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St. Amant v. Thompson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/517

517

1967

Phil A. St. Amant

Herman A. Thompson

<p>On June 27, 1962, Phil St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a television speech in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. During this speech, St. Amant accused his political opponent of being a Communist and of being involved in criminal activities with the head of the local Teamsters Union. Finally, St. Amant implicated Herman Thompson, an East Baton Rouge deputy sheriff, in a scheme to move money between the Teamsters Union and St. Amant’s political opponent. </p> <p>Thompson successfully sued St. Amant for defamation. Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Thompson did not show St. Amant acted with “malice.” Thompson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. That court held that, although public figures forfeit some of their First Amendment protection from defamation, St. Amant accused Thompson of a crime with utter disregard of whether the remarks were true. Finally, that court held that the First Amendment protects uninhibited, robust debate, rather than an open season to shoot down the good name of anyone who happens to be a public servant. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Sibron v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/63

63

1967

Sibron

New York

<p>After following Nelson Sibron for several hours, and observing him talking with several narcotics addicts, NYC police officer Anthony Martinez stopped Sibron and questioned him. When Martinez said: "You know what I am after," Sibron began reaching into his pocket. Simultaneously, Martinez thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket and pulled out several heroin envelopes. Following his arrest for drug trafficking, Sibron sought to suppress the heroin evidence as the product of an unconstitutional stop-and-frisk search. When the Criminal Court of New York City denied his motion, Sibron appealed but suffered adverse rulings in the New York State appellate courts. On appeal, the US Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard Sibron's case together with a related case, Peters v. New York. John Peters appealed his arrest and conviction for intent to commit burglary after a stop-and-frisk search of his person revealed burglary tools.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/645

645

1967

Jones

Alfred H. Mayer Company

<p>Jones, a black man, charged that a real estate company in Missouri's St. Louis County refused to sell him a home in a particular neighborhood on account of his race.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/660

660

1967

Board of Education of Central School District No. 1 et al.

James E. Allen Jr., Commissioner of Education of the State of New York et al.

<p>A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School District No. 1, contending that the law violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the boards did have standing, but also found that, because the law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type of school they attended, the law did not violate the First Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Terry v. Ohio

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/67

67

1967

Terry

Ohio

<p>Terry and two other men were observed by a plain clothes policeman in what the officer believed to be "casing a job, a stick-up." The officer stopped and frisked the three men, and found weapons on two of them. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to three years in jail.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Case-Swayne Company, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/66

66

1967

Case-Swayne Co.

Sunkist Growers, Inc.

<p>Since 1958, Sunkist Growers, Inc. organized as an agricultural collective, and about 12,000 growers of citrus fruit belonged to this collective. Sunkist grouped these growers into local associations, each with a designated packing house for preparing fruit for market. Most of these associations were comprised entirely of fruit growers operating under a cooperative structure, but about five percent were corporate growers with their own packing houses. An additional fifteen percent of the associations were private for-profit corporations and partnerships; these associations operated by marketing contracts, not by the cooperative structure.</p> <p>Sunkist controlled approximately seventy percent of all oranges produced in Southern California and Arizona. This control manifested in several ways. Each grower in a cooperative local association agreed to market all fruit through his association, to appoint the association as the marketing agent for all his fruit, and to contract with one packing house. While each association reserved the right to decide its prices and markets, Sunkist had sole discretion to pool products for exports, and could set maximum supplies for a given area.</p> <p>The Capper-Volstead Act privileged collective activity in processing and marketing in the production of agricultural products. It was enacted to provide an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition against combinations in restraint of trade. Case-Swayne manufactured orange juice and other blended juices as an independent operator. It alleged that the Sunkist system was a conspiracy of trade in violation of the Sherman Act and sought treble-damages under the Clayton Act. The district court granted Sunkist’s motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed in part. It held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Sunkist engaged in monopolistic practices, but also held that the participation of non-producers in Sunkist’s system did not destroy its exempt status under the Capper-Volstead Act.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/695

695

1967

Charles C. Green et al.

County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia et al.

<p>New Kent County had two schools that taught students elementary through high school. Prior to 1965, New Kent school taught all white students, while George W. Watkins school taught all African American students. After <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>, the school district implemented a “freedom of choice” plan, where all students could choose which school they wanted to attend. While the school district did not prevent anyone from attending the school they wanted to, only a few African American students transferred to New Kent and no white students transferred to George W. Watkins. Several students and parents from the school district brought this action against the school district, arguing that the plan did not adequately integrate the school system. The district court upheld the plan. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, but remanded the case for a more specific order concerning desegregation of teachers.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Bruton v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/705

705

1967

George William Bruton

United States

<p>George William Bruton and William James Evans were tried together for robbing a jewelry store that also operated as a U.S. Postal Service contract station. At trial, the judge admitted in to evidence Evans’ confessions, made to the postal inspector and later to police. In the confession, Evans names Bruton as his accomplice. The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession for Evans’ guilt or innocence, but to disregard it as inadmissible hearsay for Bruton’s charges. The jury convicted both men. Evans and Bruton appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court set aside Evans’ conviction, finding that the confession to the postal inspector should not have been received into evidence. The court upheld Bruton’s conviction because the district court properly instructed the jury not to use the confession when considering Bruton’s charges.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Maryland v. Wirtz

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/742

742

1967

Maryland

Wirtz

<p>The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (Act) requires every employer to pay each of his employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce a minimum hourly wage and a higher rate for exceeding a maximum number of hours per week. The Act excluded the federal government or any state government or political subdivision from the definition of "employer." In 1961, the Act was amended to include employees of any enterprise engaged in commerce or production of commerce, such as the operation of a hospital or any place that cares for the sick, a school, or an institution of higher education. The Act also removed the exemption for the state governments and their political subdivisions.</p> <p>The state of Maryland and twenty-seven other states sued W. Willard Wirtz, the Secretary of Labor, to prevent the enforcement of the Act as it applied to schools and hospitals operated by states or their subdivisions. The states argued this expansion of the Act was unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause and conflicted with the Eleventh Amendment's protection of states' sovereign immunity. A three-judge district court held that the extension of the Act's coverage to commercial enterprise and state institutions did not exceed Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause because it did not transgress the sovereignty of the states. However, the court declined to consider the Eleventh Amendment issue. Maryland appealed directly to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Unions

Shapiro v. Thompson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1967/9

9

1967

Bernard Shapiro

Vivian Marie Thompson

<p>Thompson was a pregnant, nineteen-year-old mother of one child who applied for assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program in Connecticut after having recently moved there from Massachusetts. Connecticut denied her aid since she did not satisfy the state's one-year residency requirement. This case was decided together with Washington v. Legrant and Reynolds v. Smith. In Washington, three people applied for and were denied AFDC aid on the ground that they had not resided in the District of Columbia for one year immediately preceding the filing of their application In Reynolds, two appellees, Smith and Foster, were denied AFDC aid on the sole ground that they had not been residents of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to their applications as required by a Pennsylvania Welfare Code.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Watts v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/1107_misc

1107 MISC

1968

Robert Watts

United States

<p>On August 27, 1966 while attending a protest and discussing police brutality, eighteen-year-old Robert Watts stated, "I have already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J." A federal statute makes it a crime to "knowingly and willfully" threaten the life of the President. Watts was arrested, tried, and convicted in federal court for violating this statute. Watts argued the statement "did not constitute a 'threat' within the language of the statute." On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected this argument, finding that the statement violated the statute even if Watts had no intention of carrying out his threat, and affirmed the lower court's judgment.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

Maxwell v. Bishop

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/13

13

1969

Maxwell

Bishop

<p>On November 3, 1961 William L. Maxwell was arrested and charged with raping a woman in Hot Springs, Arkansas. The jury convicted him of rape but did not render a verdict of life imprisonment. Accordingly, the trial court imposed the death penalty, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. Maxwell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the district court and claimed that his conviction and punishment were unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the jury had determined the guilt and the penalty in a single proceeding. Additionally, he argued that the jury was not given any standards or direction regarding the imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. The district court denied the writ, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Powell v. McCormack

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/138

138

1968

Adam Clayton Powell

John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives

<p>Adam Clayton Powell pecked at his fellow representatives from his unassailable perch in New York's Harlem. Powell had been embroiled in controversy inside and outside Washington. When Powell failed to heed civil proceedings against him in New York, a judge held him in criminal contempt. His problems were only beginning. He won reelection in 1966 but the House of Representatives voted to exclude him.</p>

majority opinion

reversed in-part/remanded

Judicial Power

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/13

13

1968

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., Interstate Commerce Commission, et al.

