Datasets:

drgary

/

ft9_justice

like 0

Beilan v. Board of Education, School District of Philadelphia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/63

63

1957

Herman A. Beilan

Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia

<p>On June 25, 1952, Herman A. Beilan, a teacher in the Philadelphia school system for the previous 22 years, presented himself in the Superintendent’s office at the latter’s request. The Superintendent asked if Beilan had been the Press Director of the Professional Section of the Communist Political Association in 1944. Beilan requested to speak with counsel before answering, and he was allowed to do so. After speaking with counsel, Beilan informed the Superintendent that he would not answer that question or other similar ones. The Superintendent informed Beilan that refusal to answer such questions could lead to his dismissal. On November 25, 1953, the Board of Public Education initiated dismissal proceedings against Beilan and cited Beilan’s failure to answer the Superintendent’s question regarding his 1944 activities as evidence of “incompetency.” There was a formal hearing, at which Beilan did not testify. The charge of incompetency was sustained and Beilan was fired. The administrative appeal upheld the decision of the local Board. Beilan appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which set aside Beilan’s discharge. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Patterson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/91

91

1957

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Patterson

<p>Alabama sought to prevent the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from conducting further business in the state. After the circuit court issued a restraining order, the state issued a subpoena for various records, including the NAACP's membership lists. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Lawn v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1957/9

9

1957

Howard Lawn

United States

<p>These are two consolidated cases involving several individuals involved in a tax evasion scheme. The petitioners were indicted and testified before a grand jury without being warned of their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the district court dismissed the indictment. The appeals court affirmed the dismissal. While the appeal was pending, the United States initiated a new grand jury proceeding and, at a trial by jury, the petitioners were found guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The petitioners suspected that prosecutors used privileged information gained in the first indictment to aid in the second proceeding, violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Scales v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/1

1

1960

Junius Irving Scales

United States

<p>The Smith Act's membership clause prohibited membership in organizations advocating the violent or forceful overthrow of the United States government. Junius Scales was criminally charged with membership in the Communist Party of the United States ("Party") because it advocated the overthrow of the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit." Challenging his felony charge, Scales claimed that the Internal Security Act of 1950 ("Security Act") stated that membership in a Communist organization shall not constitute a per se violation of any criminal statute. After failing in both a district and appellate court, the Supreme Court granted review.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Federal Housing Administration v. The Darlington, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/13

13

1958

Federal Housing Administration

The Darlington, Inc.

<p>The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was authorized under the Veterans’ Emergency Housing Act of 1946 to insure mortgages for projects that provide housing to war veterans. The Darlington, Inc., a corporation formed in 1949, obtained FHA mortgage insurance for a building in Charleston, South Carolina. Although The Darlington, Inc. submitted the required reports of its monthly rental rates for each of the units, the reports never mentioned the fact that an affiliate of the corporation was renting fully furnished rooms on a daily basis. The affiliate continued to rent these transient apartments after an amendment to the Act specifically excluded such units from eligibility for federal mortgage insurance. The FHA stopped insuring the mortgages because The Darlington, Inc. violated the terms of the Act. The Darlington, Inc. sued the FHA for a declaratory judgment and claimed to still be eligible as long as the building was used for “principally” residential purposes. The district court granted relief. On appeal, the Court remanded the case to a three-judge panel. The panel affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Draper v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/136

136

1958

James Draper

United States

<p>John Marsh, a federal narcotics agent, was stationed in Denver and regularly worked with James Hereford, a paid informant. On September 3, 1956, Hereford told Marsh that James Draper had recently moved to Denver and was dealing drugs. Four days later, Hereford informed Marsh that Draper had gone to Chicago to pick up heroin and would be returning by train on either the morning of September 8 or 9. Hereford also provided a detailed description of Draper and the bag he would likely be carrying. On September 9, Marsh and a Denver police agent saw a person exactly matching that description exit a train from Chicago. Marsh and the police officer stopped him and arrested him. In his pocket they found two envelopes containing heroin, and they found a syringe in his bag.</p> <p>Before his trial, Draper moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and the syringe as having been secured through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court dismissed the motion after finding that the officers had probable cause to arrest Draper without a warrant and therefore the evidence was the fruit of a lawful search. Draper was tried and convicted of knowingly concealing and transporting drugs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second District affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Abel v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/2

2

1959

Rudolph Ivanovich Abel also known as 'Mark' and also known as Martin Collins and Emil R. Goldfus

United States

<p>Rudolf Ivanovich Abel maintained an artist’s studio in Brooklyn Heights, New York while living in New York at various inexpensive lodgings. In early May of 1957, Reino Hayhanen informed the American Embassy in Paris that he had been acting as a secret agent for the Soviet Union in the United States since 1952. He also informed the embassy that he had assisted a Soviet agent he only knew as “Mark”, whom he identified as a resident agent in the United States with the military rank of colonel. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) agents began a long investigation of Abel, but did not seek to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant relating to Abel.</p> <p>FBI agents gave three agents from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) a report on Abel as a suspected spy; the FBI agents also asked them to prepare an Immigration detention warrant. On June 21, 1957, FBI agents found Abel at the Latham Hotel in Manhattan and questioned him unsuccessfully for a half hour. A short time later, INS agents who were waiting outside packed up all of Abel’s personal effects in the room. They seized over two hundred items but found no weapons or evidence of alienage; the FBI also seized several items after an agent checked Abel out of the hotel, including three items contested at trial.</p> <p>Two INS agents flew Abel to a maximum security camp in McAllen, Texas, where FBI and INS agents interrogated him for four weeks. On the third day, he admitted he was in the United States illegally. A criminal warrant for Abel’s arrest was issued on August 7, 1957 while Abel was in his Texas cell; he also learned that same day that he was indicted for espionage. Agents brought Abel back to New York, where the district court tried and convicted him of espionage. The prosecution introduced seven items seized before the government obtained a search warrant. The United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed Abel’s conviction, holding that INS agents could search Abel’s hotel room incident to his valid arrest and pursuant to a deportation arrest warrant.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/248

248

1958

Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota Division

WDAY, Inc.

<p>The radio and television station WDAY, Inc. broadcast the speech of A.C. Townley, a legally qualified candidate in the 1956 United States Senate race in North Dakota. The speech was broadcast uncensored as a reply to previous speeches made by two other Senate candidates. Townley’s speech accused the other candidates and the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of America of conspiring to establish “a Communist Farmers Union Soviet.” Farmers Union sued Townley and WDAY, Inc for libel in district court. The court dismissed the complaint against WDAY, Inc. and held that the Federal Communications Act of 1934 granted the station immunity from liability for such defamation. The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Barenblatt v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/35

35

1958

Barenblatt

United States

<p>During hearings of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Lloyd Barenblatt, a university professor, refused to answer questions concerning his political and religious beliefs along with his associational activities. He was found in contempt of Congress for failing to cooperate with the committee investigation.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Barr v. Matteo

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/350

350

1958

William G. Barr

Linda A. Matteo and John J. Madigan

<p>Linda Matteo and John Madigan created a plan for utilizing $2.6 million in funds from the Office of Housing Expediter. The Office’s commission was coming to an end, and the plan involved firing and rehiring employees on a temporary basis until the life of the Office was extended or ended. William G. Barr, general manager of the Office, vehemently opposed the plan, and several Senators attacked the plan on the Senate floor. Barr decided to suspend Matteo and Madigan. He issued a press release explaining his reasons. Matteo and Madigan sued for libel based on the statements in the press release.</p> <p> In certain circumstances, government officials are protected from civil suits for actions done in the scope of their official duties though absolute or qualified privilege. The district court ruled in favor of Matteo and Madigan, rejecting Barr’s claim that his statements were protected by privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, considering only absolute privilege. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded so the court of appeals could consider qualified privilege. On remand, the court of appeals held that qualified privilege existed, but was defeated due to Barr’s malice. The court remanded the case to district court for a new trial.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Williams v. Lee

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/39

39

1958

Williams

Lee

<p>A non-Native American merchant ran a general store on a Navajo reservation. The merchant filed a collection action against petitioners, Native American customers, for goods sold on credit at the store. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the trial court's judgment that the state courts had jurisdiction. The Native American customers sought review.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Brown v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/4

4

1958

Emanuel Brown

United States

<p>Emanuel Brown was a witness at a federal grand jury investigation into possible violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Act (FMCA). Brown refused to answer questions asked by the grand jury, invoking the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The district judge ordered Brown to answer the questions, telling him that the FMCA provided immunity against any prosecution that might arise from Brown’s testimony. Brown still refused to answer. After several failed attempts to make Brown answer the questions, the judge held him in contempt of court and sentenced him to 15 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/45

45

1958

Beacon Theatres, Inc.

The Hon. Harry C. Westover, Judge of the United States District Court of the Southern District of California, Central Division, et al.

