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Question about a ticket cost Last week I was issued a ticket for "Operating Vehicle While Texting/Reading/Typing". It was a bs ticket since I had just pulled out of a parking lot and was merely plugging my phone in to charge it. Regardless, I probably don't have a shot at winning that since I was still looking down with a mobile device in my hand. My question is regarding the cost of this ticket. Ordinance 257.602b states it's just a $100 fine for the first offense. The magistrate told me it was going to cost me $240. I didn't pay it because her GPS was down and I don't carry around $240 in cash on me... The ticket was issued in Tuscola County, Michigan. I did a bunch of digging around and found this: http://www.14adistrictcourt.org/traffic_court/traffic_fines.html It shows $240 as the total for the ticket, which is ridiculous to begin with, but what is the difference in the Fine and Cost and what are SMCO and BLDG? How can a fine cost $100 but I end up having to pay $240?

Consider that stuff "court costs" or "court fees." They are actually often things not related to the court, like environmental fee, or emergency medical something or other, or park poop bag fee. Pretty much whatever either the legislature or administrative decision makers what to put on there. And FWIW, if you were not texting get your phone records and bring them to court to prove that you did not send any texts in or around that time.

Unfortunately, your chances are nil. There are panels on every metro station where tickets and fares are listed, and on those a summary of the conditions is posted and a pointer to where to get the full conditions: not only the web but also at the customer centers. Nonetheless, the ATM ticket conditions are also published at the DOGC, short for Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya. That's where all laws are published and, although in reality almost no one reads that, whatever gets published there is assumed to be known for all citizens. It's the basis for the "not knowing the law does not allow you to not obey it" principle. By the way, the T-10 usage condition (or any other ticket that allows shared use like T-70/30) state that, if used by more than one person at once, all of them have to make the same exact journey: enter all at the same station, exit all at the same station.

Is odometer fraud a felony or a misdemeanor? It's both: a felony under federal law, and a misdemeanor under Colorado law. There's no conflict; each of those sovereigns can enforce its laws independently. Someone who tampers with an odometer could be prosecuted in federal court, and convicted of a felony; or prosecuted in Colorado court, and convicted of a misdemeanor; or even both. In practice, it sounds like the federal authorities are most interested in prosecuting large-scale odometer fraud schemes, and would generally leave one-off cases to the state authorities. Are there exceptions where this may not be enforceable? This site (https://www.nhtsa.gov/equipment/odometer-fraud) indicates that the requirement for a written disclosure of odometer roll-back is not applicable for vehicles over 20 years old (also pre-2010 models, which seems a bit more restrictive). I'm having a hard time nailing this particular restriction down in the Colorado Statutes. Can anyone point out where this law is defined? As far as I can tell, Colorado law simply incorporates the federal requirement: CRS 42-6-202 (5): It is unlawful for any transferor to fail to comply with 49 U.S.C. sec. 32705 and any rule concerning odometer disclosure requirements or to knowingly give a false statement to a transferee in making any disclosure required by such law. 49 USC 32705 (a)(5) permits the Secretary of Transportation (i.e. the federal Department of Transportation) to make regulations that carve out exemptions from the mileage disclosure rules, which can be found at 49 CFR 580.17 and include the 20-year and 2010 rules. So these same exemptions apply to the state requirement. (Incidentally, the Colorado title forms do not mention this exemption.) Note, however, that this is only an exemption from the disclosure requirement. There is no exemption from the general law against odometer fraud. It is illegal to tamper with an odometer no matter how old the car is. What is the statute of limitations to pursue crimes of odometer fraud? I think this is answered in Colorado Statute 13-80-102(j) (https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2020-title-13.pdf). This seems to indicate this type of fraud has a 2-year timeline. Does this apply from date of purchase or date of discovery? 13-80-102 is a statute of limitations for civil actions, and it does indeed cover actions for odometer fraud (see (1)(j) which references CRS 42-6-204). This would apply if the buyer wanted to sue the seller in civil court. But that's unrelated to the criminal statues we discussed above, which would be prosecuted in criminal court by the state or federal government. The limit is two years "after the cause of action accrues", which is defined in 13-80-108(3): A cause of action for fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit shall be considered to accrue on the date such fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or deceit is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. For criminal prosecutions, the Colorado statute of limitations for misdemeanors is generally 18 months, from the time the offense was committed (CRS 16-5-401). For some crimes, it is defined to start instead when the offense was discovered, but odometer fraud doesn't appear to be one of them; still, it could conceivably be prosecuted under other fraud statutes. As for federal law, the statute of limitations is generally 5 years from commission (18 USC 3282).

Sending a letter to the red light camera company or police department may or may not get the charge dropped before trial. But whether the charge gets dropped before trial isn't the important question -- after all, people sometimes do get charged wrongly -- rather, the question is, if it goes to trial, whether you will win. Since this question is about California, all traffic tickets in California, including red light camera tickets, are criminal cases (that's why the case will be named "People of the State of California v. [your name]" in court documents). The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and the standard of evidence is "beyond a reasonable doubt". There is no provision in California law to fine or otherwise punish the owner of a vehicle for a moving violation, except through a conviction as the driver who committed the violation. If you plead not guilty and it goes to trial, the burden will be on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver was you. If the driver in the picture does not look like you, there is no way they can meet that burden, and the court must find you not guilty. (In most cases the prosecution will immediately drop the case when they discover that the picture does not look like you.) Note that you have an absolute right to not testify in your own criminal trial where you are the defendant, so there is no way they can force you to testify at the trial about who the driver was if it was not you (which would be irrelevant to the case against you anyhow). If you do not say who the driver was, and the police department fail to guess who it was (e.g. by searching for drivers whose licenses share the same address as you for someone who looks like the one in the picture), then nobody gets fined or punished for the violation. This is true even if you know full well who the driver was, or even if you were pictured sitting right next to them. You don't need to claim not to know who the driver was, because whether you know or not doesn't matter -- you have no legal obligation to tell the identity of the driver even if you know, and you cannot be fined or otherwise punished for the violation if you intentionally refuse to tell.

Of course it doesn't work. You haven't discovered an end-around to property ownership I gave someone a car and want it back (they refuse) You no longer own this car. It is now titled in their name. Your interest in the car is now exactly zero whether or not they paid for it. I use a shell company to buy my own debt Okay. This has nothing to do with the car. You're now out of the cash it took you to set up this new entity. How are you doing this? I assume it means paying off your creditors with money you already have. You will also have to come up with some type of bogus documents that explain to the future court why this was even done. If you have the money, why do you have debt? My shell company sues me for conveying the car to conceal it from creditors Um, Ok. Now you're also out filing fees. Let's assume you know how to do this without paying an attorney to do it for you. I settle Makes sense, since you're suing yourself. The shell company now gets a court order to seize the car Seize the car how? This is a stretch. A judgement would be against you for the value of the car. You can't settle a lawsuit using assets you do not own. A court won't order something repossessed because of an unrelated squirrelly lawsuit. An exception would be a bankruptcy court that rules the item was sold or disposed of outside the court's orders. I would expect an astute court to hit you with contempt or sanctions for trying to use it to further your interests with some sort of end-around to property ownership. Expect more fees for this use of the court's time. The shell seizes the car No. Now I have the car back No.

Let's be quite brutal here. Inexperienced driver doesn't mean the driver made a mistake. Lots of friends in the car doesn't mean they interferred with his driving. Loud music in the car is totally legal. "Perhaps was distracted" - "perhaps" you were distracted by looking at the passengers of this car instead of yielding? It seems that you drove without due attention. You noticed at the last moment that you had to yield. "Yielding" isn't just stopping right at the last second, you have to drive in a way that it is visible for others that you are going to yield, and you didn't. The other driver was 100% correct to assume that you wouldn't yield. Then you come up with an accusation that a police officer was biased. That's a very, very strong accusation. It's impossible for you to prove. It's the kind of accusation that will cause the judge to believe that you can't accept your own faults, and that you need the maximum possible fine to make you realise your mistakes. That's why you need a lawyer. A lawyer will either make sure that you only say things in court that actually help your case. Or will advise you not to fight this in court at all, if that is better for you. If you go to court on your own, you'll only get yourself into trouble. And if there was bias by a police officer, and a witness lying, and a driver driving without attention, then a lawyer with experience in these things might be able to prove that it court, although that would be a very tough call, but you on your own don't have a chance in hell. You say "the shop owner lied". The shop owner says "no, I didn't". So what's your next step? You don't know. Your lawyer knows. That's why you need a lawyer.

To be very straightforward, yes, a police department would very likely have records of their past interactions with you in the form of police reports. They cannot just throw them away because it's been scrubbed from your public record. They detail the interactions the police officer had with you. That being said, those records would not show up in a general inquiry into your record, because those records are meant to protect the officer and the department as a reference point they can go back to in case some dispute arose in the future. If a police officer really wanted to find them, they'd have to do a bit of digging for them. The difficulty in finding them would depend on what system the particular police department uses to store those records. Smaller departments may just file them in a cabinet somewhere, whereas larger ones may actually have their own searchable database. But a traffic cop out on the street is only gonna see what you're seeing at the DMV - nothing. There is also a formal NCIC database, but traffic violations would never end up in there. That is a national database that basically stores red flag persons of interest (think stolen vehicles, sex offenders, and gang members). Sometimes multiple departments within a state will share their information with each other, but a department's database is usually kept to that department only. Also keep in mind court records. The court case that had a violation removed under such and such conditions is still gonna be a public record. Those records would generally be available to a judge overseeing your case so if you repeatedly end up in court for the same thing, they're gonna know and they're gonna stop scrubbing it from your record or offerring certain options because you're clearly not learning your lesson. Many laws allow you to have one offense stricken per year and similar stuff like that, but that kind of stuff doesn't just permanently disappear. They have to keep record of it in order to know you've already had your once per year etc. Also a note about parking violations: not all of those are actually issued by police. If it was issued by a private firm then that is not something that would ever show up on your record. It would just be in a database somewhere with whatever private firm issued the fine. Those kind of tickets get sent to collections and hurt your credit score if you don't pay them, rather than affecting your driving record.

Yes - they can charge a reasonable amount to cover collection, cataloguing, safekeeping and restoration of property. Crucially they aren't specific to just the costs related to an individual item, but rather the estimated income is weighed against the estimated costs of all lost property handling in that year. The legal basis for this comes from the London Transport Act 1982, subsequently amended various times (e.g. by The Transport for London (Consequential Provisions) Order 2003) but the original gives the gist in Part V, Section 19 : The Executive shall have power to fix the charges to be paid to them from time to time for the safe keeping and redelivery of lost property and the charges shall be of such amounts or at such rates as the Executive shall think fit: Provided that - (a) the total of the charges fixed under this subsection and estimated to be received in any year shall not exceed by an unreasonable proportion the cost to the Executive in that year of making provision for the safe keeping and redelivery of lost property ; Since you specifically mentioned the driver award this is further explained in TfL's Lost Property Fees documentation: Cab-driver award Items found in licensed cabs are subject to an additional award, which is given in full to the driver. This award takes into account the value of the item and the time taken and loss of fare in delivering the item to a police station or the Lost Property Office. Which is fairly sensible, cab drivers are only earning when their carrying fares. By taking steps to mean that they aren't out-of-pocket for turning in the lost items TfL is aiming to increase the number that get handed in rather than simply discarded, or in the case of valuable items simply kept. Which is in keeping with the goals of "safe keeping and redelivery" described in the Act. The legal basis for this award is in the London Cab Order 1934, Part VIII: (2) If any property found in a cab and deposited at a police station by the cab-driver be claimed within three months from the last day of the month in which the property is received at the Metropolitan Police Lost Property Office, and the claimant proves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police that he is entitled thereto, the property shall be delivered to him on payment to the Commissioner of Police of (a) a fee in respect of the cost of collecting, keeping in safe custody, and restoring lost property ; b) an award to the cab-driver by whom the property was deposited; and (c) such additional sum (if any) as may be payable as hereinafter provided.

3 day notice to cure breach or quit over a dirty bathtub I am very frustrated with my landlord. They inspected my unit while I was at work and yesterday they posted on my door a 3 day notice to cure breach or quit over a "dirty bathtub". They didn't even give me a warning about it. In my opinion, it's not that dirty and certainly not to the extent requiring a legal threat. Also I noticed a typographical error on the notice. Instead of "Address of : Unit name" it was "Address if : Unit name" I've always paid my rent on time and I am very quiet. I am pissed they would treat me like this. I am thinking of the fighting this. Is it standard operating procedure to threaten tenants over such a small infractions? If I take this to court, is a judge going to issue an eviction order over a bathtub whose cleanliness is debatable? How can I take advantage of the typographical error?

Clean your tub. Scratch that off the list. Typo - forget about it, there is nothing here, clerical errors are curable if not outright reasonable. In CA your landlord can enter under certain circumstances. All but emergency require notice, agreement, or your presence. But what is your remedy? A civil suit for damages or call the cops and try to get the landlord charged with criminal trespass under CAL. PEN. CODE § 602.

"Reasonableness" is a deliberately vague and flexible term. It does not -- and is not meant to -- have any precise definition. Instead, it is meant to be highly case specific. A "reasonable" time to repair will therefore be longer or shorter, depending on the circumstances. If you want a scratch in your countertop repaired, a "reasonable" time is probably a lot longer than if you want the plumbing repaired. And a reasonable time to repair the plumbing may itself vary with the availability of vendors, supplies, etc. Likewise with the air conditioning. It's probably a lot more reasonable to wait three months to fix the AC if it breaks down in December than in if it breaks down in the summer, which it sounds like is what's happened to you. Based on the timing, I'd feel very comfortable arguing that the leasing company has breached the agreement. The "reasonableness" standard is meant to give the landlord adequate time to respond and get the job done properly, but it can't be stretched indefinitely as seems to be happening here, to the point where you have essentially lost the entire benefit of air conditioning by sitting in a hot apartment for the entirety of the summer. New York City has pretty strong tenant-protection laws, so I suspect that you would have the option of hiring someone to handle the repairs yourself and then deducting your costs from the rent you owe.

It is usual for a lease to specify for what purposes and on what notice the landlord is entitled to access. Often there is a provision allowing the landlord access on no notice in an "emergency" which is often not specifically defined. Access for purposes of repair, and for purposes of inspection may be on 24 hours notice, or 48 hours, or some other period, or on "reasonable notice" with no specific period specified. Access for a reasonable purpose (such as inspection) on reasonable notice that does not actually inconvenience the tenant, and that is not demanded with unreasonable frequency will probably not constitute such a breach as to justify ending the tenancy, and may well not justify sizable damages in the absence of other breaches. Much will depend on the wording of the lease or rental agreement, and on the practice of the local courts. One might well ask oneself "what actual harm will an inspection with insufficient notice do me" because a court might ask a similar question if an action is brought. If the inspection does cause a problem, then that should be addressed.

Theft is of course illegal in all US states, and pretty much every other jurisdiction. In the US that is a matter of state law, not federal. It could be reported to the local police, but it might be hard to prove. Both landlord/tenant law and privacy law are largely matters of state law in the US, not federal law. Such laws vary a good deal in different states. In many states a landlord is allowed to enter the rented premises, usually on "reasonable" notice, or without notice if there is an emergency. If the landlord actually lives in another part of the house, and simply rents a room to the tenant, the landlord may be able to enter the room more freely than if it was a separate apartment or house. In many cases where there is a written lease or rental agreement, it will specify under what conditions the landlord or landlord's agent may enter, and how much notice is required. What does the lease in the current case say about that?

When screening potential tenants, what is the proper way to turn them down, and the legal implications if the tenant asks for more details? The "proper" way to turn someone down depends on why you decided to turn him or her down. As long as you did not decline to rent to a tenant because of information you learned in a credit report or commercially available criminal background check, you are not required to notify them. However, it is a good business practice to notify them in writing as Nij's post suggests. However, it would be a good idea to keep a copy of the letter for you records and possibly write down some notes. Such as, "other applicants had higher income," or "could not verify rental history." These kinds notes one the letters you mail out will be you friend should you ever be accused of improper discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc.. Declining to Rent Based Upon a Credit Check or Commercially Available Background Check: The federal law that governs credit checks and commercially available background checks is the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). The FCRA regulates "consumer reports," which includes credit reports and criminal background checks that are assembled by companies. (The FCRA does not apply if you, yourself, are going to the state police or courthouse to get background check records). Under the FCRA, requires that people who make decisions against someone based on information in a credit or background check, notify that person. The FCRA calls this decision against someone an "adverse action" and requires that you provide the affected party the following information: The name, address and telephone number of the company that supplied the consumer report, including a toll-free telephone number for companies that maintain files nationwide; A statement that the company that supplied the report did not make the decision to take the adverse action and cannot give the specific reasons for it; and A notice of the individual's right to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information the company furnished, and the consumer's right to a free report from the company upon request within 60 days. The FCRA calls this notice an "Adverse Action Notice." See 15 U.S.C. 1681m. An adverse action notice can be oral, written, or electronic. Obviously, written or electronic would be the best since you can prove that it was sent. Also, be aware that the FCRA has civil penalties if it is violated. The Federal Trade Commission has a helpful guide that lists some of the basics of when you do and do not need to provide adverse action notice. Website: Using Consumer Reports: What Landlords Need to Know Brochure: FTC Facts for Business However, it does not cover criminal background checks, which have many of the same rules as the credit checks under the FCRA.

he is jointly liable for the remaining 3 months, even though he never signed anything. Is this true? That seems unlikely. The lease is between Adam and the landlord. Although the lease might have language making all tenants jointly and severally liable, it would affect Bob only if it can be proved that he was aware of those terms when he moved in. Your description does not elaborate on any agreement(s) between Adam and Bob. But Adam is not allowed to impose on Bob any obligations merely because relations between them broke down. Absent a contract between Adam and Bob, the question of whether Adam is entitled to any recovery from Bob could only be assessed on equitable grounds.

Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.

Yes, see section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985: (1)In a lease to which this section applies (as to which, see sections 13 and 14) there is implied a covenant by the lessor— (a)to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-house (including drains, gutters and external pipes), (b)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for the supply of water, gas and electricity and for sanitation (including basins, sinks, baths and sanitary conveniences, but not other fixtures, fittings and appliances for making use of the supply of water, gas or electricity), and (c)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for space heating and heating water. ... (6)In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. Also see the dot.gov guidance, especially the section entitled "Your responsibilities": You should give your landlord access to the property to inspect it or carry out repairs. Your landlord has to give you at least 24 hours’ notice and visit at a reasonable time of day, unless it’s an emergency and they need immediate access.

Is it legal include an image from Wikipedia into a lead-generating e-book? I'm writing an e-book, which is supposed to generate leads in the following way: People visit my landing page. There, they see a text like "Enter your e-mail address and get this e-book for free". Those, who entered and confirmed their membership, receive the e-book. As long as they haven't unsubscribed, they also receive several e-mails in the following weeks with information related to the e-book and the product I'll sell to them. The purpose of those e-mails is to make the subscriber to contact me and tell me what he or she liked/disliked about my offering (sort of market research). Based on the responses from the list members, I create and sell products. Even though the e-book is free, it's a for-profit thing. In that e-book I have this passage: There used to be a Russian management guru, Georgii Petrovich Shchedrovitski, who argued that there are two fundamentally different kinds of knowledge work: 1) Science, which looks for sameness. 2) Activity, which looks for differences. Thereafter follows a detailed explanation of his theory. Is it legal (under US laws) to include a picture of G. P. Shchedrovitski from Wikipedia in this e-book?

Wikipedia has two kinds of pictures: Reusable pictures, most of them stored at http://commons.wikimedia.org Copyrighted pictures under fair-use, stored on the local Wikipedia (in your case, the Russian Wikipedia) but not on Commons. To know what case it is, just click on the Wikipedia picture, click on the blue "Description" button, and see whether it redirects you to Commons or not. Pictures on Commons are reusable if you include the author and license (see the full requirements). Commercial use is OK. Fair-use pictures can not be reused. Unfortunately, https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Файл:Tschedrovitsky.jpg is in the second case, so you can not reuse it, even in a non-commercial setting, unless you can justify that your usage qualifies as fair-use in your country. Hopefully one day someone will find a legally reusable picture of Shchedrovitski and upload it to Commons.

You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.

It is legsl to include references showing readers where facts you include in your article were derived, or where they can be supported. Indeed academic ethics generally require doing so, although there is (in most cases) no legal requirement to do so. Listing the title, author, and publication information of a source is not an infringement of copyright. That J. Jones published an article on "How to Find the Purple Moth" [imaginary example] in volume 28 of the Journal of Moth Science is a fact.Facts are never protected by copyright. Indeed in US law 17 USC 102(b) provides that: b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. The laws of other countries are similar on this point. Indeed I do not know of any country in which facts are protected by copyright. So, including such references is fully legal, and no permission from the sources being cited is required. This is true whatever form the reference takes. In particular, if an online address for the content is included, this is still true. I do not know whether Medium, or any other specific publishing platform, will pat fees to authors based on clik-thru from such citations. That depends on their particular policies, which might be found in their Terms of Service or other policy document.

Bob is not authorized, but he may legally do so (in the US, you don't need specific authorization to perform a non-forbidden act). In creating the manual, Bob would need to avoid reproducing the questions (which are protected by copyright), and just give the answers. Copyright protection for the textbook includes not just the actual words, but also organizational structure, so Bob would need to avoid copying the structure of the exercises. As for "structure of the exercises", textbooks often have exercises for each chapter, with a clear logic to the order and content of chapters. Within the chapter exercises, there is often some rationale to the order of presentation of the dozen exercises, like starting for with simplest concepts presented in the text and moving up the ladder. In a given exercise, there my be subparts, where understanding part 1 leads you to understanding part 2, and so on. In a well-structure textbook, maybe 20% of the creative nature of the book is that artful ordering. Imposing an entirely different order on your solutions avoids copying the author's protected expression.

By posting an image (or any other content) on an openly accessible page, a person such as Alice is implicitly giving permission to anyone to view or read that content, although not necessarily to make copies of it. A link from a page operated by Bob to such content is not making a copy, nor is it any other form of infringement. However, there are other possible cases. For example, if Alice sells access to her pictures, placing them behind a paywall, so that only those who have paid have a valid ID/PW set to gain access, then if Bob provides a link that bypasses the paywall, that may well be contributory infringement (CI). When Bob builds a business model on encouraging or facilitating infringement, that will be CI. If Alice does not post her pictures, but Charlie gets copies and posts them without permission, a link from Bob's site to Charlie's may be CI, particularly if Bob gets per-click revenue or other benefits for increased traffic.

Technically speaking, such emails are copyrighted by the sender. However, showing such an email to a third party, or posting it publicly in order to comment on it would almost surely be a fair use in the US. In any case, such an email would have no commercial value, and so there would be no financial damages possible. A lawsuit over such a technical copyright infringement would, in my view, be quite unlikely, and even less likely to be successful. Indeed, filing such a suit would be one of the best ways for the business to draw attention to the issue, in an example of the Streisand Effect.

The audio book would probably be an infringing derivative work because the client could redistribute it once the client received it. It sounds very much like a product that is regularly sold by merchants relying on copyrights. Conceivably, simply reading a book aloud to a client in some sort of streaming context that could't be shared with others or replayed would merely be fair use, much like hiring a baby sitter to read a book aloud to your children would be clearly fair use. If there were an automatic text to sound converter as opposed to an individualized performance, it might not be considered infringing. There are people with programs that do this who haven't been sued, but the boundaries haven't been explored very thoroughly. Honestly, there isn't a lot of guidance in this area from statutory language, and the questions would often not be guided by much case law involving similar facts. Your intuition living in the modern world is probably almost as good as a lawyer's in this situation.

The U.S. FTC gave extensive guidance on this subject in March 2013. (You may have noticed shortly thereafter that conspicuous disclosures of free samples and compensation started popping up in reviews and posts around the web.) The FTC's FAQ covers this question in such detail I would just encourage people to visit it directly. However, as is the custom on Stack Exchange, I will reproduce the most salient content here: If an endorser is acting on behalf of an advertiser, what she or he is saying is usually going to be commercial speech – and commercial speech violates the FTC Act if it’s deceptive. The FTC (ironically?) refers to 16 CFR §255 as "the Guides." The Guides, at their core, reflect the basic truth-in-advertising principle that endorsements must be honest and not misleading. An endorsement must reflect the honest opinion of the endorser and can’t be used to make a claim that the product’s marketer couldn’t legally make. In addition, the Guides say if there’s a connection between an endorser and the marketer that consumers would not expect and it would affect how consumers evaluate the endorsement, that connection should be disclosed. For example, if an ad features an endorser who’s a relative or employee of the marketer, the ad is misleading unless the connection is made clear. The same is usually true if the endorser has been paid or given something of value to tout the product. The reason is obvious: Knowing about the connection is important information for anyone evaluating the endorsement.

Can Paypal withold funds for 180 days? Paypal, as part of their banking license, perform random checks on accounts where they ask for Photo ID, Proof of Address and Proof of Age. However, if one is unable to provide this information, for whatever reason, they prevent you withdrawing your funds for 180 days. Is this legal? (Specifically in the UK if that's relevant)

Probably Terms and Conditions extract: 7.2 Limitations on Closing Your Account. You may not close your Account to evade an investigation. If you attempt to close your Account while we are conducting an investigation, we may hold your funds for up to 180 Days to protect PayPal or a third party against the risk of Reversals, Chargebacks, Claims, fees, fines, penalties and other liabilities of whatever nature. You will remain liable for all obligations related to your Account even after the Account is closed. 10.6 Information about you a. PayPal reserves the right to request additional information from you, other than what is referred to in this Agreement, to allow it to comply with its anti-money laundering obligations. You agree to comply with any request for further information as we reasonably require to enable us to comply with our anti-money laundering obligations. This may include, without limitation, requiring you to fax, email or otherwise provide to us certain identification documents. You also agree to provide us, upon our reasonable request and at your own expense, information about your finance and operations, including, without limitation, your most recent financial statements (certified or otherwise) and merchant processing statements (if applicable). This is the contract that you agreed to be bound by.

Think of a website that has gives no option for the users to delete what they have posted -but still the users can delete their account completely. That's easy - this is exactly how all StackExchange sites (including this one) work :-). See for example: How does deleting work? on meta.SE. Is it against the right to erasure mentioned here as a part of GDPR? No, it is not (otherwise StackExchange would be in rather big trouble). The "right to be forgotten" is subject to limitations. Most importantly, it only applies to personal data. Personal data is defined as (GDPR, art.4): any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’) If what you posted contains no personal information about you, it is not "relating to" you. The details are complicated (as usual, see e.g. The GDPR: What exactly is personal data?), but "personal data" is things about you (your name, your address, your sexual history, maybe even your IP address). On the other hand, if someone asks how to solve a programming problem, and you write an answer explaining what API to call, that answer is not personal data. In addition to that, even personal data may be retained if the data controller has a need to retain that information. This is also covered in article 4. For example, the controller may retain information "for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims" - otherwise you could buy something online without paying, and then ask the seller to forget about your purchases so they cannot collect the outstanding payment. So, in summary: A website will need to allow users to delete or hide personal data that they posted - such as their user profile information, or personal information in their posts. That does not mean they are allowed to delete entire posts - it is enough if personal information is redacted or anonymized. The website may be allowed to retain that information (hidden) if they can show legitimate interest - for example billing information, or posts that are the subject of a lawsuit. The StackExchange network, for example, covers this by allowing users to: disassociate posts from their account delete their account entirely (thus effectively disassociating all posts from personal information) asking a moderator for redaction of personal data

Name and date of birth are not sufficiently unique to identify a person. While name, date of birth, and place of birth do not have to be unique, either, it reduces the number of false positives. Also, date of birth is somewhat better known than place of birth for most people. Motorist: "Sorry, officer, I seem to have lost my wallet. Everything was in there, ID, license, ..." Cop: "Tell me your name, date and place of birth, and I'll run a query if you do have a license."

When you make a request based on the GDPR, Art. 12(6) GDPR applies. Without prejudice to Article 11, where the controller has reasonable doubts concerning the identity of the natural person making the request referred to in Articles 15 to 21, the controller may request the provision of additional information necessary to confirm the identity of the data subject. As you can see, this only applies when the data controller (Blizzard) has reasonable doubts about your identity. If I understand it correctly, Blizzard provides services (games) which requires you to login with a username and password. So they have no doubts about your identity when you use their (paid) services with just a username and password. So there should also be no reasonable doubts when you make other requests when you are able to login to their website. A copy of your government ID seems unnecessary. Recital 57 also confirms that identification does not require a government ID: Identification should include the digital identification of a data subject, for example through authentication mechanism such as the same credentials, used by the data subject to log-in to the on-line service offered by the data controller. A copy of your id, includes a photograph. The photograph could show health, religious, racial or ethnic information. That kind of personal data has much stricter rules defined in Art.9 . Most governmental IDs contain a national identification number. EU Member States can limit processing of those identification numbers even further. For example in the Netherlands processing of the identification number is only allowed when a specific law exists. So Blizzard is not allowed to process a Dutch national identification number. There are also ID convers] which hide sensitive information like document numbers and photographs in case you do need a copy of an ID. Also note that identification is only possible by comparing existing personal data with the provided personal data. I assume you did not provide a copy of your ID when registering. So many things which are shown on the ID do not make sense to sent to Blizzard. It does not know your place of birth, so it cannot verify it. Art. 5 requires 'data minimisation' for personal data. So they are not allowed to process more data than required. So you also do not need to send you more data than required. You should get an answer on your request within 30 days. However, since you ask to delete your account, the answer also might be that they will deny your request. They have to explain why they will not delete your account.

In the UK it is an offence to cause a computer to gain unauthorised access to any program or data held in any computer (s1 Computer Misuse Act 1990). It seems likely that other European jurisdictions have similar laws. Certainly Germany does: Penal Code 202a data espionage (German text - English translation). (I mention Germany because the linked thread does.) It might constitute theft in the jurisdiction if the finder did not take reasonable steps to find the owner - which may include informing the police of the find. Depending on the jurisdiction it might count as 'treasure' or abandoned property such that the finder is obliged to inform the authorities (the jurisdiction has the presumption of ownership of abandoned or lost property - e.g. Scotland), which then decide what to do with it. Legally speaking it seems to me that, to declare it legal, we have to get over such hurdles. [edit] There seems to be some dispute in the comments that cryptocurrency is subject to any regulation, counts as property, is something of value or is something that is owned and can be stolen, such that the person in the questioner's scenario could be held to account under the law for his behaviour. Aren't they merely numbers? No - plainly they do have value because people trade them with currency and goods and services. The UK's tax authority, HMRC, "does not consider cryptoassets to be currency or money" but sees them as having economic value because "they can be 'turned to account' - for example, exchanging them for goods, services, fiat currency (that is money declared by a government to be legal tender) or other tokens". They are "a new type of intangible asset". Individuals are liable "to pay UK tax if they are a UK resident and carry out a transaction with their tokens which is subject to UK tax". They are liable for "Income Tax and National Insurance contributions on cryptoassets which they receive from their employer as a form of non-cash payment [or from] mining, transaction confirmation or airdrops." (HMRC cryptoassets for individuals) Are they property? Something that can be owned, something that can be dishonestly appropriate (i.e. stolen)? That's the interesting dispute. Recently, the High Court of England and Wales ruled in a bitcoin ransomware-related case that "for the purpose of granting an interim injunction in the form of an interim proprietary injunction ... crypto currencies are a form of property capable of being the subject of a proprietary injunction". In that judgment there is some discussion of the authorities for considering or deciding they are property. ([2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm)) read from para 50 if not the whole judgment. In at least two other cryptocurrency-related cases the High Court treated the cryptocurrency as property. Vorotyntseva v Money-4 Limited, trading as Nebeus.com [2018] EWHC 2598 (Ch) and Liam David Robertson v Persons Unknown 2019. There was also a suggestion in the comments that the police would not understand and would not be interested. But there are several jurisdictions where people have been investigated, arrested, prosecuted and convicted of crimes relating to cryptocurrencies. A simple internet search for bitcoin theft, fraud or money laundering will result in some reports. In any case their interest or lack of it is irrelevant to what the law may say.

You can purchase any expensive item for cash, if the seller will accept it. In the US and many other jurisdictions, a seller is not required to accept cash, but many will. In the US and many other jurisdictions banks are required to report large cash deposits to government authorities, to help combat money-laundering, drug-dealing, and tax-evasion. Such a report may trigger an investigation, and during that investigation a person who bought an expensive item for cash may well be asked about the source of the cash. Whether an answer is legally required will depend on the law in the particular place. But even if it is not legally required, refusing to answer such questions may trigger additional investigation.

You have an agreement with the store that allows you to use scan and go technology. Part of that agreement a bit that says we may ask you to help us confirm that the service is working effectively by allowing us to check your goods against the scanner or to re-scan your shopping They also say that they are entitled to withdraw your right to use the Scan and Go service at any time if you do not comply with these Terms and Conditions. If we do that, the legal agreement created between ASDA and you under these Terms and Conditions will come to an end immediately, although any relevant statutory rights that you may have will not be affected. More generally, ASDA reserves the right to withdraw the Scan and Go Service at any time, at its sole discretion You have implicitly consented to a brief stop for a rescan. I don't see any implication that they assert a right to search your person. You can refuse a re-scan and they can process you like an ordinary customer. As for shoplifting, as this article summarizes, security can make a citizen's arrest if they suspect that you have committed a crime (theft). They have to have reasonable grounds for thinking that an arrest is necessary to prevent the loss. Hence they can detain you until the constable arrives.

My story: UK passport holder, resident in Switzerland, driving from Houston to San Antonio and stopped doing 105mph in a 60mph section of highway. I was given the citation and instructions, etc., but told the officer I was leaving in 2 days and may not be able to tend to it in time. On my return to Switzerland, I called the court and asked how I could pay. I was told I could get a money order from the post office, to which I replied, "Really, the Swiss Post office will issue U.S. money orders?" After a further 15 minutes of conversation about how I was willing but unable to pay, the officer said, "Well, I guess that we ain't commin' to Switzerland to get you so just ignore it!" I asked if I could have that in writing and he asked me to write to the court and explain my situation. 3 weeks later and I received a reply saying all was forgiven and I should have no problem re-entering the U.S. or the State of Texas. So my advice would be to call them, and act willing to pay. Things may have changed and you may be able to pay with a credit card, but if you act willing and they are unable to accept your payment, then as long as you have a paper trail, you should be fine. I have entered the U.S. dozens of times since and have even sponsored visas for others.

Are pre-employment drug screening results not obtainable by the patient? Can an individual require access to his pre-employment drug screening results in the United States? I am mostly interested in California and Massachusetts.

The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) may apply to you and provide certain rights. HIPAA does seem to cover part of this, though if it covers you particularly and the lab that performed the test is a separate question. On the Department of Health and Human Services website discussing HIPAA, they outline requirements discussing pre-employment drug tests. Basically, your authorization is required in order to release the results of the drug test to your employer and there is nothing prohibiting the employer from conditioning employment on your provision of that authorization. This seems to indicate that the drug test is a medical record. In another section on the same web site concerning your medical records, it outlines that the Privacy Rule gives you the general right to inspect, review and receive a copy of your medical records if the health care provider is covered by the Privacy Rule. You can read about the privacy rule on yet another section of that web site. Generally speaking, the privacy rule applies to any health care provider that transmits health records electronically. Certain exceptions to the rule apply, however determining what those exceptions happen to be is a more difficult task. You will notice from the hhs.gov web site that any entity that is covered by the privacy act is required to give you a privacy practices notice (with certain exceptions). If you didn't receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the drug test is probably not covered by HIPAA. If you did receive a privacy practices notice then the entity conducting the test is covered by HIPAA and you have a right to review your records.

According to an HHS guide entitled "Individuals’ Right under HIPAA to Access their Health Information", HIPAA does entitle you to access your medical records; however, the medical provider has 30 days to respond to your request. See the section on "Timeliness". So if the doctor wants to withhold the information until your appointment in 3 weeks, it looks to me like they are legally entitled to do so. Massachussets law has some similar provisions which are linked from the state court system's page on medical privacy. But as far as I could tell, they also only set a 30 day window, and it only applies to requests that are related to a claim for Social Security or a similar program. It doesn't appear that the law is on your side here. You might have more luck just trying to reschedule your appointment for an earlier date, or letting them know that you would take an appointment on short notice in case they have a cancellation.

In the US, only a few states allow conjugal visits by prisoners: California, Connecticut, New York and Washington. Details of implementation for Washington are here (it is called "Extended Family Visiting"). There are various limitations, for example you can't have committed homocide within the last 5 years, you can't be on death row, and so on. Although they don't explicitly say you can have sex, you can, and they have (a small sample of) contraceptive and STD-preventing technology for prisoners to avail themselves of. If you fail to take advantage of contraceptives, then yes it is possible. There is no provision pertaining specifically to mass murder.

To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').

Taking California as an example, California Labor Code section 6314 (a) provides: To make an investigation or inspection, the chief of the division and all qualified divisional inspectors and investigators authorized by him or her shall, upon presenting appropriate credentials to the employer, have free access to any place of employment to investigate and inspect during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner. So, the only requirement is that the inspector has been authorized by the chief of the Division of Occupational Safety and Health. In principle the chief could limit this authority to those periods when the instructor has been assigned to work, but I don't see any evidence that this is the case. In particular, you can find here the policy manual on inspection procedures that inspectors are assigned to follow, and it says nothing about "only perform an inspection when you are on duty". (You might also note the discussion on page 2 about unprogrammed inspections and the criteria for performing them. One indication is "Complaint about, or observance by anyone of, an imminent hazard", which could include a hazard observed by the inspector himself.) So to your specific questions: Do any states provide legal authority by statute for an OSHA compliance officer to inspect a site when they are in their own words "not working"? Yes, California provides authority for an inspector to inspect a site "during regular working hours, and at other reasonable times when necessary for the protection of safety and health". That is the only time-related restriction in the statute. I don't think that the inspector's comment that he's "not working" has any legal significance. What is the test to determine if an individual is acting in their official capacity or acting in their individual capacity? I do not know of any reason to think that any such legal distinction exists. If Joe Smith has been authorized as an inspector by the Chief of the Division, then Joe Smith can perform inspections and is to be given free access to do so. End of story. What is the legal "bright line" for state administrative agency employment as to acting in their official capacity as an agent of the state? Based on what I said above, I think this question is meaningless.

It is legal and quite common. Your choice as consumer is at the point of selecting insurance company. If you dislike ES enough, that would be a reason to select a different insurance company. It would be surprising if your ES contract disallows pharmacy pick-up, but even if it did, that would also be legal. This does not mean that the government doesn't have the power to break up Express Scripts, under anti-trust laws. There is no clear rule regarding how successful a company can be in attracting customers.

The question of a patient's legal responsibility would arise under a negligence lawsuit, where the patient "should have known". The standard for determining what things a person "should have known" is fluid, but obviously you can start with "could have known". If a patient's can't know a fact, they cannot be said to have negligently contributed to the damage. Doctors are given these warnings, but patients are not, uniformly. It is therefore possible that a patient was never warned of the effects of an opioid prescription (I can personally attest to that lacuna in the system). Your assumption about the bottle being so labeled is only valid for the original supply bottles from which the pharmacist dispenses. However, there is also a rather compelling argument to the effect that no person in the US can in fact be unaware of the addiction risk of opioids. It is a defeasible argument, possibly applicable to a hypothetical person who has lived in complete isolation for decades. A patient is not required to undertake independent research in order to validate the science that underlies statutorily-mandated FDA approval or drugs, instead, the burden is assigned to the manufacturers and distributors (primarily doctors and pharmacists) to convey the relevant information. Thus HR 1026 would, if enacted, mandate a different warning. But the bill does not assert a lack of liability on either side, therefore the question reduces to the "simple" matter of determining if a person knew or should have known.

There is commonly a law like RCW 69.50.309 which says that A person to whom or for whose use any controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed by a practitioner, and the owner of any animal for which such controlled substance has been prescribed, sold, or dispensed may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was delivered to him or her by the person selling or dispensing the same. A controlled substance is "a drug, substance, or immediate precursor included in Schedules I through V as set forth in federal or state laws, or federal or commission rules". Schedule V includes some opiates with low potential for abuse and dependency. It does not include prescription antibiotics, and does not include Ibuprofen and other OTC NSAIDs. The cop may be right about keeping your narcotics in the original container, but wrong about anything less. I can't presently locate the Oklahoma analog of this law. After diligent searching, I even suspect that Oklahoma does not have such an "original container" law. It would count as a "counterfeit substance" if it is a controlled substance and is in a container with labeling that is not that of the original distributor, but if the contain is completely blank, it is not legally a "counterfeit substance". And again, that only applies to controlled substances.

What jurisdiction do remote workers fall under? There are many sites like elance.com or fiverr.com where you can contract out work online - often to foreign countries. Besides short-term or fixed price contracts, it's also possible to hire a remote employee on a more permanent basis. But different countries have greatly differing labor laws, and bringing a case to court may be inconvenient if the distance is great. If there is a dispute between a remote employee and an employer, which is the appropriate court to resolve this dispute? The employer's or the employee's? Is it generally allowed to choose a jurisdiction in an employment agreement? That is, is it common for countries to allow citizens to waive the use of their local courts/laws in contracts?

I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.

Jurisdiction is generally a matter for courts to decide. For example, in Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F. 3d 1294 (2012), the plaintiff, having had their work published in Sweden, had filed a claim there, and lost. They then took the claim to the United States. Copyright infringement is generally actionable per se - no damage needs to actually be proven or sustained. Typically, the rule is that the proper law will apply. This is the state that seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. Now, where there is more than one jurisdiction in which a claim may be brought - as in your example - a plaintiff may research the relevant statutes to determine which jurisdiction is most likely to afford them the most favourable outcome. It's called forum shopping. It is likely that the proper law will be that of A or C. This depends on a number of factors: Whether the infringing party profited from the infringement. If the infringing party profited from the act, then you are likely to want to bring the matter in A, so that you can recover damages. Whether the infringing party has any presence in B. If the party has a presence in B, then a claim in B is likely to be more cost-effective. Again, depending on the laws of the country, it may not be possible for the artist to bring a claim against the infringing party if they have no local presence. Some countries have laws that explicitly allow extraterritorial service. Whether the hosting service was aware of the copyright infringement. If the hosting service was aware of the infringement and failed to prevent it, then you may be able to claim for contributory infringement - they could then, depending on their contract/agreement with the infringing party, be able to claim for damages. The Napster case may be somewhat relevant to this, but it's hard to say anything concrete when working with hypothetical countries. At the very least, a claim against the hosting service - which may just be an injunction ordering the removal of the content - could be fruitful. The actual laws of the countries involved. If the artist has sufficient money, they can just choose the forum that is most favourable to them. In short, private international law is a tricky subject and there are so many factors that need to be accounted for.

Short Answer It might or might not be an anti-trust violations depending upon the states where the employers and employee are located. But, as a practical matter, it is almost impossible for an employee to prove an anti-trust violation without an insider leaking a "smoking gun" document or a company admitting to improper conduct, before a lawsuit is filed. Long Answer There is considerable regional variation regarding the extent to which legal arrangements to limit employee mobility are legal. For example, historically, Massachusetts is notorious for enforcing such limitations strictly. In contrast, California is famous for refusing to enforce such restrictions. In general, the Northeast is strict, the West is lenient and other states are in between, but it is really a state by state issue. (Incidentally, weak non-competition laws have been empirically shown by economists to be better for the economy in the sector where they might be applied but are not applied.) Usually these legal restrictions on employee mobility are imposed unilaterally by the employer without conferring with competitors, and sometimes remedies for a violation of these non-competition arrangements are limited to the employee and not the hiring company (although this is hardly universal - the intentional interference with contract tort historically arose to punish companies that induced employees to violate non-competes and duties of loyalty of existing employees of the suing firm). The anti-trust dimension comes from the agreement between competitors to honor each other's non-competition agreements, which is meaningful because in the states where Apple and Google are headquartered, non-competition agreements are basically unenforceable so this collusion between competitors has an effect in excess of the default legal situation in the absence of collusion. If Apple and Google had instead both been based in Boston instead, where their non-competition agreements were enforceable against both the employee and the new employer as a default rule of law, their agreement would probably not have violated anti-trust laws because they would simply be agreeing to follow the generally applicable law that would apply in the absence of a collusive agreement anyway. Thus, without knowing the default rules of law in the relevant states, and without knowing if there was actually an actual agreement between the competitors, you can't sue for an anti-trust violation. One of the recent revolutions in federal civil procedure, the Twombly case, arose in an anti-trust situation and held that a complaint for an anti-trust violation is not sufficient unless the person bringing suit has actual knowledge of the existence of a collusive agreement between competitors and does not merely infer the existence of such an agreement from the facts and circumstances available to the general public. It is not permissible to sue first and then use subpoenas and other pre-trial discovery procedures to determine if there was actually an express collusive agreement between the competitors rather than having their behavior arise for other reasons (since under Econ 101 microeconomic principles, marketwide price fixing by all participants and completely non-collusive perfect competition are indistinguishable as they both produce a uniform price in the marketplace for a good or service). Since this information is usually impossible to obtain prior to brining suit without an insider who leaks a smoking gun document, as a practical matter, it is usually impossible for an individual employee to prevail in an anti-trust lawsuit alleging collusion between competing firms. Under federal anti-trust laws, circumstances that have the de facto identical results to illegal collusion between competitors, where this is not actually collusion, are usually not actionable (i.e. you can't prevail in a lawsuit based upon those claims).

Yes, but ... It doesn’t protect you. Let’s imagine you put such a clause in and a person in Europe used your service notwithstanding: they’ve broken the contract but you’ve broken the law. You get the fine and they get ... nothing. Because you can’t contract outside the law you never had a valid contract with them so you have no basis to sue. Further, because you are purporting to something you can’t legally do, you are probably on the wrong side of misleading and deceptive consumer protection law: which is another fine. If you can ensure that you don’t breach local law - like by not operating over the internet - then you can choose not to deal with e.g. Europeans. If you can’t guarantee that, then you’re stuffed.

Can a district rescind an offer of employment? Yes. Any contractural offer can be withdrawn so long as it has not been accepted. You did not accept it, so the withdrawal is legal. Can they hire someone who is not qualified ... That depends on the particular law that mandates the qualification. As a general principle, anyone is allowed to work at anything unless there is a law that says “you cant do job X unless you have qualification/licence/accreditation/whatever Y.” So you need to actually read that law. Some allow a grace period for a person to do X while they get Y and some are outright prohibitions. And there are some things that people think require a specific qualification because everybody has one but there is actually no legal requirement. For example, I’m a qualified arbitrator, adjudicator and mediator. I need the qualification to work as the first one in australia and I it to work as the second in queensland but not new-south-wales but I don’t need it anywhere to work as the last one - most mediators have qualifications but they are not legally required. I am not a qualified lawyer because I don’t need to be to work as any of the above and, indeed, merely being a lawyer does not allow you to work as an arbitrator. … and rescind my offer of employment? The eligibility of the person they chose to hire has no bearing on their decision not to hire you. If they have hired an unqualified person then that is for the relevant regulator to deal with and has nothing to do with you. Are they not obligated to hire the most qualified applicant? No they are not. Employers have the discretion to choose the applicant they consider the “best”. And they can assess how your better qualifications weigh up against someone else’s past history with the organisation. Provided they do not consider things that they are not permitted to consider under discrimination law and that the process is not corrupt, they can weight the various factors how they wish. However, if an employer has stated that they will weight various applications is a specific way, then they have to do that.

Unfortunately your employer is right. The rule says that in order for FMLA to apply to you, you must work at a location with 50 or more employees within 75 miles. Your client is not your employer, even if your employer considers it a place of business. This is outlined in 29 USC 2611 (2)(B)(ii): (1) Commerce The terms “commerce” and “industry or activity affecting commerce” mean any activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce, and include “commerce” and any “industry affecting commerce”, as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 142 of this title. (2) Eligible employee   (A) In general The term “eligible employee” means an employee who has been employed—      (i) for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested under section 2612 of this title; and      (ii) for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. (B) Exclusions The term “eligible employee” does not include—      (i) any Federal officer or employee covered under subchapter V of chapter 63 of title 5; or      (ii) any employee of an employer who is employed at a worksite at which such employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50. So if you had 50 workers within 75 miles of you (regardless of state borders), then you would be eligible, unfortunately since you do not have that, you are not eligible for FMLA. The number of workers at the office that are not employed by your employer do not count. You are right that the reason for the 50 employee rule is to lessen an undue burden on an employer without adequate resources to cover your absence, but you don't have a case since you are not defined as an "eligible employee" by law.

The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete.

An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.

Mistake in contract in my favor Several months ago I signed a contract to lease an apartment in Utah, USA and took up residence in the said apartment. The contract was stated explicitly to run through August 25th. This is clearly and unambiguously stated in writing. I signed this contract and so did the landlords. However, now the landlord is telling me that this was a typo and that it should have said August 14th. I was notified of this on August 6. They are threatening to fine me or send collections after me if I do not vacate the apartment by noon on the 14th of August. The only problem is that I have employment in this city until August 19th. I would need to live in my car for five days if they kick me out. I am not overly concerned about them coming after me, as I do not believe that the case law backs them up here. However, I felt it best to get the legal opinion of the Internet on the matter. Do I have a firm case to stand on if they were to pursue legal or financial action against me? Are there specific cases or statutory considerations that you are aware of that provide legal precedent in this type of case?

I will not speak to your specific situation. I am unfamiliar with the jurisdiction and real estate contracts are one of the most highly regulated contracts so local statutes may override common law. In general, the terms of a contract are what the parties agree; the written document is not the contract - it is evidence of the contract. In a case where the parties agree that the written version is wrong then the written version is wrong. Where the parties disagree that the written version is wrong (or agree that it is wrong but disagree as to how) then each will need to provide evidence to support their position. A signed written contract that supports one parties position is extremely strong evidence! The other party would need to provide some overwhelming evidence to trump this. The general position that the courts take is that the written contract accurately documents the agreement unless someone can prove that it doesn't.

A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).

A "land contract" is not a way of renting property, it is a way of purchasing property on an installment basis without bank financing. It is Ohio's version of what in some other places is known as "contract for deed". See "What is a Land Contract in Ohio" and "How Land Contracts Work" The actual law is Section 5313. In a land contract, the buyer has equitable but not legal title. The buyer normally pays all taxes and fees, and is responsible for maintaining the property, just as if s/he has bought the property. But if the buyer defaults, all payments and equity would be forfeit to the seller. Until the buyer has paid 20% of the purchase price, or made 5 years of payments (whichever comes first) a single missed payment constitutes default and can lead to the buyer being evicted with all payments to date going to the seller, the buyer coming out of the deal with nothing. Also, if the seller still has a mortgage and defaults, the buyer may lose everything paid to date. The buyer does not have the protections that a lease gives a tenant, nor the protections that legal title gives a purchaser via a traditional mortgage. Land contracts are often used when the buyer cannot qualify for a mortgage. The buyer pays interest, and it is often at a higher rate than the current rate on a mortgage. Land contracts are often a form of predatory lending, but for some buyers they make sense. A buyer needs to carefully review the contract with a lawyer knowledgeable about land contracts, and consider the risks and benefits of this form of financing. As I understand it, there cannot be a valid land contract for one apartment in an apartment building. A land contract must be for title to the land and all fixtures, including all buildings, on it. (There was at one point some unclarity if the question referred to an apartment. It is now clear that it refers to a house, so this statement is not relevant to the OP, but may be to others.) It is not clear just what the OP's landlord (LL) has in mind. It may be that LL plans to offer a "land contract" in which the purchase would be completed only after a very long time, with the idea that the OP would simply default when s/he wanted to move. Such a default could harm the OP's credit. There seems no benefit to the OP in such a scheme compared to a lease, unless LL will lower the price significantly, taking into account maintenance costs and taxes, which OP may well be expected to pay under a land contract. Note that a landlord can't legally force a tenant to sign a document cancelling a lease, or to sign whatever s/he will call a "land contract". Nor can s/he cancel the lease without the tenant's consent except for good cause as specified in the law (such as not paying rent). S/He could become uncooperative on other matters if a tenant doesn't do as s/he wants. If a tenant does cancel his or her lease, s/he will lose some rights. Others are guaranteed by law as long as the tenant is paying rent. If one signs a "land contract", what happens depends on its provisions. OP needs to very carefully consider just what is being offered, and its risks and any possible benefits. Details of the contract will matter. No matter exactly what LL has in mind, this is not at all a usual procedure for a landlord. OP or anyone in a similar circumstance should be very careful.

Is there any way I can defend myself against penalties when mistakes are made in my favor? Another option, in a similar vein to your suggestions, is to make a contemporaneous record of the conversations. Then send an email* to the public official detailing what was said and agreed, along with a request that they reply with any observations or amendments within a certain time frame. That way you have a date-stamped document properly addressed to the other party to use as evidence or leverage. *or a recorded delivery letter etc

This is a very difficult situation. Discrimination is not the right frame within which to view this as your roommate doesn't have authority over you the way that an employer or landlord would. The basic legal issue would be whether your roommate is constructively evicting you from you residence without valid justification for doing so. And, the answer might very well be yes. But, even if that is the case, since the roommate is not an agent of the landlord, your roommate's actions probably don't relieve you from your duties under the lease. So, your relief might be to vacate the premises and then to sue the roommate for the rent you have to pay without receiving anything in return. This is expensive relative to the likely returns, and there is no certainty that you would win or that you would get your attorneys' fees if you prevailed. This would also be a slow solution taking several months at a minimum. Or, in the alternative, you could leave and cease paying the rent, forcing the roommates who remain to pay it if they don't want to be evicted as they are probably jointly and severally liable for the rent. (If they sued you for your share of the rent, constructive eviction by one of them would probably be a good defense.) The landlord could sue all of the roommates if they don't pay, causing them to be evicted and you to be on the hook for any rent or other amounts that they owe, including the landlord's attorneys' fees (and hurting your credit). You could probably cross-claim for indemnification of any amounts you were required to pay in that lawsuit against your roommate. But, this too would be an expensive, complex and slow solution if the remaining roommates don't decide to simply keep paying the rent. It would be very hard for you to evict your problem roommate for breaching the lease by denying you your equal rights to the premises, since you are not the landlord, although it isn't impossible that a court would allow this relief and it would be relatively quick. It would also leave open the question of who was responsible for the evicted roommate's rent. The remaining roommates would be liable vis-a-vis the landlord, and would face eviction if they don't pay, and probably couldn't get a new roommate without the landlord's permission. And, the evicted tenant would probably remain on the hook vis-a-vis the landlord, but might not have a duty to indemnify the roommates who stayed. Also, in any lawsuit where you sue the roommate, the roommate would likely counterclaim against you for non-disclosure of HSV2, and while that would probably not prevail in the end, it would make the legal process hellish for you. The trouble is that there are really no good solutions that you could easily impose on them. A mutual agreement between the landlord and the other tenants to release you from the lease so you could find somewhere else, or to release the problem tenant from the lease so that you and your other roommate could replace that person, is probably the best solution, but that takes mutual agreement of multiple parties.

Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules & Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.

do I have a case against them in small claims court? Yes. Your description altogether indicates that there is --at least-- an implicit contract between you and the roommates. That implicit contract is palpable from the roommates' subsequent conduct, which includes --but is not necessarily limited to-- their excuses and promises. Although there is no written contract between you and the roommates, evidence that you have paid utilities in full places on your roommates the burden of disproving the default (and common sense) presumption that bills would be split among all four roommates. Your landlord can testify via an affidavit what he knows about that arrangement and/or what he informs each new roommate on the issue of how utilities are paid. You might want to email your roommates a reminder [to pay you] in such a way that prompts them to reflect their excuses/promises/admissions in writing. The terms of their written response might evidence an oral agreement. In the alternative, the roommates would have the burden to prove that they paid you, or that you promised to cover their utilities for free. The former scenario is precisely why a reasonable payer typically requires --or should require-- a receipt when making payments (as opposed to the payee when receiving them). Regardless, your description suggests that your roommates would be unable to prove either scenario. Also the landlord could include in his affidavit that the roommates have defaulted on their rent payments as well. If the landlord refuses to produce an affidavit, you can always visit the court where eviction proceedings are taking place and obtain copy of the relevant records. With those records you would evidence the roommates' pattern of lack of payment. Although obtaining copies from the court makes your landlord's affidavit somewhat unnecessary, it is in the landlord's best interest to cooperate with you because (1) it would be unreasonable for him to alienate himself from the only tenant who honors his lease, and (2) he might need your cooperation as witness at some point. Even if the roommates were successful in proving that there was neither a verbal agreement nor an implicit contract but only "unfounded expectations" on your part, you could ask for a ruling in equity in case your claim of breach of contract fails. In terms of mere "expectations", it is much more reasonable for you to expect them to pay their share than for three three individuals to presume an unrelated roommate will cover their utilities for free. The latter just departs from common sense and common practices. how do I prevent this from happening again with future roommates? Strictly speaking, it is impossible to absolutely prevent that situation from occurring again. However, you may take the following precautions to reduce your exposure. Have your roommates sign an agreement that reflects each party's obligations and deadlines. Your agreement should also state that it is each roommate's responsibility to keep his/her receipts --or akin evidence-- in case a dispute for non-payment arises. This would streamline the production of evidence if the matter ends up in court. Consider whether or not asking each party for an aval or endorser is practicable. This provides some sort of "insurance" of roommates' default risk. Lastly, do not wait for a party's debt to accumulate that much before taking legal action. The longer you wait, the unlikelier you are to recover that money because the party may go broke or simply disappear. Moreover, keep in mind that if a party's debt exceeds the maximum amount handled in Small Claims Court, your litigation will become more involved because it would have to be in a court of general jurisdiction (meaning a circuit or district court).

What the landlord is doing is forcing you to abide by the terms of your lease agreement. You most likely agreed to a 1 year lease on a signed document, which means you're pretty much screwed because if he wanted to, he could force you to fulfill the lease and pay him anyway. However, his remarks about when you can notify to terminate are wrong. See end of answer. About Terminating Your Lease Early However, there are a few loopholes you can exploit. The easiest one is to get him to increase your rent. Ask about it, tell him that you're considering staying but tell him you want to know if he's going to increase the rent by much. If he declares that he is going to increase the rent, perfect. Get him to send it to you in writing (which he is legally required to do). Just in case though, have him on speaker phone and record every conversation you have from now on without telling him. This is legal (see this answer) and is a powerful form of evidence, so exploit the hell out of it. If you can get him to tell you that he's going to increase your rent, then you can legally submit a notice to terminate tenancy on the grounds that you do not wish to pay the increase. In this case, the amount of notice that you have to give is capped to the day that the rent increase is to take place. If you try this, do everything you can to get it in writing. Don't feel proud of snaring him and immediately announce that you're leaving because of this as soon as he says it on the phone, because you're screwing yourself out of going through the proper channels to make sure you not only win, but you've made your case air tight. Also, feel free to let you landlord know that he owes you money. Landlords in Ontario have to repay you a capped interest rate on your last months' deposit every 12 months. This rate is decided annually and for 2015 is capped at 1.6%. If your landlord wants to be anal about the rules and stick the letter of the law to you, do it back. Becoming a pain your landlords ass is a great way to get them to either become more flexible, or make a mistake that will give you an out. Notice that if he does increase the rent, he can demand that you increase your last months deposit and force you to pay it. You could "accidently" make him aware of this right in a conversation where you are concerned about a rent increase immediately after letting him know that he owes you money for the interest. "I'm concerned about the rent increase because I have to increase my deposit by law too." This way, he'll hopefully have the thought "I can avoid having to give him any money by increasing his rent by the same interest rate, so he'll owe me what I owe him, therefore I owe nothing. I'm so smart!" Then he cheerfully gives you a notice to increase rent, at which time you invoke your right to terminate tenancy on short notice due to an increase in rent. Your Landlord Is Wrong All that aside, your landlord committed an illegal act when they refused your notice to terminate, because he's denying you your rights under the RTA. From the Residential Tenancies Act: A tenant may terminate a tenancy at the end of a period of the tenancy or at the end of the term of a tenancy for a fixed term by giving notice of termination to the landlord in accordance with section 44. 2006, c. 17, s. 47 The details adjust a little bit depending on your circumstances, but the conditions in section 44 are basically to ensure the following: You are giving 60 days notice. You are not giving 60 days notice where the termination date you provide is less than the previously agreed term, except in special cases like the one I mention about increased rent. There is nothing in section 44 that can be confused to mean that you must wait until you have passed the end of your term before you can decide to leave. I suspect your landlord is deliberately interpreting the use of wording like "may terminate at the end of" to imply you have to wait to give your notice. A notice of termination is not a termination. It is a notice that in the future, you are going to terminate. Let's remove the confusion by replacing the word "terminate" with "vacating the premises and not paying another cent". That should remove any ambiguity that could be abused. So frankly you can simply go straight to the board, file the appropriate form with them and just pack up and leave when you've reached the date specified in the notice to terminate. Your final month is covered by your deposit. File the form immediately, let them know about the conversation you had with your landlord, then go to your bank and cancel the cheques you've already written (except for your deposit cheque) and simply ignore the landlord, carrying on with your moving plans. You should ask the Board if this illegal act has any ramifications. Perhaps because he has done this, this gives you an immediate out or something else. Call the Board and tell them what happened and ask them. They have an obligation to inform you correctly. Sources: Landlord Tenant Board of Ontario FAQ Final Note The Board is there to serve you, free of charge. They have a duty, as it is their explicit directive, to assist you in all matters regarding being a tenant. Phone them, talk to them at length, demand assistance. They are to inform you of your rights and guide you on the appropriate action, forms and procedure to assist you in resolving any issues you have. Note that I wrote the whole bit about getting out of your lease early legally before I refreshed my memory on the fact that you can/should give your 60 days notice before the end of your lease period. That makes the case much simpler as a I note in my answer. I left the information I already wrote however because it could be applicable or at least be of some help to others. Also note that if you're saying that the landlord came to get more cheques on the basis of his lie that he used to refuse your attempt to legally leave, then you'll need to cancel those cheques. That costs money. That alone is enough of a case to take him before the Tribunal and force him to repay the cost of those cancelled cheques. You may even successfully claim further damages or the Tribunal may voluntarily award you money for the actions your landlord is deliberately taking to deprive you of your rights. Talk to the Board.

Can I use illegally obtained code? There are some EULA which prohibit disassembly or reverse-engineering of its executables Now Joe in Somalia gets a hold if this software, disassembles it, and publishes the algorithm online. Bob in the United States gets a hold of this algorithm, re-implements it in his own software. Assuming there are no patents, did Bob do something illegal? Is this similar to a "fruit of the poisoned tree?"

Take a look at https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clean_room_design From that it appears that you are just following the specifications of the algorithm made by a third party. You're not copying the algorithm, you are re-implementing it based on certain specifications you saw online. I would say unless you agree to some contract like you will not implement this, it should be legal. Furthermore, there is distinction between legality and breaching contracts. It is not illegal to breach a contract. You could just be sued for damages and injunctive relief. Failure to abide by a judicial order, such as an injunction is illegal. DISCLAIMER: I AM NOT A LAWYER. THIS IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE.

I'm not sure this would be a copyright violation. 17 USC 117 says: (a)Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of Copy.—Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner... Due to the shutdown of the license server, it is impossible to use the program without an adaptation. It is therefore an "essential step in the utilization of the computer program", and not infringing, in my opinion.

What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.

TLDR: it's illegal to BUY it. It's illegal to USE it. Know your suppliers. That's certainly an interesting question, in light of how the market has changed in recent years, particularly due to Amazon/eBay, but even moreso due to Amazon Fulfillment and competitors. Over on diy.se, this is a constant vexation, because we see people buy crud like this all the time, and they need help installing it. And we find it's illegal to install, not even safe, and needs to be sent back in lieu of listed product. The advanced nations do have a highly effective apparatus for screening and blocking dangerous goods. However, these protections are geared toward bricks-and-mortar retail. Can you count on something bought at Wickes, Redoute or Home Depot? By and large, yes. Is it legal to export it to you? Yes, for all practical purposes. The people selling it are in an unreachable bastion in a foreign country that would not cooperate with their extradition, and would interfere with investigation. The government knows perfectly well that the stuff is complete crud, and doing so aligns with its national policies of raising hard currency and building industrial capacity, while harming the capacity of other nations. Is it legal for the item to be listed on Amazon or eBay? Amazon and eBay say "Yes". Their position is that they are merely a platform which connects buyers and sellers. They surely have excellent lawyers. Amazon is more like eBay than you might realize. Amazon opened their retail site to third party sellers. Third parties can sign up as additional sellers of a particular SKU, or write their own product listings. Since Amazon's behavior has been unchallenged, the answer seems to be "yes". Is it legal for Amazon to bring it into their warehousing systems? Amazon also opened their warehousing system to third party use. That can be for companies that don't sell on Amazon... or it can be for companies that do both Amazon and off-Amazon sales; in the latter case you order elsewhere but Amazon fulfills (ships) the item. When a company both sells the item on Amazon and it ships from an Amazon warehouse, it qualifies for "Prime" shipping where Amazon offers that. Amazon also offers "Commingling" for established SKUs. The idea is that if you have widgets in the Madrid warehouse, and I have widgets in a Warsaw warehouse... and a Madrid customer buys mine - why not ship them yours since they are all the same? I get credit for the sale and Amazon "owes you one". When you get a sale in Madrid, Amazon has one in Barcelona so they ship that one to your customer. Commingling is great, but what happens when I inject a pallet full of those SKUs - and they're counterfeits? Amazon doesn't know the difference, and your Warsaw customer gets my counterfeit. So do Amazon's Berlin and Wroclaw customers. Amazon ships them around the network to balance the warehouses, and now my counterfeit has contaminated the supply. I'm sitting in China. Whatcha gonna do about it? Again, Amazon has top lawyers, who have surely done their diligence. Still, the program is ambitious, and e-commerce giants break the law all the time with their ambitions. In the US, there's the "Express Shipment" rule, which allows small orders ($800 or less) with no duty and an informal entry process. So they ship to Mexican warehouses, and then bring the items over by the truckload. Wait, how can a truckload be less than $800? Because they don't bring it over until there's an end-user customer order, and they argue "these are for individual customers". This qualifies them to breeze through customs, bypassing the quality and safety controls that prevent Home Depot from doing the exact same thing with a truckload that hasn't found customers yet. Is it legal for you (as the end consumer) to import it? No. The rules for Conformité Européenne are that the importer is responsible. When you as an end customer buy mail-order from China, you are the importer. Under EU law, if you bring a CE-marked item into the EU, you are responsible for meeting the CE design standards, and doing in-house lab testing to affirm the performance of the product. By having the CE mark on the thing you imported, you are attesting to having done that. Further, the various nations may require that a certified independent testing lab verify your testing and claims. This was historically done by national testing labs like BSI, TUV, CSA or UL. However by treaty they are largely cross-recognized: US OSHA keeps a canonical list of "Nationally (by USA) Recognized Testing Labs" (NRTLs) that every other agency and many other countries defer to. Big Clive is probably fine, since Clive's purpose is public ridicule, not usage. Is it legal for you to install it in your house? Oh, heck no. Every nation has rules as to what certifications equipment must meet to legally be installed in a building's electrical system. For instance North America's El NEC, widely adopted or copied, has 110.2: 110.2 Approval. The conductors [wires] and equipment required or permitted by this Code shall be acceptable only if approved. "Approved" means by competent testing labs; i.e. OSHA's list of NRTLs. So no, you can't install non-approved equipment in any jurisdiction with a similar rule (and you pretty much need such a rule for inspections to have any teeth).

Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.'

My understanding is that here "derived from the program" means "created by modifying the source code of the program" and not "created by running the program". Certainly that is the way all users that I have heard of treat the matter. Note that a commercial program, such as a word processor, will be fully protected by copyright, but the maker does not claim to have any rights over documents written using it. "Derived" here seems pretty clearly to mean "derivative work" in the sense in which that term is used in copyright law. In copyright law "derived work" is a term of art with a definition specific to that field.

This is going to depend on several things. First of all, do you have a lawful, licensed copy of the SDK? My understanding is that Nintendo only licensed the SDK to selected game companies. If what you have is an unauthorized copy, you do not have the legal right even to use it. If what you have is properly licensed, then you do. Or is what you have an unofficial SDK created by someone other than Nintendo? Secondly, what does the license agreement that comes with the SDK provide? Does it require developers to register with Nintendo? If it does, you will need to comply. Nintendo cannot prevent others from writing programs designed to run on their hardware. But they can control who uses their development software, if they choose to. You cannot reproduce in your game any of Nintendo's copyrighted software (or anyone else's) without permission. That applies even more strongly if you intend to sell the software. But you can use any development software for which you have a valid license in whatever ways its license permits. I would expect this includes creating games. It would include selling games that you create that do not use any of Nintendo's code, unless there is a specific provision forbidding that in the license agreement.

There are a few ways that this could be illegal, but barring those, there is nothing per se illegal in doing what you describe. It could be a TOS/contact/licence violation to sniff the traffic: Use third-party software that intercepts, collects, reads, or "mines" information generated or stored by the Battle.net Client or the Game(s) The protocol could be protected by patent. (U.S. Patent 5,883,893) The use of the reverse engineered protocol could be illegal (fraudulently connecting to a company's server while posing as an authorized client).

When a criminal statute is repealed, are those still held under it automatically freed? How was this handled in the past when things were decriminalized, e.g. homosexuality? Is there an automatic process that guarantees freedom for those held under an abolished law, or does this have to be made explicit every time? Can one's criminal record include an offence against a statute that is no longer valid?

There are two sides to this question. First, there is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: Article 15 1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx When signing this treaty, however, the United States of America made a couple of reservations, including this one: I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: (...) (4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the time the offense was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of Article 15. (...) http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html (emphasis mine in both cases)

The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or "no contest" which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.

If a law is struck-down as unconstitutional, but all the precedent used to find it unconstitutional gets reversed; what becomes of the law? In U.S. law, the law has effect again, unless it has been amended or repealed in the meantime. Is it totally dead, needing be passed anew? In the U.S., no. It is not totally dead. It is merely dormant. It stays on the books and legislators may decide not to repeal it as a political statement. It also might be considered for interpretive purposes when construing another part of the same law. For example, the meaning given to a phrase in an unconstitutional part of the law might be applied to a different part of the law that is constitutional. Can the judiciary be asked to reinstated, after which point it can be used again? In the U.S., any court can determine that a law is unconstitutional, but the extent to which that ruling is binding precedent on other courts or other parties than those to the case before it depends upon the court in question and upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (a.k.a. issue preclusion). For example, the legal fight in the U.S. to hold bans on same sex marriage to be unconstitutional was fought in and resulted in ruling in dozens of courts at the trial court and state appellate court, and federal intermediate appellate court level before a uniform ruling was established by the U.S. Supreme Court. Further, even if the issue arises in another case where there is a controlling precedent, attorney ethics permit an attorney to make a good faith argument for a change in the law to any court, so if there is some good faith argument for doing so, the attorney can push that the issue be reconsidered. Of course, usually the answer from the court will be "no." Or can it just be enforced again without any formal process; so long as nobody sues and gets it killed again by a lower court? Sometimes government officials enforce laws that have been held unconstitutional, either because they aren't aware of the relevant court decisions, or because they think that their facts are distinguishable from those under which the law was held unconstitutional (which sometimes happens on an "as applied" basis rather than on a "facial" basis that applies to all cases), or because they think the judge before them might rule differently despite the precedent. Also, would the answer differ according to country? If so, could you please give me some examples of countries handling this differently. Yes. Many countries with legal systems based upon the legal system of countries of continental Europe like France and Germany and Spain, which are called "civil law" countries have a very different process of handling unconstitutional laws, as does the European Court of Human Rights and the highest court of the European Union. In Germany, for example, questions of the constitutionality of a law may be raised only in the Constitutional Court and not in other courts. This ruling is usually final. And, unlike U.S. courts, the Constitutional Court can rule a law unconstitutional during the legislative process, rather than in connection with an actual case or controversy relating to the law taking effect (in which case the law never gets on the books in the first place). I don't know what happens when the Constitutional Court declares a law unconstitutional. I do know, however, that in the case of the European Court of Human Rights and the highest courts of the E.U. that one of the usual remedies will be an order directed at a member state to amend its statutes to remove the offending law, with sanctions imposed if the member state fails to do so. Obviously, once such a law is repealed in this fashion, it would have to be re-enacted to take effect even if the precedent holding that the law was unconstitutional was undermined.

Yes, it's illegal new-south-wales s118 of the Crimes Act says: Where, on the trial of a person for larceny, it appears that the accused appropriated the property in question to the accused’s own use, or for the accused’s own benefit, or that of another, but intended eventually to restore the same, or in the case of money to return an equivalent amount, such person shall not by reason only thereof be entitled to acquittal. QED

The Theft Act 1968 replaces the Larceny Act 1916, which replaces in part the Larceny Act 1901, ad nauseum. In the current act, the exception is accomplished in the definitions section. Redefinition is a device commonly used by legislatures to clarify intent, where traditional wording does/did not express the desired prohibition. In addition, a special definition excluding a case makes it easier to define the general rule. To be certain, one would need a historical record of legislative discussion (and I suspect that there is no record), but it is reasonably likely that it was not previously against the (common) law to pick a wild blackberry for a snack. A reading of various prior versions of the larceny statutes suggests that it was never a crime to pick a wild blackberry, instead the crime was taking cultivated goods (which a person put some effort or resources into creating), and destroying resources on a person's land. Those are the kinds of actions explicitly identified in the prior statutes. §4(3) does state a traditional view of "property" (which is why it's in the "property" section), and would have the (presumptively desired) effect without complicating other parts of the statute. Moreover, s1(3)(a-b) of the 1916 act conveys similar "exceptionality". Norwegian theft law has a similar provision Tilegnelse av naturprodukter, herunder stein, kvister, vekster mv., av liten eller ingen økonomisk verdi under utøvelse av lovlig allemannsrett, straffes likevel ikke Appropriation of natural products, including stones, twigs, vegetation etc. with little or no economic value (taken) under the exercise of the legal right to roam is not punished

Private prosecution is allowed in New Zealand, so one possibility would be to conduct the prosecution yourself. You could either do that as a case of destruction of property, or under the Animal Welfare Act. It is not guaranteed that your charging document will be accepted (for example, if your document lacks the required content). An alternative would be to apply political pressure to the Crown Law Office, to persuade them to pursue the matter.

One answer is that you should say "yes", because it is a federal felony (5 years prison term) to say "no", because it is untrue, and you know it is untrue. This assumes that the question simply asks "Have you ever been convicted or arrested; please explain", with no qualifiers like "as an adult". If you are absolutely positive that the record was sealed, an alternative answer is "no", based on a law like RCW 13.50.260(6)(a), which say you can legally "act as if it didn't happen": If the court enters a written order sealing the juvenile court record pursuant to this section, it shall, subject to RCW 13.50.050(13), order sealed the official juvenile court record, the social file, and other records relating to the case as are named in the order. Thereafter, the proceedings in the case shall be treated as if they never occurred, and the subject of the records may reply accordingly to any inquiry about the events, records of which are sealed. California has a similar law. The problem here is that this is state law, so a valid defense for a state charge of lying, but you need to comply with federal law, and states cannot tell the FBI what to do. It is variously rumoured that the FBI does not report sealed records, but it is unwise to count on rumours, and even if it is general discretionary policy for them to delete information about sealed records when reported from the state, it is not guaranteed that the policy is absolutely always followed. You can request an Identity History Summary Check from the FBI. So the safest path is to get an informed opinion, tailored to your facts, from your attorney.

If the DA decides to press charges (we don't know) and if he is convicted (looks like a solid case), the problems are not just the sentence itself. There might be a probation period with conditions like drug tests and counseling, with penalties if he misses them. It is legal to discriminate against people based on prior convictions. While California has some restrictions on when employers may ask, they can make it one part of their assessment.

Can someone more wealthy than me bury me in legal fees? USA Federal Law - I have a company worth about $6m. I got on the bad side of a person with a company worth well over $750m (with attorneys on staff). The CEO threatened to bury me in an endless sea of frivolous lawsuits, so that I'm essentially paralyzed having to defend myself in court day after day until my legal expenses drain my bank account and put me out of business. Is this legal? Are there any countermeasures or defenses against it?

There are both statutes and customs aimed at preventing "Malicious Prosecution" and "Abuse of Process." (In Pennsylvania, for example, the 1980 Dragonetti Act allows the victim of a frivolous lawsuit to counter-sue for compensatory damages.) One can also buy insurance against this type of risk: Umbrella liability policies will generally provide a defense against civil lawsuits and any damages awarded, as will many business insurance policies. Of course, none of this is to say that a skilled legal team can't avoid all of these countermeasures and, in practice, take up a significant amount of your time and trouble. We do not have a perfect system of justice.

Not the same way as there's protection against double jeopardy in the criminal system. If Person A and Person B both have claims against Person C, even if it's for the same act or omission, each of them can independently pursue those claims. Imagine what would happen if that weren't the rule: Whoever filed first would functionally be preventing the other one from recovering their claim. What's worse, Person A and Person C could collude (say, by presenting a bad case on Person A's side) and prevent person B from accessing relief that they're entitled to. The way that the courts prevent abuse of the system by people who want to keep re-litigating the same issue is a principle called res judicata. But that's a principle that only applies when it's the same parties – say, Person A sued Person C and lost, and so sued Person C again for the same claim. This limitation protects Person B against any collusion or just bad lawyering on the part of Person A.

To be able to sue the appraiser, he would have to have a duty to you. If he was hired by a bank, his duty is to the bank and not to you. Assuming that you directly hired the appraiser, then you would have to check the contract for limits on his liability – a clause that says "you waive your right to sue me for (certain) mistakes". Now supposing that you haven't waived your right to sue, you almost certainly cannot sue for misrepresentation, unless for some reason you can prove that he knew that he was lying to you. Your best bet is arguing that his mistake was negligent. You would have to establish that the first figure was incorrect (a disagreement in figures does not establish which figure is correct). A discrepancy between county records and an appraiser's estimate can be explained by numerous non-negligence related facts (unpermitted modifications of the structure, for example). Suppose that the source of the discrepancy is inclusion of finished basement space in the earlier appraisal, or perhaps measurement error. Then you would have to prove that that error involved a lack of professional care, which implies certain professional standards (not just your feeling that the error is egregious). This article explains the ANSI guidelines. The standard tends to increase square footage because it is measured from the outside. Then you would have to establish that you were damaged by the earlier figure. The law doesn't allow you to sue because someone does something that bugs you, you have to have suffered damage. You don't say how you were harmed – I presume the problem is that the buyer's bank is not willing to lend that much money, where you relied on an earlier incorrect estimate of square footage in advertising the house and setting the price. You may have contributed to the problem by relying on that estimate when you knew or should have known from the government records that the size is something less. There is some possibility of legal recourse, but it's not obvious (so gather all of your facts and talk to your attorney).

While the state, or a creditor, can initiate a probate if no one else does (if the state does so, the official in charge of this is called the "public administrator"), neither are required to do so. Also, sometimes a guardianship is converted to a probate, but this doesn't appear to have happened. This is a thankless job that probably doesn't make sense to bother with if estate liabilities exceed the assets of the estate, but most states have a "non-claim statute" that bars creditors claims, other than liens including property tax liens, after a certain amount of time after the death. So, even if the estate may have been insolvent at death, if enough time has elapsed, many of the potential claims may now be barred, making the estate solvent again. Siblings generally have priority for appointment over a nephew, so to be appointed yourself, you would ordinarily have to receive a renunciation of their right to serve as executor before applying to do so yourself, but some states disregard that priority if no one has taken action after a certain period of time. You would initiate probate by contacting an Alaska lawyer in the vicinity of the place he was domiciled at death. The lawyer can review the guardianship court file, determine if an executor was appointed, and determine if there are assets that could justify opening an estate relative to lien debts including Medicaid liens. If there are not, letting the assets be lost to a property tax lien may make more sense that spending money to transfer his property in an orderly fashion to his creditors with nothing in it for any of his family.

You have two downvoted answers here. One of them is actually correct, one is nonsense. Question: Which one? Answer: Doesn't matter. If you provide this service without getting advice from a competent lawyer first, your risk is much too high. Making the wrong decision (either giving up on a good business idea without reason, or providing a banking service without license) will cost you much much more than paying a lawyer for advice.

The danger is not “piercing the corporate veil” (which basically removes your personal protection against problems that the company might have), but being accused of tax evasion, which the director of the company is fully responsible for. I suggest you read your tax laws very, very, very carefully or better yet, ask an accountant. An additional risk is that once the inland revenue has their eye on you, they will handle you extra carefully. Not something you want.

If you are worried that some secret will become public, you should find and meet with an attorney, not a financial adviser or other nonlawyer. Your attorney is able to shield your secret information from disclosure in ways other professionals cannot. Raise any credit score issues you're concerned about. In general, the public has a right to access judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 US 589, 597 (1978) (noting that the right is rarely litigated and not clearly defined). That right is not absolute; some records can be sealed, which means that the public can't read them. Local rules govern when that happens. I don't think the existence of a civil lawsuit could be made secretly except in special circumstances. Likewise, the plaintiff usually must identify herself, except in special circumstances. A plaintiff should assume that everything about the lawsuit--who filed it, against whom, what evidence arises, the trial, and who wins and loses--will be public.

There is no fixed rule for this. Every situation is different, and of course there is nothing specific to software in there. It is very much a matter of intent. For example, negative profits are no clear sign. Company X thinks they could make $6 million profit by developing a product and selling it, minus $4 million development cost. It turns out development cost is $10 million. Raising prices is not possible because of competition. Company X will suffer losses of $4 million, without being predatory in any way. The reality is that a judge will look at the situation, take everything into account, and make a decision based on what they see. Since this is all about competition law, the main point is the intent or effect that your pricing makes competition impossible. That's what the judge will decide. For example, if you offer your service for $500,000 while others offer a similar service for $1,000,000 you could be using some super efficient processes that allow you to make money at that price, or you might have an idiotic sales person who will drive your company into bankruptcy, or you are trying to drive your competitors out of business. That's what the judge will decide.

Can embedded software be patented in the EU? I know that no software can be patented in Europe. But what if I use software in an electronic board, and introduce that hardware? Can that be patented?

Software cannot be patented although it does have copyright. Hardware can be the subject of a patent, however, that would not cover any software aspects such as the programming built into a PROM. While it is possible to render any software into an integrated circuit, practically, anything simple enough to make this feasible is probably too simple to patent.

Unknown based on what you have posted in your question. But answer lies in the terms under which the source code is made available or licensed. The most common scenario is that such "sample" source code is provided as help to the purchaser of their product and you'll often see things that permit its use in conjunction with the hardware product. You'll also often see disclaimers that say the code is for demonstration purposes only and it not warrantied to do anything at all. But again, you'll need to review the actual language under which the code is provided and then understand and follow its terms and conditions.

If you want to implement this or a similar feature, you'd look up the patents, and either get a license (unlikely that Microsoft would give you a license), or figure out how to implement the feature without violating the patent. An example how a company I worked for worked around a patent: In order to compress data. in the best possible way, the idea was to try eight different methods to compress the data and pick the best compressed data. There was a patent for that (even though to me, this was quite obvious). Workaround: The software tried eight different methods and reported a number from 1 to 8 indicating which method gave the best result (unlike the patent, which actually gave the best result). Then the data was compressed once using the best method. No patent violation. You'd probably want a patent lawyer to check if your idea how to implement the feature violates the patent or not, and how to get around it. It takes a specific mindset that you and I don't have. And even good lawyers who are not patent lawyers might not be able to help you there. Commercial vs. open source/free software makes no difference, except that Microsoft might not bother suing you if there is no money to be made. Unless the intent is to prevent you from implementing the feature, in which case the would sue companies without money as well.

Is it actually necessary for businesses (such as a Small Town News USA Inc) that do not reside in EU to care about GDPR? Only if they offer goods/services to or monitor behavior of people in the EU (Art. 3(2)). Note that: having a commerce-oriented website that is accessible to EU residents does not by itself constitute offering goods or services in the EU. Rather, a business must show intent to draw EU customers, for example, by using a local language or currency. If it is then how (and by whom) would compliance be audited and/or enforced? Supervisory Authorities will care of it.

The software being free and open source has no impact on whether it infringes any patents or violates any copyrights. Copyrights attach to fixed representations of creative work in a tangible medium (e.g., the actual code and graphical elements of the software in question). As long as you aren't copying the copyrighted work of someone else, you should be in the clear. So, if you write your own code from scratch, or rely on code that you're allowed to use (e.g., "free" software with a permissive license that allows it to be used freely), you should be fine. On the other hand, if you copy a chunk of code that you aren't allowed to use, and then change the variable names so that it's superficially different, you're likely violating someone's copyright. Patents are a much more difficult question. To determine whether you would infringe any patents, you would have to read the independent claims of every patent that might be related. If you perform all the steps of any one of those claims, then you are infringing that claim (and therefore, the patent in which it is found). Unfortunately, this is much easier said than done. First, it may be difficult to search for all the potentially relevant patents, and once you've found them, there may be far too many to read. Second, claims are written in a type of language that is specific to patents, and someone without experience in patent law may not understand them correctly. Finally, the terms in the claims may not take on their plain English meaning, but rather may have been defined by the language in the rest of that patent, so it's possible that you might incorrectly think you were in the clear based on a misunderstanding arising from that. All that said, it may be best to go ahead with implementing an idea and then waiting to see what happens. Chances are that the implementation will arguably infringe some patent in some way, no matter what's done. But chances are also high that there will never be any worrisome enforcement action taken against it by a patent owner, simply due to the difficulty and expense associated with enforcing patent rights.

Copyright never protects ideas or processes, it only protects expression: words, images, and sounds, some of which may describe ideas. But when a work is nothing more than a translation of an idea into words, with no independent originality -- when almost anyone would use more or less the same way to describe the idea, then the work will not be protected by copyright at all, as it is not considered an "original work". Computer code that implements an algorithm often falls under this rule. It is my belief that the code shown in the linked SE thread would fall under this rule, and would not be protected by copyright at all. If this is correct, then anyone may share such a program with no copyright concern.

In my opinion, you are totally free to publish the information. There are two areas of law that can be cosidered - private and public law. In the private law area, you can be liable for revealing trade secrets, but only if you agreed to keep them by a contract. Trade secrets do not exist by themselves (there are minor exceptions, eg. in competition law, but those do not concern us), they must be protected by contracts. Another private limitations, like libel laws, won't apply here. This is not uncommon, but not in cars - you can find clauses like these in software license agreements. Then there is the public area. Is there any regulation, any policy of the state, that prevents you from publishing it? I am not aware you whole legal code of your state, but I doubt there is. It would be a harsh limitation of freedom of speech. Even if the modification could lead to illegal effect (like, modifying toy weapon to kill by rising its power...) it would be only illegal under very rare circumstances. To conclude it - freedom of speech can be limited only if there is sufficient public interest to do so, and I don't see any.

could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".

How is an area deemed unsafe and needing to be cordoned off? How is an area deemed unsafe and needing to be cordoned off? Would it be the person at the top of the law enforcement agency (police chief or sheriff) who would make the decision that a particular area is unsafe and needs to be cordoned off with police tape, would it be the elected official at the top (mayor, town supervisor, county administrator), or a judge or magistrate? What I'm imagining is that after the police tape is put up, and personnel is stationed at the tape to explain to people, if needed, that anyone crossing the tape will be subject to arrest.

The powers given to law enforcement professionals will be detailed in the relevant law that establishes them. I would suspect that the decision to cordon off an area would fall within the purview of the officer on the scene; the idea that a police officer would need to seek permission before cordoning off a motor vehicle accident or chemical spill is unworkable. I would also suspect that other emergency personnel (e.g. ambulance and fire-fighters) would have similar powers. However, such cordoning off would be a temporary measure and if it was maintained for an unreasonable period it would be open to challenge through an administrative or judicial process. If the police decided that a feature was a permanent hazard then they could seek a court order on the owner of the property to provide some measure to adequately protect the public, by either removing the hazard or providing some permanent barrier, under whatever laws seemed most appropriate.

united-states This question does not indicate in what jurisdiction the hypothetical events take place. Since they are hypothetical, I am going to assume the United States. Perhaps other answers will be given for other jurisdictions. I would be interested to read such answers. The Officer's Authority In the hypothetical situation described, it would appear that the police officer had no warrant or other court order, and that he did not have any probable cause to believe that any criminal activity was in progress, or that any crime had been committed. Indeed it would appear that the officer did not even have the "reasonable suspicion" required for a so-called Terry stop (named for the case, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which such stops were declared legal). In any case the encounter described is not a Terry stop, because such a stop takes place "on the street" or in a public place, not on private property. So far it seems that the police office is acting without lawful authority. When the man orders the officer to leave his property, the demand is lawful, and by not leaving, the officer becomes a trespasser, unless the officer has some justification not mentioned in the question. The Duty to Comply However, once the officer starts to give orders, the other person must generally treat them as lawful. There are exceptions: Officers cannot compel people to commit crimes, nor to submit to rape or murder. But orders given for the ostensible protection of the officer have particular deference. As the US Supreme court said in Terry v. Ohio (cited above): ... we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is, in fact, carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. (emphasis added) Resisting the Officer Following the logic of Terry Courts tend to give deference to police assertions of the need to protect themselves. The modern tread is to require citizens to submit to police orders in such cases, even if the citizen believes the order to be unlawful, and even if the court eventually agrees. In many states, violent resistance to such orders would be a crime even if the order was later ruled unlawful. In every US state, he use of deadly force, by drawing and firing a gun at a police officer who has issued possibly unlawful orders, but has not threatened the life or well being of anyone, and has not used any force at all, would be clearly criminal. Nolo Press's article on "Resisting Unlawful arrest" says: Historically, American citizens were legally entitled to use reasonable force to resist unlawful arrest. Some states continue to follow this rule, while others don’t. A statute rejecting the traditional rule might say something like this: “You can’t use force to resist if you know or should know that you’re being arrested by a police officer, regardless of whether the arrest is legal.” ... It’s critical to note that one can be convicted of resisting arrest even without having committed the crime that was the basis for the arrest. It should be understood that even in those US states which follow the "traditional rule" and permit resistance to an unlawful arrest, only "reasonable force" is permitted. Shooting a gun at an officer is deadly force, and will not be reasonable unless the person has a justified belief that the officer is about to kill or seriously injure the arrestee or another person without justification. Also, if the arrest is somehow lawful, even though the arrestee reasonably believed it to be unlawful, the use of even "reasonable" force is no longer permitted, and the arrestee may be convicted of resisting arrestee and other crimes. This makes resistance a dangerous gamble, even in states that follow the traditional rule. In addition, resistance is all too likely to lead to escalation of the conflict, and end with the arrestee shot dead or seriously injured. Even if the officer's actions are later held unlawful, that will not bring the arrestee back to life. Under Color of Law The question asks if the office's actions are taken "under color of law". They are, in US law. This does not mean that the acts are lawful or proper. Rather it means that they are take by means of legal authority. Such acts therefore constitute "state action" subject to the limitations of the 14th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. The Wikipedia article on this topic (linked above) says: ... just because something is done with the "color of law" does not mean that the action was lawful. When police act outside their lawful authority and violate the civil rights of a citizen, the FBI is tasked with investigating. The well known "section 1983" (42 USC. § 1983) provides a private right of action in such cases, saying: Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, Suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... Here the hypothetical officer's entry onto private property, his refusal to leave when ordered by the owner, his order to put down the pistol and step away from the other guns (implying an arrest or detention), his order to stop recording and turn over the record, and his drawing of his firearm are all acts taken "under color of law", and had the citizen submitted, he could have subsequently filed a Sec 1983 suit against the officer, although he would have had to establish harm done to collect more than nominal damages. The officer is relying on his authority as a police officer to enforce his orders, and indeed to support his presence on private property. This makes his actions clearly done "under color of law".

In the U.S. this is a notoriously perilous area of the law, particularly because the laws regarding recording vary so much between the states. A good source for this question is the RCFP. To give you an example: In Pennsylvania it is a felony to record "oral communication" in any circumstance in which the speaker would be justified in expecting it to not be recorded. Legally, as soon as you turn on an audio recorder in PA, you had better make sure nobody unaware that you're recording wanders within range of your microphone!

The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)

More generally, but subject to the specifics of state law, a person may be required to assist a police officer. For instance in Alabama A person commits the crime of refusing to aid a peace officer if, upon command by a peace officer identified to him as such, he fails or refuses to aid such peace officer in: (1) Effecting or securing a lawful arrest; or (2) Preventing the commission by another person of any offense. In Washington, the obligations is much narrower: A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer. Washington seems to be in the minority, compared to Alabama.

united-states First of all, I would not say that any police organization "rules over": any area, unless serious corruption is being implied. The usual term is "has jurisdiction" meaning that they may enforce the law, make arrests, and generally act as police. The rules are going to vary by state, and not all states even have all of these types of law enforcement organizations. But here are some ways in which they often work: A Sheriff is generally a county official, and may have jurisdiction anywhere in the county. If so, so will all the officers under the sheriff, who my all or mostly be Deputy Sheriffs. (This term is very old, going back to "shire reeve", the chief administrative officer or bailiff for a shire, or county, in England, prior to the year 1000, and on through to the modern era.) In many states the Sheriff has authority except in incorporated cities within the county. The Sheriff often supplies court officials or bailiffs, and also runs the county jail. This post tends to be more important in the western part of the US. City police generally have jurisdiction within the boundaries of a city. They may be a tiny or huge organization, depending on the size of the city. State level law enforcement may or may not be able to supersede them, county level often cannot. The state police, often known as "state troopers" have jurisdiction through the state. In some states they mostly do highway patrol and traffic enforcement on state highways. In some states they provide primary law enforcement for all areas not part of a municipality with its own police. They may provide backup and resources for small police departments not equipped to handle major crimes, particularly villages and towns that do not have the status of cities. Or that may be handled by the Sheriff's office. Many states have a Division of Investigation, sort of a state-level version of the FBI. This is sometimes administratively part of the State Police, sometimes not, but even when it is it is in practice a separate organization. It can and does investigate serious crimes anywhere in the sate, and often handles matters where the conduct of the local police is or might be in question. It may be called by different names in different states. This organization can and does take over cases from local police and sheriff's offices. They may also run central crime labs with facilities more advances than local police departments have, to whcih evidence may be sent for testing from local departments or sheriff's offices.

It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.

"I don't know" is a better answer than most, but you should only say that if it's the truth. The three most important rules to follow when being questioned by a police officer are as follows: Do not lie. Do not incriminate yourself. Be cooperative (to the extent that you're not lying or incriminating yourself). "Do you know why I pulled you over?" or "Why do you think I stopped you?" are perfect opening questions for law enforcement to ask because there is no good answer. Any answer you give puts you at a disadvantage for the rest of the stop because you've tacitly accepted the officer's assumption that you did something wrong. The best response would be to simply reply back with their own question. "Why did you pull me over, officer?" If you say it right, it's rational, polite, and cooperative without actually answering anything. Your position from the very beginning should be that you did nothing wrong (even if you know that you did). It's the officer's job to make the case. It's not your job to help them.

Fringe case of naturalization and dual citizenship (United states)? So I've given a look over State Department policy and am unsure about exact actions that can result in revoked citizenship. From here it seems naturalizing with intent to lose citizenship in another country is grounds for expatriation but its meaning is vague. http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/citizenship-and-dual-nationality.html Let's say I somehow made my own country and declared myself president of it, and everybody in the borders at the time is granted citizenship. Do I automatically lose my U.S. citizenship? Do the other US citizens? Were they naturalized even or does that not count as naturalization and they just are citizens of the new country? Have I now forced them to choose between my stylish empire in the making or the world of American citizenry? What about getting new US citizens, what if my government had no qualms about you retaining US citizenship, are you still acting with intent to lose citizenship? This may sound wacky and unrealistic but discussing this simplified example could have some useful procedural clarifications.

The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that.

As long as they have diplomatic immunity, they don't have a residency status. If either parent didn't have diplomatic immunity, then the child is a subject to the jurisdiction and they become a citizen at birth. The short explanation with the reasoning can be found on the uscis website. Namely Children born in the United States to accredited foreign diplomatic officers do not acquire citizenship under the 14th Amendment since they are not “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” and If one parent was an accredited diplomat, but the other was a U.S. citizen or non-citizen U.S. national, then the child was “born . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and is a citizen.

The law is not settled and will shortly be before the High Court (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) but theoretically: yes! The provision on Disqualification is s44, specifically subsection (i): Any person who: (i) is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Which, on the face of it, makes eligibility to sit in the Australian parliament dependent on the citizenship laws of every other country in the world: all 195 of them. Indeed, right now, any citizen of Australia (which is itself a qualification by virtue of s16 or s34), is allowed to live and work in New Zealand, and to vote after a year's residence - that is they are "entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject [but not a citizen] of a foreign power". Therefore, interpreted that way, no Australian is entitled to sit in parliament. Of course, a simple referendum1 could change the Constitution to fix that - except, a referendum must be called by parliament and we no longer have one. Personally, I think it is unlikely2 that the High Court will rule in such a way that would plunge the nation into a constitutional crises by deciding no one can sit in parliament or that who can sit is determined by the laws of foreign nations. Notwithstanding, at present there are 5 MPs who have been referred to the High Court (2 of whom have already resigned), 2 more who will be referred when parliament resumes in September, 21 known to have been born overseas who have not confirmed that they have renounced any foreign citizenship they might have and an unknown number who may have foreign citizenship by descent. Each of the cases is distinct: some were born overseas, some have foreign citizenship by descent, one is a 3rd generation Australian whose mother registered him as an Italian citizen when he was a child (17) and he claims he never knew. How the High Court will rule will almost certainly vary with the particular circumstances but its anyone's guess what they will decide. However, it appears that the drafters of the constitution intended that it should capture all dual-citizens, not just those who sought dual-citizenship by a deliberative act. If a person is found to be ineligible then different things happen depending on if they ware a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. For a Senator, the High Court would recount the results of the election - because of the strange way voting works for the Senate, only educated guesses can be made about who would replace whom (especially since the same citizen issue may apply to other candidates on the ticket). For a Member of the House of Representatives, a by-election would be held - because the Liberal/National government has a majority of 1 and 3 of their members are in the gun the results will be ... interesting. 1 Referenda in Australia are not simple. The Australian Constitution is specifically designed to be difficult to change while at the same time granting broad powers to parliament. It takes a nationwide vote and must be carried by a majority of voters nationwide and a majority in a majority of the six states (i.e. 4 or more). Since federation in 1901 there have been 44 referenda of which only 8 have been carried. In is generally accepted that a referendum is impossible to pass unless it has bi-partisan support: and sometimes not even then. 2 And by "unlikely" I mean "impossible" - a conclusion that the constitution must be read in such a way that parliamentary democracy becomes impossible would be contrary to law. Update in light of the High Court’s ruling: No Providing a potential parliamentarian has taken “all reasonable steps” to renounce foreign allegiance they are permitted to serve even if the foreign power refuses to allow them to renounce citizenship. In practice, this means writing to the foreign embassy and renouncing citizenship.

[C]ould that person, in the future, provide another I-134 for a different person who's trying to immigrate to the US? According to the Instructions for Form I-134 (PDF, 371.05 KB) If you are sponsoring more than one foreign national, you must submit a separate Form I-134 for each foreign national. There is no mention, that I can see, prohibiting future applications.

I don't know about that particular case, but you are basically right: In Switzerland, if you want to apply for citizenship, you apply for it in the municipality first. Everybody having the citizenship of the municipality has the swiss citizenship as well. In theory, the canton and the state also have something to say, but that's irrelevant for most applications. This has historic reasons, but going into the details is beyond the scope of this question. Fact is, that every municipality has its own rules, about when and how applications are handled. This has been unified a bit in recent years, but some things still differ. That is for instance, how many years you need to have lived there or who decides your application. There were municipalities (actually most) where the final decision was made using a public vote. This practice was declared illegal by the federal court some years ago, because becoming a citizen is a formal governmental act, and as such a reason needs to be given for turning an application down. This is inherently impossible with a vote. Since that law decision, most municipalities have shifted the responsibility to a committee for citizenship applications. The public can still bring in arguments, but they need to be justified (ie. if somebody knows about the applicant being a wanted criminal somewhere). Consequently, you can now call for a court to check whether the given reasoning is correct and just, if you are turned down.

If the Attorney General has officially determined that you renounced US citizenship for the purpose of avoiding taxation, you have a lifetime ban under INA 212(a)(10)(E), and there is no immigrant waiver for this ban. See 9 FAM 302.12-6. I am not sure if the Attorney General has ever made such a determination about anyone. Otherwise, I don't see anything that would prevent you from immigrating to the US like any other foreigner.

As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.

The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).

Are the names of guns protected under copyright law in the US? So I am trying to create a military shooter and therefore must have guns. I would like to include some weapons from real life (Ak-47, M16, Glock, etc.) and I would like to know what legal issues I might run into by using these names. Mainly if I could be violating copyright laws.

Copyrights don't apply to the names used. You mean trademarks. You copyright your game and you trademark the name. http://www.reddit.com/r/gamedev/comments/11v69k/using_a_guns_name_in_your_video_game/ Basically, it wouldn't be wise to use trademarked names in your game. Even though it's unlikely you would be sued and even if you were, you could possibly fight it under Fair Use, but do you want to take the chance? If some gun company decided they didn't like how you used their name, even if they have little to no grounds for a case, they can STILL sue. Anybody can sue for pretty much any reason where there is doubt. If they have enough money to throw around, they can drag you through the mud, ruin your business and then just lift their lawsuit. They don't need to win in court, just destroy you. Keep in mind that even if you don't use the name, if the gun in your game is an accurate replica of the real thing, it could still be a trademark issue. EDIT: Something you could consider though is asking permission. You never know. They may simply not care. You might even try propositioning them to pay YOU to have their gun showcased in your game. It's not entirely uncommon for companies to be willing to pay for a bit of endorsement advertising.

Words cannot be copyrighted. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, or short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive or lends itself to a play on words, it cannot be protected by copyright. The only intellectual property protection that might be afforded to such things is trademark.

Without getting into the merits of the legislation, the short answer is that the existence of a false statement/factual error in the law has no effect on the law. The legislature has essentially used a term to explain which firearms are prohibited, and then it defined that term. Sometimes the legislature's definition will generally match the definition used by the general public; sometimes it will seem as though they just pulled something out of thin air. Most lawyers would agree that it is not best practice to have definitions that don't seem to match their antecedents, but they would also agree that such definitions continue to hold the force of law.

Generally speaking, it is illegal for you to do this. Copyright gives the creator of the image the exclusive right to copy it, and just making copies to send to other people is probably not going to be fair use. Making copies without a license from the copyright holder would therefore be copyright infringement. Are there likely to be any consequences for doing this? Probably not.

It depends on your jurisdiction. Check the applicable laws; there's probably a section named something like "definitions" that gives the meaning of terms such as "loaded". For example, from RCW 9.41.010 (the "Terms defined" section of the "Firearms and Dangerous Weapons" chapter of the Washington State laws): (17) "Loaded" means: (a) There is a cartridge in the chamber of the firearm; (b) Cartridges are in a clip that is locked in place in the firearm; (c) There is a cartridge in the cylinder of the firearm, if the firearm is a revolver; (d) There is a cartridge in the tube or magazine that is inserted in the action; or (e) There is a ball in the barrel and the firearm is capped or primed if the firearm is a muzzle loader. So in Washington State, any of your examples 2-4 would be considered "loaded" for the purposes of firearms-related crimes.

Your question lacks some details. So you registered a domain name, and later find someone else used that domain name (in the past) for a hobby website? Then no, you don't need to worry about it. If that person has a current trademark on the name used in the domain name, and your website provides/sells products or services in the same area, then you could have a problem. But that doesn't sound like it's the issue.

Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.

It is not clear to me how you "use" a mythological entity, and I take no position as to the divine consequences of any unauthorized uses, but you are entitled to incorporate then in your own intellectual creations for two reasons. First, any imaginable copyright on original texts (e.g. the Bhagavad Gita) has long since expired. Not all texts are of such certifiably ancient provenance, so there may be contemporary texts created by a practitioner of Ásatrúarfélagið which is protected. Second, names (Amitāyus, Zaraθuštra, Ngai) are not protected by copyright, so you can use names.

Can an author of an app use logos that belong to auto manufacturers? Consider a mobile app related to automobiles. In order to identify the make of a vehicle within the app (in list views, menus, and buttons, for example), the author might choose to use logos that belong to car manufacturers (Ford, Toyota, etc.) Would this hypothetical use of logos scenario implicate trademark law? Would it be trademark infringement?

The use may constitute trademark infringement if it implies sponsorship or endorsement I'm going to assume US jurisdiction for this question, because you've not provided one, and you haven't provided enough car manufacturer names to suggest that this wouldn't apply to the US. I'll also only cover Federal law (the cases were tried in state courts), so be aware that there may be additional responsibilities under state law that I don't examine here. 15 U.S. Code § 1114: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 15 U.S. Code § 1125: (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. These actions - the use of the trademarked manufacturer logo within the app - is likely to constitute trademark infringement, if the trademark owner's permission is not sought prior to publication, and the use of the trademark is likely to cause confusion as to the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods. What this means, is that if the trademarks are used in such a way that a reasonable person is likely to think that: The product is an official product from the owner/brand associated with the trademark; The product is sponsored by the owner/brand associated with the trademark; or The product is approved or endorsed by the owner/brand associated with the trademark. Then an action in trademark infringement may be brought by the trademark owner. Consider the following two cases: Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elect. Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961) In this case, judgement was made for the defendant, as the defendant's field was not considered close enough to the plaintiff's for there to be a likely chance of confusion. AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979) In this case the trial judge decided that the trademarks Slickcraft and Sleekcraft were unlikely to cause confusion. This ruling was overturned on appeal and an injunction was ordered by the court. Possible defenses Nominative use of a mark When a mark is used solely to identify a product, this use is privileged. A descriptive mark used for its primary purpose Descriptive marks are a subtype of trademarks, which are descriptive in nature but have acquired a secondary meaning. Here, using a descriptive mark for its primary purpose has been found not to constitute infringement. General First Amendment protection Satire and parody are generally recognized as defenses if the primary purpose of the use is not directly commercial. If the products are not similar enough to be likely to cause confusion; and The use does not imply endorsement, sponsorship or approval of the product by the trademark owner then it should be fine. It seems that the situation in the question above would not give rise to confusion (unless the car manufacturer also develops an app, for instance), the second issue - endorsement - should be avoided. Many programs will have a legal section that includes ownership information and disclaims any association with the trademark owner(s). I have not been able to locate any cases where the effect of these sections have been tested. Further reading Overview of Trademark Law

Working a mobile car cleaner now, my manager asked me to take some pictures before cleaning and after clearing, privacy issue of the car owner California law creates an expectation of consent for taking photographs of people for purposes of commercial distribution of the image to the public. California Civil Code § 3344. But, absent copyright or design patent issues (which would only very rarely come up since most people don't own the copyrights or patents to the designs of their cars, and the owner of the copyrights generally grants an implied license for the owners of the cars to display the copyrighted or patented designs), there is no parallel requirement of consent for taking photographs of things. Furthermore there is no common law expectation of privacy in anything that someone you do business with must necessarily see with their own eyes. So, if you must see the car to clean it, then taking photographs before and after the work is done does not violate any expectation of privacy to which the customer has not implicitly consented and does not violate any California or federal statute. Better practice would be for the business to explicitly have the customers consent in writing to the photographs, to remove all doubt. But the implied consent to having someone see your car when they are cleaning it would be unreasonable to deny in almost all circumstances. A company might voluntarily have an agreement to keep any photographs taken confidential and to have its employees sign non-disclosure agreements not to reveal what they see while working. If it did, this would create a legally enforceable expectation of privacy for the customer. For some VIP clients, this contractually enforceable discretion might be something that would induce them to pay a higher price for the same services. But those kind of protections are not the default standards of law that apply in the absence of an agreement. And, even then, taking photographs for purposes of internal use only would probably not violate an agreement of this kind. The work still requires that people inside the business, including remote supervisors, be able to see the cars to do their work.

It doesn't make a difference if the product is free or commercial use, if it's initiated by a company or an individual. What you are considering would be a "derivative work" and without explicit permission from the copyright holder, it is considered a violation.

Yes, the original designer (or the designer's employer) would have a legal right to the design, insofar as it included protectable design elements. Copyright on the design of "useful" products is limited, and the exact limitations vary from country to country. However, it might be hard for the designer (or the company for which the designer works) to prove that the creation was original, and was not an actual leak. But if the designer or company has retained sufficient evidence to convince a court, then a suit could be successful. Such a possibility makes me doubt that Apple or a similar large company would do that. The risks are too great when a design of their own creation would probably be quite good enough for their purposes. But that is all speculation.

A "similar brand", even a "knock off", does not infringe trademark protection (which is the issue here, not copyright) as long as reasonable consumers or purchasers will not be confused or mislead into thinking that the product is the same as the original product, or is made by, affiliated with, sponsored by, or authorized by the makers of the original product, or that the knockoff in some way shares the reputation of the original product. Obviously that is a fact-based judgement, but a name that alludes to another product but is obviously different is generally not considered an infringement. (I recall reading of a case in which the well-known "North Face" clothing brand tried to sue a new brad called "South butt". I believe that North Face lost. Apparently I was wrong and the case was settled.)

Anyone seriously planning on doing this or anything like it would be well advised to consult a good trademark lawyer with the specifics. Specifics will matter in such a case. That said: Under US trademark law, the key question is whether a reasonable person would be confused into assuming that there is some connection, and that the new firm could be relied on based on the reputation of the old one. if so, this is a trademark infringement unless permission is obtained from the trademark holder (not likely to be granted). Since "orbitz" is a coined term its protection is stronger, there is no natural object or concept this can refer to. "AppleMoving" is less likely to be confused with "Apple Computers" because apples are real things and need not refer to computers. The likelihood of confusion depends on the specific facts of an individual case. Note also that trademark protection is a matter of private civil lawsuits. If orbitz didn't choose to sue for whatever reason, nothing would have stopped OrbitzMoving.

It's questionable, because if you design your own visual interpretation of the T-Shirt then it isn't necessarily the one from the book and thus your art has it's own copyright. However, if the current Copyright Holder and Possible Trademark owner is selling the shirt it could be an issue because yours is not official but being sold as one. If you're making it for non-sale and just cosplay, than you have a better arguement.

The example in the question is a pretty clear case of nominative use. The mark is being used to refer to, or name, the product (or service). It is not being used to sell a similar product, or anything else. No reasonable person could take it to indicate that the trademark owner has endorsed the person making the statement, nor that there is any sort of affiliation. This page from the International Trademark Association describes the concept. This concept is sometimes called "fair use" by analogy with the concept in US copyright law, but that term is not strictly accurate. It is better to simply say "nominative use" or "descriptive use". Digital Media Law's page on "Using the trademarks of others" says: As a general matter, if you are reporting on, commenting on, or criticizing a trademark owner, most ordinary consumers will not be confused about whether the company or organization is the source or sponsor of your work. You can reduce the likelihood of confusion further by avoiding a website design that looks like the trademark owner's site or resembles its product packaging, and you should never festoon your website with a company's logo (but isolated use when relevant to a discussion is OK) ... If someone threatens you with a lawsuit or sues you for trademark dilution, then a lack of consumer confusion will not help you. Here, one obvious line of defense is to argue that there is no likelihood of dilution. Federal and state dilution law protects a trademark owner against the whittling away of the distinctiveness of its famous trademark by association with other goods or services; it does not give a trademark owner the right to shut down all unflattering speech about it. If you do not associate a famous trademark with your own goods or services, then there can be no dilution (or at least that's how your argument goes). ... The nominative fair use defense protects your ability to use a trademark to refer to a trademark owner or its goods or services for purposes of reporting, commentary, criticism, and parody, as well as for comparative advertising. Courts impose three requirements on defendants who want to take advantage of the nominative fair use defense: (1) the trademark owner, product, or service in question must not be readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) the defendant must use only as much of the mark as is necessary to identify the trademark owner, product, or service; and (3) the defendant must do nothing that would suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. This defense works against trademark infringement lawsuits. The federal dilution statute, found at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A), also makes nominative fair use a complete defense to trademark dilution claims.

How ironclad are businesses's terms and conditions? I was wondering how binding my websites Terms and Conditions are. I specify a few things there, including a return policy and terms of use. I am in California. I'm starting to sell to the U.S. and then Canada, and then the whole EU.

Your terms and conditions must comply with the laws in: Your jurisdiction (California) Your customer's jurisdiction (each of the US states, Canadian provinces and ultimately countries and sub-jurisdictions in Europe) If they do they will generally be enforceable; if they don't then they will not be enforceable and you may be exposing yourself to civil and criminal sanctions. While not immediately relevant to you, Australian Consumer Law has such sanctions to goods sold into Australia from anywhere in the world; I am not familiar with other jurisdictions. With respect to your comment that you will not accept returns or refunds, this would expose you to potential fines in Australia of $220,000 for an individual or $1,100,000 for a corporation - under Australian Consumer Law returns and refunds are a consumer right. I strongly suspect that most of the jurisdictions you are selling into would take a similar position. A general "catch-all" like "to the extent permitted by law" may reduce the risk of being prosecuted but it would not eliminate it entirely. Again, in Australia, the provision is that you must not engage in deceptive and misleading conduct - merely suggesting that you will not give a refund even with the limitation above - may still be deemed "deceptive and misleading" if the court feels that a reasonable consumer might assume that they are not entitled to a refund. You need professional legal advice on this.

The rule you are alluding to with respect to a television set is called the "first sale doctrine" which basically prohibits copyright and trademark owners from limiting the ability of a buyer of a good (like a CD or authorized logo T-Shirt) protected by copyright or trademark, from limiting further sales of that good (or the manner in which the good is used by its new owner) after a first retail sale of the good with copyright or trademark protections. This doctrine was derived from an old common law rule that invalidated "restraints on alienation" of property other than intellectual property on public policy grounds, and like the "restrain on alienation" rule for tangible property, the first sale doctrine that applies to intellectual property was also (at least originally) a court created common law rule. But Minecraft isn't, conceptually, a good. It is a continuing service provided over the Internet, and firms that provide continuing services on a licensed basis, as Minecraft does, can impose terms of service (a.k.a. an "end user license agreement" a.k.a. EULA) which must be complied with in order for users to be allowed to continue to utilize the service. So, its prohibition on exchanges of things of real world value for things of game value, except as the terms of service authorize, is permitted. A user of Minecraft is more analogous legally to someone skating at an ice rink than to someone who buys a CD or book. If you buy a ticket to skate at an ice rink, the people granting you the license to use the ice rink have the right to set rules governing how you utilize that service, and to terminate your license if you don't follow the rules (e.g. by skating in the wrong direction at the wrong time). Indeed, a ticket to an event is also known in legal parlance as a form of "license" just like a EULA, and licenses to use real property are the origin of the body of law that now governs the licensing of intangible intellectual property. A Minecraft license isn't something that you own (even if you have a license of unlimited duration), it is a qualified and limited right to use something that someone else owns, that you aren't allowed to purchase, but you are allowed to use on the owner's terms. How can they enforce servers to follow that rule if the server's are not using Mojang's proprietary software. The EULA or TOS obligation in the Minecraft business model is enforceable because Minecraft isn't in the business of selling proprietary software, even though it does do that. Minecraft is in the business of licensing access to data and online resources. The EULA regulates your access to the data on servers, and the computing power of those servers, not your ownership of an app which facilitates your use of the licensed services. And, while there are various contractual remedies for violating a EULA, the most basic one is a self-help remedy: to cut you off from your ability to use the service if you violate the owner's rules. Indeed, at least heuristically, the easiest way to distinguish an intellectual property good, which is subject to the first sale doctrine, from an intellectual property service, which can be licensed pursuant to a EULA, is whether, as a practical matter, the firm distributing the intellectual property has a practical ability to deny you service going forward without resort to the courts. If the owner of the intellectual property has no practical ability to do that, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a good and be subject to the first sale doctrine. But, if the owner of the intellectual property has the practical ability to cut you off from the intellectual property being distributed without resort to the courts, the intellectual property being distributed will probably be classified as a service, which is not subject to the first sale doctrine and may be licensed.

This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about).

Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.

There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model.

The answer by Dale M. is correct, but a bit brief. "Selling" is not an exact phrase. What you do not want to do is to transfer ("sell") the copyright to the source code. If you did that, you would put yourself in legal danger because they now own the copyright to code that you use in other products, and can sue you for copyright infringement. However, you selling a copy of source code does not imply transfer of copyright in any shape of form. When you buy a copy of a book in a book store, the author's copyright is not transferred to you. Accepting this deal would put the other party in legal danger. Even if they have bought the source code, they still don't have a license to make further copies of it and sell those. This is why you need to license the software to them. In brief: Copyright grants the copyright owner a lot of rights. These rights are always licensed, not sold. The right that is relevant here is the right to create derivative works. A license is simply a contract between the two parties, describing a particular business arrangement in legally binding terms. If I were in your position, I would hire an IP lawyer to help drafting the license. But, basically, the license should say that you, as owner of the copyright to ABC software, grants XYZ company access to its source in its present form, and also grants XYZ company the right to create derivative works, but only for hardware platform DEF, and to create and distribute copies of their derivative work.

No. These companies seem to be saying that they are entitled to sell music under some sort of mandatory licensing agreement authorized by the law of the Ukraine, or by a licensing agreement specific to the Ukraine. Even if this were true, it would only give them the right to distribute the files in the Ukraine. If an American, sitting in the U.S., makes a digital copy of a file on a Ukrainian server by copying it to his or her U.S. hard drive, they have to have a license to do so issued either by the U.S. copyright holder or authorized by U.S. law. A license to distribute in the Ukraine doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. A Ukrainian statute doesn't give the U.S. end user that license. If the end user doesn't have that license, he or she is violating the copyright holder's rights and may be civilly or criminally liable. There is no scienter requirement for copyright infringement. In fact, it's not at all clear that any Ukrainian site is operating even under this dubious legal cover. This report on Ukrainian licensing agencies by an industry group claims that many Ukrainian licensing authorities are actually scams that have no rights to distribute music under any license--one of the "rogue licensing agencies" discussed is Avtor, referenced in your first example. There is some legal confusion over what group does have permission to license music and collect royalties in the Ukraine, but it's clear that Avtor doesn't, and it certainly doesn't have permission to distribute them in the U.S. If a guy came up to you on the street and told you he had written permission from Disney to videotape their latest movies with a camcorder and sell them to you for a dollar, are you violating the law if you buy it? The answer is yes, and it's the same for these Ukrainian sites.

It is legal for a company to ask for any information they want as a condition of doing business with you, so long as their request isn't proscribed by law. I don't know of any jurisdiction where a request for banking or credit information is illegal. (In this case, however, it does seem like you are being phished. You could report the matter to your country's consumer protection agency.)

How It is with sharing content on Facebook Facebook Terms of Service contains (3.8.2015) the following text in section 2.4: When you publish content or information using the Public setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture). Does this mean everyone is allowed to use that content (republish, remix...), when you publish it using Public setting? What happens If user who originally published published content, removes it?

No. That clause does not give other users a licence to reproduce the work (other than what is necessary to access or use it) or create derivative works. The copyright owner has the exclusive right to do those things. (See 17 USC 106.) The clause you quote only indicates that other users can "access" (download for viewing) your "information" and use it, too. It doesn't give away any of your exclusive copyright in the work. You do grant Facebook a licence to do certain things with your work in section 2.1 of the Terms of Service, though.

Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.

You can design whatever this system is (leaving aside jurisdictions without First Amendment-like law that lets you design to your hearts content), the problem comes in implementing. The main legal question is whether you are operating a website. A website operator has to comply with various laws that require them to remove content. For example, if you operate a website that allows users to distribute content that they upload, they can distribute copyright-protected content, and you can be held liable for copyright infringement. DMCA in the US provides a way for you to not get sued, but you have to be able to remove putatively infringing content, so you could get sued if you can't remove illegal content. This may also include legal troubles over e.g. defamatory content where a plaintiff gets a court order to remove the content – you can't plead "I can't it down" if the court orders you to do so. Napster was sued for copyright infringement and racketeering for facilitating law-breaking by others ("secondary infringement"), and in MGM v. Grokster the Supreme Court annonced the general principle that One who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses Grokster's problems arose because they clearly intended the software to be used to violate copyright law, whereas it is unlikely that Github will get sued because it is possible to use the platform illegally. So it really matters exactly what this "platform" is and what your relationship to the platform is. Describing a system is generally not illegal, realizing and maintaining one can easily be.

That post is probably illegal. Because she is making false assertions about you (that are presumably damaging your reputation), she is likely liable for defamation. Because she has copied a picture of you without authorization, she is likely liable for violating the copyright of whomever owns that picture. Commenters have suggested she might invoke a fair-use defense, but I would expect it to fail. The four fair-use factors are: The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes: Both Plaintiff and Defendant are using using the photograph to identify the holder of an account -- a Facebook account in P's case, a business account in D's. D is using the photograph in connection with a profit-making enterprise, not for educational purposes, and her use is not transformative. The nature of the copyrighted work: Photography is a creative art at the core of copyright's purposes, generally entitled to thick protection. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[P]hotography entails creative expression warranting copyright protection.") The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole: There is no indication that D took anything less than the entire photograph. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work: The question is not only whether the defendant's use affected the actual market for the protected work, but whether many people doing the same thing would depress the potential market for the work. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (Courts must consider "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market.") The potential market for the image is probably very small, but widespread unauthorized copies, publicly displayed, would undoubtedly depress whatever market exists. So all four factors cut against the defendant. Fair use is a loser defense here.

The purpose of that disclaimer is not to prevent reprimands or legal action. It's really as simple as it appears -- it's to inform the readers that the tweets in fact contain the opinion of the person who wrote them and are not intended to be understood as the official position as that person's employer. This is especially important for people who occasionally or frequently convey their employer's official position. It's not supposed to be some kind of magic word that causes something to happen. It's just an attempt to convey accurate information and avoid misunderstandings.

Copyright exists whether they make that statement or not. Giving such notice informs the public that the work is copyrighted, who owns it, and when it was published. If the work is infringed, the defendant will not be able to use an innocent infringement defense. There's nothing special about using the domain name, as it's probably the name or DBA of the business that owns the domain.

You Own The Code To answer your question on whether or not it is copyright infringement: Yes, you do own the rights to the written code but posting it on Github gives Github the right to store, archive, parse, and display Your Content, and make incidental copies, as necessary to provide the Service, including improving the Service over time. This license includes the right to do things like copy it to our database and make backups; show it to you and other users; parse it into a search index or otherwise analyze it on our servers; share it with other users; and perform it. To simply put it, no matter what license you use, you give GitHub the right to host your code and to use your code to improve their products and features. This license does not grant GitHub the right to sell Your Content. It also does not grant GitHub the right to otherwise distribute or use Your Content outside of our provision of the Service, except that as part of the right to archive your Content. So with respect to code that’s already on GitHub, I think the answer to the question of copyright infringement is fairly straightforward. Things aren’t quite as clear-cut in a scenario where Copilot is trained on code that is hosted outside of GitHub. In that situation, the copyright infringement question would hinge largely on the concept of fair use. If Copilot is being trained on code outside of GitHub, we accept that at least some of what they’re looking at is copyrightable work. So, the question then becomes if it’s fair use. Now, you ultimately can’t conclude definitively that something is fair use until you go to court and a judge agrees with your assessment. But I think there’s a strong case to be made that Copilot’s use of code is very transformative, a point which would favor the fair use argument. There is precedent for this sort of situation. Take the case of Google Books, for example. Google scanned millions of books, provided people who were doing research with the ability to search the book, and provided the user a small snippet of the text that the user was searching for in the book itself. The court did in fact find that was fair use. The use was very transformative. It allowed people to search millions of books. It didn’t substitute for the book itself. It didn’t really take away anything from the copyright holders; in fact, it made it easier for readers to access the work and actually opened a broader market for book authors. And, it was a huge value add on top of the copyrighted corpus. In the latter scenario, a lot depends on the thoroughness and the length of Copilot’s suggestions. The more complex and lengthy the suggestion, the more likely it has some sort of copyrightable expression. If a suggestion is short enough, the fact that it repeats something in someone else’s code may not make it copyrightable expression. There’s also the question of whether what’s being produced is actually a copy of what’s in the corpus. That’s a little unclear right now. GitHub reports that Copilot is mostly producing brand-new material, only regurgitating copies of learned code 0.1% of the time. But, we have seen certain examples online of the suggestions and those suggestions include fairly large amounts of code and code that clearly is being copied because it even includes comments from the original source code.

Fairly easily. You want to use their API. They give you the conditions for using it. As long as their conditions aren't illegal or unreasonable, you need to adhere to them to use their API. Is it illegal to not include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name? Almost certainly not. Is it an unreasonable term? Almost certainly not. If you want to include "insta", "gram", or "instagram" in your company or product name, you can try - but you can't then use their API.

Under U.S. Law, what does "Notwithstanding" mean? I am being asked to sign an non-disclosure agreement and one of the sections focuses on the ownership of any "works" (defined broadly to include everything from ideas to tangible products) which I might produce while employed. The first two paragraphs in the section state very clearly that everything I produce belongs to the employing company. The third paragraph seems to grant me the right to produce non-competitive products as long as I do it on my own time and do not use the company's equipment or trade secrets. As an budding entrepreneur, I will not sign this agreement unless this third paragraph overpowers the statements of the previous two. Unfortunately, the third paragraph begins with a phrase that I don't know how to interpret... "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, any provision of this Agreement which provides for me to assign any of my rights to a Work shall not apply to any invention developed on my own time without using equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secrets..." So here is my question... Does the phrase "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement" mean... a). "Subordinate to everything else contained in this Agreement..." ...or... b). "Overriding everything else contained in this Agremeent..." ...or... c). something else entirely?

Notwithstanding in this case takes its ordinary meaning - "despite": Despite anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement, any provision of this Agreement which provides for me to assign any of my rights to a Work shall not apply to any invention developed on my own time without using equipment, supplies, facilities or trade secrets… Without having the text of the rest of the relevant parts of the contract, my initial interpretation is that the effect of this, is that you would not need to assign your rights to Works produced in your own time without connection to your paid employment. Also, if this was subordinate to the other clauses you mentioned, then it would have little or no effect. Finally, the general legal principle is that works produced in your own time with no connection to your employment (resources, knowledge or otherwise) are not assigned, unless specifically stated. That is, the contract would generally explicitly state that works produced in your own time with no reliance on your employment are assigned to the Employer. However, such a term is almost certainly unreasonable and could be challenged in court if the employer ever attempted to enforce it.

South Park did the EULA gag, and such an agreement would be unenforceable as unconscionable. NDAs, on the other hand, are conscionable, but a EULA isn't an NDA. There isn't a specific statute that you can point to that either makes such a no-criticism agreement explicitly legal vs. illegal, so the case would have to be based on common law justice-style arguments. People v. Network Associates is a relevant case, where a clause requires permission to publish benchmarks or reviews of the software. The court found against the publisher. However, the restrictive condition was not part of the license agreement, which included a merger clause that declared the license agreement to be the whole agreement. The publisher had some hand-waving about mention of "rules and regulations" which they argued nullified the merger clause, where the court did not accept the argument. So for the moment, you need to decide whether disparaging a product is that important to you; or, become a legal pioneer and win a case in court. There is a bill, the Consumer Review Freedom Act under consideration (passed the Senate) which might change that, if it becomes a law. It pertains to a written, oral, or pictorial review, performance assessment of, or other similar analysis of, including by electronic means, the goods, services, or conduct of a person by an individual who is party to a form contract with respect to which such person is also a party and restricts a contract with standardized terms— (i) used by a person in the course of selling or leasing the person's goods or services; and (ii) imposed on an individual without a meaningful opportunity for such individual to negotiate the standardized terms. which says that that kind of contract with that kind of provision is void.

In your example is the spare part the subject of a design patent? I assume it is not. When you combine the spare part to create a “different product” does the finished product resemble the drawings in the design patent? If, in its intended use, the final thing is close enough to the design patent to fall within its scope then you might by indirectly infringing by inducing people to infringe. The scope of a design patent is very difficult to determine reliably. This has nothing to do with how you got the components of your product, just how the completed thing looks. Copyright does not cover products (unless it is a model of a building or a statue or mold for a statue).

(IANAL, of course) My employer tells me that EVERY professional activity belongs to the company and for EVERY activity I mentioned before I need to get written permission, That's true for software (and inventions) that may be relevant for them, but not for other professional activities. which could be withdrawn at any moment. No, not in that very general sense. they can give the permission to publish possibly relevant pieces of code on SX, and they can withdraw that permission for the future. But they cannot take it back for the past. Once they tell you they don't want your invention, there's no way back from that decision (and there are legal deadlines for claiming relevance). Even if they require written permission for you to take a side job, they must give it unless they can show a valid reason against you taking the side job in question. And that would be a per-side-job decision. And it doesn't matter if I do it on my free time on my computer at home or not. That is indeed the case for copyright of software and for inventions. clause is to protect your employer from you helping anyone who is their competitor/you being their competitor while the employment lasts. This is pretty standard and, I believe, not only legal but would be the case also if they had not spelled out this to you. The lines between what is and what is not competition are sometimes a bit complicated* So, if your employer specializes in subway station surveillance systems and you work on face recognition and then help out your local pigeon breeder's association by implementing automatic door opening by camera + automated face recognition of the [unwinged] members that's close enough to touching the interests of your employer that I'd consider it off-limits unless you had talked to your employer and they are happy with this project (after all, they could be preparing similar products unknown to you). OTOH, overhauling the crappy Excel macros for the regional annual breeder's competition would be fine. And in general, the lower your position there and the further from the actual focus of the company, the more normal it is to have another job (think janitors, canteen staff of a software company as opposed to a janitor in a hire-a-janitor-service company) The general duty not be in competition with your employer also in general prevents you from being involved in a competitor business to the extent that you have noticable influence over that competitor. So the second part of clause 1 shouldn't be too surprising, neither. (update) OTOH, what may make this particular clause invalid is the requirement also for publicly traded shares that they cannot come with voting rights. I somehow suspect that thus prohibiting you from "normal person small scale ownership" of publicly traded stocks (not all of them even have non-voting shares) is undue and invalid (too broad a restriction). However, if that clause is invalid the legal default of "no competition to employer" still applies. Here's a (German language) web site of a lawyer that discusses these questions See also here https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Wettbewerbsverbot.html Unlike the 1st clause, this is AFAIK not a spelled out default of German employment law, but it may be a spelled out version of a Tarifvertrag (unionized group contract). In any case it is probably legal to have this clause in the contract. The point is that the employer can only forbid the side job if it is against their reasonable interests, a general "no side jobs whatsoever" would be invalid. Side note: they may even be of the opinion that employment law forces them to have some such clause: the employer has a legal responsibility to ensure that you are not working more than the number of hours allowed by law. I've had such a permission that stated the constraint that the permission is valid only as long as I ensure that I stay within those legal limits and my working ability for employer is not compromised. https://www.hensche.de/Rechtsanwalt_Arbeitsrecht_Handbuch_Nebentaetigkeit.html https://www.fachanwalt.de/ratgeber/nebentaetigkeit-als-arbeitnehmer-anmelden-zustimmung-und-muster-antrag https://www.haufe.de/personal/arbeitsrecht/top-thema-nebenbeschaeftigung/nebentaetigkeit-und-arbeitsrecht-was-erlaubt-ist_76_418602.html Copyright law for employees in Germany is somewhat difficult. the one exception is copyright of software where §69b UrhG transfers the transferrable rights automatically to the employer. Whether the software is written out of office and outside working hours is irrelevant, as long as it is done in "fulfillment of the employee's role or the employer's orders" (famous court case) so again, if at work you code facial recognition systems and in the evening the pigeon breeders accounting system, the latter is not related to your work. Your open source game is also OK unless you are employed as game developer. Also that not all code is subject to copyright. An obvious explanation on SX explaining a typical pattern would not be a creative work (though the full answer may very well be) in the first place. But for creative works other than software such as plans how to implement features, technical drawings, etc. working hours or not seems to be more important for assigning the rights and the rules seem to be more similar to employee invention law ArbnErfG): if it is outside working hours and possibly relevant for the employer, the employee has to offer it to the employer before trying to sell to someone else. The clause that employer must give permission to publication of content that is possibly relevant for them seems to me to be in line with these general rules. https://www.zeit.de/karriere/beruf/2011-06/arbeitsrecht-urheberrecht https://eventfaq.de/25510-urheberrechte-im-arbeitsverhaeltnis/ http://www.urheberrecht-leipzig.de/urheberrecht-nutzungsrechte-des-arbeitgebers-an-kreativen-leistungen-der-mitarbeiter.html * I've been advised in a situation where I still believe I was not competing, and even had a written permission, that this is the stuff that makes lawyers rich, and both employee and employer poor.... Take home message: even if you believe to legally have the right to publish on SX/contribute to an open source project, think again whether you'd want this to be the source of a conflict with your employer - or whether there isn't a win-win possibility that makes everyone happy instead. What is the most legal way to participate in public activities in such situation? I'd advise to be open about what public activities you'd like follow. Whatever the contract says, your employer can always give your more permissions. In the past, I've found the majority of employers being happy to see me contributing (some had similar clauses to yours and just wanted to know, some was happy about an open source project I brought, some like to be able to say where their employees volounteer, etc.). Although there was one who wasn't (and that did contribute to my decision to leave there). From that experience, I'd personally discuss this early on now: in case the employer turns out to be too intrusive (speak to Betriebsrat or lawyer or your union if you have one to make sure they really overstep their rights) for my liking, for me that would be a reason to cancel the contract which is easier & faster during probation period.

The law does indeed say that "the maker of a sound recording is the owner of any copyright subsisting in the recording by virtue of this Part", with the exception of when a "person makes, for valuable consideration, an agreement with another person for the making of a sound recording by the other person", and the recording is pursuant to that agreement. The law does not impose a burden on the engineer to secure copyright in the recording, it imposes a burden on the person hoping to override the engineer's copyright. If there is no agreement, or if there is no consideration, then the engineer would retain copyright. However, "consideration" need not be money: it could also be publicity, e.g. a line on the album cover saying "Sound engineer: Mark Jones". In which case, the question that would have to be resolved in court is whether there was such an agreement. The other side would have to establish that there was such an agreement.

As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state.

It's saying if part of the contract is found to be void or unenforceable, that the rest of it is still a contract. It's called severability.

Bonded labor is illegal in India, but enforcement is lax. Read Right against exploitation in Fundamental rights in India. The right against exploitation, given in Articles 23 and 24, provides for two provisions, namely the abolition of trafficking in human beings and Begar (forced labour)... As per law, they cannot make the contract binding if it relates to bonding of the laborer. But a general contract may stand in court if they have made you sign the contract and paid the duty to government for the contract. This contract will be mild form of Bonds/begar-contracts. As per the requirements of the contract, usually they will ask you to give them your original documents and degree certificate. Do not do that. That will give them control, and it's illegal. From personal experience, such companies are phonies and they want to exploit you. Visa thing is a scare. As per they wont give me Experience letter and Releasing letter; they might do that, and so you will not be able to show experience. You can file a lawsuit against them. (But you know it's a waste of time in Indian courts) As per first three things you mentioned: It is written on my company's letter head. It doesn't contain any stamp paper. It doesn't contain any company seal. It's not a contract. Do not provide them your actual signatures. Make a strange signature so that you can later argue that it's not your signature. But think about the consequences: You are going to that (probably shady) company, do you think they will hold any of their promises later, at all. Think: Will the company stay in business until your bond is over? Then how will you get an Experience certificate? That ends the answer. A few suggestions I'd suggest finding a different job. I'd suggest talking to a lawyer. It's cheaper than your life being screwed up. I'd suggest talking to your family about it. Nothing written here constitutes legal advice. Talk to a lawyer to get a legal opinion on the matter.

UK: Public Access Barrister vs Solicitor The PDF entitled 'Public Access Guidance for Lay Clients' (from the Bar Standards Board) compares and contrasts Public Access Barristers (abbreviated as AB) and Solicitors. Two key differences are the question of an AB's ability to 'conduct litigation, and availability of an AB. However, besides the similarities (eg 1 AB is cheaper than 1 regular B and 1 Solicitor) and differences mentioned in that PDF, what are the other similarities and differences?

I would say all the similarities and differences between approaching a barrister directly and going through a solicitor are set out in the PDF. The historical division of barristers and solicitors is discussed in the document. Traditionally, solicitors took on cases and did the 'behind the scenes' preparation before a case went to trial, and barristers represented that client in the courtroom using the prepared materials. You needed to go through a solicitor in order to be represented by a barrister; there was no way of approaching a barrister directly yourself as a lay person. While this has changed with the Public Access Barrister scheme, this way of instructing a barrister is still seen as the 'default' method. In the usual scheme of things, you, as a client, would deal with a solicitor, and they would then instruct a barrister to represent you in court. In the Public Access Barristers scheme, you, the client, effectively miss out the solicitor stage and you approach the barrister directly. But this leaves something of a gap. In the typical client-solicitor-barrister model, the solicitor's role is to prepare the case for the barrister: collating documents for court, for example. The barrister then takes the papers, reads them, prepares an argument based on those documents and puts the client's case in a courtroom. (This isn't always the case, as the document makes clear: some barristers are not qualified to conduct litigation, for example, whereas some solicitors are qualified to represent clients in court. It's more the typical and historical model.) In the Public Access Barrister scheme, there is no solicitor to prepare the case. From the PDF provided, this means that: this is cheaper, as you're not paying for two lawyers; but conversely: you will have to undertake some of the preparation yourself, e.g. collating the papers, and there are some cases which are too complex for a client to take directly to a barrister, because a solicitor would be required to prepare all of the documents necessary for the trial. In terms of similarities, you will still end up receiving the advice and/or the representation of a barrister; you simply won't be going through a third party, but will be dealing directly with that barrister.

If you want to study the basics of law, where should you start? Don't try memorizing individual laws. That would be a waste of energy, in part because --as you rightly point out-- laws change. There are many introductory books. Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman, is an excellent starting point. The next step --broadly speaking-- consists of reading court decisions (aka court opinions). Opinions released by upper (aka reviewing) courts are available online for free. If you are interested in jurisdictions in the US, Leagle.com is one of many very good resources; EU cases are available here; and so forth. Acquainting yourself with court opinions is quite beneficial. First, court opinions [collaterally] teach how to formulate one's legal positions. Rather than merely being formulaic and a copycat, a litigant is to convey that his legal position is more consistent (compared to the adversary) with the laws and underlying doctrines. His points are easier to get across by adapting his presentation thereof to how courts are used to handle the legal principles involved. Second, court opinions identify the statutes that are relevant to the type of disputes that arise between parties. This is indicative of importance that a statute or procedural rule entails in relation to other laws. Third, court opinions reflect how statutes, rules, and doctrines are interpreted. Oftentimes the way how legislation is worded leads "laypeople" to have misconceptions on the interpretation of laws and rules, when in reality these are construed usually in a much narrower way. Law journals are a good source once you have gained some background in law and are interested in a sort of monograph about a topic that is new to you. But, as explained above, court opinions also serve that purpose (perhaps less scholarly). Having a legal dictionary is always a good idea. Courts in the US oftentimes quote definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for crucial terms which statutory law does not define. What is most applicable to real life? Without knowing whether you are interested in a particular field, it is safe to say that contract law is the most applicable. Entering contracts is part of our everyday life even if laypeople don't notice it when they purchase goods & services, reach an agreement, or engage in a course of conduct which reasonably fosters expectations. And good news is that the principles of contract law are largely similar among modern jurisdictions, including the America (the continent, not just the USA), many member states of the EU, and Asian countries. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a very useful formulation of contract law. Courts in the US very often cite the Restatement for premising their decisions on contract disputes. In countries with a civil law system, the principles of contract law are usually formulated in one or multiple sections of the [countries'] Civil Code. Procedural law (aka rules of criminal or civil procedure) is also highly applicable: Large portions thereof apply to all disputes which are brought to court. To a great extent these rules are very similar across the jurisdictions of one same country, but the litigant ought too ensure his compliance with the rules lest he loses the case for a technicality. Lastly, procedural law can be remarkably boring unless the person anticipates he will be involved in litigation.

When it says "any e-filed document submitted in support of, in opposition to, or in connection with any motion or application must be delivered to the courtroom clerk assigned to the Department in which the motion or application will be heard" this appears to apply to motions and other requests and not to complaints. This said, the easiest way to determine the answer would be to call the clerk of the court's office and ask. An answer from a clerk of the court would be definitive and easy to secure.

In a Bar exam hypothetical you are expected to discuss the merits of each party's cases. There are potentially many breaches here, you need to discuss them all.

Why is it against the law to practice law without a license? Most, if not all, jurisdictions have decided to implement a law that requires such a licence (or similar) to ensure that practitioners are properly authorised, regulated and competent in the best interests of the administration of justice and to maintain a high standard of professionalism. Any shortcomings can then be addressed either by law or the relevant regulating body.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Dale M is correct. Lawyers get calls all day long from people who want free advice and have no intention of entering into a paid representation. That is what your letter sounds like. I write separately just to add that you may have better results if you make explicit that you are aware of their rates and prepared to pay them. Even then, though, it may be that whatever you'd pay for the two hours to walk you through this is not as valuable as time they'd spend on other matters. If I have to prioritize between a repeat client and someone who will probably not pay for anything more than having one question answered, that's an easy choice.

This paper studies the question, in a restricted context of federal cases (the main problem is getting data, but turns out that some federal court clerks have been obliging). From that database, between 1998-2011 1,156,460 felony cases were resolved. 0.2% of those cases were pro se representations with virtually all cases having professional representation ("data missing" is 10 times more frequent than pro se, and the only thing rarer was pro bono attorney at 0.03%). As for outcomes, it is possible that pro se defendants had the charges dismissed at a higher rate (16.9% pro se vs. 6.1% represented -- "possible" is a way of simplifying the statistical problems in interpreting these numbers); with acquittals it's a wash, and with convictions pro se defendants may have done worse (14.8% pro se, 4.9% represented). There also seems to be a trend that juries convict pro se defendants more often than they do represented defendants (90% vs. 77.9%). Ah, and this paper follows up and contradicts the findings of the Hashimoto study, linked in the comments.

When does one become a "founder" of a business? When does one become a "founder" of a business? For example, would it be when work on the business starts or when the business is incorporated? Such events could be years apart.

"Founder" is a common term used in the startup community. The SEC refers to founders in its definition of "promoter": Any person who, acting alone or in conjunction with one or more other persons, directly or indirectly takes initiative in founding and organizing the business or enterprise of an issuer

This is a well established model in the UK. One route is the umbrella company. Y here would be the umbrella company. A would then either be providing services to Y or be employed by Y. You may be wondering what use it is if A is employed by Y. The answer here is that whilst A may not benefit from the tax treatment, X does not bear the burden of running PAYE etc. Further, because of regulations such as IR35, it may be that there is a doubt as to whether employment tax apply even if there is a contract for service. Essentially disguised employment means taxes are levied on the employer as if an employment existed; however, in this situation X has the comfort that if this arises they will (normally) fall on Y rather than X. Another route is the service company, where normally A himself will own it (or it is owned between A and A's spouse), take a combination of salary and dividends out (using two allowances if owned between spouses), and he will bill X or Y; companies exist which will perform all the necessary paperwork to do this (in which case Y is called a managed service company), as opposed to a personal service company (if A sets it up himself). It's not clear where you are based, but if you are based outside the UK (and possibly if you are inside the UK) there are accountancy companies that specialise in setting all this up.

It sounds like you may be conflating ownership and control. It's very common for an affiliate to have a contract with the parent company. These terms can be very detailed - it may give the parent company the right to sell the affiliates widgets, but not sprockets (as those are sold by another parent company). As such, you can't really measure "control" as a simple percentage. So, when the parent is selling widgets, it can reasonably claim control over its affiliate. The buyer does not need to know the exact terms governing the relation between parent and affiliate.

Liability of a Person LLC means "Limited Liability Company"; in the absence of such an entity (or equivalent) there is no "Limited Liability". A partnership, which is what you are describing, or an individual has unlimited liability. What this means is: An individual (operating alone or as a member of a partnership) is liable for their actions. They are responsible for the debts the business incurs (including those arising from legal liability) and must pay for them from their personal assets. A company is liable for its actions, however, the members of that company are liable only to the extent of the money that they have invested. Contractual protection A person (which includes individuals and companies) can attempt to limit liability by contract, however, there are limitations to this: Your liability is only limited against people who are bound by the contract; third parties (like an aggrieved copyright holder) are not Most jurisdictions restrict limits to liability that can be made in consumer contracts and some B2B arrangements You can't contract outside the law: if the law says you are liable then your contract that says otherwise is not worth a pinch of s***. You are only liable for what you are liable for To have a liability, you have to have done (or not done) something that created a liability under statute, tort or contract. There are legal means in many jurisdictions that protect content hosts from copyright claims: but you have to do what the law says you have to do to avail yourself of them. "we" or "us" will refer to ... ... has to be the person(s) that are running the business - if that is Bob and Terry Jones then that's what you write, if it is ExampleWorks LLC, write that. It cant be "example.org" because that is a domain name; not a legal person. It can't be "ExamplePedia" because wtf is that anyway? Get real advice You are running a business and exposing yourselves to liabilities and losses that you know about and probably a bunch that you don't know about. When you learnt to drive a car, or ski, or play soccer you got instruction from people who knew how to do what you wanted to do: running a business is exactly the same: get proper advice from people who know what they're taking about and pay for it if you have to.

Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.

You're not directly asking this, but I'm assuming what you're getting at is when do I owe the taxes upon receiving that pre-payment. This depends on your corporate structure as to how you can realize taxes. If you are DBA, LLC, or S-Corp you pay taxes based on your personal income at the end of the year as all earnings go to the owners because the business can't hold onto those. So if you receive those funds in Dec (assuming Dec is the end of your fiscal year), and you haven't delivered your service it doesn't matter you pay on the pre-payment funds which will really hurt you if you have to spend some of that pre-payment to deliver the service. If you are a C-Corp you can defer those taxes until you deliver the service as you can mark that revenue for the next year and several years as you deliver the service. What matters is how you declare your C-Corp's accounting practices for reporting your revenue to the IRS. What you want to do is be an accrual model. That will let you pay for things like salaries, COGS, etc before you know how much you made, and only pay taxes on the earnings at the tax rate of the corporation. Of course if you do this you would do this only if you want to keep that money in the corp to conduct business. You wouldn't want to pay corporate tax then pay personal income tax if you're the owner. So you'd want to pay out any earnings to yourself as a distribution (ie to all owners) or bonus (to individuals) to avoid the double taxation. Keep in mind I'm not an accountant, tax lawyer, but a guy who has been through exactly what you're asking. Consult professionals as needed because you'll be up your eye balls in contracts to build such a business and you'll need their help anyway.

If your LLC made 300K before paying salaries, and paid 300K total in salaries, that seems quite reasonable. You might have a point if the order of events was: LLC pays 100K in salaries, LLC gets sued for 200K, LLC raises salaries by 200K. Note that the owners have to pay income tax on 300k earnings, plus whatever else employers and employees have to pay. And an LLC doesn't pay salaries to owners, it pays salaries to employees who be sheer coincidence are also owners. It's a different matter if the company pays dividends. A company must keep dividends low enough so that it can run its business, including paying damages for lawsuits that it knows about. So if the company planned all along to pay 300k in dividends, then is sued for 200k, they likely have to reduce the dividends.

I assume you're talking about corporations, not LLCs ("limited liability companies"). LLCs aren't corporations and don't issue shares of stock, and in any event Facebook is a corporation. Information relating to the shares of a corporation is typically outlined in the articles of incorporation, but practices and governing law varies by state and by corporation. Delaware, where most large US corporations are incorporated, requires the certificate of incorporation to list the total number of shares to be issued and the number of shares in each class, as well as information about the "powers, preferences and rights, and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions" of the share classes. See 8 Del. C. § 102(a)(4). Facebook's October 2010 articles of incorporation can be found here, and information about its classes of stock can be found in Article IV.

Can a school punish you for appearing in court? My friend missed an assignment in school because of a mandatory court summons. The teacher gave him a failing grade, and overall his grade dropped 3 letters for something he couldn't control. I'm almost certain that work and school have to give you an excused absence for attending court. If this is illegal could someone give me the law that says so?

The answer is a clear maybe. The school has a set of rules and by not attending you have broken those rules. The rules may (probably do) allow for consideration of extenuating circumstances but, in general, it doesn't have to. There is probably an appeals process, you need to investigate this. That said, if there are no provisions for extenuating circumstances and/or no appeals process then this may make the contract "unconscionable"; in many jurisdictions this makes the contract void. That doesn't mean you get the marks; it means you get your money back. The circumstances of your court appearance matter: the school may grant special consideration if you are called as a juror or witness; they might not if you are a defendant. Ultimately you had a choice, to follow the rules of the court or the school; there are consequences either way.

I found a number of news stories and official documents about public schools with such policies including: "Parents face more fines and rules if their children miss too much school" from Public Opinion; "School Adopts Strict Policy on Parents Picking Up Children Late" from the Los Angeles Times; "If you're late to pick up your kid at school, expect more than embarrassment" from The Oregonian; "Late Again? This School Fines Kids Who Aren't on Time" from Parents; "Late Pick Up Policy" from Hazelwood Elementary; and "School Issues Terrifying Threat to Parents Who Pick Up Kids Late" from Yahoo Parenting The last story is about a school that threatened to call the local child protection authorities to take children into custody if parents were late, even by a short time. This was rescinded and apologized for. None of these stories mentioned any source of authority to impose such fines, nor any parent who had legally contested such fines. Public schools do not generally have authority to fine parents unless a law or ordinance grants such authority. Usually a school would need to file a report with law enforcement, and any fine be imposed by a court. But it may well be that parents are simply paying in such cases, rather than insisting on legal authority. If a student is left unsupervised, a school would pretty clearly have the right, and in some cases the duty, to notify the police or the appropriate child protection agency. Parents might fear that resisting the fines would lead to that far more drastic response, and so not challenge any fine. I did not include any of several news stories about similar practices in the UK, as the legal basis would be different there. But there were several such stories. There were also several stories suggesting that such fines can be counterproductive. It seems that some parents tend to come to regard them as fees, and are perfectly willing to pay, and the fine replaces the feeling of social obligation which might have been stronger. But that is not really a matter of law.

In New Mexico, where Better Call Saul is set, N.M. R. Prof'l. Cond. 16-505 prohibits an attorney from employing a suspended or disbarred attorney as a law clerk or paralegal only if there is an order from the New Mexico Supreme Court or its disciplinary board prohibiting that appointment. I don't believe the show ever indicates there was such an order. Other states have different rules. Some prohibit this type of activity altogether, while others permit an attorney to continue as a paralegal while suspended, but not after being disbarred. I believe some states merely require that the attorney disclose that she is using the services of an attorney who is under discipline.

People make mistakes. My assessments come with information on how to dispute them, and if yours don't you should be able to get that information. File a dispute or whatever it is you do to challenge the assessment. Include the information about you being outside the district and not having he measure on your ballot. If you're just outside the district, you might have been mistakenly included. You'll either get a revised assessment or you'll be told that you have to pay the tax. You don't have a reasonable complaint unless and until your challenge is denied.

Option 1 is that this is a private school. The school can establish whatever rules they want. There might be a cause of action for breach of contract, but more likely there is some clause saying "You have to do what the principal tells you". Private organizations are allowed to completely suppress you freedom of expression. Option 2 is that this is a public school, in which case they are bound by the First Amendment (which is a limit on government action). Such a prohibition is legally untenable, but you may have to go to court to get an official ruling on the matter. If speech is objectively disruptive, it can be limited, but your examples are not objectively offensive or disruptive, they are simply somewhat provocative. Here is a summary from the ACLU of what public schools can't do w.r.t. student appearance.

Judges and justices can file lawsuits like anyone else, but ordinarily the judges who are colleagues of the judge or justice would recuse themselves and it would be assigned to another venue at trial (in the case of a trial court judge), and on appeal would be assigned to judges who don't have a personal relationship with the judge (possibly sitting by assignment from another appellate jurisdiction or by senior judges who weren't on the bench when this judge was on the bench). A U.S. Supreme Court justice's suit would not be considered recusal worth by an unfamiliar lower court judge who is only theoretically in the jurisdiction of the justice and no suit by a U.S. Supreme Court justice has ever been deemed cert worthy. If it did reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Justice would be expected to, but not required in any enforceable way, to recuse from hearing the case.

I'll start with a list of issues presented and also note at the outset that the question correctly notes that both the school district (which is an entity distinct from the county), and the superintendent of schools, are protected from civil liability to a significant extent by the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is outlined here. Two specific provisions bear particular note: an exclusion of liability for someone who has reported a suspected child abuse case, and immunity for a school teacher who acts in good faith with regard to supervision, care and discipline of students. 1. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has no prior history of serious misconduct? Short of malice directed at a victimized student there is no liability under state law. There is also no well established constitutional right violated that could give rise to civil rights liability. Students commit crimes against each other all of the time and school officials are almost never responsible for those crimes. 2. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has a history of prior serious misconduct? The legal standard is the same but the practical analysis might be more fact intensive. Still, outright malice directed towards a victim would pretty much be the applicable legal standard and is unlikely to be present in this case, absent awareness, for example, of conditions of probation or pre-trial release after the first case that weren't enforced. 3. Is a public school in the U.S. permitted or required by law to advise parents of students at the school that student transferring into the new school has a history of violent criminal conduct? Juvenile justice law and educational privacy laws profoundly limit the extent to which a public school, or its officials are allowed to disclose that a student transferring into a school has a history of violent criminal conduct. There is no clear duty of the public school in the U.S. to disclose this fact broadly. 4. Is a statement by a superintendent to parents in a public school district that transgender girl does not pose a threat to cis-gender girls in restrooms an actionable fraud (and does it matter if there is a history of prior misconduct by a particular student in this case of which the superintendent was aware)? The statement is not, in general, false. If it was made after knowledge of this particular student, that might be a different matter, but as noted above, there are severe legal limitations on what the board is allowed to say. It isn't inconceivable that the school board or superintendent could have said more than it did to at least some people. But there isn't a clear legal duty to do so. It also isn't clear what the superintendent actually knew when he made a report to the school board even tough the information should have been shared with him. It is possible that only a lower level official in the school system had actual knowledge at that time. 5. What crime, if any, did the father of the first rape victim commit for trying to warn the parents about someone who attacked his daughter? This is partially speculation, but the father appears to have been arrested for the manner in which he acted disturbing the peace, speaking out of turn, and refusing the leave a meeting when requested, rather than sharing the information per se. 6. Did the school superintendent commit a crime somehow connected to the second rape by concealing the risk posed by the student in question? The school superintendent has a duty to report child abuse to authorities and failure to do so (if it was not done) would be minor crime. My impression of the fact is that the first rape was reported to juvenile justice system officials and resulted in action being taken. So, it does not appear that this duty was breached. According to the article: The boy was arrested and charged for the first assault in July but released from juvenile detention while prosecutors waited for DNA rape kit evidence to come back. Loudoun County Commonwealth's Attorney Buta Biberaj says at the time they had no reason to believe the boy should have stayed in juvenile detention. “If that case had gone forward and we were not able to substantiate beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that were made by the victim, he would've been out anyway,” she said. “The best decision was made with the facts that were known." This does not, however, give him criminal liability for a subsequent rape of one student by another in which he had not involvement sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy to commit sexual assault which was the case here. 7. Does the school board have defamation liability for calling the father of the victim of the first rape a transphobe? No. The school board has sovereign immunity from suits for money damages seeking to establish liability in relation to statements made in their official capacity, apparently in good faith. It also isn't clear that the statements made were actionable in the first place, or that such statements were even made by them. The school board also does not appear to have had actual knowledge of what happened until a decisive school board meeting after the second assault. 8. Does the public have any power to remove an appointed official such as the superintendent in this context? No. The political remedy is to elect a new school board that would select a different superintendent.

You cannot be compelled to sign a form indicating that you agree to something. However, your lack of agreement does not override a policy that they have authority to set. There is a contractual way that this could work out for them, depending on what exactly the document is. To be a contract, the parties must agree to the terms voluntarily, and if you do not agree to the terms, there is no contract. A 10 year old child cannot be bound to a contract, anyhow, so the child's consent is legally irrelevant, though strategically a good idea in the sense of alerting the child to their obligation. To be a contract, both sides must offer something that they are not already obligated to provide. What is the school offering? On the school's side, they might claim "We offer an education", but as a public school, they already have that obligation. Schools have broad authority to impose rules in order to operate, so in lieu of a successful lawsuit that the district overstepped their authority and violated someone's constitutional rights, the school could have a policy prohibiting use of a cell phone in school. Paired with such a policy, they can grant conditional permission, subject to the parent (and symbolically, the child) agreeing to certain terms. Since they are not obligated to allow cell phones at all, they are offering something of value to you, and you have a contract. The cell phone owner could try suing the school for keeping the phone, but the suit would fail because there was a breach of the contract. A strategy probably not worth pursuing is arguing that the confiscation clause is unconscionable (which would void the contract, which entitles the child to have a cell phone at school). Confiscating the phone is not theft, since the intent is not to permanently deprive the owner of their property (just as it is not theft when you have to leave guns or recording devices at the security desk). If a student were to take a forbidden thing without the owner's authorization (such as a gun, or a phone) and it was then confiscated, the rightful owner might be able to sue the school – as long as their hands are clear (if they had no knowledge that the thing was taken and used in an unauthorized manner). In this case, the parent clearly knows and authorizes.

Do UK citizens have a right to legal advice? As a British citizen: If I can't afford to pay a solicitor to get legal advice, am I entitled to free legal advice from the government?

It depends on the circumstances, see here. You’ll usually need to show that: your case is eligible for legal aid the problem is serious you can’t afford to pay for legal costs

In April 2021, the Ministry of Justice released a "Victim's Code". Among other things, it says: You have the Right to be provided with updates on your case and to be told when important decisions are taken. You also have the Right, at certain stages of the justice process, to ask for decisions to be looked at again by the relevant service provider. This is elaborated on, including: If the police decide not to investigate your case, you will be given an explanation of this decision within 5 working days (1 working day under Enhanced Rights). The police will also offer you a referral to a support service. Where the police or the Crown Prosecution Service are considering an out of court disposal you have the Right to be asked for your views and to have these views taken into account when a decision is made. Where this is not possible for practical reasons, the police or the Crown Prosecution Service will tell you why If you are unhappy with a police or a Crown Prosecution Service decision not to prosecute the suspect, you have the Right to ask for a review under the National Police Chiefs’ Council or Crown Prosecution Service Victims’ Right to Review schemes.

england-and-wales Yes it is legal. There is no law prohibiting such behaviour. A restaurant menu invites people to ask for items on the menu. People are free to make other offers too, e.g. "no cheese" or "will you add an egg?" or "will you accept £10 for the burger, it's all I have?" The customer is free to make an offer and the restauranteur is free to accept or refuse the offer. "No I don't want to sell you a burger patty on its own for £3." Unfair contract terms seem irrelevant because there is no contract at the stage when the customer asks the restauranteur for a food item.

Probably not. Overview You haven't specified a jurisdiction. I will talk about Australia because that's what I'm familiar with. In Australia the most relevant area of law would be tort, specifically negligence. The university would be liable to pay damages if a court found that it owed a duty of care to your friend, that it breached that duty, and that your friend suffered injury ('injury' including loss of property as well as mental suffering) as a result of that breach. Also potentially relevant would be contract law, if your friend and the university had entered into some kind of agreement relating to his security, or equity, if the university had somehow acted to lead your friend to rely, to his detriment, on the university protecting him (promissory estoppel: Walton Stores v Maher). However, I think this is unlikely unless, for some reason, the university had put up signs saying 'Please come onto our land and we will be responsible for your security'. Negligence You have stated that 'it is their responsibility to make sure all students are safe on campus.' It is not clear whether you mean to state that as a fact or whether you are suggesting it as a possible hypothetical basis of liability. I am not aware of a case that establishes the proposition that universities do have such a duty. The judgments in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 discuss the liability of the occupier of land (such as the university in your example) for injuries inflicted by criminals upon people present on land (such as your friend in your example). In that case, the defendant ran a shopping centre. The plaintiff worked at a shop in the shopping centre. At the end of the plaintiff's shift at 10.30pm, it was dark outside because the shopping centre switched the lights in the car park off at 10pm. The plaintiff was mugged in the shopping centre car park on his way out to his car. The key question there was whether the defendant shopping centre was under a duty to keep the lights on for workers leaving work (along with the question of how the failure to illuminate the area led to the attack i.e. whether the plaintiff still have been mugged if the lights were on). Therefore the question that we are presently interested in, about an occupier's responsibility to protect visitors, is only dealt with as a side issue in that case. But the principle is pretty well-established that, generally, you are not responsible to protect another person from the criminal acts of a third person. The common law has a strong presumption against imposing liability for 'omissions' as distinct from acts, which is another way of saying that the courts don't want people being liable to run out into the street and help people. See paragraphs 27 and 28 and thereabouts in Modbury Triangle. Particular relationships may exist which create such a duty. One is in relation to school children; the school is responsible for taking such care of the child as a parent would. The relevant features of this the school-child relationship include the child's vulnerability as a child and the way the school controls their movements and enviroment during the school day. I presume that your friend is not a child and the university does not control his or her movements. Therefore a court is likely to be looking at the general principle that the university is not responsible for protecting people from the criminal acts of strangers, and then looking (and probably not finding) any special feature of the relationship between your friend and the university that creates an aspect of vulnerability, reliance or control that makes it reasonable to impose a duty of care. Some people think that there is a general principle that if something bad happens to them, some identifiable person with cash must be responsible for paying compensation, whether that is an insurer, the government or a nearby corporation. The common law has not picked up that principle. The common law would slate the responsibility home primarily to the mugger. Sue them. What does the university have to do with it? Conceivably the university might also be liable along with the mugger, but the fact that an injury occurred and nobody else can in practice be held responsible does not in itself make the university liable. As mentioned by Pat W., there may be some other feature that creates a duty, such as if the university had made some change to the environment that allowed made the attack to occur when it wouldn't otherwise have e.g. moving your friend's dormitory so that the only entrance was through a dark alley, or if the attack occurred inside a university building where the university controlled entry (even then not sure that would get your friend over the line).

Now I'm having another conversation with a lawyer and I'm not particularly happy (not to say outraged) that to answer a simple question they require £95 + VAT for 30 minutes Skype session. Maybe it is a common practice in law industry - in my industry (web development) we share our knowledge in an open-source manner. The rate you were charged is actually reasonable for such a limited engagement. Few lawyers are willing to even consider providing any advice on such a limited basis. Most would try to limit their clients to cases generating thousands of pounds in an in person visit. Lawyers are in the business of selling knowledge and time, not documents and results. An open-source approach would undermine their business model just as much as it would for the movie industry or the recording industry. While I appreciate professional legal advice (I know it is required) I have a belief that by obtaining some knowledge first I'll be in a position to ask better questions. This belief is not necessarily very well founded in this context. The reality of information about the law is that the raw data has limited usefulness. One of the main things that a legal education provides is an ability to "issue spot" so that you know what points need to be researched and where to look for them. Without the overall context that a legal education provides, knowing what issues you should be looking for is difficult or impossible, and this is particular true in Anglo-American common law systems, where the law is embedded in an opaque network of appellate cases rather than laid out more or less completely in a carefully organized statute. Also, you are almost completely unqualified to distinguish between a simple question and a hard one. Just as it is difficult for a non-expert to know what is difficult or impossible for a computer to do (e.g. turning raw image input in the models of reality is very hard for computers but easy for people, while intense calculations are simple for computers but hard for people), it is often very difficult for a non-lawyer to know what is an easy or hard legal question. For example, the rights of neighboring home owners when trees start to grow across property lines seem like simple questions but are actually extremely complex legally, as is another simple question such as explaining what a book means in IP terms as a book migrates to a new platform. But, some seemingly complex points (e.g. detailed questions of tax law or civil procedure) can have very simple and clear answers. Finally, keep in mind that in a situation like spousal alimony, if you've done as much research as you state, it is very likely that a definitive answer that you are looking for simply does not exist. There a lots of legal questions that do not have clear objective answers. This is because trial judges in family law matters have wide discretion in a lot of the fine points of alimony decisions, much of it exercised at the trial court level that does not generate binding legal precedents and is not widely available to researchers. Therefore, there is really no substitute in evaluating how judges will exercise that discretion for the collective experience of an attorney who has been through the process many, many times before the particular group of judges who are likely to handle your individual case. In sum, while I understand your frustration, a lot of it is rooted in common, but inaccurate assumptions about how the legal system works.

No landlord-tenant laws that I have ever seen impose an obligation on a landlord to give a point by point response to everything in an email from a tenant. However, a tenant probably has the right or obligation to provide a landlord with written notification of a problem requiring remedy. You might then be required by law to provide a specific reply within some time frame, for example "We will fix that tomorrow afternoon", or "We are not required to fix that": it would depend on the jurisdiction and the accusation. Some caution in how you respond is warranted, because your answers can be used against you in a court of law, thus you want to be sure that your response is not misleading, and that you don't accidentally promise to do something that you won't actually do. There is a concept of "adoptive admission", where silence can be used against you. A typical case is if Smith says to Jones "That was really cold-blooded, the way you murdered Thompson", and Jones does not respond to the accusation – that fact can be introduced as evidence, because there is an assumption that if Jones were really innocent, they would protest the accusation. I don't see any way for "failure to respond to everything" in this manner could constitute an adoptive admission – an "admission" means that you directly or indirectly indicate that you did a thing, which is not the same as ipso facto agreeing to something (for example, not replying to a statement "I'd like my rent reduced by $100 per month" is not an "adoptive agreement").

What's the legality of this situation? It's unlawful and you should seek support for it. That document you linked to appears to have resources that could help you, such as support lines and counselling centres, etc. Am I being discriminated against by these landlords(companies)? I would say so. It sounds like you're being discriminated against on grounds of race and ethnic origin. It appears to violate the General Equal Treatment Act. However, I do want to stress that there may be completely reasonable factors as to why landlords are rejecting your appointment requests. For example, it would not be discriminatory to refuse housing on the basis that you don't have the appropriate income, or you have a poor credit rating, or you don't have any previous rental references. It can be very difficult to prove discrimination if any of the above factors apply, since the landlord could simply cite one of those reasons instead.

The important question is: was the £200 a fine (which is paid to the state) or compensation (which is paid to you)? Assuming it was a fine He doesn't (at the moment) owe you anything. However you can sue him for damages. Usually a claim for damages is time-barred after six years (and it is now seven years). However you weren't able to sue him yourself until you were 18, so you may have a couple of years left. However the clock may have started ticking immediately after the attack, on the grounds your parents or guardians could have sued. Talk to a solictor about this possibility; they should give you a free 30 minute consultation, and would probably take a case on a contigency fee (no-win no-fee) basis if it has any chance. In principle, you could have applied to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for compensation - but you are too late for that; you have to apply within two years (there are some exceptions, but none seem to apply to you). Assuming it was compensation He owes you £200. Now you need to enforce that payment - and again, the problem may be the six year clock. You will definitely need to talk to a lawyer about that. My gut feeling is that the £200 was probably a fine rather than compensation.

How can a municipality discourage and control destructive behavior? I live in a town of about 20,000 people, plus a large college student influx in late August, in the state of New York. Not far from my house there is a dam in a creek. Just above the dam, there are bluffs on either side where people like to jump off from very high up into the water. Then they swim over to the bank and clamber up the (eroded) slope to do it again. News about the thrill of jumping at this spot has been spreading throughout the region, and the spot is now attracting 300 people per day in good weather. There are a number of problems with this: - Alcohol and serious drug use is increasing among the visitors (e.g. Ecstasy). - We're starting to see all-night parties occurring there. - The visitors leave their cars on nearby residential streets and cause a public nuisance -- littering, blocking residents' access to their driveways, peeing on people's lawns, changing clothes in public, being rude to residents. - There are occasional injuries at the location and every few years someone drowns there. Swimming, jumping, drinking, littering and staying past dark are all illegal there, but these activities are only a violation. Penalties are listed as "a fine of not more than $250 or imprisonment for a term of not more than 15 days, and not less than $100 or 25 hours of community service." Our local law enforcement doesn't have enough staffing to go there every day to patrol the area, and when they do go, they feel so outnumbered that they don't feel that it's safe to issue citations -- they are concerned there might be a violent backlash from the crowd. Question 1: Would it be stronger deterrent to make swimming and jumping a criminal offense, with stronger penalties? Question 2: How would concerned citizens draft a law to make swimming and jumping a criminal offense? Question 3: The creek is owned by the City (the smallest entity geographically); the area around the dam is under Town jurisdiction; the policing around the dam is provided by the County sheriff's department, because the Town does not have its own police force. My question is, at which level should we propose a stronger law? Question 4: Anything else to suggest? Barbed wire? near water's edge, tangled in with the underbrush?

I'll preface this by saying I live in Australia where the lowest jurisdiction that can make an act a criminal offence is the state; local governments simply do not have that power here, Question 1: If I understand this right you have a law that you do not enforce that carries moderate sanctions and you are asking that a law that you do not enforce with greater sanctions will be a greater deterrent? Well ... no (see here). If you want to stop the behavior you have to enforce the sanctions that you have in a fair and impartial way. I would suggest that you make it very clear that starting in early September the laws will be enforced - that gives people fair warning. Then, each weekend in September you bring in enough police (State Troopers?) to enforce the law. Its not going to take many $250 fines to make people stop. Question 2: No comment. Question 3: No comment. Question 4: Sounds like a good way of getting the city sued for negligence; just because people are breaking the law does not make it legal to hurt them. If you are serious then fencing the entire area may be worthwhile but the area would still need to be policed.

TL;DR No Context Let's look at what the Act actually says: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. ... (4)A’s behaviour has a “serious effect” on B if— (a)it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence will be used against B, or (b)it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities. ... And let's look at what the Cheshire Police actually say: You/they may be in an emotionally abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Punishes you by withholding affection ... You/they may be in a sexually abusive relationship if your/their partner: ... Has ever forced or manipulated you into to having sex or performing sexual acts ... Demands sex when you're sick, tired or after beating you ... Ignores your feelings regarding sex. Discussion The Act requires the behavior to be engaged in "repeatedly or continuously" and it must have "a serious effect", meaning it must cause "serious alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities". The withholding of sex of itself does not have "a serious effect" as defined. As part of a broader pattern of emotional "controlling or coercive behaviour" within the broad context of "withholding affection" it could be a factor in evidence but the law recognizes an absolute right for anyone at any time to refuse sex (Sexual Offences Act 2003 s4). The latter part of the Cheshire Police's advice draws from this.

There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.

A follow-up story appears on the local ABC television station, indicating that the security guard pleaded no contest to simple assault. The fact that the security guard was convicted of a misdemeanor does not necessarily indicate that the deputy was allowed to have the gun in the IRS office, only that the security guard's response to the situation was not acceptable. I am not able to locate any firearm policy for the Lucas County, Ohio' sheriff's office. Many US law enforcement agencies have a policy that their officers carry their firearms essentially at all times, so that they can respond to unexpected incidents even when they are off duty. At the same time, owners of private property ordinarily can admit people, or not, for any reason at all. Unless the officer has an official reason for entering a property when the owner doesn't want the officer there, the officer isn't allowed to enter. It appears that in this case the officer had no official law-enforcement reason to enter. But this case doesn't involve private property, it involves federal property. A digest from the FBI states "Federal laws or regulations are not superseded by LEOSA. Qualified officers may not carry concealed weapons onto aircraft under the act. They also cannot carry firearms into federal buildings or onto federal property."

The area is "closed" (not open), or "restricted" to alcohol consumption. Here is a memo reminding of alcohol restrictions, noting 36 CFR 2.35 which states that The superintendent may close all or a portion of a public use area or public facility within a park area to the consumption of alcoholic beverages and/or to the possession of a bottle, can or other receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage that is open, or that has been opened, or whose seal is broken or the contents of which have been partially removed. This was done in the case of the area, apparently a few years earlier (i,e, it used to be allowed and there was a policy change). The Gateway Nt'l Park website states that "Alcoholic beverages at Sandy Hook are prohibited", as are a bunch of other things. The motivation is part of the regulation, that the superintendent determined that (A) The consumption of an alcoholic beverage or the possession of an open container of an alcoholic beverage would be inappropriate considering other uses of the location and the purpose for which it is maintained or established; or (B) Incidents of aberrant behavior related to the consumption of alcoholic beverages are of such magnitude that the diligent application of the authorities in this section and §§ 1.5 and 2.34 of this chapter, over a reasonable time period, does not alleviate the problem.

RCW 46.61.419 gives government police the right to enforce speeding violations as defined in RCW 46.61.400 in certain communities (condominiums and gated communities), per RCM 64.34, 64.32, or 64.38, if: (1) A majority of the homeowner's association's, association of apartment owners', or condominium association's board of directors votes to authorize the issuance of speeding infractions on its private roads, and declares a speed limit not lower than twenty miles per hour; (2) A written agreement regarding the speeding enforcement is signed by the homeowner's association, association of apartment owners, or condominium association president and the chief law enforcement official of the city or county within whose jurisdiction the private road is located; (3) The homeowner's association, association of apartment owners, or condominium association has provided written notice to all of the homeowners, apartment owners, or unit owners describing the new authority to issue speeding infractions; and (4) Signs have been posted declaring the speed limit at all vehicle entrances to the community. Thus there can be a speeding ticket. However, if you speed on my uncle's farm, that's just trespassing because that isn't one of the specified community types. The law only allows speeding enforcement by government law enforcement officers (not private security), and limits how low the maximum speed can be set. This raises an interesting question regarding speed enforcement on the Boeing bridge off S 104th in Seattle, which is private property and not part of a "community", yet quite urban and frequently used.

No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.

No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.

How can casinos take "extrajudicial" measures against card counters? "Cardcounting" is technically legal, but frowned upon by casinos, because it violates the "unwritten law" that casinos are supposed to come out ahead. When card counters are caught, casinos can expel them under threat of being charged with trespassing. But apparently casinos sometimes do more than that, like refusing to cash out their chips, or taking card counters to back rooms for questioning. (Detention and questioning are powers supposedly reserved for law enforcement. The casinos are only supposed to detain people until the police arrive.) How do casinos manage to conduct such "extrajudicial" proceedings? Do the police and courts turn a blind eye to them because the casinos are important to the local economy?

Extrajudicial implies there is some weight of law behind the casino behaviors you describe. I don't think there is. For example, refusing to cash out chips could just be a management intimidation tactic to try to coerce the customer into agreeing to be "questioned." Which the customer would be under no legal obligation to do. Card counting can't be proven if the counter is not using a device of any kind. The casino can refuse to serve the customer and expel the customer but they can't unilaterally keep the customer's money by not cashing the customer's chips without a judgment. I am not an attorney. This answer is not legal advice.

There are many different kinds of laws, and many different ways of violating them. The main two are (1) criminal law, which generally addresses violations that injure the government's interests; and (2) civil law, which largely addresses violations that injure private parties' interests. Some conduct can violate both sets of laws: If you steal something from a store, the government can put you in jail for theft, and the store can sue you for the value of the item you stole. If you punch someone in the face, the government can can put you in jail for assault, and the person you punched can sue you to pay for their hospital bills. If you grope a woman in a dressing room, the government can put you in jail for sexual assault, and the woman can sue you for battery. Donald Trump falls into that last category. Jean Carroll has sued him for battery, but the government cannot prosecute Trump for the crime because enough time has passed that the criminal statute of limitations has expired. Moreover, a civil trial cannot subject someone to jail time because such a deprivation of liberty requires greater procedural safeguards -- jury unanimity, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc. -- that do not always apply to civil trials like this. Trump's status as ex-president has no bearing on the penalties the court may legally impose on him.

united-states It is not required for a person to formally assert a fifth- or a first-amendment right when questioned by the police. One can simply be silent, refuse to answer any questions, without giving any reasons. But probably more effective and just as legal is to say "I won't answer any questions until I have talked with a lawyer. I want a lawyer, now." That is perhaps less likely than using the words "plead the fifth" to be assumed to be a confession of guilt, although some people and some police may take almost anything as a confession of guilt. By the way some of the points you distilled from the video (which I have not watched yet) are correct, some are half-truths, and some are quite incorrect. For example: The 5th amendment was not designed as a shelter for the guilty (despite it often being used as such). It was designed to help prevent you from unknowingly incriminating yourself. As a matter of history, this is quite incorrect. It arose historically out of a reaction to government procedures deemed oppressive. See https://law.stackexchange.com/a/63690/17500 for more detail. But helping people avoid unintentionally incriminating themselves is one of its major current functions. You can't talk your way out of getting arrested. Sometimes you can, but it is never safe to count on it. You can't know in advance if it will work, and more often than not it doesn't. Everything you tell the police can be used against you but not to help you. Not quite. If your statement is recorded, as is likely nowadays, the whole statement must be given to your lawyer and entered into evidence if you are eventually charged. (See Brady vs Maryland) Things said in your own favor may be discounted as self-serving, but the judge and jury will still hear them. But they can be very risky.

Any country is free to decide what actions are considered to be crimes, and what crimes are prosecuted depending on whether you perform the action in the country, outside the country, and depending on whether you are a citizen, a resident, both, or neither. They can also decide what are accepted defences in court and which are not. Any other country is free to decide under which circumstances they will ever extradite someone to that first country. Now you have to check the laws of the individual countries.

Utah has a lot of public parks, so to point in the right direction, I will assume that this is a public park in Salt Lake City, it's just a plain old grassy field, and it's not during a special event. A person is suspected of some crime like selling drugs, not arrested, but told by a police officer to go away and never come back. This is way beyond the power of the police. After due legal process, a proven (not just suspected) public menace could be ordered by the court to stay away from the park. A police officer can, of course, order a person to leave a park when they violate a park rule, in fact rule number 1 is "It is unlawful for any person to do or to allow or permit any of the acts prohibited by this chapter in any park in Salt Lake City", so the police cannot legally turn a blind eye to rule violations. Violation of park rules is an infraction which can earn you a ticket of up to $299. However, the officer can tell you to go away, rather than giving you a ticket or arresting you. But an police order cannot issue a unilateral restraining order. Apart from city laws, there are general state laws regarding trespass and destruction of property. The state criminal trespass law says that A person is guilty of criminal trespass if...knowing the person's... entry or presence is unlawful, the person enters or remains on to which notice against entering is given by...personal communication to the person by the owner or someone with apparent authority to act for the owner In this case, the owner is the city, and the officer has apparent authority to act for that owner. In the case of private property, the owner or his agent has very broad authority to give notice requiring you to leave (e.g. if you don't like their politics or their shirt); but in the case of public property, the government has more narrowly circumscribed authority to kick you out.

All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.

If the police order you to sit in an interrogation room and you are not permitted to leave, by definition, you have been arrested. Detaining someone against their will for longer than necessary to answer a few questions on the spot (which is a lesser imposition on your freedom called a "Terry stop") is what it means to be arrested. Legally, the police are only allowed to arrest you if they have probable cause to believe that you have committed a crime. I believe that you are confusing arrested (being detained by law enforcement against your will for more than a Terry stop), with being booked, or being charged with a crime. Generally speaking people are arrested first, and then booked next, and then charged with a crime after that, although this isn't always the order in which this happens. In much the same way, if the police observe someone committing a crime, they will first handcuff them which places them under arrest, and then book them sometime not too long later when they arrive at the police station, and then formally charge them sometime after that after a conversation with the prosecuting attorney to see if the prosecuting attorney is willing to pursue the case. Booking generally involves bringing someone to a police station, getting identifying information, taking a mug shot, taking finger prints, and depending upon what the police want to do, searching your person and inventorying your possessions prior to putting you in a jail cell in jail garb. Usually, however, the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney (it varies by jurisdiction) does have subpoena power to compel you to provide information under oath prior to trial as a witness, following the service of a subpoena upon you a reasonable time in advance as set forth in the relevant court rules, unless you invoke your 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination and are not granted immunity from prosecution based upon your testimony in exchange, or you invoke some other legal privilege against having to testify. They can, of course, simply ask you to come to an interrogation room and answer questions, and merely imply that it is mandatory without actually saying that you must and without clarifying the situation. In that case, which is extremely common, their legal right to interrogate you flows from your own consent. If you answer their questions, your answers could provide the police with probable cause to arrest you that they didn't have when they started asking questions. Indeed, often, when police interrogate you before booking you, they are doing so because they need your statements to establish the probable cause needed to legally arrest you. This is why criminal defense attorneys counsel people to immediate ask for a lawyer and refuse to answer any questions other than those needed to establish your identity. You can also ask if you are under arrest and if you are free to leave (which are mutually exclusive). If they say you are not under arrest, you are free to leave, unless you are appearing pursuant to a subpoena.

The clause you highlighted has an "or" in front of it: "..., or in such pretended character...". It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely "acts as such", which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a "thing of value" is moot. As to the "nonexistent agency" issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as "archived", but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the "acts as such" element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had "no merit" and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was "immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed". I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.

Do warranty disclaimers in software licenses carry any legal weight? Most open source software licenses contain, in capital letters, the following disclaimer: THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS OR ANYONE DISTRIBUTING THE SOFTWARE BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. Does such a disclaimer carry any legal weight? That is, if my license doesn't contain such a clause, can I as a distributor of the software be held liable for damages, and if it does contain such a clause, does it effectively prevent me for being held liable?

Some jurisdictions provide for statutory warranties on fitness and merchantability of goods. The effect of these exclusion clauses will vary between jurisdictions, so I will briefly examine two different effects of law with respect to supply of goods. For the United States, certain warranties are implied in the sale of a product, provided for in the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314, (1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchantwith respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. (2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as (a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and (b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if any. (3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. The Uniform Commercial Code § 2-315 states that: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. This means that the warranties in § 2-314 will generally apply to products that are sold, unless excluded as per § 2-316 UCC § 2-316 (2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Licenses that specifically exclude implied warranty are sanctioned by the UCC, and therefore would be considered in the United States. UCC §2-106 defines a sale as passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price. States may have additional laws that may affect the interpretation of the UCC. For example, Ark.Code Ann. § 4–1–201(32): (29) "Purchase" means taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. However, Neuhoff v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., 370 F.3d 197 (1st Cir.2004) held that windows provided free of charge to replace defective windows did not come with implied warranty. However, not all jurisdictions allow the exclusion of implied warranty. For instance, consider Australian Consumer Law. (Part 3-2, Division 1): 54 Guarantee as to acceptable quality (1) If: (a) a person supplies, in trade or commerce, goods to a consumer; and (b) the supply does not occur by way of sale by auction; there is a guarantee that the goods are of acceptable quality. (2) Goods are of acceptable quality if they are as: (a) fit for all the purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied; and (b) acceptable in appearance and finish; and (c) free from defects; and (d) safe; and (e) durable; as a reasonable consumer fully acquainted with the state and condition of the goods (including any hidden defects of the goods), would regard as acceptable having regard to the matters in subsection (3). 64 Guarantees not to be excluded etc. by contract (1) A term of a contract (including a term that is not set out in the contract but is incorporated in the contract by another term of the contract) is void to the extent that the term purports to exclude, restrict or modify, or has the effect of excluding, restricting or modifying: (a) the application of all or any of the provisions of this Division; or (b) the exercise of a right conferred by such a provision; or (c) any liability of a person for a failure to comply with a guarantee that applies under this Division to a supply of goods or services. (2) A term of a contract is not taken, for the purposes of this section, to exclude, restrict or modify the application of a provision of this Division unless the term does so expressly or is inconsistent with the provision. 67 Conflict of laws If: (a) the proper law of a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer would be the law of any part of Australia but for a term of the contract that provides otherwise; or (b) a contract for the supply of goods or services to a consumer contains a term that purports to substitute, or has the effect of substituting, the following provisions for all or any of the provisions of this Division: (i) the provisions of the law of a country other than Australia; (ii) the provisions of the law of a State or a Territory; the provisions of this Division apply in relation to the supply under the contract despite that term. What the above sections mean : (54) there are implied statutory warranties (64) that cannot be excluded by contract, (67) and applies even if the proper law of a contract is not Australia. It is important to note that these do not depend on the existence of a contract (see 54(1)); gifts are covered, though I am unaware of any case law on this. In addition, title (s51) and non-infringement ("undisturbed possession") (s52) must be guaranteed by the supplier and cannot be excluded. In addition, the mere existence of this statement, purporting to limit or remove guarantees that cannot be limited or excluded, puts the supplier in breach of s29 as they are making a "false or misleading statement in connection with the supply, possible supply or promotion of goods or services". This is a criminal or civil offence and can be punished by fines of up to $1.1 million for a body corporate and $220,000 for a person other than a body corporate plus injunctions, damages, compensatory orders and other remedies. However, a simple "To the extent permitted by law ..." at the start would make this legal. So, does it have an effect? Sometimes. But not always. And at least in the United States, there are specific requirements if you want to exclude implied/statutory warranty.

The exact laws will vary by region and country, but the laws will range anywhere between illegal and almost illegal. If you want to operate as legal as possible then you will have to disclose to the buyer that the software is malware or a crypter and you should require for the buyer to sign an agreement to only use the software for legal and educational purposes. Hiding the disclosure in a long Terms of Service agreement will likely not be sufficient. You will have to explicitly advertise that the software is malware and a crypter and that you are looking for reputable tech firms to buy your software in order to improve their software. If you sell software without disclosing to the customer that the software contains malware or a crypter then you are exposing yourself to a lawsuit for products liability, invasion of privacy, fraud and misrepresentation, the cost of damages, and possibly criminal liability.

Can the name of my LLC include the phrases "Software Engineer", "Software Engineering", or similar derivations thereof? No. Not based on what you've posted. Go to the definitions to see how engineer is defined. It may be they are talking about actual structural engineers or environmental engineers, where if you're wrong people die. But based on above, you can't use the word engineer unless you're licensed as such. Is there even a license for computer engineer? This seems more like it could be a term of use but not actually descriptive of what you're doing. IDK. You'd have to see the definitions and exceptions. Can my resume, curriculum vitae, or my advertising or promotional materials accurately report the subjects I studied in college as the subject matter of "Software Engineering", to the extent that this information is true and accurate? Yes, your CV is supposed to say what you have done, and learned and especially published (lest it's just a resume), but the answer as far as promotional materials, is NO. This, because you don't post your cv on your ad's and if you put that, you will likely be found to be trying to pose as a licensed professional based on a technicality. If that happens the licensing authority will probably censure you by disallowing a license when your qualify. If asked directly by a client, am I even allowed to divulge my area of study accurately,(of course, but you'd also have to divulge the fact that you are not licensed and cannot act in that capacity) Would it be a violation of the law to claim I had engineering knowledge since I have studied (and practiced) software engineering in the past (for instance, at previous places of work in states which did not have these kinds of limitations, or for corporations which did not offer my services to the general public)? It could be if the person reports that you are soliciting work as an engineer w/out a license. It's like a person who went to law school, passed the bar, but never got sworn in. They cannot solicit business as a lawyer. Unless there is a license for being a computer programer, there is nothing barring you from using that terminology. You could be, that if you look up the definition prior to the statue, that it says something like "for the purposes of this section the term engineer means…", In which case it doesn't even apply to you.

Gather evidence that the software you are requesting the source code of really is based on, in whole or part, an existing open source project that has a license which requires source code to be made available, and then contact that projects copyright holders. Only they have standing to sue.

Can you locate your license (generally not a trivial task)? It may appear under Help-About and a click to view EULA. The EULA specifically addresses redistribution of parts of the software and number of installations you can make with a single license. They do not say what uses you make make of the software, except that "You may not rent, lease, lend or provide commercial hosting services with the Software". There is no express prohibition against commercial or non-commercial political use of the product: anything not prohibited is allowed. The fact that they say nothing about the content that you create with Word means, they have declined to have a say in the matter. (I am not sure about the wording of the "Educational" versions of Office: those are somewhat negotiated between the institution and MS).

Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.

Can anybody create their own license? That is to say, can I for example create my own license under which I can license software? Yep. It's just a contract granting rights to use a copyrighted work. You can write your own contracts, so you can write your own software license. It's just often recommended that you don't, because common licenses are more well-understood, and inexperienced drafters may make errors that could result in problems, such as unintended restrictions, failing to restrict things that were intended to be restricted, or creating provisions that aren't enforceable in some/all jurisdictions. Can you mandate how a software will be released? Yes. Many software licenses, including GPL, do. The restrictions you describe in your example sound similar to CC BY-NC-SA. Also, would the following clause even be legal? Using this software you agree that any work and intellectual property based on or created with this software will be under the [INSERT_NAME_LICENSE] license, even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up I'm not entirely certain, but "even after any and all code from this software is removed in a future update, or even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up" seems, in my opinion, unlikely to be enforceable—especially "even if the work is rebuilt from the ground up." How would you differentiate a complete rebuild from a totally new piece of software? More broadly, once your copyrighted code is no longer in the product, there's nothing for them to license from you. It's hard to imagine how you'd be able to claim that you're harmed by someone releasing a new version of a product that used to contain your code under a different license. Without harm to you, there's nothing for a court to redress.

it would violate law? It would be very dependent of what your jurisdiction is and what the software does. I would expect most software that would be lawful to install at your home would be lawful to install at your company, but there may be exceptions. To put an hyperbolic example, if you work at the CIA and you install some remote access software that allows you to access your workstation from a non-secure PC through non-secure methods, I am pretty sure that would be illegal, even if you had the best of intentions. A recent scenario taken from real life involves some members an organization who are required to use official e-mail servers for FOIA purposes setting up their own private mail servers. Of course, YMMV. can I purchase it for myself, and then use at workplace Even if the software is legal it does not mean that it is ok to use it at the workplace. Most business have rules about what software may be installed in the PCs, who may install it and how to manage it. Your software could introduce security vulnerabilities that your IT team may need to be aware of, or incompatibilities with other software. It may introduce legal liabilities (you install a "home edition" licence in a corporate environment where that licence is invalid). Your company may discipline you if you breaking those guidelines and install software without authorization, even if there is no harm for them for this action. On top of that, if your actions cause some damage to the company, it can sue you to get you to pay for those damages. Before taking any action you should inquiry about your company's IT policy and, if your company does not have one or if the policy is not clear about allowing you to install the software, ask the people in charge (preferably in writting).

Precedent of doctor being sued after giving his private phone number I'm looking for a precedent of a doctor getting sued after giving his private phone number for a patient to consult, yet not being available at a moment of emergency.

You don't specify what country's law you're interested in, but as you mention precedent, I'll assume you're interested in common-law jurisdictions such as the United States. The short answer is: you won't find any successful lawsuits such as you describe, at least not without some significant additional facts. In order to be subject to liability, a person needs to commit a breach of some duty. In a civil suit, this needs to be a duty to the plaintiff. In order for it to be actionable for the doctor to not answer the phone, the doctor would have to have somehow assumed a duty to answer the phone at that particular time. Giving someone your phone number is not, in and of itself, a promise that you will never take a shower, or go to a movie, or let your battery run down, or for any other reason be unwilling or unable to answer your phone at a moment's notice. In addition, the patient would have to demonstrate that the doctor, by failing to answer the phone, caused some sort of harm. If the patient is having a medical emergency of some sort, the doctor's advice will almost certainly be: "Hang up and dial 911." This is something the patient can do without the doctor's help. Without some more significant and compelling facts, no court is going to impose a duty on a doctor to sit by the phone waiting for a patient's call.

Nothing in the description strikes me as illegal or unlawful, so I am unsure of the grounds your friend would have for legal action. The questions a lawyer would ask (in addition to that) would be likely to include : How does your friend quantify the damage? The law is great for pursuing financial compensation, but does not handle abstract concepts. Has your friend used psychological counselling services, and what was the cost? What additional financial costs has your friend borne? If your friend has written to the University and has expected a response, what is the evidence of diminished trust? (The letter suggests otherwise.) Would a reasonable person (the proverbial "man in the street") be psychologically damaged by the events experienced by your friend? Is there evidence of a pre-existing condition? You've also mentioned yourself as a witness. Did you witness the eviction, or would you be attesting to your friend's state of mind? If the latter, what are your psychological qualifications? In the main Western jurisdictions, the answer to the question "can my friend sue?" is usually "yes", but whether they stood a chance of winning the suit would probably be a better question to ask. Your friend would only be likely to win a case against the University or the Security company if they could demonstrate unlawful or counter-contractual activity by staff, and were able to demonstrate financial damages that had been caused by that activity.

I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.

Summary: More information needed, but I have listed out some legal claims available to homeowners when they have similar concerns. There are several issues here which need elaboration before deciding if you can take legal action. The first is: "the destroyed some vegetation on my street." If the by "my street" you mean that the street is part of your property, you may sue the builders for trespass and/or damage to property. If the street isn't your property, but the vegetation is your property, you may sue them for destruction of your property. What you are probably looking for, however, is a prohibitive injunction. This is a court order forcing the builders to avoid doing something, e.g. An order forcing them to avoid using roads adjacent to your property. To obtain such an injunction you will have to prove that what they are doing is violating your rights, is somehow harmful to you or your property, or inevitably will do either of those things. One way to demonstrate this is if you can show that you have a claim under nuisance, or damage to property, or trespass. On the description you have given us, there isn't enough to say your rights are being violated, or that your property has come to harm or will come to harm because of their actions. You should also be aware of claims under nuisance. Nuisance is when someone is doing something that prevents you from "peaceful enjoyment of your land". It appears from your question that the actions of these builders have, in your mind, done this. However there are several aspects that have to be satisfied for this to amount to private nuisance: What the builder are doing must be a "continuing state of affairs." They may have annoyed you by trampling over vegetation, but if this is a "one-off" event, it is unlikely to amount to nuisance. A reasonable person must find the conduct to interfere with the enjoyment of their land. That is to say: it isn't enough that their conduct is making you unable to enjoy your land peacefully, you have to show that any reasonable person in the same situation would find this conduct unacceptable. Finally, the context of your neighbourhood matters: if the behaviour is something expected in a residential area, then it will not amount to a nuisance. For example, heavy drilling in an industrial location will not amount to a nuisance, while the same may do so in a normally quiet neighbourhood.

47 USC 227 forbids anyone to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call, unless such call is made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States where an automatic dialing system is equipment which has the capacity— (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers. This prohibition covers voice calls, SMS and MMS, see Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness and Facebook v. Duguid. I assume that the messages are send automatically, not by hiring hundreds of people to enter numbers and send individual texts. Since businesses have been sued for doing this, a lawsuit is one of the consequences.

This is a perfectly common question. "What is your full name?" "Do you have any aliases?" "What other names do you go by?" Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.

In the absence of a contractual agreement saying otherwise, the lawsuit would probably just be subject to normal rules of tort liability. In that case, the contractor would probably lose his case unless he could prove that the one worker infected another through an act of negligence or could otherwise prove that the infected worker knew he was infected and posed a risk to others. In the basic negligence situation, the contractor would likely rely on the general duty we all have to avoid creating unreasonable risks of injury to third parties, and he would need to argue that Worker A somehow breached that duty. Coming to work knowing you're infected would almost certainly satisfy that standard, but it might be enough to simply show that Worker A was at a large gathering of unmasked people whose vaccination status was unknown. From there, he would also need to prove that breaching that duty caused him some injury, presumably by infecting Workers B through M, causing a work slowdown, causing missed deadlines, causing late fees, etc. The contractor might also pursue a claim for reckless, rather than negligent, conduct, if Worker A knew he was infected and came to work just the same. Or he might pursue an intentional tort claim if there was some reason to believe that Worker A was actually trying to get other people sick, as opposed to just ignoring the fact that such a risk existed. As I understand it, several states have also passed laws limiting liability for exposure to COVID in the workplace, so it's possible that none of these claims would be viable, no matter how strong the evidence.

This is related to Can a store sell merchandise I've left in the store? The phone in question has been mislaid and anyone who finds it has a duty to deliver it to the owner of the bench for safekeeping pending the true owner's return: if the owner does not return within a reasonable time the phone becomes the property of the bench owner (e.g. the city that owns the park). However, the specific question here is: Where the owner has returned within a reasonable time but the possessor of the phone is now clearly attempting to steal it. Most jurisdictions recognise that a person is entitled to use reasonable force to defend their life or property. For example, the law in Australia1, is generally case law for which the authority is the High Court's decision in Zecevic v DPP (1987) 162 CLR 645: The question to be asked in the end is quite simple. It is whether the accused believed upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-defence to do what he did. If he had that belief and there were reasonable grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he is entitled to an acquittal. Stated in this form, the question is one of general application and is not limited to cases of homicide. So, you are entitled to do "what you believe upon reasonable grounds that it was necessary to do" to defend your property. This would include using physical force to stop their flight and return your property to your possession: it would not include force that posed real and foreseeable risk of inflicting death or grievous bodily harm upon them. In addition, because you have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime, you are allowed to arrest them and deliver them to lawful custody (i.e. a police officer). Naturally, if you do not have reasonable grounds them you have just kidnapped them. The consequences if you do injure them is that you can be charged with a crime (battery, grievous bodily harm, manslaughter, murder etc.) and/or be sued for damages (medical bills, lost wages etc.) in both cases you could use self-defence as a defence. The difference between self-defence and vigilante justice is one is legal and the other isn't

Demanding lawyer fee discount after weak representation Is there a practice or custom of demanding reduced legal fees for poor performance? Background example: Our company was sued for alleged patent infringement. We provided a detailed explanation to our lawyers and plaintiff for why the patent in question was extremely narrow and the infringement allegations were baseless. The plaintiff persisted, and our lawyers constantly tried to persuade us to settle with the plaintiff (under terms that were not favorable to us). After a year of litigation the lawsuit ended with an in-person meeting with plaintiffs and one of our lawyers. We had other agents present who helped explain that if the plaintiffs were to lose in court they would lose their claimed patent rights, whereas if we were to lose we would lose an insignificant amount of our income. The lawsuit was concluded by a dismissal without prejudice. We feel that our lawyer did not vigorously and competently represent our interests and claims, and also that as a result of their incompetence and inattention the dispute was far more protracted than necessary. Is there a common basis for demanding a discount in the lawyer's bills for these complaints?

In general you can dispute and negotiate any bill from a professional. The stronger your arguments for disputing it, and the more coherent your demands for adjustment, the more successful you will tend to be. This is like any business negotiation. One partner at a very large U.S. law firm once admitted to me that their corporate clients almost always ask for – and receive – billing adjustments. Of course, when push comes to shove, unless you're accusing the lawyer of fraudulent billing, then typically by contract you are liable for the bills. However, non-lawyers often assume that they will lose any dispute with their lawyers because it seems like lawyers have free access to the legal system. The reality is that there is a significant threshold that must be met before a law firm will sue a client for payment. That threshold will depend on the firm's opportunity costs, the costs of litigation, their assessment of reputational risks, how much they expect to actually collect, and sometimes just how ticked off they are.

Litigation Costs v. Liability Insurance Cost It is worth noting that what the Institute for Legal Reform, a tort reform lobbying group, is stating, is not that the U.S. has "higher litigation cost" than other countries. They are financed mostly by businesses that have to pay liability insurance expenses and are motivated in their analysis to come up with any analysis to argue in favor of reducing those expenses for their backers. This Institute is stating that liability insurance costs are greater in the U.S. and that this is a good way to infer that the things that liability insurance costs pay for in the U.S. are more expensive (and both of these narrow propositions are largely true). But, liability insurance costs have two big components: (1) claims paid, and (2) costs paid in the litigation process itself. And the contexts in which these costs are incurred has to be balanced with other parts of the overall systems. As economists like to say, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Higher claims paid may be good or bad. Higher claims paid discourages businesses and individuals from doing things that hurt other people, and compensate people who are hurt by wrongful conduct and to the extent that a claim paid does both of these things an an appropriate amount (or even higher considering that not all wrongful harms are litigated for a variety of reasons). But if they are too high they may discourage business activity by overcompensating injured people in a way that discourages business activity that does more good than harm. Litigation costs are a necessary evil. These cost also discourage tortious conduct, but not so precisely as they can discourage lawful conduct that is improperly the subject of litigation as well (and in many personal injury circumstances it is not obvious in advance to 100% certainty who is at fault) and they don't compensate people who are hurt by wrongful conduct. But litigation costs are necessary to operate the system. To the extent that more litigation costs in the aggregate better distinguishes between rightful and wrongful claims, they have value, to the extent that they do not, they have less value. Alternatives Within The U.S. It is also possible to make different choices on the value of litigation costs and U.S. jurisdictions have done this in some circumstances for particular kinds of litigation. Most U.S. jurisdictions (maybe all of them) impose strict liability on an employer for workplace related injuries greatly reducing the litigation cost share of compensating workers for injuries on the job at the cost of making employers pay for injuries caused by fellow workers or the negligence of the injured employee, rather than the employer or its management. This is called the worker's compensation system. Some U.S. jurisdictions have made a similar risk reward determination in the case of minor automobile accidents, in a system called "no fault insurance" barring lawsuits for small automobile accidents (a key defined term in such systems) and requiring drivers to instead self-insure form injuries and damages in small automobile accidents, to reduce litigation costs, and limiting litigation to automobile accidents with serious injuries or very major property damage where the costs of litigation are justified in light of the magnitude of the harm for which fault needs to be allocated. Short Conclusion In sum, while liability insurance costs are higher in the U.S., that doesn't necessarily mean that the money is not well spent and appropriate. This is a political choice with pros and cons attached to it. Caveats I haven't moved to close this question because a lot of the key factors are matters of comparative law between systems of accident liability. But this is usually considered as a political and policy issue, usually raised in Politics.SE instead, with which there is often overlap with Law.SE Also, I haven't really sourced this answer, because it is long and time consuming just to get the major considerations out. There is an extensive academic literature for essentially all of the points that I discuss. But most of my own sources are hard copy books that I can't link and would be time consuming to locate sources for online that I don't have easily available at this time. One good overview of several of the long standing basic comparative civil procedure points discussed below is this article from 1987 by John Langbein, who historically was one of the leading academic scholars in the area of comparative civil procedure. Drivers Of Claims Paid Costs There are at least eight big factors that impact the substantive amount of liability awards involved, not all of which may apply in any particular two country comparison. One of the big things that liability insurance costs pay for in the U.S. is liability for medical expenses caused by tortious or allegedly tortious personal injuries that are paid for by third parties and not litigated elsewhere. In most countries, some form of universal healthcare system pays for medical costs and those universal healthcare system paid medical costs can't be recovered in litigation. In the U.S., in contrast, medical expenses are always recoverable in personal injury litigation even if those costs were actually paid by health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid, or worker's compensation insurance (in cases where the lawsuit is alleging personal injury from someone other than the employer), due to something called the collateral source rule, then the person who actually paid for the medical expenses is entitled to some of the amount recovered by the injured person in the personal injury lawsuit as a consequence of what are called "subrogation rights." Basically, the U.S. shifts a lot of what would be paid for a different kind of public or private insurance in other countries onto liability insurance. The relative amount of money spent on one kind of insurance rather than another isn't really a big deal in the larger scheme of things. The virtue of the way that other countries do it, is that there are fewer people who are injured without an ability to pay for medical care without severe economic disruption in those countries than in the U.S. and untreated medical injuries or massive economic disruption to injured people is more problematic than treated medical injuries that don't cause massive economic disruption. The flip side of that however, is that by not clearly allocating the costs of medical care to the people who cause severe injuries as a tort liability based system does, businesses have less of an incentive to be careful and injury rates are reduced more slowly. The U.S. has seen a massive reduction in accidental injury over the time period that tort reformers allege has witnesses a surge in tort liability. An older but heavily cited article on comparative law regarding the collateral source rule and subrogation rights (and other aspects of those topics) is found here. Some countries, like Germany, for example, appear to have the injured party formally assign a right to sue to someone who made payments to the injured party for the injured party's benefit. The U.S. has a high costs of living, in general, and of medical costs in particular. Even in countries where there are awards of medical costs, U.S. awards for this area large because health care costs are much higher in the United States, on average, than in any other country in the world (for reasons beyond the scope of this answer, but as pertinent to this question, including many reasons not related to the malpractice liability associated costs of medical providers). Furthermore, the U.S., while it does not have the highest cost of living in the world (it ranks twenty-one although some key regions of the U.S. with high liability insurance costs have a much higher cost of living), has a high costs of living relative to most countries. So, claims for lost wages and damage to property, and claims for non-economic damages and punitive damages that are indirectly influenced by the high cost of living in the U.S. are influenced by this fact. If you cause a U.S. worker to lose ten years of wages due to their wrongfully incurred injuries, you may have caused $500,000 of damages prior to considering the time value of money. The same injury to a worker in China or Mexico might be $50,000 or less. and 4. The United States personal injury lawsuit system allows for the recovery of non-economic damages for items like pain and suffering, emotional distress, inconvenience, disfigurement, and the like, which is not allowed, or is allowed more sparingly, in most countries other than the United States; but this is offset by the unavailability of attorney fees to the prevailing party. Image from here. In part, the U.S. rule allowing non-economic damages, however, counterbalances the fact that most legal systems allow a prevailing party in a lawsuit seeking damages for personal injury to recover their attorney fees, while U.S. law does not allow a prevailing party in a personal injury lawsuit to recover their attorney fees in most cases. Instead, attorneys for injured parties customarily charge a contingent fee (often 1/3rd of the gross recovery) for their services, and defendants in personal injury cases have their attorney fees paid for by their liability insurer. So, while non-economic damages seem like a much broader recovery in the U.S. system than in non-U.S. systems of personal injury lawsuits, net of attorney fees recoveries that aren't available in the U.S. but are available elsewhere, this difference is not so great. While no rule mandates this and there are types of cases (e.g. civil rights, privacy and defamation cases) where economic damages don't tend to be proportionate to non-economic damages, in the U.S., in a typical personal injury case, non-economic damages tend to be proportionate to and less than the economic damages award in a case. Thus, in a case with $1,000,000 of economic damages awarded, a $500,000 non-economic damages award might be typical. Many people assert that the availability of punitive damages awards is an important factor; it is actually a very minor factor. In the U.S., when someone tortious injures another and that injury is intentional or reckless, a jury may award punitive damages in addition to the economic and non-economic damages intended merely to compensate the victim of the tort. If the economic damages in the case are significant, this can't be more than an amount proportionate to the compensatory (both economic and non-economic damages combined) award, typically not more than 1-3 times the amount of compensatory damages awarded. When the compensatory damages are very small (e.g. $100), the proportionality standard isn't so strict, but the award of punitive damages still can't be unduly large. While, in theory, one could imagine a world where this is a major factor, this is actually mostly hype from tort reform advocacy groups. Punitive damage awards are rare and as a share of aggregate tort liability awards in the U.S. account for a low single digit percentage share of the total. See, e.g. U.S. Justice Department statistics. (punitive damages awarded in 5% of cases that go to trial where Plaintiffs prevail, i.e. 700 out of 25,000 trials, only about 3% of cases filed go to trial, and the median punitive damages award is $64,000). Thus, punitive damages are awarded in about one in 1190 tort cases filed. U.S. tort awards are mostly made by juries, while this is exceedingly uncommon in all but a handful of other countries. In most countries, even those with common law legal systems, all, or very nearly all civil litigation is resolved by judges without juries, and in civil law legal systems not based upon the English legal system, serious tort damage awards are made by a panel of judges and can be reviewed de novo (i.e. redetermined from scratch) by a bigger panel of judges on appeal. In contrast, the lion's share of U.S. personal injury lawsuits that go to trial are resolved in jury trials. Judges are, for a variety of reasons including desensitization from seeing many cases and social class attitudes, stingier in their award of tort damages on average than juries, and this is particularly true in the case of panels of judges that balance out extreme opinions, relative to the extremes possible with a single judge. The causes of this mirror the fact that judges are much less likely to acquit a criminal defendant than a jury, on average. Of course, there are always exceptional cases and a damages award is based upon a human evaluation of the facts. In the U.S. a jury's award of tort damages is also much harder to reverse on appeal than a judge's award of tort damages in any system, since it simply states a dollar award and the appellate court must uphold it if there is any plausible justification for such an award in the evidence presented at trial and not merely because the actual articulated reasons of the jurors (which aren't considered in U.S. civil cases) were actually proper and supported by the evidence in the record. Another related point is the juries are less predictable than judges and single judges are less predictable than panels of judges. Unpredictability causes cases to settle in the U.S. that might have been resolved in favor of one party or the other in another system, and this uncertainty, on average, works against defendants and in favor of people who have been injured. Even in civil law systems with panels of judges, however, there is still a significant amount of uncertainty, because the law of when there is liability in tort for injuries is governed by standards that are fairly vague in almost every country. The U.S. has a thinner social safety net meaning that litigation is often the only way to obtain needed economic resources when someone suffers harm from an injury. In lots of countries there is a robust social safety net of unemployment, disability and welfare payments that can provide income security in the event of lost employment due to an injury. In the U.S. these options are much more meager, so the net benefit that an injured person can receive from suing rather than relying upon the social safety net and not suing even though they could is much greater in the U.S. than in other countries. This is despite the fact that U.S. system of tort liability is more heavily fault based than the system used in civil law countries. In the U.S., while there are situations which are exceptions to the general rule, most tort lawsuits involve proof of negligence by the person that caused the harm, and that the damages suffered were caused by the negligent act. In civil law countries, there is much less of a focus on whether acts of the defendant that caused the person harmed to suffer injuries. It isn't truly a strict liability system but it is closer. The reduced necessity to prove negligence reduces the cost of litigation in civil law countries while increasing the amount of awards. Basically, there are far more cases in the U.S. where the decision is that the defendant injured the plaintiff but that there is no liability because "shit happens" than in civil law countries. Drivers Of Litigation Costs Participating in the process of recovering damages for tort injuries (i.e. true litigation costs) usually involved more aggregate litigation costs for the defendants (and for plaintiffs, defendants and courts combined) in the U.S. than elsewhere. Several factors drive this difference, including factor eight above and five additional factors. Not all of this apply in every particular two country comparison. The U.S. and other common law systems systemically allocate more litigation expenses to the parties than to the courts, than civil law countries. Image from here. From here (although there is considerable variation in the number of lawyers per capita in each U.S. state, the U.S average is 4 per 1000 people, but South Carolina with the fewest lawyers per capita has 2, Massachusetts and Connecticut have 6, New York has 9, and the District of Columbia has 77). Countries with civil law litigation systems (based on the systems of Continental Europe) have vastly more judges (about ten times as many) who are more pro-actively involved in the litigation process per attorney representing a party, than in the U.S. or other common law countries. Because of this, even if the total litigation cost to all parties and the system itself were equal in common law and civil law countries, a greater share of the cost would be paid for by the government through judicial system budgets at public expense, and less would be paid for by the parties. This also has the indirect effect of causing U.S. judges to avoid involvement in the case as much as possible until as late as possible in the case in the hopes that the delay will cause it to settle, even if the delay in resolving an issue causes the parties to incur more litigation costs than would have been necessary if the judge had paid attention sooner. The Extreme Finality of Jury Trials Results In Systemic Over-Expenditure On Litigation Costs. In the U.S. system, you get one shot at trial, and particularly given the issues present in a typical tort lawsuit for personal injury, this is virtually unreviewable on appeal. This means that a competent trial lawyer for a party needs to rule out or prepare for every possible uncertainty in advance, rather than only those possibilities at trial that are likely. In a civil law system, you can prepare for only what is likely and if you are surprised at trial, you can appeal the factual findings made and introduce evidence or arguments to address the surprises you encountered on appeal only if they actually come up. This kind of trial preparation is much less expensive than the extreme no stone left unturned approach that is typical in the U.S. As an answer from @JohnFx to this question notes, a lot of this pretrial preparation manifests itself in the form of "discovery" costs. A related subset of this factor is that the behavior of judges when presented with a tort case is much more predictable than the behavior of a random panel of citizens selected only at the end of a case. Knowing who will decide the case can focus and reduce the kind of preparation of needed and what kind of outcome is likely. For example, you can know from experience that certain kinds of testimony and evidence will be given weight by a particular judge or panel of judges to a greater degree than you can with a jury where evidence that may have lots of impact to one juror may not have as much impact as a different kind of evidence with a different juror. The stakes are higher in U.S. litigation so more litigation expense is justified as proportional to the higher stakes. If you have a serious personal injury case in the U.S. with $2,000,000 of medical costs, $1,000,000 of plausible non-economic damages award, and $500,000 of other economic damages for a total of $3,500,000 at stake, it is rational for both sides to spend money to maximize the quality of their case than they would in a case where only $500,000 plus attorneys fees can be awarded to a winner and a loser pays the other side's attorney fees, in system where medical costs paid by a third party aren't litigated and non-economic damages aren't awarded. Attorney compensation is more heavily regulated in other countries. In the U.S. attorneys are allowed to charge what the market will bear. In many countries there is government regulation of attorney fees that limit hourly rates or per task rates and don't allow for contingent fee awards. This can make U.S. litigation fees higher than in other countries. Earlier resolution of cases on the merits is possible in most other countries because decision making isn't reserved for a jury trial at the end. A logistical reality of a jury trial system in the U.S. is that the jury meets once for a few days and can't be reconvened. This means that pre-trial resolution of issues reserved for the jury is allowed only in the clearest cases where no jury could reach a different result that would be upheld on appeal. In contrast, in almost every other country, where judges resolve all or almost all tort lawsuits, it is much more feasible to arrange decision making in a manner calculated to minimize litigation costs. For example, in a U.S. personal injury lawsuit, the plaintiff must almost always present evidence of both liability (i.e. that they were wrongfully injured by the defendant) and damages (e.g. lots of medical expert and medical expense and cost of care and lost wages testimony) in the same trial that happens over the course of a few days. In many other countries it is common to bifurcate the trial so that liability is tried first and evidence of damages is only presented once the issue of liability is determined. In many other countries it is also common to resolve issues of special preconditions to liability, such as whether the driver of a truck causing injury was acting within the scope of employment, or whether a statute of limitations has run, on the merits based upon both disputed evidence and law, before the liability trial. In cases that don't go the distance to a trial on all issues, this reduces litigation costs. And, even if the resolution of early issues like preliminary issues or liability is favorable to the plaintiff, wins on those issues may cause the later issues in the case to be resolved without a trial and settled. Interest Disclosure Since I questioned the motives of the Institute for Legal Reform based upon an interest biasing it in a particular direction, I will also disclose my own relevant interests and experiences. I litigated many cases on behalf of insured defendant with casualty insurance (or the self-insurance pool equivalent) at a firm where I was employed for three years early in my career. Over the remainder of my career (more than twenty years), I have represented roughly the same number of plaintiffs in litigation where insurance is potentially a source of recovery, and a smaller but not insignificant number of defendants who also have insurance defense counsel. Most of my litigation practice involves commercial and probate cases where there is no insurance coverage for either side. I also represent many clients in transactional and commercial litigation matters who are business owners or businesses that have to pay significant liability insurance premiums in the course of their business or profession and have done considerable asset protection planning work and have taught courses on that subject to other lawyers. I have been self-employed as an attorney for more than fifteen years, and in that time period I have had to maintain both health insurance and liability insurance policies. My practice has also involved a small, but constant and significant, amount of representation of U.S. based clients with legal affairs that involve other countries such as international trade, business investment, tax, probate and child custody matters that require familiarity with the legal systems of other countries. I was an award winning law student in these subject of comparative law in law school where I was also a senior editor in the Michigan Journal of International Law.

No Let's consider a similar scenario. If you made a beverage which poisoned a number of people, would you be absolved of liability because you gave it away for free? Of course not. As there is no contract between you, they would have to bring an action against you in the tort of negligence or negligent misstatement OR under consumer protection law. To succeed at tort they would need to prove that you owed them a duty of care; from Donoghue v Stevenson "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonable foresee would be likely to injure ... persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably have them in contemplation ...". Most cases will founder on your inability to foresee the use to which your software may be put. Consumer law is jurisdiction specific but they generally contain warranties that what you provide (gratis or otherwise) is fit for purpose, merchantable and that you do not make false and misleading statements. There is a chance that a case brought under this sort of law could succeed as you have not limited the purpose, specifically declared that it is not of merchantable quality and have (presumable) said what it does so that, if it doesn't do what you said, you have been misleading and deceptive.

Yes. Lawyers are generally subject to a malpractice lawsuit, essentially the same as doctors and other professions. A successful claim generally requires proof that the lawyer's services fell below the standard of care for attorneys, and that it resulted in some injury to you.

You should do one of two things. Either (1) fire your lawyer and obtain competent counsel, or (2) demand that he pay for the "second opinion" (in actuality, co-counsel or a consultant) if he is unfit to offer a proper opinion on the case. I am unfamiliar with the bar rules in Canada, however I am willing to bet they require one be competent to the prosecute the case they take. In the U.S. in all jurisdictions, the bar rules demand that an attorney not take a case unless he is competent to prosecute it. If he is not, he has a duty to either decline the case, or to find competent assistance to bring the case to closure. Unless your lawyer told you at the outset that he can only represent your defense and not your counterclaim, then he needs to be able to advise you about both issues. You should not be responsible for obtaining a second opinion. Most lawyers would not want their client seeking a second opinion as it reflects poorly on their ability competently practice. The fact that this guy has the gall to ask you to get one is unacceptable. As an example: I recently had a case that was within my practice area. During discovery I realized there was a substantial ERISA issue. This is a very specialized area of law that I am not very adept at dealing with as it is a complex regulatory scheme I don't deal with regularly. So...once I spotted this, I contacted an colleague who specializes in ERISA, who told me what I needed to argue, and gave me a primer on the area of ERISA law that I needed to be adept at. If I didn't have a friend who worked in this area, I would've had to get a co-counsel (at my own expense) by either splitting my fee, or by hiring him as a consultant but being personally responsible for the cost. If I didn't think that would be cost effective (i.e., the value of the case was not big enough to justify me hiring a consultant) then I would've had to tell the client that an issue arose that I was not competent to deal with and that he needed someone who specialized in that area (the problem is that people who do ERISA law aren't litigators traditionally) and had the ability to litigate. Or, give him the opportunity to say, "No, I want you to be trial counsel and we will hire him as the ERISA guy." In that case, the client would be responsible for the cost of the second attorney (otherwise I would just withdraw), but I couldn't demand this. What your lawyer is doing is trying to get you to ensure he does't get it wrong, and that is not OK.

The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.

That's a sad story. The answer to your question is: Yes. If your case is attractive enough then a lawyer might agree to represent it on a contingency basis. Contact lawyers in the jurisdiction where the fraudster has a physical, business, or legal presence. In the U.S. you can ask for referrals to lawyers from the state bar association, or you can call or email them or their firms directly. However, if the amount of potential damages is too small, or the prospects of collecting them too low, then you will probably not find any lawyer interested in taking the case on contingency. If the fraudster has left many victims then you might try to pool your cases to make legal action more attractive. You also might contact the state attorneys in his jurisdictions, as they will sometimes pursue cases against serial scofflaws.

It is rather unclear what the facts are, and the legal answer would depend crucially on those facts. My understanding is that you bought a domain from a provider, and they allowed you to use a web server for some period. It also appears that you don't have a clear understanding of the contract, which may have been made online and you might not have retained a copy of the agreement (which would allow you to look at the terms). The assumption that failing to pay substitutes for explicitly cancelling a service is incorrect. If under the contract you agree to pay a certain amount per year, then you have been racking up charges for some time, and you would need to actually cancel. Ultimately, they could take you to court to force you to pay what you owe, although usually there are less drastic intermediate steps. In court, they would produce their documents to show that you owe money, and your attorney would somehow counter, perhaps by alleging that you had a good-faith belief that the contract had been terminated. It is possible that they simply messed up and failed to send you an invoice earlier, which could explain the lack of invoice. At any rate, the fact that you haven't gotten an invoice does not legally entitle you to avoid paying for the service, whether or not you use it. On the premise that they haven't taken back the domain (seems like they didn't), you can legally use it. However, if you do use it, then that would trash any claim that you believed the contract had been terminated (to argue "I thought it had been canceled" entails "and thus I didn't use the service").

Do user agreements with a company carry on after corporate mergers or splits? I wanted to ask in regards to the eBay/PayPal split about a month ago. Namely: Do the user agreements continue once the companies split? In my mind, because PayPal is splitting off into its own company and eBay is remaining as the same company: In order for a person to continue using PayPal, in effect he must agree to a new user agreement. New company, new rules and regulations. If so, how would this affect users who are not in good standing? With this said, After the split, users in good standing were asked if they agreed to the new terms and agreements. If they agreed, they continued without issue. If they didn't, they were to close their accounts. But for users not in good standing (which PayPal calls "limited accounts") the option to close accounts are not available. I.e., PayPal does not allow one to close a limited account. How would a user who was not given the option to agree/disagree with the new terms go about terminating the account (business relationship)? There are more layers of context and background, but I wanted to boil down my questions to this for the time being.

The eBay user agreement contains this clause: In our sole discretion, we may assign this User Agreement, by providing notice of such assignment in accordance with the Notices Section. The current PayPal agreement says: You may not transfer or assign any rights or obligations you have under this Agreement without PayPal's prior written consent. PayPal reserves the right to transfer or assign this Agreement or any right or obligation under this Agreement at any time. It's a good bet that every user agreement you ever clicked on had a similar clause. What do these clauses mean? They mean that when eBay spins off a new company, they can assign their rights, and your duties, under the contract to the new company. Your assumption that a new user agreement is required is incorrect.

Some jurisdictions tend to favor non-compete agreements, others hold most of them to be unenforceable. From a very quick search, BC is a little reluctant to enforce them, but they can be valid if sensibly drawn. However, the text you included in the question is not a non-compete agreement at all, it is a non-solicitation agreement, a much less restrictive agreement, which is significantly more likely to be upheld. The agreement quoted in the question does not mandate the employee continuing to work for the employer for any minimum time, not two years, and not six months. (Another provision might specify a required notice period, but that was not quoted and may not be in the agreement.) The agreement quoted does not prohibit the employee, after s/he leaves the job, from working for a competitor of the former employer, not even for a brief period. What the agreement quoted does do, is prohibit the employee from asking individuals and businesses who were customers of the former employer for orders for the same products as are sold by the former employer. This applies to orders on behalf of the employee personally, on behalf of a new employer, or on behalf of a business in which the employee has some sort of ownership stake (such as partner or shareholder). That is all that the quoted language prohibits. This means that the employee cannot ask those who were customers of the old employer, to buy from or through him, the same products that the old employer sells. It does not mean that the former employee cannot sell such products, if the inquiry comes from the customer. This sort of agreement is primarily aimed at preventing a salesperson from taking a client list with him or her to a new employer, and trying to get them to move their business from the salesperson's old employer to his or her new employer or business. If the employee is primarily an instructor and does not also act as a salesperson, this agreement will have almost no effect on him or her. This site discusses such agreement an myths about them in BC, Canada. It says: Non-competition clauses can be enforced by courts in BC. It is true that employers face an uphill battle in getting a judge to agree to enforce a non-compete, but it can and does happen. If you are wondering whether your non-compete will stick, ask an employment lawyer. Enforceability of a non-compete depends on the specifics of the wording of the clause itself and the overall employment contract. Some key considerations are whether the clause is clearly worded, and whether it is limited in time, geography and scope of what is covered. If a non-competition clause is enforced by a judge, it will only be applied to prevent the employee from the specific activities listed. If the employer has missed something from the clause, or there is a “loop-hole,” that is generally fair game. Many contracts include non-solicitation (aka non-solicit) clauses, which are meant to prevent the employee from contacting clients. Non-solicitation clauses are still an uphill battle to enforce, but slightly easier than a non-competition clauses. This is because non-solicits don’t dictate where an employee can work, just what business they can seek out. Even if there is no contract, obligations to respect confidential information, and fiduciary duties (in the case of key employees) last beyond the end of employment and can limit competition. An online paper on "Is my Employee’s Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?" by Lisa Stam says: In Canada, courts have generally been reluctant to uphold agreements that have the effect of restricting an individual’s ability to earn a living or pursue the job of their choice. Indeed, courts take the initial position that restrictive covenants in employment agreements are unenforceable, unless the employer can demonstrate otherwise. A restrictive covenant must jump through several hoops to be deemed enforceable. ... A non-solicitation agreement will allow a former employee to work for a competitor, but prevent them from soliciting the clients (and possibly the employees) of their former employer for a specific period of time. Former employees may have close relationships with clients. Allowing them to solicit these clients may give them an unfair advantage against the former employer in the marketplace. If the employee does not solicit the client, but the client leaves to follow them anyway, there is little an employer can do. ... If a court finds a restrictive covenant clause unreasonable, for example it restricts solicitation for 12 months when 6 would have been reasonable, they will not read it down to fix it. Canadian courts require the employer to get it right the first time and a flawed clause will therefore normally be unenforceable. In short, the above quoted agreement may not be enforceable. But if it is, it only restricts solicitation, not competition, and does not require the employee to work for the employer for a period of two years, or any other minimum time.

Ask yourself... What are you trying to achieve? My understanding is an employer is not obliged to provide you a positive job reference. I believe at most, they are only to obliged to confirm that you worked there. Anything above that is optional. The fact that you have left British Columbia only makes it more difficult for the company to chase you - It does not alter your legal obligations. As part of the settlement, both the employer and employee singed an mutual non-disparagement agreement. Why did you sign a mutual non-disparagement agreement if you still disagree? It leads me to believe there could be trust issues between you and others. Why do you think your old employer must abide by the agreement, but you have an exemption? Let's say you make noise - let's say your old employer in BC tracks you down. Ask yourself how an independent third party like your new employer would react when they read that you signed an agreement, then decided to ignore it. Both you and your previous employer have begun new separate journeys. You two crashed once - I suggest you not alter your path or you could crash again. Life is too short. Concentrate on making your new home in your new city and a new job a new start. It will bring you a greater benefit than breaking a signed, sealed non-disparagement agreement.

If three people inherited a house in equal shares, then a new deed should have been prepared and filed with the appropriate governmental authority (the county in most US states) before probate is closed. When that is done the authority of the executors over the house as executors has ended. However, if I understand you correctly, the two former executors are also two of the three heirs to the house. Thus they own a 2/3rds interest in the house. At least they can sell their interests without your consent, leaving you a minority owner with the purchaser owner a majority. In some jurisdictions they may be able to force a sale, paying you your share of the purchase price. But this would be because of their majority ownership, not because of their former status as executors. Addition: In some states co-owners who are joint tenants may not sell their interests without the consent of the other co-owners, but this is jnot true in North Carolina According to the site of the Hutchens Law office: ownership as tenants in common provides each party with the right to sell, gift, devise, or otherwise convey their interest in the property without the permission of the other owners. This means that the ownership interest is freely alienable or transferable. As a result, an owner may sell or give their interest in the property to anyone they want, or they may willingly or by judgment use their interest in the property to secure or satisfy a debt with a creditor. Therefore, parties entering into an agreement to purchase property as tenants in common should be aware that they may ultimately end up owning the property with a stranger. If this were to happen, there is a way out, but it may be costly. At any time, if the parties can't agree, any owner may petition the court for a partition of the property. The court could require one owner to buy another out or force the sale of the property. The court will decide the ultimate outcome based on equity. ... [I]f the intent of co-owners holding interest as joint tenants is to automatically transfer their interest at death to the survivor, the language must be on the conveying instrument as right of survivorship is not automatic with joint tenancy in North Carolina and if the language in not included, the decedent's interest will pass to his heirs. ... However, any owner has the right to convey their ownership interest during their life; and if they do, the survivorship agreement ends, and owners simply become joint tenants by operation of law. In North Carolina there seems to be little practical difference between co-owners who are tenants in common, and those who are joint tenants without a right of survivorship. But whichever form of co-ownership is chosen: tenants in common, joint tenants without a right of survivorship, or joint tenants with a right of survivorship, each of the co-owners has a right during his or her lifetime to sell, give away, or use as collateral on a loan his or her share of the property, without consulting the other co-owners. They cannot force the other co-owner(s) to sell, except by starting an action of partition in a court, when a judge would decide. An unrelated buyer might be unwilling to purchase only a 1/3 or 2/3rds interest, because the remaining co-owner(s) would still have full rights to use and occupy the house, can could sell to a different buyer. All co-owners are responsible for their proportionate shares of all expenses, including mortgage payments, repairs, and taxes.

It will depend on the specific facts Let's define a few terms: Company A was the original company, Company B is the current company (which may be the same as Company A or a different company), Owner A was (and may still be) the shareholders of Company A, Owner B are the shareholders of Company B, the Business is the enterprise that was carried on by Company A and is now carried on by Company B, the Domain is the licence from the Domain Name Registrar which may be owned by any of the above (except the Business because it's not a legal person). Owner A and Owner B might be an individual natural person or an individual company or a group of natural persons/companies. Both the Business and the Domain are assets just like a car or office furniture that can be bought and sold independently of the Company that owns them. Who owned the domain registration? This might have been Company A in its own right or Owner A in which case Company A would be using it under some sort of licence, probably an implicit and undocumented one. Was Company A or the Business bought? Both are possibilities, see Is it possible to keep assets from being taken when a company is bought by another? If the company was sold the Company B is Company A. If the business was sold then Company A is different from Company B. Company A owned the Domain and Company A was sold Company A/B continues to own the domain. There is no room for dispute here. Owner A owned the Domain and Company A was sold Owner A continues to own the domain but Company A/B retains the benefit of the licence. There is scope for dispute over the terms and duration of that licence. Company A owned the Domain and the Business was sold The terms of the contract would need to be consulted to determine whether the Domain was part of the assets that comprised the Business. There is scope for dispute here, see the Peanut Butter Wars over whether trade dress was part of the business (spoiler, it was). If it was, then Company B owns it even if it is legally still held by Company A - they would be holding it on trust for Company B pending legal transfer. There is no scope for dispute here. If it wasn't, then one has to ask how has Company B been using it for 7 years? There is scope for dispute here. It's possible that they were using it under a licence, if so, what are the terms? It's also possible they have a right to it as a result of other IP they own, usually a trademark. Owner A owned the Domain and the Business was sold The terms of the contract would need to be consulted to determine whether the licence in the Domain was part of the assets that comprised the Business. There is scope for dispute here. If it was then Company B retains the benefit of the licence. There is scope for dispute over the terms and duration of that licence. If it wasn't, then one has to ask how has Company B been using it for 7 years? There is scope for dispute here. It's possible that they were using it under a licence, if so, what are the terms? It's also possible they have a right to it as a result of other IP they own, usually a trademark.

the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply & demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.

There is no contract Specifically, an agreement to agree is void for uncertainty. If the total cost of shipping was an insignificant fraction of the value of the contract then there might be sufficient certainty - that is, it could be argued that the buyer (or seller) has agreed to pay a reasonable rate for shipping. However, in the context of most items on the site this is unlikely to be the case. As an aside, your use of the term "rescind" is incorrect. Rescission occurs when one party breaches a term of the contract and the other party elects to terminate (and optionally seek damages) in response. The correct term for both parties agreeing to release the other is "termination by agreement".

I intend to close on the house as I've already signed all the loan paper work, but is there anything that can be done about a Realtor that breaks contract? You have probably waived your claim if you proceed with the deal knowing about the Realtor's conduct. What would your damages be? Could you have mitigated them by not agreeing to the deal? Also second question would it be better to seek a personal or Real estate attorney in such situations as this? Lawyers aren't that specialized. I would not recognize a "personal" attorney as something necessarily different from a "Real estate attorney" and the questions involved are not so complex that a general practice attorney couldn't handle them. Familiarity with real estate issues would be desirable (e.g. you wouldn't want to hire someone whose practice was exclusively as a criminal defense attorney or a personal injury lawyer, or a patent lawyer, for this task), but a great many lawyers who describe their practices differently would have the relevant experience and knowledge.

Multiple deals in a row and reasonable expectation I once heard that there is a certain level of reasonable expectation that is guaranteed by law when it comes to making multiple deals with others. For instance, is the following legal or illegal to do. Bill offered to Mow Janes lawn for $1, which is agreeable. Bill mows the lawn, and gives Jane a bill for $1. Jane happily pays. A week pasts, and Jane asks Bill to mow her lawn again. Bill mows the lawn again, and give Jane a bill for $2 Jane asks why $2 and not $1, like last week Bill says that he changed the price within the last week due to high demand of his services, and that is what he charges everyone now. I do not mind which country the law exists, or if it exists at all; I was told that this was illegal to do (anecdotally), and I just want to get a quick opinion (not used in any legal way, just to cure my curiosity) and see if they were telling the truth or not. Thanks!

Bill and Jane are free to enter into a contract where, among other things, each provides valuable consideration; in this case Bill provides valuable lawn mowing services and Jane provides valuable money. In week No 1 they have negotiated the terms and the contract is complete when Bill mows the lawn and Jane pays the money. If Bill turns up next week without Jane's instruction then there is no contract and Jane does not have to pay anything; I don't think this is what you are asking but I include it for completeness. If it is understood that this arrangement continue week after week then either there is an ongoing contract or, more likely, a series of independent contracts. If there is an ongoing contract, then it can be renegotiated but it cannot be changed unilaterally by Bill. That is, he cannot unilaterally increase the price to $2. If there is a series of contracts then the terms of each of those contracts will be the same based on the course of dealing. Basically, the parties have accepted over a long period of time that the rate for a mow is $1 and Bill would have to get Jane to accept the revised rate before he mows the lawn. For your example, Jane owes Bill $1 but if she wants him back next week she will have to agree to Bill's rate.

There is nothing illegal with doing this (absent specific contractual terms or industry regulations to the contrary in particular cases, e.g. in the case of export controlled high technology products). This is called operating a wholesale business or operating as a broker. Lots of legitimate legal businesses have this business model.

Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.

I can answer for the U.S., if that's helpful. The general rule, in the United States, is that covenants not to compete are enforceable as long as they are reasonable. What constitutes "reasonable" varies from state to state. Factors considered generally include: What kind of actual harm will come to the business if you go to a competitor? In other words, is this rote language they include in every contract, or did they put it in yours because you know all the secret formulas and have the customer list memorized? Is it reasonable in time, location, and scope? Something preventing you from taking any job anywhere in the United States for ten years won't be enforceable; something preventing you from taking a job with the exact same title in the same industry in the same town for the next six months might be. The general rule at common law was that covenants not to compete were unenforceable restraints of trade; the fact that they're enforceable at all is later law created by each jurisdiction, and that means it's going to vary based on your specific jurisdiction. If you want to know whether it's okay to take a specific job based on a specific non-compete you signed, you will need to talk to a legal professional licensed in your jurisdiction--and even she may not be able to tell you for sure.

There is a clear conflict of interest - or the potential for the appearance of a conflict of interest - here. On the one hand, you are supposed to be looking for a good deal for your employer - within reason, of course. On the other hand, you want to make as much money for yourself as you can by claiming as high a rental fee as is reasonable. Most employers have policies against this. This is like hiring your side company as a vendor. You should follow your employer's policies for making sure his is totally above board, or just stay elsewhere.

It would depend on your contract. Clearly, if I was selling timber and you ordered some with the agreement that I'll try to deliver at date X with no extra penalties, it would cost some amount. If we had a contract where I deliver at date X and pay for all your cost if the timber doesn't arrive at that date, then I'll either refuse to take the contract or charge you more. Maybe substantially more.

Whether or not this would be allowed would generally call for a more fact rich situation than the one presented in the original question, that would cast light upon why a retailer might be inclined to refuse to accept payment. Hypothetical legal questions that presume that people are acting irrationally for no good reason are generally ill posed and don't have meaningful answers. Sometimes, there might be a legitimate privacy interest implicated if the invoicing party acknowledged a payment from a third party. For example, suppose that the invoice was for a paternity test and payment would confirm that the incapacitated person actually obtained a paternity test. Sometimes, there are legal rights beyond payment that are implicated and the reasonableness of a refusal might hinge on those rights. For example, suppose that the invoice was for an option to keep using an oil well. Payment of the invoice by the deadline would keep the oil well operating and the land owner sending the invoice might prefer that it not be paid so that the oil well would be shut down. Quite a few contracts are structured in this way. Maybe the invoice was for the right to purchase a first edition of a book when it was finally released, for example, and not paying it would free up a copy for someone else at a price that had increased in the meantime. Or, suppose that the invoice were for unpaid taxes and payment of the taxes would prevent property from being seized for sale by tax authorities, and the taxing authority would prefer that the invoice was not paid so that the valuable property could be liquidated. But, it is hard to imagine that there would be any reason that an ordinary retailer with an ordinary bill would ever refuse payment, although I suppose that this might trigger an interest or penalty amount owed under the contract for late payment. If that were the case, the principal of mitigation of damages, which says that a party to a contract must take all reasonable steps to mitigate their damages, might obligate the retailers to accept the payment or forfeit the penalty amounts that the retailer could have avoided as damages by accepting payment. I doubt that an undelivered tender of payment from a third party would eliminate the obligation, but, it might limit the damages that could be claimed as in the scenario above.

I know this is not what you've asked (I will get to that too), but I figured I would take the opportunity to state that the owner of the well cannot send you an invoice for the water unless you agreed to a price and entered into a binding agreement. They cannot just decide their water is worth X and then tell you that the amount is due. Just as you cannot send them a bill, in the same amount, for the use and maintenance of the pump. While the well may be located on one parcel of land, with the pump on the other, chances are, the properties were linked at one point and that is why there is a separation of the two (unless you bought it as one and divided it yourselves). This should have been dealt with on the deed, with easements appurtenant to the neighboring land regarding water rights. A contractual agreement could have been attached by reference that dictated the land with the well would maintain the well, while the landowner with the pump would maintain the equipment (or whatever you both agreed to regarding upkeep and the like). Depending on the state you live in, the property itself may not even "own" the well. For instance, in Colorado, water rights typically come by way of 100 or 200 year leases, as the native american tribes of the area "own" the water rights. Other states have laws that declare that nobody owns the water table, hence land is only owned as far down as the water table and then it is owned by the county, or state, with easements running with the deed. Other states, (I'm wondering if this is your issue) the water runs in veins and does belong only to the property that it is below – as there is no water table, so to speak. Regardless, I would talk to your title insurance policy company and ask why this easement was not addressed in the deed. I'm assuming that you did not divide the land yourselves, post purchase, and the land with the pump cannot access the water table without going onto the land of the other. Otherwise, it would be very easily solved by drilling your own well (and much cheaper), whereby you already own all of the equipment to run the water to the dwelling. You just divert your equipment to the running of your own well. It's only a few dollars a foot to drill a well, unless you live in the Granite State! Likewise, you should check with your land assessor's office, or registry of deeds, and see how the title ran back regarding water. Again, depending on jurisdiction, you may be able to drill down and over. You cannot divert, but you can access, in most jurisdictions. I say to contact your title insurance company, because the water issue should have been dealt with at title examination, and further, if your land is inaccessible to any water, it would not be sub-dividable for dwelling purposes under almost any zoning law I have ever heard of. A property that is land locked, or utility inaccessible, cannot be zoned for dwellings, without irrevocable easements or rights of ways, respectively. Just because you purchased near family doesn't have anything to do with any of this analysis. They could be anyone, or you could end up at odds, the water cannot be relationship dependent and you cannot be held hostage over natural resources. If so, I would sue the title insurance policy for a refund of the purchase price or the negotiation of the purchase price of an easement to the well/water table, assuming you have none under your land and have no existing right to it. If you just happen to have the pump, and they have the well, you own the pump and they own the well. Simple as that. You do not have to allow the pump to be used for their well. Assuming you can drill your own well, but may not want to, you can just rent them the use of the pump at the same rate they are charging you for the water. You can agree to split the cost of maintenance of each, since you've invested in the upgrade of the pump.

Is a landlord required to disclose a balloon payment? Suppose a house was rented two years ago in California, on a two year lease. If when the lease expired, the landlord refuses to renew, citing an upcoming balloon payment that would not be covered by the rent as the reason, what recourse does the tenant have?

If the lease has expired and the tenant does not have an option then the landlord is under no obligation to offer a new lease; they do not have to give any reason. They would still need to comply with the notice periods in the lease or it will revert to a month-by-month contract; in that case, the notice period is 1 month.

If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).

In saying "Not a problem at all", you cannot infer that the agent is committing the landlord to covering the difference in cost. That sentence is standard verbal fluff equivalent to "it's no bother, I'll pass the message on to the landlord". You requested him to inform the landlord of the expected higher cost, and that you hoped he would cover the difference. He then says "please calculate the difference, which we will then pass onto your landlord", so he is agreeing to pass the information on. This is not a commitment by anyone to do what you want. Of course, the lease might specifically commit them to providing a gas-fired boiler. If so, you should expect that they will cover the difference in cost for the duration of the lease (and the lease may change after the current period).

You understand the business of landlording before you get started. You don't landlord for the purpose of evicting someone. You landlord for the purpose of exchanging keys for a duration for money, specifically by creating a leasehold estate that you sell to your tenant. Your tenant has the leasehold, you don't have the money, in part because it sounds like you didn't collect any before you handed over the keys or confirm your tenants' ability and history of paying. You now want to nullify the leasehold. In general this is the eviction you ask about. You are now reliant on a court in your jurisdiction to enforce the contract law with respect to the lease language and prevailing local ordinances. I cannot speak specifically to NY courts but they have a reputation as tenant friendly so you need to demonstrate your professional approach and locally required paperwork such as a certificate of occupancy, business license, etc. All lined up to make it easy for a judge to agree with you. You have an uphill battle. Turning off utilities (as mentioned in another post of yours) is not a professional move and will bias many judges against you. No certificate of occupancy may mean your original lease contract created a leasehold contrary to a public policy of NY which could put a judge in a bind if they found your case compelling. If a competent lawyer would cost $15k then it sounds like it might be cheapest to offer the tenant a couple thousand for the keys and a signed release to walk away–spend a couple hundred on the lawyer for this. Do not give them the money until they are out and give you the keys. This is called cash for keys.

Yes, see section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985: (1)In a lease to which this section applies (as to which, see sections 13 and 14) there is implied a covenant by the lessor— (a)to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-house (including drains, gutters and external pipes), (b)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for the supply of water, gas and electricity and for sanitation (including basins, sinks, baths and sanitary conveniences, but not other fixtures, fittings and appliances for making use of the supply of water, gas or electricity), and (c)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for space heating and heating water. ... (6)In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. Also see the dot.gov guidance, especially the section entitled "Your responsibilities": You should give your landlord access to the property to inspect it or carry out repairs. Your landlord has to give you at least 24 hours’ notice and visit at a reasonable time of day, unless it’s an emergency and they need immediate access.

Can the renter declare the contract to be void because of the death of the only other party to the contract? No. The estate of the decedent steps into the shoes of the decedent and the executor of the decedent's estate can enforce the lease. What if one of the heirs comes to the renter and tries to add additional conditions? The heirs do not have the authority to modify the lease without the tenant's consent, although the tenant knows that the lease may be less likely to be renewed if the tenant does not consent. Also, the heirs, strictly speaking, don't have the authority to do anything. Only an executor duly appointed by a court does.

We don't give specific legal advice and one might VTC, but I think your phrasing is not quite right, and you are just curious about the possibility of binding the landlord to a term across leases. The first thing that a term in a contract has to so is say exactly what must be done by whom (or not done). You need to describe more precisely what it means for all future rent and rent increases to be commensurate with the current rent. You can think of conditions like "no more than 2% per annum" or "no more than 15% per annum", and then you can figure out what number is acceptable to the two of you. I would be surprised if you could come up with an agreeable number. Second, you'd have to make this limit "perpetual", which is pretty much impossible. You could negotiate the terms of the next lease today which would prevent an increase of rent by more thay you're happy with, but until governmental controls say exactly what a legal rent increase is, the property owner has the right to raise the rent by a million dollars, and you have the right to move elsewhere. It's as hard to permanently lock a landlord into an arrangement as it is to lock a tenant into renting a specific residence. Every year, you have the right to terminate the lease if the rent goes too high for you, and every year the landlord has the right to raise the rent if the current arrangement isn't sufficiently profitable. Incidentally, you might want to check with AHFC to see if you can actually do this. Your expectations don't determine what relief they provide, just make sure that you provided accurate answers to their questions and reported all income that you're required to report.

You would need to know the landlord's reasons for refusal in order to determine their reasonableness or otherwise. If there is a dispute about this (i.e. They think they are reasonable and you don't) you can seek a court order requiring the landlord to accept the sublease or alternatively, that since the landlord has breached the contract, you are entitled to terminate it. Hire a lawyer before you do this.

Using (presumably) copyrighted materials in reviews I run a film and TV show reviewing blog using the Google Blogger service. On this blog, I frequently use pictures taken from the film/episode/TV show that I am reviewing in the article. The pictures that I use are always gathered by simply using the Google Image search to find a picture that suits my need. As such, the pictures come from a large variety of sources, including others peoples reviews, promotional material and even frames from advertisements. Is the use of these images on my blog protected under Fair Use, regardless of the source of the original images? What about if I started earning money from my blog?

The UK copyright Act has the concept of "fair dealing" which is more restricted that the US concept of "fair use". For your purposes, Section 30 appears to be applicable: 30 Criticism, review and news reporting. (1) Fair dealing with a work for the purpose of criticism or review, of that or another work or of a performance of a work, does not infringe any copyright in the work provided that it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement and provided that the work has been made available to the public. (1A) For the purposes of subsection (1) a work has been made available to the public if it has been made available by any means, including— (a) the issue of copies to the public; (b) making the work available by means of an electronic retrieval system; (c) the rental or lending of copies of the work to the public; (d) the performance, exhibition, playing or showing of the work in public; (e) the communication to the public of the work, but in determining generally for the purposes of that subsection whether a work has been made available to the public no account shall be taken of any unauthorised act. For your reviews, you would need to properly attribute the source of the image that you were using and that source must be legitimate. If you can't find a clear legal pathway from the image you have to the actual copyright holder you could be in trouble (e.g. an image from someone else's blog where that image may have been uploaded illegally). Your best bet is to go to the studio concerned and use images from their official public releases with proper attribution.

It's not fair use. Fair use is when you do something that normally only the copyright holder can do. Playing a video game is the ordinary, intended use of the work. In the United States, ordinary use is not protected by copyright. 17 USC 106 sets out the rights protected by copyright. The include copying the work, producing derivative works, distributing the work, and so on. None of these are ordinary use. Someone could perhaps argue that you are creating a derivative work. I doubt that argument would work because you are not taking any protectable elements from the work. But if anyone did argue that, it would make sense to also argue that if that's so, your use would still be covered under fair use because it's transformative, does not substitute for the original work in any way, and takes very little of the work.

Yes. The copyright owner of a work has the exclusive right to "reproduce the copyrighted work" or to make "derivative works" of it. 17 USC 106. Copyright law is older than the photocopier, and it applies to copies made by means of any technology. If your intent is to duplicate the protected work, whether you do it by tracing, photocopying, or even freehand, you are infringing that right. It is possible that you could squeeze into one of the copyright exceptions, such as fair use, but these are much narrower than people tend to assume they are (especially outside of the U.S.), and they boil down to: "Well, yes, I copied your copyrighted work, but..." The bottom line is: is it copyrighted? Did you copy it, in whole or in part? Then, unless you have a very good reason, you've infringed the copyright. Whether you do it by means of tracing paper, jellygraph, or iPhone doesn't matter.

The copyright on the book of quotations protects the collection. That is, it protects the author's choice of which quotations to include, and of what order to list them in. It also covers any division of them into groups or categories, and any added text (intros, comments, and so on) written by the author. It does not protect the quotations themselves. As those are not the original work of the author, s/he can have no copyright in them. Any quotes that are in the public domain (through expiration of copyright, or otherwise) may be used freely. Any others are protected by copyright. However the use of a short quotation is often fair use under US law, or is subject to another exception to copyright elsewhere. But that depends very much on the details of the factual situation. So quotes with expired copyrights are safe to use. Others may well be safe if they are relatively short, and proper attribution is given.

Your feeling is correct. Copyright in those images is owned by Amazon, or by someone Amazon contracted with, in any case not by you. Using them to sell your bean bag would be infringement, unless you have been granted permission to use the images. (It is not very likely that you would be sued over this, but please do the right thing anyway.) In any case those stock images may not show quite how your particular bean-bag looks now. Take your own photo and upload it with your sale listing.

Let’s work it through Is the work copyright? Yes. Are you making a copy or a derivative work? Yes. Do you have permission? No. At this point, it is prima facie copyright violation. However, various copyright laws have defences for breach. You don’t say where you are but as the USA is the most permissive in this regard we’ll use the USA. If it’s not legal there, it’s not legal anywhere. If it is legal there, it’s still likely to be not legal everywhere else. is it fair use? Almost certainly not. Wizards of the Coast (the copyright owner) already do this. While this service is free for creatures from the Monster Manual, it does drive traffic to their web site where they sell stuff. They also licence (presumably for money) others to do the same. Your usage would negatively affect the copyright owners market. This counts against fair use. Because it’s already being done, your work has virtually nil transformative value. This counts against fair use. You are copying a substantial part of the work. This counts against fair use. You are not using it commercially but neither is it for educational use. This is unlikely to matter. On balance: not fair use. TL;DR This is copyright violation.

Yes, you may The layout of the board and its appearance are not protected by copyright, because they are not expressions or any other type of copyrightable content. Even if they were (say if some protested art was displayed on the board) you are displaying this for instructional purposes, and not harming any market for the board, so fair use is likely to apply (in the U.S.). The device could be protected by patent, but you are not copying or imitating the board, nor showing anyone how to do so, so that would not apply. You are not selling or advertising the board, nor knock-offs of it, so trademark protection would not apply, even if a protected trademark is visible on th board. Just in case, be sure to make clear that your video is not authorized or endorsed by the maker of the board.

"Personal use only" does not excuse copyright infringement under US law. The uploader does not hold copyright, and neither gives nor denies permission to copy his creation. The law does not require a copyright holder to deny permission, it requires the user to actually obtain permission. So no matter how you slice it (even as fair use) it is infringement for you to copy that video.

Copyright on Developer's Website I've been trying to find concrete information about developer's copyright. If a developer has its own website (in terms of business [card]) and the projects that are part of the portfolio were projects created and sold by a company, does the developer have some sort of rights to the work? After all, even though the client payed, the designer designed it and sales brought the project to the company, the programmer made it «tangible». What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer? Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?

The fact that a developer is showing off work that he/she has done for other another company doesn't imply that that developer owns any copyright to the work. In Canada, see the Copyright Act, § 13 (3): Where the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright and § 13 (4): The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right... In the US, see 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b): In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. and § 201 (d): The ownership of a copyright may be transferred... "What rights should and should not be attributed to the developer?" That is a business decision to be made on a case-by-case basis. Advice about the prudent balance of copyright between an employer/client and employee/contractor is legal advice. "Is it okay to use this projects as part of the developer's portfolio?" If the developer can link to public use of a product that he/she developed for a company, then the developer is not violating copyright by simply advertising that they worked on the product and linking to, without reproducing, the work. If the developer for whatever reason maintained copyright ownership in the code and other assets, it would not be copyright infringement to reproduce those as part of the portfolio. If the developer did not maintain copyright ownership in the code or assets, reproducing those may be copyright infringement, dependent on whether the copyright owner allowed the developer to reproduce those elements, or if the reproduction is fair use. There may be other laws or contracts implicated, though: non-disclosure agreements, trademark law, among others.

Do you have an explicit permission by the artist? Does the artist give a blanket permission to anyone which covers this kind of use of their work (a license)? If no, then you commit a copyright violation when you use their work for your blog. This applies to practically any country which signed the Berne convention which is almost everywhere in the world. Having no commercial interest is usually not an excuse to violate copyright. Regarding which jurisdiction applies when you, your website and the copyright holder are in different countries: I opened a new question about this.

Person A has to have created the data to hold copyright; for most kinds of data this has no legal effect because facts are not protected by copyright. A mineable database probably does not have the necessary creative elements for copyright. An algorithm is not protected by copyright (it might be patented). Person C's program is copyrighted. The product created by D is probably copyrighted, depending on what degree of creativity is involved in their transformation. If the transformation is automatic then no, but if creative judgments are applied to the output of the program then maybe. Though the resulting product is another database of facts, and the facts cannot be protected. In terms of "using the model", only C and possibly B have any control. If it is necessary to validate the software using A's data and A has kept the data secret, C might negotiate with A to use the data, in order to complete his program, and that could give A some interest in the program.

Assumptions Let us assume that the code involved was created during the period of employment, was within the scope of that employment, and was validly work-made-for-hire (WFH). In that case, the code copyright is owned by the former employer.dn the person who wrote it has no more rights than a random stranger would. I am also going to assume US law. Ownership of Ideas Who owns the ideas, the knowledge of how these libraries work? No one does. In the absence of a patent, no one ever "owns" an idea. ]17 USC 102(b)](https://copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html#102) provides: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Derivative Works Copyright law does prohibit anyone making a derivative work from a work protected by copyright without the permission of the owner. A derivative work is one "based on" the source work. The classic case is a translation. Exactly when a piece of software is a derivative work of another is fact-dependent. Bu several things are clear. If the source work is trivial and obvious, ther may not be sufficient "originality" for the source work to be protected by copyright at all. If the source work is not protected by a valid copyright, nothing is a derivative work of it. A "hello world" program, for example, is probably not original enough for any copyright. A straight-forward implementation of a basic algorithm like quicksort is probably not original enough, either. If there is only one way, or only a small number of ways, to express the ideas of the source work, the merger doctrine applies. This means that the expression of the work is merged into the idea, leaving the expression unprotected. When the merger doctrine applies, there is, in effect, no copyright. If a work copies ideas from a source, but none of its particular expression of those ideas, the result is not a derivative work, and is not an infringement of copyright. If a work is definitive, but is also a fair use of the source work, it is not an infringement. The usual four-factor fir use analysis must be made to determine this. In particular, if a work is highly transformative, it is likey to be found to be a fair use. Issues from the Question What if the new code (presumably, in the case of something simple) comes out exactly the same (even if I rewrite it without looking)? That Rather suggests that the work was too trivial to be original enough to have copyright protection at all, or else that there are only a few ways to express the idea, and the merger doctrine applies. But if neither o those were true, this might be an infringement. [* To be coninued*]

It's really your client that should be asking these questions. Writing the app is perfectly legal. So you can enter a contract with that client to write the app and deliver it to them, ready to be put on the Google Play store or the App Store (entering a contract needs to be done carefully, obviously). I'd make 100 million percent sure that the contract states clearly that you have zero responsibility if the app is rejected or removed for non-technical reasons, and that the legality of actually selling and running the app is also not your responsibility. The reason is that I very much suspect that running the app might be illegal, and that the chances of getting it permanently on one of the stores are rather slim. And solving those problems is outside of what a software developer can competently do.

You can license the use of your IP only for certain uses, for example (most commonly) "non-commercial". The general template of permission is "You have permission to ___ as long as you ___". What the user is permitted to do, in your scheme, is something along the lines of "only distribute the output in this manner", or "not distribute code developed with this tool anywhere else". It's up to you to prove that someone violated that condition, if they did.

What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.

The general idea of such an app is not subject to copyright protection. Ideas never are protected by copyright. So creating an app based on the functionality of a fictional app would not be a copyright violation. The logo might, if it is original enough, be protected by copyright. Any or all of the "name, the logo and the color scheme" might well be subject to trademark protection. (Names and other short phrases are not protected by copyright.) You would be wise not to use these identifying elements of the show, but instead create ones sufficiently different that no reasonable person would be confused into thinking that your app had been used on the show, or was sponsored, endorse, or approved by the show or its creators. An explicit disclaimer saying that you are in no way associated with the show or its creators, and your app is not approved by or endorsed by them would also be wise. Otherwise you might be accused of trying to pass off your work as affiliated with they show, or to trade on the show's reputation and fame. Whether you make your app an open source work is not in any way relevant to copyright or trademark claims. Whether you charge for your app is of only limited relevance to a copyright claim. Whether you sell or market your app, or use it to advertise some other product or service is relevant to a trademark claim, as trademarks are only protected against their use "in trade" which generally means commercially. However, non-commercial use of a trademark may constitute "dilution" of the mark, which may give rise to a cause of action against the person using it.

Are Captcha solver farms illegal? Let say that captcha is a picture that prevents automated programs to do a certain task. Now imagine that we have a service in which some people works to solve some captchas. These captchas are sent by other people and/or by their program for the purpose that we don't know. People who work are get some money and who ask their captcha to be solved pay some funds. So by this way, not only the owner of the farm get some money but the solvers who might not have a real job get money too. So my question is this, are these farms illegal? (in USA, UK and Canada) of so which law they break?

This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.

Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.

Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.

No, it is not. Just as it is illegal to steal from a thief, it is illegal to hack a hacker. Criminals are often considered a good target for crimes from a practical standpoint, but crimes against criminals are still prosecuted. As criminals are unlikely to report crimes against them to the authorities (particularly when doing so runs the risk of them being arrested for their crimes), targeting them does tend to result in a lower risk of being caught by the authorities, but if the crime is discovered, it will generally be prosecuted all the same. To that point, two Florida men have recently been arrested and are being prosecuted for stealing millions of dollars in Bitcoins from an illegal, darkweb drug marketplace in 2013, and there is always the more famous case of the two government agents who are in jail for stealing from the Silk Road. In your specific example, if all you did was hand over the information to the FBI, it's less likely that you'd be prosecuted than if you did so for personal gain, but you would be at risk of prosecution for engaging in vigilante computer hacking, yes. Also consider that if your actions happened to interfere with an ongoing investigation or result in the inability to prosecute (say, for the evidence you gathered being tainted and inadmissible by your involvement), you could be charged with crimes such as obstruction of justice or interfering with a police investigation as well.

The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.

Copyright in the US is usually a civil matter. Meaning that the copyright owner can sue (typically for money damages or injunctive relief) an infringer. The criminal laws that we have are aimed at the reproducer and/or distributor. In other words, chances are that you won't get in any criminal trouble for accessing academic articles of dubious origin. But never say never. RIP Aaron Schwartz.

It seems that you don’t understand what parody is. If you do understand, please explain how it’s even possible to parody computer code. What you can do with “open source” code depends on the licence the copyright holder(s) release it under. For some very permissive licences you can do what you suggest, for most, you can’t.

Is it criminal to find strings whose MD5 hash is known? No, unless the method or purpose involves gaining (or attempting to obtain) unauthorized access to others' computer systems or networks, or causing damage to them. This applies regardless of whether you program some brute-force algorithm rather or query a public [online] database that stores reverse hashes.

What rights do children under the age of 18 have while living with their parents? Do children have basic rights to Wi-Fi, food, and a bed?

See http://www.lawstuff.org.uk/the-facts/what-are-childrens-rights The relevant parts are: Wi-fi Freedom of expression and getting information: You must be able to get and share information with others, as long as this does not damage others (article 13). However, even in the UK, it is unlikely that Wi-Fi, the internet or a computer would be considered essential for this. If you can get a newspaper, reasonable access to a radio and have the ability to socialise then that would probably suffice. Food Health: You must also be able to get clean water, nutritious food and live in a healthy environment. Note that this does not require any specific foodstuffs or any drinks other than water. Bed Standard of living: You have the right to a standard of living that is necessary for your physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development. This would include somewhere to sleep; in the UK this would probably be a bed.

They are inclusive if the contract says they are, they are exclusive if the contract says they are. What does your contract say? The lease starts on 14/1/2016 This is the point at which the tenants rights begin - they can take possession from 12:00:00 am 14/1/2016. This date is included in the lease period The lease ends on 13/1/2017 This is the point at which the tenants rights end - they must be out before 12:00:00 am 13/1/2016. This date is excluded from the lease period. I have no doubt that the magistrate had a view on this but as a mediator, it is not their role to express their view: its for the parties to determine a solution which may or may not be informed by knowing the exact legal position.

There is a general EU anti-discrimination directive 2000/43 which in Article 3(1)(h) which applies the standards to housing. This document analyzes Czech anti-discrimination law. If you were discriminated against on the basis of being English, that could support legal action. There is no current EU or Czech legislation that guarantees a right to operate in the language of your choice. There have been calls to create some such legislation. Such legislation would be the implementation of Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which says that Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. There is under Article 9 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages a right to use regional or minority languages in judicial proceedings, but there is no generic "right to use your own language". There are occasional cases where governments are sued because their actions linguistically discriminate. As observed here, there was a case in Belgium where the government was sued for not subsidizing French education in non-French territories, but the court said that "Art. 14 cannot be interpreted as guaranteeing children or parents a right to obtain instruction in a language of his choice".

Anyone has a right to report illegal activities that it is aware of to the authorities. This is in fact where 99.9% of police investigations start. In addition, students of a school (or, more generally, members of any organisation) are eligible to be investigated/disciplined by the school in accordance with the rules of the school providing that the investigation and punishment are in accordance with the law. This would normally permit (require?) notification of any child's parent or guardian. In loco parentis does not arise - the school is acting as a responsible citizen; not as a substitute for the children's parents.

In the U.S. Those stories could constitute "obscenity," in which case they could violate all sorts of federal and state laws. I was surprised to discover on this DoJ page: 18 U.S.C. § 1465 and § 1466: It is illegal to sell and distribute obscene material on the Internet. Convicted offenders face fines and up to 5 years in prison. It is illegal for an individual to knowingly use interactive computer services to display obscenity in a manner that makes it available to a minor less than 18 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) –Communications Decency Act of 1996, as amended by the PROTECT Act of 2003). It is also illegal to knowingly make a commercial communication via the Internet that includes obscenity and is available to any minor less than 17 years of age (See 47 U.S.C. § 231 –Child Online Protection Act of 1998). Under some state laws merely authoring or possessing obscene material is a felony. However, if the material is not obscene then it is actually protected by the first amendment. In fact many public schools (at least when I was growing up) required us to read "literature" (e.g., The Color Purple) that included descriptions of child rape and sexual abuse. Descriptions of purportedly actual sexual abuse of minors are also common in the testimony and published biographies of abuse victims. In the U.K. Such obscene stories are also illegal in the U.K. The relevant law is the Obscene Publications Act 1959. The Crown Prosecution Service provides information on the specific application of that and related laws.

Under US immigration law, any person who at any point after February 27, 2001 meets all of the following conditions automatically receives citizenship the moment they meet the conditions: Under 18 Lawful permanent resident (i.e. has a green card) At least one biological parent is a US citizen (adoptive parents also count of some other requirements are met; stepparents don't count unless they have adopted the child) Lives in the US in both the physical and legal custody of said US citizen parent As far as USCIS is concerned, if a biological child lives with both biological parents, then the US citizen parent has legal custody. If the child was born out of wedlock, they must have been legitimated before they turned 16 to count as their father's child; the applicable law for that depends on where exactly you live. Source

The relevant law in England and Wales is the Protection of Children Act 1978. Under section 1 of the Act, it’s a defense to distributing, showing, or possessing indecent images of children if you had a “legitimate reason” to distribute, show, or possess them. It’s also a defense if you had not seen the images, didn’t know they were indecent, and didn’t have any cause to suspect they were indecent. However, the 1999 case of R v. Bowden held that downloading a digital copy of an image counts as “making” an image. This is not subject to the “legitimate reason” defense by statute (although I don’t know if it’d count as “making” if you have no reason to know the contents, like if a computer repair shop backs up a customer’s hard drive without looking at what’s on the drive). However, it is explicitly still subject to defenses in sections 1A and 1B of the Act. 1A covers spouses and partners. If you are the spouse or partner of a child between 16 and 18, then with their consent you can legally make indecent images of them (although this doesn’t apply if anyone but the two of you is in the image). You can also possess those images with their consent and give them a copy. Section 1B covers criminal proceedings, investigations, etc., and was added after R v. Bowden. Because copying a digital image counts as “making” an image, it would generally be illegal for people to work with digital copies of indecent images even if done for a good reason. To avoid that, Parliament made an exception for making an indecent image when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate crimes, as well as for criminal proceedings anywhere in the world. Parliament also exempted the UK’s intelligence agencies (MI5, MI6, and GCHQ) when carrying out their duties. These are specific statutory exemptions, so they can’t really be generalized to “if you have a legitimate reason.”

"When ever I enter my college I'm forbidden to drink energy drinks..." You are under a contract and bound by the rules and regulations of the college; read the contract you signed when you registered for classes and paid tuition. That contract will stipulate what you are allowed to do and not do in classes, in your interactions with tutors and faculty, and on the college grounds, either public or private, and probably covers a dress code, phone usage, and on and on. The only "loophole" you have available is to stop going to college. In addition, you are 17 and a minor under the law in many jurisdictions; this means you have fewer "rights" than an adult. And, the contract is technically between your parents and the college, not you and the college.

What's to stop a homeless person living in a church or a mosque? Aren't churches and mosques basically public places of worship? Couldn't a homeless man just claim he is doing an extensive period of praying? Sorry if this question sounds ignorant or dumb. I'm just curious.

In many countries (for instance, the US), churches and mosques are private property. In general, the owner of private property can throw anyone off their property; claiming you're doing an extensive period of praying doesn't matter, because they are under no obligation to let people stay as long as needed to pray (they can kick someone off the property for just about any reason). If there's a contract in play things are different, but contracts aren't in play in this situation. That said, nothing stops the church or mosque from letting the homeless stay there; this is actually not that uncommon (charity being a fairly common religious virtue).

A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data".

First off, no the Patriot Act would not stop you from participating in this organization (The Patriot Act broadened the definition of Terrorism and types of crimes that might constitute terrorism, the ability to investigate potential security threats to the United States mostly through loosening restrictions on Warrants for such investigations.). Second and more pedantically, the Patriot Act is no longer law as of March 27, 2020 (this might have gotten lost in the news due to this being the start of Covid-19 pandemic shut downs globally). Much of the Patriot Act's laws did live on in the form of the USA Freedom Act. But in 2022, no one will arrest you under any provision of the Patriot Act. Yay! All that said, I am not aware of any laws restricting 501(c)(3) organizations from taking donations (either in monetary or in kind) from non-U.S. Citizens or Residents. All that the label means is that the organization is tax-exempt and that donors to such organizations can deduct their donation from the taxes they owe to the government (i.e. if I owe $500 in taxes but I gave $1000 to a 501(c)(3) that year, then I don't owe the government any tax. In fact, the government owes me a $500 rebate.). All 501(c) organizations (there are 29 different classifications) have rules about what they may and may not do and will lose their tax-exempt status if they fail to abide by those rules. Each different category has different restrictions (For example, a 501(c)(3) may not partake in any political campaigning or lobbying as part of it's position but a 501(c)(4) may (though funds used for such activities are not tax-deductible. Really the 501(c)(3) status only applies for tax purposes, so if you are not filling out a U.S. Tax Return, it shouldn't matter to you (though you may want to see if your government allows donations to foreign charities to count for tax-deductions). Best thing to do is to reach out to the charity and ask if there are any problems with you helping given your not a U.S. resident. If there is, consider starting up a similar charity for people within your own nation... maybe even ask them if you could be a part of a chapter within your nation.

Unless the Youtube Video shows them committing a crime, then no, they couldn't be arrested and tried for a crime. Them saying it, not under oath, is just hearsay that has no evidentiary value unless there is already other evidence they have committed a crime. In that case, its an admission. But there must be other, either circumstantial, or actual physical evidence of a crime. Past intoxication is not a crime, either. Possession of drugs, if caught with them is. But saying you got high is not. People have walked into police stations and confessed to murders. But with no evidence, no body, no name of a missing person, they can't even be held after the holding period for investigatory purposes expires. If the video shows them committing assault, or breaking and entering (there actually are idiots who post this stuff), the video is actual evidence of a crime and it is often used against them. The statements can be used to begin an investigation, but people don't usually confess to anything worth pursuing even an investigation. The fact that someone says they used to do something criminal is not enough. For all you ( meaning anyone ) knows, the statute of limitations has expired because they "pirated games" 10 years ago. Your comment is right on.

It's called police and prosecutorial discretion to discern when to arrest and prosecute; and that situation in particular is also the result of a decision of the jury of the court of public opinion. Permits are required to sell on the street in Oakland. But not everyone who sells has a permit, and not everyone who is confronted about not having a permit is arrested and prosecuted. There are simply too many potential cases to prosecute. And, the police officer has the discretion to ticket or not. When you get pulled over while driving or riding a bike, you don't always get a ticket, since the officer has the option of discretion. When the officer responded and found an eight year-old selling water, he obviously was aware of the fact that it was a violation. But he was also aware of the court of public opinion. What is it going to look like if he arrests an eight year old and their parent? Allison Ettel was right, in a purely legal sense, to make the report. And technically, the child (and adult) needed a permit. And could have been ticketed and prosecuted. But it was Ettel was tried and convicted in the court of public opinion, and she lost her case. Happens a lot.

No. The repeal of pro-LGBT legislation is not sufficient. To be a refugee you must have a real and imminent fear of persecution which is generally defined to include matters like bodily harm or arbitrary detention or seizure of property on account of your status. The generalized protections existing under the law from private violence and civil rights violations in the U.S., while imperfect, is not going to suffice as a general matter to establish refugee status, particularly because many of those protections arise under federal law. A generalized fear of a "civil war" someday, and a general dissatisfaction with the amount of corruption present in the government and the bad policies of the government, in the United States, is not sufficient. Also, the United States is a free immigration zone, which means that people can freely travel and relocate to other parts of the United States, and while some places in the United States might be quite unfriendly to LGBT individuals, there are other places in the United States that are much more welcoming both in theory, based upon enacted laws, and in practice. For example, in Colorado, there are state anti-discrimination laws, one of the leading candidates for Governor is a gay man who is currently one of our Congressmen, we have had lesbian speakers of the state house, a high official in Denver's school district is a gay man who was a former state legislator, and a DA in a fairly conservative suburb of Denver vigorously prosecuted and obtained a conviction against a man who murdered a transwoman on account of her trans-status including a hate crime count, and a transman serves in the U.S. military in one of the state's federal military bases. When I walk the halls of my children's high school in Denver, the walls are full of official administration proclamations of support for LGBT students that is backed up by action and reflected in how my children's many LGBT friends were treated in their school. Denver's clerk's office proudly proclaims that it marries hundreds, if not thousands, of same sex couples every year. This doesn't mean life is perfect in Colorado, but it isn't official persecution of the kind that would rise to refugee status either. And, since anyone in the U.S. can move to Colorado or other relatively LGBT friendly states, there would not be any ground to claim refugee status. Canada, for example, would not admit someone as a refugee based upon persecution for LGBT status if that person did not demonstrate that they could not escape persecution by moving to metropolitan Denver or San Francisco or New York City. The U.S. is not necessarily the very best place in the world to be LGBT, but it is certainly near the top, despite the fact that the struggle for LGBT rights is ongoing and will be indefinitely and it isn't perfect.

I think the concerns are more economic than legal, although legal concerns are sometimes present. You don't want people to trash the place. You want there to be an "authority figure" whose presence encourages order, deal with unexpected situations, and whom people who aren't tech savvy feel comfortable dealing with, and it can create a better customer service relationship. It really depends on the nature of the premises. There is not a one size fits all rule. There are situations where one doesn't have someone on the premises. There are bank vestibules with automatic teller machines in them. There are coin entry bathroom/shower facilities. There are self-storage facilities that work like that. There are deeply rural places with low traffic that rely on an honor system rather than trying to monitor use (e.g. some campsites). There are AirBnB type rentals. The are car repair shops with after hours drop off boxes. On the other hand, there are some situations where it is pretty much inconceivable that you wouldn't have someone one site monitoring the situation. I'm pretty sure that you have to have someone on premises for a pub. I'm sure it is necessary in places where you have unaccompanied minors (at a minimum, as a practical reality for liability purposes). There aren't many medical services that can be provided in that format (although there might be a few).

A problem with the question is that it uses the loaded term "victim". If you change the question to "Are there actions that you can perform involving another person, which are crimes even if the other person consents to participating in the action", then there are very many. Selling alcohol to a minor; selling heroin to anyone; selling sex in most US jurisdictions; selling firearms to a convicted felon. Also, for a physician to assist a person in suicide, in most states. Formerly in the US, various forms of sexual intercourse were acts that consent did not make legal. Whether or not the person is a "victim" in these cases is open to debate. In the case of physician-assisted suicide in Washington, the doctor is allowed to prescribe (oral) drugs that the person ingests: only a doctor is permitted to do this, both under the DWD Act and as a consequence that only a doctor can prescribe the drugs. There seems to be a belief that it is a crime to assist a person in committing suicide, which is probably correct if the assistance is shooting the person in the head, or in general directly causing the death (thus, "I give you permission to shoot me in the head" doesn't cut it). But from what I can tell, it is not generally against the law in Washington to help a person who commits suicide (e.g. supplying the means of self-dispatching). In some countries, suicide and helping with suicide is illegal, e.g. in Kenya Penal Code 225 says Any person who (a) procures another to kill himself; or (b) counsels another to kill himself and thereby induces him to do so; or (c) aids another in killing himself, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for life. No exception is created if the person consents to being aided to kill himself.

Why does this mention the U.S.? There's a company near where I live called House of Air; it's a trampolining thing so, naturally, it has a waiver which explains as specifically as possible the many and varied ways you could accidentally die / become completely paralyzed. Naturally, it makes for light and fun reading. Most of it makes perfect sense, until this part (emphasis mine): Waiver of Liability for Ordinary Negligence of House of Air In consideration of permission to use the property, facilities, equipment, and services of House of Air, today and on all future dates, I (on behalf of myself, my child or ward, my spouse, heirs, personal representatives, my estate, my parents and assigns – referred to hereafter as “RELEASING PARTIES”) do hereby waive, release, discharge and covenant not to sue House of Air, LLC, the United States of America, and The Presidio Trust, and their respective owners, directors, officers, employees, volunteers, independent contractors, agents, affiliates, successors, assigns, and equipment suppliers — referred to hereafter as “PROTECTED PARTIES”) from liability from any and all claims arising from the use of the House of Air facilities including any injury resulting from the ordinary negligence of the PROTECTED PARTIES. I should specify- I'm in the U.S., so I'm guessing that has something to do with why that's in there. But still, why on earth is it specifying that I can't sue my country? I haven't read all that many waivers of liability, but nonetheless this isn't the first one I've read, and I've never seen that particular clause before. I am somewhat nonplussed.

House of Air is located in the Golden Gate National Recreation Area, in land owned by the US government and managed by the Presidio Trust (a corporation wholly owned by the US government). As the US government owns the land, and a government-owned corporation leased it to House of Air, House of Air's waiver indemnifies them. It looks odd, but it's just because the US government happens to be House of Air's landlord, and House of Air is indemnifying their landlord.

Typically in defamation law, claims made persuiant to litigation are not defamatory, since they are going to be tested for validity if the case goes to trial. I'm not familiar with any differences in what is generally done in settlements between the U.K. and the U.S., but since both are Common Law countries, and Settlements are very common in civil proceedings in the U.S., it's a good start. Generally a settlemant can occur anytime before the verdict of the case is rendered, although usually it will happen after preliminary hearings during the Discovery phase. In the U.S., Discovery is very broad and one need not prove that the requested items contain evidence but might contain evidence. This means that, for example, you could request a substantial amount of e-mail records from the opposing party because somewhere on the company e-mail server, there might be something to help your case. And even if after you sift through the emails and find no smoking guns related to your case, you could find some dirty laundry that's unrelated but still damning... if not more so than the initial case. Many people, especially big compainies, would rather just give the ex-employee some what he/she wants, if it means they don't get to see the proverbial man behind the curtain. Additionally the practice might fall into a legally gray area of the law that, if it reaches trial, could hurt the company or even the industry if a judge rules against the company, effectively saying that this gray area is now definately illegal. Better to eat the loss of capital with the settling out of court than to take the much larger hit of the buisness practice being illegalized all together. Typically in settlements, both parties agree to terms and sign a contract. While the whole of the terms are never discussed, almost all include that the plaintiff will drop the case and never bring the matter to court again and that both parties will sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) meaning that they won't discuss the rest of the settlement terms with anyone not party to them. If the plaintiff does break the NDA, the defendant can sue for breech of contract and recover at the least the monitary compensation they awarded in the settlement. Conversely, if the respondent breaks the NDA, the plaintiff can refile their initial suit with the addition of breech of contract (and this time it will get to court... and all the dirty laundry sees the harsh light of day.). While the respondent in a settled case can possibly sue for defamation if the plaintiff said the respondent did what the initial suit claimed they did (legally, it was never proven or disproven), or they were guilty (again, since no verdict was reached at trial, no guilt was established), the breech of contract is a much more airtight case and doesn't open up discovery to the respondent's cupability in the settled case (since the breech is about discussing the settled case at all, not the validity of the accusations of the settled case). Typically they would not go this route because then it opens the can of worms the settlement was trying to keep a lid on.

A property owner can give you an easement for the air rights of their property, which can allow you to put your own structure over their property or prevent them from putting a structure over their property (depending on the terms of the easement). For instance, a railroad might sell the air rights to an urban rail yard to a private developer so that the developer can put buildings over top of the yard. A high-rise owner might buy an easement for a neighboring property that bans them from building above a certain height in order to keep the views from the high-rise unblocked. However, a property owner can't sell you rights that they themselves don't have. The US government has exclusive sovereignty over US airspace, and there's a public right of transit through navigable airspace (defined as airspace above minimum safe flight altitudes). While the traditional rule was that a property owner owned their land up to infinity, with the development of airplanes this rule has been changed to significantly limit the rights of property owners. The FAA doesn't limit how tall a property owner can build (although too-tall structures can be declared hazards to navigation, which can cause issues with planning boards or insurance companies). However, if there are no obstructions, the airspace above 500 feet in rural areas (in built-up areas it depends on local obstructions) is open for pilots to fly through. The only way to get obstruction-free airspace restricted is to try to get the FAA to issue a flight restriction. If you're trying to get large swaths of airspace restricted, this is extremely unlikely to happen.

What "reasonable accommodation" were you requesting? That they lower the bar of determining your ability to pay your bills on time? I don't think that will qualify. A business setting a minimum bar for financial viability isn't a burden tied to a handicap. It's one thing to request a ramp, contracts in braille, etc., but it's another thing to request that they accept a highly-probable financial risk. What would you expect of them the next time "life" got in the way and you couldn't pay your rent? Another accommodation? I think what they were saying is that since you didn't pass the financial background check, and as such were not accepted as a resident, you aren't in a position to make an accommodation request.

But even then, to my understanding, a contract can't prohibit a party from seeking legal remedies. You are mistaken. A contract settling a bona fide dispute regarding people's legal rights can mutually (or unilaterally for that matter) release or waive their legal rights. In fact, a waiver or release of rights is routinely a part of a settlement agreement. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of such agreements are entered into every year and they are almost always enforced. Sometimes, but not always, a settlement agreement will also call for a dismissal of a case with prejudice, which (roughly) means a dismissal that prohibits refiling a case involving the same subject matter.

You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.

Communicable diseases are endemic to the human condition Some places, times and situations are riskier than others but there is always a risk in widespread travel. Outside of disease spread, there are other risks in travel; for example, if no-one traveled at all there would be no motor vehicle deaths. On the flip-side, not traveling has its own dangers; for example, you will not die in a house fire if you are in your car. Of course, there are enormous benefits to widespread travel; economic, cultural and personal - life is to be experienced after all. If you stop the skier from skiing, then you have just damaged the livelihood of all the people who depend on tourism; the airline, the hotel, the bartender, the ski technician, the baker in the ski resort etc. Everything is allowed unless it is prohibited By and large, this is the way that the law works. It's legal to do anything you like. Unless it isn't. It isn't illegal to travel to, say, Finland. So you can. If the government (of whichever country) decides that the costs of allowing people to travel to Finland now outweigh the benefits then they can prohibit it. However, that is a political decision; not a legal one. As for your drink-driving example, I am old enough to remember when it wasn't illegal to drive drunk, although I was too young to drive. Of course, if you are in Somalia or Kenya it's still legal. Also, what counts a drunk varies by country - you can have a couple in Finland but cross over into Russia and you are breaking the law. Why does Finland allow such recklessness? Because it's a political decision and politicians in Finland and Russia have reached different conclusions about what level of risk is acceptable. Same with travel restrictions.

This is a pretty good example of "Contributory Negligence". Depending on the precise details of the case, both (or multiple) parties may have contributed to Karen's injuries. She certainly had some role by ignoring posted signs and wearing inappropriate footwear. But the shop may have made access too easy. Maybe they didn't have a front-desk person posted in a safe-area, causing her to go seeking an employee. The shop had a dangerous bin of metal shavings without a lid on it, and at a height and location where a single misstep means someone could fall into it head-first. They had dangerous crane-control mechanism in easy reach that didn't need a Key or other Lock-out mechanism. Ultimately, the details will matter. But it should be straightforward for mediation or a trial to determine each parties contribution to the overall unsafe situation and injuries. Taking the description above at face-value, I think Karen and the shop might both be found partially responsible for the injuries. It may not be a 50/50 split, but Karen likely acted unreasonably, and the shop, despite OSHA compliance, may well have created more hazards than appropriate.

Doctor sending private information over whatsup for consultation If a doctor sends screen grabs, taken by his smartphone, of different patients' confidential health files to other doctors for quick consultation, does that potentially violate any law? Could that be considered professional misconduct (and thus imperil his license to practice medicine)?

Health care providers in the US may send protected patient records to other health care providers for the purposes of treatment, either of the patient whose information it was or of a different patient (for instance, a doctor could send a chart of a different patient with a similar issue). This can be done without patient authorization, except for two cases: if the patient has requested more restrictions on use of their information and the provider agreed to those restrictions, and with psychotherapy notes. Source: HHS. WhatsApp specifically does not appear to be compliant with HIPAA, which is the US medical privacy law. However, there are many similar systems that are compliant. The body of your question asks about taking a smartphone screenshot; with many secure messaging systems, this is perfectly acceptable, and the principle of a doctor consulting with another doctor about a patient is actually encouraged. HIPAA violations do not by themselves result in any action against a medical license, nor can anyone besides the US government file suit based on a violation (everyone else is limited to complaining to the US government). Private lawsuits and (especially) license consequences are determined by state law, and are state- and situation-dependent. A doctor who calls a press conference to announce that this patient of his has HIV is more likely to face sanctions than a doctor whose violation was just not using a secure enough messaging client. HIPAA violations like this are not that uncommon, and generally result in at most a fine against the practice.

It's almost certainly violating the company's rules, and yes, you can get into trouble for that (in the sense of an internal disciplinary matter). Whether it's a criminal hacking will depend on a) what you did; b) where you are ... but I wouldn't rule that possibility out.

Hardly ever While all doctors in private practice has a contract with each of their patients: For most practical purposes clinical negligence lawyers can forget about these. It is not that contractual duties do not exist – all private medicine and surgery is performed pursuant to such duties – but that they rarely add anything to the parallel duty owed in tort. The courts have been very reluctant to imply a duty in contract which goes beyond the duty imposed by the common law of negligence. While tort damages aim to restore the plaintiff to the position they were in before the tort and contractural damages aim to place them in the position they would have been in had there been no breach, for medical malpractice there is no practical difference.

This would be unauthorized access to a computer. The offence is found in Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Note that this is a criminal offence, approaching the police about it might be the best way of handling the situation (if you want to go that route, and also, I'm not a lawyer).

This is not a HIPAA violation. HIPAA requires that personal information not be revealed to people lacking a statutorily-defined interest, without the patient's consent. A password itself is not "personal information", though having it could lead to such information. An example of personal information would be the fact that you personally had a certain tooth filled (not that "somebody had a tooth filled"). Protected information can be revealed to certain people, such as the lab that they send samples to, or your insurance company. This is covered by what is known as "The Privacy Rule". There is a related rule, the Security Rule, which essentially says "you need to keep information safe". An example of a required security rule standard is that the provider must Implement policies and procedures to address the final disposition of electronic protected health information, and/or the hardware or electronic media on which it is stored HHS recommends degaussing, but other means of satisfying the rule exist (burning, dissolving in acid). Tossing in the trash would not satisfy the rule. Password management falls under the weaker category of "addressable", that is, a provider needs to think about how they will manage passwords, but there is no specific requirement regarding what you have to do (unlike the requirements of Data Backup, Written Contract. Incident Reporting or Media Disposal). Printing and distributing to customers your account and password would, on the other hand, be a reportable incident. Information about your name, the dental procedure done, and the cost of the procedure, is probably also on the paperwork that they give you, and that even more than your password is protected information. A provider is allowed, indeed required, to disclose protected information to the patient. The assumption is that once you have processed that information, you will destroy or protect the paperwork, as you see fit.

We cannot dispense personalized legal advice: that is what your attorney is for. However, I agree with your analysis that this is most likely covered by fair use, and indeed it is not obvious that you have taken anything that is protected. There is no creativity behind a number such as entries in the "I did N pushups" column. The arrangement of data into a web page passes the smidgen of creativity test, but "210" is not a creative number. The terms of service of a website cannot negate your right to use the website however you want in a non-infringing way. If your use is "fair use", then they can't tell you that you can't use it. In case it turns out that "fair use" fails, the matter would hinge on what exactly the TOS says. They may have granted you permission to make use of their "information". So there are three positive avenues for you to consider: not protected, fair use, and permitted. A practical difficulty is that a university lawyer is only interested in the interests of the university, and they are as likely to say "don't do that" or "get permission" as they are to say "that is fair use". You can hire a lawyer who is paid to care about your interest, though there is never a guarantee that the lawyer's advice is correct. I think it is likely that the lawyer will tell you to not say anything until legally forced to, given the apparent rebuff of your request for special permission.

Mere ideas are not, as others have said, protected by copyright. However, the police officer in such a situation may have a duty of confidentiality, particularly if s/he is informed that the contents of the phone are confidential. For example the "Officer's Code of Conduct" of Canton Ohio, says: Whatever a Police Officer sees, hears or learns of that is of a confidential nature will be kept a secret unless the performance of duty or legal provision requires otherwise. Members of the public have a right to security and privacy, and information obtained about them must not be improperly divulged. Many police departments have similar codes of conduct or policies. Such a policy might apply in the circumstances described in the question. In this page on "Confidential information" posted by the TaylorWessing law firm, it is said that: There are three circumstances in which the disclosure of information gives rise to an obligation of confidence: An obligation imposed by contract – for example, non-disclosure agreements. An obligation implied because of the circumstances of disclosure – this is determined on the basis of whether a reasonable man standing in the shoes of the recipient of the information would have realised that the information was being given to him in confidence. An obligation implied because of the special relationship between the parties concerned – for example, employer/employee relationships. The best way of ensuring that confidential information is recognised and treated as such is by contract. If no express requirement for confidentiality is imposed, the manner in which the discloser treats the information can be held as indicative of its level of confidentially. Talking about information in public places, for example, would cause the recipient to assume it was not confidential in nature. An action for breach of confidence is based on the conscience of the recipient who must have agreed or known that the information is confidential. Thus an action for breach of confidence can be brought against the original recipient of the information and any subsequent recipient who becomes aware of the fact that the information is confidential. An action for breach of confidence may be brought against a person who has used or disclosed, or threatened to use or disclose, confidential information without permission. A police officer engaged in a search of confidential documents, whether found on a phone, on a computer, or in a filing cabinet, is in a "special relationship" with the sub ject of the search, and the "circumstances of disclosure" are unusual. Use of such information for private, personal gain unrelated to any police function might be held to violate an implied duty of confidentiality, particularly if the officer is informed of the confidential nature of the documents. If the documents contain or constitute trade secrets, unauthorized use will give grounds for a lawsuit. This would not apply to proper use within a police investigation or criminal case, but it would apply to private use or disclosure by the officer. in "Release of personal information to police: your privacy rights" from the Government of Ontario it is said that: Ontario public sector organizations, such as provincial ministries and agencies, municipalities, schools, and transit systems, are required by law to protect your personal information and to follow certain rules when collecting, using, and disclosing your personal information. This document is primarily about when other governnment agencies can release personal information to law enforcement, but it might be taken to imply a similar obligation to respect privacy being imposed on law enforcement officers. In this page and other linked pages the UK metropolitian police indicate that they are subject to the Data Protection Act 2018 This is closely related to the GDPR. This restricts processing of personal data to lawful purposes. In the absence of the consent of the person searched, I doubt that use of information for personal gain having no connection with a police investigation would constitute a lawful purpose. I have not found an authoritative source, nor a court case, in which the situation described in the question, nor any closely similar situation, is addressed or decided.

Of course it is illegal. You are attempting to access somebody's data without their knowledge and certainly without their consent. In the U.K. it is a crime under the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Police and Justice Act 2006 and the Serious Crimes Act 2015. The clue here should be in the term Serious Crimes. The Human Rights Act, and indeed the ECHR, should never come into it unless it was state sponsored or corporate spying. And even then certain states have given themselves Orwellian totalitarian authority to do as they please.

Open Source Software and Legal Responsibility for Software Content I'm working with a few folks on updating some serious software for mechanism design. Engineered mechanisms have existed in the world now for a few hundred years or so. The science here isn't really new. We're debating bringing out some software for mechanism design and synthesis. We are using really smart algorithms based on physics in the natural world. No magic, just brilliant use working with the existing laws of nature. One of our concerns is the potential for lawsuits by users of the software. We're not sure if we should share our algorithms openly or if we should seek to profit from them. For example: Joe Cheap Carnival company invents a new wild ride using our awesome cool mechanism synthesis software. They have Podunk Assembly Company manufacture it with cheapest materials possible with really poor quality control. The ride goes up at a local carnival and oops it fails, and someone gets seriously hurt. Here are my questions: If our software was used by Joe Cheap Carnival's design team to synthesize a mechanism used in the faulty carnival ride, and our software encompassed the use hidden and encoded algorithms, could we be held liable for the failure? If our software was absolutely open source (github), with all algorithms and logic flow in full public view, could we be sued? (Does this change the nature of "responsibility"? ) My questions relates to: Can the open source process be used as a legal protection against a potential lawsuit for a software company? Update (post DaleM response): I'm not sure I fully understand the "duty of care" description. We make software that tells engineers how machines move. Its a similar function to what you might read in an academic text, albeit in a much easier intuitive form to use. (Drag and drop is much easier than reading a chapter of text then doing mathematical problems, even though exactly the same concepts are being used.) The function of our code is to accurately represent the laws of physics. We don't tell somebody what to design, we tell them if you want this particular output, here are a variety of ways to achieve that output. Hmmm... Lets say someone wants to design a six bar mechanism to move an object in a 720 degree circle and deliver it as fast as possible we can help with that. Fancy Machine works uses that model to deliver bolts to an assembly line for rapid manufacturing. Max g forces observed on the bolt is 8 G's. Joe's Cheap Carnival decides to use that exact same mechanism to create an exciting ride for its customers. Its ten times the scale of the bolt delivery machine, but its the same basic mechanism design. Again, Max g forces observed on the customer sitting in the ride is 8 G's. Is our design unsafe? The bolts seem to get there just fine, people, no so much. We profess no responsibility (same as an academic text book author on mechanism design.) In fact that might be a better question. Have any academic folks been sued for academic publications providing "how-to" instructions? If Joes Cheap Carnival team designs a unsafe ride with a mechanism design textbook as a reference, can the university who published that textbook be held liable? Apologies if I'm not using the correct language in the legal arena. And many thanks to you for your responses.

Sources of Liability Liability can come from: Statute law Contract law Common law Statute Law There may be (almost certainly are) laws in the jurisdiction where Joes Cheap Carnival are operating relating to Work Health and Safety. In general, these laws will impose a non-delegable duty (i.e. one you cant get out of) to comply with certain minimum standards. If operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Contract Law If you are selling this software then you can limit your liability in any way you like providing that the limitation is not unlawful. For example, under Australian Consumer Law (which covers B2B transactions up to AUD$40,000 - how much are you selling for?) you have a non-excludable warranty that the software is fit-for-purpose; so, again, if operating your software as instructed with reasonable assumptions gives results that lead to an unsafe design then you would be liable in both cases. Common Law Only parties to a contract can take action under a contract; anyone you owe a duty of care to can sue your for negligence. A person injured by a machine your software helped design need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; it would be hard to argue you didn't, You breached that duty; the software was not "fit-for-purpose", There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your software there would have been no loss, There was a legal (proximate) cause; you may be able to raise something here, if your software was used incorrectly by an engineer, your breach may be too distant Harm; the person must suffer real loss. The only plausible advantage of making your software open source is that you are showing a greater amount of care by allowing your algorithms to be sort-of peer reviewed. This is not a legal shield I would really like to depend on. TL;DR Nothing can stop someone suing you - if they want to sue you they can sue you. Your best defence to a lawsuit is to demonstrate that you did everything a reasonable person could do without the benefit of hindsight Do you really think publishing your code is "everything a reasonable person could do"? You would be far better off: Taking out professional indemnity insurance Validating you algorithms thoroughly Engaging an independent third-party to validate your algorithms Developing proper and thorough testing procedure for your software Testing it in-house Engaging an independent third-party to test it Thoroughly documenting your software including all the assumptions along with the domains where they are valid and invalid.

I finally found the actual transcript of the voir dire part of the case mentioned in the question. http://www.groklaw.net/articlebasic.php?story=2012090614295190 As can be evidenced from the transcript, the judge has specifically instructed the two jurors working as engineers at the local tech companies that they'd have to "forget" what they know about both the software engineering and the patent law itself, too, starting their work on the whole case with a completely clean sheet, using a very simple criteria for making decisions: One side or the other is going to have the burden of proof on -- one side has the burden of proof on some issues, the other side has the burden of proof on other issues. When you go into the jury room to deliberate after you've tried your hardest to understand the evidence, if they haven't educated you on it or if they haven't persuaded you, the party with the burden of proof loses. It's that simple. You don't have to -- you have to make a good faith effort to understand it, but if the party with the burden of proof has failed to do that, the party with the burden of proof loses. That's the standard. You have to -- you, the jury, decide. Now, what you cannot do is bring to bear something that you've learned in some other case, some other patent case, about how some piece of equipment works or something like that. You can't do that. It has to be based on the record here. Then, after a short break and a consultation with the lawyers, where Oracle seems to have expressed some concern to having the computer experts be on the panel, which subsequently prompted the judge to declare the following to the two potential jurors who worked at Cisco and HP: So this is really going to be directed at both of you, but, you know, you come to the party, so to speak, with some prior training that bears upon the subject matter we're going to be hearing a lot about here. That's okay. That's not disqualifying, but you -- it's okay to use your common sense when you render a verdict, but you cannot add to the record in court something that you know about the way software programming works that the witnesses didn't actually testify to. You see what I'm saying? You've got to decide the record -- the case based on the record made here as opposed to adding into it what else you may have known about the way programming and software works. Since both jurors had so much software and patent experience that they couldn't disregard it easily, they were thus both excused (page 95 of 224). All right. I think it would be too hard for you to sit in this case and sort out what you knew already against what is proven or not proven here, and itwould not be fair to the parties to have that extra burden even though you two actually know something about the subject. It's in a way too bad, but it's for the best. So you two are excused to go back to the jury assembly room. Thank you. The other instructions that the judge gives to the potential jurors is also worth reading (starts on page 36 of 224) The full transcript is at http://www.groklaw.net/pdf3/OraGoogle-942.pdf. In summary -- jurors are only allowed to talk to one another when the deliberation process starts, and, no, they are not allowed to bring any "baggage" to the case at stake.

Choice 2 is what the writers of the license have in mind. You own the physical media on which the copy is delivered, such as a DVD or floppy disk (if there was physical media). But you do not own the copy of the software, you merely have purchased a license to use it, which may be revocable under specified circumstances. This is different from the law in the case of a book. Why you buy a book, you own a copy of the book, although you do not own the copyright to the book, and may not make additional copies. The license model was adopted by commercial software distributors for several reasons, but largely to avoid the "first sale doctrine". When you buy a copy of a copyrighted work, you have the right (under US law at least) to lend, rent, sell, or give-away that copy. You do not need the permission of the copyright holder to do any of these. Those in the commercial software business did not want customers to be able to do those things legally. By making the software subject to a license, which is a contract, they could write that license to restrict or prohibit those rights. Sellers also wanted to prohibit reverse engineering of the software, and to restrict use of the software. (For example, to limit the user to installing it on a single computer.) There was at first much dispute over the enforcability of such license agreements. But most US courts now accept them as valid and enforceable, and copyright law has been modified to take account of them. Specifically, 17 USC 109 (2)(b)(1)(A) seems to include a legislative acceptance of this rule.

I'm posting an answer hoping it is not the final answer, but rather in the hopes that it inspires a better answer itself. The open source or "public domain" exception cited in my question has some constraints placed on it. For example, software that falls under 1-1.E.2.e, 1-1.E.2.f, 1-8.E.2.a and 1-8.E.2.b are not covered by the exception. So, here is a summary of every one of those sections, and the sections that those sections reference: Section 1-1.E.2.e - "Technology" for the installation, maintenance or repair of materials specified by 1-1.C.1. Section 1-1.C.1 covers Materials specially designed for use as absorbers of electromagnetic waves, or intrinsically conductive polymers, as follows: ... Not included because my software has absolutely nothing to do with materials of any kind. Entire section is about qualifying a type of material this rule applies to. 1-1.E.2.f - "Technology" for the repair of "composite" structures, laminates or materials specified by 1-1.A.2., 1-1.C.7.c. or 1-1.C.7.d. Section 1-1.A.2 covers "Composite" structures or laminates, having any of the following: ... Not included because my software has absolutely nothing to do with materials of any kind. Entire section is about qualifying a type of material this rule applies to. Section 1-1.C.7.c covers Ceramic-ceramic "composite" materials with a glass or oxide-"matrix" and reinforced with fibres having all of the following: ... Not included because my software has absolutely nothing to do with materials of any kind. Entire section is about qualifying a type of material this rule applies to. Section 1-1.C.7.d covers Ceramic-ceramic "composite" materials, with or without a continuous metallic phase, incorporating particles, whiskers or fibres, where carbides or nitrides of silicon, zirconium or boron form the "matrix"; Section 1-8.E.2 Other "technology" defined as follows: a. "Technology" for the "development", "production", repair, overhaul or refurbishing (re-machining) of propellers specially designed for underwater noise reduction; b. "Technology" for the overhaul or refurbishing of equipment specified by 1-8.A.1., 1-8.A.2.b., 1-8.A.2.j., 1-8.A.2.o. or 1-8.A.2.p. I've omitted copying quite a bit of text, but I kept the title/summary portions to illustrate that all of the exceptions to the open source or "public domain" exception have something to do with software related to restricted physical materials. There are some other exceptions to the general exception, notably the "Information Security" constraint, but note that the "Information Security" constraint applies specifically to Entries 1 and 3, and the open source or "public domain" exception is defined in entry 2. Just for fun, the definition of "Information Security": "Information security" - Cat 5P2 All the means and functions ensuring the accessibility, confidentiality or integrity of information or communications, excluding the means and functions intended to safeguard against malfunctions. This includes "cryptography", "cryptographic activation", cryptanalysis, protection against compromising emanations and computer security. Technical Note: 'Cryptanalysis': the analysis of a cryptographic system or its inputs and outputs to derive confidential variables or sensitive data, including clear text. (ISO 7498-2-1988 (E), paragraph 3.3.18). After reviewing each of the constraints placed on the various exceptions, I believe the spirit of the law here is to control: Closed source "Information Security" software that defines or uses cryptography, regardless of whether the linked crypto software is open source or not. Closed source or open source software that is even remotely related to the study or production of physical materials that you require an export permit for. Basically, if the program even mentions a material that you'd need an export permit for, you probably need an export permit for the software, regardless of whether it's open source or not. Again this is not meant to be a final answer. I'm simply posting more information about the question and my thoughts on it, hoping to assist in creating a better answer than this. Plus, a whole lot of rep is going to go down the toilet without another answer. :)

Generally, this question is not a singular inquiry as its wording may suggest on its face. What typically tends to come up as the subject of dispute is rooted in the urban legend that one cannot obtain a patent (utility) on software. This is substantially incorrect, and any patent attorney asserting to the veracity of this makes a substantially false conclusory statement of law knowingly and willfully controverting the actual state of law in, at least, all Western jurisdictions as it omits to assert to the fact that one is not barred to obtain a patent on any system that comprises of non-obvious software, and hardware to run on is entitled to a patent — except in the U.S. where one must also comply with the Alice decision requiring that at least one hardware component in addition to the hardware of a generic computer be necessary for the utility of the system. However, in the U.S., one may obtain a software-centered patent through a (i) method or (ii) a computer program product in addition to (iii) systems or apparatuses which are available avenues for patents everywhere else. When disputes around IP and software come up, this is typically at the crux of the debate: May one obtain a software patent? The answer is: One is not barred merely because the non-obvious aspect of an invention is software. For example, if one uses hardware that are prior art, in fact, patented to someone else, but by the use of software a system, method and/or computer program product achieves a different objective (since utility patents, axiomatically, must have a utility objective) one may obtain a patent, and a layman may very well consider their invention of the system as that particular component that appears to them as having required any inventive steps, encompasses the inventive novelty (understandably) which, in many cases may be software. So the advice from a patent attorney that “you can’t patent software” is simply malicious (or wide and far disbarringly incompetent). One may patent software so long as it is an invention, and the administrative (or at times judicial) process requirements are complied with. Nevertheless, since the question inquired about “IP”, below is the answer to other avenues of intellectual property. Copyrights The software code written to make this operable could be the subject of copyright as long as it is not substantially identical with another solution (or such to give reasons to believe it to be a derivative thereof) that also put buttons in the four corners. The visual design may possibly also enjoy copyright protection, but that is less plausible to imagine since not only the copyrighted work of art is protected, but anything that may objectively be deemed a derivative work (regardless of whether the “re-author” actually knew about the copyrighted material that it may be deemed the derivate of). Design patents It is possible that one could get design patents for the actual graphical design of the layout provided there isn’t something substantially similar already out there protected by a design patent. Utility patents This would most certainly not overcome obviousness, that is, the requirement for one to obtain a patent which needs that a presented invention not be obvious for anyone “with ordinary skill in the art” (an ordinarily knowledgable person in the field of the specific area of tech). Trademark I have a hard time stretching my imagination to see how this could be applicable.

The legal issues are too black and white to have any meaningful impact on an ethics discussion. The IP belongs to A and B can't use it. A's not planning to build a product around the patent is irrelevant to the law and I do not see it bring up any ethical issue, but some people who do not understand patent law might. There might be ethics issues if A hired Josh with the specific plan to fire him as soon as the application was filed and intentionally misled him about these plans. Another issue might be Josh's duty to not disclose A's confidential information (the application does not become public right away), and Josh's duty to not draw B into developing an infringing product.

If you have released software under the LGPL license, you have given all recipients the right to modify this software for any purpose, including removing or adding features in a manner that you don't like. If you don't want that, you should not release your commercial features under the LGPL. Things you could consider doing: Publish the software under a different license. This is what you're thinking about. But note that you can't just add such license terms. Either, the license is still the LGPL with some extra terms. But then, the terms of the LGPLv3 allow recipients to remove the additional restrictions. Or, this is an entirely separate license. But then it would no longer be the LGPL, and no longer be an Open Source license. Whether such additional terms create a separate license or can be removed from the license is currently being litigated in the US in the context of the Neo4J database, which added the "Commons Clause" restrictions to the AGPLv3. See a discussion of the case from the Software Freedom Conservancy here: https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/mar/30/neo4j-v-purethink-open-source-affero-gpl/ Remove the restricted features from the LGPL version and maintain a separate commercial version, or implement the commercial features as a plugin. This is sometimes known as an “open core” business model. Due to the limited copyleft effect of the LGPL, you can still combine the proprietary parts and the LGPL-covered parts into a single program, but doing so may be confusing for users. It should be absolutely clear which parts are LGPL-covered, and which are your proprietary parts that cannot be modified. However, you would not be able to prevent recipients from using the LGPL-covered parts without your proprietary components, i.e. they would always be able to remove any licensing checks etc. More generally, it could make sense to think about why you want to publish any part of the software as Open Source. Sometimes, Open Source licensing is a good business decision, sometimes it isn't. If you want to control what users can do with the software, Open Source licensing is not a good fit for your goals.

The second paragraph is an invitation for people who don't want to follow the terms of the GPL (e.g. who want to incorporate it into a larger closed-source work, or make closed-source modifications) to contact XXX for a less onerous (but more expensive) license. That would require that XXX have full rights to the software, that they did not for instance incorporate others' GPLed code. It would be a stretch to read the second paragraph as attempting to limit the first paragraph, particularly given the "please".

Do corporations have equal rights with natural persons to carpool on California freeways? Articles on SFGATE from 2013 and Wikipedia: Jonathan Frieman describe the legal efforts of Johnathan Frieman of San Rafael, CA in creating an odd test case for corporate personhood. Frieman argues that if corporate personhood is valid, and corporations have legal rights of people as evidenced by e.g., the Citizens United Supreme Court ruling that a corporation's constitutional rights as a person, specifically their rights under the First Amendment to the US Constitution, barred the government from limiting corporate donations to political campaigns, then corporations should have a right to join a carpool and thereby enable a vehicle to legally occupy the carpool lane. This may also be some kind of test case / legal protest of corporate person as the article suggests he would also be OK with a ruling that corporations aren't really people after all. Ford Greene, Frieman's attorney, pointed to California vehicle code section 470, which says the definition of a person includes "natural persons and corporations." The signs on the freeways ask carpoolers to carry "2 or more persons" which, Greene said, "is constitutionally vague." The CVC online shows: "Person" includes a natural person, firm, copartnership, association, limited liability company, or corporation. but this is a general definition and I would expect the part of the CVC that discusses the HOV lanes to have its own definition or terminology for a person, or perhaps an occupant, etc... The traffic court judge ruled against Frieman, citing the purpose of the carpool lane as defined in the code is to reduce traffic congestion: "Common sense says carrying a sheath of papers in the front seat does not relieve traffic congestion ... And so I'm finding you guilty." But Frieman plans an appeal... Outside the courtroom, Frieman said he would appeal the ruling within 30 days. "I expected to lose," Frieman said. "And I expected the judge to cite the reasons he did." Questions: has there been an appeal of this case in California? if not, does Frieman have a case or is this purely frivolous nonsense? Information on similar cases is welcome.

This is an amusing idea, but ultimately it seems frivolous: How does one establish the physical presence of a corporation in a car? Yes, corporations have some of the legal rights and liabilities of people, but they are not people. And there are plenty of rights a person has that a corporation does not. For example (at present) a corporation can't be a party to a marriage. The closest a corporation comes to any corporal presence is the address listed of their agents.

An analogy to towing companies is tempting but misplaced, since towing is a statutorily-authorized and regulated activity (e.g. RCW 46.55). You therefore cannot just charge an arbitrary storage fee for uncollected equipment, and it is highly unlikely that there is any provision in the contract which authorizes you to charge for storage. The question is why you think you think they are responsible for picking up the excavator – presumably there is a clause in the contract that says that they will pick it up. Assuming that the contract doesn't say much, then your recourse would reside in the fact of their equipment trespassing on your property. You would need to officially withdraw permission for their equipment to be on your property (since you gave it in the first place). They would have a reasonable time to retrieve their goods, and if they don't do so, you would have a basis for suing them for damages. Also, the worst thing you could do is forcibly keeping their key until they pay you a storage fee: you'd need a court-ordered award, to get anything from them. The Connecticut towing law is here. Note that in order to call a towing company to get the equipment towed (if that's even possible), there has to be "conspicuous signage" warning of the possibility of towing "on such private commercial property"; but an overriding consideration is that you may tow if the vehicle is left for forty-eight or more hours. Two points to be noted are that although the law refers to "An owner or lessee of private property", the signage requirement implies that the property has to be commercial, not residential (this limitation to "private commercial property" is repeated in the statute, indicating a legislative intent to restrict the legal towing permission to commercial property). The law refers to "motor vehicles", but it is not clear whether an excavator counts as a "motor vehicle" (defined in para 54 of the definitions section). Although an excavator is a "vehicle propelled or drawn by any nonmuscular power", exceptions are carved out for agricultural tractors, farm implements, and "and any other vehicle not suitable for operation on a highway", which I think reasonably means that an excavator is not a motor vehicle. So since the towing statute does not authorize towing of something that is not a motor vehicle, that would not seem to be an option in this case (even if there were signage, and this is commercial property). And calling a towing company would only get the item removed from your property, but would not authorize you to collect a storage fee (the towing company can only do so after the police have been notified, which they must do withing 2 hours).

The statute doesn't say much in detail (from the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (unfortunately, the site works on javascript, so, you have to navigate by opening the "Laws" menu and then making your way from there): § 1128. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b and c are not relevant) (d) When official markings are in place indicating those portions of any roadway where crossing such markings would be especially hazardous, no driver of a vehicle proceeding along such highway shall at any time drive across such markings. The last bit, (d), is of interest. Basically, you are allowed to change into the correct lane as long as the pavement markings permit it. The pavement markings at an intersection with a sign like the one you posted are generally solid white lines. These details are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, published by the Federal Highway Administration. Their information on pavement markings is available both in PDF and HTML format. Pertinently, it says: A double white line indicates that lane changes are prohibited. A single white line indicates that lane changes are discouraged. A dashed white line indicates that lane changes are allowed. Therefore, if the lines separating the lanes are, as usual, solid white lines, you are encouraged to get into the correct lane before the beginning of the solid white line, but you are permitted to change lanes across the solid lines. An example of such marking is in the right-hand example in the given image: One point of possible contention is that the New York State Driver's Manual describes the meaning of the solid white line somewhat differently: One solid line: You can pass other vehicles or change lanes, but you can only do so when obstructions in the road or traffic conditions make it necessary. I don't see any statutory basis for that description, but I may well have overlooked something. I suppose you know where the signs are specified, since you probably got the image from there, but for anyone reading this who does not know, they are specified in the publication Standard Highway Signs. This is available as a set of PDF files; the relevant file is the one containing regulatory signs; the sign in the question is 1-33, and it is in the midst of several similar signs. If a police officer ticketed you for getting into the lane too late, I suppose you should find a lawyer who specializes in fighting traffic tickets, and ask whether there really is such a thing as "too late." By my reading of the law, there isn't. (Of course, if it's dangerous to change lanes because of other vehicles, you shouldn't change lanes, but if you had, I would suppose the officer should have written a ticket for some other violation, like reckless driving.)

Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of "long arm jurisdiction." The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued "personally availed themselves" of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on "choice of law" require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld<1>, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. <1> The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states "this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts." A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the "dormant commerce clause", or the "full faith and credit clause", or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the "due process clause" of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the "privileges and immunities clause." The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.

There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.

The direct answer is "no" and the indirect answer is "yes", that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide).

The judgement actually gives reasons: The criminal law insists that every person driving a car must attain an objective standard measured by a skilled, experienced and careful driver. That is shown by McCrone v Riding ... the standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the driver. And the judgement goes on to quote R v Evans [1962] 3 All ER 1088: if a man in fact adopts a manner of driving which the jury think was dangerous to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or even doing his incompetent best. [Such considerations are] highly relevant if it ever comes to sentence. Primarily, it is to protect other road users. It is only on the matter of guilt that skill and experience are irrelevant. When it comes to sentencing, it may be a factor. And, if I might add my own interpretation, part of the reason that the skill of the driver is irrelevant is that the other users of the road cannot know whether a driver is skilled and experienced - they must therefore be able to expect this, and the law reflects this expectation. As much as we complain about other road users, we only complain because we expect them to meet a certain standard - we most likely would not complain if we truly expected them to be incompetent.

It sounds like you've read about two party consent and public spaces. But while anyone can sue, it's winning a case that's relevant. "My client respects the applicant's beliefs, but choosing to express beliefs in such a way during a job interview indicated sufficiently questionable judgement that my client was unable to consider the applicant further for the advertised position." "It has also become apparent that the plaintiff was not acting in good faith in making an application for employment." Court finds for the defendant and orders the plaintiff to pay costs.

Apple AppStore app rejection and Freedom of speech/press My question relates to one Apple App Store guideline: Referencing third-party platforms in your app or its metadata is not appropriate on the App Store. I understand this to mean that it is prohibited to show any information about other platforms in the application. So, the developer is prohibited from mentioning such words as "Android, Windows, Linux, BlackBerry OS, Web OS" and many others. I am developing a technology news application that aims to include news about other platforms on the market. Per this guideline I am allowed to show only Apple-related news in the app. The app has been rejected. How does this rejection relate to the freedom of speech and press, which is present in many countries' laws as a basic human right. Can it be considered as a censorship? Or if Apple owns the platform, it can dictate any rules and I have to obey them as a developer?

Taking the US as an example, the Constitution states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress or a state government hasn't prohibited you from comparing platforms. Another private entity has. And, that's fine. You're free to launch the app as a separate website, or print out the flyers and hand them to people on the bus, or publish your own monthly magazine comparing various platforms, so you still have freedom of speech and of the press. As an example, if you write a letter about how great the government of North Korea is to the letters department at Stamp Collectors Magazine, and they don't publish it, have they violated your human rights? The app store restriction may be quite dumb. After all, the built-in web browser allows the reading of the exact same news. But there's no law against being dumb.

Is it possible to forbid linking to a site? No. It would be quite childish and out of touch to aspire to that level of control. Publishing a website/page for permanent, wide open access is inconsistent with prohibiting accessing it from certain venues, such as hypertext links. The prohibition of linking to a site is an attempt to enforce a certain degree of selective privacy. As such, it would not be enforced by U.S. courts, and it would be laughable if other jurisdictions proceeded differently. In United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008), the court wrote that e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. That rationale is equally --or perhaps even more-- applicable to a publisher, since in this case browsers and/or the publisher himself post(s) his URL (the equivalent of a "from" address of emails) "for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information". A hyperlink is an address, so it would be similar, I believe, to disallowing someone to list an address (on a map for instance). That analogy is inadequate because it overlooks essential differences between a web address and a physical (be it home, office, etc.) address. A web address is used for obtaining information which the initial publisher deliberately makes available to the public. By contrast, the act of having one's physical address registered somewhere else serves no such purpose whatsoever. Another important difference between a hyperlink and a physical address is that "consuming" a hyperlink simply cannot annoy or harm the initial publisher (except in the extreme scenario of Denial-of-Service attacks), whereas a common knowledge of a person's address may make that person vulnerable to harassment, trespassing, larceny, and other unlawful acts. A better analogy with hypertext links would be bibliographical references, since both are types of text strings for directing the consumer to a (or "the") source of information. Neither text string causes detriment to the author/source of that information. Can you imagine if bibliographical references were forbidden by statute or by the author of that information? The mere difference that a bibliographical reference needs to be copied/pasted, whereas it suffices to click on a hypertext link, cannot permit treating the permissibility of hypertext links any differently than the permissibility of bibliographical references.

It is not obvious that it violates the TOS (which is a complex wall of text and links to chase). §3 states that "we need you to make the following commitments", followed by some subsections – you can re-interpret this as an agreement on your part to do this stuff. Those subsections relate to "legitimate accounts and users" (not relevant), "what you can do" (potentially relevant), "permissions you give" (granting them license to use your stuff), not infringing on their copyright. The second subsection about what you can "do" says that you can't "violate these or other terms", or do anything unlawful, or infringing, nor may you upload viruses, or scrape Facebook data. So it turns out that there is nothing specific in that subsection, but it does say that you won;t violate "other terms". §5 presents a bunch of other possible terms and policies: Community Standards, Commercial Terms, Advertising Policies, Self-Serve Ad Terms, Facebook Pages, Groups and Events Policy, Meta Platform Terms, Developer Payment Terms, Community Payment Terms, Commerce Policies, Meta Brand Resources, Music Guidelines and Live Policies. Those primarily apply to advertisers, group-pages, developers, commercial use and content broadcast via Meta. Community Standard applies to everybody, and as you should predict there is a long list of specific sub-categories such as "Violence and Criminal Behavior", "Safety", "Objectionable Content", "Inauthenticity" etc. You would have to hire a lawyer to do an exhaustive search and interpretation. However, it appears that using an ad blocking app is not forbidden on FB, and that seems to be what that extension is. But you should read it for yourself. All. Of. It. It may have violated the older TOS, but that clause seems to me missing from the present TOS.

One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how "being put on notice" may make such unauthorized access indeed "unauthorized access" in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the "violation of TOS = unauthorized access" theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit.

The United States has a very liberal attitude when it comes to free speech. Short of materials that are: child pornography, restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), Libelous/Fraudulent, encourage or aid others in breaking the law, or seditious/treasonous/ terroistic/other credible threats there is almost nothing that can't be published. There is another example where supposedly The Golden Book of Chemistry Experiments was banned by the US Government, but I cannot find any evidence or action against the author to support the claim. The Political Mofia by Schiff was not neccessarily banned, but an injunction from publishing was issued against the authors in US v. Schiff, 379 F. 3d 621 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 2004 per 26 U.S.C. 7408 on grounds that the books was fraudulent. Essentially it is the Federal courts that can ban a book from commerce with cause. Schools, libraries and other institutions may ban it from their collections, but not from public commerce. Wikipedia has a list of Books banned by governments that you may want to look at to find examples.

Just assuming for the sake of this particular answer that everything happens in the U.S.: I'm not sure about the particular example of Open ZFS. The registration in the USPTO Records is in Oracle's name. Using OpenZFS for distributing the same kind of software as the now closed-source ZFS would seem to be infringing to me absent a license. Maybe Oracle just tolerates the use of the "ZFS" component by third-parties since they decided at some point to license the software under an open source license. In that case, they may have a dilution (http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/TrademarkDilution.aspx) problem and the mark may be invalid. If the mark is invalid, anybody can pretty much do whatever they want with it. That said, assuming for sake of discussion that the mark is valid, there is indeed such a thing that is similar to the copyright fair use in trademarks (in the U.S. at least). It's called "nominative fair use". You can read more about it here: http://www.inta.org/TrademarkBasics/FactSheets/Pages/FairUse.aspx Bottom line is that under the nominative fair use doctrine it's generally ok for party A to use party B's trademark to refer to whatever party B is doing, even to sell products and services related to whatever party B is doing. As per the INTA document I just linked above, its for example ok to "use “iPhone” in non-stylized form on packaging for phone cases to indicate that it is usable with iPhone 6." Having a website (even with third-party ads) that discuss ZFS-related matters is similar to the iPhone example in my mind. Having a domain name that contains the mark seems riskier, but it's not necessarily downright forbidden. See: http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Toyota_Motor_Sales,_U.S.A._v._Tabari

Mongolia apparently has a list of banned words (list is NSFW) that websites can't use. And according to this State Department report: Additionally, the regulation requires Web sites with heavy traffic to use filtering software that makes the user Internet Protocol addresses of those commenting or sharing content publicly visible. The report also says: The law places the burden of proof on the defendant in libel and slander cases, and both defamation and insult are criminal charges. NGOs reported that these laws were used more frequently than in previous years to control the press. Canada is probably a better choice, even if it isn't perfect.

united-states You are protected by copyright as a matter of law, even if you don't post a copyright notice, although you have slightly more procedural rights if you do post a copyright notice and there would need to be a filing with the copyright registrar (a division of the Library of Congress) before you brought suit. You can't really get any other intellectual property protections for it except possibly a trademark if you have a distinctive mark or name or logo for the app.

What is the latest that one can enter into a right/left-only lane in order to make a turn at the intersection in NYC? Busy streets lanes near an intersection sometimes have arrow markings such as "straight only", and "right/left only": If you are on the "straight only" lane, when is the latest that you may enter into the "right/left only lane" before coming close to the intersection in New York City? If you had entered into the lane too late and gotten a ticket (1163a vtl for an "Improper Turn"), what defense could you use at a court to lessen your judgement?

The statute doesn't say much in detail (from the New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (unfortunately, the site works on javascript, so, you have to navigate by opening the "Laws" menu and then making your way from there): § 1128. Driving on roadways laned for traffic. Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others consistent herewith shall apply: (a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from such lane until the driver has first ascertained that such movement can be made with safety. (b and c are not relevant) (d) When official markings are in place indicating those portions of any roadway where crossing such markings would be especially hazardous, no driver of a vehicle proceeding along such highway shall at any time drive across such markings. The last bit, (d), is of interest. Basically, you are allowed to change into the correct lane as long as the pavement markings permit it. The pavement markings at an intersection with a sign like the one you posted are generally solid white lines. These details are governed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, published by the Federal Highway Administration. Their information on pavement markings is available both in PDF and HTML format. Pertinently, it says: A double white line indicates that lane changes are prohibited. A single white line indicates that lane changes are discouraged. A dashed white line indicates that lane changes are allowed. Therefore, if the lines separating the lanes are, as usual, solid white lines, you are encouraged to get into the correct lane before the beginning of the solid white line, but you are permitted to change lanes across the solid lines. An example of such marking is in the right-hand example in the given image: One point of possible contention is that the New York State Driver's Manual describes the meaning of the solid white line somewhat differently: One solid line: You can pass other vehicles or change lanes, but you can only do so when obstructions in the road or traffic conditions make it necessary. I don't see any statutory basis for that description, but I may well have overlooked something. I suppose you know where the signs are specified, since you probably got the image from there, but for anyone reading this who does not know, they are specified in the publication Standard Highway Signs. This is available as a set of PDF files; the relevant file is the one containing regulatory signs; the sign in the question is 1-33, and it is in the midst of several similar signs. If a police officer ticketed you for getting into the lane too late, I suppose you should find a lawyer who specializes in fighting traffic tickets, and ask whether there really is such a thing as "too late." By my reading of the law, there isn't. (Of course, if it's dangerous to change lanes because of other vehicles, you shouldn't change lanes, but if you had, I would suppose the officer should have written a ticket for some other violation, like reckless driving.)

No, the minor cannot be in violation either being on the property of residence or the sidewalk in front of that property. Montgomery County Curfew Law: Section 1-2 (Offenses): (a) A minor commits an offense if he remains in any public place or on the premises of any establishment within the unincorporated areas of the county during curfew hours. Section 1-3 (Defenses): (a) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 that the minor was: (1) Accompanied by the minor’s parent or guardian; (2) On an errand at the direction of the minor’s parent or guardian, without any detour or stop; (3) In a motor vehicle involved in interstate travel; (4) Engaged in an employment activity, or going to or returning home from an employment >activity, without any detour or stop; (5) Involved in an emergency; (6) On the sidewalk abutting the minor’s residence or abutting the residence of a next-door neighbor if the neighbor did not complain to the police department about the minor’s presence; (7) Attending an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor, or going to or returning home from, without any detour or stop, an official school, religious, or other recreational activity supervised by adults and sponsored by Montgomery County, a civic organization, or another similar entity that takes responsibility for the minor; (8) Exercising First Amendment rights protected by the United States Constitution, such >as the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and the right of assembly; and (9) Married, had been married, or had disabilities of minority removed in accordance with Chapter 31 of the Texas Family Code. (b) It is a defense to prosecution under Section 1-2 (c) that the owner, operator, or employee of an establishment promptly notified the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department, or the appropriate Constable’s office, that a minor was present on the premises of the establishment during curfew hours and refused to leave. Your property is not public, so you cannot be in offense of this ordinance being on your private property. You also cannot be in violation being on your sidewalk (or a neighbors sidewalk if that neighbor has not called police on the offender).

In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"

It may very well be illegal, depending on the laws of the country. Most people have the right to enter their own country (except for practical problems, like not being able to prove you have the right) because you list your passport and/or other ID). But it may be illegal to enter outside official border crossings, for example. Or illegal to enter without having the entry registered. Or soon, it might be illegal to enter the U.K. while avoiding quarantine, whether you are British or not. But it wouldn’t be the fact that you entering that’s illegal, it would be how you did it. If you are the Dutch owner of a Ferrari then entering the Netherlands on the A40 from Germany at 170mph is very, very illegal :-)

First off, the fact that they stopped you on private property is irrelevant. The traffic offense - you driving the vehicle with a suspended license - occurred on public property en route to the station. That offense does not simply disappear because you are now on private property, nor do the police need to wait for you to leave private property in order to stop or arrest you. So... forget the gas station even exists in this scenario. The real issue at hand here is whether or not the officer needs to actually see you driving the vehicle in order to make an arrest. The answer is no. There isn't any other valid reason your car would be where it is now other than it was driven there. If you are the only person with the car, then it's reasonable to assume that you were the one that drove it there. Plenty of people get arrested for this "connect the dots" way of proving they drove, especially in DUI cases. But the officer doesn't even need to assume that second part either. It all comes down to the actual definition of "driving" in the law books. Most citizens would interpret the word as meaning actually moving in a vehicle. That's wrong. Defining a driver and what constitutes driving is actually way, way broader in the eyes of the law. In Kansas, a driver is defined in such a way: 8-1416. "Driver" defined. "Driver" means every person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle. Essentially, having physical control over the vehicle is generally enough to label you as the driver or that you are driving the vehicle. In a lot of states, having possession of the keys to the vehicle is enough for a court to say you had physical control of the vehicle, because "physical control" is more broadly defined as "capable of making it move and within close proximity" to the vehicle. Thus, you can be arrested for traffic-related offenses. It does not matter if the car is parked, if you're filling it with fluids, or just taking a nap in the front seat.

40km/h There is no ambiguity. The speed limit on the through road is clear and the speed limit on the side road is irrelevant. The fact that Bob may be legitimately unaware that this is the speed limit doesn’t matter either. If you want to ask if Bob has a defence if issued with an infringement notice, please feel free to post a new question.

Arizona Revised Statute 28-1591 has a specific exemption for service of a parking or standing violation: B. This article does not require that either the initial notification or a subsequent summons and complaint for a parking or standing violation be issued or served as required by this article. This section carves out an exemption for parking infractions in that they don't need to be personally served. If there is no response to the complaint left on the car, the statute further states: If it is necessary to issue a summons and complaint because there is not a satisfactory response to the initial notice of a parking or standing violation, the summons and complaint may be sent by regular mail to the address provided to the department by the individual made responsible for the alleged violation by the applicable statute or ordinance. Service of the summons and complaint is complete on mailing. When service is complete the court of jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction over the defendant and can enter a default judgment. You are correct in the rest of your statement regarding moving violations reported by camera systems - the violator must be personally served. If personal service is not achieved then the complaint is dismissed with no record. This article has a good explanation of the process for service for moving violations. The article references precedence established in Tonner v. Paradise Valley Magistrate's Court. Arizona requires personal service in order to create personal jurisdiction for the court. Alternatively, the defendant can waive the personal service. In Arizona, if one takes an action recorded on a traffic camera that causes a complaint to be issued that person will receive in the mail a form that is a waiver of service. Signing such a form and returning it tells the court that you waive personal service. Refusal to sign and return the form does not remove the requirement the state has of personal service. If the state wishes to pursue the case they will need to provide personal service. If the state does successfully conclude personal service then the defendant will be liable for the initial fine as well as the cost of service. From the article and the case: Without completed service, the court does not obtain jurisdiction. “The incomplete service left the trial court without jurisdiction, i.e., without authority to enter the judgment.” Id., Supplemental Opinion, 187 Ariz. 487, 488, 930 P.2d 1001, 1002. Ignoring a personally served citation, i.e., a ticket, allows the court to enter a default judgement. In the case of a citation that was not personally served and where personal service was not waived means the court never had jurisdiction in order to render a default judgment. There is a time limit within which personal service must be completed for a complaint. I've found sources that claim both 120 days and 180 days from when the court was made aware of the complaint. Some sources also claim that the court must be notified and processes started within 10 days of the date of the infraction. If service is not completed within that time frame then the complaint is dropped and no record is retained. So, yes, parking tickets do not have to be personally served according to statute and, yes, a person in Arizona has to be personally served with a moving violation citation. Failure to achieve proper service results in dismissal of the complaint.

According to Virginia law, Every person convicted of reckless driving under the provisions of this article is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. That speed easily qualifies as reckless driving: A person shall be guilty of reckless driving who drives a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth (i) at a speed of twenty miles per hour or more in excess of the applicable maximum speed limit or (ii) in excess of eighty miles per hour regardless of the applicable maximum speed limit. The punishment for a class 1 misdemeanor is "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $2,500, either or both." But wait! An airplane is heavy, so this may also apply: If it is found by the judge of a court of proper jurisdiction that the violation of any provision of this title (i) was a serious traffic violation as defined in § 46.2-341.20 and (ii) that such violation was committed while operating a vehicle or combination of vehicles used to transport property that either: (a) has a gross vehicle weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds or (b) has a gross combination weight rating of 26,001 or more pounds inclusive of a towed vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than 10,000 pounds, the judge may assess, in addition to any other penalty assessed, a further monetary penalty not exceeding $500. By the way, I couldn't find a general reckless endangerment statute (unrelated to specific objects like firearms or specific results like injury or death) in Virginia law. The closest thing I could find was disorderly conduct, which is also a class 1 misdemeanor. It's possible I just don't know where to look.

How to find record of conviction? My mother was convicted of something nearly 20 years ago in the UK, but since it was not worthy of prison forgot about the details soon after. I need to know about it in order to fully disclose information about everyone living in my house for an application I am making, but I don't know how to find out about details about this conviction. Is there an easy way to find out about someone's (or in this case, one's own) convictions?

If the offence was minor than it may be considered 'spent' under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. A conviction resulting only in a fine is usually spent after five years. Spent convictions do not normally need to be disclosed, but you should check this with whoever is asking for the information. Your mother can apply for a copy of her own criminal record by asking Disclosure Scotland for a basic disclosure; this costs £25 and takes around two weeks if the application is made online. Due to a quirk in the Disclosure and Barring Service, this is the only way a person can apply for their own disclosure certificate. Anyone in the UK can apply to Disclosure Scotland, even if they do not live in Scotland.

The Immigration Act 2016 introduced the so-called 'right to rent' provisions under which a landlord can be prosecuted for renting accommodation to someone who is not legally in the UK. Everyone in the UK, Brits included, is subject to the Act. This gives the landlord the right to examine your work permit and to see if your visa is valid. The landlord will make a copy of the information. This makes the landlord a data controller which imposes restrictions on how the information can be used. Because this became controversial, the Information Commissioner published a brochure on the things a landlord can do with your data. All things considered and based upon what you wrote, if the landlord did not get your permission to use the data, then it's likely he is in breach. But this does not mean it's actionable or that it would be advisable to make a formal complaint to the Commissioner. If you want to pursue it, you can use the Commissioner's "Report a Concern" page as a starting point. Alternatively, you can lodge a formal complaint with your landlord and he will have to respond to it. What does the law say? The act giving the landlord the right to access your data is in the 2016 act linked above. Everything else is in the Data Protection Act 1998. The ILPA Information Sheet is at "Right to Rent". "The information sheet was updated on 01 November 2016 to take account of the second commencement order issued by the government, on 31 October 2016, bringing further provisions into force." The information sheet is recommended reading for anyone in the UK on a work permit. Disclaimer: I'm a member.

It is possible that someone is convicted. Destruction of evidence an constitute circumstantial evidence that a crime was committed, and other evidence, such as testimony, could pin the crime to one of the four possible suspects. A jury has broad discretion to assess the weight of the evidence.

Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question.

Publishing government records is pretty classic First Amendment-protected activity. Keeping in mind that one can find a lawyer to sue for anything, I think that person would likely be operating well within the law. One thing in particular that I'd recommend staying aware of is how one might attempt to monetize this endeavor. There have been a lot of sites publishing arrest records, court records, and mugshots, and then charging people to have them removed to keep them from popping up in a Google search for those people's names. That is -- rightly -- regarded as sketchy behavior; while several states have passed laws prohibiting that business model, I don't believe any such law exists in Washington State at this point.

Short answer: No. If a court destroys the criminal file due to age, the defendant's criminal record lives on in law enforcement databases, be it local, state, or federal. In San Diego, the Superior Court records are open to inspection. Court case files are public records and subject to public inspection. California Rules of Court, rule 2.400(a) states that all papers in the court files may be inspected by the public in the office of the clerk. Rule 2.550(a) says that unless confidential or sealed by law, all court records are presumed open. However, again, this does not impact a criminal history report retained by law enforcement. To get the conviction literally removed from the criminal history report, the defendant will typically need a court order directing the law enforcement agency to remove the arrest and/or conviction. For example, in California, if the defendant can prove there was no reason to have arrested the defendant in the first place. Specifically, Penal Code section 851.8 (b) requires “any law enforcement agency” to destroy their records. “[Penal Code] section 851.8 is for the benefit of those defendants who have not committed a crime. It permits those petitioners who can show that the state should never have subjected them to the compulsion of the criminal law -- because no objective factors justified official action -- to purge the official records of any reference to such action. . . ...” (People v. Matthews (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1056.) (Emphasis added) In People v. Scott M. (1985) 167 Cal. App. 3d 688, 700 [“Section 851.8 is for the benefit of those defendants who have not committed a crime.”].) Factual innocence may be determined based on circumstances at the time of arrest or any meritorious defense. Recent case law establishes the pivotal time for viewing the evidence is when the motion is heard. The statutory language “necessarily means that the existence of reasonable cause depends on the current evidence rather than simply the evidence that existed at the time that the arrest and prosecution occurred.” (People v. Laiwala, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1065, 1068 & n. 3 (2003) (emphasis added). Keep in mind in California, "expunge" does not mean to seal or destroy, but officially dismisses the conviction - leaving the public record intact. The best place to start is contacting your local public defender and ask about post conviction relief or record sealing if your arrest did not result in a conviction. Getting free advice never hurts.

Scotland: Duty of finder - Section 67 of the Civic Government Scotland Act 1982 no threshold is stated, by non compliance fine of £ 50 Northern Ireland: Cash If you find cash, please hand this into your nearest police station. Cash that is not reunited with the owner is donated to charity. England: The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person You don't need to report this to us. Please make reasonable enquiries to try to find the owner, these could include asking people nearby or in offices or shops. You could also consider leaving a note with your details. If you can't find the owner there's nothing more we can do and you should dispose of the item. Note: What is to be considered to be low value is not stated. Other jurasdictions have a threshold. In Germany it is € 10 (§ 965 (2) BGB). That would then be £ 8,43 at the present rate. For any amount larger, it must be reported to the police. If the owner is not found (again dependent on jurasdiction) it may be given to you. If the owner is found, a reward between 3 and 5% can be claimed (§ 971 BGB). Section 965 - German Civil Code (BGB) Duty of the finder to notify (1) A person who finds a lost thing and takes possession of it must without undue delay notify the loser or the owner or another person entitled to receive. (2) If the finder does not know the person entitled to receive or does not know that person’s whereabouts, the finder must without undue delay notify the competent authority of the finding and the circumstances that may be material to determine the person entitled to receive. If the thing is not worth more than ten euros, no notification is necessary. Note: The original version of the law (1896) it was 3 Marks. Sources: Section 67 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 If you find treasure or lost goods - Citizens Advice Scotland Know What To Do - When You Have Lost or Found Property (Northern Ireland) Report lost or found property | The Met The item I've found is of low value or can't be directly identified to a person | The Met Section 965 - Duty of the finder to notify (Germany)

"I don't recall" will protect you from perjury only if it's true. Let me try an example. You're asked: "Did Mr. Blatter hand you an envelope full of cash?" You say: "Not to my recollection." Now the government introduces a videotape of you receiving and counting the money, and a thank-you note you wrote to Blatter saying "Thanks for the awesome bribe!" You can defend yourself from perjury charges if you can convince the finder of fact that you had forgotten all of those things...but it's not very likely, is it? "I don't recall" isn't a magic bullet. It's like any other statement: it's perjury unless it's true.

Without sub judice rules, as exist in almost every other English-speaking jurisdiction, how can due process be assured? I have watched the media circus surrounding the arrest of a 21-year-old male on suspicion of having murdered nine people in Charleston. Vast amounts of information are spewing forth from the news media, some of which will undoubtedly be true, some of which will have been entirely made up by newspapers to sell copy, and the rest of which will be somewhere in between. How is it possible without rules of contempt to ensure that due process is unfettered? How can a jury be impaneled that has not already read so much about the case that they have preconceived ideas as to guilt or innocence? In the early stages of the search police officials declared it was a hate crime. How exactly did they know this? And couldn't its widespread circulation affect the outcome of the case?

The United States gives the accused the right to a fair trial. However, it also gives exceptionally strong protection to the media (and to people in general) to speak on matters of public concern; there are very, very few cases where a US government (federal, state, or local) can legally order someone not to publish something (as opposed to letting it be published and then issuing sanctions). The rule of thumb for content-based restrictions on speech is that they must be the least restrictive way of achieving a compelling government interest. For trials, there are other ways to achieve a fair trial without restricting the press. One of the most preferred ways to do it is to use the voir dire process, in which jurors can be rejected for prejudice. Courts can also move the trial to a new location; they can grant motions from the defense to delay the trial while things cool down; they can sequester the jurors (meaning that the jurors are kept in a central place and prevented from talking to anyone else or reading anything about the case); if none of these are done, a conviction can potentially be reversed on appeal. US courts will, wherever possible, modify the trial to mitigate the damage done by the press, rather than restrict the press to mitigate the damage to the trial. For a review of a few different approaches to this in different jurisdictions, you might want to look at this law journal article.

Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established.

I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.

The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law

Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of "acquittal" was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing "guilty as charged" and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard "not guilty as charged". After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of "guilty". The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.

The issue is not whether it is an "act of violence". The fundamental political theory of classically liberal capitalist democracies is that the state has a monopoly on the use of force and violence, or at least, is entitled to assert one if it wishes to do so. But it is recognized as a matter of political theory that the use of force and violence and the credible threat of it, is necessary to secure good order and fairness and justice in society (and from outsiders attacking the society), and to encourage people to act appropriately towards each other. In a classical liberal capitalist democracy, this monopoly on the use of force and violence is regulated and made less abusive by providing that neither liberty or property can be taken by the state without due process of law (except in certain well defined exigent circumstances where due process is provided after the fact). The nuances of what due process is required is what differs. Overall, more due process is required for more serious deprivations, and less is required for less serious deprivations since the consequences of getting it wrong are smaller and don't justify the dead weight loss of more expensive litigation in the same way. Generally, incarceration is deemed to be more serious than a fine or money judgment as explained below, so it needs more due process protections. So, the issue is that interference with personal liberty is taken more seriously than interference with property, and the answer comes from understanding why the former is more serious than the latter. At its heart, this is a widely shared normative view. And, in U.S. constitutional law, this isn't an all or nothing proposition. For example, short deprivations of liberty (incarceration for six months or less) are penalties that a state or local government may take without a jury trial, while longer deprivations of liberty carry with them the right to trial by jury, and moderate to severe deprivations of liberty (typically felonies punishable by three or more years) typically carry with them the right to an evidentiary preliminary hearing before a judge prior to a trial on the merits before a jury that is not available for less serious offenses. Similarly, there is not an absolute right to counsel at state expense in all proceedings in which an indigent defendant might be incarcerated. When the case is prosecuted by a government official, this is the case, but when someone facts potential incarceration for willfully disobeying a court order until that person complies (contempt of court) and the case is prosecuted by a private litigant (possibly pro se), there is not a U.S. Constitutional right to counsel. In the same vein, there are weaker due process protections for someone accused of a pre-trial release rule violation, violation of jail or prison rules, probation violation, parole violations, and requests to be released on parole, when they are already under some form of correctional supervision, even though they can result in longer periods of incarceration, than there are someone living their daily life faces potential criminal punishment. I can't piece together exactly how this came to be, and the legal theory literature is rather thin and not wildly referred to by practitioners. But a couple of key historical points come to mind. One is that due process protections for moderate to serious felony offense criminal defendants were historically important, because certainly as of the 18th century in common law jurisdictions, the death penalty was routinely imposed for offenses that did not cause the death of the victim, such as burglary, robbery, and rape, in part, because the governments of these societies didn't have the economic resources necessary to incarcerate serious criminals for long enough periods of time to protect the public from recidivism and to adequately deter the conduct in the first place. While the line between property and liberty may be debatable, no one would seriously doubt that the historic divide between loss of life and loss of property clearly called for more due process protections against loss of life. A second is that in the late 18th century and early 19th century, a political movement arose to oppose debtor's prisons (and the related civil remedy called "body execution"), as disproportionate and inefficient. Prior to that time, one remedy of a creditor against someone who failed to pay a debt was to have them thrown into a "debtor's prison" or "work house" where they were placed in involuntary servitude until the debt was paid in full. Essentially, the moral argument was that being poor should not be a ground for being incarcerated and simple failure to pay a contactual debt routinely involves merely being poor. In the U.S., Congress outlawed debtors prisons in 1833. The 14th Amendment adopted after the U.S. Civil War, prohibited not just slavery, but involuntary servitude for failure to pay debts, when indentured involuntary servitude to pay costs of an apprenticeship or a passage to the Americas from the Old World, had been common in the colonial period, and into the early 19th century. In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that in order to jail a person for failure to pay a fine or fee, the judge must first consider if the person was 'willfully' choosing not to pay. Closely related to this, which was a fairly new idea in the 18th century, was the idea of making the discharge of debts that a debtor has no reasonable ability to repay from the debtor's assets or earnings in the short term, routinely available as a matter of right in a court bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, weaker due process protections for monetary debts is backstopped by the fact that the harshness of this is limited by the fact that the debts can often be wiped out in bankruptcy if they are excessive, and that even if they can't be discharged in bankruptcy, that modern limits on the assets and income from which debts can be collected, almost automatically makes such debts survivable for a debtor. So, the risk of doing too much harm with an erroneous judgment is mitigated. Also, keep in mind that most money judgments and fines are compensatory in nature, are a rough justice approximation of compensation, or are proportionate to the seriousness of the harm done in the view of democratically elected legislators, acting collectively, who are presumed to be reasonable. If you deprive someone of property, for example, by failing to repay money loaned, or by destroying their property, taking a like amount of money or property from you seems like simple justice that doesn't call for close scrutiny, whether that comes in the form of a civil money judgment or a criminal restitution award. Similarly, most fines, for things like illegal parking, traffic violations, or minor municipal ordinance violations, are petty. Often they are less than one day's pay for the defendant, and hence, much less serious that depriving someone of liberty for more than a few hours. It is patently less severe. Also, the severity of a money judgment or fine bears a relationship to the ability of someone facing it to pay it. Typically, people who can afford cars can also afford parking tickets and traffic fines. Typically, people who drive cars are required to get insurance to pay meaningful amounts of money to people harmed if they have accidents. Typically, creditors only extend credit to people for whom it is not to burdensome to repay the debt. Typically, homeowners can afford to pay fines for municipal ordinance violations for failing to mow their lawns. In Northern Europe, there is an effort to reconcile the economic impact of incarceration on someone to presumptive prison sentences, with a system of "day-fines" where an offense is deemed to justify a prison sentence of up to X days, and that is converted to a fine equal to one day's wages for the defendant times the number of days (sentences imposed with the full due process protections of criminal defendants). This prevents the state from having to incur great expense to incarcerate someone who has already burden society by breaking its rules, and instead has the opposite economic effect on the state. It also prevents the community ties of the defendant from being disrupted and prevents criminal defendants from being unduly influenced by other offenders who would be incarcerated with that defendant potentially leading all involved to commit more future crimes. And, paying a fine still leaves a defendant with considerable liberty to interact with friends and family, enjoy low cost entertainment options, and move about where he or she desires. Incarceration deprives the offender of income, and also imposes all sorts of limitations on the defendant. One could imagine a system, like the day-fine system, where many fines that are punishment in excess of mere compensation or good approximation of it for the harm done are routinely as several in impact to a defendant as incarceration is to a defendant. But the U.S. does not have such a system. Punitive fines authorized by law are very rarely even remotely as severe as typical sentences of incarceration for the crimes for which those fines are authorized, when committed by natural persons. So, since fines, while they could be more severe than incarceration in a hypothetical legal system, rarely are in most non-day fine legal regimes, affording maximal due process protections in cases of incarceration but not monetary punishment flows naturally from the mere fact that incarceration, in practice, is almost always a more severe punishment, and because a bright line rule is easier to apply even in the rare cases when a fine might be more serious than incarceration. Greater due process in more severe cases makes sense because inaccurate judicial imposition or non-imposition of punishment in minor matters is less of a big deal than in very serious matters. Finally, it is worth noting that incarceration is usually reserved for offenses in which the typical defendant would be utterly incapable of providing money compensation, because the harm done is so great. Criminal offenses punishable by incarceration are designed for instances of "incalculable harm" that can't be made right with the defendant's money, while civil offenses are generally chosen as a policy option in cases where the harm caused in manageable relative to the ability of someone to make it right with a compensatory payment and/or a fine or punitive damages that proportionately compares to the harm done that is not merely economic in some way. The notion that incalculable harms are more serious and hence more important to get right, than those which are measurable and compensable, again, argues for greater due process protections in incarceration cases. (Another area where due process protections are similarly great is in termination of parental rights cases, by the way, which implicate similarly serious and incalculable harm matters.) I know that this lacks citation, but it does go a bit to illustrating the motivating ideas.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Yes The normal remedy for not receiving a fair trial or due process is the declaration of a mistrial. A mistrial legally never happened so it is up to the prosecution to decide if they want a retrial. Unless the appellant can demonstrate that no reasonable jury would have convicted on the evidence (which seems unlikely verging on impossible), the appeal will not acquit the accused.

Which state has jurisdiction in a case of a murder in an airplane? A murder happened in an airplane flying from country A to country B when crossing above country C. Who will have jurisdiction? Bonus question: What if countries A, B and C are members of the European Union?

It depends. International aviation law is tricky. One effort to set some standards down was the Tokyo Convention, also known as the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft. Here are some excerpts: ARTICLE 3 The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board. . . . ARTICLE 4 A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on board except in the following cases: a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State; b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident of such State; c) the offence is against the security of such State; d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State; e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement. The commander of the aircraft is also given some powers to restrain the perpetrator or any other person that poses a danger to the aircraft and/or its occupants. S/he is given some other options, such as the choice of where to deliver the offender (though this by no means implies that the person will be prosecuted by that State). The Convention (and related documents) was ratified by numerous nations. As for the bonus question, there doesn't appear to be any special EU law regarding this. The EASA does not cover these sort of offenses, though it would be the closest to a Europe-wide regulatory body that would be relevant here.

Based on some quick searching, this would likely be a wrongful death action. I have to pick a state, so I'll pick Nevada. The first question is what damages could be. I don't know offhand what is typical in wrongful death suits, but this appears to be beyond mere negligence: there was a hit and run involved. I have no trouble believing the claim would reach at least six figures. This is important, because federal diversity jurisdiction only includes lawsuits with over $75,000 at stake. Now, Santa Claus's citizenship matters; if he were stateless it'd be an issue, but he is a citizen of Canada. That means that federal court has diversity jurisdiction: because the lawsuit is between a citizen of one state on one side and a foreign citizen on the other (no state has citizens on both sides of the lawsuit), and meets Congress's extra requirements (enough money at stake), it can be in federal court. The way diversity jurisdiction works is that the plaintiff can file in federal court, but if they choose to file in Nevada court then the defendant can remove the case to federal court. Either party can get it into federal court. Conventional wisdom is that federal court is more defendant-friendly than state court on state law claims. It is likely that if Grandpa files the case in any court in Nevada, the case will end up in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. But suppose it is in state court? Most states don't have separate "county court" and "state court" systems; county courts are a thing, but they're a specialized thing and the serious stuff is not in those. A six-figure wrongful death claim won't go in Nevada's equivalent of small claims court. It'd go in Nevada district court, if it's in state courts. But what about other courts? Grandma was walking home, so it can be assumed she was a Nevada resident. Assuming Grandpa lived with her (which is rather likely), so is he. They then can't sue in any US state other than Nevada without being laughed out of court -- a lawsuit needs to have something to do with where you're suing. The other option is Canada, but such a suit is unlikely.

The decision will be made by whichever country arrests him first (although a minority of countries allow for the trial of people who break their criminal laws in absentia). Needless to say, if nobody manages to arrest him ever, he will not face any criminal consequences except the issuance of an arrest warrant possibly accompanied by a pre-existing conviction in absentia if arrested in countries that allow for such a proceeding. Normally, in these circumstances, either country would have jurisdiction under its own laws to prosecute and punish the criminal, and many extradition treaties would not require the extradition of someone who committed a crime punished domestically in the state in whose custody the criminal is as part of the same course of events. Many countries will not extradite someone if they could face the death penalty in the receiving country. But, sometimes law enforcement in a country with a less serious penalty will intentionally defer to law enforcement in a country with a more serious penalty that is simultaneously trying to arrest him. Ordinarily, law enforcement is not authorized to use deadly force to arrest someone who is simultaneously being arrested by law enforcement from another country against either the arrestee or the law enforcement from the other country. Indeed, using deadly force against another country's law enforcement officers who are carrying out a lawful arrest in their own country would ordinarily be considered an act of war. U.S. double jeopardy provisions of the constitution do not prohibit a second prosecution of an offender in these circumstances because of a first prosecution by another sovereign, but many prosecutors in many countries would decline to prosecute someone a second time for the offense that they have already been convicted of in exercise of their discretion, and many judges would consider time served in another country for the same offense as a factor in setting their own sentence.

No There is some room for change of venue from, say, one county to another, or one municipality to another, within the same state. In certain circumstances this may even be constitutionally required. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (U.S. 1966) ("where there is a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with publicity"). But, there's no mechanism to move a state criminal trial to another state. A cousin of the scenario you're talking about is where D has committed crimes in multiple states. In such a situation the prosecutors from different states (and also the federal system) may meet and co-ordinate their strategies, and part of that will be deciding who charges what and who goes first. An example of this is the DC sniper case, which I remember pretty vividly because I grew up in the area. The Maryland and Virginia prosecutors reached an agreement to try them in Virginia first, and second in Maryland.

Murder is most often prosecuted by the states, not the US government, and each state greatly varies on the subject. Some states consider a fetus to be a person at any stage in its development; some require harsher punishments if the defendant knew the victim was pregnant; and some have no specific mentions of whether a fetus makes any difference in the law. You can see a great breakdown of the various laws and how they are applied to fetuses in this per-state table. Any federal crimes that are prosecuted by the US federal government are also subject to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act which recognizes a fetus as a victim if it is injured or killed while committing a list of federal crimes.

Under U.S. law the prosecution must prove that the defendant committed a particular crime beyond a reasonable doubt. So, it is not sufficient to prove that someone committed one of three crimes without proving which one it was. an alternative that I thought of later: someone is found somewhere where they can legally be, but in a situation where the only way they could have gotten there would involve trespassing through one of several properties owned by different people. Since the crime of trespassing requires the prosecution merely to show that someone was on the property of another without legal authorization to do so, it might be possible to prove this crime beyond a reasonable doubt without showing precisely which property was crossed, although I wouldn't be surprised if there was a split of authority among U.S. states on this question.

Crimes are prosecuted either where they were committed, or where the harm was intentionally caused, or both.[1] The statute of limitations that applies is the statute of limitations in the country where the crime is prosecuted. Other statutes of limitations for crimes are irrelevant. Generally speaking, if a crime is still prosecutable in the place where it is committed and is a serious felony, an extradition treaty will require the country where the suspect is located to be extradited to the country where the crime was committed and the country where the crime was committed (in this case Norway), goes through the proper channels under the extradition treaty. (There are exceptions in death penalty cases, but neither of these countries have the death penalty.) The statute of limitations for murder in Portugal would not protect someone who committed a murder in Norway. Also, even if there was a statute of limitations in Norway (say it was an armed robbery not resulting in serious bodily injury instead), most countries don't count time that a suspect spends outside the country fleeing law enforcement against the statute of limitations. [1] There is an obscure exception to this for what amount to crimes against humanity that is not applicable in the case presented by the question.

Is it possible that a court of one jurisdiction would apply the laws of another jurisdiction? For example could a case heard in France (by a French court) apply the laws of the US? If no, then what is the point of such clauses? Yes. This can be done and the example you provide could happen. This is done in civil cases, but not in criminal cases. The other main exception is that a court will not apply another jurisdiction's tax laws, although this is less absolute and the other jurisdiction's tax laws may still be considered as relevant to a civil dispute, so long as they are not enforced. For example, I have litigated a case where the events took place in France in a U.S. Court where the court had jurisdiction over the parties and the relevant choice of law rules pointed to French law. The overarching principle of that the law of the place with the most significant connection to the legal issue decided applies. But there are many subsidiary rules that provide clarity in some areas (although the clarity was reduced with the effect of making forum law apply more often, in the 1960s-1980s after a previous regime of more black and white rules). A clause like this is generally effective if it the parties have any connection to the forum chosen. It is a close cousin, although not nearly so strongly preferred in the law, of an arbitration clause. Also do such clauses go by other names than "attornment" clauses? This article points out such a name is specific to Canada. Yes. In the U.S. an "attornment" clause is a provision that requires a party to a contract to affirmatively declare upon notice from the other party if the attorning party claims that the other party is in breach of the contract or has unfulfilled obligations (with the attorning party waiving any claims for breach of contract not identified at that time). An "attornment" clause is normally found in a lease or secured promissory note and facilitates the transfer of the leased property or secured debt in a way that the new owner can know that there is no risk that it is already in default apart from the transferor's representation. Otherwise, the aggrieved party wouldn't have to mention anything until the statute of limitations arrived. All of the meanings, including the Canadian one, go back to the notion of affirming the existence of certain rights in advance of a dispute arising between the parties. This Agreement shall be construed, interpreted and enforced in accordance with, and the rights of the Parties shall be governed by, the laws of the Province of Québec and the federal laws of Canada applicable therein (excluding any conflict of law rule or principle of such laws that might refer such interpretation or enforcement to the laws of another jurisdiction). The language above is a choice of law clause. The Parties hereby irrevocably attorn to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Province of Québec, judicial District of Montreal, with respect to any matters arising pursuant hereto. The language above is a choice of forum clause, a.k.a. choice of jurisdiction clause, a.k.a. choice of venue clause.

Setting up two corporations to split profits and reduce tax brackets Let's say I am receiving income in a corp from multiple entities for consulting services and most of the money I make I keep in my company to potentially pay out dividends in future years. Would it make sense to split the income (and therefore the profits) between multiple corporations to keep in the lowest corporate tax brackets? Let's say I have a yearly profit of $120,000. If the current tax brackets for corps are as follows: Taxable income over Not over Tax rate $ 0 $ 50,000 15% 50,000 75,000 25% 75,000 100,000 34% 100,000 335,000 39% 335,000 10,000,000 34% 10,000,000 15,000,000 35% 15,000,000 18,333,333 38% 18,333,333 .......... 35% It seems I should set up 3 corporations, have my clients pay each of them about $40,000, and thus each corporation would only get taxed 15%. Thereby saving $12,000-$23,000 in taxes. I could easily imagine creating N number of corps and spreading profits between them all to have the lowest tax rate. This all seems pretty easy and obvious to me, yet I don't see any advice on the subject anywhere on the internet. Is this legal? Am I missing something fundamental? Because otherwise, it seems like a pretty huge tax loophole that I would imagine would be heavily abused.

I have extensive domain knowledge of your question. In short, your plan won't work. Here's why... Corporate Taxation and the double taxation problem Corporations are taxed in the U.S. as separate legal entities (unless they meet certain exceptions described below). Therefore, if your corporation does not avoid being taxed as a separate legal entity, your plan will fail due to the “double taxation” problem. I.e, Your corporation will be taxed first at the corporate level. Then after you pay the corporate tax, YOU WILL BE TAXED AGAIN as an individual, when you take the money out of the corporation via income or dividends. Or if you decide to leave the money in the corporation, there is an excess retained earnings penalty. Subchapter-S election and "flow-through" entities The way to avoid the double taxation problem is to make a "Subchapter-S election” for your corporation. This "S-election" will cause the corporation to be treated as a “flow through” entity for taxation purposes — allowing the owners to be taxed at the individual level only. The IRS imposes additional limitations and restrictions on these "S-corporations" and their ownership structures. Limiting things like the number of owners the corporation can have etc. The problem is that even with this subchapter S election, your concept still won’t work. This is because ALL your income will "flow through” all your corporations (via IRS Form K-1) and accrue to you at the individual level. Therefore, nullifying the “compartmentalization of income” effect you were trying to achieve. Conclusion In short, your plan won’t work. There are too many rules in place to effectively close the loophole you imagined might be. Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer or an accountant. This answer is not legal or accounting advice. Please consult the proper professionals for appropriate professional advice.

It isn't "illegal" but there are negative consequences to doing so. The civil penalties for failure to file a tax return are a percentage of the tax not paid (5% per month up to a maximum amount, plus interest). There is a small penalty for not filing an information tax return (like a 1099) when you have to file one and don't owe money, but there is usually not such a nominal fine for a personal form 1040. The statute of limitation on IRS efforts to audit a tax return or to impose additional tax for additional amounts owed doesn't begin to run until a tax return is filed. Criminal penalties require an intent to deprive the government of money. If he had more withheld than he owed, he probably isn't subject to any realistic significant civil or criminal consequences, but it is highly risky if he actually owed more than was withheld from his paychecks, and it deprives him of an ability to get refunds if too much was withheld (and possibly also stimulus check refunds) after three years. The issue here is really that it is hard to see that the downsides of not filing a tax return are hard to match to the benefits of filing a tax return, which for a wage and salary earning teacher, are very slight (you could pay someone to do it for $100-$300). Also, the lack of tax returns could hurt the teacher if the teacher ever has to apply for credit or get divorced or file for financial aid for the teacher's own kids to go to college. Of course, if he had lots of unreported side income, upon which he has not paid taxes, then there are serious civil and criminal consequences.

The English version of the taxman's web page does not indicate any specific exemption or reduction of taxation due to being under 18, however provision 102.3 says that The monthly taxable income of disabled people of I and II groups (except for veterans of war), persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health from any type employment shall be reduced by the amount of 200 manats. Provision 106.2, about exempt income says that Income tax rate for production enterprises owned by public organizations of disabled people, or children with limited levels of health shall be reduced by 50 percent if not less than 50 percent of employees at such enterprises are disabled people, or persons under age of 18 with limited levels of health. These provisions imply that it is legal for people under 18 to work. The Azerbaijan Labor Code section 42(3) says A person who has reached the age of fifteen may be a party to an employment contract. and 58(6) says that Employees under age of 18 may be allowed to hold multiple jobs if their total daily working hours do not exceed the reduced work hours provided for them in Section 91 hereof. which again implies that those under 18 may work for money. There are a number of other provisions that address employees under age 18. A freelancer is not an employee, so the labor code is technically not applicable to you, but it suggests that it is legal to freelance if you are under 18. Usually, restrictions are placed on people working for others and it is assumed that people can be self-employed relatively freely. One would have to hire a lawyer to be sure, though.

Your framing of the issue is basically wrong. There is an exemption, which varies from state to state, from unsecured creditors (but not creditors that take the goods as collateral) in bankruptcy and in debt collection outside of bankruptcy (not always the same exemption), for tangible personal property owned by the debtor which constitutes the debtor's tools of the trade, but that varies from state to state, is a creature of state statute (and the bankruptcy code), is not universal, and is usually limited in dollar amount. Moreover, the exemption only applies when the tradesman actually owns the tools of his trade which is customary in some professions, but not automatic. It is only the case when the tradesman buys his own tools. There is no generic v. non-generic distinction. In the software field, education and the public domain can always be accessed. But, intellectual property, that can be protected, that is developed for the employer, is usually work for hire and belong to the employer. This default rule is subject to the terms of the agreements between the parties entered into contractually.

If you are the CEO of a public company, this might be a problem if it causes less profits for the shareholders. They could fire you if your actions cost them money. If you are the owner of a business, then the CEO of your company (you) can do anything legal that all your shareholders (you) agree with. Nobody can force your company to deal with anyone, especially with no business, except for existing contracts or if there is illegal discrimination. Now all this is not “your personal opinion” but “the ceo running the company according to the wishes of the shareholders”. You are allowed legally to discriminate against a company whose business practices you don’t like. You have to do nothing, just don’t deal with them. If Facebook sends you a million dollar order, just don’t accept it. Make sure that no sales contract is created. It is remotely possible that you have problems if such a decision causes you to go bankrupt and you can’t pay your taxes or debt, like a debtor could claim you could have paid your debt and want your personal money instead of your broke company’s money.

Offices are normally rented by businesses, so for the tax appraiser, your situation would be quite out of the ordinary. They appear to be stone deaf to the idea that an office may be rented not for business purposes, and so they lump all office renters together. If they do not want to hear you, all you can do is to keep evidence that: You are an employee; You attempted to tell them that you are not liable for the tax because you are not a business — and present that should they ever attempt to prosecute you for tax evasion or similar. Specifically, do: Keep your employment contract, communication with your bosses telling you what to do and records of them paying your taxes; Send a formal letter (not an appeal) to the tax appraiser explaining the situation Should the issue ever be escalated, they will not be able to prove that you were a contractor/business (let alone beyond reasonable doubt), and you will be able to recover costs associated with this headache.

Tim Lymington got it right in the comment. If they don't get a wage, but expect a share of profit and/or loss, they are your partners and would be "members" of the LLC. Then you don't need workers comp or even to pay any salary at all. Of course, they will also be entitled to a share of the business, but from the description it sounds like they should be.

What follows is a broad overview. I'm not an expert in this; I just have a bit of experience in this due to a tax situation my wife & I experienced a few years ago. Please do not rely on this advice except as a starting point for more Googling. Your obligations (and your assistant's) will depend on whether the assistant is an employee or an independent contractor. In general, an independent contractor is someone you hire to "get a job done"; you have minimal control over the manner, time, place, tools, etc., that the assistant uses. An employee, on the other hand, is someone you hire to come to work at a particular time and do the job a particular way. (I'm glossing over some details here; see the IRS link above for more details.) If your assistant is an independent contractor, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you must provide them with Form 1099-MISC, and file a copy with the IRS as well. Your assistant will then be liable for income taxes on this amount, as well as self-employment tax (see below.) If your assistant is actually an employee, and you pay them over a certain threshold ($600 for 2020), you are required to provide them with a W-2 form, as well as filing a copy with the IRS. In addition, if you pay them more than a higher threshold ($2200 in a tax year or $1000 in any quarter for 2020), you are responsible for withholding taxes from their paychecks, as well as paying the employer's portion of Social Security, Medicare, and/or federal unemployment taxes. How to figure these taxes is complex, but generally the employee must provide you with a completed W-4, and then you must provide them (and the IRS) with a W-2 at the end of the tax year. See Publication 15: Employer's Tax Guide for all the gory details. The self-employment tax is designed to effectively cover the employer's portion of these taxes for self-employed workers. As you might imagine, employers are often tempted to misclassify employees as "independent contractors", since this means that this tax liability gets pushed from them onto their workers, as well as just making the employer's life easier. The Feds will not take kindly to such misclassification if it is discovered. Finally, for the state of Connecticut, consult the CT 1009-MISC filing guide (if your assistant is an independent contractor) or the Connecticut employer's tax guide (if they are an employee). The distinction is pretty much the same as at the federal level.

How should a contract for Agile software development differ from a contract for Waterfall software development? All software development contracts I've seen specify that x piece of software will be developed for y dollars within z amount of time. This works out for traditional Waterfall model projects, where you do a lot of forward planning and it is reasonable to expect that you will know how long the project will take near the beginning of the project. It doesn't match up at all for Agile, where you can start without having any idea exactly where you will end up and you are expected to be able to deal with requirements changes. How would a contract for Agile software development differ from a contract for Waterfall software development? Is there a place where I can find a sample contract for Agile development?

Keep in mind that for a real project with real money on the line you should consult with a business lawyer who can tailor a form to the specifics of your project and team. That said, this is the first google result for 'Agile Software Contracting' (and there are many others): Agile Contracts Contracting for agile software development is fundamentally different from traditional project contracting. Using traditional contracts for an agile development project can endanger the project execution and causes the company to fail to get the potential benefits of agile development. The purpose of this page is to collect references to agile contracting to support organizations to change their contracting models, reduce risk and get more benefits out of adopting Agile development. THE AGILE CONTRACTS PRIMER (PDF)

OK, seems I was right to begin with, but after building some work with this I had to be sure. The problem seems to step from a lot of not-lawyers overinterpreting the reach and applicability of copyright law, which, with a few asides, is the full extent of the AGPL. Additionally, the software is not based in an English-speaking country, which may have thrown the interpreted meaning of "derivative product", as opposed to simply "product". The AGPL is indeed in almost all ways the same as the GPL version 3; in fact you can see this by diffing the two documents. The only extension of the GPLv3 made for AGPL applies to software being run on a server. While it is indeed possible to include code in the final files, which might, in theory, constitute a significant portion of this program, that does not happen. The AGPL is apparently also meant almost exclusively for software, though the wording does include the ambiguous phrase "and other products"; this concerned me as it felt as though it might apply to the resources created by the work. It, broadly speaking, does not. So, I've got nothing to worry about--unless I was distributing derivative software, which would be an entirely different question and subject to this.

Absolutely it is. If a contract contains void provisions then, in general, the contract itself is void for uncertainty. A void contract never existed so you couldn't use this to terminate a contract because there never was a contract. Contracts of employment are typically heavily regulated and the regulations may tell you to deal with void provisions in a different way. However, for common law contracts a void provision can sink the whole thing.

could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".

This aspect (and many others) of contract law is applicable in the US and various countries of the EU. can they renege after the candidate has begun their journey, thus saddling the candidate with the travel cost? No. The company would incur breach of contract. There is no need for a formal contract. The candidate only needs to prove that the company agreed (in writing, orally or clearly through its conduct) to cover or reimburse those expenses and that this elicited a meeting of the minds. The agreement would be void if the candidate incurred the expenses despite knowing (via timely notice) that the company changed its mind. Likewise, if the candidate lied on his CV, the contract (here, the company's agreement to cover the expenses) would be voidable by the company, since the candidate's intentional misrepresentations preclude the aforementioned condition of meeting of the minds. --Edited on 1/18/2019 to add ...-- Per suggestion by @KRyan, the aspect of void or voidable contract is expanded. But first, two disclaimers are pertinent: We need to be mindful that many of the follow-up concerns are either premised on or inspired by the situation described in the underlying Workplace SE post. These are somewhat beyond the scope of this Law SE question but addressed nonetheless, given their relevance as well as the OP's & audience's interest. The follow-up hypotheticals [in this Law SE question] and clarifications thereto neither speculate nor pass judgment on the stranded candidate who asked on Workplace SE. The Workplace SE post reflects a company's breach of contract. The subsequent comments here about fraud hypotheticals are mostly derivative inquiries beyond what is described in Workplace SE. In particular, we do not assume whatsoever that the stranded candidate committed fraud. The_Sympathizer commented: can the contract be voided on the spot like that without first proving in court? As it seems like it grants a rather "vigilante" justice power that is open to abuse, since effectively the "punishment" (cancellation of the flight and thus inducing a rather serious physical situation) is administered before any due process has been afforded the one accused. Yes, it can be voided on the spot (aka sua sponte). "Vigilante" justice denotes a self-attribution of punitive powers that exclusively belong to the state/government/court, whereas a party's voiding of a contract is the act of foreclosing his losses/exposures with respect to a contract that de facto never existed (such as when that contract was induced by fraud). I agree that unfortunately that is open to abuse: As a pretext to actually incur breach of contract, a company might allege that the contract was void. That is why (if taken to court) it will be the company's burden to prove that (1) it reasonably relied upon a candidate's representations (2) which were significant and blatantly false (3) given the candidate's knowledge that his lies contravened the job's core requirements. That can be quite burdensome. For instance, is the company handing out airfares without first conducting some competent corroborations about the candidate's credentials/skills? If so, one can hardly concede the company's allegation of reasonable reliance. The resulting finding would be that the contract was not voidable by the company, and thus that it is liable for breach of contract. Also, belatedly "informing" the stranded candidate that the company "is going in a different direction" falls short of evidencing that the contract was voidable. That applies even if the candidate performed very poorly in the interview or screening process. Given the hardship imposed on a stranded candidate, a company has to be morally and legally very judicious about its method and timing for "going in a different direction". But absent any representations or [company's] bylaws to the contrary, a company generally does not have the obligation to afford due process to a candidate. The court is the entity with an obligation to enforce due process as provided by law (although many of us in the U.S. have repeatedly experienced the courts' disavowal of due process). --End of edit on 1/19/2019-- a binding agreement requires both sides to give something Here, the candidate's consideration is his time and effort to accommodate the company's interest in assessing the candidate's profile at a location that is convenient to the company.

Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.

Preface and Caveats The question doesn't specify where this happened. I am providing an outline of the way that most U.S. states would handle this situation, if the fats are as they are much more likely to be and not as claimed in the question probably due to a misunderstanding of the underlying transaction. I identify areas where state laws most often vary and don't describe those areas of the law in detail since that is impossible without knowing where this happens. This is a matter of state law and varies from state to state, although most U.S. states are quite similar until you get to the fine details. Atypical language in the contract between the contractor and the client could also lead to a different conclusion. I don't know how this would be resolved in a non-U.S. jurisdiction. Background: The Structure Of A Typical Construction Loan Financed Construction Project In business and contractual disputes you can only understand the answer if you understand the underlying business transaction, which the question itself doesn't spell out very fully. The fact pattern identified in the question is so unusual that I strongly suspect that there is a misunderstanding of the facts, or an inadvertent misstatement in the language used in the question due to sloppy writing that flows from not appreciating the importance of some key facts. The transaction was almost surely structures more or less as follows (for background, I'm presenting a more general very of this kind of transaction rather than the simple one with no subcontractors or material suppliers involved, because this context helps someone understand why the laws are written the way that they are written.) Usually, the client owns real property, takes out a construction loan from a bank secured by the real estate, and hires a general contractor. The client will usually make some down payment to the general contractor who will take care of paying the subcontractors and material suppliers, and will pay the balance of the amount due to the general contractor through proceeds of the construction loan disbursed by the bank which are drawn as the work is done and payment is earned. Typically, each drawn cycle, which is often monthly for a smaller project and weekly, biweekly or semimonthly in a larger project, materials suppliers and subcontractors submit invoices and lien waivers to the general contractor based upon the work done. If the work is complete, a complete lien waiver is submitted, if he work in only partially finished, a partial lien waiver is submitted. The general contractor substantively reviews the invoices based upon a physical review of the construction site and a review of the subcontract. If there are problems it is rejected and must be resubmitted by the material supplier or subcontractor. If it is approved, the general contractor attaches that invoice as a supporting document to a draw request for the draw cycle summarizing all validly submitted invoices from material suppliers, subcontractors and itself, and also attaching a partial lien waiver from the general contractor. Then, the general contractor submits that draw request to a bank officer handling the construction loan as an agent of the property owner-client, and also a client representative for approval. The bank officer and client representative make a much less probing review of the draw request, looking only for obvious irregularities or suspicious amounts, and if everything is in order, they approve the request. Then, the bank write a check in the draw amount approved to the general contractor. The general contractor then disburses the invoiced amounts to the materials materials suppliers and subcontractors and pays itself the amounts that it has earned. Sometimes, however, the general contractor gets a valid invoice from a material supplier or subcontractor, and receives funds from the client in the form of a downpayment or a loan draw, but doesn't pay the subcontractor or material supplier with those funds. Also, sometimes, the general contractor does work that it is entitled to be paid for or incurs an obligation to a material supplier or subcontractor, but the client doesn't pay or the bank doesn't disburse the funds requested even though the request is valid. When a general contractor, material supplier or subcontractor doesn't get paid for work that is actually done at a particular piece of real estate, the law gives the firm that wasn't paid for its work on that particular piece of real estate what is called a mechanic's lien encumbering that piece of real estate. The details of how a firm with a mechanic's lien gives notice to the world of its rights, the priorities of lien's vis-a-vis each other, and the way that mechanic's liens are enforced varies significantly from state to state. But typically the notice must be given very promptly and not long after notice of non-payment is given, a lawsuit to foreclose on the real estate encumbered by the lien is commenced. An unpaid material supplier or subcontractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the general contractor for breach of contract, and sometimes also for misappropriation of disbursements from the client or the bank. An unpaid general contractor, in addition to its lien rights, can also sue the owner of the property for breach of contract. The Facts In The Question and Analysis The first paragraph of the question tells us what went wrong. The client paid an employee of the general contractor (probably a project manager) instead of the firm the employee worked for (basically embezzling the money by deceiving the client into thinking that the employee was authorized to receive a payment to the employee's firm on its behalf when that wasn't the case), and the firm of the employee who was paid now wants to get paid. This happens and lawsuits usually follows when it does. But exactly what happens next depends upon the facts in the next to paragraphs. The next two paragraphs of the question, however, are probably confused and incorrect. The next two paragraphs say: Two weeks later, the client received a letter from the contractor's lender asking the client for money owed to the contractor, saying that if it was not paid, the client could be double charged. Does the client owe the contractor's lender? What probably actually happened is that the finance office of the contractor submitted a draw request to the bank officer in charge of the client's construction loan with the bank, and also gave a notice of the draw request to the client. The client tells the bank officer not to approve the draw request because the client has already paid the draw request directly to the employee of the contractor (probably the project manager) without the knowledge of the firm the employee worked for. What Happens Next If The Facts Are As I Believe Them To Be? When this happens, the finance officer at the contractor firm talks to the client figures out what happens and then talks to the employee to whom the payment was made. If the employee promptly turns over the funds the the contractor firm, the finance officers at the contractor firm scolds the employee for screwing up the system and the client for making a payment to the wrong person and there is no harm, no foul, and the matter is over. But if the employee who took the client's money doesn't turn over the money which the client can prove to the contractor firm that he paid to the employee, several things are likely to happen. Non-Lawsuit Actions: The client will direct the bank not to pay the draw request. The employee who took the money from the client is fired (no big deal, he was probably long gone). The contractor firm and/or the client will often, but not always, report to the police that the employee embezzled the funds from the client, and if the police find it credible, will issue an arrest warrant. The main reason not to do so is that the facts are uncertain enough that the police and prosecutor don't want to touch it (e.g. the client paid the employee in cash and didn't get a receipt, or the employee when asked says that the payment was made but was a "tip" or was payment for something unrelated), or the client and/or the contractor firm don't want to harm their reputations by making public the fact that there was a theft on this job. Three lawsuits could be brought, although, in practice, these might be consolidated as claims against different parties and cross-claims between defendants, in a lawsuit brought by the contractor, or in some other configuration. The contractor firm sues the employee who took the money for converting money from a client intended for it (probably both as a tort and as a breach of fiduciary duty by an agent of the construction firm). The contractor firm sues the client for breach of contract. The question is about the liability of the client in this second lawsuit. The client might also bring a counterclaim against the contractor for negligent supervision of its employee if the employee did indeed abscond with the money and the facts support that counterclaim. If the client prevailed on that counterclaim, the judgment on the counterclaim for negligent supervision (e.g. if the contractor knew that the employee had a history of doing things like this and didn't warn the client) would be setoff against the breach of contract judgment, rather than being a defense to the breach of contract claim. The client sues the employee for fraud, conversion or theft. What Are The Rights Of The Parties In These Lawsuits? In the second lawsuit, the client has breached the contract. The contract said to pay the firm, the client paid someone else, and so the obligation under the contract was not satisfied. The disputes in the lawsuit between the contracting firm and the client will be over whether the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds as an agent of he contracting firm, over whether the payment that the client says was made to the employee was made at all, and over the purpose of the payment if a payment was made to the employee but the employee claims that it was a "tip" or a payment for something else (e.g. the employee also had a catering side hustle and the employee says it was for catering services). The issue of whether the client made the payment at all may be hard to prove if the payment was made in cash and the employee didn't provide a receipt and will come down to the credibility of the client and employee's testimony at trial. if the payment was made with a check or credit card, bank records will make it an open and shut case on that issue that will probably not be disputed at trial. If the facts reveal that the employee had apparent authority to accept the funds from the client for the contractor firm and that the payment was for work on the project and not something else, then the the payment made by the client to the employee satisfies the client's duty under the contract even if the employee wasn't actually authorized to receive the funds for the contractor firm. So, the client wins and the contractor firm's sole remedy is to sue its employee for misappropriating the client's funds. On the the other hand, if the employee did not have apparent authority to accept the funds from the client, or the payment was for something other than work on the project, or the client fails to prove that the payment was ever made, then the client owes the money to the contracting firm and must pay the contracting firm for the amount due (plus interest, litigation costs and possibly attorneys' fees depending on the terms of the contract). The client may pay that obligation out of separate funds of the client's own, or may authorize a the bank officer to make a draw on the construction loan to pay the amount owed. The construction loan bank of the client wouldn't sue the client or demand payment from the client for the amount that should have been paid to the contractor firm but was instead paid to the employee. It didn't pay money to someone it shouldn't have paid it to unless the client authorized the bank to do so. And, the bank won't pay the contractor without the client/borrower's say so. If the client authorized a draw payment from the construction loan to the employee rather than the contractor firm, the client still owes the bank for what it paid to the employee at the direction of the client (in addition to all other draws on the project), although the client may have a suit against the bank officer for negligence in administering the loan by failing to flag that the payee was wrong (which might lose but isn't a sure loss). The amount owed to the contractor firm proceeds under the analysis set forth above. What If The Facts Are Right? If, improbably, the facts as stating in the question are actually what happened, the client will owe or not owe the contractor money under the same analysis as above. But the client will not have liability to any company that the contractor got a loan from (which would not encumber the client's real estate), since the client has no contractual relationship with the contractor's lender. Post-Script On Double Payment Prevention Laws The question hinges on the unfairness of the client having to possibly pay twice for the same construction work. In some situations, where the general contractor firm is at fault for causing the double payment to happen, the law protects the client from double payment, even though those laws don't apply here. I explain why these laws don't apply below. Basically, the client has to eat the double payment when the double payment occurs because the client screwed up though no fault of the general contractor and the general contractor doesn't benefit from the double payment. Some states have laws designed to prevent property owners, often only residential property owners having work performed on their own residences, from having to double pay for work done in some circumstances. But these laws usually only apply when the client pays the general contractor firm as the client is supposed to, satisfying his contractual obligation, and the general contractor doesn't pay the subcontractor, causing the subcontractor to sue the general contractor for breach of contract and the owner to enforce the subcontractor's mechanic's lien. In those situations, the double payment prevention law eliminates the subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights when the client pays the general contractor in full, and the subcontractor is left only with a lawsuit against the general contractor who didn't pass on the client's or the client's bank's payment to the general contractor for the subcontractor's share of work to the subcontractor. In this case, the double payment laws usually wouldn't apply because the legal issue here is whether the client paid the contractor, or was deceived by the employee into paying someone other than the contractor in an act of conversion/embezzlement/fraud.

IANAL, but a EULA is a Contract of Adhesion https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/adhesion_contract_contract_of_adhesion and restrictions against publishing benchmarking data about products is fairly common https://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas A contract is a contract, even a click-through, and is legally binding; there is plenty supporting case law. You sign when you click: http://smallbusiness.findlaw.com/business-operations/contracts-and-electronic-signatures.html Basically, VMware has lots more money than you do. If they are annoyed at your posting of benchmarks that don't make their products look as good as they feel they should, they can at very least send a DMCA to the site that posts the benchmarks. Whether that works could depend on where the website is hosted. At most, they could take you to civil court, if you are in their jurisdiction. What happens, if you refuse to take your unapproved benchmark down? Can they sue you? Yes. (In civil, not criminal court). How much leg does a clause like this stand on the courts? In the United States? A contract is a contract. And VMware and you (I assume) are in the US, so the contract is enforceable. In the rest of the world? Outside of the US, enforceability is variable; that is searchable in law databases for each country and agreements between countries. Consider your motives for posting benchmarks against VMware's EULA. Do you have good points to make? Or are you simply complaining about the product? Who has more money to spend defending or fighting the EULA? You or them? If you're seriously concerned about this, talk to a lawyer and don't take legal advice from the general public.

How common is it for bills to be introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate? Five bills are mentioned in this report. Two of them, H.R. 2422 and S. 829, are very similar and appear to be applicable to the same situations (though I can not find the full text of the latter), with the only difference being that the former was introduced in the House of Representatives, and the latter was introduced in the Senate. As of the report's publication, both were pending legislation in the 109th Congress. Is it common for similar - if not identical - bills to be introduced in both the House of Representatives and the Senate at the same time? Why is this done?

The only legal requirement for bill origination is that tax bills must originate in the House of Representatives. Otherwise, simultaneous origination is quite common. Differences are resolved through a process called "reconciliation" prior to passage.

If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.

Federal countries usually define the separation (and sometimes sharing) of legislative competencies in their constitutions. There will also usually be a "default" case for if the competency is not explicitly defined in the constitution. For example, in the United States, the default is to give legislative power to the individual states via the Tenth Amendment. If criminal law is left to the sub-national entities, then the nation can usually still enact a penal code with respect to its competencies (again, the U.S. is a good example). So, I decided to make this a mini-research project by checking the countries Wikipedia lists as federations. I wasn't able to find an explicit statement as to whether there were competing penal codes in most cases, but was able to find in which level of government the constitution placed criminal law. In some cases where there are "competing" penal codes, the constitution specified which level has supremacy, making for less "competition". Without further ado, here's what I've been able to find. Links are either to an appropriate Wikipedia page, or the part of the applicable constitution dividing the legislative competencies. Take these with a grain of salt. Competing penal codes Australia Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia India Iraq Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Sudan United States Single national penal code Austria Brazil Canada Comoros Germany Malaysia Nepal Russia Switzerland Venezuela Unclear Argentina Belgium Micronesia St. Kitts and Nevis Somalia South Sudan United Arab Emirates

At least some two-plate states suggest that if you're registered in a two-plate state you must display both plates within their borders. And some even suggest you must have two plates even if your state only issues one, though this scenario would probably not withstand federal scrutiny. In Washington, License plates must be: (i) Attached conspicuously at the front and rear of each vehicle if two license plates have been issued; (ii) Attached to the rear of the vehicle if one license plate has been issued. If it was issued, you must display it. California law says (a) When two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear. (b) When only one license plate is issued for use upon a vehicle, it shall be attached to the rear thereof, unless the license plate is issued for use upon a truck tractor, in which case the license plate shall be displayed in accordance with Section 4850.5. So if you were issued one, you can drive with one, and if the department (arguably and statutorily "The Department of Motor Vehicles") issued two, you must display both. You might think that you could therefore remove one out of state plate when in California, but they also require (as of this year) that (a) A license plate issued by this state or any other jurisdiction within or without the United States shall be attached upon receipt and remain attached during the period of its validity to the vehicle for which it is issued while being operated within this state or during the time the vehicle is being held for sale in this state, or until the time that a vehicle with special or identification plates is no longer entitled to those plates; and a person shall not operate, and an owner shall not knowingly permit to be operated, upon any highway, a vehicle unless the license plate is so attached. The law in Oregon says A person commits the offense of failure to display registration plates if the person operates, on the highways of this state, any vehicle or camper that has been assigned registration plates by this state and the registration plates assigned to the vehicle or camper are displayed in a manner that violates any of the following: (a) The plate must be displayed on the rear of the vehicle, if only one plate is required. (b) Plates must be displayed on the front and rear of the vehicle if two plates are required. Somehow, they failed to cover the condition that a person does not have plates issued by Oregon. The law in Ohio is that (1) No person who is the owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to display in plain view on the front and rear of the motor vehicle a license plate that bears the distinctive number and registration mark assigned to the motor vehicle by the director of public safety, including any county identification sticker and any validation sticker issued under sections 4503.19 and 4503.191 of the Revised Code This doesn't even make an exception for vehicles from some adjacent state which have only one plate. If you otherwise keep your nose clean, the law says A law enforcement officer shall only issue a ticket, citation, or summons, or cause the arrest or commence a prosecution, for the failure to display a license plate in plain view on the front of a parked motor vehicle if the officer first determines that another offense has occurred and either places the operator or vehicle owner under arrest or issues a ticket, citation, or summons to the operator or vehicle owner for the other offense. but you can still get busted for driving your car. Finally, Montana says a person may not operate a motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, or travel trailer upon the public highways of Montana unless the motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole trailer, or travel trailer is properly registered and has the proper license plates conspicuously displayed... (1-plate exception for motorcycles etc)...All other motor vehicles must have one license plate displayed on the front and one license plate displayed on the rear of the motor vehicle. One thing to notice is that these laws are in sections on vehicle registration and not operation, where separate sections of the code regarding street-legal vehicles prohibit driving without lights or a muffler. Under the full faith and credit clause, I think your act of registering a vehicle in PA is given credit in OH, because the requirement pertains to registering, not the conditions for legal operation on the road.

If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.

No, under US law, it is an "executive agreement", not a "treaty". The vast majority of US's international agreements are done as executive agreements, and not treaties; and the power of the executive branch to make executive agreements has been repeatedly upheld in the courts. Specifically, there are two types of executive agreements: "Congressional-executive agreements". These are the ones that require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress passes the needed legislation just like any other normal legislation, i.e. a majority of both houses of Congress. Most trade agreements are passed as congressional-executive agreements. "Sole executive agreements". These are the ones that do not require changes to legislation to be implemented. Congress is not involved at all. This Iran nuclear agreement is a "sole executive agreement" because it does not require Congressional action to be implemented. (So it doesn't need to be passed by a simple majority by Congress.) The President already has the legal authority to implement all of the US's obligations under the agreement, which are the relief of certain Iran sanctions. Some of those sanctions were implemented by the President, and which the President can remove by himself. Some of these sanctions were implemented by Acts of Congress, but those Acts specifically give the President the authority to waive them. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (the "Corker bill"), passed by Congress in May 2015, also confirms that "It is the sense of Congress that: [...] this Act does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to commence;" As to your question about whether something can "have the effect of a treaty if it's passed by a simple majority". The answer is yes (in the other way around). The Supreme Court ruled in the Head Money Cases that "treaties" (ratified by 2/3 of the Senate as specified in Article II) have the same legal effect in US law as regular legislation passed by Congress (by a simple majority of both houses), which means that Congress can modify or repeal (insofar as US law is concerned) any "treaty" that is ratified by the Senate, by passing a later law that contradicts it, just like it can with regular legislation. So, yes, any regular legislation passed by a simple majority (including for congressional-executive agreements) has the same legal effect as treaties.

The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator.

No; only 23 states require their congressional districts to be contiguous. See Reapportionment and Redistricting in the West by Gary F. Moncrief: Only 23 states have [contiguity] requirements for their congressional districts, although as a practical matter most congressional districts will be contiguous; the relative dearth of legal limits is a manifestation of the fact that few states have provided any express legal constraints on congressional districting at all. But that's not to say more states don't have contiguous districts. On Profesor Justin Levitt's website, he observes that: Many states require contiguity only "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. I am having a difficult time finding a list of states with such requirements; I will update if I find it.

Could a personal jetpack flight legally occur over Australian cities? Have just been reading about the remarkable jetpack flight over Dubai, in the article Flying over Dubai — and other places — with jetpacks (a YouTube of the incredible flight is available on YouTube). My question is, what is the law regarding a similar flight over an Australian city? (for example, flying over the Sydney Harbour Bridge and around the Centrepoint Tower)

Assuming that the aircraft is allowed to operate in Australia, that the pilot was licensed, communications were to spec etc. then the answer is given in designated Airspaces handbook. Without going into details the airspace above Sydney is controlled and permission from Airservices Australia would be needed.

Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the "Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?" comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.

There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb).

in japan operation of an unmanned airborne vehicle, aka UAV, aka Drone, inside a city might be legal, if a special license is obtained: Drones may not be flown in the following manners without special permission from the Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism: 150 meters (492 feet) above ground level; near airports; above densely inhabited areas, as defined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This means in reverse, that you could have such a special license, but that license needs to be obtained for each operation 10 days prior, may only be done in daytime and within line of sight between drone and operator. However, city centers are densily inhabited areas, so the default is banned. However, in the countryside, flying a UAV does not require a special license, as long as the general other rules are followed (150 m above ground, 30 meters of any obstacle, daytime only, line of sight, etc). Among the requirements is also a total ban on alcohol at the control. As a result, the operation as depicted is not lawful under the ordinary laws as they operate in our world, unless the drone operator has special permit.

You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective).

This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.

First of all, to clarify some numbering, HR 4635 (107th Congress) was not actually passed. The language was passed as part of HR 5005, becoming Public Law 107-296, and this provision now appears at 49 USC 44921. The exact text of this provision is: A Federal flight deck officer shall not be liable for damages in any action brought in a Federal or State court arising out of the acts or omissions of the officer in defending the flight deck of an aircraft against acts of criminal violence or air piracy unless the officer is guilty of gross negligence or willful misconduct. The language makes it clear that this is only referring to civil liability. So, if the officer is defending the flight deck, and they are sued for damages resulting from their actions, the plaintiff will not win (assuming the law is correctly applied). But this law says nothing about whether or not they can be prosecuted for a crime. In any case, the officer in your example does not appear to have been defending the flight deck, so this law wouldn't apply at all. In your example, the officer's defense against a murder charge would probably be based on defense of others. There is a discussion on Justia. It seems that a key question would be whether shooting the unruly passenger was proportional - was there a reasonable fear that the passenger was actually going to kill someone?

You cannot stop the claim. But the good news is that claims of jurisdiction by many countries are routinely ignored by many other countries. So enforcement attempts might fall short. I've written things here that might get me into real trouble with the authorities of North Korea if I ever traveled there and if they were able to match my real-world identity with this account. But I don't plan to travel there. Likewise, before I went to Turkey I should probably review what I've written about their government, and then wonder if it is worth the risk. Probably yes, it wasn't very incendiary. But my home country and those I tend to visit (if there is no pandemic ongoing) would not extradite me for what I wrote.

What is the difference between "murder", "manslaughter" and "homicide"? Do "murder", "manslaughter" and "homicide" have different legal definitions? Or are they just terms referring to the same act used in different jurisdictions?

The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence).

Most of your examples don't seem to be so much self-contradictory, as limited to a subset of the obvious meaning for purposes of a particular law. When a term has a specific meaning within a particular field or context, it is often called a "term of art". For example "Fair use" is a term of art in US Copyright law, and "Under color of law" is a term of art in US civil rights law. "Standing" is a term of art in most common-law jurisdictions. But a term of art is usually somewhat broadly understood, and is not limited to one particular law or section of law. I would just call such a thing a "specially defined term" or just say "Q as defined for purposes of the XYZ law".

The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.

The language is worded broader: "A victim of [list of crimes] or that victim's representative shall have the following rights as provided by law:" The list is seemingly alphabetically, and covers besides arson injuring people, also aggravated arson & battery, misuse of explosives, negligent use of a deadly weapon, murder, [two other types of homicide], kidnapping, [various types of sexual misconduct], [two types of hit and run], [two types of child endangerment]. That is a closed list, that gives the victim or his representative (estate or legal guardian) the rights enumerated after.

Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop & account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop & Search and Arrest covered by the OP.

There are great jurisdiction by jurisdiction differences in the statutes of limitations that apply to crimes. Some jurisdictions have no statute of limitations for any serious crime (e.g. Canada and if I recall correctly Virginia). Others have statutes of limitations for almost all serious crimes other than murder (e.g. Colorado). Where there is a statute of limitations, the primary issue is that the ability of the prosecution and defense to secure reliable evidence that will allow a jury to enter an accurate verdict. This potential to conduct a fair trial can be compromised by a delay in pressing charges. Alibi witnesses can die or disappear to someplace that they can't be located, the location of the alleged crime can change in ways pertinent to proof, memories of witnesses in general can fade. Records or correspondence that could show intent can be destroyed. This is particularly a burden for an innocent criminal defendant who did not know that he or she needed to prepare a defense and gather evidence to respond to criminal charges. Some states toll statutes of limitations during a period of a victims minority or incapacity when brining charges may not be feasible. Other states have a long statute of limitations in rape cases where there is DNA evidence available that can conclusively tie a defendant to the scene of the crime (lack of consent would still have to be established), but a shorter statute of limitations in other rape cases. Murder and fraud are the most common offenses to lack a statute of limitations, in the first case, because it is considered the most serious crime and because the victim is unable to report the crime, and in the latter case, because fraud, by its nature and by the perpetrator's design, may go undiscovered for very long periods of time. Is there a line of reasoning to decide which classes of crime have a limited window for prosecution? While I've given some examples of the considerations that apply, ultimately, this is a legislative and political decision and not a legal one. You can't determine by reason alone which classes of crimes will have a limited window for prosecution. Different legislative bodies make different decisions on the same issues at different times and in different places.

Under Canadian law, causing the death of human being is homicide. If the homicide is "culpable", it is an offense (crime). In the described scenario, it might be culpable homicide if the death was due to "criminal negligence". That would be the case if in doing a thing, the person "shows wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons". We've now reached the end of what statutory law has to say about the question. Court cases take us a bit further in understanding criminal negligence. The wisdom of the courts is distilled to ts essence in jury instructions, which say The Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct showed a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable person in the circumstances; and that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have foreseen that this conduct posed a risk of bodily harm. R. v. Tutton is an example: the court finds that The phrase "wanton or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons" signifies more than gross negligence in the objective sense. It requires some degree of awareness or advertence to the threat to the lives or safety of others or alternatively a wilful blindness to that threat which is culpable in light of the gravity of the risk assumed. Ultimately, though, the fact-finder must evaluate the behavior against a highly subjective standard as to "what a reasonable man would do". I cannot imagine a scenario where shoving a person realistically could lead to them falling into traffic and getting killed but there the shoving was ordinary horseplay. Pushing a person in the direction of oncoming traffic is abnormal behavior that shows shocking disregard for the probable harm caused to another. But perhaps there is some innocent scenario where this was really just a tragic outcome. So the answer is, it could be culpable homicide, or not, depending on the facts. To be classed as murder (rather than manslaughter) the person has to intend to cause death (§229), which is missing from this scenario.

In the US, the details are determined at the state level. The term "abandonment" is used very broadly, and can include a situation where a parent leaves a child without making contact for a period of time (which may result in termination of parental rights, but not a punishment). "Abandonment" as it applies in Washington state is explained here. There is what is known as a "safe haven" law, which allows a newborn (under 72 hours old) to be transferred (anonymously) to a qualified recipient (health care employee, medic, etc.), and not be liable under the criminal laws. This does not include dumping the infant in the snow. Under RCW 9A.42.020, the parent would be guilty of criminal mistreatment in the first degree if their action "causes great bodily harm to a child or dependent person by withholding any of the basic necessities of life" (note that the law is not specific to children), and this is a class B felony. There are multiple grades of mistreatment, so if the action "creates an imminent and substantial risk of bodily injury" or "causes bodily injury or extreme emotional distress manifested by more than transient physical symptoms", this is 4th degree mistreatment, which is a misdemeanor. There are, in parallel fashion, laws against abandonment of a dependent starting at RCW 9A.42.060, punished as a class B felony down to a gross misdemeanor. The maximum penalty for a class B felony is $20,000 and 10 years in prison, and for a simple misdemeanor it is 90 days and $1,000. In case death results, the discussion could move to the homicide statutes. Homicide by abuse is when, with extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person. and this is a class A felony. If a person "recklessly causes the death of another person", this is manslaughter in the first degree (class A felony), but if it is "with criminal negligence", it is manslaughter in the second degree (a class B felony). Manslaughter charges are predicated on there not being an intent to kill. If the intent was to actually kill the child, this would be first degree homicide, where the punishment is life imprisonment. Additionally, first degree homicide can be found if "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person". State v. Edwards is a relevant case, where a person was charged with both second degree murder and homicide by abuse, and the issue came up that "extreme indifference to human life" is not a self-evident expression. It turns out that case law in Washington interprets this, as applied to first degree murder, as meaning "indifference to human life in general", not "indifference to the life of the specific victim". After a lengthy review of principles of judicial interpretation, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to give the first-degree murder definition of indifference, that is, it is up the the jury to decide what constitutes extreme indifference, for homicides other than 1st degree murder.

Is contributory "publication" a defense against libel? Suppose there was a work of fiction where one of the characters was based on a real one. And suppose the real person sued the author and, through the process of discovery, found private emails, author's notes, etc., that confirm the claim. But suppose that nobody other than the author and the real person connected the fictional character to the real person prior to the lawsuit, and it was the lawsuit itself that drew attention to the connection in public. Subsequently, the real person suffered damages, but had suffered none before his lawsuit. Can the defendant then use a "contributory negligence" defense, arguing that the damage was realized due to the actions of the plaintiff? "Contributory" negligence or other contributions are a factor in other areas of the law. Is it a factor in libel?

A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.

If you state, to a third person, that Joe has performed a criminal act then that is defamation and you can be sued. Unless it is true. However, if you are relying on the truth as a defence you will need to provide evidence that it is. At the moment you lack: a criminal conviction of Joe any physical evidence against Joe any personal knowledge that Joe has committed these acts. All you have, is second hand rumours that this has happened to 5 women, some of whom have reported it to you in person. This is called hearsay and it is not evidence. It may be true, it probably is true - you can't prove it's true and in court, that's all that matters. If you were sued your only possible defence is to call these women to give the evidence they are unwilling to give - are you willing to betray their confidence to that extent?

Presumably you mean "and make untrue accusations of wrong-doing". In the US, defamation involves statements about a legal person, and a place, government or government body, or industry is not a legal personal (a specific business can be, however). In the course of "defaming" a city, you might end up defaming a supposedly fictitious individual who bears a striking resemblance to a real person, for example a made-up New York real estate tycoon named Ronald Rump who runs for president. Or you could defame the "police department of Bug Tussle" which in fact is composed of only one person -- that is, you refer to a group but the group is so small that it actually refers to an identifiable individual. See this answer regarding defaming people in fiction. Okay, it's not actually true that a government can't be a legal person. The fact that in the US a government can't sue for defamation would be rooted in the First Amendment, and is surely embodied in case law that is lurking. In Canada, governments have had more power to pursue critic via defamation suits. In Ontario, Halton Hills (Town) v. Kerouac 80 O.R. (3d) 577 (2006) says that "a government may not sue in defamation". I expect that there is some such ruling in the history of US law.

Typical in any of the several united-states No, this fails to meet two of the core elements of libel. The statement must be Adverse (fails) Stated by one party To a second party About a third party (fails) The case you're thinking of, where a company brags excessively about their company or products, are covered by a variety of securities and trade laws, such as false advertising. Many of these are applicable in the Federal domain, i.e. are Federal rather than state laws. Edit: Now I see you've changed the question a bit to claiming to be first. Yes, the injured party can sue for that, but they are more claiming false advertising than libel. Accusing someone of not being first-to-market is not a particularly powerful or damning claim. Oreo didn't invent the sandwich cookie nor did Apple invent the computer. So such a claim is really a lot more about the publicity than actual, provable damages; so the controversy is more likely to be aired outside the court system, or in the courts but mainly for the publicity. (an example of the latter being the "Taco Tuesday" trademark-busting action; IIRC Taco Bell even paid the other party's legal fees, despite prevailing.)

Here is an example: The Author agrees to hold harmless and indemnify the Journal and The University against any legal claim or action or expense of any nature arising from any claim of infringement of copyrights or proprietary rights resulting from publication of the manuscript or claims of libel, obscenity, unlawfulness or invasion of privacy arising out of anything contained in the manuscript as furnished by the Author. Suppose Author infringes the copyright of Jones, by copying large parts of it into Author's work. Author is now in legal trouble because he illegally copied stuff into his manuscript, but Journal is also in big (bigger) legal trouble, because it made many copies of Jones' word and sold them. Jones will now sue everybody, mostly the Journal (since Journal has money, and Author doesn't). Thanks to the indemnity clause, when Journal gets sued, all of the costs (of litigation and judgment) have to be born by Author. The primary purpose is to protect Journal from suits by third parties. Nothing can keep you from getting sued, but such a clause (theoretically) means that the person whom your contracting with has to cover the cost of his wrong-doing (assuming that he is not a turnip). The term "hold harmless" is there to guarantee that Author can't decide to sue Journal for publishing a libelous or infringing article. The functions are similar, but not totally the same: this and references therein could be interesting reading, by way of more details. He argues against using both terms, and instead you should use only "indemnify". In this case, the court said "When two words are used in a contract, the rule of construction is that the words have different meanings", which caused the court to assign distinct meanings to the words (which are typically used as though they mean the same thing), which doesn't seem to have been the original intent.

As I understand it, you can pretty much sue anybody for anything. The question, of course, is would you win the suit? All the lawyers here can correct me, but I believe in order to win, you would have to Show standing, that is, they're your comments and not someone else's Show that it's a deliberate act, and not just someone accidentally clicked the wrong checkbox. Show that it was an act by the agency and not by Facebook, for example. Show that you've been singled out for your viewpoint (they allow some people's comments) Show that there is no other reason to delete your comments (they're obscene, or advocate for an illegal act, for example). I'm probably missing something else. The real question is, even if you could demonstrate all these things, would it be worth it? You may spend $1,000's and you might not recover your legal fees. The case might take years.

The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement".

I virtually never see "without prejudice" used in anything but court documents, unless the writer does not know what he's saying. A typical example would be when a person sues someone, but brings the case in the wrong court. The judge would dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could refile somewhere else. In contrast, if the person filed in the correct court, but the judge ruled that the plaintiff had done nothing wrong, the judge would then dismiss the case with prejudice. I believe I have on some occasions seen the phrase used in legal correspondence, perhaps noting, for example, that a party was willing to settle his sexual harassment claim for X amount of money without prejudice to their claims for some unrelated issue. In either event, "without prejudice" is typically referring to the ongoing ability to litigate a claim. I'm not entirely clear on how you're envisioning it being used as e-mail boilerplate, but I can't see any reason to do so. If you did, that would not have any effect on the e-mail's admissibility. EDIT: One other note, because I hadn't looked at it before. The LinkedIn article to which you linked and the comments on it are basically nonsense. Legal advice from a graduate of the "School of Life" is about as valuable as life advice from a graduate of a school of law.

Can I publish a book and source code in the book under different licenses? Can I publish a book and the source code in the book under two different licenses? Eg. Publish a book under the GNU FDL license, but license the source code examples in this book under the Apache license?

As long as you own the copyright to the works, you can even publish the source code itself under two different licenses, which can be radically different. For example, MySQL is licensed under both a commercial and an open-source license. Given that you can publish a single piece of work as multiple licenses, it is your choice which one you wish to grant to the book or the code, as long as you own the copyright.

If you create a new work that is derived from or based on someone else's work, it is a derivative work, and you cannot do so without permission from the original copyright holder. If the original work is made available under a CC-BY_SA 4.0 license, you have permission, but it comes with conditions. One of those is that you must attribute the original work -- you must say what work yours is based on and who created it. Another is that you must license your own derived work under the same CC-BY-SA license (or a compatible one). This does not mean that your work is not copyrighted -- it is. But it does mean that you must grant to others the same rights that the creator of the work you used granted to you. That is what the "share alike" or SA part of the license means. if you don't like that, you should not use a work licensed under CC-BY-SA terms to create your own work. If you publish your work but fail to grant that license to others, you are infringing the copyright of the work you used, and could be sued. Note that if you had created a compilation rather than a derived work -- for example if you created an album of images from various sources, some of them under CC-BY-SA licenses, you would retain a copyright on the collection as a whole, and that would not have to be under CC-BY-SA. But in this case you say that you used the other person's image as a background for your own illustration. That is creating an "adapted" or derivative work, i am fairly sure, and invokes the share alike clause of the license. You might also want to consider the different case mentioned in If I include an unmodified CC-BY-SA work in a book, does the whole book have to be CC-BY-SA?

Not necessarily, but also possibly. Google Books may (or may not) have a license to distribute images of the book covers in question. This license would be between Google and the owner of the copyright of the book cover. Just because Google has a license to distribute the image of the book cover to you does not mean that you have a license to distribute the image of the book cover to your customers. However, depending on jurisdiction, using the book cover to identify a book might also be legal under relevant fair use statutes. It is also possible that the particular book cover is not protected by copyright. For example, a particular book cover might have entered public domain. If this question is not a hypothetical, you should probably consult a lawyer.

If you have released software under the LGPL license, you have given all recipients the right to modify this software for any purpose, including removing or adding features in a manner that you don't like. If you don't want that, you should not release your commercial features under the LGPL. Things you could consider doing: Publish the software under a different license. This is what you're thinking about. But note that you can't just add such license terms. Either, the license is still the LGPL with some extra terms. But then, the terms of the LGPLv3 allow recipients to remove the additional restrictions. Or, this is an entirely separate license. But then it would no longer be the LGPL, and no longer be an Open Source license. Whether such additional terms create a separate license or can be removed from the license is currently being litigated in the US in the context of the Neo4J database, which added the "Commons Clause" restrictions to the AGPLv3. See a discussion of the case from the Software Freedom Conservancy here: https://sfconservancy.org/blog/2022/mar/30/neo4j-v-purethink-open-source-affero-gpl/ Remove the restricted features from the LGPL version and maintain a separate commercial version, or implement the commercial features as a plugin. This is sometimes known as an “open core” business model. Due to the limited copyleft effect of the LGPL, you can still combine the proprietary parts and the LGPL-covered parts into a single program, but doing so may be confusing for users. It should be absolutely clear which parts are LGPL-covered, and which are your proprietary parts that cannot be modified. However, you would not be able to prevent recipients from using the LGPL-covered parts without your proprietary components, i.e. they would always be able to remove any licensing checks etc. More generally, it could make sense to think about why you want to publish any part of the software as Open Source. Sometimes, Open Source licensing is a good business decision, sometimes it isn't. If you want to control what users can do with the software, Open Source licensing is not a good fit for your goals.

The copyright holder is free to release the work under whatever licenses the copyright holder wants, in the absence of a contract saying otherwise. A copyright holder could sign a contract not to release under another license, but otherwise I don't see why he or she would waive the rights. The copyright holder can always decide not to reissue under a different license. The copyright holder basically retains all rights not specifically signed away. Everyone else is limited to what copyright law allows and to what license terms they have.

Bob is not authorized, but he may legally do so (in the US, you don't need specific authorization to perform a non-forbidden act). In creating the manual, Bob would need to avoid reproducing the questions (which are protected by copyright), and just give the answers. Copyright protection for the textbook includes not just the actual words, but also organizational structure, so Bob would need to avoid copying the structure of the exercises. As for "structure of the exercises", textbooks often have exercises for each chapter, with a clear logic to the order and content of chapters. Within the chapter exercises, there is often some rationale to the order of presentation of the dozen exercises, like starting for with simplest concepts presented in the text and moving up the ladder. In a given exercise, there my be subparts, where understanding part 1 leads you to understanding part 2, and so on. In a well-structure textbook, maybe 20% of the creative nature of the book is that artful ordering. Imposing an entirely different order on your solutions avoids copying the author's protected expression.

The creator of the software doesn't provide any warranty. If you feel confident in the quality of the software, nothing stops you from providing a warranty. If the software doesn't meet your guarantees, you will have to pay out because you provided the warranty, depending on the terms. Not the creator of the software because they explicitly didn't provide any warranty. If that's what you want to do, go ahead. I wouldn't. You don't have to republish under the BSD license, which you wouldn't. You must attach the license terms, which clarifies the role of the original creators, and that they don't give a warranty. Doing this allows you to copy the software. It doesn't mean you can't provide a warranty.

The GPL does require you to keep any existing copyright notices: You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you [...] keep intact all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty [...] The GPL also recommends adding a notice to each file: Copyright (C) yyyy name of author - This program is free software[...] From my reading of the GPL, if the software you modify contains such notices, which is likely, you must preserve them. This effectively attributes the original author. However, as far as I can see, there is no requirement to have a list of acknowledgements (as is customary in scientific papers), which lists all the software you used. How to attribute parts that are integrated in source form? (Where licence information is given in the file header) If you keep the original file header (and possibly add to it), that should be enough. How to attribute parts that are integrated in binary form? As far as I can see, there is no additional attribution required for distribution in binary form. The GPL requires you to supply the source code along with the binary form, so the attribution in the source code will be available.

Is homeowner liable for police injury during raid Hypothetically speaking, let's say that a person is very paranoid about intruders, government, end of the world, so on. They decided to buy some land and have a fence around the property with clear markings "do not enter" and warnings that there are "traps" in the area. The person makes every reasonable attempt to warn people not to enter. Now after sometime, authorities secure a search warrant and approval to raid the house via legal means, and the warrant and raid are both justifiably issued. Let's assume that the person was willing to cooperate with the authorities as well after they had identified themselves. The person is also willing to assist in disarming / identifying any traps. Would the home owner be liable for any damages done to the authorities if they were injured by his "traps" prior to them identifying themselves or after? Note: Trap could be anything in FM 5 31 maybe even an inner electric fence.

Even if the authorities aren't injured, the homeowner may well face criminal charges. Many states make it illegal to set booby traps; for instance, California makes it a felony in section 20110 of the Penal Code. The definition of "boobytrap" in the code is "any concealed or camouflaged device designed to cause great bodily injury when triggered by an action of any unsuspecting person coming across the device;" on the face of it, it is definitely not clear that a generic "there are traps" sign makes it not a boobytrap (whereas a sign on the trap announcing its presence probably would). If a trespasser falls victim to a trap, that can be grounds for a successful lawsuit against the homeowner; see Katko v. Briney (an Iowa civil case). The duty of care to trespassers is low; there's no general duty to mitigate hazards. However, one part of the duty is generally that one may not lay a trap for trespassers (example: report from Connecticut Office of Legal Research).

Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his "land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city." This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, "Order without law," sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)

The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.

Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.

Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.

First, if the police officer had reasonable cause to believe that a crime was in progress then the search would not be illegal in the first place. However, let's assume the search was illegal. Normally the evidence would be excluded under the exclusionary rule. However, there are two exceptions known as the independent source and attenuation doctrines. The evidence of the police officer as to the imprisonment would be excluded. However, the evidence of the victims is independent of that illegal search and their testimony would be admissible. Further, that testimony would allow independent discovery and admissibility of any physical evidence in the property. However, if the victims were dead, then there would be no independent discovery and none of the evidence would be admissible.

I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.

colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be "attempting to commit burglary", so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not "reasonably appears about to commit" sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado. Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. (Source) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the "heat of passion" defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying.

Does "furtherance of a crime" exception to attorney–client privilege apply if the attorney is unsure? If a lawyer suspects that a client shall commit an imminent crime, then attorney-client privilege ceases and communication is not privileged. But what if the lawyer is unsure whether the crime is about be committed? For example, consider this hypothetical: A client informs their lawyer after killing someone through torture (for example, by burying them alive), and also of the location of the killing. If the victim has already died, then the crime is murder; so presumably this communication is privileged. However, if the lawyer doesn't know definitely that the person has died (attempted murder), then furtherance of that crime may be prevented. Does the lawyer have a duty to report the information to the police? Are there any legal implications if the lawyer is wrong?

(US Answer) Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, "A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary... to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm..." Most states have incorporated the MRPC into their own state legal ethics codes. Therefore, as to whether a lawyer may tell the police, it comes down to whether death is reasonably certain, and whether the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure is necessary to prevent the death. In the case of a person buried alive, death is reasonably certain, and whether the disclosure is reasonable will be based on what the lawyer knows and doesn't know - was it a month ago? ten minutes ago? etc. If the lawyer believes it is too late, he is obligated to stay quiet. If he believes there is a chance of saving the life, and that belief is later judged reasonable if he is investigated, there will be no penalty for him if he discloses. There is no duty for a lawyer to report a crime committed by a non-lawyer/non-judge, so non-disclosure should have no negative ramifications legally. Disclosure found to be unreasonable could be punished by private censure, public censure, suspension of license, or even disbarment, depending on the view of the bar association's ethics investigators.

There have been cases in the UK where paying someone's legal bills was interpreted as joining their case. So when A with no money libels someone, and B with deep pockets pays A's lawyer, then B risks being held liable for damages if A gets convicted. So B should be very careful. Just giving you money is probably the safest. But attorney-client privilege is between attorney and client. I have been laid off twice with my company asking me to take an employment lawyer and paying for it. (Interestingly each time the bill was exactly the maximum amount the company was willing to pay :-) It would have been absurd if my company could demand information that is under attorney-client privilege just because they paid the bill. Why did two companies pay the lawyers bill? Because that way they ensure that the separation is without problems. The lawyer explained the settlement contract and what it meant exactly. They also checked that the contract didn’t contain anything unacceptable which the company would have fixed. So if I had tried to sue them later I would have no chance to win (but there was no reason to sue). Another reason not to sue was that the company offered I settlement that was very significantly more than was legally required, but if you sued them you would only get what you got in court - most likely less than you would get without suing. So basically they paid to make sure I would have no reason to sue them later.

Can an attorney plead the 5th if attorney-client privilege is pierced? Yes. But if the prosecutor offers the attorney "use immunity" for the testimony (i.e. a binding promise that the attorney's own testimony won't be used against that attorney), then the 5th Amendment privilege can be overcome as well. In other words, the prosecutor can unilaterally force an attorney to waive his or her fifth amendment rights by granting the attorney immunity from having that testimony used against the attorney, even if the attorney doesn't want to do that. This is established, for example, as noted in the comments by bdb484, by the case of Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, (1972) (“The United States can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by conferring immunity”).

This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party.

The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your "beating his wife and kids" example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.

This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.

A lawyer is obligated to protect his client's interests and to carry out his client's directions in these matters. Not doing so would violate multiple ethical rules applicable to lawyers. Some of the relevant provisions of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct which are the template for every state's ethical rules (some with local variation) are: Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. (b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities. (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent. (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. Rule 1.7 Conflict of Interest: Current Clients (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer. (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing. Rule 1.13 Organization as Client (a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. (b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law. (c) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if (1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and (2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization. (d) Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged violation of law. (e) A lawyer who reasonably believes that he or she has been discharged because of the lawyer's actions taken pursuant to paragraphs (b) or (c), or who withdraws under circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under either of those paragraphs, shall proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or withdrawal. (f) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing. (g) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders. Rule 1.16 Declining or Terminating Representation (a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer's ability to represent the client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged. (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if: (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client; (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (3) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; (4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation. (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. Rule 2.1 Advisor In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. A lawyer is certainly within his rights, and indeed his duty, to inform a client that his proposed course of action is unwise, and can withdraw from representing the client. But, in general, in a transactional matter, unless the proposed conduct constitutes a crime or fraud, the lawyer may not defy a client's directions. Of course, while there are general rules in the law, there are also almost always fact specific exceptions to those rules. For example, while ordinarily, writing a tough contract when dealing with a minority counterparty would not be a crime or fraud. But, if an easy contract was used with all non-minority counterparties, but not with minority counterparties and the client's instruction was intended to discriminate on the basis of race, it might very well be unlawful or even a crime, in some circumstances to do so, which would alter the lawyer's obligations. Even then, however, a lawyer would almost never be authorized to affirmatively draft a contract contrary to the client's instructions as opposed with declining to do that work at all.

"Hearsay" is a term used for statements offered in evidence in court that are not admissible because the person who originally made the statement has not testified to it. The hearsay rule is complex, and has many ramifications and exceptions. Legal texts take hundreds of pages to explain all these complications. But the term is not appropriate unless the statement is offered as evidence in court, or there is a plan to offer it. An ordinary email that no one plans to offer in court is neither hearsay nor not-hearsay, it is just a set of statements that may be true or untrue, accurate or mistaken. If for some reason this email were to be placed in evidence in court, the default procedure would be to call the person who originally wrote it to testify, and ask questions like "Did you write this? When did you write it? was it the truth to the best of your knowledge when you sent it?" If the original sender cannot or will not be a witness, then whether the email will be accepted as evidence will depend on what is sought to be proved by the email, and what evidence there is that the email was sent, and by whom, and was the truth as far as the sender knew. If what you really want to know is whether the email accurately quotes the organization's lawyer, just email or write that lawyer, saying something like "Does the attached email accurately represent an opinion that you gave to {organization} as I have been told it does?"

Is it legal to be detained by a private rail or bus company for not having a valid ticket? My question relates specifically to the UK. Is it legal for a private company, say a train or bus company, to detain you if they determine that you don't have a valid ticket? Furthermore, if it is legal, what rights do you have in such circumstances? Obviously, if you were arrested by the police you would have a given set of rights, but train companies, and the private companies that run the train stations in the UK, whilst government owned, are private companies (if I understand correctly).

I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. In this case, if you don't have a valid ticket (or refuse to produce one), and don't provide your name and address, the officer of a railway company may detain you1 (my emphasis): If a passenger having failed either to produce, or if requested to deliver up, a ticket showing that his fare is paid, or to pay his fare, refuses or fails on request by an officer or servant of a railway company, to give his name and address, any officer of the company may detain him until he can be conveniently brought before some justice or otherwise discharged by due course of law. Essentially, if you don't have a ticket and are asked to show one, it would seem that you are required to provide either your name and address, or pay your fare. The only cases I can find where s 5(2) has been cited were: Covington v. Wright [1963] 2 QB 469 The defendant boarded a bus and travelled further than the fare was paid for. However, being a case involving a bus and a train, one would assume that the legislation and therefore the case is not authoritative for trains. However, the London Passenger Transport Act cited herein seems to have the same effect as the Regulation of Railways Act. Ormiston v. Great Western Railway Company [1917] 1 KB 598 This case involves a passenger travelling on a valid, first-class ticket, then being detained by a porter who claimed that they had held only a third class ticket. He was released and was not entitled to special damages simply as a result of slander. On the relevant question of citizens' arrests, it was found later that2: Court had to consider the question whether it is necessary to allege that the words impute an indictable offence, and it was held that it was not necessary. Pollock B. in giving judgment said: “The expression ‘indictable offence’ seems to have crept into the text-books, but I think the passages in Comyns' Digest are conclusive to shew that words which impute any criminal offence are actionable per se. That is, the notion that the offence must be indictable seems not to be based in common law. As for your question about your rights - the power to arrest you though the punishment is only a fine does not support an action for special damage on its own. You should probably consult a lawyer if you are so detained, as there does not seem to be anything in the Act that allows the company to prohibit you from doing so - or from doing else, for that matter, so long as you do not breach the peace or act in some other tortious manner. You would also likely to be free to pay the fine (or produce the ticket, if you had one and had not done so by this point in time), or provide your name and address. If you were detained without cause - that is, you were not given the option to supply your name, or not given the opportunity to produce your ticket or pay the balance of the fare, then you may be entitled to damages under a claim of an action of false imprisonment. Apologies for the lack of links to the cases - I've used paid databases so they likely wouldn't work, but you can try to find these cases in BAILII or some other database you might have access to. 1. Regulation of Railways Act 1889 52 & 53 Vict c 57 s 5(2) This legislation has had numerous amendments and restrictions applied - you should consider the full extent of these as applicable to the specific location where such an incident occurs. 2. Hellwig v Mitchell [1910] 1 KB 609

While it is from a different jurisdiction, the following goes to the heart of the matter: Arrest, when used in its ordinary and natural sense, means the apprehension of a person or the deprivation of a person's liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether the person has been deprived of personal liberty of movement. Directorate of Enforcement v Deepak Mahajan, (1994) 3 SCC 440 at ¶46 (SC of India) In your example, the police officer has been deprived of "personal liberty of movement"; if they can still speak there would be no legal impediment to them placing the person who arrested them also under arrest. It would then be incumbent on both parties to deliver each other into lawful custody. The citizen would need to seek out a law enforcement officer to do this; the police officer has already done so, being their own law enforcement officer. After this, comes the paperwork.

The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.

Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.

Police officers can lie to you He asked to search your car. He’s allowed to do this. You said no. You’re allowed to do this. He lied to you when he said he would get the K9 to search the car - this would not be legal. But he’s allowed to tell you lies. You made an admission of criminal activity. He now has probable cause to search. He legally searched, confirmed your admission and booked you. Seems legit to me.

If I have correctly untangled the law, Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act part 3 identifies as a condition where you are not prohibited from revealing personal data: The processing is necessary for compliance with any legal obligation to which the data controller is subject, other than an obligation imposed by contract. The Animal Welfare Act 25(1) says An inspector may require the holder of a licence to produce for inspection any records which he is required to keep by a condition of the licence I can't tell if you are required to keep customer names, but if you are, it looks like the pieces fit together and you would have to provide the records. Call a solicitor to be sure, though.

england-and-wales The length of time a suspect is held in police custody before being released is unrelated to the police's power (and duty) to sieze potential evidence for further examination or to require e.g. the surrender of a passport as a condition of pre-charge bail (along with the requirement not to apply for international travel documents or tickets etc). If the suspect is assessed to be a flight risk, under section 50A(2)(a) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) they can retain a passport if they see... the need to secure that the person surrenders to custody The retention of property, such as a phone, is allowed under section 22 PACE: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above— (a) anything seized for the purposes of a criminal investigation may be retained, except as provided by subsection (4) below— (i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or (ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and (b) anything may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence. (3) [...] (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. [...]

If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.

How to avoid image copyright infringement I am making a website for a client who has a store and is trying to sell their products on the web now. I told the client that they would need to provide me with images of all of their products and instead, they directed me to the websites that sell the same items and told me to use their images instead. I explained that we would need to at least provide a shoutout to the website for using their images but the client does not want this. Do I need to be worried about using another web site's images when I am simply the builder of the web site who is not gaining any personal benefit besides being able to use the web site as part of my portfolio?

In the abstract, two businesses that cooperate in violating a third party's copyright could both face liability. Applying that information to the facts you gave would amount to legal counsel. If you don't want to tell the client 'no,' you should speak to a lawyer about your potential liability. Beyond the legalities, do you really want your portfolio to advertise that you design sites by ripping other sites off?

The first thing that people need to do is to quit over thinking it. That being said, I'm going to see if I can tackle your problems one by one, before summarizing and providing my own opinion: Many users don't care if their code is copied. I'm like that. I left a couple comments on Shog9's post that read this: Good point: Licensing does not prevent careless or malicious use. I'm surprised about how many people are thinking that this license will let them steal their code, because it's already happening right now. I don't want to sound pessimistic, but when thousands of people break a license/law/contract, it's a bit of a lost cause. You're not significantly damaged in a direct way, so honestly, let it go. All I want is to make sure that no one can come up to me if something of mine screwed something on there side. Aside from that, I don't care about people who don't attribute me: chances are, they have no moral sanity, and I will appreciate the people who do, and help me out. As it is, I'm 16, I share what I know with a good heart, and in a well-spirited manner, and at the end of the day, knowing that I was able to help someone out makes my day. I don't mind if my code is copied. I know that people will copy my code whether I like it or not, but I also know that there will be people in the world who will say "thanks", and will try to attribute me where possible. I feel good about that. That being said, I don't care. But the person who uses my code does. The license that affects all Stack Exchange posts are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike license, or CC BY-SA. Code contributions don't fit well with this. This excellent post on Open Source explains why it's discouraged for code. What these people want is a code-friendly license, so that they can stay in the clear when it comes to copyright issues. The next thing they want, is for someone to come after them over some licensing issue. You may think that people are good, but you never know the world around you. They can be evil. For other users, they don't mind their code being copied to another post, as long as there is a link to the post and a mention of the original author. Most people post with good intention. There's not that much of an issue from a legal perspective either: The license allows people to copy and paste into answers of their own, and since the license remains the same, there's no issue to get into. The license allows it, and contributors kind of have to acknowledge it. I don't think anyone cares what happens to code that is less than 3-4 lines at least. I can probably agree. Such code probably wouldn't be eligible for copyright anyway, since it's so trivial. Many jurisdictions have a "Threshold of Originality," which means that simple things can't be under copyright. Stack Exchange does not probably want people to own the code they submit. For example, Stack Exchange has (and probably wishes to retain) the right to keep even deleted posts in the visibility of the high rep users (even if the author is against it). Wait what? You may be right that it is in Stack Exchange's interest to host content. After all, they get hits, which helps them as a business. It is illegal for companies to host illegal content. If somebody sees objectionable, copyrighted content hosted on Stack Exchange that they would like removed, then they need to file a DMCA Takedown Request. This is also why moderators, like myself, cannot process legal requests. The reason why Stack Exchange doesn't act themselves, even if they see something that is copyrighted and objectionable, is because it's a form of liability. When YouTube began removing copyrighted content themselves, they received a wave of lawsuits (If you remove some, you need to remove all. Why didn't you remove mine? being the argument). The plaintiff's won those, and when YouTube did nothing, they weren't liable at all. If a user wants to have their content taken down, it's tricky. You need to look at the Terms of Service for Stack Exchange: (quoting Section 3) You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange When Stack Exchanges gets your content, you grant them an irrevocable license to your contribution. This is pretty standard across a lot of sites: it's just a way to secure data and stay in the clear of licensing issues. At the same time, it doesn't seem fair for SE to acquire complete ownership of the content. The user must still have the final say, if the content is to be used for purposes not already agreed upon in the licence. They don't. What users have done is that they have provided a license of their content to Stack Exchange. This is done, again, through their Terms of Service: You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. The user grants a license to their content to Stack Exchange, but they do not assign or relinquish copyright. The code still belongs to them. It's important not to conflate the user contribution policy, with copyright assignment. You are still free to add an additional license to your content (known as dual or multi-licensing), and have a copy for your own use. Stack Exchange will always host a copy licensed under the CC BY-SA license. Stack Exchange can expect a high level of decorum and respect for laws from its users. At the same time, it cannot expect redundant attributions anywhere and everywhere, because one of its main aims is to not waste the users' time. Not only Stack Exchange expects it, but many copyright laws in various jurisdictions require it too. There's a concept known in many jurisdictions known as moral rights. These are rights that are irrevocable, whether you like it or not. Generally, these include attributions, disclaimer of liability, and other rights as well. Even if your work is in the public domain, you still retain these moral rights. If memory serves me right, the right to be attributed is revokable under United States copyright law. Therefore, attribution becomes more a courtesy, when the right is revoked. Licenses such as CC BY, and CC BY-SA still require attribution as a part of their licensing terms. What defines attribution is generally up to the person who uses the content. If memory serves right again, one can not demand how to attribute. There should be a clear-cut way to determine what is code and what isn't. The code formatting indicators on SE may not be adequate because some users simply use backticks, or 4-space indented text for other not-so-codey text. Personally, I feel like making the entirety of a post under both the Creative Commons license and whatever proposed code license they use is the best option, and allow people to use moral judgement to determine the most appropriate license. The concern comes about people who lack such judgment. I bet these same people don't follow the existing license anyway - and are a lost cause. We made it through! There will always be debate on the license of choice. Some people want the GPL, a license that's apparently closer to the status quo of Creative Commons license (I disagree that it's a good match), while other's want permissive licenses, such as the MIT or the Apache licenses. I'd prefer the permissive type, since it allows use in closed-source applications, and grant more rights (i.e. less restrictions) to the people that use them. I'm not going to right much because my hands are tired, but I'm sure if you've got more questions about the open source licenses themselves, you can probably ask on Open Source Stack Exchange.

In the USA, you are covered by the DMCA act, which you should most definitely read. I can't sue you and your website for copyright infringement unless I first send you a DMCA takedown notice. (Of course I can sue, but I will lose). In the DMCA notice I have to tell you who I am so that you can contact me, I have to tell you under perjury that I am the copyright holder or an agent of the copyright holder of some work, and that I believe your website is infringing on that copyright. You then have the choice to remove the material, which means I cannot sue you for copyright infringement because you acted on my DMCA notice, or you can refuse to remove it and I can include you in a copyright infringement lawsuit. By not acting on a DMCA notice you take full responsibility. If you remove the material, you should inform the person who uploaded it. That person can decide to be Ok with the removal (and hope they won't get sued for copyright infringement, and they usually will be fine), or they can send you a counter notice. That counter notice would tell you that the uploader believes he or she isn't infringing any copyright. After receiving a counter notice, you may reinstate the material, and you tell the sender of the DMCA notice. Again, you are now legally protected. The uploader can now be quite sure to be sued, unless the DMCA notice was sent in error.

Bringing fair use into this sounds iffy if you are partnering -- that is a commercial relationship which should be defined. If they did send you a file with their logo for a specific purpose, you can assume that you are allowed to use it for that specific purpose. If they did not send you the file, you can assume that they did not give you permission, or they would have included the file ...

You probably can. There are a few questions here. First, is the message protected by copyright? In general, it probably is, but there are many exceptions that might allow you to use it without permission. Unfortunately, these exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The exceptions tend to allow the use of small excerpts of a work for various sorts of purposes that don't undermine the copyright holder's ability to profit. That leads to the second question, which is why you are using that message. If you're including it in your source code so you can test whether a message generated at run time is in fact that message, that's one thing, and it's probably okay. On the other hand, if the owner of the copyright sells a database of all its message strings, and you're compiling a similar database that you also intend to sell, that's probably not okay. A third question concerns the Firefox license terms. It's entirely possible that they allow you explicitly to do what you're considering, in which case it doesn't matter what copyright law says about it. On the other hand, Firefox is open source software, and under some open source licenses, if you incorporate any of the source code in your own product, you are required to release your product's source code under the same license. If you're not already planning to do that, you should consider carefully whether including that error message would trigger that provision (if there is one) of Firefox's open source license.

Wikipedia and you likely have no contract. If you don't have to click "I agree" to access the data, its likely there is no contract. Therefore this is a pure IP law question. The ONLY IP law issue that I see is copyright. The DATA is not subject to copyright. Only the expression of that data. So copying the html and selling that IS potential copyright infringement. Copying the data in some other format and using that is not. Finally, even if you do copy the full html (i.e. full expression), this MAY be licensed by their terms of use (as you suggested they have licensed some content). That is a more particularized legal question that I can't answer here.

A matter of terminology, what you want is not the copyright, but a license to use the copyright, presumably a non-exclusive license. You would probably need to approach a licensing department at Disney. They will ask lots of questions, and if they are open to the possibility, will quote a fee, which will, i would think, be sizable. Anyone should be able to ask, but I suspect that most requests are refused. It would probably be well to have a business plan laid out, and exactly how the images would be used in your plan. Disney can refuse any license, or offer one on whatever terms it pleases.

Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.

What regulations govern suspension of students? Where students are violent, suspensions may be justified, in order to ensure the safety of other students. However, for non-violent behaviour, what regulations are in place with regards to suspension, and what recourse do students (or their parents) have? Surely, if a student is entitled to an education by means of some statute or regulation, withholding it needs to be statutorily or regulatorily sanctioned? This relates specifically to the United States; I imagine states will have different regulations, so please answer with whatever jurisdiction(s) you are comfortable with. If you also have experience with other jurisdictions, that would be interesting.

General Resource: the U.S. Department of Education puts out a nice compendium of the various state laws. Below are my jurisdictions. Illinois: (105 ILCS 5/10-22.6) In brief, school administrators may be delegated the authority to suspend students for gross disobedience or misconduct without consulting the board or the parents. In this case they must notify parents of the suspension, forward a full statement of reasons for the suspension, and notify the parents of their right to have it reviewed by the board. Expulsions, on the other hand, require a hearing at the board. Much of the due process for suspensions came frome Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Of interest, language changes took effect in 2011 authorizing suspension for gross disobedience or misconduct using electronic means. North Carolina: (NCGS 115C) In particular, Article 27 deals with discipline. The law distinguishes between short-term, long-term, and 365-day suspensions (...the latter is for firearm possession). This is a fairly good summary of NC School Discipline Laws and Regulations (prepared by ed.gov), while this is a good summary of the governing case law.

There is no (statutory/regulatory) legal basis at all for claiming that a department, chair, faculty member or other individuals must "back off" in the face of a Title IX claim. However, the chair and department could face civil liability for violating the rights of the accused (depending on what the action taken was). This assume that there is no university rule mandating "backing off" – violating university rules may have consequences. The possibility of civil consequences arises if the university (via the department or the chair) violates their contract with the accused, by penalizing the person contrary to the terms of the contract (look for the grievance clause). However, academic units are usually set up in such a way that "the department" can't do anything, but the chair can, perhaps following a vote of the faculty. The faculty could denounce the accused, but as long as they didn't cross the line to defamation they can express themselves as they see fit. The chair, on the other hand, probably has the power to actually punish the accused, and would need to back off somewhat. For example, the faculty might wish to impose a substantive sanction, but they almost certainly don't have the power to do so, whereas the chair probably does. So the chair needs to check that his actions, as The administrative officer in the department acting as the agent of the university, do not constitute breach of contract w.r.t. the accused.

The Highway Code said: Vehicles. Any vehicle driven by a learner MUST display red L plates. In Wales, either red D plates, red L plates, or both, can be used. Plates MUST conform to legal specifications and MUST be clearly visible to others from in front of the vehicle and from behind. Plates should be removed or covered when not being driven by a learner (except on driving school vehicles). [Law MV(DL)R reg 16 & sched 4] The good old Highway Code "Must" vs "Should". "Must" means that it is a legal issue, anything that is "Should" is only advisory

Everything is allowed unless the law says it isn’t Common law systems like the USA are ‘exceptions based’ - the law permits everything except what it prohibits. So, your question is backwards - rather than looking for laws that allow it, you need to look for laws that prohibit, restrict or regulate it. There are laws that regulate this but none that prohibit it.

The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions "based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'", which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.

In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.

There is a grievance procedure whereby a student can file a complain against a professor. (The possibility that there is no procedure is negligible: I can find the document if you name the institution). They may have reviewed the situation and taken whatever action they plan to. The person complaining will receive notice of the outcome, but it is unlikely that the outcome will be made public. Supposing that you are just an interested bystander: your right is to withdraw from the university, write a letter of protest, or continue as usual. You have no special legal privileges in this situation, because you were not directly harmed. You cannot sue a person for making society less livable for you. I cannot sue the university because (as a professor at a presumably different institution) I am only ephemerally harmed by university administrations covering their legal interests rather than punishing the wicked. You have no standing (technical term) in a lawsuit. Now suppose you were actually the aggrieved student and the wrong was a wrongful public accusation of plagiarism (defamation). The defamed student can sue the professor. This is true no matter what the result of the internal disciplinary process is – except that the university might cleverly get the student to agree to shut up in exchange for some desirable outcome.

As someone who is not a lawyer, but is familiar with FERPA and university policies as a former instructor, I would be more than willing to bet that you signed or otherwise agreed to some type of Terms of Service before being given access to that type of service. There are almost certainly numerous things you signed to become a student, as well as various policies you agreed to in first gaining access to the computer services, which would apply here. I can tell you with certainty that the school where I was a student had a policy that I agreed to that they would make certain information available to other students unless I chose for it to be restricted. However, my university did not have any photos of students that were viewable by other students in a directory. That said, there were also times I participated in extra-curricular activities where I was required to sign release forms giving the school the rights to video tape, record, and photograph me, and to do what they wished with those things. So, with that in mind, I suspect that's partly due to FERPA restrictions, but also largely due to their own privacy policies that go beyond what FERPA requires. All in all, I doubt they would be okay with you using their photos for your own private use - student privacy is something that is taken very seriously.

Are principles of judicial interpretation subject to legislative control? In the news you often read about differing philosophies of judicial interpretation, especially when important cases are decided (like several recent US Supreme Court decisions). I recently browsed through a book by Antonin Scalia in which he outlines a number of specific principles he endorses and does not endorse, with citations to earlier case law. Apparently there is some debate about the merits of such principles and how (or whether) judicial interpretation of legislation comports with legislators' understanding of what they are doing. It is clear that many of these "canons" can be overridden on a per-law basis by including language in the law that explicitly goes against some judicial principle that would otherwise apply. However, my question is, are the principles themselves subject to legislative control in a broader sense? Can legislatures pass "meta-laws" which define how other laws are to be intepreted? For instance, could the US Congress pass a law saying "Wherever ambiguity arises in statutory interpretation, the statute in question shall be understood as to favor the least powerful party in a dispute"? Or "No special deference shall be given to interpretation of statute by administrative agencies" (i.e., to curtail Chevron deference)? Or more generally, can a legislature pass a law saying "The law shall be understood as X", where X is some principle of intepretation that is not specific to the law in which it is contained, but is meant to constrain interpretations of all other laws (or some subset of other laws)? Would such laws be valid? I'm interested mostly in the situation in the US, but would be interested to know how the issue could play out in different countires, or in particular US states.

Yes, legislative bodies can pass legislation that constrains the interpretation of the rest of their legislation. In the U.S., see 1 U.S.C §1-8. In Canada, see The Interpretation Act. In British Columbia, see The Interpretation Act. As an example of a back-and-forth between the courts and congress regarding a setting a standard of review, consider the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Summarizing from Holt v. Hobbs 574 U. S. ____ (2015): In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that "neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden the exercise of religion usually do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment". Congress desired a stricter test that prohibited the burdening of religion regardless of whether the laws are neutral or generally applicable. Congress passed RFRA in 1993, which required that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person — (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest". RFRA was passed with the goal of setting the standard of review for all other legislation that burdens a person's exercise of religion. Without RFRA, the standard of review would have been that used in Smith, based solely on First Amendment protections. With RFRA, the standard of review became stronger, basically strict scrutiny. An example of Congress setting the factors to be used in a balancing test is the addition of fair use via the Copyright Act of 1976. Prior to 1976, courts had been applying a fair use exception based on common law rather than statute. The act encoded in statute the four factors that Congress wanted to be considered and listed several purposes for which fair use was explicitly applicable. In this case, Congress basically codified the fair use doctrine as it was being used at the time by the courts. It could be considered an expression of approval for the existing interpretation of the time and a desire to prevent drift in that analysis.

Shall Whenever a law or legal text uses shall there is no discretion allowed. Read it as has to when it prescribes something. If it is written in the negative (shall not), you can read it as it is forbidden or X is barred. [the] Congress of the United States [...] shall consist of a Senate and House of Representative This prescribes that the congress has to have these two parts, not more, not less. Special meetings shall be called by the president or secretary in a like manner and on like notice on the written request of three (3) Directors. Whenever 3 directors sign letters demanding a meeting, then the president or secretary has to follow the process explained before. Congress shall make no law [that does X] Note that this is a negative shall! Read it as Congress is barred from doing a law that does X. Shall obviously can have exceptions or modifiers. Such often are in modifying sentences following them. Meetings of the Board of Administration shall be open to all unit owners. Notice of all meetings shall be posted on the official bulletin board ofthe Association at least forty-eight (48) hours in advance of each scheduled meeting and directed to the attention of all unit owners. In case of an emergency, a meeting of the Board of Administration may be held without notice. There has to be a notice on the board at least 48 hours before a meeting, unless there is an emergency. May Legal texts usually use may whenever there is an option to do something. It usually marks the possibility to do something and vesting the discretion to do so in somebody. Often, they come with a minimum or maximum time an event has to occur from a deadline. The department may enter an order doing one or more of the following if the department finds that a person has violated or is operating in violation of any of the provisions of this section or the orders issued under this section: The decision if something happens is vested in the department [of Agriculture and Consumer Services]. If they decide to act, then it has to come from the list that follows the section. Special meetings of the Board may be called by the president on five(5)days notice to each Director [...] It is at the discretion of the president to call a special meeting. If they do, it has to be done with 5 (or more) days warning to the Directors. Including the other paragraph of OPs document, then it also has to be posted 48 hours before the meeting on the board, unless it is emergency.

Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.

How should one reconcile these conflicting understandings? A holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that it has not later abandoned is, by definition, the correct interpretation of the U.S. Constitution for all purposes of U.S. law, even if a plain reading of the constitutional language might suggest otherwise.

In the vast majority of countries (both common law and civil law), statutes are interpreted in a manner that reflects the intend of the drafters of the statute a.k.a. legislative intent, when it is possible to reasonably determine what was intended. There is a canon of statutory interpretation in almost all legal systems that provides that absurd or nonsensical interpretations of legislative language are to be disregarded in favor of those that reflect the likely intent of the body passing the law, even if the literal and technical reading of the words does not state precisely what was intended. Thus, if there is a clear grammatical, punctuation, or spelling error and the intend meaning can be discerned from the language of the law, the larger context of the law, or extrinsic evidence such a legislative history and public discussion of the reasons for enacting the law in the first place, those clues will be used to interpret the legal effect of a law. Could this mean legal consequences or would I be safe as I "bought nothing illegal"? No. Ignorance of the law is no excuse even in cases where the interpretation of the law calls for the courts to ignore minor errors in legislative drafting. You would have an argument, but where you can state "in fact 'Scolopendra gigantica' does not exist and they most likely meant 'Scolopendra gigantea'." The likelihood that you will face legal consequences is great. Also, in this particular example, keep in mind that biological species sometimes have more than one accepted Latin name, or once had a different name than the currently accepted name. For example, in this case, "gigantica" and "gigantea" are different grammatical inflections of the same Latin root word, and really are the same word in the same way that "geese" and "goose" are different tenses of the same word in English that refer to the same genus of birds. If a scientist discovers a new type of centipede and names it 'Scolopendra gigantica', would it be illegal immediately? The judges would look at all of the facts and circumstances and decide if the new species was within the scope of what the law intended to ban. But, the mere fact that the word is the same would not make the law apply to it. In the same way, suppose that a law had an exemption and didn't apply to animals in the town of Zootopia where many exotic pets are naturally common in the wild because a failed zoo released them into the area. But, given that context, the town of Euclid could not make itself exempt from the law by renaming itself Zootopia after the former town of Zootopia was disincorporated after its residents were all eaten by lions. If it was illegal to own a 'Scolopendra gigantea' due to that law and a scientist now names a new centipede 'Scolopendra gigantica' would that immediately legalize the 'Scolopendra gigantea'? No. For the same reasons discussed above. Footnote Re Similar Issues With Controlled Substances Laws This said, the issue you discuss does come up, and sometimes wins and sometimes loses, in the case of laws regulating controlled substances (i.e. illegal drugs). One of the reasons that this comes up is that the proper names of chemical substances in organic chemistry is not, as it is in biology, arbitrary. The name of an organic chemical is determined from looking at which atomic elements in which combinations with what kinds of bonds to each other are present. Given a chemical diagram of an organic chemical, every organic chemist would give it the same name, even if they've never discussed it, and likewise, you could ban an organic chemical that has never been observed or synthesized in real life and it would be illegal if it ever was synthesized. These statutes have usually been interpreted strictly to apply only to the named chemicals, but usually include an additional statutory section that either ban "analog" chemicals that are intended to or do have the same biochemical effect as the banned chemical, or allow an administrative agency to add new chemicals to the list without legislative action. Still, complications do come up even then because many lawyers and legislators become lawyers or politicians because they couldn't become doctors or engineers, because they flunked organic chemistry. (Joking aside, almost 50% of college students in the United States taking organic chemistry for the first time fail the course. This and first semester calculus are the most frequently failed college courses in the United States.) The Florida Cheese Ban For example, Florida recently classified a chemical present in many kinds of ordinary cheese as a controlled substance, which would in theory make every grocery store owner and millions of Floridians felons. Florida probably meant to ban high concentration synthetic extracts of that chemical administered as a drug, but didn't do anything to say so. But interpreting the statute to have that meaning was harder in that case since the same statute applies to many, many different drugs and the interpretation of the statute would make the ban on the chemical found in cheese make sense, would not make sense for the other drugs on the list. But, Florida courts may ultimately end up ignoring the addition of that chemical to the list based upon the canon against absurd interpretations, at least on an "as applied" case by case basis where the literal meaning of the statute would make millions of Floridian felons for violating this law. The Grand Junction Conviction For Possession Of A Legal Drug Another case came up in Grand Junction, Colorado where a woman was prosecuted by a government lawyer for possession of a controlled substance for possession of a chemical named in the indictment, and her government provided public defender had his client plead guilty to the crime. The woman tried to explain that this made no sense since its was an ordinary prescription drug, but the prosecutor, her own lawyer and the judge didn't believe her, and her public defender told her she was certain to be convicted anyway. (It isn't clear if she actually had a prescription for the drug, but even if she didn't, it wouldn't have been a crime.) So, she took a plea deal and was sent to prison to serve a medium length incarceration with work release sentence, instead of the medium length prison sentence she could have received if she went to trial, was convicted, and received a typical sentence for that conviction. The problem was that the chemical she was indicted for possessing in violation of the controlled substances act wasn't actually on the controlled substances list and wasn't an analog version of a controlled substance. There was also no reason to think that the drug he was convicted of possessing which had no pleasurable psychoactive effect was ever intended by the legislature to be banned or regulated. About a year later, in the year 2005, when this issue was ultimately discovered, a different criminal defense lawyer brought a post-conviction challenge to the conviction on the convicted woman's behalf, and the convicted woman was released with the conviction vacated, because the crime she was indicted for committing and convicted of didn't exist. Allysan Isaac, 24, was held nearly a year in work release for something that a judge said Tuesday was not even illegal. "You were incarcerated for a case that was not a crime," said Mesa County District Judge Brian Flynn, who presided over the case. Flynn, the prosecutor and Isaac's defense attorney were unaware last year that the offense she was charged with was not a violation of the law. No one had noticed that a prescription drug found in Isaac's possession, an anti-anxiety medication called Buspirone, is not a controlled substance. ... District Attorney Pete Hautzinger said he had "no idea" why Isaac had been charged with and convicted of something that wasn't a crime. The defense attorney who represented Isaac in the first case was also baffled. "I don't have an answer," assistant public defender John Burkey said. "Nobody caught it. The police were saying it was a controlled substance." (Source quoting from and citing an article I read and confirmed the story from in the Rocky Mountain News, a now defunct newspaper. Corroborated here.) Incidentally, even though this woman was horribly wronged because of this wrongful conviction, the prosecutor and judge had absolute immunity from civil liability for the wrongful conviction, and criminal liability requires knowledge that you are committing a crime. The government likewise had no duty to compensate her for her wrongful incarceration because her rights weren't intentionally violated by anyone as required by civil rights statutes. She may have had a claim for legal malpractice against her own lawyer, for which negligence can be a basis of liability. Even that would have been a difficult case to win, however. This is because she would have to show that the public defender violated the standard of care of a reasonable lawyer by relying upon law enforcement's claim that a substance was a chemical banned by the controlled substances act which is a question of fact upon which expert witnesses could reasonably disagree. There is nothing in the public record to show that she pursued such a claim, but a private settlement reached before the case was filed wouldn't be revealed in that way. So, it is possible that a private settlement was reached in a legal malpractice case against her public defender that never actually resulted in a case being filed in court.

Each case is decided on its own facts I know you want a clear answer to where the bright line between illegality and legality but there simply isn’t one. The reason you feel there is a “legal grey area” is because there’s a legal gray area. The way the common law works is that there are some acts and omissions that are clearly crimes/torts/breach of contract, some that aren’t and some that live in that grey area. When someone brings a case in the grey, the court will make a ruling that will apply to similar facts and we get a little light on the subject. Then the legislature changes the law and it all goes dark again. Each of your bullet points is simply too vague and encompasses so many fact patterns that it’s impossible to say. For example, “Using a fake name/birthday”: do the ToS prohibit this? is there an intent to mislead or deceive? are there laws that prohibit this? is a benefit being received dishonesty? etc. If you come with a specific, detailed fact pattern there might be case law that is specifically relevant that will allow an answer with a high chance of being right. However, nuances matter and no two fact patterns are exactly the same and the difference might be enough to distinguish your case from the precedent. Or there might not be a relevant precedent because no one has sued/prosecuted on this fact pattern before. Then we are in virgin territory and even experts are only making educated guesses until the judge (and the appeals court(s)) hand down their decision. These are the most interesting cases to watch but the most terrifying to be part of. If you need to ask the question”where’s the legal line on this?”, there’s a decent chance you have a foot on each side.

Short Answer Yes, Supreme Court decisions apply everywhere right away. (Unless the decision says it doesn't.) No, we do not have to wait until new laws are passed. Explanation Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This allows the court[s] to interpret laws passed by legislatures. And this is the basis for applying the ruling everywhere (in the U.S.) immediately. From Marbury at 178: if a law be in opposition to the Constitution [...] the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. [...] the Constitution of the United States confirms [...] that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Judicial Restraint (Nominally) courts either interpret or invalidate existing law. In the former case, the law will persist (with the new clarity added by the decision). In the latter, the law will be struck as unconstitutional and, therefore, no longer exist.

how (academically) acceptable are such discussions and proposals? Some academic somewhere has probably discussed it, and did not breach strong academic norms by doing so. Is it the academically acceptable practice to argue about such questions or is it a marginal view? It isn't taboo to argue such a position, but it is highly marginal and extreme. It is even more extreme in Eastern Europe (nominally in the civil law tradition) than it is in common law countries (which have more of a natural law tradition), and would be least marginal in the U.S. which has a strong natural law tradition, although it would marginal even in the U.S. Legal positivism (i.e. the law is what legislators and the governmental process including courts and citizen ballot issues says it is), is very strong now compared to prior eras and stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. The battle between natural law and legal positivism was mostly won by legal positivism by the late 19th century although the debate continued indifferent to the reality on the ground. Philosophically, human rights are often viewed as an enlightened codification of natural law (which sometimes justifies its extraterritorial application), but it would be rare for someone who was a strong supporter of natural law to argue that human rights codifying natural law should be disfavored (really, that kind of reasoning is mostly seen in pre-modern Confucian legal arguments in China as part of the Eastern rule of law v. rule of man argument that tends to favor rule of man on the theory that any codification can be twisted by sneaky lawyers).

Landlords liability for white goods I have just rented a property in England. The house has a built-in cooker, but the markings on the oven panel for temperature and the different modes (grill/defrost/fan settings etc.) are completely worn off. I have been told by the estate agent that there is nothing he can do and that I will have to cook by "trial and error". Does the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 apply here and could I reasonably insist that the agent contacts the landlord to get the panel replaced?

The Supply of Goods and Services Act doesn't apply here. Section 1(1) says that the only contracts concerning goods covered by the Act are those 'under which one person transfers or agrees to transfer to another the property in goods'. A lease doesn't transfer the cooker to you: it gives you exclusive possession of a dwelling containing the cooker. The cooker remains the property of the landlord. Assuming that your lease is for fewer than seven years, the statutory provision for a landlord's repair obligations is set out in s11 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. Unfortunately this does not help you: although the landlord is responsible for maintaining the gas and electricity supply equipment, the Act specifically excludes 'appliances for making use of the supply of ... gas or electricity'. The text of your lease may have specific provisions for the repair and upkeep of the cooker, so you should read it carefully and seek advice if you are unsure. Most landlords will leave copies of the instruction manuals for installed appliances. You should ask for a copy of the manual if one was not provided and can't be found in the flat. In practical terms, you should report the fault in writing to the landlord (or managing agent if you have one), saying that you are unable to use the cooker and that it is a potential danger given that you don't understand how it works. At the very least, you should ensure that the condition of the cooker is reflected correctly on your inventory.

The overwhelming majority flats in England are leasehold, not freehold; older buildings typically have 80 or 100-year leases, newer buildings usually have 999-year leases. Therefore you are dealing with the freeholder as a landlord for the matters that a HOA would deal with in the US. Depending on your landlord you may want to reconsider your statement that HOAs "are pure hell". It is possible for the leaseholders to collectively buy the freehold although it is time-consuming and expensive and happens very rarely. If they do they set up a body similar to a HOA.

The right to adequate housing is a political question, the content of which is unclear in the UN's fact sheet. What they say is: All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, clean drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, food storage facilities, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services. Sanitation facilities are not completely ignored, so there is a theoretical basis to start from. However, that list of desiderata is not legally enforceable, so it would depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. In the state of Washington (US), a rental that lacked any sanitary facility (toilet) would be a violation of the health code: even hot water is required by law. In other countries, esp. where running water is not ubiquitous, there may be no legal obligation for a landlord to provide a toilet with running water. Whether legal action could be taken against the landlord depends on local law. A property owner can evict a tenant, subject again to local law. Usually, it requires a legal process where the owner petitions the court to evict the tenant, and in case the tenant has a contractual right to be there, the owner has to show cause (tenant breached the terms of the lease). A landlord does not generally have an obligation to find alternative housing for a tenant, but perhaps there is such a law somewhere, related to tenant tenure. The mention of a co-owner is a bit confusing. If A is the sole owner of a property, A can exercise landlord rights. If A and B both own the property, either of them can exercise landlord rights. However, if they disagree, i.e. A wants to evict tenant C and B wants to let C stay, the dispute between A and B must be resolved, and if they cannot come to an agreement then B can cause a delay of the eviction until the dispute is resolved in court. Again, the details on this would depend on the jurisdiction, and in part whatever landlord-tenant laws there are.

I don't wish to gainsay or contradict a "professional adviser", especially as I have no idea on what information they based their suggestion. All I can do is direct the OP to the relevant extracts from the section headed "II ACCELERATED POSSESSION CLAIMS OF PROPERTY LET ON AN ASSURED SHORTHOLD TENANCY" in the Civil Procedure Rules, especially my emboldened text at the end of Rule 55.15. Rule 55.14 (1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Rule 55.15 (1) On receipt of the defence the court will – (a) send a copy to the claimant; and (b) refer the claim and defence to a judge. (2) Where the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence – (a) the claimant may file a written request for an order for possession; and (b) the court will refer that request to a judge. (3) Where the defence is received after the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired but before a request is filed in accordance with paragraph (2), paragraph (1) will still apply. (4) Where – (a) the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence; and (b) the claimant has not made a request for an order for possession under paragraph (2) within 3 months after the expiry of the period set out in rule 55.14, the claim will be stayed.

This hinges on what you mean by "spy". Generally, a landlord cannot enter a leased or rented property* without the tenant's consent, nor can their agents. (They can arrive and ask to enter, as can your neighbors whether or not you own your home, but you are not required to acquiesce in either case). A landlord can view the publicly viewable portions of the property at their leisure, as can their agents, or any member of the public for that matter. A landlord could possibly be notified of a tenant's actions in a number of ways: such as viewing the public portions of the property, being notified (or billed) by utilities or public agencies, or receiving complaints from the neighbors. A neighbor has no more, and no less, legal ability to spy on you if you owned your home vs if you rent your home. So, they would have no more right to, say, spy at your house with a telescope than if you owned the property yourself, but no less right to complain if you have a loud (or audible) party or a large number of guests; the only difference being they can complain to someone who could potentially do much more than they could if you owned the property yourself. Thus, the answer to your question depends on what is meant by "spying". *This assumes that this is a separate property; a landlord who rents out a room in their own home often has far greater rights.

My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.

It says it's an "MP4 player" but it doesn't play MP4s. This seems rather straightforward to me---assuming it really doesn't play any kind of MP4 at all. I would agree you could go back to the shop armed with the appropriate wording from the SoG Act and state your case to the manager. If the front desk staff are unhelpful don't argue with them but rather ask to speak to the duty manager. No doubt the staff will talk about their thirty day return policy, but you are not interested in this; since you are relying on your statutory rights. If that is not successful, write directly to the head office. Keep your letter short, neutral and with no emotion whatsoever. Describe the facts, include proof of purchase, and request your money back. Argos is a large shop, they will pay you off ("as a gesture of good will") rather than fight a pointless claim in the SCC. However taking an action to the SCC is not necessarily free so you might yourselves not feel it worth it.

If you were given a non compliant notice, you haven’t been given notice You can stay as long as you like or for 4 months after they give you the correct notice. The landlord’s legal obligation was to give you 4 months notice: not his agent, or the Queen, or some guy he was chatting with at the pub. Whether that causes other people with other contracts problems is a matter for them to work out, it’s none of your business. However, … The management agency is the landlord’s agent. That means, as far as you are concerned there is no legal difference between what they do and what the landlord does. If either of them had given you a valid notice, it is as though the landlord had done so. However, if the landlord says something to the agent, from your point of view, the landlord is talking to themselves. If the landlord has sold the property, it comes with any existing leases. If the landlord has promised vacant possession and can’t deliver it, then they have broken the contract with the buyer and the buyers can sue your landlord for damages or possibly terminate the contract or both. If that happens, and it was a result of the agent’s negligence, the landlord can sue the agent.

Forcing a government official to do their job In the wake of the United States Supreme Court legalizing same-sex marriage, a number of county clerks and other officials have announced their intent to refuse to issue licenses for such marriages. What legal remedies are there in such a situation?

The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.

I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.

In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.

Ballot photos Anti-ballot-photo laws may not be constitutional. Two of them have been struck down for violating the 1st Amendment. Rideout v Gardner Case 1:14-cv-00489-PB Indiana Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc., d/b/a American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana v. Indiana Secretary of State, et al., Case 1:15-cv-1356-SEB-DML California's has been amended by the legislature to allow disclosure of a filled-in ballot as long as it isn't part of violating some other law (like vote buying). Open container laws Open-container laws have never been held to be unconstitutional. These are state laws, and states have broad freedom to legislate as long as they don't violate their constitution or elements of the Federal Constitution that have been incorporated by the 14th Amendment. My guess is that they would be upheld because they would pass rational basis review: they are rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here is an example of an open-container law surviving a constitutional challenge. State are encouraged to pass open-container laws by 23 USC 154. If a state does not have an open container law, they receive less federal highway funding. This kind of condition was upheld by South Dakota v. Dole.

That depends entirely on the laws of the country involved. Some countries do make having homosexual relations a crime, indeed a very serious one. I haven't heard of one which prosecutes for being in a same-sex marriage or relationship entered into in another country, but such a country could hold such a trial if it chose to. Perhaps more likely, if a same-sex couple visited such a country, evidence of a continuing same-sex relationship might be treated as evidence of same-sex sexual acts, and thus of a crime under that country's laws.

Laws regarding billboards and advertising are very local in nature and are typically handled under city/county zoning ordinances. Start with calling your local county zoning office. They will tell you the city/county laws regarding your particular residential zoning overlay, if city or state laws supersede county laws, and recent changes in law that might matter and if the sign might be grandfathered. There can be different types of "residential" zoning and the city/county will tell you this; some allow limited commercial use and signage, and some don't. The housing subdivision you are in may also have covenants; you'll know if there are covenants if you received information when you bought property in that subdivision. 1,2,3,4,8: These depend on local laws. 5: Very generally speaking, land owners typically do not have absolute rights to land usage; that is the rationale behind zoning laws (among others, like health and public safety, building codes, national defense, etc.), because some types of land usage impact adjacent users and the general public. 6, 7: Potential consequences include fines and requirements to take the billboard down, but again, those possibilities are very localized. The size of the billboard could come into play; again, this will be very localized. Some signage may be grandfathered, too. In order for the city/county to look at the situation and possibly take action, you may have to file a written protest with the zoning office; they would help with the process. You may have to present your case at a public city council or county commission meeting, but that basically involves saying such and such is happening and you want the city/county attorney to look into relevant laws. It would help your case if you had a list of names of others in the area who are also unhappy about the billboard. I doubt you will need legal representation to lodge a protest, but if it comes to that, Google for free legal aid in your area. If the city/county attorney won't take action (which is possible, as this involves prosecutorial discretion as to if the city/county wants to press the issue with the landowner), you can look for free legal aid in your area and consider your options.

There are multiple police forces in the US: city, county, state and national, and each is responsible to a relevant executive. Typical "police" are city police, who are responsible to a chief of police, who is appointed at the municipal level. Counties usually have an elected sheriff, and a set of deputies; at the state level, they are usually called state troopers. The typical protocol is that decisions are made at the lowest applicable level, so Seattle police enforce or refuse to enforce laws within Seattle, and King County police enforce or not in remaining unincorporated locations in the county. Individual city officers do not then decide to ignore the chief of police and instead follow orders from the county sheriff or the governor. However, each state grants vast powers to their governor, so it is possible that in the case of a state of emergency, the governor can take command of all law enforcement in the state. Governors "can't" deploy police to oppose federal law enforcement in a shoot-out, except that they might actually do so on some theory that federal law enforcement officers are violating the law. In general, you are not immune to arrest for illegal acts just because you are a law enforcement officer. The governor of Washington could easily (in the legal sense) declare an emergency and order state troopers to prevent federal officers from effecting arrests. Of course, resolving these disputes in court is another option.

The court said in Obergefell (emphasis mine): Under the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right. If same-sex couples are to be given in marriage the "same legal treatment" as opposite-sex couples, the divorce process must also be the same.

Is it legal to search for commerce sites listing items at erroneously low prices and exploiting such errors? Occasionally a website will post incorrect prices for items they are selling. (Maybe it was caused by a typo during their data entry process, or the result of a bug in their code.) Once they realize their error they correct it. If I notice the error before they do, and I attempt to buy the item before they fix it, is that legal? I.e., if I knowingly try to exploit their mistake could I be violating any law? Now, if I continually monitor websites, waiting for such an error, just so I can buy at erroneously low prices, does that pose any further legal issues? I'm not hacking or changing their prices. I'm just waiting to buy until an incorrect price is mistakenly posted.

There may be violations of consumer protection and/or advertising statutes here by the online store, but the common law position is that: The website's owner is making an invitation to treat Based on that, you are making an offer The contract comes into place when the website's owner accepts your offer. The time of contract formation is "when the parties give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract." You would need to read the site very carefully, in particular their terms and conditions, acknowledgement page and/or email to see if they are actually accepting your offer or if there are conditions attached. If there is no clear, unconditional acceptance then there is no contract at that time; this applies even if you have paid for the goods. If this is the case (and I strongly suspect that it would be for most online stores), then their acceptance of your offer and the formation of the contract probably does not come into effect until they "give objective manifestation of an intent to form the contract" by shipping the goods. Up until that time there is no contract and their only obligation to you is to promptly refund your money.

It's from a company called MarkMonitor that does trademark protection for clients - specifically around internet activities and that includes domain cybersquatting - which is illegal in the US under the ACPA, and of course that's what you were/are doing. So it could be a legitimate request as these things go. But that's not the whole story - the domain in the e-mail you posted is "walmartt.com" which is not only currently owned by Walmart Inc. but always has been, in fact the current Registrar of record is the aforementioned MarkMonitor. So either this isn't a legitimate request because you don't own "walmartt.com" and therefore this is spam or phishing (in which case feel free to delete it and move on with your life), granted that would be a pretty impressive bit of phishing since you are currently cybersquatting some Walmart-typo domains. Or you're just telling porkies all the way through your question for reasons of your own.

Is that extortion? false advertising? or in any way illegal? Not at all. The owner of the site is simply exercising his right as outlined in the terms and conditions from when the user signed up. And giving users an option for continued use of the site (that is, for him not to exercise a right of which they were always aware) does not constitute extortion.

As you have agreed, by contract, not to reverse engineer the product, technically it would be a "breach of contract" to do so, assuming such terms are enforceable where you live (or wherever the EULA selects as the choice of forum).

In England and Wales, falsely suggesting a sale or discount price would be contrary to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. https://www.hants.gov.uk/business/tradingstandards/consumeradvice/goodsandservices/pricinglaw practices that have been widely used by businesses for many years are now deemed under the Guide as “less likely to comply” or, in other words, more likely than not to be viewed as misleading and in breach of the CPUT Regulations. So what is now less likely to comply? Price establishing for 28-days within a 6-month period Using a reference price that applied many months (at least more than 2 months) prior to the promotion. Using a reference price when only a minimal amount of product actually sold at that price. There is now an expectation that a business will have sold a “significant number” of units at the higher price in order to make a price comparison. https://marketinglaw.osborneclarke.com/advertising-regulation/no-more-28-day-rule-pricing-and-promotions-under-the-spotlight/

You had bought product A. That constitutes you offering the seller a contract for you to get product A for your money. They keep the money and send product B - and now are in breach of the contract, as that is materially different from the contract both agreed to. Legal recourse is, depending on the customer protection laws, a refund of the payments or getting the correct product A. If you have a right for the Product A depends on exactly how it was advertized and the exact ToS.

Assuming USA law: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2315 If you accept or buy goods that are knowingly stolen you may be fined or imprisoned. If you buy goods and later find out they were stolen you can sue for a refund. However, I'd say the likelihood of getting your money back is incredibly low.

Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.

Is it legal for landlord to prohibit subleasing, under Texas law? It's quite common that plans change, and a residential lease must be broken. Of course, since one has agreed to pay the full price of the lease, they're on the hook for it, unless they can find someone else to help them mitigate the damages. However, the sublessee might only be interested in taking over a certain part of the lease (e.g., say, month 5, 6, 7 and 8 of a 12-month lease), and would not be interested in taking over the whole lease, thus having to find another lessee for months 9 to 12. Does the landlord have the right to refuse to mitigate tenant's damages to accommodate such an arrangement? In my experience, the corporate landlords always simply say "we don't do subleasing, you can only take over the whole lease [and then deal with re-leasing]". But doesn't this violate the provision about damage mitigation? http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/PR/htm/PR.91.htm Sec. 91.006. LANDLORD'S DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES. (a) A landlord has a duty to mitigate damages if a tenant abandons the leased premises in violation of the lease. (b) A provision of a lease that purports to waive a right or to exempt a landlord from a liability or duty under this section is void. I was reading on UniformLaws.org that in certain situations and/or states, landlord's failure to mitigate damages is automatically grounds for contract termination (thus no rent or damages are further due), does it at all apply here? IV. What Are the Consequences of Landlord’s Failure to Mitigate? Jurisdictions have taken one of two approaches in handling the landlord’s failure to comply with the duty to mitigate. The current version of the URLTA provides that if the landlord fails to use reasonable efforts to mitigate, “the rental agreement is deemed to be terminated by the landlord as of the date the landlord has notice of the abandonment.” In effect, this provision precludes the landlord from recovering any damages past the date of the abandonment. About half of the jurisdictions that have URLTA-based statutes (AK, AZ, CT, IA, KS, KY, MT, OK, OR, RI, SC) have retained this provision in their statutes, while the other half (AL, FL, HI, MI, MS, NE, MN, TN, VA, WA) have omitted it. Nevada has a similar provision in its non-URLTA statute. If you're the original tenant, what recourse can you take? If you're a prospective sublessee, is the landlord at all obligated to put you in contact with the original tenant for you to potentially inform the original tenant of their rights, and, potentially, see if they're interested for a sublease instead? Anything else that can be done if you're already in contact with the original tenant?

Landlord-tenant law is an area that is heavily statute-based, jurisdiction-dependent, and far from uniform across the country. A complex, specific, multi-part question like this one is not going to get a simple answer. In general, though, I can clear up some of the confusion with a quick example. Let's say you abandon your lease, but as you do so, you write a letter to the landlord saying: "While I won't be living there any more, my friend's band needs a place to practice. They have agreed to pay half my rent if you let them play there 4 nights a week. They'll be starting on Tuesday at 11 PM: please have a set of keys waiting for them at the front desk." The landlord does not give your friends the keys. They re-key and clean the apartment and rent it two months later. Are you going to stand up in court and argue, with a straight face, that you should only be liable for half the rent for those two months because of the landlord's "failure to mitigate"? Again, jurisdictions differ, but the duty to mitigate is not absolute. If the landlord could rent out a $1,000/month apartment for $5 a month, it doesn't have to do that, and you can't make the Court take $5 a month off their damages if they refuse to do so. Also, you seem to be confused about what subleasing is. A sublessor owes duties to you; you still owe the duty to your landlord to get the rent paid. A sublease is an agreement between you and a third party to pay you rent. It does not affect your relationship with the landlord at all, unless it's a breach of your agreement with the landlord or of local law protecting the landlord from unauthorized subleasing.

Can I just not renew their contract and go back to my place in 2 months or do I still need to give them 6 months' notice? Short answer: 6 months' notice Long answer: I'm assuming this is a fixed-term Assured Shorthold Tenancy. Unless a landlord is going down the Section 8 route where the tenant has broken the tenancy agreement, they will need to serve a "Section 21 Notice" under the Housing Act 1988 requesting the tenant to leave a property. The Act has been amended to extend this notice period to 6 months, and any fixed-term tenancy that ends during that period will roll over to a periodic tenancy until the end of the notice period. This is the relevant extract from the government's website: Section 21 notices requiring possession of a property under an assured shorthold tenancy Landlords can only use a Section 21 notice to ask their tenants to leave their property: If the notice expires at or after the end of the fixed term. During a tenancy with no fixed end date - known as a ‘periodic’ tenancy. From 29 August 2020, a Section 21 notice must give tenants at least 6 months’ notice of the fact that the landlord requires possession. This give some more detail about s.21 Notices.

Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.

Your rights and responsibilities in this realm are a matter of local law, sometimes down to the level of the city, plus whatever is stipulated in the lease. In San Francisco, for example, No Person shall have upon any premises or real property owned, occupied or controlled by him, or her, or it any public nuisance [which includes] Any visible or otherwise demonstrable mold or mildew in the interiors of any buildings or facilities This does not say whether the owner or the occupant is liable for remediating the situation. Shower mold is gross but not a health hazard (the SF ordinance just lumps all mold into one category). Since you have no written lease, there is no automatic clean-up requirement. There might be a law requiring a tenant to clean the premise to its original condition, for instance in Washington, tenant must Upon termination and vacation, restore the premises to their initial condition except for reasonable wear and tear or conditions caused by failure of the landlord to comply with his or her obligations under this chapter. Landlord duties are here: there is no duty to provide ventilation. However, the bathtub appears to be in a common area and not your particular unit. The landlord duties also require the landlord to Keep any shared or common areas reasonably clean, sanitary, and safe from defects increasing the hazards of fire or accident so in Washington, it's his problem and not yours. In general, even if a tenant is responsible for some form of cleanup, that does not constitute legal license for a facility upgrade. It might cost a couple hundred dollars to hire a person to wash ordinary mold accumulation, and does not justify getting a $5,000 new tub. Since this is in a common area, you would not be solely liable for whatever the damage was. The part where you say "crack in a common bath tub" is a large red flag: it suggests to me that somebody negligently broke the bathtub, and then caused behind-the-wall damage by letting water infiltrate without notifying the landlord. If you broke the tub and let it rot, you could be liable. If the tub was broken already and the landlord didn't bother to do anything about it, that is his negligence. The three questions that you should try to answer are: (1) what are the duties of landlord and tenant in my jurisdiction, (2) what was the actual harm done, and who did it, (3) what is the ordinary cost of whatever repair was done.

Is this charge legal in Georgia? No. It seems unlawful. First, it appears that the landlord was negligent and failed to mitigate damages. Since in general utilities are billed monthly, it is unreasonable for the landlord to have waited this long for a $2 charge that occurred on the first day of your tenancy. Second, legislation typically sets a deadline for a landlord to send a former tenant an itemized bill to cover for damages other than normal tear and wear. According to O.C.G.A. § 44-7-34(a), that deadline in Georgia is 30 days. Whereas the $2 charge is right (at least from a moral standpoint, as you mention), the $50 surcharge is devoid of merit.

If the tenant were alive, you couldn't stop them from taking away their personal property, could you? No matter how overdue the rent was. Nor could you deny them access to the property, except through formal eviction. AFAIK the estate generally has the same rights that the decedent did. So if the tenant would have had the right to remove their property, then their estate should have that same right. I'd be concerned about legal risks to you if you try to withhold it - I wouldn't want to do so without having advice from my lawyer that it was okay. (Answers on this site are not legal advice and most of the users are not even lawyers.) The decendent's personal property should now be part of their estate, so if it has any value, the representative should have to sell it if necessary to settle their debts. Thus even if you release the property, some of its value may still come back to you. Of course, if the decedent had other debts, and their assets don't cover them all, you may not be able to recover everything you're owed - that's one of the risks you run when you decide to become a landlord. In particular, the personal representative is not obligated to pay off the overdue rent out of her own pocket.

If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.

This all depends upon where you are. I am a landlord and I am answering based upon the laws of the U.S. and the states that I operate in. First things first. You are not the property owner. While this does not limit the answer, it is a factor. You do not have the right to the property even if you have a key and the permission of the tenant. You are not the property owner, do not represent the property owner nor the tenant, and by contract do not have legal rights to the apartment. It does put you in a different situation. As a landlord, it is against the law for me to provide access to a tenants apartment to anyone without authorization. This, of course, precludes emergencies such as welfare checks. In the case of the police, a warrant is required or a form that the police fill out that allows the police to gain access. This would be used in cases such as when a spouse requires the recovery of personal property during a domestic dispute. A judges order is not always possible in these cases. These are often limited cases and the form absolves the landlord of liability even in cases where the police act incorrectly. So without a warrant or a form that certifies any lawful request, anyone including the landlord can be arrested for a crime. For your situation, a quick call to the landlord would have been appropriate. Without a warrant or certification, the police still had options including waiting for the person in question to either leave or return to the apartment or even request a warrant by phone. Often, the warrant, once signed by the judge, can be read over the phone. Any landlord should always have a paper copy provided within minutes since some cruisers will have a printer and can print the warrant. Your refusal appears to be legal. However, in the future, you can ask for a copy of the warrant that you provide the landlord. I do not wish to paint a negative image of the police who do the hard work that most people will never take on, they are after all heros, however, some do not know the law perfectly well especially tenant landlord law. As well, some will try and get away with skirting the law trying to get an important job done. It does happen. I hired a lawyer just last week for an illegal request unrelated to the question here. Addressing the OPs comment: Hello, I believe I misstated the situation a bit in that the locked door in question was for the apartment building and not a tenet's apartment itself. I have edited my question. Does this change anything? Technically, this does not change much of anything, however, the request by the police can be seen as a reasonable one. They just may want to talk to the individual which is reasonable. In this case, I might have let them in if the access I was giving them was to a common space such as a hallway. In this case, the outer door locks are only to keep Intruders from entering the building and not meant to restrict access for valid purposes. Are you in trouble? I would say no. If anyone asks, you can give reasonable arguments for your situation. However, the next time, consider what I have written here. The police have a tough enough time doing their jobs. If you can help and stay within the proper boundaries of what the law allows, that would be best.

When were the Black Acts passed in Scotland? In 'The Scottish Legal System' 1, the authors say that The first printing press was introduced into Scotland in 1507, but it was not until 1541 with the printing of the Black Acts that it was applied to legislation. However, the Records of the Parliaments of Scotland state that the Black Acts were not passed until May 1584. Which source is correct? 1 White, Willock & MacQueen; fifth edition (2013); para 2.15.

From what I can tell, both are correct. The RPS refers to two different things as Black Acts: laws printed with a printing press using a heavy typeface (hence, "black") in 1541, and laws that established Parliament as supreme over the church (called "black" because they were bad for the church) in 1584.

Trivially, yes The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791. Every time there has been a dispute about what it means that has gone to court since then, the judgement of that court has established, overturned or clarified precedent - that's what common law courts do. The government can limit your speech The Supreme Court has recognized categories of speech which receive lesser or no protection from the First Amendment. For example, inciting lawless actions, fighting words, true threats, obscenity, child pornography etc. They have also determined that it doesn't limit the government's power to impose reasonable time, place or manner restrictions on speech. As Justice Holmes put it in Schenck v. United States (1918), "Even the most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic." It applies to parts of government which derive their power from Congress Which is, in most cases, all government. The executive actually has surprisingly little power granted by the Constitution (Article II, Section 2). All the other powers of the executive are technically delegated powers of Congress and are therefore subject to the First Amendment. Similarly, only the Supreme Court draws its mandate without going through Congress Article III, Section 1) - all other courts are subject to First Amendment restrictions. It only restricts government The limitation is a negative one on the US Congress (and through incorporation, the states). It does not, of itself, restrict private actors who are free to restrict speech however they want within their own property, including both physical and online spaces. It is open to the government to enact laws that would extend an affirmative right to free speech onto non-state actors (see Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins (1980)), however, the Federal government has not done so and neither have most states.

1. You need to read and utilize law textbooks, the MOST UPDATED editione. Try to access a library of a university that has a law faculty. Failing that, try a local library — but local libraries may not stock (pricey) law textbooks, or their most updated edns. I scanned Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text Cases Materials (2020 9 edn), beneath for you. But the NEWEST edn is 2022, 10 edn, as at May 23 2022. Herring updates his book every 2 years. Two other leading textbooks are Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law (2021 16 edn), and Smith, Hogan, & Ormerod's Text, Cases, & Materials on Criminal Law (2020 13 edn). 2. Look up the Act of Parliament in the Table of Legislation. See scan beneath. 3. Finally, you shall find the cases expatiated in the body, and cited in the footnotes! See scan beneath.

On January 15, 1780, the Continental Congress resolved to establish "for the trial of all appeals from the courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture", then a few lines later resolved "defraying the expence of said court of Appeals", and resolved actions "to carry into full and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of Appeals", thus clearly establishing the acceptance of the first federal court of the US, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. Some years earlier, Nov. 25 1775, the Continental Congress passed a number of resolutions pertaining to judiciously deal with seized goods in the course of the war (when there was no codified law or court system), where "prosecutions shall be commenced in the court of that colony in which the captures shall be made", but "cases an appeal shall be allowed to the Congress, or such person or persons as they shall appoint for the trial of appeals". The Court of Appeal of England and Wales was created in 1875, which seems to be the first UK court specifically established for hearing appeals. There is no obvious linguistic reason for these different names assigned to the functionally same court in two countries, but once a name is officially given, it takes an act of Congress or Parliament to change the name.

The question contains an incorrect assumption -- the assumption that this manuscript or any ancient manuscript is protected by copyright. As can be seen in this well known chart under US law an unpublished document, such as a manuscript, is protected for only 70 years after the death of the author, or 120 years after the work was created if the death date is not known, or the identity of the author is not know, or the work is of corporate authorship. A work written by a person who lived from circa 950 to circa 1010 is in the public domain under US law, with no room for doubt. The exact term of copyright protection may vary somewhat under the laws of other countries, but in none of them is a document written by a person who died over 1,000 years ago protected by copyright. This work is in the public domain, and no one owns any copyright in it. (A manuscript whose author died after 1948, or that was created after 1898 might well be protected by copyright.) [The statement in italics above is apparently incorrect. It seems that under UK law such a work may be under copyright if it is unpublished. IMO this is a bizarre result but such seems to be the law.] The current owners of the physical manuscript can control who has access to it, and on what terms. Thy could use an NDA or other contract to prevent such people from publishing or distributing the text. But if they allow general access to it, they have published it, and anyone may legally republish it as they see fit. Any person allowed access under a restrictive contract to which s/he has agreed may do whatever that contract permits, and not what it does not. A modern derivative work, such as an annotated edition, or a translation, would have its own copyright, but this would not protect the original text. If the original question means that there is an unpublished manuscript recent enough to be under copyright, then its author or the author's heir or the person or entity to whom the copyright was sold or given or left owns the copyright. In that case, no one may make a copy of the manuscript, including a transcription, or of any part of it, unless with permission from the copyright holder, or in such limited ways as is permitted by fair dealing (in the UK and much of Europe) or fair use (in the US). The question does not give enough detail to judge if the partial copy suggested would qualify -- this always depends heavily on the specific facts of the case. It seems that under UK law some unpublished works are protected which would be in the public domain if they were published. I am not sure how they can be share without being legally "published" and so lose protection.

This is a live political issue. Currently, the various datasets are incomplete and have known accuracy issues. Considering a particular parcel of land: It might not be in the Land Registry at all. About 85% of land in England and Wales is registered, and less in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Scottish registered land might only appear on the paper "Register of Sasines", as opposed to the more recent electronic database, or potentially in even older county-specific sasine registers. The owner might be a company, partnership, trust, etc., rather than a natural person. The ownership and control of that company (etc.) can be hard to trace. Companies House data is not verified; companies can be incorporated overseas; the trusts register is not publicly searchable; things can be muddled. Raw data might not show that a dozen properties, each owned by a single company that owns nothing else, are in fact ultimately controlled by a particular person of interest. Different people may own the freehold, or a leasehold, or have various other forms of ownership or control. Even a long-term tenancy may be of interest for database purposes. Because of continuing interest in anti-money laundering, tax evasion, and general accumulation of wealth, there have been plans to have a new "register of beneficial ownership". Such a register would record, for each plot of land, the name of the human beings who actually own and control it in the end. In the anticipated structure, each of those people would have an identifying number, and so we would get your proposed reverse index where you could look up a person and see what they owned. The register introduced by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 is the "Register of Overseas Entities" (ROE). However, as the name suggests, it only covers companies/partnerships/etc. from outside the UK. It's operated by Companies House. Overseas entities who have dealt in UK land since 1999/2014/2022 (depending on which part of the UK the land was in) have to list their beneficial owners. Because this is new, it is also not very complete yet: it only went live on 1 August 2022 and no penalties apply until the deadline of 31 January 2023. In Scotland, the "Register of Persons Holding a Controlled Interest in Land" (RCI) is meant to do the same but not just for overseas entities. It is live since 1 April 2022 and the initial registration period ends on 1 April 2023, so again it may not be very complete just yet. There will likely be more political tussle over potential creation of a more extensive UK-wide register. Until that exists, this is a known problem with the extent of current data. You can get a partial view but even that will be frustrating when it comes to the most interesting chunks of property.

Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.

Civil registration of births, marriages and deaths in the United Kingdom is a nineteenth-century innovation, based on the previous practice of keeping parish records of baptisms, marriages, and burials. The history is different but parallel in England (and Wales) and Scotland. What the churches were originally trying to do was to record information about their own ceremonies, because there are religious consequences to being baptized, married, etc. Civil law follows: you might have to prove in court that you were validly married to such-and-such a person, now deceased, and therefore had the right to live in his home as his widow. The parish system, because of its general utility, was regulated by legislation. In England, it was made mandatory in all parishes in the middle of the sixteenth century (although in practice, this happened at different rates in different places). Legislation in the following centuries covered the manner of keeping records, penalties for non-compliance, and fees for registration. For example, by the late seventeenth century you would have to pay sixpence to register the birth of each child, and a massive 40 shillings if you failed to do so within five days of the event. Registration also served as a device to give nonconformists an incentive to join the established churches, as there was no secular way to prove age, and few ways to marry. With liberalisation of religious strictures in the nineteenth century, the civil system began in England and Wales in 1837, and in Scotland in 1855. Under the Acts (6 Will 4 c.33, 17&18 Vict c.80), records were kept by governmental authority, with no religious qualification required. This was helpful for non-Anglicans or non-Presbyterians wanting to live their lives, and helpful for the government for having a more complete set of records for the population in general. Currently, registration of births is free, but there are various penalties for not doing it in time, and it costs money to get copies of birth certificates. The fees are not based on any estimate of lifelong earning power or anything of the kind. There was a very brief period (1695 to 1706) where in order to fund a war with France, the government levied a variable rate tax on parish register entries. The rates depended on the degree of the person registered. It was abolished due to its considerable unpopularity, also resulting in low rates of compliance and therefore revenue gained. The law, An Act for granting to his Majesty certaine rates and duties upon Marriages Births and Burials and upon Batchelors and Widowers for the terme of Five yeares for carrying on the Warr against France with Vigour, 6&7 Wm&Mary c.6, now called the "Duties on Marriages, etc. Act 1694", set out the following for births: Paupers: Free Most people: Two shillings Aristocrats: Between twelve and thirty pounds depending on rank, and with a surcharge for the eldest son, in addition to the two shillings. Baronets, knights, lawyers, academics, gentlemen and senior clergy: Between one and five pounds, plus the two shillings. Anyone not included in the above but who is rich: Twelve shillings. Similar fees were charged for marriages and so on. I believe this is the only time in UK law when there were differential fees for registration depending on the status of the parents. The scale was presumably based on the idea that wealthier people could afford to pay more. There were no legal consequences for the child as a result of the different fee paid, except insofar as they would be disadvantaged later in life if they were not properly registered. The law was repealed and the "Warr against France" has also been over for a long time. As usual, the "sovereign citizen" conception is completely bogus. There is not, and has never been, any notion of a birth certificate being a financial instrument. The confusion may be due to the word instrument being used for lots of different kinds of official documents, as well as a general boneheadedness about how the law works. A birth certificate is a convenient way to prove the circumstances of your birth, and for the government to collect statistics. Indeed, a paper copy of a certificate is just a way to make the management simpler - you can get many copies or none, at your option - since it saves effort compared to inspecting the centralised registers themselves.

Can an API be licensed? My question is this simple - can an API (Application Programming Interface) be licensed? How does such licensing work? I mean, to have the source/binary licensed under one licence and the API under another one (or even the same one). Example usages: source closed + API licenced open source + API licenced I have found following examples of API licensing: Google Maps API Licence Mapillary API

To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.

Ok here is my go at answering my own question: (see comments above & below for links) Depending on what you want to do, GPL can be a bit complicated, with multiple versions, version numbers, and added exceptions over the years. it can be a headache. However, for this purposes of app development incorporating GPL/LGPL libraries, it is fairly straightforward. Keep in mind to check version numbers on all relevant documents, although they are most likely v3.0. As far as I know linking to a GPL library binds you to also releasing your code under GPL. So that is a no-go for closed source, but that brings me to my 1st question. is it legal for me to remain closed source while incorporating external libs that are both BSD and LGPL? and I think the answer to that is yes provided that I dynamically link to said component (.so .dll .dylib .framework). Permission of this is granted under section 4d of LGPL v3.0. d) Do one of the following: 0) Convey the Minimal Corresponding Source under the terms of this License, and the Corresponding Application Code in a form suitable for, and under terms that permit, the user to recombine or relink the Application with a modified version of the Linked Version to produce a modified Combined Work, in the manner specified by section 6 of the GNU GPL for conveying Corresponding Source. 1) Use a suitable shared library mechanism for linking with the Library. A suitable mechanism is one that (a) uses at run time a copy of the Library already present on the user's computer system, and (b) will operate properly with a modified version of the Library that is interface-compatible with the Linked Version. My 2nd question Would it change the ability for me to stay closed source if i were to use an altered version of one of these libraries? It is my interpretation that in this case the only source you would need to provide is that of the modified library, and that the application itself can remain closed source. I'm basing this on grounds that nothing has changed from the situation for my 1st question other than the fact that the modified component library is now a derivative work under standard GPL v3.0. finally my 3rd question what is the legal effect on static vs dynamic linking? This seams to be a bit iffy. Again see section 4d of the LGPL v3.0. By this wording dynamic linking is much preferable, and there are basically no requirements. If you choose to link statically though(in other words as part of the project build) things get complicated. To fully understand see LGPL definition of "Corresponding Application Code", and then see sections 4 5 and 6 of the GPL document. Full source is not required, but as far as i can tell you are required to provide all necessary materials for someone to build the project from scratch, so they can use a different version of the library if they so choose. This, in my opinion, would not be closed source. I hope that is clear enough? I did quite a bit of looking around the internet in coming up with this answer, and in the end even some reading of the license, though I'm not sure I've actually read them through in there entirety. Keep in mind that there are multiple version of each license, and you should check version numbers for each LGPL library you use. There is a lot of good information on on opensource.stackexchange, although much more than one can process in a single sitting, and with occasional disagreement on finer points. Below are some related links. gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.txt gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.txt copyfree.org/content/standard/licenses/2bsd/license.txt opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/1700/are-derivative-works-a-subset... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/2772/can-this-nvidia-licence-be-us... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/2488/do-i-need-to-host-qt-source-w... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/1431/are-there-examples-of-proprie... opensource.stackexchange.com/questions/5162/are-the-terms-of-lgpl-3-0-alr...

As Greendrake says, you can legally create your "open source" license. There are two problems with this: Since you are not an experienced contract lawyer, there is a significant risk that your license doesn't do what you intend it to do. As a consequence, people who you want to use your software might not do so, because your license prevents it or makes it too risky. Or people may use your software in ways that you didn't want to allow, because the text of your license doesn't prevent it. Your license terms may be incompatible with other open source licenses. For example, I might want to use GPL licensed software A, and your software B with your license in my application. Being careful, I give both licenses to my lawyer, and the lawyer says, "sorry, you cannot possibly follow the terms of both licenses, because GPL and Ky's license require that you do two contradictory things. You can use software A and follow GPL's terms, or you can use software B and follow Ky's license terms, but you can't use both". All in all I would recommend that you use a widely used open source license.

Yes you can. What you do is called mere aggregation. Your app and the GPL container run isolated and do not share memory space: they are clearly separate programs vs parts of one program, so your app does not get infected by GPL.

Yes A software license is just a contract and parties to a contract are free to agree whatever terms they wish under the doctrine of freedom to contract. Government can restrict what terms can be used in a contract either in general (e.g. for being against public policy) or specifically (e.g. by requiring wages be paid in money). None of the terms you mention fall foul of any restrictions I know of.

Yes. This is a frequently asked question on the foundation's homepage, and answered without ambiguity (source): Can I use a Raspberry Pi in a commercial product? This is a very common question, and the answer is yes! Once you have bought a Raspberry Pi, it's yours to do with as you wish. You would be in good company too, as in fact the Raspberry Pi is regularly used and sold for commercial applications third parties. Note that this the default consequence of a contract of sale in all jurisdiction I know of (but I am not a lawyer): The seller does not retain property rights in the particular item, and by the mere selling of the item implies there are no other rights that might prevent the buyer from using it as they wish. Apart from the particular computer now in your property, there are other legal requirements: "Copyleft" softweare: Large parts of the Raspbian software are licensed under "copyleft" licenses (importantly, versions of the General Public License, GPL). These licenses are meant to provide your customers with the means of reproduciing and building upon the "copylefted" software. You will need to provide your customers with the source code to those software items, the tools and documentation needed for building, and a written notice. Your own programs need not be licensed under a "copyleft" license, provided that you don't build on (distribute "derative works" of) "copyleft" software. The open source licenses involved are not meant to exclude commercial use, and there are helpful compliance guides available ( a, b ). Non-free software: Make sure to not include non-free software, like Mathematica or Oracle Java, which are not licensed for commercial redistribution. Trademarks: Your use of the words "Raspberry PI" or the raspberry logo is subject to restrictions, as is usual with trademarks. Speaking of the logos: You can request permission to use their "powered by Raspberry Pi" logo. Market regulations: You need to abide by regulations, for example safety and electromagnetic interference. Repackaging the Pi might mean you'll need to test and recertify your product, I'm not an expert. Video codecs: Some Raspberry Pis (up to 3) include specialised video decoding hardware. If you want to use it with the MPEG2 codec, you'll have to buy an activation key for small one-time fee per device - £2.40 for MPEG2, £1.20 for VC-1; other codecs are already activated. I don't think you'll need a license even for commercial, for-sale devices, but I am not your lawyer. Just to be clear, nothing prevents your buyers from cloning your software. (This is not a consequence of you providing the Raspbian source code - they can just clone the contents of your SD card.) While you can retain copyright in your own code, you'll probably have no effective means of detecting infringement. However, the physical design of the rest of your device will not be affected. Your business model needs to account for this fact.

What are exactly the legal consequences of "All rights reserved"? Almost none. You have to explicitly grant copyright rights. You don't even need the Copyright notice for them to apply. My "almost" is because the notice makes it harder for somebody to argue "they didn't realize". Do I still need an additional SW License Agreement or is the Copyright notice above + a Disclaimer of liability sufficient? If this is free software (I know you said it isn't), do yourself (and everyone else) a favour by picking a license you like. Preferably either GPL or MIT (depending on your taste). There are far too many free licenses already. Please don't add another. (It also makes it much easier for any user of your software: "Oh yeah, GPL v2. We understand that. We can use it." as opposed to "What are the implications of using this one??" As this is not free software, I think you need a paid-for lawyer (who understands IPR in your juridiction.) Edit: In principle, I believe you don't need anything. The code is copyright, so the customer can't do anything with it (without explicit permissions that you haven't granted). However if the customer doesn't realize that or thinks you won't mind, you then have to go to court to enforce your rights (and probably end up with a disgruntled customer). A short, clear, license will make it clear to the customer what they are allowed to do, and save all that aggravation.

I'm assuming that you are not seeking to change the license, and so it will remain GPLv3. As long as you've built on the original software, that license still applies. You also need to keep the previous copyright notices, including the names of the original people. Assuming that, everything you're doing is legal, which is what's on topic here. There is some etiquette around forks (which is what you're doing), which would be on topic at the Open Source Stack Exchange. I'm puzzled by your desire to have a different license text. You can't change the license from GPLv3, so that has to stay the same. (If the original has GPLv3 "or, at your option, any later version", you can drop the any other version text if you like.)

Who owns a copyright on a scanned work? If there is a work that is out of copyright (was published in the 1800s) but I can only find it in an online repository, can the repository claim a copyright or other limitation on my use of their scanned copy?

In the US, the original author still owns the copyright, unless the original work was out of copyright (in which case no one owns the copyright): copyright is not granted for just pressing a "scan" button, and mechanical reproductions are not eligible for copyright (copyright protects creativity, and a scan involves zero creativity). To quote 313.4(A) ("Mere Copies") of the Compendium of US Copyright Office Practices, Third Edition: A work that is a mere copy of another work of authorship is not copyrightable. The Office cannot register a work that has been merely copied from another work of authorship without any additional authorship. [...] Examples: [...] Photocopying, scanning, or digitizing a literary work. That doesn't necessarily mean the repository can't put any restriction on your use of the copy; the repository may have a terms of service. Terms of service are rooted in contract law, not copyright; just because the work is in the public domain, doesn't force the repository to show it to anyone who asks, and they can force you to agree to a contract first. The enforceability of that contract is fact-dependent.

The creator of the derivative work has copyright in the derivative work. The copyright would protect only the new elements of the derivative work. Wikipedia is a good place to start. In the case of a book with updated grammar, depending on the extent of the changes, it would probably be easier to copy the original directly than to eliminate the updates from a copy of the derivative work.

The text and content (including all diagrams and illustrations) of the 1847 work (and of any other work published in 1847) are in the public domain in the US and everywhere in the world. You may freely use them verbatim or in any modified form that you wish. You are not even legally required to credit your source, although not to do so would be unethical, in my view. The version by Nicholas Rougeux that is linked to in the question has the licensing statement: Posters and website design are copyright Nicholas Rougeux. All other content and diagrams are under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International license (CC BY-SA 4.0). This will not apply to any content copied from the 1847 version, of course. You may use any of the new content and diagrams so released, or make and use derivative works based on those elements, provided that you comply with the CC BY-SA 4.0 license. This has a number of provisions, but the major ones are that you must release your work under the same license, must acknowledge your source work, and must not impose any additional conditions or restrictions on users of your derived work. These are spelled out in sections 3.a and 3.b of the license (linked above). Please read the full terms if you intend to use this license. If this procedure will satisfy your purpose, you do not need any further permission from Nicholas Rougeux, nor to pay any fees or royalties to him. If you do not choose to place your work under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, then you must not use the diagrams from Rougeux's version, nor modified versions directly based on them, nor an overall design clearly and directly based on the original design of that version, unless you secure permission from Rougeux (or the current copyright holder of Rougeux's version, whoever that may be). Given that Rougeux chose to release under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license, he may well be unwilling to grant permission under a different license, but that is his choice to make. Exception: in the US, you may use content from the Rougeux version to the limited extent permitted by fair use. This is not likely to cover the use of all or a large number of diagrams, particularly for a competing version of the same base work. Without specific information on how much content you would be using from that version, and how similar it would be to the original, no one can reliably determine if fair use would apply or not, but fair use is most likely to apply when a strictly limited amount of content is reused, and particularly when it is used for a different purpose than the original. Also, fair use is a strictly US legal content, and a work that might be held to be fair use by a US court might be considered an infringement by the courts of some other counties. Other countries have their own exceptions to copyright which are different in scope and terms from fair use. Many of them are significantly narrower. Note that a work posted to the internet is in effect published in all countries, and a copyright holder might choose to sue in any country s/he pleases. US courts might well enforce such a judgement even if it would not have been the judgement of a US court. Rogeux (or any other creator of a new edition) can have no copyright in elements already present in Byrne's 1847 work. Any similarity to Rogeux's work that is because of a similarity to Byrne's 1847 work is not copyright infringement. But any new elements introduced by Rogeux (or anyone else), including the manner of adding interactivity to a diagram, may well be protected by copyright (although the idea of having an interactive version of the diagram will not be). Any new or significantly modified text or diagrams introduced in a later version will be protected. As to any other versions of the 1847 "Byrne's Euclid" that may have been published, the publishers gain no copyright over the original 1847 work or any of its elements, including text, diagrams, or color scheme. Provided you do not use any original content newly introduced in such editions, you do not need to secure any permission from, or pay any fee to, the copyright holders of such editions. However, you may not use any such original content, or modified versions clearly based on such original content, without permission, unless an exception to copyright, such as fair use, applies. All that I said above about fair use would then apply. A copyright holder may grant or refuse permission to use a protected work or create a derivative work on any terms that s/he chooses, and charge any fee or royalty rate s/he thinks proper. Lack of response to a request for permission must be treated as if the response was "No".

All your work is yours. They've made it very clear it wasn't a work for hire, so it's yours. They can't copyright any of their ideas. You can't copyright an idea. Only specific creative elements authored by them and present in your work could be covered by copyright. You didn't use their block diagrams. I don't see how references to other sites to look at would constitute a creative element they authored. That said, you probably want to talk to a lawyer and get a written legal opinion that you can rely on.

This sounds completely incorrect to me. First, subsequent research is not normally a "derivative work" for the purpose of copyright, since copyright doesn't protect your ideas but only the particular form in which you have expressed those ideas. Second, as the owner of the copyright, you can permit anyone to make any sort of copy or derivative work, or sell, assign, or license the ability to do so to other parties, without regard to whether the work has been published. The real reason that nonpublication of your work would stifle further research is that researchers will not have access to it.

Exactly the same way it works over all other content There are no special classes of copyright, there’s just copyright. What a user of a service may do with copyright materials will be spelled out in the licence. If there is no licence, then they are left with fair use/fair dealing.

Assuming that the images are in fact released by the copyright holder under the CC_BY 2.0 license, and not under the CC_BY_NC or CC_BY_SA license, you are free to use the image on a book cover. That the book is erotic makes no difference. You must attribute the cover image to the original creator, as specified in the license, unless the creator has indicated that no attribution should be provided. You must not state or imply that the original creator has in any way endorsed your book or you. Be careful to check that the person releasing the image is in fact the copyright holder. It is not unknown for someone to upload someone else's image and claim to release it under a CC license. Obviously a "license" from someone who had no rights does not give you or anyone any rights. Just as buying stolen goods from a thief does not give you title to them. It is your responsibility to confirm that the person who released the image had the right to do so.

Under 17 USC 106 (3) one of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is: to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; Distributing an entire book cannot plausibly be considered to be fair use. Nor does the library exception apply. The exception in sec 109 (first sale doctrine) applies only to: the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner... 17 USC 501 (a) says: (a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 or of the author as provided in section 106A(a), or who imports copies or phonorecords into the United States in violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be. Therefore both Bob and Sue have infringed the copyright, and could in theory be sued for doing so. However I cannot see anything in 17USC which makes receiving an unlawful copy an infringement, or any other crime or tort. It seems to me that Alice has no legal liability, whatever her moral position may be, unless perhaps she could be charged with conspiracy to infringe the copyright, which seems unlikely to me in practice, and perhaps not possible even in theory. If Bob has in fact done this only once, for one book, the chancre of the copyright owner learning of it, or filing suit even if the owner does learn, is perhaps not large. But that would be no defense if the owner chose to sue. Some copyright owners choose to explicitly permit actions similar to that of Bob (where e-books are involved), provided that Bob does not charge a fee, regarding it as good advertising. But that is the copyright owner's choice to make, and most commercial publishers do not take that position. Bob could have legally loaned his copy to Sue, and Sue could have legally passed it on to Alice, without anyone infringing the copyright. Making the copy without permission was infringing, and passing on the unlawful copy was also an act of infringement. Receiving one copy or many does not seem to be a violation, unless it is part of a plan to later distribute unlawful copies. Sue did not make a copy. She distributed an unlawful copy, which is also infringement, as the quoted part of Sec 106 says. While in theory the publisher could have authorized Bob to make the copy, this is not plausible and no reasonable person would believe this to be an authorized copy. So Sue has good reason to believe that the copy is unauthorized. So the distribution is infringement.

What laws regulate owners of fundraising websites? Is it true that any one can set up a website for fundraising without declaring a legal entity? For example, my church needs to raise fund for repair work, the project would cost about $40K. If I want to create a website for people to send me money for that cause, do I have to declare a business?

There's nothing that makes it illegal to ask others to give you money to donate to a third party. But if you want to say you're fundraising on behalf of another organization, obviously you need its permission. And if you want contributions to be considered charitable for tax purposes, and you want to make sure you don't wind up paying taxes on contributions "sent to" you but then passed on, then you may need to start worrying about a separate entity. It would be more straightforward to offer to create, host and administer the website for the church, with it receiving the contributions directly.

You are free to sell or not to sell to whoever you like (unless it is illegal discrimination, like not selling to white Christians), but it doesn't make a difference, because anyone who buys the software from you can legally sell it on to anyone they want. So you cannot control who ends up owning the software. If I want the software and you don't sell it to me, and I still want it, I'll just ask a friend to buy it and give them the money. Other people would just get a pirated copy if you refuse to sell to them (and would have very little bad conscience since they offered you cash and you refused to take it). You can put terms into a license, and in the USA this is binding. The customer may not agree with the license, and in that case they have the right to get a refund for the software. In the EU, I don't think a license is binding, so you'd have to sign a legally binding contract with the buyer. Apart from all that, you have very little chance to find out if the software is used against your wishes and to do anything about it.

The website owner brings in an expert programmer who testifies that the user cannot have gotten to a certain part of the site (or download, etc.) without having clicked to accept the terms of service, and that this document they're holding is a true and correct copy of the terms of service as of that date. That's evidence in favor of the site, and an adverse party has to have stronger evidence in order to overcome it. If the person didn't save a copy of the terms themselves, they'll have a hard time on this. Then the other party's attorney tries to discredit the programmer by asking questions like "how do you know there are no bugs in the software which could have allowed somebody to reach this without agreeing to the terms of service" etc. Apparently, some sites don't require users to click indicating agreement. If the company has significantly changed the site, terms of service, etc. since the time the user registered, and doesn't keep any copies of old versions around, and admits this, they'll have a hard time enforcing an agreement (as they can't produce a copy of it). If the user kept a copy, the user might be able to present that. It's up to the finder of fact to decide what to believe and how much weight to give the various witnesses' testimony.

You need a privacy notice for any website (if you're subject to GDPR). Having a PayPal button alone does not trigger such an requirement, since any website is already processing personal data such as IP addresses even if there's no third party content. But it's good that you think about issues for including third party content. As rulings such as the Fashion ID case and the more recent Google Fonts judgement have clarified, you are responsible having a suitable legal basis when you cause visitor's personal data to be disclosed to third parties. Even just embedding/loading a button or logo can cause personal data such as IP addresses to be disclosed to the recipients. You might have a legal basis if earlier, the user already opted in to payment with PayPal (could be consent per Art 6(1)(a) GDPR, or necessity for performing the contract per Art 6(1)(b)). Loading the embedded content just because the user might want to use it is probably not compliant though. For example, the common PayPal donation button is problematic. Thus, instead of linking a PayPal SDK, you might want to host the code + assets for the PayPal payment functionality on your own servers, or only load the PayPal content after the user unambiguously indicated that they want to use this content. I've discussed the PayPal donate button previously, as well as background on the Fashion ID case and click-to-consent wrappers for embedded content. What the Fashion ID case made very clear though is that you're only responsible for compliance for those data processing activity where you can actually influence the “purposes and means” of processing. You have no control over what PayPal does with the data on their servers, so they are solely responsible for that. And if the PayPal button navigates to a PayPal website, you're not responsible for what cookies PayPal sets on its own website. It is thus correct that the PayPal popup has its own cookie banner – you are not responsible for the contents of the popup. You also don't need to collect consent for cookies and similar technologies that are strictly necessary to provide a service that was explicitly requested by the user. For example, session cookies, XSRF protection cookies, and cookies containing a shopping cart are often such strictly necessary cookies. You must still be transparent about the use of such cookies, but you probably don't need a banner to announce this. So I think that you can probably go without a cookie banner, though you should probably get consent before loading PayPal content into your page, and you will likely want to be transparent about cookies as part of your privacy notice.

To do so I used some images and Gifs which may be under copyright but since I don't earn money for myself and there is no company backing me I was hoping that there is some protection for private persons like me who just want to showcase the project. Sorry. If your website is public facing (i.e. not password protected and available only to family and close friends), you need to follow copyright law. There is no exception to copyright just because a project is run by an individual for non-commercial purposes. I am also insecure about the GDPR regulations since I give users the ability to create an account and try it out. Your profile says you're in the EU. Then you need to comply with the GDPR. Is there any way to protect me against greedy lawyers and companies? Could I write something like: "This website is a peace of art" and save myself with arguments like "artistic freedom" or "free speech"? Nope. A controversial website run by Peter Sunde had at one point a "free speech" disclaimer (similar to the one you propose) posted. However, Sunde did never use this defense in court: Finnish court slaps Peter Sunde with €350k fine. If he had shown up in court, I am pretty sure the court would have told him that such a disclaimer has no legal merit. The only protection that will make you completely safe is to adhere to the law.

First, the press release is copyrighted from its inception and may have been work for hire (a close call since you wrote them for an LLC and the LLC had a deal with them). There is a copyright in someone, although the absence of a copyright notice limits the remedies available for infringement. Second, a link is not a copyright violation. Third, copyright protects an exact manifestation of an idea or description of a fact, not the idea or fact itself. Fourth, there are two different doctrines that could protect an exact copy of a press release. One of two doctrines, which applies if the press release has been released to the public, is an implied license. Press releases are meant for the general public and reprinting them when that is their intended purpose is an implied grant of permission. In the same way, if you have an unfenced front yard to a concrete path leading to your front door, anyone who wishes to meet with you has an implied license to walk up to your door and knock. Whether this implied license can be revoked or not is a harder question. The other of the two doctrines, which is not limited to press releases that have been released, is "fair use". In this situation, when the work was short, has been released to others, has limited literary value, transmits unprotected facts relevant to you, relates facts that may also be a matter of public record (the sale anyway), and you aren't trying to profit from the text of the press releases themselves just from the facts that they convey, the case for fair use is pretty decent even though this is a business use. Ultimately, however, to be squeaky clean and avoid litigation, you can link rather than regurgitate the press releases, and can write your own statements about the facts in them from scratch. This information is not privileged or trademarked. If you didn't sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) or if they were released to the public, they aren't subject to trade secret protection either. If they were only released to the customer whose sale was involved and there is an NDA they could conceivably be trade secrets but even then the case would be very weak since the information doesn't create value by virtue of being kept secret.

Are the monetary donations collected by the recipient subject to federal taxation according to IRS law? Yes. Usually, money received from an activity from third-parties with no personal relationship to you (assuming that "you" are not a tax exempt organization), are taxable income under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law, as a form of "compensation for services", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(1), or as "gross income derived from business", under I.R.C. § 61(a)(2) (exactly which prong of I.R.C. § 61(a) it comes under isn't legally relevant for tax purposes in this situation). This is also informed by I.R.C. § 83(a) (which is a general rule even though the balance of the Code section applies mostly to equity compensation in entities), which states in the pertinent parts (material in brackets inserted for clarity): If, in connection with the performance of services, property is transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are performed, the excess of the fair market value of such property . . . over the amount (if any) paid for such property [by the person who receives the property], shall be included in the gross income of the person who performed such services[.] But, gifts are expressly excluded from income under Section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code as interpreted by case law. One point which the case law makes clear, however, is that an obligation to pay doesn't need to be a legally binding obligation to make a payment something that counts as income rather than a gift. The tax law instead looks at the substance of the interaction and the reality of how decent, well mannered people would act under circumstances in which they receive an uncompensated benefit. Ultimately, whether are voluntary payment made through a private individual or business's website is taxable income or is not taxable because it is a gift is a case by case determination to be made in light of all of the relevant facts. For example, if your mother donates $7,500 to your website on your birthday, even though all of your other "donations" are from third-parties whom you have never met in person in amounts from $5 to $100 and you have provided all of those other third-parties with some kind of service or benefit through your website (e.g. they were allowed to read free webcomics or listen to music you wrote and recorded without charge over the website), the donation from your mother probably counts as a gift, even though the other donations probably count as income taxable income. But, in the absence for any reason for the donation other than gratitude for the performance of the services provided by the website, or for the conduct of the business that the website belongs to, the donation will generally be treated as income under Sections 61 and 83, rather than as a gift under Section 102. The notion of a gift is normally limited by case law and suggestive related section of the Internal Revenue Code that illustrate its intended meaning in the case of gift loans and bargain sales made for donative purposes, to circumstances in which the person making the gift has received nothing in return for it. A donation to a website usually wouldn't meet this test to show a transfer's character as a gift. The most familiar example, upon which there is a great deal of case law and authoritative guidance, is that tips paid to restaurant and hospitality industry workers are income rather than gifts, and are subject not only to income taxation but also to FICA payroll taxation. These tipping situations are closely analogous to voluntary payments made through a website. There are a great many tax regulations, court cases interpreting tax law, and authoritative guidances from the IRS (such a revenue rulings) that address the basic concepts that I've set forth above. And, the income tax law authorities are further informed by the statutes and case law governing gift taxation, which is, as intended, interpreted to define a gift in a matter that dovetails more or less perfectly with the definition of a gift for purposes of Internal Revenue Code Section 102. As the IRS explains at its website discussing the gift tax for which the concept of a gift is defined consistently with the income tax concept of a gift: The gift tax is a tax on the transfer of property by one individual to another while receiving nothing, or less than full value, in return. The tax applies whether or not the donor intends the transfer to be a gift. The gift tax applies to the transfer by gift of any type of property. You make a gift if you give property (including money), or the use of or income from property, without expecting to receive something of at least equal value in return. If you sell something at less than its full value or if you make an interest-free or reduced-interest loan, you may be making a gift. Donations which are not income are gifts and there is a tax on gifts given (paid by the donor rather than the person receiving the gift). But, there is a $15,000 per donor per donee exception per year from gift taxation for gifts under the Internal Revenue Code, in addition to more than $12 million per lifetime per person exemption from gift and estate taxation for gifts in excess of this $15,000 amount (called the annual exclusion) and inheritances left at death. So, usually, if a transfer is treated as a gift rather than as income, no tax will be due. But this part of this answer's short summary of the law is the top level conceptual framework for all of those other subordinate tax law authorities. Also, this income is also subject to self-employment taxation, which is imposed in lieu of FICA on income which is not a wage, salary or employment-related tip. Often self-employment taxes are due on self-employment income even when no federal income tax is owed upon it. if there is a clear answer, do states with personal income taxes do the same regarding website donations? Most states and localities with a personal income tax start from the federal definition of income and modify that definition in ways that the taxing jurisdiction deems fit either to make sense (limiting the tax to income related to the state, for example, at least for non-residents), or to fit local policy preferences (e.g. exempting from income taxation, capital gains made in an investment in the state favored by state lawmakers). Almost no states or localities have chosen to deviate from the federal definition of income for income tax purposes with respect to donations made to websites that are not non-profit entities.

A privately held company can generally pursue any lawful business activity unless it has led its private investors to believe otherwise with its representations. A publicly held company (i.e. one with shares or bonds traded on a securities exchange, or otherwise marketed to the general public, or having more than 500 investors and more than a certain amount of capital), must essentially disclose to its investors all foreseeable material risks associated with the investment, including the risk of losses in cryptocurrency if it makes material investments in it. Shareholder consent wouldn't be required, but disclosure of this potential investment activity to shareholders (allowing shareholders who are displeased to sell shares in the company to avoid the risk) is required in publicly held companies.

Do digital works need to be sent to the copyright office? In the US, if I release a video game (or other digital work) online do I need to send a physical copy to the Copyright Office?

Not unless you also released it in physical form. First, you don't have to send anything to the copyright office; registration is only required before you actually file an infringement lawsuit. Second, when you do register, the Copyright Office says: What works may be registered with electronic deposits? The following classes of works may be registered in eCO with electronic deposit copies: Unpublished works; Works published only electronically; Published works for which the deposit requirement is ID material (see the Special Deposit Requirements section of Circular 1 for more on ID material); Published works for which there are special agreements requiring the hard copy deposits to be sent separately to the Library of Congress. All other classes of works may be registered via eCO (application and fee payment) but require hard copies of the work(s) being registered. Under part 2, if it was only released electronically the USCO will take electronic deposit.

You automatically have a copyright in any copyritable things you create. So you own copyright over the pictures you sent him (as long as you created them)

All computer programs are not just copyrightable, they are protected by copyright as soon as they are put into fixed form (for example, as soon as I type it on my computer which will save it as a file on a disk). The copyright owner doesn't have to take any actions whatsoever to have a computer program protected by copyright. It’s not just computer programs, even many fonts are copyrighted because they are essentially computer programs. BTW. What I just wrote is also protected by copyright. There are some licenses involved that I agreed to when I submitted it to this website, and which allow the website to publish and you to read this text, but I'm the copyright holder. PS. There is a comment saying “computer programs are not literary works and therefore not copyrightable”. That may have been true or arguable in the 1980’s. It’s not true now. PS. No, stack exchange doesn’t own the copyright to my post, I do. Unless I was an employee of the company and posted on their behalf. Stack exchange needs and has a license to publish this post.

Copyright Prominent at the bottom of the page is: © RealClearPolitics 2015 This is nice because it tells you who you have to approach for a licence. If it wasn't there the material would still be copyright you just wouldn't know who owned the copyright. Questions So: If I'm looking to build an app or write a book and I wish to use statistics, am I allowed to basically use their numbers as long as I cite where it is coming from? No, unless what you do constitutes fair use and I don't think it does. If I do make a profit from it, do I owe any royalties to the original scientists/surveyers? No, but you would owe whatever licence fee you negotiated with the copyright holder, ostensibly RealClearPolitics. Must I ask them for permission? Yes, unless you are OK with running the risk of being sued. Commentary I see books reference hundreds of studies all the time This is because they are generally protected by Academic Fair Use public polls should be open information to everyone The only public poll that I know of is an election and that information is available. What you are looking at is a private poll commissioned by and paid for by RealClearPolitics and it is their intellectual property; why should that "be open information to everyone"? commercial interests may be legally entangling Always

It would be terribly risky for you to simply link another company's terms of service. What if they take their server down? What if they change their terms? You would not even know when exactly the changes were made. Copying their terms means you might run into copyright issues on the text. Either pay a lawyer to write your ToS for you, or see if you can find something in the public domain.

If you do not have permission to make and distribute reproductions of the work, then it is illegal to make and distribute reproductions of the work. US copyright law Indian copyright law

This appears to mean that the author, while retaining copyright, is allowing anyone to make copies without asking permission from the author. This would seem to be similar to a CC-BY license, or perhaps more exactly a CC-BY-ND license, as the author has apparently not granted the right to create modified versions or other derivative works. This does not require one who makes such copies to distribute them free of charge, unless there is another provision not mentioned in the question. Amazon, or anyone else, would be free to sell copies at any price they cared to ask. If the author wanted to limit the sales price, that would take another provision, and might not be enforceable.

Technically speaking, such emails are copyrighted by the sender. However, showing such an email to a third party, or posting it publicly in order to comment on it would almost surely be a fair use in the US. In any case, such an email would have no commercial value, and so there would be no financial damages possible. A lawsuit over such a technical copyright infringement would, in my view, be quite unlikely, and even less likely to be successful. Indeed, filing such a suit would be one of the best ways for the business to draw attention to the issue, in an example of the Streisand Effect.

Which takes precedence, conversion or bankruptcy? Suppose Mr. Investor gives $50,000 to Mr. X to invest in his business. And suppose instead of investing in the business, Mr. X gives the $50,000 to his brother, a day or so later. That would be conversion, I believe. And let's assume that this money was easily traceable. Suppose Mr. X later files for personal bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee will want to pull the $50,000 of "fraudulent conveyance" to the brother into the bankruptcy estate. But the investor files a conversion claim for the same amount? Who (the bankruptcy estate or the investor) gets priority on the $50,000 in such a situation? Is there a legal means of determining this?

I'm assuming you're talking about U.S. federal bankruptcy law (Title 11). Once bankruptcy is declared, any claims against the debtor are subject to the bankruptcy laws, and any claims against the debtor in any other court are automatically stayed under 11 USC 362. That means if you bring an action against the debtor for conversion, a court will not hear it, because the debtor's bankruptcy stays any such action. It gets more complicated if you want to sue the brother. In general, except in limited circumstances, the brother is not protected by the bankruptcy stay. [source]. So you can likely sue the brother. Your question about "priority," however, may be based on a misunderstanding of how the law works. If you sue the brother and win, you will get a judgment against the brother, which you can then attempt to collect from the brother's assets. If the trustee convinces a court that the property in question is, in fact, the property of the estate, the trustee can recover it from the brother, or from anyone the brother subsequently gave it to, until it is transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value--who must be unaware of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance. See 11 USC 550. Because you were aware of the fraud, you are not a bona fide purchaser for value, and the statute seems to give the trustee the ability to recover the money from you, just as it would from the brother. In practical terms, this will rarely happen--but if it did, the bankruptcy estate would win, because the avoidance of a transfer means the property was never the brother's in the first place.

Does signing a contract after explaining it was not legally binding count as contract fraud? No. However, depending on the details of the contract, the circumstances, and the parties' subsequent conduct, the donor's ability to prove he actually disclosed it to the couple would strengthen his position. The prima facie elements of fraud are listed in Key Finance, Inc. v. Koon, 371 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2015): (1) a material misrepresentation; (2) known to be false at the time made; (3) made with specific intent that a party would rely on it; and (4) reliance and resulting damage. The donor's disclaimer to the couple "telling them [the contract] was not legally binding" strikes elements (1) and (2). That preempts the relevance of (3). No matter how bizarre it is that the donor eventually bowed to the couple's pressure, that does not change the fact that elements (1) and (2) are stricken. Your description does not reflect whether or how the couple incurred any losses, but the requirement of the couple's reliance is preempted by virtue of the donor's disclaimer. Furthermore, the donor's "history of questionable truthhoods" can only weaken the couple's position of "reasonable" reliance on any representation the donor makes (in case the couple shared back then your concept of donor's reliability). The donor's questionable assertions "[to] further his personal agenda" seems to be irrelevant in this matter because, as you say, "he gained no benefit from the contract". Also, it is unclear from your description whether or not the donor has been sued/charged at all. The donor's mere allegation that he was sued has no legal effect --such as defamation or malicious prosecution-- unless one adds intricate assumptions into this matter. As for "he says the judge chose to 'charge' him", it is possible that he was charged for something else and he is (whether unintentionally or on purpose) mischaracterizing whatever proceedings in which he was involved. The sole act of signing that contract upon proper disclaimer does not render the donor liable for fraud.

Dead people have to pay their debts just like everybody else It is one of the primary roles of the executor to make sure this happens. Dead people can dispute a debt just like everybody else Just because someone says you owe them money, that doesn't mean you owe them money. In fact, the onus of proving the debt lies with the person claiming the money. It is perfectly reasonable for an executor to ask the creditor to do so. Some questions that are appropriate to ask: Presumably, the entitlement arises under a contract; when was the contract entered into? What were its terms? Where is the evidence the deceased agreed to these terms? Do the terms comply with (consumer) law? Have the prices been calculated in accordance with the terms? Have previous invoices been submitted and paid on the same basis? All the issues you mentioned. These are all things the creditor would need to prove if they went to court. If they can provide satisfactory answers to these then pay the bill. If they can't then try to agree to a settlement amount acceptable to both parties. If you can't do that, let them sue the estate and let a judge decide. The debts of the deceased person are payable by the estate of the deceased person for which the executor is the trustee. The executor has a duty to the beneficiaries of the estate to act in their best interest. This means paying bills that they are satisfied are justified, contesting those that aren't but ultimately, making commercial decisions that benefit the beneficiaries. Getting bogged down in a court case may not be in their best interest especially if it delays finalisation of the estate. In any event, the executor is not liable personally for the debt, or for anything they do or fail to do if done or not done in good faith.

It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be "what a reasonable person would conclude" (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to "Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes", which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is "an insignificant value". The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia).

We don't want this issue to adversely affect our credit and got legal consulting which suggested we should pay the debt collector to protect our credit score, and then sue the landlord for the money back in small claims court. I'm a little worried about this strategy since it requires to hand away the money first, and am trying to get second opinions. The debt collector is probably either the owner of the claim against you, if it is an assignee of the claim, or an agent of the landlord for purposes of collection. Thus, payment to the debt collector is equivalent to payment of the landlord. The law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction regarding whether payment constitutes of waiver of a right to sue over the debt. Sometimes it is necessary to designate the payment "under protests" or "reserving all rights", but that is not a uniform rule of law that applies in all jurisdictions, and I do not have the time and familiarity with that state's law to research Massachusetts case law on that point accurately.

Since Alice uses "CASH ACCOUNTING" expenses are accounted for when they are paid by her, not when someone else receives it. So in your hypothetical, when she initiated the transfer would be the date that the payment is considered to be made. On the other hand, "ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING" means that Alice would account for the expense when it was made. Generally this would be earlier than the CASH date. But either way, she would account for it in 2022 based on what you said above.

I think that you are distorting the legal situation by describing it as a debt denominated in XYZcoins. According to the LII page "Debt": Debt is a financial liability or obligation owed by one person, the debtor, to another, the creditor. Note that a debt is a financial liability. That means that it is payable in money, in some recognized currency. In the XYZcoin case, there is not a debt, but a contract of exchange. It can only be satisfied by handing over the cryptocurrency specified in the agreement, unless the parties agree to change that. When a person signs a contract to sell a house, for example, that person does not owe a debt denominated in houses. Rather, that person has agreed to deed over a specific house on specific terms. If the seller refuses to close the deal and the would-be buyer brings a legal action, the judge may order specific performance, that is, order the seller to sign the papers needed to transfer title to that specific house. A similar remedy may be available on a contract to sell a painting or other object that is unique, and cannot be replaced easily by a different object of the same type. Something similar may occur with a contract to sell or trade stocks not listed on any exchange, where there is no clear market value, and the purchaser wants shares in that particular company, not a sum of money.

In general, the law seeks to make all parties whole. There is no mechanism for profit-sharing between thieves and their victims. Victims of theft are entitled to receive their money back plus the applicable rate of interest (called the judgment rate). They are not entitled to profits or windfalls above and beyond the statutory judgment rate of interest. What if the act of stealing the money has destroyed the owner's business and has left him with a lot of debt and bankrupt? Criminal statutes provide for the return of stolen funds plus interest. Recovery of damages, as you describe, is provided by civil statutes and common law. So, to recover damages, the victim would need to sue the thief in civil court.

What are possible motives for avoiding insurance in an auto accident? My parked car was involved in a hit and run accident outside of my house. Luckily, one of my neighbors saw the incident happen and the other driver ended up getting caught and cited by the police for it. The driver is a minor, so his father is handling the ordeal. He is very insistent that we not go through insurance, so he would like to pay me directly for the damage to my vehicle. My question is: what is his likely motivation for wanting to go that route? Is his motive purely financial (i.e., not have his insurance rates raised) or is there some legal benefit to him paying for my damage out of pocket? I live in the state of North Carolina.

The most likely reason the other driver doesn't want to go through insurance is to avoid a raise in his premiums. However, there could be more serious consequences, up to and including having his insurance cancelled, for example, if the son was not supposed to be driving the car, or based on the criminal nature of the offense. However, there can be serious consequences to not dealing with insurance. Some (if not all) insurance policies require him to report the accident; by failing to do so, he may risk losing his insurance. More importantly to you, if he does not report a claim to his insurance, his insurance will not pay it. This is important to you, because insurance companies, as a general rule, pay claims. Random people don't always; they ignore you, they move out of state, they go bankrupt. If this is a serious amount of money, you need to talk to a lawyer before you enter into a contract with this person, to make sure that it's enforceable, and that if you don't get paid, you have some recourse.

Texas and California are actually what are called Presumed Speeding states, unlike most others which are Absolute Speeding states. (There is a little known third category called Basic, but this is uncommon). In a presumed speeding state, a speed-limit violation offers someone in your shoes far more flexibility in building your defense than the more common absolute state. In states that use this presumed system, such as California and Texas, it is not illegal to drive over the posted limit as long as you are driving safely and this can be established. For example, if you are driving 50 mph in a 40-mph zone, you are "presumed" to be speeding, yes. However, despite this prima facie evidence (meaning "on its face") of speed in excess of the posted limit, if you can show you were driving safely you may be able to mount a pretty decent defense. Just because you got a ticket is not prima facie evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that you were speeding. You are presumed innocent. If they prove you were speeding this is all they need to make their case, unless you rebut it. But there is a lot of room to rebut this presumption – and that is if they prove it. They must (as with all criminal cases) prove you did what you are accused of beyond a reasonable doubt – the highest standard of proof in the U.S. So, if everyone was going 80 MPH in a 70MPH zone, you would argue that the road was (I'm assuming) dry, unmarred, you were traveling in heavy enough traffic that to slow your speed to the posted limit would actually be less safe than traveling with the flow of traffic. You can talk about the state of your vehicle (repair, handling, etc.), how you stayed in one lane, and you can describe your skill at driving – especially if you have no other tickets and you have been driving for a long time. If you were weaving in and out of traffic, riding someone's bumper, if it was pouring rain, the road was bumpy or under construction, or if you admitted speeding (if you did this you can still rebut with a showing of safe driving, but ignore all info regarding challenging radar or other means of determining speed), or if any other evidence exists that the officer would testify to that shows you were not driving safely, this will not be successful. A successful example of a speeding defense in Texas: on a clear, dry morning with no other cars on a wide, straight road, a man is pulled over for being clocked going 50 mph in a 40 MPH zone. He had a perfect record and had been driving 22 years. He was driving a 2-year-old car. He convinced a judge that this was driving safely given those conditions and was acquitted. That's because facts presented were sufficient to "rebut the presumption" that by going over the posted limit he was driving at an unsafe speed. NOTE: Never bring up your driving record unless it is spotless. Unless you are a habitual offender it cannot be used against you or be brought into evidence at all, unless you open the door. You can also mount a defense based on the radar detection device, if one was used. You can seek records as to when the calibration fork was last checked, when the last time it was professionally calibrated (rather than self calibrated). You can ask, in a leading way (only if you know) how close the car behind and in front of you were (you don't want to be too close to the car in front of you, however if the cars were tightly grouped it is more likely the radar detector could have read another vehicle): e.g., "Isn't it true that the car behind me was only 1.5 car lengths behind me?" Only do this if you know, but if you can get the officer to admit that the car behind you was close, that can be used to rebut the radar detection and goes to the argument that driving slower would have been dangerous and you were driving safely with the flow of traffic. You should be prepared to put on an entire trial if you fight the ticket. In Texas, I believe speeding is considered a Class C criminal offense (rather than a civil offense as in most absolute states); hence, they have to build the prima facie case against you and prove it beyond reasonable doubt. If you can afford one, get a good traffic violation attorney. Always choose a jury in this type of case. Everyone speeds a little and you are far more likely to be acquitted by a jury than a judge. You should also ask to have the case assigned to the county seat; request this in writing ASAP. If you are trying the case, be prepared to go after the officer. Note any distinguishing marks on your car (if any), recall what you wore, what time of day, the lighting, all that. Even go back to the scene at the same day and time and take video showing the flow of traffic, (hopefully) the straightness of the road, etc. Cross-examine him on all facts with confidence and in a leading manner. Always ask for the calibration reports and you will get all evidence against you in discovery. This thing about 10mph being the minimum they can give a ticket for: ignore that, it's rubbish! It's meant to get you to admit to him that "you were only going 8 or 9 over." Also, that whole percentile argument is not relevant and will not work at all. You must show that you were driving safely given all the facts and circumstances to rebut the presumption that you were driving unsafely by speeding. It is worth fighting as you will also incur surcharges, increased insurance rates, and points on your license that are cumulative and stay for 3 years – a certain amount of which gets you suspended if you get (or have) more violations.

"No fault" is a term of art in this case. In a "no fault" insurance regime, such as the one in place in Utah, minor car accidents are covered by the insurance company of the person who suffers the damage, and not by the person who is at fault in the accident. Utah's "No-Fault" Insurance System Utah is a "no-fault" car insurance state. This means that when a car accident occurs, the people injured in the crash turn to their own insurance coverage first (and sometimes exclusively), filing what is known as a "first-party" claim. This insurance is required to pay at least $3,000 in Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits, regardless of who was at fault for the accident. For minor accidents, that may be the extent of the process -- an injured person receiving a settlement from their own car insurance carrier. Because Utah is a no-fault state, its laws limit the situations in which people injured in car accidents can step outside the no-fault rules and file a liability claim or lawsuit seeking compensation from others who may have caused the accident. Before filing a lawsuit after a car accident in Utah, an injured person must first have incurred $3,000 in medical expenses stemming from the accident, or must have suffered certain kinds of serious injuries as a result of the accident. In Utah, the kinds of injuries that qualify under this "injury threshold" are: - permament disability - permanent impairment - permanent disfigurement, or - dismemberment Without knowing more details about the damages suffered and the terms of the respective policies, it is hard to determine if your claim is or is not beyond the threshold where private lawsuits are allowed. It could be that property damage is not covered by "no fault" at all, or that it could be covered by "no fault" but that you have waived that coverage. If this is a case where private lawsuits are allowed, someone who is injured would hire a private personal injury lawyer, unaffiliated with their insurance company, to sue the person at fault in the accident to recover the damages not covered by your no fault coverage due to the other driver's fault. This would not be the responsibility of your insurance company, unless you have uninsured motorist coverage and the other driver was uninsured, which does not seem to be the case. In non-no fault states and in cases in a no fault state where a lawsuit is allowed, your insurance company (after paying any PIP benefits) would not be involved and cannot help you sue the other driver. If you sue the other driver, the other driver's insurance company will hire a lawyer to defend him and would have authority to settle the case up to the policy limits of the other driver's insurance policy. The insurance company has a duty to affirmatively help you obtain the rights you are entitled to under your policy and if they fail to do so this is called a "bad faith breach of insurance contract". But, they are not obligated to help you with respect to harm not covered by your policy.

Look at companies such as Haggerty that insure only classic and low mileage cars. They have no issue giving full coverage on your classic car while at the same time you keep your daily driver with another company. Since this is the business model of an entire group of companies that specialize in specialty vehicles, I would think it would be legal.

Bad people are quite uncommon Most people behave in good faith most of the time - don't tie yourself in knots over the very few people who would be unscrupulous enough to try to do this. Burden of proof The person who makes the allegation has the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities. So the person who claims they didn't receive it has to prove that. If there are two equally credible witnesses, one saying they packed and posted the thing and one saying the thing was not packed then the burden has not been met. If the person who packed it has a photo of it packed and addressed then the other person has definitely not met their burden of proof. Insurance Insure it against loss or damage in transit. Then you can just replace it and claim on your insurance.

depending on the Jurisdiction, you actually were in violation of law! In germany it is a misdemeanor to drive with the high beams on in such a fashion that it blinds or dazzles other road traffic, such as traffic from the front. It is also a traffic violation to drive with front lights that don't properly illuminate the street - such as a broken one. In the worst case, improper illumination voids the validity of the safety certificate (TÜV) and thus you may not drive the car at all on public streets until you have repaired the defect. Not having a valid TÜV can mean you are also not insured! In the US: YES, a stop is most likely legal In the united-states, Terry v Ohio is the governing case. It prescribes that, to initiate contact with a car and detain it on the street curb, reasonable suspicion is enough. What could be reasonable suspicion for the police? In the case presented, 'The high beams are on constantly to hide non-functioning/sufficient normal light' would be the very first thing that comes to my mind, so there very likely is reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop. Ot of course 'The high beams are suitable to dazzle me for a split second, and thus the driver endangered traffic'. Endangering traffic can actually be a felony in some cases. Or just 'They shone their brights into my eyes and violated the High Beam statute' - which is actually the most likely case. As a result, while a broken headlight is not reasonable suspicion to search a car, them and high beams might qualify to make a stop reasonable, especially if at first just a verbal warning not to dazzle oncoming drivers was intended by police. Only if the local law is worded in a peculiarity, that might invalidate a stop. And you might be in violation of law here too! california High Beams can be a traffic violation within 500 feet of oncoming traffic and 300 when trailing another car, if they are not so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. florida Under Florida Law, it is also a noncriminal traffic infraction to drive with the high lights on in such a way that it blinds traffic within 500 feet of them oncoming and 300 if you are behind them. Again, the test is that the beams are only ok if they are so aimed that the glaring rays are not projected into the eyes of the oncoming driver. new-jersey Here comes a possible source for your quote: New Jersey has a similar high beams law, but also a recent case. The judgment from the New Jersey Surpreme Court is only valid in New Jersey. According to it a high beam violation has to be witnessed by the officer themselves to justify a "terry stop". If you dazzle a moving police cruiser they may stop you. If you dazzle the moving car in front of them, they may stop you. But if you beam your high beams at a stopped car or no car at all, then the police can't stop you. HELD:The trial court and Appellate Division properly concluded that the motor-vehicle stop violated the Federal and State Constitutions. The language of the high-beam statute, N.J.S.A.39:3-60, is unambiguous; drivers are required to dim their high beams only when approaching an oncoming vehicle. Neither a car parked on a perpendicular street nor an on-foot police officer count as an oncoming vehicle. The judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the trial court s suppression of the evidence is affirmed. Had the officer, in that case, operated the car while being on the same road, the stop would have been constitutional. But he was on foot in a crossing street. texas Wait, actually the quote stems from Texas. However, it has nothing to do with high beams but additional lights such as "Angel Eyes". Texas too has a High Beam Statute, which just like other states, bans blinding oncoming traffic: (c) A person who operates a vehicle on a roadway or shoulder shall select a distribution of light or composite beam that is aimed and emits light sufficient to reveal a person or vehicle at a safe distance ahead of the vehicle, except that: (1) an operator approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet shall select: (B) a distribution aimed so that no part of the high-intensity portion of the lamp projects into the eyes of an approaching vehicle operator; and Even in Texas, blinding the police cruiser would thus be enough to stop the car, at least for a verbal warning and lecture. Common courtesy While it might not be against the law to dazzle someone everywhere, it actually does impact the other drivers: there have been crashes induced by traffic running high beams and blinding oncoming traffic, which then ran off the road or into other cars. In some countries, if they catch you for causing a crash that way, you are in for negligence. As a result, it actually is common courtesy in Europe to dim off your high beams when you notice oncoming traffic, and, if you don't run high beams yourself but notice high beams oncoming to flash them up for a brief moment so you get noticed.

Under U.S. law, when you hire someone and they are injured while doing work for which you hired them, the ordinary tort law regime does not apply. Instead, you are in the worker's compensation regime, under which the employer is strictly liable for the injury. Whether the employee or the employer was at fault in any way (negligent, grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional) is largely irrelevant (except that worker's compensation insurance does not cover the employer's intentional harm to workers which is the employer's responsibility to pay on an uninsured basis). This applies to all injuries on the job, whether or not they are related to the work, and whether or not anyone involved with the employer actually did anything wrong. For example, an employer has strict liability for the injuries of a convenience store clerk sustained by the clerk in an armed robbery of the convenience store where the clerk is working undertaken by felon who escaped from prison hours before due to the carelessness of the prison guards. Usually, that injury is fully insured if the employer has the legally required worker's compensation insurance in place, but the penalty for not having it in place is most commonly that the employer has liability to the full extent, if not greater, than the employer's worker's compensation insurance would have if it was in place. Worker's compensation recoveries are limited to actual economic damages like lost wages and medical expenses, without regard to non-economic harms like pain and suffering and worker's compensation plans also have a very limited death benefit when the worker has no dependents. But these limitations on damages don't always apply when the employer fails to have worker's compensation insurance in place. Worker's compensation liability varies from place to place, but in most states it applies to independent contractors who have not put in place worker's compensation insurance for themselves as well. In your example, Fred has full liability for Barney's injuries. Uriah does not have liability for Barney's injuries due to his good faith belief that he was acting in self-defense or defense of others. But note that Fred's strict liability for Barney's injuries does not preclude a third-party from having liability as well, both to Barney (for damages for which there is not employer liability under the worker's compensation regime such as pain and suffering, and/or in the case of an intentional tort like the armed robbery of the convenience store, punitive damages), and to the employer/worker's compensation insurer for a subrogation claim to recover the amounts paid to Barney as a result of the third-party's negligence or intentional acts.

As Mark's answer indicates, you are evidently thinking of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. "Public acts" being laws, it may seem at first glance that states must fully respect the laws of other states. But the interpretation of this clause by the courts is rather different, and has evolved a bit over time. The short of the (modern) matter is that it mostly applies to matters concerning the judiciary. SCOTUS has recognized a "public policy exception" to the clause, which limits the ability of the clause to force a state to abide by laws which are in conflict with their own (for the most part: they don't have to). Driving privileges, and more generally who is licensed to do what (doctors, hunting, concealed carry, etc.), within a state falls under that public policy exception. So Texas does not have to obey New Hampshire's laws concerning the legal privilege to drive. As a basic sanity test, if this were not the case, then why wouldn't everybody in Texas not simply bounce off to New Hampshire for a summer to get their license there and then return to Texas and never bother with insurance? It entirely undercuts the state's sovereignty and ability to set their own laws if any other state can so easily create loopholes around them. Moreover, despite what the name might suggest, a "driver's license" is more a certification that you have the requisite skills, physical performance (passing an eye test), and knowledge to drive safely and in accordance with that state's traffic laws. It certainly makes sense for a state to require you to demonstrate at least that much, but they may also impose additional requirements. A requirement for insurance demonstrates your ability to handle financial liabilities that may reasonably result from your driving. All states currently accept a valid out-of-state license in the above sense: that you are certified to have the requisite skills, that it is valid proof of age, etc. Though if you become a permanent resident there they may require you to take new tests. However to legally drive in any particular state you must not only have such certification (a driver's license) but also satisfy any other conditions, such as age requirements and insurance requirements. As an aside, such state-by-state variations as to who is licensed to do what are in fact quite common, especially across history, even on very prominent issues. But even nationwide resolutions of those issues via SCOTUS have never, to my knowledge, utilized the Full Faith and Credit clause to do so. And, really, how could they? By saying since some state could force all other states to do X via the clause, then X must be a constitutional requirement? Or that any one state could unilaterally dictate laws in all other states? Madness! For one example, anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed (certain) interracial marriages, were quite common until 1967, when SCOTUS struck them all down using the 14th amendment. More recently, gay marriage was forced to be recognized in all states, also via the 14th amendment. In both cases, before those SCOTUS rulings, the courts had generally recognized that the Full Faith and Credit clause did not compel the state to recognize (out-of-state) marriages it did not want to recognize. These both fell under the public policy exception.

Can the chairman of a NASDAQ-listed company also be the chairman of another company? I am looking to find out if a chairman of a NASDAQ-listed company can serve another company as the chairman. Please cite all sources used, so that I may reference and personally check. I looked through the NASDAQ policies and rules but was unable to find anything.

Nothing is going to explicitly say that this is authorized — it's allowed because it isn't forbidden by any of the following: The Dodd-Frank Act Sarbanes-Oxley The Securities Exchange Act (1934) The SEC rules The specific NASDAQ listing standards NASDAQ (and NYSE) has requirements for independent directors and committees (from outside of management), but it doesn't forbid a person from serving on multiple boards of directors of listed companies, as chairperson or otherwise. If the companies are competitors or have trade secrets they need to keep from each other, etc, then the conflict of interest could prevent serving on both boards.

How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position & merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.

Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A & B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.

No You can outsource if you don't disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the agreement), or if you have the principal's permission to disclose it to the third-party contractor. The clause only applies to confidential information - a subset of all information. I know that independent contractors should have the freedom to complete the work in whatever way they want Not at all. George Clooney, the actor, is an independent contractor - he can't outsource. Of course, this is an example of a personal services contract but, more generally, while the starting position in contracting is that either party may delegate their obligations (although they remain responsible for them) the parties are free to structure their contract however they like. If they want to prohibit outsourcing, they can. If they want to specify that certain personnel must be used (or not used), they can.

The order itself is here. It applies to "any United States person", which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that "you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE", and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading.

What should I do? Don't get intimidated, don't sign/accept/submit to his "agreement" now that you are securing employment elsewhere, and make sure that henceforth all your communications with the CEO & his startup be --or continue to be-- in writing. The CEO's attempt to be reimbursed is pure non-sense because hitherto there is no mutually agreed clause between you two to that effect. Generally speaking, compensation is for the professional's work, not for his employment spanning "n" pay periods. Having there been no employment/founders agreement of any type, he will be unable to prove that this was agreed any differently in your case. Furthermore, the CEO's threat to seek reimbursement of your earned compensation unless you submit to his "mutual" agreement not only amounts to extortion, but it also reflects his cluelessness about contract law. For instance, that contracts which are signed under hardship or duress are voidable. By contrast, submitting to his conditions will needlessly impose on you the burden of proving duress once you decide the situation is unsustainable. This is in addition to the legal weight with which your acceptance and subsequent conduct would support the CEO's allegation(s) that you two have "at all times" been in a cognizable contractual relation. Being realistic, it is highly doubtful that a startup which pays you weeks late is able --or even willing-- to spend money on a lawyer for nonsense like this.

This is very likely to be legal. The devil is in the details (there are lots of forms that are expensive to have lawyers prepare that you have to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission to carry out this plan and the transaction may need to pass anti-trust review and media ownership consolidation requirements to pass muster, for example). But this is pretty much the standard arrangement in a hostile takeover of a publicly held company (except that usually the offer is limited to a majority of the shares outstanding, or whatever percentage is necessary to secure control, rather than all of the outstanding shares of the company, and usually the control premium is a little larger than 26%). In practical reality, the Board will often have put in place a variety of legal measures, sometimes called "poison pills" to allow it to discourage tender offers (which is what these are called) when faced with bidders that management doesn't like, which can be waived for bidders that management does like, and this frequently results in litigation under an expansive and involved body of state corporate like in the Delaware Chancery Court in most cases. But those steps are more often speed bumps than deal killers in these kinds of transactions. The way this plays out in a privately held company, where there is frequently a shareholder's agreement restricting transfers, would be quite different. But the question appears to contemplate a publicly held company scenario/. Also, in practice, even an extremely wealthy investor couldn't afford to make a purchase like that without financial institution support (often in the form of corporate bonds in what is called a "leverage buy out"), or a "committee" of wealthy investors working together. But again, the source of financing doesn't seem to be the main point of this question.

Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.

Can California landlords protect against tenants paying retainer instead of rent? I've heard that in San Francisco, with a landlord that's not on top of his things, and a tenant who doesn't care about his credit report, it would be cheaper to withhold rent and pay a retainer instead of paying rent, and such a tenant will not be evicted if they select doing a jury trial. Is there a way for a landlord in California to protect against such situation?

Your question is not particularly clear, but it sounds like you're describing a situation where: The tenant doesn't pay the rent The landlord files an action to evict the tenant, and The tenant files a request for a jury trial. The act of filing for a jury trial doesn't guarantee that the tenant won't be evicted, but it will likely make the eviction process more time-consuming and expensive for the landlord. I'm assuming the tenant is entitled to a jury trial--otherwise this would be useless as a stalling tactic. In that case, the question you really want answered is, can the landlord force the tenant to waive any right to a jury trial by contract, for example in the lease? In California, the answer is no. The linked document suggests that you may be able to specify some form of ADR, which would avoid the expense of a jury trial, but the California courts won't let you get away with a straight jury trial waiver.

If you buy a house, you can generally rent out a room in the house, unless in that jurisdiction there is some law against renting rooms in houses (that's actually a condition in my neighborhood, one widely ignored). If it's legal to rent (lease) a room, it is generally legal to sub-lease that room – as long as that's allowed under the original lease contract. I have never heard of a jurisdiction that has a blanket prohibition against subleases. So as far as the actual question goes, the answer is, "yes". The links are about something a different, namely rent control law in San Francisco, and the question of whether a tenant can be evicted from a rent-controlled unit because the owner wants to move in to the unit. Owner move-in eviction requires a specific procedure for giving notice, and the links are about these requirements. Conceivably, though, the question could be whether a person can buy a house that is being rented out, do a proper owner move-in eviction, and then lease a spare room. The SF rent laws require a good faith intent to move in and use as the primary residence for 3 years, and nothing prohibit subsequently leasing a room. Those laws pertain to evictions, not re-rentals. (It should be noted that once eviction under section 37.9(a)(8) has been carried out on a unit in a building, no other unit in the building can ever be so recovered. That could mean that the room in the house could never again be recovered, if it is considered to be a separate "unit" from the "unit" that is the whole house).

Just think of the subtenant cum owner as two separate people with two separate roles. Tenant = T Subtenant = ST Old owner = OO New Owner = NO The rights of the tenant vis-avis the new owner will be informed by the lease and the local laws. Generally, if the sale happens in the middle of the existing lease, the NO is obligated by the terms, as is the T. NO cannot just kick T out, and T cannot just break the lease. The lease may say what could happen and local laws will apply. Likewise, ST has whatever contract with T that previously existed. Pretend NO and ST are different people. If T owes NO $1000 per month, and ST owes T $400 a month, that continues even though ST and NO are the same person. Depends on what kind of dispute. See above. All contracts continue, subject to whatever the lease with the original owner and the subtenancy agreement say abut modifying or breaking the lease and sublease. Local laws apply. Note, if the subtenancy was "off the books" or was done when not allowed by the original owner, and if it was not in a place that the local law says owners cannot deny subleasing, then tenant might not have any protection. ST, now that he is owner could just move out and stop paying. On the other hand, even if he is the owner, he cannot just say "I am the owner now, so I am moving back in for free" because the original lease gave the tenant use of the whole property. But ST could just drop out because T always owed OO, and now NO, the full rent. Do you mean if rather than sublease, they were both on the original lease? Interesting, but just imagine it as the obligations before the sale = the obligations after the sale. I don't know though. There are some tax implications for an owner occupied rental.

Short Answer Can an incomplete and unsafe building be rented to a tenant on a commercial lease if the building never received a certificate of occupancy? Yes. Unless your lease says otherwise. Your sole source of legal protections is your lease. Without knowing the detailed provisions of your lease, it is impossible to know. Long Answer The General Rule In commercial leases, to a much greater degree than in residential leases, the principle of buyer beware (a.k.a. caveat emptor) applies. Commercial leases are typically negotiated between sophisticated parties, and if the tenant doesn't want to start paying rent until the certificate of occupancy is issued despite a lease that says otherwise, then that is tough luck and the tenant is bound to the terms of the lease. Commercial leases are generally rented in "as is" condition, sometimes with and sometimes without a tenant finish and improvements allowance from the landlord. Unless otherwise agreed, in a commercial lease, the burden is on the tenant to do "due diligence" including a physical inspection of the property by a professional inspector and independent review of the zoning status of the property to confirm that the tenant's business is allowed to operate at that location, much as a buyer of real estate would. If the tenant identifies an objection during the due diligence period set forth in the lease or contract to enter into a lease with the tenant, then the tenant can choose to get out of the lease obligation. But, there is only a due diligence condition if the tenant bargains for it. The lease allocates responsibility to maintain the building in good repair and may allocated this responsibility to the landlord or the the tenant. In one of the most common types of commercial leases, called a triple net lease, virtually all maintenance obligations are the tenant's responsibility: The triple net absolves the landlord of the most risk of any net lease. Even the costs of structural maintenance and repairs must be paid by the tenant in addition to rent, property taxes and insurance premiums. Some firms, such as WeWork build their entire business model around entering into the "as is", triple net commercial leases with landlords that are the norm, and then subletting the properties to smaller businesses on a furnished, all maintenance and building services provided, gross lease basis. Many states have statutory or common law implied warranties of habitability in the case of residential leases that require that a certificate of occupancy be in place and that other conditions be met by the landlord: An implied warranty of habitability is a warranty implied by law in all residential leases [ed. in states that have such a warranty] that the premises are fit and habitable for human habitation and that the premises will remain fit and habitable throughout the duration of the lease. New Mexico, in particular, has many statutory protections for residential tenants (statutes found here). But, almost none of these protections extend to commercial leases in New Mexico, because commercial leases are not leases of dwelling units, as defined in the relevant statutes. Note that not every state even has an implied warranty of habitability for residential tenancies. Colorado did not have one until the early 2000s, and it had only very weak protections for tenants regarding habitability until the current decade. Before then, in Colorado, a defective or unsafe condition of the premises was not a defense to paying rent under either a commercial or a residential lease in the state. In theory, a county or municipal government could impose a habitability requirement on commercial leases. But, this is very uncommon because, as the examples below illustrate, there are circumstances where it is sensible, even in a fair deal, to place the burden of making property subject to a commercial lease habitable. Examples Of Situations Where This Would Not Be Required In A Fair Deal Most commercial tenants insist upon terms that say that the obligation to pay rent starts when a certificate of occupancy is issued and the tenant is allowed to take possession of the premises. But, there would certainly be some times when a commercial tenant would pay rent on property that does not yet have a certificate of occupancy. For example, in what is called a "pad rental", a business rents a basically vacant lot with only a concrete foundation and utility hookups and zoning approvals in place, and then the tenant builds a shop or office building on the pad. See, e.g., this commercial lease offer on Loopnet, a major internet site for listing property available to be leased by businesses: ABOUT 4900-5100 N WICKHAM RD , MELBOURNE, FL 32940 Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Listing ID: 15146692 Date Created: 2/11/2019 Last Updated: 3/19/2019 1 LOT AVAILABLE - Rental Rate $3.79 /SF/Yr Lease Term 20 Years Service Type To Be Determined Date Available Now Space Type Relet Lot Size 0.69 AC DESCRIPTION Pad ready site with all utilities, parking field, ingress/egress, retention, and site lighting IN. Join Goodwill, Einstein's Bagel, Verizon, Twins Car Wash, Wickham Road Music, and Nail Salon in this 100% leased new retail center. HIGHLIGHTS Pad ready site. In a commercial pad lease, typically, a tenant would start paying rent immediately and the length of time needed to get the tenant's shop built and approved for occupancy by local government officials is their problem. But, even then, the terms would depend on what was negotiated between the landlord and the tenant which would depend to a great extent on how hot the local commercial real estate market was and on the other terms. A landlord will usually offer more favorable terms (such as a provision stating that rent is not owed until a certificate of occupancy is issued) in a weak rental market, but may also decide to have very tough lease terms with a somewhat lower monthly or annual rental rate. Also, as in the example above, conditioning rent payment on occupancy or availability for occupancy, is less common in a very long term lease such as the twenty year lease being offered for the pad rental above. Something very similar is done in an existing building that requires tenant finish. At one extreme, the landlord will do tenant finish to the tenant's specifications at the landlord's expense and the tenant will only start to pay rent when the tenant takes occupancy. At the other extreme, the tenant will start paying rent immediately and do the tenant finish at the tenant's sole expense. In between, the tenant may do the tenant's own tenant finish pursuant to landlord approved plans, with the landlord contributing a tenant finish allowance that will often be less than the full anticipated cost of tenant finish work, and the rent will be reduced or waived for a set period of time which may be less than the actual or anticipated time that it takes to complete the tenant finish. This gives the tenant an incentive to not waste tenant finish dollars and to push the contractors doing the work to finish as soon as possible. In yet another example, it wouldn't be terribly uncommon for a landlord to rent a commercial space that is already occupied by squatters, or holdover tenants, to a new tenant on a triple net basis. In a lease like that, the tenant is responsible for evicting the current occupants, rather than the landlord. The promise that the leased property won't be occupied by someone else when the lease commences is called the "covenant of quiet enjoyment" (which is "a covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants."). This provision is often, but not always, included in a commercial lease, although often, courts will imply in law a covenant of quiet enjoyment into even a commercial lease, in the absence of express language in the lease stating that the covenant of quiet enjoyment is not intended to be included in the lease. Conclusion It all boils down to the terms of the lease and a reasonable construction of the relevant lease terms. The fact that there is such a thin amount of legal protection from unfair lease terms is one of the reasons that most commercial tenants hire an attorney to help them negotiate the terms of a commercial lease, in addition to, or instead of, a commercial real estate broker. Footnote: Why Is Commercial Lease Law So Harsh? The duties of a commercial tenant are much closer to, and in some cases, almost identical to, those of an owner of real property and are not infrequently for long terms such as twenty, or even ninety-nine years. Why would a landlord and tenant enter into a commercial lease in these situations, rather than having the prospective tenant simply by the property subject to a mortgage? A lot of this is tax driven. Many businesses would purchase their buildings rather than lease them if taxes were not a consideration and the commercial lease is basically a tax favored alternative to a mortgage payment. When the commercial landlord is a mortgage lender in all but name, and a commercial tenant is a building owner in all but name, it makes sense to place the legal maintenance responsibilities of a building owner on the commercial tenant. A business can deduct every dollar paid in rent from its revenues when determining its taxable income, even the portion economically attributable to land value and depreciation in the structure of the building, as it is paid. But, if the business finances the purchase of the property with a mortgage, the business can deduct the interest paid, but not the principal payments. Depreciation of improvements on real estate (for most of recent U.S. tax history, over a straight line 39.5 year depreciation period) can counterbalance some of the principal payments, although often more slowly than the principal payments are actually made. Also, if depreciation deductions wipe out too much of the business's income, those depreciation deductions are disallowed or deferred. Furthermore, the portion of the purchase price of property attributed to land value can't be depreciated at all. In many cases, this quirk of the tax law is addressed with a business structure in which: (1) a non-profit that doesn't care about the tax treatment of its income leases the land to (2) another business that builds a multi-tenant building on the property which it owns even though it doesn't own the land the building is built upon, subject to a mortgage with a long amortization period similar to the depreciation period for the building, which in turn is (3) leased to businesses that actually used the multi-tenant building by the building owner. Second Footnote On Rent Control and Cooperative Apartments Even further afield, in places like New York City that have rent control, residential tenants become more economically equivalent to apartment owners, and residential landlords become more economically equivalent to a combined mortgage lenders and home owner's association. There was a strong demand for rent control in New York City at the time that rent control was adopted, because economic necessity meant that mostly people needed to live in one unit of a multi-unit apartment building, but the legal concept of ownership of one unit within a larger apartment building that is now commonly called a "condominium" in the United States, did not exist. So, there were a lot of renters in New York City who very much wanted to be de facto apartment owners who didn't have the legal tools available at the time to achieve this goal. The other work around which was used in the Northeast before the condominium was invented was a "cooperative apartment", in which all of the residents of a particular apartment building owned the entire building and were jointly and severally liable on the mortgage on the building, but then were allocated a unit within the building in exchange for economic obligations to the cooperative association that managed the building on a not for profit basis for its owners.

Typically the landlord will have a preexisting clause in the lease that says the landlord may choose to amend the lease at a later date. While that may be in contracts, I don't see that holding up in court. You can't unilaterally amend contracts to add new terms without acceptance on part of the lessee. Any clause in the contract like that will require notification of the lessee of the change and a chance for the lessee to terminate the contract without recourse on part of the lessor. Generally this must be done in the same format as the original lease (written). Most jurisdictions don't allow for a verbal amendment to a written lease. So in a way, yes, it is legal for a landlord to require payment via a certain method (like a direct debit from a bank account). They cannot however change the payment terms unilaterally without notification and acceptance. They can use language such as sending the notification (via registered mail) and then saying that a failure to respond is acceptance (because you are, by actions, accepting the terms by continuing to live there).

You should have seen this coming. This might vary a bit from place to place, however it would generally be accepted that if you are in a rented place, you have to pay rent. Most jurisdictions would have some law which requires pro-rata'd payment for the time you actually stay, there would not be any requiring the landlord let you stay free. An uninvested third party might ask "Why would a landlord provide you with 5 days free rent". Another way to look at it is that one of the elements of a contract is consideration (think payment) - Thus in contracting to stay in his place longer you should expect to provide consideration - and pro-rata'd rent would be typical.

If the landlord has a right to charge a late fee (and that late fee is not a penalty) then that right accrues from the instant that the rent is late i.e. any time after 5:00:00 pm precisely if that is the time stated in the lease. If only a day is stated then it would be midnight. For case law on the penalty doctrine see PACIOCCO & ANOR v AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED [2016] HCA 28 which involved a challenge to a bank charging late payment fees on credit cards.

Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might "take" land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.

Do I as a European Union citizen have the right to watch TV shows outside my country and download in my country? In the UK, it is possible to download TV shows in the UK and watch them afterwards outside the UK. http://iplayerhelp.external.bbc.co.uk/tv/watch_outside_uk I would like to know if this is based on EU regulations or just UK regulations. If it is based on EU regulations, it should be possible in other EU countries as well.

The BBC iPlayer restrictions are not, as far as I'm aware, based on regulations; they are based on licensing agreements (in fact, the page you link to says this explicitly). Whether the same is true of programs from other services in other countries--or even other services in the UK--is going to depend on the contracts between those services and you and the contracts between those services and their content providers.

This will ultimately depend on the specific laws, but the scope of EU laws like Directive 2006/114/EC is generally restricted to the EU Single Market. Thus, we would have to consider whether the advertisement in question is directed at that market. In your scenario, you have two US-based companies that engage in comparative advertising via an US-based platform. But where these companies are headquartered is not directly relevant, as non-EU companies can participate in the EU Single Market as well. Instead, EU rules are applicable if either: the comparative advertising occurred in the context of the activities of an EU establishment such as an EU-based subsidiary; or the advertising was directed to a country in the EU Single Market, for example by fulfilling the criteria listed in the Pammer and Alpenhof cases. For example, lets assume that the companies do not have a direct EU presence, but that they offer goods or services to consumers in the EU and the comparative advertisement was in German and mentioned prices in Euros. If so, there would be a good argument that EU rules apply and that the comparative advertising was potentially illegal. But as another example, lets consider two restaurants/diners in Memphis, Tennessee, US, that made unfair comparative advertisements which were distributed via YouTube. It is possible to view the advertisement from the EU. But is there any reason for this ad to be illegal in the EU? No. This ad falls out of scope of EU law as the ad is not directed towards the EU Single Market, and it is unlikely to mislead consumers in the sense of fair competition laws as there won't be any potential customers for the Memphis restaurant in the EU. National laws could take a more narrow approach though. Does YouTube have any responsibility here? No, fair competition laws generally only address the competitors, not the platforms through which advertisements are distributed (e.g. newspapers or social media platforms). Online platforms with user-generated consent benefit from safe-harbor laws. However, there are some legal theories such as the German Störerhaftung under which it might be possible to hold an otherwise-privileged service provider responsible for acts committed by an unknown third party. Note that while comparative marketing is quite regulated in the EU and thus rare, it is not actually illegal when done fairly. For example in Germany, § 6 UWG defines criteria to determine whether comparative advertising is unfair.

My understanding is such: It doesn't matter where the company is incorporated (e.g. incorporated in the US = "American company"). It matters where the company does business. Companies must comply with the law in ALL countries that they do business in. Facebook does business in the UK, so they must comply with UK regulations, including those by the CMA, just like any other UK company. So, what can Facebook do? Comply Appeal Ignore and face legal penalties (fines, suspension of ability to do business in the UK, seizure of UK assets, etc.) Stop doing business in the UK (e.g. see Google News leaving Spain over their news aggregation law).

If fish were caught in international waters, should we consider its origin as the closest country or the ship's flag? Neither. The rules in the united-kingdom (which is no longer in the EU, but I assume they are comparable as they have not been substantially changed since leaving) are: Fish caught at sea You must label all fish caught at sea with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) catch area. You must also label fish caught in the Northeast Atlantic, Mediterranean or Black Sea with: the name of the FAO sub-area or division a map or pictogram of the catch area

In ABC v Aereo 573 U. S. ____ (2014), the US Supreme Court held that activity almost identical to what you describe is copyright infringement. Respondent Aereo, Inc., sells a service that allows its subscribers to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. When a subscriber wants to watch a show that is currently airing, he selects the show from a menu on Aereo’s website. Aereo’s system, which consists of thousands of small antennas and other equipment housed in a centralized warehouse, responds roughly as follows: A server tunes an antenna, which is dedicated to the use of one subscriber alone, to the broadcast carrying the selected show. A transcoder translates the signals received by the antenna into data that can be transmitted over the Internet. A server saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive and begins streaming the show to the subscriber’s screen once several seconds of programming have been saved. The streaming continues, a few seconds behind the over-the-air broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes [copyright] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the air. We conclude that it does. A nicer summary, oral argument transcript and audio are available from the Oyez Project. In my opinion, your example is more clearly an infringement of copyright than Aereo's. Aereo dedicated separate antennae to receive a signals for each subscriber at the subscriber's direction, and rebroadcast the signal over the internet in near real-time. This let them argue two things: 1) that they were not performing the work, only letting other people perform it, and 2) that the performance was not "to the public". In your example, the server is receiving and saving the broadcast, and then later, that single copy is being reproduced and transmitted to whomever requests it. That would certainly be considered both reproduction and performance to the public.

The video in some ways belongs to YouTube. Although it's a royalty free one, they have rights to the video, and you ARE using THEIR service, this means that you have to follow their terms of use. It's best to get an offline copy from the content creator. Source: YouTube Terms of use section 6C For clarity, you retain all of your ownership rights in your Content. However, by submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content in connection with the Service and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business, including without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all of the Service (and derivative works thereof) in any media formats and through any media channels. You also hereby grant each user of the Service a non-exclusive license to access your Content through the Service, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such Content as permitted through the functionality of the Service and under these Terms of Service. The above licenses granted by you in video Content you submit to the Service terminate within a commercially reasonable time after you remove or delete your videos from the Service. You understand and agree, however, that YouTube may retain, but not display, distribute, or perform, server copies of your videos that have been removed or deleted. The above licenses granted by you in user comments you submit are perpetual and irrevocable.

Yes, this is a viable option. And no, it doesn't need to be perfect. The use of such a filter is a technical means, but it also serves to communicate that Small Town News explicitly does not envisage to provide service to Europeans or others resident in the EU. If a user chooses to use a VPN to do visit Small Town News webpages, it's reasonable to expect that this would be comparable to buying the Small Town News paper in print while physically in the USA. It's a common principle that courts have to decide on jurisdiction, and actions of a party can factor in this decision.

You are framing it wrong. It is not that "they have put a barrier" to public domain information, it is that they have added an additional source of that information. The new source has a barrier, yes, but that does not prevent you from accessing the same information elsewhere. If you own a copy of some public domain data, you are not allowed to prevent other users from accessing other copies (by claiming copyright infringement or the like); you cannot even prevent people from doing copies from the copies you did provide them. But you are not forced to allow other users to access your copy. Consider the logical conclusion if that were the law. The moment that you downloaded some public domain file into your computer, you would be forced to give access to your hard disk from the internet, isn't it? Would you need to leave your home door open if you happened to have a printed copy of the text there? Of course, there is a need to discriminate between "public domain" (without licence) and "not public domain but open licence" (BSD, CC, GPL, etc.). In the later case the licence could be tailored so that the work could appear in archive.org but that it would be illegal to provide it with the business model of Academia.edu1. But that would be possible only for works not in the public domain. 1 To be decided by a judge on the basis of the wording of the licence and jurisdiction.

Do claimless advertisements need to have disclaimers? My question concerns the requirement for advertisements to carry a disclaimer stating that they are advertisements, specifically in the United States. According to the FTC (though not in these words), an advertisement delivered through a trusted medium, such as the words of a celebrity or the side of an email client, has financial incentive to exaggerate the effectiveness of the product. Therefore, ads can mislead the public by using the trust in the medium to present the biased claims as truth, if it is not made clear that the information was sponsored and therefore may not be entirely unbiased. Obviously, if a blogger publishes a blog post stating that he or she used a given product and lost X amount of weight in Y amount of time, and this blogger received compensation from the maker of the product for this blog post, it would be misleading not to disclose that this was a paid advertisement. However, what about ads that make no claims whatsoever? If a Coca Cola employee were to spray paint the Coke logo onto a telephone booth, this could encourage people nearby to drink more Coke, but there was no disputable claim made. Not only that, but a similar situation could happen organically as well, if say a supermarket marked its beverage aisle with the Coke logo. There's no claim, no possible source of exaggeration, simply an image, and the assumption that it will increase sales. Does this logo on the telephone booth then need a disclaimer? The same logic could be extended to the giant advertisements in Times Square in NYC, which often do not feature claims, just branding.

As a preliminary matter: there is no, so far as I'm aware, a blanket FTC requirement that every ad carry a disclaimer or a label. Some FTC rules do require disclaimers in certain circumstances. This document gives some background. In summary: if a claim made in an ad is false, a disclaimer can't fix it. If it is true, a disclaimer is unnecessary. A disclaimer only comes into play if the ad is true, but contains a potentially misleading implication. So, for example: "In a survey, 4 out of 5 doctors recommended our product." If 4 out of 5 doctors actually recommended some other product, no disclaimer will help you. If the survey was taken in 1901, or the only choice was between your product and being eaten by wolverines, you will need to disclose that fact prominently in your ad. One of the most commonly encountered disclosure requirements, and one you mention in your question, are disclosures related to endorsements and testimonials. The endorsement rules are set out in this document, but in general, it's the same deal: if there's something about the endorsement that would qualify it in the mind of a person evaluating whether to buy the product, then you need to disclose that. This is why you see disclaimers such as: Stating that people praising a product are actors, not real users of the product Stating that celebrities are paid endorsers, not just enthusiastic users of the product If you post something on your personal blog raving about a product, for instance, and don't disclose that you were paid to say nice things about the product, that could be a violation. There are more good examples at the link above. The common ground in all of these situations is that the advertisement or endorsement is in some way actually or potentially misleading. If you run an ad that is not misleading in any way--for example, just a poster with the product logo or a non-informational tag line ("Coke: It's A Beverage!"), there is no need for a disclaimer that I'm aware of.

Generally you can only use logos (i.e., symbolic trademarks) if you have the trademark owners' permission. You may certainly use the names Cisco and Microsoft nominatively, although they might ask you to provide a disclaimer of any affiliation including sponsorhip or approval, if it gets to them. "Not making any money" is also not the sole determinative factor in proving your defense of "fair use".

This is a legal question, a business question, and an ethical question more than it is a bike question. Obviously there are risks when anyone rides a bike. And some people might have invisible conditions that would place them at special risk when riding a bike. But, as a shop owner, if a special risk is immediately visible, you open yourself up to a charge of negligence if you fail to take that risk into account. This happened in Canada, and I'm not knowledgeable about Canadian law. It's also interesting that this happened at a Giant company store, not a mom-and-pop bike shop. The fact that the store is operated by Giant may have made the operator more liability-conscious, but it also means they were better prepared to deal with liability than a mom-and-pop store. If I were in the position of selling a bike to someone who exceeds its load rating, I might want them to sign a document acknowledging that fact, and indemnifying me for any damage or injury sustained as a result, but I wouldn't make them promise to lose weight. But I'm in the USA, not Canada, and jurisdiction matters.

The store is, as far as i can see, not using the trademarked image to sell their cake. Your family does not intend to sell anything at all. This photo, from the description, could not reasonably be confused with an official image from the trademark holder. (all of this is based on your description, of course). Therefore, the trademark holder probably won't sue for trademark infringement, even if they somehow heard of this event, and if they did sue, they would quite likely lose. You would be making a copy of a presumably copyrighted image. You might have an active defense, but that is very hard to be sure of in advance. (Note that "fair use" is a very specifically US legal concept, and would not apply in the UK. The roughly comparable concept is "fair dealing" but that is more restrictive, and follows somewhat different rules.) In any case, it is possible that the rights holder would sue, and if the situation were a bit different (the was only one person pictured, making the shirt with the protected image very prominent, for example) there might be a larger chance of such a suit being successful. No business is going to want a bakery department manager deciding whether a particular use of a particular image does or does not infringe IP rights, and whether it does or does not expose the business to significant risk. Just to get an opinion from their lawyer on whether this image infringes would probably cost them several times the price of the cake with image printing. The store has no doubt written its guidelines to err well on the side of caution, because one suit, even if they won, would cost far more than the profits of many cakes, and if they lost, could have a very negative effect on their bottom line indeed. The store is entitled to restrict what business it does to keep itself safe from lawsuits. It is going to keep well on the cautious side, in all likelihood, and so it should. I fear you will have to find a store with a different policy, or use a different picture.

For paper contracts there are even statutory "prominence" requirements, generally applicable to "disclaimers": see this Q&A (using local talent), based on UCC §2-316. In a given jurisdiction there will be various contexts where a disclaimer must be made prominently such as in Washington this one regulating life insurance contracts that there must be a "prominent statement that the contract does not provide cash surrender values if such is the case". "Onerous contract" is taken to be an accounting term about costing too much to comply, and I assume (from recent context) that you don't mean that specialized usage. This article goes through US law in terms of website agreements, which are one kind of "fine print": the points here apply to paper contracts as well. If the terms are not physically in "the agreement", they they must be incorporated by reference, thus "some reference must be in the contract that the customer actually sees it", see E.J. Rogers, Inc. v. UPS, 338 F. Supp. 2d 935. Various cases address the amount of notice required (Manasher v. NECC: must "indicate a clear intent that the provisions would be considered part of the agreement"). International Star Registry of Illinois v. Omnipoint Marketing clearly established that a signed paper contract can refer to online terms (url provided, a "have read and agree..." statement above the physical signature). For clickwrap contracts, see Hugger-Mugger, L.L.C. v. NetSuite – clicking agree means that you are held to have read and understood the terms, as long as the terms meet the standard for incorporation by reference. The central requirement of notice is that there has to be a clear indication that the external document is incorporated into the contract, and the party must be clearly told where that document is. While a seller / service-provider can change the terms of a contract, those changes do not automatically apply to an existing party to an earlier version – Douglas v. US District Court, 495 F.3d 1062 and references therein – unless the customer is actively notified of a change in terms. As far as I know, there is no case law establishing a computational specification of what it means to "notify" a customer of incorporated terms. There are plenty of terrible web pages where links go nowhere (can fine print be in invisible ink?). One might assume that a diligent customer would trace all of the relevant documents to see what they agreed to if they are told that they must agree to these non-existent terms. One might also assume that since there is nothing there, agreeing to a null document adds nothing to the contract, and the vendor bears the responsibility for making the terms actually findable, though they bear no responsibility for making sure the customer looked.

It is conceivable that A's employer would claim that the intellectual property was actually created by A in the course of their employment rather than B. That would be a question of fact for the lawsuit to determine. Realistically, assuming A and B both testify that B created the intellectual property with no input from A and A's employer had only the IP address as evidence, it is pretty unlikely that the fact finder would find that A created the intellectual property. A's employer would almost certainly need to provide some additional evidence that would show that the balance of probabilities favored the employer's position (i.e. A works at FedEx writing software for package logistics, B is a 12 year old kid with no formal computer science training, and the intellectual property in question involves the implementation of sophisticated graph traversal algorithms that would be common in package logistics applications).

The rule on a tagline is really not significantly different from that on a logo, or brand name. If anywhere in the packaging, advertising, or promotion of a product or service, a registered or protected trademark of another is used, without permission from the holder, in such a way that a reasonable consumer might plausible believe that the product is made by the same maker, or comes from the same source, as the product associated with the trademark, or that the product has been approved or endorsed or sponsored by the mark holder, that would be trademark infringement. Phrases such as "inspired by" or "google-style" might have such an effct, depending on the whole of the circumstances. A disclaimer, such as "This film is in no way approved or enforced by the creators of Star Wars, it merely uses similar ideas" might, if sufficiently prominent, help avoid possible confusion. Comparative advertising such as "far more exciting than Star Wars ever was" generally makes it clear that the item is not endorsed, and indeed is to some extent competitive. That is generally considered an example of nominative use and is not infringement. But the more similarity is implied, the more consumer confusion is invited, and the more the new product seems to trade on the reputation of the established product. That is exactly what a trademark is intended to prevent.

Yes. Art 13 requires you to provide “the identity and the contact details of the controller”. You are the data controller. Your name and address are necessary to establish your identity. Using AdSense means you're offering an internet society service commercially. In that case, there's also probably some EU fair competition directive that was implemented in your countries national law and will provide equivalent requirements. For example, my country Germany has a far-reaching Impressumspflicht. Not sure if this is the most relevant EU law, but Art 22 of Directive 2006/123 requires that your country passed laws to ensure that you make available “the name of the provider, his legal status and form, the geographic address at which he is established and details enabling him to be contacted rapidly and communicated with directly and, as the case may be, by electronic means”. I think you would be in scope of this directive since you're acting commercially. This legally mandated self-doxxing is unfortunate for private bloggers, but it's also essential for making it possible to enforce data subject rights: if you were to violate someone's privacy rights, how could they sue you if they don't know where to serve you with a lawsuit? However, all things are a balancing act. These requirements are not intended to limit freedom of expression. If you're just trying to communicate something to the public without jeopardizing your anonymity, then paradoxically social media services can be more attractive.

What prevents me from using vehicle anti-theft laws to regain possession of an impounded car in Maryland? My car was impounded in MD due to expired tags. I've since paid the state and county fines for this, but the county police use a private impound lot which charges exorbitant fees for storage. MD law gives county officials the right to take possession of a car for unpaid fines, and authorizes them to contract the service to a third party. However, since paying the fine, the county is no longer in possession of the vehicle, the towing company is. MD vehicle antitheft law states "A person may not take a vehicle without the consent of the owner of the vehicle and with the intent to deprive the owner temporarily of the owner's possession of the vehicle, even if without the intent to steal the vehicle." What exactly prevents me from using this antitheft law to regain possession of the car without paying? (I realize this argument would not hold up in court, I'm just curious about exactly why that is)

For starters, you can't "use the antitheft law" because you are not a criminal prosecutor. I'm not sure that the criminal statute would support a civil action for replevin, at least until you've paid all the fees that the towing company is explicitly authorized to charge and they still refuse to release the vehicle. And if that was the case, you wouldn't need the criminal statute — the title to your vehicle should be sufficient. See Baltimore County Code (2003) §18-2-203 for the police department's authority to remove and store cars with expired registration "by contract." See also §§ 21-16-111.1 et seq. and §§21-16-123 et seq. regarding police initiated towing and licensing of towing companies. The latter set of statutes and the fee schedule fixed by the county are available here.

Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not "contraband" (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned.

Reading those clauses, you can see that you can park in an emergency. You can park with your vehicle dies and you can't move it. You can park if it is specifically allowed (maybe a sign saying "unrestricted parking allowed here"). Otherwise, you may park on a parking lane (or roadway, or shoulder) but subject to conditions also listed: "unless there is a clear passage for other motor vehicles, and your vehicle can be seen for 60 metres (200 feet) along the roadway in both directions". Regardless of the name of the piece of road, you are allowed to park there but only if your car is clearly visible, and there is room to get around you.

Can you get a ticket? Absolutely. You're relying on the knowledge of the person issuing you the ticket. How knowledgeable are they? In my experiences around the world, people enforcing laws on a day to day basis know surprisingly little about the law (although they often think they know everything). I think this part of the code you mentioned might be relevant: 5200.(a) When two license plates are issued by the department for use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear. But "the department" likely refers to the Department of Motor Vehicles in the State of California, which never issued you anything. But that may not stop eager law enforcement personnel from issuing you a ticket. If you do receive a ticket, I think you'll successfully be able to fight it and win. It will be obvious to a judge that there is nothing you could have done to reasonably avoid the issue. Just make sure you have documents showing that you only moved very recently. According to the the State of California's official Department of Motor Vehicles website, you have only 20 days to get your registration (and likely the state's mandatory insurance) switched to your new state. See https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/pubs/brochures/howto/htvr09#reg I have no idea how vigorously they enforce the law there. It's likely up to the whims of the people in charge of enforcing it.

Yes, you would be responsible. Maintaining the vehicle in a state that enables compliance with the law is the owner's responsibility, and it is a driver's responsibility to comply with the speed limit. There is no knowledge or intent requirement in a speeding violation. That said, a judge might show leniency if you came to court with documentation of a repair or recalibration of the speedometer after the citation.

Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case "street legal" not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: "State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. "Machine gun" means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) "Destructive device" means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) "Destructive device" includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device.

UK seat belt law is here. What you were doing is illegal and carries a fine of £500. As to your specific questions: How illegal is this? It is not a criminal offence in any way. What is the possibility of me getting caught? If a police officer notices you will almost certainly be booked. What is the possibility of being noticed? Depends where you are. If I'm caught what fines and / or penalties can I expect? £500 What's the absolute worst that could happen as a consequence of my actions? You could crash and your passengers could die, you would then go to jail for dangerous driving occasioning death. Having 2 people in a seat belt is extremely hazardous - it would be far safer (but still illegal) to have one person in the seat belt and the other one unrestrained. Could it be possible for me to get away with a warning? No Could I get my licence revoked? (:/) Seat belts offences do not carry a points penalty so, of itself, it would not lead to loss of your licence.

In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"

"Reverse Engineering" a plain text file format If a file output from a non-open source program is stored in plain text. What legal implications are there for building a parser to read that file into my program? Is there any legal distinction between one that is plain text vs binary vs encrypted?

Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.'

A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.

What happened is that you created a legal mess. You are obviously on the hook for copyright infringement. The maintainers of the project will scramble to replace your code with newly written code. They will likely ask your company which code they are complaining about - that puts your company into the problematic situation that they shouldn't identify code that isn't theirs, that it will be hard to sue for infringing code when they didn't give the project maintainers a chance to fix it, and that everything they identify will be replaced. Since it is your actions that caused the trouble, anyone suffering damages from your actions can sue you.

Go to the Source If you follow the Legal link at the bottom of the page and read the terms of service, among other things, it says (my emphasis): 1. Access to the Services Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Stack Exchange may offer to provide the Services, as described more fully on the Network, and which are selected by Subscriber, solely for Subscriber’s own use, and not for the use or benefit of any third party. ... Subscriber certifies to Stack Exchange that Subscriber is an individual (i.e., not a corporate entity) at least 13 years of age. ... 2. Network Content ... The Network is protected by copyright as a collective work and/or compilation, pursuant to U.S. copyright laws, international conventions, and other copyright laws. Other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement, Subscriber may not copy, modify, publish, transmit, upload, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in this Section), create derivative works based on, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content, software, materials, or Services in whole or in part. Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. From time to time, Stack Exchange may make available compilations of all the Subscriber Content on the Network (the “Creative Commons Data Dump”). The Creative Commons Data Dump is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. By downloading The Creative Commons Data Dump, You agree to be bound by the terms of that license. Any other downloading, copying, or storing any Content for other than personal, noncommercial use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from Stack Exchange, or from the copyright holder identified in such Content's copyright notice. In the event You download software from the Network, the software, including any files, images incorporated in or generated by the software, and the data accompanying the software (collectively, the “Software”) is licensed to You by Stack Exchange or third party licensors for Your personal, noncommercial use, and no title to the Software shall be transferred to You. Stack Exchange or third party licensors retain full and complete title to the Software and all intellectual property rights therein. 3. Subscriber Content You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. ... Consequences Under Clause 1 Subscribers to Stack Exchange must be individuals (natural persons in legalese). The proprietor of LearnHub.org are unlikely to be an individual and are therefore not a Subscriber under the terms of use. Under Clause 2, everything on Stack Exchange is copyright and some things are trade marked as well. The copyright for posts vests in the Subscriber and is licenced to SE (CC BY-SA 3.0) or vests in SE directly as the creator. Clause 8.1a. of CC BY-SA 3.0 requires SE to grant a licence to any recipient of a distribution (e.g. on a web site) on the same terms. For this reason the limitations on the copyright in Clause 2 can only apply to those items where copyright vests in SE directly; not to the content of the Subscriber posts. Assuming that it is only Subscriber posts that they are reproducing then they either need to: Comply with CC BY-SA 3.0 and attribute the work as required by that licence; what they have put up does not on the face of it do that because: They are referring to an earlier version of the licence Attribution under 3.0 is detailed in Clause 4.c. and this doesn't meet the criteria. Have been licenced by the original copyright holder; which seems unlikely. Meet the fair use criteria; attribution would not be required but would certainly be polite. Fair use turns on the specific facts of the case - on the face of it they could put forward a credible argument that their use is fair use. Complications Jurisdiction matters here; copyright laws are not uniform across the world. For example, Australian copyright has a much more limited "fair use" concept than the US and also creates a "moral copyright" of the author that exists independently of the copyright of the owner. For signatories to the Berne Convention; the country of origin for simultaneously published works (which online posting is) and therefore the law applying is the country that gives the shortest term of protection. The convention is annoyingly silent of what that means if there is more than one qualifying "Country of Origin"; this leaves scope for litigants to try to apply the most favourable domestic law that could be applicable and the case could be brought in any of several jurisdictions. This is the stuff that makes lawyers rich!

If you change a single character, that's clearly a partial copy. Copyright protection has a limited extent, however. The protected work must be original and not obvious. For example, there are only so many ways to write a function that computes the average of two numbers, so the copyright owner of one body of code cannot claim infringement by the author of a second body of code simply because they both have a function float Average(float a, float b) { return (a + b) / 2; } A surefire way to avoid infringing copyright is to specify the function of the code and then have someone who has never seen the code write it from scratch. This is sometimes called clean-room engineering. Otherwise, there is no way to answer your question definitively. If you create a modified copy of the code (a "derived work" in copyright terminology), there is no strict formula available to evaluate the extent of the infringement. It comes down to a case-specific analysis of the facts by a judge. Depending on the jurisdiction, which you have not specified, there may be specific laws or judicial precedent that guide the judge, but the determination will still require a specific analysis of the facts. For example, if the alleged infringer raises these arguments, the judge would have to determine how obvious the code is, or whether the copyright claimant even owns the copyright to the code.

It isn't true that modern encryption necessarily makes messages indistinguishable from random noise. However, let's assume that this is true, for the sake of your question. It depends on how the statute is written, but a reasonable one would not make it a crime to send random noise. It could be enforced by proving that you did the encryption, and then sent what you encrypted across a communication channel. They could have undercover operatives waiting to be sent encrypted material. The encryption system that a user chooses to use might not be as secure as advertised (making it very easy to distinguish from noise if you know its weakness). If all the government had was access to the communication channel and listened there, then you're right, it would be hard to prove and enforce, but they have access to more than that.

This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as "a computer". Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your "obtains information" element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be "without authorization or exceeds authorized access". The law doesn't explain with "without authorization" means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of "prohibited access", meaning "express denial of permission", and if the computer owner had set the computer to "prohibited access" by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. "Unauthorized" can also mean "has not been explicitly authorized", i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes "unauthorized access". Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has "obtained information", since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result ("damage" is defined as "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information"), and how printing would be "reckless". It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.

You are creating a derivative work. You are only allowed to do this if the library comes with a license that allows this. If you want to give your derivative work to anyone else, copying it is copyright infringement unless the license allows it. Copying the derivative work and attaching a different license is most likely to be copyright infringement. And if people receive a copy with an open source license that is not justified and rely on it, that’s creating one unholy legal mess for everyone involved and can be massively more expensive than plain copyright infringement. No license means you don’t have permission to do anything with it, not creating derivative work, not distributing it, and certainly not publish it with an open source license.

Big corporation in the UK, Intellectual Property and a Contract I've recently been offered a job at a large technology corporation based in the UK. I've yet to sign the contract but I found something in it which concerns me. Intellectual property, ideas and inventions Any Ideas or Inventions you have or make or any Materials that you create or develop in the course of your employment with us and/or using our equipment or materials will (subject to the provisions of the Patents Act 1977 and Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988) automatically, on creation of the same, be the absolute property of the Company. By signing this contract you’re agreeing to take all actions required by the Company to protect the Invention or Idea or Materials and to pass ownership to the Company. You also agree to waive all of your moral rights under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988. Ideas include (without limit) patents, domain names, trademarks (whether registerable or not), designs, utility models, copyright or any applications made for these and the right to apply for them in any part of the world. Inventions include (without limitation) any discoveries, creations, inventions or improvements and/or additions to an invention (whether patentable or not and whether or not recorded in any medium), confidential information, know how, business names, moral rights and any similar rights in any country. Materials include (without limit) any documents, designs or computer programs on any media. Does this mean, once I sign the contract, while working under this company all my ideas are owned by the company? I would have thought any ideas or works I create while using their equipment would be theirs but things created on my own time using my own equipment would be mine. Does this mean my ideas are all owned by the company I will be working for? If that's the case I'm very concerned. And if it is the case is this considered the norm for contracts with large technology companies?

The UK Government released an article last year that explains some of the issues relating to ownership of copyright This article is informative. The headline point: Ownership of literary, dramatic, musical, artistic and film works created by an employee during the course of their employment, automatically vests in their employer by virtue of section 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The meaning of during the course of their employment has been interpreted by the courts to mean during the course of normal or specifically assigned duties, and that these duties include the creation of intellectual property for the employer. Patents are similarly affected - if the role does not specify or would not imply the creation of patents and other IP, it may not vest in the company automatically. This is a standard clause and is designed to protect the interests of the company, in the event that you create intellectual property as part of your role. Bear in mind here that there's no real need for this property to be created during work hours. That is, if part of your role is to design new software, ownership of that software vests in the company, whether you spent substantial amounts of work hours making it or not. Conversely, if your role does not include, or would be expected to include, the creation of intellectual property, then if you do so - even if it is during work hours - ownership may not necessarily vest in the company. IP you create in the course of your employment will vest in the company in the course of your employment will probably mean: if you are employed to create IP generally, all any IP resulting from your work, or; if you are employed to create a specific work, that work and possibly related works. This is a fairly standard clause, for most companies - I have had several jobs (though none of them technology-related) and they all include some clause to this effect

Yes and no. [note, the following is all written about US law. In other jurisdictions laws are, of course, different (though usually not drastically so.)] In the US there are (at least) three different bodies of law that might apply to code: copyright, patents, trade secrets. Copyright covers original expression. Anything you write is automatically, immediately protected under copyright. The copyright applies to the code itself, and anything "derived" from that code. It's up to the courts to decide exactly what "derived" means. One case that's long been viewed as a landmark in this area is Gates Rubber v. Bando Chemicals. The Court of Appeals for the tenth Circuit decision includes a section titled: "The Test for Determining Whether the Copyright of a Computer Program Has Been Infringed." Note that you can register a copyright, and that can be worthwhile, such as helping recover some damages you can't otherwise. Patents are quite different from copyrights. Where a copyright covers expression of an idea, a patent covers a specific invention. Rather than being awarded automatically, a patent has to be applied for, and awarded only after the patent office has determined that there's no relevant prior art to prevent it from being awarded. A patent, however, covers things like somebody else independently discovering/inventing what's covered by the patent. A trade secret could (at least theoretically) apply to some process or procedure embodied in the code. A trade secret mostly applies to a situation where (for example) you're trying to form an alliance with some other company, and in the process tell them things you don't tell the general public. If you've identified the fact that what you're telling them is a trade secret, and they then tell a competitor (or the general public, etc.) or more generally use that information in any way other than the originally intended purpose, it could constitute a trade secret violation. As a side-note: patents and copyright fall under federal law, so they're basically uniform nation-wide. Trade secrets mostly fall under state law, so the exact details vary by state. Absent a reason to believe otherwise, I'd guess your interest here is primarily in copyright infringement. The key here would be showing that one piece of code was derived from the other. That is, it specifically would not apply in a case where there were only a limited number of ways of doing something, so anybody who wanted to do that had to use one of those ways. Since this would not indicate actual derivation, it would not indicate copyright violation.

A piece of paper with writing on it is NOT a contract! A contract is the terms and conditions that the parties agree that they will be bound to. A written contract merely serves as evidence (really good evidence) of what those terms and conditions were. For this to matter, it would have to be part of a dispute about the contract. If the parties looking at the term know and agree on what it means then that is what it means. If there is a dispute about this term then a 3rd party (e.g. judge, arbitrator) will look at the term and the context of the contract (both the written contract and the actions of the parties in giving effect to the contract) and decide what they think the parties meant. For the example given, I don't think there is any room for dispute about what is meant and it would be disingenuous of either party to claim that there could be. "Time is of the essence" is a commonly used legal phrase with a well understood meaning - it explicitly makes time a condition of the contract; generally, time is a warranty. A condition is a term for which termination of the contract is a possible remedy; you cannot terminate for breach of a warranty. "Time of the essence" is either a typo or, if deliberate, is clearly trying to get across the same concept. TL;DR 100% enforceable.

None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.

By "unlicensed" you mean that it doesn't state a license for use (MIT, GPL, etc.)? Those licenses are just a codified bundle of terms of use that cover many many edge cases. You have in place a much simpler agreement that covers the primary situation: you using/modifying the code for your own use. It's just like borrowing a car. You will ask a friend "hey, could I borrow your car for a bit?" "sure!". You know there's a possibility that you'll get in an accident or something weird will happen, but you think the chances of that are minimal and you would be able to work it out. If you ask a car rental company, they'll give you a full contract covering every situation that may happen. Similarly, a large company would be hesitant to borrow a car for corporate use without a legal framework surrounding it. So you will likely be in the clear if you are just using it for a small project with minimal legal/financial implications. If you plan on turning your project into a multi-billion dollar empire, you should revisit your agreement.

Basically, "in the course of your employment" means "while you are working, or should be working, for the employer". If you're not using company resources or time to create or acquire the works in question, and the works are unrelated to company business, they're quite unlikely to become the company's property. (Particularly since the company almost certainly doesn't have an interest in controlling the distribution of your vacation photos.) When you let your personal side projects and the company's stuff get intertwined, that's where the troubles begin. Works made on company time, or using company resources, or to do company-related things, may be claimed by the company, and this agreement basically says you'll cede ownership of the works to them, patents and all, for whatever amount of money they decide it's worth paying you.

As the comment by Ron Beyer mentions when a company wants to impose such restrictions they are normally done through non-compete, non-solicitation, and non-disclosure agreements, as well as via trade secret law. Note the word "agreements". "Restrictions on working in the field" are simply a form of non-compete agreements. A company cannot, legally, simply impose such agreements on its employees. It can require an employee to sign such an agreement as a condition of employment, and it can often require such an agreement from a departing employee as a condition of a severance payment. Exactly what is covered by such an agreement depends on its terms, and those vary widely. In most US states there are limits on the scope and duration of such an agreement. In some states the restrictions can be broad and of fairly long duration, in others they must be narrow and of fairly short duration. An agreement that goes beyond a given state's limits will not be enforceable in court, if the defendant brings that fact up. Trade secret law can prevent an employee from disclosing the trade secrets of a former employer to a new employer, or indeed to anyone else. But that does not prevent a former employee from getting a new job in the field, as long as the employee does not disclose any trade secrets. If an employee has signed, or is asked to sign, such an agreement, it is a good idea to consult a lawyer with employment law experience. If the state is known, I could edit this answer to include the limits, if any, on such agreements in that state.

There are a tangle of issues going on in this question. First, distribution of hardware-related code in commerce might very well void any right you have to patent the software and might bring it into the public domain for purposes of patent law. Publicly disclosed inventions, even if protected by copyright, are part of the "prior art" and can't be protected by patents. Second, you have to disclose the material ideas in an invention in order to patent it, in your patent application. The bargain of a patent is that you get protection for about two decades in exchange for contributing your idea to the public domain when it expires. Third, usually people protect software with copyright rather than patent, although there are pros and cons to each approach. Fourth, if someone knows enough about your invention to subpoena the place where you store it, you have probably disclosed too much information pre-application to patent it. Fifth, usually the "real" target of a subpoena gets notice of it and an opportunity to defend against the subpoena (e.g. for improperly disclosing a trade secret) before it is carried out, but the same does not apply, for example, to National Security Letters under the Patriot Act (which are supposed to be used only in national security investigations or counter-terrrorism operations, but might be abused). Certainly, an ordinary person can't issue a National Security Letter for private commercial gain without corrupt government assistance. Sixth, to issue a subpoena, there must be some pending case to which someone can claim the subpoena is relevant. A random person can't just subpoena information because they want to. Seventh, even if a server host isn't based in the United States, that doesn't mean that there isn't some means by which a court might assert subpoena power over information on server host. There are many legal "hooks" that could apply. Eighth, defending an isolated subpoena isn't terribly expensive. Typically, you'd be looking at a legal fee in the $1000 to $5,000 (U.S.) range, which is much, much less than the dollar cost of patenting an invention in any country. In short, while there are pros and cons of using a U.S. based server host, people in the IT industry routinely attach far too much importance to this fact which is only very rarely an important one legally. There are many other issues which are much more important in this fact pattern to your ultimate goal.

Can I protect myself against misused funds if i invest in a self employed person's project? If I invest a sum of money to a self employed individual for their project can I sue them for the return of the investment if they meet the following general points: can't or won't show me what they've used the funds for can't or won't show me progress that has been made, and seem to be living extravagantly What is the risk that the funds can being used for personal indulgences instead of the earmarked project by a self employed individual?

The first thing you need to do is establish if the arrangement that you have with the person is a contract or not. In summary a contract requires: Intention to create legal relations. Note: social and family agreements are presumed not to have this intention. If you have given money to a friend or relation, then the onus is on you to show that you both intended to be legally bound; otherwise the money is legally a gift. Agreement Consideration Legal Capacity Genuine Consent Legality of Objects If you do not have a contract then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. If you do have a contract then, depending on the amount of money, your best course of action may be to write the money off and get on with your life. If you decide not to do this then you need to determine what the terms of the contract are. That is, what did you agree to do and when and what did they agree to do and when. If you do not have these written down in a signed document then your best course of action is to write the money off and get on with your life. Verbal contracts are as legally binding as written ones but it is a bugger to determine what was actually agreed. If you can determine what the terms of the contract are; has the other person broken any of them? For example, unless the contract says they must: show you what they've used the funds for show you the progress that has been made, and not live extravagantly (this would possibly be void term anyway for uncertainty or meaninglessness) then they do not have to! If they have (or there is a reasonable belief that they will) breach the contract then you can: Affirm that the contract continues Terminate the contract Repudiate the contract (i.e. there never was a contract) Seek an order for Specific Performance Seek an injunction Seek damages

Be careful of the 10% time “perk”. It is not your own time. It is work time where you are self-directed. Any project unrelated to your work should be on your actual own time not dork time that is free of specific assignment. Fortunately the section 39 of the UK patent law is short and relatively straightforward. It is focused on “the course of your usual duties” not on whose time you were on or whose equipment you were using. It belongs to them if - (a) it was made in the course of the normal duties of the employee or in the course of duties falling outside his normal duties, but specifically assigned to him, and the circumstances in either case were such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result from the carrying out of his duties; or (b) the invention was made in the course of the duties of the employee and, at the time of making the invention, because of the nature of his duties and the particular responsibilities arising from the nature of his duties he had a special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking. Otherwise it’s yours. See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-patent-act-1977/section-39-employees-inventions-right-to-employees-inventions

Fraud wrongful or criminal deception intended to result in financial or personal gain So, you knowingly deceived the US government in order to make a financial gain by not paying the right amount of tax. Sounds like fraud to me. Specific penalties for the IRS are here. Of most relevance is Title 26 USC § 7201 Attempt to evade or defeat tax: Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof: Shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years Or fined not more than $250,000 for individuals ($500,000 for corporations) Or both, together with the costs of prosecution Note that this is per offence. If you have done it for 6 years that is 6 offences so the maximum you face is 30 years and $1,500,000 plus the costs of prosecution. In practice, how bad can this get? This bad. You need a lawyer now.

This depends on the representations that were made at the time of forming the contract, the prior knowledge of possible interference, and the nature of the interference by the third party. If the interference, or likely interference was known: To you, the vendor, and you made representations that your service would work despite this, or you did not disclose this, then you may have sold a product that was not fit for purpose and the client may be entitled to statutory relief, or may not be required to fulfil their contractual obligations To you and the client, and you notified them that this may prevent use of your service, and despite your advice they decided to enter into the contract, then the client is unlikely to be entitled to relief and must fulfil their contractual obligations To only the client, then they are unlikely to be entitled to relief and must fulfil their contractual obligations If the interference is of a nature such that the third party was aware of your contractual relationship, caused such an interference resulting in a breach of contract, and was not entitled to create such a breach, then the third party may have committed the tort of economic interference (generally known as tortious interference) and either you or your client may be entitled to seek damages, if any.

If you commit a robbery but then return the money, can you be prosecuted? Yes. Similarly, if you breach copyright and then stop, can you be prosecuted? Yes, however, you will probably not be because: Your offence may not have been noticed by the copyright holder, and/or The damages they would get are probably not worth the effort.

It's legal to sell your program if it doesn't infringe any law or anyone else's intellectual property. Examples of things that can get you into trouble: statutes: Some countries have export laws that forbid you to distribute certain types of encryption without proper export controls. patents: If you use a design or invention that is under patent protection you could be liable for infringing patent rights. trademark: If you improperly use a trademarked name you could be subject to damages. licensing: If you violate a license to which you have agreed you can be sued for damages. copyright: If you appear to have copied something without license you can be liable for damages. Just because: If someone wants to sue you, they can. Since there's no way to guarantee your business won't run into liability from infringement – or from some other failure – people normally conduct business through entities like LLCs that shield them from personal liability. Depending on their concerns and finances, they may also: Buy liability insurance Consult professionals like IP lawyers to: review their business and products in advance to look for and address glaring infringements, and/or correctly protect their IP using the tools mentioned above.

UK: For all I know you cannot be fired unless you are hired. They must hire you. Once a job offer is made and accepted, they must hire you. If they don't, call a lawyer. I personally know someone who got hired, and when he arrived for his first day's work at the new company, he found that the whole department that he was supposed to join had been laid of. The company had to hire him. PS. "Financial difficulties" means you call a lawyer urgently. Once they are bankrupt your chances of extracting money are not good.

As long as what you are posting is factual, public knowledge then you shouldn't be in violation of any SEC rules. Short-selling in-and-of itself is perfectly legal, so is exercising your right to free speech, in so far as the things you say are true and known. Now if you made up some story about Musk and it caused the stock to fall where you gain, this could be a violation. Likewise if you have come to be in possession of private knowledge and blog about that, you could be in violation of SEC rules.

Big corporation in the UK, Conflicts of Interest and a Contract I've recently been offered a job for a large technology corporation in the UK. I've asked another question here about IP but also have a question on Conflicts of Interest I'd thought I'd ask separately. I'm technically a director of a company which is not currently trading (and I've not taken any pay from). I'm worried that this might be problematic with my soon to be employer. In the contract it states: Conflict of interests You mustn’t be involved either directly or indirectly with any other trade or business competing in or conflicting with the interests of our Company. If you want to be involved with another business whilst working for us then you’ll need to get a letter from the Director of your area confirming that they’re happy for you to do this. We understand that many people make investments for the future and you’ll not be prohibited from being a holder or owner of any stocks and shares as long as they’re listed on the stock exchange and you don’t hold more than 4% of the total share or loan capital of another Company. ... I set up the company I'm a director of as a side project and I am fine with resigning from it. Is me being a director of my side-project company a problem here? My side-project company and the one I've got a job offer from, are only related in such that they are both technology based but otherwise are unrelated.

Critique I'm technically a director of a company ... You either are or you aren't - there is no "technically" involved. ... is not currently trading ... And doing nothing can create a conflict of interest? How? You mustn’t be involved either directly or indirectly with any other trade or business competing in or conflicting with the interests of our Company. "competing or conflicting" is the key here - if the "other trade or business" can adversely affect the performance of your employer then you have a conflict, if not, you don't. are only related in such that they are both technology based but otherwise are unrelated. Sorry, but that is so vague as to be totally useless - what company today is not "technology based"? Pharmaceutical companies are technology based, so are construction companies, so are law firms but one would hardly call them "related". Solution Conflicts of interest are easy: If you don't think you have a conflict of interest and they don't think you have a conflict of interest then you don't have a conflict of interest. If either or both of you do; then you do. Tell them about it! Conflicts of interest are a problem because people think that if you are keeping secrets then you are doing it for a nefarious purpose! In 90% of cases declaring the potential conflict resolves the conflict because the other party says "That! Don't be silly; that's not a problem!" or words to that effect. In the 99.9% of the remaining 10% of cases then sensible people can come up with sensible solutions, for example: If you want to be involved with another business whilst working for us then you’ll need to get a letter from the Director of your area confirming that they’re happy for you to do this.

You need to be very clear with B that you intend to continue to operate A. You need to be clear whether you are to be an actual employee of B, or a hired contractor for B. If an employee, you need to agree with B how much time you can devote to A while employed by B, or to put it another way, how much time (per day, week or whatever) you are expected to devote to B before doing stuff for A. Are there to be restrictions, such as a ban on your doing things for A while at B's worksite? Above all, you need to agree on who owns what rights to both the existing A code, and any new code will be held by you, and what rights will be held by B. All the above should be in a written agreement, and you would be wise to have a lawyer draft or at least review the language. If B will not agree to this, you will have a choice to make: put A on hold while working for B, or not accept B's offer. Do not lie to B about what you are doing with A. Oh, and if you had any sort of non-compete agreement at the job you quit four months ago (let's call them C) be sure that you comply with it, or are prepared to fight it. If there is any question, this is another area where you would do well to consult a lawyer. Many non-compete agreements claim more than local law allows, and are not enforceable. Many others are very much enforceable. It depends on the wording of the agreement, and the provisions of the law where you are located. Also, do not use any confidential data from C without C's written permission.

You cannot contract outside the law Any "contract" that purports to break the law isn't a contract - it's an unenforceable agreement. For example, across all jurisdictions, a contract that is unconscionable is void. So is a contract that requires one of the parties to break the law - a "contract" for murder for example. In addition, you cannot call an employment relationship a "business" relationship - if the relationship meets the requirements of an employer-employee relationship then that's what it is and woe betide you if you haven't complied with all relevant entitlement, tax, insurance and safety laws. In addition, all of the relationships you listed are contracts.

Only if the company consents While some jurisdictions have by statute allowed corporations to be bound by pre-incorporation contracts, New York is not one of them and holds to the common law principle that a person cannot enter a contract before that person exists. In your circumstances the company is only bound by the second contract. So, who is bound by the first? Well, corporations can only act through agents and agency law tells us that an agent who purportedly acts for a non-existent principal is actually acting on their own behalf. So, the person(s) who signed for Company X on the first contract are personally bound to the contract. Unless they explicitly told Company Y that they wouldn’t be. It seems that they didn’t so Company Y can require performance of the first contract by them and of the second by Company X. Company Y must, of course, fulfil its obligations under both contracts - it needs to bear this in mind if it is actually impossible to do both, for example, transferring the same property to the signers of the first contract and Company X or becoming a full time employee of both. If so, it might be in Company Y’s best interests to let the first contract “die”.

It's not clear exactly what you're asking, when you say "the company I work for" – i.e. are you asking "can they fire me?" (almost certainly they can, even if their TOS thinking is legally misguided – unless in your country there are laws that prevent firing employees). To be certain, you need to hire an attorney who is sufficiently savvy about web page technology that they can accurately judge what you are doing, and whether you can fruitfully resist their demands. You seem to be skeptical of their position because you are "not affecting their servers in any way". The TOS is not about affecting their servers, it is about affecting their intellectual property. It appears that your code does a number of the prohibited actions such as and perhaps most importantly "modify". If you have distributed a program that allows users to modify company content on their own computers, then the user might be in violation of the TOS, but not you (since you're not running a server that redistributes). However, I am betting that in order to create and test the program you had to violate the TOS. Additionally, you could be vicariously liable for the infringements of others, especially if this program can only be used to infringe on copyright, and you know this fact. That is pretty much the end of the legal part. As for how you should respond, your attorney, and not Law SE, deals in recommendations.

Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to "the future" pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void).

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).

What is "unjust enrichment?" What is unjust enrichment under the law? It's understandable if associated with liability for wrongdoing. Apparently, this is not a necessary condition. How does it operate independently of liability for wrongdoing?

Unjust enrichment is an equitable theory of recovery that provides a fallback, for lack of better words, avenue of recovery for situations where no contract actually exists between two parties, but one party has received a benefit. The classic example is: Jane hires Dan to mow her lawn and tells him where her house is. Dan mistakenly mows Bob's lawn next door. Dan has no contract to mow Bob's lawn, but Bob has been unjustly enriched based on Dan having mowed his lawn. In this case Dan would have an equitable claim of unjust enrichment against Bob for the value of his yard services mistakenly provided Bob. In sum, any time someone receives the benefit from someone else's efforts, where the one providing the benefit mistakenly provides those services in good-faith, the one receiving the benefit has been unjustly enriched.

Bankruptcy does not obliterate legal financial obligations (taxes that you owe, fines, etc.). Fines either do or do not (any more) accrue interest, depending on jurisdiction. Fines for criminal conviction can accrue interest. By law, no fine can be unreasonable, but there is no simple determination of what is reasonable versus unreasonable. The matter reduces to whether the penalty would be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. Federal law suggests a upper-ballpark of $250,000 for an individual felony or $5,000 for an infraction, but there is no actual upper limit, for example a crime resulting in pecuniary gain may receive a fine of twice that gain, so fines can be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The government can seize property including wages in order to satisfy a legal financial obligation. However, you can not be imprisoned because of an unpaid fine, although you can be imprisoned for willfully not paying a fine when ordered to do so (there is no legal clarity as to what constitutes "willful" non-payment). As noted in this article, seemingly small fines can balloon to large sums (they cite an example of a 4-fold increase in initial fine owing to interest and similar increases.

It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.

A government always has standing to enforce violations of its own laws in its own jurisdiction. The harm to its legally protected interest is its interest in enforcing its own laws. While the forum here is a civil action, the basic concept is the same one that authorizes a government to enforce its own criminal laws. Also, a government agency may seek fines and not merely compensatory damages or liquidated damages in lieu of compensatory damages, unlike private litigants in civil actions. A civil government enforcement action is civil in the sense that only monetary damages and injunctive relief are sought, rather than incarceration, and that the court rules for civil actions apply (and as a result, the constitutional rights of criminal defendants are not invoked). But from a standing/political theory/legal theory perspective, this is almost like a quasi-criminal action in which restitution for the victims is also sought. Many labor, consumer protection, health, safety and environmental laws authorize enforcement by a state agency through the attorney general, or in the alternative, by private litigants acting as a "private attorney general." In the area of employment discrimination, the usual situation is that you must first seek relief by filing a complaint with the appropriate agency, and then have a private cause of action to enforce your rights associated with the complaint only if and when the agency decides not to pursue the case with its own resources. The harassment involved here is being conceptualized as a form of employment discrimination that is subject to that kind of regime. This arrangement is legislatively favored because it provides a means by which people who can't afford attorneys can obtain relief.

In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine."

Yes, of course slavery is illegal. "Involuntary servitude" imposed upon someone through due process of law is not slavery. This is analogous to a death sentence for a capital crime, which, because it is imposed by due process of law, is not murder. Similarly, the judicial imposition of a fine, or the forfeiture of other property, is not theft. Now, rhetorically, one can speak of the conditions of modern imprisonment as "state-sanctioned slavery," just as death-penalty opponents speak of "state-sanctioned murder" and recipients of parking tickets can speak of "state-sanctioned theft." But there's a big difference between rhetoric and the law.

Possibly. I am analyzing this issue under generally applicable, majority, common law rules of law (applicable in the U.S. (except Puerto Rico and Louisiana) and in most countries that are or were part of the British Commonwealth), when not modified by statute or regulation. If there is a contract regarding what is to be done, the measure of damages is "the benefit of the bargain". And if the benefit of the bargain included an express or implied warranty that the transaction would be conducted in a manner that obtained a tax benefit and that tax benefit was not obtained, the difference between the economic value of the agreed result and the actual result would be recoverable as monetary damages (which would then raise the meta issue of the tax treatment of the recovery which is beyond the scope of this answer). Two other kinds of claims in addition to a straight breach of contract claim are also plausible. One is a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising in every contract, which requires that someone who has discretion in the way that they perform a contract to do so in a manner that reflects the intent of the parties regarding the objectives and purposes of the contract when carrying it out. By intentionally disregarding the intent of the parties, in how the transaction would be carried out, damages in the form of additional taxes could be incurred. Another is a claim for breach of fiduciary duty in a case where the person carrying out the transaction and the person for whom the transaction was carried out are in a fiduciary relationship, such as a customer and a broker with discretionary authority, or an agent and principal, or a lawyer and client. Usually, when someone is entrusted with discretionary management of someone else's money or property, a fiduciary relationship arises by operation of law. The taxes unnecessarily and intentionally incurred in this case could also be damages for a breach of fiduciary duty. On the other hand, in contracts and transactions of this character, there would frequently be an express contractual waiver of any right to recover for taxes incurred, allegedly wrongfully, in the transaction. This waiver would be effective against a claim for breach of contract or a claim alleging that a fiduciary negligently violated a duty of care owed to the person upon whose behalf the transaction was conducted. But, waivers of rights are generally ineffective and void as contrary to public policy, when the wrongdoing purportedly waived is intentional or conducted in bad faith in a manner that is knowingly contrary to the mutual intent of the parties to a transaction. So, while a waiver would be effective if someone accidentally incurs additional taxes for someone else, it generally wouldn't be effective if someone screwed up the tax outcome intentionally as the question proposes in its example.

It's hard to give a definitive answer, since the specific details matter. You should read this question and answer, What is a derivate work? for more information. If you're really considering investing the time and energy to create such a product, you might consider getting advice from an actual attorney, and not from strangers on the Internet.

Is it legal to program a published game for educational purposes (and put the source code on GitHub)? I own a card game that I enjoy playing (not a playing card game using a standard 52-card deck). I enjoy it enough that I thought it'd be fun to write a program (complete with AI!) that plays that game. Is this legal? Furthermore, may I publish the source code to a public website such as GitHub without incurring any legal issues? Assuming it's illegal for me to do this, at what point does doing this become legal? I likely cannot simply change all the names of the various cards to something else, right? If I start changing the rules of the game, does that make it legal for me to share my source code, for instance? It'd be a game that's heavily inspired by the original, but isn't (different rules, different cards, different amounts even).

If any elements of the game are protected by copyright, then you cannot reproduce those elements (17 U.S.C. §106) unless your reproduction falls under a fair use exception (17 U.S.C. §107). Elements that may be protected by copyright include: artwork specific language on each card the aggregate effects of the cards (i.e. copying a single card's effects might not infringe copyright, but if you copy the effect of a bunch of the cards, such that you are taking expression of the original author's creativity, that might infringe, even if you change the words used) Whether an element of the game is protected by copyright is a fact-intensive question that would depend on the specifics of the game. Whether your copy infringes is likewise a fact-intensive question that would depend on what you copy. Fair use is also a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis, but in my opinion, it is likely that creating a computer program derivative work (17 U.S.C. §101) of the game for your own personal education would be considered fair use. From a practical standpoint, even if it were not fair use, it would be near impossible for the copyright owner to discover. Posting the code on GitHub tips the scales away from fair use because of (17 U.S.C. §107(4)): "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." But, none of the factors are determinative on their own. You ask: I likely cannot simply change all the names of the various cards to something else, right? I agree. In my opinion, the selection and arrangement of the effects attributed to each card is an expression of the author's creativity, and no matter what you call the cards, copyright in the game would be implicated if you retained the effects associated with each card. If I start changing the rules of the game, does that make it legal for me to share my source code, for instance? At some point, it will be an entirely different game, so certainly, in the limit, your work would not be infringing. We can't answer where that line is, but in general, the less of the original author's creativity that you re-use, the less likely a ruling of infringement. Also, in general, the more transformative your work is, the more likely a fair use exception would apply.

Alice has been developing her own enhancements, and they're pretty similar to Bob's. Neither Alice nor Bob has copied the other's enhancements, so neither has violated the other's copyright in the enhancements. Whether that could be proved in court is another matter, of course, but since the original work is licensed under creative commons the question unlikely to arise in court. Would Alice be prevented from coming up with enhancements to her own game if other people could prove they thought of and released the idea first? No. Copyright does not protect ideas. It only protects a particular expression of those ideas from being copied. Theoretically, if two authors come up with identical 500-word descriptions of something and can establish that each did so independently, neither has a claim against the other. The practical problem there, of course, is that it would be impossible to prove such a thing. Could Alice outright claim Bob's "Adapted Material" because he developed it on her original work? Assuming that in publishing his adaptations Bob followed the terms of the creative commons license with respect to the original work, Alice's only claim would be that he copied her adaptations without following the terms of the license. If Bob can show that he did not do so, her claim would fail. In a comment, you wrote: Suppose Alice went ahead and intentionally, somehow provably ripped off Bob's "Adapted Material" because she liked the content so much, does Bob reserve any rights on his adaptation, or is Alice able to commercialize the work that Bob did in extending her original work? If we assume that Bob complied with the license of the original material, we know that he licensed his adaptations under "the identical terms," so Alice would be able to use Bob's adaptations under those terms for non-commercial purposes. Since the assumption here is that Alice provably copied something of Bob's, I think it is fairly clear that she would be liable for damages if she exploited that material commercially without paying royalties.

Making the game free makes very little if any difference to the position here. There are two kinds of IP issues that could possibly be involved: copyright and trademark. Note: both copyright and trademark are civil, not criminal issues (except in very limited circumstances which do not apply to the situation described in the question). You will not "face charges" but might possibly be sued. If you are asked to take down such a game and comply, this might end the matter, but if an IP holder claimed that damages had occurred before the game was taken down a suite might possibly still be brought against the developer. Copyright Names, like titles and other short phrases, cannot be protected by copyright. As long as no other text from anyone else, and no images are copied or imitated, copyright is not infringed. This means that there are no copyright issues. Game mechanics and rules cannot be copyrighted, although the words of game rules can be. Therefore, fair use which is a strictly US copyright legal concept, is not involved here. Neither is fair dealing, a somewhat similar legal concept from the UK and some commonwealth and European countries. Trademark Here is the main issue for this situation. The names of individual Pokémon characters are probably (almost surely) protected as trademarks. That means you cannot use them to identify your game, or any other product or service, and you cannot use them to advertise or market your game. This is true even if the "selling price" is $0. The use here does not seem to be nominative use, as you are not intending to refer to Pokémon or any of its variants. You are just reusing the names. As long as you make it very clear that your game is not made by, nor in any way authorized or endorsed by the makers of Pokémon, this is probably not trademark infringement. But if the makers of Pokémon become aware of your game, they might well send you a cease and desist letter, and they might file a trademark infringement suit. Even if you were to win such a suit, as I think you might well do, it might be costly to defend. Could you alter the names to ones you invent form yourself? That might save a lot of trouble and hassle. What is the value to you in reusing the well-known Pokémon names?

No, this is not true. Copyright can be enforced selectively. You are confusing copyright with trademark. Company can lose its trademark if they aren't protecting it. All the meanwhile they can choose to ignore some copyright infringement while enforcing their rights on others with no legal problems what-so-ever. In order to illustrate the difference: for example, if someone would make a clone of Super Mario and would call their clone as well "Super Mario" and maybe even would call themselves "Nintendo", even if they have programmed the whole game by themselves from scratch and the art and music would be all different, they wouldn't be infringing the copyright but challenging protected trademarks. In your case, the naming was identical, the art and everything was too similar to the original and therefore the clone was challenging the trademark that needs constant protecting.

This can't be right. If I modify open source code as part of the work done, by nature of the open source license that code can not become intellectual property of the client. Certainly it can. That which is "developed or produced" would be the modifications to the pre-existing code, i.e the copyright on the derivative work so created. If the base code was under a share-alike or copy-left license, then the client can only distribute it under the same license (or a compatible one, perhaps). But nothing compels the client to distribute it, and for the client's use, the client owns the copyright, without fear of any future claims by the contractor. If I have my own code/scripts/settings/templates/etc that I use as a contractor, and I modify those in the interest of coding efficiency in the interest of serving the client, it hardly seems correct that these assets become property of the Client. Those are your work, and you can choose whether to sell the copyrights to the client or not. Again, only the work done for that client would be covered under the wording quoted above, unless there is another provision that grants the client a license to use the pre-existing work which you modified for the job, which there probably ought to be. Or I suppose the agreement could assign copyrights in pre-existing work to the client, but that seems an odd choice, and the language in the question would not do that. You and the client could agree on a different provision such as: The contractor grants to the client a fully-paid, non-exclusive permanent license to use all intellectual property developed under this agreement, and any pre-existing works that may be incorporated therein. The contractor warrants that s/he is entitled to grant such license, without infringing on the intellectual property of any other person or entity. That wording would have the contractor retain all copyrights and other IP, but provide a license to the client to use it without further payment or expiration. Many other ways to structure such a provision are possible, dividing the rights up however the contractor and client can agree. The price for the work might vary depending on what rights the client obtains. Both forms, and many others, are perfectly legal, it is just a question of what the contractor chooses to sell, and what th4e client chooses to buy.

As you've presented them, I doubt the functions are protected by copyright in the first place. Originality is one of the threshold requirements for copyright protection, and it demands that the work in question be independently created by the author, and that it possess some minimal degree of creativity. If you're talking about programming at a level so basic that the function truly must be created in a particular way, there is no originality in simply following the instructions. And even if there's some wiggle room, but the language you used has likely been independently replicated by many programmers, that's still not original enough to be copyrightable. What you want to watch out for, though, is the possibility that they've been combined into an original arrangement that is protected. I don't know enough about how copyright law is applied to code to say where or how that line is drawn, but my instinct would be that it could be a fairly low threshold.

No. GPL works are copyrighted (as are most creative works basically everywhere in the world, as soon as they're created, whether or not the author does anything about it), and copyright is what gives the GPL "teeth". Without copyright, you would generally be able to duplicate and distribute programs without any kind of license or permission from the author. Copyright law restricts your ability to do those things. The GPL is a license, which means it's a grant of permission. It says that you may copy and modify and do other things, provided that you comply with the other provisions set out in the license. Quoting from the GPL v3: You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Program. [...] However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License. So if you were to distribute some GPL-licensed software in a way that didn't comply with the terms of the license, the legal framework that would allow someone to sue you to stop you doing that would be copyright law.

A document can be distributed under more than one license. Just because it has been made available under a CC license for free, doesn't mean that IEEE can't negotiate a different license with different terms that allow them to sell the content. (This is similar to the way that a software library can be available for free under a license that permits non-commercial use, but also be made available for a fee for commercial use.) If you want to know whether IEEE is legally selling Aaron Swartz's manuscript, you can contact Morgan & Claypool, the publisher that owns the copyright, and ask them whether this use by IEEE has been authorized by them. For the other documents you mention, contact MIT Press. Etc.

What legal liability does one's participation on Stack Exchange carry? This question is motivated by a question which came up recently on engineering.SE: Cracks on the wall. It may be closed in the future so I will summarize. The user posted pictures of (very large) cracks in the wall of his house and asked the community "could you please advice to do continue the construction as per proper standard or I have demolish the house and re-built again?" A professional engineer advising this individual under the auspices of a hired firm would have certain legal obligations to the correctness of their opinion. If one were to advise this individual in a way that led to him living in an unsafe structure on Stack Exchange, what legal repercussions could they face? In particular, is there any legal precedent (read prior court case) which absolves freely offered online advice from liability?

I imagine that under English and Welsh law, the relevant tort would negligent misstatement, as there is no contract between the parties. From Practical Law: A claim for negligent misstatement may arise whether or not a contractual relationship exists between the parties. However, if there is a contractual relationship, it is more likely that a claim would be brought for negligent misrepresentation. Whether or not a claim for negligent misstatement would succeed would depend on several factors. Firstly, a duty of care must exist between the parties. From the Oxford Dictionary of Law: A negligent misstatement is only actionable in tort if there has been breach of a duty to take care in making the statement that has caused damage to the claimant. There is no general duty of care in making statements, particularly in relation to statements on financial matters. Responsibility for negligent misstatements is imposed only if they were made in circumstances that made it reasonable to rely on them (Hedley Byrne v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 (HL); Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). Whether or not it was reasonable to rely on the advice is hard to say, as it depends on a number of different factors. In the light of the fact that most cases of negligent misstatement involve professionals acting in their professional capacity, it seems unlikely that a court would find it reasonable to rely on advice taken from an internet site. Most relevant for this question, however, is the case of Gary Patchett and Karen Patchett v Swimming Pool & Allied Trades Association Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 717. This is possibly the legal precedent you are looking for. Practical Law again: The Court of Appeal held by a majority that, although the website made representations that it knew users would be likely to rely on, there was not sufficient proximity between the parties, and the website advised users to obtain an information pack before engaging a contractor. Accordingly, the appellants had failed to establish the duty of care that is a required element of a claim for negligent misstatement. If a website owner does not owe a duty of care to its users, then it seems highly unlikely that one user would be found to owe a duty of care to another user. On that basis - and with the large disclaimer that I am not a lawyer - it would seem that were one to rely on the advice given on a StackExchange site, there would be few, if any, legal repercussions for the person who gave the advice. The conclusion is to get professional advice from a professional, rather than any StackExchange site - including this one!

I am not a lawyer; I am not your lawyer. You do not cite a jurisdiction so this makes it very difficult to get a definitive answer. What follows is for Australia but the general principles are common law and would be applicable to other common law jurisdictions except where statues apply or case law has diverged. In the first instance, it seems that you were not party to any arrangement to pay for the electricity. So on the face of it you are not party to any contract requiring you to pay. Even if there was such an agreement: family, domestic, social and voluntary agreements (which this would be) are presumed not to be intended to legally bind the participants. Whether this presumption would be overturned would depend on the specific facts. On the face of it, there is no legal obligation to pay. Your options are: Do nothing; this puts the ball in their court, they can: Forget about it (it would then be over) Attempt to sue you with little prospect of success (which would cost them and you a lot more than $50 irrespective of who won) Do something illegal like beating you up (you really need to assess this risk) Tell everyone they know (in person and on social media) what a skiving prick you are (you could probably sue them for damages but that's not really going to happen, is it?) Pay them what they are asking Offer to pay them something less. Option 1 is likely to break any relationship you have with the person, Option 2 is likely to preserve it and Option 3 could go either way. Ultimately, like most legal questions, this is not about the law; it's about relationships ... broken ones mostly.

No. I doubt a court would find you have standing to pre-emptively sue to enforce a policy which has not resulted in any harm to you. Recommendation I recommend you write an open letter to the president of the university advising them of the situation. Publish the letter in the campus newspaper. In the letter, include language like, "I am hereby, officially putting this university on notice of a danger to student safety." And "there is already a university policy against this, but it is not being enforced." And, "I beg, I implore this university to please enforce this policy." And "If, God forbid, someone were to get injured, this letter will be proof you were made aware, even warned publicly, of imminent danger to your student population..." The purpose of this letter is to nudge the university into enforcing the policy out of heightened awareness of liability if someone were to be injured.

This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.

Yes lawyers do this. quite often in fact. There are professional and publicity reasons of course, that should suffice to not give bad advice and harm your career. But there is also a legal reason. Lawyers are responsible for the advice they give (as most professionals). If they give bad advice, they may be liable for damages!

Maybe, Hence the Lawsuits In the absence of clear statute law these all circle around tort law. For the scooter companies, trespass to chattels, and for the affected landowners (who hire the removalists) trespass to land and nuisance seem applicable. In essence, I can’t take your stuff (trespass to chattels) but you can’t leave your stuff on my property (trespass to land) or impeding access to it (nuisance). If you do, I am entitled to the reasonable costs of dealing with it. Note that, as owner, you remain responsible for you stuff even if you rented it to someone else. Both sides are pushing hard into unexplored areas of law so we await the judgement with interest. Then we’ll know.

As you say, the roommate who was there "did not equate the sound of a running toilet with wasting water". That, I am afraid to say, is negligent: normally, when you hear constantly flowing water, you do something about it. Somebody has to pay for the water, and assuming the water is in your name, that is you. You could yell at the roommate, but legal negligence is irrelevant to the water bill. However, if there were any resulting damage (for example to wiring or walls), that is where the question of negligence would come up: you probably would be found liable for damage to the building that resulting from letting the condition persist. But unless the fill valve broke at the tank and leaked water onto the floor (which would be clearly obvious) there won't be any damage that you are liable for. I assume that the leak developed from an old part giving out. This would be normal wear and tear, for which you would not be responsible (assuming you didn't cause the problem, for example by putting concentrated bleach in the tank). You you are saying that the landlord is trying to charge you for the repairs, and on this point, the landlord is on thin ice. A landlord cannot just make up rules about assigning liability for damage: that is a matter to be determined by the courts. A tenant can do things to a fill valve that can cause a leak; and the seal has to be replaced every few years. The tenant is not liable especially for routine replacement of the fill value seal, and does not become liable because they failed to inform the landlord in a prescribed manner. Not reporting a leak within 24 hours does not contribute to the underlying failed part. You could probably contest the legality of that bit of maintenance clause 24, in that the landlord cannot unilaterally declare who is responsible for damage. At the trial, both sides will present relevant evidence, and the judge / jury will decide whether the tenant's negligence caused the seal to fail.

we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early & unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.

How to make people follow city laws regarding dogs on a leash? I live in Toronto. There is a by-law that all dogs should be on a leash when inside one of the city parks. But nobody follows this. People with big dogs let the dogs run free and they sometimes get too close for comfort. Pointing out the law to the owner results in unpleasant conversations, involving expletives. The owners treat the parks as their own backyard, without any concern for others. What should I do? Should I consult the Toronto Parks department? I am not too sure of getting any answer.

According to this press release, Toronto is "stepping up enforcement" of its leash by-law. You should call 311 to report violations: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/29/101000050429.html You can find more information here: http://www.toronto.ca/311/knowledgebase/47/101000050447.html http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD You can find a list of areas where dogs are permitted to be unleashed here: http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=5a81dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=b6c9dada600f0410VgnVCM10000071d60f89RCRD I note, however, that the press release says that "A dog is considered running at large if it is unleashed, off its owner's property and not under its owner's control." Reading this strictly, where all three conditions must be met, a dog owner is permitted to unleash a dog if it is still possible for the owner to control the dog. I don't know how the courts have interpreted this, but it could certainly be interpreted very widely.

First, to be clear, this is almost never a state level limitation. To the extent that the link in the question implies otherwise, it is incorrect. Instead, local governments, typically a municipality or in an area that is not part of any municipality, a county, enacts land use regulations, the most common of which is usually called a "zoning code." There are also usually locally adopted building codes that supplement the zoning code. A zoning code typically establishes rules regarding how different kinds of real estate can be used in different enumerated zones. Usually, there are several different zones in which residential uses are allowed and different rules apply in each one. One of the typical limitations in a residential zone is to establish the number of unrelated people who don't own the home who may live there. The purpose of such limitations is to discourage the establishment of boarding houses, group homes, women's shelters, homeless shelters, flop houses, and halfway houses in relatively low density residential zones, on the theory that these uses are undesirable in terms of neighborhood character and cause undesirable people to move into a neighborhood that lowers property values for other people who live there. More crassly, people in affluent neighborhoods want to ban property uses that make it possible for poorer people to live near them. Often the actual scope of the limitations, however, is far broader than is necessary to prohibit these particularly unpopular "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) uses. The drafters of zoning codes are frequently more concerned about preventing loopholes in their restrictions from being identified than about limiting property rights in a respect that most current property owners in the zone don't avail themselves of anyway. For example, in Denver, where I live, the City Council recently passed a Group Living Amendment to its zoning code easing restrictions on uses of residences by unrelated people. This measure was sufficiently controversial that members of the public used their referral powers to petition to have the repeal of the recently enacted legislation places on the November 2021 general election ballot for voters to consider repealing it. As the link in the question notes, homeowner's associations, frequently also impose limitations on this kind of use of a residence, which are often even more strict, and are frequently adopted for the same reason. HOAs have more authority to do so than local governments because as private entities, they aren't required to meet constitutional law limitations on their authority. The question is, if both parties agree to forgo any safety measures that it might be there to protect, who exactly is it hurting if one person pays the other to stay over? In simple terms: why is it illegal? Why does the government care who stays in who's house, while paying money? Is there some 3rd party that is negatively affected if the guidelines aren't followed? The third-party is the neighboring property owners who fear that the quality of their neighborhood will be reduced by this kind of agreement. I am sympathetic to these criticisms. But, they aren't barriers to enacting laws if people with the power to enact legislation disagree. The simple rule is that in the real world, legislation is not required to adhere to a liberal/libertarian ideal in which laws are enacted only to regulate matters in which someone else may arguably be harmed. Subject to light constitutional regulation, the authority of local government's to enact legislation regulating the use of property is frequently plenary (i.e. unlimited) or close to it. The government can do anything it wants that it isn't forbidden from doing by the constitution or a higher level government's statutes. Courts aren't permitted to second guess the accuracy or desirability of these legislative determinations in most cases. Many states, furthermore, have "home rule cities" that are expressly protected from having their legislative authority limited in many respects by state legislation. A regulatory taking, the prevents property from having any beneficial use, must be compensated by the government enacting the regulation of its use. But regulatory laws may reduce the value of property by limiting the uses to which it can be put so long as there is still some beneficial use of the property that remains available. A very light and disputed impact that is perceived to be negative, such as the one in this case, is a sufficient rational basis for a municipal or local government to enact such legislation, and many local government zoning codes do, in fact, regulate this kind of activity. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the authority of local governments to enact this kind of legislation in the United States in the face of a constitutional challenge to it, in the case of Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co. in 1926, although some more extreme versions of limitations on non-related people sharing a home have subsequently been held to be invalid, mostly as a result of later enacted federal fair housing laws.

Yes they can You are approaching this from the wrong direction. Their right to enforce what you can and can't do doesn't come from radio-spectrum law; it comes from property and contract law. You are on their property subject to a license that they give you to be there. One of the terms of that license is that you won't set up or operate a wireless network. No doubt there are other things you are not permitted to do; for example, you may not be able to sell goods and services. If you breach the terms of the license then you are trespassing and they are within their rights to have you removed. In addition, if you are a student (or staff), this is probably one of the terms of your contract with the university. If you breach it, they can terminate your candidature (employment). Contracts can impose obligations on you that goes beyond what the law obliges you to do. Indeed, there is no contract if it only requires what is already required.

As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.)

It depends on how you got the right to participate in the event. Let us assume that you "sign up" for the event, and agree to certain conditions in exchange for being allowed to participate. In that case, there could be a condition prohibiting you from tracking the route, or publicizing the track: you have to read what the agreement says. Agreement might be necessary if the track is on private property (you need permission, otherwise you're trespassing). If this is a run on city streets, you can (possibly) follow along on the public sidewalk, and as a non-participant, you aren't bound by any agreement so you can upload whatever you like. You might also be a non-participant follower in the street, which might not be allowed by the city, but that is between the police and you and not the organizer. Running down the middle of the street is not generally legal, but the police might not care enough to ticket you.

This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order.

Depends on where you are, and what law would be broken and why. In germany, there is the concept of rechtfertigender Notstand (justifying emergency). If there is a present danger to a Rechtsgut (legally protected interest), one can take necessary and proportional steps against another legally protected interest. Say I walk through a winter landscape and there is a person who has broken through the ice of a lake (a present danger of the loss of life). Nearby is a yard with a ladder leaning on a shed. I would be allowed to enter the yard (normally trespas) and take the ladder (normally theft) in the rescue attempt (life counts for more than a ladder, using a ladder is necessary/appropriate for an ice rescue). The details are, as usual for Law SE, complicated.

Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - No 10 Downing Street is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So, people with legal authority over the space can restrict or ban your access if, for example, you repeatedly flaunt the rules that they impose on the space. Their private security can request that you leave. If you refuse, you are trespassing and subject to arrest, either by security as a citizens arrest or by the police.

Re: "Our mass infringement", is LearnHub doing anything illegal? On meta ELU, there's a question: Mass infringement of our copyright, which goes on about how some SE sites are being "scraped"; cut and pasted with no attribution, to sites such as LearnHub.org. From what I gather, their site hurriedly put up: Question is already asked and answered on Stackexchange.com and shared under Creative Commons - Attribution-Share Alike 2.5 Generic Is that enough to fulfill their legal obligation? Was it ever required, or is LearnHub just crossing their T's and dotting their I's? I must admit, my eyes glazed over reading this and this, my take-away being that it's not even required here legally, that's just our site rules.

Go to the Source If you follow the Legal link at the bottom of the page and read the terms of service, among other things, it says (my emphasis): 1. Access to the Services Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, Stack Exchange may offer to provide the Services, as described more fully on the Network, and which are selected by Subscriber, solely for Subscriber’s own use, and not for the use or benefit of any third party. ... Subscriber certifies to Stack Exchange that Subscriber is an individual (i.e., not a corporate entity) at least 13 years of age. ... 2. Network Content ... The Network is protected by copyright as a collective work and/or compilation, pursuant to U.S. copyright laws, international conventions, and other copyright laws. Other than as expressly set forth in this Agreement, Subscriber may not copy, modify, publish, transmit, upload, participate in the transfer or sale of, reproduce (except as provided in this Section), create derivative works based on, distribute, perform, display, or in any way exploit, any of the Content, software, materials, or Services in whole or in part. Subscriber may download or copy the Content, and other items displayed on the Network for download, for personal use, provided that Subscriber maintains all copyright and other notices contained in such Content. From time to time, Stack Exchange may make available compilations of all the Subscriber Content on the Network (the “Creative Commons Data Dump”). The Creative Commons Data Dump is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. By downloading The Creative Commons Data Dump, You agree to be bound by the terms of that license. Any other downloading, copying, or storing any Content for other than personal, noncommercial use is expressly prohibited without prior written permission from Stack Exchange, or from the copyright holder identified in such Content's copyright notice. In the event You download software from the Network, the software, including any files, images incorporated in or generated by the software, and the data accompanying the software (collectively, the “Software”) is licensed to You by Stack Exchange or third party licensors for Your personal, noncommercial use, and no title to the Software shall be transferred to You. Stack Exchange or third party licensors retain full and complete title to the Software and all intellectual property rights therein. 3. Subscriber Content You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. You grant Stack Exchange the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to use, copy, cache, publish, display, distribute, modify, create derivative works and store such Subscriber Content and to allow others to do so in any medium now known or hereinafter developed (“Content License”) in order to provide the Services, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by You. ... Consequences Under Clause 1 Subscribers to Stack Exchange must be individuals (natural persons in legalese). The proprietor of LearnHub.org are unlikely to be an individual and are therefore not a Subscriber under the terms of use. Under Clause 2, everything on Stack Exchange is copyright and some things are trade marked as well. The copyright for posts vests in the Subscriber and is licenced to SE (CC BY-SA 3.0) or vests in SE directly as the creator. Clause 8.1a. of CC BY-SA 3.0 requires SE to grant a licence to any recipient of a distribution (e.g. on a web site) on the same terms. For this reason the limitations on the copyright in Clause 2 can only apply to those items where copyright vests in SE directly; not to the content of the Subscriber posts. Assuming that it is only Subscriber posts that they are reproducing then they either need to: Comply with CC BY-SA 3.0 and attribute the work as required by that licence; what they have put up does not on the face of it do that because: They are referring to an earlier version of the licence Attribution under 3.0 is detailed in Clause 4.c. and this doesn't meet the criteria. Have been licenced by the original copyright holder; which seems unlikely. Meet the fair use criteria; attribution would not be required but would certainly be polite. Fair use turns on the specific facts of the case - on the face of it they could put forward a credible argument that their use is fair use. Complications Jurisdiction matters here; copyright laws are not uniform across the world. For example, Australian copyright has a much more limited "fair use" concept than the US and also creates a "moral copyright" of the author that exists independently of the copyright of the owner. For signatories to the Berne Convention; the country of origin for simultaneously published works (which online posting is) and therefore the law applying is the country that gives the shortest term of protection. The convention is annoyingly silent of what that means if there is more than one qualifying "Country of Origin"; this leaves scope for litigants to try to apply the most favourable domestic law that could be applicable and the case could be brought in any of several jurisdictions. This is the stuff that makes lawyers rich!

Yes, assuming the material was given the standard license. You would be creating a derivative work, and only the copyright owner has the right to authorize creation of a derivative work. See the copyright FAQ for general information. The owner can file a DMCA takedown notice with YouTube and they will by policy notify you of the infringement claim and unless you file a counter-notice (you legally couldn't given the facts you're asserting), they will take it down. The owner can also sue you.

I've found Google's filtering based on licence to not be very reliable, at least not reliable enough to trust from a practical legal perspective. Using a photo that you don't own the copyright to is a risk. You may be infringing copyright by doing so. The owner may eventually ask you to stop, or they may sue you for damages. Further, some copyright infringement is criminal 17 USC 506. In my opinion, it would be unwise to use a work commercially that you don't affirmatively know you have permission to use.

This is all outlined at Terms of Service - Stack Exchange When you ask a question, and/or comment on or answer a question, or otherwise participate on an SE site, you license your content to SE. You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license. In turn, (emphasis mine) Subscriber acknowledges that Stack Exchange has no control over, and no duty to take any action regarding: which users gains access to the Network; which Content Subscriber accesses via the Network; what effects the Content may have on Subscriber; how Subscriber may interpret or use the Content; or what actions Subscriber may take as a result of having been exposed to the Content. Much of the Content of the Network is provided by and is the responsibility of the user or subscriber who posted the Content. Stack Exchange does not monitor the Content of the Network and takes no responsibility for such Content. Subscriber releases Stack Exchange from all liability for Subscriber having acquired or not acquired Content through the Network. ... This doesn't mean someone can't sue you anyway, notwithstanding that disclaimer. Anyone can sue anyone in civil court. That's the way the system works. Someone could track you down and sue you for the (bad) advice you gave that cooked their Macbook, even though they got that advice on SE and SE states that SE is not responsible for any damages resulting from the use of the information. The TOS of all SE site(s) shows that anyone who uses SE sites is bound by this click-through agreement, even if they didn't read it. And that should suffice in a court if it gets that far. It should suffice for any attorney thinking of taking the case of someone who wants to sue you. Again, someone could sue you; but chances are really great that it will never go very far due to the legal nature of SE and your contributions. This SE site - Law SE - has more of a specialized TOS, as practicing law without a license is illegal, and giving legal information as a layperson (or even as an attorney, of which there are some who particpiate here) needs special terms; see the sidebar for this disclaimer and link: Law Stack Exchange is for educational purposes only and is not a substitute for individualized advice from a qualified legal practitioner. Communications on Law Stack Exchange are not privileged communications and do not create an attorney-client relationship. General Disclaimer - Law Stack Exchange So, if you do get sued by someone who cooked their Macbook by following your bad advice, you can ask about the lawsuit here on Law SE. But, unless your question is about general legal procedures, terms, case law, etc. (as outlined at What topics can I ask about here? - Law SE), your question will be closed because this site is not for giving specific legal advice in specific legal situations, especially active lawsuits. You will be advised to talk to an attorney.

You are clearly seeking legal advice. Answers on this site come from anonymous people on the internet and are not legal advice. You should not act based on information from this site. I am unaware of any lawsuit where one would be sued for merely storing and reading HTML for personal use. Downloading a webpage is probably not a copyright violation. Most things you create, including HTML source code, are protected by copyright and copyright includes the exclusive right to choose who can read what you created. I couldn't find any actual reference to this but I would hazard a guess that displaying an HTML webpage online is implicitly allowing others to read that code. I believe this guess is correct because all modern web browsers have the capability to view source that nobody considers illegal and browsers also include the capability to save webpages to disk. These browsers are made by companies with large legal departments, I doubt Internet Explorer would include this function if using it was a copyright violation. Here begins speculation: However, your expanded question says that not only you wish to read the HTML code but you also wish to process it, extract information from it and use what you learn this way. This could, I think, be prevented by the copyright holder. Still, what you are describing is commonly done in the world. Services such as Google, Bing or the Wayback Machine go far beyond what you are doing. In theory, I can see this as being a copyright violation but again, the fact that these big companies - without any kind of contract with the website owners - keep doing it is big evidence in favor of legality of storing webpages. You should be careful about how you use the stored data, though. For example, computer programs often have a stipulation in EULA that prevents you from reverse engineering the code. I could see that the use of some websites could be protected in such manner. Further (not authoritative) internet pages on this topic: https://stackoverflow.com/q/22819287/1580088 https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20120621055815AAvJPvN

I'm assuming that you are in the UK, as you are talking about the British Standards Institue. In general the truth cannot be copyrighted but an expression of that truth can be, provided that it is creative or original to at least some extent. In this case the equations and constants you want to use are descriptions of scientific truths. If you translate them into another form (e.g. a computer program) then you are not copying the creative bit (the layout and arrangement of those equations and explanatory text), so you are not violating the copyright. Edit: I should also have said for (3) that their descriptions of the constants and variables will be copyright. You would have to avoid copying their words. However given that these are going to be terse descriptions of facts your words can still be pretty similar without infringing on copyright, because there are only so many ways of describing the acceleration due to gravity, or whatever. Take a look at some alternative references to see what words they use.

I assume based on your reference to .edu and your can-spam-act-of-2003 tag that you are interested in United States law. The scheme you describe is illegal under the CAN-SPAM Act. 15 USC 7704 (b) (1) (a) (ii) (b) Aggravated violations relating to commercial electronic mail (1) Address harvesting and dictionary attacks (A) In general It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail message that is unlawful under subsection (a), or to assist in the origination of such message through the provision or selection of addresses to which the message will be transmitted, if such person had actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances, that— (i) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means from an Internet website or proprietary online service operated by another person, and such website or online service included, at the time the address was obtained, a notice stating that the operator of such website or online service will not give, sell, or otherwise transfer addresses maintained by such website or online service to any other party for the purposes of initiating, or enabling others to initiate, electronic mail messages; or (ii) the electronic mail address of the recipient was obtained using an automated means that generates possible electronic mail addresses by combining names, letters, or numbers into numerous permutations. The last part (ii) specifically forbids what you propose ("combining names... into various permutations). Under 15 USC 7706 you may be liable for statutory damages of up to $250 per email. In addition to being illegal, I suspect your plan will also be ineffective: this sort of spam attack would be really easy for the university to detect and block.

There's existing copyright infringement and future copyright infringement. Let's say you sold a million records with infringing contents. That's copyright infringement. It has happened, you can't undo it. Now you get sued. If you think you will lose, it would be a good idea to change the music to be not infringing, so the next million records are not infringing and add to the damages. It doesn't fix the infringement that has already been done, but makes sure there is no further infringement. And infringement after you were told about it and asked to stop might be punished more harshly.

Terminology for contracts in multiple Languages My company is having contracts drafted in both English and Japanese and we want to have the English version take priority over the Japanese. Is there a specific legal term for this structure?

I don't know of a specific legal term but such clauses are quite common in contracts which consist of more than one document. The English words "priority", "prevail" and "precedence" have the meaning you want, however, "precedence" runs the risk of being confused with "precedent" which does have a very specific legal meaning. A clause similar to: If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity between the English and Japanese language versions of the contract, the English version shall prevail. You need to make very sure that this clause can be translated unambiguously into Japanese!

is it legally acceptable to state that 7.5 hours is the standard amount No. Because you are a contractor not employee, there is no "standard" to refer to. You are only entitled to what your contract provides for, that is £N per day no matter how much time you worked. That said, if there is no word "overtime" in the contract, you cannot use one to justify how much you charge. You can, though, charge for weekend days (unless the contract explicitly prohibits working on weekends). what should be done about going into the future with this work and asking for a revised contract? 1) Learn the lesson; 2) Make up your mind about what you want to be paid for: hours, days or output; 3) Discuss/negotiate contract terms with your clients.

For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.

In the german language, in jurisprudence, we have lots of latin terms / expressions, because latin expressions seem to be more exact. Is this also the case in the english speaking world? You are correct that there are many Latin expressions in the English speaking legal world. You are not fully correct regarding the reasons that this is the case, and in some instances this means that you can't trust a Latin legal term to mean the same thing in common law jurisprudence as it does in civil law jurisprudence. In England, Latin made its way into legal use because the clergy and literate Norman French elites spoke Latin for affairs of consequence and state and used it for that purpose in much the same manner that elites in India today use the English language. But, they were using Latin to document their own rulings and decisions in the feudal records which were largely based on tradition, common sense and local custom and practice. (This was also true in Scandinavia until the Scandinavians adopted legal codes based upon continental models in the 18th and 19th centuries or so.) In Germany (and most of continental Europe) the situation was different. In the Roman Empire, the judicial role was delegated mostly to people we would call arbitrators these days, who issued written decisions in Latin after cases were litigated before them by people we would call lawyers today, and these were collected, edited, arranged by subject and published in books that are the equivalent of the legal digests or case reporters today. When the Roman Empire collapsed, these fell into disuse, but monks continued to copy sets of them of future generations through the dark ages. Then, sometimes around the late Middle Ages/early Rennaisance it became fashionable for lords and officials making judicial determinations to reference these digests in their decision making on something of a grass roots basis until it became accepted practice after a few centuries for there to be formally trained jurists who were familiar with the digests and it was expected that these trained professionals relying on these historic Roman legal sources were the only legitimate way to make legal decisions. This process is called the "reception" of Roman law in early modern Europe and was the foundation of the law in most continental European countries that ultimately became civil law countries until it was so jumbled and arcane that Napoleon streamlined it by having an expert prepare his civil code with the idea that it could be used to get fair and accurate legal resources without lawyers or legally trained jurists. Germany and Spain then copied this efforts in their respective national styles. Germany strove to be more detailed and more exactly accurate in codifying the Roman law substrate using "legal science" intended for use by legal professionals, and has a longer more detailed civil code with more major categories and more rigorously consistent used of defined terms throughout their codes as a result. Spain was, if anything, a bit more loose in drafting than the French, but made substantive adjustments to reflect local ideas on the correct rule of law. These codes, in turn, were used as models by almost everyone else in Europe. To make a long story short then, Germany and other continental European countries use Latin legal terms not just because Latin was a common language of the clergy and literate elite, but because they were borrowing Roman legal terminology directly from Roman legal sources that had been preserved by monks in through the Middle Ages and then restored to active use in the early modern period, unlike the English, who were mostly coining Latin legal terms for non-Roman legal concepts or borrowing Roman legal terminology in an uninformed and frequently not technically accurate way compared to the way they were used by the trained legal scholars familiar with Roman legal sources on the continent.

This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for?

It depends to a large degree on local employment laws. Depending on how the counteroffer was worded, it might have constituted anything from a binding legal contract for employment for some reasonable minimum term, or a totally non-binding suggestion that was worth less than the air breathed while pronouncing it. Some things to consider would include: What are local employment laws like? Do they require that termination be for cause? If so, what are causes for termination? Does termination require any kind of remediation beforehand? Note that in an at-will, right-to-work state in the US, odds are that the employee can be fired for any time and for any reason, supposing the employer hasn't accidentally entered into a contract by extending the counteroffer. What did the counteroffer say? Did it stipulate that the offer was not for a definite term and that the company reserved the right to terminate the employee for any reason, or no reason at all? Odds are any sufficiently serious business in an at- will, right-to-work state would use standard legal language in any offer or counteroffer to ensure that they are on the right side of this, so odds are the counteroffer was accepted with no obligations at all on the company. Does the termination affect eligibility for unemployment benefits? I would say most likely not, as the termination would probably be recorded as being for no reason legally speaking (if they admitted to terminating the employee for seeking other employment, interested government officials could take a dim view of the company's actions). You'd probably have at least some unemployment compensation coming your way. Some professional - not legal - advice. Never accept a counteroffer. Only get another offer in the first place if you are committed to leaving your current employer no matter what. If your company really insists, you should insist on a minimum definite term of employment written into a legal contract which is signed by an executive and notarized. No company will agree to this (unless the term is shorter than you'd want as a full-time W-2 anyway) but if they do, hey, you have some security (if the company agrees to this, have your own lawyer - whom you pay with your own money - review the document). Even then, I would be very, very careful about staying at a company after getting a counteroffer. Don't do it. Ever. Never accept a counteroffer. One comment asks why I recommend never accepting a counteroffer. There are at least two reasons: The reason you are looking for a new job should be that there is something about your current job that isn't completely satisfactory and that you haven't been able to fix. Either you have grown out of the position, don't like the work, feel you're underpaid, don't get along with somebody, etc. If you were unable or unwilling to fix any of these issues without having another job on the table, having another job on the table shouldn't be what makes you willing and able to fix them. Why work somewhere that you'd constantly need to go job hunting to address workplace issues? Unless the company makes firm agreements about how long they're going to keep you around, you have no guarantee that they'll keep you. Presumably, you didn't have one before, and you don't have one at the new job, but the fact that you are currently employed might support the assumption that your employment would be continued at your current employer and the offer might support the assumption the new employer plans to employ you indefinitely. When you put in your notice, it makes the company more aware of the fact that you could leave at any time; while a perfectly rational actor would realize that this doesn't change the situation at all, companies are run by people and people often act irrationally. Perhaps your manager is vindictive, perhaps your manager is scared that you will still leave after accepting the counteroffer. Maybe your manager knows there are layoffs coming but needs you for the busy season. Hiring replacements can be time-consuming and expensive - and employees who are getting offers of employment elsewhere and putting in notice might be seen as risks. I'm not saying that accepting a counteroffer has always turned out badly. Falling coconuts kill 150 people every year. Still, I am not going to add a coconut rider to my insurance policy and I am not going to accept a counteroffer.

Am I contractually obligated to follow that old handbook? Yes. Consider this: your employer gave you a copy of the handbook saying, "here is a copy of the staff handbook." Because of this, you know that the document in question is the staff handbook of your company, regardless of the fact that it bears an old name, and that the policies it expresses are part of the terms of your employment contract. If you were truly concerned that the document in question had no validity as the staff handbook, you perhaps should have expressed that concern by telling the person giving you the document that they appear to have given you the wrong document, because it bears a different name. By not doing this, you accept the terms in the document. On the other hand, if you do do that, you'll just irritate the people who have to produce a rebranded staff handbook so they can give you a copy.

No Or at least not necessarily. Contract terms are legally one of three types: Conditions, Warranties, or Intermediate. Breach of any term allows the aggrieved party to sue to recover damages - monetary compensation to restore them to the position they would have been in had the breach not occurred. Breach of a condition also (or instead) allows them to terminate a contract. Breach of a warranty does not. Intermediate terms are terms that might be a condition or might be a warranty depending on how egregious the breach was. A contract can explicitly make a term a condition, the historical and still used phrase being that X is “of the essence”. If the contract is not explicit (most aren’t), then that is the concept that the court uses to decide - is the term “of the essence”, that is, absolutely fundamental to the performance of the contract. Similarly a term can be explicitly a warranty, usually by saying party Y “warrants” something. Most incidental or procedural terms are warranties - if breached, they never give rise to a right to terminate. Most terms are intermediate, particularly most terms about time. Normally, intermediate terms are warranties but if a breach is egregious enough, then this can elevate the term to a condition. Payment terms are a classic: if you are a day or a week late in making payment, the other party can’t cancel the contract. If you are a year late, they can. Somewhere in between, your breach changes the term from a warranty to a condition. For your situation, the early delivery is clearly a breach of a warranty, not a condition. If it even is a breach - the contract may say that they are obliged to deliver by 1 December: delivery on 1 November is clearly in compliance with that term. If it is a breach, you do not have the right to terminate the contract and if you tried you would be breaching the contract yourself by repudiation. By the way, repudiating the contract is definitely breaching a condition. A huge number of contract disputes turn on who validly terminated and who repudiated the contract. If it is a breach, you can sue for damages which, since they have not charged you for November, would be what it cost you or what you lost by having their bin on your premises for a month. My guess that this would be in the order of zero.

Poker considered as gambling? I heard a lot of people say that Poker is a game of skill, not a game of luck. And often, you see the same winners in the finals of poker tournaments. Does that mean online poker sites do NOT require a gambling license to operate?

Game of skill? Nonsense. There are skills that can help you out / prevent you from making bad decisions, but it's still gambling nonetheless. There is no gambling license you can obtain to operate an online poker site, or really any other online site that allows gambling, in the United States. It is completely against the law. In fact, the FBI shut down a few of these poker sites back in 2011 for fraud. Read up on United States v. Scheinberg.

Please note that I'm not a lawyer. If you need specific legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney. Every time someone buys an item from someone else, there's at least an implied contract of sale where the seller of the item agrees to give the buyer the item to be purchased in exchange for a sum of money or other object of value which the buyer agrees to pay as consideration. Generally, in an online purchase, a contract of sale is completed when payment is made and the product has shipped. If the seller fails to provide the item you intended to buy after you make your payment, that's a breach of this contract of sale as the seller has failed to execute their end of the contract. I seriously doubt a "no refunds" policy would excuse the vendor for breaching the contract of sale. If you cannot resolve the issue with the vendor, then your best bet is to initiate a dispute through your credit/debit card issuer.

Games can be protected by patent. You get some protection through copyright, but only on things like artwork and the precise text of the rules; someone could copy the ideas of the game with different artwork and not violate your copyright. You would need a patent in each country you want to protect it in. In general patents are expensive and complicated. Here is some general guidance on the relevant law in the USA, and how it applies to video games. If you hire a developer you can do so with a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). This is a contract requiring them to keep your ideas secret. Here is an article about using NDAs when hiring a contractor, but its a complicated area of law and you might be better hiring a lawyer to draft one for you.

It comes down to intent ... and possibly responses to illegal activity. Localbitcoins intention is to facilitate trade in bitcoins - in itself a legal undertaking. Cryptocurrancy transactions can be used for illegal purposes but it is not the sites intention to enable that. Amazon.com intention is to facilitate trade in books - in itself a legal undertaking. Some books contain material that is prohibited under some countries laws but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal books. Ebay.com intention is to facilitate trade in "stuff" - some "stuff" is illegal but it is not the sites intention to enable trade in illegal stuff. Silk Road intention was to facilitate trade in illegal goods and services - therefore they are accessories to the crimes committed.

It is a fact that a particulate chess game was played on a particular date by certain specific players, who made specific moves. Facts are not protected by copyright. Anyone is free to report such a game, including the exact moves, and the names of the players. Such games are often used in books about chess, and the same thing is done in books about other games, such as bridge and go, where a record of the play is often kept. If someone else has described or analyzed such a game, you may not copy that person's wording without permission (except to the limited extent permitted by fair use or fair dealing). A chess diagram simply represents the position of the pieces in a standard way, and has no original content beyond those facts, and so is not protected by copyright either. If a person has invented a chess game or a series of chess moves that never took place to illustrate a point in analyzing chess, re-using that sequence of moves might make the new analysis a derivative work of the previous one, if the coverage of the invented sequence of moves is extensive. But that would not apply to the moves of an actual game that was actually played. There have even been cases of fictional stories based upon real historical chess games. For example "Unicorn Variation" by Roger Zelezney. 17 USC 102 says: In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. This is the "fact/expression distinction" by which it is said that facts are not protected by copyright, although the form of expressing those facts often is. The same section has the list of kinds of protected works. This includes literary, dramatic, musical, and pictorial works, dance, audiovisual, sound and architectural works. A chess game does not fall into any of those categories. Thus it is ineligible form protection on two separate but related grounds. Beyond that, under the Feist vs Rural decision, a work must have an element of originality to be protected by copyright, and a list of the moves made by chess players has no original content, although an analysis of a game would. The copyright laws of many other countries have been interpreted similarly. As to the question of offense, in the US at least, and in most other countries, a true statement is never legally defamatory, even if the subject dislikes it. If it is true that Player X lost to Player Y on such and such a date, reporting that fact cannot be libel or any form of defamation. Otherwise the loser could never be named in any sports reporting.

There is no law against driving a hard bargain If you were describing real estate owners rather than YouTube channel owners we’d have a term for them: a motivated seller. There is no law against using the fact that someone is desperate to sell to negotiate a lower price: that’s just good business. In general, common law legal systems do not involve themselves in whether a price agreed between two parties was fair: if you want to sell your original Picasso for $1 or pay $1m for a used tissue, that’s up to you. If you have ethical issues with that, don’t do it but it’s not illegal. Legal issues can come up where you are the cause in some way of the motivation. A lender foreclosing on a mortgage is ok. A lender offering to buy the property to avoid foreclosure is not. The first is just enforcing the terms of the contract, the second looks like undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Some countries have laws against profiteering and you would need to look at the legal definition to decide if this is or isn’t profiteering. In the US, it isn’t because their laws only deal with profiteering that damages the government. Some US states have laws against price gouging but these are usually to prevent charging too much, not too little. Which clauses of YouTube's Terms of Service would be violated? None. YouTube does not have any terms about selling your digital assets and we know it happens. Which US sanctions would be violated? It’s impossible to say without reading the sanction. If it’s illegal to transfer money to the sanctioned people then the whole plan falls over because you can’t pay for the channel in the first place.

In the worst case if they shut shop, then how might I go about getting my money back? It is unlikely that you can. A SAFE is not a loan (and for that matter isn't even a share in the company) and doesn't create an enforceable contractual right to get your money back. If you make an equity investment and the company loses money and goes out of business, you lose everything you invested. If the promoter made false representations that induced you to invest, or actively concealed material facts about the investment, you might be able to sue the promoter for securities fraud under federal regulation 10b-5, or under a state securities law, or under a common law fraud theory. You could also sue to issuer of the investment (i.e. the company) but that would usually be futile because the company is broke and hence judgment proof. State or federal securities regulators or a local district attorney or state attorney-general might pursue the case in lieu of a private civil action by you, but getting them to take action is often quite difficult. But, if your investment wasn't induced by fraud and instead the management of the company simply made bad decisions that caused the company to fail, you have no remedy. The investment was for a SAFE (Simple Agreement for Future Equity). I have the signed SAFE with me. This is a very unusual way for a QoZ to be structured, which adds to the sense that this may have been a shady venture.

If not, how can I keep the game's name in the app title? Pay them a licence fee. Of course, they may not be willing to licence their trademark to you or you may not be willing to pay what they ask - that’s their prerogative; you can’t force people to sell you their stuff. Hasbro’s, sorry, I mean [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] owner’s lawyers, have explained the trademark law very well and while nothing is impossible, your chance of winning a lawsuit is as close to 0 as makes no difference. Here’s another point of view about similar circumstances. If you lose you will have to change the name anyway and pay damages (everything the game has earned is typical) and, probably, [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] owner’s costs. They are offering you a really good deal in allowing you to change the name and not suing you. If I remove the game's name from my app title, I'm afraid people won't be able to find my app anymore. Tough. The fact that people are finding your app because of [CROSSWORD GAME NAME] only strengthens the case against you. How is it different from a book entitled like "Become an expert in [GAME NAME]" ? It isn’t because the publisher almost certainly paid them a licence fee.

What is a Transition Bond Company? I've come across the term Transition Bond Company, and I'm trying to figure out what it is – in relatively plain English, since I lack any legal background whatsoever. The context in which I've seen the term used is in connection to regulated utility companies in the US (e.g., electric companies). Any explanation?

"Transition bonds" are debt for which the collateral is "transition property." Periodically U.S. states authorize utilities to levy a charge on individual consumer bills. The reasons they may do so are varied (e.g. to compensate a former monopolist during the transition to a competitive utilities market). The right to levy this charge now and in the future is a type of (transition) property. Since this right has value in the form of a future stream of revenue, it can serve as collateral when debt it taken on (here in the form of bonds). The utility with the property rights can form a subsidiary called a "transition bond company" that handles the bond issuance. Here are a few examples of state laws to the above effect. Massachusetts Connecticut

Short Answer It depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances. But based on your description, this approach is likely problematic and might not withstand judicial scrutiny. Explanation Plaintiffs can attack this behavior as a sham transaction. Court could find this to be a fraudulent conveyance. and provide relief via clawback order. Badges of Fraud include: (Source: Wikipedia) Becoming insolvent because of the transfer; Lack or inadequacy of consideration; Family, or insider relationship among parties; The retention of possession, benefits or use of property in question; The existence of the threat of litigation; The financial situation of the debtor at the time of transfer or after transfer; The existence or a cumulative effect of a series of transactions after the onset of debtor’s financial difficulties; The general chronology of events; The secrecy of the transaction in question; and Deviation from the usual method or course of business.

Variations of contracts must be consented to by all parties. This means that if the company sent your friend varied terms, it would have included means by which she would have consented - this may be by continuing to use a service. You cannot unilaterally change the terms of a contract. You could try to charge the company PoS terminal storage fees, but it's highly unlikely to be enforceable if they don't agree to it. In theory if they are aware of the change and they accept them in some way then they are bound to the terms just as she would be, even if they later claimed that they were not aware of them. There is some precedent - in Russia - for this with a bank and it made the news some time ago. There's plenty of cases in which people who don't read EULAs or loan contracts thoroughly are still forced to honour their obligations to their creditors under them.

A contract need not say anything about the fact that the company could be sold. What matters is that the terms of the contract are not changed. Since there is no opt-out on transfer clause, you have to finish the term of the contract (or pay whatever fee is assessed if there is an early termination clause). So the question is how certain you are that you did not agree to the possibility of adding a "Universal Service Fund" charge. There may be subtle language which allows the company to add charges for specified purposes, and the new owners are availing themselves of that possibility. It may be difficult to determine just how this fee is legal (if it is), because customer service might just say "we are now charging this fee", or "we have to charge this fee", but you could try asking them where in the contract this new fee is allowed. You can hire an attorney to read over the contract to see where this possibility is mentioned; perhaps it is not, and then an exchange of letters between attorneys might be necessary. There is such a thing as the Universal Service Fund, which is a government operation to improve rural telecommunications. Telecomm companies have to pay a percent of their interstate revenues to this fund. If your bill has not increased since the acquisition, that suggests that you simply did not know that you had been paying into the fund, since the original company didn't give you a detailed invoice. If it has increased by this amount, that suggests that the earlier owner hadn't exercised an option to pass the cost on to the customer. It is likely that there is some clause in the contract that addresses charges required by law. That does not mean that you could not prevail in a suit against the company, but it would make the job harder (more expensive) for you. One company sort of explains how they are legally allowed to pass the cost on to the customer. Because it is allowed by federal regulation, it need not be mentioned in the contract.

What would be an appropriate legal classification? A trust. How could this entity be structured so it could manage multiple estates? As a trust. Could this entity choose to keep, say, 30% for internal use e.g. resuscitation research? If that’s what it says in the trust deed, yes. How could this entity be made "recession-bulletproof," such that it could survive collapse of civilization? It can’t. Could it be given autonomy under the direction of a single person, or even sovereignty along the lines of a Mars colony? A trust is managed by its trustee(s) for the benefit of the beneficiaries. A trustee can be an individual or a corporation and there can be one or more of them. It couldn’t be given sovereignty - only nation states are sovereign. Could it be immune from legal jeopardy if it chose to accept clients who volunteer to be frozen before they die? No. What might happen to the estates if the economy is radically altered, e.g. a scarcity-free system where money is obsolete? Beats me - you’re the science fiction writer, you make it up.

Landlord-tenant laws are state-specific, and given the number of states it's impractical to scan all of the laws, but based on a reading of a handful of such laws I doubt that there is any law requiring landlords to pay the oil for a rented house. (The matter would be different if there was a multi-unit building with no individual control over temperature, thus pooled fuel usage). It's not clear to me what you assumed the agreement means, where it says "N/A". Perhaps you believed at the time that the place had a different heating system, and you relied on that assumption. In that case, you might be able to go to court and have the contract voided, and you could pick another place to live. If the "options" are specified so that some things are assigned to tenant, some to landlord, and some are N/A, that would especially lead to the reasonable belief that there was no oil heat in the house. But if the only indications were "landlord" versus "n/a", then you could interpret "n/a" as meaning "not the responsibility of the landlord". Analogously, if the agreement only lists "tenant" and "n/a" then a reasonable interpretation would be that this means "the tenant pays" versus "the tenant does not pay". This reasoning would also have to survive the alternative interpretation that the tenant pays for everything, except that n/a means "there isn't one of these". In other words, the meaning of the term might be determinable from the overall context of what's in the agreement. Since the house does not come with a full tank (as with car rentals), the question of what to do with the residual oil at the end of the lease should also be specified. Unlike gas or electric, you're not just paying for actual consumption, you're paying for potential consumption, and you would have an interest in the remaining half-tank at the end of the lease. You could just walk away from that investment (pumping it out and taking it with you could be illegal, since the stuff is kind of a contaminant), or you could have an agreement where the landlord buys the oil back from you, but that should be specified in the agreement (and I assume it isn't). This kind of consideration could support a claim that you reasonably believed that there was no oil system (if there were, there would be some term relating to your interest in the residual oil), or even a belief that the landlord would pay the cost of the oil (since he ultimately gets the remaining oil at the end of the lease). You attorney (hint) should advise you how to approach this.

It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures).

I suspect contract law will affect the ability to do this. Terms like "USB" and the associated logos etc are intellectual property (trademarks, copyrights, etc) owned by the USB Consortium. If you don't comply with their terms, you probably cannot describe your product as a USB product. THE USB-IF LOGOS MAY BE USED ONLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PRODUCTS WHICH HAVE PASSED USB-IF COMPLIANCE TESTING AND ARE CURRENTLY ON THE INTEGRATORS LIST. THIS REQUIRES THAT THE COMPANY BE ASSIGNED A USB VENDOR ID NUMBER.

What is the penalty for illegitimate quoting? I recently saw this Tweet and it made me wonder, in general, can a person be penalized for attributing a false quote to another person? If so, what would that penalty be? If it’s a law, is it a state law or federal law? President Obama at the UN: "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan" — Duncan Meisel (@duncanwrites) September 23, 2014 (Answers regarding the U.S. are sought, but answers regarding other nations are welcome as well.)

In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation.

They can’t But they aren’t This is the law (as amended). Section 9 contains the penalties. In any event the police don’t fine people they issue an infringement notice which is an allegation of an offense - police can issue these even if they reasonably believe they took place - they are entitled to be wrong. The person given the notice can admit the offense by paying the fine or contest the allegation by going to court.

united-states That is going to depend greatly on the circumstances. In the US generally anyone may express an opinion on the value or merits of an investment, indeed that is protected speech under the first amendment. However, a person with an interest in a stock or other security who publishes an opinion or statement intended to deceive people, with the further intent of profiting by the deception, may well have committed securities fraud. If the published text contains false statements of fact, known to the author to be false, or that the author knows have not been checked and might well be false, that is additional evidence of such fraud. There are other cases in which such posting of an alleged "opinion piece" might be criminal or an actionable tort. But that would not make the site illegal. It would be the specific acts by specific people that would be illegal. Only if the site were routinely used for such unlawful purposes and seemed to have no legitimate purpose would one be likely to say that the site was illegal, and even then it is a stretch.

Mockery is allowed; hate speech isn’t While freedom of speech is guaranteed under French law it does have limits. Since 2004, these limits have applied to gender and sexuality. Mockery is contemptuous or insulting speech; hate speech or vilification incites hatred, serious contempt or ridicule. The boundary between them must be established on a case-by-case basis including both content and context (“I’m going to get you” can be a serious threat but it can also be what a father says to his child when chasing them in the park) but in France, as in other liberal democracies, the benefit of the doubt goes to speech being considered lawful.

A statement cannot be libel unless it actually identifies the plaintiff to defame him. The identification need not be by name, but it must be specific enough that the public would be able to determine who the statement referred to. You can read more about this concept at Prof. Eugene Volokh on Libel Law Therefore, if nobody other than the plaintiff or defendant learned about the connection before the filing of the case or the publication of discovered emails, the original work of fiction was not a libel. And by telling everyone that the connection existed, yes, the plaintiff was impliedly consenting to any further alleged libel and it would be a defense from liability for the plaintiff. Furthermore, there wouldn't be libel unless whatever the fictional character did was untrue (something the real plaintiff didn't do) and the public would think that whatever the character did was actually an assertion that the real plaintiff did it. I could write a satire about a President Brock O'Bama who is actually a lizardman in disguise, and that's my First Amendment right, not a slander of the President. Disclaimer: only describing the common law and majority rules. State laws may differ.

Could a phrase "Don't buy from X" with indirectly implied material be considered defamatory? No. The phrase is only an order, wish, or instruction, which is different from making a direct or veiled statement of fact. Even in jurisdictions where a statement of opinion could be actionable, a stated wish of that sort cannot be construed as defamatory. anyone that reads the marketing material would indirectly have a false picture about company X. It depends on the contents of the marketing material, on which you did not elaborate. Persuading the customers on the basis of truthful representations as to why X's product is better than A's does not mean that people have a false image about X. The context and exact wording of someone's statements could amount to omitting and/or juxtaposing facts in a way that conveys some falsity, but your description gives no indications of that being the case here.

It is not a crime in the US. It may be a firing offense depending on the nature of the appointment (that is, what exactly do you mean by "diplomat"?) or at least cause for demotion / reassignment. A diplomat from another country could be declared persona non grata, but again it is not a crime to act contrary to a governmental boycott call, in the US. This follows from the First Amendment.

The simplest method is to demonstrate the falsity of the claims: this is simpler than pursuing punitive action against the opposition because in addition to demonstrate the falsity of the claims, you have to demonstrate willfulness and deceitfulness of the oppositions actions. In reading appellate decisions, you will often encounter statement by the higher court that the losing part urges so-and-so, or that the lower court applied a law or doctrine incorrectly, and they explain why that is in error. Such snippets are an excellent model for rebutting incorrect legal claims, although they are usually just the "executive summary" of the refutation. If one side cites Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 as case-law support for the proposition that courts should defer to the interpretation of government agencies whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute, so long as Congress has not spoken directly to the precise issue at question, a refutation would draw on those decisions to show that the three citations do not support the proposition (in my example, it would be unnecessary to do this because it is patently obvious that this is a wildly irrational argument, but many cases depend on a deeper reading of the case law). Rather than focusing on accusations of gibberish, you could focus on establishing the lack of legal merits behind the opposing side's claim.

What is the advantage of setting up separate IP holding companies? I find that many companies set up separate companies to hold intellectual property. Examples follow: Dunkin' Brands Group, the company which operates the Dunkin' Donuts and Baskin-Robbins chains, has associated intellectual properties assigned to DD IP Holder, LLC and BR IP Holder, LLC, respectively. Gearbox Software, developer of the Borderlands franchise and Battleborn, has associated intellectual properties assigned to IPerion, LLC, and Necromonger, LLC, respectively. What are the advantages of maintaining an IP holding company(ies) separate from the operating company? What disadvantages might there be for doing this? Answers should be in the context of United States law.

Placing assets (real or otherwise) in a holding company separate from the operating company serves a number of purposes. It is a form of insolvency insurance; creditors of the operating company have no recourse on the assets of the holding company. It can be a tax minimization mechanism: The holding company charges a licence fee to the operating company, either splitting profits for a jurisdiction with a progressive tax rate or transferring profits to a tax haven. It can offer different investment profiles: some people want to own IP and collect rent, others want to operate businesses - splitting the functions allows shareholders to take different stakes in each company. This works for both private and public companies.

In the US, trademarks do not need to be registered. The owner of the mark can sue in state court for infringement of the trademark without ever registering. However, there is increased protection and specific benefits to registration. The US Patent and Trademark office (USPTP) PDF publication Basic facts About Trademarks says (on pages 10-11): In the United States, parties are not required to register their marks to obtain protectable rights. You can establish “common law” rights in a mark based solely on use of the mark in Principal Register provides a number of significant advantages over common law rights alone, including: • A legal presumption of your ownership of the mark and your exclusive right to use the mark nationwide on or in connection with the goods/services listed in the registration (whereas a state registration only provides rights within the borders of that one state, and common law rights exist only for the specific area where the mark is used); • Public notice of your claim of ownership of the mark; • Listing in the USPTO’s online databases; • The ability to record the U.S. registration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to prevent importation of infringing foreign goods; • The right to use the federal registration symbol “®”; • The ability to bring an action concerning the mark in federal court; and *The use of the U.S. registration as a basis to obtain registration in foreign countries. The USPTO is supported in part by fees from trademark applications, and obviously wants to promote registration. Registration involves fees, and time and expense in preparing the application. It often involves the services of a trademark lawyer. Many businesses find nit worthwhile. Whether it is a good idea for a particular business is an individual, fact-based, business decision, and I cannot advise on it.

An LLC is a legally distinct entity from your person. Basically, if your LLC is sued, and you lose, you can lose only what you put into your LLC. Your personal assets are untouched. A very sophisticated plaintiff may try to get around this suing both your LLC and you personally. (I've done this myself.) Even so, if you are careful to keep the business of your LLC separate from your personal business (no commingling of assets, no use of your LLC to pay your bills, but only a salary), then the law will often absolve you of personal liability for the "actions" of your LLC. The reason I warn against "commingling" is because if you do this, you can lose the protection of the LLC as a separate entity, and become personally liable for what the LLC does. This is known as "piercing the corporate veil." If you have home rental operations in more than one state, you may want to establish LLC's for each state. That's because some states are more tenant- and other states are more landlord- friendly than others, meaning that you may want to defend yourself differently in one state versus another.

That depends on how you get the ingredient list. If the list is published and not protected by a patent, then anyone is free to use it in making the same or a similar product. If the product is patented and the ingredient list is covered by the patent, and the patent is currently in force, then making a similar product would probably be patent infringement, and the patent holder could sue and collect damages. If the list is secret, and has been protected as a Trade Secret, and if the would-be imitator gets the formula improperly, then the owner of the formula would have valid grounds for a trade secret lawsuit and to collect damages in that suit. Improper means would include breaking into the owner's files, or inducing an employee or contractor to violate a confidentiality agreement. But analyzing the product and figuring out its composition, a form of reverse engineering would be perfectly proper, and would give the formula owner no claim. Similarly, if the owner was careless and allowed the formula to be disclosed, the imitator would have done nothing improper. So the outcome depends on the details of facts not stated in the question.

Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.

The companies really need to speak to an IP lawyer as this question is seeking specific advice which this site is loathe to give out for fear of compouding issues. The answer would depend on the license agreements and enforceability in various jurisdictions. According to https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0368d7ee-0eb3-4e3e-a143-4410969a15bb/eula-for-vs2010?forum=vssetup Microsoft says you cant rent out the software - but this applies to the "Pro" version - I could not find anything on the "Premium" version - so most likely Microsoft to have some clam. The flipside is how enforceable this EULA is - and this would probably vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It would be a very, very good idea to speak to a lawyer before letting Microsoft come onto the premises - as "inviting them" to do this is almost certainly not going to improve the Asians company's case and will allow Microsoft to go fishing further and make it easier for them to expand on and collect evidence should they decide to pursue the matter.

The question is always, would a reasonable customer be confused into thinking that the two are the same, or that there is some relation or sponsorship or attribute to one product or firm the rightful reputation of another. That is always dependent on the specific facts and the specific market involved. So-called "famous" marks get extra protection. The exact markets involved will matter. Any stylizations such as colors and typefaces may matter. Logos may matter. I can't say if one of those specific names would be found to infringe on the other.

You can't You agreed: by submitting Materials in any form to the Company, in addition to other provisions of the Terms, you automatically grant Company a royalty-free, world-wide, irrevocable, non-exclusive, and assignable right and license to use, copy, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, edit, translate, create derivative works from, transmit, distribute, publicly display and publicly perform such Materials for the purpose of displaying and promoting the Materials on any website operated by, and in any related marketing materials produced by, the Company and its affiliates. They can keep and use your data forever and give it to whoever they want. The clause you quote doesn't alter that. All it says is that once a year, if you ask, they will tell you what information they shared and with whom. If they feel like it they will tell you how to get the information deleted.

Why are judges allowed to read news and media opinions? I find it interesting that apparently judges are allowed to read news and opinions about the litigation in front of them, whereas juries would not be. Why is there such a distinction, and are there any limitations to ensure fair rulings? For example, this is regarding Citing previous Malibu Media’s sheer abuse of court process, New York judge denies early discovery (via DSLR: King v. TWC), where the judge apparently cites some industry study about copyright trolls, and explicitly names the plaintiff as such, denying its motions and dropping the lawsuit.

Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare

This seems to be a mix of question about law and a meta-question about this site, but I'll treat it as an on-topic question about law. The author of a question, or answer, owns the copyright to their contributions, and they can re-publish to their heart's content. Any user who posts here grants a license to SE and other users to use content posted here, so I don't have to ask you permission to quote you. As part of the permission granted by SE to use this website, you have agreed to "follow the rules" set by SE. There are many rules, some spelled out more clearly that others. For example, if you post a question, you indirectly agreed that your content can be upvoted or down-voted. Certain content can be "closed" and deleted, when the content is deemed to violate the rules in particular ways (is spam, porn, abuse, or judged to be poor-quality). Judgment (on different matters) can be rendered by community managers, moderators, or other users. The agreement is here, see especially here. If we take the post that you linked to, it is quite possible that it was deleted because it is not a general legal question, in violation of the acceptable use policy. If you want a historical analysis of your particular case, it should be asked on Law Meta.

Judges don't have timesheet entries (and are often expressly excluded from FOIA obligations). They get paid salaries and are expected to work hard enough to clear their dockets in reasonable periods of time, however long that takes. If you wanted a more direct evidentiary estimate, you could estimate that a judge and his clerk together probably work 90-120 hours a week, figure out how many trials and hearings of what length were conducted and deduct that time spent on that from the total, and then divide the remaining hours by the number of opinions one can estimate that the judge wrote (or better yet, a reasonable estimate of the number of pages of opinions that one can estimate that the judge wrote). Typically, a lot of the legal research grunt work and more boilerplate parts of an opinion are written by the law clerk under some general instructions from the judge, with the judge writing the more substantive sections personally and heavily (or lightly, depending upon the quality of the law clerk) revising the draft opinion as a whole. The longer the opinion, the more likely it is that a substantial portion of it was written by the law clerk. For similar kinds of legal writing (e.g. appellate briefs and motions for summary judgment and proposed orders or written closing arguments) one to six hours per page from all professionals working on the document would be in the right ballpark. Judicial opinions come with some efficiencies, because once a judge decides a point of law or reaches a factual conclusion it doesn't have to be belabored in the same way that a litigant who isn't sure if their reasoning will be persuasive or not must. But, judicial opinions also typically have to spell out a greater proportion of legal and factual foundation for the end analysis that isn't hotly contested, will summarize all of the material points from the evidence presented in the case, and will frequently also recap in some detail the arguments made by the advocates for both sides of the case before actually engaging with those arguments in an analysis section. On balance, those factors probably pretty much balance out. If the judicial opinion is shorter, elegantly written, contains pithy turns of phrase, and/or contains lots of legal citations or factual analysis not raised by either party, it is probably closer to five or six hours per page or more. If the opinion is longer, has a rote and mechanical feel to it, and has very little factual analysis or references to law not mentioned by the parties, it is probably closer to one hour per page or even less. When some of these factors go one way, and other of these factors go the other way, it is probably in between in terms of hours per page. This said, sometimes it takes a judge a long time to write an opinion, but the end product is very short and elegant. In these situations, often what happened is that the judge and the judge's clerk spent lots and lots of hours writing a long and detailed first draft, then got an insight that provided a much more efficient and succinct way to reach a resolution to the case. In those circumstances, there would be dozens or scores of hours of work that went into the discarded first draft, only to be superseded by a half a dozen or dozen hours devoted to a much shorter final draft. In those cases, the final draft of the opinion might be ten or twenty hours per page or more once you include the time spent on the discarded draft. Of course, another factor is that some judges are just more efficient legal writers than others, and some judges have more familiarity with some areas of law than others. A opinion that might take one judge twenty hours to write might take another judge presiding over the very same case and producing an opinion of the same length and quality a hundred hours to write. The opinion in Meads v. Meads was 176 pages. If I had to make a best guess, I'd estimate that it probably took about 600 hours to write, probably about two-thirds of which was law clerk hours and probably about one-third of which was judge time.

We cannot and will not try to answer "what should i do?" questions here. Nothing in the linked page makes me think that the views expressed in the previous question here are any less correct. They certainly have not changed the law on copyright. The linked page is an open forum. Many of the posts o9n that thread express ill-informed and incorrect views of how copyright works, and what it protects. Several google searchs find no trace of the suit described in the thread. Note that in US law no copyright claim may be heard in a small claims court, except for the federal copyright office's small claims tribunal. I am not sure if the same is true in Canada, but it might be that the suit was simply dismissed on such a basis. In any case small claims cases do not establish legal precedents in Canada or the US. Of course it is true that anyone can sue over almost anything, even when there is no valid legal basis for the suit. If the suit had been won by the claimant, or even settled that would be larger grounds for worry. A person seriously worried over publishing a book such as that described in the question might do well to consult a lawyer with relevant expertise. A single consultation plus an opinion letter might not cost very much. But 17 USC 102 (b) is very clear that copyright never protects facts, as are the copyright laws of other countries. Note that reports of the events of sports matches are not protected by copyright, although expressive language and analysis may be. 17 USC 102 (b) reads: (b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. Article 2 paragraph (8) of the Berne Copyright Convention provides that: (8) The protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information. There seems little room for copyright protection of the moves of chess games.

In any court, there will be situations where a judge has discretion to make some decision. The judge might have to decide "did X meet the burden of proof", and due to the situation two reasonable and competent judges could come to different conclusions. You couldn't blame either for the decision, even though they would make opposite decisions. On the other hand, a judge might make gross mistakes. The judge might decide "X met the burden of proof" when this is clearly a mistake. That's what the appellate court is interested in. An appellate court checks whether the judge made mistakes that a judge shouldn't make. So in this situation, the appellate court doesn't decide whether X met the burden of proof. The appellate judge decides "did the trial judge make a decision that a trial judge shouldn't have made". An appellate judge might think to himself or herself: "well, I would have decided differently, but this trial judge’s decision was one that a reasonable judge could have made", and if that is what he or she thinks, the original decision will stay intact.

It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.

united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a "motion in limine" or a "motion to suppress". If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, "I object". If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge "sustains" the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge "overrules" the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is "received" into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say "guilty" or "not guilty" with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a "verdict" and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is "not guilty" on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is "guilty" the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an "error". The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an "error" if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that "error" possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way.

This is a question of civil procedure more so than law. The customs and practices of civil procedure are established by legal precedent, not laws made by legislatures. In general, a witness can answer a question however they want as long as it is responsive to the question. Litigators will attempt to bully a witness into certain types of answers, but this is not "illegal" nor is it "illegal" for witnesses to craft their answers as they like. As for yes-no bullying there are two general cases: (1) The question is factual. If the questioner asks a purely factual question, like "Did you go to the factory on that Tuesday?" then a yes-no answer can be compelled. If the witness tries to explain why he went to the factory, or something, then he can be cut off, because he is being unresponsive. (2) The question is hypothetical. If the question is hypothetical or suppositional, then the witness can reject the question. For example, if the question, "You told your boss that you hated your wife, isn't that right?" In this case the witness can answer, "I reject the question, the prosecutor is putting words in my mouth." or can say "I resent the implication." or "That does not accurately reflect what happened." or whatever. Any time a question "paints a picture" or establishes something hypothetical and simply asks the witness to agree with the fantasy scenario, the witness can refuse to answer, or can answer with a counter scenario which they consider to be more accurate. I would add that in case (2) where a questioner tries to paint a false scenario, it is a risky move, because it opens the door for the witness to say whatever they want. For example, imagine this exchange in the courtroom: Prosecutor: "You told your boss that you hate your wife, isn't that right?" Witness: "What actually happened is..." Prosecutor: "That is a yes or no question, answer yes or no." Witness (to judge): "Your honor, the question mischaracterizes the conversation I had with my boss, I want to explain what actually was said." Judge: "The witness may proceed with his answer." Prosecutor: "I withdraw the question." Defender: "The prosecution has opened the door, let the witness answer." Judge: "The witness will answer the question." So, now the witness has permission to answer however he likes, and the prosecutor has blundered by making a vague question that created the situation where that was possible. The main thing a witness has to do is not try to say irrelevant things or try to add information beyond what was asked for, in that case the questioner can cut them off.

Is occupation distinct from "source of income"? As per California Government Code, section 12955, it's illegal to discriminate housing accommodation based on the source of income. However, what about the occupation itself? For example, is it possible to have an apartment complex dedicated to those in the field of engineering? Or where all occupants are engaged in (unrelated) technical startups?

The Code defines "Source of income" as: lawful, verifiable income paid directly to a tenant or paid to a representative of a tenant. There's nothing to suggest that the occupation is a relevant consideration otherwise. What it would mean is that if the occupation of a person is relevant to their source of income, it would be illegal to discriminate on that basis. I would consider occupation distinct from source of income - I could (but don't) have a family trust that is my source of income, and my occupation is volunteer work. My occupation is very clearly not my source of income.

This is an open question. California's Unruh Act prohibits discrimination in public accommodations on the basis of political affiliation. This same issue has come up previously, in a case where four neo-Nazis showed up wearing swastika pins at a German restaurant. When they refused to remove the pins, the restaurant called the police to remove them. The Nazis sued the restaurant under the Unruh Act, which prohibits various forms of discrimination in public accommodations (restaurants, hotels, etc.) Although the Unruh Act does not specifically mention discrimination on the basis of political ideology, the California Supreme Court has interpreted its list of classes as describing, not limiting, the classes eligible for protection, which it has also explicitly said include political affiliation: Whether the exclusionary policy rests on the alleged undesirable propensities of those of a particular race, nationality, occupation, political affiliation, or age, in this context the Unruh Act protects individuals from such arbitrary discrimination. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 726 (1982). Based on these interpretations, the trial court refused to dismiss the Nazis' case against the restaurant, and the parties eventually settled without going to trial. Read commentary about the case here. So it seems clear that the Unruh Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of political affiliation. Because wearing a swastika indicates that you affiliate with the National Socialist German Workers' Party or one of its offshoots, the Unruh Act probably prohibits a business from discriminating against customers on the basis of wearing a swastika. But federal law may pre-empt the Unruh Act. But the problem doesn't end there, because intepreting the law that was creates potential conflicts with federal public-accommodations law, employment law, and the First Amendment. For instance, federal law prohibits the creation of a "hostile environment" in terms of both providing public accommodations on equal terms regardless of race, and in terms of equal employment opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proving a hostile environment can be pretty difficult, but if you could demonstrate that allowing swastikas on premises created a hostile environment for customers or employees, you'd then have a strong Supremacy Clause argument that the Unruh Act can't be enforced to require the admission of swastika-wearing customers. Beyond that, businesses have First Amendment rights on generally the same terms as natural humans. There's a reasonable argument to be made that those businesses, in banning swastikas, are communicating a First Amendment-protected anti-Nazi message, or that they are exercising their right to control who speaks in the forum that they control. If the court were to accept either of those arguments, it would again mean that the Unruh Act probably could not be enforced to benefit those wearing swastikas.

could this mean my employer owns the idea and anything I develop --since I would use the same technology for my idea that I do at work? No, unless by "technology" you mean the employer's materials or resources (see condition 3 of the clause). Your remark that "this is completely and utterly unrelated to [employer's] business model" survives items 1 and 2. Likewise, working on your idea outside hours survives the corresponding part of item 3. Would this also mean that any open-source software I develop outside of work automatically belongs to my employer? No, unless the software you develop is "based on [your] knowledge [etc.] of (COMPANY)".

As a adult of sound mind, you are responsible for your actions. Background checks for job applications are common place to determine suitability. The employers have the right (and responsibility) to choose what is in their best interest. If through your previous and present actions, they come to the conclusion that you will become a liability to their interests, they will determine that you are not suitable for the position. Not being suitable for a position is not a discrimination, but a determination of fact. Rights and responsibilities go hand in hand. The same is true for the employers. They too have the obligation to act in their own that of their other employees that of their clients interests. In cases where a judge comes to a conclusion that the rights of others are being impeaded, they will most likely decide for that party. It is unlikely that a judge will assume that an individual is the center of the universe and that everyone else must revolve around that individual.

The Dept. of Labor makes it easy for you: as they say, it is illegal discrimination. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), Civil Rights Center (CRC), is charged with enforcing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-16, which prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin, as it applies to employees and applicants for employment at DOL. National origin discrimination can involve treating applicants for employment or employees of DOL unfavorably because of their actual or perceived place of birth, country of origin, ancestry, native language, accent, or because they are perceived as looking or sounding "foreign."... National origin discrimination can also include disparate treatment because of a person's accent

There appears to be no "oppressive child labor" occurring and therefore no breach of labor laws. The definition of oppressive child labor expressly excludes employment by "a parent or a person standing in place of a parent" except in identified hazardous occupations; gardening not being one of those. Notwithstanding, schooling in California is compulsory between the ages of 6 and 18 subject to a number of exemptions which the person concerned may or may not have. If you are concerned about this you should contact the Department of Education.

Usual disclaimer: I'm not a lawyer. If you are serious about proceeding with this, talk to a lawyer who specialises in this kind of thing. I imagine that you will need to provide proof of the above incidents in order for any legal action to succeed. Accessing a tenant's room without notice or permission, and without a very good reason (e.g. a gas leak) is likely to be classed as harassment; specifically, "acts calculated to interfere with the peace or comfort of the residential occupier". Renting out your room and removing your belongings before the end of a tenancy is likely to be illegal eviction. Both of these are criminal offences under the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Shelter mentions that it's normally local authorities, rather than the police or individuals, who carry out prosecutions under this act (see also: Shelter articles, Landlord Law Blog articles), so you might want to start there. There is also the matter of civil action, including for breach of contract. For that, consider speaking to a lawyer.

The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.

If Person A gets permission to use Person B's computer, but uses it for illegal activities, who is held liable? I had this idea to make a network where people can get paid to let other people use their computer for computing purposes. Let's say they got permission to use Person B's computer under terms and conditions, basically saying: "I will not do anything illegal using this computer." And they agreed upon the terms. But Person A used Person B's computer to do something illegal like, let's say, distributing paid music for free (without permission) using that computer as a server, so they are violating copyright law. But how can one say "Person B is innocent!" in a valid way, before they have to even leave for court. Oh, and Person A and Person B both have unlimited liability.

This is likely to depend on whether Person B is aware of what Person A is doing, regardless of any imputations Person A makes as to the nature of their business. If Person B is aware, or it is found that Person B ought to have been aware, that Person A is doing something illegal, then they may be held contributorily liable for damages suffered. For instance, in (what is still) a landmark case for copyright infringement, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), Napster was found to be contributorily guilty of copyright infringement. A defense that they attempted is they weren't aware of it - which was thrown out on the basis that they should have, and could have, known that it was happening. I'm not a lawyer, but you'll need to give a lot more information about the situation for liability to be determined. Oh, and also — both of them could be held liable. It's not necessarily a case of one or the other.

Yes The relevant legal concepts are copyright, contract law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. You are liable to be sued by the people affected for damages and/or be prosecuted by the government for the felony under either or both laws. Let's start here: "I bought a game". No, you didn't; you bought a licence to use the software in accordance with the terms of service (licence) that you freely agreed to. All modern ToS will not allow you to reverse engineer the software. If you breach those terms of service then you have broken a contract - that is what allows them to sue you. They will no doubt argue that the prevalence of cheat routines developed by people like you reduce the number of people willing to play the game - say 100,000 users x $10/month * 12 months = $12,000,000. They will also ask the court to impose punitive damages to discourage this sort of thing. Which brings us to the copyright violation. You are allowed to copy their software provided you comply with the ToS. But you didn't. Therefore you are in breach of the Copyright Act and subject to additional civil and criminal sanctions. Finally, your "cheats" access their servers in a way that the ToS doesn't authorize. This puts you in breach of the CFFA - breaking this carries serious jail time penalties. Not to mention that in the US, a criminal conviction will preclude you from many jobs, including, naturally, any with access to company computer systems. Putting aside the illegalities, cheats are unethical and ruin the game experience for hundreds of thousands of people who don't use cheats. You are a criminal - stop being one!

"Public domain" refers to things in principle copyrightable but where protection has lapsed, been repudiated, or is a statutory exception (such as government works). A website is not "in the public domain". The idea that a website is "public property" is (*cough*) mistaken. There are basically two ways in which a web interaction could be illegal. The first regards whether accessing another person's computer is illegally accessing a computer, which is a crime. Authorization essentially comes down to "permission": if the owner permits me to access the computer, I am authorized. Putting stuff out there on a web server is an open-ended grant of permission to look at a web page. That simply means that if I create a web page (with a bunch of links or not), I am granting you permission to interact with my computer to that extent. It does not create permission to hack into a password-protected subdirectory. An ordinary web crawler automates what a clicking human does. Copyright law is also relevant, in that the stuff I put on my webpage is not to be copied without permission. Any webpage access necessarily involves automatic copying from machine to machine: in putting stuff out there for the world to see, I am saying that the world can do that level of automatic copying that arises from normal html-and-click interactions. It does not mean that you can download and do stuff with my copyrighted content (i.e., it is not an abandonment of copyright: I did not put that stuff in the public domain). Putting a web page out there in an unrestricted fashion means that you've given a certain level of permission to "copy" (at least in the automatic server-to-browser viewing sense). I may want to impose conditions on peoples' access to my stuff, so I can impose terms on such material. For instance, I may require users to agree to certain conditions before accessing the CoolStuff subdirectory. Users then have to jump through a minor hoop and agree to those terms. In that case, my permission is conditional, and if you violate the terms of that agreement, I may be able to sue you for copyright infringement. It could then be a violation of my terms of service (TOS) if I say "you may not crawl my website" (in less vague language). A TOS gets its legal power from copyright law, because every webpage interaction involves copying (I assume that technical point is obvious), and copying can only be done with permission. You may technologically overcome my weak click-through technology so that the bot just says "sure whatever" and proceeds to illegally use my web page: I can sue you now for copyright infringement. The robot-specific methods of meta-tags and robots.txt have no legal force. Although there is a way to say "no you may not," which is tailored to automated access, the meaning and enforcement of these devices has not yet reached the law. If my page uses NOFOLLOW and your program doesn't know or care, you (your program) do not (yet) have a duty to understand, detect and respect that tag. Prior registration is also not a legal requirement, and very many pages that are on the master crawl list get there from being linked to by someone else's web page. Again, there is at present no legal requirement of pre-registration (and there is no effective mechanism for verifying that the site owner has registered the site). Archiving and especially re-displaying someone's content is, on the other hand, not legal. It would be plainly copyright infringement if you were to scoop up someone else's webpage and host it. You can analyze their material and somehow associate it with some search terms, and display a link to that page, but you cannot copy and republish their material. You can put very short snippets out there taken from a web page, under the "fair use" doctrine, but you can't wholesale republish a webpage. (It should be noted that the archive.org is an internationally recognized library, and libraries have extra statutory powers to archive).

Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.

It is not possible to say that this is generally fair use, although sometimes it would be. A copy for personal use is still a copyright right violation on its face, and fair use does not categorically exclude non-commercial or personal use of copyrighted works. It is a highly fact specific inquiry. The likelihood of anyone discovering that you have done so and deciding to sue over it is slight, but that doesn't mean that there isn't potential copyright infringement liability. Compare this to speeding. People do it all the time, and even driving one mile per hour above the speed limit is still a traffic violation. But it is rare for less serious violations to be ticketed.

Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.

It turns out that there is no difference between the ethical answer and the legal answer, in this case. The law recognizes the property right which a person has when they create a thing, such as a font, and that right is encoded in the law of copyright. The relevant US federal code is contained in Title 17, which you can read (essentially identical laws exist in virtually or perhaps actually all countries). The important thing to understand is that there is not a distinction between "privately" trespassing on a person's property and "publicly" trespassing on a person's property. The violation of the owner's property rights comes from taking the material without consent. There is a legally-recognized exception to the owner's rights, in the form of "fair use", which is widely misunderstood to mean "if it's not for profit, the property owner has no legal protection". Simply taking and using someone else's IP non-commercially is not "fair use".

I'm not sure it makes sense to talk about having "jurisdiction" over an IP address, for the purposes you're discussing. If you wanted to sue the IP address itself--something that is possible under limited circumstances--then you might need to locate it for jurisdictional purposes. But I don't think that's what you're talking about. You're talking about taking civil or criminal action against the people who are using the IP address to commit crimes. What matters, in that case, is not a theoretical legal question about the location of an IP address. It's questions like: where do these people live? Where do the people downloading the illegal content live? Where are the physical servers located? ("In the cloud" is not an answer--there are physical servers somewhere making up that cloud). For jurisdictional purposes, the chair they're sitting in when they upload the illegal data, and the location of the AC power outlet the physical server is plugged into, are as important as, if not more important than, the metaphysical "location" of the IP address of the server.

Does "so as to" limit the application of a permission, or define it as a possible use case I have been asked to sign an employment agreement which includes The Employee irrevocably appoints the Employer as the Employee’s lawful and authorised attorney to sign a document or do any thing and generally to use the Employee’s name so as to give to the Employer the full benefit of this clause. in the clause relating to Intellectual Property. My main concern here is that so as to reads to me as if it was an example of possible usage, and not a limitation of authorisation. Something along the lines of "appoint us as your attorney so we can sign paperwork, such as those required for this clause, on your behalf." Using the example from https://english.stackexchange.com/a/129573 Ensure that the firewall is properly configured so as to prevent an attacker from infiltrating our network. could seem to support this since a "properly configured firewall" can do more than just protect your network from infiltration. If the phrase for the purposes of was used instead it would read as though authorisation was being granted, but would be restricted to this one specific use case. In terms of legal documents (and probably everywhere else?) does so as to restrict the authorisation to only the provided purpose?

Contractual terms must always be read in context. Given the context, it is unlikely that the term could support the definition that you are worried about. It is clear that the purpose of you appointing the company as your attorney is to allow them to perfect the IP rights you have given them by the other parts of the clause; not to allow them to sell your house or make end-of-life decisions. If you are worried about it, ask them what they mean and ask for the clause to be clarified to your satisfaction.

Use of SE is subject to the terms and conditions specified here. Section 3 says "You agree that all Subscriber Content that You contribute to the Network is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Exchange under the Creative Commons Attribution Share Alike license." That means that your contributions can be used forever. That means the stuff is there, end of story. Section 11 on Termination says "Stack Exchange may also terminate, block, or suspend any and all Services and access to the Network immediately, without prior notice or liability, in its sole discretion, for any reason or no reason at all, including but not limited to any Subscriber breaches of any of the terms or conditions of this Agreement". That means you can be banned. So, yes, what they did is legal.

Assuming Chegg own the copyright, then they can restrict the activities that copyright protects The statement you quote is no more or less than the rights granted to them by copyright law. Basically, it's their stuff, they get to decide how you can use it. However, that does not necessarily mean that the uses that you have nominated are prohibited. For that, we would have to look at the specific fair use or fair dealing exemptions to copyright protection where you are. It's likely that both of your usage scenarios would meet fair use and probably fair dealing (which is harder to meet). You may also find that, buried somewhere in those massive terms of use, is something that deals with this directly.

There is no general answer: it's a state-by-state question. Texas Occupations Code 1001.301(b) says that a person may not, unless the person holds a license issued under this chapter, directly or indirectly use or cause to be used as a professional, business, or commercial identification, title, name, representation, claim, asset, or means of advantage or benefit any of, or a variation or abbreviation of, the following terms: (1) “engineer” etc. You cannot call yourself that, in Texas. Subsection (f) provides for an exemption: Notwithstanding the other provisions of this chapter, a regular employee of a business entity who is engaged in engineering activities but is exempt from the licensing requirements of this chapter under Sections 1001.057 (Employee of Private Corporation or Business Entity) or 1001.058 (Employee of Certain Utilities or Affiliates) is not prohibited from using the term “engineer” on a business card, cover letter, or other form of correspondence that is made available to the public if the person does not: (1) offer to the public to perform engineering services; or (2) use the title in any context outside the scope of the exemption in a manner that represents an ability or willingness to perform engineering services or make an engineering judgment requiring a licensed professional engineer. 1001.057 does allow an exception for "products manufactured by the entity", which under the law includes computer software. Whether or not (1) and (2) apply to a given employee / business depends on what they do: you can't open up a code-writing shop for the public and use the term "engineer", but you can be a software engineer for Shell Oil. In Washington, RCW 18.43.010 says that it shall be unlawful for any person to practice or to offer to practice in this state, engineering or land surveying, as defined in the provisions of this chapter, or to use in connection with his or her name or otherwise assume, use, or advertise any title or description tending to convey the impression that he or she is a professional engineer or a land surveyor, unless such a person has been duly registered under the provisions of this chapter. which is not as clear as Texas law (I would not have thought that a "software engineer" is a "professional engineer". The term "professional engineer" is defined in RCW 18.43.020 as a person who, by reason of his or her special knowledge of the mathematical and physical sciences and the principles and methods of engineering analysis and design, acquired by professional education and practical experience, is qualified to practice engineering as defined in this section, as attested by his or her legal registration as a professional engineer. Having kicked the can down the road a bit, "professional engineering" is defined as any professional service or creative work requiring engineering education, training, and experience and the application of special knowledge of the mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences to such professional services or creative work as consultation, investigation, evaluation, planning, design, and supervision of construction for the purpose of assuring compliance with specifications and design, in connection with any public or private utilities, structures, buildings, machines, equipment, processes, works, or projects. If "software engineering" is a kind of "professional engineering", you must register, and here are the requirements, which ultimately refers you to the PE Electrical and Computer exam, which includes EE-type stuff that probably few software engineers know, and some software-related stuff including general computer architecture that is also not general knowledge among computer programmers. Judging from advertisements for "software engineer" position in Washington, jobs state qualifications as as having a degree and knowledge of software, but not possession of a license or being registered as a "professional engineer" (and the exams only happen twice a year so it's not a trivially satisfiable formality). Either there is a massive conspiracy to mislead applicant or scoff at the law or, more likely, software engineers in Washington are not considered to be "professional engineers". This includes huge numbers of jobs with Microsoft, which are open to students who are years from being able to satisfy the 8-year experience requirement.

To use an API over a network connection (as opposed to, e.g., the Windows API), a user communicates a request to the API host, or server, and awaits a response. The host of the remote API can refuse to serve requests from users for probably any reason. Such services often require users to accept a license as a condition of using the service, and they may charge a fee as a condition of the license. A license to use a service is obviously not necessarily bound to a license for the use of its source code, just as the ability to reach the service is not dependent on the ability to see (let alone use) the code in any format, whether it be the source code or some compiled form of the code. In essence, source licenses and service licenses have different primary goals, at least inasmuch as the source license seeks to restrict someone who has actual physical access to compiled code, and possibly source code. Service licenses do not have that concern, though I have seen service licenses that also prohibit decompiling. This is probably the result of a CYA attitude among lawyers: the language is already in the standard software license text, and it doesn't hurt anything to leave it in, and it could help if a service user somehow managed to download the program code.

That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: "it describes the goals", "it does not contain any promises", "it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to". If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.

On what grounds would you sue? Contract Well, I think that you would struggle to find the necessary elements (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) In particular, you would struggle to prove that there was intention to create legal relations on their part and possibly on yours. Are you able to identify in your "back & forth" a clear, unequivocal offer and acceptance? Without knowing the details of the "back & forth": I was hoping that someone at $organization might be willing to write an article explaining what you do, the history of the organization and how it works appears on the face of it to be a request for a gift; not an offer to treat. Promissory Estoppel If you don't have a contract then it is possible (IMO unlikely) that they induced you by your actions to commit resources (your time in writing) in anticipation of a reward (them publishing what you wrote). To be estopped they would have to have known that you were writing the article in the expectation that it would have your organisation's name in it, that they did not intend for that to happen and that they allowed you to invest those resources notwithstanding. If you can prove all of that then you can require them to do what they promised. The big difficulty I see in this is did you tell them that a) you were writing the article, b) it would have your name in it and c) you expected it to be published in that form. Copyright If they publish the work or a derivative work without your permission you can sue for breach of copyright. As it stands, they probably have an implied licence to publish and you would need to explicitly revoke that. Options There are two reasons to go to court: Money Principle If you are going to court for money then this is at best a risky investment and at worst a gamble: balance your risk and reward carefully. If you are going to court for a principle then I simultaneously admire your principles and think you're an idiot. Make a deal Explain that the reason that you wrote the article was a) to support their fine publication and the fantastic work it does (even if you don't) and b) to garner good publicity for your organisation. You understand and admire their strong editorial stance (especially if you don't) but the article involved a considerable amount of work and could they see their way clear to give you a significant discount (~80%) on a full page ad facing the article.

Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.

Public domain status of works by the state of Texas Stuff written by employees of the US government as part of their employment are supposed to be public domain simply because they're a US government employee, per Wikipedia. So what about for the state of Texas? More specifically, what about student publications like The Daily Texan that are owned by a state-owned university?

The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.

Copyright protection exists for any work (picture, paragraph, song etc), and persists for many years until it expires. Unless the work was created a long time ago, or was created by the US government (not the same as "funded by government money"), you should assume that the work is protected. That means that you must have permission to copy it. Sometimes, a work has associated with it some such permission, in the form of a "license". Without such a license, you have to request the copyright owner for permission to copy – whether or not they say that the work is protected by copyright (because by law it is protected, so they don't have to say that it is). If you request permission to copy, and do not receive the required permission, then you cannot legally copy the work. The copyright holder has no obligation to explicitly deny permission. You can certainly list the URL for an image, you just cannot copy the image in your book.

What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.

You would need a court order to force them to take it down. There is virtually no chance a court will order them to take it down, because it would be almost impossible to do so without violating the First Amendment. You would have to prove that forcing a publisher to stop saying that you teach at the university would advance some compelling governmental interest, and that there isn't a better way to advance that interest. It's not clear what you mean by "cyberstalking," but if you're talking about someone sending you harassing messages, then the court would probably conclude that the better option would be to punish the harasser, rather than limit the publisher's speech. You could try paying them off or sending a threatening legal demand, but I doubt either would go far. I suspect that the best course would be a persistent campaign to escalate up their chain of command to find a sympathetic person willing to help. Even that, though, I would expect to be tough, because I'm sure you wouldn't be the first person trying this.

The various seals of the United States Government aren't governed by copyright but by 18 U.S. Code § 713. Section a covers the great seal of the United States (emphasis mine): Whoever knowingly displays any printed or other likeness of the great seal of the United States, or of the seals of the President or the Vice President of the United States, or the seal of the United States Senate, or the seal of the United States House of Representatives, or the seal of the United States Congress, or any facsimile thereof, in, or in connection with, any advertisement, poster, circular, book, pamphlet, or other publication, public meeting, play, motion picture, telecast, or other production, or on any building, monument, or stationery, for the purpose of conveying, or in a manner reasonably calculated to convey, a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the Government of the United States or by any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. Based on a plain reading of the law, it would seem that you are allowed to reproduce the seal so long as you do not do it in such a way that would convey approval by the government to do so. If you actually intend to do this, you may consider checking with a competent attorney to make sure your use does not "convey a false impression of sponsorship." Note that this only applies to the great seal, the rest of the section covers the seals of the President, Vice President and the houses of Congress and specifically requires approval by an appropriate entity before reproduction of those seals, depending on the context.

I presume that Dad will check with the college attorneys, so this is for information purposes only. Smith v. Daily Mail 443 U.S. 97 concerns a newspaper which published the name of a minor arrested for allegedly murdering someone (having legally obtained that information). SCOTUS held that The State cannot, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's name lawfully obtained by a newspaper. The asserted state interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender to further his rehabilitation cannot justify the statute's imposition of criminal sanctions for publication of a juvenile's name lawfully obtained There was a state law prohibiting a newspaper from publishing a minor's name involved in a criminal proceeding – it specifically singled out newspapers, hence the holding includes the mention of newspapers, but the footnotes in the case indicate that they "don't need to go there" (the equal protection question was unanswered), because "First Amendment rights prevail over the State's interest in protecting juveniles". The First Amendment right would be the same, applied to video, and classroom use.

There are limits to what you are allowed to modify on your car. Federal safety regulations require certain features to be installed by the manufacturer, and to be maintained by the owner in a state that they remain functional. Besides obvious things like brakes, you need working headlights, turn signals, bumpers, wipers, etc. Heated seats is an option. A luxury convenience feature. Most cars don't have heated seats. If you had heated seats, but left them off or the switch broke and they weren't working, there would be no reason for the State Patrol to care one bit that your rump was a bit chilly. So, the state doesn't care enough make it illegal to have heated seats or not. It is entirely your choice. The question then becomes, does the state have any reason to care whether you have a manual switch to turn them on or off, or use a special software code to enable the feature? Logic dictates that if they don't care whether or not you have the feature, and don't care if you are using it or not, they would have not reason to care about the particular method you use to turn it on or off... Therefore the only real question is does BMW care? They might, if you came up with a method of enabling heat without a subscription and it became known to them. Especially if you made money publishing a how-to guide that cost them potential revenue. But that would be a civil, rather than a criminal matter. To me this action would be equivalent to buying a burger at a place that charges $.25 for a packet of ketchup, and instead using your own ketchup. It's your burger, and your ketchup, do what you want! ADDENDUM: Based on discussion on the other answer, as well as a suggestion in comments, I would like to briefly address (my opinion) on the applicability of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DCMA) of 1998. I actually just looked up this act, and have only a layman's understanding of copyright law, but there is a basic element that needs to be met for a violation to occur: The copyrighted material must be reproduced, altered, repurposed, and distributed in some manner. Private avoidance or selective non-use of a digital feature would not seem to rise to that level. I touched on this above when I alluded to publishing a written hack. It would probably also apply if you offered code that would bypass a feature, or to a car tuner offering to enable the feature for a fee. If there is a commercial benefit, there is a potential "victim", and a copyright issue. However, even code is questionable... There are many examples of companies offering aftermarket Engine Control Module code to enhance performance or improve gas mileage. Of course a manufacturer could always challenge a commercial competitor, but lawsuits cause money and create publicity - positive and negative. About the only "free" enforcement tool a manufacturer has is to not honor the warranty on any owner altered parts. Of note is the fact that seat heating elements are not digital, copyrighted, or otherwise protected work. The digital intellectual property that MIGHT potentially be at the center of a copyright controversy is the function of the pay system and the processing of an access code that unlocks a relay. What that relay sends electrical current to is really immaterial. It could be your stereo, it could be the airbag... One person snipping and splicing wire to avoid the IP "brain" and install a simple on/off switch or rheostat for personal use of seat heat should not be violation of any digital copyright law.

If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you "Write a novel" and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios & Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court.

Sexually Discriminatory Uniform In my school/sixth form the uniform policy states that girls are not allowed to wear trousers and boys are not allowed to wear skirts. Despite multiple attempts to come to a civil solution to this situation we, the student council, have failed to get this amended so that it does not discriminate. Surely in this day and age such discrimination cannot be legal in the UK? Do we have any legal grounds under which we can formally challenge the school about this blatantly sexist policy?

The answer is a clear maybe. See https://www.gov.uk/discrimination-your-rights/types-of-discrimination Discriminating on the basis of sex is illegal, however, applying different rules on uniforms is probably not discrimination under the law. To be discriminatory it must put the class of person at an unfair disadvantage, be harassment or victimisation. You would have to demonstrate that refusing to allow females to wear trousers puts them at an unfair disadvantage (and vice versa because these are separate discriminations) - victimisation is not an issue here, harassment might be but it would have to be actually happening. You should look at things like comfort, practicality, sports, play etc.; the problem is that the better your argument for girls the worse it is for boys.😓 The steps you can take are spelled out in the link, starting with communicating with the organisation. So marshal your arguments and write them a letter and then move on to mediation. At the very least you should get an insight into why they oppose your position. If you deal constructively with their concerns you may get what you want.

In the UK, no offence is committed, however many public locations cite the Data Protection Act 1998 as a reason to stop people taking pictures. DPA does not mention this topic at all, and is a red herring (however informing the location of this is unlikely to help, I have discovered) In fact, in the UK, the only laws that appear to exist cover either specific locations and properties (eg military installations) or using photography to take pictures of individuals in areas where they have an expectation of privacy. The Photographer's Rights Guide published by digitalcameraworld in 2012 is still current as far as I can see. It has this specific guidance: Photographers Rights: Taking Pictures of People in Public Are you breaking any law when you’re taking pictures of people in public? Probably not, but the position under UK law is uncertain. There are currently no general privacy laws under UK law, but the UK courts must take into account the European Convention on Human Rights, which gives everyone the right to respect for their private and family life. As this is an area of law that has been developing rapidly over the last few years, it is hard to be certain what will constitute an infringement. The key issue is whether the place the image is taken is one where a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, it has been suggested that the right of privacy of a child could be infringed by publishing a photo of them with their parents in a public street. It is therefore advisable to be careful when taking photos intended for publication, even where the subject matter is in a public place. Failure to obtain a model release for the use of an image will certainly make it harder to sell the picture to stock libraries. Photographing children The same laws apply to adult and child subjects, but a child does not have the legal capacity to consent and a parent or guardian must therefore do so on their behalf. Be aware that schools, leisure centres and places where children and adults gather usually have their own photography restrictions. Although decent photos of children (see our tips for better pictures of babies, children and teenagers) taken in a public place may be fine for non-commercial use, seek permission from the child’s parents or guardians and don’t shoot covertly with a long lens. For commercial images, you’ll need to get a model release signed by the parents. Also read the section on the powers of police and security guards.

No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.

The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.

This is largely a matter of state law. In California, for example, this would be plainly unlawful (my emphasis): All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status, or sexual orientation are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. (Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 51) Other states may define "business" more narrowly, or exclude professional services. Also, there is the question of professional ethics. Discriminating against a racial group will likely run afoul of the rules of the licensing board, the AMA, the APA, and other organizations. Finally, remind your friend that every racist has what they regard as good reasons for their racism, and your friend is not special in that regard.

With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates.

A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.

There are two legal jurisdictions in the Channel Islands, the Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey. The law in Guernsey differs from the law in the UK partly because the Common Law developed differently (more Norman influence on Guernsey than on England) and partly because Guernsey and the UK have different legislatures and so pass different laws. Until recently the UK was a member of an organisation based in Belgium and Luxembourg called the European Union which has its own legal system and courts and which requires member states to enact identical legislation in certain matters including, in particular, employment law. Although the UK is no longer a member of the EU most of its employment laws remain as they were in the EU-era. By contrast Guernsey has never been a member of the EU. So this is an additional reason for differences in laws. Generally the parties to a contract can stipulate what law governs the contract and which country's courts have jurisdiction. For example a contract between a Guernsey company and an individual resident in England could be stipulated to be governed by the laws of France and subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Barbados (this particular example is highly unlikely but I am just illustrating the principle). If the contract does not stipulate the law (or the contract is unwritten) then there are default rules which determine which jurisdiction's laws apply. However, that said, most countries, including England and Wales, have some "mandatory" employment laws. These are laws which apply to everyone employed in England (or Wales) even if England/Wales does not generally cover the contract of employment. Mandatory laws typically cover such things as minimum pay rates, rest periods, minimum paid holiday entitlement, protection from unfair dismissal etc. So some employment laws in England and Wales apply to everyone working in England and Wales whilst some other aspects of the employment relationship are governed by the law of the contract - which might be England and Wales or might be some other system of law.

Is there a recourse against UPS for not delivering packages on time? I have a "new" address and ZIP code that appears to confuse UPS and consistently causes them to delay delivery of packages to me. I've tried filing complaints with UPS itself, but to no avail: I tried talking with their local dispatcher but they still don't do much other than help finally locate and deliver the individual missing-package-of-the-week. As a consumer, I don't even get to select which carrier the merchants I buy from will use so, as far as I'm concerned, UPS has a sort of monopoly here. I've tried filing a BBB report, but it appears that BBB doesn't concern itself with requests for compensation other than refunds. I would like to make some sort of punitive claim against UPS, even if it is just symbolic. What recourse do I have against UPS for their negligent service to me?

Private carriers typically (and UPS in particular) only have a contractual obligation to the person who pays to send the package. Unless you're the one directly paying UPS to deliver the package you have no legal recourse because you're not a party to the "contract of carriage." It does seem like you're suffering due to contractual and operational failures of UPS, but your recourse is against the merchant you paid for the goods, because you also paid them for delivery. The merchant has recourse against UPS under their contract if they want to pursue it. Legally: UPS does not have a monopoly on shipping, and their contractual duty is only to their customer. The best you can do is encourage those from whom you purchase to aggressively claim against UPS for delays, and to use other carriers when possible.

Two questions. Since the answer to the second answers the first I will go out of order If a person did that could he be found liable for damages in a civil action? Or does it run afoul of any criminal statute? As far as the post office is concerned, per Domestic Mail Manual 505 1.3.1 your heavy boxes shipped Business Reply Mail (BRM) are considered waste. Mailing the box with BRM as a label would not be a crime as long as you did not improperly ship prohibited items, like ammunition, or were trying to commit another crime such as sending a bomb or drugs through the mail, but it would be thrown out or returned to you. See: customer support ruling If a person did that could he be found liable for damages in a civil action? Or does it run afoul of any criminal statute? Unless you wasted the post offices time with excessive bulk mailings of junk or any of the reasons given before, not likely.

If you have no contract to provide the service then you have no obligation under contract law to do so. However, if you are aware that withdrawing the service could or would cause damage to their business then doing so may leave you open to a suit on the basis of negligence; particularly if you do so precipitously and without warning. You should write to them in the following terms: Despite our agreement that the contract would not be renewed you have not made any arrangements to stop using my service. Consequently I consider that by your actions, you have continued to treat the contract as ongoing. I am happy for this arrangement to continue on a month-by-month basis and will be invoicing accordingly. If this is acceptable, please respond by 4pm on x/y/z; if you do not do so I will switch the service off at 4pm on x/y+2/z

Nobody know what constitutes "scamming", because it's not a legal concept. There is no sense in which receiving a gift itself constitutes "scamming". Since scamming is vaguely about dishonesty, there is an imaginable scenario where you could be liable for a false representation, for example if you impersonated someone else in order to receive something of value, you could be prosecuted in California. You should not assume that a police officer saying "That's not our problem" is proof that you committed no crime or civil tort. Your lawyer can give you advice as to whether you have anything to worry about, legally. The other stuff about being called a scammer or having pictures posted might be a violation of Facebook's TOS, and you can always complain to Facebook central authorities. Technically, uploading a picture that someone took is a violation of copyright law, if you didn't give permission to do so. It might run afoul of some state~provincial or national privacy law, depending on where this takes place.

First-class mail is acceptable for many different kinds of delivery in legal contexts. It is often not sufficient for service of a summons or subpoena, as noted in the other answer. But I don't think any of that is relevant, because you're dealing with a product recall, not legal service. This is almost certainly a voluntary recall, as mandatory recalls are very rare. If that is the case, I don't know of any law that requires a notice to be made in any particular way whatsoever. Instead, the Consumer Products Safety Commission has broad guidelines (see page 18) for how a company may consider communicating the fact of a recall, and they include many mechanisms that are even less verifiable than first class-mail: a joint news release from CPSC and the company ... information on company external websites ... a national news conference and/or television or radio announcements; use of a firm’s social media presence to notify consumers of the recall, including Facebook, Google +, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Pinterest, company blogger networks, and blog announcements ... And so on. I don't have that much experience with consumer-protection law, but I'd be surprised if it imposed any obligation to send certified mail or anything more certain than first-class mail. Separate from the recall requirements, though, it may be that a contract with a dealership or the warranty provides some other requirements.

No, you could not have prevented them from collecting their belongings But you could have sued for trespass Unless those boxes were part of the contract for sale, they remain the vendor’s property and just like you can’t withhold your mate’s trombone that he accidentally left after that great party, you can’t withhold the vendor’s boxes - that’s called “stealing”. What you could (should?) have done is refuse to settle until the boxes were removed. As the vendor was in breach, if you suffered any unmitigated loss as a result of the delay, you would be entitled to recover it. This is one of the reasons why you should inspect on the day of settlement. Given that you accepted the breach, even though the vendor’s boxes were technically trespassing, they could reasonably raise the defense that they had implicit permission- at least for a reasonable time. “A few days” is a reasonable time.

The details published in The Guardian today offer a little (but not much) hope that Competition & Markets Authority will force airlines to refund you. I live in a tier 4 area but was due to fly to Scotland on Wednesday. Can I get a refund? The airlines are only obliged to refund customers if they cancel the flight. The fact you cannot travel by law makes no difference as key workers will still expect to travel and therefore flights are still available. Ryanair is offering those in lockdown and unable to travel between now and Christmas Eve a fee-free switch to a new flight – but only until 15 March 2021. British Airways is offering vouchers to those who decide they no longer wish to travel. EasyJet customers are being offered refunds if the new restrictions mean it would be illegal to take a flight. However, if your airline is refusing a refund, rebooking option or voucher, it is worth notifying the airline that you cannot travel because of the restrictions and that you would like a refund or voucher. This is because the Competition and Markets Authority is investigating whether airlines should be forced to reimburse those in this position. You could find you receive a payout later.

It's based on the date the letter was received, not the date it was mailed. Since it's certified, it's not received until somebody signs for it, which starts the clock. The actual date isn't possible to calculate from the information on hand. The delivery receipt would have the date it was signed for, it would be prior to the end of the 30th calendar date from that date. Edit... Your new "twist" results in void service and doesn’t require action by the HOA. Certified mail is a service of the USPS, hand delivering or email does not legally count as "certified mail". If a contract requires service by a specific method (e.g. certified mail), then delivery by any other means is invalid and of no effect.

How hard should a car insurance company try to keep a policy holder up to date? This is a situation that I find myself in currently, albeit much abbreviated: The insurance for our car was due to be renewed. Having not heard from the company, we logged into the on-line portal and saw "No action required, your policy will be renewed on XX/XX/XXXX". Assuming the company's own portal would be correct, we let it roll over (as we did the year before, without issue). Then, we got pulled over by the police for no insurance, so we re-checked the portal and it stated the same, No action required. We phoned up customer services and they (unhelpfully) said, "We sent you an e-mail [Which we never received] and we won't issue a Letter of Indemnity because we sent that [single] e-mail" We checked our inbox, we got all the monthly news updates, but no e-mail about renewal. So, now we're stuck with a producer that we cannot produce because their portal claimed we had to do nothing. My question is this: If an insurance company are not planning on renewing your policy because they "require more information", yet their own portal claims the opposite, how liable are they? Additional information: All other renewals we had with them, we got no correspondence until a week after the renewal date (when we received the digital and hard-copy certificate). We assumed it would be the same this year also. No payments have been missed, the last one being taken on the first of the month (3 days before the renewal date). They claim this is for the final month of the period covered by the old policy. They are refusing the Letter of Indemnity as they deem a single e-mail - without any attempted follow up by phone or mail - is sufficient to state intent (contrary to the portal) of not renewing. Also note that we proved this e-mail was never received by microsoft customer servers who kindly restored all deleted messages to ensure it wasn't a client error). UK law provides that drivers must be insured (see selected answer). Please let me know if any other information is required.

Although your question didn't ask about the criminal side of this, it's important to consider the offence of driving without insurance in the UK. Section 143 Road Traffic Act 1998 provides that— (1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act— (a) a person must not use a motor vehicle on a road or other public place unless there is in force in relation to the use of the vehicle by that person such a policy of insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the requirements of this Part of this Act ... (2) If a person acts in contravention of subsection (1) above he is guilty of an offence. (3) A person charged with using a motor vehicle in contravention of this section shall not be convicted if he proves— ... (c) that he neither knew nor had reason to believe that there was not in force in relation to the vehicle such a policy of insurance or security as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. If it's not too late, it may be worth challenging the matter in court on the basis of a s143(1)(c) defence (i.e. you didn't have reason to believe that your policy was not in force). You should speak to a solicitor immediately if you want to consider this. As mentioned in the previous answer, you may have a claim against the insurer if you can provide that you were misled into believing that your policy had been renewed automatically. You should read the terms and conditions carefully to discover whether they were entitled to communicate on matters of renewal solely by email. Again, you should speak to a solicitor to establish whether you have a realistic prospect of success. (in case you're curious, the 'security' mentioned in s143 refers to a sum of £500,000 which, if deposited with the Courts Funds Office, exempts an individual or corporation from the insurance requirement)

Your personal liability depends on your state law regarding the family car doctrine, so the answer there is "maybe" (Texas is not a state with that doctrine, so simple ownership of the car does not confer liability). You would be liable if your supervision of the child was negligent, which means approximately that you knew or should have known that she was a bad driver and would cause damage. Still, the insurance company is suppose to indemnify you (plural) against such loses, as long as they are legally required to do so. That would include many considerations, such as whether the driver was covered under the policy, whether the car was being used contrary to the terms of the policy (being used commercially), and so on. The insurance company is entitled to make a reasonable determination of whether they are responsible for the loss (and if so, to what extent). If they actually decline to cover the loss, you would need to sue them to make them comply with the terms of the policy (and your lawyer would give you a detailed explanation of why they are not liable, in case they aren't). The plaintiff works with his insurance company to recover his insured losses, and with his lawyer to recover any uninsured losses. His insurance company works with your insurance company, up to a point, and then the lawyers get involved. Your daughter does not work with his insurance company, and your insurance company probably has said something along the line "only talk to us". The insurance that a driver typically has may cover some of their own medical costs, but does not provide a payment for "pain and suffering": that is an uninsured loss. It is not generally required that drivers carry insurance to cover their own medical expenses – it is required that they insure against damages, in general, suffered by other parties (if the defendant is at fault). So there is probably nothing for the plaintiff to work out with his insurance company. In Texas, if the defendant is entirely at fault, defendant will be liable for 100% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 90% at fault, defendant will be liable for 90% of plaintiff's damages. If defendant is 49% at fault, defendant is not liable. Defendant can, in any event, also sue for damages, so if defendant is 49% at fault, defendant can recover 49% of her damages. The insurance companies might be able to talk it out and reach a clear resolution of the matter, but it could be more in their interest to throw the dice and work it out in court. One can always sue at the very start, and drop the suit if it becomes advantageous.

Main Question: Most likely not under Magnuson-Moss or U.C.C.. Question 1: If a charge payable before hand was not set forth in any written warranty, it is most likely not legal to deny remedy to the consumer. However, even if it was, it is possible that it would not meet the federal minimum standards for warranties as, per paragraph (d) a warranty has to provide for remedy without a charge. If there is absolutely no way for you to obtain the information to prove that a remedy is due — for e.g. no third party has legal or technical capacity to diagnose the vehicle — that is likely also a term to be found unconscionable and void, and may be found fraudulent, malicious and/or oppressive which may entitle one to collect punitive damages. (It is worth obtaining written confirmation of whether this decision is made in accord with their policies or on a line that they announce to be recorded) Question 2: Most likely same as Question 1. Question 3: Most likely same as Question 2. According to 15 U.S.C., subsection (a) of Section 2302 entitled "Full and conspicuous disclosure of terms and conditions; additional requirements for contents: "In order to improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products, any warrantor warranting a consumer product to a consumer by means of a written warranty shall, to the extent required by rules of the Commission, fully and conspicuously disclose in simple and readily understood language the terms and conditions of such warranty. (4) A statement of what the warrantor will do in the event of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written warranty—at whose expense—and for what period of time." (5) A statement of what the consumer must do and expenses he must bear. (6) Exceptions and exclusions from the terms of the warranty. (7) The step-by-step procedure which the consumer should take in order to obtain performance of any obligation under the warranty, including the identification of any person or class of persons authorized to perform the obligations set forth in the warranty. (12) The characteristics or properties of the products, or parts thereof, that are not covered by the warranty. (13) The elements of the warranty in words or phrases which would not mislead a reasonable, average consumer as to the nature or scope of the warranty. It may, in addition to any or all of the above, be a violation of paragraph (8), (9), (10) and/or (11) based on specific fact patterns. To the 2nd point added: If the manufacturer stated that the vehicle would run at least a certain number of miles on a full charge for a certain number of miles driven or number of years, and did not stipulate it otherwise, they would have to remedy this. It is highly likely that they tried to evade making such written statement (if not written, it's not a warranty under Magnuson-Moss). If they did, and they did not define the scope of what they would have to do in the case of a defect or malfunction, they would have to remedy it by repairs within a reasonable time; if they fail, they would have to refund or replace. This does not mean that it is likely worth pursuing the matter in court other than maybe in small claims (See: ohwilleke's reply to this question for a general explanation). Moreover, most auto manufacturers put arbitration provisions in their sale contracts and/or their warranties and generally it may be required of one to opt out of it within 30 days of entering into the agreement. If that took place, first the dispute would likely need to be disputed through a qualified dispute resolution mechanism of the manufacturer, dealer, distributor and/or sellers choice depending on who gave the warranty. The specific State's lemon laws may provide for civil penalties for willful violations which may or may not be a very high bar to meet depending on the State's case law, and which is more likely to make it worth for "lemon" lawyers to take the case, but generally they are not a great deal more like hyenas of this segment of the law. It may still be worth considering for one depending on the specific facts, including State jurisdiction and the impeding nature of the nonconformity. (Please specify a State for the State's lemon laws applicable in this hypo)

There is a reasonable chance that the amount that you are borrowing and paying interest on is through a third party, so the dealer can't just waive the interest for the period when they are fixing the car. Legal responses would include canceling the sale, and suing for damages. The problem with suing for damages is that this isn't costing you an extra $15/day (the loan gets paid off at a fixed time, regardless of how much you get to actually drive the car). It would be a considerable stretch to argue that you were deprived of a week's worth of enjoyment for the car because of the wrongful acts of the dealer, and should be compensated. Your attorney would be in a good position to tell you, based on the facts and Texas law, whether that approach would be futile. The legality of the situation primarily depends on what the contract says. It is likely that the contract has clauses that maximally disclaim responsibility to the maximum extent allowed by law. There will be some clause that says something about taking delivery of the car, so you can check whether they have breached the contract on that point: it is possible that there is some escape hatch like "as soon as possible, upon receipt of payment". It seems pretty clear that they concealed a material fact, in order to induce you to buy the car. For example, the manufacturer may have installed a defective veblitzer which had to be replaced, and a reasonable person would not buy a car with a defective veblitzer, thus the veblitzer is a material fact. Or: the veblitzer may have been damaged in a flood. The fact that the car is, by their representation, not safe to drive in its current state, the mind of fact that would push most people into the "no thanks" category. To pursue the fraud angle, you need to be more specific about the defective part in your complaint. The only way to force them to reveal the nature of the missing part is to sue them and compel disclosure of the relevant facts during discovery. Again, your attorney would deal with this. You should bear in mind that if the sale is simply cancelled, you may not be able to recover the loan application or processing fee, and the trade-in will no doubt have been sold, so you can't get the old car back. There are laws against deceptive trade practices which might be applicable, depending on whether they said anything deceptive in their disseminated advertising. Section 17.46 may be applicable, if they patched the car together temporarily with a counterfeit veblitzer.

While German law indeed requires providing correct contact information it does not require the recipient to answer queries. It is there so that you can submit legal notifications. In your case I wouldn't be so sure that the information is not correct. However, even if the contact information is incorrect, there is not much you can do about it. This is reserved to the following groups by § 8 Abs. 3 UWG: every competitor; associations with legal personality which exist for the promotion of commercial or of independent professional interests, so far as a considerable number of entrepreneurs belong thereto, and which distribute goods or services of the same or similar type on the same market, provided such associations are actually in a position, particularly in terms of their personnel, material and financial resources, to pursue the tasks, under their memoranda of association, of promoting commercial or independent professional interests, and so far as the contravention affects the interests of their members; qualified entities that prove that they are entered on the list of qualified entities pursuant to section 4 of the Injunctions Act or on the list of the Commission of the European Communities pursuant to Article 4 of Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests (OJ Number L 166 page 51); Chambers of Industry and Commerce or Craft Chambers. Unless you are a competitor you are out of luck. The hoster or other providers can't do anything and don't need to, as they are not required to check legality of their user's websites. It doesn't really matter where you are by the way for these laws.

Suppose Bob gets a typical term life insurance policy and pays the premiums through the contestability period. . . . If Bob elects not to receive any such treatments and, as a result, dies of this illness in the policy's term, does the insurer have grounds to deny or reduce the claim? No. This is not one of the reasons that an insurance company is allowed to refuse to pay a death benefit when an insurance policy has become incontestable. Once premiums have been paid through the contestability period, the only grounds upon which the insurer may deny or reduce the claim are: Bob isn't actually dead. A life insurance company almost never disputes this issue if it is presented with an apparently authentic death certificate, and it routinely requires claimants to provide it with a death certificate if it doesn't already have one in its file. But, if Bob walked into the insurance company's office alive and well, with his own death certificate, and handed it to the claims adjuster for the insurance company, the insurance company wouldn't write him a check. After the contestability period expired, Bob stopped paying the premium, was given a warning that the policy would terminate or have a reduced premium if he didn't pay the premium by the end of the grace period for doing so, and he didn't pay the premium. In the case of a term life policy this failure to pay would result in the insurance company having no obligation to pay the benefit. In the case of a whole life policy that has not already had all premiums contemplated by the policy paid in full, failure to pay the premium will usually only reduce the amount of the benefit that is payable by the insurance company upon death relative to what it would have been if the premium had been paid in full. Bob has transferred the policy to someone else who will be entitled to the benefit instead (e.g. in a viatical settlement or a transfer of the policy to an ex-spouse or trust). Bob died after the life insurance policy expires for reasons other than non-payment of a premium (usually because the death happens at an age older than the age covered by the policy). For example, my life insurance policy has a provision that states that no life insurance benefit is payable and the policy terminates upon my 75th birthday. This reduces the premium I pay and isn't a concern to me because after I'm that old I won't need to make up for any lost income in order to provide for my children. Another kind of life insurance policy that doesn't always pay a benefit when the insured dies is a "second to die" policy that pays a premium only when both of the insureds (typically a husband and wife who anticipate a large estate tax liability at a second death) have died. Bob had an accidental death policy rather than a plain vanilla life insurance policy. In this case, Bob's death from a terminal illness would not be considered accidental unless, for example, he actually died because a tornado hit the hospital he was in before he died from his terminal illness. What constitutes an accidental death is sometimes the subject of litigation. The whole point of an incontestability clause (which typically makes the policy not subject to contest after one to two years) is to prevent life insurance companies from refusing to pay a death benefit in situations including those like the one described in the question. Generally speaking, state law requires that life insurance policies to be incontestable after one to two years. An incontestable policy can also generally not be contested on the grounds that misrepresentations were made in the application for the life insurance policy, and preventing refusals to pay benefits in these situations is the other main reason that life insurance policies become incontestable. Note that even in the case of an accidental death policy, after the incontestability period expires, the life insurance company may not refuse to pay a benefit on the basis of fraud in the life insurance application. Once an accidental death policy is incontestable, the only reason the insurance company may refuse to pay a premium other than the reasons that apply to any other life insurance policy (as described above) is that the death was not accidental. Because it doesn't cover all possible deaths of the insured, accidental death policies are generally very inexpensive relative to the size of the benefit, compared to term life policies covering the same period of time for the same insured. Also, even if the insurance policy was still contestable, the insurance company could not refuse to pay the death benefit if Bob had been truthful in his insurance application at the time that it was made and Bob had kept his premiums current through the date of his death. For example, if Bob applied for his life insurance policy in January and answered every question on his application truthfully thinking that he was healthy, his application was approved in February, he was diagnosed with a terminal illness in March, and refused treatment and then died in April, the insurance company would not have a right to refuse to pay his death benefit, although in that situation, the insurance company would probably conduct an in depth investigation before agreeing to pay the death benefit. One of the reasons that the law doesn't allow insurance companies to refuse to pay in these situations is that (1) everyone dies eventually, so dying sooner only modestly adjusts the timing of when the benefit gets paid, and (2) the vast majority of people try to stay alive, even when there will be a death benefit payable when they die, if there is any realistic chance of doing so. Therefore, the economic cost to the insurance company of allowing some people to decline medical treatment when faced with a potentially deadly illness is very modest. The contestability period only exists at all to prevent people from applying for life insurance policies and lying about their lack of a known terminal illness when they apply for life insurance, which would allow people to avoid paying a life time of premiums and still receiving a life insurance benefit. But, since a terminal illness is pretty much defined as something that is expected to cause you death in six months or less, a year or two of contestability is usually sufficient to prevent this potential loophole from being exploited by unscrupulous terminally ill people.

If I may paraphrase the scenario: The customer has a contract with the insurer The customer is contemplating undergoing a certain procedure and is unsure if it is covered under the contract The customer calls the insurer to ask this specific question The insurer says "yes" The customer undergoes the procedure The insurer refuses to pay on the ground that it is not covered under the contract. Let's put aside issues of evidence and what can be proved and assume these facts are not in dispute. There is no question that the contract has been renegotiated; it hasn't. This avoids the necessity of considering if the insurer's employee has the authority to do this or it the customer can rely that they do even if they don't. There are two possibilities: The procedure is covered and the insurer must pay under contract The procedure isn't covered and the insurer must pay under the tort of negligent misstatement. The insurer is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee. The insurer owes a duty of care to a customer who asks such a question to answer it correctly. It is foreseeable that the customer would act on the insurer's advice and incur costs that they may have avoided if the correct advice had been given. Nothing is ever certain in the law but this is as close as you can get.

The CEO, with his lawyer have tried to convince me that this only apply to current client and any past clients that I have work on. Is this true? No. It will be true only if they make that clarification in the clause or a properly added amendment. The clause currently has no indication that it is limited to "current client and any past clients that [you] have work[ed] on". The CEO's & lawyer's refusal to amend the clause so as to make it consistent with their attempts [to persuade you] would be a red flag. Their inconsistent representations to you suggest that they are not planning to honor the covenant of good faith on which all contracts are premised. Should I expect the CEO to offer a fair contract or is this something you read and negotiate? You should require a contract that seems fair to you. And by "to you" I mean that it has to be in line with your expectations regardless of the average conditions in the labor market. Negotiations are not binding. They are merely a preamble to a contract, and that contract is binding. This is why you should reject a contract that falls short of your requirements. Some clauses are unlawful and/or void and unenforceable as unconscionable or for contravening legislation (unlawful clauses can and do arise even if drafted by attorneys). Thus, although you might not have to worry about those clauses in particular, the company's mere attempt to include them in a contract should alert you of the high risk of ending up with other abusive terms & conditions which are binding and enforceable nonetheless.

Is it necessary to renew a tenancy agreement which states: "Expire on (but continuing thereafter by virtue of statute..)" I have been living in UK for 10 years, lived in 5 different places. Only one of my previous landlords used to renew the contract every year. By renewing I mean signing a new contract and new dates but NO changes. Is it necessary to do that? when there is no changes in the circumstances or the line above validates the contract even after the expiry date?

If this is a typical private sector tenancy, then it would initially be a fixed-term one year'assured shorthold tenancy' a type of assured tenancy. The Housing Act 1988 says: If an assured tenancy which is a fixed term tenancy comes to an end otherwise than by virtue of— (a) an order of the court of the kind mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) or any other order of the court, or (b) a surrender or other action on the part of the tenant, then, subject to section 7 and Chapter II below, the tenant shall be entitled to remain in possession of the dwelling-house let under that tenancy and, subject to subsection (4) below, his right to possession shall depend upon a periodic tenancy arising by virtue of this section. So if the tenancy was not renewed then it would be replaced with a periodic tenancy. This has different rules to the fixed-term tenancy. Whether renewing the tenancy is necessary or not depends on whether either party strongly prefers the fixed-term tenancy to the periodic.

It depends on whether the lease requires it. If the lease requires you to have renter's insurance, you have to have renter's insurance. If it requires you to have a specific company's renter's insurance, you have to have the specific company's renter's insurance. If you don't do that, you have violated the terms of the lease and can typically be evicted. If you comply with the terms of the lease by having some renter's insurance and they still want you to have a specific brand of insurance, you have not violated the terms of the lease, and you cannot be evicted for such. They cannot "bill you" just because they want to change the terms of the lease -- that requires your agreement, or they can unilaterally change the lease terms at the end of the current period. The same goes for package service (I don't even understand what a monthly package service charge would mean).

Yes There is no general legal prohibition on perpetual contracts. What you describe is not a perpetual contract A perpetual contract is one where at least one parties obligations are indefinitely ongoing and there is no mechanism in the contract (outside breach or repudiation) for terminating it. The contract you describe has a mechanism for termination albeit only available to one party. Perpetual contracts can be entered into knowingly and willingly - most perpetuities, where a person leaves the income on an investment to a university or charity forever subject to conditions, are of this type. Or they can be entered into accidentally, for example, a fixed term contract with an automatic renewal where the renewal term is not specified is a perpetual contract. The important point is there must be no explicit mechanism in the contract for bringing the contract to an end for it to be a perpetual contract. In commercial arrangements, courts may imply a term that the parties can terminate on reasonable notice but this is subject to all the normal limitations. Your example As described, because there is an explicit term allowing termination, this is not a perpetual contract. Such a contract would be subject to the normal common law doctrine of unconscionably (which it almost certainly is) and, in some jurisdictions, consumer protection laws against unfair contract terms.

Not successfully It is not required that a person knows they are dealing with an agent of the principal rather than the principal directly - an agent speaks with the principal’s voice. Robert has consented to allow Elizabeth to act as his agent. It actually doesn’t matter if he consented before she acted or afterwards, he has agreed to be bound by Elizabeth’s actions. Rachel & Jared have agreed to enter the lease and indicated as much by signing the document. It doesn’t matter who signed it for the landlord or even if it was signed - leases have to be in writing but there is no common law rule that they need to be signed.

Is this something for small claims court Yes. The explicitness of your prior leases overrides the statutory variations that might exist among jurisdictions in this regard. And the total of 50$/month for six or seven years indicates that you would have to pursue recovery in small claims court (at least if the landlord refuses to reimburse you). In Wisconsin, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is six years. See 893.43. Statute of limitations means the lapse of time upon which claims of certain type are no longer actionable. Thus, you would only be able to recover the fees of the latest 6 years except for this year's lease, since your current lease no longer specifies that the landlord will cover that cost. For more information on small claims courts, see chapter 799 of the Wisconsin statutory law.

Your boss is totally wrong. Legally, there is no such thing as a "probation period" in the UK. You have the right to your holiday payment, according to the days that you worked. What can happen: The legal minimum is I think 28 days per year including bank holidays, but most companies give 23 or 24 days PLUS eight days bank holiday. Your contract may say that the first three months are called probation period, and during that time you only get the legal minimum, and after that the much more common higher amount. That would be legal. But even so, you would be entitled to seven days, minus any bank holidays where you didn't work.

"an agreement by email for the cost of rent and damage deposit etc." may well constitute a lease. If it doesn't specify a term or ending method, it is probably a month to month lease. If nothing is specified about notice to leave, you probably should gt 30 days notice. The law in BC is the Residential Tenancy Act. However, many localities have laws that modify or supplement the provincial law. You probably need legal assitance beyond the scope of this forum. a Tenant Resource Advisory Center (Trac) might be able to help. Their web sitre also provides links to various other resources, including legal referrals. The Tennant Survival Guide offers pointers to legal aid. This site offers additional resources. So does the BC Law institute Note, even if you have certain legal rights in theory, the person from whom you are renting may not respect these. Consult legal or community sources to determine your best approach. This question is really beyond the scope of this forum.

There's good information at https://www.gov.uk/private-renting-tenancy-agreements/your-landlord-wants-to-end-your-tenancy. There are several types of tenancy with different rules, but in all of them, the landlord has to give you a certain amount of notice to move out, and it has to give a specific date. "Three months from when a buyer is found" doesn't seem to fit that, so I would say you have not yet received formal notice to move out. This statement may have just been a courtesy to give you more advance warning. So for instance, if you are in a tenancy that requires two months notice, the landlord may have intended this to mean "I plan to send you formal notice about one month after a buyer is found." Of course, this is not binding; he could send you formal notice tomorrow if he changes his mind. As far as I know, the sale of the house is really irrelevant in all of this. You don't automatically have to move out just because the house is sold; if you're not explicitly told to leave (with appropriate notice) then you don't have to, and you'll just start paying your rent to the new landlord. If you have a fixed-term tenancy, then the sale of the house doesn't shorten it. I am not sure what the point is of getting angry at the estate agents. Your tenancy is a matter between you and your landlord, and the estate agents have nothing to do with it. They work for your landlord, not for you.

If no open source license is given on a github account, what rules apply? The GitHub help pages says that You're under no obligation to choose a license. It's your right not to include one with your code or project, but please be aware of the implications. Generally speaking, the absence of a license means that the default copyright laws apply. This means that you retain all rights to your source code and that nobody else may reproduce, distribute, or create derivative works from your work. This might not be what you intend. Even if this is what you intend, if you publish your source code in a public repository on GitHub, you have accepted the Terms of Service which do allow other GitHub users some rights. Specifically, you allow others to view and fork your repository. Would a forked repository be able to be used to produce something commercially?

I'll quote from my answer on a similar question from Programmers.SE: ...[T]he Github TOS have this to say about material hosted on their site: By setting your repositories to be viewed publicly, you agree to allow others to view and fork your repositories. Hosting on Github means that the author grants others the right to "view" and to "fork" the repository. Here, "fork" probably just means "use Github's fork feature", which creates a repository clone, hosted on Github. GitHub's use of "fork" here probably refers to the software feature of the website github.com called "Fork," which allows users to create a verbatim copy of a repository on github.com. The TOS do not require the author to grant any other specific rights, like the right to prepare derivative works or to redistribute copies of the work, so "fork" here probably is not used the general sense of "produce a derivative work." Thus, the code's presence on GitHub does not grant you rights to reuse the work in ways protected by copyright (commercial or otherwise) without a explicit license from the author.

You need to check what license the library comes with. The fact that you want to create a public domain program doesn't give you any rights to any library. So read the BSD license and see what it tells you whether and how you can use the library. For example, if you used a GPL-licensed library, you could not put your program in the public domain legally.

Their code, their rules A copyright holder is free to offer their work under none, one or many licences. They can, at the same time, use their own work however they see fit without regard to the licences they have given/sold to others (except, they can only give one person an exclusive licence). As an analogy, let’s say I own a fleet of cars. I can drive my cars anytime I want. I can let Jim drive my cars anytime he wants for free. I can let Mary drive a specific car on Thursdays and only within 10km of the depot. I can let Joe drive my cars providing he pays me $50 a day. And I’m not going to let Fred drive them at all because Fred’s a jerk. Each of those is a different licence.

Whenever there is a license to share things, the license creator wants the license to be widely used, but absolutely does not want slightly different licenses that could be used to trick people, or that just cause legal problems when used. Normal copyright law applies. And for the reasons above, the GPL license as an example allows you to copy the license verbatim but absolutely doesn’t allow you to make any modifications other than changing who is the person licensing a work. I would be curious what happens legally if someone licenses something with a sneakily modified copy of the GPL and then makes claims against a licensee who assumed it was the original GPL.

One cannot use the works of others unless one of the following applies: The copyright holder has given permission, usually in the form of a license, often explicit, but sometimes implied. The work is not protected by copyright. This can happen in several ways, but the most common is that the work is old enough that copyright has expired. In the US, works older than 1927 are currently out of copyright. So are some others, the rules are a bit complex. In many countries, if the author or creator died more than 70 years ago, the work is out of copyright. In some countries this is a different number, between 50 and 100 years. This is not likely to apply to a file distributed with current software. If an exception to copyright applies. In the US this would most likely be fair use. In the UK it would probably be fair dealing. In other countries there are a variety of exceptions that might apply, including personal use in some. AS a comment by Jen points out "use" here refers only to those rights protected by copyright, such as making and distributing copied, making nd distributing derivative works, and the like. (Displaying and publicly performing seem unlikely to apply.) Now lets consider the specific situation, and which if any of the reasons for lawful use might apply. License or other permission. There is no explicit license. Since the program is distributed to be run, there is an implicit license to make the sort of use of the file needed to run the program. If the documentation describes how to employ the file as part of running the program, there is almost surely an implied license to employ it in that way. There is not, however, permission to make copies unless that is needed to run the program. There is surely not permission to make derivative works of the file or distribute copies to others, even if you do not charge anything. Expired copyright This pretty clearly will not apply. Fair use This might apply, or might not. There isn't enough info in the question to tell, not even to make a good guess. If any use would be non commercial, that helps fair use a bit. If the use would be for a different purpose than the one the developers used it for, that helps fair use a lot. If the use of the file harmed the market for the program, or served as a substitute, that lean against fair use. without knowing what the file is, what it does, and how it might be used, one really cannot weven guess.

To answer the question in your title: Yes, software licenses are copyrighted. They are written works that involve (significant, expert) creative effort to create. The best solution would be for Grammarly to hire a lawyer and say "we want a new EULA. We think this one covers a number of points our current one doesn't". Most legal documents will be copyright for the same reason (there may be a few that are so stereotypical that there is essentially no creative effort in putting them together).

First off: Legally, everything is copyrighted anyway. Licensing is not at all necessary. Hence, even if a court would disagree with # SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0, that would just make it closed source. Having said that, the law generally doesn't bother with trivialities such as "file headers". Any commonly accepted way to state the copyright and license terms is OK. Your LICENSE is such a common convention. If you want to avoid all doubt what is covered under that license, put a reference to that LICENSE in each header. If you have just five files in one directory that are all licensed the same, I wouldn't even bother with that. Again, the default position is that everything is closed source.

There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses.

When is it okay as a retail store owner to refuse service to a customer? I was reading about the bakery that has been fined for refusing to provide a cake for a lesbian couple: http://jezebel.com/bakery-that-refused-to-bake-cake-for-lesbian-couple-mus-1715747809 ... and I wondered what rights retail store owners have for when they can or cannot refuse service. If a couple came into the bakery and smashed a display case (to go to an extreme) or used offensive language to the other customers, my assumption is that it would be legal for the bakery owner to refuse that couple service. (Please correct me if I'm mistaken.) However, it would be illegal for the bakery to refuse service to customers based on the color of their skin, sexual orientation, gender, etc. Could someone explain to me the legal distinctions therein? I believe there is something about the latter type being discrimination based on a "permanent condition" but that's the sort of thing I'm looking for some clarity about.

Federally, in places of public accommodation, discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This was upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241. As summarized in that case, "Public Accommodations" cover: any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence any restaurant, cafeteria . . . any motion picture house . . . any establishment . . . which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or . . . within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment . . . In Oregon, there are additional restrictions imposed by the Equality Act of 2007: Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age if the individual is 18 years of age or older. In Oregon, a "place of public accommodation" includes: Any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation or otherwise. Other states may not have these extra prohibitions or different prohibitions. They may also have statutory exceptions for peoples' sincerely held religious beliefs. Why the legislature chose to specifically protect these classes is a policy question better asked on Politics.SE.

The precise details (and citations) will vary with jurisdiction, so this answer deals only with principles. If you pick up and "take possession of" property belonging to somebody else, you are a thief. [Note that 'taking possession' rather than picking up to restore to the owner/correct place is what makes the difference, which is why in real life nobody who cannot prove your intention will take action; but your question explicitly concedes the point.] If the property does not belong to the supermarket, you are not stealing from them, but from the currently unidentified owner: this makes no legal difference. You might conceivably have a defence if you can prove that the owner has abandoned the property, whatever the definition of "abandoned" is in your jurisdiction (note that it is up to you to show this, and possibly that you knew it before you picked up the property). If it belongs to the supermarket, this cannot be true; if a box of matches has fallen out of someone's pocket, it might possibly be (whatever the laws are, it is very unlikely that they have ever been applied in such a trivial case, so there may be some uncertainty). in any case, the shop is undoubtedly allowed to throw you out, ban you from returning to their premises, and inform other shops and the police that they believe you to be a petty thief, based on their experience.

Indeed, article 3.24 of the Arbeidsomstandighedenbesluit: Toiletten en wastafels In een bedrijf of inrichting zijn in de nabijheid van de ruimten waar de werknemers hun werkzaamheden verrichten een voldoende aantal toiletten aanwezig. In of in de onmiddellijke nabijheid van de ruimten waarin de toiletten zich bevinden zijn voldoende wastafels. De toiletten of het gebruik van de toiletten zijn naar seksen gescheiden. My translation (intentionally less idiomatic than it might be in order to parallel the Dutch word order): Toilets and lavatories In a business or facility there are in the vicinity of the areas where the workers perform their work a sufficient number of toilets present. In, or in the immediate vicinity of, the areas where the toilets are, there are sufficient lavatories. The toilets or the use of the toilets are segregated by sex. It's a very long law, so I haven't read it all, but it doesn't seem to impose a penalty on people who disregard the sex segregation of the toilets. I suspect that it imposes a responsibility on the employer to enforce the segregation, and presumably a penalty could be imposed on the employer for failing to do so. I do not know what mechanisms would be available to the employer to penalize an employee who uses the wrong toilet. I don't know anything about the catering industry, and I cannot infer why you ask about it specifically. If you're asking about toilets provided by such businesses for their customers, however, I suspect it's likely to be governed by another law. (I further suspect that sex-segregated toilets for customers are optional in at least some circumstances, since small bars and restaurants often have only one toilet.)

When a platform has the right to kick you out as they deem fit, without any evidence why they did it, does that change if you have a paid? It depends on the purpose of payment and the terms & conditions it triggers. Your description reflects that payment entitles the user to have no ads "and stuff" (?). Payment does not necessarily entitle the user to continued access, diligence from customer service, or other features. Without fully knowing the platform's terms & conditions regarding payment it is impossible to identify what obligations (other than not displaying advertisements) your payment creates on the platform. The information you provide here is insufficient for assessing whether you have a viable claim such as fraud or breach of contract. On the other hand, the platform's apparent arbitrariness and lack of response might support a finding of unfair or deceptive practices if the platform does not honor or proportionally reimburse your payment. Many jurisdictions have legislation prohibiting practices which are unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable (example: MCL 445.903). Oftentimes statutory law establishes an agency in charge of addressing customers' complaints.

Yes and No Selling your own body for sex is legal. Buying sex is illegal. Therefore the transaction as a whole is legal on the part of the seller and illegal on the part of the buyer. See Prostitution in Canada and Prostitution law in Canada. If you think this is odd, you are not alone '... one judge referring to the laws as "Alice-in-Wonderland" and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court referred to the situation as "bizarre"'. In the circumstances, although I know of no case law on this, it would appear that any contract for prostitution would be void for illegality. Presumably, to enforce payment for services rendered the service provider would need to pursue a quantum meruit claim in equity.

Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave.

There is no intention to commit theft, so there is no criminal act on the part of the customer. Even if there was a criminal act, the ability of the restaurant to detain the cusomer (citizen's arrest) is very limited in most jurisdictions. The restaurant can ask the customer for his name and address, but there is no legal obligation on the customer to provide this. Refusal to do so, however, might be evidence of intention to avoid paying and at that point the restaurant might call the police. The customer can leave, and the restaurant can pursue the debt through the civil courts if they have means to do so - they may have CCTV of the customer and his car registration which can be traced. Petrol stations, where people often fill up and then realise they can't pay, usually have established "promise to pay" procedures where they take the customer's details and the customer has 48 hours to pay before police or civil enforcement action is taken.

Extrajudicial implies there is some weight of law behind the casino behaviors you describe. I don't think there is. For example, refusing to cash out chips could just be a management intimidation tactic to try to coerce the customer into agreeing to be "questioned." Which the customer would be under no legal obligation to do. Card counting can't be proven if the counter is not using a device of any kind. The casino can refuse to serve the customer and expel the customer but they can't unilaterally keep the customer's money by not cashing the customer's chips without a judgment. I am not an attorney. This answer is not legal advice.

Log Viewing Specific Patient PHI? Under the HIPAA and HITECH Regulations (US) is it required for a system to record an audit trail for every time a user accesses any PHI(Protected Health Information)? As I understand it, an audit trail of user logins is required, as well as any time a user adds, edits, or deletes PHI. Does simply viewing / accessing PHI need to be logged as well?

Simply viewing must be logged. 45 CFR 170.210(b) Record actions related to electronic health information. The date, time, patient identification, and user identification must be recorded when electronic health information is created, modified, accessed, or deleted; and an indication of which action(s) occurred and by whom must also be recorded.

The "Privacy Rule" (45 CFR Part 160 and Part 164, Subparts A, E) don't forbid this. Sect. 164.502 states the general rule: (a) Standard. A covered entity or business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as permitted or required by this subpart or by subpart C of part 160 of this subchapter. "Health information" is defnes in part 160 as any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual. Your picture would not constitute health information (and anyhow, they are allowed to gather health information, just not freely disseminate it – the pictures on the wall were presumably with permission). There is no general law (which would be state law) against taking a person's picture (though commercially exploiting someone's picture would require permission, via the concept of personality rights), and it is directly required in a number of instances (for identification purposes – school ID, driver's license, passport, voting in some states). It is an unusual requirement and since they scanned your driver's license it is especially inexplicable. Assuming that this is just a story they tell all patients because they want before and after pictures (which you would have to consent to, if you didn't already in one of those "sign here" flurries), saying that this is for "security purposes" would be untrue, but I don't think it's actually illegal. Taking but not using a photo would not cause you harm, so if you had let them take the picture, there would not be a basis for suing. If they use it for advertising without permission, that would be a problem.

There are circumstances in which medical ethics historically authorized treating physicians to defer sharing information with patients or even to mislead them in their best interests medically, although the scope of what is considered ethical in that regard is narrowing. But in the fact pattern described in the quoted material there is no plausible way that this withholding of information could be justified. If it was intentional (or for that matter, even if it was negligent) there could be grounds for tort liability for harm caused as a result (although causation and damages are hard to prove). On the other hand, just because it could give rise to tort liability, doesn't imply that the action is necessarily a crime, at least without some kind of motive other than random spite to intentionally provide a false result. However, it is quite difficult to come up with a believable reason that this would happen to someone at random. If the person taking the test bribed someone to provide a false result, which is plausible, that is one thing, but just doing it randomly really doesn't make any sense. The fact pattern provided sounds like it doesn't include the "full story." Why keep records of the actual test results (or for that matter why do the actual tests at all) if you are merely going to intentionally provide a false negative?

No, nor can I request a copy of your tax return. See 5 USC 552a. Record maintained on an individual are not subject to disclosure.

California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.

Term 1 isn't going to hold up, but that is not a GDPR matter. It's just a matter of basic consumer protection law in the EU. You can't offload responsibility for your mistakes. Looking at 2, Dale M. already pointer out that it's now how the GDPR works. You are the Data Controller. X,Y and Z are Data Processors. Article 28(1) of the GDPR is in direct conflict with your disclaimer. You accept zero responsibility, the GDPR says you are fully responsible. That's the exact opposite.

This article basically says "it depends": If it is genuinely used to improve tenant safety then that is OK, but if it is used to track your private life then that is not acceptable. Cameras that cover communal areas used by several properties are generally acceptable, but cameras covering individual properties are much less so. It sounds like this falls into the latter category. Assuming you haven't got the camera yet, I suggest you write to the Landlord asking for a written justification of the cameras, and a policy for the use of the camera. E.g. it will only be viewed if an incident is reported. Once you have the justification you can then look for inconsistencies (e.g. if they aren't planning to snoop at random times, how are they going to notice someone up to no good? And how would they tell?) You could also just say "no". The installation of this camera probably counts as a material variation of the rental agreement. You could also propose a compromise: you will install the camera, but only provide footage as you see fit rather than allowing your landlord to view the camera at any time. CCTV installations are covered by the GDPR, so you should ask your landlord for the associated paperwork. Amongst other things they will need to state how long they want to keep the footage and provide a justification for that. "We might want to re-run it" is not a justification. Having all this stuff written down will help if you ever suspect he is abusing the footage. Edit Another thought: does the landlord own other properties? Are they having cameras installed too? If not, why not? They should have a policy about this.

Health care providers in the US may send protected patient records to other health care providers for the purposes of treatment, either of the patient whose information it was or of a different patient (for instance, a doctor could send a chart of a different patient with a similar issue). This can be done without patient authorization, except for two cases: if the patient has requested more restrictions on use of their information and the provider agreed to those restrictions, and with psychotherapy notes. Source: HHS. WhatsApp specifically does not appear to be compliant with HIPAA, which is the US medical privacy law. However, there are many similar systems that are compliant. The body of your question asks about taking a smartphone screenshot; with many secure messaging systems, this is perfectly acceptable, and the principle of a doctor consulting with another doctor about a patient is actually encouraged. HIPAA violations do not by themselves result in any action against a medical license, nor can anyone besides the US government file suit based on a violation (everyone else is limited to complaining to the US government). Private lawsuits and (especially) license consequences are determined by state law, and are state- and situation-dependent. A doctor who calls a press conference to announce that this patient of his has HIV is more likely to face sanctions than a doctor whose violation was just not using a secure enough messaging client. HIPAA violations like this are not that uncommon, and generally result in at most a fine against the practice.

What does the long underscore in United States case citations stand for? United States court cases are commonly cited like this: Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) So... what is "___" here?

Underscores are often used to indicate that the particular case has not yet been assigned to a specific volume (preceding the reporter abbreviation) or page (following the reporter abbreviation). In your example, the case will appear in volume 576, but the exact page has not yet been determined.

According to United States federal law, 1 U.S. Code § 109 - Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. So it depends on whether Congress expressly said what to do, and if they didn't say anything, it defaults to being able to still prosecute. But this only applies to federal laws, not state laws. There's also an exception to this. In United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934), the Supreme Court said that a prosecution for a violation of the National Prohibition Act could not be continued. However, this was a special case, as the constitutional provision (the 18th Amendment) that allowed the act in the first place had just been repealed (by the 21st Amendment).

It isn't that uncommon to do something similar to this, which is called a "test case". One of the more familiar examples of this kind of litigation conduct is the case of Plessy v. Ferguson. There have been test cases, for example, that involved important questions of E.U. jurisdiction in civil law countries as well.

To what cases is the judge referring to here? None: neither the quoted article (2023-06-02 05:57: Prozess gegen Lina E.: Stadt Leipzig verbietet Solidaritäts-Demonstration) given in the english version of Wikipedia nor the german Wikipedia version (Dresdner Linksextremismusprozess – Wikipedia uses the quote given in the english version. In the article itself, the name 'Hans Schlueter-Staats' is used only once: The arrest warrant against them will be suspended against conditions, said Hans Schlueter-Staats, presiding judge of the State Protection Chamber at the Dresden Higher Regional Court, on Wednesday evening at the end of the verdict. She only has to serve the remainder of the sentence if the verdict becomes final. Assume that, for whatever reason, someone added a fabricated quote, in the Wikipedia page, that is not contained in the given source hoping that nobody would notice (either because the reader can't read German or simply wouldn't look). It would be very strange for a judge whos primary duty, in a civil law system, is to read the law as written, to give a personal opinion about previous rulings (which was the reason I looked: to read the exact German text). Whoever fabricated that quote was obviously unaware of this or didn't care hoping that others would simply assume it to be correct due the given source of a newspaper that has a reputation as being a reliable source.

"Esq" Is short for "Esquire" which was once the lowest level of the English system of titles for nobility and gentry (originally an esquire was a sort of apprentice knight, and later it indicated that a person was a "gentleman" but without any higher title) Lawyers started using it to indicate that although paid professionals, they claimed a social status above that of tradesmen and shopkeepers. It is now largely obsolete, but some lawyers still use it. Most of the other initials refer to the form of business organization that a lawyer or law firm uses. More specifically: "PA" means "professional association" a form of organization which reduces the individual liability of members of the firm. See this q&A A pay is in many ways similar to a corporation or an LLC. "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company" which is a version of an LLC used specifically by groups of doctors and lawyers. "PLC" like "PLLC" means "professional limited liability company". The two terms are interchangeable when used for law firms, but PLC is also used for a Public Limited Company, which is a quite different sort of thing, and will not be a lawyer or law firm. APC, A.P.C., PC, P.C., and Prof. Corp. all stand for "Professional Corporation" a form of organization which is similar to a PLLC. "LLP" means "Limited Liability Partnership" a variation on the classic partnership organization. "SP" means "Sole Proprietorship", that is one lawyer working alone. None of these tell you anything about the kind of law a lawyer or firm does. None except SP tell you anything about how many lawyers a firm has. And none tell you anything about how competent a lawyer is. For the most part, none of these terms is of any importance to a client or would-be client of a lawyer or law firm. Reputation of the specific firm is far more important.

If the suit is to be filed in the US, the first step is to officially register the copyright. No US copyright infringement suit can be brought until the copyright has been registered. The registration process includes a formal declaration as to who the author is (or authors are). (I believe this statement is made under penalty of perjury.) Once the registration issues, the certificate of registration is admissible evidence of the facts stated in it in a us court. Indeed 17 USC 410 (c) provides that: (c) In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court. In other countries, the testimony of the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit is itself evidence that the work was created as stated. In either case, it is possible for the defendant to challenge the assertion and claim that s/he is the actual author. Showing when and where the work was first published can usefully corroborate the plaintiff's testimony. Having included a copyright notice in the initial publication may be of value, but if the notice only lists the pen name, it is not of much value. Records of the platform on which a work has been published may help in verifying the identity of the author. So may the testimony of others who saw or read the work, or who were told about it by the author. An author's own copies may be of value, if they carry a timestamp, as computer files generally do. But computer timestamps are not usually secure. Timestamps on email generally are reasonably secure, and could establish that the content existed and had been transmitted on a specified date by a specified person. But none of this will matter unless the defendant claims that the plaintiff is lying in claiming authorship. Unless that happens, the plaintiff's testimony will usually settle the matter. A person whose work seems to have been infringed would usually be wise to consult a lawyer with experience in copyright suits. Such a lawyer could advise if it is wise to bring suit at all, and if it is, what evidence will probably be needed.

A copy of the source material is hosted by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute: Street v Mountford, [1985] UKHL 4. I quote the portion showing that the spelling used in the source is "lodgings": ... as landlords commonly do in the case of lodgings ...

There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.