Aberdeen & Rockfish Railroad Company, et al.

<p>The Baltimore &amp; Ohio Railroad Company operated in the “Official territory,” along with several other railroad companies (Northern lines). Aberdeen &amp; Rockfish Railroad Company and several other railroad companies (Southern lines) operated within the “Southern territory." Beginning on July 17, 1947, the Northern lines tried to obtain new divisions of the freight rates that applied between the Official territory and Southern territory from the Interstate Commerce Commission. These proposed divisions would be based on actual, relative costs of service.</p> <p>The Commission determined that the existing divisions violated the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), which directed the Commission to set aside inequitable divisions of joint rates and to prescribe equitable divisions. In determining the relative costs that controlled the divisional formula, the Commission frequently relied on unadjusted average costs incurred by the railroads on the average of all traffic in their territories, and not on actual costs incurred by the Northern and Southern lines. The Commission found that the existing divisions violated the ICA because they allocated a lesser share of revenues to the Northern lines based on relative costs.</p> <p>The Administrative Procedure Act required that courts set aside agency findings that are unsupported by substantial evidence. On appeal from the Commission’s decision, the district court set aside the Commission’s decision. It held that the Northern lines failed to prove that the Commission relied on substantial evidence about the relative costs of handling north-south freight traffic, noting that the burden of proof lay with the Northern lines. It also rejected the Commission’s finding that the divisions required adjustment due to the greater revenue needs of the Northern lines.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/19

19

1968

Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corporation

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission

<p>The Secretary of the Interior is responsible for the maintenance of national parks and for providing the facilities necessary to allow the public to enjoy them. In the performance of this duty, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior contracted Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp (UISC) to provide guided tours of the National Mall on minibuses that visitors may board and disembark at various sites. The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission (WMATC) sued to enjoin UISC from conducting tours without obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity from the WMATC. The district court dismissed the suit, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed without opinion.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Younger v. Harris

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/2

2

1970

Evelle J. Younger, District Attorney of Los Angeles County

John Harris, Jr. et al.

<p>California's Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited advocating, teaching, or aiding the commission of a crime or unlawful acts of violence or terrorism. John Harris, a socialist, was indicted under the statute. Harris claimed the law had a "chilling effect" on his freedom of speech. After a California state court upheld Harris' conviction, a federal district court struck down the Act because of vagueness and overbreadth.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/20

20

1968

Joyce C. Thorpe

Housing Authority of the City of Durham

<p>Joyce Thorpe, a tenant at the federally subsidized McDougald Terrace, was evicted after being elected president of the building’s Parents Club. The Housing Authority gave no reason for the eviction. When Thorpe attempted to learn the reason, her requests went unanswered. The Housing Authority of the City of Durham obtained a court order to force Thorpe’s eviction. Thorpe argued that she was evicted because of her activity with the Parents Club, in violation of her First Amendment rights, but the state appeals court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the eviction. </p> <p>While the case was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular which stated that all evicted tenants should be informed of the reason for their eviction. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for a ruling in accordance with the circular. The North Carolina court refused to apply the circular on the ground that it was to be applied prospectively. Throughout these proceedings, Thorpe remained in her apartment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Due Process

Benton v. Maryland

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/201

201

1968

John Dalmer Benton

Maryland

<p>Benton was charged with burglary and larceny in a Maryland court. A jury found him not guilty of larceny but guilty of burglary. He was sentenced to ten years in prison. He won his appeal on the grounds that the grand jury that indicted him and the petit jury that convicted him were selected unconstitutionally. The case was remanded and Benton chose to confront a new grand jury. It indicted him for larceny and burglary; the petit jury found him guilty of both charges. Benton then appealed arguing that that re-indicting him on the larceny charge after he had been acquitted amounted to double jeopardy. The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed, following the U.S. Supreme Court's <i>Palko</i> decision, which held that the double-jeopardy clause did not apply to state court criminal proceedings.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/21

21

1968

Tinker

Des Moines Independent Community School District

<p>In December 1965, a group of students in Des Moines held a meeting in the home of 16-year-old Christopher Eckhardt to plan a public showing of their support for a truce in the Vietnam war. They decided to wear black armbands throughout the holiday season and to fast on December 16 and New Year's Eve. The principals of the Des Moines school learned of the plan and met on December 14 to create a policy that stated that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it, with refusal to do so resulting in suspension. On December 16, Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt wore their armbands to school and were sent home. The following day, John Tinker did the same with the same result. The students did not return to school until after New Year's Day, the planned end of the protest.</p> <p>Through their parents, the students sued the school district for violating the students' right of expression and sought an injunction to prevent the school district from disciplining the students. The district court dismissed the case and held that the school district's actions were reasonable to uphold school discipline. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision without opinion.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/258

258

1968

Morris H. Kramer et al.

Union Free School District No. 15

<p>Section 2012 of the New York Education Law permitted school districts to limit eligible voters in school district elections to citizens owning or leasing taxable real property and parents of children enrolled in public schools. Union School District No. 15 applied these restrictions. On April 25, 1965, Morris H. Kramer, a resident of district 15 who resided with his parents and had no children, attempted to register for the local school district elections. His application was rejected for failure to comply with the restrictions. Kramer filed a class-action suit against the school board in federal court, claiming his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated. The district court initially declined to hear his constitutional claims, but, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the district court to hear Kramer's claim. On hearing the complaint, the court found no constitutional violation and denied Kramer's claim.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Stanley v. Georgia

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/293

293

1968

Stanley

Georgia

<p>Law enforcement officers, under the authority of a warrant, searched Stanley's home pursuant to an investigation of his alleged bookmaking activities. During the search, the officers found three reels of eight-millimeter film. The officers viewed the films, concluded they were obscene, and seized them. Stanley was then tried and convicted under a Georgia law prohibiting the possession of obscene materials.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/29

29

1968

United States

Concentrated Phosphate Export Association, Inc. et al.

<p>After World War II, the United States made funds available through the ‘Marshall Plan’ to many countries to pay for commodities sold by American companies and shipped from the United States and other free-world sources. Congress made foreign aid funds available to bring commodities to the Republic of Korea, beginning with the Mutual Security Act of 1954.</p> <p>In 1961, the Concentrated Phosphate Export Association (CPEA) organized to act as an export-selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its member corporations. CPEA organized under the Webb-Pomerene Act, which Congress passed to help American firms compete with foreign cartels. The process began when Congress allocated funds to various Agency for International Development (AID) programs. The United States thus directly financed the purchase of commodities allocated to Korea, approved via a complicated, tightly regulated application procedure. The United States assigned two of the CPEA contracts, and the Republic of Korea assigned the other nine, subject to detailed regulation by AID. The contracts only circulated in the United States.</p> <p>The United States filed an action to enjoin price fixing and business allocation activities among the CPEA’s five major member corporations. The district court held that CPEA’s sales were ‘export trade’ for the purposes of the Sherman Act; hence, although CPEA conceded that its members were coordinating their sales actions, CPEA did not violate the Sherman Act. On January 1, 1967, the State Department amended its regulations to preclude Webb-Pomerene associations from bidding on contracts where the procurement was limited to United States suppliers; in response, the CPEA dissolved on December 28, 1967, despite the district court’s favorable ruling.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Allen v. State Board of Elections

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/3

3

1968

Allen et al.

State Board Of Elections et al.

<p>Voters and candidates in Mississippi and Virginia filed four separate cases seeking judgments that certain amendments to their states' election laws and procedures were subject to the pre-approval requirements of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and hence were not enforceable until the state complied with the requirements. The district courts found that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the voting changes in the four cases and dismissed the complaints. The voters and candidates filed direct appeals, and the cases were consolidated.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Boyle v. Landry

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/4

4

1968

Boyle et al.

Lawrence Landry et al.