<p>Fox West Coast Theatres held various contracts for "first-run" rights of movies in San Bernardino, CA. Beacon Theatre opened a drive-in theater in the area and threatened to sue Fox West Coast over their "first-run" contracts claiming they violated antitrust laws, in particular the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Clayton Act. Fox West Coast filed an injunction against Beacon taking legal action, and Beacon counterclaimed.</p> <p>The lower court denied Beacon a trial by jury because the suit involved both matters of law and equitable damages. Beacon appealed this decision on the grounds that the alleged competition between Beacon and Fox West Coast was a matter of fact to be decided by a jury pursuant to the Seventh Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. Beacon responded by seeking a writ of mandamus.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 v. Sax Enterprises, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/5

5

1958

Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255

Sax Enterprises, Inc.

<p>In February of 1955, Hotel Employees Union, Local No. 255 began an effort to organize employees at resort hotels in Miami and Miami Beach, Florida; these hotels wholly occupied a stretch of land from Collins Avenue to the Atlantic Ocean. The National Labor Relations Board, however, had a stated policy of refusing jurisdiction over hotel employees. Hence, the union did not petition the board for an election or certification.</p> <p>In March, the union tried to establish a procedure to collectively bargain for the employees of the various hotels. It could not reach an agreement between the employee representatives from each hotel, so it addressed a letter to the Miami Beach Hotel Association requesting a conference. It also sent copies to each hotel and published copies in local newspapers. The Association -- which was not specifically authorized to bargain for its members -- did not answer the union’s request. In response, on April 13, 1955, the union began a strike at nine hotels, including the Sherry Frontenac.</p> <p>The hotels filed for an injunction against the picketers. Of the nine cases, the district court tried seven separately, with each judge retaining jurisdiction over his particular case. In each of the seven cases, the trial judge held that there was not enough evidence of violence to justify enjoining the picketing on that basis. Before each court could address whether the unions were coercing hotel employees to unionize, however, the Florida Supreme Court intervened. On the basis of the hotels’ complaint, it held that the real purpose of the strike was indeed to coerce hotel employees to join the union, in violation of Florida law.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Federalism

Dick v. New York Life Insurance Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/58

58

1958

Blanche Dick

New York Life Insurance Company

<p>William Dick was a 47-year-old farmer and experienced hunter who lived with his wife Blanche on a farm near Englevale, North Dakota. William had two life insurance policies issued by the New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, payable to his wife. Each contained a double indemnity clause preventing payment if William's death resulted from “self-destruction, whether sane or insane.” On January 20, 1955, between 10:30 and 11:00 am, Blanche entered the farm’s silage shed and found her husband lying on his back. She saw a wound on his head and knew he was dead; William's double-barreled shotgun was lying near his body.</p> <p>The county sheriff later determined that the shotgun was held about eighteen inches from William's body with the stock toward the feet and the barrel along the body when it was fired. He also determined that the gun likely did not fire from a person jarring, pounding, or dropping it, although there was also evidence that the gun had occasionally discharged accidentally in the past. Dr. Veitch, the county coroner, found another wound in William's chest, but determined that it was the wound to William's head that caused his immediate death; the chest wound likely only resulted in a great deal of pain. Dr. Veitch, who was also William's personal physician, testified that William had mild to moderate non-specific prostatitis, which left him tired but did not prevent him from doing farm work. William did not apparently leave a suicide note or mention suicide to his relatives or friends. In connection with Blanche's later claim for benefits, however, Dr. Veitch listed the cause of death as “suicide.”</p> <p>New York Life Insurance filed an action in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, claiming that William committed suicide. Under North Dakota law, proof of insurance coverage and death by gunshot wound shifted the burden to the insurer to prove that the death was not accidental. The jury found for Blanche Dick and awarded $7,500 in damages. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, reviewed the evidence and determined that the shotgun could not have fired unless someone or something pushed or pulled one of the triggers. It further concluded that the evidence could not be reconciled with any reasonable theory that the shooting was accidental, given William's experience as a hunter and the multiple gunshot wounds on his body.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Spano v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/582

582

1958

Vincent Joseph Spano

State of New York

<p>On January 27, 1957, Vincent Joseph Spano was involved in a bar fight with Frank Palermo, Jr. Palermo knocked Spano to the ground and kicked him in the head multiple times. Later that night, Spano acquired a gun, found Palermo, and killed him. On February 1, 1957, a grand jury indicted Spano for first-degree murder and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Two days later, Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a longtime friend of his who was enrolled in the police academy. During that conversation, Spano told Bruno that Palermo had been beaten up in a fight, he was dazed, and he shot at Palermo. The next day, Spano turned himself in but refused to answer officers’ questions. The police questioned him for several hours before they brought in Spano’s friend Bruno to play on their friendship in order to convince Spano to confess, which he eventually did.</p> <p>The confession was admitted into evidence at trial, and the jury was instructed to consider it only if it was found to be voluntary. The jury found Spano guilty and sentenced him to death. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Abbate v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/7

7

1958

Abbate

United States

<p>In the midst of a labor strike against Southern Bell Telephone Company, Louis Joseph Abbate, Michael Louis Falcone, and Norman McLeod met with James Shelby, a union official, in a Chicago tavern. Shelby requested the others’ assistance in carrying out plans to bomb certain Southern Bell facilities in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Abbate and Falcone did not go through with the plan and instead informed Chicago police when McLeod obtained dynamite and traveled to Mississippi. The State of Illinois subsequently charged all four with the crime of conspiring to destroy the property of another. Abbate and Falcone pled guilty and were sentenced to three months in prison each. Because several of the targeted facilities were used exclusively by the military and federal agencies, federal prosecutors subsequently charged Abbate, Falcone, and Shelby with conspiring to destroy property essential to the U.S. communications systems. At trial in federal district court, McLeod testified against his former co-conspirators, and the jury found them guilty. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgments against Abbate and Falcone on appeal. In their petition to the Supreme Court, Abbate and Falcone argued that the federal prosecution subsequent to their convictions under Illinois law violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prevents someone from being tried more than once for the same crime.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/753

753

1958

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Alabama ex rel. Patterson

<p>Alabama filed a civil contempt order against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) when it refused to present a list of the names and addresses of all its members and agents within the state. The NAACP claimed the order violated the NAACP’s constitutional rights. The Alabama Supreme Court twice dismissed petitions for certiorari to review a final contempt judgment. </p>

per curiam

reversed

Judicial Power

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Bowers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/9

9

1958

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company

Stanley J. Bowers, Tax Comissioner of Ohio

<p>These are two consolidated cases concerning the tax consequences of importing goods from foreign countries that are then used for manufacturing in the United States.</p> <p>In 9, Youngstown Steel and Tube Co. imported ores for manufacturing, which were stored at its plant in Ohio. Under the U.S. Constitution, imports are not taxed. Youngstown took the ore needed for each day of manufacturing from the storage piles to stock bins. The state of Ohio assessed property tax on the ore because Youngstown had changed the ore from an import to a manufacturing supply. Youngstown argued that the ore kept in storage bins was not taxable because it was held for storage only. Youngstown also argued that the tax violated equal protection because it applied to residents of Ohio, but not to non-residents who had property in the state. After exhausting administrative proceedings, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the tax.</p> <p>In 44, Plywood Corp. imported lumber and veneers for manufacturing. Plywood piled the lumber in a yard in Algoma, Wisconsin for storage and drying. The City of Algoma taxed half of the stored supplies on the theory that at least that amount was destined for manufacturing. Plywood paid the tax and sued for a refund. The trial court and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the tax.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1958/94

94

1958

Bibb

Navajo Freight Lines Inc.

<p>An Illinois law required that trucks and trailers on its highways use a contoured mudguard, while Arkansas required them to have a straight mudguard. All of the other states required one type or the other. Arguing that the Illinois law unduly burdened interstate commerce, Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. prevailed in the lower court, which issued an injunction preventing Bibb from enforcing the law. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Aquilino v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/1

1

1959

Robert Aquilino and Joseph Sero dba Home Maintenance Co.

United States, Ada Bottone, Fleetwood Paving Corp., Colonial Sand and Stone Co. Inc.

<p>A general contractor defaulted on federal tax payments and payments to subcontractors. Under the Internal Revenue Code, the U.S. government claimed priority over the lien on the “property rights to the property” of the general contractor. The subcontractors also claimed priority, because the amounts owed to them were large enough that they constituted “trust funds” under a New York tax law. The subcontractors were the beneficiaries of these “trust funds” so the general contractor had no property rights. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted the subcontractor’s motion to for summary judgment and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals of New York ruled in favor of the United States</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Federal Taxation

Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/22

22

1959

Nina Kinsella

United States ex rel. Singleton

<p>Specialist Second Class James W. Dial of the United States Army and his wife, Joanna Dial, were charged with involuntary manslaughter for the death of their one-year-old child while stationed in Germany. James Dial was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, sentenced to three years in prison, and dishonorably discharged. His wife was not an active member of the military, but because she was a dependent of an active military member, she was tried in military court in Germany. She moved to challenge the jurisdiction of the military court over her case, but the motion was denied. She pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.</p> <p>Mrs. Dial's mother, Alberta Singleton, filed a writ of habeas corpus on her daughter's behalf and argued that civilian dependents of military personnel cannot be tried in a military court. The circuit court judge stated he did not want to grant the writ of habeas corpus but was bound by the Supreme Court case <em>Reid v. Covert</em>, in which the Court held that non-military personnel cannot be court martialed for capital offenses. Nina Kinsella, the warden where Mrs. Dial was serving her time, appealed the writ and argued that the defendant in <em>Reid v. Covert</em> was on trial for a capital offense, whereas Mrs. Dial was on a trial for a non-capital offense. Therefore, the court was not bound by that case.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Goett v. Union Carbide Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/3

3

1959

Ellen Goett as administratrix of the estate of Marvin Paul Goett

Union Carbide Corp. and Amherst Barge Corp.

<p>Ellen Goett sought recovery for her husband’s death under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act. Her husband, Marvin Paul Goett, drowned while repairing a barge owned by Union Carbide Corp. Marvin worked for Amherst Barge Corp. as a sand blaster. Ellen argued that Union Carbide was negligent when it delivered the barge to Amherst for repairs without any rescue equipment. The district court ruled in favor of the Goetts, finding that the barge was unseaworthy and Union Carbide was negligent. The court awarded the maximum amount of damages based on negligence. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Union Carbide did not owe a duty of seaworthiness to Amherst employees. The court also held that the barge was not unseaworthy but did not indicate whether the Goetts could recover damages if it were.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

International Association of Machinists v. Street

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/4

4

1959

International Association of Machinists, et al.

S. B. Street, et al.

<p>Several labor unions entered into a union shop agreement that authorized spending union funds to support political causes. Many union employees opposed those causes and sued to enjoin enforcement of the union shop agreement. The employees argued that forcing union members to fund political activities they disagree with unconstitutionally restrained free speech. The Superior Court of Bibb County granted the injunction and the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

Hess v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/5

5

1959

Henry L. Hess Jr.

United States

<p>Located on the Columbia River between the states of Oregon and Washington, the Bonneville Dam consisted of several facilities including a spillway dam with eighteen numbered bays separated by fifty-foot gates. On the bed of the river was a concrete structure called a baffle deck, which extended the width of the dam. This deck was lined with concrete blocks called ‘baffles’, designed to reduce the downstream velocity of the river. Over the years, the flow of water eroded the baffles. To restore them to their original condition, the United States contracted with Larson Construction Company, an independent contractor. The United States retained the right to inspect Larson’s work, but did not have direct control over it.</p> <p>On August 20, 1954, Larson’s tug ‘Muleduzer’ set out from Bradford Island pushing Larson’s barge. As the tug and barge approached bay nine, the Columbia River’s flow was clearly turbulent; despite this, Larson proceeded with its work. The barge veered north when it reached bay nine and the port bow struck a pier. Water flooded a hole in the bow, and the barge and tug were swamped and sunk. Most of the crew drowned, including George William Graham; Graham was a member of the sounding party aboard the tug. The crew died in navigable Oregon waters.</p> <p>Under Oregon’s Employers’ Liability Law (ELL), employers were liable for failure to use every device, care and precaution practicable for the protection and safety of life and limb. Oregon’s Wrongful Death Act (WDA), however, only permitted recovery for deaths caused by a wrongful act or omission, and set contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery. Henry Hess, the administrator of Graham’s estate, filed an action against the United States under both the ELL and the WDA. The district court entered judgment for the United States, holding that the United States was not liable under either statute. It ruled that the ELL did not apply to Hess’ case in part because the ELL imposed a higher standard of duty than federal maritime law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that only the WDA applied to Hess’ claim.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Economic Activity

Flemming v. Nestor

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/54

54

1959

Arthur Flemming, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Ephram Nestor

<p>Ephram Nestor immigrated to the United States from Bulgaria in 1913 and became eligible for old-age benefits in 1955. In 1956, he was deported for having been a member of the Communist Party in the 1930s. When he was deported, his old-age benefits were terminated and notice was given to his wife, who remained in the country and was eligible to receive his benefits. Nestor sued in district court and argued that the termination of his benefits violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in that it deprived him of an accrued property right. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nestor, and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare directly appealed to the Supreme Court.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

United States v. Republic Steel Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/56

56

1959

United States

Republic Steel Corp., International Harvester Company, Interlake Iron Corp.

<p> Republic Steel Corporation, International Harvester Company, and Interlake Iron Corporation operated steel mills on the banks on the Calumet River. Their manufacturing processes produced industrial waste. Water containing waste was recycled back into the river. Most of the solid waste was separated and disposed of, but liquid and small particles were dumped into the river. Over time, these small particles reduced the river depth from 21 feet to less than 9 feet in some places. The Rivers and Waters Act prohibits the “creation of any obstruction….to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States.” The statue does allow for certain exceptions authorized by the Secretary of the Army. The United States sued the steel companies for creating an obstruction by dumping their industrial waste. The district court granted an injunction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the waste deposits did not constitute an “obstruction” under the Act and even if it did, an injunction was not permitted.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/6

6

1959

Sentilles

Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corporation

<p>In April of 1953, Daniel J. Sentilles, an engineer specializing in marine refrigeration, left the port of Santa Mara, Colombia, aboard the S.S. Montego to assist the ship in transporting bananas to Miami, Florida. The ship experienced rough waters during the journey, and on one occasion, Sentilles was knocked off his feet and washed across the deck by a large wave. The next day he developed a cough and other flu-like symptoms that persisted for several days. From Miami, he traveled to New Orleans, where he was treated for an acute case of pulmonary tuberculosis. Sentilles sued the owner of the S.S. Montego, the Inter-Shipping Corporation (“Shipping”), in federal district court under the Jones Act, which regulates U.S. shipowners. Sentilles argued that the accident aboard the S.S. Montego activated or aggravated a dormant tuberculosis infection. At trial, three medical specialists suggested that the accident could have caused the tuberculosis flare-up. A jury found in favor of Sentilles and awarded him $20,000 in damages. On appeal, Shipping argued that the evidence did not justify the jury’s conclusion. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted Shipping’s argument and reversed the judgment. Sentilles argued that the appellate court applied an improper standard of review by failing to consider the reasonableness of the judgment reached by the jury.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Dusky v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1959/504_misc

504 MISC

1959

Dusky

United States

<p>Dusky was charged with kidnapping and rape. He was schizophrenic, but was found competent to stand trial and was convicted. On petition of writ of certiorari, Dusky argued his conviction to be reversed on the grounds that he was not competent to stand trial.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/11

11

1960

Crown Kosher Super Market

Gallagher

<p>The owners and a majority of the patrons of Crown Kosher Super Market are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which forbids shopping on the Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown on Saturday. Crown Kosher Super Market had previously been open for business on Sundays, on which it conducted about one- third of its weekly business. In 1962, the Massachusetts’ Legislature enacted a statute forbidding shops to be open and doing any labor, business, or work on Sunday. The Crown Kosher Super Market argued this provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it does not respect their religious practices. The federal district court held that this provision is unconstitutional, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that the provision does not prohibit the free exercise of religion.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Meyer v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/13

13

1960

Meyer

United States

<p>In 1943, Peter Meyer took out life insurance policies in his own name worth $50,000. He pledged his insurance policies to Huntington National Bank of Columbus, Ohio as collateral security for a loan. This gave the bank the right to satisfy its claim out of the 'net proceeds of the policy when it becomes a claim by death.' After Peter Meyer pledged the policies to the bank, the United States determined that he owed $6,159.09 plus interest in unpaid taxes. The United States filed notice of tax lien on July 11, 1955.</p> <p>Peter Meyer died on December 28, 1955, owing $26,844.66 to Huntington National Bank. Ethel Meyer, the petitioner and Peter Meyer's widow, was named executrix of his estate and received $441.21, representing the remainder of the full cash surrender from Peter Meyer's insurance policies after payment to the bank.</p> <p>The United States brought suit against Ethel Meyer under 26 U.S.C.A. 6321 and 6322, arguing that it should be compensated for the full tax lien by marshalling the funds already paid to Huntington National Bank. At trial, Ethel Meyer argued that she owed nothing to the government because she was not personally liable for Peter Meyer's tax lien. She also argued that the tax lien did not and could not attach to the net proceeds of the cash surrender because those proceeds would be exempt under New York Insurance Law.</p> <p>District court Judge Edmund Palmieri held that the government was entitled to recover the full tax lien through the insurance policy's full cash surrender. The court relied on <em>United States v. Behrens</em>, where the court ordered a defendant to pay both a bank lien and tax lien from the same cash surrender. Although most of Peter Meyer's cash surrender was pledged to the bank for the payment of loans, this did not preclude the government from collecting on its full tax lien first. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed in a <em>per curiam</em> ruling. The court agreed that Behrens controlled the case.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/164

164

1960

William H. Burton et al.

Wilmington Parking Authority et al.

<p>In August 1958 William H. Burton, an African American, entered the Eagle Coffee Shoppe, a restaurant leasing space within a parking garage operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, and was denied service solely because of his race. The Parking Authority is a tax-exempt, private corporation created by legislative action of the City of Wilmington for the purpose of operating the city's parking facilities, and its construction projects are partially funded by contributions from the city. The Parking Authority provided the restaurant heating and gas services and maintained the premises at its own expense. Burton filed suit seeking an injunction preventing the restaurant from operating in a racially discriminatory manner on the ground that doing so violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state court granted the injunction but was reversed on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/21

21

1960

Aro Manufacturing Company, Inc.

Convertible Top Replacement Company, Inc.

<p>Convertible Top Replacement Co., Inc. obtained a patent for a “convertible folding top with automatic seal at rear quarter.” The folding top included a flexible top fabric, supporting structure, and a sealing mechanism. None of those parts were individually patented. Convertible Top sued Aro Manufacturing Co., Inc. for direct and contributory patent infringement for manufacturing and selling replacement fabric designed to fit the patented device. After trial, the district court ruled in favor of Convertible Top and enjoined Aro from further manufacture or distribution of the fabric replacements. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Chaunt v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/22

22

1960

Chaunt

United States

<p>Peter Chaunt, a Hungarian native, came to the United States in 1921 at the age of 22. He became a U.S. citizen in 1940, one year after filing a petition for naturalization with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). In 1953, the Government filed a complaint, which alleged that Chaunt had concealed and misrepresented his arrest record in his application for citizenship, and sought to revoke his naturalization. The district court held that Chaunt had concealed his membership in the Communist Party and three arrests in Connecticut for distributing handbills, violating park regulations, and committing a breach of the peace. All of the arrests occurred more than ten years prior to Chaunt’s naturalization. The district court cancelled the order granting citizenship to Chaunt, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Knetsch v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/23

23

1960

Knetsch

United States

<p>Knetsch purchased annuity savings bonds from Sam Houston Life Insurance Company. In return, the company gave Knetsch loans and an annuity contract that would produce monthly annuity payments upon maturity. However, Knetsch kept borrowing from the insurance company in amounts that kept the net cash value of the annuity so low that it could produce no financial benefit other than tax deductions. Knetsch claimed payments to the insurance company as interest paid on indebtedness. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deductions and determined a deficiency amount for each of the two years in question. After paying the deficiency, Knetsch brought suit to obtain a refund in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The court ruled in favor of United States, holding that the transaction was a sham because it did not create "indebtedness" and, therefore, there was "no commercial economic substance" beyond the tax deductions. The U.S. Appeals Court for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federal Taxation

Mapp v. Ohio

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/236

236

1960

Dollree Mapp

Ohio

<p>Dollree Mapp was convicted of possessing obscene materials after an admittedly illegal police search of her home for a fugitive. She appealed her conviction on the basis of freedom of expression.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Gomillion v. Lightfoot

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/32

32

1960

Gomillion

Lightfoot

<p>An act of the Alabama legislature re-drew the electoral district boundaries of Tuskegee, replacing what had been a region with a square shape with a twenty-eight sided figure. The effect of the new district was to exclude essentially all blacks from the city limits of Tuskegee and place them in a district where no whites lived.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Wilkinson v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/37

37

1960

Frank Wilkinson

United States

<p>Frank Wilkinson was summoned to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for questioning before a subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee. The subcommittee was investigating Communist propaganda in the southern United States. Wilkinson refused to answer any questions, including whether he was a member of the Communist Party. He did not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and argued instead that the subcommittee had no authority to interrogate him. Wilkinson also argued that he was only called before the subcommittee because of his public opposition to the Un-American Activities Committee. Wilkinson was incited and convicted for contempt of Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Torcaso v. Watkins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/373

373

1960

Roy R. Torcaso

Clayton K. Watkins, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland

<p>Roy R. Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland, but he could not receive his commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God as the Maryland Constitution required. He sued for his commission in the Maryland Circuit Court on the grounds that the requirement violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The circuit court rejected his claims and the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Monroe v. Pape

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/39

39

1960

James Monroe, et al.

Frank Pape, et al.

<p>On October 29, 1958, thirteen police officers, including Frank Pape, arrived at James Monroe's Chicago apartment at 5:45 A.M. The officers broke down the door, forced Monroe and his wife to stand naked in their living room, and ransacked the apartment. Afterwards, James Monroe was escorted to police quarters and held for ten hours on "open" charges while he was interrogated about a murder. The police did not have a warrant for the search or the arrest, and refused Monroe permission to call his attorney.</p> <p>Monroe brought a complaint against each of the Chicago police officers individually and against the City of Chicago. The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was not liable under the Civil Rights Act nor for acts committed in performance of governmental functions. All defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause of action under the Civil Rights Acts. The district court dismissed the complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/49

49

1960

United States

Virginia Electric & Power Company

<p>In 1944, Congress authorized the construction of a dam on the Roanoke River and for that purpose sought to acquire a 1,840-acre easement from the 7,400-acre estate surrounding the Dan River, a tributary of the Roanoke River. The Virginia Electric Company owned 1,540 acres of the property in question that had been purchased from the estate owner in 1907 and would be part of the government’s easement. In 1951, the government reached an agreement with the estate owner to purchase the easement for one dollar and to officially acquire the land through a condemnation proceeding. The Virginia Electric Company, whose land was about to be taken in the easement, intervened to contest the issue of just compensation.</p> <p>The district court awarded a substantial compensation to the Virginia Electric Company, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in United States v. Twin City Power Company that held that the amount of compensation should not take into account the value of the land for water power purposes. On remand, the district court appointed commissioners to evaluate the value of the land and awarded $65,520 in compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Due Process

Baker v. Carr

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/6

6

1960

Charles W. Baker et al.

Joe C. Carr et al.

<p>Charles W. Baker and other Tennessee citizens alleged that a 1901 law designed to apportion the seats for the state's General Assembly was virtually ignored. Baker's suit detailed how Tennessee's reapportionment efforts ignored significant economic growth and population shifts within the state.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Poe v. Ullman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/60

60

1960

Poe

Ullman

<p>Paul and Pauline Poe, a married couple, decided to use contraceptives to prevent a fourth pregnancy after their first three children had died in infancy. Another woman, Jane Doe, sought to obtain access to contraceptives in order to forestall a second pregnancy that could be life-threatening. Since the late 1800s, Connecticut had prohibited the distribution and use of medical advice on contraceptives, although these laws were not regularly forced.. The Poes and Doe argued that the laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment. </p>

plurality opinion

Judicial Power

Braunfeld v. Brown

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/67

67

1960

Braunfeld

Brown

<p>Abraham Braunfeld owned a retail clothing and home furnishing store in Philadelphia. As an Orthodox Jew, he was prohibited by his faith from working on Saturday, the Sabbath. The Pennsylvania blue law only allowed certain stores to remain open for business on Sundays. Braunfeld's store was not one of those types allowed to be open. He challenged the law as a violation of the religious liberty clauses because he needed to be open six days a week for economic reasons and was prohibited from doing so by a tenet of his faith and the blue law.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Boynton v. Virginia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/7

7

1960

Bruce Boynton

Commonwealth of Virginia

<p>Bruce Boynton, an African American law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C. to Montgomery, Alabama. The bus route went through Richmond, Virginia, where there was a 40-minute stop scheduled. Boynton entered the segregated restaurant in the bus station and sat on the side reserved for white customers. Both a waitress and a manager requested that Boynton move to the other side of the restaurant, and he explained that he was an interstate bus passenger and refused. A police officer arrived and arrested Boynton. He was tried, convicted, and fined for unlawfully remaining on the premises after being forbidden to do so.</p> <p>Boynton appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court in Richmond where he filed a motion to dismiss and argued that his constitutional rights were violated. The Hustings Court denied the motion. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

McGowan v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1960/8

8

1960

McGowan

Maryland

<p>Several employes of a discount department store sold a few items, such as floor wax and loose-leaf notebooks, to customers on a Sunday. By doing so, they violated Maryland's blue laws which only allow certain items, such as drugs, tobacco, newspapers and some foodstuffs, to be sold on Sundays.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Kesler v. Dept. Of Public Safety

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/14

14

1961

Harold Beck Kesler

Department Of Public Safety, Financial Responsibility Division, State of Utah

<p>In June, 1957, a Utah court entered a judgment against Harold Kesler for negligently operating a motor vehicle. When Kesler failed to pay the judgment for over sixty days, the judgment’s creditors, following Utah’s Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (UMVSRA), filed the unpaid judgments with Utah’s Department of Public Safety. As a result, the Department suspended Kesler’s driver’s license and vehicle registration until he paid his judgment. </p> <p>In December, 1959 Kesler, who had still failed to pay the judgment, filed for bankruptcy in federal bankruptcy court. Although this released him from his judgment debts, the Department refused to restore his driver’s license and vehicle registration. The Department claimed that, under the UMVSRA, a bankruptcy proceeding will not release debts for negligently operating a motor vehicle. </p> <p>The United States District Court for the District of Utah, affirmed the law and refused to both restore his license and to invalidate Utah’s law. A direct appeal to the United States’ Supreme Court followed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Western Union Telegraph Company v. Pennsylvania

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/15

15

1961

Western Union Telegraph Company

Pennsylvania

<p>Western Union Telegraph Company, headquartered and incorporated in New York, processed money orders between people living in different states. This case concerns money orders between payors in Pennsylvania and payees in other states. Over the years, Western Union accumulated a large sum of money from payees who never claimed the money sent to them. Pennsylvania law states that when property goes unclaimed for seven years and the whereabouts of the owner are unknown, that property escheats to the state. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania started proceedings to escheat the unclaimed money. Western Union argued that Pennsylvania provided insufficient service of process, and had no power to protect Western Union from other states who might attempt to escheat the same money. The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Pennsylvania and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Coppedge v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/157

157

1961

Mark Coppedge, Jr.

United States

<p>In early December of 1957, Mark Coppedge broke into a pharmacy and stole property, including a check writer and a batch of blank money orders that he filled in, forged, and cashed. He was tried and convicted in district court a year later, but he appealed his conviction based on information that corrupted the jury. A newspaper published an article regarding a witness who was too afraid of Coppedge to testify, which was information relayed to the judge while the jury was out of the room, and the jury should not have known. Coppedge petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit for permission to appeal in forma pauperis, which would free him from the obligation to pay court costs. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. Gilmore

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/21

21

1962

United States

Don Gilmore et ux.

<p>Don Gilmore was the primary owner and managing officer of three different franchises of General Motors in California. In 1955, Don Gilmore and his wife, Dixie Gilmore, divorced. The trial court determined that the divorce was absolute without alimony for Dixie, which meant that Don successfully protected his assets from Dixie's claims that his assets were community property. Don's legal expenses totaled about $40,000 for the taxable years of 1953 and 1954. The Internal Revenue Code allows deductions from gross income for "ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year for the conservation of property held for the production of income."</p> <p>Gilmore sued in the Court of Claims to recover alleged overpayment of income taxes related to the legal expenses incurred during the divorce. The Court of Claims held that the legal expenses were attributable to Gilmore's successful resistance of his wife's claims to certain assets and were therefore deductible for federal income tax purposes. However, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue found that these expenditures were personal or family expenses and therefore not deductible. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question in the administration of the tax laws.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federal Taxation

Glidden Company v. Zdanok

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/242

242

1961

Glidden Company

Olga Zdanok

<p>Olga Zdanok and other individual employees of Glidden Company(Glidden) sought to recover damages for breach of collective bargaining agreement in New York state court, and then Glidden removed the case to federal district court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship. Judge J. Warren Madden, an active judge on the Court of Claims at the time, granted the employees damages. Glidden argued that the guarantee in Article III of the Constitution that judges should hold their offices during good behavior meant that Judge Madden displayed a lack of appropriate judicial independence. </p> <p>Previous judicial precedent had established that the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the United States Court of Claims were neither confined in jurisdiction nor protected in independence by Article III of the Constitution, but that there were created by other powers Congress possessed under Article I. Congress had since enacted statutes explicitly including the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in Article III of the Constitution. </p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Garner v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/26

26

1961

John Burrell Garner

Louisiana

<p>In a number of consolidated cases from Louisiana, several defendants were convicted of disturbing the peace by sitting at lunch counters that were reserved for patrons of a different race and refusing to leave. Defendants alleged that their convictions were based upon no evidence of guilt and, therefore, denied them of due process of the law. Defendants were denied post-conviction relief in the state courts, and the Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Organized Village of Kake v. Egan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/3

3

1961

Organized Village of Kake, Angoon Community Association

William A. Egan, Governor of Alaska

<p>The State of Alaska threatened to enforce its anti-fish trapping law against two local Native American tribes. The federal government had not designated a reservation for the tribes. The tribes depended on the salmon they trapped for survival and received permits to use the traps from the Army Corps of Engineers and the United States Forest Service, as well as favorable regulations from the Secretary of the Interior. The president of the Kake Village Council was arrested while trying to moor a trap. The tribes sued to enjoin Alaska from enforcing the anti-trapping law. The district court dismissed the suit and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/2

2

1961

Robert Kennedy, Attorney General

Francisco Mendoza-Martinez

<p>Francisco Mendoza-Martinez (Martinez) was an American by birth with dual Mexican citizenship. Martinez admitted that to avoid the draft, in 1942, he left the United States for Mexico and did not return until November, 1946. As a result of his deliberate absence, Martinez entered a guilty plea in 1947 to violating Section 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (the "Act") and served 366 days in prison. Five years after his release, Martinez was issued an arrest and deportation warrant premised on a violation of Section 401(j) of the Act which divested draft dodgers of their U.S. citizenship. Following a dismissal of his appeal from the Attorney General's special inquiry decision stripping him of his U.S. citizenship, Martinez challenged the constitutionality of Section 401(j) in District Court but was defeated. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's opinion upholding the district court decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. This case was decided together with Rusk v. Cort.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Hoyt v. Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/31

31

1961

Hoyt

Florida

<p>A Florida statute automatically exempted women from jury duty and did not place women on jury lists. Women could, however, volunteer and register for jury duty. After an all-male jury convicted Mrs. Hoyt for murdering her husband, she appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. The Florida Court upheld the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Douglas v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/34

34

1961

William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes

California

<p>William Douglas and Bennie Will Meyes, two indigent men, were arrested and charged with thirteen felonies, including armed robbery and assault with intent to commit murder. A single public defender represented both defendants. The public defender asked the trial court for a continuance because he was unprepared, there was a conflict of interest between the two defendants, and Douglas requested a new attorney. The judge denied the request for a continuance. The defendants then requested that the public defender be removed from the case. The judge granted that request but denied their request to appoint a new attorney. The defendants completed the trial without any representation. A jury found the defendants guilty of all thirteen felonies. </p> <p>The defendants appealed. The Second District Court of Appeals for California’s Third District did not appoint counsel to represent the defendants, because, based on their review of the record, appointing counsel would add no benefit to the defendants’ case. Following this decision, that court affirmed the trial court’s decision. </p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Vaughan v. Atkinson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/323

323

1961

Vaughan

Atkinson

<p>The general maritime law of the United States has long obliged ship owners to indemnify seamen against expenses of injury or illness suffered while on the job aboard ship. An ill or injured seaman is entitled to "maintenance and cure," that is, to compensation by his employer for the expenses of his medical treatment and subsistence (i.e., room and board) while convalescing ashore. (Until 1982, a seaman could obtain free medical attention from the US Public Health Service. In such a case, the USPHS effectively relieved the seaman's employer of the duty of cure.)</p> <p>At discharge, after two voyages on <em>S.S. National Liberty</em>, seaman Clifford Vaughan got a hospitalization certificate from the master, N.J. Atkinson. Vaughan then spent three months in a USPHS hospital and two years as an outpatient undergoing treatment for tuberculosis. The ship owner ignored Vaughan's request for maintenance as an outpatient. For a while before obtaining clearance to return to duty, Vaughan worked ashore as a cab driver. Later, he sued unsuccessfully in federal district court for maintenance and for damages from the ship owner's failure to promptly pay, including his attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Wong Sun v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/36

36

1962

Wong Sun and James Wah Toy

United States

<p>Police arrested Hom Way for possession of heroin. While under arrest, Way told police that a man named “Blackie Toy” once sold him an ounce of heroin at his laundry on Leavenworth St. Later that day, police found a laundry run by James Wah Toy. Nothing on the record identified Toy as “Blackie Toy”, but police arrested him anyway. Police then went to Toy’s house where they arrested Johnny Yee and found several tubes containing less than one ounce of heroin. Police also arrested Wong Sun. Police interrogated the men and wrote statements in English for them to sign. Both men refused, citing errors in the statements. At trial in U.S. District Court, Toy and Sun were convicted on federal narcotics charges. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Brown Shoe Company, Inc. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/4

4

1961

Brown Shoe Company, Inc.

United States

<p>When Brown Shoe Company bought Kinney Company Inc., the United States sued Brown for antitrust violations of the Clayton Act. The United States argued that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the shoe manufacturing and sales industries. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri ruled in favor of the United States. The court ordered Brown to divest itself of all Kinney stock and assets and to operate Kinney as separately as possible pending complete divestiture. The court gave Brown 90 days to come up with a plan for complete divestiture. The case reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, which allows direct appeal of final district court judgments.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Campbell v. Hussey

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/42

42

1961

Phil Campbell, Commissioner of Agriculture of Georgia and Georgia Farm Bureau Federation Inc.

William Hussey, Jr., et al.

<p>The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act provides uniform standards for classification and inspection of tobacco. The regulations under the Act require sellers to identify type 14 tobacco with a blue tag. The Georgia Tobacco Identification Act requires sellers to mark the same type of tobacco with a white tag. Several owners and operators of tobacco warehouses in Georgia sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia to enjoin enforcement of the Georgia law. The three judge court granted the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Link v. Wabash Railroad Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/422

422

1961

William Link

Wabash Railroad Company

<p>On August 24, 1954, William Link sued Wabash Railroad company over injuries he received when his car ran into a Wabash Railroad train at a crossing. After six years of motions, a pretrial hearing was set for October 12, 1960. On October 11, 1960, Link’s attorney contacted the Wabash Railroad attorney to inform him that he was doing work in Indianapolis and would miss a deposition that was set to happen before the hearing. The next morning, Link’s lawyer called the courthouse to notify the judge that he was detained in Indianapolis filing papers for a case before the Iowa Supreme Court. He said he could not make it to court that day but was available both of the next two days. Two hours after the pretrial was supposed to start, the court found that Link’s lawyer had not provided a sufficient reason for missing the hearing and dismissed the case “for failure to prosecute the action.” The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

United States v. Borden Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/439

439

1961

United States

Borden Company

<p>The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company were both large distributors of milk products based in Chicago, Illinois. Each company sold dairy products to retail stores under a plan that gave independent stores discounts on the list prices based on the volume of the independent stores' purchases, up to a specified maximum discount. The dairies granted grocery chain stores a flat discount, without reference to the volume of their purchases, at a rate substantially higher than the maximum discount available to independent grocery stores.</p> <p>The government brought a Section 2(a) Clayton Act suit against The Borden Company and Bowman Dairy Company, seeking an injunction against selling milk products at prices which discriminated between the independent groceries and the chain groceries. Each company conducted its own cost study in an attempt to demonstrate that the differences in pricing between independent groceries and chain groceries were due to actual cost differences. The cost studies demonstrated that it was less costly on average to sell to chain stores. So, the dairy companies argued that the price discrimination was justified by the cost justification proviso of the Clayton Act.</p> <p>The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the Government's suit, concluding that the cost differences demonstrated by the two companies' cost studies were sufficient to justify the price discrimination. The United States appealed the District Court's decision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Hutcheson v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/46

46

1961

Hutcheson

United States

<p>Maurice A. Hutcheson, a president of a labor union, refused to answer eighteen questions before the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field. Although Hutcheson appeared to be concerned about the state using his words against him in a pending state criminal trial, he specifically waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Instead, he argued that the Committee only wanted to expose his wrongful acts, and that this exposure would violate his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the Committee's questions acted as a "pretrial" of the state charges.</p> <p>The United States District Court for the District of Columbia found the union president guilty of contempt of Congress. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the judgment. Hutcheson appealed the appellate court's decision.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Engel v. Vitale

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/468

468

1961

Steven I. Engel, et al.

William J. Vitale, Jr., et al.

<p>The New York State Board of Regents authorized a short, voluntary prayer for recitation at the start of each school day. A group of organizations joined forces in challenging the prayer, claiming that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The New York Court of Appeals rejected their arguments.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/5

5

1962

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Button

<p>The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business."</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Hodges v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/58

58

1961

John E. Hodges

United States

<p>On April 30, 1956, the Chicago Police Department arrested John E. Hodges on charges of armed robbery. On May 2, 1956, two members of the District of Columbia Police Department traveled to Chicago and interrogated Hodges for about an hour before producing a written statement. Hodges was returned to Washington, D.C., indicted, and pled guilty. Hodges later withdrew his plea and entered a plea of not guilty. On April 15, 1957, Hodges went to trial and was found guilty. He did not appeal.</p> <p>Three months later, Hodges filed a motion in district court to vacate his sentence, arguing that his confession was coerced and should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. The motion was denied without a hearing. Hodges appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.</p>

per curiam

Criminal Procedure

Robinson v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/554

554

1961

Robinson

California

<p>A jury found defendant guilty under a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Defendant sought further review from the United States Supreme Court. </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/6

6

1961

Theodore R. Gibson

Florida Legislative Investigation Committee

<p>In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) received much criticism from state legislators as it pushed ahead with litigation to combat segregation. The State of Florida, in 1959, established a Legislative Investigation Committee to study what were called "subversive organizations." Gibson, president of the Miami branch of the NAACP, was subpoenaed before the committee and asked to produce a membership list of his organization. He refused and was found in contempt.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Fong Foo v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/64

64

1961

Fong Foo, Robert Knupp, Standard Coil Products Co.

United States

<p>Standard Oil Co. and two employees, Fong Foo and Robert Knupp were tried for conspiracy and concealing material facts within the jurisdiction of a governmental agency. The group allegedly falsified tests on goods manufactured at Standard Oil’s plant. Before the government finished presenting their case, the district court judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal for all parties on all counts. He then entered formal judgments of acquittal on the grounds of improper conduct by the Assistant U.S. States Attorney and a lack of credibility in the testimony of government witnesses. The United States filed for a writ of mandamus from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, asking the court of vacate the judgments and order a new trial. The court granted the writ, holding that the district court did not have the power to direct the judgment of acquittal.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Killian v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/7

7

1961

John Joseph Killian

United States

<p>John Joseph Killian was an employee at the Allen-Bradley Company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a member of Local 1111, United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers of America. From October of 1952 to February 28, 1953, Killian served as an officer of Local 1111. On December 9, 1952, the president of Local 1111 ordered all officers to come to the union office to execute affidavits stating that they were not members of the Communist Party, in accordance with the Taft-Hartley Act.</p> <p>As early as the fall of 1949, Killian was a member of the Communist party group on the campus of the University of Wisconsin and in the city of Madison, Wisconsin. Killian held a number of the group’s meetings in his home. Government witness Sullivan transferred his Communist Party membership to Madison in October 1949; Killian contacted him in his role assigning individuals to Communist Party groups or cells. In November of 1951, Killian and others formed a Communist Party cell to operate within the Allen-Bradley plant. Killian suggested to a government witness and co-worker, Ondrejka, that both should become stewards of Local 1111 to advance party aims within the union; both subsequently became officers and participated in union meetings.</p> <p>Killian was charged with making false statements in an affidavit. At trial, both Sullivan and Onrejka testified that they joined the Communist Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. On cross-examination, Sullivan and Ondrejka testified that the FBI paid them monthly amounts for their services, and were reimbursed for expenses incurred in Communist Party activities. Killian moved for production of all statements given by Sullivan and Ondrejka to the FBI, with a particular focus on reports made by Ondrejka of his reimbursable expenses and receipts signed by Ondrejka; Killian requested this evidence to impeach the witnesses’ testimony. Killian also moved to strike both Sullivan and Ondrejka’s testimony. The government instead offered to produce a list showing the dates and amounts of payments to Ondrejka and whether each payment was for services or expenses. Killian refused this substituted evidence, and the district court denied Killian’s motions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld Killian's conviction, holding that the district judge properly excluded the requested reports and receipts because they were not related to the direct testimony of the witnesses.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/78

78

1961

Goldblatt

Town of Hempstead

<p>Herbert Goldblatt owned 38 acres of land within the Town of Hempstead (town) and often used the land for his business of mining sand and gravel. During excavation, water filled the crater, which widened and deepened. The town expanded around the excavation and later enacted a series of ordinances to regulate mining excavation within its limits. In 1958, the town amended an ordinance to prohibit excavation below the water table and impose a duty refill any excavation currently below the level. In 1959, the town sued Goldblatt for not complying with the ordinance. Goldblatt argued the ordinance is unconstitutional because it was not regulatory but rather represented the town confiscating his property without compensation. The Court of Appeals of New York held for the Town of Hempstead, allowing them to enforce the prohibition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Due Process

Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/79

79

1961

Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., et al.

United States, et al.

<p>In accordance with the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Secretary of Agriculture promoted milk-marketing orders in the New York/New Jersey region that included compensatory payment provisions. The provisions in question required those who buy milk elsewhere and bring it into the region to pay the farmers who supply that region a “compensatory payment.” The petitioners were milk processing plant operators in Pennsylvania who challenged the validity of the “compensatory payment” provisions by arguing that they failed notice requirements and conflicted with other provisions of the Act that required uniform prices. The district court held these provisions to be invalid, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and upheld the validity of the provisions as authorized by the Act.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Russell v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1961/8

8

1961

Norton Anthony Russell

United States

<p>Six individuals were indicted and convicted for refusing to answer pertinent questions before a grand jury. Each of the individuals moved to squash the conviction because they were not told what the subject of the inquiry was, so had no basis for determining what questions were pertinent. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the convictions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Townsend v. Sain

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/8

8

1962

Charles Townsend

Frank G. Sain, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois

<p>The Chicago police arrested and detained Frank Townsend, a drug addict, in connection with a murder. After several hours of questioning, Townsend began going into withdrawal and asked for a doctor. A doctor gave him a medicine Townsend alleges was a "truth serum." While under the influence of the medication, Townsend confessed to the murder. Townsend alleged that the medicine caused his confession and, therefore, was not admissible at trial. Defendants disputed most of the facts surrounding the confession. The Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois admitted the confession at a trial by jury. The jury found Townsend guilty and sentenced him to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction.</p> <p>Townsend subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court denied the writ without a hearing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that the District Court's inquiry should be limited to undisputed portions of the record.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Ferguson v. Skrupa

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/111

111

1962

Ferguson

Skrupa

<p>A Kansas statute made it a misdemeanor to enter into contracts for "debt adjusting" (a practice in which a debtor agrees to pay a monthly fee to an adjustor who then makes payments to the debtor's creditor). Skrupa was in business as a "Credit Advisor" and engaged in this practice. A lower court held that the Kansas statute was an "unreasonable regulation of a lawful business" and struck it down.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Economic Activity

Avent v. North Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/11

11

1962

John Thomas Avent et al.

North Carolina

<p>S. H. Kress and Company operated a general variety store on Main Street in Durham, North Carolina. On the first floor, Kress had a stand-up counter where it served food and drinks to both black and white customers. On the basement floor, however, Kress operated a luncheonette department with signs posted stating that it was for employees and invited guests only.</p> <p>On May 6, 1960, seven students tried to seat themselves at the luncheonette counter. Five, including John Thomas Avent, were black students at North Carolina College for Negroes in Durham. The other two were white students at Duke University. All seven were involved with civil rights student organizations to varying degrees. Before each sat down, the store’s manager W. K. Boger spoke with the students individually. He told them that the luncheonette department was for employees and invited guests only, and asked them to leave. Both white students, however, were only asked to leave when it became clear they were sitting with one or more black customers. When the students refused to leave, Boger called an officer of the Durham police department, who arrested the students and charged them with trespassing.</p> <p>At trial, Boger testified that it was Kress’ policy to refuse service to black customers at the luncheonette department, and to refuse service to white people in the company of black people. The district court convicted all seven defendants of trespassing. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Noting that North Carolina had no laws mandating the separation of white and black customers in restaurants, the court upheld proprietors’ common law right to exclude individuals on the basis of race.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Gray v. Sanders

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/112

112

1962

James H. Gray et al.

James O'Hear Sanders

<p>Since the beginning of the 20th century, the State of Georgia used a county unit system for counting votes in primary elections. Under this system, the candidate who received the highest number of votes in a county would receive all of that county's unit votes. The overall winning candidate would then have to receive a majority of the county unit votes statewide. This system ended up giving rural counties a majority of the unit votes, even though rural counties made up only about a third of the population as of the 1960s.</p> <p>In 1962, James O'Hear Sanders, a voter in Georgia's most populous county, brought suit against several representatives of the Georgia State Democratic Executive Committee and the Secretary of State of Georgia. Sanders claimed that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Seventeenth Amendment. As a voter within one of the urban counties, Sanders claimed his vote had less of an influence on the nomination of candidates than that of a rural voter. A special three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia agreed with Sanders and held that the county unit system violated the Equal Protection Clause. However, the district court did not outlaw the county unit system entirely. The State appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/142

142

1962

School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania

Edward Lewis Schempp

<p>Under Pennsylvania law, public schools were required to read from the bible at the opening of each school day. The school district sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute. The district court ruled that the statute violated the First Amendment, even after the statute had been amended to permit a student to excuse himself. </p> <p>The Court consolidated this case with one involving Maryland atheists who challenged a city rule that provided for opening exercises in the public schools that consisted primarily of reading a chapter from the bible and the Lord's Prayer. The state's highest court held the exercise did not violate the First Amendment. The religious character of the exercise was admitted by the state. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Haynes v. Washington

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/147

147

1962

Raymond L. Haynes

Washington

<p>On the evening of December 19, 1957, Spokane police officers arrested Raymond L. Haynes near a gas station that had just been robbed. Haynes admitted to the robbery as officers drove him to the police station, and he signed a written confession after he was told that he could not call his wife until he signed it. At trial, Haynes argued that the confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary and coerced. The judge admitted the confession into evidence, and the jury found Haynes guilty. Haynes appealed, and the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Gideon v. Wainwright

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/155

155

1962

Clarence Earl Gideon

Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections

<p>Clarence Earl Gideon was charged in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering. When he appeared in court without a lawyer, Gideon requested that the court appoint one for him. According to Florida state law, however, an attorney may only be appointed to an indigent defendant in capital cases, so the trial court did not appoint one. Gideon represented himself in trial. He was found guilty and sentenced to five years in prison. Gideon filed a habeas corpus petition in the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court's decision violated his constitutional right to be represented by counsel. The Florida Supreme Court denied habeas corpus relief.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Lopez v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/236

236

1962

German S. Lopez

United States

<p>On August 31, 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Roger S. Davis visited Clauson’s Inn, located in North Falmouth, Massachusetts, as part of an investigation into possible tax evasion. He spoke with German S. Lopez, who operated the inn, to determine whether there was any dancing or other form of evening entertainment. Lopez denied it, but when Davis returned later that night, he saw dancing in the lounge and bar. On October 21, Davis returned to tell Lopez that the Inn might owe a cabaret tax and requested the Inn’s financial records. Lopez suggested that the two could reach an “agreement” and offered Davis $420 with a promise of more money if he dropped the issue. In Lopez’s version of the events, the money was for Davis to prepare the paperwork and put the Inn’s books in order. Lopez agreed to file paperwork for the current quarter and asked Davis to come back on October 24. Davis reported the meeting and turned the money over to his superior. When he returned on October 24, Davis wore a recording device. As they discussed Lopez’s tax liability, Lopez emphasized that he wanted Davis “on [his] side” and gave him more money. </p> <p>Lopez was charged with four counts of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent. Prior to trial, Lopez filed a motion to suppress the recorded evidence, and the motion was denied. He was convicted on three of the counts in district court. Although the defense did not focus on entrapment, the trial court judge provided jury instructions on the issue. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. </p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/45

45

1962

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.

Paul

<p>California prohibited the sale or transportation within its borders of avocados that did not meet a certain standard of maturity, which was defined according to oil content in its Agricultural Code. The federal Secretary of Agriculture used a different system for determining the maturity of avocados that were grown in Florida. Oil content was not a factor in these standards. Florida avocado growers tried to prevent the enforcement of the California law against them with regard to avocados that met the federal standard for maturity but did not have the oil level required by the California law. </p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Economic Activity

McNeese v. Board of Ed. for Community Unit School Dist. 187

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/480

480

1962

Louis McNeese, Jr., a minor, by Mabel McNeese, his mother and next friend et al.

Board of Education for Community Unit School Dist. 187, Cahoka, IL et al.

<p>African American students in District 187 sued the school under the Civil Rights Act, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the school district contained an almost identical number of Caucasian and African American students, the petitioners alleged that the two races were taught in separate parts of the building and were compelled to use separate entrances and exits. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure exhaust administrative the remedies available under an Illinois law prohibiting segregation public schools. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Federal Power Commission v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/48

48

1962

Federal Power Commission

Tennessee Gas Transmission Company

<p>In 1959, Tennessee Gas Transmission Company filed a 7% proposed rate increase across all six of its zones with the Federal Power Commission. The rate increase was based on the expected cost of service and rate of return. The Commission imposed a five-month suspension period while hearings were conducted to determine whether the rate increase was reasonable. At the end of five months, the new rates would be applied, but they were subject to refund if the hearings found a reasonable rate lower than 7%. On August 9, 1960, the Commission found that only a 6 1/8% increase was reasonable and that Tennessee Gas must provide refunds. </p> <p>Tennessee Gas challenged the ruling by arguing that requiring a refund prior to a final determination of cost made the company unable to recoup its 6 1/8%. Because Tennessee Gas spreads its rates differently across the different zones, there are certain zones in which the refund would be greater than the value of the new rate. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found in favor of Tennessee Gas.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part

Economic Activity

Brady v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/490

490

1962

John L Brady

Maryland

<p>A Maryland jury found John Brady and Charles Boblit guilty of first-degree murder in the state Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County. Brady maintained that he participated in the preceding robbery, but not in the killing. At sentencing, both men received the death penalty. After trial, Brady learned that Boblit previously confessed to the murder, but the prosecution suppressed that evidence for Brady’s trial. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that suppression of the confession denied Brady due process and remanded the case to reconsider the question of punishment only.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Sherbert v. Verner

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/526

526

1962

Sherbert

Verner

<p>Adeil Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, was fired from her job after she refused to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith. The Employment Security Commission ruled that she could not receive unemployment benefits because her refusal to work on Saturday constituted a failure without good cause to accept available work. Under South Carolina law, employers were not allowed to require employees to work on Sunday. </p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/52

52

1962

Best

Humboldt Placer Mining Company

<p>In order to gain immediate possession of public land needed to build a dam, the United States sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Northern Division to condemn any outstanding mining claims on the land. The complaint asked the court to allow the United States to have the validity of any claims determined through administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. Respondents sued to enjoin the administrative proceedings, but the District Court granted the United States summary judgment, holding that the court should wait for the administrative determination before proceeding with any mining claim. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that because the United States initiated the condemnation suit in District Court, the validity of mining claims must be left to the judiciary.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Judicial Power

Griffin v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/6

6

1962

William L. Griffin et al.

