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Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-115

09-115

2010

Chamber of Commerce of the United States, et al.

Michael B. Whiting, et al.

<p>Various business and civil-rights organizations challenged the enforceability of The Legal Arizona Worker's Act ("LAWA") in an Arizona federal district court. They argued that federal law preempted LAWA, which requires Arizona employers to use the federal E-Verify employment verification system and revokes business licenses of those who hire unauthorized workers. The district court upheld the statute.</p> <p>On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that LAWA was not preempted explicitly or impliedly by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"). The court reasoned that IRCA although IRCA expressly preempts all state and local laws imposing sanctions for hiring or recruiting unauthorized aliens, it excepts licensing laws – like LAWA – from preemptive reach. The court also reasoned that mandating the use of E-Verify is not impliedly preempted by IRCA because Congress could have, but did not, expressly forbid states form requiring E-Verify participation.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

United States v. Tinklenberg

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1498

09-1498

2010

United States

Jason Louis Tinklenberg

<p>Following a jury trial in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, Jason Louis Tinklenberg was convicted of possessing firearms after having been convicted of a felony and possessing materials used to manufacture methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 33 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release.</p> <p>Before trial, the district court had denied Tinklenberg's motion to dismiss the indictment for a violation of the STA. On appeal following Tinklenberg's conviction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the trial court had indeed violated the act and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Revenue

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-520

09-520

2010

CSX Transportation, Inc.

Alabama Department of Revenue

<p>CSX Transportation, Inc. ("CSX") brought suit against the Alabama Department of Revenue in an Alabama federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the imposition of the state's sales and use tax on diesel fuel. CSX argued that the tax discriminates against railroad companies in violate of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 ("RRRR"). The district court had granted a preliminary injunction, but of its own accord, dissolved the preliminary injunction and dismissed the case.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court appropriately dismissed the action. The court reasoned that because it had already ruled in favor of the Alabama Department of Revenue on an identical challenge to the tax in <em>Norfolk S. R. v. AL Dep't of Rev.</em>, the district court was correct in dismissing CSX's suit.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Wall v. Kholi

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-868

09-868

2010

Ashbel T. Wall, II, Director of Rhode Island Department of Corrections

Khalil Kholi

<p>In December 1993, a Rhode Island jury convicted Khalil Kholi on 10 counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges stemmed from the alleged molestation of his two step-daughters. A judge on the state superior court sentenced Kholi to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment, and the state supreme court affirmed the conviction in February 1996. Kholi did not file a federal writ of habeas corpus at that time. Instead, he filed a motion seeking sentence reduction as a form of post-conviction relief, which was denied. Kholi exhausted his procedural options regarding sentence reduction in 2007, at which time he began his appeal for federal writ of habeas corpus, which was well beyond the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's standard one-year limitation on filing. In September 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment that a petition for leniency is different from an appeal to correct legal errors and therefore does not result in a tolling of the statute of limitations under AEDPA. A circuit split exists on the issue. The First Circuit's decision was in line with a Tenth Circuit ruling on the same issue, but the Third, Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have previously ruled that a petition for leniency does not toll the statute of limitations under AEDPA.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1403

09-1403

2010

Erica P. John Fund, Inc., fka Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc.

Halliburton Co., et al.

<p>A group of Halliburton Co. shareholders, led by the Erica P. John Fund, filed a lawsuit that contends that from 1999 to 2001, the Houston-based company falsified earnings reports, played down estimated asbestos liability and overstated the benefits of a merger. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied the investors' motion for class certification in the case, holding that they couldn't sue as a group because they hadn't established that they lost money as a result of the alleged fraud. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-529

09-529

2010

Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy

James W. Stewart III, Commissioner, Virginia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services, et al.

<p>The Virginia Office of Protection and Advocacy ("VOPA"), a state agency dedicated to advocating on behalf of persons with disabilities, sued several Virginia state officials in their official capacities in a Virginia federal district court. VOPA alleged that the officials violated two federal statutes when the officials refused VOPA access to state records which VOPA argued it was entitled. The officials moved to dismiss the case arguing that they were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.</p> <p>On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the state officials were immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The court reasoned that: (1) Congress did not abrogate state immunity under the statutes which VOPA sued under and (2) the mere receipt of federal funds by Virginia under the two statutes did not mean that the state had consented to suit. The court declined to extend the Eleventh Amendment exception established in <em>Ex parte Young</em>, where a private party may seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials, noting that VOPA was not a private party but rather a state agency.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federalism

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-779

10-779

2010

William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, et al.

IMS Health Inc., et al.

<p>In 2007, the Vermont legislature passed a law that banned the sale, transmission or use of prescriber-identifiable data (''PI data'') for marketing or promoting a prescription drug without the consent of the prescriber. The law also prohibited the sale, license or exchange for value of PI data for marketing or promoting a prescription drug.</p> <p>Three companies -- IMS Health, Verispan and Source Healthcare Analytics, a unit of Dutch publisher Wolters Kluwer -- that collect and sell such data and by a trade group for pharmaceutical manufacturers challenged the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit struck down the measure, holding that it violated the First Amendment because it restricts the speech rights of data miners without directly advancing legitimate state interests.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Freeman v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-10245

09-10245

2010

William Freeman

United States

<p>William Freeman was charged with one count of crack possession, among other charges, and entered a plea agreement that included a sentence of 106 months. After his agreement was accepted by the trial judge and his sentence was entered, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to reduce the disparity in the treatment of crack and powder cocaine, and made the amendment retroactive. Freeman sought to reduce his sentence accordingly.</p> <p>But in December 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky refused to do so. In November 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

General Dynamics Corp. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1298

09-1298

2010

General Dynamics Corporation

United States

<p>More than 20 years ago, General Dynamics Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. signed a contract to build eight A- 12 Avenger stealth fighters for the U.S. Navy at a total estimated cost of more than $4 billion. Three years later, the Navy and then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared the company in default and canceled the contract. The government has argued that the companies weren't able to produce the aircraft as designed on schedule and is seeking repayment of $1.35 billion, plus more than $2.5 billion in accumulated interest, arguing that the companies failed to meet the terms of the contract. Meanwhile, General Dynamics Corp. and Boeing Co., which inherited the litigation through its purchase of McDonnell Douglas, contend that the delay was caused by the government's refusal to share essential stealth technology.</p> <p>The government has argued that the companies couldn't press that argument because litigating the issue would require the disclosure of military secrets and jeopardize national security. Two lower courts agreed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Privacy

Harrington v. Richter

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-587

09-587

2010

Kelly Harrington, Warden

Joshua Richter

<p>A California trial court convicted Joshua Richter of burglary and murder. He exhausted his state court remedies and filed for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court. Mr. Richter argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court denied the petition and was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.</p> <p>However, upon rehearing <em>en banc</em>, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition, holding that the state court's determination that Mr. Richter was not denied effective assistance of counsel was unreasonable. The court reasoned that under <em>Strickland v. Washington</em> the defendant must show that "counsel's performance was deficient." And, the defendant must show that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Here, the requirements of <em>Strickland</em> were met when Mr. Richter's counsel failed to conduct sufficient pre-trial investigation to determine what forensic evidence or experts would be useful to the defense's theory when it was foreseeable what evidence the state would introduce.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

CIGNA v. Amara

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-804

09-804

2010

CIGNA Corp. and CIGNA Pension Plan

Janice C. Amara, et al.

<p>Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), plan administrators must provide all plan participants with a "summary plan description" (SPD), as well as a "summary of material modifications" when material changes are made to the plan. After CIGNA converted its traditional defined benefit pension plan to a cash balance plan, it issued a summary plan description to plan participants. In 2001, Janice Amara, one of the participants, filed a class-action lawsuit, claiming that CIGNA failed to comply with ERISA's notice requirements and SPD provisions. The U.S. District Court for the District Connecticut found for Amara, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the SPD misrepresented the terms of the plan itself.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Madison County v. Oneida Indian Nation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-72

10-72

2010

Madison County, New York

Oneida Indian Nation of New York

<p>In 2005, U.S. District Judge David Hurd barred Oneida and Madison counties in New York from foreclosing on Oneida Indian Nation-owned properties on which taxes haven't been paid. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that the counties don't have the right to sue an Indian tribe unless Congress has authorized the lawsuit or the tribe has waived its legal immunity.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Civil Rights

J.D.B. v. North Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11121

09-11121

2010

J.D.B.

North Carolina

<p>A North Carolina boy identified as J.D.B. was 13-year-old special education student in 2005 when the police showed up at his school to question him about a string of neighborhood burglaries. The police had learned that the boy was in possession of a digital camera that had been reported stolen.The boy was escorted to a school conference room, where he was interrogated in the presence of school officials. J.D.B.'s parents were not contacted, and he was not given any warnings about his rights under the 1966 decision in <em>Miranda v. Arizona</em>, such as the right to remain silent or to have access to a lawyer. J.D.B. confessed to the crimes, but later sought to have his confession suppressed on the basis that he was never read his Miranda rights. He argued that because he was effectively in police custody when he incriminated himself, he was entitled to Miranda protections. In December 2009, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that it could not consider the boy's age or special education status in determining whether he was in custody, and because he was not in custody, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Ortiz v. Jordan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-737

09-737

2010

Michelle Ortiz

Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright

<p>Michelle Ortiz, a former inmate, filed suit against several state and prison officials in an Ohio federal district court for violating her civil rights. While Ms. Ortiz served her sentence, she was sexually abused by a corrections officer on two consecutive nights. Prior to the second incident, Ms. Ortiz complained to prison officials, but was told "that the man was leaving," "this was his nature," and he "is just an old dirty man." The corrections officer assaulted her on the following night. At trial, the jury found in favor of Ms. Ortiz against two of the prison officials – Paula Jordan and Rebecca Bright.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the case. The court noted that while courts do not normally review the denial of summary judgment after a trial on the merits, a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to the general rule. The court reasoned that Ms. Jordan's conduct did not violate Ms. Ortiz's Eight Amendment right to humane conditions because Ms. Jordan was not "deliberately indifferent" to Ms. Ortiz's plight.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Astra USA v. Santa Clara County

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1273

09-1273

2010

Astra USA

Santa Clara County, Calif.

<p>In 2005, Santa Clara County, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit based on U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reports, alleging that pharmaceutical companies have systemically overcharged hospitals and clinics, making them pay millions of dollars more than necessary for prescription drugs. The Inspector General's report also argued that the government is ill-equipped to ensure that clinics are being charged correctly. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but in March 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-907

09-907

2010

Jason M. Ransom

FIA Card Services, N.A., fka MBNA America Bank, N.A.

<p>Jason Ransom filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Nevada in 2006 and proposed a plan to make $500 monthly payments over a period of 60 months. The chapter 13 trustee and two creditors objected to confirmation of the plan, arguing that $500 per month was not Ransom's projected disposable income as defined in the Bankruptcy Code. They argued that Ransom improperly included a deduction against income for "vehicle ownership expense" of $471. The trustee and creditors claimed that the deduction should be disallowed and that the monthly payment should be increased. The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the trustee and refused to confirm the plan. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, agreeing to hear the appeal on this interlocutory issue, affirmed the Bankruptcy Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Henderson v. Shinseki

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1036

09-1036

2010

Doretha H. Henderson, Authorized Representative of David L. Henderson, Deceased

Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans Affairs

<p>David Henderson filed a claim for monthly compensation with the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office based on his need for in-home care. The Regional Office denied the claim. Mr. Henderson appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Office. He then filed a notice of appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims fifteen days after the expiration of the 120-day appeal period set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The court of appeals denied the claim. The court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Henderson's notice of appeal was out of time and was not subject to equitable tolling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Smith v. Bayer Corp.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1205

09-1205

2010

Keith Smith, et al.

Bayer Corp.

<p>Bayer Corp. withdrew the cholesterol-lowering drug, Baycol, from the market in August 2001 because of its alleged role in serious side effects and the deaths of some patients using the drug. Keith Smith and Shirley Sperlazza filed a lawsuit in West Virginia state court in 2001, seeking class certification for Baycol users throughout the state. Meanwhile, a separate putative West Virginia class action, filed was removed to federal court and consolidated as part of a multidistrict litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. In August 2008, the court denied certification on grounds that plaintiffs could not litigate economic loss claims as a class.</p> <p>Counsel for Smith and Sperlazza later received a notice declaring that their case in West Virginia state court was bound by that ruling. They appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court order in January 2010.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Federalism

Chase Bank USA v. McCoy

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-329

09-329

2010

Chase Bank USA, N.A.

James A. McCoy, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated

<p>A class of Chase Bank ("Chase") credit card holders sued Chase in a California federal district alleging the bank violated the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). The investors argued that Chase violated the act when it increased interest rates retroactively after the credit account was closed as a result of a late payment to the bank. The district court dismissed the complaint.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding in part that Regulation Z of TILA required a creditor, like Chase, to provide contemporaneous notice of interest rate increases that occurred because of customer default. Here, Chase failed to provide such notice.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-290

10-290

2010

Microsoft Corporation

i4i Limited Partnership, et al.

<p>The owner of a patent for a computer language, i4i Limited Partnership brought suit against Microsoft Corp., alleging that the custom XML editor in certain versions of Microsoft Word, Microsoft's word-processing software, infringed i4i's patent. The jury found Microsoft liable for willful infringement, rejecting the company's argument that the patent was invalid, and awarded $200 million in damages to i4i.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Microsoft's motions for a new trial. And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the district court order, finding that Microsoft needed to offer "clear and convincing evidence" to overcome the traditional presumption that patents approved by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office are valid.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Sykes v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11311

09-11311

2010

Marcus Sykes

United States

<p>Marcus Sykes pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana enhanced Sykes' sentence under the ACCA after determining that he had previously been found guilty of three violent felonies.</p> <p>In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that "fleeing police in a vehicle in violation of Ind. Code § 35-44-3-3(b)(1)(A) is sufficiently similar to ACCA's enumerated crimes in kind, as well as the degree of risk posed, and counts as a violent felony under ACCA."</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Flores-Villar v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-5801

09-5801

2010

Ruben Flores-Villar

United States

<p>A California federal district court convicted Ruben Flores-Villar under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of being a deported alien found in the United States. On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Flores-Villar argued that the relevant provisions of the INA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment on the basis of age and gender. The provisions impose a five-year residency requirement, after age fourteen, on United States citizen fathers but not mothers, whose residency requirement is merely one year. The Ninth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's holding in <em>Nguyen v. INS</em> which did not deal precisely with the provisions before the court, but held that other more onerous residency requirements for fathers but not mothers in the INA did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that the provisions challenged by Mr. Flores-Villar also did not violate the Equal Protection Clause and affirmed the judgment of the district court.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

Civil Rights

Tolentino v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11556

09-11556

2010

Jose Tolentino

New York

<p>Jose Tolentino was pulled over for playing his music too loudly. The officer ran a check on Tolentino's DMV files and discovered that not only was his license suspended, but it had also been suspended at least 10 times prior. Tolentino was arrested and charged with first-degree aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in exchange for five years' probation. He later appealed, claiming his driving record should have been suppressed, because the police stop and subsequent DMV record search were illegal. The Court of Appeals of New York, the state's highest court, disagreed and upheld his sentence.</p>

per curiam

Judicial Power

Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1159

09-1159

2010

Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., Roche Diagnostics Corp., and Roche Diagnostics Operation Inc.

<p>The case arose over a licensing dispute between Stanford University and pharmaceutical firm Roche Molecular System over the ownership of patents used in the company's HIV test kits. Stanford School of Medicine professor Mark Holodniy developed the technology behind the kits. As a researcher at the university, patents from his work would normally be automatically assigned to Stanford. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act allows universities to retain the rights to research funded by federal grants. But Holodniy also signed a contract with Cetus Corp., a company that later sold its line of business to Roche, that give the company the patent to anything that resulted from their collaboration. In February 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the university lacked standing to maintain patent infringement claims against Roche.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

National Aeronautics and Space Administration v. Nelson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-530

09-530

2010

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Robert M. Nelson, et al.

<p>A 2004 Bush administration antiterrorism initiative extended background checks required for many government jobs to contract employees, including scientists and engineers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a research facility operated by the California Institute of Technology under a contract with NASA. Twenty-eight lab employees, who do not have security clearances and are not involved in classified or military activities, filed suit over what they considered to be overly intrusive background checks. A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the background checks halted while the case continued. The divided court later declined an en banc review.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Privacy

Milner v. Department of the Navy

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1163

09-1163

2010

Glen Scott Milner

Department of the Navy

<p>Glen Milner, a member of an organization dedicated to raising community awareness about the dangers of Navy training exercises near Puget Sound, sued the Department of the Navy in a Washington federal district court under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to obtain the release of Navy documents relating to the effects of explosions at several locations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Navy.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that documents relating to the effects of explosions constituted internal personnel rules and regulations of the agency which are subject to exemption from disclosure by the FOIA. The court reasoned that such documents are "predominantly" for internal agency use that present a risk, that if disclosed, would circumvent agency regulation.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Privacy

United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-382

10-382

2010

United States

Jicarilla Apache Nation

<p>In 2002, the Jicarilla Apache Nation of New Mexico sued the federal government for allegedly mismanaging financial interests and funds, which are held in trust for the tribe's benefit. The tribe is seeking access to attorney-client communications about the trust operation. The Court of Federal Claims denied a petition by the United States to vacate its orders requiring the government to produce the documents.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-6

10-6

2010

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc.

SEB S.A.

<p>French-based SEB S.A. sells home cooking products in the United States through an indirect subsidiary, T-Fal Corp. SEB owns a patent for a type of deep fryer with an inexpensive plastic outer shell. The improvement of the patent was to separate the shell from the fryer pan to allow for the less expensive material. Hong Kong-based Pentalpha Enterprises, a subsidiary of Global-Tech Appliances, a British Virgin Islands corporation, began selling its deep fryers to Sunbeam Products Inc. in 1997. The company developed the product after purchasing an SEB deep fryer and copying its features. Though Pentalpha solicited and received a "right-to-use study" from a U.S. attorney citing no infringement of any patent, the company had failed to notify the attorney of the copying. SEB filed a lawsuit against Sunbeam and the companies settled. Though Pentalpha was aware of that litigation, it subsequently sold the same deep fryers to Fingerhut Corp. and Montgomery Ward &amp; Co. In 1999, SEB sued Montgomery Ward, Global-Tech, and Pentalpha for infringement in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled against Pentalpha. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court decision and further held that "deliberate indifference" to potential patent rights satisfies the knowledge requirement for induced infringement.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega, S.A.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1423

08-1423

2010

Costco Wholesale Corporation

Omega, S.A.

<p>Watchmaker Omega S.A. sued Costco Wholesale Corp. when it bought a shipment of the Swiss-made watches from another importer and sold them for below Omega's suggested retail price. Omega contends that Costco's sale infringes on their copyright of the Omega logo on the back face of the watch. Meanwhile, Costco argues that Omega is precluded from bringing a copyright action after a sale due to the Doctrine of Exhaustion, or "first sale" rule, under which certain rights are "exhausted" after a sale of the copyrighted good.</p> <p>A judge on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California backed Costco, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the first-sale doctrine did not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

Economic Activity

Bullcoming v. New Mexico

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-10876

09-10876

2010

Donald Bullcoming

New Mexico

<p>Donald Bullcoming of New Mexico was sentenced to two years in prison for a felony aggravated DWI/DUI. The State introduced a blood alcohol test (blood draw) that was taken from Bullcoming under a search warrant issued following his refusal of the breath alcohol test. Bullcoming argued that the laboratory report of his blood draw results was testimonial evidence subject to the Confrontation Clause.</p> <p>The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and upheld the trial court's ruling that the forensic report was a business record. The court ruled that a blood alcohol report is admissible as a public record and that it presented no issue under the Confrontation Clause because the report was non-testimonial. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted discretionary review, but while the case was pending, this U.S. Supreme Court issued its 2009 decision in <em>Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts</em>, clarifying that forensic laboratory reports are testimonial and therefore the Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits. In applying the <em>Melendez-Diaz</em> ruling, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the blood alcohol report was testimonial evidence, but it was admissible even though the forensic analyst who performed the test did not testify.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Camreta v. Greene

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1454

09-1454

2010

Bob Camreta

Sarah Greene, et al.

<p>Sarah Greene filed a lawsuit against Bob Camreta, a caseworker with the Oregon Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford, contending they interviewed her daughter without a warrant, probable cause or parental consent. The girl's father, Nimrod Greene, was arrested for allegedly molesting a 7-year-old boy. The boy's mother told police that Sarah Greene had complained that she "doesn't like the way Nimrod makes (his daughters) sleep in his bed when he is intoxicated and she doesn't like the way he acts when they are sitting in his lap." After interviewing one of the girls, Camreta concluded that she had been sexually abused and had the girls removed from the home. Nimrod was charged with sexually assaulting the boy and one of his own daughters. After a mistrial, he accepted a plea bargain in which he maintained his innocence but admitted there was enough evidence to convict him. Greene insisted the allegations were lies, and the daughter who was interviewed later recanted her statements. District Court Judge Ann Aiken of the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the lawsuit. In December 2009, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed, allowing Greene to pursue her Fourth Amendment claims against both defendants.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

DePierre v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1533

09-1533

2010

Frantz DePierre

United States

<p>In April 2008, a federal court jury found Frantz DePierre guilty of distributing cocaine. He was also found guilty of distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, which carries a 10-year minimum sentence. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the sentence, citing its past precedent. The opinion also notes that the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits also interpret the statute the same way.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1343

09-1343

2010

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.

Robert Nicastro, et al.