<p>Plaintiffs, several African American residents of Chicago, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a number of Officials of Cook County and Chicago for the enforcement of a number of Illinois Statutes and Chicago ordinances prohibiting mob action, resisting arrest, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and intimidation. Plaintiffs contended that the officials violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free speech by threatening enforcement of the statutes for the sole purpose of harassing and intimidating Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed the case in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. A three-judge court upheld all of the statutes except for one subsection that prohibited "the assembly of 2 or more persons to do an unlawful act" and one subsection a statute that prohibited intimidating a person by threats to commit any criminal offense. The court enjoined the officials from enforcing these two subsections. Defendants appealed the decision as to the intimidation statute.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Street v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/5

5

1968

Street

New York

<p>Sidney Street was a black veteran of World War II and a recipient of the Bronze Star. He held a position with the New York City Transit Authority and had no prior criminal record. On June 6, 1966, Street was in his Brooklyn apartment listening to the radio when he heard a news announcement that civil rights activist James Meredith had been shot by a sniper during his march through Mississippi.</p> <p>Street went to a bureau drawer and removed an old 48-star American flag. He carried the flag to the intersection of Lafayette Avenue and St. James Place, one block from his residence. He laid a piece of paper on the sidewalk. Then, keeping the flag properly folded, he set it on fire with a match. He held the burning flag in hand as long as he could, then laid it on the paper so that it would not touch the sidewalk. When a police officer arrived, he found Street standing over the burning flag and talking to a small group of people. Street admitted that he burned the flag. The officer later testified that he heard Street shout, "If they did that to Meredith, we don't need an American flag."</p> <p>The New York City Criminal Court charged Street with malicious mischief for willfully and unlawfully defiling, casting contempt upon, and burning an American flag. The allegation included Street's words at the scene of the flag burning. At trial, Street moved to dismiss the information on the grounds that Street engaged in a constitutionally protected act because the flag burning was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment. The court dismissed this motion; Street was convicted and given a suspended sentence. On appeal, the court affirmed Street's conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, holding that the flag burning was an act of incitement fraught with danger to the public peace.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Brandenburg v. Ohio

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/492

492

1968

Clarence Brandenburg

State of Ohio

<p>Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism."</p>

per curiam

reversed

First Amendment

Kaufman v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/53

53

1968

Harold Kaufman

United States

<p>During his trial for armed robbery of a federally insured savings and loan association, Harold Kaufman admitted to the crime but unsuccessfully claimed insanity. He was convicted and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Kaufman then filed a post-conviction motion in district court challenging the evidence that proved his sanity. He alleged that the evidence was unlawfully seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied relief, holding that unlawful search and seizure was not an available attack in post-conviction proceedings. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Williams v. Rhodes

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/543

543

1968

Glen A. Williams et al.

James A. Rhodes, Governor of Ohio

<p>To be placed on the ballot in a presidential election, Ohio law required a new political party obtain voter signatures totaling 15% of the number of ballots cast in the preceding gubernatorial election. Both the American Independent Party and the Socialist Labor Party sought ballot access in Ohio for the 1968 presidential election. The American Independent Party, formed by supporters of George C. Wallace, obtained the requisite number of signatures but failed to file its petition for ballot access prior to the February 7, 1968 deadline. The Socialist Labor Party, which until 1948 had been on the ballot, failed to collect enough signatures and was also kept off the ballot. The parties filed separate suits in U.S. District Court against several state officials, including Governor James A. Rhodes, contending that being kept off the ballot violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases were consolidated, and the court ruled that each party must be given write-in access but did not require the state to print the parties' candidates' names on the ballot. The American Independent Party requested and was granted an injunction forcing the state to add the party's candidates to the ballot while the case was on appeal. The Socialist Labor Party filed a similar request, but did so much later, and was denied primarily to avoid confusion in requiring the reprinting of another set of ballots.</p>

majority opinion

vacated

Civil Rights

Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/6

6

1968

Carroll

President and Commissioners of Princess Anne

<p>A white supremacist organization held a public rally near a courthouse in Princess Anne, Maryland. During the rally, members of the organization made racist and derogatory speeches amplified over a public address system. Officials of Princess Anne and Somerset County obtained a restraining order to prevent the organization from reconvening the next day. The order was <em>ex parte</em>, so no notice was given to the organization. The order restrained the organization from holding rallies in the county for 10 days. At trial, the Circuit Court issued an injunction for another 10 months. On appeal the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the 10 day order, but reversed the 10 month injunction because the period of time was unreasonable and arbitrary.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Boykin v. Alabama

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/642

642

1968

Edward Boykin, Jr.

Alabama

<p>In the spring of 1966, a series of armed robberies were committed in Mobile, Alabama. In two instances a gun was fired, and one person was injured when the bullet ricocheted off the floor. The petitioner, 27-year-old Edward Boykin, Jr., was arrested on five counts of robbery. He was provided with court-appointed counsel and pled guilty on all five counts. The judge did not ask Boykin whether he entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily, nor does the record show that Boykin was aware of his rights to trial by jury and to confront his accusers.</p> <p>Pursuant to Alabama law, a jury trial determined Boykin’s punishment. Boykin did not testify and offered no evidence regarding his character. There was no evidence of a prior criminal record. The jury sentenced the petitioner to death on all five counts. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the death sentence, but three justices dissented on the grounds that the record did not show the petitioner entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Hadnott v. Amos

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/647

647

1968

Sallie M. Hadnott, et al.

Mabel S. Amos, et al.

<p>The National Democratic Party of Alabama (NDPA) sought to place the names of minority candidates on the ballot for local and state-wide offices. Alabama election officials denied the NDPA request under the Alabama Corrupt Practices Act. The NDPA then brought suit in a special three-judge U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama claiming constitutional violations. NDPA lost and appealed directly to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Initially, the Court heard arguments on October 18 in support of a temporary restraining order which it had granted on October 14. The day after oral argument, the Court granted the order and subsequently addressed the merits of the controversy on March 25.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Samuels v. Mackell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/7

7

1970

George Samuels, Abraham C. Taylor, Herman Benjamin Ferguson, Arthur Harris, Mandola McPherson, Max Stanford, Merle Stewart, Hampton Woodward Rookard, Ursula Virginia West, Milton Ellis

Thomas J. Mackell, Louis J. Lefkowitz

<p>George Samuels and several other defendants were indicted in state court on criminal anarchy charges, in violation of New York state law. The defendants filed for an injunction in federal court to prevent continuation of their case. They argued that the New York laws violated due process, First Amendment freedoms, and equal protection. The district court found the laws constitutional and refused to grant the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power

Presbyterian Church in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/71

71

1968

Presbyterian Church in United States

Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church

<p>The general Presbyterian Church (general church), and two local churches, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church (Hull Church) and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church, were in dispute over the control of properties used by the local churches in Savannah, Georgia. The local churches withdrew from the general church due to these conflicting views. In response, the general church took over the local churches’ property. Each of the local churches sued the general church for trespass on the disputed property. The general church argued that the civil courts don't have the power to determine whether the general church had departed from its faith and practice. The district court disagreed and concluded that, under Georgia law, the implied trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church was terminated because of the general church’s substantial departure from its doctrines. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision by agreeing with the general church that the First Amendment prevents civil courts from ruling on church doctrine issues. </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Chimel v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/770

770

1968

Chimel

California

<p>Local police officers went to Chimel's home with a warrant authorizing his arrest for burglary. Upon serving him with the arrest warrant, the officers conducted a comprehensive search of Chimel's residence. The search uncovered a number of items that were later used to convict Chimel. State courts upheld the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Epperson v. Arkansas

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/7

7

1968

Epperson

Arkansas

<p>The Arkansas legislature passed a law prohibiting teachers in public or state-supported schools from teaching, or using textbooks that teach, human evolution. Epperson, a public school teacher, sued, claiming the law violated her First Amendment right to free speech as well as the Establishment Clause. The State Chancery Court ruled that it violated her free speech rights; the State Supreme Court reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

Gunn v. University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/7

7

1969

Lester Gunn, Sheriff of Bell County, Texas et al.

University Comm. to End War in Viet Nam

<p>Members of the University Committee to End the War in Viet Nam (Protestors) were protesting at a speech by President Lyndon B. Johnson at Central Texas College in Killeen, Texas. After being attacked by the gathered crowd, the Protestors were arrested and charged with disturbing the peace. The Protestors sued and asked that a three-judge panel be convened in the district court to overrule the disturbing-the-peace statute since it violated their First Amendment rights. That court found the statute unconstitutional but stayed the injunction that would prevent enforcement of the statute until the next session of the Texas legislature, so that the legislature might enact a constitutionally permissible statute. However, the Texas legislature did not enact a new statute at its next session, and the court took no further action. Lester Gunn, the local sheriff, appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Gunn based his appeal on the Three-Judge Court Act, which allows direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders granting or denying an injunction by a federal court of three judges.</p>

majority opinion

none

Judicial Power

Spinelli v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/8

8

1968

William Spinelli

United States

<p>Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) applied for, and were issued, a search warrant to assist in uncovering evidence of defendant William Spinelli conducting illegal gambling activities. In the affidavit required for the warrant application, the FBI agents stated the defendant was known to "local law enforcement officials as a bookmaker." The FBI related in the affidavit that agents had tracked defendant Spinelli for five days, and that on four of the days, Spinelli was seen crossing into St. Louis, MO, entering an apartment at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. Finally, the agents offered that they "had been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136."</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Nacirema Operating Company, Inc. v. Johnson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1968/9

9

1968

Nacirema Operating Co. Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company

William H. Johnson, Julia T. Kloseck, and Albert Avery

<p>These are two consolidated cases involving the same Respondents. William Johnson and Jonathan Klosek (husband of Julia Klosek) were employed by Nacirema Operating Company as longshoremen and Albert Avery was employed by Old Dominion Stevedoring Company. Johnson and Avery were injured and Klosek was killed during separate accidents that occurred while on the dock unloading a ship. The Deputy Commissioners of the United States Department of Labor denied claims by the men and their families under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act (the Act) because the injuries did not occur “upon the navigable waters of the United States” as required under the Act. The district court upheld those decisions and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Dutton v. Evans

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/10

10

1969

A.L. Dutton

Alex S. Evans

<p>A jury convicted Alex Evans of murder. The prosecution presented 20 witnesses who described Evans’ participation in the murder. A prison inmate testified that one of Evans’ conspirators in the murder said “we wouldn’t be in this now” if it weren’t for Evans. Evans’ counsel questioned the inmate, but still argued that Evans’ right to confrontation was violated because they could not confront the conspirator. The judge overruled Evans’ objection citing a Georgia statute that allows admission of conspirator’s statements against co-conspirators. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction.</p> <p>Evans filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the Georgia statute violates Evans right to confrontation because it is broader than the rule used in federal conspiracy trials. The court found no “cogent reasons” for the Georgia hearsay exception.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

Williams v. Illinois

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/1089

1089

1969

Williams

Illinois

<p>Willie E. Williams was convicted for theft of credit cards, checks, and papers worth less than $150. He received the maximum sentence for petty theft in Illinois: one year of imprisonment and a $500 fine. If Williams was unable to pay the fine (and an additional $5 in court costs) at the end of his sentence, he would remain in jail to “work off” the fine at a rate of $5 per day.</p> <p>While in jail, Williams petitioned the trial court to vacate the “work off” provision of his sentence. Williams argued that he did not have any money or property with which to pay the money portion of his sentence, but he would pay if released after one year and allowed to get a job. The trial court held that Williams’ ability to pay might change by the end of his sentence and dismissed his petition. Williams appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and argued that the denial of his petition violated his right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Colonnade Catering Corporation v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/108

108

1969

Colonnade Catering Corporation

United States

<p>A group of federal agents entered Colonnade Catering’s (Colonnade) New York premises to search for resealed liquor bottles, possession of which is a violation of federal tax law. After searching for some time, the agents asked Colonnade’s president, Salvatore E. Rozzo, to unlock a locked liquor storeroom. Rozzo refused and asked the agents if they had a search warrant. The agents responded that they did not need one. When Rozzo continued to refuse to unlock the storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized 53 bottles of liquor and two funnels.</p> <p>At trial, Colonnade moved to suppress the evidence discovered in the warrantless search and argued that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision and held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid warrantless administrative inspections. Therefore, the statutes, which authorize federal agents to enter any building or place where objects subject to a liquor tax are kept “so far as it may be necessary” in order to examine them during the day or business hours, do not violate the Fourth Amendment. The appellate court also found that the statutory provisions were equivalent to a warrant given their clarity and narrow scope.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. White

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/13

13

1970

United States

James A. White

<p>A government informant, Harvey Jackson, wore a concealed radio transmitter and engaged in four conversations with defendant White at three different locations: Jackson's house, a restaurant, and Jackson's automobile. Government agents listened to each of the radio transmissions, thereby overhearing defendant White make self-incriminating remarks regarding his involvement in multiple narcotics transactions. Jackson was unavailable during the trial, so the prosecution offered the testimony of the agents who had conducted the electronic surveillance as evidence.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/135

135

1969

Walz

Tax Comm'n of the City of New York

<p>Frederick Walz, the owner of real estate in Richmond County, New York, brought suit against the New York City Tax Commission, challenging property tax exemptions for churches. Walz alleged that the exemptions forced him, as a taxpayer, to indirectly contribute to those churches.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Wheeler v. Montgomery

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/14

14

1969

Mae Wheeler

John Montgomery

<p>Mae Wheeler was a 75-year-old widow who lived solely on her welfare check and monthly Social Security payment. On August 30, 1967, the San Francisco Department of Social Services learned that Wheeler had received the proceeds from her late son's veteran insurance policy. After a county welfare supervisor called Wheeler, the Welfare Department began withholding Wheeler's welfare check pending an investigation. Wheeler requested a hearing and for the restoration of her payments until her cause could be heard. Wheeler did not get the restoration of her payments, but she ultimately prevailed in her claim and had benefits restored several months later. </p> <p>Wheeler along with other similarly-situated people were granted class action status, and the class claimed that California welfare termination provisions deprived the class members of their constitutional due process rights by terminating welfare benefits before having a full and adequate hearing. A three-judge District Court for the Northern District of California held that the California procedure for pre-termination review satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court reviewed the California court's opinion </p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Dandridge v. Williams

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/131

131

1969

Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare

Linda Williams et al.

<p>The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, established by the Social Security Act of 1935 and jointly funded by the state and federal governments, provides financial assistance to children of families with little or no income. Under the program, each state computes a "standard of need" for each family. In Maryland, the standard of need increased with each additional member of the family, but became incrementally smaller, with an upper limit of $250 per month. Linda Williams, a single mother, and Junius and Jeanette Gary, husband and wife, were Baltimore residents and parents of eight children each. They objected to Maryland's means of calculating standard of need on the ground that it discriminated against larger families, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They also argued that the calculation conflicted with the stated purpose of the program as laid out by the Social Security Act. They filed suit against Edmund P. Dandridge, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Public Welfare, and several other state officials. A U.S. District Court originally ruled the Maryland regulation violated both the Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause. On reconsideration, the court altered its ruling and based its judgment entirely on constitutional grounds but nonetheless struck down the provision.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

North Carolina v. Alford

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/14

14

1970

North Carolina

Henry C. Alford

<p>North Carolina charged Henry Alford with first-degree murder. That charge carried a possible sentence of life imprisonment or the death penalty. Alford agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a second-degree murder conviction. When Alford took the stand, he testified that he was innocent and pled guilty to avoid the death penalty. The judge ensured that Alford made his decision freely after consulting counsel. Alford maintained his guilty plea, and after receiving evidence of Alford’s extensive criminal history, the judge sentenced Alford to the maximum 30-year sentence.</p> <p>After unsuccessfully attempting to obtain post-conviction relief, Alford petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied relief on the grounds that Alford’s guilty plea was entirely voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the plea was involuntary because its primary motivation was the fear of death.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

DeBacker v. Brainard

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/15

15

1969

Clarence De Backer

Homer Brainard, Sherriff of Dodge County Nebraska

<p>A juvenile court judge declared 17-year-old Clarence DeBacker a “delinquent child” and ordered him committed to the Boys’ Training School for forging his father’s signature on a check and attempting to pass it off as legitimate. Before the hearing, DeBacker had requested a jury trial, but the judge denied the request. The Nebraska Juvenile Court Act denies juveniles a trial by jury. Instead of seeking review of his sentence, DeBacker flied for state habeas corpus, arguing that the juvenile court violated the Sixth Amendment when it denied him a jury trial. The Nebraska District Court dismissed the petition and the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal, DeBacker argued that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions in <i>Duncan v Louisiana</i> and <i>Bloom v Illinois</i> entitle him to a jury trial.</p>

per curiam

Criminal Procedure

Baird v. State Bar of Arizona

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/15

15

1970

Sara Baird

State Bar of Arizona

<p>Sara Baird graduated from law school at Stanford University in 1967 and passed the bar examination in Arizona. Among the questions asked by the Arizona Bar Committee, she answered Question 25, which requested that she list all of the organizations to which she has belonged since the age of 16. She declined to answer Question 27, which asked whether she “had ever been a member of the Communist party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence.’” Because she did not answer that question, the Committee did not process her application any further. The Arizona Supreme Court denied Baird’s petition for the Bar Committee to show cause why she should be denied admittance to the State Bar of Arizona. </p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

In re Stolar

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/18

18

1970

Martin Robert Stolar

State of Ohio, Columbus Bar Association

<p>Martin Robert Stolar was admitted to the New York Bar in 1968. In his application, he answered several questions about his social, religious and political affiliations. When Stolar applied to the Ohio Bar in 1969 he supplied the Ohio Bar Association with all of the information from his New York Bar application. The Ohio Bar also subjected Stolar to an oral interrogation where they asked questions relating to whether he was associated with any organization that advocated the violent overthrow of the government. Stolar refused to answer those questions and the interrogation committee recommended that he be denied admission to the Bar. Stolar had nothing in his record, other than refusal to answer the questions, that showed that he did not have the necessary good character for admission to the Ohio Bar. The Ohio Supreme Court approved the committee’s recommendation without opinion.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Waller v. Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/24

24

1969

Joseph Waller, Jr.

Florida

<p>Joseph Waller stole a mural from the St. Petersburg City Hall. The city charged and convicted him in municipal court with two ordinance violations. Based on the same acts, Waller was prosecuted and convicted in the Circuit Court of Florida for grand larceny. On appeal, Waller argued that the municipal court and subsequent circuit court prosecutions put him in double jeopardy. The District Court of Appeal of Florida rejected this argument and upheld the conviction.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Boddie v. Connecticut

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/27

27

1969

Gladys Boddie et al.

Connecticut

<p>Gladys Boddie was a married resident of Connecticut receiving welfare benefits. She filed for a divorce in New Haven County Superior Court. However, Boddie was not given a hearing because she had not paid the filing fee under Section 52-259 of the Connecticut General Statutes. Given her welfare status, she was unable to pay the fee. Her requests for fee waivers were also denied. Boddie and others who were denied divorces under Section 52-259 challenged the fee requirement in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They alleged that the fee requirement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court upheld the requirement. Boddie appealed to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Brady v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/270

270

1969

Robert M. Brady

United States

<p>Robert M. Brady pleaded not guilty to kidnapping. After learning that his codefendant confessed and would be available to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. The crime had a maximum penalty of death, but a U.S. statute allowed the death penalty only if the verdict of a jury recommends. The judge sentenced him to 50 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 30 years. 8 years later, Brady sought relief in U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming his guilty plea was not voluntarily given because the possibility of the death penalty coerced his plea. The district court denied relief and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed, finding that Brady changed his plea because of the codefendants actions. The court held that an intervening decision <i>United States v. Jackson</i>, which held the death penalty unconstitutional because it imposes an impermissible burden on an accused’s Fifth Amendment right to not plead guilty and Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, did not apply.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/28

28

1969

United States

Interstate Commerce Commission, et al.

<p>The Great Northern Railway Company and the Northern Pacific Railway Company filed applications with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a proposed merger of themselves and three subsidiaries. The ICC decided that the merger would result in savings, improved service, and more efficient use of the railroad’s facilities. These benefits were outweighed, however, by the potential loss of jobs and lessening of competition. The ICC later reopened its investigation, focusing on the amount of savings the merger would produce. This time, the ICC approved the merger, concluding that the proposed savings were more important. Several railroads filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that the ICC failed to give proper weight to the decrease in competition the merger would produce. The district court affirmed the ICC decision. The Supreme Court heard this case on direct appeal.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Economic Activity

Carter v. Jury Commission of Greene County

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/30

30

1969

Willie Carter Sr., John Head, Rev. Percy McShan

Jury Commission of Greene County et al.

<p>African-American citizens of Greene County Alabama filed a class action against the Greene County, Alabama Jury Commission, alleging racial discrimination in the selection of potential jurors, and the Governor of Alabama, for appointing an all-white jury commission in a predominantly African-American county. The class members alleged that they were qualified for jury service but never summoned. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the Alabama statute governing jury selection was unconstitutional and enjoining future enforcement of the statute. The Alabama statute provided that potential jurors should be “generally reputed to be honest and intelligent” and “esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judgment.” The district court held that the Jury Commission did not follow the Alabama statute and systematically discriminated in preparing jury lists. The court ordered a new list created in compliance with the Alabama statute and constitutional principles. The court declined to invalidate the statue or compel the Governor to appoint African-Americans to the jury commission. This case was heard on direct appeal.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/41

41

1969

Choctaw Nation

Oklahoma et al.

<p>Through several treaties, the United States granted the Choctaw and Cherokee Nations several million acres of land in what is now Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation sued the State of Oklahoma and several corporations for leasing gas, oil, and mineral rights to the river beds of the Arkansas River within that land. The Choctaw Nation was allowed to intervene to claim that the riverbeds of Arkansas River within their land grant belonged to them. The district court ruled against the Indian Nations, holding that the land grant did not convey rights to the river beds. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Evans v. Abney

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/60

60

1969

Reverend E.S. Evans et al.

Guyton G. Abney et al.

<p>In 1911, U.S. Senator A. O. Bacon conveyed land to the city of Macon, Georgia through a testamentary trust for the purpose of providing a park for white persons only. The city operated the park in that manner, but after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, people of all races were permitted to use the park. The managers of the park attempted to have the city removed as the trustee because it could no longer legally enforce racial segregation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of African American citizens who intervened, holding that the public nature of the park required that it be treated as a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of who owned the park. The trustees of Bacon’s estate then moved for a ruling that the trust was unenforceable, because racial segregation was no longer permitted, so the property should revert to Bacon’s heirs. The trial court granted the motion, holding that racial segregation was an integral part of the trust, so the court could not simply amend the trust. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.<br />

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Goldberg v. Kelly

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/62

62

1969

Goldberg

Kelly

<p>John Kelly, acting on behalf of New York residents receiving financial assistance either under the federally-assisted program for Families with Dependent Children or under New York State's home relief program, challenged the constitutionality of procedures for notice and termination of such aid. Although originally offering no official notice or opportunity for hearings to those whose aid was scheduled for termination, the State of New York implemented a hearing procedure after commencement of Kelly's litigation.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/632

632

1969

Beatrice Alexander

Holmes County Board of Education

<p>The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, ordered school districts across the country to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” However, nearly fifteen years after this order, many school districts, including schools in Holmes County, Mississippi, were either still segregated or saddled with laws making it very difficult for full integration to take place. In the summer of 1969, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi entered an order allowing the schools in Mississippi to continue using “freedom of choice” laws, which allowed parents to choose which school their children attended. The petitioners appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 23, 1969. That court, in a per curiam decision, reversed the lower court, but required the school districts to create and submit alternate plans by August 27, 1969. The petitioners then appealed. </p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

United States v. W. M. Webb, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/63

63

1969

United States

W.M. Webb, Inc., et al.

<p>W.M. Webb and other commercial fishing companies owned fishing boats that, according to established custom, were manned by independently contracted captains and crew. The company that owned each vessel was responsible for equipping it and hiring a captain, who then hired a crew. At the completion of each shipping expedition, the boat docked at a fish-processing plant, where the captain and crew were paid based on the volume of their catch. There was no guarantee that they would be paid if they did not catch fish. The commercial fishing companies determined at which plants the boats would dock and generally in what areas they would fish. The captain and the crew were responsible for the day-to-day running of the boats and expeditions.</p> <p>The commercial fishing companies paid employers’ taxes under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and claimed refunds for the taxes due on the earnings of the captains and crews. They then sued for the refunds in district court, which held that the companies were entitled to the refunds. The district court held that the captains and crews were not “employees” for the purposes of the statutes because the amount of control the companies exercised over the boats was not enough to create an employer-employee relationship. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p> <p> </p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Federal Taxation

Coleman v. Alabama

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/72

72

1969

John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens

Alabama

<p>John Henry Coleman and Otis Stephens were convicted of assault with intent to murder. The primary evidence against them was the identification by the victim, Casey Reynolds. He identified the pair in a police lineup at the Birmingham City Jail. During this lineup, the police had Coleman and Stephens say certain phrases that Reynolds remembered his attackers saying. Coleman and Stephens also did not have counsel at their preliminary hearing. The Alabama Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, rejecting augments that the lineup was so suggestive that it likely caused a misidentification, and that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage of prosecution where the defendants were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied review.</p>

plurality opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Vale v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/727

727

1969

Donald J. Vale

Louisiana

<p>New Orleans police officers had a warrant to arrest Donald J. Vale on narcotics charges. While staking out Vale’s home, the officers saw Vale come out of the house and do what they thought was a drug deal. The officers arrested Vale outside his home and told him they were going to search the house. The officers did not have a search warrant. During the search, the officers found narcotics in a back bedroom. This evidence was admitted at Vale’s trial where he was convicted. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. The court rejected Vale’s argument that the narcotics evidence was the product of an unreasonable search and seizure.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Welsh v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/76

76

1969

Elliot Ashton Welsh II

United States

<p>On March 27, 1964, Elliot Ashton Welsh II was ordered by the Selective Service to report for physical examination after having been classified I-A and available for military service. Walsh requested and filed application for conscientious objector status. On his form, Welsh specifically indicated that his objection was not rooted in religious belief; he responded "No" where the questionnaire asked if he believed in a supreme being. An appeal board rejected his application. Welsh refused to appear for induction and, on June 1, 1966, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court ruled in <em>United States v. Seeger</em> (1965) that conscientious objector status was not reserved to individuals of a traditional religious background. On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that because Welsh denied any religious foundation for his beliefs, whereas Seeger had characterized his pacifist beliefs as "religious," Welsh's conviction was valid.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

First Amendment

In re Winship

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/778

778

1969

In Re Winship

<p>At age twelve, Samuel Winship was arrested and charged as a juvenile delinquent for breaking into a woman's locker and stealing $112 from her pocketbook. The charge also alleged that had Winship's act been done by an adult, it would constitute larceny. Relying on Section 744(b) of the New York Family Court Act, which provided that determinations of juvenile's guilt be based on a preponderance of the evidence, a Family Court found Winship guilty, despite acknowledging that the evidence did not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship's appeal of the court's use of the lower "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof, was rejected in both the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court and in the New York Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Byrne v. Karalexis

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/83

83

1969

Garrett H. Byrne

Serafim Karalexis et al.

<p>Serafim Karalexis owned and operated a movie theater in Boston that was showing a movie entitled “I am Curious (Yellow).” The film was produced in Sweden and is about a girl’s search for identity and her relationship to the contemporary social and political problems of the time. During the course of the film, she takes a lover, and the film shows their explicit sex scenes, including scenes of oral sex. Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne determined that the film was obscene because it appealed to a “prurient interest in sex,” was offensive to community moral standards, and had no redeeming social value. He charged Karalexis with violating a state statute that prohibits the exhibition of obscene films.</p> <p>Karalexis sought an injunction in district court in order to prevent this prosecution and future ones under a law that he argued violated the First Amendment protection afforded to such films..The district court held that the law was likely unconstitutional and granted the injunction.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

United States v. Reynolds

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/88

88

1969

United States

W.G. Reynolds and Mary N. Reynolds

<p>The United States sued to condemn over 250 acres of W.G. and Mary Reynolds land for use in the Nolin Reservoir Project. The Fifth Amendment authorized this type of taking as long as the government provided “just compensation”. The Reynolds’ claimed that the original project did not contain 78 of the acres the United States tried to claim. A jury awarded the Reynolds’ $20,000 as compensation for all the land taken. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered a new trial, finding that the jury instructions referred to matters disclosed outside the jury’s presence. Both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected the United States’ argument that the “scope of the project” issue was a question for the judge to decide, not the jury.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Williams v. Florida

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1969/927

927

1969

Williams

Florida

<p>In 1967, the state of Florida passed legislation to allow six-member juries in criminal cases. Johnny Williams was tried and convicted for robbery by such a jury. Williams, lost in a Florida appellate court; he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Time, Inc. v. Pape

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/109

109

1970

Time, Inc.

Frank Pape

<p>In November 1961, the Civil Rights Commission released the fifth volume of its report for the year. One section of it focused on police brutality and made reference to the Supreme Court case <em>Monroe v. Pape</em>. The case was based on allegations that Detective Pape and other officers broke into the Monroe apartment, assaulted the Monroes, and took Mr. Monroe to the police station where he was held for ten hours without being charged or advised of his procedural rights. A week after the report was released, Time Magazine published an article that quoted extensively from the report’s coverage of the allegations without ever explicitly stating that they were allegations rather than findings.</p> <p>Pape sued Time, Inc. for libel in district court and Time moved for dismissal. The district court granted the motion, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In the intervening time, the Supreme Court decided <em>New York Times v. Sullivan</em>, which stated that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his or her official conduct unless there is evidence the statements were made with actual malice. This decision became the basis for the district court granting summary judgment for Time, Inc. The Court of Appeals again reversed, and held that a jury must decide whether actual malice was present. After the third trial, the district court granted Time, Inc.’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed for a third time and held that the issue of actual malice was one for the jury to decide.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Griggs v. Duke Power Company

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/124

124

1970

Griggs

Duke Power Company

<p>Willie Griggs filed a class action, on behalf of several fellow African- American employees, against his employer Duke Power Company . Griggs challenged Duke's "inside" transfer policy, requiring employees who want to work in all but the company's lowest paying Labor Department to register a minimum score on two separate aptitude tests in addition to having a high school education. Griggs claimed that Duke's policy discriminated against African-American employees in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. On appeal from a district court's dismissal of the claim, the Court of Appeals found no discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Griffin v. Breckenridge

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/144

144

1970

Eugene Griffin et al.

Lavon Breckenridge et al.

<p>A group of black Mississippi citizens filed for damages against two white Mississippi citizens pursuant to 42 U.S.C Section 1985 subsection 3 which protects against conspirators interfering with the civil rights of others. R.G. Grady, a citizen of Tennessee, was driving the plaintiffs in the suit along a public highway, when the defendants, acting under the misconception that Grady worked for the organization Civil Rights for Negroes, allegedly pulled their truck into the path of Grady's car, causing him to stop. The defendants were accused of forcing Grady and his passengers to step out of the car and preventing their escape. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant James Calvin Breckenridge proceeded to beat Grady and the plaintiffs in the head with a club, injuring them. The defendants also threatened the plaintiffs verbally and pointed firearms at them. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint, basing their decision on a previous case, <em>Collins v. Hardyman</em>. This case limited section 1985 subsection 3 to apply only to conspiracies somehow related to state laws or state officials, to avoid possible conflict with the U.S. Constitution. The Court of Appeals agreed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Civil Rights

Tilton v. Richardson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/153

153

1970

Tilton

Richardson

<p>The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were free to use the buildings for any purpose.</p>

plurality opinion

vacated/remanded

First Amendment

New York Times Company v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873

1873

1970

New York Times Company

United States

<p>In what became known as the "Pentagon Papers Case," the Nixon Administration attempted to prevent the New York Times and Washington Post from publishing materials belonging to a classified Defense Department study regarding the history of United States activities in Vietnam. The President argued that prior restraint was necessary to protect national security. This case was decided together with United States v. Washington Post Co.</p>

per curiam

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Harris v. New York

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/206

206

1970

Harris

New York

<p>Harris was arrested for making two sales of heroin to an undercover police officer. Before receiving the Miranda warnings, Harris said that he had made both sales at the request of the officer. This statement was not admitted into evidence at the trial. However, Harris later testified in Court that he did not make the first sale and in the second sale he merely sold the officer baking powder. Harris' initial statement was then used by the prosecution in an attempt to impeach his credibility.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/281

281

1970

Swann

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

<p>After the Supreme Court's decision in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education, little progress had been made in desegregating public schools. One example was the Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, system in which approximately 14,000 black students attended schools that were either totally black or more than 99 percent black. Lower courts had experimented with a number of possible solutions when the case reached the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Civil Rights

Cohen v. California

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/299

299

1970

Cohen

California

<p>A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "FUCK THE DRAFT. STOP THE WAR" The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

First Amendment

United States v. Harris

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/30

30

1970

United States

Roosevelt Hudson Harris

<p>A judge issued a warrant to search Roosevelt Harris’ residence based on a federal tax investigator's affidavit. The affidavit stated that Harris had a reputation with the investigator for being a trafficker in illegal liquor, and a local constable located illegal whiskey on Harris’ property. The constable had purchased whiskey from Harris in the past and feared for his life if his name were revealed. When police searched Harris’ residence, they discovered illegal non-tax paid liquor. At trial, the district court admitted the evidence obtained during the search, and Harris was convicted of possession of non-tax paid liquor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the investigators affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search. This made the search illegal and any evidence obtained during the search inadmissible at trial.</p>

plurality opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Coolidge v. New Hampshire

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/323

323

1970

Coolidge

New Hampshire

<p>In the wake of a "particularly brutal" murder of a fourteen-year-old girl, the New Hampshire Attorney General took charge of police activities relating to the murder. When the police applied for a warrant to search suspect Edward Coolidge's automobile, the Attorney General, acting as a justice of the peace, authorized it. Additionally, local police had taken items from Coolidge's home during the course of an interview with the suspect's wife. Coolidge was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/301

301

1970

Webster Bivens

Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics

<p>In 1965, six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster Bivens’ home without a warrant and searched the premises. The agents handcuffed Bivens in front of his wife and children and arrested him on narcotics charges. Later, the agents interrogated Bivens and subjected him to a visual strip search. Bivens sued the agents for $15,000 in damages each for humiliation and mental suffering. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Criminal Procedure

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/322

322

1970

Joseph McKeiver et al.

Pennsylvania

<p>These cases involve juveniles brought to trial without a jury. The first involves Joseph McKeiver and Edward Terry, fifteen and sixteen year old boys charged with acts of robbery, theft, assault, and escape. At trial before the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia, each was denied a request for a jury trial. A Superior Court affirmed the order, and, after consolidation of their cases, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did likewise, saying there was no constitutional right to a jury trial for juveniles. <em>In re Burrus</em> concerns the consolidated cases of more than forty juveniles ranging in age from eleven to fifteen. Most of the juveniles faced misdemeanor charges stemming from protests of school consolidations that took place in November and December, 1968 during which, on six different occasions, they blocked traffic and refused to clear the roadway. Additionally, one sixteen-year-old juvenile faced charges of disorderly conduct for an incident that occurred at the local school. In each case, the judge denied a request for a jury trial. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of North Carolina both affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no constitutional requirement for a jury trial for juvenile defendants.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/444

444

1970

Mrs. Robert Lee Moore, et al.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education

<p>Plaintiffs, a group of parents of children in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District, sued the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (Board) in state court and argued that the state court should issue an injunction to prevent the Board from implementing a plan to assign children to public schools based on race. The plaintiffs claimed that this plan violated the children’s constitutional rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in <em>Brown v. Topeka Board of Education</em> as well as a North Carolina state statute that prohibited districts from assigning children to schools based on race. The state court issued the injunction, and the defendants moved the case to federal court by arguing that, because the issues in the case dealt with the U.S. Constitution, the federal court had jurisdiction. The district court heard arguments in this case with a similar one, <em>Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education</em>, and subsequently struck down the state court injunction by holding that the state statute was unconstitutional.</p>

per curiam

none

Judicial Power

Procunier v. Atchley

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/44

44

1970

R. K. Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections

Veron Atchley

<p>In 1959, Veron Atchley was convicted of murdering his wife by shooting her six times. The star witness at trial was Atchley’s insurance agent. The agent met with Atchley after his arrest to talk about the life insurance policy on his wife. During this conversation Atchley admitted to lying in wait for his wife with a gun, but said that the shooting was an accident. After notifying police, the insurance agent returned with a hidden recording device. Atchley made the same admission. Over Atchley’s objection the tape was admitted at trial. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction.</p> <p>Atchley then sought habeus corpus relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the tape was an unconstitutional involuntary confession. The district court agreed, ordering a new hearing on the issue of voluntariness. The district court held that the trial could not have reliably determined whether the confession was voluntary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Oregon v. Mitchell

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/43-orig

43-orig

1970

Oregon, et al.

John Mitchell, Attorney General of the United States

<p>In 1970, Congress passed Voting Right Act Amendments that lowered the voting age in state and federal elections from 21 to 18, forbade the use of literacy tests at the polls, and forbade states from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice presidential elections based on state residency requirements. The states of Oregon, Arizona, Idaho, and Texas sued, and argued that these Amendments infringe on rights the Constitution reserves for the states.</p>

plurality opinion

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/49

49

1970

Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc., et al.

Lowell Wadmond, et al.

<p>The requirements to be eligible for admission to the Bar in New York included that the applicant must be a citizen of the United States, have lived in the state of New York for six months, and passed a written examination. In addition, the Bar required the creation of Committees on Character and Fitness to determine whether an applicant “possesses the character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.” The Committees required two affidavits in support of the applicant and a questionnaire filled out by the applicant. The petitioners were organizations and individuals representing a class of law students and recent law school graduates who sued two of the Committees by claiming that the vague and overbroad questions violated the applicants’ First Amendment rights. The questions related to the applicants’ political beliefs, membership in political association, and loyalty to the United States Constitution. A three-judge panel of the district court granted partial relief with respect to specific questions but sustained the validity of the New York system as a whole.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/498

498

1970

North Carolina State Board of Education, et al.

James E. Swann, et al.

<p>Following a desegregation case that began in 1965, on February 5, 1970, the district court ordered the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system to implement a court-approved desegregation plan. Prior to this order, a suit had been filed in state court that sought an order enjoining the use of public funds for the transportation of students for desegregation purposes. In the midst of the extensive litigation, the North Carolina legislature enacted an anti-busing bill. Swann and other plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the statute, and a three-judge panel was convened to consider the issue. The three-judge panel declared the statute unconstitutional.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Perez v. Ledesma

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/60

60

1970

Leander H. Perez, Jr.; Louis Reichart; George Bethea; Earl Wendling

August M. Ledesma, Jr.; Harold J. Speiss; Lawrence P. Pittman

<p>August Ledesma and several others were arrested and charged with violating both a Louisiana statute and a parish ordinance prohibiting display of obscene material for sale. The arresting officers seized the material in question. While the state court proceedings were underway, Perez, and the others arrested, sued in federal district court for a declaration that the statute and the ordinance were unconstitutional. A three-judge court convened and upheld the Louisiana statute, but found the arrests and seizure of materials invalid. The court prohibited use of the seized materials in the state criminal proceedings. The court noted that it had no jurisdiction to consider the ordinance, but expressed that it was probably invalid. A single federal judge later ruled the ordinance invalid. Local law enforcement officers directly appealed the district court decisions to the U.S. Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Judicial Power

Graham v. Richardson

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/609

609

1970

John O. Graham, Commissioner, Department of Public Welfare, State of Arizona

Carmen Richardson et al.

<p>The state of Arizona restricts the distribution of welfare benefits to individuals who are either United States citizens or aliens who have lived in the country for at least 15 years. In 1969, Carmen Richardson, a resident alien of Arizona who met all requirements for welfare eligibility except the residency requirement, filed a class action lawsuit against the Commissioner of the State's Department of Public Welfare questioning the constitutionality of that requirement. The three-judge court in the District of Arizona found in favor of Richardson, but the Commissioner appealed. In the same year, a similar class action suit was filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, resident aliens of Pennsylvania challenged state law which dictated that if a Pennsylvania resident did not qualify for federal aid then he or she could only receive welfare benefits from the state if he or she were a citizen or had applied for citizenship. This three-judge court also found in favor of the resident aliens. However, one judge disagreed, and the defendants, namely the Executive Director of the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's Department of Public Welfare, appealed.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Civil Rights

Wyman v. James

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/69

69

1970

George K. Wyman, Commissioner of the State of New York Department of Social Services

Barbara James et al.

<p>Barbara James and her son Maurice lived in the Bronx, New York City. Shortly after Maurice's birth, Barbara James applied for assistance under New York State's Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). James began receiving assistance after a caseworker visited her apartment. Two years later, James was scheduled to be visited again by a caseworker. This visit was required under New York State law and would affect her benefits under AFDC. She refused to allow this visit. In a procedural hearing, she continued her refusal, and her AFDC assistance was terminated by New York State as a result. James then filed suit under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the caseworker visit was a search and would violate her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The District Court ruled in her favor. New York appealed.</p>

majority opinion

reversed

Criminal Procedure

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/66

66

1970

George A. Rosenbloom

Metromedia, Inc.

<p>George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the obscenity charges.</p> <p>Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for libel. The district court held that the First Amendment standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for knowingly and recklessly false statements, did not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the knowingly and recklessly false standard applied.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

First Amendment

Johnson v. Louisiana

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/69-5035

69-5035

1970

Johnson

Louisiana

<p>The Louisiana State Constitution and Code of Criminal Procedure allowed less-than-unanimous juries to convict defendants in criminal cases in which hard labor is considered as punishment. Nine of twelve jury members were needed to return a guilty verdict. Johnson was convicted of armed robbery by a jury split nine to three.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Apodaca v. Oregon

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1971/69-5046

69-5046

1971

Apodaca

Oregon

<p>Apodaca and two other defendants were convicted of assault, burglary, and grand larceny before three separate juries, all of which returned verdicts which were less than unanimous. Two of the cases were 11-1 and the other was 10-2 in favor of conviction.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/73

73

1970

Ida Phillips

Martin Marietta Corporation

<p>In 1966 Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) informed Ida Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with preschool-age children; however, at this time, Martin employed men with preschool-age children. Phillips sued and alleged she had been denied employment because of her sex in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment by holding that, because seventy-five to eighty percent of the applicants hired for the position for which Phillips applied were women, there was insufficient evidence that there was bias against women. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.</p>

per curiam

vacated/remanded

Civil Rights

Clay v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/783

783

1970

Clay

United States

<p>Board No. 47, Louisville, Kentucky, denied the application of Cassius Clay, also known as Muhammad Ali, for classification as a conscientious objector. Clay then took an administrative appeal to the Kentucky Appeal Board, which tentatively classified him I-A, or eligible for unrestricted military service, and referred his file to the Justice Department for an advisory recommendation. The Justice Department concluded, contrary to a hearing officer's recommendation, that Clay's claim should be denied. The Department wrote that Clay did not meet any of the three basic tests for conscientious objector status; that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form, that this opposition is based upon religious training and belief, and that this objection is sincere. Subsequently, the Appeal Board denied Clay's claim, but without stating its reasons. When Clay refused to report for induction, he was tried and convicted of willful refusal to submit to induction. The Court of Appeals affirmed.</p>

per curiam

reversed

First Amendment

Atlantic City Electric Co. v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/78

78

1970

Atlantic City Electric Co.

United States

<p>The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued an order increasing freight rates on several commodities, including bituminous coal. The increases were issued at the request of several railroads because of a need for revenue to offset increased operating costs. Seven public utilities, who use large amounts of bituminous coal, sued to enjoin and set aside the order, claiming that the rates were unreasonable and the ICC’s order deprived them of due process of law. Several state departments of agriculture intervened as parties plaintiff, and several railroads intervened in support of the ICC. The district court granted the ICC’s motion to dismiss, holding that the utilities failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Interstate Commerce Act. This case was heard by the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal.</p>

equally divided

affirmed

Economic Activity

Connell v. Higginbotham

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/79

79

1970

James Higginbotham

Stella Connell

<p>Stella Connell applied for a teaching position with the Orange County school system, where James Higginbotham was the superintendent of the Board of Public Instruction. Connell was employed as a substitute teacher, and later dismissed from her position for refusing to sign the loyalty oath required of all Florida public employees. The oath stated that the employees “will support the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Florida” and “do not believe in the overthrow of the government of the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence.” The district court held that the provision of the oath that employees will support the Constitution is valid, but the provision not to overthrow the government is unconstitutional. Connell appealed directly to the Supreme Court. </p>

per curiam

reversed in-part

First Amendment

Zenith Radio Corporation v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/80

80

1970

Zenith Radio Corporation

Hazeltine Research, Inc.

<p>After refusing to renew a patent licensing agreement, Zenith Radio Corp., a radio and television manufacturer, was sued by Hazeltine Research, Inc., for patent infringement in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Zenith counterclaimed, alleging anti-trust violations, misuse of patents, and a conspiracy to restrain trade in Canada, England, and Australia. Zenith asked for treble damages and injunctive relief. Zenith contended that Hazeltine's license forced them to pay for use of unpatented products and that Hazeltine had illegally conspired with foreign patent pools to prevent Zenith from expanding into those markets.</p> <p>Before trial, Zenith had stipulated that Hazeltine and its parent corporation were one entity for the purposes of litigation. The District Court entered judgment against Hazeltine and its parent corporation, awarding Zenith treble damages and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award, but otherwise reversed the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated all judgments against Hazeltine's parent corporation because Zenith's pretrial stipulation did not properly designate the parent corporation as a party to the litigation.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Economic Activity

Williams v. United States

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/81

81

1970

Clarence Williams

United States

<p>These are two consolidated cases. In 81, Clarence Williams was arrested in his house in 1967. Police searched the house for an hour and 45 minutes, discovering heroin on a shelf in a bedroom. The heroin was admitted at trial and Williams was convicted of concealing illegally imported heroin. Williams appealed, arguing that the search of his house was illegal under Chimel v. California, a case decided on June 23, 1969 that narrowed the permissible scope of searches incidental to an arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Chimel did not apply retroactively, and the search was valid under pre-Chimel standards.</p> <p>In 82, Joseph Elkanich was convicted on three counts of selling narcotics in 1962. At trial, evidence included marked bills planted by a federal narcotics agent. The bills were seized during a search of Elkanich’s apartment after his arrest. The arrest and search were upheld at trial and on appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Elkanich then unsuccessfully applied for post-conviction relief in the district court. While the appeal of that decision was pending, &lt;i&gt;Chimel&lt;/i&gt; was decided. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court.</p>

plurality opinion

affirmed

Criminal Procedure

United States v. Vuitch

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/84

84

1970

United States

Vuitch

<p>The District of Columbia had an abortion statute that prohibits abortion unless “necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life or health.” Milan Vuitch, a licensed physician, was indicted in federal district court for performing abortions that violated this statute. The district court held the abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague. The United States appealed directly to the Supreme Court.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

Privacy

Lemon v. Kurtzman

https://api.oyez.org/cases/1970/89

89

1970

Alton J. Lemon, et al.

David H. Kurtzman, Superintendent of Public Instruction of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

<p>Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual salaries.</p> <p>The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.</p>

majority opinion

reversed/remanded

First Amendment

Taylor v. Barkes

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-939

14-939

2014

Stanley Taylor, et al.

Karen Barkes, et al.

<p>On November 13, 2004, Christopher Barkes was arrested for violating his probation. As part of his intake procedure, a nurse performed a medical evaluation, as required by the institution in which he was being held. Despite Barkes’ long history of mental health and substance abuse problems, neither his responses nor the nurse’s observations reached the threshold necessary under the institution’s protocols to initiate suicide prevention measures, so he was placed in a cell by himself. Barkes was awake and behaving normally at several points the following morning, but when an officer arrived to deliver lunch, Barkes had hanged himself with a sheet.</p> <p>Barkes’ wife and children sued Stanley Taylor, Commissioner of the Delaware Department of Correction, and Raphael Williams, the warden of the institution in which Barkes had been held. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had violated Barkes’ Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to properly supervise the contractor that provided medical treatment at the institution. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established constitutional right, and the district court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment.</p>

per curiam

reversed

Civil Rights

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/13-1339

13-1339

2015

Spokeo, Inc.

Thomas Robins

<p>Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo) operated a website that provided information about individuals such as contact data, marital status, age, occupation, and certain types of economic information. Thomas Robins sued Spokeo and claimed that the company willfully violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by publishing false information about him on the website. However, Robins was unable to allege any “actual or imminent harm,” so the district court granted Spokeo’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and Robins’ lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. Robins then filed an amended complaint in which he alleged that he suffered actual harm to his employment prospects due to the website falsely claiming that he was wealthy. The district court originally denied Spokeo’s motion to dismiss but later reconsidered its order and dismissed the complaint for failure to state an injury in fact. Robins appealed and argued that the district court could not reconsider its previous decision and that he had sufficiently alleged an injury in fact to qualify for Article III standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that, although the district court could reconsider its ruling, the allegation of a violation of a statutory right is sufficient injury to qualify for standing.</p>

majority opinion

vacated/remanded

Judicial Power

Campbell-Ewald Company v. Gomez

https://api.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-857

14-857

2015

Campbell-Ewald Company

Jose Gomez

<p>On May 11, 2006, Jose Gomez received an unsolicited text message advertising the U.S. Navy. The text message was the result of a partnership between the Navy and the Campbell-Ewald Company, a marketing consultant that the Navy hired to help with a recruiting campaign. The compilation of the list of targeted phone numbers and the actual sending of the message was outsourced to a company called Mindmatics.</p> <p>Gomez sued and argued that that Campbell-Ewald violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by instructing or allowing a third-party vendor to send unsolicited text messages on the behalf of a client. After Campbell-Ewald’s motion to dismiss was denied, the company offered Gomez a settlement, which Gomez rejected. Campbell-Ewald again moved to dismiss the case and argued that Gomez’s rejection of the settlement offer made the claim moot. The district court denied the motion, and Campbell-Ewald moved for summary judgment based on the argument that the company had derivative sovereign immunity because it was acting on behalf of the government. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and held that Campbell-Ewald was not entitled to the derivative sovereign immunity defense because the defense had only ever been applied in the context of property damage resulting from public works projects.</p>

majority opinion

affirmed

Judicial Power