, to indicate compatibility, or to make comparative claims, and that is nominative use (using the mark as the name of the thing marked). Nominative use is specifically not infringement. Copyright Names, taglines, titles, mottos, and other short phrases are not protected by copyright at all. See the US Copyright office Circular 33 -- Works Not Protected by Copyright, where it is stated: Words and short phrases, such as names, titles, and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship. The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the word or short phrase is novel, , distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words. This circulart includes as exMPLES: The name of a character Catchwords or catchphrases Mottos, slogans, or other short expression As I wrote in https://writing.stackexchange.com/questions/60965/what-are-the-fair-use-rules-in-the-usa-for-short-quotes-from-books-or-song-lyric Literary references, including short quotes, to other works of fiction are commonly allowed as fair use. They are usually appropriately attributed. There are several reasons for this. Such references normally do not serve as a replacement for the original. They normally do not harm the market, actual or potential for the original. And they are often transformative, that is, they re-user has a different purpose and achieves a different effect from the original. All of these factors are important in fair-use decisions, and all lean toward fair use for literary or pop-culture references. In fact, there are few cases to cite on such references, because it is so widely accepted that they would be fair uses that no on ever sues over them.

As is typical with legal matters, "it depends". It is not copyright infringement to mention the name of an artist or work of art. It may be infringement of trademark, or of the right of publicity. For example, Apple Computers has trademarked the name "Apple" in the domain of computers, so you cannot call your computer company "Apple Computers", without their permission. You also cannot advertise in a way that implies that Taylor Swift endorsed your product, without her permission – this is the "right of publicity" (the name may differ, e.g. "passing off" depending on jurisdiction). The situation in the US is highly variable, since it depends on state law. The legal inclinations of the particular artist may be irrelevant, since they often have legal arrangements with publishers, and if you are going to get sued, it might be the publisher that sues you. Hiring an attorney to evaluate the specifics of your idea is the only reasonable approach to the matter.

Let me be sure that I understand the situation. You set up an account with Big Company, which uses BigCo as a trademark. You want email about that account to reach you with a unique address, so you set up '[email protected]" and gave that as your email when setting up tha account. You don't plan to use that address for any purpose but communications from BigCo to you and from you to them. (Of course these aren't the actual names.) Have I understood the situation correctly? It seems that you ar not using 'BigCo" in trade, nor are you likely to be confused with an official representative of BigCo, so you are not infringing their trademark. However, someone using such an email more generally could perhaps be so confuse, so BigCo has a somewhat legitimate concern, as they cannot know the very limited use you plan to make of this address. The only way that the could force you not to use such an email address would be via a court order as part of a suit for trademark infringement, whcih under the circumstances I doubt they would get. However, unless they have some sort of contract with you to the contrary, they can control who registers on their site. and could refuse to register you using an email address that includes their name or alias. Convincing them to accept your registration, even though it does no harm to them, will almost surely be more trouble than it is worth. Give them "[email protected]" or something else that is not their name, but will suggest their name enough that you will know who it is. This will serve your purpose fully, and avoid a long argument with people who are reading from a script (once you get past the automated process, if you can even do that). This is all assuming that I have understood the situation correctly. I am also largely assuming US law, since you didn't mention a jurisdiction. (EDIT: UK law should not be very different on these points.)

Land seized during war Say one day Country A attacked Country B, and this began a full blown war between the two countries. During this war, Country B seized some of Country A's territory along their mutual border, and Country B ended up winning the war. Now that the war has ended, is Country B required by some international law or law of war to return the seized land to Country A? Does it matter that Country A started the war, not Country B?

Country A and country B must do whatever they agree in the settlement of the conflict between themselves - returning or ceding of territory being one of these. Or they can disagree about these laying the seeds for further conflict. The most recent example of this is Russia's seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine; which they legitimised by a plebiscite. AFAIK, Ukraine and the international community has not accepted this but neither are they doing anything about it - legally Crimea is still part of Ukraine, practically it is part of Russia.

We have made a complaint about this decision to the local administrative and highest courts of Finland. Both of these courts rejected our complaint (the highest court rejected our right to even file a complaint!) without even looking into the details of the matter at hand. Did you hire a lawyer? If the court rejected your complaint without even considering it, it may have been procedurally improper. Generally speaking, once your complaint is rejected by a court with proper jurisdiction, the matter is resolved and you lost. End of story, too bad. You have no recourse but to accept the action of the local government as lawful even though you believe that your case was wrongfully decided. In any case, I doubt that the local government's action in your context is illegal. This is an issue of "condemnation" and not zoning. Generally speaking, the government has a power of eminent domain to seize property for a public use so long as a process is in place for the owner to obtain compensation for the seizure. A government owned recreation center would generally be considered a public use. Certainly, nothing you have described would violate the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2010/C 83/02, Article 17. As you note: No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. This is a case where the deprivation is in the public interest, in which the Finnish courts have decided that the conditions provided by law for doing so have been met, and in which you acknowledge that you have a right to compensation. Since it appears that the compensation has not yet been determined, it is premature to say that the compensation you receive will not be fair or paid in good time, and you need to participate actively and vigorously in the compensation process to make sure that you do make the best case you can for fair compensation. Also, as you note, this has happened many times in Finland. This strongly support the conclusion that this action is legal under Finnish law, even if you would prefer to interpret its laws in another manner. Of course the compulsory purchase will not be paid with a fair market price but with a much lower price, which is technically a legalized robbery as it has many times occurred in similar cases in Finland. My next step is to file a complaint to the European Union Fundamental Rights commission in hopes that they can help me. An appeal to the European Union sounds futile to me, as everything you have said suggests that your rights under the E.U. Charter have not been violated. Call it robbery if you will from a moral perspective, but as you note, it is legalized robbery in much the same way that taxes are "legalized theft." Your efforts would be better sent hiring a lawyer to help you negotiate with the local government over the price. If you make a strong evidentiary case that the land is worth more than you have been offered, you have a decent chance of getting more than you have been offered, even if it is less than what you believe it is worth. You also have a better case of winning on appeal on the issue of an unfair price in a second instance court in Finland, than you would on the issue of whether the condemnation was legal, on which the settled law in Finland and under international law is that it generally is legal in your circumstances.

Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers "that be." This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is "any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism." What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who "the powers that be" happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow "laws" set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat.

The main treaty here is the Outer Space Treaty and its implementation in US law. For your purposes, the relevant sections of the treaty are Article II: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article VI: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities...The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty... and Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel thereof... Article II means that setting up your colony doesn't give you ownership over the land it sits on (and Article XII permits anyone to stop by for a visit at any time), but it doesn't outlaw setting up a permanent base. And I hope your "all the resources" includes a small army of lawyers. Between them, Article VI and Article VIII make the United States government responsible for anything you do in space, so there's a lot of paperwork involved in getting permission to do anything above the Karman line.

In most cases, the state boundary line controls. For example, Kentucky owns the Ohio River along its border with Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. In essence, the boundary between Kentucky and these three future states is the low point of the Ohio River's northernmost bank. This was established by a Congressionally passed law in 1792. The boundary is defined by federal statute on a case by case basis for each of the rivers that is a boundary between U.S. states. Most codifications of a state's statutory laws also restate the federal statute defining the state's boundary at the beginning before the actual portion setting forth state laws begins. In the case of the Rio Grande river, which is a boundary between the U.S. and Mexico, an international boundary treaty determines where the boundary between the U.S. and Mexico is for this purpose. International treaties similarly define all other international water boundaries of the United States. This isn't the end of the story, however, because many activities that take place in the "navigable waters of the United States" (which basically means with respect to rivers, rivers wide and deep enough to be used for commercial transportation, like the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers and the Colorado River) are governed by federal admiralty law, rather than by state law (even if both sides of the river are in the same state). For example, the employment law of ship crews operating on the navigable waters of the United States are governed by admiralty law, and so are most laws governing tort liability in collisions between boats/ships, and most laws governing salvage of boats/ships that have sunk. Some admiralty law cases must be litigated in the U.S. District Courts (i.e. in the federal court system's trial courts) which have exclusive jurisdiction over some admiralty law issues, while other admiralty law issues, while still governed by federal admiralty law, may be litigated in either state or federal courts which have concurrent jurisdiction over some admiralty law issues. Still, to the extent that admiralty law does not apply, the state law of the state in which that part of the river is located will govern. Fun fact: As a young lawyer I once was part of a group of lawyers litigating an admiralty law case arising out of an incident taking place on the Colorado River near Grand Junction, Colorado. Do I have any defense for breaking breaking state B's law if I assumed I was still in state A jurisdiction? No. You could argue at trial that you really were in state A jurisdiction. But if the finder of fact at trial determines that you were in state B, then state B law applies.

So generally, when a region of a nation tries to break away and form a new nation or join a nation, it's acceptance as a nation is generally based on the Diplomatic Recognition of other Nations. This can either be de facto or de jure, with the former acting in a manner of having some acknowledgement of a government of a territory, while a de jure recognition typically is stronger with embassies, consulates, and treaties between the two nations. For example, the United States has de jure recognition of France and vice versa, while they merely have de facto recognition with Iran (They recognize there is a government of the territorial area known as Iran, but they feel that the current government is illegitimate and refuse to engage with it in diplomatic relationships. Iran similarly knows there is a United States, but refuses to recognize it for political reasons as well.). When two nations do not have de jure recognition they will often appoint another nation "Protecting Power" who will act as a representative of the appointing nation in the nation they do not recognize. Currently, the Swiss Embassy in Iran has an office dedicated to U.S. affairs as it is the Protecting Power of the United States in Iran. Iran has asked Pakistan to have the same duties. And before you ask, yes, it is the geopolitical equivalent of two people in the same room not speaking to one another, but telling a third person to give the other person a message (U.S.: Switzerland tell Iran that they will give us back our citizens who are being held in their jail cells or we will drop bombs on them. Switzerland: rolls eyes Iran, the U.S. says they want their guys back or they will bomb you. Iran: Oh yeah? Tell U.S. 'Death to America!' Switzerland: eye roll They said... U.S.: Already routing the bombers!) If a region is claimed by more than one government, than it becomes disputed territory. Presently China has a lot of disputed territory with its neighbors and Maritime neighbors. Ongoing disputes include territories also claimed by India, Bhutan, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and The Philippines. Interestingly, the dispute with Taiwan is over who is the real government of China... Taiwan claims much of the other disputed territory China does... plus some territories which China has resolved disputes over. The Russia-Ukraine situation will likely leave the territory in question (The Donbas and Crimea Regions) listed as disputed. Generally, disputed territory doesn't mean nations cannot be friendly, as the United States has a number of territorial disputes with Canada, despite being very strong diplomatic allies (with the single largest land boarder between two nations in the world, disputed territory was bound to happen). Perhaps the most interesting is the now resolved dispute of the San Juan Island in Washington State. Oversimplified History has a good video about it on his YouTube channel, specifically the "Pig War" confrontations and does a pretty good job of highlighting just how dramatic the change to the modern border would have been.

It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.

This is true of the merchant ships of most countries. The collection of all merchant ships bearing a nation's flag are collectively its merchant fleet. Basically, this means that German flagged merchant ships are subject to German admiralty law when on the high seas, and that German merchant ships can be conscripted to aid a war effort on behalf of Germany in times of war. Stated another more direct way, this means that in exchange for the benefits of German sovereignty for a merchant ship owner, the merchant ship owner must sign up to be eligible to have his ship drafted into the German navy in times of war. A U.S. specific description of the "merchant marine" can be found here, but the general concept that: "The Merchant Marine is the fleet of ships which carries imports and exports during peacetime and becomes a naval auxiliary during wartime to deliver troops and war materiel.", is equally applicable to the German Basic Law as used in this case. A unitary merchant fleet is the naval equivalent of an "unorganized militia" or "selective service" made up of people eligible to be drafted, but who haven't actually be called up for military service.

Are loose in-box licensing agreements binding? I just purchased a vacuum cleaner and upon opening the box, there was a loose sheet of paper with a licensing agreement. The agreement said that using the product constituted acceptance of the agreement and that if I did not accept the agreement, I had to return or destroy the product. No explicit, active action was required to accept the agreement in order to use the product. My primary question is whether an agreement presented in this format is binding in the United States. I have a secondary question regarding this agreement. It placed restrictions on how the product could be used and on transferring the product to another party. Does the United States allow such restrictions on physical products such as vacuum cleaners or do purchasers automatically have the right to freely use and transfer products in accordance with the law?

I can't speak for the US but in Australia this would not be binding. You entered a contract for the vacuum cleaner the terms of conditions of which were made known to you at the time of purchase – the ticketed price, any store or website displayed terms and whatever was written on the outside of the box. Any alleged terms that were not made known when you entered the contract e.g. because they are inside the box are just that: alleged. In addition, the manufacturer would have committed an offence under Australian Consumer Law by misleading you that such terms were binding. This could lead to a fine in the multiple millions of dollars if the breach is widespread and egregious enough.

I was told that when you sign something in the UK, then it is your signature, no matter what name you are using. So if you sign a contract with my name, then it's your signature and you are bound by the contract. Things might be invalid because you signed and not me. For example, if you sign a contract selling my car in my name, then that contract is not valid. If some document needs signatures of two witnesses, and you sign with your name, then with my name, then there are no two signatures. As far as I know, signing under a false name is not in itself criminal, but might very well be supporting fraud, for example, and might therefore be illegal. The contract for the sale of my car, signed by you using my name, would very likely be part of fraud and therefore criminal.

Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html

Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff-

The CC-ND license seems to be what you are looking for. However, Sec. 2(a) has two conditions, one allowing copying and distribution of the unmodified original (as stated in A), but also allows the user to modify but not distribute a modified version of the work (they may "produce and reproduce, but not Share, Adapted Material"). This would mean that a reader could rewrite your paper, as long as they keep it to themselves. If this bothers you, I think you could not rely on a standard named license, instead you'd have to provide your own – such as CC-ND 4.0 without clause (2)(a)(B). Rewriting a legal document is a risky proposition, even for a legal professional, because you have to carefully think through all of the implications of any new punctuation, adjectives, and deletions. If you contemplate deleting clause (2)(a)(B), you should come up with a line of reasoning that compels you do delete it in order to accomplish your goal, and check that the deletion doesn't thwart that goal. That is why people pay money to lawyers (and also why you need to make your goal clear to that lawyer, lest the agreement be inconsistent with your goal).

Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.

The issue you identify isn't really a copyright issue. The same issue would arise if the product contained public domain images in the advertisements that aren't present in the work itself. Essentially, the question comes down to whether there was actionable deceptive advertising. Usually, these claims arise under specialized consumer protection statutes that offer remedies and means of enforcement different from an individualized fraud lawsuit, and usually a deceptive advertising claim is easier to prove than traditional fraud lawsuit. Traditional fraud lawsuits normally require a showing of damages caused by reasonable reliance upon the misrepresentation, which is uneconomic to prove in the case of an individual small consumer purchase. Usually, deceptive advertising of consumer products is established in a lawsuit by a government official in charge of regulating deceptive advertising or a class action lawsuit, and often statutory damages are assigned to each violation rather than requiring detailed proof of economic harm for compensatory damages from some but not other images being present. Often fine print in the advertisement or in a purchase form before buying the product discloses the disconnect. Also, the mere presence of an image in an advertisement doesn't necessary imply that it is included in the product. So prove of deceptive advertising liability in these cases is often difficult even with these relaxed standards. There are many gray area and close cases, and often, businesses settle these lawsuits rather than litigating them. A more specific answer would require knowledge of which jurisdiction's laws apply, which is often a non-trivial question in Internet based advertising lawsuits.

Recall the basic principle of copyright law, as detailed in 17 USC 106: The copyright holder has the exclusive right to make copies; prepare derivative works; or distribute copies by sale, rental, lease, or lending. Other people can legally do these things only if they are given permission by the copyright holder, typically via a license. (Remember, the literal meaning of the word license is permission.) Often, the copyright holder will require a prospective licensee to accept various terms and conditions before the license will be granted. If there is "no EULA", or if there is one but the purchaser has not agreed to its terms, then the purchaser has not been granted any such license, hence does not have permission to do any of the things listed above. If they do so anyway, it is illegal copyright infringement and they will be liable for damages. To use a firewall analogy, copyright law is "default deny". So let's take your questions one by one: Do they own the software? US law has no concept of literally owning software. The closest thing is owning the copyright, which the purchaser certainly does not. It still belongs to the vendor that wrote the software (or whoever they may have later transferred it to). Can they legally alter the code of the program they purchased? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. The copyright holder has not granted them a license to do that. (There are some exceptions for purposes such as reverse engineering and interoperability, see 17 USC 1201(f)). Can they legally redistribute it No; again, that is the exclusive right of the copyright holder, and the purchaser has not received their permission. or transfer ownership? Maybe, if the first sale doctrine applies. Its application to software is complicated. The user has a better case for being able to sell the software if it exists as some tangible object which is transferred (physical media, pre-installed on hardware, etc). Can they legally modify the code of the program for others who have also purchased the same package? No, that would be preparing a derivative work. Can they take that software and install it on a secondary machine? No, that would be making a copy.

Can there be a scenario where the use of an IED against an enemy is legally justifiable? (It's for a book, I swear...) Before I go any further, let me be clear that this is for a work of fiction. Doing some research for a story where a military protagonist becomes trapped behind enemy lines, with a plan to have her hold out until rescue against superior forces by adopting asymmetric warfare tactics, including the use of improvised explosive devices. This is an urban environment, but it's a situation where most of the civilians formerly in the area are already gone (either dead, fled, or captured), and she's actively trying to keep the enemy away from a pocket of survivors. Under standard Western rules of war, is it legal for her to use IEDs in this context? I did a little research already but that article mostly just deals with IEDs being used partially or fully for ideological reasons with no care to collateral damage (and often deliberately targeting civilians).

The fact that an explosive device is improvised is irrelevant to any law of war with which I am familiar. "Legal in war" is more a matter of deciding which treaty, convention, or custom you care to respect.

The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate.

I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.

The simple answer to the question you asked is that they are not mutually exclusive. Self-defense and “castle doctrine” are defenses. A person can be charged and tried for murder, and one or both of those can be their defense. But shooting someone in self defense does not guarantee immunity from a charge or trial. In the first place, you need to show that it was indeed justifiable self-defense. As a source for this answer, see Texas state law library. https://guides.sll.texas.gov/gun-laws/stand-your-ground That site itself says that the laws are complicated and refers readers to “plain English” from which I selected https://www.bhwlawfirm.com/deadly-force-self-defense-in-texas/ For self defense, the site says: Texas law provides for a justifiable defense at trial when using deadly force if the person claiming self defense: Reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary; Had a legal right to be on the property; Did not provoke the person against whom deadly force was used; and Was not engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force was used. For protection of property, it says Under Texas Penal Code §9.42, a person may use deadly force against another to protect land or property if: He is the owner of the land; He reasonably believes using the force is immediately necessary to prevent arson, burglary, or robbery; and He reasonably believes that the land or property cannot be protected or recovered by any other means. OK! To summarize the story linked by the OP, homeowner hears and then finds a man outside breaking into homeowner’s shed. He confronts intruder who then moves toward homeowner with a pickaxe. Homeowner shoots and intruder runs off. let us agree that the first shot was allowed under Texas law, preventing a robbery and perhaps an attack with a pickaxe. The homeowner says that he then shot again “into the night.” At this point he is shooting a fleeing person. We can even leave out all of the irregularities once he calls 911 two hours later to report an invasion in progress even though the intruder was dead. In any case, there is also the questions are: Is the homeowner’s version of events true in the first place? If we accept everything he said, was the shot the killed the man justifiable under Texas law? These are for the prosecutor to decide if it is worth trying and the jury to decide. Back to your question of how can they charge him if he had a right to stand his ground? Further, even if a person has a justification for using force, he may still be arrested and face trial. Self defense is a defense against a murder charge, not a get out of jail free card.

Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)

I can't comment on what the legal situation would be in your home country, but as a matter of U.S. law, the hypothetical scenario you've described is not illegal. First, because you aren't a U.S. citizen and because you aren't operating in the United States, the U.S. government probably has no jurisdiction over you, your website, or your conduct. Even if it did, the most relevant statute, 18 U.S. Code § 1017, would not apply. The statute prohibits the "fraudulent or wrongful" use of the FBI's seal. But "fraudulent" and "wrongful" generally refer only to conduct where one uses deception or other means to obtain money, property, etc. to which they have no lawful entitlement. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973). Because you aren't using the seal to obtain anyone's property through deception, this use would not fall within the statute's proscriptions. Even if the government sought to prosecute you, you would have a valid First Amendment defense. The First Amendment protects the right to free speech, and it does not allow statements to be criminalized merely because they are false. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). This outcome should be unsurprising to most U.S. observers. I think most people would agree that the U.S. obviously cannot prosecute a Hollywood producer for making a movie dramatizing the FBI's efforts to shut down the Pirate Bay, even if it displayed the FBI's seizure message on a monitor in the course of the movie, and even if it showed the seal being used on a completely fictional website. The hypothetical you're describing is not materially different. In both cases, the seal is being used to falsely create the impression -- for entertainment purposes -- that the FBI has shut down a website. Saying false things for entertainment purposes is not a crime in the United States.

You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.

This is controlled by state law (there is also a federal murder statutes but the federal government doesn't dictate defenses for state law). Here is Washington's. RCW 9A.16.020 says when use of force is lawful, and there are different "public officer" vs. "person" related provisions. Generally, public officers may use force (1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer's direction; but persons (other than those assisting an officer) may only use force (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Additionally, RCW 9A.16.040 is a long section specifically about officers, the most germane parts of which are that use of deadly force is justifiable (a) When a public officer applies deadly force in obedience to the judgment of a competent court; or (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty; or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer meeting the good faith standard of this section or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony; RCW 9A.16.050 has more limited circumstances when homicide is justifiable by others (not in self-defense): (1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished; or (2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the slayer, in his or her presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in which he or she is In other words, the box for police officers is bigger: they can use deadly force to do their job, your plumber cannot. RCW 9A.16.040 is not a general license to kill: the rest of the section details the conditions under which one can consider such use of force to be lawful. The officer must have "probable cause to believe that the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or a threat of serious physical harm to others". If that is so, "deadly force may also be used if necessary to prevent escape from the officer". Also, as usual, the fact-finders do not make that judgment post hoc, the officer at the scene does and he "shall not be held criminally liable for using deadly force without malice and with a good faith belief that such act is justifiable pursuant to this section". In enacting this law (in case the courts wondered, years later, the legislature declared The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens' permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200 [since recodified], 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers There do not appear to be statutory defenses for federal murder statutes, instead this results from common law interpretation, implemented in federal rules of criminal procedure (discussed here w.r.t. defenses) and jury instructions in the various circuits.

Do law enforcement agencies have to announce DUI checkpoints in advance? What does the 1990 Supreme Court case out of Michigan which found sobriety checkpoints did not constitute a violation of the fourth amendment require, explicitly or implicitly as the case may be, in terms of law enforcement agencies announcing or publicizing their planned checkpoints in advance? Does it require agencies or departments to publish in advance the specific time, location and purpose of checkpoints in advance? Does it require agencies or departments to announce that checkpoints will be operated within some jurisdiction over some period of time? Does it not require but suggest either of the above? Bonus question - does some other national/federal authority (e.g., the NHTSA, DOJ, newer court cases, etc.) have any rules, regulations or guidelines that govern local and state law enforcement agencies' operation of sobriety checkpoints?

You are referring to Michigan State Police v. Sitz 496 U.S. 444 (1990). It does not require or suggest a requirement of advance publication of any details regarding the checkpoints. The dissent mentions that "a sobriety checkpoint is usually operated at night at an unannounced location. Surprise is crucial to its method." This point was not countered or even mentioned by the majority. In this case, a state committee had created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity. The mentions this as a background fact, but does not rely on the existence of these guidelines as a requirement for the constitutionality of checkpoint stops. It does contrast checkpoints with "roving patrol stops". Quoting from Martinez-Fuerte 428 U. S. 543 (1976), the majority in Sitz said: "at traffic checkpoints, the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion". There are state guidelines, some states have constitutions prohibiting sobriety checkpoints (lots of case law at the state level regarding this), and some state legislatures have made these illegal. In Sitz, the checkpoints were being operated subject to guidelines developed by the Sobriety Checkpoint Advisory Committee (of the State Department of Police). Federally, the NHTSA has guidelines on visibility and publicity towards the goal of effectiveness.

Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.

Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.

A state's criminal jurisdiction normally applies to acts committed in that state's territory. So if you consume something in state A, you can't be charged in state B for violating state B's prohibition against consuming that thing. However, if state B has a prohibition against public intoxication, and you enter its territory while intoxicated, you could be charged for violating state B's prohibition on public intoxication. The fact that you're crossing state lines also increases the possibility that the federal government would want to get involved; the location of the federal prosecution could be in either state, although neither state's court system would be involved.

We should start with the rule regarding presentation of search warrants. The US Court search and seizure warrant form explicitly says Unless delayed notice is authorized below, you must give a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was taken, or leave the copy and receipt at the place where the property was taken. State will have similar rules, e.g. Washington's CrRLJ 2.3. (d) Execution and Return with Inventory. The peace officer taking property under the warrant shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the property is taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken. This does not explicitly say "before starting the search," and the wording "shall give ... a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken" implies that the two documentary items can be presented at the same time (therefore after the search). Arkansas's rule Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.3 is slightly different (b) Prior to entering a dwelling to execute a search warrant, the executing officer shall make known the officer's presence and authority for entering the dwelling which is not a requirement to present the warrant itself, and then (c) In the course of any search or seizure pursuant to the warrant, the executing officer shall give a copy of the warrant to the person to be searched or the person in apparent control of the premises to be searched. The copy shall be furnished before undertaking the search or seizure unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such action would endanger the successful execution of the warrant with all practicable safety, in which case he shall, as soon as is practicable, state his authority and purpose and furnish a copy of the warrant. So there is some variation in the requirement for handing over a copy of the warrant. Body searches might be subject to different standards per jurisdiction. Washington search law has extensive limits on strip and body cavity searches, whereas searching pockets is like searching a premise (a copy of the warrant must be eventually presented, along with an inventory of items seized). It is typically stated that ideally, police will show a copy of the warrant to the person being searched or whose premise is being searched, but ideally does not mean "must always". I have not found any case where an officer reasonably could have shown the warrant prior to conducting a search (when so requested by the searchee) but unreasonably refused.

In general, you do not have civil recourse against the government for (lawful) legal process that you are the victim of. "Counterclaim" would only be applicable when A sues B, and B makes a counterclaim against A – the police don't sue you, they arrest you, and the prosecutor prosecutes you (or decides not to). If the police beat you up, you could sue them for violating your rights, under what is known as Section 1983. Given the scenario you describe, this comes closest to involving false arrest, meaning that there was no probable cause for arrest. Otherwise, the police have immunity for their actions. But if there is a legal arrest warrant, there is probable cause (existence of probable cause is the standard for issuing an arrest warrant), so no claim against the police will succeed. I am leaving out the anomalous concept of an unlawful arrest warrant, where a judge issued an arrest warrant but there is in fact no probable cause. Such a case would be covered by Section 1983, where either the judge or the swearing officer (or both) violated your rights.

In the U.S. there is no law that requires you to ever say a word to a law enforcement officer, and lawyers generally encourage you to minimize what you communicate to them anyway. I can't think of any situation where a request for information could not be demanded in writing. As a practical matter, in some situations you will probably be subject to some extra scrutiny and inconvenience: E.g., in a stop-and-identify situation, you could hand the officer a note saying, "Please make any requests for information from me in writing." The officer may infer that you have some disability, but if he does not (or discovers you don't) he may get irritated enough to subject you to harassment for "contempt of cop". Of course, if you can understand him, you are still required to obey an officer's lawful orders no matter how they are communicated. But "speak" is not a lawful order.

I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.

Does a police officer have to get permission to break the law? Does a police officer require permission before breaking the law? Justice Brandeis states: Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means — to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal — would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S.Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting):

The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."

As I understand, the limited liability that police enjoy, requires that people bringing civil cases against police must prove that the police person should have had a reasonable knowledge of the civil rights that you accuse him of breaking, for the civil case to be successful. This isn't quite right. The test you are referencing is the one for qualified immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on government officials only for violating a "well-established" constitutional right. A rule of law is "well-established" when there is controlling case law in that jurisdiction when a factually similar binding precedent exists in that jurisdiction to show that the alleged conduct is unconstitutional. This test is employing the legal fiction that police officers are familiar with all of the binding precedents in the jurisdiction regarding what constitutes a violation of a constitutional right, which is held against officers. Of course, in reality, almost no police officers have that exhaustive a level of understanding of the law. What the test does, however, is to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for money damages when they take action which, in fact, violates a constitutional right, but which no case law in a factually similar case that was binding precedent established before the incident took place. Thus, police officers are relieved of liability for incidents that they would have to predict that a future court would find violated a constitutional right. This is sometimes phrased as being justified because a reasonable police officer could not have foreseen a new rule of constitutional law or a novel application of an existing rule of constitutional law to a new situation. One of the reasons that the qualified immunity rule is controversial, however, is that courts have the discretion to decide a case on qualified immunity grounds without determining if the underlying action indeed did violate a constitutional right, and this prevents constitutional law from evolving normally over time to applications in new factually novel situations. The key point, however, is that this requirement that a constitutional right be well-established to be enforceable in a civil action is an "objective" test in that it is decided without any reference to what the particular individual being sued actually knew about the law in the particular circumstances presented. A police officer who acts without actually knowing the law does so at his or her peril.

Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.

In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.

Yes new-south-wales A non-exhaustive list: At common law, a police officer can arrest without warrant any person the officer reasonably suspects has committed a felony. A private citizen can arrest without warrant only where a felony has actually been committed. Both police officers and private citizens can arrest without a warrant a person who commits a breach of the peace, or where it is reasonably believed that the person is about to commit a breach of the peace. In NSW a police officer’s common law duty to take a person before a justice as soon as practicable after arrest has been replaced by a statutory scheme introduced by the Crimes Amendment (Detention After Arrest) Act 1997. Under Part 10A police may detain a person for investigation for 4 hours, or for a further period not exceeding 8 hours if a warrant to extend the investigation period is obtained. Police can detain people 'for their own good' - for example, an intoxicated or drug-affected person; private citizens can't. Police can stop and search a suspect before an arrest on reasonable grounds; private citizens can't. Police can give directions to the public (the 'move-along' power); private citizens can't. Police can demand a person's name and address; private citizens can't. Police can demand disclosure of the identity of a driver and passengers in a motor vehicle; private citizens can't. Police can stop and search vehicles (including the road block power); private citizens can't. Police can conduct forensic procedures; private citizens can't. Police can conduct customs inspections (as can customs officers); private citizens can't. Police can search for internally concealed drugs; private citizens can't. Police can execute search warrants; private citizens can't. etc.

This is a deescalation tactic. By giving some ridiculous far out reason, the officer hopes to distract you from any combative or aggressive feelings you have about being stopped. You can do this too, if someone you think is getting progressively angrier might try and hurt you, bringing up something random forces their mind off their anger, even just for a moment. And sometimes, that's enough to avoid a conflict. As for the legality of telling you the reason, no they are not required to tell you the reason, as has been mentioned several times on stack exchange. If an officer says to himself, "I think this guy has crack on him because of X," and it's captured on his body cam, then he's covered. He can prove to the court that he did have reasonable suspicion to detain you, even if he later tells you, "I have a report of zombies in the area and I need to see your ID to determine if you have a death certificate."

I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.

I did not perform a complete survey but The Jurisdictional Limits of Campus Police reports that, "subject to jurisdictional constraints, campus police officers had virtually the same powers as their municipal counterparts." (Internal quotes omitted.) Generally speaking, police are police not administration. Here are some statutes: ILLINOIS HIGHER EDUCATION (110 ILCS 1020/) Private College Campus Police Act. The Board of Trustees of a private college or private university, may appoint persons to be members of a campus police department.... Members of the campus police department shall have the powers of municipal peace officers and county sheriffs. MASSACHUSETTS General Laws PART I TITLE II CHAPTER 22C Section 63. The colonel may... at the request of an officer of a college, university, other educational institution... appoint employees of such college, university, other educational institution or hospital as special state police officers. Such special state police officers shall... have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college, university, or other institution or hospital. Oklahoma 74-360.17 ...certified campus police officer shall have the authority to enforce... State criminal statutes. Campus police departments formed by private institutions of higher education pursuant to this act shall be deemed to be public agencies in the State of Oklahoma Here is a case: People v. Boettner, 362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y.Sup., 1974) is a case where school officials at a private school tried to get the cops to come execute a search. While the cops were dragging their feet obtaining a warrant, the school officials did their own search, found marijuana which they turned over to the police. Suspect was arrested and convicted. When the cops can't go into the room, send in the administration. Sort of. present search and seizure was conducted by college officials in a private capacity without government knowledge or participation and concludes that as such it is not subject to fourth amendment constraints. While it is true that a student does not lose his constitutional rights at the school house door or at the entrance to the college campus neither does he become cloaked with greater protection than any non-student who is the subject of a seizure of evidence by a private citizen. BUT the judge makes sure we understand that "State Police had no knowledge of and did not participate, directly or indirectly, in the search conducted by RIT officials on the 15th." So "it cannot be said that the RIT officials who decided on their own to search defendants' rooms were acting as agents, either actual or implied, of law enforcement.... Nor can it be said that the present search was only one incident in a close and continuing relationship between RIT and local law enforcement officers.... In the final analysis, RIT acted on its own, for its own reasons, and to further its own purposes." Regarding a written policy: The fact that the rules of the college regarding room searches were not complied with is of no consequence in determining the admissibility of the evidence for purposes of a criminal proceeding. Public schools are an entirely different animal. In those cases the university staff are public employees and their searches can be fourth amendment violations but they ARE allowed to conduct searches subject to the "reasonable exercise of University supervisory duties." "Even though the special relationship that existed between these petitioners and Troy University officials conferred upon the University officials the right to enter and search petitioners' dormitory rooms, that right cannot be expanded and used for purposes other than those pertaining to the special relationship." Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F.Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala., 1970) Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State Univ., 284 F.Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala., 1968)

Under which circumstances does "loser pays" apply in the United States? In the U.S., unlike e.g. Britain, both sides usually pay their own legal fees; seldom does the loser pay the winner's legal fees. However, there are some exceptions. One that I know of is that if someone files a lawsuit that is dismissed for lack of merit, the original defendant can countersue for legal fees. And, of course, "loser pays" applies to contracts where the contract says so. What are other circumstances in the U.S. where the loser of a litigation pays both sets of legal fees?

Each side paying for their own litigation costs is called the American Rule. As you noted in your question, it contrasts the English Rule where the losing party pays the winning party's litigation costs. In the United States, there are literally thousands of specific exceptions to the American Rule but they can be divided into these general categories: Contracts that say the losing party pays. This is one you pointed out in your question and is pretty common. Common Fund Doctrine. This is legal principle that courts have applied where it would be unfair for a plaintiff to pay their legal fees because it would be ultimately coming out of their pocket. Some classic examples are: A beneficiary suing a trustee for violating his fiduciary duties; shareholders suing the management of a company; and some types of class-action and antitrust cases where the efforts of the attorneys benefited the "common good". Contempt proceedings. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923). This would only apply where one party is asking the Court to hold an opposing party in contempt, not where a judge initiates a contempt proceeding. Today, most states and the federal system have court rules that would likely apply here as well. Bad Faith litigation. As you noted in your question. This would be bad-faith/frivolous lawsuits and action in litigation that needlessly delay or increase the expenses of the opposing party. Statutes. This is by far the largest category. There are too many statutes to list but here is a sample of some broad categories: Civil Rights Cases (Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, housing discrimination, Americans with Disabilities Act, Etc.) Consumer Protection cases (Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Act, etc.) Landlord-Tenant cases Environmental Protection Cases Open Records Law cases (Freedom of Information Act and similar state statutes) The statutes that contain fee-shifting provisions are generally ones where litigation is thought to be in the "public interest." The idea is that the legislature wants to encourage the private enforcement of certain laws. Allowing the recovery of attorney's fees provides financial incentives for lawyer to take cases where the ultimate damages award is small and might be less than their legal fees. There is a good law review article in the American University Law Review called The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice on this topic. While it's 20 years old, the policy considerations and historical perspective remains accurate.

Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A.

For the first question - No, patents are territorial. A US patent is not "working" anywhere else. Of course one can apply in multiple countries if the proper time frames and procedures are followed. There is a mechanism (PCT Treaty) that allows a straightforward way to apply in over a 140 countries simultaneously. Although it is frequently used, it is expensive to continue to prosecute the application in each place and even in high-value inventions only a handful of places are eventually chosen to actually pursue patents. Each country's/region's laws and processes are different and success in patenting can vary. Normally two countries would not have the same thing patented by different inventors. The patenting or publication of the first one would make it prior art to the second filed one. This should be found by the second examiner and stop a duplicate patent by a second inventor. However there can be subtle differences between similar inventions and mistakes do happen. In the case of true simultaneous invention this can happen. To get a patent, the invention must be novel - that means no one has published or patented it anywhere in the world at any time in any language. Before the AIA law in the U.S. the law said "or known in this country". It could have made a loophole where something was known publicly elsewhere but did not constitute prior art in the U.S. That is now changed to be world-wide. Even if the examiner does a world wide search they might miss something and a patent might get issued even though the invention was not novel and a patent elsewhere is granted. To invalidate it the original patent owner would need to look into available procedures in country A. It might be court or it might be administrative. In most places an annual “renewal” fee must be paid to keep a patent in-force. In the U.S. a “maintenance” fee must be paid at the 3.5 year, 7.5 year and 7.5 year points in order to stay in-force. A patent who’s renewal or maintenance fee hasn’t been paid is expired for fee reasons. That can imply that it can be revived by the patent owner by paying the fees and usually a penalty. There may be a time limit or a small set of allowable circumstances to revive. A patent labeled expired for fee reasons might now be past its normal lifespan and therefore not revivable. In general patents are given to inventors and those an inventor assigns their rights to. Someone else can’t come along and revive a patent they had nothing to do with originally. There is no “re-patenting”.

Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.

What's the use of contracts if you can't take a contract violator to court? A clear, thoughtful contract can be a deterrent to misconduct, and Australia is one of many jurisdictions where pro se litigation is allowed. Self-represented litigants certainly have to undergo a steep learning curve and are expected to comply with a code of conduct, procedural law, and so forth, but my point is that hiring a lawyer is not compulsory. Even if for some reason the defrauded party declines to sue the tortfeasor (thereby forfeiting the recovery of the losses), there is a societal obligation to alert others about the tortfeasor's misconduct. Making the contract available to others facilitates alerting them on objective grounds so they don't become the tortfeasor's next victim, and it simultaneously helps for setting the record straight that the damages/losses were not one's own fault. Without a contract, it would be more difficult for others get a sense of whether misconduct occurred at all. Or worst, halfway down the line, you don't have any money left to pay your lawyers, and they leave the case. Hence the importance to litigate in pro per from the start. It is easy for a person retaining a lawyer to postpone (be it due to family obligations, workload, and so forth) his learning of the law. But that postponement only makes the client more vulnerable to his lawyer's subsequent withdrawal when court proceedings are midway: the client would have the dilemma of either finding another lawyer to resume the case --predictably at a higher cost--, or cram the learning curve in trying to keep up with the proceedings.

Is there any validity to these claims? No, except maybe in bankruptcy proceedings that involve additional circumstances/factors. A loan is a contract. What you describe is simply a debtor's attempt to replace the contract he incurred with a creditor. As such, the creditor is entitled to decline the settlement offer, thereby leaving the initial contract (in this case, the original conditions of the loan) in force. Generally speaking, declining a new proposal does not invalidate the contract that would have been replaced if the offeree were to accept such proposal.

Short Answer It might or might not be an anti-trust violations depending upon the states where the employers and employee are located. But, as a practical matter, it is almost impossible for an employee to prove an anti-trust violation without an insider leaking a "smoking gun" document or a company admitting to improper conduct, before a lawsuit is filed. Long Answer There is considerable regional variation regarding the extent to which legal arrangements to limit employee mobility are legal. For example, historically, Massachusetts is notorious for enforcing such limitations strictly. In contrast, California is famous for refusing to enforce such restrictions. In general, the Northeast is strict, the West is lenient and other states are in between, but it is really a state by state issue. (Incidentally, weak non-competition laws have been empirically shown by economists to be better for the economy in the sector where they might be applied but are not applied.) Usually these legal restrictions on employee mobility are imposed unilaterally by the employer without conferring with competitors, and sometimes remedies for a violation of these non-competition arrangements are limited to the employee and not the hiring company (although this is hardly universal - the intentional interference with contract tort historically arose to punish companies that induced employees to violate non-competes and duties of loyalty of existing employees of the suing firm). The anti-trust dimension comes from the agreement between competitors to honor each other's non-competition agreements, which is meaningful because in the states where Apple and Google are headquartered, non-competition agreements are basically unenforceable so this collusion between competitors has an effect in excess of the default legal situation in the absence of collusion. If Apple and Google had instead both been based in Boston instead, where their non-competition agreements were enforceable against both the employee and the new employer as a default rule of law, their agreement would probably not have violated anti-trust laws because they would simply be agreeing to follow the generally applicable law that would apply in the absence of a collusive agreement anyway. Thus, without knowing the default rules of law in the relevant states, and without knowing if there was actually an actual agreement between the competitors, you can't sue for an anti-trust violation. One of the recent revolutions in federal civil procedure, the Twombly case, arose in an anti-trust situation and held that a complaint for an anti-trust violation is not sufficient unless the person bringing suit has actual knowledge of the existence of a collusive agreement between competitors and does not merely infer the existence of such an agreement from the facts and circumstances available to the general public. It is not permissible to sue first and then use subpoenas and other pre-trial discovery procedures to determine if there was actually an express collusive agreement between the competitors rather than having their behavior arise for other reasons (since under Econ 101 microeconomic principles, marketwide price fixing by all participants and completely non-collusive perfect competition are indistinguishable as they both produce a uniform price in the marketplace for a good or service). Since this information is usually impossible to obtain prior to brining suit without an insider who leaks a smoking gun document, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible for an individual employee to prevail in an anti-trust lawsuit alleging collusion between competing firms. Under federal anti-trust laws, circumstances that have the de facto identical results to illegal collusion between competitors, where this is not actually collusion, are usually not actionable (i.e. you can't prevail in a lawsuit based upon those claims).

The hypothetical situation would be a material misrepresentation of the facts, as well as a fraudulent misrepresentation - both are grounds for nullifying the contract. Under your hypothetical this is almost certainly material and is certainly a fraudulent misrepresentation. A fraudulent misrepresentation of the facts pertinent to a contract occurs when one party, to a bargain for exchange, misstates a fact and either knows or believes that the fact is not true, or is not sure whether or not his statement is true but claims it to be true nonetheless. If a party to the contract relies on the fraudulent misrepresentation and enters into a contract based on that misrepresentation, the contract is voidable by the innocent party. A material misrepresentation is a misstatement of fact that will induce a reasonable person to enter into a contract. If a misrepresentation is material to the contract, the contract will be voidable by the relying party even if the misrepresentation is not fraudulent. So, in this scenario, the contact would be voidable because there is both a material misrepresentation, as well as a fraudulent one. If the other party suffers a monetary loss because of the deceit, you would almost certainly be held responsible for any damages that may flow from the inducement.

Can I make fan merchandise and sell it? Can I create Overwatch fan merchandise (such as prints, buttons, keychains, etc.) and sell it at conventions?

Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.

In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).

Technically, as I've read the unreal license agreement, the person who made the mod would owe Epic 5% royalties on all your sales related to the mod, even if they did not collect the sale price. You cannot be a party to a license you did not agree to, but Epic has very strange royalty terms that seem unreasonable on the surface and I'm not sure they've tested that in court. Here is what the license says: Royalty You agree to pay Epic a royalty equal to 5% of all worldwide gross revenue actually attributable to each Product, regardless of whether that revenue is received by you or any other person or legal entity, as follows: a. Gross revenue resulting from any and all sales of a Product to end users through any and all media, including but not limited to digital and retail; b. Gross revenue resulting from any and all in-app purchases, downloadable content, microtransactions, subscriptions, sale, transfer, or exchange of content created by end users for use with a Product, or redemption of virtual currency, either within a Product or made externally but which directly affect the operation of the Product; c. Gross revenue from any Kickstarter or other crowdfunding campaign which is directly associated with Product access or in-Product benefit (e.g., in a multi-tiered campaign, if an amount is established in an early tier solely for Product access, your royalty obligation will apply to that amount for each backer with the same access, but not on additional amounts in higher tiers based on ancillary benefits); d. Your revenue from in-app advertising and affiliate programs; e. Revenue from advance payments for a Product (from a publisher or otherwise); f. Revenue received in connection with a Product’s inclusion in a streaming, subscription, or other game-delivery service (e.g., Apple Arcade, Microsoft GamePass, or any similar or successor services), including without limitation development funds and bonuses; and g. Revenue in any other form actually attributable to a Product (unless excluded below). So the first part says "regardless of whether that revenue is received by you or any other person or legal entity". So somebody else may have revenue attributable to the product (aka a 50% increase in sales due to this mod), and you owe it even if you are not collecting or receiving that money directly. The last part (g) also says that revenue in any other form attributable to the product. Epic's license doesn't allow you to make a "front-end" to a paid product and release the front-end free, and collect money on the back-end. So if revenue is attributable to the product you develop, you owe royalties on the sales related to the product regardless of you collecting that income or not. Notice how it doesn't say "directly attributable to each Product...", it says "actually attributable to each Product". This is the part I find a bit egregious and not sure it will hold up in court, however the terms of the license are written so that the developer of the Unreal product has to pay royalties even if they don't collect money from it themselves.

Generally speaking, you must be Licensed, or enter a written agreement, in order to use any logos from any company, especially any time the reference is referenced commercially. There are exceptions to the rule, and some are more lenient than others, but you should always check before showing any company's trademarks or brand icons. For example, Intel® allows third parties to refer to them by name, but displaying a logo requires a license or written permission, per their Trademarks and Brands guideline. You'll find that most companies are probably willing to overlook violations of Licensing as long as the product is placed in a favorable light, since's that's basically free advertising, but you'll want to take the extra few moments and simply call them and ask. A ten minute call could save you tons in legal fees and/or fines. From what I've seen, most companies will allow use of their company name for most commercial and non-commercial uses, but reserve some logos only for licensed partners, and others still only for themselves. They will also generally specify appearance guidelines, such as rendering ® and ™ only the first time on each page of printed material, as well as a specific guideline for sentences and phrases that the name may or may not appear in. They also usually specify that such phrases may not imply that the company is a partner or representative of the company, etc. You can see Intel's Trademark Symbols and Acknowledgements page for an example of what you'd expect to be required to do. This page also gives some example sentences of acceptable and unacceptable phrases. For example: Correct Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core™ processors. Incorrect Usage Look for PCs with Intel® Core. Mostly, they're concerned about making sure ™ is used correctly, as well as specifying that they make processors, not entire systems. You'll want to try and stay on the good side of their legal department, and represent fairly.

a few quick notes that come to mind. As the commenters point out: DSGVO is indeed the German equivalent name to the GDPR (English term) "Imprint" isn't a privacy related topic that much, as such it's not really changed by the upcoming GDPR The GDPR changes many things, but the requirement for up front information isn't one of them - so it would've already been a rule to follow Sometimes the question who is responsible for privacy information might not be that easy to decide when you're on platforms. I take this situation as being pretty clear though. You are basically given a blank slate, you can do with that page whatever you want, and the visitor has no clue whatsoever that it might be hosted by Github. In addition to this, Github would be classified as a data processor (providing the tool) and you as the data controller who is in charge of practically everything except for the provision of the page. I hope this helps. Btw. it's not that hard anymore to write a privacy policy these days.

No you don't. There are two copyright holders regarding the derivative work: yourself, for creating the original. the other artist, for creating the modified version. The other artist has received the right to use your original through the CC-BY license, under the condition that they attribute you appropriately. However, you have not received any rights to the other artist's work.

In what way is the mark you made not your acceptance of the contract? It doesn’t matter if it’s your name, or someone else’s name, or an X or the Bluetooth logo or a caricature of Donald Trump. You made it - it’s your signature.

I think the law there is quite clear - you have 14 days to return the goods for a full refund, except for digital content, which you can't return once you started downloading it. That's what it says. The arguments that you try to give were quite obvious to the law makers. I think you can assume they were aware that "digital content does not have a physical form". Now if you purchased, but haven't downloaded or started downloading yet, then obviously you can get your money back. You came up with some theory that this is a "visual vanity item". You can't see it unless you download it. Once you download it, that's it. If you don't download it, you can return it. Let me repeat this: Your fancy analogies mean nothing. There are in the EU laws about being allowed to return goods for a refund. There's the general rule for buying in a store (no right other what the store offers voluntarily), online purchases (some days to return), and online purchases of digital goods (no return once you started downloading). That's the law. Your attempts at redefining the situation are totally pointless. The law says what it says. What you try to redefine doesn't mean one thing. The law clearly distinguishes several situations, and analogies don't count. What happens counts. You bought from a digital item from an online store that needs to be downloaded. And as soon as you start downloading, there is your right to return it gone. And your reasons for wanting to return the goods are completely irrelevant. You don't need any reasons, and having reasons doesn't help you.

Fourth Amendment traffic stop followup question This is a follow up question from why doesn't the 4th amendment apply to traffic stops. So, the current answer states that the 4th amendment applies to traffic stops, which makes sense to me. So after thinking about that and looking up some odd articles that arguably make sense, I'm kinda curious of one of the issues that can arise from that. Question: During a legal traffic stop, let's say that when they ask for licence and registration, you ask can these documents be used against me in the court of law. It seems the answer would have to be yes Since they can and if you were to receive a ticket, they would be a part of the evidence. Assuming you give them your identification information since you are being detained and investigated, how can an officer handle such issue of not violating the 4th Amendment? Issuing a ticket for failure to have insurance would seem to have no basis since there is no proof, and requiring the proof would require either a warrant or the person to give up their right? This is a theoretical question about individuals and their rights and I do have full insurance and produce it every time. I'm not looking for answers that involve the driver to forfeit their rights (i.e. "I would just hand it over", "issue the ticket, and let the courts hash it out", etc). I think we can make a safe assumption that the person is a reasonable person that likes to preserve their rights. And again, this is from the perspective of a honest police officer that would like to keep the person's rights intact. I will flag answers that go down that road as not an answer since they clearly would be opinions.

See Rodriguez v United States 575 U.S. ___ (2015). It has language describing the extent to which a police office can make "ordinary inquiries" incident to a traffic stop (internal citations removed): Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The government is only prohibited from unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless traffic stops are allowed if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver has violated a traffic law. Once stopped, the officer can make "ordinary inquiries" described above. Regarding Fifth Amendment concerns, the Fifth Amendment's document-production privilege does not apply to regulatory type records that are required to be kept by law or items analogous to a required record. Baltimore City Dept. of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990)

Police officers are authorized to use force regardless of what they are wearing, to effect an arrest. One issue will be whether the defendants should know that they were under arrest, but there is no requirement to utter particular phrases when dealing with a combative lawbreaker. There will be an internal investigation at some level to determine whether the officers violated any department policy, and no doubt the video and testimony of those in the are would be relevant. There probably is some policy to the effect that you have to distinguish yourself from a street vigilante (you have to state your authority), though I can't find any specific online publicly-available department rules. There is no law that requires an officer to say that he is one, or to show his badge, before starting an arrest.

I think this is a reference to Section 14-224: (a) Each operator of a motor vehicle who is knowingly involved in an accident which results in the death of any other person shall at once stop and render such assistance as may be needed and shall give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any officer or witness to the death of any person, and if such operator of the motor vehicle causing the death of any person is unable to give such operator’s name, address and operator’s license number and registration number to any witness or officer, for any reason or cause, such operator shall immediately report such death of any person to a police officer, a constable, a state police officer or an inspector of motor vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or station, and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the accident causing the death of any person and such operator’s name, address, operator’s license number and registration number. There are subsequent similar paragraphs about accidents resulting in injury or property damage. The wording is a little bit confusing and it appears that you don't strictly have to report to the police, if you instead identify yourself to a witness.

No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412

I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.

To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.

You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.

Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.

Pokémon Go hot spots and private property As we all know Pokémon Go is all the rage. There have been reports that police stations are common hot spots for gyms and collections. Churches have also been a common hot spot. I think there is also a story where a man bought an old church and now that is his residence. Regardless of whether that story is true it made me think: What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory, but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? Is it currently legal to say, "Go to person X's house and touch a tree"? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? To me both are attractions which cause a gathering of people.

What is the legality of someone putting a virtual hot spot on your property without permission? I know we are in uncharted territory but how would this compare to setting up a contest that would require going on your property without permission? The existence of a game does not authorise entrance to private property, barring some agreement with the owner. That is - if it is trespassing without Pokemon Go (or, for that matter Ingress), then it is trespassing while playing them. That being said, the creators of the game are free to place their in-game targets anywhere they please, and it is hard to imagine a scenario where they would be liable for their users' actions, unless they have not taken reasonable steps to prevent their users from doing so - Niantic clearly instruct their users to respect the law and also, only require that their users be within a certain distance of these points, not actually be at them. Is it currently legal to say Go to person X house and touch a tree? If not, does the current law extend to augmented reality? Nope, unless it can be done without entering private property (which includes the airspace above the property, to some extent). And there are no special cases for augmented reality. Now, there is some possibility that if they create a private nuisance - by being too loud, or by otherwise interfering with the use of the property - owners of a property could bring a claim in tort against players for doing so - or charges for a public nuisance, when done in a public area.

Firstly, yours is not a valid argument. What is meant by "generally accessible" is public places like plazas, stretches of green by the road, parks, parking lots, etc. The definition is kind of a negative and could be more easily phrased as: "You may camp at A) designated camping areas or B) private places where you are entitled to camp". This means you either have to find a camping area where you pay a fee for a period of time, or you may camp on private grounds that either belong to you, or you have been given explicit permission to camp, say in a private garden or field. Of course this is practically impossible if you don't know anyone in there. But, the screenshot explicitly restricts this rule with the leading prase "Im Gemeindegebiet" which means if you leave the legal boundaries of Werfen, Salzburg county law applies (Which may or may not be similar). Disclaimer: While I don't have legal background, I can tell from personal experience that local governments are touchy on this and striking up camp somewhere where you are not allowed to will at least (if detected) require you to leave the premises immediately and the police may charge you with trespassing.

The location of your residence entrance is irrelevant for the law, what matters most is your "street address", i.e. mailing address. That is the address (therefore city) that you use for voter registration, and basically how you identify "where I live". If you lives 5 miles out in the country in an unincorporated area, you'd still use Needles (e.g.) as you mailing address: but you would not be able to vote for a mayor of Needles, just based on your mailing address. Both municipalities might claim jurisdiction based on the physical location of the property, especially for matters of building code. It should not be possible for both municipalities to tax the full value of your property, but they could split the assessment proportionally. The cities themselves are not collecting the tax, the county is (though property straddling a county line raises an interesting question).

Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.

You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards.

Tenant rights when unhappy with new owner of property - Ohio In late July 2015, Individual A entered into a lease with Managing Company X. This was a one year lease, scheduled to end in July 2016. In April 2016, a representative of X approached A about signing a new lease to go in to effect for when the current one was up. The representative and A agreed on a 6 month lease that would end in January. Between April and June, Managing Company X sold the property which contained over 150 units, to Managing Company Y. Since then, the individual has been unhappy with the services provided by the new landlord entity. Hot water was gone from their individual unit for 7 days, and there is a mold problem that has been known for 10 days, with no move made by anyone from Y to fix the issue. Tenant A has given written and digital notice that they are counting to the thirty day cap for landlords to make repairs, as Ohio law states, before escalating the issue. Assuming that the mold issue is resolved before the thirty day cap, does tenant A have any other legal reason to terminate the lease since they are unhappy with the new landlord, and their current lease was signed under the idea that Managing Company X would still be the owner of the property? Clarification as questioned by Nate: There is no mention of ownership changes in the lease, and (if relevant) the lease specifies leasing "from Managing Company X, the property ___". Subquestion: There are laws that protect the tenant from having their lease terminated by the new landlord, but is there similar logic or law that restricts the tenant from breaking the lease?

The terms of the lease are subject to Ohio's law. The only option for a tenant terminating a rental agreement is ORC 5321.07(B)(3), in response to failure to fulfill obligations under 5321.04. Those obligations relate to safety and health, keeping things in good working order, not abusing access and privacy rights. There is no obligation to make the tenant happy. As a general rule, when you sell real estate, rental agreements transfer from seller to buyer. If they did not, tenants could be evicted as trespassers or rents could be raised massively within the period of the lease. The tenant's obligation remains the same, and it has simply been transferred to another person.

You want a lawyer who accepts tenant-side landlord tenant cases, usually a solo practitioner or small law firm or legal clinic. Medium to large sized law firms usually don't practice that kind of law at all, or only represent landlords, as a matter of policy. The usual problem, however, is that lawyers are often too expensive relative to the amount in controversy to make sense to hire to fully represent you in a matter like this one. You might want to have a "limited engagement" such as a one time consult with a lawyer, rather than a full retention of a lawyer, over an issue like this one.

If you were given a non compliant notice, you haven’t been given notice You can stay as long as you like or for 4 months after they give you the correct notice. The landlord’s legal obligation was to give you 4 months notice: not his agent, or the Queen, or some guy he was chatting with at the pub. Whether that causes other people with other contracts problems is a matter for them to work out, it’s none of your business. However, … The management agency is the landlord’s agent. That means, as far as you are concerned there is no legal difference between what they do and what the landlord does. If either of them had given you a valid notice, it is as though the landlord had done so. However, if the landlord says something to the agent, from your point of view, the landlord is talking to themselves. If the landlord has sold the property, it comes with any existing leases. If the landlord has promised vacant possession and can’t deliver it, then they have broken the contract with the buyer and the buyers can sue your landlord for damages or possibly terminate the contract or both. If that happens, and it was a result of the agent’s negligence, the landlord can sue the agent.

The landlord might be able to sue the tenant for actual damages arising from the double occupancy, if utilities are paid by the landlord. Two people tend to use more water than one person. Establishing that there has been any loss would be tricky, but let's assume that there is evidence pointing to some dollar figure. Then the landlord might sue the tenant for causing this damage.

Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.

This is actually pretty standard. You have a contract with a business to provide some service, and you get a bargain on the price of the service as long as you stay with them for some period, such as 2 years. You could get the 'pay as you go' option which doesn't have a termination fee, but that costs more if you are sure you can commit to what you signed up for, for that period. So it's not that you can't terminate the contract, it's that you can't just walk away from your obligation (what they call a "minimum term agreement"), cost-free. The early-termination fee is part of the cost of moving. You have to look in the Legal Agreements & Contract part of Account Details on your account to get the specific agreement that you are bound by. Generally, you are subject to that fee, unless the subscriber dies, or is in the military and is shipped out. You can also transfer your service from area to area – I assume you either are moving to an area without Xfinity service, or you elected to not use Xfinity in that location. It is legal for a business to put their business interest above that of a customer, even in the case of regulated "utilities".

A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.

You have acknowledged that the house was in "new" condition, which establishes a baseline for determining if the present state is normal wear and tear. The lease and California law agree that normal wear and tear is not the responsibility of the tenant. You may then need to sue the landlord in small claims court to get the remainder of the deposit (the above guide will be useful). The thing that is not clear is exactly what constitutes "normal wear and tear". The state guide tends to emphasize extreme forms of damage such as dogs chewing the woodwork, or cigarette burns. If you do ordinary cleaning on the walls, windows, carpets etc. then it is more likely that the judge will find in your favor.

No break clause in academic contract I came across a mention of a "no break clause" in academic contracts, i.e. a clause in working contract by which an academic is liable to a penalty if they terminate their contract before the end of a fixed term. This is not related to a compensation of relocation costs. I wonder if this was or is legal and practicable in the U.S. and Europe? I am equally interested in historical perspective (1950s) and modern days.

In contract law in the United States, this is a "liquidated damages" clause. It provides that when one side breaches the contract, it has to pay a certain amount of money to make up for it. Normally this is done where it is difficult to calculate the actual damages in the event of a breach, or where the parties would rather avoid calculating the actual damages--a common example is where you put in an earnest money deposit on a house and then forfeit the earnest money if you do not buy. However, there are restrictions on what kind of damages are permitted. Notably, a "penalty" usually refers to an unreasonable amount that is unenforceable as against public policy. It would ordinarily be unreasonable to make someone pay a hundred million dollar penalty for breaking a ten thousand dollar contract, for example. Liquidated damages clauses frequently say "this is not a penalty" and "the parties agree this is reasonable" to make it harder to invalidate them on public policy grounds. Instead, if the liquidated damage payment is a payment meant to reflect actual damages that are just hard to calculate, it is much more likely to be enforceable. You would need to research liquidated damages and penalties in the state whose law governs the contract to determine whether the particular clause is permissible under state law. See https://www.google.com/search?q=restatement+of+contracts+penalty&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8

Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.

No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.

The EULA is in most jurisdictions a legally binding contract; there is plenty of case law that supports this. You can only be liable under a contract for breaching its terms and only to the extent that the other party suffers harm from that breach. Clearly, if you haven't read the terms then you are greatly increasing the chance that you will inadvertently breach them but not reading them would not, of itself, be a breach and I can't see what harm could flow anyway.

For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.

http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/experts/article-1698485/Can-I-discuss-my-pay-with-colleagues.html In short, there are no laws prohibiting or rendering such contract clauses unenforceable, but an employer cannot rely on such a contractual clause to abrogate its obligations under the Equality Act 2010.

I think you are misinterpreting what the article is saying. It's not Germany as a whole that is banning managers contacting employees (and since you are not a manager, this wouldn't affect you anyway), it is the German ministry of Employment banning it for its employees. When it comes to your own workplace, you will need to look at your own contract and see whether you are allowed to work on the weekend without, for example, getting extra money for that work. This is probably not the case for you as a PhD student, but if it is, you would usually need to talk to your employer before doing work on the weekends.

Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.

Is it trespassing if you unlock a door to which you found the key? I'm not looking for legal advice. I live in a shared house. Each bedroom has a lock on the door. I keep finding keys in communal areas, for example keys in the bottom of a cupboards. The keys look like they're for the locks on the doors. I tested some keys on the door to my room and am wondering would it be legal to try to unlock other doors with the keys I found? I would like to know if the landlord is leaving keys to tenants rooms around the house because I wouldn't feel safe assuming he didn't leave a key to my room lying around. Normally I would ask but several rooms are vacant right now and others are on vacation etc.

No it is not legal; it is trespassing. the common law definition of trespassing is to enter someone's land or property without their permission. By locking the door they have denied permission to everyone except those to whom they have given a key. If someone finds a key that happens to fit the lock, there is no longer a physical restriction but as they do not have permission, the legal restriction is still in force.

This article basically says "it depends": If it is genuinely used to improve tenant safety then that is OK, but if it is used to track your private life then that is not acceptable. Cameras that cover communal areas used by several properties are generally acceptable, but cameras covering individual properties are much less so. It sounds like this falls into the latter category. Assuming you haven't got the camera yet, I suggest you write to the Landlord asking for a written justification of the cameras, and a policy for the use of the camera. E.g. it will only be viewed if an incident is reported. Once you have the justification you can then look for inconsistencies (e.g. if they aren't planning to snoop at random times, how are they going to notice someone up to no good? And how would they tell?) You could also just say "no". The installation of this camera probably counts as a material variation of the rental agreement. You could also propose a compromise: you will install the camera, but only provide footage as you see fit rather than allowing your landlord to view the camera at any time. CCTV installations are covered by the GDPR, so you should ask your landlord for the associated paperwork. Amongst other things they will need to state how long they want to keep the footage and provide a justification for that. "We might want to re-run it" is not a justification. Having all this stuff written down will help if you ever suspect he is abusing the footage. Edit Another thought: does the landlord own other properties? Are they having cameras installed too? If not, why not? They should have a policy about this.

In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"

No illegal eviction took place, if he wasn't a tenant The term of the room rental was specified beforehand. There was no renewable or extension clause in the rental agreement. Bob also is not a tenant: he is a guest in a hotel. The Hotel offers cleaning services, as the OP specified. By overstaying, his items now were trespassing, the removal was legitimate. However, there is a point at which a short term renting of a hotel becomes living at it. Where this is is often dependant on how long or in what way you stay. Where's the line between a Tenant and a Guest? THAT is the operative question. When does a Guest/Lodger become a Tenant and can get eviction protection? In germany a couple of Hotels actually do have renters with a special rental contract - which is vastly different from the normal room rental. For example, the Maritim in Hamburg has year-rentals. These are actual renters with a rental contract and eviction protection, that give up some tenant rights for services (e.g. room cleaning service for limits in remodeling). However, overstaying at a hotel can actually become a crime: Einmietbetrug - obtaining a room in a hotel or a residency but not wanting to pay or mischaracterizing your ability to do so - is a variant of fraud and thus can be punished under §263 StGB; Under the operating law, a hotel guest is not afforded with all rights of a tenant, unless they are explicitly pointed out like with longstay contracts. In california the line is 30 days, in new-york-state it is the same but they also need to not have a different residency. in england-and-wales, the operative case when someone is a lodger or tenant is Brillouet v Landless (1995) 28 H.L.R. 836: a hotel Guest is not a tenant, even after more than a month of stay. In fact, courts following this case argue, that such a person is only licensed to be on the premises, and the license could be revoked without eviction procedures. In fact, the Brillouet v Landless case is very close to the example. Brillouet rented a room in September, and extended the stay. Then he did not pay (or rather, his accommodation services didn't. In October, Landless sought to get rid of Brillouet for non-payment, just telling him to leave. Brillouet applied for an injunction against the eviction and got a temporary one (to preserve the status-quo) till the hearing. Mere days later, and the first instance court handed out judgement against the application of an injunction to protect Brillouet. The Hotel guest, so the court, was not a tenant under the Housing Act 1988: The Protection from Eviction Act depends on premises having been let as a dwelling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of protection from eviction and seeing no tenancy (emphasis mine): It is an essential prerequisite of any tenancy that the tenant should have, so it is said in some of the authorities, exclusive possession. In my judgment the facts of this case particularly when one bears in mind that Mr Brillouet upon his own assertion avails himself of at least some of the facilities (he goes to the restaurant occasionally for his breakfast) — come nowhere near demonstrating that he has or has had within this room exclusive occupation. At best in my judgment he could conceivably be a licensee. One then has to examine once more the terms of the statute to ascertain whether he is a licensee entitled to protection under the 1977 Act. As the section to which I have alluded makes plain, only licensees who occupy as a dwelling premises which they do occupy are entitled to protection. If, as in my judgment the facts here clearly demonstrate, the occupant is no more and no less than a hotel guest properly so-called, then the accommodation is not let to the licensee as a dwelling. Street v Mountford (1985) AC 809 most likely doesn't apply if any hotel services are offered by the hotel. In the case, Mountford was found a tenant because Street did not offer any services beyond the room and furnishings itself. The presence of any service would change the pattern significantly, as the House of Lords decided: It applies against Bob if the hotel offers cleaning service/room service, and by offering service beyond the room and the furnishing within it, it is lodging, not a tenancy: The occupier is a lodger if the landlord provides attendance or services which require the landlord or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the premises. A lodger is entitled to live in the premises but cannot call the place his own. [...] Street provided neither attendance nor services and only reserved the limited rights of inspection and maintenance and the like set forth in clause 3 of the agreement. On the traditional view of the matter, Mrs. Mountford not being a lodger must be a tenant. Mehta v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc (2000) 32 H.L.R. 45 doesn't apply, as that case revolved around a verbal contract with the manager for 6 month exclusive use of rooms. Mehta became a tenant by that contract and eviction protection applied. In contrast, due to how agreements with hotels are generally written, Westminster CC v Clarke (1992) might apply: If the contact specified that the hotel does have unlimited access (which is typical) and that reassignments of rooms (like, another guest in the room) might apply, then there is no tenancy. Could Bob be a tenant? For Bob to be a tenant under the E&W interpretation (following the pattern established by Street & Brillouet), the facts must be such, that several things must be true: Exclusive possession: No services are offered at all beyond the room. For example, there can't be any shared facilities with the rest of the hotel that Bob has access to, and services such as room cleaning or fresh towels or laundry are not offered either. Not using them is not enough, they can't be offered at all. (both Street, Brillout) If in exclusive Possession, Bob still isn't a tenant if he is what Street calls a service occupier. That's an employee who is given a place to sleep in to perform his duties to the employer, like a Butler or Maid. (Street) Bob is also not an owner in fee simple, trespasser or mortgagee in possession, or an object of charity - for which all other rules apply. (Street) In the alternative, one fact makes them automatically one: There was a contract that in its form stipulates they are a Tenant (Mehta v RBS)

You are in a tough spot. The main risk is "civil forfeiture" of the duplex if you have sufficient knowledge that it is being used for purposes of drug dealing and take no action. See, e.g., a case from October 1, 2021 when a house was seized on this basis. But the tenant has property rights under a lease that you can't abridge unless you can prove that there is a violation of the law. And, it isn't obvious if you know enough to trigger civil forfeiture exposure based merely on uncorroborated statements from another tenant that observe only conduct often associated with drug dealing and not deals themselves. Still, the knowledge you do have might trigger a duty to inquire if you want to escape civil forfeiture liability. Under the statute, to defeat a civil forfeiture action (assuming it has been used for drug dealing), you must show: (e)(1) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section if the owner of such interest or interest holder establishes that the owner or interest holder: (A) Is not legally accountable for the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, did not consent to it, and did not know and could not reasonably have known of the conduct or that it was likely to occur; (B) Had not acquired and did not stand to acquire substantial proceeds from the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture other than as an interest holder in an arm's length commercial transaction; (C) With respect to conveyances for transportation only, did not hold the property jointly, in common, or in community with a person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture; (D) Does not hold the property for the benefit of or as nominee for any person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture, and, if the owner or interest holder acquired the interest through any such person, the owner or interest holder acquired it as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; and (E) Acquired the interest: (i) Before the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture, and the person whose conduct gave rise to its forfeiture did not have the authority to convey the interest to a bona fide purchaser for value at the time of the conduct; or (ii) After the completion of the conduct giving rise to its forfeiture: (I) As a bona fide purchaser for value without knowingly taking part in an illegal transaction; (II) Before the filing of a lien on it and before the effective date of a notice of pending forfeiture relating to it and without notice of its seizure for forfeiture under this article; and (III) At the time the interest was acquired, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture or likely to become subject to forfeiture under this article. (2) A property interest shall not be subject to forfeiture under this Code section for a violation involving only one gram or less of a mixture containing cocaine or four ounces or less of marijuana unless said property was used to facilitate a transaction in or a purchase of or sale of a controlled substance or marijuana. The language in bold is the most threatening part that effectively establishes a duty of inquiry and a duty to take action if your inquiry establishes that drug dealing is going on. If you can't establish that you were ignorant of wrongdoing, and reasonably so, under the circumstances of being told by one of your tenants that something is going on, you are at great risk of losing the duplex to civil forfeiture if the DA can prove that drug dealing is taking place by far less than a reasonable doubt standard. You might want to hire a private investigator to look into the situation carefully, and to try to evict the allegedly drug dealing tenant if the private investigator corroborates the fellow tenant's claims.

Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks.

You were trespassing The community college is a public institution but they can decide what part of their land you can walk on and in what circumstances. Just like the military is a public institution but they don’t let you walk across their shooting ranges. To be clear, in the absence of clear “no dogs allowed” signage, you were not trespassing until you were told about the policy. At that point, you were legally obliged to remove yourself (or more precisely, your dog) from the campus as soon as possible. When you refused to do so, you became a trespasser. It’s trivially easy to find out who you are. One photograph, one reverse image search they’ll know everything about you right down to your shoe size. Even if you don’t use social media, I’m sure some of your family and friends do. In most US states, trespass is a misdemeanour and also in most states members of the public can arrest someone who is committing a misdemeanour in their presence. They can use reasonable force to do so and can hold the arrestee until they can transfer them to the custody of a law enforcement officer. Admittedly, this seems unlikely but it is possible. If you have caused damage, you can be sued. It seems that your discussion with the college staff was somewhat protected so the loss of productivity of those staff members is a loss that the college suffered and that they could sue you for. Again, not likely but possible. Alternatively, they could just report you to the police who may or may not bring charges. Note: this assumes the dog is a pet. If it’s a disability assistance animal, it can’t be excluded. See: Are sidewalks on a university public or private property? Can a local government charge a fee to enter a public downtown area during an event? Trespassing or Public Property? Is a mall considered a "public place" for copyright purposes?

The actual law in BC, the Residential Tenancy Act, guaranteed a tenant's rights to the rental unit and the common areas, and restricts the landlord's right to enter the rental unit. Common areas are distinct from the rental unit. A common areas is "any part of residential property the use of which is shared by tenants, or by a landlord and one or more tenants", and a rental unit is a "living accommodation rented or intended to be rented to a tenant". In this case, that would be the room. There is no restriction at all on landlord's access to common areas, and there is no requirement that landlord access to common areas be for specific purposes. Access to the rental unit, on the other hand, must be for a reasonable purpose.

Does the Icelandic government recognise ULC-officiated marriages? Is a marriage officiated by an ordained Universal Life Church minister (and performed in the country) legally recognised in Iceland? The Wikipedia page on the ULC only lists US states and this site doesn't include Iceland. I think I may have accidentally married some people at a festival.

One can find contradictory claims out there. Here is an English version of the marriage law. There is a surprising amount of legal rigamarole (in Norway, as well) pertaining to clearing "impediments". Assuming that the parties have done their part, then we move to Chapter 4. Article 16: Marriage may take place before a minister of the church, a representative of a registered religious organization empowered to perform such ceremonies, cf. Article 17, or before a civil official so empowered So turning to Article 17: Religious solemnization of marriage shall be performed by the ministers of the National Church, and priests or other representatives of registered religious organizations in Iceland who have been empowered to perform such ceremonies by the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and that is now part of the Ministry of the Interior. I can't find any indication that ULC has been approved. There are 49 religions officially listed by Statistics Iceland, including Siðmennt, a secular humanist organization which gained official status on May 3rd, 2013 when the organization was officially registered as a secular life stance organization under a law passed in the Icelandic Parliament on January 30th of that year. A formal ceremony was held by the Interior Minister Ögmundur Jónasson who had strongly supported our cause, to mark this historical event. As a result, Siðmennt gained the same legal and funding status as religious life stance organizations in Iceland. Weddings conducted by Siðmennt celebrants since then are legal and couples no longer have to go to government offices for that purpose. In light of the fact that Siðmennt is officially listed and ULC is not listed, I would conclude that you did not accidentally marry anyone, even if they had dealt with the impediments.

If you want to sue them, you should start with the US Constitution (as a model), in particular the Free Exercise clause: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof". The question is whether one could overturn homicide statutes on the grounds that an individual holds to traditional beliefs that a human sacrifice is required every few months. Or, is it an unconstitutional prohibition of the Mormon belief in polygamy to outlaw polygamy, see Reynolds v. US, 98 U.S. 145. The court held that the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative power of Congress. It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have exclusive control. This being so, the only question which remains is whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and go free. This would be introducing a new element into criminal law. Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Suppose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious worship; would it be seriously contended that the civil government under which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Observe that a religious exception to the law would be unconstitutional, as establishing religion as a means of gaining extra rights. The reductio ad absurdum of the unfettered religious-belief excuse is: Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances. The "wall of separation" was modified more recently in the 60's and 70's. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, the issue was compulsory education imposed on Amish children, where higher education was held to be antithetical to the Amish doctrine of a simple life. The court rules that The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children and especially it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish There were additional holdings pertaining to the legitimacy of the purported belief (that is, is there really such a doctrine – clearly yes). You might have better luck purporting to be a Rastafarian or Hindu, so I will set aside that complication. The core question will be whether the government has a "compelling interest" in the restriction, also whether the restriction is narrowly tailored. In the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, Sherbert's employer required her to work 6 days a week (a change in policy during her time of employment), which she refused to do (as a member of SDA) and was fired. Sherbert was denied unemployment benefits because the firing was for cause. The court ruled that Disqualification of appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment in which she would have to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion. and There is no compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute which justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's right to religious freedom under the First Amendment. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 brings us to the neighborhood that you are interested in living in. The relevant detail is that Smith (and Black) were fired for ingesting peyote in connection with a ceremony at a Native American church. The court ruled that The Free Exercise Clause permits the State to prohibit sacramental peyote use, and thus to deny unemployment benefits to persons discharged for such use To be more precise, Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. We can contrast this with Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. The city of Hialeh passed an ordinance forbidding animal sacrifice, specifically to suppress the Santeria church. The Supreme Court said, no, you may not do that: Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied ... The ordinances' texts and operation demonstrate that they are not neutral, but have as their object the suppression of Santeria's central element, animal sacrifice. At least so far, restrictions on drug use have not been overruled as conflicting the the Free Exercise clause, although if e.g. Washington state were to prohibit Mormons from purchasing marijuana (where others can), that would surely be struck down as unconstitutional. There are a number of other relevant developments, for example Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993, in reaction to Employment v. Smith, and that law statutorily mandating that strict scrutiny be applied to the question of whether a law violates the 1st: but this was ruled unconstitutional as applied to the states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507. Then in Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (Schedule 1 tea for religious purposes), the court ruled that The courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca which is to say, we have a case where the federal government was prohibited from enforcing a drug prohibition involving religion. A challenge of the type which you have in mind will surely also involve the question of the legitimacy of the purported religion, where UDV was founded in 1961 whereas one might suspect that your claimed religion is a pretext to smoke pot (hence the Rastafarian suggestion). The WWII era conscious objector cases held that the CO exception to military service is not limited to governmentally-approved religions, but as a general rule, the courts have not ruled that you can simply claim to have a religious belief which is being infringed on and thereby be excempt from the law. The basic issue would be whether either the US government of the state of Kentucky have a compelling interest in preventing the use of marijuana. The Kentucky Supreme Court does indeed recognize the concept of "strict scrutiny", so the case is not doomed from the start.

It is certainly true that different states who share a Head of State can have different succession rules. Thus William IV of the United Kingdom was also King of Hannover. The UK allowed female succession, so Victoria was Queen of the United Kingdom; Hannover didn't, so he was succeeded by Ernest Augustus there. At the moment, all the Commonwealth Realms of which Elizabeth is Head of State have the same rules of succession. They all changed the rules regarding whether a first-born girl would be heir apparent together. They could decide to have different rules of succession, but they probably won't.

Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.

Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.

In jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, it is generally necessary to show that the spouses agreed to marry each other, that they held themselves out to the public as married, and that they cohabited or consummated the marriage. Once this happens, a common law marriage comes into being. In Colorado and most jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, once a common law marriage is entered into it is binding for all purposes, and cannot be dissolved except by divorce. In all jurisdictions that recognize common law marriage, any subsequent relationship which would otherwise constitute a common law marriage does not give rise to a common law marriage of someone who is already in a common law marriage, because the law does not recognize that you can be married to more than one person at once (and indeed, criminalizes marrying more than one person at once). Many jurisdictions that do not themselves have common law marriage will recognize a common law marriage which was effective where it was entered into between the parties. Colorado and some other states and some programs in the federal government (including the Social Security Administration) also recognize the rights of someone who is a "putative spouse" which is someone who believes in good faith that they are married to their spouse and that their spouse was not married to anyone else at the time that they believed that they were married to their spouse. For example, someone who married in a state that requires a marriage license to do so, who thought that a marriage license was obtained when it wasn't, might be a putative spouse. Similarly, someone who obtained a marriage license or met the requirements of a common law marriage at a time that their supposed spouse was divorced when in fact a decree of divorce was never obtained, might be a putative spouse. One spouse can be a putative spouse, even if the other one knows that the marriage isn't valid. But, anyone who knew that their supposed spouse was already married at the time that they purportedly got married would not qualify as a putative spouse, because the person could not believe in good faith that they were married under a legal regime mandating monogamy. Note that I am using the term "common law marriage" in the somewhat narrow sense of a marriage not formally licensed by the government based upon the principles of the English common law as received by the jurisdiction in question. There are countries, in which, by statute or legal custom that does not derive from the English common law, marriages are recognized without being registered with the government. For example, a country might recognize Islamic law as effective for family law matters between Muslims, and might hold that a marriage not licensed by a government marriage license was still valid if the marriage was effected in a manner recognized by Islamic law. In that case, the first four unregistered marriages of a man made without a death or divorce of a spouse would be valid, and any further purported marriages would be invalid. But, a purported marriage of a married woman to another man would be void and probably punishable by some very severe Islamic law sanction.

The document may, but probably doesn't say what it is you are witnessing. For example, a person witnessing a statutory declaration in NSW attests: their qualification to be a witness (JP, solicitor etc.) that they actually saw the declarant sign it that they asked the declarant if they believed their declaration was true that they have known the declarant for more than 12 months OR the declarant provided a photo ID and either their face matched the photo or they had a valid reason for not showing their face. If it doesn't say then what you are witnessing is that the signature was made by a person whom you could identify if necessary (e.g. if the person denied the signature).

In the U.S., the common way to address this would be called a servitude among academics and legal scholars, although it would typically be titled either an "easement", or more likely a "covenant" (which is the customary name at common law for a promise that runs with the land). It would typically be reduced to writing and executed by both parties and recorded with the same formalities as a deed (i.e. it would typically be signed and acknowledged before a notary public, would contain a legal description, and would be coded with both parties in the grantee-grantor index). In New Zealand, I suspect that the process would be similar. One complication in New Zealand that might make the formalities different is that, New Zealand has a title certificate based system of real property recording called a Torrens Title system which it adopted in 1870, rather than the less formally structured race-notice recording system that, in principle, allows almost anything to be recorded without requiring that it fit in a particular box of types of documents that are permitted. Since 2017, in New Zealand, valid legal interests in law do not arise unless they are recorded. Since 2017, the New Zealand system's official copies are also now entirely electronic. Covenants are governed by Sections 240-250 of the Land Transfer Title Act of 2017 and seem to correspond to the kind of contract described in the question.

Full faith and credit to Vermont In 1777 the politicians of Vermont published a litany of grievances against the government of New York and declared that thenceforward they considered Vermont a separate state pledging no allegiance to New York. Then they existed as an unrecognized state for 14 years before being admitted to the Union as the 14th state, first under their constitution of 1777 and then under their revised constitution of 1786. In 1777 they quickly asked the Continental Congress to be accorded representation in Congress, and being turned down largely because of objections from New York (repeatedly during 1777 through 1785) they took the position that Vermont was not a part of the USA (and in fact engaged in separate peace negotiations with the British, in which they said they would submit to being a British colony if the British would protect them from New York; those negotiations led to some prisoner-of-war exchanges). (Recall that no one ever defined the boundaries of the USA until the preliminary articles of peace were signed in November 1782, and they included Vermont within the boundaries. They had to do that because New York claimed Vermont was a part of New York.) When Vermont was admitted to the Union in March 1791 (after the legislature of New York decided in 1790 to give up that state's claims on condition that Congress decided to admit Vermont) no new state constitution took effect and no new governor assumed office, nor new justices of the state's highest court, etc. The state government simply continued. Governor Thomas Chittenden, sworn in in October 1790, continued his term of office. (Chittenden was actually re-elected annually from 1778 to 1788, but then Moses Robinson served a one-year term as governor from October 1789 to October 1790, then Chittenden was again re-elected repeatedly until he died in 1797.) The act of Congress admitting Vermont to the Union did not say anything about creation of a new state or a new state government, but rather said "The State of Vermont" had "petitioned the Congress" for admission. So it appears that under Vermont law, no new state was created but an already existing state got admitted to the Union, and federal law said nothing to the contrary. (Congress passed several bills pertaining to Vermont in February and March 1791. One of them admitted the state to the Union; one created a federal court in Vermont; one established a port of entry and customs house or something like that, where people entered the state from Canada; one fixed the number of representatives Vermont would have in Congress; and one provided that the U.S. census, conducted elsewhere during the previous year, should be extended into Vermont.) So does the full-faith-and-credit clause of the U.S. Constitution require every state to grant full faith and credit to to official acts of the State of Vermont during its years as an unrecognized state? Is there a sort of tacit retroactive recognition? (Vermont's constitution got revised again in 1793, and I suspect one reason for that was that it was no longer appropriate to have a list of grievances against New York in the state constitution.)

In my opinion, from the moment Vermont became a state, as decided by Congress, every state has to give full faith and credit to its records, acts, and judicial proceedings. Congress in 1790 acted under the authority of the full faith and credit clause and passed a law that eventually became what is known today as 28 U.S. Code § 1738. That law was mostly unchanged through the years, aside from an amendment in 1948. That law provided for each state to recognize each other's acts, records, and judicial procedures under the appropriate seal. In 1813 the Supreme Court decided Mills v. Duryee. In this case the Supreme Court decided that the authority for states providing full faith and credit came under this law. This law does not list any dates of effectiveness nor does it restrict its effectiveness to when Vermont entered the union. Thus in my opinion at the moment Vermont entered the union full faith and credit should have been given to all its acts, records, and proceedings. As I cannot find any case law in the affirmative nor in the negative I interpreted it myself above. Later the Supreme Court recognized a public policy exemption from the full faith and credit clause, likely anything that falls under that exception need not be recognized.

Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively "amend" through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.

Prior to the 14th and 15th amendments, the US Federal Constitution and the Federal laws passed under it neither allowed nor denied anyone the right to vote. The decisions on who would and would not be allowed to vote, including for members of Congress and for President, was wholly in the hands of the sates, and were regulated by the various state constitutions and laws. A few states permitted women to vote, and at least one permitted free blacks to vote, at least for a period of its history. The Federal government had nothing to say on the matter. In at lesat one case the US Supreme Court refused to consider such a question. That was the case of Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) which grew out of the Dorr Rebellion The state of Rhode Island, had retained its pre-revolutionary charter (dating from 1663) as its constitution, and required the ownership of a significant amount of landed property as a qualification to vote. The Wikipedia article on the rebellion (linked above) states: By 1829, 60% of the state's free white men were ineligible to vote (women and most non-white men were prohibited from voting). In 1841 a group led by Thomas Wilson Dorr held a convention to draft a new state Constitution, (known as the "People's Constitution"), and held ratifying votes on the draft. They declared that it had been approved by a majority of those qualified under the old laws as well as a majority of those voting and qualified under the new rules, and that it was therefore the valid constitution of the state. The old (charter) government said this was invalid and illegal. Attempts to establish the new government by force failed. However, a revised state constitution that greatly expanded voting rights was passed and took effect in 1843. Luther v. Borden was a case of trespass against members of the militia acting under the charter government, brought by a supporter of Dorr. The plaintiffs brought extensive evidence (over 150 pages) intended to establish that the Dorr or "People's" constitution had been validly ratified by a majority of voters, and that the old constitution had improperly restricted voting rights. The case went to the US Supreme Court, where Chief Justice Taney wrote in the majority opinion: The plaintiff contends that the charter government was displaced, and ceased to have any lawful power, after the organization, in May, 1842, of the government which he supported, and although that government never was able to exercise any authority in the State nor to command obedience to its laws or to its officers, yet he insists that it was the lawful and established government upon the ground that it was ratified by a large majority of the male people of the State of the age of twenty-one and upwards, and also by a majority of those who were entitled to vote for general officers under the then existing laws of the State. ... The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island. The question relates altogether to the constitution and laws of that State, and the well settled rule in this court is that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution and laws of the State. Besides, if the Circuit Court had entered upon this inquiry, by what rule could it have determined the qualification of voters upon the adoption or rejection of the proposed constitution unless there was some previous law of the State to guide it? It is the province of a court to expound the law, not to make it. And certainly it is no part of the judicial functions of any court of the United States to prescribe the qualification of voters in a State, giving the right to those to whom it is denied by the written and established constitution and laws of the State, or taking it away from those to whom it is given; nor has it the right to determine what political privileges the citizens of a State are entitled to, unless there is an established constitution or law to govern its decision. {emphasis added} Thus, until the passage and ratification of the 14th and 15th amendments, which forbid states to deny the vote based on race, national origin, and a few other grounds, the Federal Constitution had nothing to say on the point. States were required to grant the right to vote to women by the 19th amendment in 1920, and the 26th (1971) prohibited denial on the ground of age to anyone 18 or older. The 24th (1964) prohibited denial for failure to pay a poll tax or any other tax. The 14th amendment has been held to guarantee the equal weight of votes, in what was at first known as the "one man, one vote" rule (later "one person, one vote") and has been used to overturn individual and group denials of voting rights. But there were no federal voting rights in the years before 1865. I am not aware of any writings by any of the "founding fathers" (say the members of the Constitutional Convention) that seriously discuss the possibility of a female President. But they did consider and endorse the possibility of a person being elected president who might not be qualified to vote in some of the states. They declined to impose, or permit Congress to impose, a property, or other variable, qualification on the president, even though many of the original states had property qualifications for voters. Options for this were proposed and voted down in the Convention's drafting process.

Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.

First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap.

In New York State, towns are not "part of" cities; they are distinct political entities with their own separate borders, and they do not overlap or contain each other. You can see on this map (Wikipedia but I couldn't find an official one that was as easy to read) that the Town of Henrietta and the City of Rochester are separate. In fact, they do not even share a common border (the Town of Brighton is in between). The laws and municipal code of the City of Rochester do not apply in the Town of Henrietta, nor vice versa. Henrietta has its own Town Code, linked from its official website, but I could not find any regulations on towing vehicles from private property, nor in the Code of Monroe County in which the Town is located. So I would assume that New York State law applies.

I am presuming at this point that no one is "the President elect" in the eyes of the Constitution until the electoral college votes in December. In the 20th amendment, the beginning of the sentence is : If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died... So, that means January 20th, according to section 1 of the same amendment. At that time, not only have the electors already voted since at least a month, but Congress supposedly has certified the election of the dead guy and his running mate 14 days prior. That's the time when someone is or isn't president-elect in regards to this amendment. That's for your first sentence. Now for the rest, and taking your example of the 2020 election, if Biden had died between November and December, the options available to the Electors in each state are different. Some will be able to vote for someone else than Biden for president, possibly someone named by the DCCC, but many Electors in different states will not have that option. The way I see it, there's two options. Either there are no (or almost no) faithless Electors, then the Biden/Harris ticket gets certified on January 6th (what could possibly go wrong 👀), then pursuant to the 20th amendment Harris gets sworn in as the President on January 20th. Or, a lot of the Electors who can legally be faithless, get faithless, then the democratic electoral votes are split, no ticket gets to 270, which triggers a contingent election by the House of Reps (and the Senate selects the VP). Who they elect is anyone's guess. So, if you allow me a bit of presumption as to what you meant, you seemed to imply that Electors voting for a dead guy would be absurd, but in fact it seems like it would be the safest scenario for their party.

In Article I, section 9, the Constitution says: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. A "capitation" is also called a head tax; it means you tax $X for every person. The meaning of "other direct Tax" is less clear; the historical understanding in the late 19th century was that it didn't apply to income. However, one thing that is clear is that it does apply to a property tax: if the federal government seeks to tax you on the value of your real or personal property, it must apportion the tax among the states on the basis of population. If Virginia has 2.5% of the US population and New York has 6.25%, then the total tax money collected from Virginia must be 2.5% of the total tax money collected nationwide, and likewise for New York; the total money collected from Virginia must be 40% the amount collected from New York. This doesn't mean Virginia's rate is 40% of New York's. If Virginia's land had a total value of 40% what New York's did, then the rates would actually be the same. But the ratio between tax collected from the two states would have nothing to do with property value; it would be just based on population. This is a rather convoluted and silly system; one theory I've read suggests that part of the point was to discourage these sorts of taxes unless they're truly necessary (and if they do happen, to collect the most money from the states with the most congressmen that could vote on the bill). But it's unworkable for almost any actual tax that's not a head tax, and head taxes are very much out of fashion. Most taxes have been considered to not be direct taxes. Income tax was generally not considered direct either. However, an 1895 Supreme Court case (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.) found that a tax on income which was derived from property (rent, dividends, interest, etc.) was effectively a tax on the property, and so was a direct tax. This would apply to only a subset of income (wage income wasn't included), but it's a reasonably significant subset. Many people didn't particularly like the decision; it pretty much said "the kind of income rich people make can't be taxed by a practical method, only this impractical apportionment system." The Supreme Court can be overruled via constitutional amendment; that's what the 16th Amendment did. It clarified that Pollock was no more, and that income tax didn't need to be apportioned no matter where the income came from. It was enacted precisely because apportionment is utterly impractical.

Can an ISP respond to a DMCA counter notice on behalf of a user? We are an ISP, allowing our users to write reviews of their educational experience. Normally the users' free speech rights are protected through the Communications Decency Act, Anti-SLAPP statutes, first amendment, etc. all that. Lately though, a entity's CEO/Owner filed a DMCA request against us and a very negative review about him and his school in particular, claiming copyright ownership over it. We can claim to be an ISP and gain those restrictions, but as the review is anonymous (we have the IP though), we have no way to contact the author. Furthermore, the DMCA request is clearly false/perjurious -- for several reasons. The CEO did not write such a scathing negative review of himself in the third person and then decide to submit it to us anonymously, only to request the takedown. Clearly he is not the copyright owner. The CEO has contacted (harassed) us many times (email and letters) concerning this and other reviews, claiming defamation, slander, trademark infringement, and anything else he could think of. Clearly the review is not his. We know his IP addresses and the IPs of his staff based upon the emails, of which other false (positive) reviews were submitted. The review authors grant us copyright to use their reviews, via a disclaimer on the survey itself. We normally have a process for the review authors to remove their own reviews, which other reviewers use. We also have a process for entities to dispute the validity of reviews, which other entities use and have used successfully. But we generally reserve the right to decide if a review is valid via process, and this DMCA takedown is putting us into the awkward position of forcing us to choose between being an "ISP" or a "content author/submitter". If we choose not to play the ISP part in responding, then it seems that we open ourselves up to suit as a defamatory content author. Basically, can we preserve our DMCA- ISP "immunity" and still respond on behalf of the review author? Edit: I guess basically I am asking a sidestep question. What do we do when WE have the information that demonstrates that the content is non-infringing, and that the DMCA filer is plainly lying? Apart from signing an affidavit (and releasing his/her identity), the original author has no way to prove that he/she is the original author either. And it is really beside the point, since the entity is trying to get negative reviews removed, not protect a copyright of something they own. I mean, it is clear abuse of the system. Edit 2: Though my question is pointedly what I am dealing with, perhaps it should be revised to a more simple question. For instance, what do you do if you are an ISP who receives a DMCA for content YOU own, and YOU produced, and YOU exclusively hold the copyright for. Do you have to take down your own content until you send a counter notice, and record the counternotice to yourself? So upstream ISPs have forwarded the DMCA to you to handle (because you own all of the servers and power and colocation facility). There's this built-in assumption in the DMCA which is that the one filing the takedown is actually the copyright holder, and all they have to do is sign a BS lying affidavit, certifying that they believe it to be theirs, which carries very little consequence, and then at that point the onus is upon everyone else to either show they are not involved, or give up the personal information of the owner to a potentially litigiously malicious party. For instance, the information that the DMCA counter notice demands, would otherwise not be provided without subpoena.

Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.

If you own the copyright (because you wrote the book), you can do whatever you want with it. If someone else has the copyright, you have to get their permission to do what you propose. That could be the author, the author's estate, or some other party. It then depends on what the interest of the rights-holder is: they could say "No way!", "Sure, for a payment of $100,000", "At $1 per copy, here is how you must keep track of copies", "Okay, as long as you include this notice that prevents further re-distribution" or "Huh, I never thought of that. Sure, I grant you complete license to do whatever you want". A publisher is relevant only when the publisher requires a transfer of copyright to the publishing company, or if the rights-holder has granted them a certain type of license (e.g. an exclusive license). If the author has granted someone else an exclusive perpetual right to distribute, then they cannot also grant you a license to distribute for free. That is really the author's problem, though, since the publisher doesn't hold the copyright so can't sue you, instead the publisher would sue the author for breach of contract.

Any google review would be hearsay. That means, it would be proof that someone posted a review, and what was written in the review, but it wouldn't be proof that any facts claimed in the review were true. As it is proof of posting, anyone who feels slandered could sue for slander and be successful (depending on circumstances). But trying to claim that the contents of a review is a true fact will fail. You can of course try to contact the person writing a review, and they might be willing to appear in court as a witness. That would make it a statement by a witness which would be taken seriously, and not just hearsay. Since lying in a court as a witness is a serious matter, someone posting a false review will very likely not be willing to appear in court for you.

Yes, a licensee of Sketchfab is only required to cooperate with this audit process because it was agreed to in a contract. Copyright law does not (in the US, or anywhere else that I know of) give a content creator such a right to demand proof that something is being used in accord with a license. If a content creator or copyright holder thinks that some content is being used without permission, or is an unauthorized derivative work, the holder has only a few possible courses of action. The holder can send a cease and desist letter. This has no legal force, but puts the alleged infringer on notice, makes further infringement clearly "knowing", and may well cause an infringer to stop infringing for fear of an expensive suit. The holder can send a takedown notice if the content is online in a venue that accepts such notices. But there is not a legal obligation to honor such a notice, and a counter-notice may lead to the content being put back up. Finally the holder may sue for copyright infringement. This has significant upfront costs, and requires significant time from the holder or the holder's business. The holder may therefore be unwilling to bring suit unless significant recovery seems likely. Once suit is brought, the holder will have discovery rights to demand answers to relevant questions from the alleged infringer, including the source of the content in question.

Yes So far so good. This is a copyright violation but it is probably fair use - certainly there is case law permitting a copy of a backup digital asset to be made so I don’t see why a similar argument wouldn’t work with backing up a physical book. Clear copyright violation. Alice can rent out the original under the first sale doctrine but the ‘backup’ is not so protected. It’s not fair use because it’s use is commercial, the work is a type of work the author expects to profit from, the entire work has been copied and the use is deleterious to the market i.e. the renters are less likely to buy an original - it falls foul of all four factors of the fair use test.

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

The first thing that has to be done (in court, or via lawyer-to-lawyer communication) is that The Company has to prove that they own the copyright. If they accomplish that, you can defend yourself by providing proof of a license to download and redistribute. From what I can tell, you cannot directly prove that, since the rights-holder did not give you the license. The issue is that a third party cannot impose a license on a work simply by putting it out there with a file that claims to be a license from the artist. So this brings in the Free Music Archive: they presumably have some evidence that the rights holder did indeed grant the alleged license, and may be able to provide proof. Your argument may be credible, in the sense that you had a good-faith belief that the item was so licensed, and the website would provide a basis for concluding that that belief is reasonable. If the work was licensed, then the some rights holder would know that, but not necessarily the current one. Assume the artist made a recording, transferred the rights to Company A, who later sold the rights to Company B who is now coming after you. Artist may have licensed it when it was his, and forgot to tell A. A may have licensed it when they sold the license to B. Artist may have improperly licensed it after he sold the work to A (under the "I wrote it, I have the right to do whatever I want" non-legal theory). A might have improperly licensed the work after selling the right to B (maybe by mistakenly including it in a package deal, i.e. via bookkeeping error, rather than ignorance of the law). Or, they may simply have forgotten. If this is a DMCA takedown notice, the notice-giver could just be abusing the system. But we don't know how you were contacted, so I'll leave DMCA out of this for now.

How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.

Definition of food? What is the legal definition of food in the United States? Particularly, in the context of food, food products, food industry, food additives, etc., what is a precise, formal, legal definition of food? Some references to potentially useful sources, and some discussion: The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C) §201(f), which can be found in 21 U.S.C. §321(f) defines food, but in a tautological manner: food is used for food. (f) The term “food” means (1) articles used for food or drink for man or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article. Similarly 21 CFR §170.3(m) defines food as (for the purposes of the subpart on food additives): Food includes human food, substances migrating to food from food-contact articles, pet food, and animal feed. The primary portion of this is also a tautology: food includes food. It says that 'food' includes human food, but what constitutes this human food? (This definition serves the purpose of establishing the word food as more broad, for the subpart, than just human food, including also residues from contact substances and animal food. But I am interested in what defines the human/animal food that it refers to). The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) does not seem to add any definition of food. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 amends the FD&C and provides definitions for dietary supplement. The act deems dietary supplements as food, and also distinguishes them from "conventional food". But does not define food nor conventional food. So the question is: what (besides chewing gum) constitutes food? And where is it defined?

There isn't likely to be a single universal definition; a word can be defined in different ways for different laws. It's entirely possible that these laws have no more specific definition of "food" than what you've found. In that case, a court interpreting the law would presumably follow the plain meaning rule, under which "ordinary words have their ordinary meaning". Should there be a dispute, a judge would have to determine whether the substance in question is "food" in the ordinary sense of the word (in some cases, judges have cited widely used dictionaries when looking for an "ordinary" definition). They would also try to determine whether the legislature would have intended this particular substance to be covered by the law.

None of the things listed are statutes. They are all parts of or compilations of parts of statutes. A 'statute' is a document issued by an official body, such as Congress, which contains a law or command. 'USC' refers to the United States Code, which is a compilation of statutory law. It is not the law. It is prima facie evidence of the law, but may be proven to be wrong. The 'statute' is the Act passed by Congress. These can be found in the United States Statutes at Large. For example, the Labor Management Relations Act 1947 (Public Law 80–101, 61 Stat 136, also known as the Taft–Hartley Act) is a statute, passed by Congress on 23 June 1947. It is codified at (i.e. a reasonably reliable copy of the provisions of the Act, taking into account subsequent amendments, can be found at) 29 USC s 401-531. But 29 USC is not a statute in any sense of the word. To use a particularly 'meta' example: 1 USC 204(a) codifies the rule that the USC is prima facie evidence of the state of the law of the United States, but the statute which made this rule is Public Law 80-278, 61 Stat 633 ('An Act to codify and enact into positive law, title 1 of the United States Code, entitled "General Provisions"'), which consists of a slab of text copied out of the United States Code as it then stood. So Congress does sometimes enact parts of the Code; but the Code itself is not a statute.

The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.

What a statute means can be difficult to determine. There are several approaches to statutory interpretation that could be helpful: Textual: The plain meaning doesn't confine "use" to a few particular types of uses. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. Legislative history/legislative intent: The previous version of the subsection did limit prohibited uses to only composing, sending, or reading electronic messages. Given the amendment, it seems that the legislature no longer desired that limitation. When the bill was introduced, Rep. D'Amico stated the purpose of the bill was to "[expand] the prohibition on driving while using an electronic communication device to include uses beyond composing, sending, or reading an electronic message." During debate, when asked what a person should do that doesn't have Bluetooth, Rep. D'Amico suggested "You put it on speaker phone". When asked, "Where would you place the phone?", Rep D'Amico replied, "Wherever you feel like; just not next to your ear." During the same debate, D'Amico described the bill: "What House Bill 1247 does is ban handheld cell phones while driving a vehicle." In my opinion, the declaration of the bill's sponsor, and the debate surrounding the bill treated it as expanding the prohibition from including only texting and email to also include voice conversations. As far as I can tell, the full scope of "using" under this statute hasn't been tested in court, but I could see this going either way. The plain text provides an expansive prohibition on any use of an electronic communication device. However, a court might also be convinced by the legislative intent that only aims to add handheld voice communications to the previous list of prohibited activities (or it least it could be argued that this is the case). Further, under a purposive construction, a court could even look beyond the explicit legislative intent and find that the core purpose was to prevent distraction, in which case "using" could include any activity on your electronic device that distracts you as if you were texting, or making a phone call (eg. selecting the next song to play in your music app).

You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on "spirit" (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of "other factors", such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.

It depends on whether one honestly believes that the supermarket would consent to them eating a snack before paying for it. If there is no consent, either explicit or implied, then it is theft as no contract has been performed or fulfilled so ownership hasn't transferred, as follows: Theft is defined by section 1Theft Act 1968 as: (1) A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and “thief” and “steal” shall be construed accordingly. The two elements relevant here are "dishonestly" and "intention of permanently depriving". Section 2 offers three defences to being dishonest, with this being the only one applicable here: (1) A person’s appropriation of property belonging to another is not to be regarded as dishonest— ... (b) if he appropriates the property in the belief that he would have the other’s consent if the other knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it... The definition of intention to permanently deprive may be found at section 6: (1) A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights... See this article by News Shopper that explains it in a much better way than I could without me commiting plagiarism: Buying a product at the till is what transfers the ownership from the product belonging to the shopkeeper, to it belonging to you. And only when that sale is complete do you have the legal right to consume or use it. If you eat the chocolate before you legally own it, you are permanently depriving the owner of his right to the product – he can no longer refuse you the sale or take the item off the shelves.

What statutory or prerogative authority is the FSA exercising when it allows such false labelling? As other answers have noted, they have executive discretion to "turn a blind eye" to what would normally be a violation of food safety laws and just decide that, right now, their government-mandated priorities are better served by not enforcing that particular letter of the law in these particular circumstances. In theory, someone could probably challenge that decision and take them to court over it, claiming that they were derelict in their duties or not acting impartially and in the public interest. However, in this case they'd probably have a pretty good defense against and such claims, both due to having explicit authority to make such decisions in emergencies (as also noted in other answers), and also because the decision itself seems pretty fair (it applies to all producers using sunflower oil in their products) and justified by the circumstances (more on that below). What public good is supposed to be being served here? It is stated that allowing items to be labelled "sunflower oil" that contain no sunflower oil "[maintains] the supply of certain food products", but this is nonsensical because replacing a product with another product does not maintain its supply, regardless of whether the replacement product is labelled accurately or falsely. Labelling the replacement as being the product it replaced appears to maintain its supply, but it doesn't actually maintain its supply. That is fact rather than opinion. You seem to be assuming that this advice by the FAS is about allowing someone to sell bottles of "sunflower oil" that actually contain rapeseed oil. It's not. It's not even really about products like crisps (potato chips, for those not in the UK) or pesto sauce or margarine that might contain sunflower oil as a major ingredient. For those products, the news page you linked indicates there are separate rules that apparently require, at a minimum, applying a sticker to notify consumers about the substitution: "where sunflower oil is a key ingredient, such as crisps, retailers will imprint information on substitute oil onto existing labels." However, think about all the other foodstuffs sold in stores that might include sunflower oil as a minor ingredient, like, say, granola, mustard sauce, instant noodles, mashed potato powder, microwave popcorn, frozen pizza, bolognese pasta sauce or just plain white bread. (If you're wondering where the random list of products above comes from, I just looked quickly around in my kitchen for products that had sunflower oil, rapeseed oil or some other neutral vegetable oil listed as a minor ingredient. There are surprisingly many.) I assume you would agree that all of these products would still be substantially the same product regardless of which kind of vegetable oil was used in them. The companies making all those products, and many others besides, typically order their product packaging in bulk, often from overseas, getting a new shipment of boxes or wrappers or labels maybe every few months or years. And of course those will all have the ingredients list printed on them, as mandated by law. If they want to change the ingredients, that means they have to send a new design to the company that makes the packaging and wait however many days or weeks or months it takes for the packaging company to make and ship the new packaging with the updated ingredients list to them. Normally that's not much of a problem, because normally food manufacturers don't tend to change ingredients in a hurry. Usually they'd plan such changes months in advance, order the new packaging well ahead of time and probably use up all of the old packaging they have in stock before actually making the switch so that they don't have to throw it away. (Companies that do need to frequently switch ingredients, e.g. due to seasonal or unpredictable availability, usually plan for that in advance e.g. by making their labels generic enough to accommodate the change or, where that's not allowed, finding workarounds like indicating the exact type or origin of the ingredients in codes that are stamped on the packaging late in the manufacturing process. That's why you occasionally see stuff in ingredients lists like "vegetable oils (rapeseed, sunflower or soybean)" or "produced in EU and non-EU countries" or "see last letter of expiration code for country of origin: A = Spain, B = Morocco, C = Israel, D = China".) In this particular case, however, a lot of companies that had been using sunflower oil in their products, and expected it to remain easily available, were caught short when the war in Ukraine broke out and the price of sunflower oil suddenly went way up, as companies selling the oil realized that there probably wouldn't be much sunflower oil exported from Ukraine this year. At that point, the companies that had been using sunflower oil as a generic cooking oil in their products would normally have a limited number of options, none of them particularly good (for either the companies or consumers): Keep using sunflower oil at whatever cost and transfer the increased cost to consumer prices. (To make things worse, the more companies do this, the higher the price of sunflower oil will rise, as they're basically competing for a limited supply.) Switch to a different type of oil and order new packaging ASAP, hoping that it will arrive before your existing stock of sunflower oil runs out. (This might take longer than usual, since presumably other companies are also in the same situation, so the packaging makers are probably swamped with sudden orders. Also, your stock of old packaging is now useless, and you might have to throw it out.) Order the new packaging immediately and pay extra for expedited delivery. Again, you'd be competing with lots of other companies who also really want to be the first to get their new packaging, so premiums for fast delivery are likely to be high if you can get it at all. All of that extra cost will also likely transfer into consumer prices. Use the existing packaging but apply stickers with updated ingredients lists on top of the old ones. That's not nearly as easy and cheap as it sounds, not only because you still have to get the stickers printed (and the printing companies are probably also swamped with orders), but also because you'll have to apply them to every single box or bag or carton, likely by hand. That's a lot of expensive manual labor that will, again, likely increase consumer prices. Just halt production until you can get new, updated packaging (or more sunflower oil at a reasonable price). That's probably the worst option for both the manufacturers and the consumers, since it results in lots of lost income for the manufacturers and product shortages for the consumers. Still, if all the other options are even more expensive, some manufacturers might be forced to do this. The exceptional decision by the FAS to selectively enforce the food labeling requirements in this particular case basically offers these food manufacturers one more option: switch to an alternative type of oil now, but keep using the old packaging until you can replace it. Practically speaking that's probably the best outcome for almost everyone. There's really very little difference between sunflower and rapeseed oil — both are neutral, mostly flavorless vegetable oils suitable for generic cooking purposes — and most people probably can't really tell them apart, especially not when they're used as minor ingredients among many others. Of course, there may still be people who really don't like the taste of rapeseed oil (assuming they can taste it) or are allergic to it (which, as the news article you linked notes, is very rare) or have some ethical or religious objection to consuming it (not that I'm aware of any, but I'm sure someone out there has one). Hence the news release, so that those people who might be affected by the substitution can find about it in advance.

You can write anything you want (basic First Amendment protections): the question is whether one would be liable for damage that arises from what you're written, or whether you can distribute what you've written. Distribution may be restricted, thanks to the Commerce Clause (hence FDA regulations, which figure prominently in the analysis). Most software writers are not medical practitioners, and vice versa, and what the software writer does is implement something described by a competent medical practitioner. It is logically possible that a med. practitioner might also try to write software (no problem) and distribute it (possibly a problem); or, a software writer might read up on something on Wikipedia and try to implement it (again, no problem) or distribute it (possible problem). Damages can be sorted into two categories, implementation errors and scientific errors, and having ruled out deliberate sabotage, we are left with negligence. If the software writer failed to use suitable care in writing code that sums a set of numbers, the software writer has been negligent. If the person purporting to have the qualified scientific knowledge mis-states the formula, that person has been negligent. It is possible for many parties to be negligent (the programmer failed to be diligent in understanding the software requirements; the medical professional failed to adequately explain what was required of the program). The FDA does regulate medical devices, and "device" is construed pretty broadly (condoms are non-exempt class 2 medical devices). There is FDA guidance on medical software which makes it clear that the device manufacturer shoulders the regulatory burden. Anytime you manufacture a tangible thing (which is within the scope of FDA regulation for medical devices), you have to have the thing approved. Many (most?) medical devices implement software, and are thus within the scope of FDA scrutiny. It is not illegal to write software that ends up being implemented in an unapproved medical device, but the unapproved medical device itself is illegal. It is reasonably likely that purported medical software (not a gadget with software build in) would be held to be a non-exempt device. To know if something is exempt, you would look at the exemptions list, and determine that your program (or thing) is not on or implied by anything on that list. The visual acuity eye chart is a class 1 exempt item, as is the manual toothbrush. There is no way to specifically look for things that are only software, or that contain software, so the search through the list would have to be guided by knowledge of the subject area. Canada is helpful in explaining when software is a regulated medical device. This is non-probative w.r.t. US law but gives you an idea what is likely to be considered a "device". Under Canadian law, the software would be clearly a regulated medical device. The FDA has a power-point that attempts to say something about the matter which warns you that you are on your own and "You will need to go back to study and use the source regulatory documents" to make the determination. Eventually, slide 13, they hint that if you intend the software to be used in diagnosis, prevention, or treatment, then it is a device (so, yes, the aforementioned software would be a device, and probably not exempt from regulations). General purpose software (word processors, web browsers, communications software, etc.) are not indented to be used for a regulated purpose, although they can be so used, and thus they are probably not subject to FDA regulation. There is a murky relationship between regulatory approval and liability. Being approved by the government does not convey immunity to negligence suits (see Wyeth v. Levine), but being approved can have weight in determining whether a party was negligent, since regulatory scrutiny ostensibly filters out errors that could have been caught. Federal approval does not preempt state tort law, as the court ruled. Regulations pertaining to medical devices hold for anything that qualifies as a device, and is not defined (negatively) in terms of disclaimers. If you sell a medical device but label it saying "this is not a medical device, it is not created by a competent medical practitioner", that doesn't make it not a medical device. Unfortunately, what counts as a regulated device is based on intended use, and there is an obvious connection between disclaimers and intentions. Taking MS Word as an example, MS does not as far as I know say that "Word is not intended to be used as a medical device". It can certainly be used to diagnose, teat, and prevent medical conditions, but so too can a screw driver or pretty much anything else. The number of non-medical uses vastly outweigh the medical uses, so it would be deemed not to be a regulated device. A program which prescribed a set of prayers to be uttered in case of illness would be subject to First Amendment override of any FDA regulations. Quack medical devices are prohibited (that's why there is regulation of devices in the first place), but discerning the fine line between permitted actions based on nutty beliefs and forbidden actions is not easy. The FDA also has guidance on the distinction between "Complementary and Alternative Medicine", which does not clearly state that, for example, a software reading of your cakra-energies based on a computer program's questions is not a medical device. They do say of mind-body medicine (mentioning yoga, biofeedback and tai chi as examples) that "CAM practices in this domain would not be subject to our jurisdiction under the Act or the PHS Act", but then say "any equipment or other products used as part of the practice of mind-body medicine may be subject to FDA regulation, depending on the nature of the product and its intended use" (hence a yoga-enabling program may be subject to regulation).

Is it legal to charge GST2 of 2.5% in Australia? I recently bought a meal at a restaurant and when I looked at the receipt later I noticed that it shows a GST2 charge of 2.5%. As far as I know there has only been one GST rate in Australia since it was introduced: 10%. Some items, like basic food, are GST-free, so effectively they have a GST of 0%. I've never heard of GST being charged at any other rate in Australia. Is this legal?

You are correct in that the GST is 10%. It never has been (and likely never will be!) 2.5%. You're also correct that some items (generally considered as 'essentials') are GST free. For example, the ATO includes 'most basic food' on its list of GST-free items. However, these GST-free items are completely GST free, and restaurant meals certainly don't class as basic food. Perhaps interestingly, the wholesale sales tax when it was first introduced in 1930 was set at 2.5%, but it wasn't at that rate for long (see A brief history of Australia's tax system). If I had to guess, I'd say this is probably a dodgy set up in this restaurant's point-of-sale system (there's also no such thing as 'GST2'). Hopefully their returns to the tax office are not as dodgy!

As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.

After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.

While it is true that cash is legal tender, this can still be overridden by mutual agreement (i.e. in a contract). So the legal tender status only matters if payment methods were not agreed upon before entering into an agreement. In other words: If a restaurant lets you eat without telling you they do not accept cash, they will have to accept cash. However, if they explicitly tell you they only accept card payments, they can insist on this later. This applies in both the United States, in Germany, and in Canada (see e.g. It may be legal tender, but more businesses are snubbing cash). So to address your points: As I understand the legality would work something like this: 1) I accept the the contract where I agree to pay with card in exchange for food Yes - however, in accepting the contract you also accept that the restaurant is "cashless" (assuming the restaurant clearly tells you so, e.g. by putting up a sign or by saying it in person). I attempt to fulfill the contract to the best of my ability, but am prevented from doing so by circumstances beyond my control Yes. Since you attempted to fulfill the contract, you did not commit the crime of theft (which requires intention not to pay). However, you still owe what you promised when entering into the agreement, which is to pay with a card. At this point I owe the restaurant the money, but since the original transaction failed, this is a debt, which I offer to settle with legal tender No. As explained above, if the agreement stipulates a specific payment method, this generally overrides the "legal tender" aspect. In short: You agreed to pay with a card, so you are required to pay with a card. If you cannot pay with a card, you have not fulfilled your part of the agreement. It is is arguable that it is not your fault, but this does not change your obligation. Now you must either negotiate a suitable alternative (cash, cheque, golden watch...), or come back to pay later with a card. Also, the business may be able to charge you additional costs, such as extra accounting work or interest because of your non-standard payment - that would depend on the details.

The acts in question don't distinguish between online and in person sales. Both are retail sales. A retail sale is a sale for use rather than a wholesale sale for resale. Wholesale sales are exempt from sales tax and so are easy to distinguish. Online sales are still retail sales. It is a distinction without a difference. Sales and Use Tax Law § 6007(a)(1) and common law case law would suffice. There is also case law under the UCC, and the relevant federal statutes. But, I doubt that the argument of the vendor would be that it didn't make a retail sale (at least once their lawyers got involved). More importantly, there is nothing that says that online sales aren't retail sales. Bob should contact the online sales department to seek a remedy since he was advised by the company to contact that department. But the part of the company handling his complaint doesn't change his rights. Warranty rights don't depend upon the intent of the parties. If a warranty arises and it good isn't as warranted, there is a legal right to a remedy. If a store doesn't honor one's legal warranty rights, then you sue the store for damages, typically, in a court of limited jurisdiction, or if there is an arbitration clause, in a consumer arbitration forum (some of which are not actively doing business due to controversies in recent years, leaving a judicial forum open).

Given that this is a UK based company, the most applicable Act would be the Unsolicited Goods and Services Act 1971 A person who, not having reasonable cause to believe there is a right to payment, in the course of any trade or business makes a demand for payment, or asserts a present or prospective right to payment, for what he knows are unsolicited goods sent (after the commencement of this Act) to another person with a view to his acquiring them [for the purposes of his trade or business], shall be guilty of an offence and on summary conviction shall be liable to a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale. This law specifically refers to [unsolicited] charges for entries in directories. You also mentioned that they're misrepresenting that a company is already a customer and sending out invoices on that basis. That would be a breach of the Fraud Act 2006 A person is in breach of this section if he dishonestly makes a false representation As to their enforceability, that answer is no. If this came before an actual judge, the judge would throw it out in a heartbeat. No agreement was made to provide a service in return for a payment and these companies rely on sending threatening letters via (seeming) third-parties precisely because they wish to avoid that level of scrutiny.

It is legal. 18 USC Chapter 17 contains laws regarding what you can/cannot do with US legal tender. It doesn't mention anything about buying, or selling US tender at or above the face value. And there are several businesses in the USA that do this (coin exchanges which purchase coins at less then face value and give you dollar bills in return, etc...). However I would be concerned that your action might look like money laundering to the customs official on your way back home. Or on the way going to the foreign country for that matter. Which could be very bad for you. I would talk to a lawyer about this.

Yes, this is gambling. The coupons have a value; gambling is the wagering of something of value. As to if it is illegal gambling, that would depend on the law in the jurisdiction where it takes place: for an internet transaction this could be the jurisdiction of the website owner or the user or both. As an example: in Australia, the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 is administered by the Department of Communication and the Arts, it provides: Any game of chance, including games of mixed chance and skill played over the internet, is prohibited under the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 if it’s provided to someone who is physically in Australia. The Act defines a gambling service as: gambling service means: (a) a service for the placing, making, receiving or acceptance of bets; or (b) a service the sole or dominant purpose of which is to introduce individuals who wish to make or place bets to individuals who are willing to receive or accept those bets; or (c) a service for the conduct of a lottery; or (d) a service for the supply of lottery tickets; or (e) a service for the conduct of a game, where: (i) the game is played for money or anything else of value; and (ii) the game is a game of chance or of mixed chance and skill; and (iii) a customer of the service gives or agrees to give consideration to play or enter the game; or (f) a gambling service (within the ordinary meaning of that expression) that is not covered by any of the above paragraphs. The Act provides exemptions, however, based on the small amount of information in your question its hard to tell if any would apply. Broadly, the exemptions allow for certain types of gaming to be licensed/regulated. The Act applies to any service that may be accessed by people in Australia irrespective of where it is in the world.

Is it Legal to drive while listening to headphones? Are there any laws that prohibit the use of headphones while operating a vehicle?

The answer depends on the state. In California, you are generally prohibited from driving with headphones in/over both ears. (California Vehicle Code 27400) gnasher729's answer explains how even if this is not illegal per se, it may be illegal by implicating other laws.

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

While it is not illegal to own, it may still be illegal to ride on public property. Private property owners can ban them even if they were legal and need to be consulted individually. I have been unable to find out if new laws spoken about have been passed in New York since the beginning of the year. Based on what I have found (as of the end of 2015), it would be best to consider that they are illegal to use on public areas just as any other unlicensed motor vehicle. As of November 2015 Some property owners have banned them for liability reasons, as it is easy to see how a rider could trip on a bump or unexpected curb. And although they have taken the Upper East Side and other parts of New York City by storm, the state classifies them as motorized vehicles that cannot be registered, so riding them in public can incur a steep fine. Earlier this week, the NYPD's 26th Precinct tweeted: "Be advised that the electric hoverboard is illegal as per NYC Admin. Code 19-176.2*." and December 2015 some lawmakers were talking about making them legal. Truth or Fiction Collected on: 12/28/2015 gives the following summary A spokesperson for the New York City Department of Transportation has explained that the law’s definition of “electronic personal assist mobility device” was broad enough to include hoverboards, and that they would be regulated as such. In NYC, because the population is above 1 million people, electronic personal assist device riders must be licensed, and the devices must be registered with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. Hoverboards are illegal, the spokesperson said, because the NYSDMV would refuse to register them for legal use: NYSDMV’s position is that these vehicles are likely “Electric personal assist mobility devices.” NYS Vehicle and Traffic Law 114-d defines “Electric personal assist mobility device” as “Every self-balancing, two non-tandem wheeled device designed to transport one person by means of an electric propulsion system with an average output of not more than seven hundred fifty watts (one horsepower), and the maximum speed of which on a paved level surface, when propelled solely by its electric propulsion system while ridden by an operator weighing one hundred seventy pounds, is less than twelve and one-half miles per hour.” NYS VTL 125 generally defines “motor vehicles” as “Every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power.” However, VTL 125 specifically excludes some classes of vehicles from the definition of “motor vehicles.” Under VTL 126(a-1), “electrical personal assistive mobility devices operated outside a city with a population of one million or more” are not considered motor vehicles. However, in NYC, because the city population is greater than one million, NYSDMV considers “hoverboards” that meet the definition of “electric personal assist mobility devices” the same as motor vehicles. Based on that interpretation, it would be illegal to operate a hoverboard in NYC without a valid license to drive a motor vehicle. Beyond that, the motor vehicle would need to be registered by NYSDMV (which NYSDMV will not do), inspected, insured, and otherwise treated as, and subject to regulation like, any other motor vehicle. A person who operates a hoverboard in NYC (or any other NYS city with a population greater than a million) would be subject to arrest and prosecution for myriad NYS VTL violations, including, but not limited to, driving a motor vehicle without valid registration or insurance.

What is the correct way to handle this situation? Strictly speaking, each driver exceeding the speed limit is in violation of the traffic sign even if everybody else also infringes it. Thus it is completely valid for the police to pull & fine anyone from among those drivers. Statutes like the one you mention are intended for scenarios where a driver departs significantly --and for no apparent [lawful] reason-- from the speed limit, such as driving at 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. Typically a driver would not get pulled over in the scenario you mention (driving at 62 mph where everybody else drives at 65 mph). The exception would be some police department(s) requiring its cops to meet a quota of fines per week, but that would be quite a questionable practice having nothing to do with the legislative intent. Speed limits are supposed to represent normal and reasonable movement of traffic. If informed consensus is that a particular speed limit is inconsistent with that principle (for instance, where limit is artificially low and raising it would not compromise safety), then a request could be submitted to the Oregon Department of Transportation.

So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.

You are completely in the wrong. It is against the law to operate a motor vehicle without a license. It is against the law to have a motor vehicle that is not insured. It is against the law to violate the conditions of your probation which almost certainly provide that you are not allowed to operate a motor vehicle until your license is reinstated and you have insurance in force. Your personal belief that you didn't break the law is not a valid reason not to pay a fine on a ticket that is ratified by a court. The cop was right when he told you that you were crazy.

No, she cannot 42-2-101(3), C.R.S. provides: “No person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has in his or her immediate possession a current driver’s or minor driver’s license or an instruction permit issued by the department under this article.” "(5) No person who has been issued a currently valid driver's or minor driver's license or an instruction permit shall operate a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state without having such license or permit in such person's immediate possession." The law requires you to carry your license. If your sister only has an instruction permit in her possession, she must operate under its rules until she is in possession of her permanent license. Just in case people think "highway" means a high-speed roadway, the CRS defines highway: "Highway" means the entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel or the entire width of every way declared to be a public highway by any law of this state.

Yes, police are allowed to touch your car or wipe snow off the windshield to view a parking permit. Indeed, if they just ticketed people because their permit could not be seen through the snow, there would be a huge public outrage. They are not allowed to search your car without permission or probable cause in an emergency, but wiping snow or touching the exterior of your car do not constitute searches. Likewise, towing companies are allowed to touch your car in order to tow it away for whatever legal reasons there are for towing a car.

Are there situations where it is legal to threaten someone with a gun but not legal to fire the gun? One of the essential rules of firearm safety is to never point a gun at anything or anyone you do not intend to shoot. It also seems to be a consensus that whenever it wouldn't be lawful to shoot someone in self-defense, brandishing a gun would also not be lawful. I would like to clear this question more. Is there a conceivable situation in which it would be completely legal to point a gun at a person, but not be legal to pull the trigger? I know that the two have different severity. I also know that brandishing a gun, even in a situation it was illegal, could have a lesser chance of prosecution, mainly because there is less evidence (while shooting someone will leave plenty of evidence). So, it can happen that in a situation both are illegal, but only shooting will be prosecuted. This is not what I'm asking. I'm asking whether it can be that one would be legal but the other not. I'm mainly interested in the USA and Europe, if there is a difference. This question is purely theoretical, it was inspired by a comment on this answer. I would also like to keep it in the realms of civilian self-defense.

Examples Detention: A person suspected of a felony can be detained at gunpoint (and, in many jurisdictions, subject to "citizen's arrest"). A more clear example is when you encounter someone committing a felonious assault. You can brandish your gun and order them to stop. If they do stop, then you cannot shoot them unless there is no alternative to preventing them from inflicting grievous bodily harm on another. Defense: If you reasonably feel that another person poses a real and grievous physical threat, you can brandish a gun in defense. A common example is the slight woman followed into a vacant alley by a large man. She can brandish a gun to keep him at bay, but she cannot shoot him if he is not making explicit threats and (supposing one accepts the "Tueller rule") makes no aggressive motion within 21 feet of the woman. Law One helpful explanation of the distinction, by a MO attorney citing the MO Supreme Court: While deadly force can only be used to meet the threat of deadly force, the threat implied by brandishing is justified by a low level threat. “When a person has reasonable cause to apprehend on the part of another a design to inflict a great personal injury, and there was reasonable cause for him to apprehend immediate danger of such design being accomplished he is justified, and has the right, ‘to avert such apprehended design,’ and in proper circumstances the right of attack may be essential to the right of self-defense.” More detailed analysis can be found of California Penal Code 417 (California's law against "Brandishing," which is similar to brandishing laws in most states): [I]f you were lawfully defending yourself or defending another person, California's self-defense laws will excuse your otherwise criminal act. You lawfully act in self-defense or in defense of others when you reasonably believe that you or another person is about to suffer imminent harm, and you fight back with no more force than is reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. I.e., sometimes it's enough to say, "Stop!" But sometimes it's necessary to present a gun for the bad guy to get the message. Additionally: Simply drawing or exhibiting a weapon isn't enough to justify a conviction for 417 PC. In order for prosecutors to convict you of brandishing a weapon or firearm, you must do so in a rude, angry, or threatening manner. The same law review provides illuminating comparisons with the related offense "Assault with a Deadly Weapon" (ADW — CA 245 PC).

In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.

There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.

This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).

Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.

The law on self-defence in England is very clear Under Common law, a person is allowed to use necessary, reasonable and proportionate force to defend themselves, another or their property from imminent attack. Further, Section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides that: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. (2) Subsection (1) above shall replace the rules of the common law on the question when force used for a purpose mentioned in the subsection is justified by that purpose. Is John's action self-defence? It would appear that John could avail himself of both the common law, because he is being attacked, and statutory defences because the attack would appear to be a criminal assault. Both defences require that the force used be reasonable. The definitive statement on reasonable force comes from Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814, 832: The defence of self-defence is one which can be and will be readily understood by any jury. It is a straightforward conception. It involves no abstruse legal thought. … Only common sense is needed for its understanding. It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but may only do, what is reasonably necessary. But everything will depend upon the particular facts and circumstances. … It may in some cases be only sensible and clearly possible to take some simple avoiding action. Some attacks may be serious and dangerous. Others may not be. If there is some relatively minor attack it would not be common sense to permit some action of retaliation which was wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation. If an attack is serious so that it puts someone in immediate peril then immediate defensive action may be necessary. If the moment is one of crisis for someone in imminent danger he may have [to] avert the danger by some instant reaction. If the attack is all over and no sort of peril remains then the employment of force may be by way of revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure aggression. There may no longer be any link with a necessity of defence… If a jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish a person attacked had only done what he honestly and instinctively thought was necessary that would be most potent evidence that only reasonable defensive action had been taken. Essentially, if the jury is satisfied that John struck out to stop an ongoing attack, this would be self-defence. If the attack was over, and John struck the aggressor as they were leaving, this would not be self-defence.

I think you're referring to this image: This is the prosecutor pointing the AR-15 at the jury. Evidence, including guns, is allowed in the courtroom, but the prosecutor was widely criticized for his dramatic antics: pointing it directly at the jury, with his finger on the trigger (the rifle should have been checked for being empty, but not having your finger on the trigger unless you intend to shoot, no matter what, is elementary gun safety).

In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?

Why do judges wear costumes? Many judges often wear robes in the courtroom, but sometimes, they also wear it outside of the courtroom. Where did the robes originate, and why do judges (and lawyers) wear them? For example, the first image shows justices of the Canadian Supreme Court, the second shows justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the third shows a british judge.

The black judicial robes date back in time hundreds, if not thousands of years. In medieval times, all educated people in the British isles, not just judges wore robes and these were customs descended from the Gaelic people who originally ruled Britain and Ireland. This custom differed from that of the Romans who wore togas. The Gaelic elite wore robes with color signifying rank, black being the lowest rank, that of a docent, the lowest level of a professor. Later, when the Saxons invaded they eventually adopted some of the customs of the Gaels. The culmination of this was the founding of what is now known as Oxford University by King Alfred, the greatest of the Saxon kings. This tradition was preserved and developed at Oxford which affected the dress of all academics, including lawyers and justices. Thomas More in his regalia typical of an Oxford Don, c. 1500 These patterns of dress also were influenced somewhat by Italian clerical styles. The main difference between the Italian styles and the Gaelic styles is that Italian robes are usually coats, opening in the front. The Gaelic robe either has no opening at all, just a hole the head is put through, or is divided at the back. Wigs The custom of wearing wigs or perukes was a late development which originated in France in the 1700s and has no great antiquity at all.

Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong.

If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't "tipped off" by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for "good cause." Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.

We have all see on TV the judge instruct jurors that during trial they are not to speak about the case with anyone, even other jurors, unless all jurors are present and they are deliberating. However, contrary to the example given about England, in the U.S., those restrictions evaporate at the end of the trial. After a trial concludes, the court has no continuing control over the jurors and could not impose lasting restrictions without it. The Constitution provides the guarantee of trial by a jury of ones peers. In the U.S. for all general civil cases and all criminal cases, we have public trials. (special courts and tribunals are created to deal with cases involving classified information and issues of national security, and the courts have mechanisms for handling trade secrets, etc. to insure that information is not presented to jurors) So in that sense, there is nothing a juror could be exposed to in during their service as jurors that would require any type of continuing restriction.

The Queen (or King) is not the government; she represents the State. The difference is often ignored by ministers, but is important particularly in constitutional cases. Miller began as Miller v Home Office, a judicial review case. When it became clear that the question was what powers the government actually had in a certain situation, the Supreme Court decided that constitutional points should be argued by, effectively, an amicus curiae on behalf of the state, with government lawyers defending their own viewpoint (and other interested parties intervening). This made it, in their view, a case of the state versus the government, with 'Miller' being either an acknowledgement that the applicant remained a party or a means of distinguishing this case from all the other "R. -v- Government" cases over the years, depending on your point of view.

In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws & regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this "How Stuff Works" article.

In simple terms does someone request a judicial review when they believe their rights have been violated and want a court to make an order that would help them? No. A judicial review in Canada is when the court reviews an administrative decision, that is, a decision (including by omission) made by the executive branch of the government or another entity exercising public functions under legislative or administrative delegation, as a last resort to preserve the rule of law, as an exercise of the inherent judicial authority. If your rights were not violated by a decision of the executive branch of the government, a judicial recourse may still be available, but usually not called judicial review. For example, if your contratual rights were violated by a private party (e.g. you are owed money), you can still sue the person in court as an ordinary civil lawsuit. In certain cases however, an administrative tribunal can make a decision regarding private disputes; the decision of the administrative tribunal, a public body, is subject to judicial review. If your constitutional rights are violated by a primary legislation passed by the Parliament (or provincial legislature), you may apply to a competent court for declarative relief, but usually this is also not referred to as judicial review, despite some similarities and some intersections in practice. The scope of judicial review is limited. The courts show considerable deferrence to the elected legislature and government and only exercise the power when all other legal resorts are exhausted. The legislature often provides administrative recourses with quasi-judicial characteristics (e.g. administrative tribunals, see later), which must be exhausted before the court steps in. The legislature sometimes deliberately limits or even attempts to bar judicial review through privative clauses. Although completely barring judicial review is not possible, it can influence the court's deferrence. Usually, one must obtain a leave (permission) from the court before commencing a judicial review proceedings. Then, if the leave is granted, the judicial review proceeding is not a proceeding for the judge to substitute their own decision in place of what the original decision maker made. New evidences are generally not admissible in judicial review; the judge only considers what is involved in the attacked decision. In most cases, the judge assesses whether the decision-maker was reasonable in their interpretation of law and their exercise of legal authority; it does not matter whether the judge would have made a different decision. In most cases, if judicial review is granted, the original decision is quashed (cancelled) but it is remitted to the original administrative body for re-determination (usually with another officer or panel). Seeking judicial review does not automatically prevent the administrative decision from coming into force, unless the applicant specifically demands the stay of decision and the judge agrees. There are exceptional cases where the judicial review is conducted on a standard of correctness, notably when procedural fairness is involved or when another important constitutional or general legal question should be determined conclusively. The applicable standard of review is based on the Supreme Court judgement in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov. In such cases, the judge would make what they think should be the correct decision with respect to the part of decision that should be follow such standard. Even then, the judge usually would direct the original decision maker to make a new one consistent with their judgement, instead of making a new one. What exactly is an administrative review An administrative review, or reconsideration, is when the administrative body itself provides a way for an interested party to request a review of the original decision by the administrative body itself (although often by another officer within the same service). It is generally not a legal right, and only granted when there is a clear error (e.g. the decision maker had the wrong file) to ensure administrative certainty. The term is usually not applied if there is a formal statutory structure of reexamination by another decision maker for an administrative decision, even if the new reexamination occurs within the same body. or administrative tribunal? Administrative tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies established by law (passed by legislatures) that makes independent decisions on behalf of the executive government. They are established to avoid costly and slow-moving lawsuits in courts and to specialize in specific areas of law to better serve the interests of justice. There are several types of administrative tribunals: dedicated conflict resolution tribunals between private persons, for example: Landlord and Tenants Boards that resolve disputes arising from real estate leases human rights tribunals where many discrimination claims in services and employment are resolved labour relations boards that deal with the recognition of labour unions and conflicts (grievance) between unionized workers and employers tribunals that review particular types of government decisions, e.g. the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, who has jurisdiction to hear appeals on certain types immigration decisions (e.g. deportation of a permanent resident) tribunals that make independent decisions for the government, despite the tribunal itself being part of the executive branch, e.g. the Competition Tribunal the Copyright Board other bodies exercising public statutory functions, e.g. the professional regulatory bodies (e.g. law societies, colleges of physicians and surgeons) are administrative tribunals for the purpose of exercising functions delegated to them by law, even if often they are private societies, for example, the decision to or not to admit a lawyer by a law society is subject to judicial review as the law society is exercising its delegated public authority (to regulate who can practice law). Some tribunals may have multiple functions described above; for example, the IRB is the first decision maker on the grant of refugee status, while also having statutory jurisdictions over appeals of certain immigration decisions (including the decision itself made over refugee status). As all powers of an administrative tribunal must be based in law, only those decisions that the legislature said could be dealt by these tribunals can be to an administrative tribunals; for example, temporary visa decisions (e.g. for visit or studies) are not appealable before IRB, but judicial review of the officer's visa decision can be directly requested. I get the impression it can happen in the work place, school or some sort of organization with a certain level of formality and structure. If it concerns the government, it may involve an administrative action that may be subject to judicial review. For example, a federal government employee may have recourses with the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board, whose decisions are subject to judicial review. A public university's decision (including a student's grade) may also be an administrative decision subject to review. The internal university appeal procedures could be seen as similar to the functions of administrative tribunals, but these internal boards are usually not established by law and are appointed by internal university procedures. Otherwise, it is a private dispute where a formal structure may be desirable for legal and moral reasons. I also understand that it need not be fair, or at least what counts as fair is not defined. A public body exercising a quasi-judicial function, particular an administrative tribunal, must be fair. It is a matter of natural justice where the court is not reluctant to correct an administrative decision maker. The duty of fairness generally does not apply to political or legislative decisions. While there is no simple definition of what is fair and the application of the principles of natural justice necessarily depends on the case in question, there is a significant body of case law on what consists fairness (or rather, unfairness). For example, arbitrary or dishonest decisions are almost always unfair. Decisions made without possibility of being heard are often unfair. Undisclosed conflicts of interest can also bring fairness into question. A private body in its private capacity (i.e. not exercising a public function) has no general constitutional or natural justice requirement to be fair, but the law may impose upon private persons a positive duty (e.g. provision of goods and services without racial or sex discrimination; dismissal without notice only possible for cause). if it's a non-government organization, but when can a judicial review override an administrative review's decision? If it concerns a non-government organization that is not exercising a public function, a judicial review is not possible; other recourses may be possible, e.g. an ordinary lawsuit, or recourses to a public body (e.g. if you have problems with a landlord, you can go to the LTB). If it concerns an actual administrative decision, judicial review is granted, among other possible reasons: when the decision maker lacks the jurisdiction to make the decision, e.g., when they make a decision outside their statutory powers when the attacked decision is unreasonable; for example, when the decision is not supported by logic or evidences (that were submitted during the administrative decision making) when it is incorrect on an important constitutional question or other question of law, or the principles of natural justice had been breached during the decision making process.

Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.

Texas District Attorneys - Law Is Merely A Suggestion? Art. 2.01. DUTIES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS of the TEXAS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, CHAPTER 2. GENERAL DUTIES OF OFFICERS states: It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, including any special prosecutors, not to convict, but to see that justice is done. Note that "shall" has specific meaning defined in Sec. 311.016 of the Texas Gov't Code as "Shall" imposes a duty." My question is: Are Texas D.A.'s given independence from the law (aka statutes)? Because, who knows what "justice" is?

They are not given independence from statute. This clause just says that conviction is not the end goal of the prosecutor. If in light of the evidence, the prosecutor comes to believe a person is not guilty, they are not to proceed with the prosecution. They must not hide exculpatory or mitigating evidence in order to get a conviction.

I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.

In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.

To answer the first question, the answer seems to be "generally not." In federal courts, this is explicitly not allowed -- rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states that the only people who can be present before a grand jury are government lawyers, the witness being questioned, interpreters, and a court reporter In state courts, the rules vary by state. However, again, private citizens are generally either completely not allowed to act as prosecutors, or are only allowed to act as prosecutors in a restricted set of situations and subject to the ultimate control of public prosecutors. For instance, in Virginia (which allows private prosecutors), the private prosecutor can't speak in front of a grand jury, initiate a criminal case, or participate in a decision to dismiss charges (page 23). In New Hampshire, private prosecution is limited to misdemeanors with no possibility of jail time, and again the state can dismiss charges (page 8). Rhode Island, like New Hampshire, allows private prosecution for misdemeanors but lets the state dismiss charges (page 11). The justification for allowing the state to dismiss charges is generally "prosecution is inherently a governmental task, so the government must retain ultimate control."

The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.

In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine."

None of the factors you list about Charlie committing a crime, about to commit a crime* or being responsible for the officer's injury apply to whether or not Bob can shoot Charlie on behalf of the officer. On the other hand, if Charlie's actions lead Bob to the reasonable belief that Charlie represents an imminent threat of death or grave bodily injury to anyone then Bob will be justified in using force, including deadly force, to stop Charlie. I'm aware of many states that also allow the use of deadly force to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A normal citizen can go to great lengths to assist the police and stories of citizens coming to the aid of police officers are easily found. There may be some reason the police officer felt the need to use deadly force against Charlie. Bob will need to make his own determination based on all the factors available to him, which may include communication from the officer. If Bob decides to shoot Charlie then an investigation will center on whether it was reasonable for Bob to deduce that the use of deadly force was justified given the information available to Bob at the time. Some states have laws that penalize refusal to aid a police officer. A list of them can be found on this wikipedia page. Notably, California just repealed their statute requiring assistance. *The statutes of some states allow the use of deadly force to prevent the commission of felonies, typically forcible felonies. However, just because a crime is listed as a forcible felony doesn't always mean that deadly force can be used to stop the crime. An example comes from Florida where the statutes state that deadly force can be used to stop forcible felonies, the statutes also define burglary as a forcible felony. However, the courts have ruled that the use of such force is not reasonable where the structure being burglarized is unoccupied.

A law has to be "broad" to include a lot of possible crimes and intent of criminals and account for the good faith of non-criminals. "Intentionally access without authorization/exceed" is actually fairly specific; "intent" is the keyword. Someone making a mistake may have intent to login, but no intent to commit a crime. Someone confused by "different pages of demo and live accounts" can easily defend their actions by pointing out that they were confused. It's up to the reasonableness of the pertinent law enforcement and prosecutors to take into account the evidence that reasonable mistakes were made by little old ladies and not charge them with a crime. And for the most part, 98% of the time, law enforcement and prosecutors are reasonable.

Is it legal to lie to a US federal law enforcement officer? If a law enforcement officer stops someone on the street and asks questions related to an investigation, the person is not under oath. The person therefore presumably cannot be prosecuted for perjury. Assuming the person decides to respond to the questions, is there any federal law requiring the responses to be truthful? If so: What law or laws apply? Does the law supply a definition of "truth"? Must it be "the whole truth and nothing but the truth," or is there a different standard? One reason for this question is interest in the degree of inequality between an interrogating officer and the subject of the interrogation, in light of the fact that the officer is allowed to lie.

This is one of the things Martha Stewart was convicted of. 18 USC 1001 is the US federal law requiring truthfulness. That statute forbids you to falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact. One limitation on how broad this law is, is that it has to be a matter "within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States". If your neighbor is an FBI agent and he asks if you're the one who broke his window, and you lie, that's not a federal matter. Another limitation is that the lying has to be material. The essential part of the law is subsection (a). Subsection (b) then states an exception: (b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. Then you also owe a lesser duty of truthfulness to the legislature. Taking note of US. v. Yermian, it is not required that the person you lie to be a federal officer. Yermian lied to his employer, who was a defense contractor, and the fact that the relevant form was submitted to the government for scrutiny is what made it a matter in federal jurisdiction. Comparing the wording of 1001 to the perjury statute, the operative expression for perjury involves statements "which he does not believe to be true", we can see that the perjury statute requires telling the literal truth (see Bronston v. US), which allows so-called lies of omission (of a particular subtype: much more could be said about that). In contrast the lying statute forbids both literally false statements and concealing of the truth. I don't have cases at my fingertips that indicate how broad your truthful answers have to be, for example if you think the FBI is trying to put away a friend and ask you about what he did on June 14, and you know that he did a bad thing on June 13, would it be lying in the relevant sense to conceal that fact which they didn't ask about. [ADDENDUM] A session of perusing cases has led to a tiny bit of further information. A literal reading of the statute says that you are in violation of the law if you falsify a fact (sloppy epistemology, unless it refers just to altering records and evidence), or conceal a fact, and the courts recognise this as a fundamental division. As for falsifying, the way that has been applied is to refer to cases where the accused makes a statement which asserts something that he knows to be untrue. Thus, saying "No" to a question when the truth is "Yes" is a violation. A propos concealment, in US v. Diogo 320 F.2d 898 the court states that False representations, like common law perjury, require proof of actual falsity; concealment requires proof of wilful nondisclosure by means of a 'trick, scheme or device.' This case is pre-Bronston so there is mixing of concepts from perjury law and lying law, which would not happen now, but we can steering clear of their perjury citations. The crucial fact is that accused(s) were technically married in New York, for immigration purposes, and they were accused of a 1001 violation for having indicated that they were married. Part of the government's case was that such a marriage is not valid, and the court rejected that conclusion. The government's second prong was to maintain that the court "should affirm appellant's convictions on a theory of concealment", and this too the court rejected, saying "proof of their ulterior motives in marriage would not be tantamount to proof of willful and knowing concealment of these material facts". What they said on the forms was literally true, and they did not have a duty to volunteer information that they probably knew the government was interested in. Contrarily in a later case, US v. Zalman 870 F.2d 1047 we are told that the underlying purpose of a marriage is a material fact which bears upon the validity of the marriage, and that any false or fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the actual purpose of a marriage in order to gain status as a resident of the United States can be punished under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 so you have to be more truthful than the literal truth standard. There are also circumstances where there is an independent duty to give information, such as reporting income to the IRS. In US v. Hernando Ospina 798 F.2d 1570 the court maintained It is clear that in order to support a section 1001 concealment conviction there must be a legal duty to disclose the facts the defendant was convicted of concealing citing US v. Tobon-Builes 706 F.2d 1092, where again there was a legal duty to report "existence, origin, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash". In other words, it is not clear what information you are allowed to not volunteer when asked a question in a federal matter.

In general in the US, anyone may photograph anyone else if they are all in a public place, although in some states such a photo may not be used commercially without permission, which must often be paid for and may be refused. It is unusual for police to photograph people on the street, but they might want to document who was present at a particular place and time. They can do so, but I am not at all sure that they can prevent a person from covering his or her face, or turning his or her back, or charge a person who does so with obstruction. I don't think so. Under some circumstances in the US police may ask a person for identification, and may charge a person who refuses to provide it. This varied from one state to another, and usually depends on the specific circumstances. (If a person is driving an automobile, police may demand to see a driver's license, for example.) Unless a police officer puts a person under arrest, the officer has no general right to control that person's actions, beyond instructing the person not to interfere with ongoing police work. I do not think an obstruction charge would hold up for covering one's face or turning away in the absence of an arrest.

There are certain situations where the law may require you to provide some information -- particularly when you've been pulled over for a traffic violation -- but it is typically limited to basic identifying information. Beyond that, it is legally advantageous to refuse to answer questions. If you are doing so, though, you should explicitly invoke your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and your Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Invoking the Fifth prevents the police from using your refusal to answer as evidence, and invoking the Sixth requires the police to stop asking you questions. It may, however, be practically disadvantageous to refuse to answer questions, as there are cops who are just looking for a reason to act like a psychopath.

In most US States (probably all of them) failure to follow the Lawful orders of a police officer is itself a crime, and is grounds for the officer to arrest the person, even if the person had not done anything wrong prior to that. This obviously leads to the question: what orders are lawful? The officer has a pretty broad range of discretion. Ordering a person out of a car, or to roll down a car window, is pretty clearly lawful. Ordering a person to commit a crime would not be lawful. Neither would ordering a person to submit while the officer rapes or robs the individual be lawful. In practice, the officer will usually think that all of his or her commands are lawful, and might feel threatened by any failure to comply. In which case, the officer might shoot. This might not be upheld later if the command was not lawful and/or the officer's fear was not reasonable, but that will do the person shot little good. It is usually wise to comply with any commend, unless it puts you very directly at serious risk. Remember you don't know what else has happed to the officer that day. Has the officer had a fight with his/her spouse that morning? Just been denied a promotion? Been turned down for a mortgage? None of that should matter, legally, but it will affect the officer's attitude, and can lead to escalation, even if the person stopped is in no way at fault. An instruction to "shut up" is probably not going to provoke an officer to shoot if it is disobeyed, but it might help to escalate the situation. It is probably lawful, depending non the exact circumstances. As to the first amendment issues, that would probably come under the 'time, place, or manner" regulations that may be applied to speech. And even if it is not held to be lawful, the time to contest it is in court, not during the stop. If the officer feels safer with the window fully rolled down so that the officer could reach in, that is probably a lawful command.

Is asking police to justify their orders illegal? NO but the manner in which the "asking" is done may be.

In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.

An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading "not guilty". 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of "lying" is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.

While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork.

President-Elect Succession If the Electoral College elects a future President and that person dies before taking office, would the Vice-President elect become President?

Government FAQ on the Electoral College: If a winning Presidential candidate dies or becomes incapacitated between the counting of electoral votes in Congress and the inauguration, the Vice President elect will become President, according to Section 3 of the 20th Amendment. Section 3 of the 20th Amendment: If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. [...]

No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ...

In the U.S. Federal judges are appointed by the president and confirmed by a vote in the senate. There are no professional qualifications required.They serve for life unless removed by impeachment or they resign. Some have resigned due to scandal. Some have been impeached and some voluntarily retire.

The direct answer is simple -- the US Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2) provides that electors are appointed in the manner that state legislatures direct -- so the answer is the state legislature decides. But state legislatures don't exist in a vacuum, and the reality is not so simple. State legislatures direct the manner of choosing electors by passing state laws, which, in the case the state decides to choose electors by holding some sort of popular election, include laws for how and when ballots can be cast or received, and how recounts are to work, etc. Normally, state laws are interpreted by state courts, and state courts can strike down or modify state laws if they find that the state laws violate the state constitution. And more fundamentally, state legislatures derive their authority from state constitutions, so in principle, state legislatures should not be able to perform any act that does not conform to the state constitution (which is interpreted by the state courts). However, the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) overturned the Florida state supreme court ruling on how to conduct recounts in the Florida election for presidential electors. Normally, federal courts do not get involved in state law issues, but the decision was mostly made on equal protection grounds, and the equal protection clause is part of the federal Constitution. So federal courts can get involved if there is an issue that relates to federal law or Constitution. In the Bush v. Gore case, there was an interesting concurring opinion that said the Florida supreme court had acted contrary to the Florida legislature, but this opinion was only joined by 3 justices, so it is not binding. Recently, the issue came up again when the US Supreme Court declined to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania state supreme court that said the Pennsylvania constitution required mail ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 3 days after Election Day to be counted, even though the state law said they must be received by Election Day. Notably, although the US Supreme Court declined the stay, the order listed that 4 conservative justices dissented and said that they would have granted the stay. This was before Justice Barrett was confirmed, so, now that she is confirmed, depending on her legal position on this issue, there might now be a majority of 5 justices that would intervene against the state court if such an issue were to come up again. The order did not list the legal reasoning for each of the dissenting justices, so it is unclear what legal justification they had in mind in agreeing to overrule the state court.

Two Questions This is actually to separate questions. Qualified candidates may receive funds from the federal Presidential Election Campaign Fund. Ballot access depends on the provisions of state laws. One does not imply the other. Federal Funding Candidates who qualify may elect to receive federal funding from the Presidential Election Campaign Fund for either or both the primary and general elections. "Minor party" candidates are those whose party received at least 5% of the vote in the previous presidential election. "Major party" candidates are those whose part received at least 25% of the vote in the previous presidential election. Those who meet neither level are "new party" candidates. New party candidates may receive partial reimbursements after the election if they get at least 5% in the election. In addition to the vote share, candidates must demonstrate having received at least minimum levels of contributions in "small" donations in each of 20 states or more to be eligible, and must agree to contribution and spending limits, and to making required disclosures. Many candidates who would be eligible elect not to agree to the limits, thus not accepting the funds. See this Wikipedia article (linked above in a comment) for more details. Ballot Access Each US state determines what a candidate must do to be included on the ballot, and these rules vary. In many states any party whose candidate received more than a specified minimum percentage of the vote in a previous election will have its nominee included. In many cases the relevant election is the immediately previous election for Governor. Other candidates may typically qualify by obtaining signatures on a petition. In most states the signers must be registered voters, and a minimum number must come from each county or election district. The details vary by state. For example, In Maryland, Code § 5-703 specifies 10,000 voters, or 1% of the votes cast for Governor in the previous election for Governor , whichever is less. However, under Code § 8-502 a candidate may be placed on the primary ballot by a petition signed by at least 400 registered voters in each Congressional district in the state, or if a candidate is "generally recognized" as a candidate for a "principal political party" as certified by the Secretary of State. Uncer code § 1-101 a "principal political party" us one of the two top vote-getters in the previous election for Governor. By the way, under code § 4-103 a political party, to retain that status, must poll at least 1% of the votes for the highest state-wide office in a general election, or have been selected as the registered choice of at least 1% of the registered voters. All the above citations are to the Maryland election code. Other states will have roughly similar provisions.

The Constitution does not describe such a method, and no one has ever tried to do so. During and immediately following the U.S. Civil War, states that attempted to secede from the U.S. to join the Confederate States of America were not represented in Congress until their insurrections ceased and a post-war government approved by the Union forces in the Reconstruction era was in place. But this was not on the theory that these areas had ceased to be states, it was on the theory that there was a vacancy in the positions because these areas had not held elections for the U.S. House of Representatives, had not nominated U.S. Senators, and were in degradation of the U.S. Constitution once the 14th Amendment was adopted (denying the right to serve in office to confederate leaders until Congress acted otherwise). Prior the 14th Amendment this denial of U.S. government representation was simply viewed as a function of practical reality and the war powers of Congress, and perhaps the "invasion or insurrection" and "Republican government" clauses of the U.S. Constitution. Certainly there is no recognized roadmap for doing so today.

There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC §19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.

Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.

Tennants have not been informed that the house has been sold I rent a house that the landlord is trying to sell, and the landlord said I have 3 months to leave from when he has found a buyer. The estate agents have found a buyer, but they have not yet informed me. I only know the house is sold because they put a 'sold' sign up outside the house Does that mean I have 3 months from now? or 3 months from whenever they contact me?

There's good information at https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-tenancy-agreements/your-landlord-wants-to-end-your-tenancy. There are several types of tenancy with different rules, but in all of them, the landlord has to give you a certain amount of notice to move out, and it has to give a specific date. "Three months from when a buyer is found" doesn't seem to fit that, so I would say you have not yet received formal notice to move out. This statement may have just been a courtesy to give you more advance warning. So for instance, if you are in a tenancy that requires two months notice, the landlord may have intended this to mean "I plan to send you formal notice about one month after a buyer is found." Of course, this is not binding; he could send you formal notice tomorrow if he changes his mind. As far as I know, the sale of the house is really irrelevant in all of this. You don't automatically have to move out just because the house is sold; if you're not explicitly told to leave (with appropriate notice) then you don't have to, and you'll just start paying your rent to the new landlord. If you have a fixed-term tenancy, then the sale of the house doesn't shorten it. I am not sure what the point is of getting angry at the estate agents. Your tenancy is a matter between you and your landlord, and the estate agents have nothing to do with it. They work for your landlord, not for you.

Section 11(6) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 says In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. There is also an absolute right to enter in an emergency (such as fire). Note that the law does not require tenant permission (a landlord may obviously enter for any reason with permission): the law says when he may do so without permission. If the "viewing" is related to repairs, then you just have to accept it. However, "viewing" usually means "showing prospective new tenants". In that case, there is the 28 day end-of-tenancy entry right which, if you didn't omit anything, is not relevant. In light of the common law right to quiet enjoyment, you have the right to exclude the landlord (or anyone else) absent a statutorily expressed override. Permission can be inferred by word or action under common law, for example if a person appears at the door and you open it wide and step aside, you have implicitly granted permission even if you didn't say "I hereby permit". Explicitly denying permission (even once) eliminates any reasonable possibility of inferring permission. If you had gotten an email saying "we'll come by at 4:30" and you reply "Alrighteo, see you then", that can reasonably be interpreted as permission. If you do not reply, they cannot infer permission (obviously: X sending a message to Y does not entail that Y received or read the message). If a person does not have a right to enter property, then doing so by force constitutes trespass, which is plainly against the law.

I would assume that the seller ('Transferor') still owned numbers 7 and 11 at the time of the sale. If so, this clause means that the owners of 7 and 11 (now and in the future) have a right of way on the path coloured blue on the plan. The land still belongs to number 9, but the owners cannot build on it so as to block the path. (As mckenzm comments, "on foot only" is an important qualification; the neighbours do not have a right to install utilities under the path, and the owner can put in obstacles that prevent bringing cycles down it).

Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).

It depends on what state this is. In Washington state, there is a form that sellers must fill out, and section 3 addresses sewer connections. This matter could have been disclosed – the allowed answers are "yes; no; don't know" (or NA). These are sellers disclosures, and Zillow / Redfin are free to be unreliable (I personally know that they are wrong about square footage). A real estate agent also doesn't become liable for being misinformed. Assuming your state has this or analogous question, "No" means that you were told (doesn't matter if you didn't notice it), and "Don't know" means you're gambling. Let's say that the answer was "Yes". Still, you can't necessarily sue (and win): you would have to prove misrepresentation (fraud or negligence) and not innocent error. You could do this by, for instance, proving that seller had the septic tank cleaned out some years earlier. Perhaps an action against buyer's inspector is possible, since that's nominally what they might have been hired to find out. But that is only true if checking the sewer connection can reasonably be considered part of the deal, so you have to look at the contract with the inspector (and the inspector's report).

There are no squatters Neither Bob nor Sue are squatters: Bob was there with the owner's permission and Sue was there with Bob's. Adverse possession requires possession that is, well, adverse: against the wishes of the true owner. Bob was almost certainly a tenant, paying rent in services rather than cash. Clearly, the terms of that tenancy are unclear and may not be legal but that is more likely to rebound against the landlord rather than the tenant. So long as the rent (whatever it is) continues to be paid the estate’s tenancy should continue. However, the landlord could start procedures to end the tenancy (probably requiring 1 months notice) at any time.

You said it yourself - "The only way for me to remove him is through an eviction process". From this link - give the tenant a non-payment termination notice, signed by yourself and including the address of the premises, the date the tenant needs to vacate (at least 14 days out) and the grounds for notice being non-payment of rent. The notice also needs to say that they can pay the rent owing (including 2 weeks in advance) or enter into, and fully comply with a repayment plan you agree to. The notice needs toproperly delivered - in person, b post, fax or hand delivered in an addressed envelope to a mailbox as the home address. (If posted, you need to allow an extra 4 days for delivery) Once you have done that, you apply to NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal for a termination order. (You can make this application at the same time, but it can't be heard until the time to remedy has passed).

Under section 214 of the Housing Act 2004 (as amended), the penalty for not protecting the deposit is considered separately from the deposit itself. In the case where the tenant has already moved out (emphasis mine): (3A) The court may order the person who appears to the court to be holding the deposit to repay all or part of it to the applicant within the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the making of the order. (4)The court must order the landlord to pay to the applicant a sum of money not less than the amount of the deposit and not more than three times the amount of the deposit within the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the making of the order. (See also here and here). In other words, if this goes to court, the landlord may be faced with paying back (in the worst case for him) the entire deposit, plus a penalty of up to three times the deposit. Therefore, unless the landlord is feeling confident, privately agreeing for him to pay two times the deposit could be a good deal, as it's half what a court could award.

How to say "a.s.a.p." in a formal contract I want to send a worker a contract that I will pay "a.s.a.p.". Is there a better way to write it in a contract? I feel it is better to specify a date, but it might look even worse than a.s.a.p. to write "within two weeks" or "before the end of the first week in July"? There is not a conflict, I just want to make clear that I'm not trying to trick the guy into a business and not paying him.

The problem with "as soon as possible" is that one could then say "Well, I've got a lot of bills, so it's not possible to pay you until Uncle Bill dies and I get my inheritance". A good contract leaves no doubt about who does what, when. A specific date is best, though if there is a certain amount of backing and forthing, "July 30" could be "tomorrow", and therefore "within 14 days of acceptance" would still identify a specific date -- provided that the date of acceptance is there in the contract. (It usually is, but doesn't absolutely have to be).

You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.

Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies.

In general, "making a reservation" does not create a contract, except when it is obvious that you have a contractual agreement. That would be the case with an airline reservation, and one clear sign is that you have to pay for the ticket when you make the reservation; or, it you don't, then there is no contract, and they can cancel or change the price. You would look for clear signs of an agreement, such as a "agree to terms" button that you have to click. Paying a deposit is another clear sign. Then you would simply look at the terms of the contract to see what their obligation is, and what yours is. They may have strongly committed to providing service in which case you might have a cause for legal action if they break that commitment, or they might have made no specific promises about service in case of intervening events (such as if the chef has a heart attack, or the power goes out). If we do think of this as a contractual matter, you breached your duty as a customer, to be there by 7:30, so even if there is a contract, they didn't break it. The note that you added renegotiating the arrival time was insufficient – it is outside of the contract, and possibly something that they didn't see (they only look at the names and official time blocks reported by the web page). In lieu of a contract, there could be some statutory obligation, i.e. a specific regulation in Sweden saying "if a restaurant accepts a reservation, they absolutely must hold the space available for the entire reserved time", which is an unreasonably onerous business practice that no nation requires.

No The contract is created at the moment that an offer was accepted. In normal circumstances: You accepted an offer that they made to the general public by sending a purchase order for specific items at specific prices, or They accepted your offer by communicating their acceptance to you (being advised that the goods have been dispatched counts). However, in this circumstance, the company has been explicit that the contract is only created when either: You checkout and pay, or They “supply an invoice to you.” It appears that neither event happened so there is no contract. Their specific terms have overridden the common law rules on offer and acceptance (as they are allowed to do) and the offer has not been accepted until you receive their invoice. Specifically, it cannot be accepted by performance (dispatching the goods) and the requirement for the invoice to be supplied overrides the postal rule. Note that, in this case, you got lucky. 99 times out of 100 there would have been a valid contract and you would have breached it. In future, cancel orders specifically, don’t make assumptions.

How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.

There is nothing in that contract that says anything about 3 months notice period. The 3 months is the legal default for contracts that do not expire on their own, unlike yours, that has all properties of a limited time contract. I would personally see the detailed description of how you can end this contract as overriding any legal default. But as always, with this specific contract in the original language, you need to see a lawyer to know for sure. Your contract clearly states: you can leave your appartment whenever you want, even before the agreed upon time. If you leave between the 15th and the end of a month, you have to pay for that month in full. If you leave between the 1st and the 14th of the month, you have to pay the fair share of the rent for the days you where there. So for example, on a 30 day month if you lived there for 10 days, you still have to pay a third of the rent and the landlord will return the rest if you paid for the month in advance. If you live there for 16 days, you have to pay for the full month and nothing will be returned if you paid for the month in advance. Please note that you need to "hand over" the vacated rental object during normal business hours. So don't go in there on the evening of the 14th at 16:59. And don't try to "hand it over" when you haven't moved your stuff out yet. At the hand over, you give the keys to the landlord and that is it, it is the last thing you do. Very likely your landlord will want to have a look at the rental object while you are there, so they can make sure it is all in order, you did not damage it or did not leave any of your stuff. Generally speaking, there is nothing your landlord could do to you if you decide to leave early. They cannot make you leave even earlier or any other retaliatory shenanigans you may have heard of in other countries. In Germany, such contracts are not adversarial. You don't need to keep it a secret to the last second. If you know you want to leave on a certain date, inform your land lord, make an appointment for the "hand over" well in advance and save yourself (and them) all the stress from doing things last minute.

could I claim that my product must be added asap? And is it reasonable to ask for compensation for the missed revenue due to pushing back the launch? Unfortunately, no. Your description reflects that you consciously treated as sufficient the limited knowledge you had at the formation of the contract. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at §154(b). There is no indication that (1) at the formation of the contract the company committed to a more specific timing, or (2) you would have declined the invitation had you known at the formation of the contract that the company would keep postponing the inclusion of your product in the way you describe. You were given the expected date only after you performed your duties pursuant to the contract, which defeats the notion that the company's timing was any relevant to your decision of entering the contract. The only way you could prevail is by proving that the company breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implied in all contracts. See Restatement at §205. Other than that, the lack of contract provisions to protect your interests give the company significant discretion.

Why does YouTube hide "Ad displayed" or "Ad can be skipped messages" under the header? Scrolling about one day I noticed some text beneath the header of the YouTube page: When I release the scroll, the underlay of the page returns to normal and the text is hidden once more. Are they legally required to do this, or is there some other reason for putting this text on the page? And, if it is required by law, how do they get away with hiding it as such?

There is probably no legal reason for this message. These aren't the only two messages that can be displayed. If you look at the source, you see this: {'ADDTO_CREATE_NEW_PLAYLIST': "Create new playlist\n",'ADDTO_CREATE_PLAYLIST_DYNAMIC_TITLE': " $dynamic_title_placeholder (create new)\n",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER': "Watch Later",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER_ADDED': "Added",'ADDTO_WATCH_LATER_ERROR': "Error",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE': "Watch Queue",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE_ADDED': "Added",'ADDTO_WATCH_QUEUE_ERROR': "Error",'ADDTO_TV_QUEUE': "Queue",'ADS_INSTREAM_FIRST_PLAY': "A video ad is playing.",'ADS_INSTREAM_SKIPPABLE': "Video ad can be skipped.",'ADS_OVERLAY_IMPRESSION': "Ad displayed." Looks to me like some messages to help with debugging.

Stack Exchange have already covered this in a couple of places, from MSE's A site (or scraper) is copying content from Stack Exchange. What should I do?: When should I not report these sites? They follow all the attribution requirements. As mentioned before, there is nothing wrong with copying our content elsewhere on the web, so long as they are following all the attribution requirements given. There is no action we can take against a scraper who follows all the rules. And the old Attribution Required blog post mentions that the actual requirements are: Visually indicate that the content is from Stack Overflow or the Stack Exchange network in some way. It doesn’t have to be obnoxious; a discreet text blurb is fine. Hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) Show the author names for every question and answer Hyperlink each author name directly back to their user profile page on the source site (e.g., http://stackoverflow.com/users/1234567890/username) By “directly”, I mean each hyperlink must point directly to our domain in standard HTML visible even with JavaScript disabled, and not use a tinyurl or any other form of obfuscation or redirection. Furthermore, the links must not be nofollowed

Why do you think Oracle have not been protecting their trade mark? Using a trade mark to describe the product (“Written in JavaScript”, “Seeking JavaScript developer”) is not an infringement and the trade mark owner is under no obligation to, indeed, cannot stop this. Where they are required to defend their trade mark is when it is being used in such a way that there is the risk of confusion that the goods or services could be confused with the trade mark owner’s goods or services. Further, they are not required to defend all breaches, only enough to show that they are actively doing so. Also it is not important that the trade mark be associated with the trade mark’s owner. Do you know who owns the trade mark “Ben & Jerry’s”?

In the United States, the case law on framing as copyright infringement is fairly scarce and somewhat conflicting. Consider first the 2007 Ninth Circuit Appeals ruling in Perfect 10 vs. Amazon.com. Google included framed images on their site. Google did not have the right to display these image works, but the ruling says ultimately that they did not display the works (emphasis mine): Instead of communicating a copy of the image, Google provides HTML instructions that direct a user’s browser to a website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size photographic image. Providing these HTML instructions is not equivalent to showing a copy. First, the HTML instructions are lines of text, not a photographic image. Second, HTML instructions do not themselves cause infringing images to appear on the user’s computer screen. The HTML merely gives the address of the image to the user’s browser. The browser then interacts with the computer that stores the infringing image. It is this interaction that causes an infringing image to appear on the user’s computer screen. Perfect 10 argues that Google displays a copy of the fullsize images by framing the full-size images, which gives the impression that Google is showing the image within a single Google webpage. While in-line linking and framing may cause some computer users to believe they are viewing a single Google webpage, the Copyright Act, unlike the Trademark Act, does not protect a copyright holder against acts that cause consumer confusion. Note that this second paragraph highlights that iframe linking may not be a copyright violation, but it may be illegal for other reasons, e.g., trademark violation, by confusing the origin of the framed content. This ruling appears to be in contradiction to the 1998 district court case Futuredontics Inc. v. Applied Anagramic Inc., which found that framing creates a derivative work. The most striking difference from the Perfect 10 case is in the following passage (emphasis mine): Defendants primarily rely on Louis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. [...]. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that a Game Genie which merely enhances audiovisual displays which originate in Nintendo game cartridges does not constitute a derivative work because... it does "not incorporate a portion of a copyrighted work in some concrete or permanent form." Id. at 968 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the Game Genie could not duplicate or recast a Nintendo game's output. Galoob did distinguish Mirage and noted that the Mirage decision would have been different had the plaintiff "distributed lenses that merely [*10] enabled users to view several art works simultaneously." Id. Nevertheless, Galoob... is distinguishable from the instant case. Galoob does not foreclose Plaintiff from establishing that AAI's web page, incorporates Futuredontic's web page in some "concrete or permanent form" or that AAI's framed link duplicates or recasts Plaintiff's web page. There appears to be a fundamental disagreement between these two cases over whether a webpage that includes a link actually "displays" the linked work. The Perfect 10 ruling viewed the page as HTML instructions that were only related to linked works insofar as those instructions could cause a user's browser to render framed content from a copyright holder different from the author of the HTML page. By contrast, the Futuredonics case considered the intended rendered output of a browser as a derivative work that includes the framed page in a "concrete or permanent form" and that "duplicates" the framed page. I'm not sure how to reconcile these two cases. Perfect 10 is more recent and from a higher court, but I'm insufficiently skilled in law to determine if and how that counts for anything. It's also possible that facts of the two cases are sufficiently different that the different rulings could be reconciled and both remain true simultaneously. Now that we've considered the case law, if you will indulge me in a moment of armchair speculation, let us consider an interesting hypothetical. Suppose I am the owner of apsillers.com. I host an HTML page on my site at http://apsillers.com/my_favorite_stories.html. My my_favorite_stories.html page frames a public domain resource at http://example.com/PD_Story.html. (I am not the owner of example.com.) Surely, we can agree that this is not copyright infringement. At a later time, the owner of example.com changes the text at http://example.com/PD_Story.htmlto include copyrighted content whose use by me would constitute infringement. My my_favorite_stories.html page remain totally unaltered. Does my_favorite_stories.html now violate copyright? The Perfect 10 ruling says no, because my_favorite_stories.html is only instructions. The Futuredontics ruling would appear to say yes, because it considers the final rendered output of the HTML, which now suddenly includes infringing content. It seems powerfully counterintuitive that the infringing status of my written work (my_favorite_stories.html) should change, dependent on the copyright status of a linked resource, when the content of my written work has remained totally unaltered. Perhaps you might argue that my case is different because I did not intend at the time I wrote my HTML page to infringe copyright. However, intent is irrelevant in making the initial yes/no determination of infringement (but may grant me a lesser punishment, as it would be innocent infringement.)

I'm curious to know, because Google allowed their ownership of the domain to expire, why do they still have the rights to it even when it was bought by another individual. You're making an incorrect assumption here. The domain was never allowed to expire. An error in Google's domain registration interface allowed him to make an order for the domain. The domain was never actually purchased, but the act of ordering the domain gave Mr. Ved access to the domain in Google's Webmaster Tools. As the domain was never actually available for purchase, Mr. Ved had no rights to it. (The domain is not even registered through Google's domain registration interface; it's under a completely separate company, MarkMonitor, that specializes in high-value domains.)

If your app is published under US law, then the DMCA would apply, just as if it was a web site. The DMCA doesn't say anything about what particular technology the distributor is using. TO be protected by by the DMCA's "safe harbor" provision, you will need to include a notice in your app that you accept takedowns, and provide an address or method by which they can be sent, and an agent who will receive them. (You can be your own agent if you choose.) When and if you recieve a take down notice, you must check if it is valid in form. According to this Wikipedia article, a takedown notice must include: (i) A physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (ii) Identification of the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site. (iii) Identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material. (iv) Information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the complaining party, such as an address, telephone number, and, if available, an electronic mail address at which the complaining party may be contacted. (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. (See the actual text of the relevant section of the law.) If you receive (through your designated agent) a valid takedown notice, you must promptly remove the content and notify the poster (or you can instruct to poster to remove it, but you must do so yourself if the poster does not). If the poster then files a valid counter notice (see the linked sources above) with your agent, you must notify the sender of the original notice, and if the sender does not notify you of a copyright suit filed within 10-14 days, you must restore the content. Provided that these rules are complied with, the host gets a 'safe harbor" and cannot be sued for copyright infringement, nor for the act of taking down the content. I believe that the agent must be registered with the US copyright office. The courts have not ruled on just how quickly an ISP or other host must react to the takedown notice. It must be "expeditious". Moreover, Under the DMCA (i) 1) (a) The host must have, post, and enforce a policy denying access to repeat infringers, or lose safe harbor protection. The text of the provision is: (i) Conditions for Eligibility. -(1)Accommodation of technology. —The limitations on liability established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider— --(A) has adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers;

Do they have to use all caps? Well, no. It's just that companies feel that's the easiest way to make the text "conspicuous" which is required by the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly in § 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. (2)Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof." The term "conspicuous" is defined in § 1-201. General Definitions. "Conspicuous", with reference to a term, means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is "conspicuous" or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following: (A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and (B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language. So you could make the text all bold and italic. You could make the font color purple. It's just that most companies use the caps lock key, whatever their individual reasons may be. I'll also note that this is a commercial code and these rules are found under Article 2 - Sales. So you'll only see this requirement taking effect in terms/disclaimers for companies which actually let end-users engage in commercial activity (they're actually selling something). Any site which doesn't facilitate commercial activity will likely be using a warranty disclaimer as a note of "hey, this is a free site, so no you don't get a warranty or legal expectation of service of any sort."

Earlier this year, the Internet lawyer Arnoud Engelfriet wrote a blog post about exactly this topic. As it is written in Dutch, I will summarize it here: As you also said, deleting posts breaks the flow of the archived conversation and it makes your archive incomplete. This is a problem for the freedom of expression and information. But Art. 17(3) GDPR includes an exception to the right of erasure for this situation. So posts do not need to be deleted. However, profiles are not included in this exception. So they must be removed, but they can be pseudonymized. For example replace the username with user89432, and remove all details from the profile. If other posts contain the nick of the author of an anonymized post, that is considered an journalistic, academic artistic or literary expression, so Art. 85 GDPR would apply, so the right of erasure does not apply to that. Bottom line: you only have to pseudonymize the account, if that person wants to be removed from the forum.

If an employer overpays salary, how long do they have to take action to be rectify the mistake? The BBC reported that army helicopter pilots were over paid, and that the Ministry of Defence is aiming to recoup the over payments. What surprised me is the length of time between over payment and action from the Ministry of Defence: A freedom of information request showed £829,000 in overpayments had been made to 210 pilots between 2007 and 2013, because of the administrative mistake. In cases where over payment has happened, how long does an employer have to recoup the payment before that money becomes the employees? Source: Army helicopter pilots quit in overpayment row

Normally the statute of limitations is five or six years (I think it's different between Scotland and the rest of the UK). The reason for the limitation is that if your employer asks for money back, you obviously should be able to defend yourself, for example by proving that you never received that money. After five or six years it is assumed that you wouldn't be able to provide any such evidence, so nobody can ask for the money back anymore. That's not specific to overpaid wages but quite general. In addition there is the question whether the pilots should have known they were overpaid. For example, I'm quite happy with my salary, but if it was less, I would look for and find a different job that pays better. If the company claimed in five years time that I had been overpaid all the time, then I would say that if they had given me the "correct" lower payment, I would have found a better job elsewhere, so asking me to repay the money seems quite unfair. (Why do you need to defend yourself? Maybe your salary was £3,000 per month. Someone in the right position records that they are paying you £4,000 but puts £3,000 into your account and £1,000 into their own. Then that person has an accident and their replacement finds that you were overpaid according to their records.)

In practice this is rarely done in the US. There have been cases of employment contracts with automatic increases tied to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) or some other measure of inflation -- I believe at one time a number of union contracts specified this. Employer and employee could certainly agree on any such formula. But in the absence of any explicit provision for such a link, and an agreed formula for the resulting salary, I think a stated salary would be interpreted as a fixed sum, not subject to change until an explicit change is made. Fixed wages are the almost invariable custom, and in the absence of any explicit provision for an automatic inflationary change, I think a court would assume a fixed amount, if it came to a court case.

Is It Too Late To Collect The Bill? Probably not. There is a statute of limitations for collecting unpaid medical bills that varies in length in different jurisdictions, and the age of the bill in the question is approximate, so it is hard to know for sure if this one is too old. The relevant statutes of limitations in most U.S. states would be at least three years and in some it could be as much as ten or twelve years. If I recall correctly, in Canada, the relevant statute of limitations would be determined at the provincial level. Given that this was "a couple of years ago" realistically, it is probably not barred by the statute of limitations yet. Are Interest Charges Allowed. Generally yes. Most jurisdictions allow for pre-judgment interest at a statutory rate from the date due in the absence of a contrary agreement and if the provider's paperwork with you provided for another interest rate, that would apply instead. So charging interest is allowed. The existence of a dispute wouldn't change this result, although it would, of course, mean that if some portion of the bill was disallowed in a later lawsuit that interest would be owed only on the portion that the court found was actually owed. The Provider's Remedies A Lawsuit If these bills are not paid, they can sue. Statute of limitations, or errors in billing, or failure to seek reimbursement from the police as arranged with them, would all be legitimate defenses in lawsuit brought by the provider. Given the modest amount allegedly owed and the existence of defenses, this might not be a very attractive one for the provider to choose to bring suit to collect. Credit Reporting On the other hand, in lieu of suing, the provider could simply report it as a bad debt with a credit reporting agency through their collections company. This would look bad on your credit (for up to seven years in the U.S., although you could insist on filing a rebuttal statement as part of your credit report, I don't know how disputes about credit reporting work in Canada). Paying them would almost admit that there was a late payment for credit reporting purposes, but also might prevent the incident from entering the credit reporting system at all.

Not returning a payment made in error may amount to theft. s.5(4) of the Theft Act 1968 covers this scenario: Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds. And the leading case law is A-G Ref (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182 where, in similar circumstances: The defendant, a police woman, received an overpayment in her wages by mistake. She had noticed that she had received more than she was entitled to but did not say anything to her employer. She did not withdraw any of the money from her bank account. The trial judge directed the jury to acquit. The Attorney General referred a question to the Court of Appeal. Held [on appeal]: It was possible for a theft conviction to arise where the defendant had not withdrawn the money. There was a legal obligation to return the money received by mistake.

We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately.

Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.

if a manager emailed an prospective employee a contract containing the pay rate of $20/hr, if the prospective employee crossed out $20/hr and replaced it with $25/hr, then went to work and gave the manager the contract which he failed to carefully read, continued working for a few months, would the employee be entitled to $20/hr? A party ought to timely alert or notify the other counterparty about any disagreements or proposed changes. This is especially recommendable when evidence suggests that the counterparty's expectation that the party only would sign the contract was reasonable. In the example you outline, the employee's unilateral alteration of the compensation/rate in the contract seems unlikely to favor the employee's position. That is because typically employer and employee negotiate compensation prior to formalizing their agreement. In that case, the employee would need stronger evidence with which to overcome the employer's credible argument that he did not knowingly accept the altered rate.

I have the same line in a contract that was just sent to me. So I did some quick research into this. However, I AM NEW TO THE SYSTEM AND DO NOT KNOW IT WELL!!, so please do not act on this information without seeking further advice from the relevant professionals. From what I can gather, the "Arbeitszeitgesetz (ArbZG)" is the law that governs working hours in Germany. Here is a link: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/arbzg/gesamt.pdf I used Google Translate to translate this information and found that in §3 it states that "The default daily working time must not exceed eight hours. It can only be extended up to ten hours if within six calendar months or 24 weeks an average of eight hours working day is not exceeded." This would lead me to believe that even if overtime is not paid as extra on top of your salary, they must give you the time off at another time to keep the average working day to 8 hours. **However, as the working week is Monday - Sat, the average working hours per week may be calculated as 48 hours per week, and not 40! Once again, I am not fully sure of my information, so use at your own risk!!

Is it illegal to download cracked software one has purchased? Assuming someone purchases a piece of software, but due to an error, has to wait for an arbitrary amount of time to download the software, would it be a criminal act to download or use a cracked version of the software while waiting for the company to provide a method of downloading the software?

The starting point is whether you infringe copyright by downloading or using the cracked software. The licence you purchase relates to a specific copy of the software. The licence almost certainly does not say 'You can use any copy of this software.' It will usually say something like 'You may install this software', surrounded by other language that makes it clear that 'software' refers to a specific copy. E.g. the Windows 7 EULA says 'you may install one copy of the software on one computer' and, in another place, says 'By using the software, you accept these terms. If you do not accept them, do not use the software. Instead, return it to the retailer for a refund or credit.' Nothing in that licence allows you to download an infringing copy of Windows from elsewhere and apply your licence to that copy. In the case of Windows, you don't have a licence to run 'Windows', you have a licence to run a specific copy of Windows. Therefore, even though you have purchased a licence, you would not have a licence for the cracked copy. Running a computer program inherently requires you to make copies of it in memory. In the absence of a copyright licence, this is copyright infringement: MAI Systems Corp v. Peak Computer Inc (1993) 991 F.2d 511 (defendant, who was not a licensee in relation to software, ran software and in doing so created copies of the software in memory; the person was purportedly authorised by a licensee to do so, but the licensee did not have the right to so authorise the defendant). In some jurisdictions, there is legislation to permit non-licensees to run software without infringing copyright, but these provisions (at least the ones in the US and Australia) don't apply to copies of the program which are themselves infringing copies. See 17 USC 117(a) and section 47B of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Now, supposing you do infringe copyright, the question of whether that is a criminal act will depend on the jurisdiction and the other facts of the case. In Australia, downloading or using software is almost never a criminal act (offences under the Copyright Act require trade in infringing copies or commercial scale, etc). In the US, infringing copyright for commercial gain (e.g. if the software is for use in a business) or of particularly expensive software might be criminal under the No Electronic Theft Act. Furthermore, downloading the 'cracked' software may make one complicit in the distributor's offending, specifically by way of 'counselling and procuring' or 'conspiracy'. The distributor's offending may include the kind of commercial copyright infringement that is criminalised.

Yes, you do. But you should not base your claim primarily on copyright, but just on the license contract you agreed to. It's typically much easier to prove that a party did not fulfill its part of a sales contract (here: Pay the agreed amount) than to prove violation of a copyright you own. Also, you then only need to sue one guy, and not care about every platform your game might be hosted on. This is particularly difficult here, since they have not done anything wrong. It's not their fault that the publisher didn't properly pay the programmer. They (very likely) got their copy of the game legally. For details, you should consult a lawyer. We can't give you detailed legal advice.

BAD idea It is one thing to upload the phonebook and associated pictures for use of the owner of the phonebook. It isn't a fair use of the phonebook pictures - and you might not have a license anyway, as some people associate photos with numbers that they don't have a license to associate with anyway. But what if instead of a photo of the person, the first photo someone associated with the person is a photo of something like... crack cocaine, a photo of someone in a very compromising situation, just genitals, or some other thing that is just as tasteless or possibly criminal to share? In that case, your company is possibly committing defamation, and in case sharing or possessing of the image itself is illegal, your company is now the actor and liable. Depending on the content of the picture, distribution of pornographic material (possibly even underage material of that sort) could be up that alley just as much as hate speech through symbols, usage of banned symbols (such as swastikas in Gernamy) and many many others.

The question uses the word "decriminalized". That implies that such downloading was previously a criminal act. I don't see anything in the Swiss law that says or implies this. (It is not usual for a copyright law to make ordinary infringing conduct criminal. Article 9(2) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Such laws, which vary significantly from country to country, provide exceptions to copyright. For example, fair use in the US, or fair dealing in the UK. Use of a work that falls within an exception to copyright is not an infringement of copyright. Article 19 of the Swiss Copyright Law provides that: Published works may be used for private use. ... Persons entitled to make copies of a work for private use may also have them made by third parties subject to paragraph 3 This is part of Chapter 5 Exceptions to Copyright. Chapter 5 includes articles 19 through 28. These define various acts which "may be" done under specified conditions, and which are not then infringements of copyright. This means that neither civil suits nor criminal prosecutions may be brought against anyone for doing such acts under the specified conditions. It should also be noted that article 19 nowhere mentions "downloading". It permits "making use" of protected works, and in particular "making copies". Downloading is one way of making a copy of a work, but the permission granted by article 19 is not limited to that method of making a copy.

Import laws apply to the one who imports. In your scenario that is the person in country A only. The server owner does not cause the digital content to be transmitted to A. The one who downloads does.

Of course you have to follow the license. You seem to have a license that doesn't allow distribution and want to know if giving copies to the Dutch or Chinese branch of your company is distribution. First, you should not make that decision. Your company's lawyers should do that. Second, such distribution is with some licenses perfectly legal if you distribute the software with source code. That's a business decision which you or your manager or his/her manager... can make. Such questions (whether giving a copy to your Dutch branch is distribution) often don't have an answer that is yes or no but maybe - if you went to court, would a judge say that it is distribution? The answer is quite clearly "maybe". So unless you can find a safe way, there is a risk. Again, your lawyers will assess the risk.

If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.

The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty.

Is there any obligation to provide a service after a contract expires? I had a contract to provide web services to someone for a few months. The contract has now expired and has not been renewed. The client was horrible to work with and I no longer want to work with them, but they have made no effort to find someone to replace me. If I flick the switch their online business goes offline. If I do this and they offer to pay me to bring it back online, do I have to do it? I don't want to work with them anymore and have already given them the backups. The contract expired almost 2 months ago now and I'm getting annoyed that they are taking advantage of me for a service I am not being paid for.

If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z

I had a contract with a company, but that company changed its name. Is my contract still enforceable? Yes, because what matters is the entity itself. A contract is not stricken merely because one or more parties changed names or labels.

If a contract sometimes uses the wrong name, is it still valid? Yes. It is valid as long as the contract as a whole permits identifying the parties (unequivocally) and ascertaining their role with respect to the contract. Using "Contractor" and "Consultant" interchangeably despite only the former being explicitly defined seems a bit sloppy, but it does not by itself alter or invalidate the meaning of the contract. The excerpt you reproduce is self-explanatory. Its first sentence identifies the parties, and there are only two. Thus, there is no reasonable way to dispute that the second sentence means "Contractor shall indemnify Company", since a clause of the sort "he will indemnify himself" makes no sense. Moreover, the legal definitions of Indemnitor and Indemnitee (Black's Law Dictionary) clearly make reference to "the person" (who protects or is protected, accordingly) and "the other" (that is, not to self).

As soon as you start working in your second job, you will be violating your first contract. If you refuse to start working in your second job, you will be violating the second contract. You were very careless. Not much of a legal question, but the question is how to get out of the mess you created at the lowest possible cost. I would suggest that you go as soon as possible to the second company (the one with the part time contract), tell them that you are very sorry but you didn't read your first contract properly, and that you cannot start working for them. If you seem suitably sorry there's a chance that they will tear up your contract and send you home, with no more damage than a big red "DO NOT HIRE" in you records. If things don't go nicely (and you don't have any legal right to expect them to be nice about it), you go and get a lawyer.

You have a contract - they have fulfilled their obligation (they paid you), if you do not fulfil their obligation (not to post it online) then you are in breach of the contract. Your obligation continues even if you gift the money back to them. If you breach the contract then they can sue you for the damage that they suffer. Presumably this would be damage to their reputation and for a public figure this could run into millions of dollars. In demanding additional money from them beyond what you are legally entitled to you are, at least, flirting with the crime of extortion/blackmail. This would not be a matter for them to sue you for, it would be a matter for the DA to prosecute if they chose to make a complaint. There doesn't seem to be a defamation issue here because you are not stating anything that isn't true. Now, the extent of the agreement appears to prohibit you posting it on the internet, however, the spirit of the agreement is that you will keep the information secret in all respects - that is likely how a court would look at it. Of course, if someone does steal the information from you then you haven't broken the agreement but you would probably have to prove that it was stolen when they sue you.

If two parties have a contract, where one party is required to do X in exchange for the other party doing Y, then the terms specified in that contract would determine what happens. You would have to see exactly what it says, especially if the other party has the option to not give you money. A contract might say "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X; if A elects not to make payment, notice must be given 60 days before X". Failing to give timely notice is thus breech of contract. However if the clause only says "A shall at his option give B $5,000 by date X", then there is no requirement for advance notice. And this assumes that there is a contract whereby both parties have some obligation to the other. A gift, on the other hand, carries no obligations on the giving party. There may be some social code to the effect that they should have told you by now, but failing to give advance notice is at most rude and certainly not legally actionable.

No If you breach the contract that may allow the rental company to terminate it (among other things), however, termination would need to be communicated to the customer. Only if they kept it after that, with the intention of permanently depriving the company of it, are they stealing it.

Suppose Publisher printed 10,000 copies under the terms of the contract, and within those two years they sold 7,000 copies (and paid royalties). If you did not receive leftover copies at the end of the 2 years, then either (1) they broke the contract or (2) at the last minute they sold the remainder to some third party. If the latter is the case, they would be obligated to pay royalties on that last sale, and the numbers should add up (assuming you know how many were printed initially). If they failed to pay royalties, or they continued to sell the book, you would need to send your lawyer after them. Another possibility is the lost-email excuse – "We emailed you asking if you wanted the books, and you didn't reply, so we sold them" (disposing of does not necessary mean "destroy"). The burden would be on them to prove that they offered you the remainders and you elected not to purchase (if that is the wording – the contract could have required a specific refusal, not just a failure to respond). Under the contract, Publisher can't just decide to keep printing the book, nor can they continue to distribute it (but a third party could distribute existing copies forever). You would have "legal exposure" i.e. some risk of being sued if you republish, but it might be minimal – definitely get your attorney to advise you on that. Vendors might refuse to sell the republished work if they think it is an unauthorized edition.

If someone catches a Pokemon that is on my property, is that theft? Does something that is virtually located on your property like in Pokemon GO incur any kind of property right for the property owner?

In this answer, I address title question: "If someone catches a Pokemon that is on my property, is that theft?"1 The Pokémon is an entry in a database, presented by Nintendo to users in their mobile app and can be included in a user's collections after that user completes some in-game actions. It isn't your property. It isn't even their (the users') property. Further, a Pokémon appears for all users can be captured again and again by multiple users until it disappears for all users. One user capturing a Pokémon doesn't make it unavailable for others. The Pokémon doesn't "become subject to" any property rights of the owner of the real property that it happens to be virtually overlaid on. Said another way, it doesn't "incur" any of their property rights. Capturing it in-game is not theft. 1. The question in the question body is "does [a Pokémon] incur any kind of property right for the property owner". Incur means "to become subject to". That is different than the broader verb "implicate". This question does not ask (and this answer doesn't answer) whether the Pokémon can implicate the property owner's property rights (e.g. via attractive nuisance, trespass, etc.). Some of that is addressed at a separate question.

They have copyright in their additional text, and possibly in things like their visual design choices (fonts, layout etc). They may also have introduced a few deliberate typos to detect any literal copies from their version (rather as mapmakers add a few imaginary features to their maps). None of this creates any rights to the original text. You are still free to produce your own copies of the original text. Just get it from some other source so you can be sure not to include anything of theirs.

Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low.

This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer).

The part about "If I'm the owner of the content, surely I have the right to request its deletion" is the problem. Sure, you have the right to request, but you can't legally compel. You have an agreement with them, according to which you got something, and they got something. You can't then take back the thing that you gave them, which is permission to use. You didn't give them the IP itself, which you still hold. Here's an analogy. You may own a car, and can give a person permission to use the car (let's say "if you bring me back a pound of cheese from the store"). You cannot later change your mind (especially after you've gotten the cheese) a say that you retract that permission and therefore they actually stole your car. When permission to use is given, as long as the conditions for granting permission are satisfied, you can't un-give permission.

Actually, neither the council nor a private owner are responsible for illegal actions by unauthorised people on their property. This is obvious: if an intruder enters your property and, while there, shoots someone you cannot be held responsible. However ... Since you have made them aware that there are intruders on their property acting illegally and causing a nuisance to the neighbours and they have done nothing they are quite likely negligent, even recklessly negligent. Rather than sue them, consult a lawyer and get them to write a letter that if they do not take action by X date you are going to sue them.

There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things.

No It's your device, you can do what you like with it (subject to the law - you can't hit people with it. Unless they want to be hit: whatever turns you on, turns you on). However, if you do operate it outside their instructions then they would not be legally liable if it failed and injured you or someone else or set fire to the cat or whatever. The "prohibition" would limit their legal liability.

Rent increase with 2 offers in California Bay Area I just received my rent increase notice and noticed that there are 2 offers: One year lease contract would increase my rent by 10% Month-to-month leasing with the amount from #1 + $500. I got this notice 40 days prior to the current leasing agreement ends and I'm in California. I know that landlord must give 30 notice if the increase is < 10% but the 2nd options is much more (>15%). Is it legal? Thank you.

The relevant law is section 828(b)(2) of the civil code: (2) If the proposed rent increase for that tenant is 10 percent or less of the rental amount charged to that tenant at any time during the 12 months prior to the effective date of the increase, either in and of itself or when combined with any other rent increases for the 12 months prior to the effective date of the increase, the notice shall be delivered at least 30 days prior to the effective date of the increase, and subject to Section 1013 of the Code of Civil Procedure if served by mail. Your landlord is offering to renew your existing one-year lease for a 10% rent increase, and as such, a 40-day notice meets the requirements of "at least 30 days". The fact that you're also given the option to change your lease terms at an increase of more than 10% is irrelevant.

Is this even legal? Yes, it is lawful. The Ontario Tenancy Act does not seem to outlaw that type of clauses. But the clause (or lease) will be binding only if you agree to it. Also note that the clause refers to reasonable costs, which implies that those costs must be for a reasonable cause. In other words, the landlord would be barred from recovery of legal expenses if you persuade the Board that the landlord's complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Notwithstanding that the clause is lawful, I would personally discourage you from agreeing to pay the adversary's attorney fees. Note that the clause may apply in the event that neither party fully prevails, whence it is in your best interest to preclude the risk of having to reimburse the landlord in that scenario.

My answer would be different if either Alice or Bob was the landlord, or the landlord had a separate agreement with Alice and Bob. If a single lease is written, per the comment, that Alice and Bob are components of "the tenants", and "the tenants" have rented the named premises, then they all have equal rights to occupy the whole premises under the lease. If the landlord is professional I will further presume they all have joint and several liability for the whole rent; it would be inequitable to alienate Alice with joint and several liability from any part of the premises without her consent. If there is a separate roommate agreement that allocates rooms and expected share of rent or controls behaviors, then that is a contract that can form as a meeting of the minds of the roommates where they each trade something of value, such as exclusive use of a room. The narrative suggests an original verbal agreement that Bob would like to change. That's nice but Alice doesn't have to agree; or can agree with other changes of value to her such as the ratio of expected rent reflecting the ratio of use and access to the space Alice would have.

am I obligated to pay this fee? Yes. You entered the lease despite been aware of the existence of that fee. That meets the contract law tenet that an agreement be entered knowingly and willfully. Does it not invoke an issue where they can arbitrarily set the price? If the landlord requires a fee that is unreasonably high, that would violate the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As such, that part would be unenforceable, meaning that the landlord may only charge a reasonable fee. Likewise, unless the lease clearly entitles the landlord to decide the telecom fee arbitrarily, the lease would fail to meet that extent of the aforementioned tenet of a contract being entered knowingly. Does this fall under the category of lease addendum? The form (or format) in which the requirement of telecom fee was mentioned --and agreed upon-- does not matter. The landlord only would need to prove that the tenant was --or should have been-- aware of that fee. Usually the landlord can prove that by showing/producing in court the lease with tenant's signature.

You need absolute written buy in from the landlord. His agreement is with you, not this new person. If the new person stops paying for whatever reason, then landlord is coming after you.

No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.

If it were me, I would leave. Who wants to rent a room in a home where you are not wanted? However, there should be concessions. I would ask for 1.5 months rent refunded, but would happily settle for one month. I am sure there are many nice rooms, close by, where you are welcomed. Given additional information commented by the OP, the landlord is looking to increase his rents. Evidentially this municipality has strict rent controls. In this case, I would enter negotiations with the landlord. I would offer him a percentage of his anticipated rent increase and probably start at 50%. If the OP has been a good tenant (always paid on time, and low maintenance) the landlord might see this as a bargain. No need to find a new tenant and no need to vet one that might pay poorly. The better the tenant has been, and the more strict the renter protection laws the more appeal this offer will have to the landlord. The benefit for the OP is they don't have to move, or find a new place with its associated costs and inconvenience. If the landlord is just a mindless corporate drone with no decision making power, this will not work.

If there is a contract, Bob is entitled to damages There probably is a contract in this case - the landlord (through their agent) has made an unambiguous offer which Bob has accepted by signing the lease. The contract comes into effect with Bob’s acceptance irrespective of if the landlord has (or ever does) sign it. If the agent has acted without the landlord’s authority that is a matter between them - the landlord is in a binding contract with Bob by virtue of the agency doctrine.

Is disclosing a trade secret only to a judge in court, as happened in "The Prestige", something that could happen in reality? The 2006 film The Prestige begins with a magician drowning while performing a magic trick, with another man accused of murdering him. During the trial, the magician's engineer is asked to reveal the secrets of the trick where the magician died. He is reluctant to do so. Cutter: If I reveal my magician's secrets here in open court, I'll be unemployable and the secrets will be worthless. The Real Transported Man is the most sought-after illusion in the business and I have the right to sell it on. Judge: Mr. Cutter, I see your predicament, but we are talking about a capital offence; Alfred Borden's life hangs in the balance. If you were prepared to disclose the details to me in private, I might be able to judge their relevance to the case. Might this be an acceptable compromise? Is this something that could happen in a real court session? I don't think there was a jury in this trial, but would that change the answer? If it matters, the movie takes place in 1900s London.

In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.

This is a heavily fact-dependent question. Exactly how and how much your work "evokes" the original will matter. That said, your belief that "My understanding is that as this doesn't contain any mechanical part of the original movie it is fine." is not at all correct. If your new work is clearly based on the original work, it would be a derivative work. For example, if Shakespear's Romeo and Juliet were still in copyright, West Side story would have been a derivative work, and would have required permission. You would do well to consult a lawyer knowledgeable in this specific area, in your specific jurisdiction, as the detailed rules vary by country, although the general principles are pretty much world-wide.

The accusation would be the crime of securities fraud ("insider trading" is legally meaningless), under 15 USC 78j(b). There is a bit more elaboration in 17 CFR 240.10b5-1. That law prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in" in connection with a securities transaction. Under 15 USC 78ff, violation of the law can result in a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years, thus it is a crime. As a crime, the standard of proof required is must higher than it in for a civil forfeiture (which can be as low as "reasonable suspicion"). In the US, and pursuant to the Due Process clause, that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is (from in re Winship), "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged". The statute itself does not state the elements that must be proven to secure a conviction, but they can be discerned based on jury instructions (which are circuit-specific). The 9th Circuit instruction is here. You can see that there are 4 specific allegations that have to be chosen between, and the prosecutor has to have at least alleged one of those prohibited acts (so that the jury can decide if the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did that thing). The evidence you have presented could constitute "reasonable suspicion", but not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". If we had a different standard of proof in criminal trials, where it was sufficient to just suspect based on a small bit of evidence that a person may have done something prohibited, then the conclusion could be different. Or, if you had stronger evidence surrounding the sale, your argument might carry a bit more weight. In other words, criminal prosecution is based on quite a lot of specific and objective evidence about what happened. An example of the kind of evidence and allegations required to get the ball rolling can be seen here; for "insider trading" specifically, look here (this case is based on an FBI investigation, where an agent will presumably testify to hearing the defendant state a plan to violate the law).

I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.

This supposes that the patentable concept can’t be learned form the operation of the whole program and hiding the invention while making use of the invention in public is not a disclosure. However, in the US there is a famous case In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) that concluded a public demonstration that didn’t expose the inner workings did start the clock on a bar to patentability. See previous question https://patents.stackexchange.com/questions/20886/would-the-demonstration-of-an-invention-be-considered-public-disclosure The answer (from me) has the caveat that this is a pre-AIA case and courts might come to a different answer under that current law. The U.S. has viewed public use, especially commercial public use, as disqualifying (after a grace period) but the rest of the world puts its emphasis on actual disclosure of the inventive concept so this result might be different elsewhere. One thought experiment would be to analogize with an article in a widely available journal with the words Don’t read the article that starts on page 19 on the cover. From a disclosure point of view I do not think that is different from it being possible, but illegal, to read.

There is precedent for the idea that double jeopardy need not apply when the initial trial was a sham because the judge and/or jury had been bribed. See Aleman v. Judges of Cook County Circuit Court, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998). This case was very similar to your hypothetical: Aleman was initially acquitted of a murder, but years later it came to light that he had bribed the judge (in a bench trial). He was retried and convicted in state court. He appealed his conviction on the grounds of double jeopardy, but the Seventh Circuit denied his appeal, accepting Illinois' argument that because of the bribe, Aleman was never "in jeopardy of life or limb" in the first place.

It would be a violation of 18 USC 1001, which is the law against making false statements to the federal government. Paul Mozer, who was a Salomon Brothers trader, received a four month sentence for doing something along those lines in 1994. Bidding on something implies an intent to pay for the thing, which in this case is a falsehood: in so doing, one "falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact" (that you don't intend to pay for the thing).

I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.

Can a city hire someone to mow my grass (against my wishes)? Recently the city sent a crew to mow my grass without notifying me or giving me any advance notice of any kind. Did they violate my rights by sending these people without my permission? (Details below) My front yard was in full compliance with local ordinance of 6" and below grass length. My backyard was in violation. I woke up to an individual walking past by back window. Important note: my backyard is not accessible from the front without the gate being unlatched from the backyard. I could not communicate with any of the individuals who "serviced" my yard. I did manage to figure out they were hired by the city, mostly from the bill they sent me. Edit- City billed me directly (Bryan, TX). Bill lines up with "services" provided and address on city website.

Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).

I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty.

Absolutely not. You have to use the legal system, whereby the sheriff is the one who uses force if it is necessary and ordered by the court. You can file an action at your local courthouse. If you want to do this self-help style, figure out how to file a petition, and figure out what you are petitioning the court to do. First off, of course, you need to figure out what you really want. For example, do you want a squatter to leave your apparently abandoned house; do you want a fence removed from your property; or do you just want to be sure that he can't claim possession of a chunk of your land in 3 more years (but the fence doesn't bother you)? Since you're apparently talking about removing a person from your property, you might start by calling the police. If this is a former tenant as opposed to a stranger who broke in, don't bother (police don't get into civil matters until the court tells them to), just start the appropriate legal process. You might be filing an unlawful detainer action, but it would be a slower eviction if the person is a tenant.

The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.

Actually, neither the council nor a private owner are responsible for illegal actions by unauthorised people on their property. This is obvious: if an intruder enters your property and, while there, shoots someone you cannot be held responsible. However ... Since you have made them aware that there are intruders on their property acting illegally and causing a nuisance to the neighbours and they have done nothing they are quite likely negligent, even recklessly negligent. Rather than sue them, consult a lawyer and get them to write a letter that if they do not take action by X date you are going to sue them.

I know this is not what you've asked (I will get to that too), but I figured I would take the opportunity to state that the owner of the well cannot send you an invoice for the water unless you agreed to a price and entered into a binding agreement. They cannot just decide their water is worth X and then tell you that the amount is due. Just as you cannot send them a bill, in the same amount, for the use and maintenance of the pump. While the well may be located on one parcel of land, with the pump on the other, chances are, the properties were linked at one point and that is why there is a separation of the two (unless you bought it as one and divided it yourselves). This should have been dealt with on the deed, with easements appurtenant to the neighboring land regarding water rights. A contractual agreement could have been attached by reference that dictated the land with the well would maintain the well, while the landowner with the pump would maintain the equipment (or whatever you both agreed to regarding upkeep and the like). Depending on the state you live in, the property itself may not even "own" the well. For instance, in Colorado, water rights typically come by way of 100 or 200 year leases, as the native american tribes of the area "own" the water rights. Other states have laws that declare that nobody owns the water table, hence land is only owned as far down as the water table and then it is owned by the county, or state, with easements running with the deed. Other states, (I'm wondering if this is your issue) the water runs in veins and does belong only to the property that it is below – as there is no water table, so to speak. Regardless, I would talk to your title insurance policy company and ask why this easement was not addressed in the deed. I'm assuming that you did not divide the land yourselves, post purchase, and the land with the pump cannot access the water table without going onto the land of the other. Otherwise, it would be very easily solved by drilling your own well (and much cheaper), whereby you already own all of the equipment to run the water to the dwelling. You just divert your equipment to the running of your own well. It's only a few dollars a foot to drill a well, unless you live in the Granite State! Likewise, you should check with your land assessor's office, or registry of deeds, and see how the title ran back regarding water. Again, depending on jurisdiction, you may be able to drill down and over. You cannot divert, but you can access, in most jurisdictions. I say to contact your title insurance company, because the water issue should have been dealt with at title examination, and further, if your land is inaccessible to any water, it would not be sub-dividable for dwelling purposes under almost any zoning law I have ever heard of. A property that is land locked, or utility inaccessible, cannot be zoned for dwellings, without irrevocable easements or rights of ways, respectively. Just because you purchased near family doesn't have anything to do with any of this analysis. They could be anyone, or you could end up at odds, the water cannot be relationship dependent and you cannot be held hostage over natural resources. If so, I would sue the title insurance policy for a refund of the purchase price or the negotiation of the purchase price of an easement to the well/water table, assuming you have none under your land and have no existing right to it. If you just happen to have the pump, and they have the well, you own the pump and they own the well. Simple as that. You do not have to allow the pump to be used for their well. Assuming you can drill your own well, but may not want to, you can just rent them the use of the pump at the same rate they are charging you for the water. You can agree to split the cost of maintenance of each, since you've invested in the upgrade of the pump.

Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket.

IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.

Can you file for, or take, legal action against someone in a country where you're not a citizen? Say I drive to Mexico and someone punches me in the face; I want to sue them for it. Do I have the right to sue them under Mexican law, meaning I can begin legal action within that country not as a citizen? Would it have to settle differently? Mexico is just an example. I'm sure there's a more general answer to this with regards to some kind of international laws, or perhaps a normal right.

Yes, in most jurisdictions citizenship or residency is not a pre-requisite for standing. However, be aware that there are plenty of jurisdictions where the practical effect of being non-native gives you effectively no chance of winning. "Fair" in some countries means their citizens always beat foreigners.

All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.

If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.

It isn't explicitly prohibited so long as the amount claimed is in the aggregate less than $20,000. But, it would probably be better to file separately. First, very simple single party, single transaction cases are what small claims court is designed to do, and going against the flow often creates unforeseen confusion for the judge in the Justice Court who isn't a sophisticated civil litigation expert. The Justices of the Peace who preside over Justice Courts that handle small claims cases in Texas often aren't and don't have to be lawyers or even high school graduates. Second, if you sue as a group, and one of your group is the lead person handling the case (and that person isn't a lawyer), the lead person is at grave risk of being found to be practicing law without a license by taking actions in a lawsuit on behalf of your fellow plaintiffs.

In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.

My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others.

The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement".

Is a country an institution or an entity? Neither. It's a sovereign state (a "political entity", not an entity in the sense of a legal persona).

Is it possible to "fix" copyright infringement by deleting the "infringing" part? Two Live Crew was sued by the holders of Roy Orbison's copyright for their version of "Pretty Woman." Titles are not copyrightable, so the basis for this suit was the copied first line: "Pretty woman walking down the street." (The rest of the two songs were very different.) "Crew" had a "parody" defense for using the first line. But suppose they didn't. Could they fix the problem by e.g. changing the infringing first line to something like "Pretty woman running through the park?"

There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.

There are a number of existing legal sites that do this, for free or for pay. The main concern for a website operator pertains to the DMCA "safe harbor" provisions, which protect against vicarious liability for infringement. A "report piracy" option is not sufficient; see this answer to a related question.

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. I would interpret the Copyright Board's interpretation in relation to tariffs when musical works copied for private use only, as the document's scope does not appear to extend beyond that. However, in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 FCR 241, a consortium of record industry corporations attempted to request confidential ISP account holder information. Essentially, the plaintiffs failed to bring adequate evidence to prove the magnitude of copyright infringement; additionally, it is specifically stated at [24-5] that: Subsection 80(1) [as am. by S.C. 1997, c. 24, s.50] of the Copyright Act provides as follows: 80. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the act of reproducing all or any substantial part of (a) a musical work embodied in a sound recording, ... onto an audio recording medium for the private use of the person who makes the copy does not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the musical work, the performer's performance, or the sound recording. Although the Copyright Modernization Act, did, in fact, introduce a number of amendments, Subsection 80 still reads as it does when the BMG case was decided. Since this case, I can find no court that has found this ruling to be invalid, and no cases which have considered and not applied this subsection. There is also Subsection 29.22 (1) (which applies to all works): 29.22 (1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to reproduce a work or other subject-matter or any substantial part of a work or other subject-matter if (a) the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made is not an infringing copy; (b) the individual legally obtained the copy of the work or other subject-matter from which the reproduction is made, other than by borrowing it or renting it, and owns or is authorized to use the medium or device on which it is reproduced; (c) the individual, in order to make the reproduction, did not circumvent, as defined in section 41, a technological protection measure, as defined in that section, or cause one to be circumvented; (d) the individual does not give the reproduction away; and (e) the reproduction is used only for the individual’s private purposes. Subsection 80(1) creates a special exemption purely for musical works, and so the less restrictive conditions there should be found to apply to them instead. On the basis of the case above, and my consideration of the Copyright Act, I would find that reproduction of a musical work does not constitute copyright infringement, pursuant and subject to s 80(1) of the Act.

By "buying the song" on Gumroad you don't actually buy the song, you buy the right to do specific things with that song. I couldn't find the exact license terms, but for 800 Yen (about $6) for a whole album I highly doubt that this will include much more than the right to listen to the song on a private device. The rights to publicly perform, reproduce, redistribute, use commercially etc. usually cost a lot more. So if you want the rights to use the song in your own video, you will have to negotiate the purchase of a license which allows you to do that with the creator. Or if they reassigned their copyrights to a music label or copyright collective (which some music artists do), with that organization. There are some exceptions in the copyright laws of some countries where you can use parts of a song without a license. For example, the "fair use" exception in US copyright law if you review, discuss or analyze a song. But such exceptions usually don't apply if you use the song as background music, adapt the song into an own work or even just reupload the song on your own channel.

In general, using content provided by another who incorrectly posted it under a permissive license, such as a CC license, does not grant a valid license from the real copyright holder. That is, if A writes some code (or a song, or creates an image, or whatever else), it is protected by copyright. If B then posts it to the web, with a statement that it is released under a particular license, without having obtained permission from A, then B's "release" is of no value, because B had no rights to grant. If C downloads and uses this content, relying on B's license, then A could take legal action against C. C would probably be considered (in the US) an "innocent infringer" which reduces the minimum statutory damage amount, but does not otherwise change C's legal position. A could, if it chose, bring suit and possibly obtain a judgement including some damages. But to return to the practical case of code posted on one of the SE sites. Given the comparatively short code sections usually posted, and that they do not usually form a complete working program, and given further the stated educational purpose of SE, it is likely that in US law such a posting would constitute fair use, and in the law of other countries fall under one or another exception to copyright. That is a general conclusion, the details would matter. I have not heard of a case similar to that suggested in the question. I find it unlikely that an SE poster would post copyright-protected code without permission, that is valuable enough to be worth an infringement suit, and substantial enough and having enough effect on th market for the original to be outside the protection of fair use. Such a situatiion is, of course, possible, even if unlikely. Note that a cease-and-desist letter is not a court order, and is really only a threat of court action. its only legal effect is to put the recipient on notice, so that continued infringement is not without awareness of the copyright claim. To have legal effect the claimant must actually bring an infringement suit, which is not without cost.

No Copyright protects expressions of ideas but not ideas. A song with the words if a poem set to music would generally require the permission of the owner of the copyrighted poem. An instrumental score “inspired by a poem” would not remotely be using the same expression, or a derivative of, the poem. Titles are not subject to copyright and there are many books with identical titles. Try “The Gathering Storm” as a book title.

You probably own the copyright, since this wasn't an explicit part of your job. However, there may be other legal reasons which preclude you from using them anyway; copyright isn't all there is. Since you are in the middle of an active dispute, you should consult an actual lawyer (which I am certainly not) for legal advice.

Whether the use of excerpts from songs protected by copyright in the cover version of a different song is a "fair use" under US law is always a fact-driven question, and often there is no clear answer to fair use issues short of a lawsuit. One must remember that fair use is a specifically united-states legal concept, and that reproduction of such a cover version outside the US would not be protected by fair use, even if it was fair use under US law. Fair use is defined by 17 USC 107. That law spells out the four factors that must always be considered in any fair use claim. They are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. These have been explained and analyzed in several answers here on law.se, recently including this answer. In this case the commercial nature of the compilation probably causes factor (1) to lean against fair use. The creative character of the songs being used will cause factor (2) to lean slightly against fair use. That the use is for a charitable purpose might have a positive effect on factor (1), although it does not fit the "educational" purpose specifically mentioned in the law. I don't see how this would be in any way relevant to the other three factors, but it might influence the decisions of copyright owners. There is not enough information in the question to even approximate an analysis of the other two factors in this case. Note that the "substantiality" mentioned in factor (2) refers to how much of the source work is used, not how large a part of the resulting work it forms. Note also that there is a wide range of what has been acceptable here. In one famous case (Harper v Nation Enterprises) some 300 words of a 500 page book were found not to be fair use because they were held to be the "heart of the work"; in that case there was also a substantial market effect. One might want to consult a lawyer with expertise in copyright and music to get a better idea if the specific use seems likely to be a fair use. Alternatively, one could ask the copyright owners of the works of which excerpts are to be included if a license can be obtained. Some owners will in some cases provide licenses for a small fee or even for no fee if the source is properly acknowledged. Others will not. Licensing of one song by a given artist does not affect whether use of another song by the same artist is or is not fair use, but it might influence the willingness of that artist to license the second song on favorable terms.

Can maps from Google Maps be used in school presentation? I'm doing a presentation for a class in college. Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps? To clarify, I'm not using the actual photographs or street views of google maps, just the street names. Is this allowed? I tried reading their terms of use but couldn't understand it.

If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.

You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.

You will need to obtain permission from the company whose logo you intend to use before using it. Just because you use a product from that company in your devices doesn't necessarily give you permission to use their logo. Many companies have co-marketing plans that you can apply to be a part of but generally you and your product must meet certain requirements in order to be a part of it.

Not only can’t you trademark it, you can’t use it The original logo is covered by copyright which belongs, prima facie, to the original artist. It doesn’t matter that they are based in Russia; Russia and the US are both signatories to the Berne Convention which means they protect each other’s copyright. That means you can only use it if it is fair use (it isn’t) or if you have the copyright owner’s permission (you don’t). Could I still use the logo I bought and trademark it in the US granted that the seller had made some revisions to the stock photo he found? Not if the seller didn’t have permission to make those changes. Creation of a derivative work is one of the exclusive rights copyright gives. The seller had changed up some parts of the stock image, this includes color scheme, orientation, and made the picture look a little low poly. See above. The original artist of the stock photo is based in Russia and as far as I can see there is no registered copyright on it and don't think they could apply for US copyright anyway. They already have copyright. They would need to register it in the US before they could sue but there is no impediment to them doing so. While I'm not sure where the seller (located in Pakistan) officially downloaded the logo, I had nothing to do with the final design of it or downloaded anything from a stock photo website myself, so I'm not sure if I'd be bounded by any terms of the stock photo website Makes no difference. Just because you didn’t steal the car, that doesn’t make it ok for you to drive it. The stock image is very niche and a bit random. Across all the websites the artist has published it on, it has about 5 or 6 downloads altogether. Not relevant at all. As far the copyright of the seller's work goes, the Fiverr terms state that buyers have all the copyright, though I don't know if this is nullified by the use of the stock image. You can’t sell something you don’t own. If the seller had no right to upload the photo (as it seems they didn’t), the terms of the website don’t matter. The true owner never agreed to those terms and isn’t bound by them.

Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...

The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.

Generally speaking, what isn't illegal by law is legal. It's possible for law enforcement agencies to share crime rates, maps, and their data, but within any laws regarding access and sharing of that data. Such crime data may be publicly available, but that depends on local and state laws. The local or state agency would have to enter into a legal licensing agreement - if local and state laws allow such sharing - with the GPS company to provide the data, update it, and reasonably assure that it is accurate. The more realistic reason GPS systems might choose to not show crime data may be public relations. If a GPS user lives in an area that has been objectively identified by data as having a higher than baseline crime rate, i.e. for carjackings, that user may not be very happy with that designation. Worse, what happens to public relations when data errors show an area is wrongfully identified as high crime? What kinds of lawsuits could result? Real estate agents suing since bad data from a GPS unit soured the sale of a house?

You are responsible for any processing of data that happens under your control – but are you the data controller in this scenario? Since you have no meaningful influence over whether or not this backup happens on the operating system level, there could be a strong argument that you aren't a data controller for these backups. And if you aren't a data controller for that processing activity, you aren't responsible for compliance. However, if you were to integrate directly with relevant Google APIs in order to facilitate backups that could make you a controller. Then, Google would either have to be your data processor (won't be the case here), or you would need a legal basis for sharing the user's data with Google. For example, you could ask for the user's consent before activating such features.

Buying a vehicle that may have been involved in a hit-and-run I was interested in buying a truck from someone in Kentucky, USA. A friend said he heard the person selling it had performed a hit-and-run about a month earlier. No one was hurt, but police were looking for the perpetrator. Apparently no one got a licence plate number, only a description of the truck. It was pretty obvious the truck had hit something. Suppose I bought the truck. Would I be responsible for the hit-and-run if they ever found out exactly who did it? I did speak to the police, that I thought I knew who it was, but they didn't care at all.

The Kentucky restriction against "hit and run" is KRS 189.580, which says that The operator of any vehicle, whose vehicle…is involved in an accident …shall immediately stop and ascertain the extent of the injury or damage and render reasonable assistance Notice that the legal requirement is for the operator to do something: the law requires nothing of the vehicle itself. Supposing that you are correct that the vehicle was operated by someone who hit and ran, then if the police gain suspicions that such is the case, and if those suspicions are reasonable, then then could obtain a warrant to obtain evidence from the vehicle, which could be used against the operator. The fact that you (might) now own the vehicle would not transfer legal responsibility to you – responsibbility goes with the actor, not the instrument.

There is a form, which both parties to the sale sign. Note that it does entail paying sales tax. There are other aspects to the sale which reinforce the "It's not my car anymore" message, such as returning the plates and getting a receipt for the plates. Even doing the sale in a DMV lot would not help you.

The police performed an "open air sniff". Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.

Here's the thing: if the plaintiff/appellant/claimant are the same legal entity as the defendant/respondent, it's plain to see that one of them must lose. For instance, consider a case where two trains operated by the same corporation collide. Assuming that the drivers both performed their duties, the company is vicariously liable – such a case is frivolous and is likely to be thrown out for that reason. It's just a waste of time and money. Or your second example: If the woman was driving the city vehicle and crashed it in the course of her duties, it is the city that will be the defendant in the proceedings, not the woman. So essentially: while it's difficult to prove that something has never happened, these are good reasons to expect it would not happen.

In California (where lost+found laws have been discussed quite a lot), this would be either "lost property" or "abandoned property". With abandoned property, you can do what you want. With lost property, it is legal to ignore it. If you take it, you have the obligation to try to return it to the owner. If you don't do that, it's theft. If you don't take it, you have no obligation whatsoever. Put it somewhere where the loser (the person who lost it) is more likely to find it, for example on the street. Don't take anything. Clarification for comments: There is a box. And the owner of the box is nowhere to be seen. That box is by definition lost or abandoned - it is abandoned if the owner got rid of it intentionally, it is lost if the owner is looking for it. We don't know. We can make guesses depending on the situation. No matter whether lost or abandoned, you are legally absolutely fine if you just ignore it. You have no reason to try to return it to its owner. If you don't make it your business, it's not your business. But if you decide you want the box, or bits of it, and it isn't abandoned (which is hard to know for sure), then you have to try to find the owner first, and if you don't find them, then you can keep it.

Washington state dedicated a section of their code to explicitly make this illegal (to install it, not just use it). RCW 46.37.685(1)(b) says It is unlawful for a person to have an installed license plate flipping device on a vehicle, use technology to flip a license plate on a vehicle, or use technology to change the appearance of a license plate on a vehicle. and it is illegal to sell them. Georgia does not seem to have a specific law on the topic, but the same effect holds under GA Code §40-2-41, which says: Unless otherwise permitted under this chapter, every vehicle required to be registered under this chapter, which is in use upon the highways, shall at all times display the license plate issued to the owner for such vehicle, and the plate shall be fastened to the rear of the vehicle in a position so as not to swing and shall be at all times plainly visible... It shall be the duty of the operator of any vehicle to keep the license plate legible at all times. No license plate shall be covered with any material unless the material is colorless and transparent. No apparatus that obstructs or hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate shall be attached to the rear of any motor vehicle required to be registered in the state. We can start with the question of whether the vehicle must be registered: yes, it does. Then we can ask if "which is in use upon the highways" is true. This is not obvious, because that clause could be interpreted as meaning "which is at some time or other in use upon the highway", or else as "at those times when it is in use upon the highway". I strongly suspect that the courts would find in favor of the first interpretation, not the second, especially since the law also says that you must "keep the license plate legible at all times" (not "at all times when you are on the highway"). Finally, a plate flipper clearly "hinders the clear display and legibility of a license plate", and the law prohibits the attachment of such device, not just its use. So obscuring your license plate is just not legal.

I took my car to the mechanic to have a squeaky brake looked at. I was told it would cost $30. The mechanic fixed whatever the problem was. When I was checking out, they could not find a $30 brake-work item in their computer so they billed it as Tire Balancing $30. Or some such thing. Meh, accounting. This is not how the law works. The prosecution needs to prove every element of the crime you are charged with. They need to prove you did not signal. The way this usually works is the cop takes the stand and testifies, and you can cross examine him. Then you can testify if you want to, and can be cross-examined. There might be other evidence against you also, like a dash cam. Assuming there is no other evidence, and that the officer did not prove every element of failing to signal, you do not need to testify. You can tell the judge that the prosecution failed to make the case and ask to have the charge dismissed. Of course, if the judge thinks they did make their case, then you lose. On the other hand, you could take the stand and testify, and subject yourself to cross examination. Just a word of warning, if it's your word against a cop's word, you will lose. Your best bet is to get discovery, get the dash cam, and show that you did signal. Be aware, if you get too saucy, the prosecution can add charges. So they could add the speeding charge, but of course, (see above), they then need to prove it.

Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses – for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).

Is it legal to backdate an agreement? On Workplace.SE, "My employer wants me to a sign an NDA that is backdated more than 2 years" describes the following scenario: OP is an employee working on a project OP has been working (for 7 years as an employee and for 2 on this project) without an NDA Their employer now wants them to sign an NDA for the project, backdated two years (i.e. dated two years ago to the start of the project). The OP's jurisdiction is presumably Texas. My question, is it legal to backdate an NDA like that? Is it a civil contract whose parties are allowed to agree (even retroactively) than an NDA is in place? Or could doing so (backdating such a document) be considered fraud, forgery, or anything illegal, or even for some reason ethically or morally wrong? It seems to me that it might be legal (assuming that I as the employee were willing to sign it) because as an employee I'd assume that some NDA was in place even if haven't signed one (so it's as if the agreement or meeting of minds was in place even before it was documented). On the other hand it also appears to be creating a false document, so, I don't know.

Generally you can back-date the effective date of a contract. Texas does not have any specific laws that prohibit it and in contracts law, this concept is called the "relation back" theory of contract effectiveness. See Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bradley Real Est. Trust, 909 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 1990) for an explanation that back dating violates no general contract law principles and is "determined by the intent of the parties as deduced from the instrument itself." Aside from the obvious issues where someone is back-dating a contract to commit some type of fraud, back-dating raises a whole host of unforeseen consequences with regards to a party's performance under the contract as well as the rights of third parties. The best practice is to make it clear that the effective date and the execution date are different. This avoids confusion and ambiguity that could call the enforceability of the contract into question. Some of the issues that arise when back-dating a NDA are: Liability for disclosures the employee made between the effective date and when the contract is executed/signed. This is particularly troublesome if the NDA provides for liquidated damages or imposes other penalties. If the effective date and execution date are not clear, there might not be a “meeting of the minds.” (The essential elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, consideration, and meeting of the minds.) This is a problem for the employer more than the employee. Liability to third parties. Say an employer licensed some technology from a third party and everyone working on the project was required to sign NDAs. Employer could be on the hook here. Also, the employer and employee could both be in trouble if they were back-dating the contract to trick the third party into thinking it had been signed all along. The issue here is fraud. So, the bottom-line is that is generally legal/enforceable, but one should have a clear explanation for the difference in the dates.

Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation.

I assume that you arranged a contract with some company which paid the contractor the full amount, and not you have to pay that company. If you stop paying the finance company, they will initiate legal proceedings against you to make good on your obligation, and that won't affect what the contractor does. It might not hurt you to write a formal letter (no phone calls) to the contractor stating that you require them to complete the job by some date certain, and hope that you won't have to take the matter to court. If you decide to write the letter yourself, you want to avoid saying anything that could be held against your interest, for example "I don't care how crappy a job you do, I just want this job done!": you need to be sure that what you say in a letter does not put you at a legal disadvantage. The best way to guarantee that is to hire an attorney to write the letter. If you want your money back (plus interest), you will almost certainly need to hire an attorney to write the letter. It is possible that there is an arbitration clause in your contract, requiring you to settle disputes with the firm Dewey, Cheatham & Howe. In that case, your attorney might not be able to do much for you. There cannot be a clause in a contract that penalizes you simply for hiring an attorney.

Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant.

tldr; the agreement is a mess, one-sided, do not sign. This agreement does little to serve your interests, and a lot to harm them. It is also fairly poorly phrased, I have doubts that someone with legal knowledge wrote it. It states: I agree to not disclose, or discuss with anyone, any matters relating to the investigation You are agreeing not to talk to the investigator. If you do talk to them, you will be in breach of the terms you've agreed to. I'm sure they'll just say "oh, that's not what it means" - but that is not how contracts work, they mean what they say. It also says: which includes but is not limited to: ... All documents created by me or shared with me during the investigation. This applies to documents created during the investigation, not in relation to the investigation, not for use in the investigation, not related to the complaint. And again, you can't share these documents with anyone, including the investigator. It may well be unenforceable, as it gives you nothing in exchange for the rights you are giving up, and the concept of "consideration" is key to the common law of contracts in the USA, and also Canada (stemming from British common law) which means both parties must receive something of value: Here's a wiki article on Consideration in US law and a page on Consideration in Canadian law With all of these flaws and the fact that it may well be unenforceable, it would not be wise to sign it. If it did the following, it might be a more useful agreement: Had time limits, after which the restrictions are lifted Allowed you to acknowledge the case and state that you can't discuss it while it is ongoing Applied only to the workplace, talking to the press and publishing details to the public internet, such as social media - this may already be in your contract of employment (relating to bringing the company into disrepute) if so it isn't really a restriction being applied by this agreement, but a re-iteration of the existing agreement Promised a fair investigation in a timely manner, with a report at the end, and appropriate action is taken if claims are substantiated, and libel has occurred Or, they could offer you money right now for your silence, that would absolutely be consideration, in some jurisdictions, the sum may need to be considered reasonable, but this is not universal. There are also cases where NDAs turn out to be invalid: 11 ways NDAs can be invalidated An actual case where an NDA was found to be too broad

Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.

The date and location of the signature merely documents when/where the signature was made, and doesn't have a lot of legal significance for ordinary contracts. This information is probably only useful if you need to argue that you could't have signed the contract because you weren't in that town on that day. Despite this small lapse your contract is perfectly valid, in particular you are required to make any payments that are part of this contract. It doesn't make sense to get this corrected. However, if any actual information (for example, you address) changed, then you should notify the gym to update the information.

Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned Can the employer legally keep his last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ? No, unless (1) the employee resigned and (2) his resignation does not amount to constructive termination. The employer may withhold the remaining $7,000 only if the employee did not meet the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx". Absent any language to the contrary, the requirement of "1-year commitment" is to be construed as the consideration expected from the employee (namely, "not to quit") in exchange for the bonus. Termination by the employer is self-defeating in the sense the employer himself made it impossible for the employee to fulfill the consideration that was expected from the employee. Therefore, the employer forfeits his entitlement to reimbursement. In the event that the employee met the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx", he would be entitled to the remaining $7,000 as well. Virginia labor law has no provision for treble damages (this is in response to one of the comments, per the OP's suggestion). The statutory provisions are only a civil penalty no greater than $1,000 for each violation, a portion of attorney's fees, and "all wages due, plus interest at an annual rate of eight percent". See Code of Virginia at § 40.1-29 A.2, F, and G. Item E of that statute determines which violations are misdemeanors and which are felonies. This statute would be applicable only if (1) the employer disavows the employee's entitlement to the remaining $7,000, and/or (2) the employer withholds a portion of the employee's earned compensation in an attempt to recover the initial payment of $3,000.

Could anyone translate crystal clearly an American radio's copyright department's e-mail? This is the continuation of the prior question. I had confessed prior to receiving their ( NPR ( kindly see the above question. )), very specifically, having had revealed our homepage and the their materials that had been posted before, such as like in this e-mail. Message: I am a director of a company, in English, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX." I've been listening to your Yokosuka navy base station ( I assume it would be so. ) since around 1997 and I enjoyed yours and since I always heard "support for NPR..." and you've been saying you are a "public radio". Granted, so that with that reason above, and after having read your "material" chapter, I was not able to comprehend for 100% sure if I had breached your copyright. We already uploaded used your products such as here http://www.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX without your permission, so if I had breached your copyright, just kindly let me know and I will delete them. This is a blog, but I am almost 95% sure I had infringed your copyright. However, can' we "compensate" for the possible breach by paying certain amount of due? And also, we would like to ask your permission to use your products even with certain amount of payment. Sincerely And their copyright department replied, Unfortunately NPR does not allow other websites to post our content, nor do we allow our material to be translated. You are welcome to link to NPR content from your page, along with a description of the report, if you would like. Here are the rules for linking: (from NPR's Terms of Use page at NPR.org) NPR encourages and permits links to content on the NPR Services. However, NPR is an organization committed to the highest journalistic ethics and standards and to independent, noncommercial journalism, both in fact and in appearance. Therefore, the linking should not (a) suggest that NPR promotes or endorses any third party's causes, ideas, web sites, products or services, or (b) use NPR content for inappropriate commercial purposes or in any way that is unlawful or harmful to any other person or entity. We reserve the right to withdraw permission for any link. I hope this meets your needs. Thanks, Actually, their message didn't "meet" my requirement. I wanted an answer such as "Yes you can, or No, you can not." Or Such as "You can use our content should you pay XXX dollars per the product." Could anyone guide me about their e-mail please? Thank you in advance.

This appears to be very clear to me: "NPR does not allow other websites to post our content..." I cannot think of a more clear way to say "Do not reproduce our content on your site." Since you asked about licensing the right to reproduce their content, and they flatly ignored your request, I think it is safe to assume that they are not interested in licensing that right to you, even for a fee. This is also consistent with their "NPR does not allow [any] other websites to post..." language. It is always the copyright holder's right to refuse to offer any particular person (or all persons generally) a license, no matter what payment they might offer. (With the exception of statutory licenses, which in the U.S. exist only for recording covers of musical works.) They have also ignored your request to recompense them for infringement already performed. If in the future they decide to take legal action against you for your past infringement (hugely unlikely that such a hassle would be worthwhile for NPR) or seek any out of court settlement (again, quite unlikely they will care enough), I'm sure they will let you know. As they've said in their email, you are welcome to link to NPR's content. You are, of course, not welcome to spread misinformation or lies about NPR by claiming something like, "Look at this wonderful article that NPR wrote purely for us, at our personal request," or "NPR thinks that In Home Teaching Agency XXX is a great company, so we built a curriculum around their content," when NPR has never said any such thing. Any legal issue around linking would probably be a trademark offense, by wrongfully suggesting that NPR endorses you, or by misrepresenting yourself as an agent of NPR. If you don't do either of things, and just say, "Here's an article on [subject X] published by NPR," you're probably fine. If you want to be very thorough, you could include a disclaimer on your site like, "In Home Teaching Agency XXX is not a licencee or partner of NPR. Links to NPR articles are included for educational purposes only," or similar. This seems pretty excessive to me, since a reasonable person won't assume that linking to an article from a major news source suggests a partnership, but I suppose it couldn't hurt to include such a disclaimer.

Go to court and find out There is no doubt that humming a tune and recording it (or performing it in public) is a derivative work - a right reserved to the copyright owner. Whether it is fair use depends on the specifics of the case. From the tweet, we simply don’t have enough information, however, at a guess, it is probably not fair use. Fair use in law is Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 17 U.S.C. § 106 and 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include: the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. Most people miss “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,” - if you aren’t doing one of those things then you start behind the 8-ball when yo move to the 4 factor test. Note that the “criticism, comment, news reporting,” etc. must be about the copyrighted work - I can’t use your copyrighted work to, for example, parody a politician unless you are that politician. Many people have completely the wrong idea about what copyright infringement and fair use actually are, in part because the use of music on YouTube is allowed, not because it’s fair use but, because YouTube was smart enough to negotiate and pay for a permissive licence with music producers. For a full explanation, see this video.

Go to the Source If you follow the Legal link at the bottom of the page and read the terms of service, among other things, it says (my emphasis): 1. Access to the Services Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Stack Exchange may offer to provide the Services, as described more fully on the Network, and which are selected by Subscriber, solely for Subscriber’s own use, and not for the use or benefit of any third party. ... Subscriber certifies to Stack Exchange that Subscriber is an individual (i.e., not a corporate entity) at least 13 years of age. ... 2. Network Content ... The Network is protected by copyright as a collective work and/or compilation, pursuant to U.S. copyright laws, international conventions, and other copyright laws. Other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement, Subscriber may not copy, modify, publish, transmit, upload, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in this Section), create derivative works based on, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content, software, materials, or Services in whole or in part. Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. From time to time, Stack Exchange may make available compilations of all the Subscriber Content on the Network (the “Creative Commons Data Dump”). The Creative Commons Data Dump is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. By downloading The Creative Commons Data Dump, You agree to be bound by the terms of that license. Any other downloading, copying, or storing any Content for other than personal, noncommercial use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from Stack Exchange, or from the copyright holder identified in such Content's copyright notice. In the event You download software from the Network, the software, including any files, images incorporated in or generated by the software, and the data accompanying the software (collectively, the “Software”) is licensed to You by Stack Exchange or third party licensors for Your personal, noncommercial use, and no title to the Software shall be transferred to You. Stack Exchange or third party licensors retain full and complete title to the Software and all intellectual property rights therein. 3. Subscriber Content You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. ... Consequences Under Clause 1 Subscribers to Stack Exchange must be individuals (natural persons in legalese). The proprietor of LearnHub.org are unlikely to be an individual and are therefore not a Subscriber under the terms of use. Under Clause 2, everything on Stack Exchange is copyright and some things are trade marked as well. The copyright for posts vests in the Subscriber and is licenced to SE (CC BY-SA 3.0) or vests in SE directly as the creator. Clause 8.1a. of CC BY-SA 3.0 requires SE to grant a licence to any recipient of a distribution (e.g. on a web site) on the same terms. For this reason the limitations on the copyright in Clause 2 can only apply to those items where copyright vests in SE directly; not to the content of the Subscriber posts. Assuming that it is only Subscriber posts that they are reproducing then they either need to: Comply with CC BY-SA 3.0 and attribute the work as required by that licence; what they have put up does not on the face of it do that because: They are referring to an earlier version of the licence Attribution under 3.0 is detailed in Clause 4.c. and this doesn't meet the criteria. Have been licenced by the original copyright holder; which seems unlikely. Meet the fair use criteria; attribution would not be required but would certainly be polite. Fair use turns on the specific facts of the case - on the face of it they could put forward a credible argument that their use is fair use. Complications Jurisdiction matters here; copyright laws are not uniform across the world. For example, Australian copyright has a much more limited "fair use" concept than the US and also creates a "moral copyright" of the author that exists independently of the copyright of the owner. For signatories to the Berne Convention; the country of origin for simultaneously published works (which online posting is) and therefore the law applying is the country that gives the shortest term of protection. The convention is annoyingly silent of what that means if there is more than one qualifying "Country of Origin"; this leaves scope for litigants to try to apply the most favourable domestic law that could be applicable and the case could be brought in any of several jurisdictions. This is the stuff that makes lawyers rich!

Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.

The reason is 17 USC 106: the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following... (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work The original picture is the underlying protected work. The ASCII reproduction is a derivative work. If you get permission to make the derivative work, it is okay. Otherwise, it is copyright infringement. There is an escape clause, "fair use", which amounts to taking a chance that you won't be sued and then arguing that you didn't do them any prohibited harm. If you make any money off of the game, you have a major strike against you. I suggest reading the fair use FAQ; basically, it is really hard to know how a fair use defense will fare, but based on prior cases, I'd say it's infringement, not fair use.

You may have issues if you take their content wholesale. Even if they freely distribute them, they still retain copyright. As such, they absolutely can claim copyright. Whether they will or not is another question. Your best bet around this is Fair Use doctrine. You can take a part of their work (e.g: a single question) and do your video based on how you work out your answer, with your video mainly focusing on the 'working out' part (thus satisfying the 'educational purposes' part)

are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.

The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.

What is the origin and history of the term "grand theft auto"? This comes from an English Language Lerner's Stack Exchange question, the current answers to which are lacking in historical/legal analysis of the term. What is the origin of the legal phrase "grand theft auto"? In particular, is there any legal or historical rationale for the ordering of the terms? (E.g. why isn't it "grand theft of auto" or "auto grand theft" or even "grand auto theft".) There are some claims that it's simply an elision of a comma ("grand theft, auto") implying that it's a simplification of something like an entry in an (alphabetized) list of crimes. Others have indicated that there might be some Law French or Latin influence in putting the descriptor last (along the lines of "courts martial"). Are either of these accurate with the historical origin of the term, or is there some other reason?

"Grand theft, auto" is specific crime in some jurisdictions. It's not a universal legal phrase. Furthermore, it is a slang expression like "Murder One." I doubt any jurisdiction has a crime of "Grand theft, auto." It might be "Grand theft, automobile." "Theft" or "larceny" is a common law crime. "Grand theft" (or "Grand Larceny") is statutory crime that usually imposes a higher penalty for the theft of a higher value item(s). Not all jurisdictions even have "grand theft." The taking of an automobile may be defined as a simple larceny or it may be defined as a separate crime of auto theft. In New Jersey (a model penal code state), automobile theft is just theft with different penalties or the separate crime of joyriding. Penal codes are normally arranged with in taxonomy structure. Typically it would like something like: Property Crimes Theft Grand Theft auto going from general to specific. In New York, there are "Theft crimes" (with robbery and larceny being types of theft).The taking of an automobile is just a larceny. However, over $1,000 in value makes it a grand larceny. The bottom line is "Grand theft, auto" is a slang term that refers to the statutory crime of grand theft where there are specific provisions for the theft of an automobile.

Does this theory have any basis in current or historical fact? Not really. The sovereign citizen movement uses legal terms, but not correctly, and often confounded with Biblical doctrine, and hones in on stylistic matters that are not legally material now and weren't legally material at any time historically, like capitalization rules (which, actually, were historically wildly inconsistent, see, e.g., an image of the original U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence). There was an era from roughly the mid-1800s to the early 1900s when the law was very hung up on the precise wording of deeds (e.g., a deed to "John" rather than to "John and his heirs, successors and assigns" created a life estate rather than transferring full ownership of land), or stating precisely the right things in a legal complaint to have a right to legal relief (when what was required to be stated was discernible only from legal authorities like decades of case law reports or legal treatises). But, while that was an era when technicalities and legal fictions that would seem to a layman to be similar to those of the sovereign citizen movement were important legally, none of the actual technicalities and legal fictions that were historically important in the law are actually utilized by the sovereign citizen movement. Instead, it makes up technicalities and legal fictions that never existed historically, in the service of a defiant, anti-government agenda in which it is easy to impose liability on others but hard to impose liability on adherents of the movement, while the historical technicalities and legal fictions served the opposite role - with a pro-government agenda in which it was hard for non-professionals utilizing red tape filled bureaucracies to impose liability on others but was easiest to do with regard to people who defied authority, like sovereign citizens. Likewise, there has never been any means by which individuals can evade liability for taxes, for criminal conduct, or for civil liability committed by them personally, then or now. The question restates the common misconception that: For example, a plumber may operate in the capacity of an LLC to avoid personal civil (though probably not criminal) liability for any mishaps that may happen while on the job. But, in fact, even with all of the modern limited liability entity formalities complied with, this isn't actually true. One can never have limited liability for work that one personally carries out. Limited liability only protects you from contractual liabilities and from vicarious liability for the acts of your agents and employees. And, doing so still does not insulate you from criminal liability for acts of your agents and employees for the most part due to RICO and solicitation and conspiracy offenses. One can never evade liability in the manner that the sovereign citizen movement suggests, even if one complies with actual legally recognized formalities.

united-states Names and short phrases are not subject to copyright protection. A list of such phrases is probably not protectable either. Game mechanics are not protectable either. While short phrases can be protected as trademarks, they can be so protected only if they are used to identify a product or service, or to advertise that product or service. Terms used within the game are not normally subject to trademark protection. Even if such a term did have trademark protection, using it within the game would not be using it "in commerce" or "in trade", that is to identify or market the game. A brand name, a slogan, or a logo are typical trademarks, the name of a thing within the product is not. In short, a list of character classes would not, in the US at least, infringe copyright or trademark protections on another game.

Probably Police like to solve crimes and going straight to a location where they know a stolen vehicle is seems like an easy win. However, there is no legal obligation for them to do so.

Illegal weapons Weapons are defined and are made illegal by statute. In many states, it is illegal to possess brass knuckles. For example, California penal code 12020(a)(1) makes it illegal to possess "any metal knuckles", "writing pen knife", "any leaded cane", among other things. I don't know of any state where it is illegal to pick up a stick, or keys, etc. So, yes, there is a legal distinction between your four scenarios. The mechanic is committing a crime by merely possessing the brass knuckles. The others are not committing a crime by the mere possession of the things you mention (unless there are states where they've been made illegal). Effect on a self-defense analysis Courts would have the jury go through the same self-defense analysis in each of these cases, regardless of the legality of the weapon used. We've described that analysis here. A pure self-defense analysis does not factor in the legality of the weapon that is used. But, if the weapon has been made illegal because of its disproportionate ability to injure, etc. that might weigh against the reasonableness of the force that was used when choosing to use that weapon in self-defense. Possession of an illegal weapon might also weigh against the credibility of the owner of that illegal weapon.

To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.

A contract can’t legalise illegality Let’s assume that absent the “simulation” disclosure in the ToS, this would be fraud. The question then becomes, does making the disclosure make it not fraud? Fraud requires dishonesty and deception. These are measured by what a reasonable person would determine from the overall conduct so a small piece of truth in amongst a web of half-truths and outright lies is still dishonest and deceptive. From the perspective of US law, is Bob doing this regarded a scam? No, but only because “scam” isn’t a legal term - it’s slang for fraud and this is fraud Is this a criminal case, or a civil case? Both What evidence can Tom provide to support the lawsuit? Whatever he has. However, in practice, these types of fraudsters are rarely ever caught and it’s even more rare for the victim to recover their money. They are usually off-shore in countries with either poor rule of law or which will not extradite their nationals.

I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; "indemnity" is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.

Is it legal for the military to shoot down a plane that is going to crash? In a few cases pilots have been rendered unconcious or killed and their planes have flown on as 'ghost' planes. So imagining a situation where the pilots of an airliner suddenly die and the passengers are unable to break their way into the cockpit, but this plane is on a direct collision course for a major place like Times Square or the Whitehouse. Is it possible for the military to legally shoot down a plane over a rural area before it reaches a location where it will kill possibly hundreds?

Unequivocally yes. An Australian judgement asserted this by (happily) adopting the reasoning of the US courts: The matter also came up for discussion in the Communist Party case where Justice Dixon adopted the U.S. view that: ... it is within the necessary power of the Federal government to protect its own existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities. And to this end, it may provide for the punishment of treason, the suppression of insurrection or rebellion and for the putting-down of all individual or concerted attempts to obstruct or interfere with the discharge of the proper business of government ... A plane (or ship, or train etc.) that is not responding to hails and acting to put citizens at risk is a legitimate target of military force. It doesn't matter if it is acting that way because of a deliberate decision of its controllers (e.g. terrorists), because it's not under control or because it's controllers are idiots.

It could probably be argued that a bullet intentionally shot from a gun is abandoned property, and thus the shooter has no claim to its return. In addition, such a bullet might be evidence of a crime, to be seized by law enforcement, although that would not affect its ultimate ownership, at least not in the US. Intent matters in such cases. A person who shoots a gun probably does not reasonably expect to retain possession and control of the bullet, whatever may have been shot at. Well, someone shooting at a properly controlled target for practice on his or her own property probably retains ownership of the bullet.

You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.

Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.

You are not reading a law book here and you should not interpret a driving test so literally. It's quite clear that the question implies you should follow all of their instructions regarding how to proceed through traffic. Sometimes those instructions do involve "breaking laws" such as driving on the wrong side of the road or proceeding through a traffic signal that was not turned off. The B option clearly does not mean they have the power to disobey all laws in existence, only those concerning traffic as evidenced by the examples given. You are not Sheldon Cooper and you should know how to interpret a vague question correctly. You are also not a gopher, and you can correctly deduce that crashing into another car or driving off the cliff into the water is not in your best interests, and that calling the police to report someone abusing their position is probably a good idea. If you're concerned by the wording, try contacting the California DMV to have them clarify the wording.

18 USC 32(a) says Whoever willfully— (1) sets fire to, damages, destroys, disables, or wrecks any aircraft in the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States or any civil aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both 18 USC 31(1) defines "aircraft": The term “aircraft” means a civil, military, or public contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, fly, or travel in the air. A personal private drone is not public or military, but it is "civil". In the definitions (b), it also says: In this chapter, the terms “aircraft engine”, “air navigation facility”, “appliance”, “civil aircraft”, “foreign air commerce”, “interstate air commerce”, “landing area”, “overseas air commerce”, “propeller”, “spare part”, and “special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States” have the meanings given those terms in sections > 40102(a) and 46501 of title 49. The Title 49 definition (16) say “civil aircraft” means an aircraft except a public aircraft. So on that count alone, it is illegal, a federal crime. On a second count, it is illegal: it would count as destruction of property. In Washington under RCW 9A.48.070 it is a Class B felony: (1) A person is guilty of malicious mischief in the first degree if he or she knowingly and maliciously... (c) Causes an impairment of the safety, efficiency, or operation of an aircraft by physically damaging or tampering with the aircraft or aircraft equipment, fuel, lubricant, or parts. The exact details depend on what state this happens in. FAA restrictions for drones is that they should be flown below 400 ft, specifically §107.51 says A remote pilot in command and the person manipulating the flight controls of the small unmanned aircraft system must comply with all of the following operating limitations when operating a small unmanned aircraft system... (b) The altitude of the small unmanned aircraft cannot be higher than 400 feet above ground level, unless the small unmanned aircraft: (1) Is flown within a 400-foot radius of a structure; and (2) Does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit. If the drone is actually trying to hit you, you can avail yourself of the defense of self-defense, but that is not available if you simply dislike it that someone flies too high over your property. There is no specific minimum distance from the aircraft and the ground, but the operator must fly the thing safely, and not above people. And finally, apart from the criminal aspects of shooting a drone out of the sky, you can also be sued for property damage, and is thus illegal. That said, in light of Boggs v. Meredith, this does not mean you will get anywhere if you sue the gunner for blasting your plane, at least if your venue is the western district federal court in Kentucky. You can sue in state court for trespass to chattels, and the FCC could (but did not) seek an action against the offender for blasting a plane out of the sky, but there is a narrow path for suing in federal court. The district court found that the plane-owner stepped off the path (the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). A state court could decide whether the airspace in question is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the US.

So each government has jurisdiction of the crime if and only if it occurs within their borders. In addition, the Federal Government can take a crack at any crime any where in the United States, though typically they only do so if the crime involves crossing state lines (kidnapping over state lines, ect). At the maximum, suppose for arguments sake Alice fatally shoots Bob while Bob is standing at dead center of the Four Corners Monument (the only place in the United States where four states meet). This means that one act of Murder has been committed in four seperate states, so Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona can all claim jurisdiction over the case and each prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder. Additionally, the Federal Government may step in and also prosecute Alice for First Degree Murder (though they are more likely not too. The Feds rarely prosecute crimes after the State UNLESS the State did something horribly wrong... I.E. Utah let her go because Utah is crazy). Additionally, the monument marks the dividing line between the Navajo Nation and the Ute Tribe, both semi-autonomous Native American Tribes that have their own recognized court systems, so they could conceivably charge Alice with First Degree Murder. So in total, the most amount of times someone can be charged for the same crime due to cross-jurisdiction is 7 times (Four States, 2 Tribal Governments, and one Federal Government). In likely hood, a few of these guys will pass because it's a waste of effort. If Alice gets the death penalty in Arizona, Colorado can't kill her a second time. It's important to note that each government gets exactly one trial so Alice can't be convicted twice in Arizona. A more realistic example occurred in the D.C. Beltway Sniper Case, where the perpetrators were tried in both Virginia and Maryland but only for the crimes committed within those states. VA got first crack because they had (and eventually carried out) the Death Penalty. Maryland tried both for insurance in case the VA cases got thrown out for reasons. The Feds found this satisfying and decided not to press their charges.

The U.K. Civil Aviation Authority provides information about making noise complaints to the relevant airport. It also notes that your local planning authority can provide more information about operating hours and noise restrictions. You could also ask at Aviation Stack Exchange for more information about identifying the aircraft and owner. This is also a political issue that Parliament attends to from time to time, so you can talk to your MP about it: Research Briefing: Aviation Noise (2017) Independent Commission on Civil Aviation Noise (2021) At common-law, there might have been causes of action available in trespass, nuisance, or public nuisance, but the Civil Aviation Act 1982 says that "[n]o action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect of nuisance" as long as aviation regulations and orders are complied with.

Software licensing: how to handle a client with outsourced IT supplier? I work for a software supplier that licenses commercial software to clients. The license has various conditions - don't copy it, only use it for licensed purposes, etc. A lawyer has reviewed the agreement and identified a risk where a client has an outsourced IT provider. In this case, the software would be running on computers owned by the IT provider. Potentially the IT provider could copy the software. However, they are not signatories of the license agreement, so it would be more difficult to enforce against them. The lawyer has suggested making it a tripartite agreement (software supplier, customer, IT provider). This would fix the issue, but introduces other complexity. This must be an extremely common issue for commercial software. What other approaches can be used to deal with outsourced IT providers? Jurisdiction is England & Wales, but interested in general approaches.

There are two common approaches. The first approach is simply to let copyright law apply. Under the default terms, the IT provider has no rights to copy your software. Running software is allowed, of course, and not a problem that you need to deal with vis-a-vis the IT provider. You still can sue them if they copy your software, even in the absence of a contract. That is the chief function of copyright, after all! The second approach is to allow the customer to subcontract third parties to act on behalf of them, while acknowledging that such subcontracting does not dissolve them from any responsibilities towards you. In other words, if the 3rd party would do something unauthorized, you have a claim towards the customer and they have a distinct but related claim towards their IT supplier.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

Your GPL example detracts from the question: see this recent answer. Setting aside GPL-specific conditions, the legal underpinning of software licensing is copyright law, whereby copying source code or an executable is only allowed with the permission of the copyright holder. There are two partial exceptions: "fair use" (generally not relevant to software), and a specific statutory permission to copy software in particular ways (making a backup, plus the act of executing software which requires copying from disk to memory). The latter permission only applies if you have legally acquired a copy of the software. Which explains why nobody sells copies of software, they sell a license to use software (a subtle, legalistic distinction, which is essential to modern software qua business). The terms of the license say what you may and may not do: if you violate the terms, you do not have permission to copy the software, and are liable for copyright infringement. One limit on the terms is that they cannot take away a right that you already have by copyright law (e.g. "fair use" cannot be negated by a license term). Another limit is that the terms have to be consistent with contract law, hence the license cannot include a human centipede obligation – or, "all your stuff belong to us". When a contract is ambiguous, the ambiguity is construed against the writer, and that is also so with software licenses. Also like the situation with contracts, the terms have to be legal, that is, cannot deny some right or requirement encoded in law. There is a legal requirement that disclaimers have to be "prominent", and that holds of license terms. As for "tricking" a person, that's not supposed to happen, with a proper license. If you put stuff out there and say nothing, nobody has been given permission to copy the item. You can make it available to a specific named person, but that is limited to one person, thus a license includes language allowing anyone to copy, but also requiring that the license be retained with any subsequent copies. Hence B copies from A, and sees the license; B may share with C (assuming a decent license) but must include that or substantially equivalent license; and so on. A problem arises if B redistributes without original license, substituting a bogus license. When C copies, that copying is not done with the permission (implied or express) of A, and C could be open to legal consequences. B is also clearly open to consequences, since re-distribution with the self-perpetuating license is a violation of the terms of A's condition grant of permission. Ignorance of the true ownership of copyright is no excuse, and there is no general innocent-infringement exception to copyright law in the US. However, the part of copyright law that talks about remedies for infringement, 17 USC 504(b)(2) lessens the burden on the innocent infringer: In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Still, not zero. I don't see how adding some NOPs would make it impossible to prove that you have a copy of someone else's IP. Perhaps it's not a trivial, but still quite possible.

Licencing agreements The company producing these has successfully negotiated a licencing agreement with the IP holder to use the IP. These are extremely common. Subcontracting They have actually been commissioned by the IP holder to make these things for the IP holder e.g. for the IP holder to sell in their own outlets. As part of that agreement, they are also allowed to sell on their own behalf. Piracy They are breaking the law and hope they will be undetected, not worth prosecuting or operate out of pirate jurisdictions which will not enforce foreign judgements.

Unless you have a legally valid IP right related to the specification that statement is meaningless. When a software license is granted it is based on the copyright of the code. The copyright of the spec. just stops people from copying the spec - it does not protect the information in it. You can restrict copying of the spec. under copyright, you can make up a name for the spec (like USB or Bluetooth) and get a trademark and only allow the trademark use in limited cases(doesn’t stop implementation of the spec), or get a patent that would be necessarily infringed if something complying with the spec was created and used, sold, made, etc. or you can keep it secret and only show it to people who contractually agreed with your terms.

You can replace the software on the device The supplier does not have to help you to do so You are correct that because you own the device, you can do what you like with it. That means you can install whatever firmware or other software on it that you like. However, the supplier does not have to provide this to you or assist you in any other way.

Unfortunately the answer is a vague "it depends." Commercial versus non-commercial is not clearly defined in actual law, and is usually up to the specific license to define what it considers to be commercial use. If you were putting them on your business cards, then it's just being used for advertising and whether it's commercial use is a bit controversial. If the license explicitly prohibits the use of the work in advertising, then the license should explicitly mention that and should not rely on the term "commercial use" to cover or protect it. Creative Commons ran an excellent study on commercial versus noncommercial use back in 2009: Defining “Noncommercial” - A Study of How the Online Population Understands “Noncommercial Use” In the United States, for example, the Copyright Act does not define a copyright owner’s rights in terms of commercial or noncommercial use. Instead, copyright law sometimes attaches legal significance to whether a use is “commercial” or “noncommercial” or whether a user is deemed to be a commercial or noncommercial entity, However, rarely are the terms defined, and the law offers no specific guidance on how to differentiate between commercial and noncommercial uses or users of copyrighted works. If you were putting them on a business card you were making for the client, then that would be more clearly identified as commercial use because you're using it in something you are selling for a profit. What your client will be using them for is not relevant, because you're the one selling them to the client and you need to have the right to be able to do that.

If Client was foolish enough to pay Bad Contractor (BC) without obtaining a proper assignment of copyright in the source, or at least a sufficient license to allow Client to use the code and create modified versions, then BC owns the copyright to the source, and anyone who creates a modified version without permission from BC is a copyright infringer. The contract under which BC was hired should spell out what rights Client is to acquire, and when they will pass to client's ownership, but it might be that Client didn't get such terms into the contract. Or perhaps BC disputes that Client has fulfilled all its obligations. Yes, an infringement claim could be brought against an individual employee, although it is more likely that it would be brought against the employer, or against Client. It could be brought jointly against all three: programmer, new contractor (NC), and Client. Of course, BC's IP rights only matter if BC files an infringement suit. And it might be that a court would find an implied contract, in line with industry practice and the fees that BC was paid, and toss out such a suit. But courts are often reluctant to create contracts that the parties never agreed to. It would be risky for NC to depend on such an outcome of a possible suit. If you or NC are to work on this, you might want to have a contract in which Client explicitly indemnifies you for any copyright claims by BC, saying that they will take on and pay for the defense of any copyright suit BC may bring, and pay any damages that may be awarded to BC. That would largely remove the risk for NC and for NC's employees.

Sputnik-era NSF-funded books: is this a license? In 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, which also had the unintended side effect of launching frantic attempts in the US to reform math and science education. A common pattern in these efforts was that the NSF encouraged university professors to drop their research work and spend a chunk of their lives writing textbooks. Usually there was some kind of three-way arrangement involving the NSF, the professor, and a publisher. Tax money flowed in from the NSF, and the publisher published the book. When the book came out, there was language on the copyright page stating that the materials were available to be adapted by all publishers. This was to encourage innovation and allow the materials to be freely improved by educators if the initial version didn't work well. Sometimes this public availability was after a fixed date, something like 5 years after initial publication. Some important and influential books of this kind are: The SMSG ("new math") books for K-12 (info, scans) The Berkeley Physics Course PSSC Physics (books and films) I have seen varying claims online about the legal status of these materials. For example, I've seen claims that the SMSG books were immediately placed into the "public domain" so that they could be freely adapted and experimented with by various educators. However, this SMSG book has a standard copyright page, with a copyright by Yale University Press, and no notice saying that it was freely available. The 1960 edition of PSSC Physics has a standard copyright page, but a later college-level book based on it has this additional notice: The materials taken from the original and second editions and the Advanced Topics of PSSC PHYSICS included in this text will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975. The book Electricity and Magnetism by Purcell from the Berkeley Physics Course has this: The preparation of this course was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to Educational Services Incorporated. In accordance with the National Science Foundation's policies concerning curriculum revision material developed under their auspices, McGraw-Hill Book Company, a division of McGraw-Hill, Inc., announces that the material in the Berkeley Physics Course, Vol. II ELECTRICITY AND MAGNETISM, which is copyrighted by Education Development Center (a successor by merger to Educational Services, Inc.) and published by McGaw-Hill Book Company in 1965, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970. Interested parties should address inquiries to the Managing Director, Educational Development Center, 55 Chapel Street, Newton, Massachusetts, 02160. Because the Purcell text is a classic, I did substantial work a few years ago on producing a free digital version. However, I belatedly began to wonder whether I was really on solid legal ground. I contacted EDC, which still exists but no longer owns the copyright. They sent me through a chain of contacts. It turns out that there is a third edition of the book from Cambridge University Press, and CUP is licensing the book from Purcell's sons. CUP wants to protect their commercial interest in the book and has refused to give me contact information for Purcell's sons. Is the language in the front of these books a license, or is it only the offer to negotiate a license? Is this different from the type of modern copyleft license we see on projects such as Wikipedia, where I don't specifically need to contact the copyright holder? I suppose a license is a type of contract, and modern copyleft licenses have all the elements that are needed in order to make them legal contracts. Is some such element missing from the notices in these books? The notice in the front of the Purcell book says, "In accordance with the National Science Foundation's policies concerning curriculum revision material developed under their auspices, [...]" This seems to imply that when these publishers took NSF money, they accepted an obligation to freely license the materials. Can they simply duck out of this obligation by selling the copyright to someone else, or is the copyright somehow encumbered by this obligation?

There is a subtle difference between NSF policy and enforceable obligation. The primary stick that goes with the carrot is being excluded from future funding. Current policy does not generally force material in the public domain, but it is a possibility in "exceptional circumstances". There no doubt is a paper record somewhere in D.C. indicating whether such a codicil was added to any of these grants. NSF generally does not have contracts with individuals, they have contracts with institutions who have relations (typically employer-employee) with individuals, so even if there were a policy requiring works to be put in the public domain, NSF would have to go after the institution, who would have to go after the author. Since that would conflict with longstanding NSF policy on copyright, it is unlikely that they would want to pursue such an approach. The statement that McGraw-Hill Book Company announces that the material, which is copyrighted, will be available for use by authors and publishers on a royalty-free basis on or after April 30, 1970 is not itself a license, it is a suggestion that a license will com into existence. A present-tense declaration "this work is dedicated to the public domain effective April 30, 1970" can be interpreted as a license effective of a date certain. Similarly, "will be available to all publishers for use in English after December 31, 1970, and in translations after December 31, 1975" does not say that it is in the public domain effective of some date. One might say that the copyright statement is simply not well written and the author really intended the books to be in the public domain as of those dates. But without compelling evidence that the book was actually released into the public domain, a court is very unlikely to abrogate a person's property rights.

...articles are never signed by authors. Is it then enough that the magazine itself is in the public domain? Absolutely not. Even though articles are not signed, they are still copyrighted at moment of being written by whoever wrote them, and upon publication by who the authors are writing for. That's basic copyright law; read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berne_Convention Further, the magazine's own Terms of Service outlines this: Intellectual Property The contents ... supplied to you in conjunction with the Site and/or a Digital Application (such contents, design and materials being collectively referred to as the "Economist Content"), is copyright of The Economist and its licensors. You may not use or reproduce ... for any reason without written permission from The Economist... http://www.economist.com/legal/terms-of-use

are there any safeguards you could take to preemptively block such behavior, such as a disclaimer inside the book cover that reads something like The safeguard you outline would be overridden as soon as the author enters any contract that requires assignment of copyright. (I would not delve in the differences between licensing and copyright assignment because that hypothetical author is dealing with a contract of adhesion which readily requires assignment; the author has no option to change the ToS to allow for licensing only) Under contract law, one of the essential prerequisites is that the conditions of a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. By deliberately clicking on a ToS page to move forward with the uploading a copyrighted work, the author is signaling his awareness and acceptance of the ToS. The fact that the author chose not to read the ToS is irrelevant and very unlikely to strike whatever entitlements the website owner formulated in the accepted ToS. For the same reason, the author's safeguard disclaimer does not bind the website owner: It cannot be said that the website owner was aware of that disclaimer at the time of the formation of contract between the author and the website owner. That is, the website owner did not knowingly and willfully accepted the author's safeguard. The website owner is not even expected to know about any safeguards which one of its potential user intends to establish. The length of a ToS document is also irrelevant because the website owner has the valid argument that "the user-author could have skimmed through the ToS or do a search (via Control-Find) of keywords such as 'copyright' or 'property', whence any allegation of 'inadvertent' assignment of copyright is untenable". Is there a way to protect your IP from inadvertently being licensed/stolen/assigned via TOS "agreements", without having to waste your life reading huge one-sided online "contracts" that are "subject to change without notice" anyway? Yes. That consists of not uploading one's works in such platforms. In contract law that would be expressed as "declining an exchange of considerations". There are many other alternatives for an author to promote his work without being required to assign copyright.

The case US v. Siesser is about such an attempt, where violation of 18 USC 229 was one of the charges (to which he pleaded guilty). It is a chemical weapon under the provisions of that chapter – it's not the chemical per se, it's the chemical when used for a purpose (like, killing people). Specifically A toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a purpose. You could buy it to calibrate NMR devices, I guess. There may be specific state regulations as well.

In the United States, I would strongly expect that an accurate depiction of historical fact (even if uncomfortably graphic) would be protected under the First Ammendment. Otherwise, the government could functionally censor the worst parts of history (as being too awful to discuss or depict), which is exactly the kind of thing the First Amendment is designed to prevent. There are three important categories of speech that are not protected: (1) "fighting words" directed at a person intended to provoke a fight, (2) words that infict emotional distress such that it qualifies as a tort, and (3) speech that court finds to qualify as "obscenity". Of these three, your game probably will not qualify for the first, since it generally requires speech directed at a specific person or people. I also suspect (less confidently) that an emotional-distress tort would not succeed since your game is not directed at any particular living people. Even if the game caused emotional distress to someone, your public release of the game probably could not qualify as a tort against that specific player who happens to experience emotional distress. The Miller test is used to determine if a work is obscenity. Wikipeida summarizes its three parts, all of which must be satisfied to constitute obscenity: Whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards", would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory functions specifically defined by applicable state law, Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The first two are explicitly sexual in nature. I don't know if there is any similar prohibition against hyper-violence, but even if there were, as long as your game does not run afoul of the "lacks serious artistic value" condition, you will be on the safe side of the line. Note that none of this stops anyone from initiating legal action against you (which may cause headaches for you); it only stops those legal actions from succeededing.

A GPS trace of a car's path, on its own, is unlikely to be covered by copyright in the first place. It is primarily made up of facts (the locations of roads and lanes), and there is no creativity involved in its creation. A database of facts may be protected by copyright as a compilation if there is some amount of creativity in how it is assembled, but this does not extend any protection to the individual contents of the database (cf. Feist v. Rural).

If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens.

Factual assumptions ohwilleke's answer is entirely correct. However, it makes factual assumptions based on the standard meaning of "journal" and "author", which I believe to be unwarranted. From the question, it seems likely that we are talking about a scientific paper, which operates under a very different economic and legal model. I am going to assume that: the authors sent a draft of the paper, the preprint, to the journal editor; the journal editor sent the draft to external experts (the reviewers); those reviewers, and possibly the editor, gave some feedback; the authors modified their draft based on that feedback to produce the final version; throughout all this, the authors, editor and reviewers agreed with the journal’s policies; the journal policies require a transfer of copyright to the publisher, a legal entity that "owns" large number of journals and provides some technical services (article typesetting, maintenance of a web site with the journal contents, maintenance of DOIs, etc.); neither the authors, nor the editor, nor the reviewers received monetary compensation for their work (this is a key economic difference from non-academic journals, but as we shall see, it has little legal effect) In theory, all depends on the copyright release agreement When the author(s) submit a draft to a journal, they have to click through an agreement to release copyright. Such a clause could, in theory, be anything the authors and the publisher agreed that does not violate contract law. In practice, because the publishers are a small oligopoly, the agreements are more or less standardized. The "sample publishing agreement" given as example at https://www.elsevier.com/about/policies/copyright (as downloaded on March 2, 2023) is more or less representative: I hereby assign to the Copyright Owner the copyright in the manuscript identified above (where Crown Copyright is asserted, authors agree to grant an exclusive publishing and distribution license) and any tables, illustrations or other material submitted for publication as part of the manuscript (the “Article”). This assignment of rights means that I have granted to the Copyright Owner the exclusive right to publish and reproduce the Article, or any part of the Article, in print, electronic and all other media (whether now known or later developed), in any form, in all languages, throughout the world, for the full term of copyright, and the right to license others to do the same, effective when the Article is accepted for publication. This includes the right to enforce the rights granted hereunder against third parties. The authors are the sole intellectual contributors to the preprint version, but a copyright release agreement could still bar them from publishing it. The vast majority of agreements between novel authors and publishing houses forbid the author from selling the book rights to another publisher or posting drafts of the novel on the author’s website (two actions that would result in greatly diminished sales for the publisher). The published version incorporate revisions where the reviewers and possibly the editor contributed significant intellectual contributions. Again, all depends on the copyright agreement - the publisher terms could in theory require that the reviewers and editors release their contribution under an irrevocable license to the authors. In practice, all goes to the publisher. The financial structure is irrelevant The fact that authors (and reviewers, and editors) are not paid by the publisher is irrelevant. Yes, a contract (in common-law countries) requires consideration from both sides; however, consideration needs not be monetary. There is not much doubt that publication of an article is "consideration", at the very least because that is considered prestigious among a significant fraction of the population. In addition, there is ample evidence that funding agencies and university HR staff evaluate and promote scientists based primarily on the papers they publish in scientific journals. In practice, preprint rules are lax The vast majority of academic publishers allow authors to publish the preprint version although conditions vary (only the preprint, only on a personal website, only for a limited time, only after some embargo period, only if you cite the final article with the correct DOI, etc.). I would speculate that this is the result of cultural pressure. Many academics decided to post their articles (sometimes the preprint before sumbission, sometimes the published version) on the internet without much regard to pesky questions of copyright law, because they viewed publishers as gatekeeping greedy monopolistic parasites. The publishers decided to embrace the practice in order to be able to put some limits on it, rather than try to mass-fire lawsuits against the people who provided them with free labor. Regardless of whether that speculation is correct, the current arrangement is not the inevitable result of legal rules, and publishers could conceivably decide to change their preprint sharing policies at any moment. Limitations to the copyright of research papers This section is quite obviously not exhaustive, but given that the original question does not specify a jurisdiction, I did not search beyond what I already know. In the united-states, works produced by employees of the federal government as part of their work duties are generally public domain (17 U.S. Code § 105; do note that subsection (b) means certain works produced by certain institutions still are under copyright). Hence, if the authors were both researchers at a federal research institution, the preprint is public domain and can be republished irrespective of the publisher’s will. (I am led to believe, however, that most US researchers are not employees of the federal governments, but rather of private or state universities.) In europe, as a result of public pressure against publishers (see "greedy monopolistic parasites", above), the European Commission published non-binding guidelines (2012/417/EU) asking that there should be open access to publications resulting from publicly funded research as soon as possible, preferably immediately and in any case no later than 6 months after the date of publication, and 12 months for social sciences and humanities That (non-binding) recommendation has been adopted with varying adaptations in various EU countries. The exact implementation in a given country should be checked before relying on it. For instance, in France, article L533-4 du code de la Recherche allows authors (after the six or twelve months embargo period) to post the published version (not just the preprint), irrespective of what what signed with the publisher, as long as at least half of the funding for the research came from public funds. I will assume neither of those apply. The copyright owner is likely still around Academic journals are born and die regularly. However, academic publishers rarely do (Elsevier is almost 150 years old). As ohwilleke says, the copyright release contract signed 40 years ago is likely still valid; even if the publisher folded, it would apply to the publisher’s legal successor. (The question of how legal rights are liquidated in a bankruptcy would be an interesting question that I am not competent to answer; it is plausible that under certain circumstances the contract would be dissolved.) If the authors can access the copyright release they signed back when they submitted the article, you might be able to determine that posting the preprint or the final article is acceptable. (I realize that this is a fairly ludicrous hypothetical, given that the paper was published 40 years ago.) Otherwise, it is extremely likely that the publisher would be able to sue, even if the publication occurs with the authors’ full support. Whether they are likely to do so, and whether publishing anyway is ethical, are of course non-legal questions.

Can someone be convicted with an unwarranted surveillance video? If I were to place recording equipment within someone's home without their consent or a warrant, completely on my own accord and unsanctioned, would I be committing a crime? If I were to record someone committing a crime such as murder or assault with that equipment, would I be able to use that as evidence in court to convict the perpetrator of such wrongdoings?

There is no common law offence of electronically recording a private place/activity, but many jurisdictions have legislation that makes it an offence: e.g. Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic), s 7. Whether evidence collected through illegal surveillance is admissible will depend on the legislation in each jurisdiction. For example, in Victoria, such evidence is inadmissible unless the court decides that admitting the evidence is sufficiently desirable: Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 138. This discretion reflects 'the fundamental dilemma... between the public interest in admitting reliable evidence (and thereby convicting the guilty) and the public interest in vindicating individual rights and deterring misconduct and maintaining the legitimacy of the judicial system': Australian Law Reform Commission (2006) 'Uniform Evidence Law', [16.84].

There is no way to know for absolute sure. The statutes do not address the question, so one would look at the case law. There appear to be about a dozen wiretapping cases that made it to the court of appeals in Maryland, and none of them involve implied consent (e.g. where it is announced prior to recording that the call may or will be recorded – prior is mandatory). The probability is high that implied consent suffices, since the legislature did not specific require express consent and consent is not generally taken to mean express consent. One can and should hire an attorney who will give you a professional and considered (but not infallible) opinion, if it really matters.

Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?

As far as I know, every jurisdiction in America limits perjury to cases of lying under oath. Because it seems unlikely that the driver would be under oath at this point, you would probably lack probable cause to make an arrest. At the same time, many states have separate laws addressing the making of false reports, lying to an officer, etc. I'd imagine most jurisdictions would have a law supporting an arrest for lying at the scene, even if not for perjury.

There are no such laws that are specific to rape, but there are general laws about false statements. In every state there is some law against making a false statement to a government official, e.g. Washington RCW 9A.76.175 which says that one who "knowingly makes a false or misleading material statement to a public servant is guilty of a gross misdemeanor". To shift context slightly, if you report to the police that Smith stole your lawn mower when in fact you gave it to him, that is a false statement. However, there would have to be clear proof that you lied in your report, and not that there was a misunderstanding. If Smith stole the mower but the evidence did not support a theft conviction, that does not mean that you can be prosecuted for making a false statement (whereas, if someone has a video of you telling Smith "Here's a mower, which I give to you because I like you", then you could almost be prosecuted for making a false statement, were it not for the fact that the video is illegal in Washington). Perjury is the other related crime: RCW 9A.72.020 "a materially false statement which he or she knows to be false under an oath required or authorized by law". [Addendum] About the video of the mower being given away... Washington is an all-party consent state, meaning that you can't just record people, you have to have their permission (everybody's permission). RCW 9.73.050 says that information obtained by illegal recording shall be inadmissible in any civil or criminal case in all courts of general or limited jurisdiction in this state, except with the permission of the person whose rights have been violated in an action brought for damages under the provisions of RCW 9.73.030 through 9.73.080 which is to say, "unless the person(s) who did not give permission to be recorded now give permission for the evidence to be admitted". Since "you" would be the one making a false statement, "you" would have an interest in suppressing the video, thus "you" could withhold permission for the video to be introduced.

Recording other people without consent is a crime (§ 201 StGB). But so is threatening other people with violence (§ 241 StGB). Secret recordings and other acts can still be legitimate if they are necessary and appropriate to deflect harm (§ 34 StGB), similar to how hurting someone can be legitimate if you're acting in self-defense. If you're prosecuted for this, it will be up to the court to determine if your act was necessary and proportionate. But regardless of what you did, your recording can be used as evidence against the ex-roommate. German criminal law does not generally exclude illegally acquired evidence. The main risk of disclosing this recording is that you are also providing evidence against yourself for possible wiretapping charges (which may or may not be punishable as discussed above).

united-states In the US, the default rule is that your home is your castle. In general, nobody, not even the police, can enter your home without your permission. The main exception to this rule is that police do not need your permission if they have a search warrant to search your home. To get a warrant, the police must convince a magistrate that they have good reason (ie, "probable cause"), such as a gps track, to believe they will find evidence of a crime if they search the house. The police in your hypothetical are in a similar situation to police who are tracking the gps signal from a "bait car/bike/phone/tablet/package." (A bait car is a car/etc that has been fitted with a camera and gps tracker, and left out as bait for thieves.) As long as the car is in public view, the police do not need a warrant to search it and arrest the person driving it. However, once the bait car is out of public view, where the police can no longer see it, they need a warrant to go in and recover it, even if they can see it on the tracker. (See, for example, the instructions for bait car programs from the Eugene and Reno Police Departments.) (For phones, which may not be in "plain view" even if the thief is, the police use ring programs to make the phone ring. Hearing a phone respond to a ring program gives them probable cause under the "hearing" version of the "plain view" doctrine.) Bottom line: In the US, the police need a search warrant. Since search warrants take time and effort, police may be unwilling to get a warrant for something as low valued as a phone. If the police can't or won't help, there are various options for privately enforcing one's rights. These range from the legal -- knocking on the door and confronting the thief -- to the illegal -- left to your imagination.

It's really the other way around: film crews can legally travel with the police. This is very similar or identical to what you saw on YouTube. From http://blogs.findlaw.com/celebrity_justice/2014/04/cops-and-suspects-rights-whatcha-gonna-do-when-they-record-you.html (dated 4/18/2014) "Cops" will soon begin a 10-week filming stretch in San Jose, California, for the first time in the show's 26-year history, reports the San Jose Mercury News. The "Cops" crew will hit the streets alongside San Jose's finest to provide a window into what these men and women do in America's 10th largest city. More from that link: When the officers on "Cops" arrest most of their suspects, the circumstances leading up to the arrest are out in public. However, in order to avoid unlawfully appropriating the images of those caught on "Cops'" cameras, the crew asks the arrestees to sign a release form. The "news crew" are producers who have permission from the police to follow along. As above, they ask each suspect to sign a release after the arrest. These arrests take place in public, on public streets and right-aways, where filming of the public is legal. If the arrestee does not sign the release, their face is blurred in the resulting footage that is made public. This does not mean the producers or videographers are automatically allowed into a private residence. They need a release to go onto private property (unlike the police involved in an investigation) and as such, the resident can actually forbid the cameramen from entering the house even while the police have entered. The footage from the body cams of the police are a different story; they are public employees of the local government and are bound by the laws of the locality. A search of Google News shows that in San Fransisco, the issues of the use of body cams by police and public access to that video is an ongoing issue; some laws have been finalized, others are bound to change. Around the US, some localities at this point in time allow public access to the footage from police cams; others only after department or local governmental review; still others only on in as need basis for prosecutions. ...the cop is the only one in this situation who can command the filmers to stop. Even if the "news crew" is not a news crew and just someone from the general public, it is generally legal for the public to film the police, as long as they are not causing issues with the police and stay out of the way (re: all of the recent news regarding police shootings and the footage available on YouTube and in news sources). There is case law pertaining to that, but IANAL, so I'll let someone else outline that. But https://photographyisnotacrime.com/ is a good resource. In the US, you pretty much have no expectation of privacy while in public.

Is there any mechanism to enforce judicial recusal? Is there any mechanism to force a judge to recuse him/herself from a case? (I mean above and beyond filing a motion and leaving the decision to the judge him/herself to decide?) For example, Justice Ginsberg recently commented on the U.S. presidential election by taking a favorable position for one leading candidate and against another. If a case were to come before the Supreme Court (à la Bush v. Gore) with the potential to determine the outcome of the election, is there a mechanism by which Chief Justice Roberts (or any subset of the justice panel or any other body, like congress) could force Justice Ginsburg to recuse herself from the case? Or could she unilaterally make the decision to stay on as a potential swing vote? Even if there is no legal mechanism for an ex parte recusal, I'm curious what the legal ethics of this situation are also.

The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.

The court clerk was right. A judge is not supposed to interact with a party (at least not in the absence of the adversary) except during court hearings for which the adversary was notified and given an opportunity to attend. Also, there is no need for you to prove the mere fact that you went to court. That in itself is either inconsequential or palpable from the hearing transcripts. When you file in court papers such as a motion or a response to a motion, you may --and should-- bring an extra copy for the clerk to stamp it. That a clerk does with no objections. The stamp reflects the date on which you file your document(s). That stamp incidentally evidences that you or someone on your behalf went to court but, again, that sole fact is inconsequential. There is no such thing as "motion to appeal". A litigant may initiate an appeal, or appellate process, once the judge has decided a case in its entirety or in part. If the ruling to be appealed does not close the case, the upper court might refuse to review the issue(s) appealed until the whole case has been decided (that refusal is known as denial of the appellant's leave to appeal). Your description nowhere indicates that the judge has already made any rulings or that there have been any hearings on your matter. Your mention of prior motions suggests that you should gain acquaintance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and of Appellate Procedure. Those rules cover several aspects of litigation, including motion practice, the allowed methods of service, and the requirements to file an appeal in upper courts.

The question somewhat misstates the concept of estoppel in a legal sense. Estoppel does not mean that one is prevented from changing one's opinion. Estoppel means that when one gives a third party cause to rely on one's position, by word or conduct, one cannot then adopt an altered position and use it to legally attack that third party. For example, if one has invited a person onto one's land, one cannot turn around and sue them for trespass. In the case in the question, the Board hired counsel to give them an opinion, which was given. Two years later, a contrary opinion was offered, along with a recommendation for action, which was not followed. No third party was induced to rely on either opinion to its detriment. No estoppel seems relevant. And by the way estoppel is an equitable defense that would be raised by the third party, not unlike the defense of "clean hands". If the board acted on the first advice to its detriment, and thinks that their counsel was negligent in not having gotten the advice correct the first time, they might possibly have a case for legal malpractice, but only if they can get experts (other lawyers) to say that their counsel was in fact negligent , and also prove that this did in fact harm them. If they didn't act on the advice, harms seems less likely, although the details would matter a lot.

First, there are many versions of Robert's Rules of Order: here is an early free version. §26(c) suggests a procedure for creation of a committee to draft resolutions, and §53 contemplates other (standing) committees. Nothing therein suggests that there are restrictions on the right of a member to vote, in terms of a mandatory adjournment. However, RRO is not a Universal Organizational Bylaws, so in order to have any force, it must be adopted as part of the bylaws (in whole or part). It especially cannot dictate who is eligible to vote – that is a detail that has to be in the organization's bylaws.

The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to "make a case". The "court of public opinion" may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.

First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.

Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.

With regard to subpoenas, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Trump v. Vance makes it clear that states can issue subpoenas to sitting presidents. (The case in question involved a subpoena to a third party for the president's records, not to the president himself, but the opinion makes it clear that the court would apply the same reasoning in either situation.) The questions of what actions a state may take to enforce such a subpoena if it is not complied with, or of arrest / indictment / trial by a state, have never arisen and thus have not been resolved by courts.

Does "personal, noncommercial use" preclude use of Pokemon GO "Lure Modules" to attract players to non-commercial events? I represent a local denomination that is actively trying to get people to learn about our church by attending a church service. To help accomplish this, I would like to place a "Lure Module" near my church building. (A "Lure Module" attracts uncaught Pokemon and, in turn, players) However, the app's Terms of Service state: Niantic grants you a limited nonexclusive, nontransferable, non-sublicensable license to download and install a copy of the App on a mobile device and to run such copy of the App solely for your own **personal**, noncommercial purposes. Likewise, another section says: Subject to your compliance with these Terms, Niantic grants you a personal, noncommercial, nonexclusive, nontransferable, non-sublicensable, revocable license to download, view, display, and use the Content solely in connection with your permitted use of the Services. My own quick research into the subject suggests that "personal use" simply means "not for business use" and thus all other uses are permitted. However, since the ToS explicitly say personal AND non-commercial use, I'm not 100% sure my use of a Lure Module for the purpose stated above would qualify as acceptable.

There is ample reason to conclude that "non-commercial" would include a church, as well as advocating a political cause or candidate. The hard part of "personal". In the context of (Canadian) bankruptcy law, it can mean "non-business use"; in the context of "personal use property", it can be "A type of property that an individual does not use for business purposes or hold as an investment. In other words, property that an individual owns for personal enjoyment". US tax law takes "personal purposes" to refer to non-business purposes. But in the context of copyright (especially music downloading / copying), it is taken to refer to the use of or by an individual. Distributing free copies of a protected work does not get legally sanctioned due to the copying being non-commercial. The alternative term "private" is much clearer, in identifying "just you", but is probably avoided in this kind of context so as to avoid the wrong inference that you can only play Pokemon in the privacy of your own home. So the slightly less clear term "personal" is used instead of "private" especially in copyright-related contexts. "Personal" and "private" are not exactly the same, but when it's about use, I don't see any difference, and I think there is no question that use to attract to a church or political candidate is not "private", it is public. Since the license does not define "your own personal purposes" and there is not an existing crystal-clear definition of "personal purposes", the phrase could be given its "ordinary (plain) meaning". Of course, plain meaning has to give way to contractual intent, so we have to figure out what the parties intended. Except, you don't have a contract with Niantic, but still, plain meaning surely has some place in the law of licenses. At this point, in a lawsuit, both sides would hire an expert witness like a linguist or English teacher to make the case that a church or other non-commercial non-private use is / is not included in the meaning of "personal purpose". A silly argument could be made to the effect that if you personally have an interest in doing something then it is a personal purpose (if specifically commercial, it would be precluded by the term "noncommercial"). What makes this silly is that everybody does things for personal purposes (even acting in a way that benefits others, since you do so for the personal reason that you should do so), and thus "personal" would not mean anything. That is, "personal purposes" does not mean "whatever motivation or interest you personally have". You can also gain a certain understanding of what "personal purposes" means by looking at similar licenses. In the context of academic publishing, authors are typically granted license to copy "for personal, professional, or teaching purposes". Professional purposes and teaching purposes are things that the person has an interest in, so by mentioning these things separately, we must conclude that "teaching" is not a "personal purpose". And so: I would conclude that a court could find that using a product to support a political campaign, philosophy, or religion, is a "public" purpose, not a "personal" purpose. At the same time, at least as I understand it, a lure module is a thing that others besides yourself personally can see (I admit, I don't go), which implies that the purpose of the thing is not entirely private. In addition, there is a fair amount of buzz out there about how a lure could be good for business, which is (1) clearly in contradiction of the license terms and (2) clearly a golden opportunity for Niantic, perhaps in a few weeks after everybody gets hooked and then they will offer non-personal licenses. Their license terms also say that you will not "use the Services or Content, or any portion thereof, for any commercial purpose or for the benefit of any third party or in a manner not permitted by these Terms". I would say that that definitively says "No don't do it", and it also means that you can't be nice to a neighbor. So what they literally say and what they really intend are probably completely different things.

No These are derivative works and making them is copyright breach. Doing this as a hobby or even for the entertainment of friends in private is likely fair use. Distribution or performance in public (monitored or not) is likely not fair use and you would need a licence. Here is a summary of the relevant law in australia.

It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.

A fundamental requirement of criminal culpability is intent. Based on the description this whole process is happening after a user has already had their phone seized. If a person was not aware of Signal's hidden files to damage the police's data forensics software, they will not have met the criminal intent requirement, either maliciously or under a criminal negligence theory. None of the prongs of CFAA are strict liability statutes (18 U.S. Code § 1030 "Whoever having knowingly accessed a computer..."), so that would not apply here. If we imagine a person that is aware of all the information from Signal about their app intentionally abusing Cellebrite's package and with intention to cause damage downloads Signal's malicious files to their phone, I think it's an open question whether or not they would be liable under the CFAA. Specifically, 18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(5)(A) (emphasis mine) Whoever knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; An argument on this could go both ways. On the one hand, the owner of the phone could be found to not have substantially caused the information to be transmitted to a protected computer, as the police were the integral cause for that in executing their warrant. On the other hand, this sort of file could be considered a digital "booby trap," and booby traps are illegal for essentially this reason, that they have a foreseeable effect of causing harm to people who are lawfully inside a building without the owner's permission. In this case, the owner's trap was sprung by law enforcement but still placed by the owner in order to damage them.

By itself, a chess position is not personal data. Personal data is “any information relating to an … identifiable natural person”. Since the file in question includes the name of the opponent, it is clearly personal data about the opponent. If the files are used for “purely personal or household purposes”, the GDPR won't apply per Art 2(2)(c). If the files are shared more widely – especially if the files are published – then GDPR becomes relevant. The person/entity who is data controller has to consider GDPR compliance. Data controller is whoever determines the purposes and means of processing of personal data (the “why” and “how”). The first question would be under which legal basis this personal data about another person can be shared. The GDPR offers multiple legal basis, notably “legitimate interests” and “consent”. Consent is always an option, but must be freely given (entirely voluntary). Legitimate interests can serve as a legal basis after a balancing test between your interests and the data subject's rights and interests. This balancing test also depends on the reasonable expectations of the data subject, which in turn depends on the more general context. For example, in a chess community where such sharing is completely normal there would likely be a legitimate interest for you to share games as well, if the games occurred in the context of this community. But if you play a game with a friend who is not part of this community, the friend cannot reasonably expect that their name and associated personal data would be shared. The second question would be how you would satisfy further GDPR compliance obligation, in particular the Art 13/Art 14 right to information. When collecting personal data, it is necessary to provide certain information such as your identity, what processing is being carried out, and how the data subject can invoke their GDPR rights (a privacy notice or privacy policy). This might be difficult or awkward to do. Practical solutions to these problems: If you want to share a game but aren't sure that the opponent is OK with this, remove identifying aspects such as names. For example, you could crop a screenshot, or describe the game in textual notation without listing the opponent's name. Play the game via a chess website that publishes the game. This way, the website is the data controller, and you and the opponent are the data subjects. This avoids having to act as the data controller yourself. This might work for private interactions, but not e.g. if you run a chess club and require members to play via that website – you might still be in a data controller role then and have full compliance obligations.

No, it's not illegal... Ads are shown as a contract between the site that hosts it and the advertising company. The contract does not stipulate that customers need to buy something, in fact, the contract can't force the customer to buy anything! At best, the contract can pay the hosting site based on the ad being shown, clicked, or any sale made after it. ...but you will do exactly the opposite Advertizement is made to put your own brand into the head of people. In fact, most ads don't have any effect on people. As I am writing this, ads for a kid TV, travels to Turkey and the primetime films for the weekend on the TV-station I have on are shown. I have no intention of consuming any of these advertised products. Impact of a campaign is measured by two metrics: people reached, and people responding. People reached is measured in clicks. People responding is measured in changes in earnings or sales. Clicking the ad increases the reached rating. If the rating is bad, the ad campaign is just ineffective... which leads to the most paradoxical thing: Bad advertisement and good advertisement both lead to more advertisement - bad to level out the missing response, good to maximize the response. By clicking on the ad you just funnel more money to the ad industry. When does it get illegal? [DDOS] The only way it would become illegal is if John Doe sets up a computer - or rather a botnet - and has that network click the ads thousands of times per second. Google can handle easily 83,000 searches per second, twitter gets more than 9000 tweets that are distributed to millions of people, Tumbler and Instagram handle together about 2500 posts per second. In fact, every second, more than 100000 Gigabytes of traffic run through the net. To have an impact on one site, you need to be truly a large number of calls... and then it is called a DDOS. DDOS is illegal under the CFAA, in this case 18 UC 1030: (a)Whoever— (5) (A)knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b)Whoever conspires to commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. In the UK, you'd break the Computer Misuse Act of 1990 section 3, because denying someone else service via DDOS is unauthorized, clearly unauthorized, and prevents access to any data (the website) on any computer (the server): (1)A person is guilty of an offence if— (a)he does any unauthorised act in relation to a computer; (b)at the time when he does the act he knows that it is unauthorised; and (c)either subsection (2) or subsection (3) below applies. (2)This subsection applies if the person intends by doing the act— (b)to prevent or hinder access to any program or data held in any computer But can a DDOS be protest? [NO!] Anonymous attempted to petition to make DDOS a legal form of protest in 2013. The petition got 6,048 of the 25000 signatures needed to warrant an answer by the white house - unlike people in 2016 asking for a Death Star. At least it prompted Joshua I. James to write a research paper about the proposal in March. He too points to the CFAA and Section 5A, especially the sentence I quoted above. Among a lot of stipulations, he points out that internet protest in the shape of a DDOS would need to follow the same rules as a legal protest on the streets - which for example demands that entrance to businesses can't be blocked, and one is not allowed to harass employees and customers. According to the general rules for legal protest as given, there are still a number of challenges. First and foremost, entrances to businesses should not be blocked. In terms of DDoS, if sustained denial of service takes place, then access (entrance) to the server (business)is effectively blocked. This means that, at a minimum, sustained denial of service should be considered as a non-legal approach to protesting. Thus, he concludes sustained DDOS is per se can't be a legal protest, and even a non-sustained DDOS would impact people using the site in a way they will deem harassing - which means that even a non-permanent DDOS can't be a legal protest. And then comes the final blow: DDOS, unlike a real protest on the streets, can't, by its very nature, inform people of why there is protest, even if it were a form of protest! This means that nobody knows it is meant to be a protest and not a normal DDOS, and as it can't convey what the action is about, it can't be a proper protest.

There are a number of misconceptions here. GDPR does not generally impose blanket bans, but things get dicey if you're using data in a way that is not strictly necessary. Consent (freely given opt-in) is a way to continue nevertheless. A website without ads, tracking, or potentially tracking embedded content can probably work without having to ask for consent. Under the GDPR, every processing of personal data needs a purpose. This purpose must be covered by a legal basis. Some processing might be legally mandated or required by a contract with the data subject. It's also possible to base processing on a legitimate interest, but this requires a balancing test that also considers the data subject's rights and interests. As a last resort, consent can be an appropriate legal basis, but this comes with additional restrictions. Once you have a clear purpose that is covered by a legal basis, you can process the minimum data necessary to achieve the purpose. Sometimes, laws prescribe a particular legal basis. This is the case for cookies. You can use cookies (and similar technologies that access information on the end user's device) as strictly necessary to provide a service explicitly requested by the user. If you go beyond that, the ePrivacy Directive says you must obtain consent first. So for example, session cookies, shopping carts, or cookies that remember a “dark mode” preference are all perfectly fine because they are strictly necessary for something the user is trying to do. Also, you can use cookies to remember if the user gave or declined consent. On the other hand, analytics or tracking cookies are not necessary and require consent. If a website embeds third party content, this discloses personal data such as IP addresses to the third party. This disclosure requires a legal basis, most likely consent. There is case law about this regarding Facebook Like buttons on a page (→ Fashion ID case) but the same principle can be generalized to embedded Tweets or Youtube videos, images, or JavaScript files. A common way to handle this is to replace the embedded content with a placeholder, and to only load the embed once the user gives consent. But not all other domains or services are “third party” in the sense of the GDPR. When you engage a company to act as a data processor on your behalf, they are contractually bound to only use the data as instructed by you, and not for their own purposes. The GDPR allows you to outsource processing activities such as serving web content, as long as you have a suitable contract in place. Such “data processing agreements” are common for hosting providers or CDNs. When consent is to be used as a legal basis, it's important to consider the various conditions that the GDPR imposes (see Art 7 GDPR). The core principle is that consent must be freely given. You cannot make access to a site conditional on consent, so a naïve cookie wall or captive portal will be non-compliant. It's fine to force a choice, but “no” MUST be valid and possible. That consent is freely given also means that you must provide enough context for the user to make an informed decision, that the user must give consent through an unambiguous, affirmative action (consent is never the default), and that consent must be specific for a particular purpose (you can't bundle unrelated purposes). That is why modern consent management tools have multiple layers of information and allow the user to give consent for individual purposes (e.g. yes to analytics but no to ad personalization). In your particular context, you could proceed as follows: Figure out what kind of external content you're currently including. Can you enter into a data processing agreement with the external providers? If so, sign that. Can you host the content locally? This can be an easy solution except for video streams. Careful: copyright concerns might make this impossible. Can you replace the content with placeholders that only load if and when the user gives consent? That way, the rest of your site remains accessible without annoying consent walls. If the third party content is an unavoidable and essential part of your page, use an interstitial to inform the user of the risks before they proceed.

Your friend's relationship with the game company is one of contract. You don't say what the contract terms are, so it's impossible to say whether they were breached by your friend or the company. In any case, it is likely that the only remedy your friend could seek is damages, probably limited to whatever outstanding portion of the subscription they have not had the benefit of. It seems unlikely that it will be a large enough amount to be worth pursuing. As a private company the game provider can choose to contract with who they wish, or not as the case may be (unless they can be shown to be discriminating against protected characteristics).

Converting to a minority religion in India? What if one wanted to convert to minority religion in India. The problem is it may not have a registered religious organisation associated in India. Is religious choice in India restricted a few religions? Does one have to create an organization and get itself registered?

As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.

In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.

An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.

Unless there is something special in Pakistani case law on this topic, it would pass the originality requirement. In my opinion, it is actually very well laid out, and it is clearly not just slapping a few tags on plain text. This article does not indicate any particularly high standards for originality in Pakistan.

The law doesn't distinguish between two Christians with divergent beliefs, or between an atheist and a Christian (obviously with divergent beliefs). The law simply does not care what religion you have, or whether you have one. The law just says "follow the law!". The complication is that part of the First Amendment which says that the law is to be neutral as to religion also has what's known as the "Free Exercise Clause", the part that says "or prohibiting the free exercise thereof", which has been taken to refer to actions undertaken because of that belief. There have been various rulings on the conflict between religious doctrine and laws requiring or prohibiting certain actions (mandatory flag salutes, conscription, religious pamphleting). When a law conflicts with a fundamental right such as a right protected by the First Amendment, such a law is allowed only in narrow circumstances (known as strict scrutiny). It is up to Congress to state what kinds of First Amendment-based exceptions there are to laws. In a case involving the draft, SCOTUS held in US v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 that The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption This view underlies the current regulation on employment and religious discrimination in 29 CFR 1605.1 that In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. The question that EEOC or the courts would have to answer is, what fundamental life belief is being violated by compelling a certain action? Forcing Muslims to eat pork violates a fundamental belief of Muslims. Prohibiting Muslim employers from discriminating against pork-eaters does not violate those beliefs, because there is no fundamental life belief held by Muslims that it is a mortal sin to hire pork eaters. In this case, Ann is at a disadvantage because she can't maintain that being forced to hire Christine violates a fundamental belief of hers (it's like refusing to hire pork-eaters). If Christine was obnoxious in espousing her viewpoint in a manner that reflected badly on Ann's business, Ann can fire Christine. Ann might, on those same grounds, refuse to hire Christine if there was a well-justified belief that such damage to her business will result (you don't have to wait until your business is destroyed). The (implied) fact on Christine's resume is not sufficient evidence that Christine will cause a problem for Ann's business. Instead, it is a plain instance of religious discrimination, which is prohibited by law.

What discrimination? As explained in Conflict between a religious belief that accounts for the existence of transgender people vs. one that doesn't the Constitutional protection of the Free Exercise Clause applies to the exercise of a deeply held belief (religious or not). So, let's accept that a person believes that certain sexual practices or gender identity is morally repugnant for whatever reason and that belief triggers the Constitutional protections. That means, that the person cannot be forced to engage in those sexual practices or adopt a different gender identity. It does not mean that they have a licence to discriminate against people who do in a work or public environment - they can, of course, choose to avoid such people in their private life. Alternatively, if the person believes that they are required by their faith to discriminate on the basis of those characteristics then such a belief does not get Constitutional protection as it is now affecting the rights of others. In the same way that someone who believed in human sacrifice would not get Constitutional protection.

Reservations aren't of or for a single tribe (meaning roughly "ethnic group"), they are for a particular Nation (whether or not that term is used in a specific case -- it could be "Confederation" or "Band"). In Washington state, the Yakama Nation is a confederation of people who are Klikitat, Palouse, Walla Walla, Wanapum, Wenatchee, Wishram, and Yakama; the Tulalip Tribes covers the northern Lushootseed tribes made up of the Duwamish, Snohomish, Snoqualmie, Skagit, Suiattle, Samish, and Stillaguamish. Only 2/3 of the recognized tribes have reservations. The key legal concept is not exactly being "of a certain tribe", it is "being enrolled". Ancestry relates to enrollment (and disenrollment) via individual rules about membership. Federal Indian law is encoded in Title 25. Let's just say that a question about what that title says is way to broad to ever answer. Generally speaking, there are two types of reservation land, trust land and fee land. The US government holds trust land in trust, which has various restrictions on transfer, and is exempt from taxation: transfers require higher approval (tribe, BIA). Fee land is land that the individual(s) own outright. In the case of fee land, anyone can purchase that land. The land that would be of interest for this question is trust land. The Yakama reservation, for instance, has open and closed areas, the latter being mostly trust land with use restricted to enrolled members. On fee land located within a reservation, that does not mean that one is completely free of tribal rules. After all, off the reservation, you are still subject to the local government's land use rules (zoning restrictions, for example). The ruling of Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492 U.S. 408 is very complex and says "yes and no". Tribes do not have authority to zone fee land on the reservation owned by non-members, but they do have authority to generally zone fee land on closed areas of the reservation. (Very roughly speaking, fee land is subject to general government-planning type restrictions on land use that we are all subject to; but there are limits on how discriminatory those rules can be. Above all, fee land is in fact owned by the individual, and a tribe cannot claw the land back, though they can buy it back). A Nation can set rules for membership which would be patently illegal in the general context of US law. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, the situation was that the rule of the Santa Clara Pueblo nation said that the children of a Pueblo woman who married outside the tribe (e.g. to a Navaho) may be denied tribal membership, but did not exclude children of a Pueblo man who married outside the tribe. The consequence is that the children of a woman lose the right to reside on that land after the mother dies (also can't vote, etc.) The short version is that SCOTUS held that this is legal. Indian nations enjoy sovereign immunity, so you can't sue them.

The only religious matter I'm aware of that are inadmissible are for special circumstances where one's religious beliefs may be compromised if asked in court. The classic example tends to be clergymen/women being subpeonaed for information against a defendant in court. Conversation with clergy is protected in the United States and is one of a few times cops are not allowed to listen to your one phone call or visit. The typical invocation of this would be a criminal, who confesses his sins to a Catholic priest, and may confess to a crime while receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Since Catholic Priests are bound by the "Seal of Confession" to not speak about the identity of the sinner or nature of the sin. The Priest can be excommunicated if he does this. However, if the religion of the witness is relevant to the case (say a discrimination case) it might be prudent to inquire into the witness's religious beliefs. Suppose a major employer has a special menu in their cafeterias for Hala and Kosher observers but does not offer a fish or non-meat option for meals on Fridays in Lent, then a Catholic's belief in this practice might be called into question.

Major difference between criminal and civil law being that there has to be no specific victim in former? Is it true that while for prosecution according to civil (private) law there has to be a party that has been wronged (I'm going to refer to as "victim" from now on) while for criminal law that does not have to be the case? More specifically that in criminal law …: Something might be a victimless crime or a crime where the victim isn't clearly defined (can't be pin-pointed to, e.g.: the "public", the "future"). Something might involve a victim who does not consider him or herself one (while being of sound mind, having legal capacity, etc.)

Yes. In a civil case, there are two parties and the case is about finding out who has which obligations to whom. In a civil case, the plaintiff has to prove that they actually incurred damage through the actions of the defendant. A criminal case is the state vs. the defendant. The "wronged party" is the society as a whole, usually represented by the prosecutor. The victim, if there is one, just plays the role of yet another witness to find out if the defendant needs to be punished and how. There are also examples of crimes which are completely victimless but still punished by some societies. For example, in many places sexual intercourse between two consenting adult siblings is a crime (incest), even though there is no victim. Also, for some crimes it is even a crime to attempt to commit it. So one can be punished in a criminal court even though they didn't actually succeed in causing any damage to anyone. Example: I throw a rock at your car. When I hit, you can sue me in a civil court and force me to pay for the repairs. When I miss, I caused no damage to you, so there is nothing you could sue about. But what if I throw a rock at you and miss? That's attempted assault, maybe even attempted murder. When law enforcement finds out about it, I could be arrested, prosecuted and convicted to a prision sentence, even though you are perfectly fine.

They have the same standard of proof but different onus The legal system places the onus of proving an allegation on the person making the allegation. For your example, this is A if they are suing B or the government prosecutor if B is being prosecuted. The standard of proof is “beyond reasonable doubt” if B is defending a criminal prosecution and “balance of probabilities” if B is defending a civil prosecution or a lawsuit. Courts have historically been reluctant to define these terms further because doing so can lay grounds for an appeal if the judge oversteps so they mean what their plain English formulation means and what they mean precisely in any given case is one of the things the trier of fact has to decide. For A or the prosecutor to win, they have to meet this burden for each and every element of the offence or cause of action; if they don’t, then B wins. So, B doesn’t have to offer a defence at all and will still win if A doesn’t meet their burden. If B does offer a defence then the trier of fact compares the evidence of each side and decides which they prefer and therefore whether A has met their burden. A jury doesn’t have to give reasons for their decision; a judge does. In general, the decisions of the trier of fact are not appealable unless there was no reasonable basis in evidence to support the decision. For example, the evidence of B might not be believed - this is fine, unless the reason for not believing it is that B has a beard and everyone with beards are liars. Options 2 and 3 are simple matters of comparing evidence and deciding which is preferred. Option 1 is different; it is what’s called an affirmative defence. Here, A has met their burden because B conceded. Now B is relying on the position that they had a legal excuse, that is B is alleging a position and B has the burden of proving it. Now, the burden on B is always “balance of probabilities” because B is not alleging that anyone committed a crime so they don’t have to reach the criminal standard.

An employer doesn't have the authority to authorize its employees to violate the law. An employee who personally participates in a crime has both criminal and civil liability for the employee's actions. Private sector employers have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the actions of their employees taken in the scope of their duties. In other words, anything that an employee of a private sector employer is liable for, the employer is also liable for. Governmental employers do not have vicarious respondeat superior civil liability for the civil rights violations of the employees. Direct civil as opposed to vicarious civil liability, and criminal liability for an employer (governmental or private) is generally limited to acts carried out by employees of the entity at the direction of senior management or pursuant to a policy, explicit or implicit, of the employer. This said, it is the nature of large employers to break tasks into component parts spread over many employees in different parts of the employing entity. In some circumstances, an individual employee's role may be such that the employee lacks sufficient information about the overall course of action of the employer to know that their actions are part of an overall course of conduct by the employer that constitutes a crime or tort. For example, to retreat to an old school example, suppose that there is an employee who sits in front of a shredding machine all day and feeds paper into and clears paper jams, etc. whose job is to shred whatever documents are put in a bin next to his work station. This guy, who makes no decisions regarding what is to be shredded and has no real knowledge of why documents are being shredded, probably doesn't have criminal or civil liability if his labor is used to illegal destroy some documents. For all the shredder guy knows, he could simply be destroying redundant copies of documents to free up space in the filing cabinets while a single archival copy is retained. Typically, criminal laws require some level of mens rea (i.e. intent) which may be intent to do something in particular, it may be knowledge of certain facts, or what have you. An employee is generally only going to face criminal liability is the employee who carries out the wrongful act on behalf of the employer does so with the requisite knowledge and intent set forth in the criminal statute.

The rules of criminal procedure are going to differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In US federal court, for example, a criminal trial in absentia can happen, but only in limited circumstances. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43. A notable example of a defendant not appearing for a federal criminal case is the recent case, arising from the Mueller probe, against Concord Management and Consulting LLC (a Russian entity).

Yes, they can be sued civilly Or, for that matter, be prosecuted by another jurisdiction- pardons only work within the jurisdiction that issued them. In a common law jurisdiction, the pardon cannot be used as evidence Nor, for that matter, can a criminal conviction. This is partly because the elements that need to be proved for the civil wrong won’t correspond to the elements of the crime. But mostly, because it just isn’t allowed.

This assumes there is a difference under the law between reckless and negligent homicide (which does not exist everywhere). In Washington state there is a distinction between 1st and 2nd degree manslaughter, per RCW 9A.32.060 and .070. What could be called reckless homicide is when (a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or (b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the mother of such child. and 'negligent homicide' would be A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person. The distinction is laid out in RCW 9A.08.010, compare A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. and A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. However, it is important to know what "knows" means: (i) he or she is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) he or she has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. The fact that X has manufactured a nutty belief that killing a person doesn't lead to death does not override the fact that a reasonable person would know that stabbing a person in the heart will in fact kill them, and is murder. You could put that in contrast to the situation where he has a belief that stabbing a victim in the butt will cure him, and he is unaware that the victim's heart is freakishly in the wrong place, near his wallet – that would be negligence (being unaware). In general, you aren't given legal credit for having bizarre beliefs about how the universe works, unless it can be turned into an insanity defense.

As far as I understand, no one can jail anyone as a result of a civil matter. I can't just say, hey! You did this! I'm taking you to jail. You simply don't have the reason and authority to do so - and I doubt the jails would want random people coming in for random reasons. Courts also don't send people to jail for this. As far as I understand, you can only be jailed by a judge for a criminal matter. However, you can go to jail as a result of a civil matter. When this happens, you need to found guilty of a criminal offence, most notably Contempt of Court. You can be found guilty of that offence if you don't respond/comply to the court's instructions - such as failing to repay debts. In order to be found in contempt, the court needs to find that you also intended to refuse the court's instruction (this is known as mens rea). If you were found liable, the court would not send you to jail. They would instead tell you to repay the damages that you owed the creditor (the person who filed suit). Inability to do this does not result in contempt of court, however, you should generally let the court know of this. In terms of this, the court can allow the creditor to garnish wages, have scheduled payments... etc of the debtor. To answer the main question, the only time that the court will jail a person will be upon conviction of a criminal offence (such as contempt of court), and not a civil matter (such as liability).

Unfortunately, the police are correct The limit on filing a civil claim (a lawsuit where you seek monetary compensation) is before you turn 40. If you were 11 in 1985 then it is too late to sue your assaulter. For criminal prosecution, the law was changed in 2016. Prior to the change, the limitation was the same as for civil cases. After the change, there is no limit but only if the offence was committed on or after 1 January 2017. Assuming that your reference to Kelly is to this guy - the alleged offences were committed in the 1990s and the prosecutions are under Illinois, Minnesota and Federal law (the Federal crimes alleged are not the sexual assault of a minor). Each state has it's own rules.

My past employer is talking openly to my boyfriend about my leaving the job I walked out on my position as a medical assistant. My boyfriend is still a patient there, and during his last apointment, the doctor openly talked about how wrong I was to walk out on my job. Does he have a legal right to talk to others about how I left my employment? They're already making it impossible to use as a reference as its left me with nothing but dead ends.

Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation.

Not very nice of the employer, actually quite cowardly. Being not nice and cowardly is not against the law. Being in the EU, and having been employed for ten years, the company will have duties to find a different position in the company at the same pay, and only when that fails, the employee can be laid off and will have a reasonable amount of notice, plus a reasonable amount of redundancy pay due to him. Unfortunately, he can expect only the legal minimum if the company behaved like this already. Good companies would provide a generous redundancy pay, plus pay for you to have any agreements checked by an employment lawyer of your choice - which means the employee can be sure they are not ripped off, and the employer is sure they cannot be sued for any reason. Obviously if they want him to quit, then the one single thing your relative mustn't do is to quit. Let them pay him. Plenty of time to look for a new job.

As Tom says and these guys reiterate (I'm quoting those guys), "Employment relationships are presumed to be “at-will” in all U.S. states except Montana. The U.S. is one of a handful of countries where employment is predominantly at-will". Montana (Dept. of Labor and Industry) also states that they are the only ones in the US like that. Montana Code 39-2-904(1)(b) states that a discharge is unlawful if "the discharge was not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of employment". (2)(a) then states that "During a probationary period of employment, the employment may be terminated at the will of either the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason or for no reason". There is a presumptive 6 month probationary period in case an employer say nothing, but it could be longer or shorter (it can be 7 years for university professors, and I don't find anything in the code preventing an employer from setting the probationary period at 50 years).

I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B.

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

You generally are not required to share your medical details with people you don't want to. That said, the camp would also not be required to allow people who don't comply to enroll. They can't force you to divulge your information, but you can't force them to let you come if you don't, either. HIPAA deals with the ability of healthcare providers to disclose medical information to parties who aren't the patient themselves - it would be a HIPAA violation for your doctor to disclose your information directly to the camp without your consent. HIPAA has absolutely no bearing on who you choose to disclose your own information to, however - you can disclose your own information to anyone you want.

People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise.

What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year.

Does an email constitute a binding contract with regard to LLC Ownership Transfer? I'm one of three cofounders of an LLC incorporated in Delaware. The LLC is very much a startup and has not been profitable nor has any assets. Because of lack of sales, one of our founders told us that he didn't want to continue working on the business and we parted ways. It was very informal, and we didn't go through the process of getting him off the LLC. Later, the other remaining founder and I started working with a friend and wanted to bring him into the company as a replacement for the founder who left. We began a long chain of emails with my friend and the ex-founder and eventually agreed to pay a certain price for 1/3 of the company. The conversation ended by him accepting our price in exchange for a transfer of 33% ownership of the LLC. We told him next steps were we would set up a time to meet, sign the necessary documents and transfer the money. About a week after that, the business lost our most valuable account whom was responsible for ~90% of the sales. That combined with some other factors led to my friend deciding that he didn't want to pursue ownership in the company and walked away from the potential transfer. The ex-founder is understandably upset, considering he thought he was about to get a nice payday from this and is now threatening legal action against us. I'm assuming he means to file a civil lawsuit to get the agreed upon sum for his shares of the company. I'm wondering if he actually has a case here. Are we legally obligated to pay him and force the LLC transfer even though we no longer want it? No documents signed or filed and no money has been exchanged. I have read that in certain situations, email correspondence CAN BE interpreted as a binding legal contract. I'm unsure if that applies to this situation. Interested to hear what you all think. Thanks!

TL; DR: It is possible you might have a binding, enforceable contract. It depends on the facts. A trial court will determine the facts unless there is a settlement. Hire an attorney. 1. Contracts require certain elements in order to be enforceable. This website defines the elements of a contract to include the following: The requisite elements that must be established to demonstrate the formation of a legally binding contract are (1) offer; (2) acceptance; (3) consideration; (4) mutuality of obligation; (5) competency and capacity; and, in certain circumstances, (6) a written instrument. 2. Emails are not the contract. They are evidence of a contract. The emails themselves would not necessarily constitute a contract. However, they could be offered as evidence to prove there was a contract and what the terms were — thereby establishing a rebuttable presumption of a contract. In order to win a rebuttal, the litigating party would need to establish by a preponderance of evidence that one or more of the elements of a contract did not exist. 3. Contracts do not need to be written to be enforceable. Contracts do not always need to be written (or signed) in order to be enforceable. Oral contracts are just as enforceable in many cases as written agreements. The classic exception to this rule is that many (if not all) states require contracts to transfer real estate be written, not oral agreements. 4. Courts consider the behavior of the parties as evidence of a contract. Another category of evidence courts consider when deciding contract cases is the behavior of the parties. There is a legal theory called estoppel which Google defines as: ...the principle that precludes a person from asserting something contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that person or by a previous pertinent judicial determination.

Do I need to create an LLC if I already own the domain? No. Can someone legally create an LLC with the same name as my domain? Yes. Just trying to understand what the difference is between an LLC and a business An LLC, a "limited liability company," is a kind of legal entity that has a separate identity from the members of the LLC. The members' liability is limited with respect to the company's liability, hence the name. A business is a commercial activity. The two concepts are independent. A person can have a business without forming a corporation, or indeed many businesses. A single corporation can also have many businesses. Back to the question about someone forming an LLC using your domain name, this raises the issue of trademark protection. In the US, at least, you can't register a trademark unless it is "in use in commerce" (15 USC 1051(a)(3)(C)), which means explicitly that you cannot use the mark "merely to reserve a right in" it (15 USC 1127). But there are many subtleties of trademark protection that are widely misunderstood by most people, so if you anticipate wanting trademark protection for a name, you will probably want to learn about how trademark protection works and likely talk to a trademark lawyer.

A contract agreeing to share 50% of the profits from the game with him would be legal but it would be unwise, because it could create a general partnership, depriving him of the benefits of limited liability associated with the LLC. The better course would be to amend the Operating Agreement of the LLC so that he would be a "Class B" member and to provide that "Class B" members do not have voting rights and share 50-50 in profits from the game but not in profits from other sources. This would give everyone limited liability protection and would make it absolutely clear that he is receiving profits as a co-owner, rather than wages as an employees, thereby avoiding the incidents of employment of which there are many.

There is no requirement to name the parties to a contract I just bought a cup of coffee. I did not give my name to the other party to that contract and while I know the name of the shop, I do not actually know the legal entity I contracted with. Nevertheless, we have a binding contract and, for example, if that coffee gave me food poisoning, I would have legal recourse under that contract. Similarly, there is no difficulty signing a contract under a pseudonym - it still creates a legally binding relationship. The practical difficulties While there is no legal problem, there is an evidentiary one - if someone enters a contract and later disclaims doing so, how do you prove that they did? Or vice-versa, if someone alleges that it was you that entered the contract, how do you prove that you didn’t. What you need is some way of definitively but anonymously tying the person to the contract. I can think of lots - a fingerprint, DNA, public key cryptography, a trusted third-party intermediary to name just a few. This is essentially a technical problem rather than a legal one.

If your LLC made 300K before paying salaries, and paid 300K total in salaries, that seems quite reasonable. You might have a point if the order of events was: LLC pays 100K in salaries, LLC gets sued for 200K, LLC raises salaries by 200K. Note that the owners have to pay income tax on 300k earnings, plus whatever else employers and employees have to pay. And an LLC doesn't pay salaries to owners, it pays salaries to employees who be sheer coincidence are also owners. It's a different matter if the company pays dividends. A company must keep dividends low enough so that it can run its business, including paying damages for lawsuits that it knows about. So if the company planned all along to pay 300k in dividends, then is sued for 200k, they likely have to reduce the dividends.

I wrote a letter to the Eclipse Foundation. The consultant pointed me to section 5 in their FAQ. My case falls under the term "linking". He warned that he isn't a lawyer, but offered the following short answer: The Eclipse Foundation does not consider linking with EPL content to be a derivative work and so you are not required to disclose your source code.

You can’t die “during” a sale The formation of a contract is instantaneous, if the buyer dies they have to die before there was a contract in which case the seller keeps the car or after there was one in which case the buyer’s executor and the seller must do everything necessary to complete the sale (or breach the contract and get sued). This has nothing to do with any administrative obligations that either party owes to a third party like the DMV. Failing to properly transfer title may lead to complications and disputes latter on but it doesn’t directly affect the contract.

How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.

Is it legal for a landlord to prorate additional days of rent without mentioning price? My friends and I entered a year-long lease agreement where we each paid $600 per month to stay in an apartment. The original contract we signed stated we were to move out on May 26. However, as that date approached, we realized it would be significantly easier if we could move out on the 31st. Because of this, we asked the landlord if we could stay the extra five days. He said yes and didn't mention any additional cost. A few weeks after we moved out, the landlord sent us a bill for the five extra days we stayed, calculated by taking the monthly fee and multiplying it by 5/31. We had thought we would be able to stay the extra five days for free. Is this allowed? Was he required to tell us that we would have to pay more money if we stayed the five extra days? Or should we have seen this coming? We live in the US.

You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical.

Financially, the landlord can take you to court and get a judgment against you where you have to pay that rent, so you won't save any money. If you hire an attorney to defend you in the lawsuit, that will cost you extra money, so you could be worse off than just paying rent and staying there. The lease might have late payment fees, and if you that would be additional money that you would owe. In addition, there could be some reputational damage to you that could affect your ability to secure a lease in the future (a black mark on your credit history). Also note that in Georgia, a landlord has no obligation to seek an alternative tenant, so he can let the unit sit empty for 4 months (though he cannot collect twice on the same unite).

While I don't like agreeing with a landlord, you are in the right here. Your tenants do not have the right to access the property now they have moved out. If they were still living there things would be different and it would be reasonable for them to fix minor damage (to preserve their deposit). They did not do so. Get the damage fixed professionally, keep all reciepts, and take it out of the deposit.

There is certainly no legal problem in asking if the tenants would be agreeable with the landlord discontinuing the security service. Even if it were in the lease, a lease like pretty much any contract can be changed by mutual agreement of all parties (unless there is a law preventing such a change, which is rare and I do not think will apply in this case). A more difficult question would be if the landlord would be within his or her rights to discontinue the service without asking the tenants first, since it is not in the lease. Since the property was advertised as coming with the service, it might be held that the continued service was reasonably expected by the tenants, and thus an implicit term of the lease. But since the landlord does not plan to take such unilateral action, that remains a purely theoretical issue. The landlord could offer the tenants a small rent reduction, perhaps one quarter of the amout that was being paid to the security firm, but there is no legal requirement to do so. As to whether asking for such a change would be "rude", I don't think so, but that is a matter of opinion, and not really on-topic here.

Short answer: Yes, you can get out. However, this will be harder than you may want it to be. You will need to check your lease agreement for an arbitration clause. If the lease mentions disagreements will be handled by arbitration (or an arbiter), you need to know that going into this. Arbitration clauses usually stipulate that the landlord picks the arbiter, who will almost always be predisposed to side with the landlord. This pamphlet sheds insight into the situation. Skip down to PDF page 22, section header "My neighbors are constantly playing loud music..." Summarized, you can get out but if other tenants are not as affected, it will be hard to prove it affects you differently. You do, however, have the benefit of knowing the particular situation is illegal (as compared to the pamphlet's example of playing music, which is only situationally illegal). First, get written, signed testimony from other tenants (your roommate, the one above the smoker, etc). Preferably, get these signatures notarized. The testimony should include an acknowledgement that the signer has smelled the marijuana and a statement about how often this occurs, along with the date of signature. Next, send a certified letter to your landlord. Keep a copy of this letter. In it, state your intention to move unless they fix the situation within thirty (30) days. Remind them you already have informed them of this situation. Inform them you have (hopefully notarized) testimony of the marijuana smoking from other tenants, remind them that this is illegal, and that this is affecting your health. You may also warn them that if they do not rectify the situation and you leave after thirty days, they cannot keep your deposit or charge you a termination fee- they have breached your lease contract through failure to maintain a safe and livable rental unit (a gentle reminder that you will seek legal action if they attempt to keep your deposit or charge you fees is appropriate). In the letter, request an immediate, written response with their intentions on the matter, and give a deadline (like 3 days from receipt). As a certified letter, you will know when they get it. The wording of this letter is important. You want to clearly state the facts without sounding self-righteous, angry, or vindictive. And proofread the heck out of it. If the landlord is faced with possible legal action for forcing an illegal tenant to follow the law, and certain legal action for trying to keep a legal tenant to remain in illegal, harmful circumstances, they may well decide to oust the smoker. If your scare tactic doesn't work, however, you should make good on the threat- really do leave after thirty days, and if they attempt to charge you for anything or withhold your deposit, you really should contact a lawyer. You should also, however, have the money saved to pay the termination fees, just in case. Because the smoke affects you differently, and there is no easy way to prove this, an unsympathetic court (or arbiter) may rule against you. (NOTE: I am not a lawyer, but I did have to break a lease and spent a good deal of time researching and discussing my situation with a lawyer. In the end I lost my deposit but did not have to pay any fees or missed rent.)

Unfortunately, your relative is more in the wrong here First, the COVID situation does not change anyone's rights and obligations under a contract (see What effect does an event like the current Covid-19 pandemic have on contractural obligations?). So the landlord (through their agent) is obliged to provide the property and your relative is obliged to pay the rent and to occupy the premises (most residential leases contain a requirement for the tenant to live in the premises and not leave it empty). Your relative (through you) has indicated that she will be in breach of her contract. The agent has considered her position and has offered two (IMO generous) alternatives: Allow her to continue with the lease without taking possession providing the rent is paid. To release her from her obligations under the contract and return the rent. To put it in perspective, if your relative simply "walked away", she would be liable for the rent until a new tenant was found and, if that new tenant was paying less rent than she was, the difference for the duration of the lease plus the costs of finding a new tenant - advertising, agent's fees (usually 1 month's rent) etc. Now, the landlord has an obligation to minimise your costs so advertising the property could just be prudent. However, if they lease it when your relative's contract has not been properly terminated then it is they who are in breach. Surely they can't take the rent and offer to re-let the property at the same time? Surely they can. What they can't do is relet the property without properly terminating your relative's lease. Would they even be entitled to retain the deposit under these circumstances? Absolutely. The deposit is to cover their losses if your relative breaks the lease - as she has indicated she is going to do (this is called anticipatory breach). Finally, I'd rather not go down this route but is there any protection for my relative for not being forcefully 'evicted' - since she's paid the deposit, rent - and those haven't been returned? Having never taken possession, she is not being evicted.

Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.

I got and answer from lawyer in Netherlands. To rent out to the company is not without risks. You rent out to the company and the company rents out to the actual user of the apartment. That is subletting. The sub-lessee is protected by law. So when the company fails to pay, you can end the contract with the company (you have to go to court for this), but then you will become the lessor to the actual user (=sub-lessee) then. If you feel that that is against your interests, you have to start a court procedure within half a year to end the contract with the actual user. Also note: it is forbidden to rent out to people that don't have a legal status. So you make sure you trust the company very well if you are going to rent out to them. I recommend to seek help from a real estate agent that is well known and member of NVM or other trustworthy organisation.

Airline should refund ticket in event of security risk? I'm a physics student and researcher who travels a fair amount to communicate with scientists in my field, and I recently booked a non-refundable ticket through Turkish Airlines to get from Boston to Geneva next week. I was aware that Turkey was not the most stable region, but all travel warnings at that time regarded southeastern Turkey; my flight has a 16 hour layover in Istanbul, which is on the western side of the country. I was told recent events would not be a problem, both by Turkish acquaintances and service representatives of Turkish Airlines. However, that was when I booked the March 25th flight at the beginning of the month. When the bombings in Ankara (central Turkey) occurred last weekend, I called Turkish Airlines to cancel my flight, suspicious that violence was moving westward. After four separate customer service calls, they finally gave me the following breakdown of my non-refundable ticket: $360.00 USD for fuel taxes (non-refundable) $129.00 USD minimum ticket cost (non-refundable) $96.76 USD refundable ticket cost Which adds up to $585.76 USD, only $96 of which is refundable. I complained to their customer service representatives that the circumstances were such that I should not feel compelled to take a flight when there was a reasonable chance I would find myself in serious danger during my travels to Turkey (this was the only reason which would have driven me to cancel my flight). Their response was that they had no evidence of danger in Istanbul or Ataturk airport, and that I would be safe during my 16-hour layover. However, I was suspicious, and felt that this was not exactly a statement the Airline could guarantee. Last night, I called again because the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul issued a travel warning yesterday (March 17), saying that U.S. Government buildings and tourist areas might be targets for acts of terrorism. I called Turkish Airlines again and complained; they redirected me to a Customer Care Relations form which I could fill out to request a full refund. I did so. The airline usually takes 48 hours to respond. This morning, Istanbul was victim to a suicide bombing in a populated tourist area. At least 36 were injured, and five were reported dead. I am concerned that after hours of effort, I will not be able to obtain a full refund, even though there is now evidence of a clear and present danger in Istanbul. Given that I have had to book another last-minute flight through a safer region (Canada to Geneva), I would expect Turkish to at least refund the cost of my ticket, or provide me with a credit for future travel (although I am so concerned with the way they do business that I do not think the latter is acceptable anymore). If they do not provide me with a full refund, my next step will be to go to small claims court. My question is whether there is a court precedent for my situation. Is there any chance I will get my money back in filing a claim? In my view, the situation is like this: suppose you buy a cake from a bakery. You pay up-front for the cake, and are told that the purchase is final. This sounds reasonable, because you trust the business owner to provide you with a product which is, at the very least, safely comestible. However, when you stop by a week later to pick up the cake, the baker tells you that there is a reasonable chance the cake has cyanide in it, and that you would endanger yourself in the act of consumption. The baker then refuses to provide you with a full refund for your purchase. This situation seems unreasonable to me in the exact same way that my current situation does. What are your thoughts? Thanks so much for your help.

As I said in my comments, "It was your choice to ask for a refund because you chose to assess the events as a safety risk to yourself and the airline." The airline did not assess a risk and as a result cancel the flight and issue refunds. The airline did not disregard advisories or laws pertaining to the terrorist acts that took place and result in legal triggers that mandated the airline cancel the flight and give refunds. If a city or country is classified as a war zone - by that country itself or some international body, or by the US State Department - then there are triggers that either suggest or mandate flight closures, through a myriad of laws and jurisdictions. It is solely your perception of the risk to yourself and the airline that you are using as a reason to ask for a refund. You have made a decision on your own and simply don't have a case for a refund. http://www.turkishairlines.com/en-int/travel-information/legal-notice/terms-amp-conditions/cancellation-refund

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

In general, "making a reservation" does not create a contract, except when it is obvious that you have a contractual agreement. That would be the case with an airline reservation, and one clear sign is that you have to pay for the ticket when you make the reservation; or, it you don't, then there is no contract, and they can cancel or change the price. You would look for clear signs of an agreement, such as a "agree to terms" button that you have to click. Paying a deposit is another clear sign. Then you would simply look at the terms of the contract to see what their obligation is, and what yours is. They may have strongly committed to providing service in which case you might have a cause for legal action if they break that commitment, or they might have made no specific promises about service in case of intervening events (such as if the chef has a heart attack, or the power goes out). If we do think of this as a contractual matter, you breached your duty as a customer, to be there by 7:30, so even if there is a contract, they didn't break it. The note that you added renegotiating the arrival time was insufficient – it is outside of the contract, and possibly something that they didn't see (they only look at the names and official time blocks reported by the web page). In lieu of a contract, there could be some statutory obligation, i.e. a specific regulation in Sweden saying "if a restaurant accepts a reservation, they absolutely must hold the space available for the entire reserved time", which is an unreasonably onerous business practice that no nation requires.

Is UPS allowed to take my money and business without intention to fulfill its side of the transaction? No. The company's belated change of mind constitutes breach of contract, and its subsequent refusal to give you a refund completes the prima facie elements of fraud and/or unjust enrichment. The company's acceptance of your package & money and its subsequent act of sending your package to NC strike the applicability of its clause on Refusal of Service (see the link provided in the other answer). The blanket term of "among other reasons" is hardly enforceable at that point. In particular, the existence of a lawsuit between the recipient and the company further weakens any merits of the company's belated change of mind. That is because, by virtue of that lawsuit, the company currently has to deliver to that same recipient other packages anyway. Thus, the company cannot allege that delivering your package "is unsafe or economically or operationally impracticable". Also, since you are the one who paid for the service, the company cannot withdraw on grounds of "the person or entity responsible for payment is not in good standing".

She could refer this to the Cyrpriot Commissioner for Personal Data Protection, but I would try contacting the company first and telling them to remove her Personal Data from the public website - or delete it completely. If they don't give a satisfactory response, mention the CPDP. This could lead to the data being removed within a few days, while an official complaint is likely to take longer. She may have grounds for legal action which would result in the company being compelled to take down the data (or to close the website), but if your friend is thinking in terms of compensation, what compensation would she seek? If she can demonstrate and quantify financial losses that occurred specifically because of this disclosure there might be a possibility, but I suspect that would be difficult to prove.

Probably The US, like all other nations, has absolute sovereignty over its airspace. There is no clear line between airspace and space but 60,000 feet is clearly in the former. The US, like all other nations except Lichtenstein for some reason, is a signatory to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation which, among other things, makes it an act of war to use force against a civilian aircraft. Now, acts of war are not, per see, illegal - there are international laws about armed conflict and there are philosophical arguments about just and unjust wars but war itself is a political rather than a legal construct. Article 5 of the convention gives the right to all other states the right to operate civil aircraft within US airspace (and vice-versa) without prior permission (apart from regularly scheduled flights which do require permission) subject to compliance with the convention. Relevantly, unmanned balloons are dealt with in Annex 4 - it states that permission is not needed for light meteorological balloons but is needed for any other balloon which might enter foreign airspace. The Chinese claim that the balloon was “mainly” meteorological but the convention requires it to be “exclusively” meteorological. It also requires it to be “light” meaning having a payload weighing less than 4kg - unless the payload of this ballon was made of unobtainum, it weighed more than 4kg. They also argue that it drifted off course and entered US airspace inadvertently. This would be a legitimate claim if the entry of US airspace was unlikely at the planning and launch stages of the operation. We simply do not have the information to assess this claim. The US claim that this was a surveillance aircraft. If this is so, then the aircraft is not a civil aircraft and the Chicago Convention does not apply which brings us back to pure sovereignty - the US can do what it likes with things in its own airspace. There is a treaty between NATO members and former Warsaw Pact members dating from the 1990s that allow surveillance overflights of each other’s territories. However, there are two problems with this: China was never a signatory, and the US withdrew during the Trump Presidency. So, if this wasn’t a balloon that inadvertently and unexpectedly drifted off course, the US was allowed to shoot it down.

The answer has two parts depending on how you get here. Airline answer: Any such question by a CBP officer is merely a last-chance option to supplement the response you gave on the declaration form. The form asks a series of specific questions which are difficult to misunderstand (if you speak English), you say yes or no, and fill in applicable details. If you remember that you put an apple in your luggage, you can verbally amend the declaration. It is not necessary or practical to recite the statutory, regulatory and case law authority to ask these questions. As I recall, the electronic version asks the same questions. All versions of the form that I have encountered over the decades have included the perjury warning. If you had an alternative experience for you did not fill in a customs declaration form, that would be unusual, and a significant failure by the CBP officer(s). Land-border answer: you are right. In this case (when no customs declaration form is filled out), they rely on every person's obligation to know and comply with the law. You are required to declare the $12,000 cash that you are bringing back, and you cannot plead "I didn't know I had to declare that cash". You can always make suggestions for service-improvement to the Dept. of Homeland Security.

You are entitled to a refund, since the "hotel" breached their contract with you. You can sue both the booking company and the individual, though identifying and serving legal notice on the individual will be more difficult. The amount in question is well within the scope of small claims court in Norway. The biggest challenge there is that you have to first contact the local police to get a hearing with the local Conciliation board. You might also sue the booking company in your own location (which would be easier), though depending on how you made the booking they might not be liable. On the third hand, the time between the complaint and now is relatively short and does not yet reach the level of being "an unreasonable delay". As for whether the cost would exceed. You will have to shoulder the burden of the filing fee, which can be added to your award in the case of a judgment in your favor.

Felons Allowed Banking License & Right To Discriminate Against Other Felons? Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays PLC, and The Royal Bank of Scotland are all American Felons. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas As a felon you cannot become a lawyer, doctor, or pharmacist. In some states you cannot vote. Public service jobs are out (police ff,emt). Banking jobs as well. So, how are these banks still in business, legally?

They are still in business because they went to the agencies that regulate them and sought exemptions and waivers from the requirements that they not have criminal convictions. Certain highly regulated industries, like the banking and securities (stocks, bonds, etc.) industries require the companies, their executives, and individual people be licensed. Usually, individuals and companies with a history of "bad behavior", are denied licensure. Each industries regulations and laws define what that bad behavior is, but a felony conviction for a financial related crime certainly meets that definition. However, being denied a license or booted from the industry is not automatic. The agencies that enforce these regulations, have the ability to continue to license someone who has a felony conviction. I know I am speaking in general terms, but let us look at the securities industry for a specific example. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, companies that manage investments/mutual funds, like J.P. Morgan & Chase, Co. must be licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. To paraphrase, Section 9(a) of the 1940 Act, it says that individuals cannot control or manage an investment company if they had a felony conviction on the past 10 years. It goes on to state that those same requirements apply to companies meaning they are denied a license. But, section 9(c) allows “people” (which includes companies) that are prohibited from being licensed to get an exemption from these rules through the SEC's administrative process. Here, JP Morgan and the other companies mentioned in the press release are big players in the securities industry. All of them manage mutual funds and buy/sell securities for clients. Therefore, they each applied and received this exemption at the same time or right before they pleaded guilty so it wouldn’t disrupt their business. Here are the administrative orders from the SEC’s website dealing with this exact issue. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., et al. - Notice of Application and Temporary Order Release No. IC 31613; File No. 812-14466 The permanent order: SEC Release No. IC - 31674 If you’re interested in the law that applies, these orders are a good place to start. Also, here is a less detailed article on this issue in the NY Times.

Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.

In Texas, as in most of the US, the law is "Employment at Will". This means that an employer is free to fire people at any time, for any reason, or none, as long as it is not for one of the few reason forbidden by law, such as racial or age discrimination. Hourly employees are entitled to overtime pay in such cases, but "exempt" employees are not. Nor are they entitled to comp-time as a matter of law, that is at the option of the employer. (The question seems to imply that the employee in question was "exempt" but does not actually say so.) The only really effective recourse against that sort of "death march" is to quit and find a better job, or to threaten to do so while they still need you, unless the conditions return to acceptable ones. I have heard of people in such a situation who "get sick" every day at 5:30pm, because local law forbid requiring ill employees to work. But that is pretty much inviting an arduous and possibly expensive administrative and/or legal battle, and will depend on the specifics of the state/local law. In any case, it is too late for the person in question to try that. On the facts as stated, there might be a valid claim of age discrimination. But additional facts would be needed to establish this, and it would be in my view unwise to try it without consulting a good employment lawyer. Such a lawyer could advise exactly what must be proved and how, and what the probable chances of any recovery would be.

Your understanding of “legal tender” is flawed There is plenty of case law to show that governments can place reasonable restrictions on payment by legal tender up to and including excluding it entirely. Picano v Borough of Emerson explains this very succinctly: Finally, there is no basis for concluding that defendants violated 31 U.S.C. § 5103. Section 5103 provides that "United States coins and currency . . . are legal tender for all debts, public charges, taxes, and dues." None of the cases cited by plaintiff stands for the proposition that § 5103 requires a local government (or any other entity) to accept payment in cash, and no court has so held. The refusal by governments to accept pennies (or any other small denomination) has withstood challenge multiple times. 31 U.S.C. § 5103 does not create a requirement to accept cash.

the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.

Police can lie However, in the United States they have to read you your Miranda warning (most other democratic countries have similar warnings): You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. They have told you everything they are required to tell you - effectively “we are not on your side.” After that, they can lie their asses off. Of course, they wouldn’t ask you for a DNA sample - they’d ask you if you’d like a glass of water. Then they’ll take the DNA from that.

Note: IANAL Does the placement of a sticker stating, "We accept XYZ credit cards," essentially obligate a business to accept that card? It depends on whether you mean whether they are obligated to provide goods/services to someone who presents the card, or whether, having provided goods/services, they are obligated to accept the card as payment. For the first question, the answer is "no". The credit card brand could theoretically go after them, however, as names of credit networks are trademarks, so claiming to accept a card but not doing so is trademark infringement. For the second, the answer is "pretty much". Since they misrepresented their establishment, there is no mutual assent and therefore no contract. If they try to use "defrauding the innkeeper statutes", those require fraudulent intent. If you fully intended to pay for you meal by a credit card, and it was their choice to refuse payment, then you have no fraudulent intent. The only avenue I can see for them is some sort of equity argument, but that would be problematic, especially if they ask for the retail, rather than wholesale, price, and not worth the hassle of collecting. So, legally, you can just walk out, but in practice if they have a bouncer they might make trouble for you.

> What does that last sentence mean? It means that federal law does not provide premium pay on Sundays and Holidays the way MA does. > Should I be getting paid more than I am? No. Check out G.L. c. 151, § 1A: the hours so worked on Sunday or certain holidays shall be excluded from the calculation of overtime pay In other words, take your eight hours on Sunday and subtract that from the total hours for the week. That number minus 40 is how many OT hours you get. This calculation is called crediting - basically the employer credits your time-and-a-half Sunday work against your total hours for the week. Crediting is allowed and it is why you do not get the Sunday pay on top of your overtime. If you want to get in the weeds take a look at Swift v Autozone where the MA Supreme Court describes why crediting is allowed. Also see 29 U.S.C. 207(h)(2) which tells us that extra compensation is creditable..

Is it legal to hack my wifi hotspot's password? I'm gonna explain it exactly: Parents divorced, I have a laptop from mom, and a smartphone from my father (with subscription contract), with internet access, and hotspot capable. My question is: If i make hotspot on the phone (from my father), to share internet, is it legal to crack it's password using the laptop (from my mother), for penetration testing purpose? I'm not exactly sure, and i don't wanna end up messing with the police. I'm just trying to see how long it takes to crack the phone's wifi password, to make it as secure as possible.

US law (18 U.S.C. § 1030) only addresses US government computers, computers used in a way that affects interstate commerce, and those of financial institutions. Turns out, cell phones and home computers affect interstate commerce. So the forbidden acts are delimited by expressions like "having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access", "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access" or "knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value". Notice that the law is stated in terms of authorization to access, and not "cracking passwords". Similarly, 18 U.S. Code § 2701 uses phrases like "accesses without authorization". Each state has its own laws: in Washington, RCW 9A.52.110-130 identifies forbidden acts via phrases like "without authorization, intentionally gains access". The closest I can find that comes to a law that might imaginably have some bearing on "password cracking" is 18 U.S. Code § 1029 which prohibits uses of "counterfeit access devices". An "access device" is defined in para (e) as "any ...means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money..." (there is the usual attempt at an exhaustive listing behind the ellipses). A password cracker would then be an access device since it along with a user interface to a system allows one to access the system and thus the internet of things. A counterfeit password cracker would be e.g. one manufactured by BlackhatHackersoft which passes itself off as one manufactured by WhitehatHackersoft. However: 18 USC 1029 specifically says "knowingly and with intent to defraud produces, uses, or traffics in one or more counterfeit access devices", and the intent that you describe is not to defraud. If you want a paid analysis by a professional, you can hire an attorney. My view is that if the police were to come after you, that would be an abuse of law, because the law does not prohibit taking reasonable steps to select a safe password (something like "CorrectHorseBatteryStaple", which I hear is now just behind "password" in use as a password).

Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.

It's generally correct in the American system that everything not forbidden is permitted. But the law you're looking at isn't really an exception. You have the legal right to tamper with evidence if tampering is not illegal, but this statute makes it illegal. The language you've highlighted merely says that the law does not apply to those who have some other affirmative grant of authority to do so. So if you stab someone to death in your kitchen, you can't remove the body or other evidence, but the detectives investigating the case can, because they have the legal authority to process the scene and maintain the evidence for trial. So the law is similar to the "speaking in public" hypothetical, but that doesn't make it meaningless. Because of the First Amendment, that law doesn't actually outlaw anything, but the tampering law faces no such legal barriers. You had the right to tamper until the government said you didn't. Now that it says you don't, you can only do it on the government's terms, which require an affirmative grant of authority.

This hinges on what you mean by "spy". Generally, a landlord cannot enter a leased or rented property* without the tenant's consent, nor can their agents. (They can arrive and ask to enter, as can your neighbors whether or not you own your home, but you are not required to acquiesce in either case). A landlord can view the publicly viewable portions of the property at their leisure, as can their agents, or any member of the public for that matter. A landlord could possibly be notified of a tenant's actions in a number of ways: such as viewing the public portions of the property, being notified (or billed) by utilities or public agencies, or receiving complaints from the neighbors. A neighbor has no more, and no less, legal ability to spy on you if you owned your home vs if you rent your home. So, they would have no more right to, say, spy at your house with a telescope than if you owned the property yourself, but no less right to complain if you have a loud (or audible) party or a large number of guests; the only difference being they can complain to someone who could potentially do much more than they could if you owned the property yourself. Thus, the answer to your question depends on what is meant by "spying". *This assumes that this is a separate property; a landlord who rents out a room in their own home often has far greater rights.

Since there are cases where it is legal to break into a car, is it legal to publish a guide on how to break into a car online? It is legal to publish this guide. Indeed, it is legal to do so even if there are no cases where it is legal to do so. Does it need to have a disclaimer saying to comply with all applicable laws? No. Could the author be held responsible if someone uses the instructions to illegally break into a car? Generally not. I could imagine that there might be some very specific and exceptional fact pattern where it might, but that would be the rare exception. But see man sentenced to twenty-years in prison after pledging support to ISIS and uploading a bomb making video related to that pledge.

If you show that you received a message through WhatsApp that looks like it was sent by some person, then this is to some degree evidence that the person sent that message. Obviously they can claim that someone used their phone, or that someone forged the message and so on. The contents of the message may be hearsay. Just because someone sends a message doesn't mean the message is true. On the other hand, if someone sends a message saying "I'll kill you", that's not evidence that they were trying to kill you, but it is evidence that they threatened you.

Under United States law, it is not illegal to simply make an account on a forum where criminal activity takes place. The closest thing I can think of would be misprision of felony (AKA failure to report a crime), which requires active concealment (see United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 1977)). Simply observing evidence of criminal activity and not reporting it would not qualify. However, if that forum also contains material that is illegal to posses (such as child sexual abuse material), downloading that (even by simply viewing it using your browser) could be a crime. I would note that I am specifically not advising you whether or not doing any of the other things, like making and publishing tutorial videos on how to access such sites, is likely to get you into trouble with the law. If you want that sort of legal advice, you should contact a lawyer, as the advice is going to be very specific to the exact details.

Your code is considered free speech (Bernstein v. United States) and you have allowed the use of the code via the MIT license. Since the application of your code is very generic and is not specifically targeting anyone. You probably are not criminally liable. This is simply writing a "Proof of Concept" for security testing purposes. That same way Metasploit, Nessus, and Nmap have actual exploit code but are considered tools of the trade. Now if you go around using your spyware on non consenting victims. You might get a visit from some people with guns and badges that have 3 letters on them.

Under what circumstances is it OK to intentionally drive at people? If a civilian is driving a car towards a person who is a police officer, that is historically sufficient justification for the officer to apply the instant death penalty against the driver. Even if a driver is trying to drive around an officer to get away, the officer's perception (or even a claim to have that perception) that the driver tried to hit them with a vehicle is enough to justify an instant death penalty against the driver. Based on these cases (there are plenty of them!), it would seem like it's never legal or OK to drive at another person, or in a direction that could be interpreted as attempting to hit another person. Given the severe & instant punishment, it seems like this is not even close to the boundary (hence the bold "never"). When a civilian intentionally drives into a crowd (e.g. in Las Vegas, or Isla Vista, or SXSW) and people get hurt (even if nobody's killed), that's considered a severe violation of the law and serious charges follow. Even driving towards a crowd, before reaching it, can be enough to warrant fatally shooting a civilian driver. This generally supports the conclusion above. However, when it's the police doing it, it's fine for them to intentionally drive straight into/through a crowd that has lawfully gathered in a city's Market Square to watch Independence Day municipal fireworks (while it's not OK for a civilian to drive into a crowd gathered to watch municipal fireworks elsewhere). Driving directly into a crowd with loud sirens and lights is apparently a good crowd dispersion technique. The press doesn't even cover it except as a closing footnote on another story, to emphasize how hard the police are working to keep citizens safe. When the crowd is not just assembled but also protesting, it's apparently OK for even non-police drivers to drive directly into a crowd. Here's one example from Ferguson, where the driver cleared it with police and even got charges brought against the protesters for damaging her car. Here's another example from Ferguson. Where it's someone driving into a crowd of anti-Trump protesters, police just shrug and help out the driver, before arresting protesters for being in the way. A driver in that situation might apologize, but doesn't face charges. The clearest rules I can figure out from this is that it's legal to drive at people when it's the police doing it or when the crowd is assembled for something that might fall under a First Amendment category as opposed to people just being in a busy place. However, I don't especially like that answer. In trying to find a stronger one, my own personal sense of ethics clearly has no bearing or relevance to this question. If it did, all of the latter examples (even the police car) would be in the "illegal" category along with the first ones. So, what does the law say? What's the legal rule? Where does that rule come from (i.e. law citations)?

Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses – for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).

Not necessarily. Your own statements and the statements of the officer would be legally sufficient to convict you. Also, your statement that you don't believe you are at fault is strongly at odds with a widely held interpretation of the traffic laws (not stated in the formal language of these statutes). The prevailing interpretation of the traffic laws is that you are always at fault if you rear end someone because you failed to maintain a safe distance, pretty much as a matter of strict liability and regardless of the circumstances, because a safe distance is almost by definition a distance that it is possible for you to come to a full stop from if the care in front of you suddenly comes to a stop for any reason. The only situation I can imagine where there wouldn't be liability for rear ending someone would be if you were at rest behind them at a stop light and they actively backed up into you. In practice, almost any judge and almost any jury, would convict you of failure to maintain a safe distance if you rear ended someone absent the most extraordinary of circumstances. I honestly don't know any lawyer or likely potential juror who wouldn't convict you under these circumstances with only the testimony of the police officer and your own testimony (which you would have to offer to have any shot at avoiding a conviction) to establish that you did indeed rear end someone. Police are allowed to lie to suspects of crimes, and often simply do not have an accurate understanding of how the legal system works. So, you are not entitled to rely on a statement made by a police officer. Of course, it is also certainly possible that his statement is consistent with local practice in your neighborhood traffic court. So, showing up to contest the charge might still make sense, and it wouldn't be uncommon to receive a plea bargain with fewer points against your license, just for showing up to court.

Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.

The legal question here is whether police have an enforceable power to enjoin a person from visiting a particular person or from entering a particular jurisdiction (especially the one where they have police powers). The obligation to obey police orders generally ends at matters regarding arrest, traffic orders, or crowd control. Freedom of travel is a fundamental constitutional right, along with freedom of association. That does not mean that you can go absolutely anywhere you want and do anything you want with whoever you want, but it does mean that any restriction have to be encoded in law, and such laws have to pass strict scrutiny. Any enforceable legal restrictions would have to emanate from the courts.

"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.

A "police car" doesn't necessarily have a special legal status, so a police officer can theoretically drive a beat-up pickup truck and "be legal" (but not in Washington, see below). What matters is whether others have to give special attention to the vehicle. The pertinent question is, what are the requirements for being an authorized emergency vehicle. I'll give you Washington state law, and you can apply this to other states fairly easily. RCW 46.37.190(1) mandates that Every authorized emergency vehicle shall, in addition to any other equipment and distinctive marking required by this chapter, be equipped with at least one lamp capable of displaying a red light visible from at least five hundred feet in normal sunlight and a siren capable of giving an audible signal. (3) Vehicles operated by public agencies whose law enforcement duties include the authority to stop and detain motor vehicles on the public highways of the state may be equipped with a siren and lights of a color and type designated by the state patrol for that purpose. The state patrol may prohibit the use of these sirens and lights on vehicles other than the vehicles described in this subsection. Given these restrictions, a driver knows whether they must get out of the way, and whether they have to "pull over" (stop driving and get ready for a brief traffic detention). The manner of attachment of "stuff" on the outside of the vehicle falls under general state patrol safety rules, whereby for example you can't balance a rocking chair on the roof and speed down the highway. The state patrol has reasonable discretion to deem that a particular mode of attachment is "unsafe" – this won't be like building-code minutia. Duck tape would probably be deemed to be an insecure means of attachment. There can be some statutory provisions regarding use of private vehicles, for example RCW 46.37.185 allows green lights on firefighter's private care: Firefighters, when approved by the chief of their respective service, shall be authorized to use a green light on the front of their private cars when on emergency duty only. Such green light shall be visible for a distance of two hundred feet under normal atmospheric conditions and shall be of a type and mounting approved by the Washington state patrol. The use of the green light shall only be for the purpose of identification and the operator of a vehicle so equipped shall not be entitled to any of the privileges provided in RCW 46.61.035 for the operators of authorized emergency vehicles. Flashing blue lights are prohibited by WAC 204-21-230(c)(4) "other than a law enforcement vehicle as defined in WAC 204-21-020", which is "a publicly owned or leased vehicle operated by a law enforcement agency and which is used for the law enforcement functions of the agency". That means that in Washington, the town sheriff cannot use his personal car as a law enforcement vehicle. I expect there to be some variation on that point across the US. The lights-and-sirens law is what keeps ordinary people from putting lights and sirens on their vehicles.

Edit: I didn't notice a that this question was tagged for Canada; this answer is based on U.S. law. "Must you stop walking" and "can the police detain you for leaving" are different questions. Must you stop? I'd expect a lot of variation from state to state, but there are definitely situations in which you must stop. In Ohio, for instance, an officer who "reasonably suspects" that that you have committed, are committing, will commit, or have witnessed the commission of violent felony, is permitted to stop you and ask for your name, address and date of birth, and it is a crime to refuse to provide that information. R.C. 2921.29. But at the moment the officer asks you to stop, you're in a tricky position. If you haven't done anything wrong, you'd be inclined to think that the officer has no basis to stop you and that you're justified in walking away. But if someone just called the police and said someone fitting your description just robbed a store two blocks away, the officer has reasonable suspicion that you committed a violent felony, but you have no way of knowing that. This sort of thing happens pretty much all the time. In the absence of that reasonable suspicion, though, Ohio courts have repeatedly held that it is not obstruction for you to just walk away (or even run!) from the officer. Can the police detain you for walking away? Obviously, if you're in a situation where it is a crime to not answer questions, the police can detain you because they just watched you break the law. But what about when you're within your rights not to answer? The police can still detain you with a Terry stop when they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you are committing a crime, or that you just did, or that you're about to. And they can continue that Terry stop until that suspicion is confirmed or dispelled, or until they can't reasonably expect to get anymore information by detaining you. Based on the facts you described, it seems unlikely that they could legally detain you based on your termination of the conversation. Still, I imagine that there could be circumstances where they might stop someone, ask questions, and then reasonably suspect that the person was engaged in a crime based on his decision to walk away, especially if the person hasn't explicitly invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence.

It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.

How much do I have to change a logo from an Video game IP (pokemon go) to create items and sell them? I'm an entrepreneur who wants to capitalize on the wild success of the mobile game Pokemon Go. There are three teams within the game that have distinctive logos, see the bird icons in the image below. My question is, if I wanted to take those logos and modify them and print those on clothing and other items for sale, would I be able to do so? How could I protect myself from litigation if I wanted to go through with this plan? Would modifying the original icons, or created brand new stylized version of the icons suffice? Would I have to put that this is unlicensed merchandise on my sale page, and would that protect me?

There is no such thing as "alter it by X amount and it's legal". If the original can be determined at all, it would fall under derivative work and be an infringement. https://www.copyrightservice.co.uk/copyright/copyright_myths -- See #6 and #7 And Stanford: http://fairuse.stanford.edu/2014/12/22/much-photo-need-alter-avoid-copyright-infringement-hint-cheshire-cat/ Kienitz v Sconnie Nation And the well known Shepard Fairy/Hope poster case: http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/shephard-fairey-is-fined-and-sentenced-to-probation-in-hope-poster-case/?_r=0

The Google terms of service do not prohibit using their translate programs to create something that you sell. TOS for using their API would be irrelevant, since that isn't what you're doing. There is no clear copyright issue: as far as I can tell, there is not yet any case law suggesting that the output of a program can be owned by the copyright-holder of the program. (Copyright must be held by a legal person, i.e. an actual person or a corporation, and a program cannot yet be a legal person). A human-performed translation is subject to copyright protection since what is protected is that which is created by the (translating) author, and a program lacks that creative element. A translation owes its existence to the program-user using a particular tool to create the work, be it a pen or a translation program. What is unclear at present is whether a person using machine translation in a permitted fashion to create a derivative work thereby gains copyright to that derived work.

You need permission from the copyright holder(s) to make the prints at all unless it falls under some fair use doctrine or is a work in Public Domain. If permission is granted, it would presumably involve you paying money on some negotiated basis. An artist might flatly refuse to give permission to your plan to use their art as a component of your art.

A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.

Yes. The introduction to the license says "You may adapt — ... build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially". (My emphasis). Note that there is an attribution requirement so you need to find a way to attribute each image to its individual author. For the fine details, you certainly need to read the actual license (rather than the introduction) and you probably need to consult your own, paid-for, IP lawyer - but if you are just scoping the project out at the moment, you should be fine. For contrast, here is a Creative Commons licence that does prohibit commercial use.

I take it that you intend using the logos of the various companies to show that you do business with them? That would be "nominative use" and would be legal even without permission, but it would be better practice to ask for permission. You would need to make it clear that these companies do not endorse or recommend you (unless they do and say so in writing). If you get permission, ask about any color variations they are OK with. Would it be possible to put a black or dark color undercard below any logos that are white on transparent? this would make them visible and be a minimal change to the standard form of the logo. Again, the key thing is to make it clear that you are not claiming to be any of those companies, nor to be endorsed by them. And yes, a short consultation with a lawyer knowledgeable in trademark law would be a very good idea, and might not be very expensive.

This a bit dubious. You write "I know you can make a digital copy of a book or CD you own." but that is true only under limited circumstances. Making such a copy for one's own personal use would likely be fair use (in the US). Selling copies would pretty clearly be copyright infringement. Giving away free copies to significant numbers of people would also be infringement. Temporarily lending copies ro a small number of people might be considered fair use or might not. For the board game, you could allow others to play with the copy you own in person. But COVID makes that unsafe. Assuming the game art is under copyright protection (some older games might have protection expired) selling such images or making them widely available would clearly be infringement. Making them available only during the course of play to a limited group, with technical measures to prevent or discourage copying and no fee charged might pass as fair use, and the game company might well not want to pursue the matter in any case. If you create new art which can be used for the same game, it would be somewhat less likely to be considered infringing/ Even then selling access would probably be trademark infringement, and perhaps infringe the copyright on the rules of the game. There would be legal risk in doing this sort of thing.

As far as I am aware both these answers are incorrect, but as I am not a lawyer let me quote the World Intellectual Property Organization (part of the UN): Photos of trademarks Unlike copyright law, trademark law as such does not restrict the use of a trademark in a photograph. What it does forbid is the use of a trademark in a way that can cause confusion regarding the affiliation of the trademark owner to the image. If consumers are likely to mistakenly believe that the trademark owner sponsored a photograph, then there may be trademark infringement. For example, if a Nike logo was visible on the t-shirt worn by the boy in our photo-shoot scenario, this could be seen as an attempt to appropriate consumer goodwill associated with the Nike trademark. So, caution is required if photographing someone wearing or consuming a trademarked product. Source: IP and Business: Using Photographs of Copyrighted Works and Trademarks (emphasis mine) So the basic idea is that if the Washington Redskins would not want to be associated with the Biden campaign, they could file a lawsuit claiming that the photo suggests there might be an affiliation between the campaign and the sport organization. In other words, the question one has to ask is: Is there a chance we might benefit in any way from the goodwill associated with the trademark? The way it was explained in a copyright course1 I watched was that: you don't need to worry about a McDonald's in the background of your photo you need to be careful where you use a general photo of a specific McDonald's and taking a photo of a political candidate in front of a McDonald's is not acceptable without permission2 The verdict The biden campaign claimed that A campaign aide told Fox News the logo was removed from the photo because it is "copyrighted" and claimed that such a step is "a very common practice on campaigns." To my knowledge that are no actual copyright concerns here, but - just like with the aforementioned course - trademark matters often get covered in the same setting as copyright laws, so I have a very easy time believing that this is 'a very common practice on campaigns'. It's incredibly unlikely that for this specific photo the Washington Redskins would have actually claimed that Biden was benefiting from the goodwill associated with their brand (especially considering all the controversy surrounding them), but it's a completely believable general policy. The interesting thing is that they didn't care as much about postings on social media compared to more traditional channels, but this is in line with what I have seen in many companies and organizations. 1 - This course was trying to generalize international law in a way that content producers won't get in trouble anywhere rather than exclusively explain US law. 2 - The example didn't use a 'political candidate' explicitly, but something along the lines of a recognizable public figure who is not just getting a burger

When a pastor gets a marriage license from the state are they required to marry homosexuals? I've heard a lot of controversy over whether or not pastors who deny same sex couples should be fined, jailed, etc. If the pastor is licensed by the state don't they then have to be religiously unbiased like any government employee or establishment?

The connection between priests and marriage is via laws regulating the solemnization of marriage. Washington's RCW 26.04.050 is typical: ...Justices of the supreme court, judges of the court of appeals, judges of the superior courts, supreme court commissioners, court of appeals commissioners, superior court commissioners, any regularly licensed or ordained minister or any priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any religious organization, and judges of courts of limited jurisdiction as defined in RCW 3.02.010 Not ship captains, notice. Solemnization is not required. RCW 26.04.010(4) says No regularly licensed or ordained minister or any priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any religious organization is required to solemnize or recognize any marriage. A regularly licensed or ordained minister or priest, imam, rabbi, or similar official of any religious organization shall be immune from any civil claim or cause of action based on a refusal to solemnize or recognize any marriage under this section. There is no similar waiver for non-religious officiants. The First Amendment is theoretically what has limited governments ability to require priests to violate their religious beliefs; but I would not be surprised if that changes in the near future. In which case, permissive laws like the Washington law could be trumped by federal anti-discrimination law.

The various news stories are somewhat unclear about what this bill actually does, so let us look at the text of the bill. The bill would (in addition to other changes not specifically connected with sexual identity or orientation) create section 1001.42 (8)(c)(3), reading: A school district may not encourage classroom discussion about sexual orientation or gender identity in primary grade levels or in a manner that is not age-appropriate or developmentally appropriate for students. Exactly what it means for "A school district" to "encourage classroom discussion" is less than clear. If such discussion is not on the syllabus, nor suggested by the administration, but a teacher starts it, would this law ban it? Note that no penalty is specified for violation, although parental suits against a school district are authorized by the new subsaection 1001.42 (8)(c)(4). On its face the bill appears to prohibit the district from "encouraging" any such discussion in the primary grades (K-3 it seems), and from encouraging it if such discussion is not "age-appropriate" in other grades. As to the question of whether this bill, if it becomes law (as seems likely) would violate anyone's constitutional rights, that is a bit tricky. Teachers and students both have First Admendment rights even during school (see Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) for the key case) but this bill does not purport to prohibit a teacher from making any particular statement. The state does have considerable authority to regulate the curriculum of schools, particularly public schools, and what shall occur there. How this provision would be enforced, and what sort of speech, if any, was actually prohibited under it would probably be important in any lawsuit over its constitutionality. A law that prohibited any mention of sexual identity in school would probably be unconstitutional, but this bill does not claim to do that. If it does that in practice, that would probably weigh against it.

Freedom of Religion Concerns I doubt that this policy would be held to be unlawful on First Amendment freedom of religion grounds. Indeed, such requirements usually exclude church-related service. Also, I don't see how this policy discriminates against your religion specifically. It seems on its face to apply to all religions equally. Even if "Church-related" is read broadly to include both service that benefits a church, and also service that is organized by a church, that doesn't preclude you from coming up with some other kind of service that is neither of these things. Why would you be prevented from coming up with service that is neither of these things when other students do not? Unless you have also undertaken Holy Orders or something, in which case 100% of your time away from school would be devoted to your church, it is hard to see what the problem would be with this requirement for you as opposed to someone else. And, it would probably be improper for a public school to allow you to use religious activities to satisfy a graduation requirement - that would sound like an establishment clause violation. Some of the relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases are: Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington School District v. Schempp (1963) This pair of cases shaped the modern understanding of how the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment constrains prayer in public schools. In Engel, the Court struck down a New York State rule that allowed public schools to hold a short, nondenominational prayer at the beginning of the school day. The Court decided that these prayers amounted to an “official stamp of approval” upon one particular kind of prayer and religious service, and said that, since teachers are agents of the federal government, the scheme violated the Establishment Clause. The reasoning in Engel was also applied in Schempp, in which the Court struck down a Pennsylvania policy that required all students to read 10 Bible verses and say the Lord’s Prayer at the beginning of each day. While a student could get an exemption with a parent’s note, the Warren Court decided that this still amounted to an unconstitutional government endorsement of a particular religious tradition. Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) This case adjudicated a different sort of Establishment Clause challenge, where the controversy dealt with a statute providing financial support for teacher salaries and textbooks in parochial schools. The Burger Court unanimously decided that this financial aid scheme violated the Establishment Clause and delineated the governing precedent for Establishment Clause cases known as the Lemon test. Under Lemon, statutes (1) must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have primary effects that neither inhibit nor advance religion; and (3) cannot foster an “excessive government entanglement with religion.” The Court held that this scheme violated the third prong of the Lemon test. Allowing Church-related community service projects could implicate both the second and third prongs of the Lemon test. In a pertinent ruling, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that no public funds be used to assist religious organizations, even if this prevented a facially neutral voucher program from treating religious and non-religious schools equally. The opinion in this 2015 case reviews some of the relevant law. A critical portion of the analysis is that aid to religious institutions must be limited to institutions that do not discriminate on the basis of religion and that supporting religious institutions at the K-12 level is more of a concern than doing so at the higher educational level. A Church, however, would (and should) discriminate on the basis of religion. In General There has been consideration of whether community service requirements, in general, are constitutional. Generally, courts have upheld the programs. See also here. In particular, Rhode Island is in the 1st Circuit of the federal courts, which has expressly ruled that community service requirements are constitutional. A 1999 law review article in the Duke Law Journal considers the issue from several perspectives. So does a 1997 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review article. A 1916 case called Butler v. Perry is a particularly strong precedent in favor of the proposition that mandatory service is constitutional, despite arguments to the contrary under the 13th Amendment. The issue was discussed in the New York Times in a 2003 article. Both are concerned about the involuntary servitude aspect of the requirement, but given that school attendance may be mandatory, and a community service requirement is one, relatively unconstrained aspect of mandatory educational activity, this isn't a very easy case to make.

Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).

It is perfectly legal and, many would argue, reasonable to have secular reasons to do something that happen to align with religious reasons. In other words, just because there's a religious reason to do something doesn't invalidate secular reasons to do the same thing. The New York Times had an article in 2013 that explained the origin of the federal holidays in 1870: Congress acknowledged that Jan. 1 is "commonly called New Year's Day" and Dec. 25 is "commonly called Christmas Day." and further on in the article: If you read the language of the [1870] bill, it's clear that Congress chose dates commonly celebrated as holidays by the American people, not for religious reasons but because of a history of recognition and celebration on those dates. The federal holidays make sense from an efficiency perspective. If a significant number of federal employees will be taking those days off for celebratory purposes then it doesn't make sense to open federal offices if there's not enough staff. Federal holidays only apply to federal employees and the District of Columbia. There's no requirement that your private employer, state employer or you recognize those holidays.

Your beliefs about your past and your mission would probably be considered to be personal religious beliefs. As Israel does not have a state religion this does not have any legal significance (except it may make a difference as to which religious court is considered to have jurisdiction over your family disputes). Your religious beliefs do not override the law, because otherwise anyone could make anything legal for themselves just by declaring a belief that it was moral. Hence you will be subject to all the same laws as everyone else. If you break the law and claim your beliefs as justification then you may be judged unfit to stand trial by reason of insanity and committed to a mental hospital.

There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.

I am a notary public in Vermont and have had to deal with people who had name variations. Readers of Law StackExchange like to citations to reliable sources; I'm not going to do that, just describe my experience. Many states do indeed allow a person to adopt a new name through usage. Government agencies and large commercial agencies don't like that, and they can and do thwart the law by imposing their own administrative procedures. If you don't like their procedures, fine, give a lawyer a $20,000 retainer, have the lawyer sue, and wait three years. And after spending all that money, the court might find that although it isn't a crime for a person to change their name by usage, there is no law requiring the administrative agency to accept it. If you don't have tens of thousands of dollars to waste or years to wait, you have two choices. Get married, and use the marriage license as evidence of your name change. The format of marriage licenses is different in every state, so how well this works depends on the state. The other option is to get a court-ordered name change.

Processes for a law to be passed In the US, what is the process for passing a new law? What are the stages and what are the regulatory bodies involved? Does it depend on the type of law? Also, once a law is passed, is there any legal procedure by which such law can be withdrawn? Finally, are there any international bodies which can override a US law?

"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).

It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.

The provisions of the credit card account agreement will be governed by Delaware law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The provisions of the online services agreement will be governed by New York law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The electronic communications agreement will be governed by the law of the place with the most significant connection to any disputed issues arising under it. It could also be considered to be an extension of the online services agreement rather than a separate agreement. UDAP is an acronym referring the state deceptive trade practices acts. The unfair act involves non-receipt of paperless billing statements. Even with this level of detail, I don't believe it is possible to know in advance which of the agreements is implicated and which state's laws will be held to apply (or if the differences between the laws of the candidate states is even material on the issue in question). These issues are decided on a case by case basis when there is a mishmash of facts and the outcomes are not terribly predictable. It also isn't obvious that there is a provision covering the conduct in question in any of the three potentially relevant states. The Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act doesn't appear to clearly apply to financial services at all. New York's application to financial services is quite narrow and subject to an exception for conduct in conformity with federal law. A failure to provide an invoice, without more, isn't necessarily a deceptive trade practice at all. All in all, there isn't a straightforward or easy answer to this question that can be reached from the information provided.

The concept of "ignorance" of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.

Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.

Unless there is a law or regulation against it, it is legal. However in a big government it can be practically impossible to determine whether something is legal. For example, nobody even knows how many criminal statutes have been promulgated by the U.S. federal government. And that's nothing compared to the volume of executive regulation and judicial case-law that determines whether something is illegal. I.e., in practice determining that something is legal is a bit like proving a negative. Furthermore, if you look long enough some argue that you can probably find some law under which almost any action could be considered illegal. Note also that even if it is not against the law, it could be proscribed by contract (read your Terms and Conditions!), and breach of contract is in general – but with an astonishing number of exceptions! – illegal.

No. This is black-letter constitutional law. From Article 1, section 9: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.

What is considered "public" in the context of taking videos or audio recordings? According to the answers in this question it's legal to photograph someone in public without their consent. I'm assuming the answers still hold true for video or audio recording (such as what can be done with a smart phone). What counts as public? For example, if you're at the gym or you're in an office and record yourself and by chance someone else gets in it, or a conversation is overheard, is that illegal? Or if you paid to watch a sporting event at a stadium? There are certainly times when T.V. shows do it, such as Candid Camera, and I seem to recall a news station who would use a hidden camera carried by the interviewer. In this video someone recorded how easy it was for him to break into the building and I don't think he had prior approval to do so. I'm targeting the question towards Canada.

In the U.S. this is a notoriously perilous area of the law, particularly because the laws regarding recording vary so much between the states. A good source for this question is the RCFP. To give you an example: In Pennsylvania it is a felony to record "oral communication" in any circumstance in which the speaker would be justified in expecting it to not be recorded. Legally, as soon as you turn on an audio recorder in PA, you had better make sure nobody unaware that you're recording wanders within range of your microphone!

The United States has a fairly strict definition of where you have an expectation of privacy, a public bus certainly isn't a private place. In public, anyone can take pictures and video of anyone or anything else. You may have some sort of case if the girl were to use those photos to knowingly help your father violate the restraining order, but it doesn't sound like you believe that was the case.

As an example, under the laws of Colorado, USA, deleting the footage would be a crime. See CRS 18-8-610: A person commits tampering with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he: (a) Destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with intent to impair its verity or availability in the pending or prospective official proceeding; If you cause a crash, you should certainly believe that you are going to be sued, and a lawsuit is definitely an official proceeding. And it sounds like your purpose in deleting the footage is to prevent it from being used in that lawsuit. So you'd be clearly guilty under this law. It is a class 6 felony, carrying a sentence of 12-18 months in prison and a fine of $1,000 to $100,000. It may be counterintuitive, but according to a law firm, a digital video would be considered physical evidence: Physical evidence may include electronic records, videos, or audio recordings. This includes emails, text messages, social media messages, image files, video files, and computer files. If you don't delete the video, it is likely to be demanded by the plaintiff during the discovery process so that it can be entered into evidence. Rule 37 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure lists the sanctions that can be imposed if you refuse, such as: charging you for legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs in trying to obtain it assuming that the video proves whatever the plantiffs say it would show (e.g. that you were speeding, driving recklessly, etc) entering a default judgment against you (the plaintiffs automatically win the suit, as if you had refused to show up in court) holding you in contempt of court, which can lead to you being put in jail until you choose to comply, as well as fined.

You can read about the obligation to access public records under Kentucky law here. This page is the Louisville PD' statement about what is available. They state that "Some items have been redacted, blurred or withheld for privacy or legal reasons", noting for example that the statute "exempts from disclosure under the Open Records Act information that, if disclosed, would create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Any further reference to redactions for personal privacy /concerns is also made pursuant to this law and/or HIPAA". The plaintiff's filing is not available and the police department has not commented, so we don't know exactly what is being demanded. However, the PD has not claimed that they are withholding the requested records for legal reasons, and the media alleges that the suit alleges that the PD lied about the existence of said records (note the double allegation). Body-worn cameras are specifically included here, and this part says that you can sue in county court. FOIA does not apply, because the Lousiville PD is not an agency of the US government.

There are multiple issues with what you are trying to do, including issues with copyright, personality rights, and data protection. You are trying to use other people's content and likeness for your advertisement. Unless you are certain that you can do this in your relevant jurisdictions, without their consent, this sounds like a very bad idea. At least under GDPR, “but they made it public” is not an excuse. Personal data is personal data regardless of how you acquire it. The GDPR also has a very broad concept of identifiability that goes beyond direct identifiers or PII. If you want to use other people's personal data, you need a legal basis, and must provide them notice about your processing. Consent (informed opt-in) is one legal basis, legitimate interest (opt-out) another. You are suggesting to avoid this by blurring PII, but you may also have to blur other content that is indirectly identifiable. Real anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is a really hard problem. In some cases, a legitimate interest is able to avoid such problems. E.g. if I make a video with commentary about a Tweet, it would likely be OK to show surrounding personal data like the responses including the identities of the various accounts, to the degree that this is relevant to the commentary and/or necessary for proper attribution. However, that commentary likely has strong protections under freedom of expression. At least from an European viewpoint, a tutorial, demo, or advertisement would not have a freedom of expression argument that would shift a GDPR legitimate interest balancing test in your favour. Instead of blurring almost everything in your video or working on GDPR compliance, content licenses, and release forms, you should consider a different solution: create dummy content just for your videos. You can use your own content, and maybe add a dummy profile.

It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a "public forum", First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may "reserve the forum for its intended purposes": but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time". In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying "We don't want people filming inside the holding area" is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.

GDPR seems quite clear that if you are recording calls, video and/or audio, you must get consent. Wrong. The GDPR requires that your have a legal basis for processing personal data. Consent is a legal basis but there are others. With respect to note taking, the GDPR only applies to “personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” So, if they notes are not about an individual (and many B2B phone calls will not be) or are neither automated nor filed, the GDPR does not apply. If they are captured by the GDPR, you need to have a legal basis for the notes. Again, consent is one but it is not the only one.

Ark. Code 5-60-120 is very clear that the act of intercepting is a crime. Not just "recording and using", not just "recording", but intercepting in any way. Specifically: It is unlawful for a person to intercept a wire, landline, oral, telephonic communication, or wireless communication, and to record or possess a recording of the communication unless the person is a party to the communication or one (1) of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception and recording. Intercepting is illegal, therefore it is not "okay". Perhaps the "sort of a lawyer" was speaking of the probability of getting caught doing it.

Can a shopping mall force Pokemon Go players to leave? To add to the recent influx of legal questions about Pokemon Go, I'd like to ask: Can a shopping mall force people playing Pokemon Go to leave (without fear of legal repercussions)? I heard from a friend that a shopping mall declared that anyone playing Pokemon Go in the store would be kicked out. But I imagine myself walking into such a mall, and an employee comes over and asks "Stop playing Pokemon Go or leave." My response is perhaps "No." or maybe alternatively "Can you prove I'm playing Pokemon Go? And no you may not inspect my personal belongings." What can they legally do? For example, (for a specific legal domain) lets say I'm in New York. And if the short answer is yes, are there any ways players could twist the situation? For one example, could players sue the store for discrimination? Or some other way? Would the decision in any way put the store in a tricky legal situation?

I think you would have difficulty distorting the situation - Pokemon Go is not magic that defies existing laws, and this would be no different to a mall issuing a trespass notice (which is effectively how they would kick you out) for any other reason. I would question the ability of a store to "Arrest" you - that is a job for the police - After they trespass you (ie by giving you notice to leave), if you come back again then they can call the police to arrest you - but its not as clear-cut as someone seeing you playing a game and arresting you. I don't think Pokemon players are a "protected class" of people, so finding a valid cause of action might be tricky. About the best you could do would be to talk with your wallet (ie shop elsewhere with your friends), but for my money that would make me more likely to go to that mall !

Due to competition/antitrust laws it can be illegal, more so if the search engine is dominant in the market. This has actually been realized in the EU where they fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing their market dominance and favouring their own Google Shopping service in search results. For further information, that fine has been specifically addressed on this site. In the US, this has not yet come to such a dramatic penalty, but there have been investigations. The FTC has investigated similar search results manipulation among other antitrust issues, but ultimately decided not to file a lawsuit as the changes to the search algorithms "could be plausibly justified as innovations that improved Google’s product." Following this inaction, as of November 2017, the state of Missouri is also investigating Google on the same issue. I'm not certain if manipulating search results on its own is illegal, but with market dominance (like what Google has), it certainly is.

The web-browser game was copyrighted the moment it was created by the individual. It did not need a copyright notice to be copyrighted, or a TOS to inform you of copyright. The individual was fully within the law to claim infringement and demand you stop disturbing your mod as an unauthorized change to their game. They should have had a TOS up when they started distributing the game, but that's their choice. The developer could - or have their attorney - send their own legal "takedown notice" of infringement directly to you rather than Tweet about it or approach Google. Google's takedown and your "copyright strike" is different than your original copyright violation and involves Google's TOS - Google Chrome Web Store Developer Agreement | Google Chrome - regarding copyright violations of apps and code under distribution. By your use of the store, Google reserves the right to remove your extensions when there are ...violations of intellectual property rights, including patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, or other proprietary right of any party,... And, the original game being free and your mod being free rarely matters in copyright law and in cases of infringement. That's something a court would decide on the case and in looking at precedent(s). ...can I get into legal trouble for this? You could be sued by the maker of the game in civil court; that's up to them. Google's recourse is to simply remove the mod from the store and possibly restrict your use of their service(s), according to their TOS. For more background, see the Law SE Meta post I have a question about copyright. What should I read before I ask it? .

Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.

united-states There is no general rule against one company or person buying both broadcasting rights and merchandising rights to a particular piece of content in the US. There are anti-monopoly/anti-trust laws, but those generally only apply if a particular entity holds a monopoly or a commanding market position in a whole market sector. If one firm held the rights to 80% of all online games, for example, an anti-trust action might well be warranted. But a single game or property is not generally considered to be a market sector for anti-trust purposes. Exactly what the proper market sector is in such cases is often a complex, technical, and highly disputed issue. The "original owner of the IP" can decide who s/he wishes to sell that IP to -- nothing requires, or forbids, that different sets of rights be sold to the same buyer. The original owner will attempt to get the best deal available. Sometimes that is a very lucrative deal, and sometimes it is far from that. As long as unlawful methods are not used to induce a sale, whatever bargain the parties make is generally acceptable to the law. I do not know who did, or did not, buy any of the rights to Squid Game, and that info might not be publicly available. But there is no law that I know of against the same party having both broadcast and marketing rights to it, and perhaps other rights as well.

In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed.

Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?

Getting permission from the game owner would be a sensible approach. If you get it, great. Then you could do it with the owner's blessing. It's possible to do your write up without the owner's permission, but then you have to be much more careful. For instance, the names of games cannot be copyrighted. No one can prevent you from writing "A Guide to Bridge," or "A Guide to Chess," etc. On the other hand, some games are trademarked, in which case you will need to attach a TM (trademark) symbol when referring to them. In this case, see a lawyer. You are also allowed to discuss the game itself "in your own words," but you must be careful not to "plagiarize" anything from the rules, or the official game description. That is, while you can refer to specific aspects of a game, such as building houses and hotels, the leash on copying is fairly short, as little as five words. This does not refer to five words in a common sequence referring to a single thought like "The United States of America," but it could refer to five words in an original or unusual sequence such as "I think therefore I am," by Rene Descartes, or "X houses and Y hotels," where the numbers X and Y define the number of houses and hotels in a certain board game trademarked (I believe) by Parker Brothers.

Do I have to demand copyright rights from a friend? Long story short. I've been a developing a game for a ~2 years now and release is coming. In the middle of the development I was helped by my friend (she is a designer). She helped me to create most of game's UI and some of the arts. This is about 70% of all game's artwork. Everything else is on me. We never agreed in writing or verbally on any reward and it was a friendship team up. She wanted to gain some experience and I needed a designer. Right now she is not in the team for a personal reasons. We worked around 3 months in total. All assets done under my tight control. The game is set to be released on Apple AppStore. It will not be free. Plus I own all the source files as she gave it to me. The question is: do I have to retrieve any copyrights from her? If yes then how? What is the process of retrieving rights if there is a demand for one? I wish I could use all the assets exclusively and I want to be safe from just-in-case situations. The thing is overcomplicated with that she is in the other country right now.

You don't need the copyright. You need a license that allows you to use the artwork. If there was no agreement in writing or verbally about a payment, then she owns the copyright on all the artwork she created, and you have no license. Publishing your app without copyright or license would be legally very dangerous; it would actually be copyright infringement. You have no right to demand the copyright or a license. You can persuade the designer, usually by paying money, or by paying some percentage of the income from the app, to give you the copyright or a license to use the graphics. And you definitely want things in writing. How to get a license? You find the person, send her a letter asking for a license, which would be for example a letter saying "I hereby grant s1ddok the non-exclusive right to include the artwork listed below, to which I hold the copyright, in the applications XXX and YYY, and to sell copies of those applications including the artwork, in exchange for a payment of $ZZZ" or something similar. She may do this if offered an appropriate amount money, or a percentage of the sales or profits, or some amount per application downloaded. A copyright transfer is a bit more complicated (especially if she is abroad) and will also cost you more, because copyright transfer means she loses the right to her own works.

I'd like to sell t-shirts with the direwolve emblem of the "House Stark" in Game of Thrones, and of course, I've been immediately asking myself if HBO which produces the serie actually had some copyright on that emblem. This is not a close case. Your proposal, or anything remotely similar, would almost certainly constitute a copyright violation and result in a lawsuit by the producers of the show if not done with a license from the company. They would easily win this lawsuit. The damages that they were awarded would greatly exceed the amount of profits you made from your sales (realistically, more than a $1,000 per T-Shirt plus many tens of thousands of dollars of legal fees and costs would be typical). You would probably have to go bankrupt and some or all of the damages award against you might survive bankruptcy because your copyright violation was an intentional act. Every episode of the TV show is a copyrighted work and what you are proposing would be a "derivative work" since it is derived from the copyrighted TV show. Derivative works made without a license from a a copyright holder are a violation of copyright laws. There are also probably myriad specifically trademarked symbols and phrases that are registered with the appropriate government official (the Patent and Trademark Office for U.S. trademarks). So, it is highly likely that there would be a trademark violation as well if a license was not obtained. Your basic business model is at its very heart and essence fundamentally illegal. There is nothing you can do to fix it without getting written permission from the publishers who have probably long ago sold the rights to do this to somebody else for an immense amount of money. You should abandon this idea and try to come up with another business venture instead.

Yes, such a site can be created without infringing copyright Facts about the game are facts.They are not protected by copyright. Criticism of, and comment about the game, is an activity protected by the US First Amendment. Making such comments is very likely to be fair use under US copyright law. In general the author of a work, such as a book or a game, or the maker of a product, has no right to grant or withhold permission to discuss or comment on the work. This is true not only under US law, but also in the law of most countries (perhaps of all countries). The name of the game might well be protected as a trademark. But that does not allow the trademark owner to prevent discussion of the game, clearly identified by the name of of the game. As long as nothing is being sold or rented, or advertised for sale or rental under that name, and there is no attempt to claim that the site is sponsored or approved by the trademark owner, and there is no likelihood of confusion, there is no trademark infringement. This is true under US law, and under the trademark laws of most other countries. A wiki is a specific technology. It can be used for community discussion, or for a company's internal documentation, or for any of many other purposes. Wikipedia has popularized this technology. Not all community discussion sites are wikis, however, nor are all wikis for community discussion. Just as not all novels are books printed on paper, and not all books are novels. In any case, setting up a wiki about a topic such as a game, a movie, or a novel does not require permission from the owner or creator of the game or of any trademarks associated with the game or work. The same would be true for a discussion forum about such a game or work that is not a wiki. If a wiki uses excessive quotes from game dialog, or uses the game's logo without permission, or reproduces other game assets, such as character art, maps, and the like without permission, that might be copyright infringement.

No It says right on the page you linked: These downloads are not public domain, as they are parts of content that has already been licensed and distributed. Although using these downloads may be permissible as long as the project itself falls under the rule of "Fair Use," it is ill-advised to use these downloads for any project intended for profitable gain or commercial advertisement, unless otherwise stated by Kyutwo.com.

Under US law your proposed use would be considered copyright infringement of the film/TV copyrights unless it is considered "fair use." The evaluation for "fair use" defense can only be done by a Federal Court judge as part of a lawsuit. The judge will evaluate the fair use defense using a four part test that evaluates: (1) the purpose and character of your use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion taken; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market. This is a very fact specific inquiry, so it isn't amenable to easy yes or no answers. However, based on your description your use wouldn't be very transformative under step (1) since you are using frames from the movie unchanged, and you are using it for commercial purposes as opposed to criticism/commentary/education. Nor does step (2) seem to favor you since the anime films are not heavily based in facts that you would be reusing/publishing. Step (3) would likely favor you since the amount of material taken is very small (1 second) compared to the work as a whole. Likewise, step (4) would also likely favor you since your use is unlikely to impact the commercial market for the original film/tv show. If you intend to rely on the "fair use" defense, then you should definitely hire an attorney who can give you an individualized opinion rather than the generalities I've provided here. As to other GIF users in the App Store, they may (1) have licensed the underlying content, (2) be blatantly infringing the copyrights for the content and hoping not to get caught, (3) relying on fair use (see above), and/or (4) claim DMCA safe harbor as a message board so long as user are the ones uploading the GIF content.

Making the game free makes very little if any difference to the position here. There are two kinds of IP issues that could possibly be involved: copyright and trademark. Note: both copyright and trademark are civil, not criminal issues (except in very limited circumstances which do not apply to the situation described in the question). You will not "face charges" but might possibly be sued. If you are asked to take down such a game and comply, this might end the matter, but if an IP holder claimed that damages had occurred before the game was taken down a suite might possibly still be brought against the developer. Copyright Names, like titles and other short phrases, cannot be protected by copyright. As long as no other text from anyone else, and no images are copied or imitated, copyright is not infringed. This means that there are no copyright issues. Game mechanics and rules cannot be copyrighted, although the words of game rules can be. Therefore, fair use which is a strictly US copyright legal concept, is not involved here. Neither is fair dealing, a somewhat similar legal concept from the UK and some commonwealth and European countries. Trademark Here is the main issue for this situation. The names of individual Pokémon characters are probably (almost surely) protected as trademarks. That means you cannot use them to identify your game, or any other product or service, and you cannot use them to advertise or market your game. This is true even if the "selling price" is $0. The use here does not seem to be nominative use, as you are not intending to refer to Pokémon or any of its variants. You are just reusing the names. As long as you make it very clear that your game is not made by, nor in any way authorized or endorsed by the makers of Pokémon, this is probably not trademark infringement. But if the makers of Pokémon become aware of your game, they might well send you a cease and desist letter, and they might file a trademark infringement suit. Even if you were to win such a suit, as I think you might well do, it might be costly to defend. Could you alter the names to ones you invent form yourself? That might save a lot of trouble and hassle. What is the value to you in reusing the well-known Pokémon names?

Copyrights don't apply to the names used. You mean trademarks. You copyright your game and you trademark the name. http://www.reddit.com/r/gamedev/comments/11v69k/using_a_guns_name_in_your_video_game/ Basically, it wouldn't be wise to use trademarked names in your game. Even though it's unlikely you would be sued and even if you were, you could possibly fight it under Fair Use, but do you want to take the chance? If some gun company decided they didn't like how you used their name, even if they have little to no grounds for a case, they can STILL sue. Anybody can sue for pretty much any reason where there is doubt. If they have enough money to throw around, they can drag you through the mud, ruin your business and then just lift their lawsuit. They don't need to win in court, just destroy you. Keep in mind that even if you don't use the name, if the gun in your game is an accurate replica of the real thing, it could still be a trademark issue. EDIT: Something you could consider though is asking permission. You never know. They may simply not care. You might even try propositioning them to pay YOU to have their gun showcased in your game. It's not entirely uncommon for companies to be willing to pay for a bit of endorsement advertising.

No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.

Why does the law give immunity from crime, to children below age 12? I understand if children below the age of 7 were granted immunity, because they don't understand very well, what crime is. Children above age 10 definitely do understand. So why does the law absolve them? If that's the case, then there are many other adults who have a weak understanding of right and wrong. They could have been absolved too. Are children absolved because if they were jailed or kept in a remand home, it could have a deep psychological impact on them? Or is there some other reason?

Children below age 7 (or age 10) aren't granted immunity; they were not tried often because they are arrested in a rare case (less than 2% in all juvenilen offenders) (refering to Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice, National Academies Press) Note that people aged 16 or 17 (or even 15) is already triable for criminal charges (see R v Balham Youth Court). Back to your question, why do juvenile offenders are sometimes not being charged in juvenile courts? There are mainly two reasons: They have less experience than adults. Although adults and juvenile can take a similar approach in making decisions, juvenile lacks experience to make themselves vulnerable to misperceptions. Which could somehow be said that they lost the intention to commit crime (mens rea) Juvenile lacks understanding to legal process. For children under 15, they are not familiar with the rights they have, like the right to have a lawyer, or the right to remain silence. This could make it unjust to order them appear before a judge (or magistrate) to be tried. Therefore, juvenile offenders are sometimes absolved from litigation. Need to note that, in some jurisdiction, juvenile offenders (under 15) can also be charged in juvenile courts summarily and be sent to rehabilitation center, or even be sentenced.

(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).

There's only one crime that could be applicable in this case, section 145 (1) of the Criminal Code: 145 (1) Every person who escapes from lawful custody or who is, before the expiration of a term of imprisonment to which they were sentenced, at large in or outside Canada without lawful excuse, is guilty of (a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. While the term "lawful excuse" isn't well defined in Canadian law, and its interpretation varies from crime to crime, it certainly includes obeying what ultimately amounts to being an order to leave the prison. If there's any doubt about this being a valid excuse for the prisoner, the same doubt would apply to same excuse any prison guard would have for helping the prisoner to "escape". A person has no right to be imprisoned, and so has no basis to insist remaining imprisoned or to protest their release. Being released early from prison isn't a crime, and can happen legitimately for a number of reasons. On the other hand, remaining in the prison after being ordered to leave would be trespassing at least.

Do criminals really "have no recourse" if their ill-gotten property is stolen by a third party? Basically yes. At sentencing, they can argue that restitution or fines should be limited because the money was in turn stolen from them and they don't have it. For example, I once had a client who was the sole heir to the estate of someone who had a substantial amount of illegal drugs in their possession at the time of the decedent's death (worth perhaps $100,000 USD), but the illegal drugs were stolen after the death of the decedent by someone known to my client. There was no legal way for my client to gain possession that stolen property or its worth.

However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.

The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now!

At the federal level, per 18 USC 751, escaping is a crime. In United States v. Allen, 432 F.2d 939 it was held that an arrest need not be lawful in order for an escape to be illegal; Laws v. US states that "This court has said that a sentence imposed for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751 is 'not affected by the validity of the sentences being served at the time of the escape'", giving numerous citations. I don't find cases where the escapee was exonerated; prosecutors have the discretion to not prosecute for committing a crime, so it would be hard to find a case where the legality of such a conviction was upheld (also, hard to find a jury willing to convict in such circumstances).

The child does not have a legal right to determine how Iowa's compulsory education law is obeyed. The first section of the law says that the custodian of a child who is of compulsory attendance age shall cause the child to attend some public school or an accredited nonpublic school, or place the child under competent private instruction or independent private instruction and no other provision gives the child veto power. However, on the upper end, a child "under sixteen years of age by September 15 is of compulsory attendance age", with thus turning 16 during the school year being subject to compulsory education until the end of the school year". Let's say that the child turned 16 on Labor Day, then the compulsory education law does not apply. Still, until the age of majority, parents have the custodial right to make decisions in the best interests of the child. That right can be terminated, see Chapter 600a. Under certain circumstances, a child can petition the court for emancipation, which means that they will be treated as an adult under the law, and can therefore exercise their own judgment and live with the consequences. You would look at 600A.8 to see the grounds for termination – an objection "I don't like their choice of school" will not qualify.

Do I have to update old jQuery Libraries to prevent my source code from being GPL? I'm trying to reuse some old source code in what is going to be a commercial web application. This old code was made using jQuery 1.2.1, which is dual licensed under the MIT and GPL licenses. I've seen that recently, jQuery has got rid of the GPL licence and now it's only MIT. I rather not use newer versions since I'd have to test the code again to make sure no bugs were added. So, Does this change of licence affect old versions of jQuery? I mean, if jQuery 1.12 is MIT only, does that remove GPL from jQuery 1.2.1? Most importantly, does this put my code under GPL? Do I have to update old jQuery Libraries to prevent my source code from being GPL? Thanks in advance.

Just because newer versions of jQuery are available under one license doesn't indicate what license(s) older versions are available under. With permission of all copyright holders, the license can be modified. However, it does require the permission of all copyright holders. You would have to see the license terms distributed with jQuery 1.2.1 to see what license(s) that particular version is under. However, the GPL doesn't impact you in this case, since the library is dual licensed. As the recipient, get to choose the license that you wish to comply with. In this example, you can choose to comply with either the GPL license or the MIT license. Since the MIT license is easier for you to comply with, you simply need to conform to the terms of that license in your application.

The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological measures that effectively control access to a copyrighted work. So you can't legally "crack" the software, period -- even if you own a disc containing the software and have a valid license to use it, a license to use the work is not authorization to circumvent access controls. So if the disc is copy-protected, by my understanding of the DMCA, you're kinda screwed. (The company might be willing to provide you a replacement copy, even if only to maintain the illusion that the software is "licensed, not sold". But you can't make one yourself.) Likewise, if you have a copy of the disc but have lost the license key, you're screwed. Even if you could prove beyond any doubt that you are the licensee, there's not any law i'm aware of that would compel the copyright owner to provide you another license key. And courts have held that distribution of license keys without authorization is a violation of the DMCA. So whoever might provide you another key, if they're not the copyright holder, has broken the law. If you managed to copy the disc from a friend (without circumventing any kind of copy protection), and had your own license key, you might be in a better position. Many EULAs allow you to make a backup copy. Even if they didn't, copyright law does, so there's a possible case for fair use.

Broadly speaking, the difference is the "sharealike" clause of CC-BY-SA. Any derivative of a CC-BY-SA work must itself be licensed CC-BY-SA, whereas a derivative of an "MIT with attribution" work can be under any license the author wants. There are a number of other differences in the fine print (eg. CC forbids DRM, where MIT doesn't), but that's the big one.

Being or not being open source makes fairly little difference in trademark law. If a commercial firm (Yoyodyne, say) had used the name "Portable Network Graphics" and the abbreviation "PNG" in trade, and taken such further steps as would be needed to protect it in the relevant countries, that firm would have a protectable trademark. Note that in some countries, a trademark must be registered to have any protection at all (much of the EU follows this rule). In others, use in commerce can offer some protection even without registration (the US follows this rule). Had this happened (in an alternate reality) Yoyodyne could have sent a cease and desist letter when open source developers started using the mark. If the devs did not cease, Yoyodyne might have obtained an injunction, or damages for trademark infringement, or both. They could also have issued a takedown notie to the site hosting the project. But had Yoyodyne failed to defend the mark effectively and allowed it to become generic, Yoyodyne might have lost all rights to it. Also, had Yoyodyne ceased to use it in trade for a significant period, they might have lost rights. This is a place where the different laws in different countries might lead to different results. Note that "Portable Network Graphics" is rather descriptive, and not particularly distinctive. Descriptive marks, like "Tasty Pizza" generally get weaker protection, while more distinctive marks, such as "LuAnn's Tastee Pizza" are more strongly protected, in general. Again this depends on the country, and the specific facts. In general the first to use, or to register a mark, gets the rights. When one entity is the first to use, but a different one is first to register, things can get confusing, and results will be different in different countries. Note that a Cease and Desist letter is not a legal requirement. It is a threat of possible future legal action, and often an offer to avoid such action if the recipient does as the sender requests. The recipient can comply with the letter, wait for court action, or try to make some sort of compromise deal. Open source projects, as other answers suggest, often choose to comply.

It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t.

You are concerned that your application is somehow a derivative work of MariaDB and therefore subject to the GPL. It's not totally clear to me whether that is the case or not. But it doesn't matter, because you are not distributing MariaDB itself (or any other part of your application). You're running it on a server which users are connecting to remotely. From MariaDB's licensing FAQ: Internal usage is free The GPL license only affects code that you distribute to other parties. Internal usage within an organization is totally free and not subject to any conditions. There is no such thing as 'internal distribution' that would restrict the usage of your code by requiring it to be GPLed. Connecting to a remote service that runs MariaDB (or any other GPL software) in the background is also free. For internal programs for which you own all the copyright(s), there is essentially no risk in using GPL software. The argument you can use in your defense is that if the software became GPL as part of the distribution, you as the copyright holder could immediately revert your part back to its original copyright. No one has the right to require you to reveal or redistribute your code to the outside of your organization even if you would have distributed it internally linked with GPL software! If your lawyers are concerned about distributions of software linked with GPL libraries between different legal entities within your organization, you can solve this by distributing your components and the GPL software separately, and have your other entity combining them. You can also switch to use the new LGPL client libraries. The use you have described in your question clearly falls into this case, and the presence of this FAQ item clearly demonstrates that the MariaDB developers intended to allow you to do this. The Free Software Foundation (the people who wrote the GPL) agree with this position for both unmodified copies and derivative works. Technically, you don't need a license to "use" a piece of software at all, assuming you have lawfully obtained it. But you're concerned about the possibility of creating a derivative work, for which a license is required. Fortunately, the GPL doesn't care about derivative works so long as they are not distributed.

Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.

To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.

Is Pokemon Go legal at all in the UK? The Vagrancy Act 1824 has this to say every Person playing or betting in any Street, Road, Highway, or other open and public Place, at or with any Table or Instrument of gaming, at any Game or pretended Game' of Chance outdated or not, I believe this is the law. So... what's the situation here? Edit: because I was asked where did I find this, it's in http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1824/83/pdfs/ukpga_18240083_en.pdf

I've had a good look at the Vagrancy Act, and I have to say that i can't find the text that you're looking for. It's possibly been repealed, in which case it's not, in fact, the law - even if it were, it is unlikely that this provision would have applied to most games, as it appears to be Games or pretended Games of Chance that it targets.

This was attributed to Dumblaws.com, which is now mercifully nonexistent. It is false, as is the supposed law against fishing for whales on Sunday (seriously? Whales in Ohio?). If someone makes such a claim and gives a specific citation like "ORC 1533.02", you can look that law up. Otherwise, you can go to the state's repository of laws, which is searchable (not all states are as enlightened). No laws mention "whale" or "housefly", and only 23 address "fly", only referring to insects in a couple of cases where e.g. bakery showcases must keep out dust and flies. You might take on this collection, hosted by a law firm. I haven't bothered to check if "It is illegal to drive a camel on the highway" in Nevada – that a least verifiably refers to a law that did exist.

If the "Pokeball" image is copyrighted and/or a trademark of Nintendo/whoever makes the Pokemon games, then whoever put that image out there under CC 3.0 BY is in violation and can be sued and will probably lose, and you would be in violation and can be sued and will probably lose. Your penalty would almost certainly be less since your violation was "innocent", that is, you had no way of knowing that the "Pokeball" imagery was somebody's protected intellectual property. ... Except you kind of maybe should know that, unless whoever made the Pokemon games (Nintendo or other) put the image out there and you can verify that, that maybe this license could be bogus and you should consult with who you imagine the owner of that IP may be or an impartial professional who could tell you for sure. I'm thinking if it were me I would do a little more research - and maybe get a paid opinion - if I was really thinking about using this for any but private purposes.

You can’t use pictures You can’t use any of these, nor can you make your own art that is derived from these. That’s copyright infringement and there is no fair use defence because you are specifically trying to do something Nintendo already does. You can reproduce that stats of the Pokémon because stats are facts (even if they are facts about fictional things) and facts are not protected by copyright.

Yes, you are then an online bank. This is an issue that computer games have had to figure out, when it was possible to move money both ways, cash to game gold and game gold to cash. (think Diablo's Real Money Auction House). If you allow people to store cash value in the game, and then take the cash value back out, then you are banking. Even though it's a game, you'll have people using it as a bank, and not playing the game at all but merely using it for funds storage and movement. Even if you surcharge significantly to deter this (i.e. $1 buys 90 game gold, and 110 game gold pays $1), there will always be people willing to pay the surcharge -- criminals. This is the whole point of the Homeland Security-driven "Know Your Customer" laws. The government doesn't want criminals using your real-money-trading platform to launder money. I know that you imagine a business model where this would be awesome. Actually you'll spend most of your time dealing with this kind of thing: Ann Onymous signs up and does nothing on your platform except load the account with money and send it to someone. Harold Hack is longtime customer who is active on the platform in all the normal ways. One day Harold adds a card, and loads an unusual amount of money onto the account. Both of them transfer money to Boris Badguy, who withdraws it. All fine, working as intended. But then, Ann and Harold's credit card payments reverse. They were stolen credit cards. But you're angry at Ann and Harold, and you dun them ferociously to make good their payment per your Terms of Service. Ann is unreachable. You don't believe Harold because deadbeats lie. It takes you awhile to realize this isn't first-party credit card fraud, and Harold's account was actually hacked. Harold doesn't normally post from Moldova at 3:30am. By this time, Boris is in the wind. Unfortunately, your business model doesn't let you make enough money to offset these kinds of losses. And it's hell on customer relations. You finally get arrested for using customer deposits to pay payroll, because you should've been keeping it in escrow. Being a bank is not for amateurs.

This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.

Is it ok to copy the game concept and even with mostly similar content like "fighting", "building houses" etc ? Yes, but ... I should also mention that pretty much my whole User Interface is based on the User Interface from "Parallel Kingdoms" Is copyright violation. Ideas are not protected by IP law. The tangible representation of those ideas (art, words, layout, format etc.) is protected.

"...claiming that the license can be revoked at any time." Of course a game company can revoke their license at any time. The company grants you a license to use the product, and a license is not an obligation on their part to provide the product, or a right to use it on your part. There's nothing illegal about a license or TOS that has clauses which stipulate when the license or TOS can be revoked changed or revoked.

Divorce case with split custody: Age of child when he/she can be moved out of of state without consent of other parent This question is about the case of relocating from one U.S. state (Georgia) to another (Florida) for employment reasons in a situation where The person relocating is a divorcee (a single parent mom). The divorce case was initiated and has been handled in the court in Georgia. The settlement (back in 2005) was a split custody where the father has been obligated to pay a small amount of child support each month. In this case the divorcee would prefer to relocate with the child; the child is currently 12 but it is not clear on whether the child wants to stay with the mom or with the dad (who remarried a couple of years ago). The question stems from the split custody as that would make it difficult for the mom to live in south Florida. The question is, is there a minimum age at which point the child can decide which parent he or she stays with?

Note that I am not a lawyer. All law code here is from the official Georgia Law at LexisNexis. In the case of Georgia, the law regarding a child’s election changed in 2008. Prior to 2008, a 14 year old child could choose with which parent to live, unless the judge determined that the chosen parent is unfit. As proving that a parent is unfit was not always easy, the Georgia General Assembly in 2008 replaced the unfit parent standard with a Best Interests of the Child Standard. This new standard provides more flexibility to the judge in determining custody. Some basic facts about how the law in relation to the child's selection of parent: A parent that wishes to modify an existing custody arrangement must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred that warrants a new decision by the court. If the child is 14 then the child's desire to select the parent may be considered as the "material change in circumstances". However the court will only consider the child's choice if at least two years have passed since the last custody determination. These aspects of the law can be seen in Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 5, which states: (5) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless the parent so selected is determined not to be in the best interests of the child. The parental selection by a child who has reached the age of 14 may, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child; provided, however, that such selection may only be made once within a period of two years from the date of the previous selection and the best interests of the child standard shall apply. Note that the expression "The child's selection for purposes of custody shall be presumptive unless..." is the same as saying that "the child's selection shall be controlling (the decision) unless...". As to children that are between 11 and 14 the law states as follows (Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 6) (6) In all custody cases in which the child has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years, the judge shall consider the desires and educational needs of the child in determining which parent shall have custody. The judge shall have complete discretion in making this determination, and the child's desires shall not be controlling. The judge shall further have broad discretion as to how the child's desires are to be considered, including through the report of a guardian ad litem. The best interests of the child standard shall be controlling. The parental selection of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years shall not, in and of itself, constitute a material change of condition or circumstance in any action seeking a modification or change in the custody of that child. The judge may issue an order granting temporary custody to the selected parent for a trial period not to exceed six months regarding the custody of a child who has reached the age of 11 but not 14 years where the judge hearing the case determines such a temporary order is appropriate. (Note that a "guardian ad litem" is the same as a "legal guardian".) If the child is younger than 11, there is no expectation for the judge to consider the child’s preference when awarding custody. Besides the desire of the child, the judge may consider following factors listed under Georgia statute 19-9-3, article 3: (3) In determining the best interests of the child, the judge may consider any relevant factor including, but not limited to: (A) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between each parent and the child; (B) The love, affection, bonding, and emotional ties existing between the child and his or her siblings, half siblings, and stepsiblings and the residence of such other children; (C) The capacity and disposition of each parent to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child; (D) Each parent's knowledge and familiarity of the child and the child's needs; (E) The capacity and disposition of each parent to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, day-to-day needs, and other necessary basic care, with consideration made for the potential payment of child support by the other parent; (F) The home environment of each parent considering the promotion of nurturance and safety of the child rather than superficial or material factors; (G) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (H) The stability of the family unit of each of the parents and the presence or absence of each parent's support systems within the community to benefit the child; (I) The mental and physical health of each parent; (J) Each parent's involvement, or lack thereof, in the child's educational, social, and extracurricular activities; (K) Each parent's employment schedule and the related flexibility or limitations, if any, of a parent to care for the child; (L) The home, school, and community record and history of the child, as well as any health or educational special needs of the child; (M) Each parent's past performance and relative abilities for future performance of parenting responsibilities; (N) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent, consistent with the best interest of the child; (O) Any recommendation by a court appointed custody evaluator or guardian ad litem; (P) Any evidence of family violence or sexual, mental, or physical child abuse or criminal history of either parent; and (Q) Any evidence of substance abuse by either parent.

The legal responsibility to support a child arises from "parentage" and not "genetic relatedness", therefore one of two identical twins will not be assigned such responsibility simply because of genetic relatedness. However, genetic facts can enter into a legal proceeding for support, and can be evidence to establish parentage. In the US, the rules for determining parentage are generally established by the Uniform Parentage Act, instantiated for instance in Washington state RCW Chapter 26.26A. RCW 26.26A.100 spells out the full set of rules: A parent-child relationship is established between an individual and a child if: (1) The individual gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in RCW 26.26A.700 through 26.26A.785; (2) There is a presumption under RCW 26.26A.115 of the individual's parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding or a valid denial of parentage is made under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265; (3) The individual is adjudicated a parent of the child under RCW 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (4) The individual adopts the child; (5) The individual acknowledges parentage of the child under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under RCW 26.26A.235 or successfully challenged under RCW 26.26A.200 through 26.26A.265 or 26.26A.400 through 26.26A.515; (6) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.600 through 26.26A.635; or (7) The individual's parentage of the child is established under RCW 26.26A.705 through 26.26A.730. §§300-355 govern the use of genetic tests in determining parentage, according to which genetic test results can be evidence of parentage, but §§600 ff specifically address assisted reproduction and surrogacy agreements – RCW 26.26A.610 for example specifically assigns "parentage" to a person who consents to assisted reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent of a child, and under §605, a donor is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction.

The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.

TLDR: get a divorce. Basically, the US (as with most countries) recognizes valid marriages from other jurisdictions that would be valid if performed by the couple in the US. Which means that same sex marriages before Oberfell would not have been recognized but are now. Marriage with minors are not recognized. Multiple simultaneous marriages are not recognized (no second or third husbands or wives). Some common law marriages can have problems with this, as there is no record of the marriage.

In California, the small claims court has jurisdiction over claims up to $10,000. In order to have personal jurisdiction over him: He must have a summons and complaint hand delivered to him (or to certain other people such as an adult who lives in his household, or to his secretary if he has one). This is called "service of process" and there are professionals called "process servers" who can do this for you in most cities. The service of process can take place anywhere in the world and still be valid. The summons and complaint must be hand delivered by a person over the age of eighteen who is not a party to the lawsuit and is not your attorney. The events that form the basis of the lawsuit must have happened in California, not merely the United States (long arm personal jurisdiction), or he must have the summons and complaint personally hand delivered to him in the State of California (tag jurisdiction). If you win, either by default if he fails to respond by the deadline, or following a trial, you will get a piece of paper called a judgment that legally determines that he owes you $X, which you must then enforce. A judgment can be enforced, for example, by garnishing his bank accounts, garnishing monies due to him from an employer or from a sole proprietorship he operates, seizing tangible personal property that he owns with the assistance of a sheriff, or putting a lien on real estate he owns. A judgment from a California small claims court can only be enforced against assets in California. There is a relatively simple process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from any other U.S. state. There is a relatively difficult and expensive process for having a judgment from California turned into a judgment from England that only sometimes works because some aspects of the U.S. civil court system (like punitive damages) are considered to be against public policy in England and are thus not enforceable there. You cannot have someone arrested for failure to pay a civil judgment. Enforcing the judgment is likely to be much more difficult than getting the judgment in your case. It is also possible to make a criminal complaint if the acts genuinely constitute theft. If a prosecutor finds that there is probable cause to back up your claim, the prosecutor could obtain an arrest warrant from the court in the place where the theft took place and that could be served within California when the individual is present in California (i.e., he could be arrested in California, after which the criminal justice process would proceed). Generally, to constitute theft, it must be intentional and must not be a mere breach of an agreement, in which case it is a breach of contract rather than theft. Any theft small enough to be addressed in small claims court would probably not be considered serious enough for the government to request extradition from the U.K. for, a step usually reserved for serious felonies, but if extradiction was sought from the U.K., the process on the U.K. side is described here. Any extradiction request would be handled by the prosecutor's office and law enforcement, in cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies.

We cannot stipulate that a 6 year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault, but that stipulation might be baked into the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, a child under age 8 is statutorily incapable of committing a crime. Between 8 and 12, there is a statutory presumption that a child is incapable of committing a crime, but that is rebuttable. The statute says "Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime", and it say nothing about understanding concepts. Florida law used to allow that a 6 year old can commit a crime, then when they arrested a 6 year old, they changed the law. But, the law says A child younger than 7 years of age may not be taken into custody, arrested, charged, or adjudicated delinquent for a delinquent act or violation of law based on an act occurring before he or she reaches 7 years of age, unless the violation of law is a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08 so a 6 year old can be arrested (charged, tried, convicted) for murder. Virginia does not appear to have any statute declaring 6 year olds to be categorially incapable of committing a crime. The question of capacity is of course a real consideration – insanity remains a defense against criminal charges.

How to Best Help I suggest you ask around at the courthouse. You might need to get advanced permission from the judge. Every courthouse is setup a bit differently so it's hard to say exactly whom you will need to ask. But ultimately that will probably require the judge's advanced approval. Order of Child Support You used the term violation so I will assume the mother has in her possession a copy of the Order of Child Support (OCS) resulting from the divorce or paternity case that determined the amount and timing of support payments she is entitled to. Correct? Aside: If the mother doesn't already have an OCS it's pretty simple to get one. Most states just have a standard set of forms and a formula to apply. There is very little subjectivity involved. Unless one or more of the parties has unreported or variable income. And she can also collect back child support too. Back Child Support AFAIK you are not barred by statute for seeking back support as far back as when dad's obligation began. Which AFAIK is when mom became the primary caregiver. In practical terms, this would be the first day mom had the kids living with her and dad didn't live with them. Interest on Unpaid Child Support Most states allow mom to collect interest on (ordered but) unpaid child support at a rate set by statute. In some states the interest rate is in the 9 to 12% range. You need to compute it using a spreadsheet. You go back to each ordered monthly obligation, calculate the number of months from then until the current date, then multiply that number times the obligation amount times 1/12 of the interest rate. Then add all those months together to get the total. Like I said, a spreadsheet is the easiest way to do this calculation. Motion for Contempt of Court Assuming you have acquired an OCS, enforcement is also pretty straightforward. In some states, the mechanism to force the father to pay is called a Motion for Contempt of Court for violating the OCS. Again, it's so common, unfortunately, most courthouses support pro se litigants by having all the necessary forms on hand and volunteers to help people fill them out! When mom files the contempt motion with the court she will schedule a date for a Show Cause Hearing, at which time dad will need to appear and explain why he should not either pay up or be found in contempt of court. Courts enforce child support VERY strictly. So the paperwork alone should be enough for her to win her case. Unlicensed Practice of Law As for you "helping her" in court. Be very careful. That sounds dangerously like practicing law without a law license. There is a thing called a "bar" in the courtroom that only attorneys or clients are allowed to cross (by practice and tradition). That's where the term bar exam originated. Anyway, if you want to try that, be very careful and you might want to run that by the judge or clerk and get prior approval first because the unlicensed practice of law has the potential to be a sticky wicket. Use of an Interpreter I would be shocked if the court did not make allowances for non-native English speakers to use the services of an interpreter in the courtroom. That's something you definitely need to ask around at the courthouse for all the details. And whether the interpreter needs to be licensed, registered or otherwise approved by the court in advance. Process Service One last point. Make sure to properly process serve dad with the motion and paperwork. Process service is what will bind him to appear at the show cause hearing. You should be able to find forms, instructions and a professional process server by asking around down at the courthouse. Dad will have a chance to respond in writing to the motion prior to the hearing. And mom will have a chance to respond to his response. Ask around at the courthouse how all this works. Especially the deadlines involved. These are also strictly enforced. State Registry Enforcement Assistance One last, last point. In the future, it might help if the OCS made a provision for the father to pay directly to the state registry for child support enforcement. The will keep track of all the payments and can provide enforcement assistance like levying bank accounts and garnishing wages, etc. So that could help with future enforcement. Disclaimer I am not a lawyer. I am not your lawyer and you nor the mom are my client. This is not legal advice. So please don't do anything based on what I write here; if you do, please be aware you do so at your own risk. So seek the advice of a real lawyer if you are going to actually do anything that might create an issue.

12 USC Ch 38A regards single family mortgage foreclosures and 12 USC Ch 38 regards multifamily mortgage foreclosures, however both law applies to mortgages held by or guaranteed by the federal government; nothing in those laws establishes an exception to the right to foreclose in case of kidnapping or some other special circumstances. There has to be written notice of the judicial proceeding, but it is not required that the owner be physically handed and made aware of that notice. Outside of those cases involving the federal government as the foreclosing party, the details are determined by state law. In Washington, there might be a non-judicial foreclosure under RCW 61.24.031, where you get a Notice of Default. The requirement is that you send the borrower a letter giving the relevant information ("YOU MUST RESPOND..."). You must exercise "due diligence" in providing notice, which is defined in subsection (5), which includes (and is not limited to) sending both first-class and either registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, a letter to the address in the beneficiary's records for sending account statements to the borrower and to the address of the property encumbered by the deed of trust You also have to call 3 times, then another certified letter receipt: there is, again, no condition that says "if you can't find the person, you cannot foreclose". One part of the process is that the borrower can apply for mediation under the Foreclosure Fairness Act, guidelines here. However, this would require that someone be able to act on the borrower's behalf, which may not be the case.

Does showing the county council my customer records break the Data Protection Act? I run a home boarding dog business. As part of their home check for licensing conditions the local council demanded to see my customer records. As these include names,addressees, telephone numbers and email details as well as details of their pet dog I refused saying this was against the Data Protection Act to do so without the customers' written permission. The council employee told me it was her right to see the records under the Animal Welfare Act. Am I correct to refuse under the Data Protection Act? I showed her the blank forms of the information the customer provides but not the actual completed forms, which she demanded to see. Would someone be able to advise me of my and more importantly my customers' legal rights in this situation please?

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.

Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.

According to The official government page "Freedom of information (FOI)" FOI only applies to FOI bodies. These are mostly bodies that are publicly funded (for example, government departments). If you want to apply for records that are held about you by a private organisation, you can apply under data protection laws. FOI allows the public to have information about what the Government is doing and it is often used by journalists, campaigners and opposition parties. ... Organisations that are covered by FOI FOI laws apply to public bodies unless they are exempt. FOI bodies include: Government departments Bodies that were set up by an Act of the Oireachtas (for example, the Consumer and Competition Authority was set up by the Consumer and Competition Protection Act 2014), or established by a Minister or the Government A company where the majority of the shares are held by or on behalf of a Minister of the Government, or any of its subsidiaries A higher education institute that is publicly funded Some non-public bodies that get a lot of public funding Unless the company you are dealing with is an "FOI Body" it seems that the Irish FOI will not apply. The official Irish Government page on "How to access your personal data under the GDPR" states: Make your request in writing Ask as soon as possible and in writing. This can either be by letter or email. Seeking your personal data is known as making an access request or a data subject access request. You should state in the letter or email that it is an access request. This means that both you and the data controller will have a record of the request and its content if an issue later arises. Some large companies allow you to automatically download your personal information directly through their website. Contact the relevant data protection officer Many large organisations have a Data Protection Officer (or DPO) and they are generally the best person to contact about your request for information. You should be able to find their contact details in the privacy policy or ‘contact us’ section of the organisation’s website. Where there is no specific email address for a data access request, you should use the organisation’s general contact details. ... How will the company or organisation deal with my request? The data controller must respond to your request within one month. However, if you complain to the Data Protection Commission, the organisation may be given some extra time if it missed the deadline as a result of COVID-19. If the request is complex or involves a large amount of information, the data controller can extend the time to respond by a further two months. You should receive a written explanation for any extension within the initial one-month period. If your request is very broad and requires the data controller to provide a large amount of information and documents, you may be asked to reduce the number of documents containing personal data requested. However, you can insist on receiving all the information and documentation held. If you do, it may take longer to comply with your access request. In general, the data controller should respond to your access request in the same format the request was made, or in the way in which you specifically asked for a response. For example, if you emailed your request, the data controller should provide the information by email, unless you request otherwise. ... What can I do if I am unhappy with the outcome of an access request? If you are unhappy with the way your access request was processed, you can make a complaint to the Data Protection Commission (DPC)](https://www.dataprotection.ie/). The DPC is Ireland’s independent authority with responsibility for upholding the right of people in the EU to have their personal data protected. It monitors compliance with GDPR and other data protection legislation and deals with complaints in relation to data protection breaches. The DPC website contains helpful explanations of data protection law. You may be unhappy with the way your request was handled because: There was no response or a delayed response to your access request The response to the request was incomplete You believe the data controller wrongly relied on exemptions to not share your personal data with you How do I make a complaint? Complete the DPC’s online complaint form. You will be asked to provide evidence to support your complaint. This includes: Evidence of your access request Correspondence between you (or your legal representative) and the data controller and information in support of your belief that the data controller holds your personal Information The GDPR provides the right of access to one's personal information under Article 15, but leaves the details of times for response and handling of complaints to the national data protection authority and to national law. In the case of Ireland this is the Irish DPC. The GDPR dos not provide a right of private action (that is the right to bring an individual lawsuit) to enforce its data access provisions.That can only be done through a complaint to a national data protection authority.

No, it is not legal. Regardless of their location, the only legal options for companies serving to EU residents are to either deny access altogether or to make consent truly optional1 Recital 42 states (emphasis mine): Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement[...] Recital 43 states: Consent is presumed not to be freely given [...] or if the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is dependent on the consent despite such consent not being necessary for such performance. 1 Of course, remember that consent is only one of several means that allow them to process data. For example, if you were getting a trial account for a limited time, it would be considered a legitimate business need to ensure that you are not just opening new trial accounts when the old ones expire. So, if they wanted some data from you to ensure that you are not a previous user and you refused to provide it, then they could deny giving you that trial account without breaking the GDPR.

Not legal advice - you should consult an attorney who knows your local jurisdiction. That's a general statement, but especially true here because the GDPR does not include personal liability for directors (or others) in the event of a data breach, but domestic laws may indeed do just that. The UK is one example where certain circumstances can lead to criminal liability for directors of a firm in the event of a breach. That said, your company should care. The fines for knowingly allowing a breach or not reporting it properly in a timely manner have been made more significant than the prior Directive. There are things you could do to potentially mitigate consequences in the event of a breach and a fine being levied on the company, such as aligning with best practices and getting certifications. In sum, the actual punishments for noncompliance will vary by jurisdiction, but any business that handles data in the EU should undoubtedly be ensuring it is aware of what, if any, obligations it has and taking steps to comply before May's deadline.

You premise is correct. The processor is someone that processes data on your behalf, and since the GDPR definition of processing is extremely broad, that is about every third party subcontractor that you use for data processing, including various cloud providers. I'm afraid it will soon become a huge mess with a gazillion contracts to sign. I disagree. Yes, the GDPR says that a contract between the controller and processor must exist, but Article 28 of the GDPR does not say anything about how the controller shall document these instructions. Basically, in cases like the one you describe where John Doe relies on a web agency for having a contact form on the web, there will be a standardized (by the web agency) service agreement between the John Doe (controller) and the web agency (processor). There is nothing stopping the parties from agreeing that this service agreement that John Doe accepted as part of the onboarding procedure is also the DPA as required by the GDPR. Putting something like the following in the service agreement would do it: The parties agree that this Service Agreement between You (controller) and Us (processor) set out Your complete and final instructions to Us in relation to the processing of Personal Data and that processing outside the scope of these instructions (if any) shall require prior written agreement between You and Us. You also agree that We may engage Sub-processors to process Personal Data on Your behalf. The Sub-processors currently engaged by Us and authorized by You are listed in Annex A. I think we will se a lot of amendments in service contracts as the GDPR gets better understood, but I don't really see a flood of DPAs in addition to these amended service contracts.

This depends on the context – GDPR rarely restricts the use of specific kinds of data (see Art 9) but instead regulates the processing of this data, and the purposes for which it is processed. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person (Art 4(1)). So to show that some information is not personal data, you must show either that it doesn't relate to the identifiable person, or that it's not possible to identify the person. Whether a person is identifiable depends on the means of identification that are reasonably likely to be used, taking into account the cost and effort of these means (Recital 26). This recital also mentions that singling out a person is a kind of identification. If you have lots of birthdays so that there are no unique birthdays, or if the birthdays are stored without contextual information that would allow identification, this can indicate that it's not personal data. Some examples to illustrate my views: Scenario 1: you are collecting statistical data in a shopping mall and are collecting birthdays from passer-bys, without any additional information. This information is anonymous and not personal data, since you have no reasonable means to identify the persons. Scenario 2: in an office, there's a publicly visible calendar on the wall with the birthdays of all staff members. However, the calendar doesn't say whose birthday it is. This information is likely personal data, since it's reasonably possible to infer the correct person based on contextual information. At least HR would also have the birthday for all staff members on file, so that the company clearly has the means to identify anyone. (This doesn't mean such a public calendar is illegal, just that there must be a legal basis.) It is more difficult to determine whether information also relates to an identifiable person, i.e. whether this information is about that person. This depends not just on what the information is, but how the information is used. AFAIK there has yet to be EU-wide guidance by the EDBP, but the ICO has listed some hints. I think that a birthday of an identifiable person will almost always relate to that person.

Binding share wining on Facebook On Facebook a retail business posted a $1 lottery ticket and stated will share with Friends. If the ticket really wins the $4 million is that binding?

Yes, for those who 'liked' the business after reading the post, but less likely for those who had already liked the business. Under contract law, the business's post is an offer to share the winnings with anyone who is a friend of the business on Facebook. A promise is enforceable if consideration is provided under a bargain; the consideration can be of nominal value (e.g. the act of 'liking' a page). In the context of a business page, in a time when 'followers' and the like are regarded as valuable from a marketing perspective, it is entirely reasonable to interpret the post as offering an exchange of likes for a chance to win money. The commercial context and involvement of money would cause a court to presume that there was an intention to create a legally-binding contract (Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502). I am not entirely familiar with how the designation 'Friend' applies to businesses on Facebook. My understanding is that businesses have pages that are different to user pages. Businesses don't have 'friends'. They have people who 'like' the business. However, the word 'Friend' in the post has to be given content and therefore would be read as 'people who are listed as having liked this page'. People who had already liked the page are less likely to be able to enforce the promise to share the winnings, because they didn't do anything. They might be able to argue that they forwent the opportunity to un-like the business and that this forbearance is consideration. However, they would have to show that this was in consideration of the offer to share the winnings. Contract law is based on objective manifestations of agreement, not subjective thoughts (Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422), so it isn't necessary to show that the individual did in fact have the offer in mind when they liked (or didn't un-like) the page. However, it is necessary that the promisee have knowledge of the offer and not be acting out of some completely separate purpose (R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227); therefore if a user had liked the page some time ago and never knew about the offer until after the lottery was won, then they might have a hard time claiming a binding contract. Aside from contract law, the other possible head of liability is equitable estoppel (I mention this particularly for the people who had already 'liked' the business page before the offer was posted). However, equitable estoppel usually requires some element of detrimental reliance. Leaving a pre-existing 'like' on a page in reliance on a promise to share lottery winnings is unlikely to stir a court to find an equitable estoppel, since the detriment is trivial. Contrast Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, where the detrimental reliance was knocking down a building and starting to construct a replacement. Equitable remedies are discretionary, so the judge has plenty of leeway to not order compensation. This answer is based on the common law. There is nothing in Texas law which would make the outcome any different to the outcome in any other common law jurisdiction.

Of course you'd be in legal trouble, the contract is still valid. I also don't know why you don't consider virtual goods to be goods. Take this example: You buy a 1 year subscription for (example) netflix. The next day they cancel your subscription but don't give you the money back because its not a "real good". This should make it clear that virtual goods are goods too in the eyes of the law. Question is if police/lawyers care about it as much as for "real" goods.

Yes, they are. A business can decide not to do business with someone for pretty much any reason. The obvious prohibited reason is due to your race. But I don't see how eBay would even know your race. Some State laws might protect you, but I don't think there's any that applies in this case. For example, California might give you a means of appeal if someone stole your identity and they performed those transactions, not you. But I don't know of any Federal or State law that would change the very, very basic principle of law that a property owner gets to decide who can and cannot access their property. eBay owns eBay. One key benefit of ownership is precisely that you can make decisions that other people consider to be unfair, discriminatory (other than the specifically prohibited categories) and draconian. Other people don't have to agree with your decisions for them to be lawful.

In German Law you need to give your agreement ("Willenserklärung") to a contract or in this case terms of service. This is done by telling the other part. In some cases this can also be implied by an action (example: putting your bottle of beer onto the cashiers table is an offer to buy this bottle). As a second criteria a "Willenserklärung" needs to be the exact will of the part that declares its will (the website user in this case) §§ 133, 157 BGB or that the other side (you) could only see so (not the case here as this mainly speaks of content). If you visit a website and there are terms of services, the "Willenserklärung" is only given when the user read and agreed to the terms. If he did not, the terms of service are not applied until the user agrees to them. So I would recommend to block the website until the user agreed (overlay) as you need to proof he did when in court. Additionally there are so called AGB's in Germany. Those are contracts that are used or planed for many (more than 3) uses and set by one side (you). This may apply here, so you need to follow a lot of other rules like making sure the user had access and agreed, then there are many content restrictions and so on... I recommend consulting a German Lawyer specialized on this topic as this is very complex and includes other German laws for Media too, depending on the content of your site and terms. Also note that everything said is only based on my own knowledge and can not be used as safe legal source.

No. This is not gambling. Your quoted and paraphrased definition is especially misleading, since the original definition given on uslegal.com explicitly excepts bona fide business transactions valid under the law of contracts, such as the purchase or sale at a future date of securities or commodities, contracts of indemnity or guaranty and life, health or accident insurance. You pay an extra fee for the privilege of being on a waitlist for selection to an upgrade. That fee and list does not guarantee getting the upgrade any more than the fee and ticket guarantees you will have that seat on board that flight on that day. You only receive the tangible benefit if there is sufficient space and you satisfy the criteria set out by the airline (terms and conditions as provided at booking, policies applied by the airline whether publicly known or not, etc.).

First, shares are a form of raising capital. A company must have some capital, and Bob receives the shares in exchange. So it is not free (the exact minimum would depend of the requirements for incorporating). In both cases, Bob is not only a shareholder but the manager of Bob Limited. Bob will not incur liabilities for being a shareholder, but he can be at fault for his actions as a manager (for example, if he gives false financial data about Bob Limited in order to get credit for investing). Do not confuse Bob the Managerand Bob the Shareholder, as they are different roles. Of course, if you are a trading company and Bob the Manager approachs you asking for credit for Bob Limited, you will have to consider which assets Bob Limited has to cover possible debts, and you will ask him the books or other proof. If Bob the Manager provides you the correct information about Bob Limited and does nothing "funny"1, Bob the Manager is off the hook; you did provide credit hoping to get profits but you knew that there was a risk, and you were given the data needed to evaluate that risk. If Bob the Manager did things the wrong way (he did "cook" the books, he did provide false data or he did appropiate Bob Limited money) then Bob the Manager will probably be prosecuted. But Bob the Shareholder will not be liable for this, he will only lose the assets he did put forward as capital as the Bob Limited value will drop to zero. B) does not change much the situation, Matt still only loses his part of the company2. The difference here is that if Bob the Manager did "funny" things and did not manage the company correctly then Matt may sue Bob the Manager, too. 1For example, using the assets borrowed to buy a nice mansion and then selling it to Bob the Shareholder (or to Bob the Manager) for $1. 2Which is not valued at $50 but as half the net worth of the company. Of course, if the company was valued at $100.000.000 and Bob the Shareholder sold half of its shares for $50, people from the tax office are likely to come asking lots of questions.

This follows from a term in your agreement: in opening the account, you agreed to a binding arbitration clause. The general reason why they can do this is because it is not prohibited by law to have such clauses in agreements (in fact, the Federal Arbitration Act protects such clauses from legal challenge). For the same reasons, the clauses can impose deadlines on opt-out or require opt-out by mail as opposed to email or phone call. The premise is that if you find such terms unacceptably onerous or unacceptable, you will not patronize that business. That assumes that the customer read and understood the agreement that they signed, which I grant is often untrue.

Transfer of Personal Property The question is: are you still the owner of the guitar or is your friend now the owner. If you gifted them the guitar, they are the owner. A gift requires: intention to transfer title (you had this), delivery of the property (this happened), acceptance of the delivery by the recipient (he took it). At first glance, the guitar is now his. The concept of a conditional gift is irrelevant once the transfer has taken place - it relates to the promise to gift in the future if some condition is met and, unlike a contract, is not binding. If you have a conditional gift you can decide not to give the gift up until you make the transfer - after that, the item is no longer yours. You are now trying to make out that the transfer was by operation of a contract. This seems unlikely - see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? In particular I doubt that there was an intention to create legal relations or that the agreement was sufficiently detailed - was he required to attend the class? complete the class? enroll in the class? something else? You may have been clear in your mind that the guitar was for the class - was he? Or did the conversation go like "I'm taking a guitar class.", "Cool, I have a guitar I can give you." Even if there was a contract and he broke it, you are not entitled to the guitar back. You are entitled to the damage that you suffered by him not completing the class. Presumably, this would be the cost of hiring a competent amateur guitarist to play for you a few times.

If someone forgets that they committed a crime, are they still guilty? Let's say that a person, we'll call him Bob, decides to go out and kill someone. The police hear about the murder, but they can't figure out that Bob was the killer. A few weeks later, Bob still hasn't been found out. However, something happens to Bob (could be an accident, stroke, etc) and now he has a severe case of amnesia. He doesn't remember that he killed anybody at all, and goes about his daily life after recovering. The police later discover that Bob committed the murder, and promptly arrest him. Bob is very confused, and doesn't recall killing anybody. But yet, he did in fact carry out the murder. Is Bob guilty of the crime he doesn't remember committing? If a location is necessary to answer the question, we'll say that he resides in the United States.

Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.

If you are texting while driving and you kill someone, you can expect to be charged with vehicular homicide or manslaughter with an aggravating factor. The crime can potentially carry a penalty as high as any other manslaughter charge that arises from a gross indifference to the safety of others.It could be as high as 20 years in some circumstances. That said, it's usually much less. The penalty for such a conviction will differ based on the circumstances and the remorse/attitude of the defendant; the judge has wide discretion in sentencing. The charge may differ by state from vehicular homicide, to manslaughter, but the fact that you intentionally engaged in a distracting activity is an aggravating factor that gives rise to these type charges, where otherwise you may have been able to avoid the accident or limit the injury caused. In the state I practice in most, an 18-year-old was convicted just a couple of years ago for vehicular homicide, texting while driving, and negligent operation. He was sentenced to nearly 5 years, all but 1 suspended. He was 18 and he killed someone. In MA, texting while driving is its own offense, as it is in CA. In nearly every state in the union, texting while driving either is illegal under its own statute (or one is pending in legislature), or it is prima facie proof of reckless driving if you cause injury or death. In Santa Ana, just this past August, a 23-year-old CA woman killed someone texting while driving. After a first mistrial, due to a hung jury, she was finally convicted of manslaughter and inattentive or distracted driving causing injury or death as an aggravating factor. She got a similar sentence. The NTSB has recently released a report finding that more injury occurs in the 16-30 age group from texting while driving than drunk driving, causing nearly 3,000 deaths last year and nearly 300,000 injuries. There is no doubt with these statistics why nearly every state has either already regulated/banned this practice or has legislation pending. See these texting and driving statistics.

For the record, factual impossibility is rarely a defense to a crime. In United States v. Thomas the court decided that men who believed they were raping a drunken unconscious women were guilty of attempted rape, even though the woman was dead at the time. In this case there is no facts that made the offense impossible to commit. The suspect clearly submitted a false prescription and obtained the drugs he or she wished to obtain. There is no impossibility. Instead the police officer, as the saying goes, has the suspect "dead to rights". This is not legal advice. Consult an attorney for that.

It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.

No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412

Since we don't have a system of robot justice, it's impossible to say whether a prosecutor would file charges in this bizarre circumstance, since filing charges is discretionary. However, this situation does fit the description of murder. It is intentional, it causes death (maybe, vide infra), it is not legally justified (as self-defense, or as an act legally sanctioned by a state executioner), the victim is a person. It is not sanctioned by any "death with dignity" statute. The one issue that might be effectively argued by the defense assuming the irrefutability of the factual claims of your scenario is that perhaps the relevant crime is assault with a deadly weapon, since it probably could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim died from the shooting, and not from being incinerated by lava. It depends on where the person is shot, and with what.

Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he "should have" (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an "eggshell" victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was "fragile" - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the "Deep South" it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the "Deep South" at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.

The misunderstanding The only person who can chose to prosecute or not to prosecute a criminal case is the state: in the US this is through the office of the relevant District Attorney advised by the police. When a person makes a complaint to police (or other authorities), the police/DA commence an investigation. In an ideal world all complaints would be investigated rigorously and thoroughly, however, we live in this world. The police/DA will assess the complaint and decide if it warrants the dedication of scarce resources to investigate. One of the factors they will consider is how vigorously the complainant prods them in the ass. Ultimately, the police/DA will decide if there is enough evidence to place the matter before the courts. The complainant has no say in when or if this will happen. A complainant cannot "drop the charges"! The misconduct For a police officer to disclose to another police officer that they were the subject of a felony (or any) complaint is gross misconduct and a huge betrayal of trust. At best it shows poor judgement, at worst it is corrupt. Your friend needs professional legal advice right now!

Fighting false debt collection I went to a dentist, whose name doesn't belong here, got some xrays and a prescription. The bill was $104.00, which I paid the same day. Next thing I know, they are sending me to collections for this amount. I provided proof of payment and wrote letters, and yet this is still on my credit report. I have filed a dispute with two credit agencies. Can I sue these people? And keep in mind, I am giving you the short version of this situation.

You can sue your cat. The proper question is "Do I have an actionable claim?" Use your state's consumer protection laws: Namely, send certified return receipt letter to the collection company disputing the debt. Then, if the collection company does ANYTHING (calls you, sends a letter) after your proper notice of dispute of the alleged debt, then each act is a violation of consumer laws and will warrant x amount of payment from them: The Fed's FDCA (Fair Debt Collection Act) allows up to $1,000 per violation for acts after receiving your proper notice of dispute to the debt. Any change to your credit status after dispute relating to the disputed debt is actionable under consumer laws. Most states have some remedy tied to collection violation again. The federal statutes' remedies work too.

What legal options do I have here? I don't think I can sue for defamation of character since the email was sent to me only. Your rationale about defamation is accurate with respect to the establishment (henceforth "company"). But you may sue the person(s) who approached the company to falsely accuse you of that crime. Being banned certainly qualifies as special damage (that is, concrete damage), whence you have a viable claim of defamation per quod. If the crime that was falsely imputed to you is a felony or serious crime, then you additionally have a viable claim of defamation per se. I was thinking that I may have some legal recourse since the email clearly threatens to defame my character if I re-enter the establishment You have legal remedies, although not necessarily from this angle. The company can credibly argue that it sought to discourage you from contravening the "safety measure" it adopted in response to the accusations made about you. If it turns out that the company fabricated any false accusations it divulges, though, then you could sue the company for torts related to --and in addition to-- its defamatory falsehoods. So far the information you share here shows no signs of company's involvement in inventing the false accusations. What legal options do I have here? You need to ask the company for source and details of the information. In line with this comment, you should also ensure the company is aware of the mistaken identity. If the company declines to listen to you --and ideally see any proofs you have--, that could evidence some sort of tortious conduct on the company's part. Beware that in Florida a defamed person is required to demand a retraction of the false accusations prior to filing a defamation suit. Absent that request for retraction, it will be very easy for the sued defamer(s) to have your complaint dismissed. If the company refuses to disclose the source of the false information, then you need to seek injunctive relief in court. That means suing the company so as to (1) compel the company to identify the person(s) who accused you, and perhaps (2) strike the ban that the company put in place as a result of the false accusations. Even if you don't prevail in striking the ban, the court proceedings would give you the occasion to set the record straight and prevent the company from defaming you if you legitimately expose (to the public) the arbitrariness of its ban. To be clear, the company can always indulge in defaming you for the sake of justifying its ban, although that would be dumb in light of what you will have proved in court by then. In jurisdictions where a request for retraction is not mandatory, a plaintiff who does not know the identity of his defamer(s) may (1) file suit against "Doe defendants", (2) subpoena the non-party company so as to obtain records related to the false accusations (obviously ensuring that these reveal the authorship thereof), and (3) upon production of subpoena records and requesting the identified defamer for a retraction, amend the complaint to properly identify the defendant. This would be more efficient than filing two suits (one for injunctive relief against the company, and another against the defamers). However, I am uncertain of whether this would work in Florida, given its pre-suit requirement of request for retraction.

It is hard to tell what the statement in the OP that "95% of the contract disputes are won/lost directly by the contract itself" was intended to mean. It isn't literally true. A breach of contract claim requires a showing in every case of (1) the existence of a contract giving rise to a contractual duty, (2) an unjustified breach of one or more of its valid terms, and (3) to recover more than nominal damages, a showing of the amount of damages caused by the breach. In the simplest of breach of contract cases, say, a promissory note default case, proof of the existence of a signed original promissory note, and business records regarding the defendant's payment history establish all of these elements, and establish a prima facie case that the defendant is unable to seriously contest. One possible intended meaning of the statement that you are paraphrasing is that usually the existence or non-existence of acts allegedly giving rise to a breach of the contract are undisputed and that the litigation primarily boils down to what the contract required in the fact of undisputed extrinsic evidence of breach of contract. This is not my experience. The overwhelming majority of contract lawsuits are basically collection actions for non-payment of an invoice, for foreclosure of a lien, or for eviction for non-payment of rent, in very simple transactions, where the party with a payment obligation has undisputedly failed to perform and the performance by the party to whom payment is due is not seriously disputed either. Probably 90%+ of contract cases have this character and are resolved by default judgment. A majority of the remaining < 10% of contract cases settle with the plaintiff getting some payment or acknowledgment of debt from the defendant, usually with payment plans reached primarily based on considerations mostly related to ability to pay (which isn't legally relevant but is as a practical matter critical in the subsequent collection stage), even if there are minor or unlikely to succeed disputes over liability and damages issues on the merits. Somewhere on the order of about 0.4%-4% of contract lawsuits involve cases where there are bona fide dispute regarding whether payment was made, or whether there was a legally recognized justification for non-payment such as the failure of the party to whom payment is owed to fully perform their obligations under the contract. The interesting cases usually involve disputes over whether someone earned the amount that they sought or instead failed to perform as agreed in some manner other than payment. When there is a written contract, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the validity and terms of the written contract are undisputed, and efforts to argue that there were any side agreements or subsequent modifications of the original written contract are very challenging to prevail upon. Disputes over breach and justification for breach are more common than disputes over the terms or meaning of a written contract, even though these are certainly disputed sometimes. And, of course, there are frequently disputes over whether there was a contract, and if so, what its terms were, in the case of express oral contracts, and contracts that are implied-in-fact or inferred from the course of dealings of the parties. Another possible interpretation of the paraphrased sentiment is that usually the language of the contract determines what your rights are in a case. Certainly, the rights of the parties usually do boil down to what the language of the contracts requires. Some Statistics The Colorado state courts publish an annual report with statistical data every year. The annual report for the year 2017 was typical. In District Courts (the courts of general jurisdiction) there were 247 civil bench trials (about a quarter of which are tort cases), and 218 civil jury trials in civil cases (about three-quarters of which are tort cases), which consist mostly of contract cases, but with a minority of tort cases and property rights case and cases involving statutory rights (it excludes evidentiary hearings in domestic relations or mental health or probate cases, or pre-trial evidentiary hearings such as hearings on preliminary injunction requests, eviction hearings, non-judicial foreclosure summary hearings, and criminal or quasi-criminal trials, hearings and cases) out of 89,632 civil cases filed. About 12,000 of these are contract lawsuits (52,000 are pro forma tax lien filings). Thus, there are about 240 contract case trials out of about 12,000 contact lawsuits, with about 2% of contract cases going to trial (about three-quarters of the time before judges instead of juries) (this excludes a very small number of disputed contract claims adjudicated within probate cases each year). In County Courts (the courts of limited jurisdiction for claims under $15,000 in 2017), there were 801 civil bench trials, 14 civil jury trials, out of 140,462 civil cases filed (the vast majority of which are breach of contract cases and 98%+ of which are decided by judges usually in trials of one day or less, instead of juries), with about 0.6% of contract cases going to trial. This counts evictions as well as straight out contractual debt collection lawsuits as contract cases. There were and 1,657 small claims court trials (always before a judge rathe than a jury and limited to disputes of $7,500 or less with limitations on lawyer involvement) out of 7,118 small claims cases filed, but the mix of cases is very diverse so mapping that to resolution method isn't really workable, even though more than half would be contract cases. Essentially all of the small claims cases that don't go to trial are default judgments and day of trial settlements. By comparison, there were about 460 federal court contract cases filed in Colorado in 2016 (about 0.3% of all contract cases filed in Colorado in any given year). These cases go to trial at a rate similar to the 2% rate for state court of general jurisdiction contract cases (perhaps 7 bench trials and 2 jury trials a year) (this figure excludes bankruptcy court cases which each have multiple disputed or undisputed contract claims within them). Certainly, it would be safe to say that less than 1-2% of contract lawsuits filed in Colorado go to trial. In all cases that don't go to trial, there was a default judgment (most common), settlement (next most common), or resolution in pre-trial motion practice (least common but more common than contract cases going to trial, let alone a jury trial).

Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).

There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.

Small claims court was created for such matters. There is the possibility of a fee waiver, and if you prevail, you could get some of your costs covered (though there are other hoops to jump through if you need enforcement). A formal letter (written by you) stating that you intend to seek a legal judgment against him/her in the amount owed might be sufficient motivation for the person to pay what is owed.

Read the terms It’s quite likely that, if you took this to court, the employer would be liable to pay your daughter interest on the underpayment and possibly be fined by the state for failing to follow the law. The terms probably are offering to pay the back pay with no interest and your daughter agreeing to confidentiality about the breach. Probably - I haven’t read them. In other words, they’re asking her to sign a contract saying she gets $XXX now, and can’t make any further claims against them. Such releases are commonplace when setting a dispute and there’s probably nothing underhanded going on. Probably - I haven’t read them. Because minors can void contracts if they are not in their interest, they want you, as her legal guardian, to also sign so that can’t happen. A relatively prudent precaution on their part. The alternative is to not sign the document and they presumably won’t pay. It will then be up to you whether to sue them which will cost you money, possibly more than you will get if you win. As to whether there is a dispute: they want your signature, you don’t want to sign - that’s a dispute. Any admissions they have made in their settlement offer are almost surely without prejudice, meaning they are inadmissible in court. If you want to sue, you would have to prove the underpayment without relying on their admissions. As stated above, maybe there is no underpayment. Only you and your daughter can decide if this is a good deal.

First of all, this assumes that the debt consolidation firm would be willing to buy, and the CC company willing to sell. With a trial already scheduled, this might well not be the case. Secondly, when (if) the debt consolidation firm buys the debt, they buy the rights of the seller. In many states the trial could go forward, with the debt consolidation firm substituted as plaintiff. It is not automatic that a sale of the debt would postpone the legal case. Certainly if this happened once, it seems very unlikely that a second debt consolidation firm would buy the debt from the first. And as the comments by Moo and ohwilleke suggest, such a scheme would be fraudulent and criminal, if discovered. It might also constitute contempt of court for intentionally abusing the process of the court. Not a good or safe idea.

Does jumping a fence between two public spaces constitutes trespassing or other law violation? I noticed that many places, specially in the United States, have fences separating two streets, even for pedestrians. My guess that the streets are not connected for cars to calm the traffic on residential streets and to relieve congestion on main roads, but the segregation for pedestrians also seems more to intend to lengthen the trips for people walking, thus forcing them to use cars instead. Since both sides are public spaces, thus crossing those forbidden passages does not seems to constitute trespassing at first, but would that constitute another violation? Here is an example of such kind of fence

"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.

Trespassing requires that you be on someone else's property without their permission. The supervisor has explicitly given you permission, so it's not possible for you to trespass. You are correct that someone with the proper authority could revoke this permission at any time, at which point you would have to leave or be guilty of trespassing. The only way this situation could constitute trespassing is if they revoke your permission and you ignore them. You can't trespass somewhere that the property owner has allowed you to be and you observe the rules they have set (which may be implied) for you being there.

Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their "suspicions" to the government without e.g. "reasonable suspicion" could easily run afoul of the First Amendment.

The critical consideration is that the permitted left turn must be onto a one-way roadway in that direction. One is not permitted to perform a left turn which involves crossing traffic from the left, which would also imply that it is not a one-way roadway.

This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.

From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning.

It would seem that the law involved is probably Section 58-17-4096 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 58. This is part of the General Railroad Law of SC (GRL), and apparently was last revised in 1996. Section 58-17-4096 reads, in full: (A) It is unlawful, without proper authority, for a person to trespass upon railroad tracks. (B) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days. Note that the section does not specifically define "proper authority" nor "trespass" (nor do the definition sections at the start of the GRL), so those terms should have their ordinary meanings. It might be argued that the landowner has "proper authority". It is interstice to contrast this with the previous section, SC Code § 58-17-4095 (2012) which gives a rather detailed list of who is authorized to "park or operate a vehicle on a railroad right-of-way". Persons authorized are: an employee of the railroad ... in the performance of his duties [one who] has authority from the railroad [one who] is using a public or private roadway which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is acting in an official capacity with the military, police force, a fire fighting organization, or some similar public authority ... which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is an employee of a public utility or telecommunications carrier, or of the forestry industry ... The question asks: Can a law that effectively bars a property owner from access to their property be enforced or does the constitution protect the property owner’s rights and thus make them exempt from such a state law? There is no such absolute right of access by the owner specified in the US Federal Constitution. As the comments by Nate Eldredge suggest, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment might be relevant, but that would have (or should have) been applied when the railroad lines were put in, and if proper compensation was paid at that tiem to the then landowner, future ownership would include the restrictions then imposed. Any easement should be recorded on the actual deed to the property, but a tract map would not normally show it. Moreover, it is possible that the railroad was put in before the fourteenth amendment made the takings clause applicable to the states, or before this incorporation was recognized in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Even so, an easement might have been obtained by private agreement between the railroad and the owner of the land at that time. In the "Interactive Constitution" article "The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause" by Richard A. Epstein and Eduardo M. Peñalver (both noted professors of law) it is said that: ... The Clause also applies, not only to the confiscation of all existing interests in any individual piece of property, but to the confiscation of certain lesser interests in property. Under Anglo-American law, these would include recognized interests like easements (such as rights of way), leases, mortgages, life estates, and remainders. ... ... Any time some private party could seek a court order stopping another private party from engaging in harmful activities, the government can impose the same limitations through fines and court orders without a duty to compensate. A law or regulation authorized by law may bar access by a landowner to a part of a property in proper cases. For example if the land is environmentally sensitive, or if there is a dangerous condition, such as old ordnance on a former proving ground or battlefield. Such a law would probably be a partial taking, and require appropriate compensation, depending on the exact circumstances The answer by Greendrake which says: the only theoretically possible case of trespassing here is that of trespass to chattels, but that is a tort, not a crime. There can be no charges, only claims. is incorrect because of Section 58-17-4096, which specifically makes such trespass a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. However, in Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern(Opinion No. 25454, Opinion Filed April 29, 2002) the South Carolina Supreme Court found that a railroad claiming under an 1845 charter which authorized it to purchase land, and force such purchases, had acquired only an easement, not a title in fee simple. The opinion by Justice Waller refers to and quotes the SC 1845 Act No. 2953 which granted powers of acquisition to the railroad, and mentions other similar acts of the same era granting such powers to other railroads. The opinion also cites the SC 1868 Act No. 43, 7, which explicitly limits such railroad tenures. The Justice wrote: The circuit court, pursuant to numerous cases of this Court, held Railroad acquired only an easement to use the tracks, rather than a fee simple determinable, and that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity. ... In Ragsdale v. Southern Ry. Co., 60 S.C. 381, 38 S.E. 609 (1901), the Court construed a Charter to the Spartanburg and Union Railroad which had provisions identical to those of sections 9, 10 and 11 above. The Court noted that, under sections 9 and 10, the Legislature had specifically provided that land taken by and paid for by the railroad would vest in fee simple. However, the Court noted that no such words were used in section 11, which provided only that the company shall have "good right and title. . . so long as the same may be used only for the purpose of said road." The Ragsdale Court, after citing Justice Wardlaw's dissent in Lewis, concluded: [t]he legislature wisely made a distinction in the tenure by which the railroad company held the land when it was under one or the other of said sections. Having reached the conclusion that the rights of the parties are different under the foregoing sections, . . . [o]ur interpretation of the foregoing sections is that the railroad company acquired only a right of way over the land described in the complaint. ... We adhere to the wealth of authority in this state and hold the 1845 Charter created only an easement in Railroad, such that Faulkenberry is entitled to use the disputed crossing. We note, however, that although Faulkenberry may cross the railroad tracks, he may not do anything which would unreasonably interfere with Railroad's use of its easement. Marion County Lumber Co. v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 75 S.C. 220, 55 S.E. 337 (1906) (owner of the dominant estate cannot materially interfere with use and enjoyment of servient estate's easement; owners must be held during continuance of easement to have abandoned every use of the land except such as might be made consistent with the reasonable enjoyment of the easement). See also Brown v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 30, 33, 324 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ct.App.1984). ( A footnote to the opinion mentions that: The circuit court ruled that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity to cross the railroad tracks. In light of our holding, we need not address this alternate ruling. Note that in the Faulkenberry case there was apparently a road crossing the tracks, although not an authorized crossing. The doctrine of an easement by necessity might apply in the case described in the question. Detailed legal advice would be needed to determine this, and quite probably a court case.

Health insurance just for a particular gender? Can a company provide health insurance just for a particular gender? For example by giving different premiums for different genders. I think they can give different premiums for different age groups. Is this legal in USA? I am leaving aside arguments about who is a man and who is a woman. This is a hypothetical question. I was thinking since different genders have different health needs may be some can benefit from low premium.

From healthcare.gov: How premiums are set Under the health care law, insurance companies can account for only 5 things when setting premiums. Age: Premiums can be up to 3 times higher for older people than for younger ones. Location: Where you live has a big effect on your premiums. Differences in competition, state and local rules, and cost of living account for this. Tobacco use: Insurers can charge tobacco users up to 50% more than those who don’t use tobacco. Individual vs. family enrollment: Insurers can charge more for a plan that also covers a spouse and/or dependents. Plan category: There are five plan categories – Bronze, Silver, Gold, Platinum, and catastrophic. The categories are based on how you and the plan share costs. Bronze plans usually have lower monthly premiums and higher out-of-pocket costs when you get care. Platinum plans usually have the highest premiums and lowest out-of-pocket costs. Factors that can’t affect premiums Insurance companies can’t charge women and men different prices for the same plan. They also can’t take your current health or medical history into account. All health plans must cover treatment for pre-existing conditions from the day coverage starts. https://www.healthcare.gov/how-plans-set-your-premiums/

Firstly, this is actually a really good question - The Australian Constitution grants few explicit protections or rights to people, and it does not protect you from discrimination on the basis of age. In any case, you'll find that it is not a violation of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) - see s39. This makes an exemption, amongst others, to the Act when acting in compliance with specified Commonwealth laws, or with State or Territory Acts or Regulations, which typically enact minimum drinking ages. In general, governments are able to legislate within the bounds of their powers, usually as enumerated in a constitution, and sometimes limited by a bill of rights. Even where the power to legislate with respect to age is not specifically granted, governments are generally empowered to legislate with respect to other matters where age may be a factor: employment, sale of goods, gambling, etc.

You can’t “mislead or deceive” in “trade or commerce” in Australia It is flat out against the law to mislead or deceive - you can’t lie, you can’t conceal salient facts, you can’t tell half truths, you can’t even tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth if that could be misleading. The fines are huge (for example), plus the contracts are unenforceable, plus the reputational damage is extreme. The types of practice that you describe would result in orders to return the premiums, plus fines plus probably revocation of the licence to be an insurer in Australia if they were systemic. This is particularly true of insurance companies - the legislation that applies to them is enumerated here.

Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.

The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may apply to you and provide certain rights. HIPAA does seem to cover part of this, though if it covers you particularly and the lab that performed the test is a separate question. On the Department of Health and Human Services website discussing HIPAA, they outline requirements discussing pre-employment drug tests. Basically, your authorization is required in order to release the results of the drug test to your employer and there is nothing prohibiting the employer from conditioning employment on your provision of that authorization. This seems to indicate that the drug test is a medical record. In another section on the same web site concerning your medical records, it outlines that the Privacy Rule gives you the general right to inspect, review and receive a copy of your medical records if the health care provider is covered by the Privacy Rule. You can read about the privacy rule on yet another section of that web site. Generally speaking, the privacy rule applies to any health care provider that transmits health records electronically. Certain exceptions to the rule apply, however determining what those exceptions happen to be is a more difficult task. You will notice from the hhs.gov web site that any entity that is covered by the privacy act is required to give you a privacy practices notice (with certain exceptions). If you didn't receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the drug test is probably not covered by HIPAA. If you did receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the test is covered by HIPAA and you have a right to review your records.

A doctor can choose their patients A doctor has a professional duty to render aid in an emergency. However, apart from this and assuming the decision is not made for a prohibited or unlawfully discriminatory reason, they can refuse to see whoever they want. What you have here is poor customer relations, not illegally. Find a better doctor.

Generally speaking, no: Sex is a protected characteristic and discriminating between applicants based on a protected characteristic is prohibited so an employer is not free to hire only men or women simply because they would prefer to. But there are exceptions, like “occupational requirements” (which is probably what your athlete example is getting at). And, looking at the example you provided, it might - with a caveat - fall under an exception called “positive action”, as provided in section 158 and 159 of the Equality Act. However, the conditions under which this is allowed are tightly regulated and it would come down to the specifics (e.g. whether the number of women in that activity is “disproportionately low”). The caveat is that the Equality Act specifies that the protected characteristic (i.e. sex/gender in this case) can only be taken into account when choosing between two equally qualified candidates. I don't know whether this was ever tested in court but this would probably preclude advertising a position as “women-only” (as opposed to soliciting applications from both men and women and then selecting a woman with the explicit goal of increasing the number of women in your department). The Government Equalities Office guide on positive action also contains language strongly suggesting that limiting the search to women from the get go might not pass muster: Positive action can be used at any time in the recruitment or promotion process. […] However, it is expected that, in the vast majority of cases, any use of positive action as a ‘tie-breaker’ between candidates who are of equal merit for a particular post will be at the end of the recruitment process, at the actual point of appointment. […] In order to use positive action provisions in a tie-breaker situation, the employer must first establish that the candidates are of equal merit. Note that there is no such “equally qualified” clause in section 158, which deals with everything else than recruitment and promotion. Thus, it is perfectly fine to create a training programme that would be only open to women, if the goal is to increase the proportion of women in an activity where it is disproportionately low (an example provided by the same guide is a development programme “to help female staff compete for management positions”). Incidentally, all this is allowed under EU law (articles 5 and 7 of Directive 2000/78/EC).

There is not enough detail on the plan to say anything yet. But it is important to understand that the Canada Health Act is not an obligatory law but outlines conditions for provinces to receive significant federal contributions to their budget. Even if the conditions are breached, the federal government would be the only one who has the power to do anything, unlike a Charter violation that gives individuala a cause of action. It likely does not breach the prohibition of user charges: 2 [...] user charge means any charge for an insured health service that is authorized or permitted by a provincial health care insurance plan that is not payable, directly or indirectly, by a provincial health care insurance plan, but does not include any charge imposed by extra-billing. [...] 19 (1) In order that a province may qualify for a full cash contribution referred to in section 5 for a fiscal year, user charges must not be permitted by the province for that fiscal year under the health care insurance plan of the province. [...] since the plan is to impose a financial charge on all vaccinated and such charge is not tied to their access to or actual usage of the public healthcare system. The accessibility criterion may be another ground of breach: 12 (1) In order to satisfy the criterion respecting accessibility, the health care insurance plan of a province (a) must provide for insured health services on uniform terms and conditions and on a basis that does not impede or preclude, either directly or indirectly whether by charges made to insured persons or otherwise, reasonable access to those services by insured persons; [...] But again, it is the access or the provision of services that matters, the other side of equation is not directly touched except that any charge or other measures, if there is any, should not impede or preclude reasonable access to healthcare. However, even if it does not violate the letters of the law, it violates, in my opinion and when framed like a tax on unvaccinated, the spirits of a universal, accessible health system underpinned by the Act, which is one of the political arguments against the plan. It would be much harder to argue against the fiscal equivalent, though. A bonus for vaccination would likely be much more politically and legally acceptable and less controversial.

What is pro bono? I heard someone say; "I used to work with you for free. Now I'm gonna do it pro bono" And I thought he just repeated himself. But I want clarity. So what does pro bono actually mean?

My understanding is that "for free" is simply "for free", but pro bono publico refers to a subset of free work aimed at certain recipients, specifically those unable to pay, or charitable, civic etc. organizations on behalf of such people, or (to a lesser extent) a worthy organization of limited means for free or reduced rates. So working for Bill Gates for free would not be pro bono work, since he has no problem with means.

About the same as it is for engineers, doctors, architects, hairdressers, plumbers etc. to be collegiate It’s a job. You have shared interests (at least your profession). Why wouldn’t you be friendly? It’s your client’s who have a dispute; not you.

It means that if one party breaks the lease and the other party chooses not to enforce their rights in relation to the breach, it doesn't mean that they won't enforce their rights the next time that provision is breached unless they agree that in writing thereby changing the agreement. Which may just be the longest coherent sentence I have ever written.

This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.

"If it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you." (said while grabbing the handle of sword) This is a famous conditional threat where the speaker/actor was not found to express intent to do harm; perhaps better called a negative condition. This probably confuses matters but if you are to search for more answers this could be a good place to start. One of the elements of common law assault is that the threat must be able to be carried out immediately; it must be imminent. I do not have a cite for this but I recall that this means that conditional threats are excluded from assault. So calling a politician on the phone and telling them that if they do not drop out of a race you will hurt them is not assault. So, "You cut that out now or you’ll go home in an ambulance" sounds a lot like, "stop or you will get hurt." The victim has the opportunity to avoid the danger; the threat is not imminent. But the facts here are interesting because the speaker touched the victim while speaking which might mean fear of imminent was real. But they were in a crowded room in front of cameras - could the victim really feel that threat was imminent? Plus, the "you will go home" implies a future harm. Oh, and the speaker does not say "I will hurt you," maybe she was actually trying to protect the victim from someone else's actions. Like when my teacher knew someone was waiting outside the classroom to fight me and she told me, "if you go out there you will get hurt!" I would hope that a jury would consider this hard bargaining.

Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.

You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.

There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.

Can you copyright data? I was reading this link and it says at the bottom that: The panel data are copyrighted by the Initiative on Global Markets and are being analyzed for an article to appear in a leading peer-reviewed journal. I also read that data is not copyrightable, as stated here. I suspect the latter is true but I am not sure - if so, is the former not legally enforceable?

My remarks pertain only to US Law. Laws vary in other countries. Subject matter eligible for copyright protection in the US must be expressive and creative. To the extent data are merely measurements of observable fact in the world, they are not copyrightable. It may be that the presentation or interpretation of data is eligible for copyright protection (for example, artwork used in charts, graphs, graphics, etc., that is expressive and creative), subject to various equitable use provisions (in particular Fair Use, which is still a legal grey area). The methods by which data are gathered can be considered IP, but is the domain of patents. Methods are not copyrightable (17 USC 102(b)).

The words "proprietary format" are important. Are you sure the format is proprietary? If it is, then it's likely protected in which case they might have grounds to sue (but that does not mean they would definetly win). If the format is not proprietary, and so long as you don't share data which is proprietary then I believe you fine. I'm not a lawyer - but I cite GIF files as an example. They were still protected by the US and some other countries until at least the late 90s and there were various threats to open source linux companies who shared code that used the file format. I'm not aware of anything other than threats and never heard of any company being sued, let alone winning or losing. Another example that comes to mind is the RedHat ISO format. My understanding is RedHat could not stop anyone from sharing open source, but they could prevent folks from sharing the format they assembled and shared the open source. Again, I am not sure if it was ever tested in any court of law anywhere.

If you are utilizing the name of the characters just so users can rate them (by rate - I mean rank, review, critique) you should be fine. Copyrights are subject to "fair use" by the public. For purposes such as review, criticism, and comment - this is generally considered to be fair use. Is the site commercial or for-profit? That could impact the analysis, but only if you are making money flowing from the use of the actual copyrighted material(s), rather than advertising (like Adsense) or something similar (this should not suggest that those type sites cannot violate copyright, but it's part of the analysis). If it is something you are investing money into creating, you may want to get a formal legal opinion. But if the site if for fun, or hobby, you are likely fine if what's described is the only use. http://www.socialmediaexaminer.com/copyright-fair-use-and-how-it-works-for-online-images/ This link is to a great, easy to read and understand article on fair use, what it is and what it allows. Keep in mind each case is fact intensive, however, from what you are describing this seems fine.

Names of people, institutions, and events are not protected by copyright. Things that have occurred at events like math tournaments are facts, and may be recounted, in your own words, with no fear of infringing any copyright. Facts are never protected by copyright, although a particular description of facts could be, and so could a particular selection and arrangement of facts. Specific math techniques and their names are not protected either, and may be described without infringing copyright. The items you mention in the question are: video game / movie references and names No copyright issue here. common integration bee problems No copyright issue here. names of a university / math competition organizers No copyright issue here. integration techniques and formulas No copyright issue here, unless you copy an extensive description of a technique without rewriting it in your mown words.. using someone's Overleaf Latex package to format the book This depends on the license for the package, but there is not likely to be an issue. In short I think you are worrying over issues that are in fact non-issues.

united-states In the United States, information released through the federal Freedom of Information (FoI) process, or any of the various state-level versions of FoI, is considered public information. The person who receives it may share it at will, or publish it. Indeed many such inquiries are made by news reporters who intend to publish the information, and many others are routinely posted to various web sites. I suspect that the law on this point in the UK is similar, but I have not checked it.

These are some thoughts about the state of affairs in the US, I do not know how it works in the UK. In the US it seems to be a legal gray area. Gray enough that I do not think any lawyer could say for certain that the use of the data is legal. The data is stolen. If possessing stolen property is illegal then possessing this data is also likely illegal. Of course experts disagree, Stuart Karle, an adjunct media professor at Columbia University and former general counsel for the Wall Street Journal says: ...the documents have been published by the hackers, they are now public by virtue of being put on the Internet. But Barrett Brown was charged with trafficking in stolen authentication when he forwarded a link to some stolen emails. He signed a plea for acting as an accessory after the fact. He spent more than a year in jail while they sorted it out. In the US there is no law banning the download of hacked documents. In fact Bartnicki v. Vopper 532 US 514 (2001) stands for the rule that journalists can report on illegally obtained information. But contrast that with the Barret Brown prosecution! And decide where a data scientist fits. Also there is the question of whether an illegally recorded conversation is of the same "illegal" nature as hacked personal information.

Those posts are talking about making a modified copy of a copyrighted work. The key word is copy. You are not making a copy. Copyright is not about how a physical embodiment of a copyrighted work is treated. You can burn a book and shred a newspaper. Neither of those actions is making a copy. Also, cutting up a newspaper and pasting a picture on your wall has nothing to do with any “derivative works” issue.

Important story, but BoingBoing also doubts the BBC's wording. It could be an attempted summary of a previous story on BBC Newsnight on 18 July: Lord Porter of Spalding, a former bricklayer, alleged corporations were running tests on the safety of their high-rise building materials but refusing to share the results. Releasing the results could allow residents and local authorities to know if their buildings are at risk of a fire following the Grenfell catastrophe which claimed the lives of at least 80 people. There Lord Porter was talking about results commissioned by private companies including manufacturers, where the labs wouldn't provide information because of 'intellectual property rights' of the client, or presumably commercial confidentiality. Under these situations, it is said the private concerns have no obligation to disclose. If this is what the BBC story was referring to, then at least investigations by government or third parties wanting to reveal characteristics of the products wouldn't have a copyright (or patent etc) problem.

What liability is there for a company whose genetic modifications make their way into originally non-modified crops? Assume that a company has created genetically modified crop plant. A farmer purchases some seed from this company and plants this seed in his field. Somehow, that genetic modification jumps species and gets picked up by crops in neighbouring fields whose owners do not want this particular modification. Assume that this causes an injury-in-fact. What liability would the company have to the injured owners?

Maybe, but it is not an easy thing to do. See MARSH v BAXTER [2014] WASC 187. To be successful the plaintiff would need to prove a failure to observe a duty of care (which would be difficult if regulations on GM crops had been followed) and some actual damage flowing from it.

There is no real answer to that question at this point. If on filed such a suit, it would probably be under a negligence theory. You would sue: Forbes, because they're the website the user visited? The ad network that provided a vector for infection and didn't properly check their content? The makers of the ad, because they made the ad with malicious intent? and anyone else who might have been negligent. You then have to prove they were negligent. Can the user sue the responsible party for damages? You can sue anyone for anything. The problem is winning. Does it make a difference whether the user has taken due diligence with software updates and patches? It might. Contributory negligence would be an obvious defense to such a suit.

In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence.

Insurance is regulated at the state rather than the federal level in the United States, and the terms of individual insurance contracts also matter. Most states prohibit insurance of intentional unlawful acts as a matter of public policy, either under common law doctrines or under express statutes or regulations. The public policy is that no one should be insulated from liability for their own intentional acts. And, in insurance policies for individuals who are not employers, this is typically accomplished with an intentional acts exclusion in the language of the policy. (Negligent acts are almost always insurable. The status of acts that constitute gross negligence, willful and wanton conduct, reckless conduct, or bad faith conduct, varies somewhat from state to state.) But, the situation is muddier when the insured is an employer or an entity. It frequently is possible for an employer or entity to insure itself against unauthorized misconduct by employees or officers or directors who are breaching their duties to the employer or company, rather than carrying out the official policies of the company. Factories don't knowingly do anything. People in or connected to factories do things and know things. And, if a factory employee is cutting corners in violation of his job responsibilities and that hurts the company, that could be an insurable risk. But, if a factory employee is acting in accordance with the directions of the CEO and Board of Directors in causing the factory to emit waste violating the law, and if the people giving him orders known that this violates the law, then this is probably not an insurable loss of the company as a matter of public policy. Another complication involves the question of who is insured. The Town of Greenfield may be able to legally buy insurance that compensates it for the costs of having to deal with intentional environmental law violations by factories undertaken as a matter of corporate policy in the town, even though the corporation couldn't buy this insurance. Indeed, the Town could even impose a tax on the corporation that requires it to pay the premium on the Town's insurance policy. But, this wouldn't relieve the corporation of liability or violate public policy because the insurance company would have a right of "subrogation" to sue to owner of the factory to reimburse it for the full amount of any claims that it had to pay to the Town. This is true even if the corporation and the responsible individuals in the corporation are, in fact, judgment proof or bankrupt, so that the subrogation right is actually meaningless in fact. It is also probably legal for a company to "self-insure", i.e. to set aside reserves of its own money to pay for it violations of the law in the future without regard to intent, and to have administrators employed to process payment in those situations, because then it is not actually insulated from harm for its own wrongdoing. But, this is risky because a policy of condoning illegal conduct could subject the company to punitive damages and sanctions in addition to compensatory damages. It also matters what kind of harm the insurance policy pays for. It would not be illegal, in almost any state, to issue an insurance policy that pays for a criminal defense lawyer for someone who is accused of a crime. But, it would be illegal in almost every state to issue an insurance policy that pays for fines and court costs and restitution imposed as punishment for committing a crime. Paying for a criminal defense lawyer, or a bail bond, at a time when you are presumed innocent, is not a form of punishment and hence is an insurable expense.

Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger I agree that this inquiry significantly overlaps with the post of which this one is marked by NuclearWang as possible duplicate. Thus, the answers (such as why breach of contract is inapplicable) and comments provided there largely apply here. I will only address the slight differences. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that it was I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. A claim of fraud would fail in court because you will be unable to prove that the restaurant knowingly misrepresented to you (that is, despite knowing it to be false) that it was serving you a veggie burger with the intention that you would rely on that representation. Two hints indicate that the restaurant didn't act with that fraudulent intention: (1) When asked, the cashier told you that yours was not a veggie burger; and (2) he promptly indicated his intention to mend their mistake by telling you that he would make a new burger. A claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) would also fail. You wrote: After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant stated that they started laughing at my husband and I. The fact that the employees waited till you and your husband left reflects that they refrained from intentionally inflicting any emotional distress. A significant factor that will favor them is the fact that they stopped laughing once your daughter asked them why they were laughing: My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. Even if you genuinely feel disrespected by their subsequent laughter, there are no legal remedies because their laughter insofar an expression was neither obscene nor disparaging nor threatening/harassing. Laughter can be an understandable way, and possibly a psychological need, to relieve the stress from a situation like this in a context of hours of hard work in exchange for low wages with which to pay their bills. Moreover, the same fact [that they waited till you and your husband left] contradicts the allegation that they laughed "at" you. Strictly speaking, the restaurant could viably sue your daughter for defamation if the restaurant incurs any losses (including court-ordered sanctions against the restaurant) as a result of falsely attributing to it the hostile or belittling behavior implied by the particle at. By this I intend to illustrate how certain actions under pretext of extreme "sensitivity" can backfire. People elsewhere are victims of much worse misconduct or offenses that have detrimental effects and long-lasting ramifications. The court system is --if only in theory-- intended to redress wrongs which are more serious than a mistaken order at a burger restaurant.

The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.

The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.

Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his "land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city." This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)

Proper way to turn down a tenant When screening potential tenants, what is the proper way to turn them down, and the legal implications if the tenant asks for more details? I would like my response to say as little as possible and also account for the case where I have not selected another tenant yet and the listing is still active. The best I have come up with so far is: Thank you for your interest, but I have decided to select another applicant. However, I'm not sure what to say if they ask for more reasons. I guess this is akin to what reason you would provide when someone presses you as to why you don't want to go on a second date. The less you say, the better?

When screening potential tenants, what is the proper way to turn them down, and the legal implications if the tenant asks for more details? The "proper" way to turn someone down depends on why you decided to turn him or her down. As long as you did not decline to rent to a tenant because of information you learned in a credit report or commercially available criminal background check, you are not required to notify them. However, it is a good business practice to notify them in writing as Nij's post suggests. However, it would be a good idea to keep a copy of the letter for you records and possibly write down some notes. Such as, "other applicants had higher income," or "could not verify rental history." These kinds notes one the letters you mail out will be you friend should you ever be accused of improper discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc.. Declining to Rent Based Upon a Credit Check or Commercially Available Background Check: The federal law that governs credit checks and commercially available background checks is the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). The FCRA regulates "consumer reports," which includes credit reports and criminal background checks that are assembled by companies. (The FCRA does not apply if you, yourself, are going to the state police or courthouse to get background check records). Under the FCRA, requires that people who make decisions against someone based on information in a credit or background check, notify that person. The FCRA calls this decision against someone an "adverse action" and requires that you provide the affected party the following information: The name, address and telephone number of the company that supplied the consumer report, including a toll-free telephone number for companies that maintain files nationwide; A statement that the company that supplied the report did not make the decision to take the adverse action and cannot give the specific reasons for it; and A notice of the individual's right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information the company furnished, and the consumer's right to a free report from the company upon request within 60 days. The FCRA calls this notice an "Adverse Action Notice." See 15 U.S.C. 1681m. An adverse action notice can be oral, written, or electronic. Obviously, written or electronic would be the best since you can prove that it was sent. Also, be aware that the FCRA has civil penalties if it is violated. The Federal Trade Commission has a helpful guide that lists some of the basics of when you do and do not need to provide adverse action notice. Website: Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know Brochure: FTC Facts for Business However, it does not cover criminal background checks, which have many of the same rules as the credit checks under the FCRA.

Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as "their neighbor" instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings & proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.

Yes, they seem to have broken the law. In California, notice must be given for an eviction. This can be a 30/60/90 day notice with no reason needed (typically because the landlord wants the property for something else) or a 3 day notice with cause- the most typical being not paying the rent. Note that COVID exceptions exist, though I don't believe they apply to you. Even after that time, a landlord cannot physically remove a tenant or attempt to drive them out through the destruction/removal of property, locking them out, or cutting off utilities. They are liable for damages suffered as well as penalties. There are lawful procedures in place for this. The removal and destruction of your belongings could constitute either larceny or vandalism. Either way, by unlawfully removing your possessions, they are liable for the damages caused.

The emails both are and are not hearsay If the landlord seeks to use them as evidence that you did the things stated in the emails, that’s hearsay. However, if he seeks to use them as evidence that he received complaints about you, that’s not hearsay. Notwithstanding, this is no doubt a hearing in a tenancy tribunal or small-claims court - strict rules of evidence generally don’t apply in those. The emails are therefore likely something that will be admissible even if they are hearsay.

The issue is not enforceability per se, it is the problem of proving what you agreed to. If the landlord adds conditions that are against your interest, he would need to show that you agreed to those conditions: if you add conditions against his interest, you'd have to likewise prove agreement. Since you both have copies of the agreement, it's a matter of comparison to see if the documents are the same. Rather than voiding the earlier agreement and rewriting everything, the change can be initialed. If you were to cross out the rent and insert a lower figure, you would need proof that he agreed to this (hence, his initials on your copy). In your case, the change is apparently in your interest rather than his, so there's no realistic way that this could become an issue (that I can think of: maybe there's a clause that has to do with the move-in date and moving in early actually works against your interest, in which case he would need to prove that you agreed. The fact of moving in early is sufficient proof of agreement).

As user6726 said, a contract to sign away statutory tenant rights is virtually never going to be enforceable. Tenancy is a situation that basically always involves contracts; the whole point of statutory rights is to limit the scope of these contracts. Waiving tenancy rights would be sort of like waiving minimum wage. "Consideration" doesn't change anything, because it's assumed when you're talking about contracts. A contract without consideration is void. However, while your example of consideration isn't really what "consideration" means, it is a possible exception to tenancy rights. Certain situations are generally excluded from statutory tenancy rights; for instance, being in the hospital for two months doesn't make you a tenant. RCW 59.18.050 (to go with user6726's Washington theme) also excludes Occupancy by an employee of a landlord whose right to occupy is conditioned upon employment in or about the premises. In other words: You can provide your employee with housing that they only keep as long as they work for you, and in that case they're not a tenant. A live-in housekeeper is a perfect example of this.

No The tenant is liable if they break a contract: there is no contract here. One of the tests for a contract is that there is an offer that if accepted will create a clear, unambiguous contract. Looking at the enumerated facts: Alan advertises a room to rent in a joint tenancy property in which they are lead tenant - not an offer, this is an invitation to treat Zoe views the room and verbally expresses an interest in renting it - not an offer, this is the opening of negotiations Alan passes on Zoe's contact details to the estate agent - not an offer, this is communication between one party and their agent The estate agent contacts Zoe by email, providing a draft contract and asking for further information in order to complete her details - not an offer, the contract is a "draft" Zoe provides the requested details, again by email - not an offer, just a transfer of information The contract is drawn up and the estate agents inform both Alan and Zoe that it is ready to be signed - this is an offer A week later (having not yet signed), Zoe informs the estate agent that she no longer wants to take the room - ... that was not accepted Further, the tenant is liable if they are promissory estopped - they have withdrawn a promise made to a second party if the latter has reasonably relied on that promise. Zoe has made no promises other than one to negotiate - she has negotiated.

Your question seems to be about abandoned property and whether Missouri’s statute on disposing of property after a tenant abandons his/her property applies. See Mo. Rev. State. Ann. § 441.065 (“Abandonment of premises, disposition of remaining property.”) Assuming there was no agreement (in writing or orally) for the 19 year-old to pay rent, he was most likely a guest and not a tenant. As a guest, landlord-tenant laws, would not apply to the property that that was left at the nice family’s house. The definitions section of Missouri’s landlord-tenant statutes (and common sense) support this analysis. See Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 441.005. Therefore, the issue them becomes did the 19 year abandon his property? To that question, I think the answer is yes. Missouri Courts have defined the test for “abandoned property” in Herron v. Whiteside, 782 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 1989), stating: Abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment of ownership so that the property ceases to be the property of any person and becomes the subject of appropriation by the first taker. Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.App.1974). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. Id. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Id. Intention to abandon may be inferred from strong and convincing evidence and may be shown by conduct clearly inconsistent with any intention to retain and continue the use or ownership of the property. Herron, 782 S.W.2d at 416. So to synthesize that passage from Herron, the court is saying that there is a 2 part test for determining if property is abandoned. Did the person intend to abandon the property? Did they commit some act to show this intention? If the answer is yes, to both, they the “first taker” or person that gets possession after the property is abandoned is the new owner. Here, it seems that the 19 year-old intended to abandon the property. He left without explaining why and stated that he would not unload the property if the nice family tried to return it (implying he would not accept the property back). Looking at the second part, him moving without giving notice, and telling the nice family that he won’t accept delivery of the property are both acts showing his intent to abandon the property.

Why might Title 18 Section 793 be unconstitutional? During the House hearing today (July 7, 2016) Director Comey implied that section 793 of Title 18 might be unconstitutional as to applying the "gross negligence" standard to Hillary Clinton. What is the law that supports this reasoning as to unconstitutionality?

We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf

There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this.

Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.

The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.

There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.

When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.

What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be "crucial military information".

The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requir­ing the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawful­ness of an order is a question of law to be deter­mined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful.

During a traffic stop, should you disclose that you are carrying a licensed firearm without being asked for it? Consider a routine traffic stop and assume the driver or the passenger has a firearm, legally obtained, and legally concealed. Is there any obligation to reveal that they are carrying that firearm? Also, should one disclose it of your own accord when you are in the following dilemma: You have it on your person or nearby where instead of surprising the officer during the routine stop, you'd rather honestly disclose it The disclosure is a double edged sword, if you do it may make the officer anxious, nervousness and trigger active. On the other hand, if you don't and during the course of interaction some aspect having a firearm comes to light.

In South Carolina for example the law says A permit holder must have his permit identification card in his possession whenever he carries a concealable weapon. When carrying a concealable weapon pursuant to Article 4, Chapter 31, Title 23, a permit holder must inform a law enforcement officer of the fact that he is a permit holder and present the permit identification card when an officer: (1) identifies himself as a law enforcement officer; and (2) requests identification or a driver’s license from a permit holder. In Washington, on the other hand, the law simply requires a permit (or the gun must be locked in the trunk), and you have no obilgation to volunteer such information. Some states allow local options, e.g. NY generally has no duty to inform law but apparently Buffalo, Rochester and NYC do. It's pretty complex, because there is variation in exactly what laws say depending on whether the gun is loaded, or whether it is concealed, or in the trunk.

From the German lawyer association ("Deutscher Anwaltverein") one can find the following (Google-translation): In the case of a purely preventive identity check, the officers are initially only allowed to determine the identity of the respondent. This means that you can ask for your name, date and place of birth, home address and nationality and have your ID shown - by the way, as a German citizen you don't have to always have your ID with you. "You don't have to answer any questions beyond that," says lawyer Robert Hotstegs from the German Lawyers' Association (DAV). Of course, police officers often try to gather more information with emphatically casual questions. "Well, where do we come from" or: "And where are we going now?" Are typical examples. The police are not allowed to insist on an answer. Anyone who, as a respondent, is voluntarily too willing to provide information can harm themselves and possibly even give rise to concrete suspicions. So they are allowed to ask such things, but you don't need to answer everything. How to handle such situations, again according to the link above: “I recommend answering the survey as briefly and politely as possible. This has a de-escalating effect and helps to end the unpleasant situation as quickly as possible, ”says Attorney Hotstegs. However, you should always answer the questions about yourself. Because if the police cannot determine the identity of a person or only with great effort, they may take further measures to determine the identity. This includes taking it to the police station and, under certain circumstances, a search. Otherwise, these measures are not permitted without a specific reason.

From the Highway Code: Rule 112 The horn. Use only while your vehicle is moving and you need to warn other road users of your presence. Never sound your horn aggressively. You MUST NOT use your horn while stationary on the road when driving in a built-up area between the hours of 11.30 pm and 7.00 am except when another road user poses a danger. Law CUR reg 99 Rule 195 Zebra and parallel crossings. As you approach a zebra crossing ... do not wave, flash your lights or use your horn to invite pedestrians across; this could be dangerous if another vehicle is approaching be patient, do not sound your horn or rev your engine as this can be intimidating ... Rule 214 Animals. When passing animals, drive slowly. Give them plenty of room and be ready to stop. Do not scare animals by sounding your horn ...

Not with that license Your post makes clear that you have a sports license, not a hunting license. In that case, it was delivered in accordance with R312-40 of the code de la sécurité intérieure: Peuvent être autorisés pour la pratique du tir sportif à acquérir et à détenir des armes, munitions et leurs éléments (...): 1° Les associations sportives agréées (...) 2° Les personnes majeures (...) Sauf dans le cadre des compétitions internationales, ces armes ne peuvent être utilisées que dans les stands de tir des associations mentionnées au 1° du présent article. A license to acquire and own arms, ammunitions and related elements (...), can be granted to: 1° Accredited sports associations (...) 2° People older than 18 (...) Except within the framework of international competitions, those weapons can only be used in shooting ranges of associations mentioned at 1°.

The general rule is that "public records" must be disclosed unless they are by definition not public records. This study summarizes US public records law on a state by state basis, if the issue is about the US. Taking Massachusetts as an example, the law defines public record here, so if the item is not a public record, it is not required to disclose the item. Clause 26 has a long list of exceptions such as (j) the names and addresses of any persons contained in, or referred to in, any applications for any licenses to carry or possess firearms issued pursuant to chapter one hundred and forty or any firearms identification cards issued pursuant to said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on sales or transfers of any firearms, rifles, shotguns, or machine guns or ammunition therefor, as defined in said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on said licenses or cards ... (o) the home address and home telephone number of an employee of the judicial branch, an unelected employee of the general court, an agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of a political subdivision thereof or of an authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within those categories; provided that the information may be disclosed to an employee organization under chapter 150E, a nonprofit organization for retired public employees under chapter 180, or a criminal justice agency as defined in section 167 of chapter 6. (p) the name, home address and home telephone number of a family member of a commonwealth employee, contained in a record in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within the categories listed in subclause (o). If the information is not legally a public record, there is no obligation to disclose. There is a general requirement via statute, regulation and court rulings requiring the government to protect personal information, such as this. You can get a list of sources on that topic here. This does not mean that the government body in question can be forced to redact that information, but it is at least possible that there is a (slim) legal basis for requiring them to protect your privacy.

So for your first question, yelling "Stop Thief" loudly at the thief is perfectly legal (Like Yelling "Fire" in a crowded theater, it's legal if the theater is infact, on fire... the quote implied that it was a prankster who drew amusement from the reaction of the people who took him seriously). This may alert store employees, who have a specific kind of Citizens Arrest Power known as "Shopkeeper's Privilege" and is a reduced liability compared to Citizens Arrest. This is also pretty basic self defense agains people who are not engaged in any physical action against you but are starting to scare you. Suddenly shouting draws attention to you and discourages them from their behavior "I SAID DON'T TOUCH ME" being suddenly shouted in a Wal Mart is going to get notices from the immediate crowd drawn to you, and by poximate location, the person who is making you uneasy. For your second question, maybe, it depends... since the cop is clearly chasing the guy, you meet the qualification to use non-deadly force in stopping the criminal (i.e. you are witnessing a person committing a crime, in this case, resisting arrest or persuit) and it would certainly be reasonably non-deadly force if you were to trip, grab, or push the fleeing suspect. Citizens Arrest doesn't specify a minimum time to qualify, so if the officer is seconds behind, and you detain the criminal in this action until the gap is closed, it still counts.

I think that the question you are really asking is whether a contract not to disclose certain information (e.g. to authorities) might be void as contrary to public policy, or illegal. Sometimes it is illegal to do so. For example, often concealing personal information in connection to the transfer of funds constitutes money laundering, which is a crime, or securities fraud. The key question is whether there is a legal duty to disclose in a particular context and whether the concealment facilitates some sort of fraud.

You know that a judicial proceeding has been filed against you when you are "served" with notice. In fact, legal proceedings cannot generally proceed without somebody swearing that you were served notice. If a criminal complaint is being pursued against you then you might also learn of this fact when an investigating law enforcement agent contacts you to question you or arrest you. "Filed a case" could mean all sorts of other things. For example, it could be that they filed a police report, or filed a complaint with some company or non-law-enforcement entity. It could be that they have in fact filed a claim in a court of law and whoever is serving process just hasn't been able to find you. In any of these events I don't know of any way that you could proactively determine that without knowing exactly where and how the "case" was "filed." Actually, if a criminal complaint was filed against you and approved then a court in another state could have issued a warrant for your arrest. Contact your local police and they should be able to do a nationwide search for open warrants on you. Police will not typically release information on "open investigations." So even if you knew the exact agency where it was filed they may not tell you anything. If they decided not to investigate it then you might have a right to request the complaint under open-records laws – that depends on the state and the agency.

What is an arbitration between two companies...? I was involved in an accident and now my insurance and the other persons insurance couldn't come to an agreement as to who is at fault. I called the other person's insurance (Geico) and they're telling me that is an arbitration with my insurance and could take 3-4 months! What does this mean?

The companies agree to resolve the dispute with a neutral arbitrator. This is similar to a court action, but instead of a judge or panel of judges, there is an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. The two parties to the dispute must agree to this in advance. For more information, you can consult the rather thorough Wikipedia article on the subject: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitration

You can read about (federal) damages from the Surface Transportation, but they are at least liable for 60 cent per lb. for damages. The company has to inform you that you have the option for full-value, which you can waive. In addition, they are allowed to limit their liability for damages for items of high value such as furs and jewelry, things worth more that $100/lb (sounds like the coffee table might be such a thing). You are also required to give notice of high-value items. If you waived full coverage in exchange for a lower rate, then it would be non-productive to take them to small claims court. Also, under state law, there may be an arbitration clause which would prevent you from suing them (so, check the contract).

Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.

In all honesty, this completely depends on the judge you happen to get that will hear your case. There's no straight-forward "yes this will work" or "no this won't work" answer in a case like this. But a couple things to keep in mind: The fact that he was from out of town doesn't matter. If signs were displayed, then he has to obey the signs. Your argument about the placement of the signs may or may not work, again depending on the judge. But make sure you take more evidence than just some numbers derived from guess work (you'll need pictures of where the car was parked, where the signs are at, and exact measurement between the two signs and the vehicle, pictures of obstructions, etc). It's up to you to decide whether collecting all of that is worth the $45. Someone has to pay the ticket. You cannot just go to court and get it dismissed because you weren't driving. By default, the parking ticket obligation falls onto the owner of the vehicle. If you know you weren't driving, you can then request the person who was to reimburse you, or even sue them for reimbursement if they refuse. Continuing from #2, in some jurisdictions and especially if the parking ticket was issued by a private company (like at a strip mall) that doesn't use police enforcement for parking, you can provide them with the name and address of the person who was driving and have them re-send the ticket to the correct person, but not always. However, relying on this is a bad idea. The ticket, while issued to another person, is still attached to your vehicle and if the other person refuses to pay, it's your vehicle that will be impounded, booted, etc if the ticket is left delinquent. Then you just have even more hassles to deal with. Having outstanding tickets for your vehicle could also affect your insurance premiums. Don't let this linger for too long. Get on top of it and decide what the two of you are going to do as soon as possible.

Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.

The law says don't drive an unsafe vehicle on the road. You disobeyed the law. There were methods of having your tyres fixed without driving on the road (e.g. taking the tyres to the mechanic in a different vehicle, calling a mobile mechanic etc.) so you have no defence of necessity. In all likelihood you will be convicted and penalised. You need legal advice. Whether it's fair or not is a philosophical consideration, not a legal one.

Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.

If you are going to sue, and can prove they overcharged - consider going to the small claims court. It should cost you $15 + time - unless you loose quite badly - in which case its conceivable the court could award costs against you (I don't know if this is true of the small claims court in NY). You can represent yourself, so no heavy legal bills. It will take a a few hours of your time to prepare and have the hearing. Of-course, very often, just by filing you will get the opposing party to sort out the issue - and probably won't even need to go to court.

What is the rationale behind fair use exemptions? "Fair use" is one exemption that allows the use of copyrighted material. From what I understand, this exemption falls into one of two broad categories: Teaching, research, news reporting, etc. Basically, this is "educational" use of one sort or another. Although there may be a commercial purpose (for a college, research lab, newspaper), etc., there is a public policy priority of informing people. The second category is comment, criticism, or parody. Here, the use is clearly commercial, but is often allowed. My understanding is that's because such work is protected under free speech, and perhaps opens new markets (e.g. among people who are "anti" a given work, and who probably wouldn't purchase the original). On the other hand, certain other "derivative works" are not considered fair use, even though they may be at least somewhat "commentative," and also have educational value. Why might that be? That is, how might they differ (legally) from items in (2) above?

It is complicated to answer why a law is what it is. Judge Frank Esterbrook writes (in the forward to Reading Law by Scalia and Garner): Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it "intends" only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others something else, if some interest groups favor one outcome and others something different; how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? I will provide the historical background leading to the current fair use statute and case law, but take from it what you will as to why it is what it is. Fair use is a statutory defence provided by 17 USC 107. Its application is clearly demonstrated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Fair use was an "exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act". (Campbell) Courts had been finding exceptions for "fair abridgements" and other precursors to fair use as far back as under the Statute of Anne of 1710. (Campbell, citing William Patry's "The Fair Use Privilege in Copyright Law".) This doctrine worked its way into US case law in the nineteenth century. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841)1, Justice Story distilled the essence of law and methodology from the earlier cases: "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." (Campbell) Folsom states: There must be real, substantial condensation of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work. This early incorporation of fair use focused on whether something new was being created, or whether the "chief value" of the original work was being taken. This primary focus on transformativeness has stuck with with fair use doctrine until today. Campbell said (internal citations removed): The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's words, whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation ("supplanting" the original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transformative". Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use. Campbell also includes the following statement of rationale for why Congress included section 107: Congress meant § 107 "to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way" and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition of fair use adjudication. H. R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976) (hereinafter House Report); S. Rep. No. 94-473, p. 62 (1975) (hereinafter Senate Report). There is no support for your separation of "parody, comment, and criticism " from "teaching, research, and news reporting", or that there are differing amounts of commercial use allowed for these types of work. The statute lists together "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research" as examples purposes. The statute requires that "whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes" be considered in all fair use cases. There is also very little if any First Amendment rationale expressed for the fair use doctrine. The intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law is more clearly found in the idea/expression dichotomy. 1. Folsom v. Marsh full opinion text

Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.

You cannot claim copyright protection of the underlying work, but you can claim protection for your contribution. Under 17 USC 101, the resulting work is a derivative work: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. As an "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression", the work is protected by copyright law: but that only applies to the modifications that you added.

Regardless of the license associated with a document, there is no copyright protection on information. Copyright protection prevents copying "expression", e.g. the wording, but not the facts / opinions expressed through those words. The non-legal academic concept of "plagiarism" is where the notion of attribution primarily comes into play. There is a special exception under 17 USC 106A that imposes an attribution requirement for works of visual art. CC and other license schemes may add in an attribution requirement for actual copying of the expression (the "BY" attribute in CC). If a work is licensed under CC-BY, you may copy the actual expression provided that you follow the terms of the license, which primarily means that you have to attribute the work in the prescribed manner. This does not apply to extracting information from a work, because information is not protected by copyright.

The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.

The campaign is a copyrighted work distinct from any work it contains Consider this answer - even though it’s made up of uncopyrightable words, the particular arrangement of those words is a copyrighted work. The same is true of an arrangement of pictures. While the competitor is free to use the pictures, they can’t use the campaign. The ironic version is fine providing it is a true parody. Parody is an fair use under copyright law.

First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.

First, copyright does not apply to "brands". Copyright exists in literary works which includes art - a picture (any picture) usually has a copyright belonging to the creator of the picture. Brands are protected by Trade Marks. To be clear: A picture of you is protected by copyright belonging to the creator The phrase "Mickey Mouse" is protected by trade mark belonging to the Disney corporation A picture of Micky Mouse is protected by copyright and trade mark. (when) would it be legally OK for me to do so without the copyright owner's permission? You can use copyright material without permission if you meet the fair use criteria in your jurisdiction. You can use trade marks if there is no risk of people confusing your goods and services with the trade mark holder's and you do not cause damage (including loss of potential income) to the trade mark holder or it is fair use (e.g. you are writing a review of a Micky Mouse cartoon). Is it legal if I do not distribute them to others at all? No, this would be OK as copyright fair use, but not as trade mark fair use. Is it legal if I give them to my family/relatives for free, e.g. as a gift? No, not fair use for either copyright or trade mark. Is it legal if I give them away to others for free (meaning I'm losing my own money on them)? No, see above. Is it legal if I sell them to others at-cost (i.e. for the same price I obtained them, meaning I'm not making any money from them)? No, see above. If the answer is "yes" to any of the above, can the copyright holder explicitly prohibit me from doing so, or would such a prohibition be unenforceable (e.g. if this would be fair use)? It isn't allowed. Yes they can stop you. No, it isn't fair use; there is no "fair use" defence for trade mark infringement here - you are depriving them of income because you are not buying their T-shirt! Any other factors that are relevant but which I'm forgetting? Will they sue you for doing these things? Probably not.

This piece of computer science was patented - I thought you can't patent software? See this document This document described storing a tree data structure as xml for querying and processing. This is trivial computer science. How did this patent get approved?

It's not software; it's a "method," which is a type of process. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. 35 USC §101 (Software would be a particular program employing this process, written in a particular programming language and run on a particular hardware platform.) To be protected by patent, an invention must be novel and non-obvious. The patent office doesn't get too deeply into questions of obviousness, however; these will come up when a patent's validity is challenged, for example in court, generally in response to an accusation of patent infringement. If you believe the invention is obvious, and that you could prove that in a court of law, you can use the invention secure in the knowledge that you will prevail when IBM comes after you for patent infringement. If you don't have very deep pockets, however, you might want to think twice about pursuing that strategy.

There is something called the exhaustion doctrine that says that once the holder of a patent sells a patented device, they have relinquished control over that particular instance of the patent implementation. Anyone who legally purchases this hardware has the right to run whatever software they want on it, as long the software is otherwise legal (software designed to defeat DRM would be an example of software that is is not legal).

What you're talking about is called black-box reverse engineering. It can be done, and as long as you are meticulous in your record keeping the fact that it has been done should be an appropriate defence against copyright infringement. But that doesn't help against patent claims - while in copyright cases the fact that code has or has not been directly copied is critical, in patent cases it its irrelevant: if you use a patented method, it's a violation. You therefore will need to be careful about any patents that may have been issued to the original author, as well as avoiding copying.

As far as I can tell, whenever GitHub redistributes code, it adheres to all of the requirements of the GPL/BSD etc. For example, it never gives away code without including the license text, and it doesn't claim to add unpermitted restrictions to the code. The section you're concerned about is this: That means you're giving us the right to do things like reproduce your content (so we can do things like copy it to our database and make backups); display it (so we can do things like show it to you and other users); modify it (so our server can do things like parse it into a search index); distribute it (so we can do things like share it with other users); and perform it (in case your content is something like music or video). That section isn't worded very precisely, but I understand this to mean they want to reproduce your content in full, not just the code without the license text attached. They want to display your content in full, as you provided it. They want to modify it internally (i.e. they are not redistributing this modified form) in order to allow searching. To the extent that they display code-snippets as search results, that is likely defensible as fair use (search engines are frequently cited as examples of successful fair use defenses). GitHub appears to be acting consistently with the GPL when it reproduces, displays, modifies, and distributes code that you upload. If I'm correct about these facts then nothing that GitHub does with the code goes beyond what the many contributors to a GPL project have explicitly permitted, or what is otherwise permitted by fair use law. If you had some code with a more restrictive license, you might not be able to simultaneously comply with that restrictive license and GitHub's License Grant. Consider the scenario where you have some code that is licensed exclusively to you, and you are not given permission to reproduce or distribute it. In that scenario, the code's license prevents you from agreeing to GitHub's request for a license grant.

In theory "legalese" is English: you will find every word in the dictionary, and the rules of grammar are exactly the same. However in practice it is true that legal documents are often written in a very specific style. There are a number of possible reasons for this: The document must say what it intends very precisely. Most regular language is quite sloppy and ambiguous, but lawyers share with computer programmers the need to ensure that what is said is precisely what is meant. A legal document exists within a legal system in which certain words or phrases carry very specific meanings. For instance in the UK the words "in trust" when talking about money or property will automatically import a huge body of law (and its also possible to have that law apply even if you don't use the magic words). Lawyers know about these things, and will write a document to either invoke or avoid those bodies of law as they see fit. Related to (2) above, laws and legal precedents give lists of things that must be done or proved. Legal documents will often follow these lists using the same terms in order to avoid future challenges. For instance US patent law specifies what must go into a patent application, so you had better follow the format and use the same subject headings. Within patents in particular, the patent office manual allows a patent to be rejected because of informal language that leaves the patent unclear. Patent lawyers and examiners have evolved an informal set of conventions about how things are said. If you use these conventions the examiner will have a much easier time understanding what you mean. Its not "cargo cult", more a specialised language. (Note: the following is about the US patent system, but similar considerations apply everywhere.) Lets take a look at an example patent picked at random: The abstract lists the key elements of the invention in very abstract terms, such as "vibrating mechanism" and "power source". If you were writing this in "informal" language you might mention a specific power source such as a battery. But doing so limits your invention: what if something other than a battery (such as a super-capacitor or spring-driven generator) is used? That would be a separate invention not covered by your patent. So patent lawyers take time to think and ask about generalisations. The next interesting part is the Claims. These set out precisely what is and is not covered by the invention. If the Claims don't cover it then its not in the patent. The format of each Claim is defined in 35 US 112, so if you don't do it like that it won't count. Finally we get to the Description. This is intended to explain the invention to "any person skilled in the art". It also needs to explain the prior art and show why the invention is new and useful, because those are statutory requirements. Much of this is in fact written in an ELI5 way, if the 5-year-old had swallowed a dictionary. The reason is that any little thing omitted or assumed can be used by a future challenger claiming that the hypothetical "person skilled in the art" would have failed to understand or know it. So lets take a sample paragraph from this patent (numbers refer to diagrams in the patent): The electrical connection 22 may include a circuit device that transforms a DC power provided by the power source 26 to AC power for the vibrating mechanism 28, which circuit devices are known to those having ordinary skill in the art of circuit design. This anticipates a possible variation on the invention and stops it being patented separately. It asserts that the "circuit devices" are known, so it doesn't need to describe them in detail. If that assertion wasn't there then someone might challenge the patent on that point, but since the assertion has been accepted by the patent examiner it is presumed to be correct. Note the "... ordinary skill in the art ..." phrase: this is explicitly calling out to the language in Title 35. You might imagine that such a variation would be obvious, and therefore not patentable. However it is very difficult for a court to decide in hindsight whether something would really be obvious to a person skilled in the art; you wind up with each side hiring expert witnesses who will give competing testimony as to whether it seems obvious to them. As a result the courts have set a very low bar to a claim that something is "non-obvious". The language used throughout a patent is of vital importance: infringement cases can hinge on the most trivial of linguistic issues. This blog post by a patent lawyer has a list of examples, including this one: For example, in Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., Chef America tried to protect a cooking step for heating a dough at a certain temperature inside an oven. But Chef America drafted the claim to read “heating the . . . dough to a temperature in the range of about 400 degrees F. to 850 degrees F.” The Federal Circuit reasoned that “to” is not “at” and, thus, the claim required the dough (not the oven) to be heated to the specified temperature. The Court then ruled that the claim was not infringed. In fact, under the Court’s claim construction, this claim could not possibly be infringed unless one wanted to make burned dough. See also this case on "partially" not including "totally", and this post on why the word "disclosure" is now used instead of "invention". Patent lawyers call this kind of thing "patent profanity", i.e things you simply do not say. So if you don't use this kind of "legalese" in your patent the following things are much more likely: Your application will be rejected because the examiner cannot understand exactly what your invention consists of. Trivial variations on your invention will turn out not to be covered. Someone will challenge your patent on the grounds that you didn't explain everything that a "person skilled in the art" might need to know.

If the details of your implementation are not disclosed by the previous patent, and more generally, if they are novel and non-obvious in light of the entire body of prior art (including the previous patent), then you could obtain a patent whose claims are limited to implementations that include (some of) those details. That said, your patent would not exclude the coverage of the previous patent—it is possible for something to be covered by the claims of multiple patents, even patents with different owners. If your implementation is a method that includes every step of a claim of the previous patent, then performing your implementation would still infringe that patent (regardless of the existence of your own patent or patent application). Analogously, if it is a device that includes all of the elements of a claim of the previous patent, it would infringe. Of course, the other patent may not be valid, and so you could seek to invalidate it if desired (but this can involve lengthy & expensive legal proceedings).

If you use the reviewer's code, or code derived from it (e.g. if you just changed a variable name) then they own the copyright on that part of the software. If the reviewer describes a solution which you implement, or if you re-implement the code from scratch while taking ideas and methods from the reviewer's code, then you own the copyright on that code. However if there are only a few ways to implement something in code then the code is not creative and hence cannot be copyrighted. For example the regular expression in the question you link to is (as far as I can tell) the only correct solution to the problem: any programmer addressing the problem will have come up with that RE. In this the position is akin to a database of phone numbers: while the collection may be copyright (depending on whether selection or arrangement required creativity), the fact that Alice Jones has the number 012345 is not copyrightable, and neither is the alphabetical arrangement of names. Where it gets messy is the boundary between the two. The requirement to detect 4 or more repeated digits in a credit card number could be implemented in a number of ways, but whether there are enough of these to qualify any particular solution as "creative" would be a matter of fact for a court to decide.

It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.

Can I discriminate against someone I hire to (mow my lawn) (cut my hair) (fix my plumbing)? If I can, what's the legal difference between a business that is forced to not discriminate when hiring someone and a person hiring somebody to perform a service for him?

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates employers and employees. The prohibition on employer practices says it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. You are not an employer, which is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person For completeness, an employee is an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. The federal law prohibits refusing to hire any individual (i.e. they don't have to be an employee), so you can't use the argument "a barber is not an employee". However, in case some law is stated in terms of "employees", a barber is not generally an employee under the law. The literal words of the law state that if a person happens to employ 15 or more people in a business that affects commerce (whatever that might be), then because of that aspect of their life, they can never discriminate in the selecting a barber, etc. That is, the law does say "an employer cannot discriminate in that very business whereby they are legally deemed to be an employer". However, so far the federal government far has not gone after an employer hiring 15+ people for discrimination in barber selection. State laws are also relevant and may have lower thresholds. The Washington threshold is 8.

It is not legal to give false responses on such a declaration. The point of anti-discrimination laws is that they say when it is legal vs. not legal to discriminate against an employee, and Alex is expected to have faith in the legal system to protect his legal rights. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of the law may be understandable, but still does not legally justify falsifying information given to an employer. In certain cases (look for the fine print and mentions of "penalty of perjury") you can be fined and imprisoned for lying. More commonly, your employment can be terminated when you are discovered. You may also be held liable for consequences of such lies. Your employer's health insurance contract might require truthful and accurate reporting of medical facts and a lie about your condition could result in termination of coverage.

It is mandatory for the employer to provide sufficient restrooms (“cabinets d'aisance”), as per article R4228-10. Other provisions regulate evacuation, ventilation, heating, disabled access, etc. There is no provision regarding when employees are permitted to use the restrooms. There can't be a single rule that works for every profession: some jobs don't let you leave your post whenever you like (e.g. machine operator, driver, guard, teacher, etc.). The most common dispute regarding restroom use is whether employees should be paid during that time. Some employers want to count restroom use as unpaid pause time. Strictly speaking, that's legal: an employee who is in a restroom is not at the employer's disposal, therefore this doesn't count as work time. However enforcing this is often logistically difficult and wildly unpopular, so in practice it's only done in places where employees must clock out to reach a restroom. I could only find one case with actual jurisprudence. In 1995, an industrial butchering company (Bigard) decided to limit restroom breaks to three fixed times a day. This was, as you might expect, unpopular; the employees went on strike, and eventually the labor court struck down this measure. That's a precedent, but it doesn't seem to have made its way to the appellate court. Your case is also slightly different in that the restrooms would only be inaccessible for an hour, which is shorter than in the Bigard case. So legally speaking, it isn't clear who will win. You'll have a better chance of success by banking on the unpopularity of the measure. Talk with your colleagues and your representatives and shop stewards. Point out that employees who are trying to hold it in are unlikely to be at the top of their productivity.

You may want to ask Reich what he personally was talking about. There is a distinction within the US between states which prohibit mandatory union membership versus allow mandatory union membership. In about half of the states, a union cannot force an employer to accept a contract which obligates that a person join the union. These are known as right-to-work laws. No state requires all workers to join a union, and no state forbids the formation of unions.

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.

Isn’t this discrimination since nationals do not have to apply? Yes it is discrimination. But that does not make it illegal. In fact discrimination is in general legal unless it is based on some characteristic which is specifically forbidden as a basis for discrimination (e.g. race). And in general, all of the countries in the world allow and enforce discrimination based on nationality; for example non-nationals will not be able to run for Head of State (and additional restrictions may apply). The EU members allowing similar rights to the citizens of other EU countries is the exception, not the rule, and once the UK stops being bound by EU treaties it can impose its own legal system on non-nationals. And while EU treaties give lots of rights to EU member-countries citizens, they still allow for discrimination based on nationality (for example you cannot run for Prime Minister or MP of Spain as a foreign EU resident). Isn’t the UK Government breaking the law? This could go against EU treaties, but the point is that the UK will no longer need to comply with them. is the UK Government responsible for the harm and distress caused to the individual health and mental wellbeing? No, the UK Government is not responsible if you do not like its laws to the point that it affects your health. Is there any ground for challenging this scheme legality in court? Unlikely. In any case it will not be because you are frightened by it, any challenge would be in the grounds that the government actions act against some other UK law. For example, if the decision to make such a list was made by the Executive but it contradicts some law approved by the Parliament. If this list does not contradict any law, then there are no grounds for challenging it. Would there a breach of my human rights if I was not to apply for settle status and then subsequentially got deported (taken away from my children, home, business, etc.)? How about if I was refused, re-entry or access to public services (NHS for example)? If you do not apply you will not have any evidence that you were settled, and the government could legitimately believe that you are irregularly in the country and try to expel you; you probably would have an opportunity to prove that you were settled even if you were not in the list but that could be way slower, more expensive, riskier and stressful than just registering now. Get this clear: that settled person list is to help you to show that you were a UK resident before Brexit and to give you the protections that are being negotiated between the UK and the EU for expatriates. Probably you could choose not to enlist, but it would work against you.

Sure, you can sue; but who are you going to sue? You have to prove someone knew about the fact that one condo resident was going to be paying for the other condo's hot water. Mixed up plumbing and electrical systems are fairly common in apartment and condo complexes, especially ones that have been converted. Chances are high it's a mistake and was not done on purpose. If you can find the original general contractor, he's going to say it wasn't him, talk to the plumbing contractor. Who will say I didn't do it, and my work is only guaranteed for five years, so talk to the plumbing inspector. He'll say he didn't see it, and besides, all those inspection records were thrown out ten years ago. The condo association may or may not have had oversight of the construction. Can you prove the neighbor knew about it and didn't tell the condo association? Can you prove the realtor who your dad bought through knew about it? Was there a home/condo inspection done - paid for by your dad or the seller - before the sale that might have spotted it? The police aren't going to care; technically, it is a crime, in a way, but it's not like someone tapped into someone's cable TV or electrical power meter last week. This is a problem from years ago, more than likely from the original construction; so who is really responsible? The police aren't going to run that down. And, what are the damages? A few months of part of a power bill? Is it really worth a lawsuit and a lawyer? Against who? I can't see a lawyer jumping into it. If you want to do something for whatever comes next, yes, collect evidence. Tell the neighbor he/she's on your hot water. Take photos and get a licensed plumber to take a look at it and give you an estimate for separating the water systems. That will document that the two systems are not separate. (Either call your own plumber or ask the condo association for the name of someone). Then, start with the condo association. They may be responsible for the inspections before the sale. At very least, the condo association may have to check off on the repairs. And, they may know more about it (oh, yes, we've heard about that in a few other condos...) You could bring it to everyone's attention at a meeting; it may be a common issue in the complex, and other residents may not know about it. If, in fact, the neighbor doesn't have their own water heater, they may be more on the hook for expensive repairs than your dad. They may have more of a case against the condo association than your dad.

Search warrant against third party On a TV program, they described a case in the USA where a man went missing, presumed murdered; four years later the police was told that he might be buried in his garden, the home had meanwhile be sold to new owners, so the police asked them politely for permission to dig up their garden, and the new owners agree. What would happen if the owners disagreed? Would the police get a search warrant (when it is quite clear that the new owners of the house are under no suspicion whatsoever)? Now if the new owners disagreed because there are things in their garden, like marijuana plants, that they don't want the police to see, would there be any way to let police in without getting into trouble for these plants?

The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.

As a legal matter, you need to call or visit your local police station, report that you found some lost money, answer their questions honestly and dispassionately (they don't care about your hate etc. unless it's causing an active situation they have to deal with, and even then they don't much want to hear you go on about it), and then let them deal with it. You can tell your neighbor, if he inquires, that you have handed the matter to the local police and he can inquire with them about claiming it; feel free to ask the police to affirm that's the suitable course of action. You can expect to be given legal possession of it if they are unable to determine the true owner in accordance with local law. You can ask the police for details on that, though they'll probably just tell you as a matter of procedure without prompting.

Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card ("does that invalidate all evidence against you". What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search ("the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons", US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a "social cost" consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The "social costs" consideration was specifically related to "social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large", but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century).

That is not a valid assumption. Many states have laws that let you presume someone is a threat to your life if they forcibly enter your house. Simple trespass on your land does not let you reasonably presume someone is a murderer. An autonomous killer drone is not a comparison you want to make: those may be illegal entirely, and are likely to seriously hurt any claim of justifiable force. “You forfeit your right to live when you set foot on my property” is not justifiable. If the dogs are trained to be a hazard to the community, that’s an argument in favor of having them confiscated and destroyed. Dogs are not people. Under normal circumstances, they cannot be protected under self-defense or the defense of others. Those doctrines only apply when a person is in danger. Deadly force is sometimes allowed to protect property, but this tends to be strictly limited. To start with, you can only ever use force to prevent illegal damage to property. If your concern is “this animal control officer will destroy my dogs within the scope of their duty,” that’s not protecting against an illegal use of force. Deadly force in defense of property is also normally limited to particular crimes that are inherently dangerous, like arson, robbery, or burglary. Even in Texas, simple theft only justifies deadly force during the nighttime. Deadly force is also not justifiable if there were reasonable other options. Shooting an animal control officer is unlikely to be the only way to temporarily stop them from destroying a dog. Threatening violence in order to influence a judge’s decision is terrorism. This hypothetical man is a terrorist. He may well find himself on death row for murder, but he’s also going to face separate charges for terrorism.

An officer is allowed to pull you over for speeding and then decline to give you a ticket for speeding. So the lack of a ticket has nothing to do with it (unless you actually weren't speeding, not even 1 MPH over.) Simply having past felonies, however, is not a reason for an officer to be able to search the car. Without a warrant, he'd need probable cause, consent, or some other exception to the warrant requirement. It's impossible for me to say what happened here. Maybe your husband had an outstanding arrest warrant? Maybe the officer saw the gun from outside the car? Maybe one of you said "OK" when he asked to search the car? Or maybe the search was illegal after all?

Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.

Your question goes to a person's state of mind, which gets tricky; the intention of the law is that to be guilty of trespassing a reasonable person would need to know they had entered into or were remaining in a place they are not supposed to be. Specific requirements for what that means is going to vary by jurisdiction (closed-off area, posted signs, verbal notice, etc). Trespass is knowingly entering another owners’ property or land without permission, which encroaches on the owners’ privacy or property interests (Cornell Law). In your example, John would not be trespassing unless and until Joe asked him to leave and John refused to do so.

With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.

What decides what's "reasonable"? In reading a few laws recently, I've seen a lot of non specific words like "reasonably", "expeditiously", and "sufficient". I'm wondering how judges decide what is "reasonable" when the way the law is written is so subjective .

Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted".

This might be better on English.SE since it is really just about the meaning of English words, and there are several related questions on that site. I think therefore is a spelling error and they meant to write therefor. Therefor means "for that", just as thereof means "of that". If so, then sentence could be rephrased: If the Grantor timely objects to any disbursement, or the reasonableness of the disbursement, or the necessity for the disbursement, ... There might be a grammatical debate as to whether it should be "necessity for the disbursement" or "necessity of the disbursement". In the latter case, you could write "the necessity thereof". But in either case, it clearly means "whether the disbursement was necessary".

The case Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 may help to explain this. In a use-of-force case, "courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force, and then judge the claim by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right", therefore "The notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard is rejected". Such claims "invok[e] the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures," and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard". In invoking the notion of "reasonable", the court is referring to the fact that a person chooses an action being in possession of certain knowledge, and using that knowledge plus reasoning, to judge an outcome. So when a suspect appears to be armed, the officer has to decide whether the weapon is real and whether the suspect is likely to use it against the officer. When one conjectures that a lesser degree of force could have been used because it turns out that the suspected weapon was a plastic toy, one is appealing to knowledge not available to the officer at that time. In Graham, the court held that the legal question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation In other words, the judgment is made by reference to the objective facts of the circumstance, and not the subjective emotional state of the officer. As the court put it, "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight".

There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.

Yes, there is a reasonableness limit, and this is especially true in consumer transactions. If you were given an estimate and the final bill is a lot more than what you were expecting, you can dispute it. The final price should be ‘reasonable’. The law doesn’t say what counts as reasonable, so you’ll have to agree it between you. You should consider: the estimate you agreed to [if there was one] any changes, and why they happened anything that happened that was beyond the control of the trader, like bad weather or the cost of materials going up https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/consumer/getting-home-improvements-done/problem-with-home-improvements/ When it comes to work itself, the act states that a tradesman or professional has a 'duty of care' towards you and your property. Any standard or price you agree must be honoured. But if it isn't agreed in advance the work must be done to a reasonable standard, at a reasonable cost, and within a reasonable time. So if you haven't fixed a price, you don't have to pay a ridiculously high bill. All you have to pay is what you consider 'reasonable' and invite them to sue you for the rest. Be careful though, in some circumstances when you are withholding payment you may have a claim made against you by a supplier if you are in breach of contract. What's a reasonable amount would be what similar tradesmen would have charged for the job. So get a few quotations. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/articles/1fdlwC9xzyxjCpWMlsCGG3j/supply-of-services NB that article refers to The Supply of Goods & Services Act 1982, which was partially superseded by the Consumer Rights Act 2015.

The general principle is that when one party writes a contract, and there is an ambiguity, the ambiguity is interpreted against the interest of the writer (contra proferentem). The case of Hypercheck v. Mutual and Federal Ins. confirms that South African law operates under this doctrine.

It may "seem[] normative" that "a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions." But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of "Peter Pan" whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.

Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot.

Explanation of the key elements of the Supreme Court "Pretty Woman" Parody Case? Both the original (Roy Orbison) version and the Two Live Crew version began, "Pretty woman walking down the street..." Was this seen as copying under the "five word" plagiarism rule? According to the Supreme Court, the Two Live Crew version veered sharply away from the original, to the point of being "opposite." That is, the original celebrated a white woman, while the Two Live Crew version mocked a black woman. Was this what made it was parody, and after the appeals court decision was overturned, could therefore possibly make it fair use? In the end, there was a settlement, under which Acuff-Rose, the owner of the original, received no damages, but did receive licensing fees. Two Live Crew had earlier sought (and been refused) such a licensing arrangement, meaning that it got to its starting point. Apparently this was an equitable result given the hazards of further litigation. But was it possible that Two Live Crew could have performed its version "for free" if the appeals court had later found that "parody" made it fair use?

This case did not find that Two Live Crew's version was fair use. Rather it held that it could be fair use, contrary to the lower court ruling that its commercial nature precluded a fair use defense based on parody. The court remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding. The two parties settled without getting a final decision on fair use. It was never really contested that this work was parody. The issue was whether the commercial nature rendered it unfair. The Supreme Court told the lower courts to assess the taking under the full four-factor fair use analysis and that commercial use doesn't automatically make a parody unfair. One source of confusion is that you seem to be conflating parody and fair use. Parody is just one purpose (along with criticism, education, and others) that has been generally held to swing the balance in favour of fair use. Last, the "five word plagiarism rule" is not a legal standard.

Your question is whether you can copy instrumental portions of recorded music, and modify it to create a new work, without permission. The answer is that this is illegal. This would be creating a "derivative work", and under copyright law, only the copyright holder has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. Whether or not you have paid for a copy of a recording, you would still need a separate license to legally extract and use part of a recording. This includes taking just one instrument, and includes taking just a part of one instrument. Material on Youtube is subject to different licenses: in some cases items are free of restrictions, in some cases, you can't legally copy them at all. The standard Youtube license does not allow any copying. Copyright infringement of music is rather common. Enforcement of copyright must be pursued by the copyright holder, and you would need to discuss your specific plans with a copyright attorney to determine your probability of getting sued. Ultimately, you might get away with minimal copying, relying on a fair use defense (you still get sued, but you might prevail and not have to pay). There are street rumors that there is an N-note threshold for copyright infringement, where people often pick numbers from 3 to 7, but in fact there is no clear rule. This resource assembles relevant case law. Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, in the 6th District, establishes the rule that any amount of copying is infringement, whereas VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone in the 9th District rejects that finding and allowed a case of .23 seconds (230 milliseconds) of copying. The "de minimis" doctrine is independent of "fair use" which has a statutory basis, but seems to have arisen from similarity doctrines which are involved in proving that copying took place.

It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t.

Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization".

Making and sharing and using subtitles for movies is not legal. It is copyright infringement. I paint this statement with a very broad brush. The movies are copyrighted (they are original and fixed in tangible form). (17 U.S. Code § 102(a)) 17 U.S. Code § 106(2) provides that the owner of copyright has the exclusive rights to prepare and to authorize to preparation of derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 17 U.S. Code § 101 defines derivative work as a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.... So we have established that the copyright holder has exclusive rights to authorize translations, but this exclusive right is limited by fair use. 17 U.S. Code § 107 provides some examples of fair use: criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research If these subtitle files are not used for a fair use purpose (the examples cited are examples only, not an exhaustive list) then translation is infringement. If the files are used for one of the fair use purposes then § 107 also gives us the factors to determine whether that particular use is fair use: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Is it a violation of copyright to publish a computer program that exactly produces such a piece, without containing the piece itself in the program? Yes. A program that reproduces a particular work is functionally a derivative work and is a copyright infringement. A program that composes music not tied to a particular work would be patentable, but the algorithm would not be protected by copyright, although derive works based on the code implementing the algorithm might be protected by copyright. Of course, this assumes that the person devising this algorithm knows about the original work that it will produce. If the person devising and the person using the algorithm are ignorant of the existence of the prior work that it produces, it is not a copy or a derivative work and is not infringing. The source of the creation of an allegedly infringing work in relevant in copyright law even thought it is not relevant in patent and trademark law. Copyright protects independent inventors of the same work from infringement liability, although this may be hard to prove. In theory the burden of proof to show copying is on the personal bringing the lawsuit alleging infringement. But, a copyright infringement plaintiff can meet their burden of proof in a copyright case by inferring that copy was made from the circumstantial evidence of the allegedly infringing work's similarity to the allegedly infringed work without direct evidence of copying or deriving the work from the original work.

No, it isn't. A sound recording of a song has a few different elements that are distinct from one another, but they are each protected by copyright (unless the song is old enough to have passed into the public domain): the lyrics the melody and other aspects of the musical composition the instrumental arrangement the recording itself A sound recording is protected by copyright even if it is a recording of something that isn't protected by copyright. If you use a portion of the recording that has no lyrics, or if you use technical means to suppress the lyrics or filter them out, you still have to contend with the copyright protection of the other elements. But sometimes it is allowed to use copyright-protected material. There is a lot of discussion about "fair use" and other circumstances under which one can use copyright-protected material without permission. The most clear-cut way to use copyright-protected material without violating copyright, however, is to have permission in the form of a license. You can always ask.

I believe the author has published it online. I agree. It is posted at his publisher's website. However, I am unsure if I'm allowed to read it. This answer assumes you are in jurisdiction whose copyright laws is based upon the Berne convention (i.e. the civilized world + USA). Assuming it was the author published it online, it is perfectly legal to read it. Technically, the author is performing his work by putting it online, and by reading it, you are just enjoying his performance. Also, if you are in a jurisdiction with an explicit exception from copyright for personal use, or where fair use allows making copies for personal use, it would also be legal to download it, or to print it on paper (but for personal use only). As for downloading and printing for non-personal use - that is not legal in Berne jurisdictions.

Why don't screenwriters get sued more often? Musicians get sued a lot for stealing other musicians work, but movie writers also riff on a lot of the same ideas of one another, yet I never hear of screen writers/directors getting sued. Why is that?

One reason could be because of the scènes à faire doctrine. Many of the things you notice as similarities are not infringement. I don't know the counts of lawsuits for music infringement vs screenwriting infringement. There may just be more songs than screenplays. Screenwriters/producers do get sued, though. See Cinar Corporation v. Robinson 2012 SCC 25.

The relevant law is trademark law. The basic question is whether the mark is identical or creates an unreasonable risk of confusion with the protected mark. There is no per se 30%-40% rule. I can imagine cases where changing a single letter in a long phrase turns a trademark violation into a parody or clearly different mark (see the Electric Company TV show). I can also imagine cases where changing a large part of the mark could still be infringing and confusingly similar. A parody is protected on fair use grounds in copyright law (which could conceivably come into play since this is a derivative work but would be protected since it is a parody), but in trademark law the issue is that a parody is unlikely to be confused for the original. Of course, at a fine grained level when one is looking at particular cases rather than general ideas, you would have to know which country's laws were involved, for example, where the goods would be sold.

Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.

You can report it to the publisher(s) Protection of copyright is a matter for the individual rights holder: some (I’m looking at you Disney) are vigilant, thorough and draconian in protecting their rights, others don’t care at all. Unless you are the rights holder it’s none of your business. In much the same way that the guy charging your neighbour for 4 hours gardening but being long gone in 2 isn’t. If you like your neighbour or feel duty bound to do something, you tell them and then leave it to them what they do with it. This is not a matter for the authorities as it doesn’t rise to the level of criminal copyright infringement. Just like the gardener above, this isn’t a crime.

Copyright is automatic - it starts to exist when you create a work of a type protected by law. Lyrics are such a work, and thus your lyrics are protected. Even the fact that the lyrics go with an existing (public domain) melody is protected. In addition, your recording is protected. However, the melody is probably not copyrighted, and does not become copyrighted merely because you re-used it. (Probably, because you didn't indicate how old, so I assumed old enough that nobody remembers the origin)

There is no legal difference, really. There may well be a practical difference. It is much easier to steal a wheelbarrow than it is a 20-foot section of 2-foot wide iron conduit. But doing either is theft, and the legalities are pretty much the same. It is indeed easier to copy a song lyric, or a poem, then the text of a novel, say. But if done without permission, either would be copyright infringement, unless of course an exception to copyright, such as fair use (in the US) or fair dealing (in the UK and some other countries) applies. (Or unless the text is out of copyright. One may lawfully copy Shakespeare, for example. Or Mark Twain.)

You are correct that you are inviting a lawsuit if you file a counter-notice. You are also correct that it might be a clerical error. Your attorney is the guy who recommends a best course of action for you. Part of the ensuing trouble would be the bill from your attorney. If the copyright holder wins in court, they could recover from you based on actual damages, statutory damages, and profits under 17 U.S.C. §504. The first is how much they lost (e.g. via sales or licensing fees) from your infringement. The second is a fixed amount ranging from $200 to $150,000, depending, provided that the work is registered. It is more likely that your case would fall in the $200 category, given a mistaken belief that you had permission as innocent infringement. The last is about whatever profits you made from the infringement that exceeds the copyright holder's losses. Incidentally, under the relevant provision, 17 USC 512(g)(2)(C), they will restore your material shortly after receiving the counter notification, unless its designated agent first receives notice from the person who submitted the notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material on the service provider’s system or network. Notice that all that YT has to have done is received notification that a lawsuit was filed. The other party does not have to prove to the provider that they filed a lawsuit.

It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.

Lawyer billing the other party for writing a letter to them (I'm in New Zealand, but I'm also interested in answers/data points from other jurisdictions) A friend whose Intellectual Property (design patent) is being infringed engaged a lawyer who intends to write a cease and desist letter to the other party, and to send a bill to this other party for his letter! Although it is likely the other party is aware they are infringing, my friend has not reasonably communicated with this other party asking them to stop prior to getting his lawyer involved. I can't quite put my finger on why, but it is my distinct impression/feeling that if the other party challenges the bill, they could not be forced to pay it. Are there any rules of law around this kind of thing?

As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings

Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.

The issue of who pays directly for the items and/or to contractors is irrelevant. The important thing is to memorialize the agreement/arrangement in writing so as to preempt or solve eventual disputes. A clearly written agreement signed by the parties would supersede any presumption of conditions and rights arising solely from the parties' conduct.

There are basically two kinds of things one could do. One could assign or transfer intellectual property rights and contracts related to the app to the entity, or one could license the intellectual property rights to the entity. Generally speaking, in a related party transaction, everything should be in a signed writing, and a notice of the transfer of an intellectual property right that has been registered or filed with a government agency should be provided to the government agency in question. Since there are potentially copyright, patent, trademark, publicity, and contractual rights that might be associated with the app, each aspect which exists should be transferred or licensed, as the case may be. While the forms to do this aren't particular long, the concepts involved and correct terminology are subtle, so this would not be a wise undertaking to attempt on a do it yourself basis.

The answer to the question "can so-and-so sue me?" is almost always "yes", regardless of context. Such a suit might be baseless, and it might get settled in your favor, but you still have to spend the time and money to defend yourself. This can be disastrous for a start-up that's trying to get off the ground, and it's how patent trolls make their money. (I'm not accusing SnapChat of engaging in such tactics as a rule, of course; I'm just pointing out that the legal system does allow for them.) Whether or not you are likely to be sued is a separate question, and one that can really only be effectively addressed by a trademark attorney with full knowledge of the particularities of your situation.

How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.

Your client is confused about how copyright law works (at least in the United States and virtually every other country I've ever heard about copyright in). If I were guessing, they read something like this from the United States Copyright Office: The copyright in a derivative work covers only the additions, changes, or other new material appearing for the first time in the work. Protection does not extend to any preexisting material, that is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a third party. and figured that because it's a derivative work, the copyright only covers the additions and changes they make, and there's no copyright protection for the original work. This misunderstands the law: the original work still has its own copyright (assuming it hasn't expired), and permission from the holder of the copyright on the original work is required to create that derivative work in the first place*. The copyright on the derivative work is separate—that is, both copyrights exist in parallel. * Some exceptions, such as fair use, exist, but would be unlikely to apply to the situation you describe.

There are two cases to distinguish: information that the other party does not want to give without court order, and information that the other party may not give without court order. Only the former case matters, of course, since the latter by definition requires a court order. So, if the other party is legally capable of giving the information, but it's commercially not sensible for them, then you'll need to sweeten the deal. And that's business, not a legal question anymore. In other words: there's no legal instrument that's at the same time equal to a court order but also different from one. When you need a court order, there's no alternative to a court order.

Is this a breach of contract? We are taking care of a deceased family member's estate and to get rid of an old vehicle we placed an online ad - we were asking $150. Someone responded and we accepted their offer - all via email. Now our extended family has decided that they would like to keep the old vehicle for sentimental reasons. So we contacted the prospective buyer and told him that we are sorry but we are no longer selling the vehicle. His response was that we have a contract and that he will be filing a breach of contract. He claims he has already spent $200 prepping for the vehicle - materials to restore it. No money was exchanged between us and the vehicle never left our possession Does the prospective buyer have a valid argument? Do the emails constitute a contract?

You might take a look at this summary. You have an offer, consideration (a promise of something valuable), acceptance, and "mutuality" i.e. there was no confusion over what you are talking about. Email is a form of writing, and written contracts are the strongest that there are. In this case, the offeree relied on the contract in buying materials and who knows what else. If there's nothing surprising that you're not mentioning, a court would then obliged you to make him whole. That could be in the form of compensating him for his losses, or else ordering specific performance (i.e. making you sell the car). Specific performance is most likely with real estate deals where the seller reneges, but maybe not in this case, and maybe especially not in Wisconsin. It is likely that you could keep the car for a price, but you'd really need an attorney to advise you on that.

Not a lawyer, but: In many countries, a purchased item is your property once you removed it from the premises of the seller. In practice, this rarely makes a difference. You have entered a contract with the seller where the seller has to deliver the product, and you have to pay the money, you did your part, they have to do their part. There would be a difference if the item was stolen while in the store, or damaged by fire, or if the store went bankrupt and bailiffs took the item. If these rules apply in your country, then what they did is not theft, otherwise it would be theft (in all countries, if the store removed the door from your home after it is installed, that would be theft). You paid for a door, the store owes you a door. You have a legal contract. Both sides are bound by that legal contract. They have to do what the contract says (delivering the door that was displayed in the store), if they can't, then they have to do the nearest thing that isn't to your disadvantage, like delivering a new door. Or possible a different door that was on display. They can't just declare your contract invalid because it suits them better. That wouldn't be the case if this would put the store at an unacceptable disadvantage. For example, if thieves had broken into the store and stolen ten doors, including yours, the store might get away with returning your money. Since they intentionally sold your door again to someone else, I don't think they could use this as an excuse. I'd go once more to the store and ask them whether they want to deliver a door to you, according to your contract with the store, or if they want you to get a lawyer. A letter from a lawyer might work wonders. (Or of course the lawyer might tell you that I'm completely wrong, but they don't know that, so telling them that you will hire a lawyer might be enough).

A contract need not say anything about the fact that the company could be sold. What matters is that the terms of the contract are not changed. Since there is no opt-out on transfer clause, you have to finish the term of the contract (or pay whatever fee is assessed if there is an early termination clause). So the question is how certain you are that you did not agree to the possibility of adding a "Universal Service Fund" charge. There may be subtle language which allows the company to add charges for specified purposes, and the new owners are availing themselves of that possibility. It may be difficult to determine just how this fee is legal (if it is), because customer service might just say "we are now charging this fee", or "we have to charge this fee", but you could try asking them where in the contract this new fee is allowed. You can hire an attorney to read over the contract to see where this possibility is mentioned; perhaps it is not, and then an exchange of letters between attorneys might be necessary. There is such a thing as the Universal Service Fund, which is a government operation to improve rural telecommunications. Telecomm companies have to pay a percent of their interstate revenues to this fund. If your bill has not increased since the acquisition, that suggests that you simply did not know that you had been paying into the fund, since the original company didn't give you a detailed invoice. If it has increased by this amount, that suggests that the earlier owner hadn't exercised an option to pass the cost on to the customer. It is likely that there is some clause in the contract that addresses charges required by law. That does not mean that you could not prevail in a suit against the company, but it would make the job harder (more expensive) for you. One company sort of explains how they are legally allowed to pass the cost on to the customer. Because it is allowed by federal regulation, it need not be mentioned in the contract.

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

Don't trivialize this because it appears to be minor and inexpensive. If something goes wrong, you could be liable for damage. You should have an idea of what a reasonable cost should be based on the rent and condition of the property. Discuss it with the landlord. If the landlord chooses to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, acknowledging that you aren't responsible for reimbursing the landlord for the cost or acknowledging receipt by the landlord of any contribution from you and a statement that the contribution fulfills your lease requirement. If you're going to fix it, you should have something in writing, signed by both you and the landlord, agreeing to the choice of replacement parts and the choice of anyone you hire to do the work. It might be nice to think you can save money by doing it yourself. But if anything happens and there's damage, you could be liable. You should have renter's insurance. You should check your renter's insurance policy to see what, if anything, it says about tenant responsibility for repairs. Your insurance might pay for it. More importantly, will your insurance protect you if something goes wrong and there's damage? I recommend you copy this and modify it as you see fit or, if you don't this is correct, make up something that you think is correct. Keep an electronic copy on your computer. But also have a notebook in which you keep how-to papers, so you don't have to figure it out all over again at some time in the future and to use the how-tos you accumulate to help you make new how-tos as necessary. Also keep documentation, especially warranties. Scan receipts (receipt ink is notorious for fading over time) and warranties, keep them the electronic copies on your computer and print the receipts and put the printed receipts and original receipts with the warranty papers in the notebook. Keep a manilla envelope with receipts, warranties, instructions, and any papers you receive from anyone you hire to do the work. When you move out, you should give the envelope to the landlord so the landlord will be able to maintain what was installed and obtain warranty service if necessary.

Suppose the shop bills you $2000 and you have a $750 deductible. You pay them $750, your insurance company pays $1250. Now suppose instead that the shop purports to waive the deductible. In order to get the insurance company to pay $1250 they still have to bill $2000. Then they don't collect the $750 from you. Presumably they write it off as bad debt. It smells like insurance fraud to me, on two counts: first, the shop expects to receive $1250 for a service but they produce a bill of $2000 for the insurance company's benefit and then do not seek payment from the insured party for any balance purportedly due beyond $1250. Second, the insured party has a contract with the insurer undertaking to pay the first $750 of the claim but has conspired with the shop to avoid paying that amount through deception. Had the shop played by the rules, they would have billed $1250 and the insurer would have paid $500. The shop isn't waiving your deductible; it's getting it out of the insurance company by fraud, with your collusion. Another way of handling this is that the auto body shop submits an estimate for the cost necessary to restore the car to a certain degree but then restores the car to a lesser degree. If everyone is aware that this is happening then it might be acceptable, depending on the terms of the insurance policy.

Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.

In the vast majority of jurisdictions, unpaid property taxes give rise to a lien that runs with the land. So, the new owners have an "in rem" responsibility to pay those taxes that can be collected against them solely by foreclosing on the tax lien and seizing the property if the tax isn't paid. Whether the previous owners also have any responsibility for the unpaid property taxes depends on state law which varies and on the terms of the real estate purchase and sale contract and deed in the transaction. Where I live, the real estate buyer is protected against a surprise tax bill once the sale is done in two main ways. First, the title company provides insurance against unpaid real estate taxes and will deduct any potential unpaid real estate taxes from the funds provided to the seller at closing unless the country treasurer has verified in writing to them that there are no real estate tax arrears for that parcel of property. Second, if the property is conveyed by a warranty deed that does not exclude a warranty that there are no property tax liens in existence for the relevant years, then the buyer has a right to sue the seller for the unpaid back taxes if that warranty turns out not to be true. Almost all sales of real property for full consideration between unrelated parties are carried out by a general warranty deed of this type that doesn't exclude property tax liens except for the current calendar year. If there is no title company involved in the transaction and/or the property is not conveyed by a warranty deed (e.g. it is conveyed by a quitclaim deed), then you could still avoid this risk by checking with the county treasurer to see if any back property taxes are owed on the parcel being sold and getting a certification in writing from the county treasurer of that fact, before agreeing to close on the sale. The title insurance company, or you, if there is no title insurance company, should also check the county real estate records normally maintained by a county clerk or recorder, to confirm that the seller really owns the property sold and that it has not been sold in a tax sale which would eliminate the back tax obligation but which would also mean that the seller no longer owns the property.

Is it even possible to use the Google Maps API without violating their terms of use? I went to the Google Maps API terms of use page and scrolled down and found section at 10.5f, which read: No incorporating Google software into other software. You will not incorporate any software provided as part of the Service into other software. If taken literally, and "other software" is the developers application, it appears as though one could be in violation just by using the Google Maps API service in any application, full stop. Does this mean everybody using the Google Maps API is in violation of the terms of use?

Does this mean everybody using the Google Maps API is in violation of the terms of use? No. 'Incorporate' could mean several different things but clause 10.5(f) would be interpreted in its context. The other paragraphs within clause 10.5 relate to conduct by which you use Google's data to populate your own system or obscure the fact that you are using Google's system to provide a service. Accordingly, the kind of 'incorporation' whereby your software makes part of the Google Maps system's user interface appear as part of your software's user interface is not prohibited. The other key bit of context is the fact that Google Maps is obviously intended to be used. It would be absurd to offer a service and, in the terms of service, prohibit anybody from using it. A court would interpret the words such as to avoid such absurdity. See e.g. Dockside Holdings v Rakio [2001] SASC 78; Westpac Banking Corporation v Tanzone [2000] NSWCA 25.

StackExchange probably has no obligation to continue to provide the content, however StackExchange probably cannot stop copies from continuing to be used, reproduced, etc. from the Terms of Service (click on Legal below): You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. Bold added by me. The content is licensed to SE, unlike some sites where you transfer ownership of content to the site. SE can continue to use your data, but you still own the copyright. They can't limit your use of your own content, because you remain the owner. SE cannot use your content in a way that violates the Creative Commons Share Alike License, but I don't see any limitations on how SE makes your work available, including to a limited audience. They could, for example, probably move to a paid model because there are no commercial exclusions (unlike the Creative Commons non-commercial variations of the license). You could post a copy of SE content elsewhere, as long as you adhere to the requirements: In the event that You post or otherwise use Subscriber Content outside of the Network or Services, with the exception of content entirely created by You, You agree that You will follow the attribution rules of the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license as follows: You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually displays or otherwise indicates the source of the Subscriber Content as coming from the Stack Exchange Network. This requirement is satisfied with a discreet text blurb, or some other unobtrusive but clear visual indication. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content includes a hyperlink directly to the original question on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12345) You will ensure that any such use of Subscriber Content visually display or otherwise clearly indicate the author names for every question and answer so used. You will ensure that any such Internet use of Subscriber Content Hyperlink each author name directly back to his or her user profile page on the source site on the Network (e.g., https://stackoverflow.com/users/12345/username), directly to the Stack Exchange domain, in standard HTML (i.e. not through a Tinyurl or other such indirect hyperlink, form of obfuscation or redirection), without any “nofollow” command or any other such means of avoiding detection by search engines, and visible even with JavaScript disabled. Making a complete copy of SE would seem to be within the terms of the license, as long as all the requirements for attributing, linking, etc are met, so you could mitigate the risk of the SE material going away in that manner.

Yes, that’s allowed. Under the Stack Exchange terms of service, content you upload is licensed to Stack Exchange Inc. on a non-exclusive basis under CC-BY-SA 4.0. The terms of service do not give Stack Exchange the copyright to your contributions, and a non-exclusive license means you are not promising Stack Exchange that “only Stack Exchange will be allowed to use this content.” That means you can continue to do whatever you want with your own content and do not need to mention Stack Exchange at all. The only restriction is that you can’t stop Stack Exchange from continuing to use your Stack Exchange content under CC-BY-SA 4.0, and since it’s a Creative Commons license you also can’t stop anyone else from using your Stack Exchange content under that license.

If that is the licence that Uber are operating under then they are breaking it. This is not legal in that Google can sue them for copyright breach. However, this is the licence that Google offer to the average person on the street for which they pay Google nothing. It is entirely possible that Uber and Google have come to terms on a completely different licence arrangement which may involve Uber handing over slabs of cash (or not) and not needing to attribute. Google is free to offer licences on different terms to different people.

The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.

Ok here is my go at answering my own question: (see comments above & below for links) Depending on what you want to do, GPL can be a bit complicated, with multiple versions, version numbers, and added exceptions over the years. it can be a headache. However, for this purposes of app development incorporating GPL/LGPL libraries, it is fairly straightforward. Keep in mind to check version numbers on all relevant documents, although they are most likely v3.0. As far as I know linking to a GPL library binds you to also releasing your code under GPL. So that is a no-go for closed source, but that brings me to my 1st question. is it legal for me to remain closed source while incorporating external libs that are both BSD and LGPL? and I think the answer to that is yes provided that I dynamically link to said component (.so .dll .dylib .framework). Permission of this is granted under section 4d of LGPL v3.0. d) Do one of the following: 0) Convey the Minimal Corresponding Source under the terms of this License, and the Corresponding Application Code in a form suitable for, and under terms that permit, the user to recombine or relink the Application with a modified version of the Linked Version to produce a modified Combined Work, in the manner specified by section 6 of the GNU GPL for conveying Corresponding Source. 1) Use a suitable shared library mechanism for linking with the Library. A suitable mechanism is one that (a) uses at run time a copy of the Library already present on the user's computer system, and (b) will operate properly with a modified version of the Library that is interface-compatible with the Linked Version. My 2nd question Would it change the ability for me to stay closed source if i were to use an altered version of one of these libraries? It is my interpretation that in this case the only source you would need to provide is that of the modified library, and that the application itself can remain closed source. I'm basing this on grounds that nothing has changed from the situation for my 1st question other than the fact that the modified component library is now a derivative work under standard GPL v3.0. finally my 3rd question what is the legal effect on static vs dynamic linking? This seams to be a bit iffy. Again see section 4d of the LGPL v3.0. By this wording dynamic linking is much preferable, and there are basically no requirements. If you choose to link statically though(in other words as part of the project build) things get complicated. To fully understand see LGPL definition of "Corresponding Application Code", and then see sections 4 5 and 6 of the GPL document. Full source is not required, but as far as i can tell you are required to provide all necessary materials for someone to build the project from scratch, so they can use a different version of the library if they so choose. This, in my opinion, would not be closed source. I hope that is clear enough? I did quite a bit of looking around the internet in coming up with this answer, and in the end even some reading of the license, though I'm not sure I've actually read them through in there entirety. Keep in mind that there are multiple version of each license, and you should check version numbers for each LGPL library you use. There is a lot of good information on on opensource.stackexchange, although much more than one can process in a single sitting, and with occasional disagreement on finer points. Below are some related links. gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.txt gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.txt copyfree.org/content/standard/licenses/2bsd/license.txt opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/1700/are-derivative-works-a-subset... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/2772/can-this-nvidia-licence-be-us... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/2488/do-i-need-to-host-qt-source-w... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/1431/are-there-examples-of-proprie... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/5162/are-the-terms-of-lgpl-3-0-alr...

Am I as the user of this site in any way liable if the music turns out to violate copyright? Yes. In a similar way to if I give you “permission” to take my neighbour’s car. Only worse. Because stealing requires intent - you have to mean to do it - while copyright violation is strict liability - if you do it, you’re guilty. If the user that uploaded the item did not have the authority to give the site permission then the site does not have permission and neither do you. If you take reasonable precautions such as performing a reverse image source and verifying that the item appears to be owned by the same person everywhere and, perhaps, reaching out to them then your violation will be an “innocent” infringement which mitigates but does not eliminate damages. The only way to be sure with copyright is to know the provenance of the copyright/licences back to the original creator.

OK, seems I was right to begin with, but after building some work with this I had to be sure. The problem seems to step from a lot of not-lawyers overinterpreting the reach and applicability of copyright law, which, with a few asides, is the full extent of the AGPL. Additionally, the software is not based in an English-speaking country, which may have thrown the interpreted meaning of "derivative product", as opposed to simply "product". The AGPL is indeed in almost all ways the same as the GPL version 3; in fact you can see this by diffing the two documents. The only extension of the GPLv3 made for AGPL applies to software being run on a server. While it is indeed possible to include code in the final files, which might, in theory, constitute a significant portion of this program, that does not happen. The AGPL is apparently also meant almost exclusively for software, though the wording does include the ambiguous phrase "and other products"; this concerned me as it felt as though it might apply to the resources created by the work. It, broadly speaking, does not. So, I've got nothing to worry about--unless I was distributing derivative software, which would be an entirely different question and subject to this.

How do I report Child Labor Law violations in California? I live in California and once a week I see a gardener mowing the neighbors' lawn. He may be here legally or illegally (as millions are) and that's a different issue. The issue is that he has a kid with him every time. The boy is maybe 13 or 14. He deserves an education that is not limited to how to mow a lawn. In other words, he should be in school. I called the police. They don't want to deal with it and referred me to Child Protective Services. I called them too and they don't want to deal with it. They said I should find out where he lives and what school he should attend, and then report him to the school. I work full time and don't have time to follow this guy around and watch him and his slave child do yard work. I don't speak Spanish otherwise I would start engaging in a conversation and ask him outright where he lives, and maybe pretend to be interested in hiring him so I could get his info. Isn't there any agency that I can contact that will actually take some action?

There appears to be no "oppressive child labor" occurring and therefore no breach of labor laws. The definition of oppressive child labor expressly excludes employment by "a parent or a person standing in place of a parent" except in identified hazardous occupations; gardening not being one of those. Notwithstanding, schooling in California is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 18 subject to a number of exemptions which the person concerned may or may not have. If you are concerned about this you should contact the Department of Education.

In the United States who has the authority and what is the procedure to determine if conduct by an individual is "illegal"? You are conflating several different ideas here, which is probably the source of your persistent confusion. 1) Actions are legal or not Illegal: Not authorized by law; Illicit ; unlawful; contrary to law The law sets out certain things that you must do (you must stop at a red light) and things you must not do (you must not drive under the influence). Sometimes actions fall into a gray area of the law, or aren't addressed at all, but if something is spelled out, then it's very clear whether the abstract action is legal or not. Running a red light is illegal. Driving under the influence is illegal. There are definitions and specified penalties for both. 2) A person may or may not be guilty of an illegal action Guilty: Having committed a crime or tort Abstract actions can be legal or illegal, but people commit crimes. When someone commits a crime, they are guilty of that crime. This is true whether or not they are ever prosecuted, or even if law enforcement knows who the guilty one is. If someone runs a red light at 2 in the morning on an empty street, it's still illegal and thus they are guilty of running a red - but no one will ever catch them. If someone is shot in the middle of the street, then someone is guilty of shooting them. Again, the shooter may never be found, but whoever they are, they are still guilty. 3) An individual may or may not be guilty of the crime of which they are charged. Charge: the statement of the alleged offense that brings a person to court If law enforcement (whether your local traffic cop or the FBI) believes that you are guilty of a crime, they can charge you with committing it. They may be right. They may be wrong. But the suspicion of having committed it is enough to charge you. To continue the traffic example: If an officer sees you running the red light, they can write you a ticket (effectively charging you) for doing so. They may or may not actually be right (it could have been yellow or malfunctioning, for example), but law enforcement has the power to charge regardless. 4) A defendant may or may be found guilty and convicted. Conviction: In a general sense, the result of a criminal trial which ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged. Finding a person guilty by verdict of a jury. This is where the presumption of innocence comes in - the default assumption is that the accused did not commit the crime that they are being charged with, and it's the prosecutor's job to prove otherwise. If the accused is found to not be guilty of the crime, then they (presumably) didn't do it - it doesn't necessarily mean the crime didn't happen, just that this specific person didn't commit it. Alternatively, the defendant can be found not guilty for other reasons - the judge or jury can determine that the crime didn't take place, took place but was justified, or the defendant wasn't in their right mind at the time. On the other hand, if they are found guilty, they're convicted and sentenced to whatever an appropriate punishment is. TL;DR Whether something is legal is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. Someone who commits an illegal act is guilty of doing so, even if they are never charged. Again, this is determined by the legislature when they pass laws. People are charged with violations of specific laws by law enforcement. Defendants can be found guilty by the court system. In other words, only the courts can determine whether a specific individual actually committed illegal behavior, but the behavior is still illegal regardless.

Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks.

Probably not An employee is someone that the employer "suffers or permits to work" - moderators would appear to be caught by this. There are specific exemptions carved out in the public and not-for-profit sectors where they "a) work toward public service, religious or humanitarian objectives; b) not expect or receive compensation for services; and c) not displace any genuine employees." However, they very specifically say “Under the FLSA, employees may not volunteer services to for-profit private sector employers.” So on the face of it, a moderator is an employee and is entitled to minimum wages and conditions for the hours they work. AOL settled a lawsuit in 2009 with their moderators who were suing for wages for an undisclosed sum and so the case did not set a precedent. This article suggests that "for-profit companies don’t have volunteers; they have lawsuits waiting to happen" and uses examines the situation at Reddit (which could equally apply here). Facebook employs moderators so the precedent exists that this is work that employees do. When the lawsuit happens, we'll find out. It will turn on the particular facts - some types of mods for some companies may be employees while others may not.

I don't know of any law requiring schools to proactively disclose the results of these sweeps, but if you asked for them, the Michigan Freedom of Information Act would likely require both the police and the school to release records that would give you an accurate picture of what happened. At the very least, I would expect the police department to write up the results of its sweeps in a report to send up the chain of command. I would also expect that those results would be communicated in writing to the school district. The police should also maintain a log of all property they have seized; if they seized anything from the school, it should show up there, as well.

What can we do to dismiss such report? Does she just show up at a local police department telling them that she's fine and it was her own decision? In short, yes. She shows up at a local police station, tells her side of the story including the whole bit about things getting destroyed and her getting kicked out, cites the missing persons report, and make it clear that she's not missing but an independent adult who is free and making her own decisions. Since she's over 18, she can do that. (Bringing proof of age might be helpful.) The mystery of the missing person will be considered solved from the police side. She does not have to give a specific address where she's living, just convince the officer that she's OK and making an intentional decision to create distance between herself and her mother. She could also try calling (the same local station which is convenient to her current location) before showing up to see if that satisfies the officer, and only go in if needed. Would I get in trouble for being in a relationship with her daughter since I was 20 and she was 16? We had never met in person until now, to avoid any trouble. Shouldn't be a problem, as long as it's a mutually willing (non-coercive) relationship. Her mother said the police also wanted to talk to me separately. I do not want to get involved in this at all. Can I reject it? Yes, you can reject it. You do not have to answer ANY question a police officer asks; you have the right to remain silent and/or to say only "I have the right to remain silent." To reduce the probability that they'll even ask questions, you might prefer not accompanying your girlfriend when she goes to clear the missing persons report, if she goes in-person. This adds more weight to her assertion that she's going there to clear it of her own free will, not because you're forcing her.

Etiquette is not "above" the law in the sense that an etiquette rule excuses a violation of law. However, at least in the US, the police are not required to investigate every alleged violation of law, nor is a prosecutor required to proceed against every lawbreaker, and the decision to proceed may be influenced by a perceived etiquette violation. It should also be mentioned that while a third person has no right to prevent you form talking to anyone who is willing to talk to you (unless the 3rd person is the parent of guardian of an underage person you wish to address), it is not in any way illegal to instruct you not to do so, even if the instructions are incorrect as a matter of law. Assaulting you is, of course, a different matter.

I think that there won't be any trouble from Germany, but the US could be a problem if the girl reports the case to authorities. In that case, further details would depend on the state in question. As far as Germany is concerned, there are two sections in the penal code that could be relevant here: § 176 StGB - Sexual abuse of children § 182 StGB - Sexual abuse of juveniles To make things more complicated, we would also have to take into account juvenile penal law and whether Germany would have jurisdiction in the first place. 1) Jurisdiction: I'm not sure whether this case would fall into German jurisdiction under § 3 StGB as the case could be deemed to be committed in the US. However, in that case, Germany could still assume jurisdiction under § 5 item 8 StGB. 2) Since our guy was only 18, it would be at the discretion of the court to decide whether juvenile criminal law or regular criminal law is to be applied. In the former case, the sentence would be lower (if there is a sentence at all). But then we still have to figure out whether our guy broke a law in the first place. So first of all, let's take a look at § 176 StGB: “Section 176 Sexual abuse of children (1) Whoever performs sexual acts on a person under 14 years of age (child) or has the child perform sexual acts on them incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between six months and 10 years. (2) Whoever causes a child to perform sexual acts on a third person or has a third person perform sexual acts on the child incurs the same penalty. (3) In especially serious cases, the penalty is imprisonment for a term of at least one year. (4) Whoever 1. performs sexual acts in the presence of a child, 2. causes the child to perform sexual acts, unless the act is subject to a penalty under subsection (1) or subsection (2), 3. influences a child by way of material (section 11 (3)) or information and communication technologies a) in order to cause the child to perform sexual acts on or in the presence of the offender or a third person or to have the offender or a third person perform sexual acts on the child or b) in order to commit an offence under section 184b (1) no. 3 or under section 184b (3) or 4. influences a child by showing pornographic images or depictions, by playing pornographic audio recordings, making pornographic content available by way of information and communication technologies or pornographic speech incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (5) Whoever offers or promises to supply a child for an offence under subsections (1) to (4) or who arranges with another to commit such an offence incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term of between three months and five years. (6) The attempt is punishable; this does not apply to offences under subsection (4) nos. 3 and 4 and subsection (5).” Since the girl is 15 years old, this section is probably not relevant. However, to know for sure, we would need to know her exact age when contact started. If she was only 13 years and 11 months and contact lasted 1 year and 2 months, then § 176 might be relevant after all. That takes us to § 182. “Section 182 Sexual abuse of juveniles (1) Whoever abuses a person under 18 years of age by taking advantage of a predicament by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having said person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing the person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have sexual acts performed on them by a third person incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine. (2) A person over 18 years of age who abuses a person under 18 years of age by performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them for a consideration incurs the same penalty. (3) A person over 21 years of age who abuses a person under 16 years of age by 1. performing sexual acts on that person or having that person perform sexual acts on them or 2. causing that person to perform sexual acts on a third person or to have a third person perform sexual acts on that person, and thereby exploits the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-determination, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or a fine. (4) The attempt is punishable. (5) In the cases under subsection (3), the offence is prosecuted only upon request, unless the prosecuting authority deems there to be a special public interest in prosecution which calls for ex officio intervention. (6) In the cases under subsections (1) to (3), the court may dispense with imposing a penalty pursuant to these provisions if, having regard to the conduct of the person against whom the offence was committed, the wrongfulness of the act is minor.” § 182 para. 1 StGB applies only to cases where the offender takes advantage of a predicament. I seriously doubt there's a predicament involved here. § 182 para. 2 StGB only applies for sexual acts for consideration, i. e. when money is being paid. Since apparantly there was no payment involved in this case, no problem here and we can go on to para. 3. § 182 para. 3 StGB only applies to cases where the victim lacks the capacity for self-determination and the offender is at least 21 years old. Neither is the case here. Summary: As far as Germany is concerned, there's no trouble to be expected under § 182 StGB. § 176 StGB might cause problems but only if the girl was under 14 when contact began. (You stated that she's 15. This could mean that she just turned 15 but was 13 years and 11 months when contact began.) As far as German law is concerned, it looks like our guy was overly cautious and there was no need to cut contact. From the US perspective, however, things will probably be different. I'm not familiar with US law but we would probably need to know the state in question.

Depicting real places, public organisation names, and generic industries in an inaccurate manner in fiction Could it be a case for libel if a fictional story has reference to the following… Places and countries (and some details, like description of locations, which may not be accurate) Reference to law enforcement/military organisation (and some details about their organisational structure which may not be accurate, but are not necessarily depicting them in bad light) Not naming any specific company or brand name, but rather depicting an entire industry in bad light (For eg: making claims that the insurance industry is in general prone to misrepresentation of facts while pitching their products)

Presumably you mean "and make untrue accusations of wrong-doing". In the US, defamation involves statements about a legal person, and a place, government or government body, or industry is not a legal personal (a specific business can be, however). In the course of "defaming" a city, you might end up defaming a supposedly fictitious individual who bears a striking resemblance to a real person, for example a made-up New York real estate tycoon named Ronald Rump who runs for president. Or you could defame the "police department of Bug Tussle" which in fact is composed of only one person -- that is, you refer to a group but the group is so small that it actually refers to an identifiable individual. See this answer regarding defaming people in fiction. Okay, it's not actually true that a government can't be a legal person. The fact that in the US a government can't sue for defamation would be rooted in the First Amendment, and is surely embodied in case law that is lurking. In Canada, governments have had more power to pursue critic via defamation suits. In Ontario, Halton Hills (Town) v. Kerouac 80 O.R. (3d) 577 (2006) says that "a government may not sue in defamation". I expect that there is some such ruling in the history of US law.

No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.

Yes. This is legal. The only possible liability for a truthful and accurate disclosure of fact is a defamation action (in the absence of a privacy clause in the contract) and this is truthful so it would not violate anyone's legal rights. Credit reporting agencies routinely collect such information and court actions to collect unpaid debts are also a matter of public record. Credit reporting agencies in this business also have some additional obligations (such as the obligation to remove an entry after a period of time and an obligation to present rebuttal statements from the person affected). But, you should understand that merely publicly sharing truthful information about a factual matter is not really what a "blacklist" means. Normally, a blacklist includes an implied understanding that certain actions will be taken as a result of placement on the list rather than merely sharing information for what it is worth. An example of a law prohibiting a true blacklist from Colorado is the following: § 8-2-110. Unlawful to publish blacklist No corporation, company, or individual shall blacklist, or publish, or cause to be blacklisted or published any employee, mechanic, or laborer discharged by such corporation, company, or individual, with the intent and for the purpose of preventing such employee, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual. Incidentally, I'm not convinced that the statute would be constitutional if enforced under modern First Amendment jurisprudence, although one U.S. District court case from 1971 did uphold its validity in the face of a somewhat different kind of challenge. Resident Participation, Inc. v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).

Defamation is a false statement. If the police have arrested you or charged you with a crime, then a press release stating that you have been arrested or charged is a true statement, and not defamation. If the agency falsely stated that you were guilty of the crime then you'd have a case for defamation. If the police did not actually have probable cause for arresting or charging you, then you might have a case, perhaps for false arrest or malicious prosecution. In 1996 Richard Jewell was investigated by the FBI in the Atlanta Olympics bombing. He was never officially charged. However, multiple newspapers and TV networks named him as a suspect in the bombing. Eventually the US Attorney in the case issued a press release explicitly stating that Jewell was not a suspect. Jewell filed at least 5 lawsuits for libel, and received settlements in at least four. Since no government agency had officially named Jewell as a suspect, the suits were against media outlets and Jewell's employer. One might guess that the basis of the reporting was someone in law enforcement speaking off the record, but the press generally doesn't name their confidential sources, so we don't know.

A statement by a fictional character is part of the fiction, and so is normally protected by copyright. A short exclamation such as "You are not prepared!" might be ruled to be too short and not sufficiently original to be protected if it were used separately, but that would apply just as much to a short statement that was not a quote from a character. But something like one of Gandalf's speeches on "mercy and pity" to Frodo in Chapter 2 ("The Shadow of the past") in book 1 of The Lord of the Rings would clearly be protected. The longer and the more distinctive such a text is, the more clearly it would be protected. Whether it is put in the mouth of a character or is part of the narration makes no significant difference. Note, in a copyright sense a statement does not "belong to a particular universe", rather it belongs to a copyright owner, often the author, or in the case of a video game quite likely thy publisher. As this comment by Kevin mentions, and as I should have mentioned, reproducing a short quotation from a work of fiction, particularly if properly attributed, is quite likely to be fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don't make any money off it? for more specific details. See also the threads tagged fair use If a quote is used for a different purpose than the original, in what is called a "transformative" manner in copyright cases, then it is more likely to be held to be fair use. The smaller of a percentage of the source item the quote is, the more likely it is that it will be considered to be a fair use. The less the use of a quote serves as a replacement for the source, or harms the market for the source, the more likely it is to be considered a fair use. See the links above for more detail.

The argument would have to be either a derivative work under copyright, or a trade dress/trademark claim. Neither sounds very solid at all. Neither copyright nor trade dress/trademark protect ideas like a TV format. They can only protect very similar expressions of an idea that necessarily flow one from the other and, for example, the game mechanics can't be protected by copyright.

Yes you can, and you can even include "editorials or subjective content". However, if you include factual statements, or words that imply factual statements, the company could claim that they are false, and therefore defamatory. Indeed they might claim that in any case. If you make no false statements of fact, they should not be able to win a defamation suit, but you might need to spend time and money defending yourself if they choose to sue. The detailed rules on defamation vary by jurisdiction, in the US by state. But in no US state can defamation be found against a person who neither made nor implied a false statement of fact. Use of the name of the company, along with "boycott" as in "BoycottXYXCorp.com" would not infringe any trademark XYZ might have. It is clearly Nominative use, as no one could reasonably believe that such a site was run by, sponsored, or endorsed by XYZ. Again, XYZ could always sue, even if they are highly likely to lose quickly.

If you are using just the names, there is no issue - you can't copyright a fact. If you are using actual images (you appear to say you are not, but you also asked "Am I allowed to include images of Google Maps) - then the answer is still yes within your usage case - provided you attribute them to Google. If you look at this link it specifies that you are OK to use this in Reports and Presntations, Books which are not guidebooks and which have less then 5000 copies and presentations. If you are using them online, you need to use the imbedded versions (ie you can't just screenshot them - you need to link to them). If you are still unsure, you can contact [email protected] to request specific permission.