<p>An accident severed four fingers off the right hand of Robert Nicastro who was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal. A British company manufactured the machine and sold it through its exclusive U.S. distributor. Nicastro sued J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., the British company, and its U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd., in New Jersey state court for product liability. The state supreme court reversed a trial court's dismissal, finding that the foreign company had sufficient contacts with the state.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Due Process

Kentucky v. King

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1272

09-1272

2010

Kentucky

Hollis Deshaun King

<p>Police officers in Lexington, Ky., entered an apartment building in pursuit of a suspect who sold crack cocaine to an undercover informant. The officers lost sight of the suspect and mistakenly assumed he entered an apartment from which they could detect the odor of marijuana. After police knocked on the door and identified themselves, they heard movements, which they believed indicated evidence was about to be destroyed. Police forcibly entered the apartment and found Hollis King and others smoking marijuana. They also found cash, drugs and paraphernalia. King entered a conditional guilty plea; reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from what he argued was an illegal search.</p> <p>The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that exigent circumstances supporting the warrantless search were not of the police's making and that police did not engage in deliberate and intentional conduct to evade the warrant requirement. In January 2010, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, finding that the entry was improper. The court held that the police were not in pursuit of a fleeing suspect when they entered the apartment, since there was no evidence that the original suspect even knew he was being followed by police.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1156

09-1156

2010

Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.

James Siracusano, et al.

<p>Investors in Matrixx Inititiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") filed suit against the company in an Arizona federal district court for violations of federal securities laws. The investors alleged that Matrixx failed to disclose that one of its products, Zicam nasal spray/gel, caused anosmia (the loss of the sense of smell) in numerous customers. The district court dismissed the case holding that the investors failed to alleged "materiality" in their claim because their evidence was not "statistically significant."</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the investors had pled sufficient facts going to the issue of materiality in order to avoid dismissal. The court reasoned that whether facts are statistically significant, and thus, material, is a question of fact that should ordinarily be left to the trier of fact – usually the jury. Here, the district court erred when it took liberties in making that determination on its own.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

McNeill v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5258

10-5258

2010

Clifton Terelle McNeill

United States

<p>Clifton Terelle McNeill was sentenced to 300 months imprisonment after he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm and 240 months imprisonment for unlawful possession with intent to distribute approximately 3.1 grams of crack cocaine.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina determined McNeill to be an armed career criminal and then departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines to sentence McNeill to the maximum sentence applicable. McNeill contends that he is not eligible for sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act because the drug-related convictions upon which the district court relied do not qualify as serious drug offenses under the ACCA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the district court order.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Fox v. Vice

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-114

10-114

2010

Ricky D. Fox

Judy Ann Vice, as executrix of the Estate of Billy Ray Vice, et al.

<p>In January 2005, Vinton, Louisiana Police Chief Billy Ray Vice, who was seeking re-election to his post, sent fellow candidate Ricky Fox an "anonymous" letter trying to blackmail him into dropping out of the race. A month later, someone accused Fox of uttering a racial slur and, at Vice's instigation, filed a false police report regarding Fox's alleged use of the term. Fox brought a civil rights suit against Vice and the town in state court in December 2005, asserting both state and federal claims, and the case was removed to federal court in January 2006. Separately, in April 2007, Vice was tried and found guilty of extortion in state criminal court for the anonymous letter. In 2007, in response to a motion filed by the defendants, Fox admitted that he had failed to properly present any federal cause of action, so the district court dismissed Fox's federal claims with prejudice and remanded the remaining state law claims to state court. The district court then granted the defendants' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that Fox's federal claims were frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. Fox appealed the fee award to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and in a split decision the appeals court affirmed the district court's order.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Attorneys

Montana v. Wyoming and North Dakota

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/137-orig

137-orig

2010

Montana

Wyoming and North Dakota

<p>1950, Montana, Wyoming and North Dakota signed the Yellowstone River Compact, which spelled out how the states would share water. In 2007, Montana sued Wyoming, alleging farmers and other water users along the Powder and Tongue rivers were being harmed by Wyoming's excessive water use. Attorneys for Wyoming argued that much of the water used by the state's residents and businesses was not covered by the 1950 agreement.</p> <p>Special Master Barton Thompson issued an interim report, finding that Montana had grounds to sue over Wyoming's expanded use of water since 1950. However, Thompson rejected Montana's claim that Wyoming should be held liable for increased water use due to irrigation improvements. Meanwhile, North Dakota, also a member of the Yellowstone compact, was named as a second defendant in the original lawsuit. But Montana officials have said its inclusion was a formality and that they have no disagreement with their eastern neighbor.</p>

majority opinion

Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-291

09-291

2010

Eric L. Thompson

North American Stainless, LP

<p>Eric Thompson and his fiancée-then-wife, Miriam Regalado, worked for North American Stainless, the owner and operator of a stainless steel manufacturing facility in Carroll County, KY. Regalado filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in September 2002, alleging that her supervisors discriminated against her based on her gender. On February 13, 2003, the EEOC notified North American Stainless of the charge. Slightly more than three weeks later, North American Stainless terminated Thompson's employment. Thompson filed a complaint, which alleged that he was fired in retaliation for Regalado's EEOC charge. Retaliating in that way, Thompson asserted, violated section 704(a) of Title VII, which forbids an employer to "discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has... made a charge ... under this title." The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed Thompson's complaint, holding that Title VII "does not permit third party retaliation claims." A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court order. But the court of appeals granted the employer's petition for rehearing en banc. A splintered en banc court upheld the dismissal of Thompson's complaint.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-846

09-846

2010

United States

Tohono O'odham Nation

<p>In 2006, the Tohono O'odham Nation of Southern Arizona filed a complaint against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that the United States government handled $2.1 billion in transactions for the nation between 1972 and 1992 and "has never fulfilled its duty to provide a true and adequate accounting' of the trust funds. The lawsuit also alleged "gross mismanagement" by the federal government. One day later, the tribe filed a similar complaint against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims seeking monetary damages for the earnings shortfall in its trust accounts. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the lawsuit because a similar claim was being heard by a different court in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1500. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the CFC's dismissal of the case, concluding, "the Nation's complaint in the Court of Federal Claims seeks relief that is different from the relief sought in its earlier-filed district court action."</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-834

09-834

2010

Kevin Kasten

Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corporation

<p>On December 11, 2006, Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic terminated Kevin Kasten's employment. Mr. Kasten filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in a Wisconsin federal district court alleging that he was retaliated against for filing complaints about the legality of the location of Saint- Gobain's time clocks. Mr. Kasten alleges that the location of the time clocks prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear. Saint-Gobain motioned for summary judgment arguing that purely verbal complaints, like those made by Mr. Kasten, were not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that unwritten, purely verbal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Unions

American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-174

10-174

2010

American Electric Power Company Inc., et al.

Connecticut, et al.

<p>Eight states, New York City and three land conservation groups filed suit against four electric power companies and the Tennessee Valley Authority, five entities that they claimed were the largest sources of greenhouse gases. The lawsuit alleged that the utility companies, which operate facilities in 21 states, are a public nuisance because their carbon-dioxide emissions contribute to global warming. American Electric Power Co. and the other utilities argued that the courts should not get involved in the issue. The companies contended that only the Environmental Protection Agency can set emissions standards. A federal judge on the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York initially threw out the case, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said it could continue.</p> <p>The states in the lawsuit are: California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wisconsin. The Open Space Institute, the Open Space Conservancy and the Audubon Society of New Hampshire also are plaintiffs. The other utilities are Cinergy Co., Southern Co. Inc. of Georgia, and Xcel Energy Inc. of Minnesota.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-277

10-277

2010

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Betty Dukes, et al.

<p>Betty Dukes, a Wal-Mart "greeter" at a Pittsburg, Calif., store, and five other women filed a class action lawsuit in which they alleged that the company's nationwide policies resulted in lower pay for women than men in comparable positions and longer wait for management promotions than men. The certified class, which in 2001 was estimated to comprise more than 1.5 million women, includes all women employed by Wal-Mart nationwide at any time after December 26, 1998, making this the largest class action lawsuit in U.S. history. Wal-Mart has argued that the court should require employees to file on an individual basis, contending that class actions of this size – formed under Rule 23(b) of the federal rules of civil procedure — are inherently unmanageable and unduly costly. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has three times upheld the class certification.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Turner v. Rogers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-10

10-10

2010

Michael D. Turner

Rebecca L. Rogers, et al.

<p>In January 2007, Michael Turner appeared in Oconee County, S.C., Family Court because he was behind in his child support obligation. He did not have an attorney, and he was not asked whether he needed or wanted representation. He presented some evidence of his inability to work, but the court made no finding as to Turner's indigent status. The judge held him in contempt and sentenced him to one year in jail. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected Turner's argument for court-appointed counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-313

10-313

2010

Talk America, Inc.

Michigan Bell Telephone Company, dba AT&T Michigan, et al.

<p>Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress sought to open up the local telephone markets to competition by requiring incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) to share their equipment and services with competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs). Under early interpretations of the law, incumbent-constructed entrance facilities had to provide at-cost access to the competitors. In AT&amp;T Inc. unit Michigan Bell Telephone Co.'s interpretation, the FCC's Triennial Review Remand Order in 2005 created a means to charge for the use of the facilities, and the company announced plans to do so.</p> <p>Competitor carriers complained to the Michigan Public Service Commission, and it ruled that the entrance facilities should still be provided at cost. Michigan Bell sued in federal court and won. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Staub v. Proctor Hospital

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-400

09-400

2010

Vincent E. Staub

Proctor Hospital

<p>As a member of the U.S. Army Reserves, Vincent Staub was required to attend occasional weekend training as well as a two-week training program during the summer. Staub was also a lab technician at Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill. He was fired in 2004 and later filed a lawsuit claiming that his supervisor was out to get him as a result of disapproval of his military service. He won $57,640 in damages at trial. But a more senior executive, not the supervisor, ultimately decided to fire Staub. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the decision-maker shared the supervisor's anti-military bias.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-238

10-238

2010

Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC, et al.

Ken Bennett, in His Official Capacity as Arizona Secretary of State, et al.

<p>Arizona enacted a campaign finance law that provides matching funds to candidates who accept public financing. The law, passed in 1998, gives an initial sum to candidates for state office who accept public financing and then provides additional matching funds based on the amounts spent by privately financed opponents and by independent groups. In 2008, some Republican candidates and a political action committee, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, filed suit arguing that to avoid triggering matching funds for their opponents, they had to limit their spending and, in essence, their freedom of speech.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for District of Arizona found the matching-funds provision unconstitutional. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned the case, saying it found "minimal" impact on freedom of speech.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1476

09-1476

2010

Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania, et al.

harles J. Guarnieri

<p>In 2005, Duryea police chief Charles Guarnieri filed a discrimination lawsuit against the Pennsylvania borough, alleging that council members retaliated against him because he had successfully challenged a 2003 decision to fire him. Guarnieri had challenged his firing through arbitration and was reinstated to his position as chief in 2005. His suit alleged that council then issued 11 employment directives, which he claimed placed humiliating restrictions on him, to retaliate against him. He further alleged the borough improperly withheld overtime pay from him and had improperly delayed issuing health insurance benefits. A jury heard the case in April 2008 and awarded Guarnieri $45,358 in compensatory damages and $52,000 in punitive damages. The borough appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the verdict. In February 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the overall verdict entered by a federal jury, but it overturned the panel's award of $52,000 in punitive damages. The ruling differs from decisions by all 10 other federal circuits and four state supreme courts.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1448

08-1448

2010

Edmund Gerald Brown, Governor, et al.

Entertainment Merchants Association, et al.

<p>Associations of companies that create, publish, distribute, sell and/or rent video games brought a declaratory judgment action against the state of California in a California federal district court. The plaintiffs brought the claim under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking to invalidate a newly-enacted law that imposed restrictions and labeling requirements on the sale or rental of "violent video games" to minors. The district court found in favor of the plaintiffs and prevented the enforcement of the law.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that: (1) violent video games did not constitute "obscenity" under the First Amendment, (2) the state did not not have a compelling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm to minors allegedly caused by video games, and (3) even if the state had a compelling interest, the law was not narrowly tailored enough to meet that objective.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Stern v. Marshall

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-179

10-179

2010

Howard K. Stern, Executor of the Estate of Vickie Lynn Marshall

Elaine T. Marshall, Executrix of the Estate of E. Pierce Marshall

<p>The saga continues in the long-running inheritance dispute over the estate of a deceased Texas billionare. J. Howard Marshall's will left nearly all his money to his son, E. Pierce Marshall, and nothing to (now deceased wife) Anna Nicole Smith, aka Vickie Lynn Marshall. The younger Marshall died in 2006 and Smith died of a drug overdose in 2007. Smith had previously fought the will, claiming that her husband promised to leave her more than $300 million. Howard K. Stern, Smith's former attorney and boyfriend, has continued the legal battle on behalf of Smith's estate. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that Marshall was mentally fit and under no undue pressure when he wrote a will leaving nearly all of his $1.6 billion estate to his son and nothing to Smith.</p> <p>The Supreme Court will revisit the estate battle four years after the justices sent the case back to lower courts for further review. In the earlier case, the court only addressed whether or not federal courts can rule on Smith's claims.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Private Action

Skinner v. Switzer

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-9000

09-9000

2010

Henry W. Skinner

Lynn Switzer, District Attorney for the 31st Judicial District of Texas

<p>A Texas state court convicted Henry Skinner of capital murder and sentenced him to death. Subsequently, Mr. Skinner brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the prosecuting attorney in a Texas federal district court alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the district attorney refused to allow him access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The district court dismissed the case. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that circuit precedent established that Mr. Skinner's claim was not cognizable as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, but instead must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. Juvenile Male

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-940

09-940

2010

United States

Juvenile Male

<p>At the age of 13, S.E. engaged in non-consensual sexual acts with a 10-year-old child. This activity continued until S.E. was 15 and the victim was 12. S.E. and the victim were residents of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana. In 2005, the district court sentenced S.E. to two years of detention at a juvenile facility, followed by supervised release until his 21st birthday.</p> <p>In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"). Its reporting and registration requirements apply to adults and juveniles 14 or older who commit certain serious sex offenses.</p> <p>When S.E. completed his sentence, he moved to a prerelease center for six months. S.E. did not engage in a required job search and center officials deemed him a program failure, requesting his removal. In 2007, after SORNA's enactment, the district court revoked S.E.'s supervised release because he failed to meet the conditions of supervision. The court ordered, among other conditions, that S.E. register as a sex offender.</p> <p>S.E. appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, challenging the mandate to register as a sex offender. In May 2008, S.E. turned 21, and the order to register expired. Over a year later, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, writing for a unanimous court, held that SORNA was invalid on its face because the constitution forbids laws that are enforced retroactively. The Supreme Court, in a <em>per curiam</em> opinion, asked the Montana Supreme Court to decide whether the question presented was moot because the district court's order had expired. Justice Jim Rice, writing for the court with two dissents, held that S.E. was obligated to register under the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("MSVORA"). Hence, as Montana law required S.E. to register, and this registration was not contingent on the 9th Circuit's decision, the federal question was moot.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Brown v. Plata

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1233

09-1233

2010

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, et al.

Marciano Plata, et al.

<p>The Prison Law Office in Berkeley, Calif., filed a class-action lawsuit in April 2001 on behalf of Marciano Plata and several other prisoners, alleging that California prisons were in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, which bans "cruel and unusual punishment." Following a lengthy trial, a special panel of three federal judges determined that serious overcrowding in California's 33 prisons was the "primary cause" for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered the release of enough prisoners so the inmate population would come within 137.5 percent of the prisons' total design capacity. That amounts to between 38,000 and 46,000 inmates being released.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Davis v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-11328

09-11328

2010

Willie Gene Davis

United States

<p>Police arrested Willie Gene Davis after a traffic stop. He subsequently gave a false name to the officers. After discovering his real name, the officers arrested him, handcuffed him and put him in the police car for giving false information to a police officer. Then they searched the vehicle and found a gun in his jacket. He was charged and convicted for possession of an illegal weapon. Following a jury trial, Davis was convicted and sentenced to 220 months in prison. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that while the search was illegal the evidence found in the vehicle was still admissible.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-568

10-568

2010

Nevada Commission on Ethics

Michael A. Carrigan

<p>Nevada law requires elected officials to disqualify themselves when they are asked to vote on matters that touch on ''commitments in a private capacity.'' In 2006, a member of the Sparks City, Nevada Council, Michael A. Carrigan, disclosed that his campaign manager was a consultant to a business seeking to develop a casino, before voting its way in a land-use matter. The Nevada Commission on Ethics later ruled that the vote was improper and censured Carrigan.</p> <p>The Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, saying it violated the First Amendment and citing the Supreme Court's decision last year in <em>Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission</em>. ''Voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, '' Justice Michael Douglas wrote for the majority.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Fowler v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/10-5443

10-5443

2010

Charles Andrew Fowler, aka Man

United States

<p>Charles Andrew Fowler shot and killed Christopher Todd Horner for trying to interfere with his plan to rob a bank with four other men. Horner had approached Fowler's accomplices as they sat in a stolen Oldsmobile, decked out in black clothes and gloves. Fowler, who had stepped out of the car to use cocaine, snuck up behind Horner, grabbed his gun, forced him to get on his knees and shot him in the back of the head. One of Fowler's accomplices later implicated him in the murder, and a jury convicted Fowler of killing Horner with the intent to prevent him from communicating information about a federal offense. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 10 years. Fowler claimed the government failed to prove that a federal investigation would have been likely, and that Horner would have transferred the information to a federal officer or judge. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Sossamon v. Texas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/08-1438

08-1438

2010

Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III

Texas, et al.

<p>Harvey Sossamon, a Texas inmate, sued the state of Texas and various state officials in their official and individual capacities in a Texas federal district court. In part, he argued that he was denied access to the prison's chapel and religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). The district court dismissed the claim.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Sossamon could not sue Texas officials in their individual capacities under the RLUIPA. The court reasoned that because the Act was passed pursuant to Congress' Spending Power and not its Fourteenth Amendment Power, it did not create a cause of action for damages against state officials sued in their individual capacities. As to official-capacity lawsuits, the Fifth Circuit held that regardless of whether RLUIPA creates such a cause of action, it is barred by Texas's sovereign immunity.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Cullen v. Pinholster

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-1088

09-1088

2010

Vincent Cullen, Acting Warden

Scott Lynn Pinholster

<p>A California state court convicted Scott Lynn Pinholster of double murder and sentenced him to death. After exhausting his state court remedies, he petitioned for habeas corpus relief in a California federal district court, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. The district court upheld Pinholster's conviction but granted habeas relief on his death sentence. A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.</p> <p>During rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief, holding that the denial of habeas relief during the guilt phase was appropriate, but not during the penalty phase. The court noted that <em>Strickland v. Washington</em> requires trial counsel to investigate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Here, the court reasoned that Pinholster's counsel failed meet to meet his obligations.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Snyder v. Phelps

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-751

09-751

2010

Albert Snyder

Fred W. Phelps, Sr., et al.

<p>The family of deceased Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder filed a lawsuit against members of the Westboro Baptist Church who picketed at his funeral. The family accused the church and its founders of defamation, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress for displaying signs that said, "Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Fag troops" at Snyder's funeral. U.S. District Judge Richard Bennett awarded the family $5 million in damages, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the judgment violated the First Amendment's protections on religious expression. The church members' speech is protected, "notwithstanding the distasteful and repugnant nature of the words."</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Mayo Foundation v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-837

09-837

2010

Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research, et al.

United States

<p>The Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research ("Mayo") and the University of Minnesota ("University") sued the United States in a Minnesota federal district court seeking a refund for taxes paid under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA"). They argued that payments made to doctors in their residency qualify for FICA's student exemption. The district court agreed and awarded judgment in favor of Mayo and the University.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the residents in this case did not qualify for the FICA exemption. The court reasoned that Treasury Regulation 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) excludes "full-time employees" from the FICA student exemption. Here, the resident doctors were full-time employees and, therefore, were excluded from the FICA exemption.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-525

09-525

2010

Janus Capital Group, Inc., et al.

First Derivative Traders

<p>First Derivative Traders, individually, and on behalf of various Janus Capital Group ("JCG") shareholders sued JCG and its investment advisor subsidiary Janus Capital Management ("JCM") in the Colorado federal district court (subsequently transferred to the Maryland federal district court) alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission. They argued that JCG and JCM unlawfully made misleading statements in prospectuses about various Janus funds, most notably that it did not permit "market timing" of the funds – the practice of rapidly trading in and out of a mutual fund to take advantage of inefficiencies in the way the funds are valued. The district court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that investors stated a claim against JCG and JCM by asserting that both were responsible for making misleading statements about the funds' prohibition of market timing. The court reasoned that JCG investors would have inferred that, even if JCM had not itself written the alleged misstatements about JCG's practice of market timing, JCM must have at least approved of the statements.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-893

09-893

2010

AT&T Mobility LLC

Vincent Concepcion, et ux.

<p>Customers brought a class action lawsuit against AT&amp;T Mobility LLC in a California federal district court. They alleged that the company's offer of a free phone to anyone who signed up for its service was fraudulent to the extent the company charged the new subscriber sales tax on the retail value of each free phone. AT&amp;T moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause contained within its contract of service. The district court denied the motion.</p> <p>On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that (1) the arbitration clause was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") did not expressly or impliedly preempt California law governing unconcionability.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Michigan v. Bryant

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2010/09-150

09-150

2010

Michigan

Richard Perry Bryant

<p>A Michigan trial court convicted Richard Perry Bryant of second degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Mr. Bryant challenged the admission of the victim's statements at trial for violating his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The victim stated that Mr. Bryant shot him, but died shortly thereafter. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statements that the victim made to police before his death were testimonial and their admission violated Mr. Bryant's right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the victim's statements were made in the course of a police interrogation whose primary purpose was to establish or prove events that had already occurred, not to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency. Therefore, the lower court held that the statements were "testimonial" for the purposes of the enhanced confrontation protections set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in <em>Crawford v. Washington</em> and should not have been admitted against Mr. Bryant at trial because he did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the victim prior to his death.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Lafler v. Cooper

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-209

10-209

2011

Blaine Lafler, Warden

Anthony Cooper

<p>Anthony Cooper was convicted of shooting a woman in the thigh and buttocks after missing a shot to her head. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit overturned the conviction after Cooper claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. His lawyer told him not to take a plea offer, thinking that there could not be a finding that Cooper intended to murder his victim. But Cooper was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other charges. The appeals court said the incorrect advice equals unconstitutional ineffective assistance and ordered Cooper released. But Michigan officials argue that Cooper got a fair trial and that the verdict should not be thrown out because of his lawyer's mistake.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

FAA v. Cooper

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1024

10-1024

2011

Federal Aviation Administration

Stanmore Cooper

<p>In 2006, pilot Stanmore Cooper disclosed that he was HIV-positive to Social Security officials in order to receive medical benefits but withheld his status from the Federal Aviation Administration. But the Social Security Administration then turned over his medical records to the FAA, which revoked his license. Cooper filed suit against the agency for emotional distress for mishandling his medical records. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exchange of records was improper and that Cooper has standing to sue.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Privacy

FCC v. Fox Television Stations

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1293

10-1293

2011

Federal Communications Commission, et al.

Fox Television Stations, Inc., et al.

<p>In 2004, the Federal Communications Commission said that TV stations could be fined for indecency violations in cases when a vulgarity was broadcast during a live program. That happened on Fox in 2002 and 2003 when Cher and Nicole Richie cursed during award shows and were not bleeped.
 The FCC never actually fined Fox, but the network took issue with the regulatory agency setting the stage for future fines and challenged the fleeting-expletive rules. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the FCC's rules were "unconstitutionally vague" and had a "chilling effect."</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Vasquez v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-199

11-199

2011

Alexander Vasquez

United States

<p>On August 5, 2008, Joel Perez and Carlos Cruz drove to a Shell station in Arlington Heights, Illinois, with Cruz at the wheel. They met with Alejandro Diaz, who was working with Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") officials. Diaz instructed them to meet him at a different location to complete the deal. Instead, Perez walked to a nearby Denny's, where Alexander Vasquez waited for him in the driver's seat of a black Pontiac Bonneville. Perez got into the passenger seat of the Bonneville and called Cruz, telling him that he was not willing to follow Diaz. Cruz walked to the Denny's where he was introduced to Vasquez. Diaz called Cruz to ask why they were not following him. Cruz informed him that they wanted to complete the deal in the Denny's parking lot, telling him, "We got the money here." Vasquez echoed this statement.</p> <p>Diaz contacted his DEA handler, Agent James Chupik. Law enforcement agents surrounded the parking lot in their vehicles; several officers approached the Bonneville to arrest Vasquez, Cruz, and Perez. Cruz, outside the car, raised his hands in surrender. Vasquez, however, immediately put the Bonneville into reverse, striking two squad cars. He then shifted gears and headed for an agent. Agent Chupik stepped in front of the Bonneville and commanded Vasquez to stop, but was forced to dive out of the way. The Bonneville headed west on the eastbound lanes of Algonquin Road.</p> <p>Several minutes later, police found the Bonneville abandoned in a Walmart parking lot. A bystander told the police that he saw two men run from the vehicle into a McDonald's. Vasquez and Perez ran into the McDonald's, through its kitchen, then split up. Arlington Heights police officers quickly apprehended them, however. They found a cell phone on Vasquez and several cell phones on the ground near Perez; records indicated several calls between Vasquez's cell phone and both phones apparently belonging to Perez. Police impounded the Bonneville, and later found $23,000 in cash hidden in a secret compartment.</p> <p>A federal grand jury indicted Vasquez with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine and with attempting to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. At trial, Agent Chupik testified that he instructed Diaz to have Cruz and his "customers" meet Diaz at a gas station in Arlington Heights. In a transcript of the call between Cruz and Diaz, however, Cruz only referred to a single customer. Vasquez's counsel attempted to impeach Agent Chupik on this point, but the judge found the difference to be trivial, limiting Vasquez's right to cross-examination and to refresh Agent Chupik's memory with the transcript. The government introduced Vasquez's previous drug conviction into evidence to demonstrate Vasquez's intent; he was convicted for dealing drugs with Perez in 2002.</p> <p>Vasquez called Perez's wife Marina as a witness to testify. Marina Perez testified that she called Vasquez before the events in question to ask him to pick up Joel Perez at the site of the failed drug deal, implying that Vasquez was there by coincidence. In response, the government introduced transcripts and audio recordings of conversations between Marina Perez and her husband as evidence of bias. These indicated that Marina Perez spoke to her husband about a possible plea deal; Marina Perez also mentioned that Vasquez's attorney had told her that, "everybody is going to lose." The trial judge allowed these transcripts and recordings to be admitted to show Marina Perez's bias and for the truth of their contents.</p> <p>The jury found Vasquez guilty on the charge of conspiracy but not guilty on the charge of attempting to possess cocaine.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, held that Vasquez's previous drug conviction was properly introduced into evidence. The court rejected Vasquez's claim that the police's search of the Bonneville violated his Fourth Amendment rights, noting that Vasquez abandoned the car, and that the police had probable cause to believe that the money for the drug transaction was in the Bonneville. The court also rejected Vasquez's claim that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to elicit testimony through the cross-examination of Agent Chupik. The trial court found the distinction between "customers" and "customer" to be trivial, and the court held this finding to be within the trial court's discretion.</p> <p>In a split decision, the court turned to the testimony of Marina Perez, holding that the evidence of conversations between Marina Perez and Vasquez's counsel were properly admitted to show bias and inconsistency with prior statements. While noting that the judge improperly instructed the jury that the recordings could be considered as evidence of the truthfulness of their contents, it held this instruction to be a harmless error. It pointed to other overwhelming evidence of Vasquez's guilt, including his attempt to escape capture and his previous conviction for drug dealing. It held that the jury would have convicted Vasquez absent the introduction of the transcripts and recordings in question.</p> <p>Judge David Hamilton dissented on this point alone, describing the recordings as prejudicial and inadmissible. He reminded the majority that the error is only harmless if the court is convinced Vasquez would have been convicted absent the error. He used a different test than the majority, looking to whether or not the error contributed to the conviction. He noted that Vasquez was never directly recorded or mentioned by name in any of the recordings, and that government agents were not aware of his involvement until his arrest. Judge Hamilton argued that Marina Perez' testimony about Vasquez was thus plausible evidence of innocence without the recordings on record.</p>

per curiam

affirmed

Judicial Power

Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-551

11-551

2011

Kenneth L. Salazar, et al.

Ramah Navajo Chapter, et al.

<p>In 1975, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDA) became law. Among other things, the ISDA directs the Secretary of the Interior, at the request of any Indian tribe, to enter into contracts which permit tribal organization to administer federal programs that would otherwise be directly administered by the Secretary. The ISDA further requires the Secretary to pay the tribe's reasonable contract support costs, or the costs that the tribe would incur operating the program that the Secretary would not incur. The payment of these costs was made subject to the availability of appropriations, and Congress had imposed a statutory cap on the appropriations available to pay such costs.</p> <p>Ramah Navajo Chapter entered into multiple ISDA contracts for the administration a number of federally funded programs. The Ramah Navajo Chapter originally filed suit against the Secretary in 1990 on behalf of all BIA tribal contractors under the ISDA to challenge the methodology that Interior's Office of the Inspector General used to set indirect cost rates. In 1999 the district court granted the plaintiffs leave to add a new claim for the alleged underpayment of contract support costs due to insufficient appropriations. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court eventually granted summary judgment for the government, rejecting tribal demands for contract support costs in excess of the express statutory caps on the funds available to pay such costs.</p> <p>The tribes appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit reversed. The appeals court held that the government could be required to pay all of the contract support costs requested by every tribal contractor, even in excess of the statutory cap, because Congress appropriated sufficient funds to satisfy the demands of any single contractor considered in isolation. The government appealed the appellate court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-553

10-553

2011

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al.

<p>Cheryl Perich filed a lawsuit against the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School in Redford, Mich., for allegedly violating the Americans with Disabilities Act when they fired her after she became sick in 2004. After several months on disability, Perich was diagnosed and treated for narcolepsy and was able to return to work without restrictions. But she said the school at that point urged her to resign and, when she refused, fired her.</p> <p>Perich filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which ruled in her favor and authorized a lawsuit against the school. Attorneys representing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School argued that the "ministerial exception" under the First Amendment should apply in their client's case. The exception gives religious institutions certain rights to control employment matters without interference from the courts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overturned that ruling and remanded the case back to the lower court for a full trial on the merits. The court held that Perich's role at the school was not religious in nature, and therefore the ministerial exception did not apply.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

KPMG LLP v. Cocchi

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1521

10-1521

2011

KPMG LLP

Robert Cocchi et al.

<p>Respondents, 19 individuals and entities, bought limited partnerships, which were invested with Bernard Madoff. After losing millions, Respondents sued Petitioner KPMG LLC, a financial auditor, alleging use of improper accounting standards. KPMG moved to compel arbitration under an audit services agreement between KPMG and Tremont, a fund who managed the limited partnerships. This agreement stated that any claim arising out of KPMG's services, including claims by any person for whose benefit the services were provided, would be resolved in mediation or arbitration. The Florida Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County denied the motion. The Court of Appeal of Florida, 4th Circuit affirmed. The court found that Respondents never expressly consented to the arbitration agreement, so the only claims derived from KPMG's services for the management fund were subject to arbitration. The court concluded that two of the claims were direct and not covered under the arbitration agreement. Because these claims were not arbitrable the court refused to compel arbitration of any part of the complaint.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Christopher v. SmithKline

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-204

11-204

2011

Michael Shane Christopher, Frank Buchanan

SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline

<p>Michael Christopher and Frank Buchanan began working for GlaxoSmithKline LLC ("Glaxo") as pharmaceutical sales representatives ("PSRs") in 2003. Glaxo developed, produced, marketed and sold pharmaceutical products to distributors or retail pharmacies, which subsequently sell those products to consumers when authorized by doctors via prescription. The plaintiffs worked between ten and twenty hours outside of normal business hours each week. PSRs are compensated with a salary and additional incentive-based pay; they are not paid overtime for work done outside of standard business hours.</p> <p>The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") was enacted in 1938 to protect the well-being of workers. It imposed a baseline overtime wage on employers for employees who work over forty hours a week. There was an exception to the rule for "outside salesmen", defined by the Secretary of Labor ("Secretary") as an employee whose primary duty is making sales or obtaining contracts and who is primarily and regularly engaged outside of the employer's office. Christopher and Buchanan filed suit in August of 2008, alleging that Glaxo's practice of requiring overtime work without additional pay violated the FLSA's overtime provisions. Both parties filed for summary judgment, and the district court found for Glaxo, agreeing that the plaintiffs fell within the FLSA's "outside salesman" exception.</p> <p>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. The Secretary filed an <em>amicus curiae</em> brief in support of Christopher and Buchanan's position, arguing that when a PSR promotes pharmaceutical products but does not receive items of value in exchange for those products, he does not fall within the "outside salesman" exception to the FLSA. The court rejected the Secretary's argument, however, reasoning that this definition is a simple parroting of the Congressional statute; such definitions require less deference by courts because they are not interpretive. Instead, the court pointed to Christopher and Buchanan's training in sales --and their experience in sales as a qualification for employment by Glaxo-- as evidence of their status as "outside salesmen." The court noted that the pharmaceutical industry self-regulated marketing to doctors much like other industries self-regulate direct-to-consumer marketing.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Unions

Vartelas v. Holder

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1211

10-1211

2011

Panagis Vartelas

Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General

<p>Panagis Vartelas became a Lawful Permanent Resident of the United States on January 5, 1989. On December 9, 1994, Vartelas pled guilty to conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security. In January of 2003, Vartelas took a one-week trip to Greece. Upon his return from Greece to the JFK airport in New York on January 29, 2003, an immigration officer questioned Vartelas about his 1994 conviction. On March 27, 2003, immigration officials served Vartelas a notice to appear for removal proceedings on the ground that he sought entry into the United States after being convicted of a crime of moral turpitude and could be deported.</p> <p>Vartelas appeared before an immigration judge. He submitted a motion to terminate, before filing an application for waiver. The immigration judge denied the application for waiver on June 27, 2006, and ordered the Vartelas removed to Greece. Vartelas made a timely appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which the board dismissed.</p> <p>Vartelas, through new counsel, subsequently filed a motion to reopen with the Board of Immigration Appeals. The motion to reopen claimed that Vartelas' prior counsel was ineffective having failed to raise the issue of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) could be applied retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) overturned prior law which prevented Lawful Permanent Residents from being denied re-entry into the United States after brief casual trips abroad. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion to reopen, and Vartelas filed a petition to review with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit denied the petition for review rejecting the argument that the new statute would interfere with the settled expectations of a guilty plea. Vartelas appealed the Second Circuit's decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Ryburn v. Huff

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-208

11-208

2011

Darin Ryburn, et al.

George R. Huff, et al.

<p>Darin Ryburn and Edmundo Zepeda were Burbank Police Officers. Vincent Huff was a student at Bellarmine-Jefferson High School, who was rumored to be intending to "shoot-up" the school. Ryburn, Zepeda, and other officers arrived at the school to investigate the rumors. After conducting some interviews, the officers went to Vincent Huff's home. The officers attempted to speak with Vincent Huff and his parents. Eventually, Mrs. Huff came out of the house, but she refused to let the officers to enter her home. After the police asked if there were any weapons in the house, Mrs. Huff ran back into the house. Officer Ryburn followed Mrs. Huff into the house, because he believed that Mrs. Huff's behavior was unusual and further believed that the officers were in danger. Officer Zepeda and the other officers followed Officer Ryburn into the house. The officers briefly questioned the Huffs and left after concluding that Vincent Huff did not actually pose any danger.</p> <p>The Huffs brought an action against the officers. The Huffs claimed that the officers entered their home without a warrant and thereby violated the Huffs' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court entered a judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that the officers had qualified immunity because Mrs. Huff's odd behavior made it reasonable for the police to believe that they were in imminent danger. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit partially reversed the district court's ruling. The court acknowledged that the police officers could enter a home without a warrant if they reasonably believed that immediate entry was necessary to protect themselves or others from imminent serious harm, but the court concluded that the officers' belief that they were in serious immediate danger was objectively unreasonable. The officers appealed the Supreme Court.</p>

per curiam

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Zivotofsky v. Clinton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-699

10-699

2011

M. B. Z., By His Parents and Guardians Ari Z. Zivotofsky, et ux.

Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State

<p>Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky is a United States citizen born on October 17, 2002 in Jerusalem. In December 2002, Zivotofsky's mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and a United States passport for petitioner, listing his place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel." United States diplomatic officials informed petitioner's mother that State Department policy required them to record "Jerusalem" as petitioner's place of birth, which is how petitioner's place of birth appears in the documents he received.</p> <p>On his behalf, Zivotofsky's parents filed this suit against the Secretary of State seeking an order compelling the State Department to identify petitioner's place of birth as "Jerusalem, Israel" in the official documents. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia initially dismissed the complaint after concluding that petitioner lacked standing, and that the complaint raised a nonjusticiable political question. United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that petitioner had standing and that a more complete record was needed on the foreign policy implications of recording "Israel" as Zivotofsky's place of birth.</p> <p>On remand, the State Department explained, among other things, that in the present circumstances if "Israel" were to be recorded as the place of birth of a person born in Jerusalem, such "unilateral action" by the United States on one of the most sensitive issues in the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians "would critically compromise" the United States' ability to help further the Middle East peace process. The district court again dismissed on political question grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Zivotofsky's claim is foreclosed because it raises a nonjusticiable political question.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Miscellaneous

United States v. Home Concrete & Supply

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-139

11-139

2011

United States

Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, et al.

<p>Plaintiffs Stephen R. Chandler and Robert L. Pierce were the sole shareholders of Home Oil and Coal Company, Inc. In 1999, Pierce contemplated selling his share of the business and sought professional advice in an effort to minimize tax liability generated by the sale of his interest in Home Oil. Each of the taxpayers initiated short sales of United States Treasury Bonds for $7,472,405. They then transferred the proceeds from that sale to Home Concrete as capital contributions. Home Concrete then closed the short sales by purchasing and returning essentially identical Treasury Bonds on the open market for $7,359,043. This transaction created "outside basis," or how much the partner's investment was worth according to tax rules, equal to the amount of the proceeds the taxpayers contributed.</p> <p>Home Oil then transferred its assets to Home Concrete as a capital contribution. The taxpayers (except Home Oil) then transferred percentages of their partnership interests in Home Concrete to Home Oil as capital contributions. Home Concrete then sold substantially all of its assets to a third party purchaser for $10,623,348. The taxpayers timely filed their tax returns for 1999 in April 2000. Home Concrete elected to step-up its inside basis, or the amount that the partnership tax records compute for each partner, to equal the taxpayers' outside basis. Home Concrete again adjusted its inside basis to $10,527,250.53, including the amount of short sale proceeds earlier contributed by the taxpayers. As a result Home Concrete reported a $69,125.08 gain from the sale of its assets.</p> <p>The IRS did not investigate until June 2003. As a result of their investigation, the IRS determined that the partnership was formed "solely for the purposes of tax avoidance by artificially overstating basis in the partnership interests of its purported partners." On September 7, 2006 the IRS issued a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), in which they decreased to zero the taxpayers' reported outside bases in Home Concrete. This substantially increased the taxpayers' taxable income. Plaintiff taxpayers brought action against Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seeking to recover the increase.</p> <p>As a general matter, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has three years to assess additional tax if the agency believes that the taxpayer's return has understated the amount of tax owed. That period is extended to six years, however, if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross income stated in the taxpayer's return. During the trial the Treasury Department passed a regulation stating that the six-year period for assessing tax remains open for "all taxable years… that are the subject of any case pending before any court of competent jurisdiction… in which a decision had not become final." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed and found in favor of the plaintiffs.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation

Sackett v. EPA

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1062

10-1062

2011

Chantell Sackett, et vir

Environmental Protection Agency, et al.

<p>Chantell and Mike Sackett own a half-acre lot in a residential area near Priest Lake, Idaho. In April and May of 2007, the Sacketts filled in about one-half acre of that property with dirt and rock in preparation for building a house. On November 26, 2007, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued a compliance order against the Sacketts. The compliance order alleged that the parcel is a wetland subject to the Clean Water Act and that the Sacketts violated the CWA by filling in their property without first obtaining a permit. The order required the Sacketts to remove the fill material and restore the parcel to its original condition.</p> <p>The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA to challenge the finding that the Parcel is subject to the CWA. The EPA did not grant the Sacketts a hearing and continued to assert CWA jurisdiction over the parcel. The Sacketts filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. They challenged the compliance order as (1) arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) issued without a hearing in violation of the Sacketts' procedural due process rights; and (3) issued on the basis of an "any information available" standard that is unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted the EPA's motion to dismiss, finding that the CWA precludes judicial review of compliance orders before EPA has started an enforcement action in federal court. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court order.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

United States v. Alvarez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-210

11-210

2011

United States

Xavier Alvarez

<p>On July 23, 2007, Xavier Alvarez, a member of the Three Valleys Water District Board of Directors, attended a joint meeting with the Walnut Valley Water District Board of Directors at the Board's headquarters. Mr. Alvarez was invited to speak about his background, and he stated, "I'm a retired marine of 25 years. I retired in the year 2001. Back in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor." In fact, Mr. Alvarez had not received the Congressional Medal of Honor, nor any other military medal or decoration. He had also had never served in the United States Armed Forces.</p> <p>The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 makes it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals. On September 26, 2007, Mr. Alvarez was charged in the Central District of California with two counts of falsely representing that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor in violation the Stolen Valor Act of 2005. Mr. Alvarez moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute violated his first amendment right to free speech. The district court denied Alvarez's motion to dismiss. The respondent thereafter pleaded guilty, but reserved his right to appeal.</p> <p>Alvarez appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision. It reasoned that the Supreme Court had never held that the government may prohibit speech simply because it is knowingly false and that some knowingly false speech could have affirmative constitutional value. The court of appeals denied the government's request for rehearing. Thereafter, the government appealed the court of appeals' decision.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Perry v. Perez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-713

11-713

2011

Rick Perry, Governor of Texas et al.

Shannon Perez, et al.

<p>The United States Census Bureau conducted a national census in 2010. In May and June of 2011, the Texas Legislature created a new electoral map based on changes in the state's population. Texas Governor Rick Perry signed the new map into law in July of 2011.</p> <p>Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, either the Justice Department or a special three-judge district court must approve new electoral maps before state officials may enact the map. Texas officials submitted its map to the three-judge court in Washington. The Washington court determined that state officials had used improper standards with respect to two districts. It further held that a three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas must designate an interim redistricting plan for the 2012 election cycle.</p> <p>The district court redrew 36 electoral districts. Governor Perry and other state officials appealed the district court's redistricting to the Supreme Court and requested that the Supreme Court stop the enactment of the lower court's new map. The Supreme Court granted the appeal and stopped the enactment of the lower court's new map until the Supreme Court could issue a further order on the matter.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Pacific Operators Offshore v. Valladolid

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-507

10-507

2011

Pacific Operators of Offshore, LLP, et al.

Luisa L. Valladolid

<p>Pacific Operations Offshore runs two offshore oil drilling platforms, the Hogan and the Houchin, both located more than three miles off the coast of California. Juan Valladolid worked for Pacific Operations as a roustabout, stationed primarily on the Hogan. He was killed, however, on the grounds of Pacific Operations's onshore oil-processing facility when he was crushed by a forklift. Following his death, his widow, Luisa, sought workers' compensation benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). An administrative law judge denied Mrs. Valladolid's OCSLA claim on the grounds that her husband's injury had occurred outside the geographic site of the outer continental shelf. The judge denied the LHWCA claim on two grounds: (1) Valladolid was not engaged in maritime employment, and (2) he was not injured on a maritime situs. The Benefits Review Board upheld the judge's denial of the OCSLA benefits under the "situs-of-injury" test, and affirmed the denial of LHWCA benefits on the maritime situs ground.</p> <p>The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part, ruling that the OCSLA does not have a situs-of-injury requirement. The court of appeals held that Section 1333(b) extends Longshore Act coverage to workers injured on land where there is "a substantial nexus between the injury and extractive operations on the shelf." Two other circuits that have addressed the question have reached conflicting results.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

RadLAX Gateway Hotel v. Amalgamated Bank

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-166

11-166

2011

RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., et al.

Amalgamated Bank

<p>RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC., owned the Radisson Hotel at the Los Angeles International Airport as well as an adjacent parking structure. In November of 2007, RadLax sought to expand the Radisson Hotel. It therefore obtained a $142 million construction loan from the Longview Ultra Construction Loan Investment Fund, for which Amalgamated Bank served as trustee and administrative agent.</p> <p>After taking out the loan, RadLAX was eventually forced to file voluntary petitions for relief under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Soon after, RadLax embarked on a campaign to sell the Radisson Hotel and adjacent parking structure.</p> <p>On June 4, 2010, RadLAX filed a joint chapter 11 plan, which proposed the auction of substantially all of its assets and the distribution of proceeds to various creditors. The debtors specified that no secured creditor would be permitted to credit bid at the sale. Amalgamated Bank objected to the proposed bid procedures on the grounds that a sale of its collateral, free of liens, required the debtor to allow a lender to credit bid.</p> <p>The Bankruptcy Court agreed with Amalgamated Bank and denied RadLax's proposal with regard to credit bids. The case was appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. RadLAX subsequently appealed the appellate court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Marmet Health Care Center v. Brown

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-391

11-391

2011

Marmet Health Care Center

Brown

<p>These are two consolidated case involving negligence suits against nursing homes in West Virginia. In both cases, the children of nursing home patients signed an agreement with the nursing home requiring arbitration for any disputes. In both cases, the patients died under the nursing homes' care and the children sued in state court for negligence. The trial court dismissed both suits because of the arbitration agreements. The Supreme Court of West Virginia reversed, holding that the forcing arbitration for personal injury and wrongful death cases violated public policy. The court also held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) did not preempt state public policy despite recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent to the contrary.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Smith v. Cain

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8145

10-8145

2011

Juan Smith

Burl Cain, Warden

<p>Juan Smith was convicted on five counts of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. The Louisiana state trial court, Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and state Supreme Court denied Smith's petition for review. Smith contends that the Louisiana state courts reached this result only by disregarding established precedents regarding the suppression of material evidence favorable to a defendant and presentation of false or misleading evidence to a prosecutor in past Supreme Court cases, Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States and Napue v. Illinois.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1042

10-1042

2011

Tammy Foret Freeman, et al.,

Quicken Loans, Inc.

<p>In 2007, the Freemans and two other couples, each secured a mortgage from Quicken Loans, an online mortgage lender. At the closing of the mortgage, Quicken charged the Freemans a "loan discount fee", and charged the other couples similar fees including a "loan origination fee" and a "loan processing fee". The three couples contended these fees were unearned fees in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA).</p> <p>In 2008, each couple filed suit separately in state court. Quicken removed the cases to a federal district court where the three cases were consolidated. Quicken moved for summary judgment, claiming that the claims were not actionable under RESPA because the fees were not split with another party. The district court noted a circuit split on the issue of whether RESPA did not apply where fees were not spit with another party. Nonetheless, the district court granted Quicken's motion. The couples appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's opinion. The appealed the Appeals Court's opinion.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Armour v. City of Indianapolis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-161

11-161

2011

Christine Armour

City of Indianapolis

<p>In April of 2001, the City of Indianapolis ("the city") sent a letter to property owners in the Northern Estates neighborhood informing them that their properties were part of the Brisbane/Manning Barrett Law Sanitary Sewers Project ("the project"). The project was designed to connect properties to the city sewer system, reducing or eliminating the use of septic tanks.</p> <p>In July of 2004, the Indianapolis Board of Public Works ("the board") levied an assessment of $9,278 against each property subject to the project. Indianapolis offered each property owner the option of paying the assessment in its entirety or of paying in monthly installments, subject to an annual interest rate. The petitioners, Christine Armour and 30 other property owners ("property owners"), chose to pay the assessment in its entirety.</p> <p>In 2005, the city abandoned the Barrett Law method of assessing owners' contributions in favor of the Septic Tank Elimination Program ("STEP"). As part of the transition to STEP, the board passed a measure forgiving all outstanding Barrett Law assessment balances owed as of November 1, 2005, including those assessed for the project. As a result, owners who chose to pay their assessment in monthly installments were forgiven from future payment. Owners who chose to pay their assessments in their entirety were given no reimbursement. The property owners requested compensation from the board in February of 2006 and were denied.</p> <p>The property owners filed complaint against the city in July of 2007, alleging violation of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. All parties filed for summary judgment; the trial court granted the property owners' motion, and entered judgment against the city. On appeal, the property owners abandoned their due process claim, arguing that the city violated equal protection. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the city did not have a rational basis for only forgiving the debt of owners who chose to pay in installments. The Indiana Supreme Court granted the city's motion to transfer the case, vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals.</p> <p>Justice Frank Sullivan, writing for a unanimous court, held that the city's tax policy survives rational basis review and does not violate equal protection. The city legitimately believed that 1) owners who fully paid their assessments were in a better financial position than those making monthly installments, 2) the benefits of simplifying funding for the sewer system outweighed the effort of continuing the previous taxation system and 3) the new taxation system would preserve city resources. He rejected the property owners' argument that they were a "class of one" --requiring heightened scrutiny of the city's action-- because the property owners were not singled out for discriminatory treatment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Astrue v. Capato

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-159

11-159

2011

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security

Karen K. Capato

<p>In 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato were married in New Jersey, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer, and was advised that chemotherapy might render him sterile. Before beginning treatment, Robert deposited semen at the Northwest Center for Infertility and Reproductive Endocrinology so the couple could conceive a child in the future. Karen Capato conceived a child naturally, however, giving birth to a son in August of 2001. The Capatos wanted their son to have a sibling, but Robert's health deteriorated quickly, and he died in Florida in March of 2002. He was insured by social security when he died. His will named only his son and two children from a previous marriage as beneficiaries.</p> <p>Shortly after Robert's death, Karen began treatment for in vitro fertilization using her husband's frozen semen. She gave birth to twins on September 23, 2003, eighteen months after her husband's death. In October 2003, Karen applied for benefits from the Social Security Administration on behalf of her twins. § 416(e) of the Social Security Act ("SSA") defined "child" as "the child or legally adopted child of an individual". In addition, the child must be dependent on an insured individual at the time of the qualified individual's death. § 416(h) provided an alternate method of determining a child's qualification, directing the Commissioner of Social Security to look to the intestate property laws of the domiciliary of the deceased insured individual.</p> <p>The Social Security Administration denied her claim, and Karen requested a hearing in front of an administrative court. While noting that granting benefits would be consistent with the purpose of social security, the court held that the twins were not Robert's "child(ren)" for the purposes of the SSA. The district court affirmed, echoing the ALJ's interpretation of "child(ren)". The court also held that because Robert died while domiciled in Florida, Florida's law of intestacy applies. The United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, held that the twins were clearly children under § 416(e) of the SSA because they were the biological children of a married couple. It rejected the district court's argument that Florida state intestacy law should apply before § 416(e), holding § 416(h) to be an alternate definition only used when a child's status is in doubt.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Kawashima v. Holder

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-577

10-577

2011

Akio Kawashima, et ux.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General

<p>Akio Kawashima and Fusako Kawashima are natives and citizens of Japan. The Kawashimas were admitted to the United States as lawful permanent residents in 1984. Nearly 10 years later, Akio Kawashima pleaded guilty to subscribing to a false statement on a federal tax return, and Fusako Kawashima pleaded guilty to aiding and assisting in preparing the false tax return statement.</p> <p>Immigration officials began proceedings to deport the couple who had failed to report more than $245,126 in taxable income from two restaurants they own. Anything more than $10,000 is considered an aggravated felony, and the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld their deportation.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Howes v. Fields

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-680

10-680

2011

Carol Howes, Warden

Randall Lee Fields

<p>A jury found Randall Fields guilty of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct for the sexual abuse of a thirteen-year-old child. Fields was in jail on a disorderly charge when Lenawee County, Michigan deputies questioned him about allegations of sex with a minor. The sex case was unrelated to the one Fields was in jail for at the time.</p> <p>Fields filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals claiming that his statements were inadmissible because he had not been given his <em>Miranda</em> warnings before questioning. The state court reasoned that because Fields was free to return to the jail and was questioned on a matter unrelated to his incarceration, there was no obligation to provide him warnings under <em>Miranda</em>.</p> <p>Fields then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 claiming that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated, and the U.S. District Court agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Tennant v. Jefferson County Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1184

11-1184

2011

Natalie E. Tennant, Earl Ray Tomblin, Jeffrey Kessler, and Richard Thompson, in their official capacities.

Jefferson County Commission, Patricia Noland (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated), and Dale Manuel (as an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated)

<p>In January 2012, the Jefferson County Commission brought suit against West Virginia Secretary of State Natalie E. Tennant, Governor Earl Ray Tomblin, State Senate President Jeffrey Kessler, and Speaker Richard Thompson of the West Virginia House of Delegates, each in his or her official capacity. The county commission and two of its commissioners claimed that the State's congressional apportionment statute enacted after the 2010 census violates Article I Section 2 of the US Constitution. The new statute created voting districts with significant disparities in population, violating the constitutional principle of "one person, one vote."</p> <p>Since the plaintiffs showed that the population disparities could have been reduced, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the apportionment is not constitutional and declared it null and void. The state officials appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.</p>

per curiam

reversed

PPL Montana v. Montana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-218

10-218

2011

PPL Montana, LLC

Montana

<p>In 2003, parents of Montana schoolchildren sued the owner of federally licensed hydroelectric dams on the Missouri, Madison and Clark Fork rivers within the state. The parents claimed that the owner, PPL, owed the state compensation because the riverbeds underlying its dams were part of Montana's "school trust lands." The State of Montana joined the suit in 2004, asserting that PPL also owed the state compensation pursuant to Montana's Hydroelectric Resources Act.</p> <p>The federal district court eventually dismissed the action for lack of diversity, and PPL filed suit in state court. The state countersued, arguing that it obtained title to the relevant streambeds at the time of statehood pursuant to the "equal footing doctrine." The trial court dismissed PPL's affirmative defenses, held that the State obtained title to the riverbeds at issue because those rivers were navigable at the time of statehood and concluded that the state was entitled to retroactive lease payments under the HRA. Following a bench trial to determine damages, the court imposed approximately $40 million in back lease payments, as well as future lease payments imposed by the state.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Minneci v. Pollard

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1104

10-1104

2011

Margaret Minneci, et al.

Richard Lee Pollard, et al.

<p>Richard Lee Pollard, an inmate at a federal prison run by the private company GEO Group, slipped on a cart left in a doorway and injured both elbows. As GEO employees were preparing to transport him to an outside orthopedic clinic, he said they made him wear a jumpsuit and a "black box" wrist restraint, despite his claim that both would cause him excruciating pain. Pollard sued GEO and its employees for allegedly violating his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.</p> <p>The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Pollard's suit. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for injury caused by "a federal agent acting under his authority."</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Bullock

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-1179

11-1179

2011

American Tradition Partnership, Inc.

Steve Bullock, Attorney General of Montana, et al.

<p>A Montana law states that a corporation may not "make an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party." The petitioners - American Tradition Partnership (formerly Western Tradition Partnership), Champion Painting, and Montana Shooting Sports Association - sued the Attorney General of Montana and the Commissioner of Political Practices on the grounds that the statute violated their First Amendment right to free speech. The district court found the statute unconstitutional and granted summary judgment for the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Montana found that the statute did not materially impact the freedom of speech of the corporations, and if it did, it served a compelling state interest to protect the electoral process. The Supreme Court of Montana reversed the judgment of the lower court.</p>

per curiam

reversed

First Amendment

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-393

11-393

2011

National Federation of Independent Business, et al.

Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, et al.

<p>Amid intense public interest, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became effective March 23, 2010. The ACA sought to address the fact that millions of Americans had no health insurance, yet actively participated in the health care market, consuming health care services for which they did not pay.</p> <p>The ACA contained a minimum coverage provision by amending the tax code and providing an individual mandate, stipulating that by 2014, non-exempt individuals who failed to purchase and maintain a minimum level of health insurance must pay a tax penalty. The ACA also contained an expansion of Medicaid, which states had to accept in order to receive Federal funds for Medicaid, and an employer mandate to obtain health coverage for employees.</p> <p>Shortly after Congress passed the ACA, Florida and 12 other states brought actions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that the ACA was unconstitutional on several grounds. These states were subsequently joined by 13 additional states, the National Federation of Independent businesses, and individual plaintiffs Kaj Ahburg and Mary Brown.</p> <p>The plaintiffs argued that: (1) the individual mandate exceeded Congress' enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause; (2) the Medicaid expansions were unconstitutionally coercive; and (3) the employer mandate impermissibly interfered with state sovereignty.</p> <p>The District Court first addressed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit. It determined that Brown had standing to challenge the minimum coverage provision because she did not have health insurance and had to make financial arrangements to ensure compliance with the provision, which would go into effect in 2014. The court further determined that Idaho and Utah had standing because each state had enacted a statute purporting to exempt their residents from the minimum coverage provision.</p> <p>The court also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the suit.</p> <p>The District Court then addressed the constitutional questions. It ruled that the individual mandate provision was not a valid exercise of Congress' commerce or taxing powers. The court held the entire act invalid because the mandate could not be severed from any other provision. The court dismissed the states' challenge to the employer mandates and granted judgment to the federal government on the Medicaid expansions, finding insufficient support for the contention that the spending legislation was unconstitutionally coercive.</p> <p>A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed 2-to-1 the District Court's holdings as to the Medicaid expansions and the individual mandate. But it also reversed the District Court, holding that the individual mandate could be severed without invalidating the remainder of the ACA.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band v. Patchak

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-246

11-246

2011

Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians

David Patchak

<p>The Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band ("the Band") is a Potawatomi Indian tribe in Michigan. In 2001, the Band petitioned the Department of Interior to construct and operate a casino in Wayland Township, Michigan, a small farming community with about 3,000 residents. In May 2005, the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of Interior announced its plan to take 147 acres of land in Wayland Township –known as the "Bradley Tract"-- into trust for the Band under the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA").</p> <p>David Patchak, a resident of Wayland Township, filed suit against Ken Salazar, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior on August 1, 2008, taking advantage of a stay of the Secretary's action granted due to a separate suit against the Secretary by a Michigan anti-gambling organization. Patchak alleged that the Band's gaming facility would destroy the peace and quiet of his community, create pollution, and increase crime. The Band intervened as a defendant. At trial, the Secretary argued that the Quiet Title Act ("QTA") precluded any person from seeking to divest the United States of title to Indian land trusts; hence, because the Bradley Tract was in trust while Patchak's suit was pending, the district court did not have jurisdiction. The court, however, dismissed Patchak's suit on the ground that he lacked standing to challenge Palazar's authority under the IRA, holding that Patchak's interests do not fall within the IRA's zone-of-interests.</p> <p>On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Patchak fulfilled the zone-of-interests test for standing. The court held that Patchak did not have to demonstrate that the statute was meant to benefit individuals in his situation, pointing to portions of the IRA tasking the Secretary with considering "affected members of the public" before using his trust authority. The court also rejected the Secretary's argument that the QTA barred Patchak's suit, reasoning that Congress intended the QTA to limit actions in which the plaintiff claims an interest in property contrary to the government's interest. In contrast, Patchak did not seek sole possession of title to the Bradley Track. Therefore, the court held that his suit fell within the general waiver of sovereign immunity set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Williams v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8505

10-8505

2011

Sandy Williams

Illinois

<p>Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams' conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment rights weren't violated.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Perry v. New Hampshire

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-8974

10-8974

2011

Barion Perry

New Hampshire

<p>Barion Perry is in prison for breaking into a car in 2008. Nubia Blandon told Nashua, N.H., police that she observed Perry from her apartment window taking things out of a parked car. She identified Perry at the scene but later could not pick him out of a photo lineup or describe him to police. A second witness identified Perry from the photo lineup. Perry filed a motion to suppress the photo identification because it was "unnecessarily suggestive" that he was a criminal. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld his conviction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/09-958

09-958

2011

Toby Douglas, Director, California Department of Health Care Services

Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., et al.

<p>The California Legislature approved a series of cutbacks in the payments to physicians, hospitals and pharmacies to address the state's budget deficit. In each case, the providers have sued in federal court and won rulings from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which blocked the cutbacks on the grounds that they conflicted with the Medicaid law. The providers argued that if the cutbacks were approved, the state would not provide the level of care required under Medicaid.</p> <p>The Supreme Court agreed to hear three separate appeals from the state, all of which raise the same issue. The lead case is <em>Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California</em>. The other two cases are <em>Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Association</em> and <em>Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital</em>. David Maxwell-Jolly served as the director of California's Department of Health Care Services.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Hardy v. Cross

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-74

11-74

2011

Marcy Hardy, Warden

Irving L. Cross

<p>At a trial for kidnapping and sexual assault, Irving Cross' victim, known as A.S., was terrified to testify against him, but did so anyway. The jury found Cross not guilty of kidnapping, but was unable to reach a decision on the sexual assault charges. The judge declared a mistrial and the State opted to retry Cross on the sexual assault charges.</p> <p>A.S. said she would testify at the second trial, but about a month beforehand, the State discovered that A.S. was missing. After an exhaustive search, which included visits to her parent's and old boyfriend's homes on multiple occasions, the State moved to declare A.S. unavailable and enter her prior testimony into evidence in the new trial. The trial court granted the motion and a clerk read the testimony at trial. The jury acquitted Cross of aggravated sexual assault, but found him guilty of criminal sexual assault. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied Cross' petition for leave to appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his writ of certiorari.</p> <p>Cross then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, arguing that the testimony in the second case violated the Confrontation Clause of the 6th Amendment. According to Cross, the State had not made good faith efforts to locate A.S.. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court of appeals stressed the importance of the testimony, and several avenues of inquiry the State did not exhaust in its search.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-88

11-88

2011

Asid Mohamad, et al.

Jibril Rajoub, et al.

<p>In September of 1995, Azzam Rahim, an American citizen, was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority intelligence officers in Jericho. The respondents, Jibril Rajoub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the Palestinian Authority, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, never disputed liability for the torture and murder. The petitioners, Azzam Rahim's widow and children, filed suit against the respondents under the Torture Victim Protection Act.</p> <p>The district court dismissed the petitioners' action against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization on the grounds that the Torture Victim Protection Act permits actions against natural persons only. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Wetzel v. Lambert

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/11-38

11-38

2011

ohn E. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al.

James Lambert

<p>Bruce Reese and Bernard Jackson were brothers-in-law who had committed several robberies together in the past; James Lambert was a newcomer to the group. On September 23, 1982, they agreed to rob a bar in Philadelphia, eventually settling on Prince's Lounge. During the robbery, one man walked to the rear bar and pointed a gun in the face of a barmaid, Janet Ryan. A different man instructed another barmaid, Sarah Clark, to "get the money." While Clark was placing money in a bag, she heard two gunshots from the back of the bar; a single actor had shot and killed two patrons.</p> <p>Two weeks later, Jackson identified Lambert and Reese while in custody for an unrelated robbery. Lambert and Reese were tried jointly, with Jackson testifying against them. Janet Ryan also testified, and was at first unable to identify Lambert; shortly after stepping down from the stand, however, she approached the prosecutor and indicated that Lambert was the man who pointed the gun in her face. No other witness was able to identify Lambert or Reese, but the jury found Lambert guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an instrument of crime. He was sentenced to death.</p> <p>A few months later, the Federal Capital Habeas Corpus Unit of the Federal Defender Association of Philadelphia seized the police investigatory file in what was later ruled to be an abuse of subpoena power. Lambert's lawyers declared that several seized documents should have been available to the defense at trial, filing a claim under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act. One document indicated that Jackson named a "Lawrence Woodlock" as a co-defendant. The district court denied this claim, concluding that there was no reasonable likelihood the disclosure would have changed the verdict. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the additional evidence was not significant because the defense had already thoroughly impeached Jackson's testimony. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that Jackson's statement about an additional co-defendant opened up an entirely new line of impeachment.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1195

10-1195

2011

Marcus D. Mims

Arrow Financial Services, LLC

<p>Marcus Mims sued Arrow Financial Services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit both held that they lacked jurisdiction over Mims' TCPA claim because, in their view, the TCPA creates exclusive state-court jurisdiction over private actions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity