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2,000 | 55,628 | Bilski v. Kappos | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-964 | 08-964 | 2009 | Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw | David J. Kappos, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, Patent and Trademark Office | <p>Applicants were denied a patent by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) for claims pertaining to a process of managing risk in commodities trading. The PTO examiner deemed the invention not to be of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Section 101. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirmed the decision.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Supreme Court precedent stating that an invention is patentable if: "1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or 2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing." Reasoning from this, it held that the applicants' invention clearly failed this test (machine-or-transformation test) and therefore did not constitute patentable subject matter.</p>
| 803 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,001 | 55,627 | Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1498 | 08-1498 | 2009 | Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, et al. | Humanitarian Law Project, et al. | <p>Among the plaintiffs in this case are supporters of the Kurdistan Workers Party ("KWP") and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE"). The KWP and LTTE engage in a variety of both lawful and unlawful activities. They sought an injunction to prevent the government from enforcing sections of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Section 302 authorizes the Secretary of State to designate a group as a "foreign terrorist organization." Section 303 makes it a crime for anyone to provide "material support or resources" to even the nonviolent activities of a designated organization. In previous cases, the courts have held that Section 303 was unconstitutionally vague. Congress then passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act ("IRTPA") which amended the AEDPA. It added a state of mind requirement that individuals "knowingly" provide "material support or resources" in order to violate the Act. Congress also added terms to the Act that further clarified what constituted "material support or resources." The government moved for summary judgment arguing that challenged provisions of the AEDPA were not unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted a partial motion for summary judgment, but held that some parts of the Act were unconstitutionally vague.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the terms "service," "training," or "other specialized knowledge" within the AEDPA, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutionally vague.</p>
| 1,549 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | First Amendment |
2,002 | 55,632 | South Carolina v. North Carolina | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/138-orig | 138-orig | 2009 | South Carolina | North Carolina | <p>This case originates in the Supreme Court. South Carolina seeks an equitable apportionment of the Catawba River, which starts in North Carolina and flows into South Carolina. The Special Master recommends that the Supreme Court (1) permit the City of Charlotte, N.C., the Catawba River Water Supply Project, and Duke Energy Carolinas LLC to intervene as defendants, and (2) deny South Carolina's motion for clarification of the Special Master's order.</p>
| 459 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part | null |
2,003 | 55,630 | Union Pacific R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-604 | 08-604 | 2009 | Union Pacific Railroad Company | Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen General Committee of Adjustment, Central Region | <p>The plaintiffs, employees of the Union Pacific Railroad (UPR), filed claims through their union, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET), contesting their discharge or discipline imposed by the UPR. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) dismissed the claims for lack of jurisdiction reasoning that the BLET failed to submit conclusive evidence that the aggrieved parties had held a conference with the UPR to attempt to resolve the disputes – a prerequisite to arbitration – though conferences were in fact held. The plaintiffs appealed to a federal district where the dismissal was affirmed.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the NRAB denied the plaintiffs due process by requiring evidence of conferencing on the record as a prerequisite to arbitration. The court reasoned that this requirement was not clearly established in the statutes, regulations, or collective bargaining agreement and therefore the NRAB had created a new requirement, which it imposed retroactively.</p>
| 1,064 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Unions |
2,004 | 55,631 | Pottawattamie County v. McGhee | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1065 | 08-1065 | 2009 | Pottawattamie County, Iowa, et al. | Curtis W. McGhee, Jr., et al. | <p>In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee Jr. and Terry Harrington were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by an Iowa state court. In 2002, Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's convictions were reversed because the prosecutor at their trial improperly withheld evidence of an alternative suspect. Subsequently, Mr. McGhee and Mr. Harrington filed civil claims in an Iowa federal court against Pottawattamie County, Iowa, and the prosecutors and officers involved in their prosecution. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that they were absolutely immune to civil prosecution. The district court found some defendants immune to certain claims, but denied immunity to other defendants on the other claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the prosecutors were absolutely immune to civil prosecution.</p>
<p>The Eighth Circuit held that the prosecutors were not immune from claims that they violated Mr. McGhee's and Mr. Harrington's due process rights. The court reasoned that allegations that prosecutors obtained, manufactured, coerced, and fabricated evidence did not fall within "a distinctly prosecutorial function" and thus the prosecutors were not immune to the claims.</p>
| 1,269 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | null | Judicial Power |
2,005 | 55,633 | Health Care Service Corp. v. Pollitt | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-38 | 09-38 | 2009 | Health Care Service Corp | Juli Pollitt | <p>Juli Pollitt sued Health Care Service Corp. ("HCSC") in an Illinois state court for "bad-faith conduct" and HCSC removed the case to an Illinois federal district court. Ms. Pollitt is a federal employee and receives health insurance as one of her job's fringe benefits. HCSC manages her plan. In 2007, HCSC stopped paying claims submitted on behalf of Ms. Pollitt's son because the Department of Labor told HCSC that Ms. Pollitt's health coverage was for herself only and not her family. The district court dismissed, holding that her claim was preempted by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act ("FEHB").</p>
<p>On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case to the district court. The court held that removal was inappropriate. The court reasoned that preemption is a defense, and "a federal defense does not allow removal." However, it recognized that where a claim is completely preempted by federal law, removal is appropriate. Here, because federal law does not completely occupy the entire field of health-insurance coverage for federal workers, Ms. Pollitt's claim did not "arise under" federal law such that it could be removed under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441. Instead, the court stated the only other source of removal is 28 U.S.C. Section 1442(a)(1), which says that "any person acting under" a federal officer may remove a suit that depends on the defendant's following the directions issued by a federal officer. Here, the court reasoned that because a dispute existed about whether HCSC was acting on its own or under the direction of the Department of Labor, the case should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. That court should receive evidence and make appropriate findings to determine whether it should either retain or remand the case to state court, as the facts require.</p>
| 1,890 | 0 | 0 | false | dismissal - rule 46 | none | null |
2,006 | 55,629 | Samantar v. Yousuf | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1555 | 08-1555 | 2009 | Mohamed Ali Samantar | Bashe Abdi Yousuf, et al. | <p>Natives of Somalia filed suit against Mohamed Ali Samantar in a Virginia federal district court under the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA") and the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"). Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Samantar committed torture and other human rights violations while he commanded Somali government agents under the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre. The district court dismissed the case, holding that Mr. Samantar was immune to suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA").</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the FSIA did not render Mr. Samantar immune to suit. The court reasoned that the FSIA does not apply to foreign government officials. The court further reasoned that even if the FSIA does apply to foreign government officials, it does not apply to former foreign government officials.</p>
| 873 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,007 | 55,634 | Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-475 | 09-475 | 2009 | Monsanto Co., et al. | Geerston Seed Farms, et al. | <p>Geertson Seed Farms ("Geertson") and Trask Family Seeds ("Trask") sought an injunction against Monsanto Company ("Monsanto") in a California federal district court. Geertson and Trask feared that the wide-scale sale of a new Monsanto alfalfa variety, resistant to one of the company's herbicides, would lead to cross-pollination with Geertson's and Trask's conventional alfalfa variety and thereby lead to its disappearance. The district court granted the injunction pending an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") about the effect of Monsanto's new alfalfa variety.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed holding that the injunction was appropriate and that an evidentiary hearing was not required before the issuance of the injunction.</p>
| 783 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,008 | 55,636 | Graham v. Florida | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-7412 | 08-7412 | 2009 | Terrance Jamar Graham | Florida | <p>When Terrence Graham was 16 years old he was convicted of armed burglary and attempted armed robbery. He served a 12 month sentence and was released. Six months later Mr. Graham was tried and convicted by a Florida state court of armed home robbery and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, he argued that the imposition of a life sentence without parole on a juvenile, on its face, violated the Eighth Amendment and moreover constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and thus violated the Eighth Amendment. The District Court of Appeal of Florida disagreed. It held that Mr. Graham's sentence neither was a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment nor constituted cruel and unusual punishment.</p>
| 719 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,009 | 55,635 | Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-103 | 08-103 | 2009 | Reed Elsevier, Inc., et al. | Irvin Muchnick, et al. | <p>A federal district court in New York approved an $18 million settlement in a class-action brought by freelance writers who had contracted with the defendant publishers to publish their works in print. Without authorization, the publishers reproduced the works for electronic distribution. Muchnick and others objected to the settlement.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit overturned the settlement on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over claims relating to unregistered works. The court stated that the Copyright Act grants the federal district courts jurisdiction only over those claims that arise from registered works. Since the vast majority of the claimants in the litigation based their claims on unregistered works, the federal district court did not have the power to certify a class in the litigation.</p>
| 856 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,010 | 55,639 | Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-497 | 09-497 | 2009 | Rent-A-Center West, Inc. | Antonio Jackson | <p>Antonio Jackson filed a complaint in the Nevada federal district court alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The employer, Rent-A-Center West, Inc., moved to dismiss the proceedings and compel arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and compelled arbitration.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in part that the district court was required to determine in the first instance whether the coverage and discovery provisions of the arbitration agreement were unconscionable.</p>
| 544 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Unions |
2,011 | 55,640 | New Process Steel v. NLRB | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1457 | 08-1457 | 2009 | New Process Steel | National Labor Relations Board | <p>The union representing employees at a New Process Steel plant in Butler, Indiana failed to reach an agreement over a new contract with New Process Steel. The union subsequently filed unfair labor practices claims with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") arguing that New Process Steel failed to honor its collective bargaining agreement to deal with the union as the exclusive representative of employees of the plant. A two-member panel of the NLRB agreed with the union. On appeal, New Process Steel argued that the NLRB's decision was invalid because 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) of the National Labor Relations Act requires that three members of the five member National Labor Relations Board shall "at all times" constitute a quorum.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the board. The court held that the NLRB had power to delegate its authority to a group of three of its members. In which case, two sitting members constituted a quorum. Therefore, the NLRB appropriately rendered its decision.</p>
| 1,066 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,012 | 55,642 | Bobby v. Van Hook | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-144 | 09-144 | 2009 | David Bobby, Warden | Robert J. Van Hook | <p>An Ohio state court convicted Robert J. Van Hook for aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, and imposed a death sentence. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Van Hook filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Ohio federal district court. After numerous appeals and remands, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted Van Hook relief, holding that Mr. Van Hook's lawyers performed deficiently in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at his sentencing.</p>
| 500 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Civil Rights |
2,013 | 55,637 | Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1119 | 08-1119 | 2009 | Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A., et al. | United States | <p>In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) was signed into law. In part, it added a new term to the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), "debt relief agency," and both restricted and proscribed actions by those groups falling under the definition. Subsequently, a Minnesota bankruptcy law firm sought a declaratory judgment against the United States, arguing that the BAPCPA did not apply to attorneys and law firms, and was unconstitutional as it applied to attorneys. The federal district court agreed and issued an order declaring that attorneys in the District of Minnesota were excluded from the Code's definition of "debt relief agency" and that the challenged provisions of the Code were unconstitutional as they applied to attorneys in the District of Minnesota.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that attorneys who provide "bankruptcy assistance" were included within the BAPCPA's definition of "debt relief agency." However, it also held that BAPCPA provisions that prohibited a debt relief agency from advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy was overbroad, and thus unconstitutional.</p>
| 1,185 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Attorneys |
2,014 | 55,641 | NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Pub. Util. Comm'n | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-674 | 08-674 | 2009 | NRG Power Marketing LLC et al. | Maine Public Utilities Commission et al. | <p>The Maine Public Utilities Commission along with the attorneys general of Connecticut and Massachusetts filed for petitions of review of orders of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). FERC approved a settlement and redesigned New England's "capacity" electricity market, which Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts were subject to, even though they were not parties to the settlement. FERC denied their request for rehearing.</p>
<p>On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts argued that FERC erred in finding that "transition payments" under the settlement should be reviewed under the "public interest" standard as dictated by <em>Mobile-Sierra</em> rather than the "just and reasonable" standard. The District of Columbia Circuit agreed holding that the <em>Mobile-Sierra</em> doctrine should not apply to non-parties to the settlement agreement. It reasoned that the <em>Mobile-Sierra</em> doctrine is premised on the existence of a "voluntary contract" between the parties. Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts never entered a voluntary agreement with FERC and therefore the standard was inappropriate.</p>
| 1,192 | 8 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,015 | 55,647 | Wilkins v. Gaddy | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-10914 | 08-10914 | 2009 | Jamey Wilkins | Officer Gaddy | <p>In 2008, Jamey Wilkins, a North Carolina state prisoner, filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court. Without the aid of an attorney, he alleged that he was "maliciously and sadistically" assaulted "[w]ithout any provocation" by a corrections officer. Mr. Wilkins claimed that as a result of the assault he sustained heel and lower back pain, increased blood pressure, migraine headaches and dizziness, depression, panic attacks, and nightmares of the assault. The district court, on its own motion, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. In a motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wilkins stated that he was unaware that the failure to allege medical treatment might prove fatal to his claim. The district court denied Mr. Wilkins leave to amend his complaint. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 847 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,016 | 55,646 | United Student Aid Funds Inc. v. Espinosa | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1134 | 08-1134 | 2009 | United Student Aid Funds Inc. | Francisco J. Espinosa | <p>Francisco J. Espinosa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and proposed a plan that provided for the repayment of student loans to United Student Aid Funds, Inc. ("Funds"). After Funds was notified, it filed a proof of claim roughly $4,500 greater than that was included in the plan. The bankruptcy court approved the original plan and Funds was notified it would be paid the lower figure. Mr. Espinosa subsequently completed the plan and his loans were discharged by the court. Three years later, Funds began intercepting Mr. Espinosa's income tax refunds to satisfy the unpaid portion of his student loans (the $4,500 figure). Mr. Espinosa petitioned the bankruptcy court for an order holding Funds in contempt for violating the discharge injunction. In response, Funds argued that Mr. Espinosa's student loans were improperly discharged because student loans cannot be discharged unless the debtor can show "undue hardship." This can only be shown in an adversary proceeding, which did not take place. Moreover, it argued the lack of an adversary proceeding denied Funds its Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. These arguments were rejected by the bankruptcy court, but, on appeal, were accepted by the Arizona federal district court.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that simply because Mr. Espinosa failed to comply with additional procedures required by the Bankruptcy Code to discharge student loan debt was not sufficient to set aside the discharge of his student loans, considering Funds had actually been notified of the Chapter 13 plan. It also held that Fund's due process rights were not violated because Fund's had received actual notice of Mr. Espinosa's Chapter 13 plan, even though he had not commenced the adversary proceedings.</p>
| 1,805 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,017 | 55,645 | Florida v. Powell | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1175 | 08-1175 | 2009 | Florida | Kevin Dewayne Powell | <p>Kevin D. Powell was convicted in a Florida state court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Mr. Powell appealed arguing that his <em>Miranda</em> warning was invalid because the written form used by the Tampa police at his arrest did not explicitly indicate that he had a right to an attorney at his questioning. The court of appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that informing a defendant that he has the right to "talk with an attorney" is not sufficient to inform him of his right to have counsel present.</p>
| 622 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,018 | 55,643 | Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-223 | 09-223 | 2009 | Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio | Commerce Energy, Inc., et al. | <p>In-state and out-of-state retail natural gas suppliers sued Ohio's Tax Commissioner in an Ohio federal district court alleging that Ohio's tax scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs argued that because four local natural gas distribution companies benefited from certain tax exemptions that did not benefit the plaintiffs, despite their similar circumstances, the tax scheme violated the Commerce Clause and Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.</p>
<p>The Sixth Circuit held that federal comity concerns do not bar an action that challenges the tax benefits provided to just four specific entities, but not others similarly situated. The court recognized a circuit split over whether federal comity concerns prevent federal court jurisdiction over a matter. In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit sided with the Seventh and Ninth Circuits which have interpreted <em>Hibbs v. Winn</em> to mean that comity prevents federal court jurisdiction only when state taxpayers seek federal court orders allowing them to avoid paying state taxes. This was not at issue in this case, and the plaintiffs' success would not significantly intrude upon traditional matters of state taxation in Ohio; thus, the federal court had jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit remanded the case in order for it to proceed.</p>
| 1,423 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
2,019 | 55,648 | Perdue v. Kenny A. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-970 | 08-970 | 2009 | Sonny Perdue, Governor of Georgia, et al. | Kenny A., By His Next Friend Linda Winn, et al. | <p>In 2005, the Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) and related state agencies settled a class action lawsuit with plaintiff foster children under the care of the DHR. However, the parties could not agree on the appropriate amount of attorneys' fees to be included in the settlement. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion in a Georgia federal district court for that court to make a fee determination and award. The plaintiffs argued that they were owed over $7 million for services rendered and also deserved a $7 million fee enhancement for a job well done. The district court largely agreed with the plaintiffs and awarded $10,522,405.08 in compensation, over $4 million of which was a fee enhancement. The district court reasoned that "the superb quality of counsel's representation far exceeded what could reasonably be expected for the standard hourly rates used to calculate the fee" and thus justified the enhancement.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced the lodestar figure (hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) because of counsel's skill, commitment, dedication, and professionalism. The Court reasoned that the enhancement of the lodestar amount of attorney's fees may be allowed for superior representation coupled with the exceptional nature of results.</p>
| 1,405 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Attorneys |
2,020 | 55,649 | Morrison v. National Australia Bank | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1191 | 08-1191 | 2009 | Robert Morrison, et al. | National Australia Bank Ltd., et al. | <p>In 1998 National Australia Bank (NAB), an Australian company, acquired Homeside Lending Inc. (Homeside), an American company. In 2001, NAB announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for inaccurately calculating the fees Homeside would generate for servicing mortgages, which had been calculated as present assets. Its stock price then dropped 5 percent. Later that year, NAB announced a second write-down of $1.75 billion to amend for other inaccurate calculations that had been booked as present assets. NAB's stock price tumbled an additional 13 percent. Subsequently, four owners of NAB stock filed suit against NAB and Homeside in a New York federal district court alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Three of the plaintiffs purported to represent a class of non-American purchasers of NAB stock because they bought their shares abroad. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the class of non-American purchasers.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that subject matter jurisdiction exists over claims only "if the defendant's conduct in the United States was more than merely preparatory to fraud, and particular acts or culpable failures to act with the United States directly caused losses to foreign investors abroad." Here, the court noted that (1) the issuance of fraudulent statements from NAB's corporate headquarters in Australia were more central to the fraud than Homeside's manipulation of financial data on which NAB based its statements, (2) there was no effect on U.S. capital markets, and (3) the lengthy chain of causation from NAB receiving inaccurate information from Homeside before passing the information along to its investors suggested that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.</p>
| 1,865 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,021 | 55,644 | Briscoe v. Virginia | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/07-11191 | 07-11191 | 2009 | Mark A. Briscoe and Sheldon A. Cypress | Virginia | <p>This appeal is the consolidation of three separate cases that involved defendants' conviction for possession of cocaine in a Virginia state court. On appeal, the defendants argued that the admission into evidence of a certificate of analysis in the absence of testimony at trial from the person who performed the analysis and prepared the certificate, pursuant to Virginia Code Section 19.2-187, violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the provisions of Section 19.2-187 did not violate a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights. Moreover, the court held that the defendants in these cases knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their Sixth Amendment rights to confront the forensic analysts when they failed to call them as witnesses at trial.</p>
| 834 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,022 | 55,650 | Mac's Shell Service v. Shell Oil Products Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-240 | 08-240 | 2009 | Mac's Shell Service et al. | Shell Oil Products Co. et al. | <p>Gas station franchisees won a verdict against franchisor Motiva in the Massachusetts federal district court for violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. The franchisees argued that new leases that changed the way rent was calculated and which amounted to increased rents were made in bad faith and meant to drive them out of business. They claimed that the new lease terms amounted to "constructive nonrenewal," prohibited by the PMPA, even though they signed the agreements. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the PMPA did not support a claim for constructive nonrenewal under the circumstances in the case. It reasoned that the PMPA requires franchisees faced with objectionable contract terms to refrain from ratifying those terms by executing the contract, as the franchisees did in this case.</p>
| 872 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,023 | 55,652 | Alabama v. North Carolina | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/132-orig | 132-orig | 2009 | Alabama | North Carolina | <p>Several states belonging to the Southeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact ("Compact") and the commission created by the compact ("Commission") filed suit against North Carolina. The plaintiffs allege that North Carolina was designated as a host state for a waste management facility, accepted $80 million to build the facility, but then declined to fund, license, build, and operate it. The plaintiffs seek to recover the $80 million, a $10 million sanction, and attorneys' fees.</p>
<p>The Supreme Court assigned the case to a Special Master who conducted proceedings and filed two reports. The Preliminary Report recommended denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to Count I which sought enforcement of sanctions against North Carolina; granting North Carolina's motion to dismiss Count I; and denying North Carolina's motion to dismiss Counts II-V. The Special Master's Second Report recommended denying Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granting North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Count II; and denying North Carolina's motion for summary judgment on Counts III-V. The parties then filed a total of nine exceptions to the Special Master's Reports.</p>
| 1,294 | 6 | 3 | null | majority opinion | affirmed | null |
2,024 | 55,654 | Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1198 | 08-1198 | 2009 | Stolt-Nielsen S.A., et al. | AnimalFeeds International Corp. | <p>AnimalFeeds International Corp. on behalf of a class of plaintiffs filed suit in a Pennsylvania federal district court against Stolt-Nielsen among others alleging defendants were engaged in a "global conspiracy to restrain competition in the world market for parcel tanker transportation services." After the case was transferred to the Connecticut federal district court, Stolt-Nielsen filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was denied. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. During arbitration, AnimalFeeds filed a demand to proceed as a class. A panel was appointed to determine whether the language of the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class and answered in the affirmative. Stolt-Nielsen then petitioned the Connecticut federal district court to vacate the panel's determination, which was granted.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the panel's decision. The court held that the arbitration panel did not manifestly disregard the law when reaching its conclusion that the Clause Construction Award permitted AnimalFeeds to proceed as a class, even though the Award was silent on whether proceeding as a class was permitted. The court reasoned that when parties agree to arbitrate, the question of whether an agreement permits class arbitration is generally left to the arbitrators, not the courts.</p>
| 1,437 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,025 | 55,655 | Salazar v. Buono | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-472 | 08-472 | 2009 | Ken L. Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, et al. | Frank Buono | <p>In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars built a wooden cross on top of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) as a memorial to those who died in World War I. The original cross no longer exists, but has been rebuilt several times. Frank Buono, a former Preserve employee, filed suit in a California federal district court seeking to prevent the permanent display of the cross. The genesis of his suit occurred in 1999 when a request to build a Buddhist shrine in the Preserve, near the cross, was denied. He argued that the cross' display on federal property violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed and the cross was covered.</p>
<p>While the case was pending, Congress designated Sunrise Rock a national memorial and barred its dismantling with the use of federal funds. One year later, by land swap, Congress made Sunrise Rock private property in exchange for another parcel of land. Mr. Buono moved to not only enforce the previous court order preventing the display of the cross, but also to prohibit the land swap. The district court granted both motions. The Secretary of the Interior appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reasoned that the government failed to show that the district court's fact findings or legal standards were clearly erroneous, nor did it show that the district court made an error in judgment.</p>
| 1,551 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | First Amendment |
2,026 | 55,651 | Jefferson v. Upton | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-8852 | 09-8852 | 2009 | Lawrence Joseph Jefferson | Stephen Upton, Warden | <p>A Georgia state court convicted Lawrence Jefferson of murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal at the state and then federal court level, Mr. Jefferson argued that his lawyers were constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury that he suffered as a child. On appeal to the U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, it accepted the state court's factual findings and affirmed Mr. Jefferson's conviction and sentence.</p>
| 470 | 7 | 2 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,027 | 55,656 | Smith v. Spisak | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-724 | 08-724 | 2009 | Kevin Smith, Warden | Frank G. Spisak, Jr. | <p>Frank Spisak was convicted of murder in an Ohio state court and sentenced to death. Subsequently, he was granted partial habeas corpus relief by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court held that Mr. Spisak received ineffective counsel at sentencing and the jury instructions at this phase unconstitutionally required the jury to be unanimous when finding mitigating evidence to his sentence. The court ordered a new sentencing trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of <em>Musladin</em> and <em>Landrigan</em>.</p>
<p>On remand, the Sixth Circuit reinstated its original holding. It reasoned that <em>Musladin</em> and <em>Landrigan</em> were readily distinguishable from Mr. Spisak's case and therefore he was still entitled to habeas corpus relief. Moreover, the court noted that although the Supreme Court had not ruled on a set of facts identical to those in Mr. Spisak's case, the court of appeals was not precluded from finding that the Ohio state court had unreasonably applied federal law.</p>
| 1,103 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
2,028 | 55,658 | Padilla v. Kentucky | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-651 | 08-651 | 2009 | Jose Padilla | Kentucky | <p>Jose Padilla was indicted by a Kentucky grand jury on counts of trafficking in marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number. On advice from his lawyer, he entered a guilty plea with respect to the three drug charges in exchange for dismissal on the final charge. He subsequently filed for post-conviction relief arguing that he was misadvised about the potential for deportation as a consequence of his guilty plea. The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Padilla's conviction and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.</p>
<p>On appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court, the court, relying on its decision in <em>Commonwealth v. Fuartado</em>, reversed the court of appeals. It held that collateral consequences of advice by counsel is outside the scope of the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel. It reasoned that counsel's advice on the consequences of a plea with respect to immigration is not required and therefore cannot constitute ineffectiveness.</p>
| 1,083 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,029 | 55,657 | Hamilton v. Lanning | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-998 | 08-998 | 2009 | Jan Hamilton, Chapter 13 Trustee | Stephanie Kay Lanning | <p>A Kansas federal bankruptcy court denied objections to a Chapter 13 debtor's repayment plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the starting point for calculating a Chapter 13 debtor's "projected disposable income" is presumed to be the debtor's current monthly income. However, the court stated that the calculation is subject to a showing that there is a substantial change in circumstances. The court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine whether the debtor had shown there was a substantial change in her circumstances.</p>
| 684 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,030 | 55,660 | Thaler v. Haynes | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-273 | 09-273 | 2009 | Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice | Anthony Cardell Haynes | <p>Anthony Cardell Haynes was tried in a Texas state court for the murder of a police officer. The state sought the death penalty. During <em>voir dire</em>, two separate judges presided at different stages. One judge presided when the attorneys questioned the prospective jurors individually, the other judge presided when preemptory challenges were exercised. When the prosecutor struck an African-American juror, Mr. Thaler's attorney made a <em>Batson</em> objection -- arguing that the strike was racially motivated. The judge, who was not present during jury interviews, found that the strike was race neutral and denied the <em>Batson</em> objection. The case proceeded to trial and Mr. Haynes was convicted and sentenced to death.</p>
<p>On appeal, Mr. Haynes argued that "a trial judge who did not witness the actual <em>voir dire</em> cannot, as a matter of law, fairly evaluate a <em>Batson</em> challenge." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. Mr. Haynes then filed for and was denied habeas corpus relief by a Texas federal district court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted review. It held that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals made an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its decision and Mr. Haynes warranted federal habeas corpus relief.</p>
| 1,356 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,031 | 55,661 | Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-60 | 09-60 | 2009 | Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo | Eric Holder, Attorney General | <p>Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo was admitted to the United States in 1993 and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2004, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana. One year later, he pled guilty to misdemeanor possession of Xanax, but was not tried as a recidivist. In 2006, Mr. Carachuri was notified that he was removable from the United States. He applied for removal cancellation, which was denied. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the decision.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Mr. Carachuri was ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court reasoned that because Mr. Carachuri's second drug conviction could have been punished as a felony under the Controlled Substances Abuse Act, had he been prosecuted in federal court, the conviction qualified as an "aggravated felony" making him ineligible for cancellation of removal.</p>
| 918 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
2,032 | 55,662 | Beard v. Kindler | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-992 | 08-992 | 2009 | Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al. | Joseph Kindler | <p>Joseph Kindler was convicted of first degree murder in a Pennsylvania state court and sentenced to death. He subsequently filed motions for post-conviction relief, but while the motions were pending, he escaped from prison. Pennsylvania immediately moved to dismiss the motions arguing that Mr. Kindler had waived any right to have his post-conviction motions considered because he was a fugitive. The trial court agreed and dismissed them. After recapture, Mr. Kindler moved to reinstate his post-conviction motions, which was denied. Both the Pennsylvania Superior Court and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.</p>
<p>In 2000, Mr. Kindler filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief in a Pennsylvania federal district court. The State of Pennsylvania argued that habeas corpus relief was unavailable to Mr. Kindler because Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was an "independent and adequate" state ground that precluded federal habeas review. The district court disagreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Relying on its decision in <em>Doctor v. Walters</em>, it held that Pennsylvania's fugitive waiver rule was not an independent and adequate state ground that precluded federal habeas review.</p>
| 1,302 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,033 | 55,659 | Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-586 | 08-586 | 2009 | Jerry N. Jones, et al. | Harris Associates L.P. | <p>Plaintiffs were investors in several mutual funds managed by Harris Associates. They filed suit in an Illinois federal district court arguing Harris' fees were too high and thus violated Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940. The district court dismissed the case.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 36(b) did not permit judicial regulation of mutual fund management fees. It acknowledged that management had a fiduciary duty to investors, but that did not imply judicial regulation of management's fees was appropriate. Rather, the court stated that market forces were best able to determine the appropriateness of fees.</p>
| 714 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,034 | 55,663 | United States v. Marcus | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1341 | 08-1341 | 2009 | United States | Glenn Marcus | <p>A New York federal district court convicted Glenn Marcus of violating sex trafficking and forced labor provisions of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA"). The TVPA was enacted after Mr. Marcus engaged in some of the behavior for which he was charged. Yet, the jury was not instructed as to the date when the TVPA was enacted in relation to Mr. Marcus' allegedly illegal behavior. On appeal, he argued that the TVPA was applied retroactively, and, thus, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. Applying a "plain-error" standard of review, the court held that Mr. Marcus was entitled to a new trial on Ex Post Facto grounds. The court reasoned that if it was possible for the jury, who had not been given instructions regarding the date of the TVPA's enactment, to convict exclusively on the defendant's pre-enactment conduct, then the conviction violates the Ex Post Facto clause.</p>
| 1,011 | 7 | 1 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,035 | 55,664 | Black v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-876 | 08-876 | 2009 | Conrad M. Black, John A. Boultbee, and Mark S. Kipnis | United States | <p>Four former executives of Hollinger International were convicted of mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 by an Illinois federal district court. In part, they had paid themselves $5.5 million in fees without the knowledge of the company's audit committee or board of directors. At trial, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendants guilty if it deemed they had schemed to deprive Hollinger and its shareholders "of their intangible right to the honest services of the corporate officers, directors, or controlling shareholders of Hollinger," and if the objective of the scheme was "private gain." On appeal, the defendants explained that while their objective was "private gain," the compensation had been crafted in order to avoid paying taxes to the Canadian government. Therefore, they argued that because their "private gain" was intended to be purely at the expense of the Canadian government and not the company, their actions did not violate the intent of Section 1346.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. It held that the deprivation of honest services owed to an employer is not mitigated simply because the inducement was a tax benefit obtained from a third party. The court reasoned that had the defendants disclosed to Hollinger's audit committee and board of directors that the compensation was meant to bring about tax benefits, the committee and board very well may have reduced the pay-out in light of the tax benefits.</p>
| 1,532 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,036 | 55,665 | Magwood v. Patterson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-158 | 09-158 | 2009 | Billy Joe Magwood | Tony Patterson, Warden, et al. | <p>An Alabama state court convicted Billy Joe Magwood of murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, an Alabama federal district court partially granted Mr. Magwood's petition for federal habeas corpus relief. The court upheld his conviction but instructed the state court to look at mitigating evidence when resentencing Mr. Magwood. Upon resentencing, the state court sentenced Mr. Magwood to death once again. Mr. Magwood filed a second petition for federal habeas corpus relief with the federal district court arguing that a judicial rule was retroactively applied in his case and that he lacked effective counsel at sentencing. The district court granted the petition and vacated Mr. Magwood's death sentence.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh circuit reversed, holding that prisoners may not raise challenges to an original sentence that could have been raised in an earlier petition. The court also held that Mr. Magwood's counsel was not ineffective because he failed to raise an argument that had already been decided by the state's highest court adverse to his client's position.</p>
| 1,126 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,037 | 55,667 | Porter v. McCollum | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-10537 | 08-10537 | 2009 | George Porter | Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, et al. | <p>A Florida state court convicted George Porter of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Porter filed for habeas corpus relief in a Florida federal district court. He argued that his attorney's failure to bring forward evidence about his war record and how it left him a changed man violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. The district court agreed and granted the petition. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed on the ground that the Florida Supreme Court's determination that Mr. Porter was not prejudiced by any deficient performance by his counsel was a reasonable application of <em>Strickland v. Washington</em>.</p>
| 719 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
2,038 | 55,666 | United States v. Stevens | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-769 | 08-769 | 2009 | United States | Robert J. Stevens | <p>Robert Stevens was convicted under 18 U.S.C. Section 48 in a Pennsylvania federal district court for "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain." His conviction stems from an investigation into the selling of videos related to illegal dog fighting. Mr. Stevens appealed his conviction arguing that 18 U.S.C. Section 48, on its face, was unconstitutional because it violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with Mr. Stevens and reversed his conviction, holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. Section 48. The court reasoned that the dog fighting videos he sold were protected speech and that 18 U.S.C. Section 48 did not serve a compelling governmental interest.</p>
| 835 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
2,039 | 55,668 | United States v. O'Brien | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1569 | 08-1569 | 2009 | United States | Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess | <p>A Massachusetts federal district court convicted Martin O'Brien and Arthur Burgess of attempted robbery and related weapons crimes. One of the weapons used by the defendants was an AK-47 assault rifle. At a pre-trial conference, the district court ruled that the nature of the weapon (i.e. semi-automatic, automatic, etc.) was an element of the crime and, thus, a matter for the jury to decide. After sentencing, the government appealed, arguing that the nature of the weapon was a sentencing element, and, thus a matter for the judge to decide. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, holding that under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) the nature of the weapon is an element of the crime that must be decided by the jury "beyond a reasonable doubt."</p>
| 769 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,040 | 55,671 | Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-448 | 09-448 | 2009 | Bridget Hardt | Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co. | <p>A Virginia federal district court remanded Bridget Hardt's claim for long-term disability benefits from Reliance Standard Life Insurance ("Reliance"). The court asked Reliance to reconsider its denial of Ms. Hardt's claim. Upon remand and after Ms. Hardt presented new evidence, Reliance changed its earlier stance and awarded Ms. Hardt full long-term disability benefits. Ms. Hardt then filed a motion for attorneys' fees based on her status as a prevailing party. The district court granted her motion and awarded her $39,149 in fees.</p>
<p>On appeal, Reliance argued that Ms. Hardt was not a "prevailing party" as understood by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act and thus was not eligible for an award of attorneys' fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed and reversed the district court. The court held that the district court's decision to remand Ms. Hardt's claim to Reliance did not constitute an enforceable judgment that Ms. Hardt prevailed on her claim because Reliance could have decided to deny her coverage.</p>
| 1,060 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Attorneys |
2,041 | 55,673 | Wood v. Allen | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-9156 | 08-9156 | 2009 | Holly Wood | Richard F. Allen, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, et al. | <p>In 1994, Holly Wood was convicted in an Alabama state court of capital murder during a first-degree burglary and sentenced to death. Both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. Mr. Wood subsequently filed for post-conviction relief under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, arguing that he was mentally retarded and thus not eligible for a death sentence and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The Rule 32 court disagreed and denied his petition. Mr. Wood then filed for federal habeas corpus relief in an Alabama federal district court. The district court granted relief, agreeing that Mr. Wood's counsel was ineffective at sentencing because they failed to present evidence of Mr. Wood's deficient intellectual deficiencies.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that Mr. Wood's counsel was not ineffective. The court reasoned that Mr. Wood's attorneys acted reasonably when they decided it was in Mr. Wood's best interest to leave out information that illustrated his mental deficiencies. Moreover, the court recognized that while Mr. Wood's counsel included an inexperienced attorney, he merely acted as an assistant to the two experienced attorneys chiefly responsible for the case.</p>
| 1,319 | 7 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,042 | 55,672 | Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-678 | 08-678 | 2009 | Mohawk Industries, Inc. | Norman Carpenter | <p>In 2006, Norman Carpenter, a Shift Supervisor at a Mohawk Industry manufacturing facility, was fired after violating Mohawk's Code of Ethics. He subsequently filed suit for wrongful termination in a Georgia federal district court. He argued that he was fired, not for violating company protocols, but for reporting immigration violations to Mohawk's human resources department. Mr. Carpenter stated that after filing his report, a Mohawk company attorney met with him and attempted to persuade him to recant. The report would have been detrimental to Mohawk as it was then involved in a class action lawsuit which charged the company with conspiring to hire illegal immigrants.</p>
<p>Before trial and as part of discovery, Mr. Carpenter requested information from Mohawk related to his meeting with its attorney. Mohawk contended that the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. The federal district court ordered Mohawk to disclose the information, but permitted the company to appeal. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the order for discovery. It reasoned that while the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.</em> provided an exception to the finality requirement necessary for an appellate court to have jurisdiction over appeals, the appeal of a discovery order involving attorney-client privilege did not qualify for exception.</p>
| 1,468 | 9 | 0 | false | plurality opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
2,043 | 55,674 | Barber v. Thomas | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-5201 | 09-5201 | 2009 | Michael Gary Barber, et al. | J. E. Thomas, Warden | <p>Michael Barber petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a federal district court. Mr. Barber argued that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inaccurately calculated his good time credit toward the service of his federal sentence. The good time credit statute provides that a prisoner "may receive credit toward the service of his sentence… of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term." Mr. Barber argued that the BOP should calculate good time credit based on the sentence imposed rather than the time an inmate has actually served in prison. The district court denied his petition.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing its decision in <em>Tablada v. Daniels</em> as controlling. There, the court held upheld the BOP's method for calculating good time credit. The court had reasoned that the good time credit statute was ambiguous and the BOP's interpretation of the statute was reasonable.</p>
| 954 | 6 | 3 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |
2,044 | 55,675 | Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-337 | 09-337 | 2009 | Wanda Krupski | Costa Crociere, S.p.A. | <p>In 2007, Wanda Krupski booked a trip with Costa Cruise Lines. On February 21 while on the trip, Ms. Krupski allegedly tripped over a loose cable and broker her femur. She filed suit in a Florida federal district court against Costa Cruise Lines. One year and four days after her alleged injury, Costa Cruise Lines informed Ms. Krupski that it was merely the North American sales and booking agent for the carrier, Costa Crociere. The district court allowed Ms. Krupski to amend her complaint to include Costa Crociere and dismissed the action against Costa Cruise Lines. Costa Crociere then moved for summary judgment arguing the ticket sold to Ms. Krupski stipulated that suits must be filed against it within one year of the alleged injury. Therefore, Ms. Krupski was out of time. The district court agreed and granted Costa Crociere's motion for summary judgment.</p>
<p>On appeal, Ms. Krupski argued that her amended complaint against Costa Crociere related back to her original filing and thus should be considered timely filed against Costa Crociere. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court. The court held that her amended complaint did not relate back to her original complaint. The court reasoned that Ms. Krupski was aware that Costa Crociere was the carrier all along. Thus, to relate her amended complaint back to the original complaint was not the sort of mistaken identity correction contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure15(c)(1)(C).</p>
| 1,518 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,045 | 55,677 | Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1553 | 08-1553 | 2009 | Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., et al. | Regal-Beloit Corporation, et al. | <p>Shippers sued the ocean carrier and rail carrier it used to ship products from China to the United States in a California state court to recover for damages. During the transport of the shippers' products, a train derailed damaging the products. The case was removed to a California federal district court only to be dismissed. The district court held that the contracts between the parties did not cover claims for cargo damage.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis. The court reasoned that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA") does not govern the inland transport of goods, unless the parties opted out of coverage by the Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act. The Carmack Amendment governs damage claims against motor and rail carriers, and narrowly limits the venues in which such suits can be brought. Because the district court did not consider whether the parties opted out of the COGSA by the Carmack Amendment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for that determination.</p>
| 1,080 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,046 | 55,676 | Sullivan v. Florida | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-7621 | 08-7621 | 2009 | Joe Harris Sullivan | Florida | <p>When Joe Sullivan was 13 years old, he was convicted of sexual battery by a Florida state court and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Mr. Sullivan argued that his sentence was cruel and unusual and thus violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court of appeals affirmed Mr. Sullivan's sentence without comment.</p>
| 397 | 9 | 0 | false | per curiam | null | Criminal Procedure |
2,047 | 55,681 | Hemi Group LLC v. City of New York | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-969 | 08-969 | 2009 | Hemi Group, LLC and Kai Gachupin | City of New York | <p>The City of New York sued several out-of-state cigarette vendors under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for failing to report sales made to individuals over the Internet as required by the federal Jenkins Act. The State of New York and City of New York rely on this information to collect taxes imposed on cigarettes sold in the state and city. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the City of New York's suit, holding that its claim did not meet the "causation" requirements set forth under RICO. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the City of New York met the RICO "causation" requirements and thus maintained a cause of action. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct prevented the City from collecting taxes and thus directly injured it. Moreover, the court reasoned that the loss of taxes injured the City's "business or property."</p>
| 964 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,048 | 55,682 | Hui v. Castaneda | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1529 | 08-1529 | 2009 | Esther Hui, et al. | Yanira Castaneda, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Francisco Castaneda, et al. | <p>These cases involve malpractice suits against Public Health Service ("PHS") employees. The plaintiffs filed actions recognized by <em>Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics</em> in a California federal district court alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The PHS sought a dismissal arguing that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) preempted <em>Bivens</em> claims. The district court rejected the argument and denied the motion to dismiss.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that FTCA did not preempt <em>Bivens</em> claims. The court reasoned that the FTCA was enacted six months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Bivens</em> and, thus, could not have been intended as a substitute.</p>
| 769 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,049 | 55,683 | Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1008 | 08-1008 | 2009 | Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. | Allstate Insurance Co. | <p>Shady Grove Orthopedics Associates (Shady Grove), on behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) in part for Allstate's alleged failure to pay interest penalties on overdue insurance payments as prescribed by New York statute. Allstate moved to dismiss relying on New York's rules of civil procedure which instruct that class action lawsuits are inappropriate unless specifically prescribed by statute. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York agreed that Shady Grove's class action claim was not authorized and thus dismissed its claim.</p>
<p>On appeal, Shady Grove argued that the New York rules of civil procedure conflict with Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus were not applicable. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with Shady Grove and affirmed the district court. The Second Circuit, reasoning from the Supreme Court's decision in <em>Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomkins</em>, stated that the New York rules of civil procedure did not conflict with Rule 23 and thus Rule 23 did not control.</p>
| 1,098 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,050 | 55,687 | Wong v. Belmontes | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1263 | 08-1263 | 2009 | Wong | Belmontes | <p>A California state court convicted Fernando Belmontes of murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, Mr. Belmontes filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court arguing that at sentencing his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was violated. The district court denied the petition.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Belmontes did suffer ineffective counsel at sentencing. The court reasoned that Mr. Belmontes' attorney failed to prepare and present sufficient evidence to humanize Mr. Belmontes that may have mitigated his sentence.</p>
| 696 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Civil Rights |
2,051 | 55,684 | Dolan v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-367 | 09-367 | 2009 | Brian Russell Dolan | United States | <p>Brian Russell Dolan pleaded guilty to assault resulting in bodily harm in the New Mexico federal district court. He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered to pay the victim $250 per month in restitution. Mr. Dolan appealed arguing that because the district court failed to award restitution within ninety days of Mr. Dolan's sentencing, the district court lacked the authority to do so.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. The court held that the time limits established by the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act are not jurisdictional and, thus, the district court's tardiness in entering the order does not relieve the defendant of his obligation to pay.</p>
| 729 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Judicial Power |
2,052 | 55,685 | Conkright v. Frommert | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-810 | 08-810 | 2009 | Sally L. Conkright, et al. | Paul J. Frommert, et al. | <p>Current and former employees of Xerox Corp. sued the company in a New York federal district court under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). Plaintiffs had left the employer, been paid a lump sum, and after rehire had alleged Xerox improperly calculated their benefits. Xerox argued that release forms signed by some of the plaintiffs barred their ERISA claims. The district court disagreed and then crafted a remedy to compensate the plaintiffs for their lost benefits.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court crafted an appropriate remedy, but erred in finding that the release forms signed by some plaintiffs were unenforceable. Rather, the court reasoned that the release forms were signed knowingly and voluntarily, making them enforceable.</p>
| 827 | 5 | 3 | true | plurality opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,053 | 55,686 | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-304 | 08-304 | 2009 | Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District, et al. | United States, ex rel. Karen T. Wilson | <p>In 1995, a storm hit parts of western North Carolina causing extensive flooding and erosion. Graham and Cherokee Counties applied for assistance under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program ("EWPP"). Under the program, the counties would perform or hire to perform the necessary cleanup and repair work, paying for 25% of the costs, while the United States Department of Agriculture paid for the rest. During the cleanup, Karen Wilson, a secretary for the Graham Conservation District, raised concerns that she had about the legality of the awarded contracts. She filed suit in a North Carolina federal district court against Graham and Cherokee Counties, among others, under the False Claims Act. She alleged a conspiracy that tainted the execution of the EWPP contracts and rendered the claims for reimbursement false within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the information underlying Ms. Wilson's claim was public disclosure and thus barred the court jurisdiction over the case. The court agreed and dismissed.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. It held that the audit reports that underlied Ms. Wilson's claim was not public disclosure for the purpose of the False Claim Act, and thus the district court was not barred from hearing her case.</p>
| 1,359 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,054 | 55,688 | McDaniel v. Brown | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-559 | 08-559 | 2009 | E. K. McDaniel, Warden, et al. | Troy Brown | <p>On January 29, 1994, around 1:00 a.m., nine-year-old Jane Doe was raped in the bedroom of her trailer in Carlin, Nevada. Troy Brown and his brother Travis lived in the same trailer park as Jane Doe. Their brother Trent and his wife lived in a trailer across the street from Jane Doe's trailer. Both Troy and Trent were acquainted with Jane Doe's family, but Jane did not know Travis.</p>
<p>That night, Troy drank at least ten shots of vodka followed by beer chasers; he was so drunk that he vomited on himself after leaving a bar at 12:15 a.m. Two witnesses saw a man stumbling between the Browns' trailer and that of Jane Doe's family around 1:00 a.m. Jane Doe called her mother to report the rape at approximately 1:00 a.m.; according to Troy, he returned to his trailer from the bar at approximately 1:30 a.m, theoretically giving him enough time to assault Jane Doe.</p>
<p>Troy Brown was arrested and charged with two counts of sexual assault on a child, attempted murder, and abuse and neglect of a child resulting in substantial mental harm.</p>
<p>There was a large amount of conflicting evidence drawn from Jane Doe's testimony and from the crime scene itself. Most relevantly, the state's expert tested semen taken from Jane Doe's underwear. She determined that the DNA matched Troy's and testified that the probability it belonged to another person from the general population was 1 in 3,000,000. Troy Brown's family tested the semen independently and found a random match probability of 1 in 10,000, but this was not introduced into evidence at trial. The jury found Troy Brown guilty of sexual assault and abuse and neglect of a child and sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole after 10 years.</p>
<p>On appeal, Brown argued that double jeopardy barred the duplication of sexual assault charges, that the DNA evidence was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the charge for abuse and neglect and remanded to the trial court for sentencing. The trial court again sentenced Brown to life in prison. His petition for post-conviction relief was denied.</p>
<p>On appeal to the district court, Brown claimed that the state's evidence was legally insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, using the habeas corpus review developed by the Court in <em>Jackson v. Virginia</em>. Brown submitted a report prepared by Laurence Mueller, a professor in ecology and evolutionary biology ("Mueller report"). The Mueller Report suggested that the prosecution's random match probability gave an improper impression that the likelihood of Troy Brown's innocence was also 1 in 3,000,000. It also questioned the state expert's testimony on the probability that one of Troy Brown's brothers would match the DNA sample, arguing that the likelihood of a match to one of Troy's brothers was as high as 1 in 66. The district court supplemented the record with the Mueller Report, as it was not presented to any state court.</p>
<p>The district court then set aside the state's DNA testimony as unreliable and held that no rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the district court's ruling in a divided decision. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by supplementing the record with the Mueller report and that the admission of the state's DNA evidence was a due process violation and a violation of federal law.</p>
| 3,526 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,055 | 55,691 | Schwab v. Reilly | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-538 | 08-538 | 2009 | William G. Schwab | Nadejda Reilly | <p>In April 2005, Nadejda Reilly filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Pursuant to standard practice, she listed equipment related to her catering business as "exempt" from the bankruptcy proceedings and valued the equipment at over $10,000. Trustee William Schwab independently had Ms. Reilly's business equipment appraised at over $17,000. He then sought a motion for the Bankruptcy Court to sell Ms. Reilly's equipment and turn over the proceeds, less the value of her exemption. Ms. Reilly countered that the business equipment had become fully exempt when Mr. Schwab failed to timely object when she listed the equipment as exempt. The Bankruptcy Court agreed and denied Mr. Schwab's motion to sell off Ms. Reilly's equipment. A federal district court in Pennsylvania affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, the court affirmed, holding that Mr. Schwab's failure to file a timely objection to Ms. Reilly's exemption barred him from moving to sell the property.</p>
| 1,012 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,056 | 55,692 | Kiyemba v. Obama | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1234 | 08-1234 | 2009 | Jamal Kiyemba, et al. | Barack Obama, President | <p>Seventeen ethnic Uighurs, Chinese citizens detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval- Base, Cuba sought federal habeas corpus relief in the District of Columbia federal district court. The petitioners argued that since they were no longer considered "enemy combatants" they were entitled to transfer and release from Guantanamo Bay. The petitioners feared that a transfer to China would lead to their arrest, torture, or execution. Therefore, they sought a transfer to the United States where they could be released safely. The district court granted the petition and ordered their transfer and release into the United States.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the district court lacked authority to order the petitioners' transfer and release into the United States. The court reasoned that only the political branches of government may determine the admissibility of aliens into the United States. Without specific authorization by statute, treaty, or the Constitution, the district court could not grant the relief sought by the petitioners.</p>
| 1,116 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,057 | 55,694 | Alvarez v. Smith | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-351 | 08-351 | 2009 | Anita Alvarez, Cook County State's Attorney | Chermane Smith, et al. | <p>The Chicago Police Department seized property belonging to the plaintiffs, using the power granted it by the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (DAFPA). The plaintiffs filed suit in an Illinois federal district court under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 arguing that when property is seized under the DAFPA, due process requires a prompt, postseizure, probable cause hearing. The district court dismissed, but the plaintiffs asked for a rehearing in light of <em>Mathews v. Eldridge</em>, which prohibited the seizure of real property without a prior hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit granted review.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the DAFPA did not provide adequate due process for an owner to contest the seizure of his property, reasoning the length of time between seizure and contest was too long (a maximum of 97 to 187 days). The court remanded the case and instructed the district court to devise a mechanism by which an owner can contest the validity of the retention of his property.</p>
| 1,045 | 8 | 1 | true | dismissal - moot | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,058 | 55,695 | Michigan v. Fisher | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-91 | 09-91 | 2009 | Michigan | Jeremy Fisher | <p>Jeremy Fisher was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. At trial, he argued that evidence be suppressed because its acquisition violated the Fourth Amendment. Leading up to Mr. Fisher's arrest, police officers responded to a complaint of a disturbance where upon their arrival Mr. Fisher was screaming inside the house, throwing things, and bleeding. After the officers inquired whether Mr. Fisher was okay, he ignored them and told them to get a search warrant. One of the officers then pushed the door open and entered the house and found Mr. Fisher pointing a gun at him. The trial court granted Mr. Fisher's motion to suppress the evidence, which was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied permission to appeal.</p>
| 831 | 7 | 2 | true | per curiam | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,059 | 55,690 | Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-6261 | 08-6261 | 2009 | John Robertson | United States, ex rel. Wykenna Watson | <p>A victim who obtained a civil protection order ("CPO") against John Robertson moved to hold him in criminal contempt for violating the order. A District of Columbia Superior Court convicted Mr. Robertson on three counts of criminal contempt for violating the CPO. Mr. Robertson moved to vacate the convictions, which was denied. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Robertson's conviction.</p>
| 426 | 5 | 4 | false | per curiam | null | Criminal Procedure |
2,060 | 55,693 | Merck & Co. v. Reynolds | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-905 | 08-905 | 2009 | Merck & Co., Inc., et al. | Richard Reynolds, et al. | <p>Investors brought a securities fraud class action suit against Merck & Co. in a New Jersey federal district court. They alleged the company had misled investors about the drug Vioxx's safety and commercial viability. Merck moved to dismiss the claim arguing that the investors had been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitations had run. The federal district court agreed and dismissed the suit.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. It recognized that under the "inquiry notice" standard, plaintiffs are put on notice for the purpose of the statute of limitations in federal securities fraud litigation at the "possibility" of wrongdoing. Moreover, the court held that the investors had not been put on "inquiry notice" more than two years before they filed suit, and thus the statute of limitation had not run.</p>
| 923 | 9 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,061 | 55,697 | McDonald v. Chicago | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1521 | 08-1521 | 2009 | Otis McDonald, et al. | City of Chicago | <p>Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in <em>District of Columbia v. Heller</em>. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 646 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,062 | 55,698 | Maryland v. Shatzer | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-680 | 08-680 | 2009 | Maryland | Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr. | <p>In August 2003, a detective from the Hagerstown, MD Police Department interviewed Michael Blain Shatzer Sr. regarding allegations that he had sexually abused his three-year old child. At the time, Mr. Shatzer was incarcerated on an unrelated offense involving sexual abuse of another child. After Mr. Shatzer invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, the interview was terminated. The investigation was subsequently closed, only to be reopened in January 2006 on the prompting of Mr. Shatzer's wife, when she recognized her child could make more specific allegations about Mr. Shatzer's alleged sexual abuse. Thereafter in March 2006, another detective from the Hagerstown Police Department, who was aware that Mr. Shatzer had been under investigation, but was not aware that Mr. Shatzer had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights to counsel and to remain silent, interviewed him. At this interview, Mr. Shatzer was advised of his Fifth Amendment rights, which he waived, and then confessed to specific instances of sexual abuse involving his child.</p>
<p>Prior to trial, Mr. Shatzer moved to suppress the confessions he made in the March 2006 interview arguing that his 2003 invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights was still applicable. Under <em>Edwards v. Arizona</em> rendered the confession inadmissible. The motion was denied and a Maryland trial court convicted him of sexual child abuse. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the protections of <em>Edwards</em> applies for an inmate who has been continually incarcerated and had previously invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, until either counsel is made available or the inmate initiates further conversation with police. Therefore, under the circumstances, Mr. Shatzer's confession was inadmissible.</p>
| 1,832 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,063 | 55,699 | Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1214 | 08-1214 | 2009 | Granite Rock Co. | International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. | <p>Granite Rock Co. filed suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters under the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") in a California federal district court. Granite Rock argued that a Teamsters strike constituted a breach of a no-strike clause in their collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"). The district court dismissed the case, finding that Granite Rock failed to state a claim, and denied Granite Rock's request to compel arbitration in order to determine if the CBA had been ratified.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while Granite Rock's claim against the Teamsters was outside the scope of the LMRA, the dispute should be arbitrated. The court reasoned that both parties consented to arbitration when Teamsters asserted the arbitration clause in its filings and when Granite Rock sued under the contract which included the arbitration clause.</p>
| 914 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Unions |
2,064 | 55,700 | Berghuis v. Thompkins | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1470 | 08-1470 | 2009 | Mary Berghuis, Warden | Van Chester Thompkins | <p>A Michigan state court convicted Van Chester Thompkins of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, and several firearms related charges. After exhausting his remedies in Michigan state court, Thompkins petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition.</p>
<p>On appeal, Thompkins argued that his confession was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that he was denied effective counsel at trial. The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court's finding that Thompkins waived his Fifth Amendment right was unreasonable because Thompkins refused to sign an acknowledgement that he had been informed of his <em>Miranda</em> rights and rarely made eye contact with the officer throughout the three hour interview. The Sixth Circuit also held that the Michigan Supreme Court improperly determined that Thompkins was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request a limiting instruction related to his separately tried co-defendant's testimony.</p>
| 1,051 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,065 | 55,701 | Abbott v. Abbott | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-645 | 08-645 | 2009 | Timothy Mark Cameron Abbott | Jacquelyn Vaye Abbott | <p>Timothy Abbott, a British citizen, and Jacquelyn Abbott, an American citizen, litigated their divorce in the Chilean courts. Mrs. Abbott was awarded custody of their son, while Mr. Abbott was awarded visitation rights. At Mrs. Abbott's request, the Chilean court entered an order prohibiting the child's removal from Chile by either the father or mother without express mutual consent. One year later, Mrs. Abbott moved the child from Chile without Mr. Abbott's consent. Upon location of the child in Texas, Mr. Abbott requested an order in a Texas federal district court that the child be returned to Chile pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court denied the order holding that the child's removal did not constitute a breach of the father's "rights of custody" as defined by the Hague convention.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Chilean court's order and Chilean statute that required father's consent before the child could leave Chile did not give a non-custodial father "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Hague Convention. The court stated that Mr. Abbott merely possessed the rights of "access to the child."</p>
| 1,260 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,066 | 55,705 | Weyhrauch v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1196 | 08-1196 | 2009 | Bruce Weyhrauch | United States | <p>Bruce Weyhrauch was charged in the Alaska federal district court in part with a "scheme and artifice to defraud and deprive the State of Alaska of its intangible right to [his] honest services." Mr. Weyhrauch was a member of the Alaska House of Representatives and allegedly took actions favorable to an Alaska oil company, VECO Corp., in return for future employment. At trial, Mr. Weyhrauch moved to exclude evidence related to the honest services charge. The district court excluded the evidence because it would merely have shown that Alaska could have imposed a duty upon Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, and thus did not prove he had violated any duty imposed by state law.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. It held that 18 U.S.C. Section 1346 established a uniform standard for "honest services" that governs every public official and that the government did not need to prove an independent violation of state law to sustain an honest services fraud conviction. Therefore, the court reasoned that because the district court excluded the evidence needed to prove that state law imposed an affirmative duty on Mr. Weyhrauch to disclose the conflict of interest, the evidence was admissible.</p>
| 1,265 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,067 | 55,704 | Berghuis v. Smith | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1402 | 08-1402 | 2009 | Mary Berghuis, Warden | Diapolis Smith | <p>A Michigan state court convicted Diapolis Smith of second degree murder and felony possession of a firearm and sentenced him to life in prison. After exhausting his remedies in the Michigan state courts, Smith petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a Michigan federal district court. The district court denied the petition. On appeal, Smith argued that he was denied an impartial jury from a fair cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment.</p>
<p>The Sixth Circuit held that the Michigan Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law in concluding that county jury selection "worked no systematic exclusion." The Court reasoned the state trial court's policy of excusing potential jurors for whom jury duty would constitute hardship based on child care concerns or transportation issues, when viewed together with another policy that assigned prospective jurors from the county's only large city, established a prima facie case of systematic under-representation of African- American jurors.</p>
| 1,025 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,068 | 55,703 | Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Oversight Board | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-861 | 08-861 | 2009 | Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts, LLP | Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, et al. | <p>The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the Board. However, the Board itself was under the direct supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all of whose commissioners are appointed by and can be removed by the President.</p>
<p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Board's members were inferior officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed by the President. Also, the court noted that the President's ability to remove members of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the Constitution's separation of powers.</p>
| 1,086 | 5 | 4 | true | plurality opinion | reversed in-part/remanded | Miscellaneous |
2,069 | 55,702 | Kucana v. Holder | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-911 | 08-911 | 2009 | Agron Kucana | Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General | <p>Agron Kucana, a citizen of Albania, entered the United States in 1995 and did not leave when his visa expired. Mr. Kucana applied for asylum but failed to appear at his hearing, after which he was ordered removed from the United States. He filed a motion to reopen his case, which was denied. On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. After failing to remove himself from the United States, Mr. Kucana once again moved to reopen his case, contending that conditions in Albania had deteriorated to the extent where his life would be in danger upon his return. His motion was denied.</p>
<p>On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, he argued that the BIA "abused its discretion" in denying his claim when it failed to consider an affidavit testifying to the dangerous conditions existing in Albania. The Seventh Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the matter. It found that the BIA's decision not to reopen Mr. Kucana's case was "discretionary." 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that "no court has jurisdiction to review" any decision that is under the discretion of the BIA. Therefore, the court reasoned that Mr. Kucana's claim was not reviewable by a federal court of appeals.</p>
| 1,252 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,070 | 55,706 | Lewis v. Chicago | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-974 | 08-974 | 2009 | Arthur L. Lewis, Jr., et al. | City of Chicago | <p>African-American applicants for firefighter jobs in Chicago, IL sued the city under Title VII alleging the written test used for hiring had a disparate impact. After administering the test, the city graded the scores and placed applicants in three categories: "well qualified," "qualified," and "not qualified." Because the city had only 600 positions to fill among 1,782 "well qualified" applicants, "qualified" applicants were unlikely to get job offers. The class of plaintiffs in this suit allege that the test disparately categorized them as "qualified." An Illinois federal district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>
<p>On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely and dismissed. The court stated that the 300 day limit for filing such a claim began when the plaintiffs learned that they had been placed in the "qualified" category and that the city would be hiring those in the "well qualified" category. The court reasoned that because there was no fresh act of discrimination, the time for filing a Title VII claim began when the discriminatory decision was made and not when it was executed.</p>
| 1,160 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,071 | 55,708 | City of Ontario v. Quon | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1332 | 08-1332 | 2009 | City of Ontario, California et al. | Jeff Quon, et al. | <p>Employees of the City of Ontario, California police department filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in a California federal district court against the police department, city, chief of police, and an internal affairs officer. They alleged Fourth Amendment violations in relation to the police department's review of text messages made by an employee on a city issued text-message pager. While the city did not have an official text-messaging privacy policy, it did have a general "Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy." The policy in part stated that "[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice," and that "[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used "less intrusive methods" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service.</p>
| 1,494 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,072 | 55,707 | Carr v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1301 | 08-1301 | 2009 | Thomas Carr | United States | <p>An Indiana federal district court convicted Thomas Carr of violating the Sex Offender and Registration and Notification Act. The Act imposes penalties on anyone who is a convicted sex offender, and traveling in interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly fails to register as a sex offender, unless he proves that "uncontrollable circumstances" prevented him from doing so. On appeal, Carr argued that he did not violate the act because he traveled before the Act was passed. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act does not require that the defendant's travel postdate its enactment, and, consequently, affirmed the district court.</p>
| 636 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,073 | 55,709 | Renico v. Lett | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-338 | 09-338 | 2009 | Paul Renico, Warden | Reginald Lett | <p>On the second day of jury deliberations in Reginald Lett's murder trial in a Michigan state court, the trial judge declared a mistrial because a juror asked what would happen if the jury did not agree. Mr. Lett was subsequently retried and convicted of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After exhausting his state court remedies, including an appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr. Lett petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in a Michigan federal district court arguing that his retrial violated the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. The federal district court granted the petition.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that a "court may not force a defendant to undergo retrial on a matter that concluded without a conviction or acquittal unless there was a 'manifest necessity' for declaring a mistrial." While the court further recognized that a jury deadlock is a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial, a trial judge's decision may only be upheld if it was based on an exercise of "sound discretion." Here, the court concluded that the Michigan Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial judge had exercised sound discretion.</p>
| 1,265 | 6 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,074 | 55,710 | Skilling v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1394 | 08-1394 | 2009 | Jeffrey Skilling | United States | <p>A Texas federal district court convicted Jeffrey Skilling of conspiracy, securities fraud, making false representations to auditors, and insider trading. Mr. Skilling was the former C.E.O. of Enron Corp. On appeal, he argued that the government prosecuted him under an invalid legal theory and that the jury was biased.</p>
<p>The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated Mr. Skilling's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court first held that the government's theory under the "Honest Services" fraud statute was valid. It reasoned that it was immaterial whether Enron's board of directors knew or even tacitly approved of Mr. Skilling's fraudulent conduct when he withheld information that would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Moreover, the court held that while Mr. Skilling proved that there was sufficient inflammatory and pervasive pretrial publicity to require a presumption that prejudice tainted the jury, the government met its burden to show that jury screening was adequate, and that the district court did not empanel any juror who was unconstitutionally prejudiced.</p>
| 1,173 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,075 | 55,711 | Johnson v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-6925 | 08-6925 | 2009 | Curtis Darnell Johnson | United States | <p>Curtis Johnson was convicted in a Florida federal district court for possession of ammunition by a convicted felon. He was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the district court determined that his three earlier convictions constituted "violent felonies." Mr. Curtis appealed arguing that one of his prior convictions was for battery and the Florida Supreme Court had held the Florida battery law did not constitute a "violent felony."</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Mr. Johnson's prior battery conviction under Florida law constituted a "violent felony" under the ACCA. The court reasoned that the force requirement of the definition for a "violent felony" was satisfied by the "touching or striking" element under the state battery law.</p>
| 819 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,076 | 55,713 | American Needle Inc. v. National Football League | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-661 | 08-661 | 2009 | American Needle, Inc. | National Football League, et al. | <p>American Needle Inc. filed suit in an Illinois federal district court against the National Football League ("NFL") and Reebok International Ltd. alleging that the teams' exclusive licensing agreement with Reebok violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. American Needle argued that because individual NFL teams separately own their team logos and trademarks, their collective agreement to authorize NFL Properties to award the exclusive headwear license to Reebok, was in fact a conspiracy to restrict other vendors' ability to obtain licenses for the teams' intellectual property. The district court disagreed and dismissed the case.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It held that NFL teams were a single entity for purposes of antitrust laws, and thus could not have conspired to restrict trade. Therefore, the court stated that the teams were free to license their intellectual property on an exclusive basis.</p>
| 958 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,077 | 55,712 | Doe #1 v. Reed | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/09-559 | 09-559 | 2009 | John Doe #1, et al. | Sam Reed, Washington Secretary of State, et al. | <p>Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction in a Washington federal district court to prevent the state of Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state's Public Records Act ("PRA"). In response to a petition titled "Preserve Marriage, Protect Children," plaintiffs attempted to prevent the release of the names and contact information of individuals who signed the petition. The plaintiffs argued that, as applied to referendum petitions, the PRA violates the First Amendment because it is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The district court granted the injunction.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the PRA does not violate the First Amendment when applied to require public disclosure of petitions calling for a referendum. The court reasoned that even assuming that signing a petition qualifies as expressive conduct, and that application of the PRA's public access provision has an incidental effect on a referendum signer's speech by deterring some would-be signers, the appropriate level of constitutional inquiry is intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny. Under intermediate scrutiny, the interests asserted by the state are sufficiently important to justify the law's incidental limitations of referendum petition signers' First Amendment freedoms.</p>
| 1,378 | 8 | 1 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Privacy |
2,078 | 55,714 | Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1200 | 08-1200 | 2009 | Karen L. Jerman | Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer, & Ulrich LPA et al. | <p>Karen L. Jerman filed suit in an Ohio federal district against the law firm Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"). The law firm had sought foreclosure on a property owned by Ms. Jerman and erroneously informed her that the FDCPA stated that the debt in question would be considered valid unless she disputed it in writing. Only later did the law firm discover that Ms. Jerman owed no debt and consequently withdrew its complaint. Before trial, the law firm argued that while it violated the FDCPA, its error was a bona fide error, and thus a complete defense to its actions. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the FDCPA error defense applies to mistakes of law. The court reasoned that the statutory language and legislative history behind the FDCPA did not indicate Congress intended it to apply solely to clerical errors.</p>
| 1,006 | 7 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,079 | 55,716 | Hertz Corp. v. Friend | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1107 | 08-1107 | 2009 | The Hertz Corporation | Melinda Friend, et al. | <p>Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against Hertz in a California state court. Hertz moved to remove the case to a California federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argued that there was no diversity jurisdiction as Hertz's principal place of business was California and not New Jersey. The federal district court agreed and remanded the case to the state court.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court. It held that the district court correctly applied the "place of operations test" to determine Hertz's principal place of business. Therefore, there was no diversity jurisdiction and the district court had no authority over the case.</p>
| 741 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | vacated/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,080 | 55,718 | Christian Legal Society Chapter v. Martinez | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2009/08-1371 | 08-1371 | 2009 | Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, aka Hastings Christian Fellowship | Leo P. Martinez, et al. | <p>The Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of Law (CLS) filed suit against the university in a California federal district for violating its First Amendment rights. The Hastings College of Law failed to recognize the CLS as an official student organization because state law requires all registered student organizations to allow "any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of their status or beliefs." In contrast, CLS requires its members to attest in writing that "I believe in: The Bible as the inspired word of God; The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ, God's son; The vicarious death of Jesus Christ for our sins; His bodily resurrection and His personal return; The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration; [and] Jesus Christ, God's son, is Lord of my life." The district court dismissed the case.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the school's conditions on recognizing student groups were viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Therefore, the school's conditions did not violate the CLS's First Amendment rights.</p>
| 1,190 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | First Amendment |
2,081 | 55,719 | CSX Transportation v. McBride | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-235 | 10-235 | 2010 | CSX Transportation, Inc. | Robert McBride | <p>Locomotive engineer Robert McBride filed suit after contending that he injured his hand while adding and removing railroad cars for his employer, CSX Transportation, Inc. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, a rail carrier is liable for worker injuries that result from negligence by the carrier. A trial judge instructed the jury that CSX caused or contributed to McBride's injury if its negligence "played a part, no matter how small, in bringing about the injury." The jury found for McBride and awarded him $184,250.</p>
<p>CSX argued that McBride should have been required to prove that the company's alleged negligence was a cause of the injury. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed, affirming the verdict.</p>
| 754 | 5 | 4 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Economic Activity |
2,082 | 55,720 | Stok & Associates, P.A. v. Citibank, N.A. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-514 | 10-514 | 2010 | Stok & Associates, P.A. | Citibank, N.A. | <p>In November 2008, Stok & Associates, a Florida law firm, deposited a cashier's check for $173,015 from someone the firm thought was a client into its Citibank trust account. After Citibank accepted the check and made the funds available, the bank discovered the check was counterfeit and restricted Stok's use of the funds. The problem was the firm had already wired the money to the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. Stok said Citibank then removed $173,015 from his trust account and notified the Florida Bar of the deficiency in the trust account.</p>
<p>The firm filed a lawsuit in Florida state court, alleging fraud and breach of contract, among other things. Citibank meanwhile filed a petition in federal court to compel arbitration and stay the state court proceedings, pursuant to an arbitration clause that appears in the contract governing the parties' relationship. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.</p>
| 1,016 | 0 | 0 | false | dismissal - rule 46 | none | null |
2,083 | 55,722 | Bond v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1227 | 09-1227 | 2010 | Carol Anne Bond | United States | <p>Carol Anne Bond was found guilty of trying to poison her husband's mistress, Myrlinda Haynes, with toxic chemicals at least 24 times over the course of several months. A grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Bond with two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of a criminal statute implementing the treaty obligations of the United States under the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. The grand jury also charged Bond with two counts of mail theft. Bond's attorneys argue that the statute was intended to deal with rogue states and terrorists and that their client should have been prosecuted under state law instead. Bond, a laboratory technician, stole the chemical potassium dichromate from the company where she worked. Haynes was not injured. Bond's husband had a child with Haynes while married to Bond. Haynes had contacted police and postal authorities after finding the chemicals at her home. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that Bond lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute on the basis of the Tenth Amendment.</p>
| 1,138 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Judicial Power |
2,084 | 55,721 | Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-152 | 09-152 | 2010 | Russell Bruesewitz, et al. | Wyeth, Inc., fka Wyeth Laboratories, et al. | <p>Two hours after Hannah Bruesewitz received her six-month diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccine in 1992, she started developing seizures and was hospitalized for weeks. Hannah has continued to suffer from residual seizure disorder that requires her to receive constant care, according to her parents. When their daughter was three-years-old, Russell and Robalee Bruesewitz filed a petition seeking compensation for her injuries. One month prior to the petition, new regulations eliminated Hannah's seizure disorder from the list of compensable injuries. The family's petition was denied. Three years later, in 1998, the drug company Wyeth withdrew the type of vaccine used in Hannah's inoculation from the market.</p>
<p>The Bruesewitzes filed a lawsuit against Wyeth in state court in Pennsylvania. They claimed the drug company failed to develop a safer vaccine and should be held accountable for preventable injuries caused by the vaccine's defective design. A federal judge dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act protected Wyeth from lawsuits over vaccine injury claims. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit affirmed.</p>
| 1,179 | 6 | 2 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Federalism |
2,085 | 55,724 | Pepper v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-6822 | 09-6822 | 2010 | Jason Pepper | United States | <p>Jason Pepper pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine in an Iowa federal district court. In the latest of a long-running series of appeals and remands, a newly assigned Iowa federal district court sentenced Mr. Pepper to 77 months imprisonment and 12 months supervised release – a 20% downward departure from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory range. Thereafter, the district court granted the government's motion to reduce Mr. Pepper's sentence further to 65 months imprisonment because of the assistance Mr. Pepper provided after he was initially sentenced. Mr. Pepper appealed arguing in part that the district court should consider evidence of his post-sentence rehabilitation to reduce his sentence further.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed Mr. Pepper's sentence, holding in part that evidence of a defendant's post-sentence rehabilitation was not relevant at resentencing. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent was clear that such evidence was not relevant.</p>
| 1,106 | 6 | 2 | true | majority opinion | reversed in-part | Criminal Procedure |
2,086 | 55,723 | Connick v. Thompson | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-571 | 09-571 | 2010 | Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, et al. | John Thompson | <p>John Thompson sued the Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office, the District Attorney, Harry Connick, in his official and individual capacities, and several assistant district attorneys in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983 in a Louisiana federal district court. Mr. Thompson served fourteen years on death row for a crime he did not commit because prosecutors failed to turn over blood work in a related case. The jury awarded Mr. Thompson $14 million against Mr. Connick in his official capacity. On appeal, an en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rendered a tie vote and; thus by rule, affirmed the district court.</p>
| 655 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
2,087 | 55,725 | Tapia v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5400 | 10-5400 | 2010 | Alejandra Tapia | United States | <p>Alejandra Tapia was convicted of bringing illegal aliens into the United States and of jumping bail after being charged with immigration crimes. Following the jury trial, a judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California sentenced Tapia to 51 months in prison, noting that one factor in giving her a longer sentence was to make sure she remained confined long enough to take part in a drug rehab program.</p>
<p>Tapia appealed the sentence, arguing that the district court committed plain error by basing her sentence on speculation about whether and when she could enter and complete the Bureau of Prison's 500-hour drug abuse treatment program. But in April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.</p>
| 778 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Criminal Procedure |
2,088 | 55,726 | Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-188 | 10-188 | 2010 | Schindler Elevator Corporation | United States ex re. Daniel Kirk | <p>Daniel Kirk served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971. Beginning in 1978, he worked at Millar Elevator Industries, which was later absorbed by Schindler Elevator in 2002. Although he had been promoted within the company on past occasions, in 2003, he was demoted from a managerial position to a non-managerial slot. He then resigned. Kirk filed a complaint with the Department of Labor in 2004 claiming his demotion was in violation of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act. After his claim was denied by the department, he filed suit in the Southern District of New York in 2005 under the False Claims Act. Kirk claimed the company was shirking its obligation to take affirmative steps to employ and promote veterans, invite eligible veterans to identify themselves to employers and file annual reports detailing the hiring and placement of veterans.</p>
<p>Using documentation supplied by FOIA requests submitted by his wife and his own knowledge of company operations, he claimed the company failed to file reports from 1998 until late 2004 and filed false reports in 2004, 2005 and 2006, alleging that each claim for payment on the hundreds of government contracts submitted by Schindler was a violation of the False Claims Act.</p>
<p>The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint in March 2009 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In April 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the lower court order and remanded the case for further proceedings.</p>
| 1,623 | 5 | 3 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Privacy |
2,089 | 55,728 | PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-993 | 09-993 | 2010 | PLIVA, Inc., et al. | Gladys Mensing | <p>Gladys Mensing took the drug metoclopramide for four years to help fight diabetic gastroparesis. She filed a lawsuit against the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors, contending that the drug gave her a severe neurological movement disorder, tardive dyskinesia, but none of the generic drug's manufacturers and distributors made any effort to include warnings on the label.</p>
<p>Metoclopramide manufacturers Pliva Inc. and Actavis Elizabeth LLC asked for the lawsuit to be thrown out, arguing that government regulations require thp to have the same label on metoclopramide as is on its brand-name equivalent, Reglan. Reglan did not have a warning about tardive dyskinesia while Mensing was taking metoclopramide.</p>
<p>A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota agreed, saying the lawsuit was pre-ppted by the federal regulations requiring the two labels to match. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit overturned that ruling, holding that more should have been done to warn consumers about possible risks.</p>
| 1,069 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Federalism |
2,090 | 55,727 | Premo v. Moore | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-658 | 09-658 | 2010 | Jeff Premo, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary | Randy Joseph Moore | <p>Randy Moore pled no-contest to felony murder in an Oregon trial court and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. After exhausting his post-conviction state court remedies, Mr. Moore petitioned for habeas corpus relief in an Oregon federal district court. Mr. Moore argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize that his taped confession was obtained unconstitutionally. The district court denied the petition.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and granted the petition. The court held that Mr. Moore's counsel's failure to suppress Mr. Moore's confession was both constitutionally deficient and prejudicial under the standard set forth in <em>Strickland v. Washington</em>. The court was careful to note that even the state conceded the means by which the state elicited Mr. Moore's confession were unconstitutional because Mr. Moore's request for counsel had been ignored by the police.</p>
| 967 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,091 | 55,729 | Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-987 | 09-987 | 2010 | Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization | Kathleen M. Winn, et al. | <p>Arizona taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Arizona's tuition tax credit in an Arizona federal district court. They alleged the tax credit violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it funneled money to private religious schools. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the taxpayers had standing to bring their suit and had alleged a viable Establishment Clause claim.</p>
| 490 | 5 | 4 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Judicial Power |
2,092 | 55,731 | Walker v. Martin | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-996 | 09-996 | 2010 | James Walker, Warden, et al. | Charles W. Martin | <p>A California state court convicted Charles Martin of robbery and murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Subsequently, Mr. Martin filed a round of habeas petitions in state court – all of which were denied. He then raised several new claims in petitions for federal habeas relief in a California federal district court. The court denied to examine the claims because they were not yet exhausted in state court. After Mr. Martin exhausted these last claims in state court, he returned to federal court for federal habeas corpus relief. The district court again denied the petition relying on California's statute of limitations for filing state habeas corpus petitions.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that California's statute of limitations could not operate as an independent and adequate state ground to bar federal habeas corpus review. The court reasoned that California's statute of limitations was not sufficiently defined, nor consistently applied such that it could bar Mr. Martin's petition.</p>
| 1,118 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Civil Rights |
2,093 | 55,733 | Bobby v. Mitts | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-1000 | 10-1000 | 2010 | David Bobby, Warden | Harry Mitts | <p>Harry Mitts drank bourbon until he became intoxicated and then shot and killed an African American man, while speaking racial epithets. During the police shoot-out that followed, Mitts shot and killed one police officer and wounded two others before being apprehended. At trial, Mitts did not contest the evidence proving that he had killed two men, but he instead attempted to establish that he was too intoxicated to form the required intent to kill. After a penalty hearing, the jury recommended the death penalty on both aggravated murder counts and terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders.</p>
<p>The trial court sentenced Mitts to death for the aggravated murders and to terms of imprisonment for the attempted murders. The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Mitts' convictions and sentences, and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences and denied rehearing, ruling that the trial court should have instructed the jury to merge duplicative death penalty specifications, but holding that the error did not influence the jury and was resolved by re-weighing on appeal.</p>
<p>Mitts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A federal judge in Cleveland affirmed the sentence, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate.</p>
| 1,297 | 9 | 0 | true | per curiam | reversed | Criminal Procedure |
2,094 | 55,732 | Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-76 | 10-76 | 2010 | Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., et al. | Edgar D. Brown et ux., co-administrators of the Estate of Julian David Brown, et al. | <p>The families of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus crash in France brought suit in North Carolina state court, alleging faulty tires. The tires were made in Turkey, and the plaintiffs sued Goodyear's Luxembourg affiliate and its branches in Turkey and France. A North Carolina appeals court held that the foreign defendants had sufficient contacts in the state to support general personal jurisdiction.</p>
| 420 | 9 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Due Process |
2,095 | 55,734 | Los Angeles County, CA v. Humphries | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-350 | 09-350 | 2010 | Los Angeles County, CA | Craig Arthur Humphries et al. | <p>Craig and Wendy Humphries were accused of abuse by one of their children, arrested, and their children were taken away from them. They were charged with child abuse and felony torture, but the charges were dismissed once it became clear the allegations were not true. Despite the fact that the charges were dismissed, the Humphries were placed on California's Child Abuse Central Index ("CACI") – a database for known and suspected child abusers. The Humphries subsequently filed suit against Los Angeles County and various County officials in a California federal district court. The Humphries argued that California's maintenance of the CACI violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because identified individuals are not given fair opportunity to challenge the allegations against them. The district court dismissed their claims.</p>
<p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed holding that the erroneous listing of the Humphries on the CACI violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Humphries, as the prevailing party, then moved for attorneys' fees. The Ninth Circuit awarded the fees, reasoning that the limitations to liability established in <em>Monell v. Department of Social Services</em> do not apply to claims for declaratory relief.</p>
| 1,322 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Civil Rights |
2,096 | 55,736 | Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1314 | 08-1314 | 2010 | Delbert Williamson, et al. | Mazda Motor of America, Inc., et al. | <p>Three members of the Williamson family were involved in a head-on collision with another vehicle. Delbert and Alexa wore lap/shoulder seatbelts and survived, while Thanh wore a lap-only seatbelt and died. Subsequently, they sued Mazda Motor of America for strict products liability, negligence, deceit, and wrongful death in a California state court. The court dismissed the claims, holding that federal law precluded a state court tort action "to the extent the theory of liability [was rooted in] the lap-only seat belt." On appeal, a California appellate court affirmed, holding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") regulation allowing minivan rear seats to have either lap-only or lap/shoulder seat belts preempted state court wrongful death actions.</p>
| 791 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Federalism |
2,097 | 55,735 | Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-98 | 10-98 | 2010 | John Ashcroft | Abdullah al-Kidd | <p>In 2003, the FBI arrested Abdullah al-Kidd as he was preparing to travel to Saudi Arabia to study Arabic and Islamic law. He was held for 16 days as a material witness in the terrorism trial of Sami Omar al-Hussayen. Al-Kidd has since argued the government classified him as a material witness because it lacked enough evidence to hold him as a suspect. He filed a lawsuit against then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally, claiming that he created and authorized a program that allegedly misused the material witness statute to detain suspected terrorists.</p>
<p>The lawsuit did not go to trial and in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Ashcroft's bid for absolute immunity, holding that it didn't apply because the government's motive for arresting Al-Kidd allegedly had nothing to do with the al-Hussayen prosecution.</p>
| 872 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed/remanded | Economic Activity |
2,098 | 55,740 | FCC v. AT&T Inc. | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1279 | 09-1279 | 2010 | Federal Communications Commission | AT&T Inc. | <p>CompTel, a trade association that represents some of AT&T's competitors, filed a FOIA request with the Federal Communications Commision in 2005, seeking documents related to an FCC probe into whether AT&T had overcharged the agency for work on a technology education project. AT&T fought the request, contending the production of the documents violated Exemption 7(c) of FOIA, which exempts document disclosures in law enforcement records that would constitute an invasion of "personal privacy."</p>
<p>The FCC rejected AT&T's argument, but in September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the phrase "personal privacy" applied to corporations because other sections of FOIA had defined "person" as a corporation.</p>
| 765 | 8 | 0 | true | majority opinion | reversed | Privacy |
2,099 | 55,738 | Abbott v. United States | https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-479 | 09-479 | 2010 | Kevin Abbott | United States | <p>In these consolidated cases, the defendants engaged in drug trafficking while using a firearm. Both defendants received an additional five-year sentence for using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)A), even though they received longer mandatory minimum sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act. On appeal, they argued that the sentencing enhancement provided by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)A) should run concurrently with their already longer minimum sentences. The Third and Fifth Circuits rejected the defendants' arguments.</p>
| 594 | 8 | 0 | false | majority opinion | affirmed | Criminal Procedure |