Maryland

<p>On June 30, 1960, several white and black people picketed the private Glen Echo Amusement Park in Montgomery County, Maryland. The demonstrators protested against the park's policy "not to have colored people on the rides, or in the park." During the demonstration, William Griffin and four other Negroes entered the park to test its management's resolve. A state deputy, who worked as a security staff member in the park, soon observed them. After informing them of the park's racial policy, the deputy asked them to leave. When Griffin and his friends refused, they were arrested and later convicted for criminal trespass. State appellate courts affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Edwards v. South Carolina

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1962/86

86

1962

Edwards

South Carolina

<p>187 black students were convicted in a magistrate's court of breach of the peace for peacefully assembling at the South Carolina State Government. Their purpose was to submit a protest of grievances to the citizens of South Carolina, and to the legislative bodies of South Carolina. During the course of the peaceful demonstration the police arrested the students after they did not obey an order to disperse. The students were convicted of breach of the peace. After their convictions were affirmed by the state supreme court, the students sought further review. They contended that there was a complete absence of any evidence of the commission of the offense and that they were thus denied due process of law.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Malloy v. Hogan

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/110

110

1963

Malloy

Hogan

<p>William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid in 1959 by Hartford, Connecticut police. After pleading guilty to pool selling, a misdemeanor, he was sentenced to one year in jail and fined $500, but the sentence was suspended after 90 days and Malloy was placed on two years probation. Some 16 months following his plea, a Superior Court appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify about gambling and other criminal activities in Hartford County. When Malloy refused, "on grounds it may tend to incriminate [him]" he was imprisoned for contempt and held until willing to answer questions. Malloy filed a habeas corpus petition challenging his confinement. On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors ruling, upholding an adverse Superior Court denial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Bell v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/12

12

1963

Bell

Maryland

<p>A group of 15-20 African-American students entered Hooper's restaurant in Baltimore to engage in a sit-in to protest the restaurant's refusal to serve African-American patrons. They refused to leave when requested to do so by the hostess on behalf of Mr. Hooper, the president of the corporation that owned the restaurant. Mr. Hooper called the police, who told him that they needed a warrant to be able to do anything. After Mr. Hooper swore out a warrant, the students were arrested for violating a Maryland statute prohibiting trespassing. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/16

16

1963

Banco Nacional de Cuba

Peter L.F. Sabbatino et al.

<p>Farr, Whitlock &amp; Co. contracted to buy sugar from a Cuban corporation. The corporation loaded the sugar on to the S.S. Hornfels, but in response to President Eisenhower reducing the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba issued a decree taking possession of the sugar. The Cuban government would only allow the sugar to leave Cuba if Farr, Whitlock entered into a new contract with Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government. After the sugar left Cuba, Farr, Whitlock refused to pay Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover payment. The court granted summary judgment for Far, Whitlock, holding that Cuba’s taking of the sugar violated international law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/169

169

1963

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Alabama ex rel. Richmond M. Flowers, Attorney General

<p>In 1956, the Attorney General of Alabama, John M. Patterson, filed suit against the NAACP, a New York corporation advocating for equal rights for black Americans. He filed the action as an attempt to oust the association from the state. The claim alleged that the NAACP failed to comply with Alabama statutes requiring foreign corporations to register with the Alabama Secretary of State, along with other acts more clearly related to the NAACP’s political mission. That same day, the Attorney General obtained a restraining order barring the NAACP from conducting business in the state or attempting to comply with the statutory requirements in question. Before the case was heard on the merits, the court found the NAACP to be in contempt, in part for failing to comply with a court order requiring the NAACP to produce records.</p> <p>The Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed the NAACP’s petition for a writ of certiorari. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held that requiring the NAACP to produce records including names and addresses of its members was a violation of those members’ freedom of association. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, again affirmed the judgment of contempt, arguing that the Supreme Court’s judgment rested on the mistaken premise that Alabama had incorrectly interpreted its own procedural rules. The Supreme Court of the United States again remanded the case in a per curiam opinion, holding that the NAACP had satisfied the district court’s order even though the NAACP did not produce the membership lists.</p> <p>The NAACP then filed an action in federal court, alleging that the Alabama courts were depriving the organization of its constitutional rights and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the trial court’s restraining order. The district court dismissed the action, but the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court, instructing the district court to retain jurisdiction only if Alabama state courts did not promptly try the NAACP’s case. The Supreme Court of the United States then ordered the district court to try the NAACP’s case unless the State of Alabama gave the NAACP a hearing before January 2, 1962. In December 1961, an Alabama circuit court decreed that the NAACP continued its activities in Alabama in violation of the laws and constitution of Alabama. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

United States v. Boyd

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/185

185

1963

United States , et al.

B. J. Boyd, Commissioner

<p>In 1955, Tennessee amended a statute that was based on the Atomic Energy Act and allowed the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its contractors to operate without paying sales tax. Under the amended statute, contractors must pay a contractor’s tax, regardless of the source or destination of the product. Union Carbide Corp, H.K. Ferguson Co. — both of which hold AEC contracts — and the AEC sued Tennessee to recover the sales and contractor’s tax.</p> <p>The trial court dismissed the suit due to the existing statute, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Tennessee Supreme Court upheld state’s right to collect a contractor’s tax, but found that the companies should be reimbursed for the sales tax.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Federalism

Massiah v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/199

199

1963

Winston Massiah

United States

<p>After Winston Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges, he retained counsel, pleaded not guilty, and was released on bail. While on bail, Massiah had a conversation with one of his codefendants in the absence of counsel. Unknown to Massiah, the codefendant became a government informer and allowed police to install a radio transmitter under the seat of his car. A nearby government agent listened to the entire conversation by way of this transmitter. Massiah made several incriminating statements. At trial, the agent who listened to the conversation testified to the incriminating statements over Massiah’s objection. The codefendant never testified. A jury convicted Massiah and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Fahy v. Connecticut

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/19

19

1963

Harold Fahy and William Arnold

Connecticut

<p>A jury convicted Harold Fahy and William Arnold of willful injury to public property, for painting black swastikas on the Beth Israel Synagogue in Norwalk, Connecticut. The judge admitted a can of black paint and a paintbrush into evidence. A police officer obtained these items during a warrantless search of Fahy’s garage. The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut found that the brush and paint were products of an illegal search and should not have been admitted. The court affirmed the convictions, however, holding that the error in admitting the evidence was harmless.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/20

20

1963

WMCA, Inc.

Lomenzo

<p>The WMCA, acting on behalf of several New York City registered voters, challenged the constitutionality of Article III, Sections 2-5 of the New York State constitution alleging that its apportionment formula resulted in unfair weighting of both state legislature houses by favoring lesser populated rural areas over densely populated urban centers. On appeal from a dismissal of their complaint by a three-judge district court, the Supreme Court granted the WMCA certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Wesberry v. Sanders

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/22

22

1963

Wesberry

Sanders

<p>James P. Wesberry resided in a Georgia congressional district with a population two to three times greater than that of other congressional districts in the state. He asserted that because there was only one congressman for each district, his vote was debased as a result of the state apportionment statute and the state's failure to realign the congressional districts. Wesberry sought to invalidate the apportionment statute and enjoin defendants, the Governor and Secretary of State, from conducting elections under it. The district court dismissed the complaint for non-justiciability and want of equity. Wesberry appealed. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Reynolds v. Sims

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/23

23

1963

Reynolds

Sims

<p>In 1961, M.O. Sims, David J. Vann (of Vann v. Baggett), John McConnell (McConnell v. Baggett), and other voters from Jefferson County, Alabama, challenged the apportionment of the state legislature. Lines dividing electoral districts had resulted in dramatic population discrepancies among the districts. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and senatorial district. However, the district in Jefferson County, which is near Birmingham, contained 41 times as many eligible voters as those in another district of the state. Sims and the other voters argued that this lack of proportionality prevented them from effectively participating in a republican form of government.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1963/29

29

1963

Maryland Committee for Fair Representation

Tawes

<p>Under its 1867 Constitution, the State of Maryland's Senate has 29 seats, one for each of 23 counties and six for the City of Baltimore's legislative districts. The State's five most populous political subdivisions with over three-fourths of the 1960 population are represented by only slightly over one-third of the Senate's membership. In the House of Delegates, after temporary legislation in 1962, there existed a maximum population-variance ratio of almost 6-to-1. A group of residents, taxpayers, and voters brought suit, alleging that the legislative malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ultimately, the circuit court held that as to certain counties there was invidious discrimination in the apportionment of the House and that the senatorial apportionment was constitutional. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights