elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1825023

202107

1801-2400

ZJX.ARTCC

FL

37300.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZJX

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZJX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1825023

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Type 19000

1825649.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather

While cruising at FL370; approximately 40 miles south of SAV; we experienced a severe updraft; causing the aircraft to rapidly climb to approximately 37;300 ft and then rapidly descend to approximately 36;500 ft. There was no weather displayed on our weather radar in our area of flight. The fluctuations lasted for about one minute. The rest of the flight continued as normal.

In cruise at FL370; encountered clear air turbulence. No radar echoes; must have been convective activity building below our altitude. Updraft produced rain from below; lifted aircraft 300 ft above our cruise altitude. First Officer applied upset recovery controls which required descent 600 ft below our cruise altitude. Reported the event to Jacksonville Center. No other traffic in the area; no evasive action required. Flight continued normally without further incident.

Flight crew reported encountering severe updrafts and downdrafts resulting in deviations from their assigned altitude. The flight crew recovered from the upset condition and continued the flight without issue.

1684144

201909

0001-0600

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

Daylight

Ground ORD

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1684144

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1684812.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Airport

We were departing ORD. We got off the gate on time and had a long taxi towards the North Port. At the North Port we waited for taxi instructions from ground control. He cleared us via a right turn onto taxiway Gulf. Both my First Officer and I wrote these instructions on our scratch paper. When I looked across the ramp towards taxiway Gulf it appeared that I had to go through the intersection straight ahead to enter Gulf. I proceeded forward into the intersection thinking I was about to enter taxiway Gulf. To my horror I realized that I had just crossed onto Runway 9R which was an active runway. I tried to make a 180 degree turn back to the right but my forward progress had already taken me onto the runway. So I stopped and waited for ground control to move us out of the way. Ground Control then taxied us down the runway to exit onto taxiway Mike and then over to the A Pad. Not exactly sure where the A Pad was at this point we made another wrong turn on taxiway Gulf. Ground Control then directed us to the Penalty Box where we regrouped. None of this would have happened if I had realized that taxiway Gulf ran parallel to and on the North end of the ramp. From my perspective the airport signage was confusing and contributed somewhat to the event. My taxi chart was open and available on my Electronic Flight Bag; however with the chart at full magnification it can still be difficult to understand. If our EFB would have had the GPS taxi information available to me I doubt seriously this event would have ever happened. Threats include a high workload environment; rapid and consuming clearances from controllers; poor signage; poor taxi charts; and division of duties within the cockpit. As for me better situational awareness of runways. The company could improve our Electronic Flight Bag capabilities. ATC could issue our clearances slower and more user friendly.

We operated Aircraft X from ORD. We planned and programmed FMS for runway 9R for ORD 5 departure and briefed it. We pushed back from gate and ramp control instructed us to taxi to North port and contact ground control at north port. At north port after 10 minutes of wait ground control advised us of runway 10L/DD for takeoff and gave taxi instructions to taxi right on G; G2; A and short of A 20 for runway 10L. We both CA (PF) (Captain; Pilot Flying) and FO (PM) (First Officer; Pilot Monitoring) copied taxiway instructions on our note pads. I then proceeded to make runway change programming into the FMS and CA started to taxi the aircraft. It took me hardly 30 seconds to re program the FMS and I noticed that instead of the taxiway we were on a runway. I was confused and shocked as to what was happening; and I again looked outside around to see if I am having an illusion and to my surprise when I saw runway markings and distance markers on the edges I quickly got assured that we are in fact on a runway and not the taxiway. I immediately alerted the Captain that he is on runway and not taxiway. When he realized his error he stopped the aircraft on halfway between taxiway A1 Intersection to runway 9R. I asked the CA to make a 180 turn and quickly exit the runway. CA started the turn and due to not having enough room to turn we ended up stopped facing the grass median. I immediately advised the ground controller about our inadvertent error of runway incursion. The ground controller asked us what are we doing and told us that we have entered into an active runway 9R; and gave us instruction to quickly exit the runway by taxiing on to runway 9R and exit next taxiway M to the right and then turn left on G and proceed to B Pad. In the heat of matter and rush; we both being flustered and confused; we exited the runway on M and instead of making left on G we made a right on G thus facing away from B pad. To this the ground controller came back on the radio and told us to proceed on G towards taxiway B to the penalty box and await further instructions. After 15 minutes in the penalty box; ground controller advised to copy down a number and call his supervisor after landing. And further that he will be giving us progressive taxi instructions. We were then given taxi instructions to runway 10L/DD. We very carefully briefed our taxi route and departure again and verified in the FMS all the way points and very carefully taxied to the runway and departed safely. Upon our safe arrival and terminating the flight the CA called the given number and talked to the supervising authority and apologized and admitted to the inadvertent error of runway incursion made by us. I FO very seldom fly to ORD and therefore my unfamiliarity of the airport and taxiways became a factor in situational awareness and the threat of runway change and programming the FMS for even 30 seconds resulted in an error; threat and an undesired aircraft state of a runway incursion. On the other hand even the CA being an experienced veteran and regular at flying to ORD; inadvertently misjudged and by mistake mistook an active runway for a taxiway under the pressure of avoiding moving ground traffic around and time constraints and all these threats honestly resulted in an inadvertent runway incursion. Always deal with changes on ground while still parked with parking brake on and re verify the changes in the FMS and re-brief the change in taxi routes by actually verifying the taxi routes and verbalize every coming turn or taxiway by both crew members to keep a shared mental model; plan and thought process. Company can help us by activating the moving maps on our EFB's to further enhance our situational awareness on the ground and in the flight. Thanks.

Air Carrier flight crew reported runway incursion due to confusion with signage; EFB; and ATC delivery.

1140644

201401

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Cockpit/Cabin Communication

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 161

Troubleshooting

1140644

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; MEL; Procedure

Aircraft

Reviewing our release for our first flight of the day I noticed several MELs on the inbound aircraft; one of which indicated that the Passenger Address System was Inop. Upon arrival at the gate; I noticed the 'A' Flight Attendant communicating with the passengers via the hand held megaphone. Maintenance was called and the Mechanics repaired the PA system and removed the associated MEL. Shortly after the mechanics left; the PA system once again failed and I again requested Maintenance. The Mechanic stated they did not have the parts required to repair the aircraft and was going to apply the previously removed MEL back onto the aircraft. A review of the logbook displayed numerous entries for this system over the previous five days. While reviewing the provisions of the MEL; I noted that one requirement was for the Chime System to operate 'normally.' I performed a test of the system and was informed by the three flight attendants that they did not hear any signals from the cockpit. I did hear the chime in the cockpit so I entered mid-cabin and had the First Officer attempt the test a second time. The second test confirmed the system was not functioning in the cabin. While performing this test; several passengers informed me 'that hasn't worked since we left XXX'.I returned to the jetway and expressed my concerns to the Mechanic that in my opinion we were not in compliance with the MEL as stated due to the Chime System not functioning 'normally.' He stated he agreed but had been overridden by Headquarters. At this point I called Dispatch and requested a patch through to Maintenance. While discussing the MEL with Maintenance; it was apparent that they wanted the aircraft flown as is. When I told him of the failed test of the system his response was; 'Well; the Mechanic said he heard a chime and that's good enough for me.' I told him that the two tests we performed demonstrated that the flight attendants could not hear the chimes and in my opinion the system was not operating 'normally' as per the MEL. At that point Maintenance started what I could best describe as pressure by guilt; saying such things as; 'So; you have no problem stranding all those passengers;' 'You don't feel bad that all those people are not going to get to see their families on time'; etc. I told the Mechanic the only thing I wasn't going to do was fly an aircraft in direct violation of an FAR and risk my certificate. His response was; 'That's not going to happen.' His next and last response was; 'Throw the keys on the dash as you walk out. You're done.' I informed the Mechanic at the aircraft with me of the outcome to which he replied; 'I agree with you; the system is not operating normally'. The aircraft was removed from service and all of our passengers were moved to another aircraft.Maintenance needs to understand that it is NEVER my intention to inconvenience our passengers; but SAFETY overrides all other concerns. Flight attendants using the emergency megaphone for routine cabin announcements drain the battery of the device rendering it unusable in the time of a real emergency. In addition; the lack of a way to communicate with the cabin crew and passengers during flight [or during an evacuation] endangers everyone onboard in the event of a real emergency.

The Captain of a Boeing 737 discovered the chime portion of the Flight Deck to Cabin PA System had been written up as inoperative numerous times; and despite an unsuccessful attempt to repair the system; remained MEL'd. Provisions of the FAA approved MEL required that it operate 'normally'; and when tested was determined to still be inoperative in the Cabin.

989430

201201

1801-2400

CRQ.Airport

CA

Tower CRQ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

Descent

None

Class D CRQ

Facility CRQ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

989430

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

This is actually two related incidents. There was an unsafe situation created by a chronic problem. According to the LOA between SOCAL and multiple area Towers; appendix 4; section 3 Arrivals; (a) 2; TRACON Shall transfer communications to Tower no earlier than twelve (12) flying miles; but not less than seven (7) flying miles from the airport; unless otherwise coordinated. There has been a problem with Approach Control not switching aircraft outside of 7 miles. Most of the time; we do not receive communication from the aircraft until they are; at best; 5 miles from the airport. There have been multiple instances of aircraft not being switched to the Tower until it was too late for them to avoid an airspace violation. There are many instances where an aircraft has been switched to the Tower after already being in the airspace. This has been going on for a long time. There has been communication between the facilities; and after the managers have talked to each other; it gets better for a time; but always goes back to this issue. If the controllers at the TRACON would consistently transfer communication of aircraft in a timely manner; conflicts would be avoided. At this facility; we don't expect to hear from aircraft until 5 miles or less; despite what the LOA says. If we are unable to get a hold of aircraft inside of 5 miles from the airport; we call and ask the TRACON Controller to attempt to switch the aircraft again. I recommend Controllers at SOCAL TRACON follow the LOA; and switch aircraft OUTSIDE of 7 flying miles from the airport; not from the runway. Either that or we delete the word 'flying' from the paragraph. There's no reason to have aircraft we're supposed to control that close to our airspace and not have communication with them.

CRQ Controller voiced concern regarding the on-going failure of SCT Controller's to comply with LOA requirements with reference to the transfer of communications of VFR inbound aircraft to the Tower frequency.

1025086

201207

1801-2400

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

VMC

Dusk

CLR

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1025086

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1025087.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

On landing rollout after positive change of control of aircraft to the Captain was accomplished; he made a left turn toward a high speed taxiway at which time ATC again instructed us to roll to the end of runway and exit to the right. This event took place so fast my communication; and ATC's occurred at nearly the same time. Upon hearing me and the instructions again from ATC the Captain applied heavy braking and abruptly turned the aircraft back toward the runway barely missing the taxi lights grass and runway lights while the aircrafts speed for a turn like that was excessive; AKA above 20 KTS. We then rolled to the end of the runway and made the right turn off the runway cleared the runway taxied to parking stand without further incident. After discussing the event with fellow crew members all of us were very tired due to the long duty day that started with a 4 hour stop on the east coast and then the flight to Europe. I think events like this could be avoided if a crew ferried the aircraft to the loading point and a fresh crew took the aircraft from there.

There was no damage or call from Tower. The near 18 hour day with a 4 hour sit was the problem.

A fatigued B747 Captain was exiting at a high speed taxiway when ATC directed that they roll to the runway's end. The Captain abruptly returned to the Runway while braking heavily; narrowly missing runway and taxiway lights.

1772985

202011

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Company

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1772985

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Maintenance

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy

Company Policy

During bus transportation; from the employee parking lot to airport. Social distancing is not being addressed or enforced. Employees are not 6 feet apart and the bus is completely full [to] the point where employees are holding onto the railings. Due to the current spike of COVID-19 in ZZZ; we need to enforce social distancing in the bus area and parking lot.

Maintenance employee reported that employee buses are full and social distancing on them is not being properly addressed.

1746858

202006

0601-1200

BDN.Airport

OR

3500.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF BDN

FBO

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Takeoff / Launch

Other traffic pattern

Small Aircraft

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 240; Flight Crew Type 230

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1746858

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While training with a student in the traffic pattern; we found ourselves on base inside a Aircraft Y's final. Aircraft Y had made an 8 mile out call; and I was unable to spot them visually (or on ADS-B) until we were on base. My student made his position call on base; and at that point they made a two mile call as we were on final. We flew to the numbers for a touch and go to clear the way. As we were lifting off; they made a call that they were going around. At that point my student continued the take off. Upon reflection; I should have taken control; aborted our takeoff; and put us back on the ground but I was hesitant to at the time. I view this as a learning opportunity. This was one of my first experiences instructing and will be a valuable lesson in the future. After we were airborne again; they offset to the left and we offset to the right of runway center to avoid each other.Additionally I would like to note that these incidents are not uncommon at BDN. With the volume of traffic both training and GA that this un-towered airport sees it should really have a Tower.

Instructor pilot reported a NMAC while conducting touch and goes with a student at an uncontrolled airport.

1836948

202109

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

340.0

4.0

1000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Corporate

Falcon 7X

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1836948

No Specific Anomaly Occurred Unwanted Situation

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Cleared for the visual to XXR; we turned base to final at around 1;000 ft. right over a [special event]. No TFR was active. While we operate in and out of airports in populated areas all the time; better situational awareness would have prevented this unnecessary risk of overflying a crowd. The FAA had issued a Letter to Airmen highlighting the effect on the [special event]; focusing on increased traffic; delays; etc. We had briefed the letter and focused on the highlighted increase in traffic; however; a more thorough assessment would have revealed the proximity of the event in relation to the airport/traffic pattern; risk of drones overflying the event; and risk of helicopters around the event. In the future; a more in depth assessment will occur when we are operating near these types of events.

A Corporate Pilot reported flying over an event that likely had helicopters and UAS operating in the area.

1793493

202103

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

3600.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class B SFO

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

None

Hovering (UAS)

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1793493

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 500

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors; Airport; Aircraft

Aircraft

On climb out at SFO; on initial contact with departure control ATC advised us that the preceding aircraft reported a drone near OAK at approximately 4;000 ft. After flap retraction I deemed it prudent to maintain a best rate of climb till out of 4;000 ft. At around 3;600 ft. the FO (First Officer) verbalized he had visual contact with the drone pointing to the 11 o'clock position. Shortly after; I then established visual contact. The drone passed just to our left and under us. I would estimate we came to approximately 500 ft. of it. ATC was notified and flight proceeded to destination without further incident.I'm assuming the drone was not being operated under any legal clearance. Furthermore the drone had no transponder making our TCAS useless in this case. I am pleased with my decision to maintain a good rate of climb until clear of drone.Unfortunately drone sightings around busy airports are becoming more rampant. And like bird strikes; very little is known exactly what type of damage can occur to a jet airliner if a collision occurs. It is my hope that the FAA and law enforcement will do whatever is necessary to protect the airspace that is crucial for safety of flight.

Air carrier flight crew reported a NMAC with a drone.

1822073

202107

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Challenger CL600

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Pressurization Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1822073

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On departure; aircraft failed to pressurize. Leveled off. Ran appropriate checklist from QRH. Unable to manually control pressurization. Returned to field.

Challenger CL600 First Officer reported unable to pressurize cabin and diverted to a precautionary landing.

1505974

201712

1801-2400

EUG.TRACON

OR

7800.0

TRACON EUG

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

VOR / VORTAC OED

Initial Approach

Direct

Class E EUG

Facility EUG.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1505974

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1507160.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on level at 12000 ft direct CEGAN; the IAF for VOR/DME C approach. Aircraft X was told to cross CEGAN at or above 7800 ft which is the MVA at CEGAN but the altitude to maintain inside of CEGAN on the DME arc is 10000 ft. Aircraft X crossed CEGAN at approximately 11000 ft cleared for the approach. After Aircraft X crossed CEGAN at or above the altitude to maintain on the arc I expected him to fly the approach as he needed. Aircraft X descended below 10000 ft on the arc prior to fix BRKET but didn't set off any MSAW aural alerts. After crossing BRKET at approximately 8000 ft and turned onto the final approach course he reported a terrain alert and climbed to 11000 ft. Aircraft X was then vectored for the ILS RWY 14 approach and landed without incident.I don't feel there is a systemic issue to resolve with this event other than miscommunication or misunderstanding what the pilot is supposed to do on that approach after crossing CEGAN well above the published altitude regardless of what at or above altitude had been issued. I had expected him to level at 10000 ft until BRKET.

While conducting the VOR/DME-C approach to runway 32; we received an EGPWS terrain warning between BRKET and SERTE. The initial clearance from the center frequency was direct to CEGAN at 12000 ft after we requested the DME arc to runway 32 due to winds favoring 32. As we switched to Cascade approach; we were issued the clearance 'Cross CEGAN at or above 7800 ft; cleared VOR DME-C via the DME arc'. While I realized clearance altitude was lower than the published altitude on the DME arc from CEGAN to BRKET; we did not find it unusual to be issued a clearance lower than that of a published segment due to the use of minimum vectoring altitudes by air traffic controllers. We began a descent to 7800 ft and leveled at 7800 ft somewhere between CEGAN and BRKET. We then configured flaps 8 and slowed in order to ensure that the autopilot would successfully join the approach course. However as we began to approach BRKET I noticed that my MFD was showing 7500 ft as being the highest obstacle on our display. I grew concerned enough to begin reviewing the approach plate further and became concerned as the altitude on the approach between BRKET and SERTE should have been at least 8500 ft. I expressed my concern to my first officer and he quickly pointed out the existence of an obstacle on the approach plate at 7229 ft just prior to SERTE and requested I query approach regarding the obstacle. It was at the point that I began to query Cascade approach about the clearance issued. Cascade approach replied 'Say again'. At this point we received our first terrain caution aural announcement from the EGPWS. My first officer did an EXCELLENT job of immediately applying max thrust and calling for the spoilers to be retracted (they already were). We immediately began a climb to 11000 ft which we had decided during our brief as the highest MSA was 10700 ft. While climbing we advised Cascade approach of our intentions and that we had received a terrain warning. We then requested vectors to the ILS for 14 and took the performance penalty associated with landing with a tailwind.The primary cause of this incident was the clearance of 'Cross CEGAN at or above 7800 ft; cleared VOR DME-C via the DME arc'. Because it is common practice to issue altitudes lower than published altitudes on our approach we began a descent to 7800 ft despite the minimum altitude being 10000 ft on the approach plate. After post flight debriefing; my first officer and I could find no other interpretation to the clearance other than it was safe to descend to 7800 ft.I would suggest that in the future Cascade approach avoid the use of minimum vectoring altitudes while on a published approach and issue a crossing restriction of CEGAN at or above 10000 ft in compliance with the published altitudes on the approach plate.Additionally; I will ensure in the future to query any ATC assignments at altitudes lower than published segments on the approach plate. Even if assigned a lower altitude; in this case crossing CEGAN at or above 10000 ft and then SERTE at or above 8500 ft would have complied with the approach clearance and ensured compliance with minimum published altitudes on the approach plate.

EUG TRACON Controller and an Air Carrier flight crew reported that the aircraft received an GPWS warning while on approach due to a lower that standard altitude issued.

1463073

201707

0601-1200

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

Daylight

Ground ORD

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1463073

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport

After landing on Runway 9L ORD and taxiing to gate. Taxi instruction given to hold short of approach path of Runway 9R while taxing south on Taxiway Tango. We taxied beyond that point under the approach path of Runway 9R. We notified ground immediately and were given clearance to continue taxing south on Tango. No conflicts were created and the controller didn't seemed concerned.We don't believe there was any hold short markings in place for taxiing underneath the approach path of 9R while south on Tango. We were looking for signage while south on Tango for reverse high speed Taxiway T2. Don't believe it's marked for that direction of taxi.Improve signage and markings; lesson learned to slow down and use more caution.

A321 Captain reported they received instructions to hold short of the Runway 9R approach path while taxiing on Taxiway Tango. They couldn't locate the hold short lines or any signage indicating where to stop.

1236916

201502

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

Night

Fractional

Citation Excel (C560XL)

Part 135

Parked

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing

Fuel Tank

Cessna Citation

X

Hangar / Base

Fractional

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Inspection Authority

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Physiological - Other

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1236916

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft; Procedure

Equipment / Tooling

A Cessna CE-560XL aircraft was in for A-Check inspection and fuel tanks were drained and opened for Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) inspection. Fuel tank ventilation system installed to vent tanks to outside. However; the hoses used; stretched from bay #3 to west garage door. Hoses become trip hazard and also do not seal properly; venting fumes into work area. Hoses appear to need maintenance due to deterioration. Attempted to use the Sirius multi gas detector to see what level Jet A fumes were at; but was unable to calibrate unit due to calibration gasses being empty. I have been in this area of the Hangar since XA:30pm and I am experiencing Nausea and Headaches. I recommend to install overhead vent system so that vent lines are not on floor and fumes vent out; or install an inline blower into the system now in use to provide positive airflow to push the fumes out of the hangar. Venting open fuel tanks for NDT. Excess fumes from fuel tank venting system.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) describes his work environment where deteriorated fuel tank ventilation hoses were not only a trip hazard on the hangar floor but the hose seals were venting fumes from the fuel tanks of a Cessna CE-560XL aircraft into the work area. Technician experienced nausea and headaches.

1100571

201306

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

21000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Personal

PA-46 Malibu Meridian

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 1500; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1100571

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Experienced manifold pressure fluctuation at FL210 in cruise flight. After several minutes; manifold pressure was steadily decreasing. [I] called Center to report a problem with no answer on last assigned frequency. After several more attempts; as well as an attempt to contact them on 121.5 MHZ; all with no response; the manifold pressure was approaching a level where cabin pressurization could not be maintained. Pilot in Command executed a descent from FL210 for lower altitude; while attempting to troubleshoot the problem and find the correct frequency for Center due to a missed handoff. After locating the correct Center frequency; and making contact with the Controller; I advised them of my altitude and reason for immediate descent from FL210. I asked the Controller for an immediate descent to a lower altitude; while I troubleshot the manifold pressure problem. They issued me a new clearance to FL160. I also advised them that I was not handed off to the next Controller correctly; and the altitude deviation from FL210 was necessary to avoid a possible cabin pressurization emergency. Manifold pressure was restored at the lower altitude and the flight was continued to the destination.Note: I was monitoring 121.5 MHZ during the entire flight; and did not hear any attempt from Center to contact me.

PA-46 pilot reports fluctuating manifold pressure at FL210 and the inability to contact ATC. A descent is initiated before communications can be established due to the possibility of losing cabin pressurization. At 16;000 feet MAP is normal and flight continues to destination.

1237102

201502

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

23000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 15000

Human-Machine Interface

1237102

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was the pilot monitoring and we were cleared to descend via the Arrival into ZZZ. The bottom altitude is 10;000 feet which was set properly. The 'ALT INTV' button was pressed once the clearance was received which I believe cancelled the first altitude constraint of Fix ZZZZZ at or above FL240. We ended up crossing Fix ZZZZZ approximately 1;000 feet low. The rest of the crossing altitudes were all made without incident and we landed safely. The center controller did not say anything. Active pilot monitoring would prevent this from happening in the future. I will pay closer attention to each altitude when climbing or descending from now on.

A B737-800 air crew upon receipt of a descent clearance; pressed the 'ALT INTV' button. In doing so the first altitude constraint was deleted and they crossed it 1;000 feet low.

1747086

202004

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Main Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1747086

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft

Pilot Monitoring put the gear handle down as commanded. Immediately; the crew noticed the right main gear green light did not illuminate and the amber discrete Gear light was illuminated. As Captain; I made the decision To execute a missed approach. We advised ATC and went through the standard callouts for a missed approach and as the gear retracted we noticed a loud noise and jolting of the aircraft. We were very startled by this. ATC gave us instructions to fly a south heading at 3000 feet; at this time all indications were normal in the cockpit. We as a crew evaluated the situation and decided to extend the gear on our downwind. We got the same gear indications along with a EICAS right side brace. We immediately went to the QRH and followed the procedures. I decided to request a flyby the Tower to see if the Tower could tell if the right main gear was in fact down. As we slowed and configured with flaps we also got the gear not down and master warning light. ATC said the right main gear appeared to be down. With the indications in the cockpit I decided to have CFR standing by. We then got on the SAT phone and consulted with Flight Control; Maintenance and Flight Ops. We as a crew and I as Captain decided to attempt the landing with CFR standing by. Thankfully the landing went smoothly and the right man gear did not collapse. We came to a full stop on the runway and waited for maintenance to pin the gear and tow us to the gate. We entered what we saw in the flight logbook.

B767-300 Captain reported landing safely after receiving a right main landing gear warning.

1047502

201210

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

Daylight

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Landing Gear Indicating System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1047502

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Relief Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1047486.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We lowered the gear and had no green indications for the right main gear. Did a low approach by Tower; they confirmed gear appeared down. Kept gear handle down; flew a box pattern to land with emergency declared and crash trucks ready to assist. Normal landing.

I was the Relief Officer for this leg. Captain was pilot flying; First Officer the pilot not flying. Upon gear extension for landing; Right Main Landing Gear light would not illuminate green. Left main and nose gear lights illuminated green OK. EICAS status message: 'LDG Gear Monitor' Tested bulbs and they did not test ok for right main gear. Captain then executed a go around and conducted a low flyby the Tower. He asked First Officer to declare an emergency and have Tower check that all our landing gear was down from their perspective - especially the right main gear. The Tower personnel complied and responded that all our gear indicated 'down and normal'. I gave two spare bulbs to the First Officer to replace the ones in the indicator. The two new bulbs did not test OK. No other abnormal indications or warnings. We declared an emergency and requested ARFF. Captain elected to land on Runway 17L. I had alerted the flight attendants of our situation during the go around and that we would be landing shortly but that I would let them know of any other pertinent information. While on VFR downwind leg; Captain did a quick PA to the passengers. I then called the #1 flight attendant and let him know that we would be landing in a couple minutes but did not expect any problems on landing and that it was just an indicator problem. I also let the #1 flight attendant know that Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) would be around our aircraft as we landed so the passengers might see fire trucks. We accomplished all pertinent QRH procedures and Captain landed very smoothly on Runway 17L. ARFF met our aircraft on the taxiway and did not see any problems with our aircraft. We then taxied normally to the gate and deplaned in a normal manner. Maintenance was debriefed of our situation with the aircraft landing gear lights. We made an entry in the logbook and departed the aircraft.

After a B767-300 landing gear was lowered; there was no green down indication so the crew declared an emergency and while they executed a go around the Tower reported the gear extended. The flight landed without incident.

1331238

201510

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1331238

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1331376.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Evacuated; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

After getting pushback clearance from ramp control; the lead flight attendant called to report smoke in the cabin visible with a strong odor. The following events happened quickly. I have tried to write them in chronological order to the best of my recollection. I told the push crew to cancel the push and called for the cabin fire smoke QRH. I called the FA (Flight Attendant) back to ask how much smoke there was; to which she replied that there was a haze layer in the back of the cabin. I turned off the packs and APU air to minimize possible smoke sources then turned off the APU. We opened the flight deck windows then the door and confirmed the cabin smoke had stabilized and intensity wasn't increasing so I asked the FAs to disarm the doors. I asked the push crew to ask the gate agent to bring the jet bridge back and also signaled to the gate agent to bring the jet bridge back. The FO (First Officer) called ramp control to let them know we had smoke in the cabin and requested fire department assistance then called operations to inform them and request wheel chairs and an aisle chair. I made an announcement to the passengers that we were aware of the smoke haze in the cabin and asked that everybody get off the airplane through the front cabin door as quickly as possible as a precaution. I asked that they not take personal belongings to expedite the evacuation. I shut off the APU by selecting the fire control switch to OFF AND AGENT ARM. I noticed that the smoke was stagnant so I tried to clear the smoke by closing the outflow valve and right pack to HP (High Pressure) bleed off but then realized it could create more smoke so I turned off the pack. The fire department and maintenance personnel boarded the airplane through the aft stair and the smoke cleared. The fire department walked through with a device and confirmed there was no imminent fire danger. The crew did an excellent job communicating observations to me and executing the deplaning process without incident.Prior to the smoke in the cabin report form the FA; the APU had been running for approximately five minutes with the right pack on HP BLD OFF; APU air on and cross feed levers open in preparation for engine start. The smoke remained over the aft part of the cabin until after the aft stair was opened. There was a previous write up a few days earlier for an APU OIL PRESS LOW indication.After the passengers were safely in the terminal; I notified crew services and duty pilot about the incident and advised that I did not feel safe to fly the scheduled trip and the entire crew was still shaken up about the incident. I stated that I would not be able to focus on the flight and instead would be mentally evaluating the smoke in the cabin incident. Duty pilot called me back and left a voicemail stating that he spoke with several management personnel who 'were all 100% fully comfortable with us continuing' and that I would need to contact my chief pilot if I still felt that we were not ready to continue. I spoke with the chief pilot and expressed my concern about not feeling safe to fly so soon after such a serious incident. He supported my decision to not continue the flight. I also received a phone call from crew services asking if I was going to fly or not. I again had to explain that I was not safe to fly. Having been part of a flight crew who had to previously evacuate an entire flight on a taxiway for smoke in the cabin; I take cabin smoke; possible evacuations and the safety of the crew and passengers very seriously. I feel that in this incident with the smoke intensity not increasing; it was safer for the passengers to expeditiously exit through the main cabin door into the gate area. A separate cabin fire/ smoke on the ground QRH procedure would provide better guidance to quickly isolate possible smoke sources such as APU air or cabin light ballasts that have led to evacuations in the past. Many emails have been sent by the safety department about the evacuation decision making process but these are forgotten and pilots who begin employment after the emails are sent; have no access to the information. QRH procedures remain on the aircraft and are repeatedly reviewed by pilots.I realize now that although opening the flight deck door provided immediate assessment of the smoke in the rear of the cabin; it also added complexity to the situation. Having a flight attendant in the flight deck while trying to manage the situation; complicated matters. Although intercom communication can be difficult; a flight attendant can correctly describe smoke intensity. A closed flight deck door would have allowed better situation awareness and decision making process from the flight deck out. Improved standard maintenance procedures are needed. In this case; the correction action on the logbook after the APU oil pressure low write-up was; no oil pressure low indication during normal operation. A standardized checklist could have guided mechanics through minimum steps required before signing a discrepancy off. Steps such as checking oil levels and verifying no evidence of oil leaks present; would have likely prevented this incident. I realize that not every discrepancy can have a maintenance checklist; but each malfunction indication should have a specific guide that's required to be evaluated by mechanics before returning the aircraft to service. Maintenance later said there was visible oil on the ram doors and this is what potentially caused the smoke in the cabin.I believe that we were moments away from a full evacuation. If the flight attendants would have delayed notification of the smoke and smell; or if we would not have thought of turning off the APU air; a full evacuation was likely imminent. Smoke in the cabin has the potential of incapacitating everyone in the airplane in less than 90 seconds. Therefore; I consider any smoke in an airplane a very dangerous situation where lives are at elevated risk. After significant incidents such as this one; flight crews should be taken off immediate duty assignments in the interest of safety. We must reconsider the list of events from which operations makes the decision to remove pilots from duty after significant incidents. After expressing concern to a duty pilot about not being able to safely continue a flight; a pilot should not have to re-iterate the concern numerous times to several persons. This process of having to re-iterate that one doesn't feel safe; could end in a pilot feeling pressured into flying even after originally expressing concerns.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

MD-80 Crew ready for pushback had smoke in the cabin. Passengers evacuated through the front cabin door and the flight was cancelled. Reporter recommended a separate cabin fire/smoke on the ground QRH procedure.

994844

201202

0601-1200

CMA.Airport

CA

2000.0

Dawn

TRACON NTD

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Climb

Other Obstacle Departure Procedure

Class E NTD

Aero Charts

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 4500

Confusion; Situational Awareness

994844

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Chart Or Publication

Departing from Runway 26 in Camarillo; we were cleared to depart using the published Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP). I misread the procedure which ends with left turn direct the CMA VOR. This is what we briefed and flew. The procedure requires a right turn to intercept the 265 radial and then left direct the CMA VOR. I have not flown this procedure before and was not familiar. However; in my opinion the core cause of my oversight was twofold. 1) R265 at left edge of chart; I misread as Runway 26. Therefore believed it was the start of ODP for Runway 26 CMA. 2) This turn made sense knowing I was turning away from terrain and housing for noise abatement and toward the normal pattern for the airport. Climbing through 2;000 FT the Controller at Magu asked if we were receiving the Camarillo VOR; which I thought was unusual. This is the only reason I took a second look at the ODP and realized my mistake. I could have easily not caught this mistake. The Controller was not upset; nor did he seem to recognize our error. There was no other traffic or conflict due to early departure before Tower was open in Camarillo. I have a suggestion regarding charting. If each runway that has an ODP was published in its own box; a mistake like this would be harder to make. This won't happen to me again.

A pilot reported turning left after a CMA Runway 26 departure; because he misread the CMA commercial chart Obstacle Departure Procedure (ODP) which formats the Runway 8 and Runway 26 procedures without sufficient textual separation.

1561301

201807

0001-0600

ZNY.ARTCC

NY

33000.0

Night

Center ZNY

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZNY

Center ZNY

Corporate

Global Express (BD700)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZNY

Facility ZNY.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.5

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1561301

Facility ZNY.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 14.5

Situational Awareness

1561304.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Staffing; Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I was working towards the end of a 10 hour overtime shift. We were extremely understaffed this night; with no supervisor on the shift. The shift was published 2 under the number with the Supervisor previously assigned to the shift approved to go on a detail. The shift ended up 4 controllers under staffed. Towards the end of my 10 hour overtime shift we had several controllers; myself included that needed to be relieved from their position because it was the end of their shift. We had to combine sectors to be able to get people up for the end of shift. After combining the sectors I had Aircraft X landing. I then issue a crossing restriction of 65 NM W of a fix at 27000 feet. After reviewing the tapes; it turned out I missed the read back of 25000 feet instead of 27000 feet. Then it was my turn to be relieved from position. During my relief overlap time I'm watching my relieving controller take a handoff on Aircraft Y climbing to 26000 feet opposite direction of Aircraft X. The controller issued a traffic call to Aircraft X and Aircraft Y with more than 15 miles. Aircraft X initially acknowledged the call without question. After a few seconds Aircraft X got an RA to climb and then questioned the traffic call. The relieving controller took action to reestablish positive separation. Controllers at the end of a 10 hour shift should probably not be working combined sectors with above average volume and complexity. There should be supervision on every shift to monitor these type of scenarios. The Pilots should have questioned a traffic call with an aircraft climbing through his altitude.

Sector 42 was just combined with Sector 56. I was instructed to relieve CPC on position so he can go home from a 10 hour overtime day. The current shift staffing was 4 under with no supervisor on duty. The cru-art was not up to date and there were multiple sessions of 2 plus hours working moderate to heavy traffic. CPC briefed me that Aircraft X received a crossing restriction descending to FL270. I took radar on Aircraft Y opposite direction climbing to FL260. I issued traffic to both aircraft approximatley 15 miles apart. Both aircraft acknowledged the initial traffic call. At 7 miles opposite direction Aircraft X questioned his clearance and advised me he was descending to FL250. I immediately turned Aircraft Y to a 240 heading to mitigate the loss of separation. Aircraft X received and RA and climbed back to FL270. I instructed Aircraft X to proceed direct HTO VOR when able.ZNY needs to be properly staffed in a timely matter. Area B worked -4 under the agreed upon staffing numbers. Additionally; there was no supervisor present for the entire shift. There needs to be a more timely thorough process to mitigate these challenges.

Center Controllers reported an aircraft conflict due to a missed altitude assignment read back at the end of a 10 hour shift.

1608277

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

150.0

1.9

2000.0

10

Daylight

12000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Climb

None

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 553; Flight Crew Type 94

1608277

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Departed ZZZ enroute to ZZZ1. Did a touch and go; and on climb out en route to ZZZ2; engine RPM dropped from 2400 to 1500--without any control input. Leveled the plane and attempted to troubleshoot. Checked the following:-Adjusting Mixture--made it worse...back to full rich-Added Carb Heat---made it worse....removed carb heat.-Made sure primer was locked; then Attempted to use primer...no effectLosing altitude fairly quickly; looked for biggest best landing space. Determined we would not make the airport.Picked a field 2 miles south of ZZZ1. Attempted to adjust throttle again; with no result. Arriving at first landing choice; was too high and fast; since I couldn't slow the throttle. Spotted an even larger field straight ahead. Continued on to that field. Had to pass under power line and over irrigation equipment for landing. Still traveling too fast; made a left bank to the north to slow down. Set plane down nearly in center of field; and pulled mixture. Lightly applied brakes and dodged equipment. Plane came to a stop with NO DAMAGE to the aircraft and NO INJURIES to Souls on board.

The reporter indicated the throttle linkage became disconnected from the carburetor and the attachment hardware was missing.

C172 pilot reported a loss of engine power resulted in an off-field landing. The throttle linkage was later found to have come disconnected from the carburetor.

1002935

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

240.0

5.0

1500.0

VMC

Turbulence; 20

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

VOR / VORTAC ZZZ

Initial Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 19500; Flight Crew Type 100

Confusion

1002935

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We were doing practice instrument approaches under the hood for instrument currency. Both pilots very high time retired airline pilots; but neither of us flies a lot of IFR these days. We had completed my approaches and other requirements; and I was now the safety pilot for the other guy; and we were doing the last of his approaches. He was doing a letdown to the last altitude; minimums of 1;500 FT. I noticed that we looked a bit low for our distance to the airport; and looked at the chart; and saw that he had misread the altitude for that segment; and we were actually supposed to still be at 2;400 FT! So we were 900 FT low; and neither of us caught it until it was too late. Awfully close to the houses; and we were sure glad there were no towers out there! Lessons learned include how easy it is to misread a chart and go down to minimums one intersection early; how even the safety pilot has duties beyond looking for traffic; and how rusty you get just staying current when you don't fly real IFR a lot. No apparent harm done since we still cleared all the houses by at least 600 FT and approach never noticed or at least never said anything; but I'm going to try to stay current by doing practice approaches more often than the minimum; and when I'm safety pilot I'm going to spend a lot more time watching the approach plate!

While acting as a safety pilot reporter discovers that his flying partner has descended early to the next step down altitude on a VOR approach.

1590117

201810

0601-1200

CLT.Airport

NC

17500.0

VMC

Turbulence

Daylight

Center ZTL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Center ZTL

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class A ZTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1590117

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1590682.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

We were [departing] CLT. A Heavy aircraft took off immediately before us on 36C in CLT [along the same route]. Tower gave us a 'caution wake turbulence' when they gave us the lineup and wait. After the Heavy departed; Tower crossed a couple of aircraft downfield before giving us takeoff clearance (my estimate was about 2 minutes after issuing the takeoff clearance for the Heavy). We briefed CONT IGN on for possible wake and noted where the Heavy lifted off. We were able to rotate before his rotation point and turned slightly upwind of him. Initial climbout was uneventful and we selected continuous ignition OFF at approximately 12;000 feet as we felt the wake turbulence threat was over. We were keeping an eye on the Heavy that we were following on the TCAS. As we passed through FL175; the Heavy was approximately 10 NM in front of us and 3800 feet above us (with a slightly quartering headwind of 40 knots). We suddenly encountered severe wake turbulence. I immediately turned on continuous ignition. The autopilot disconnected itself and the airplane went through a series of rather violent pitch and roll oscillations. I assumed manual control and had difficulties controlling the flight path of the aircraft. My initial reaction was to change altitude to get out of the wake; but without knowing the climb rate of the other aircraft; I was unable to determine if we could out climb it. I made the decision that the quickest and safest way to exit the wake was to make a slight turn to the left (upwind) to get out of the flight path of the heavy. As I did this; I told the First Officer (FO) to let Center know we were deviating left for severe wake turbulence. After a few seconds on the new heading; we exited the wake turbulence. The Controller did not hear us/understand us the first call; so we had to make additional calls to her to tell her what was going on. She did not sound happy with us and snapped at us for deviating without 'asking first.' We simply did not have time to ask nor did we have time to explain the situation. I exercised my PIC authority to deviation for what in my mind was an emergency situation (aircraft out of control). By the time we were able to converse with ATC; the situation was over; so we did not officially declare an emergency. I also had the TCAS on ABV/BLW modes and saw no potential traffic conflicts. We stayed on the offset heading for a few more miles until we were comfortable with the spacing and then continued on our flight. After the situation stabilized; I had my FO call the FA's to make sure everyone was ok. They reported there were no injuries but that the flight deck door had come unlocked and opened during the event (it was locked prior to the wake encounter). We re-secured the flight deck door and I made a PA to the passengers explaining the encounter in an attempt to calm their nerves. We continued without further incident. Inadequate spacing between us and a Heavy aircraft on the same route. Increase spacing requirements between medium/heavy aircraft; even in the enroute environment. ZTL Controllers did not caution us about the wake from the heavy; nor did they try to give us any additional spacing even after the severe wake encounter.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

CRJ-900 flight crew reported encountering severe wake turbulence 10 nm in trail of a wide body transport aircraft climbing through FL175 departing CLT. Reporter recommended increased separation.

1857181

202111

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2400.0

Turbulence

TRACON ZZZ

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Initial Climb

Vectors

Aircraft X; Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Confusion

1857181

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Weather

Procedure

Aircraft X was a departure out of ZZZ climbing to ZZZ1 VOR. The aircraft first entered a 036 MVA climbing through 024. I issued expedite climb; but failed to issue LA (Low Altitude) alert. The aircraft reached 028 as it entered the next MVA of 037; but briefly indicated a descent to 027 before resuming a climb. The aircraft the entered a 040 MVA climbing through 031; but descended to 027; before resuming climb. At that point LA alert activated and I issued LA alert. Pilot stated they were experiencing downdrafts.[Recommend] insuring a positive climb rate.

TRACON Controller reported vectoring an aircraft that was experiencing downdrafts; below the MVA; and failed to issue low altitude alert.

1302497

201510

1201-1800

DAB.Tower

FL

2000.0

Tower DAB

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class C DAB

Facility DAB.Tower

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.5

Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

1302497

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; General Maintenance Action

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

We noticed a problem developing with our radar presentation. Targets were appearing and disappearing at various altitudes and speeds including targets we were working. Aircraft X showed a ground speed of 610 Knots at one point as well as target jumps greater than 1NM and rapid heading changes. I instructed the trainee to discontinue lateral separation until the problem could be resolved. Also; false targets appeared and disappeared but I couldn't be certain whether they were actually false or not. I advised the Controller In Charge who in turn advised Tech Ops. The problem continued throughout the session.The radar presentation must be fixed. We cannot use radar separation when radar identification is questionable.

Approach Controller reported that radar targets were showing rapid erroneous speed readouts and were jumping around the radar displaying false heading changes.

1601944

201812

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

30.0

5.0

4000.0

VMC

Icing; 10

Daylight

4000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 180; Flight Crew Total 715; Flight Crew Type 130

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1601944

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Weather; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I departed ZZZ on an instructional flight in an IFR flight plan to try to get VFR on top for training maneuvers. When leveled at 4;000 feet MSL; I was in VFR conditions between two layers and requesting radar vectors to get to an area with better conditions; I was instructed to climb to 6;000 feet but due to the outside temperature being 0 [degrees] Celsius; I told ATC I was unable to climb to avoid icing conditions. As I continued on a heading of 180 as instructed by ATC; I realized I was not going to be able to get into an area of better weather conditions so I requested to go back to ZZZ on the RNAV XXL Approach. As I proceeded southbound; I saw some clouds in my way so I asked for different headings to try to avoid those clouds and thus getting into icing since my aircraft is not rated for flights into known icing. Since ATC didn't give me the vectors I required I turned right to a heading of 210 to avoid this one cloud and once I started turning back to my assigned heading ATC asked me for which heading I was flying; and once I told I was turning back to 180; they gave me a phone number to call for possible pilot deviation. After that I continued following the vectors; ended up going into clouds but did not pick up any icing and landed safely at ZZZ without other problems.

PA44 pilot reported a heading deviation when ATC was slow in providing vectors around weather.

1776112

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Climb

Class D ZZZ

Reciprocating Engine Assembly

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 785; Flight Crew Type 215

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1776112

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I experienced a loss of full engine power during initial climbout from RWY 32 at ZZZ. I had the student notify Tower we wanted to return for landing. We were still able to climb and engine was running smoothly so I wanted to keep as low key as possible. When asked by tower we did not request assistance and did not require priority handling. We climbed to approximately 1;000 feet AGL as we entered left downwind. Just past abeam approach end of RWY 32 while on downwind engine experienced further reduction in power without moving throttle. I told Tower we were turning base at that time; added 10 degrees flaps and aimed for the approach end of RWY 32. As we rolled onto final there was a business jet in position for takeoff on the runway. I heard the Tower clear him for an immediate takeoff; then tell him to abort and hold position. The Controller then advised me they could not issue a landing clearance. I responded that I had to land and Controller told me about the jet in position. I replied that I observed the traffic and would maneuver to pass to the right so I would not overfly the jet; and come in around and land in front of him. I flew a few hundred feet to the right at approximately 300 feet AGL; did not fly over the jet and passed well clear of him holding in position. I then slipped the aircraft into the left crosswind; lined up and landed on Runway 32 about 1;500 feet down the runway. The engine was generating enough power to taxi and I utilized Taxiway XX and called ground control when instructed for taxi back to ramp. When I reviewed the event; I believe I incorrectly assumed that the tower controller was providing me priority handling; when in fact the Controller was not fully aware of my situation. I should have just requested priority handling either prior to or as I turned downwind so Controller knew not to have the jet line up and wait on the runway before me.

C172 flight instructor reported an engine malfunction after takeoff resulting in a return to field.

1428755

201702

0601-1200

ZJX.ARTCC

FL

8000.0

Marginal

Cloudy

Daylight

Center ZJX

Personal

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZJX

Facility ZJX.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1428755

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Weather

Weather

Aircraft X checked on ZJX frequency. I called the weather to the aircraft and asked if he had weather radar onboard. The pilot responded 'Roger'. I was not comfortable with that response. I asked the aircraft again if he had weather radar. I suggested a heading of 240 degrees based on the weather that was being depicted on my scope. I cleared the aircraft direct to his destination. The aircraft dropped 500 feet. The aircraft had been level at 8;000 feet. Over the next approximate two minutes the aircraft went from 7500 feet down to 6300 feet then back up to 7400 feet. After 7400 ft the aircraft did a continuous descent below 3000 feet. Once again all of this happened in approximately two minutes time. The aircraft recovered at the altitude of 2600 feet.We; as air traffic controllers; need more advanced equipment if we are expected to assist aircraft through weather.

ZJX Center Controller worked a small aircraft and issued a suggested heading around weather; but the aircraft experienced major downdrafts.

1046805

201211

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

13000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Fuel Tank

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1046805

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

1046806.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

While climbing through 13;000 FT; I noticed the Number 1 fuel system appeared abnormally split. Knowing that I had been fueled accurately; I immediately looked to the Number 1 wing. I noticed a mist/vapor being expelled from what appeared to be the magnastick location. I am uncertain of where the actual leak was. I had advised the First Officer that we would be declaring an emergency; which we did and turned back. Due to this unique situation; we had looked for a specific emergency checklist but none existed. We had approximately 4;500 LBS at the time we noticed the issue. We then proceeded to shut down the Number 1 engine as a precaution; via the SOP and emergency checklist. We returned; landed; and taxied off the runway. I had requested from that point that we be towed to a safe location. An entry was made in the aircraft logbook.

After departure; during the initial climb to 14;000 FT; the Captain noticed a fuel imbalance. The Captain then noticed fuel leaking overboard from the left wing. The Captain called for a 'fuel leak' checklist. No such checklist existed. The Captain elected to declare an emergency with ATC and return. The Captain then exercised emergency authority and the crew shut down the Number 1 engine using memory action items as a precaution. The Captain then called for the Engine Failure/Fire Checklist. The checklist was followed to the end and the crew landed safely.

DHC8-200 flight crew notes a fuel imbalance during climb and sees what he believes is a fuel leak on the left wing. The left engine is shut down and the flight returns to the departure airport.

1165164

201404

1201-1800

ZTL.ARTCC

GA

24000.0

Daylight

Center ZTL

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Class A ZTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 840; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1165164

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

Controller directed me to descend to FL230 from FL250 then switched me to another Controller. I checked in with the new Controller and let him know I was leaving 250 for 230. He acknowledged my check in. Then called out traffic. I looked for traffic; but could not see it until it passed under my left wing and then saw it. I informed the Controller I had the traffic. I then noticed it was pretty close. As I was about to radio the Controller the other pilot asked if I was descending. The Controller immediately canceled my clearance and moved me back to 240. I executed his command. I do not know for sure; but the other pilot said my aircraft came within 500 FT of his.

A single engine pilot was cleared to FL230 from FL250 and during descent traffic was called out which he did not see until it passed beneath him less than 500 FT. ATC recleared the pilot to FL240.

1750188

202007

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

us

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Engine Air Anti-Ice

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1750188

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After takeoff at approximately 2000 feet; ENG 2 A-ICE Duct illuminated. Followed QRH procedures. Shut down number 2 engine. Returned to ZZZ. Landed uneventfully.

Captain reported an inflight shutdown and an air turnback due to an anti ice advisory light illuminating.

1308598

201511

0001-0600

ZKC.ARTCC

KS

35000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Center ZKC

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZKC

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1308598

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were at cruise at FL350. When doing the level off checks; the CA noted that there was lower than normal Yellow Hydraulic Fluid Quantity.We continued flight and [enroute] we received an ECAM alert 'LOW YELLOW HYDRAULIC PRESSURE.' We followed the ECAM and turned off the associated pumps; referenced the QRH and [flight manual] and made the decision to continue. [Later] we got 'LOW YELLOW HYDRAULIC QUANTITY.' We then ran the ECAM and reviewed once again the QRH and [flight manual]. Looking at the associated system failures; we determined that on landing we would be unable to get off the runway without assistance. At that point; we received no land ASAP message and made the [decision] to continue to [our destination]. We then informed ATC of the malfunction; requesting services to help us to vacate the runway and requesting the longest runway due to the malfunctions. We landed uneventfully and were escorted off the runway by operations and a super tug.

A320 FO reported continuing to destination after loss of Yellow Hydraulic System.

1308444

201511

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

5400.0

IMC

7

Daylight

2000

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID TECKY2

Class E NCT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 257

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1308444

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 223; Flight Crew Type 1100

Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1308797.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

Climbing on TECKY2 approximately 4;000 feet given climb unrestricted clearance to FL190 expedite through 7;000 feet. Aircraft given full power to approximately 3;500 feet VSI climb rate. Passing through 4;800 feet clearance cancelled to maintain 5;000 feet. Response to ATC was 'leveling 5;300 feet returning to 5;000 feet.' Our return to 5;000 feet was a bit slow and ATC prompted to return to 5;000 feet quickly.TCAS traffic was visible on and to west at 6;000 feet; but no TA or RA. I don't recall exactly due to heavy radio traffic and MCP adjustments; but our course may have been approximately .5 miles west as magenta line randomly shifted during our turn on procedure possibly causing NorCal to cancel climb; but we were not notified of that. NorCal then reissued the exact same clearance passing abeam traffic at 6;000 feet. Flight continued uneventfully.

On the TECKY2 Departure from SJC; I initiated a 30 degree right hand turn from MLPTS; but noticed I was tracking inside of the magenta line; so rolled out to approximately a 15 degree banked turn to match the magenta line and the white one minute airplane track line (as well as the flight director in LNAV). ATC issued a climb and requested we expedite through 7;000 feet. The Pilot Monitoring deleted the reduced climb thrust and we began to expedite the climb. About half-way through the turn the screen refreshed and the magenta line all of a sudden was well inside the turn. I returned to 30 degrees of bank. At approximately the same time ATC told us to level at 5;000 feet. When I looked at the altimeter we were passing 5;000 feet; so I initiated an immediate level-off; reaching approximately 5;400 feet. I then initiated a slow descent to 5;000 feet. After approximately a minute; we were once again given the climb with a request to expedite through 7;000 feet. We continued the SID and climbed normally.

While departing SJC on the TECKY2 Departure; the crew received an expedite climb clearance which was shortly followed by an immediate level-off clearance. There was TCAS traffic in the vicinity; but no TA was received.

1564467

201807

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

350.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Initial Climb

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140; Flight Crew Total 550; Flight Crew Type 260

Time Pressure

1564467

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

On takeoff on runway ZZ at around 350 ft AGL; I experienced loss of power on my engine. I was instructing a primary student on a flight. I told the tower that I was having engine problems and needed to land. ATC cleared me to land on runway ZY. I pitched for best glide speed and turned towards the runway. I tried emergency procedures for restart with fuel; magneto; and mixture and there was no restart. I did the Engine Failure /Power Loss During Flight checklist for landing with no engine power and glided to landing. I told the tower we needed to be towed to the maintenance hangar.Not aware of what caused the situation or what could be done to fix it.

Cessna 172 flight instructor reported an engine failure after takeoff.

1607756

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

78.0

10.0

4000.0

VMC

5

Daylight

5000

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 6000

Fatigue; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1607756

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 575

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1607760.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Human Factors

Prior to arriving for duty; I attempted to take a nap in the evening. I slept for a couple of hours; but could not sleep more than that. I felt fine when arriving for duty. I was coming off of [several] days off. I was the pilot monitoring and the First Officer was the pilot flying. Weather was extremely clear and daylight. Light tailwind at altitude. Very light airplane with 10K fuel and empty cans. We were both extremely tired; and communication was degraded between us due to a loud cockpit and mixed headset use (I was using an ANR headset and the FO (First Officer) was using [an ear plug style headset] with the left plug out of his ear so he could hear me). As it turns out; this is not a good CRM setup and communication was compromised between us. I didn't realized the FO was struggling to hear me throughout the flight until we discussed it on the ground.ATC kept us very high before clearing a descent to intercept the ILS XXL about 5 miles from ZZZ. I mentioned to the First Officer that it was going to be difficult to shoot the approach due to this. We were slightly high and fast just outside ZZZ and I suggested we needed to drop the gear and slow down to get stabilized. We were still 10 to 15 knots fast as we approached ZZZZZ; but on glideslope and it looked like we would be on speed at 500 AGL. I suggested we may need to do a go-around. I thought the FO acknowledged; but after the fact he told me he wasn't sure if I was commanding a go-around and was thinking I was waiting to see the results of a continued approach. On our previous leg we discussed going around and the shared belief that a go-around at altitude should be a slow paced methodical event. The autopilot should be engaged and both crewmembers on the same page. I honestly thought that's where we were headed. I made a mistake at that time by not being very specific and commanding a go around. We were on speed and stable at 500 AGL and it was a normal landing. However; I felt we were at the limits of FOM compliance and I don't like to be in that situation.We talked about it in the parking lot and we both realized we were very tired and the FO felt he was behind. We both decided if we could do it again we should have executed a go-around to eliminate any potential for problems. Being kept high in a light airplane is always a challenge; but add fatigue and degraded CRM due to communication difficulties to the mix and the task saturation is very high. As a suggestion; it would be extremely helpful if [we] had hot mics. The enhancement to communication would be a dramatic improvement and a real safety addition.

The flight in question was the return leg to ZZZ that departed [early morning.] I was off for several days prior to this flight and got a 2 hour nap before going to work for the first leg. Initially; I felt well rested and ready to fly. That changed significantly on the second leg. By the top of descent; I was feeling very tired. On this leg I was the pilot flying and the Captain was pilot monitoring. We have flown together before and work well together from my perspective. We were arriving on the Arrival and approaching ZZZZZ we were still being held at 8000 feet. The CA (Captain) requested lower and we were finally cleared to descend to 4000 feet and cleared for the approach. Immediately the CA commented that it would be a challenge to get down; slowed up and configured in time. I heard the comment but did not respond to it or fully appreciate that he was really pointing out that we were already behind. I still felt fine. I recognize now that I was really tired and just not reacting as quickly as I normally would have. Once on the localizer I hit the appr button but it was a little too late and the aircraft failed to capture the glide slope. I initially hit the V/S button to regain the glideslope and then immediately realized we did not have enough time for that so I disconnected the autopilot. At that point I heard the CA say something about the gear but to be honest I was having a difficult time hearing him. He was wearing an ANR headset and talking a little soft. I struggled with it the whole flight but he did not know it because I failed to tell him. That was a CRM breakdown on my part. We got the gear down and started working the flaps and the aircraft began to slow rapidly. I heard the CA mention the approach was not looking good and I was preparing myself mentally to execute a go around. As we passed through 1000 feet I do not recall what the parameters were but we did managed to get stabilized by 500 feet and make a normal landing on speed in the touchdown zone. However; this approach never should have continued. Recognizing I was not fully stable and my situational awareness was deteriorating I should have executed the go-around procedure long before I ever got to the 1000 foot call. In the future if I find myself in a similar situation I will communicate more effectively with the CA and execute the go around early in order to slow things down and start again. Secondary causal factors in this event were my fatigue and a breakdown of communication between myself and the CA. Both of those factors could have been mitigated by better CRM on my part. I should have let the CA know how tired I was feeling and that I was having difficulty hearing him. Going forward I will take those lessons with me as well.

B757 flight crew reported communication breakdown between Captain and First Officer and degraded CRM during approach.

1349485

201604

1201-1800

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

25000.0

Daylight

Center ZMP

Military

Stratotanker 135

4.0

IFR

Refueling

Cruise

Class A ZMP

Center ZMP

Military

Eagle (F-15)

4.0

Part 91

IFR

Refueling

Cruise

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 25.5

Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1349485

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was training a developmental controller on her second D-side. We had an ALTRV (Altitude Reservation) scheduled through the area with 2 KC35's and 4 F15's. This ALTRV came through yesterday with 1 DC10 and 6 F15's. There was not a separate flight plan filed yesterday on the F15's and they were requesting to break up in the sector adjacent ours. The sector previous to ours put in a proposed flight plan for the F15's. The DC10 was filed to RDR; but after the break-up requested a different destination. So yesterday's break up went smoother than todays because of the proposed flight plan. Yesterday I pointed out the issue to the FLM (Front Line Manager). This flight plan is filed through the airspace as a single ship; only the DC10; and there is no flight plan for the F15's. This is a problem as they are flying through because the URET (User Request and Evaluation Tool) flight plan is not accurately showing the correct number and types of aircraft and it's a problem for the break up as there is no flight plan on file. Today; the ALTRV was [Flight X]; 2 KC35's and 4 F15's. The F15's wanted to break off from the KC35's and the KC35's wanted to break up and return as single ships. Once again; the flight plan for the ALTRV is filed as a single ship and no flight plans are in on any other aircraft. [Flight X] informs us that [Flight Y] is going to want to break off and go to [another destination] (no flight plan on file) and the F15's; [Flight Z]; will break off and go to [destination airport] via FAR..DIK..MLS..BIL. So then we put flight plans in on the 2 new flights. The R-side attempts to break up all 3 flights but accidently clears [Flight X] as 'flight' so [Flight Y] follows him. Then the turn to destination puts them going into another area's sector and we have to coordinate with the next sector as [Flights X & Y] aren't really broken up yet. Then [Flight Y] asked for different routing and at this point they are in the next sector passing right through an arrival stream into MSP. The next sector controller calls and asks us to leave the [Flights] MARSA (Military Authority Assumes Responsibility for Separation of Aircraft) assign them 260B270 and ship them to the next sector. So the next sector ends up breaking them up. Now [Flight Z] was cleared to MOU via FAR 'as filed'. I'm not sure if they knew what 'as filed' was but we had put in what was on the ALTRV sheet. Instead of flying the routing on the ALTRV sheet; they flew direct FAR direct MOU. The next sector caught that and fixed the routing. Now; after [Flight Z] was cleared they went NORDO. So they weren't advised MARSA was terminated until they found a way to the next sector's frequency somehow. The whole thing was a huge mess that had many contributing causes. The first recommendation is that all aircraft that will split from a formation flight have separate flight plans filed. This will help out with the sector workload immensely. Military aircraft don't always have the best radios and if they are on UHF frequencies; they don't always work well. Trying to get a flight plan during flight from a military aircraft is always a high workload situation and errors can easily be made. We didn't have the equipment suffix for [Flight Z] and they were negative RVSM. The previous sector had told us this otherwise it could have been a big problem because after break up [Flight Z] requested FL360. There should have been a separate flight plan for each [Flight X & Y] and one for [Flight Z]. At the very least [Flight Z] should have had a flight plan filed as 4/F15. Then [Flight X & Y] would be filed as 2/H/KC35. They were all filed as 1/H/KC35. I was very upset because this happened 2 days in a row; after I pointed out the problem to the FLM.The issue with the break up was because of poor procedure on the part of the R-side. He should have gotten all 3 flights established at different altitudes before he cleared them and kept them in our airspace until all the routing andaltitude issues were sorted out. This became much more complicated because they went into another sector.

ZMP Controller reported of problems associated with a military flight break up after refueling. Controller reported this was a problem the day before and that it was reported to the FLM on duty.

1801951

202104

1201-1800

MMFR.ARTCC

FO

23000.0

Daylight

Center MMFR

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 130; Flight Crew Type 10000

Confusion; Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1801951

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

Descending into MMPR on the OBRUG 1B. Told to descend to FL200. Then told to descend via as we were passing FL260. There's a discrepancy between the FMC which loads to 'Cross OBRUB at or above 230;' and the chart which says 'Cross at 230.' Once given the initial descent to 200; I deleted the FMC (at or above 230) and crossed above 230 even though told to descend via. Which is correct? The chart or the FMC; and in Mexico was I supposed to cross OBRUG at 230 (as per the chart) even though initially cleared to 200 (and only later) at 260; given the descend via

Air carrier Captain reported procedure disagreements between the FMC and the chart exist on the PVR OBRUG 1B Arrival.

1192863

201407

0601-1200

LRD.Airport

TX

VMC

Daylight

Tower LRD

Air Carrier

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D LRD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1192863

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While landing at LRD on Runway 17R; just after touchdown; Tower cleared another aircraft that was holding in position on Runway 14 for takeoff; which crosses 17R approximately halfway down the runway. We had yet to cross Runway 14 on our landing roll and were very concerned that the departing aircraft and our airplane would reach the intersection at the same time. We called on Tower frequency and alerted them to our position and that we were not yet clear of Runway 14. I immediately applied brake pressure and came to a stop just before the hold short line for 14. The other aircraft also aborted takeoff. Once we were sure the other aircraft was stopped; Tower cleared us to continue across Runway 14; and the rest of the taxi was completed uneventfully.

Pilot reports while landing and before his aircraft had passed an intersecting runway; Tower Controller clears an aircraft for takeoff. Landing pilot slams on brakes and stops before intersection. Pilot advised Tower while stopping and departing aircraft rejected takeoff.

1621606

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

600.0

IMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb; Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1621606

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1621608.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

During the takeoff phase (at around 600 AGL); the Captain asked if I smelled smoke. I wasn't smelling anything and stated that while switching to departure and dialing in the new heading Tower had assigned. Before I could make the call to departure; the Flight Attendant (FA) called to the front using the EMER button instead of a normal call. I immediately called ATC for a level off and delay vectors.I could see and smell smoke at this point. I told the Captain I was putting on my oxygen mask; we established communications; and I talked with ATC while the Captain gathered information and briefed the FA. The FA was calling to the front because he had seen dark smoke rising near zones E and F. We [notified ATC] and got vectors back around for an ILS approach. We landed without any other issues and stopped on the runway to have fire and rescue drive around the aircraft to inspect. They reported nothing out of the ordinary and after talking with the FA; we determined the smoke had dissipated and we could return to the gate to deplane.Cause: After talking with maintenance we speculate the cause of the smoke was deice fluid getting blown into the engine when we were deicing. Smoke seemed to be coming out of the packs when the event happened. We followed all checklists on the ground during the deice procedure and made sure to do the run-up on the ground. No smoke was noted during that process.

On takeoff; smoke started coming out of the vents in the cockpit and the cabin. The First Officer (FO) and I donned the O2 masks and at this time; the Flight Attendant called to report smoke in the aft of the aircraft. We leveled off at 4;000 and requested vectors for a return to field. By the time we were setup on approach; the smoke had dissipated significantly and the Flight Attendant reported the same for the cabin. After landing; we had the fire department inspect the outside of the aircraft for any signs of smoke or fire. Reporting none; we decided that we should taxi to the gate for a normal deplaning.Cause: We suspect anti-ice fluid got into the pack inlets due to high winds while deicing. 40 knot winds were coming directly at the tail of the aircraft.Suggestions: Pointing into the wind for deicing could help.

CRJ-200 flight crew reported they experienced smoke and fumes on takeoff; and cabin crew subsequently reported fumes in the cabin.

1025147

201207

HEF.Airport

VA

0.0

No Aircraft

Hangar / Base

Personal

Pilot Not Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1300; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1025147

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Can you get the phone AWOS back on line at Manassas (HEF)? This is so critical to pilots that fly in and out of the airport. I am based there with an aircraft in the hangar. The phone is the fastest and easiest way to get quick information; trends; and changing conditions. It would be a great help to all that fly to/from this airport.

The reporter provided no additional information other than advising the AWOS continues out of service.

An HEF based pilot is distressed that the HEF specific AWOS has been out of service for an extended period.

1253513

201504

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 Ground Personnel

1253513

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew; Person Dispatch

Aircraft In Service At Gate; In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft; Company Policy; Procedure; Manuals

Company Policy

We got a message from Dispatch that when we got to Airport ZZZ we needed to keep everyone in their seats because we were in a 900ER and we may have the 'tipping aircraft' issue. We let the FAs know about it enroute. FO backed it up by asking dispatch if we still need to do the procedure since it did not show up on our 'In Range' reply. We were told yes. The FAs talked about the procedure with each other. None of us on the plane had done this procedure before. The FO and I had a discussion ourselves on what we needed to do. My only question was (as was the FA's) who and how were we going to be told to let the people up. In our pilot discussion; I wondered 'if' I shutdown and had the seat belt light turned off; would the passengers get up as they are conditioned to do. So I elected to do the safest thing and leave the seat belt sign on until we heard from ZZZ ops to let everyone up. So that is what we did. After we got to the gate; we shut everything down; the jetway came up which is fine; I still had the seatbelt sign on so no problem. After a very short wait; I get a call from the back saying that it was okay to let them leave the airplane. I asked her how did she know that and she told me the gate agent told her so. Confused; I asked how she talked to the gate agent; she said through the front door. We looked up and the 'FWD ENTRY' light was on. I jumped up and went to the back and sure enough; the front door was open with the agent looking in. I told them the seat belts lights were still on and they are not to open the doors when that light is on. The FAs seemed surprised as they simply heard the gate agent knock on the door and opened it. After a short discussion; we let the passengers de-plane. As a side note; while the FO was doing his exterior preflight; he noted that the nose gear strut was fully extended and felt the jetway canopy was holding the aircraft down; but we talked to maintenance and they assured us that was normal for this situation and had checked that the nose gear were fully in contact with the ground and did not rotate.Everyone but the pilots seem to be more worried about the measuring 'matrix' than safety. It ALWAYS rush; rush; rush; rush no matter what! Everyone is more concerned about 'protecting their six' then having any sort of situational awareness. As pilots we have to be EVERYONE'S safety 'thinker' and slow them down or override them. Then we immediately become the bad guys! We have also conditioned the Flight Attendants to open the door as soon as possible; and they are conditioned to react to any sound; knock; noise; whatever to rush; rush; rush even when we are EARLY; so sometimes things happen. I am not saying the measuring 'matrix' is bad; it is not; it serves a good purpose. BUT everyone needs to know that when things are 'NOT NORMAL' use common sense; the 'matrix' is a 'goal' and not an absolute! We may have not done the procedure as the station thought we should have; but no one on the crew had done this before so we decided to do what we thought was the SAFEST way to do it (keep the seat belt on so that we could be sure the PAX would remain seated). As a note; other than bringing the jetway up and knocking on the door; the gate agent did what she was told; she did not open the door in any way.

A B737-900 Captain reported a Dispatch alert not to deplane passengers at the destination until advised because of a potential 'tipping aircraft.' No one seemed to have details about the issue.

1221580

201411

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Situational Awareness

1221580

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

On my walk around I found icing on the backside of the fan blades and leading edge of fan blades. I told the push driver and the manger that was standing there about it and that I had 17 years of deicing and felt that the engine should be cleared of contamination. The manager looked at it and said it could go but I believe he was worried about just getting it out due to multiple planes waiting for gates.

Ground personnel reports discovering ice on the back side of the fan blades during his walk around inspection and reporting it to his manager. The manager takes a look and does not believe it is significant and the aircraft is allowed to depart.

1309816

201511

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1309816

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1310537.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy

Procedure

Our cargo load report on departure indicated that there was 26 pounds of 'freight' in the cargo bin. No description of the freight was on the cargo report; and none of the items at the bottom had been circled. Upon arrival at [destination]; ramp personnel notified me that unauthorized hazardous material had been loaded onto the aircraft. I inspected the box and found it was extremely well labeled.Near the packing slip was a sticker: 'PRIMARY LITHIUM BATTERIES- FORBIDDEN FOR TRANSPORT ABOARD PASSENGER AIRCRAFT' On every side of the box was placed a bright orange sticker with the words: 'CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY FORBIDDEN IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT.' I never did open the box to verify the contents. I have pictures of the cargo report and the box with all stickers visible if needed.It is currently not our procedure to go into the cargo bin and verify hazardous material or claims of freight. Although not very practical; that would be one solution to the problem.

[Report Narrative Contained No Additional Information.]

An EMB-145 crew was notified after arrival that a 26 pound Lithium-Ion battery shipment had been transported even though clearly labeled 'CARGO AIRCRAFT ONLY FORBIDDEN IN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT'.

1605521

201812

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Door Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1605521

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

The pilots have a procedure when the 737 aircraft terminated at a station to turn off the batteries. This leaves the cabin crew deplaning with pax without the use of the interphone or PA in the event of an emergency.

B737 Flight Attendant reported dangerous situation during deplaning at trip termination due to ground power interruption.

1622577

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Taxi

Falcon 50

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Parked

Parking Brake

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1622577

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Ramp

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Human Factors; Airport; Aircraft

Aircraft

Our aircraft was taxied to a busy and confined ramp area occupied by three large jets either taxiing in or out at approximately the same time. We were temporarily parked to make room and all engines shutdown. Parking brake was set awaiting our aircraft to be towed to another parking space within a few minutes. The APU was running and another jet aircraft was starting engines in the adjacent spot so noise was a factor. One pilot was walking outside our aircraft door while the other remained inside the cockpit or cabin. At no point did the pilot inside exit our aircraft or leave the cockpit or cabin unattended. Ground equipment and personnel were nearby and arranging to come straight over to tow our aircraft to a different spot. There were several notable distractions outside events on the ramp including an unattended aircraft that came loose under tow and was rolling backward on a collision course with ours. Luckily the other aircraft was stopped by a pilot running out from a hanger and opening the door to jump inside. The pilot inside our aircraft was discussing a minor cabin equipment issue with operations by phone while going between the cockpit and cabin when this event occurred. The mutual assumption was that our aircraft would be connected for towing and at some point had been chocked. The parking brake had already been set for several minutes and was holding our aircraft in position on the same ramp as it had done many times before. The outside pilot then went into the terminal to check on passengers. The pilot remaining inside our aircraft felt a movement consistent with a tug being connecting to the nose gear and went forward to the cockpit expecting to see one in place and then release the parking brake. No tug was seen and the aircraft was felt to start rolling backward despite the parking brake still being set. The pilot quickly occupied the left seat and seeing that the parking brake was still set; applied both brake pedals fully and turned on the standby hydraulic pump attempting to stop. The aircraft rolled straight back until it was either stopped by this braking action or by both main wheels going just a foot or two off the ramp area into soft ground. No damage occurred but the main wheels were stuck and the aircraft later towed back onto the ramp with proper recovery equipment.

Falcon 50 pilot reported while waiting for a tow the aircraft rolled backwards off the ramp area; even with the parking brake set.

1120501

201310

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Other; Party2 Flight Crew

1120501

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

1120802.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Normal marshaling into gate; stopped normally; normal hand signals to include chocks in signal from Marshaller. At that point I released the parking brake and called for the Parking Checklist. While accomplishing the checklist; I notice movement in my left peripheral vision; glanced up; saw the jetway moving forward; smoothly applied brakes; and set the parking brake. The aircraft started rolling backward and either pushed the rear chock out of place; the chock was incorrectly positioned; or not in position. Rampers came on the intercom; hooked up the tow bar; and towed the aircraft forward to the stop point; and I set the parking brake for the remainder of the turn. There was a briefing page change which I reviewed before reporting to the aircraft and reviewed it once again enroute. I overlooked the notice to keep parking brakes set at [specific gates at this airport; including the one we wereparked at]. A more vigilant review of the briefing page on my part would have prevented this. Recommend that briefing pages with gates like this have the gate list include bold lettering to draw additional attention to special gate requirements.

Parked at Gate XXX; Ramper gave us the chocks in signal. Captain released the parking brake and we began the Parking Checklist. After a few seconds; the Captain noticed the aircraft was rolling backward. He quickly set the parking brake and the aircraft stopped. We communicated with the Rampers via headset and they pulled us back into the gate. More vigilance by the Ground Crew giving hand signals at an appropriate time. More vigilance for the flight crew during times when we are heads down accomplishing checklists.

B737 flight crew reports rolling back after parking at the gate with chocks in. The brakes are applied and the ground crew tugs the aircraft back to the spot. The company briefing page indicates that at this gate and another the company uses at this airport require the parking brakes to remain set at all times.

1449311

201704

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

VMC

10

Night

1500

Government

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Other 107

None

Utility / Infrastructure

Cruise

None

Class G ZZZ

Gate / Ramp / Line

Government

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3500; Flight Crew Type 10

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1449311

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

At approximately XA:42; I arrived on location. Upon arrival; I performed sUAS operation in support of law enforcement officers under fire from the active shooter to provide over watch of the scene until sunset. The following information was used to evaluate the decision to continue operations beyond evening Civil Twilight at XF:20 hours: a fellow sUAS pilot and myself were within night currency on all aircraft flown (30 days); the area was flooded with light from three industrial flood lights and lights from responding armored vehicles; the aircraft met the lighting standard necessary under 14 CFR Part 107; assisting law enforcement agency had an operational night waiver under their Certificate of Authorization (COA); I have extensive education and experience in operating manned aircraft at night; and finally; the night operation did not significantly increase our Risk Assessment (RA) factor over our daytime factor. In hindsight; I should have made an emergency (Special Government Interest) request to operate at night through the FAA's Regional Operation Center (ROC).

A law enforcement UAV pilot reported operating a drone after civil twilight in violation of FAR 107.29. He and a fellow UAV operator were both night qualified and operating in support of an active law enforcement action.

1673874

201908

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Fatigue

1673874

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Staffing

Ambiguous

I am on short call reserve. Frequently; I am scheduled out to [reserve] because this is allowed per CFR 117 and our CBA. On this trip I was scheduled to fly [to] ZZZ; blocking in 14:40 minutes after my [Reserve] started; and 17:40 after I woke up for the day. Although I don't agree that this flavor of scheduling is smart or safety conscious; it's a frequent occurrence for me; and it's not realistic that I'm going to call in fatigued every time Crew Scheduling gives me a fatiguing assignment. If that were the case; I'd be calling in fatigued every week.Anyhow; on approach in ZZZ I was so tired I forgot to arm APP mode when cleared for the ILS 28C and couldn't figure out why I wasn't tracking the glide slope. I was in LOC and LVL CHG; but didn't notice that error. I couldn't figure out why my flight guidance on my PFD or in the HUD wasn't working as intended. I finally flipped up the HUD and turned off my FD. The entire approach; I was porpoising through the glide slope; first high; then low; then high; then low; etc…; and I couldn't figure out why because I was so tired. I think the approach technically met the stabilized criteria; but I honestly don't remember I was so fatigued. Once I cleared the runway; I didn't understand the taxi instructions and almost turned the wrong way.The last [XX] months on reserve have been a constant uphill against poor and unsafe scheduling; combating chronic and cumulative fatigue; and a corporate culture that pretends to put safety above all else; yet consistently demonstrates to our reserve pilots that this isn't the case. No level of threat and error management or good CRM can trap all the schedule related threats being thrown my way or the way of all of our reserve pilots. Positive; safety conscious scheduling policies and procedures could however mitigate most of these threats. Sadly; that isn't the culture at our airline presently. Frankly; I've been lucky for the last [XX] months. As I saw in ZZZ the other night; my luck has finite limits. All of our luck has limits. I'm afraid that if this level of unsafe and fatiguing scheduling keeps up for our reserve pilots; an aircraft incident or accident is on our near horizon. See abovePut in place fatigue mitigation rules for our pilots on reserve.

Air carrier pilot was flying an ILS approach in the wrong flight mode and did not understand why. Pilot described fatigue as the primary concern; regarding scheduling of reserve pilots.

1699225

201911

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Nose Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1699225

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 197; Flight Crew Type 268

1699237.0

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors

During push back; ramp crew appeared to use excessive 'angle' to maneuver aircraft during pushback. A loud bang was heard and push crew stopped push. They explained that [the] tow bar had broken and brakes needed to be set as push was ending. They advised Maintenance was needed and we called Maintenance. They arrived and assessed there was damage to the nose gear and a 'super tug' would be needed to bring us back to gate. Eventually we were towed back to the gate. Maintenance entry was produced by crew and [the] aircraft [was] taken out of service.

Broken tow bar during pushback following several loud metal-on-metal noises. Maintenance determined that the push also resulted in damage to the nose landing gear. Maintenance pinned the gear and asked flight crew to re-pressurize the hydraulic system to straighten the nose gear. Maintenance then called for a super tug to effect the gate return.

B737 flight crew reported pushback tug driver used an extreme angle resulting in a broken tow bar and damaged nose gear.

1506715

201712

1801-2400

CLT.TRACON

NC

Night

TRACON CLT

Other all

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Other all

IFR

Other all

Descent; Cruise; Initial Climb

Vectors; Direct

Class E CLT

Facility CLT.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1506715

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Company Policy

During a very busy arrival and departure session. It appeared that ZTL Center started to vector aircraft off of the arrival and towards my departure corridor. TMC (Traffic Management Coordinator) and the Supervisor told me after the fact that they released my airspace to Center without my knowledge. TMC told me they told Center to call me with a point out but I never talked to Center. Approximately 5 or 6 aircraft entered my airspace without approval or point out from me and at the time I had multiple departures climbing underneath this operation; then the supervisor approved them to hold an aircraft again in my airspace without my approval. I asked the Supervisor after this situation why this occurred and why we didn't have Center go into holding. The Supervisor told me that I should have known what was going on and that it was ok for someone else to approve operations in my airspace. I stated this was unacceptable and a very unsafe practice. After the first aircraft was coordinated; the TMC should have went in to holding in the appropriate location. The Supervisor should have seen what was happening and also discussed holding the aircraft. The supervision was very poor in this entire situation.

CLT TRACON Controller reported that his Supervisor assigned some of his airspace to ZTL Center without his knowledge.

1030176

201208

A90.TRACON

NH

13000.0

VMC

TRACON A90

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR KRANN

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Time Pressure

1030176

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Cleared via KRANN RNAV STAR; expect Runway 22. Two minutes from KRANN we were re-cleared Runway 27 arrival. I forgot to put in 5;000 FT in the MCP. I was putting Runway 27 in the CDU and the CDU showed a route discontinuity after KRANN. Plus; I was unsure of tracking outbound on the 075 radial; or 078 radial. I think we were at 13;000 FT. About this time the co-pilot said we were supposed to cross KRANN at 11;000 FT. I said; 'What!!' We were already 1;500 FT high on the descent page. I disconnected the autopilot; pulled the speed brake; and made our crossing restriction.I did not know we were cleared lower. I thought only about the route. At this point I was still hand flying and we were talking about which radial to fly. I told the First Officer 'I thought the 075;' he said; 'the 075--then; no the 078.' I said 'What?' and he pointed to the inset [on the STAR chart which displays the additional runway transitions]. Boy!! I put 5;000 FT in the MCP; put autopilot on; closed up the route discontinuity; and began briefing the Approach. We then began getting vectors; conducted the approach and landed. After completing the parking check; I told the First Officer I had messed up. He said it was confusing and we were tired. I said; 'No excuses; I messed up!' It was my first time doing this arrival; I should have looked it over better. My fault; period. The next day we had a jump-seater in the cockpit who was commuting to work. After talking a while at cruise; I said; 'You probably don't fly into BOS; but if you do; be careful on this KRANN arrival. I messed it up last night and felt like a fool. I don't want that to happen to you or anybody else.' He said; 'That's funny; because I commuted last trip on another carrier's Airbus and those poor guys messed it up also. Maybe you ought to write a safety report.' I started thinking; if other pilots are also having trouble I should write this up to prevent some other poor guys from having the same trouble.

While descending via the KRANN RNAV STAR to BOS the flight crew of an air carrier aircraft suffered serious confusion and distraction when Approach Control changed their Runway from 22L to 27.

1056352

201212

1201-1800

ZHU.ARTCC

TX

VMC

Daylight

Center ZHU

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZHU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1056352

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy

In cruise back to IAH we heard a similar call sign; Flight ABG took our hand off to a new frequency. Our flight number was Flight ABC. The other aircraft had already switched so we were asked by Houston to contact them and ask them to return to frequency. We did and both flights were unaffected. This threat of far too similar flight numbers has been a growing problem and is directly attributable to company policy. While I understand the company's marketing department assigns blocks of flight numbers for us to use; they need to be aware that there are too similar flight numbers flying in the same geographical area and they are directly impacting safety. This isn't an isolated incident; it happens frequently. Going forward I am going to report every one of these events to attempt to get the attention of the Company and FAA; in an attempt to force the company to re-evaluate their flight number assignment procedures.

Air Carrier described a confused communications event with ATC; listing that the company practice of assigning similar four digit call signs within the same area at the same time is directly impacting safety.

1285660

201508

1201-1800

RJJJ.ARTCC

FO

35000.0

IMC

Thunderstorm

Daylight

Center RJJJ

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1285660

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1285664.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Procedure

Procedure

[Inbound to Asia] we were heading west on R220; 'N route' passing NIPPI and approximately 180 NMs from NOGAL [when] our on-board weather radar started painting a significant line of showers on the N track all the way south to the O track of the NOPACs. Our flight conditions at the time were IMC with light turbulence. I contacted the flight attendant who was stationed at the forward galley to pass along to all of the other flight attendants to please take their seats. (Side note; the flight plan forecasted turbulence values at NIPPI was a 3 and NOGAL was a 2. With that information; I briefed the Purser at the gate that [we] were forecasted turbulence 9 hours into the flight). We were given clearance from Tokyo (Fukuoka RJJJ) to climb to FL350. We were unable to climb any higher due to airplane performance. At FL350; we were still IMC with the on-board weather radar still showing the significant rain showers ahead of our flight path. We discussed that we needed to get relief from our flight path and go 20 NMs right (north) of track N for weather. FO utilizing CPDLC with RJJJ; requested a 20NM OFFSET right of course for weather. RJJJ responded quickly 'UNABLE DUE TO AIRSPACE RESTRICTION'. We then asked RJJJ via CPDLC for a 10NM right OFFSET for weather. RJJJ responded quickly stating; 'SORRY; WE CAN NOT ACPT RIGHT SIDE DUE TO AIRSPACE RESTRICTION'.The significant rain showers were now closing in on our flight path. We switched to Tokyo HF; frequency 13273 and spoke to Tokyo directly telling them that we needed to come right for weather. The Tokyo radio operator responded; 'UNABLE; AIRSPACE RESTRICTION'.It was that moment; which for the SAFETY of the passengers and of the crew that I told the Tokyo radio operator that 'I was exercising my Captain's Emergency Authority and turning right to deviate from the showers'. The Tokyo radio operator responded again; 'UNABLE YOUR REQUEST'. I then responded with 'MAYDAY; MAYDAY; MAYDAY; [FLIGHT] IS OFFSETTING RIGHT OF TRACK 10NM FOR WEATHER. WE WILL ADVISE ATC WHEN WE ARE CENTERLINE TRACK 'N'. FO loaded a 10NM right offset in the FMC and we proceeded with the offset. I made a radio transmission on VHF 123.45 to all traffic that might be nearby of our intentions. We stayed on the 10 NM offset for approximately 10 minutes missing the severe weather radar returns. We were still IMC with ride conditions approaching MODERATE turbulence.Once clear of the significant weather; we removed the 10 NM offset in the FMC and proceeded back on track 'N' centerline. We contacted Tokyo on the same HF frequency and told them that we were back on centerline and clear of weather. Tokyo acknowledged our call and said thank you. I called the flight attendants who were at their station if all was all right? They told me that all was fine in the cabin.[Later] I free texted Dispatch the following; '[EARLIER TODAY] I EXERCISED MY CAPTAINS EMERGENCY AUTHORITY; THUNDERSTORMS 180 NM EAST OF NOGAL/ DEVATED R10NM FOR 10 MINUTES BACK ON COURSE MODERATE TURBULENCE'. Dispatch never responded to my free text message. FO and I plotted on our charts what a 10NM offset on track N would look like on our Pacific Orientation chart showing we were at least 25 NM from the 'Petro... UHPP' FIR. Would I do this again if placed in the same situation? For the safety of the passengers and the crew; yes; definitely and without hesitation.

The ability to deviate for weather in both directions is very important. If we can't reliably expect to be able to deviate as we see appropriate for dynamic weather events/situations; especially where airspace restrictions are critical; then maybe we shouldn't be filed on that route when weather is forecast.

Air carrier flight crew reported deviating from cleared track in RJJJ airspace to avoid weather even though ATC refused to clear the deviation.

1115157

201309

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

12500.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

TRACON ZZZ

Military

Super King Air 350

Cruise

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1115157

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

A Super King Air 350 was orbiting over [a nearby lake] at 12;500 and had been there for approximately 1 hour. With previous ZZZ departures; I had utilized vectors to avoid the Super King Air's flight path and keep departure traffic climbing. I had just finished resolving a conflict involving merging target procedures and coordination with multiple sectors. When a 737-700 checked on they were direct OAL; I instructed them to climb and maintain 16;000. My relief showed up at the position and I began the relief brief. I immediately went into the checklist and started the brief. During the brief I noticed the Super King Air was going to be a conflict with the B737-700 and I instructed the B737-700 to 'turn 10 degrees to the left vector for traffic' I did not call traffic with the vector. This vector put the B737-700 in a worse position to avoid the Super King Air's flight path. I continued on with the relief brief; and a few seconds later the relieving Controller advised me that I needed to turn the B737-700 more to avoid the Super King Air. I then instructed the B737-700 to 'turn 20 degrees to the left.' The B737-700 responded to my instructions; after they responded I realized that the control instructions I provided would not solve the conflict. I then attempted to turn the Super King Air with no acknowledgment. As the B737-700 was climbing through 11;100 I instructed them to amend altitude and maintain 12;000 and issued traffic. I received no immediate reply from the B737-700; a few seconds later they informed me that they were stopping at 12;000 for a TCAS RA. The Super King Air was never issued traffic on the B737-700. Recommendation; I had worked several busy sessions this day and was experiencing some mental fatigue. When my relief arrived I started the brief to soon. In the future; prior to starting the briefing I will take more time to review my traffic to ensure I have correctly resolved any potential conflicts. I told the B737-700 vectors to the left when I was thinking right turns; and continued to make the problem worse by issuing another left turn instead of a right turn. I think this was in part to being mentally fatigued. I will continue to improve my hearback/readback skills to avoid these mistakes. I will also issue traffic with the vector. If I had done that then maybe the B737-700 would have questioned the direction of the turn. Anticipating where VFR aircraft in and orbit will be and trying to vector around them is a bad practice. Going forward I will use altitude separation first as a 'paper stop' then apply vectors if necessary to remove the 'paper stop.'

TRACON Controller described a TCAS RA event when failing to note a developing conflict during a relief briefing; the reporter acknowledged altitude separation should have been used in this scenario.

1112152

201309

0001-0600

ZOA.ARTCC

CA

34000.0

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZOA

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

B737-500

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZOA

Facility ZOA.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1112152

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I was training on D34; my Instructor asked me if any aircraft were in conflict; after my scan I told him a B737-500 was climbing slow out of FL265 to FL370 and was a factor with a MD-83 opposite direction at FL340. I pointed this out to the R-Side. The traffic was about 7 minutes apart; my R-Side decided to issue 1;800 FPM for 4 minutes to the B737-500. The aircraft said he could do that but that he was heavy today. After a few minutes; I asked if he wanted to stop the B737-500 at FL330; and he said no; so I flashed the aircraft to the next sector. My Instructor told the R-Side that he was not ensuring separation and didn't agree with his climb rate calculation. About 4-5 minutes before the conflict point; I called the next sector as they were calling me. They asked if I was planning on toping the Md-83; I said yes; and got control of MD-83 in case we needed to turn the aircraft. Maybe 2 minutes before the conflict; my R-Side asked if I could check what direct EUG looked like for the MD-83; I told him it appeared to be maybe 5 degrees to the right. So the R-side issued it to the pilot; then 1 minute before the conflict; he turned the aircraft 10 degrees right. At 15 seconds before the conflict he asked the B737-500 to verify out of FL350; the pilot reported out of FL349; the next update we showed the Mode C at FL348 and less then 5 miles. Recommendation; better controller judgment; there was no need to keep the B737-500 climbing; we could have stopped the aircraft and let the next sector climb passing traffic.

ZOA Controller described a loss of separation event when the R-Side failed to accept the suggestions of the D-Side and tried to climb above an aircraft; the reporter suggesting an altitude 'stop' would have prevented to event.

1617896

201902

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1500.0

Mixed

Turbulence; Rain; 2

Daylight

1500

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Eclipse 500

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 6500; Flight Crew Type 1100

1617896

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

This event occurred on final approach as I was beginning to transition from IMC to visual conditions on the ILS Runway XX at ZZZ. The ILS was flown with the autopilot engaged until approximately 1;500 AGL. At approximately 1;500 AGL; I pressed the autopilot disconnect button; (gray button on the control stick). I noticed the autopilot did not disconnect and I could feel the clutch was still engaged. I paused for a moment and quickly moved to press the 'ALL INTERRUPT' (red button). The 'ALL INTERRUPT' button also disengaged the Flight Director which made it difficult to maintain the ILS glideslope and localizer course. At the moment of the failure; I had intermittent Ground contact and after a rough and wobbly transition; I was able to make appropriate corrections; complete the approach; and land safely.

Eclipse 550 Captain reported autopilot disengage issues during final approach.

1650530

201906

1201-1800

SBP.Airport

CA

3100.0

Daylight

TRACON SBA

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

GPS

Final Approach

Class D SBP

Facility SBA.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1650530

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

Aircraft X was advised to expect a single turn on to final - aircraft was tighter on the approach than necessary in an effort to squeeze him in front of 3 faster aircraft inbound to ZZZ. Aircraft X was number 1; descending to 031. Shortly afterward; the single turn to final was issued; clearance for the RNAV Runway 29 SBP issued; and the clearance read back. I took care of other duties while keeping an eye on the [aircraft]. I noticed he went through final; advised him my turn on might have been a little later/too tight; and issued a heading of 280 to get him back onto the approach course. I made a transmission or two to other aircraft; then observed Aircraft X was tracking something closer to a 290 north of the RNAV 29 final approach course; very close to the 3;500 foot MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude) around 5 mile final for SBP. I advised the aircraft to turn right heading 020 immediately and expedite climb to 035 due to high terrain. Aircraft X read back correctly; but did not begin the turn until appearing to be just inside of the eastern line of the 035 foot MVA. At this time I realized as he was turning he was heading towards a higher 4;400 foot MVA; so I issued another immediate turn to 110 for terrain with a climb to 4;500 feet. The turn was made; the aircraft climbed; and he was placed just over 3 miles north of the 2 jets inbound to SBP. He was re-sequenced to be number 3; with no additional issues on his approach. Ensure aircraft comply with instructions in a timely manner and issue instructions with time enough for pilots to comply before MVA's are a factor.

SBA TRACON Controller reported pilot making late turns while vectoring aircraft onto RNAV final resulting in entering areas of higher MVA.

1762499

202009

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 114; Flight Crew Total 5013; Flight Crew Type 3898

1762499

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Cockpit notified during pushback of a passenger who was verbally abusive to one of the flight attendants along with refusing to wear her mask. Passenger was loud and abusive and appeared to be heavily intoxicated. Captain elected to have the aircraft towed to the gate. Passenger service along with a Supervisor met the aircraft. Offending passenger was deplaned along with her traveling companion without incident. Airport police were not requested. Flight departed for ZZZ 20 minutes later uneventfully.

Air carrier Captain reported that after pushback the aircraft was towed back to the gate to remove a passenger who was verbally abusive and refused to wear a face mask.

1233039

201501

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

3000.0

IMC

Cloudy

Daylight

TRACON NCT; Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 28L

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 20400; Flight Crew Type 1800

Workload; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1233039

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Workload

1232931.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Weather; Procedure

Procedure

On the arrival; SFO ATIS was calling for 3 miles visibility and the Bridge Visuals to 28L and 28R. After passing LOZIT on the GOLDEN GATE arrival; NORCAL advised us expect ILS 28R. We set up and briefed ILS 28R. Shortly after that NORCAL said change to ILS 28L. On base NORCAL said change to ILS 28R; and cleared for the ILS 28R. When NORCAL handed us off to SFO Tower about 2 miles prior to the bridge and we checked in with SFO tower they said after the bridge change to Runway 28L. We had ground contact visually and had approximately 4 miles visibility; but could not see the airport. We felt that we would pick up the runway shortly. The First Officer; Pilot Monitoring; re-setup the FMC and flight directors for 28L and I took the airplane off autopilot and started a slight side step to the left; while we were waiting for the instruments to respond to the ILS 28L. Last minute runway change takes pilot monitoring out of the loop at a critical time. When the instruments responded to the reset we found ourselves to the left of the localizer; I believe this was due to a crosswind aloft from the East. As I was correcting for the localizer and just before deciding to go around because of the approach becoming unstable; the First Officer in the back right seat called the runway in sight to the right of the aircraft. Because of the conditions I decided the safest decision would be to continue to land. I discussed that with the 3 first officers and they agreed. I feel that NORCAL as well as SFO Tower do not realize that so many runway changes on an approach in IMC conditions is more difficult for the crew and takes them out of the loop at a critical time. I also feel that ATC does not realize how long it takes and how many steps there are to execute a runway change and properly brief each approach. I also feel that we as airline crew have a tendency to overly cooperate with ATC. I do not believe that our aircraft was in danger at any point but in retrospect I feel I should have either not accepted the clearance from tower to change runways or should have gone around in lieu of the change.

I believe the succession of approach changes (4) we received from LOZIT to final contributed to this event. I believe as a crew our willingness to comply with SFO tower's final clearance was the pivotal event. We should have responded 'Unable' and continued the approach to 28R. Instead; we attempted to change ILS approaches while inside the OM without visually acquiring the runway.

A flight crew flying the ILS Runway 28R approach to the bridge then a change to Runway 28L; with four miles visibility and still outside of 6 DME; was unable to get visual on Runway 28L. They then begin to go missed when the runway comes into view. Captain elects to continue the landing.

1245092

201503

1201-1800

BJI.Airport

MN

VMC

Cross wind; 10

12000

CTAF BJI; Center ZMP

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Other pattern work

Class E ZMP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 37; Flight Crew Type 27

Training / Qualification

1245092

Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

I preformed a go around after winds changed on my first landing attempt. On my second landing attempt and upon landing I didn't sufficiently correct for the cross wind and went off the runway. I applied more than needed braking action and when the left wing lifted the left wheel off the ground and continued braking on right wheel [exacerbated] the problem causing the aircraft to turn sharp to the right.

C172 student pilot reported losing directional control during landing when he failed to properly correct for a crosswind.

1458354

201706

1201-1800

ZLC.ARTCC

UT

12000.0

Center ZLC

Golden Eagle 421

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZLC

Facility ZLC.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1458354

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I had been sitting at the sector for about 15 mins. BigSky APCH (Boise) flashed Aircraft X; a (C421) probably 15 minutes before the aircraft would be in my airspace. The Aircraft X had a final altitude of 090 in the data block. I brought up my MIAs knowing that this altitude would be below the MIA along the route. After doing this; I came to the conclusion that 100 would be a safe altitude for Aircraft X. BigSky APCH called me for something (don't remember now) and I asked the controller to climb Aircraft X to 100 for terrain. She responded 'wilco' and took the hand off back. I continued to work and sometime later accepted the hand off on Aircraft X at 120. 'Even better;' I thought to myself. I issued the BOI altimeter to Aircraft X when the aircraft checked on and went back to working without re-checking my MIAs. Aircraft X was now between 5 and 10 nm north of the original route that I had looked at earlier. The MSAW alert went off on Aircraft X for a 129 MIA ahead. I measured Aircraft X's current heading and believe it was like a 092. I issued a right turn to a heading of 110 to Aircraft X thinking that I went more then needed on the heading. I continued to work and kept checking back on Aircraft X. It looked close to me; but I believed the heading was working and would ultimately work. The MSAW never stopped flashing that kept me second guessing. I felt that the aircraft was on the boundary of the 129 MIA; but still clear. But; the fact that the MSAW didn't stop flashing until the aircraft was clear of the MIA makes me question if I was safe or not?First off; I should have re-examined Aircraft X's route and the MIA's along it. Secondly I should have issued a stronger turn to the aircraft ensuring that it would stay plenty clear of the higher MIA.

Salt Lake Center Controller reported an unsafe situation where an aircraft was given an altitude to maintain below the Minimum IFR Altitude.

1141204

201401

1801-2400

BIRD.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center BIRD

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A BIRD

HF SSB

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 13000

Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1141204

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot

1141429.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

Queried Edmonton ATC several times about when/how to obtain oceanic clearance. Finally gave us HF frequency. About that time my crew meal came up; I began to eat and the relief pilot called Gander radio; advised we were CPDLC and requested a SELCAL check; but it did not register with me that he did not specifically request an oceanic clearance. Shortly; after crossing the FIR boundary; we received SELCAL and were given an oceanic clearance. Poor HF made the process very difficult but finally heard 'readback correct.'

What followed throughout the remaining time span contained within this report was a virtual constant struggle to obtain and maintain a clearly understandable HF communication with Iceland. Static; in/out fad; and weak signals were dominant. With the Oceanic Clearance; and multiple HF SELCALS from Iceland; numerous attempts on primary; secondary; and other frequencies printed on the Navigation charts were attempted. The secondary frequency of 11279 was totally unusable; and 8879; 8891; 4675; 5649; and 5616 were also utilized to no avail. After much difficulty an Oceanic Clearance was received and read back on HF 8864.During this HF fiasco; both CPDLC and ADS either dropped offline or were intermittent. At no point in this process was a route flown other than what the clearance that was understood by this crew.

Flight deck confusion and intermittent communications with ATC resulted in a B777 entering oceanic airspace without a clearance.

1226427

201412

0001-0600

FLL.Airport

FL

0.0

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 0; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 7100

1226427

Other Unwanted Situation

Person Observer

Other Not stated

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

The elevated portion of runway 10R/28L and taxiway 'J' east of 'J-8' ranges from approximately 35ft to 55ft above the surrounding grade level. In the event of a passenger evacuation; (especially from a widebody aircraft); in the above areas; there are few barriers or railings that would prevent passengers from falling or being pushed over the edge of the high MSE (Mechanically Stabilized Earth) walls. The elevation of these walls go up to as high as a five story building. Of special concern is that portion of taxiway 'J' which spans a railroad line and a 6 lane highway via a taxiway bridge. Any widebody aircraft stopped on this bridge would be incapable of safely conducting a passenger evacuation due to the closeness of the edges of the bridge in relation to the bottom of the deployed passenger escape slides. Additionally; FLL has only two stairways that would permit egressing passengers to escape from the vicinity of a burning aircraft; stopped on the elevated portion of the runway/taxiway; down to ground level.

A retired air carrier Captain reported concern about the lack of safe area available for passengers and crews following an emergency evacuation conducted on the artificially elevated east end of Runway 10R/28L at FLL.

1659277

201906

1201-1800

CHA.Tower

TN

Tower CHA

Military

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Final Approach

Other Instrument Approach

Class C CHA

Facility CHA.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.0

Situational Awareness

1659277

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X was instructed to circle and overfly the airfield for a left base. Aircraft X joined the left downwind for circle and another aircraft was on final. Aircraft X would have had to turn very close inside of the aircraft on final. I canceled his approach clearance while in the downwind and turned him out to a 240 heading and climbed to 4;000 feet. Aircraft X went into the 3;600 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude at 2;300 feet.

A CHA Tower Controller reported they had to vector an aircraft out of the pattern and it flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1431611

201703

1801-2400

APA.Airport

CO

0.0

Turbulence

Tower APA

Light Transport

2.0

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

None

Class D APA

Facility APA.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.5

Other / Unknown

1431611

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Weather

Weather

The aircraft was cleared for takeoff. Both wind and turbulence information were given to the pilot. At aircraft rotation the aircraft banked to the left for a split second and then returned to a wings level attitude. I did not observe the right wing of the aircraft make contact with the runway. The pilot did not say anything about hitting the wing on the runway; so I turned the aircraft and switched them to departure.

APA Airport Controller reported watching an aircraft depart; then observed the aircraft bank to the left; then correct to level wings. Aircrafts right wing apparently hit the ground when correcting.

1772411

202011

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

9000.0

Center ZZZ

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Small Aircraft

IFR

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 3; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Workload; Time Pressure

1772411

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Staffing

Staffing

Aircraft X was climbing out of 5;000 feet for 10;000 feet. Aircraft Y was 25 NM NW and level at 9;000 feet SE bound. The sectors were combined and busy with a full workload including practice approaches on the north side of the sector configuration; with multiple in-bounds as well as terminal arrival and departure traffic. Aircraft X initially had a good climb rate which declined with altitude; and became traffic for Aircraft Y. The two aircraft were opposite directions and at around 7 miles apart Aircraft X was only at 8;300 feet and climbing and would not top Aircraft Y at 9;000 feet. Traffic alert was issued to Aircraft X and given a 30 degree turn to the right and a descent to 8;000 feet. Traffic was issued to Aircraft Y and a climb to 10;000 feet. Aircraft Y reported Aircraft X in sight and was instructed to maintain visual separation and to climb and maintain 10;000 feet. To my knowledge separation was never lost but was close.Due to very short staffing; along with COVID-19 scheduling this makes it hard to mitigate busy traffic by splitting sectors in the optimal efficiency of running the NAS. Other issues that could have been preventive; would be the presence of a Supervisor to staff the area when a Supervisor was scheduled for work; however; the Supervisor was on break and a Controller in Charge took the position which greatly hurts the staffing of able bodies to the operation.

Center Controller reported a possible loss of separation and cited COVID-19 related staffing issues as a contributing factor.

1218470

201411

0601-1200

ZZZZ

FO

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked; Descent; Taxi

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Flight Attendant In Charge

Safety Related Duties

Physiological - Other

1218470

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We were making an extended descent when I was notified by Flight Attendant (FA) C and FA K that there was an extremely foul odor that was detected in the section of the aircraft; from approximately row 18 to the back galley. They were also experiencing a burning sensation in their nasal passages; metallic taste in their mouths; congestion in the throat; headaches that came on quite suddenly. FA-A; myself; proceeded to the back galley; after detecting the same odor & beginning to feel same effects; I went to forward galley & reported all to Captain by interphone. FA-B had been in the forward galley when all of this was reported. This call occurred about 5;500 feet before landing. After passengers deplaned; Captain called for maintenance & we reported to him what happened and when it occurred. Captain then advised us that the company requested he perform an engine check; running engines for 5 min; with the door closed & the mechanic on board - to see if the odor would duplicate itself. All FAs remained on board in first class area. During this test; mechanic detected the same odor & began experiencing the same ill effects that we had felt. After Captain consulted with the company; we were advised that he would have to do another engine check; much longer than the first. We chose to deplane during this second check & go into the terminal. FAs returned to the aircraft and we were told that the 2nd check did NOT produce the odor that was detected earlier. Captain made sure that we could safely function to perform our duties for a return flight before the passengers started to board. Boarding was completed and mechanics remained on board in the cockpit; conferring with the pilots; for quite some time. Myself; FA-A; FA-C and FA-K were still experiencing symptoms & ill effects on Flt back; but felt that we could make the flight; & we arrived at destination without further incidents. As of today; I continue to experience the symptoms of this exposure to the odor/fumes that I was exposed to.

A321 lead Flight Attendant is informed by another Flight Attendant of an extremely foul odor in the aft part of the cabin. The two aft galley Flight Attendants state they are experiencing burning sensations in their nasal passages; metallic taste in their mouths; congestion in the throat and headaches that came on quite suddenly. After landing maintenance is able to resolve the issue for the return flight.

1236171

201501

0601-1200

CLE.Airport

OH

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1236171

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors

While beginning the takeoff roll at approximately 90 KIAS the captain noticed the takeoff data speeds had not been entered. The decision was then made to abort the takeoff. We taxied off the runway to complete the QRH for aborted takeoff. The captain then informed maintenance; dispatch; and the on-call chief pilot that a high speed abort had occurred. Even though we completed a takeoff briefing and before takeoff checklist; we missed the fact the speeds had not been entered. After complying with the QRH checklist and waiting the required 15 minutes we re-briefed the takeoff and completed a before takeoff checklist; taking extra care to ensure all takeoff data was entered correctly. The flight continued without incident.Multiple threats led to the significant error that the captain and I failed to recognize and manage appropriately. After this event the captain and I had many questions about how we could have missed this error even though we completed a before takeoff checklist. We expected and were assigned runway 24L in CLE for departure. From our gate this was a very short taxi. Additionally the entire ramp area was covered in about an inch of ice with poor braking action reported. Most of our attention during the taxi-out from the ramp was devoted to the poor surface conditions. This was time we normally would have begun briefing the takeoff due to such a short taxi to the runway. Upon leaving the ramp there was question about our taxi instructions. We clarified the instructions with ground control and continued taxiing toward the end of the runway. This took even more time away from us as we neared the runway. I then began briefing the approach. To the best of my knowledge I briefed the airspeeds; but it is evident I did not follow my usual habit of cross checking the set speeds with the TDM I was briefing from. We were nearing the runway at this point and I made the PA instructing the Flight Attendants (FA) to be seated. We promptly heard back from them and I began to run the before takeoff checklist very quickly. I did not follow the proper checklist procedure in making sure all the speeds were set when I replied 'verified ' to the flight instruments and speed bugs checklist item. We were then immediately cleared for takeoff and we took the runway to begin the takeoff roll. While at the time I did not feel rushed; looking back on it; I was. The Captain and I failed to recognize that the time constraint caused by all of the before mentioned threats was impacting the quality of our briefings and the usage of our checklists. It was our job to manage these threats and we didn't. Informing ground or tower before takeoff that we needed a few minutes to run some checklists would have given us plenty of time to brief and properly complete the before takeoff checklist. We also could have briefed before aircraft movement on the ramp. I normally would enter the speeds myself as soon as the TDM arrives; but I was in the bathroom when this occurred and I did not verify they were entered during the post TDM briefing. I should have been more vigilant at that point as well. The captain and I had been flying together for three days and we had become confident in each other's abilities and perhaps we let our guard down due to how much we trusted each other.In the future I will be more aware of the threats associated with a short taxi to the runway and make sure all briefings and checklists are completed correctly; even if this means briefing before taxi-out or informing ATC we are not ready for takeoff and need a few minutes to complete our checklists.

CL600 First Officer reported rejecting the takeoff at 90 knots when the flight crew realized takeoff speeds had not been set.

1051578

201211

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Cabin Lighting

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1051578

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1051587.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Ten minutes after take off we received 4 chimes from a Flight Attendant advising us that they had detected some smoke and fumes around row 8. She said she will investigate it more and call us back. In the meantime; I elected to run the 'Smoke/fire/fumes' checklist. Within about a minute the Flight Attendant called us back and informed us that in fact there was smoke and fumes coming from an overhead bin; and it smelled of melted plastic. At that point she was told to keep us updated and that we would declare an emergency and return to [departure airport]. We declared an emergency with ATC and requested vectors back. Requested ARFF crew and the frequency for them. Advised Tower we would stop on the runway. After we stopped; the First Officer coordinated with the ARFF crew while I made a PA to the passengers and flight attendants. I then opened the cockpit door to get a better visualization of the cabin situation. I asked the flight attendants if it was under control and could we just taxi back to the gate promptly. Their response was; 'Yes; it's okay; taxi back to the gate.' I told them to brief the passengers that when we get back to the gate that they were to deplane promptly without their luggage; and that rescue crews would be boarding after that. To my knowledge; no injuries were sustained. Maintenance determined it was a light ballast that overheated.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

MD-82 flight crew reported a Flight Attendant called with smoke in the cabin. They declared an emergency and returned to departure airport where a defective light ballast was determined to be the probable cause.

1865770

202112

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dawn

Air Taxi

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 2 Eng; Retractable Gear

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Climb

AC Generator/Alternator

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Distraction; Troubleshooting

1865770

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Workload

1865771.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

RH Alternator light illuminated on takeoff after gear retraction. Pilot Monitoring ran QRH. We returned to ZZZ. RH Alternator failure. ATC declared [priority handling].

After rotation; the right Alt Out light illuminated. We ran the QRH and it did not fix the alternator. ATC [requested priority handling] for us; and we returned for landing. The alternator failed.

Air taxi flight crew reported the alternator failed on departure and they returned to the airport.

1117823

201309

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

100

Daylight

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2100; Flight Crew Type 840

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1117823

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

During an off-airport landing on a gravel bar; I landed the airplane too fast and not properly configured (half flaps) for a short field landing. The aircraft overran the available gravel; entered the river; and flipped over. The proximal cause of this was a last minute decision to convert what was supposed to be my second reconnaissance pass into a landing; without running a checklist or properly configuring the airplane. An additional factor was not sticking to (and verbalizing) my plan to return for more fuel if I did not find a suitable landing site before reaching the end of my fuel budget. The root causes were that I had allowed myself to become mentally fatigued over the course of about 45 minutes looking for a suitable landing site; and also had allowed myself to become fixated on having to land in the immediate area (where we had seen caribou); without returning for more fuel.

A fatigued Glastar pilot attempted to land on an off airport gravel bar but overran the landing site; entered a river and flipped over after not configuring the aircraft for landing.

1765995

202010

1801-2400

SEA.Airport

WA

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class B SEA

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1765995

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

Encountered moderate wake turbulence (10-12 degrees roll) descending on the HAWKS Arrival into Seattle. The traffic we were following was well beyond 5 miles ahead of us; we estimate about 9 miles. We encountered wake approaching BREVE and had to slow down below the 250kts published speed to exit the wake and maintain control of the aircraft. Slowing down was effective in decreasing and exiting the wake. We had briefed wake turbulence avoidance earlier in the day. So we were already being cognizant of creating spacing and yet we still encountered wake at a conservative distance. Low visibility approaches were in effect so there was aircraft congestion and the controller was busy on the radio. Initially when we encountered wake we tried to notify the controller we needed to slow below published speed to exit it. However she was occupied by radio congestion to get the message across and didn't get our request to slow for wake; until after we already passed the restriction. When we finally connected with the controller she wanted us to speed back up to the published speeds to maintain her spacing into Seattle. I assessed as PIC that we had created enough separation by slowing so we resumed published speeds per her request. We only hit minimal wake turbulence thereafter. I saw the controller's preoccupation with spacing and radio congestion a threat. Although the autopilot did not disconnect; I disconnected it when I saw the airplane to through 10 degree rolling motions.I would like to see more aircraft spacing more than 5 miles behind a heavy. I learned that controllers sometimes do not create separation for wake. It is up to the pilots to be proactive. Controller preoccupation when weather is a consideration is a threat. Controllers will unfortunately try to give clearances that may be unsafe and it is up to the crew decide and deviate if safety is compromised.

EMB-175 Captain reported encountering wake turbulence 9 miles in trail of a heavy jet on arrival into SEA.

1001607

201203

0601-1200

IAH.Airport

TX

13000.0

VMC

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class B IAH

TRACON I90

Baron 55/Cochise

1.0

Descent

Class B IAH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1001607

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Horizontal 250; Vertical 500

N

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

Climbing out of Houston we were handed off from Houston Departure to Houston Center. No mention of a traffic conflict was given on either frequency. We received a TCAS TA for traffic 12 O'clock and 3-4 miles. The Captain asked ATC about the traffic. ATC responded very casually about the traffic and said something to effect of 'oh yeah; they didn't tell you about him.' He made it seem like it wasn't a conflict and in my mind I let my guard down slightly. A few seconds later we received a TCAS RA. At this point we were climbing through 13;000 FT or so. I believe the traffic was descending to 12;500 FT. The Captain was mostly talking to ATC on the radio.I hesitated a second or two to respond to the RA (due to my guard being down by ATC's casual response to the traffic) and then I followed the 'descend; descend' RA. A few seconds after initiating the descent I visually acquired the traffic (a Beech Baron) and informed the Captain that he was in sight. At this point; I knew that the traffic was not going to be a collision hazard and shallowed my descent. I don't believe the Captain heard that I had the traffic in sight and was wondering why I wasn't still descending at the recommended RA vertical speed. The traffic then passed off of our right wing; probably 200-300 FT horizontally and 400-600 FT vertically. At this point the Captain visually acquired the aircraft. We climbed uneventfully after the incident. ATC gave no indication that ANYTHING wrong had happened. 300-400 miles down the road to our destination; we were later contacted by a later Center asking about the incident. The event occurred because ATC failed to separate traffic for us. I still don't know exactly why or how it happened but my belief is that we were handed off my Houston Departure too early and before we were properly separated by the conflicting traffic. Upon checking in with Houston Center; we were at that point still below his airspace and thus he wasn't really looking out for conflicting traffic. I think everyone made some mistakes in this incident. ATC obviously failed to properly separate traffic. I personally failed in responding to the RA immediately. I believe the Captain failed in his response to the TA and RA by calling ATC first --- and not LOOKING for the traffic first. With ATC being the first 'link' in the chain being broken; the Captain FIRST called the one person who should have avoided the entire situation to begin with. ATC's response to the Captain's inquiry was also a failure. By his responding casually and almost indicating that the traffic wasn't an issue; I believe both the Captain and I lowered our guards.

A CRJ-200 experienced a TCAS TA and RA with respect to a BE58 while climbing through about 13;000 departing from IAH.

1634183

201904

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116.93; Flight Crew Total 499.27; Flight Crew Type 499.27

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1634183

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Aircraft; MEL

Aircraft

Unable to operate Aircraft X [from] ZZZ due to multiple MEL's [Minimum Equipment List] on the fuel system.

A320 Captain refused aircraft due to multiple MEL fuel problems.

1091460

201305

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

9000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Leading Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Instructor

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

1091460

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

At approximately 9;000 feet MSL; on an east downwind just after calling for Flaps 1; the Master Caution FLT CONT light and message illuminated. The Yaw Damper had kicked off and could not be reset. We then noticed that the flaps had barely started to move and had not gone to the commanded position. There was an asymmetry indicated. I declared an emergency to Approach and told them we had a flight control problem and we would need vector to accomplish the checklist. I first went to the Trailing Edge Flaps Asymmetry Checklist; which due to the actual configuration led me to the ALL FLAPS UP LANDING checklist. After running the checklist and checking with the advisory landing distances for abnormal configurations table and adding a safety margin similar to that used in computing certificated landing data (an additional 60%) since I was not interested in using max manual braking and maximum reverse thrust; I determined that it wasn't prudent to land on 17l and requested a runway with at least 10;200 feet of available runway. ATC offered 17C and I accepted. We briefed the flight attendants and let SOC know about the emergency and proceeded to execute a visual approach to RWY 17C. Weight was approximately 127;000 pounds and ref speed was around 180 knots. I touched down and used reverse thrust and spoilers to decelerate until 60 knots when I used the wheel brakes. I passed on the info to ARFF that I had not used wheel brakes until 60 knots and had no concern for hot brakes and requested taxi to the gate. I taxied to the gate uneventfully. Conferred with Maintenance about the problem; talked with the Dispatcher and finished the IOE paperwork for my student.

While approaching to land and upon initial configuration of aircraft; the Boeing 737-800 crew received a Master Caution warning and FLT CONT light. The yaw damper had also disconnected and could not be reset. An emergency was declared and all of the appropriate steps were accomplished prior to executing an all flaps up landing at about 180 knots. Aircraft was then taxied to the gate uneventfully.

1090277

201305

1801-2400

ZTL.ARTCC

GA

7300.0

VMC

15

Daylight

8000

Center ZTL

Corporate

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 64; Flight Crew Total 8265; Flight Crew Type 1028

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1090277

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Enroute from ZZZ; I was the pilot flying from the left seat; the Chief Pilot was in the right seat and working the radios. Near Foothills (ODF) VOR; Atlanta Center asked what kind of approach we would like. We replied the visual; and were told to expect the visual and report the airport in site. We were then cleared to descend to 7;300 feet. The IAF is DAYEL intersection at or above 7;000 feet (16.3 miles from the airport.) I had planned to remain at 7;300 feet until 4.5 miles from JASVU intersection (9.7 miles from the airport and 3680 feet above minimums.) As it came time to descend I request the Chief Pilot to set the Altitude Select for 5;700 feet for the JASVU crossing; he complied; and we started down. The airport was in sight. We were VMC but still on the IFR flight plan; after descending 300-500 feet; I had it in my mind we were already cleared for the visual approach and I asked the Chief Pilot if we were. About that time Center said; I see you have started descent and we replied that we had and canceled the IFR flight plan. We did not report the airport in sight; and apparently were not yet cleared for the visual. The close proximity to the airport; the need to start down; being in VMC and having heard 'expect the visual;' prompted me to start down; thinking that we had been cleared for the Visual. The Chief pilot didn't catch it either until I questioned him. There was no traffic conflict or separation loss. The Center did not mention any deviation. Although the proper crew co-ordination is for the pilot not flying to handle and talk on the radios; I have always found that if I talk on the radios as the pilot flying; it is easier to stay 'in the loop' on what is going on. Lesson learned is basic; if in doubt ask.

A corporate flight crew began a visual approach descent without clearance from ZTL because they heard 'Expect the Visual' and began a descent when they felt they would have normally.

1364407

201606

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Personal

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.0

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1364407

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4.5

1364410.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was working R45/47 combined. Both aircraft were just west of ZZZ VOR and had been radar handed off to sector 34. I tried to ship the Citation to the next frequency but no response. So I decided to ship the Aircraft Y he took the frequency change. I have not listened to the replay of the situation yet. I tried to ship the Citation one more time. After a slight pause he said they had lost pressurization and needed lower. I said descend and maintain FL380. Aircraft Y was right underneath him and I could not tell which target was which. I called to have sector 34 turn Aircraft Y right and told him I would go left. I asked the pilot if he was able to turn left he said affirmative. I told him turn left. I believe I issued a descent to 32;000 feet at some point because I could see the targets coming apart. I realized that Sector 34 had went left. I did not like that so I told him to maintain FL380.Meanwhile I'm yelling across the room at Sector 34 asking if they went left. He said affirmative. Just then I could tell that we had room to get the Citation down and I gave him the descent to 29;000 feet. Meanwhile I had been coordinating with Sector 44 on the emergency by yelling across the room. At one point when the aircraft was in the high twenties I asked him if he was going to divert. He said maybe and that the pressurization was stabilizing. I gave the pilot a descent to 16;000 feet and was thankful everything worked out. During that Sector 34 thought it would be beneficial to descend the Aircraft Y and turn him back to the right. Happened all within 30 seconds I would guess. Also at one point I remember telling the Citation about the traffic right underneath him.

I had taken the hand off on both Aircraft Y and Aircraft X. Aircraft Y had just checked in at 37;000 feet and Sector 47 who was still talking with Aircraft X at 41;000 feet. The R47 controller calls and says Aircraft X has a pressurization problem and is descending. Aircraft Y was directly beneath Aircraft X approximately a half mile behind. I thought the 47 controller said turn Aircraft Y left. So I immediately turned Aircraft Y left out of the way of the descending aircraft. Then I noticed that both airplanes are now turning left. And I yelled I thought you said left; and he yells turn him right; turn him right.By this time Aircraft Y is further to the left than the descending airplane. I yelled across the room; you want me to turn him right now; and they yelled; turn him right; so I did; which started to bring the airplanes back together because sector 47 was still talking to Aircraft X and I guessed he was going to go further left so I turned Aircraft Y to the right. I explained to the Aircraft Y there was some confusion and now turn right and told him where the traffic was again and that he was descending; at this time; Aircraft Y wanted lower so I yelled to sector 44 and 47 and told them the Aircraft Y is descending to 35;000 feet and then issued the control instruction. I then told Aircraft Y to Fly heading 050 because I felt that would be better than keep him turning right into Aircraft X. Then Aircraft X descended through the altitude of the Aircraft Y approximately a mile and half behind him and off to his right. I then told Aircraft Y that the aircraft was clear of his altitude and to stay on that heading for a second. After I got my bearings; I climbed Aircraft Y back to 37;000 feet and cleared them on course.I had the opportunity to listen to exactly what the R47 controller said; and it was something along the lines of Turn Aircraft Y to the right; I'm turning my guy left. That is when I immediately turned Aircraft Y 30 degrees left. I guess all I heard was left and I didn't even fathom he would be turning the guy that needed the descent. I was previously an airline pilot and during sim training; practicing rapid decompressurazation; as a flight crew; your responsibility is to don your oxygen mask and start a straight forward descent. As a controller I must have thought that's what the pilot is doing; he's going straight down; move the guy below him out of the way and I guess the last word I heard from the R47 controller was left. We also had Military airspace 10 miles or so off the right side so I thought this was the safest way to go. I can think of two recommendations. On my part; I should have confirmed and not just immediately issued the control instruction. But I felt taking action was the quickest thing to do; but my action was wrong. (You want me to go what direction). And second; when we need to make a control instruction to another sector; only give that control instruction; for example. Aircraft X is descending due to a pressurization problem. Turn Aircraft Y Right.

B737-800 flight crew in an emergency descent received an RA on traffic below it that being vectored out of the way.

1437680

201704

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Ground ZZZ

Personal

Super King Air 200

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Direct

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1437680

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

On taxi out to Runway XY we smelled a plastic burning smell. I also saw a little haze in the cabin. I shut the air conditioning off (the bleed air was not on yet) and told Ground we had a problem and wanted to return to the ramp. Shutting off the aircraft didn't help so I decided to shut down the airplane and get everyone off. I told Ground I was shutting down and requested assistance.No one was injured and no sign of fire. The flap limit switch was set incorrectly and the flap motor overheated.

BE20 pilot reported detecting a burning plastic smell on taxi. After shutdown; the odor was attributed to an overheated flap motor.

1799131

202104

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Commercial Fixed Wing

Taxi

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 482; Flight Crew Type 482

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1799131

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Ramp

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

After landing at night in ZZZ we taxied as instructed by Ground to a surface designated point. When we arrived; there was an outbound jet taxiing on the south line and another air carrier under tow on the north line. We advised ZZZ Ground of the conflict and they then instructed us to just take the south line after the outbound jet. The First Officer advised me that there was not a ramp frequency when there actually was. We thought we had been cleared in by Ground but by the time I taxied in I felt like something wasn't right due to the congestion on the ramp. I asked again ' Are you sure there isn't a ramp?'. He then found the frequency on the 10-7 after we had entered the ramp area. After parking at gate; I made contact with ramp and relayed our confusion. Contributing factors include; unfamiliar operations at ZZZ. First time operating there in over a year plus first time at the new terminal. New First officer fresh off OE and only my Xth flight segment in a year due to pandemic reductions.

Air carrier Captain reported a ramp incursion resulting in a conflict and cited lack of flying as a contributing factor.

1421456

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

2500.0

VMC

10

25000

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

SID ZZZZZ

Class B ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 220; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 4100

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1421456

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure

Our clearance out of ZZZ was via the ZZZZZ SID; ZZZZZ Transition; with an initial altitude assignment of 4000 feet. After takeoff the tower handed us off to departure. I checked in with departure telling the controller that we were climbing out of (our current altitude) for 4000 feet via the ZZZZZ departure. The controller issued us a clearance to climb via the ZZZZZ departure.From reading memos that our union and company have issued in the past I remembered that a clearance of that sort means that we should climb to the top altitude on the departure procedure while complying with all constraints on the departure.Since there are different top altitudes on this departure; and since I read these memos months ago; coupled with the fact that I have actually never been issued this exact clearance without the controller also stating an altitude I queried the controller to make sure that we were all on the same train of thought. I asked something like 'Just to verify; that means we should climb to 16;000 feet via the departure?'The controller replied in the affirmative; verifying what I said/asked was correct. The controller had issued the clearance using standard phraseology and answered my inquiry in a professional manner. I was impressed with the departure controller.My only concern with this departure clearance was the fact that on all of these new departures at every airport I have used them at; not once has a controller used the standard phraseology of 'climb via.' They have always said something like 'climb via the ZZZZZ departure and maintain 16;000 feet.'I understand that the standard phraseology is meant to have less talking on the radio thus helping to relieve radio congestion but as a pilot I can tell you that the way most controllers are issuing the clearance (to include an altitude/top altitude) is much more re-assuring to us when we actually hear the number of the top altitude from the controller.I am reminded of the 'old days' when a ground controller used to issue a taxi clearance to a runway using one phraseology vs another one. One clearance meant that you could cross all runways that were not in use and another way of saying it meant that you could not. After years of runway incursions that phraseology was changed. I think that in the case of these 'Climb via the ZZZZZ departure' we could learn that also having the controller issue the number of the top altitude as part of that 'climb via' would make for less confusion and less altitude issues over the long run; with only a minimal amount of additional talk on the radio. After all; if pilots ask for clarification; like I did; that will actually tie up the radio more than if the controller just issued the altitude as part of the clearance.

The First Officer of an Airbus A320 reported they were issued a proper clearance; but asked for clarification to ensure the proper altitude.

1796869

202103

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

3300.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

PC-12

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Indicating and Warning - Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 1732

1796869

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

We had been flying on an IFR flight plan with a destination of ZZZ; a non-towered airport just north of ZZZ1. As usual; we canceled IFR once we got close to the airport; and began our VFR approach to Runway 24. Upon approach into ZZZ; got a 'Fuel Imbalance' CAS (Crew Alerting System) message with 5 'segments' of difference; without noticing any prior indication of an issue. While dealing with this issue; we also had to deal with other nearby aircraft targets as well (in the practice area right near the traffic pattern for ZZZ; no doubt). Per the appropriate checklist; we took the action of turning on the fuel pump on the fuller side. In spite of taking this action; the indication of the problem got markedly worse (increased to 6 and then to 7 segments) within only 2-3 minutes; yet we still had no controllability issues. We then ended up getting a 'Fuel Balance Fault' CAS message as well. In sum; we were close to the ground; in the vicinity of Class B; near a practice area; trying to deal with this issue. We elected to focus primarily on doing the most important things: aviate; navigate; and communicate. We flew the airplane and began a diversion towards ZZZ1; which we could clearly see. It has a longer and wider runway; which would be important in landing a bit faster than normal to avoid potential controllability issues; and it also has emergency equipment available as well. Notified ATC since the issue had happened so quickly; and the fuel monitoring device depicted that the problem had gotten markedly worse so quickly as well -- felt it best to get on the ground quickly before a controllability issue developed. Landed without incident. If we hadn't been so close to landing (instead being enroute at altitude in the middle of nowhere); we could have obviously spent more time analyzing and dealing with the issue in flight. After landing and thinking about it a bit; we believed it was an indication problem; and not an actual fuel imbalance after all. Upon further reflection overnight of our actions during the flight; we concluded that we wouldn't do anything different than we did. In general; we were pleased with what we did. It was a particularly busy time with the nearby traffic; and we quickly focused on the most important things of aviate; navigate; and communicate. The notifying ATC might be questioned; but only with hindsight; I believe -- I am comfortable with this judgment call.

PC-12 pilot reported a fuel imbalance inflight.

1715070

201912

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class B ZZZ

Y

Hydraulic System Pump

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1715070

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Maintenance Action

MEL; Company Policy; Aircraft; Manuals; Procedure

Company Policy

Our aircraft had 5 MELs and numerous other NEFs in ZZZ that we briefed thoroughly before departure. One of these was a deferred Pack 1. During cruise flight we spent a good amount of time briefing the arrival giving consideration to the icing reports; FICONs (Field Conditions); and gusty crosswinds we could expect. 45 mins prior to landing we received an ECAM for HYD G RSVR LO LVL and HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LO PR. We ran the ECAM and began to consider the ramifications. As speed breaks were partially affected; we knew the MEL for 1 pack inoperative now had an altitude restriction of FL310. We requested that altitude and advised ATC we were working a hydraulic issue and would get back to them with our intentions. With the ECAM complete we began to work through and brief the accompanying procedures. We ran the QRH landing distance numbers with G HYD LO PRESS and asked Dispatch to do the same via ACARS. Dispatch gave numbers quickly considering the FICONS and suggested 22L as the longest runway. We reviewed the now required landing gear gravity extension procedure and other inoperative items used for landing such as the number 1 thrust reverser; alternate brakes with accumulator; lack of auto brake; and slats flaps slow. Next the Flight Attendants were briefed and I told them I would soon talk with the passengers. We [requested priority handling] with ATC. Once down the landing gear could not be raised again and we wanted to decrease the chances of a go around in icing conditions with the gear down. We asked for trucks to inspect the aircraft after landing before taxiing into the gate. Passengers were then informed of the issue. I told the passengers this is not an emergency and that they would not notice anything different other than emergency vehicles meeting us at the runway to give us a quick inspection. Their pilots are frequently trained for these things and other than the pilots having a slightly increased workload it would be a normal landing. On approach to 22L we extended the gear via gravity extension and flaps sooner than normal. The landing gear doors remained down and we discussed the need to ensure they would clear anything we might taxi over later. The landing was normal and soft and the FO (First Officer) verified the correct brake pressures. We stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. As the FO coordinated with ATC for our inspection which ATC preferred on the runway; I said a quick word to the passengers. Fire crews found no issues upon inspection and we taxied to the gate. Upon shutdown passengers were invited to ask the pilots any questions they had; all were happy. Flight attendants were happy and thanked for keeping passengers so content. Maintenance control and the [Operations] were called. A Mechanic upon arrival showed us hydraulic fluid draining from the engine one pylon. No additional commentsThe workload on the pilots was significantly higher throughout this flight due to the large number of deferrals even before our loss of a hydraulic system.

Captain reported an ECAM message in flight; HYD G RSVR LO LVL and HYD G ENG 1 PUMP LOPR; causing an inflight shut down and a precautionary landing.

1462257

201707

1801-2400

TPA.Airport

FL

0.0

Daylight

Ramp TPA

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 249; Flight Crew Type 12000

1462257

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Manuals

Ambiguous

TPA has new nonstandard Safety Zone markings that can cause confusion and somewhat of a visual illusion. Instead of the standard V shaped Safety Zone; the TPA Safety Zones have squared off indentations in the leading edge area. As we entered the Safety Zone; I looked over at the fuel cart as usual and observed that it appeared to be outside of the yellow markings that defines the approved area for the fuel cart. It also appeared to be in a different general location than I am accustomed to seeing (seemed to be much farther outboard towards the winglet). We were in an aircraft with scimitar winglets which always increases my level of concern with Safety Zone intrusions. I stopped the aircraft and asked Operations to have the Ramp move the fuel cart clear of the Safety Zone. After that was done we completed parking. I went down to the ramp to speak with the Ramp Supervisor and get a better perspective of the location of the cart. TPA does have the new fuel cart markings; however these new markings are confusing. They are not a complete box as they have been in the past. They are an L-Shaped segmented line that starts and the leading edge of the Safety Zone and then turn outboard for a few feet (roughly the width of the standard fuel cart). In this situation the fuel cart was actually positioned outboard of the end of the short segment which puts it outside of the area that the yellow markings appear to define. I can't determine if the yellow markings are supposed to be interpreted to continue out the edge of the Safety Zone; in which case they should be painted that way; or if the end of the line is the end of the allowed area for ground equipment. Ramp Supervisor advised that TPA airport authority had repainted the Safety Zones and that TPA Company Management was not happy with many aspects of the new markings.Information regarding nonstandard Safety Zone markings and changes in Safety Zone markings as well as airport specific nonstandard markings should be communicated to flight crews in order to minimize risk and avoid confusion.

Determined from reporter that the new safety zone markings have been observed at other airports. Reporter assumes that the change has been required to accommodate larger aircraft and all required ground equipment (fueling carts; baggage carts; etc.) inside the safety zones. Reporter has submitted suggestions via his company's flight operations department to ensure more detailed instructions to flight crews about the changes.

Air carrier Captain reported new nonstandard safety zone markings on the ramp at TPA airport. Callback indicated that other airports have the reconfigured safety zone markings. Captain recommended to company flight operations that all manuals be updated to reflect the changes.

1739729

202004

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Night

Air Carrier

B767-300 and 300 ER

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Vectors

Parking Brake

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Crew

1739729

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1739777.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Procedure

After push back was complete; the push back crew stopped our aircraft and asked us to set parking brake. I reached down and pulled the parking brake handle up; while also pressing the brake pedal. I reported over the headset to the ground crew that the parking brake was set. Moments later; the ground crew reported the aircraft was rolling forward. At the same time; I noticed the aircraft was rolling as well. The ground crew called us over the headset to advise us; at which point I stopped the aircraft roll and reset the parking brake. The aircraft rolled about 10 feet. I asked if everyone was okay and if there was any damage. The report back from the ground crew was that everyone was safe and there was no damage. We continued with our flight at the point. Big takeaway here is that we need to always look to verify that the parking brake light is indeed on; thus verifying the parking brake is in fact set. I cannot honestly say if I checked for the light or not.

We were pushed back in ZZZ; and cleared to start engines. I was starting number 2 when we were told to set brakes. I thought I saw the Captain set the parking brake; and then I looked back at the egt to finish the start. A few seconds later; I heard the ground crew calmly say; 'sir; you're rolling.' The Captain jumped on the brakes and reset the parking brake. He then asked the ground crew if everyone was ok. The ground crew said everything was fine. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

B767 flight crew reported aircraft began rolling after tow bar was disconnected after push back.

1278763

201506

0601-1200

FFZ.Airport

AZ

4.0

2700.0

VMC

40

Daylight

Tower FFZ

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Visual Approach

Class D FFZ

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

None

Class D FFZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot; Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

1278763

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Flying the PA44 north of CHD; about 4 miles south of FFZ; the drone appeared to the left of the left wing tip; at close proximity. Drone was red with black and approximately half a foot in diameter. Tower was immediately notified.

PA-44 instructor pilot reports an airborne conflict with a drone at 2;700 feet 4 NM south of FFZ. Evasive action is taken.

1702293

201911

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

250.0

Turbulence; Windshear

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Vectors

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 522; Flight Crew Type 12000

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1702293

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Company Policy; Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Upon receiving clearance to line up and wait on ZZZ XXR; ATC began relaying wind shear alerts at the departure end of our runway. We were already evaluating the weather cells off that same end. They appeared to be nothing more than heavy rain; similar to what we had experienced on our earlier arrival. The cells were a few miles east of us moving slowly to the southeast. Tower asked us if we were able to depart under the existing conditions. As a crew; we discussed the Tower wind shear alert and what might be a fairly clear path for our turnout if we elected to go. Based on the current situation we agreed that delaying our takeoff was the best course of action. I notified Tower and the Controller directed us to exit the runway. However the Controller then relayed that the previously detected wind shear had moved off of the field and out of our path. He went on to let us know that if we could accept a turn on departure to the north; then we should stay clear of any heavy precipitation on his radar. That agreed with what I was seeing visually so; with the FO's (First Officer) concurrence; I let him know we were ready for takeoff as long as he was able to clear us for an immediate turn. Tower then cleared us for takeoff with an immediate turn to heading 360.The timing of this entire discussion; from lining up to wait until being cleared for takeoff; was about five minutes. Though I believe the FO and I took the time needed to discuss our options and develop a shared mental model before departing; I think I failed to recognize that the FO felt a little more pressure than necessary to make the initial turn quickly to avoid the weather. On takeoff we executed the precautionary takeoff profile and began our climbout. At approximately 250 feet. AAE (Above Aerodrome Elevation); the FO rolled crisply to 30 degrees of bank; making the turn to the north. Though I was a little surprised; it was clear that she was initiating the turn earlier than our procedural minimum altitude of 400 feet AAE. She clearly had control of the aircraft and we were climbing away quickly.Under the circumstances I elected to not intervene; believing that doing so could lead to confusion and distraction during a critical phase of flight. We continued our climbout uneventfully. On reaching our cruising altitude; I brought the departure turn up with the FO. She confided in me that she was so focused on the initial turn to avoid the weather that she mistakenly started it early. Like me; she realized it almost immediately but elected to continue the turn as the safest course of action under the circumstances. We both agreed that waiting the extra 150 feet in compliance with our standard operating procedures would have still kept us well clear of the weather. This event shows that even two crew members who are fairly familiar with each other and comfortable communicating can miss important cues. Looking back I could have done a better job at managing our pace. If I had just taken another 30 seconds to review our plan and talk the takeoff through; it may have either put the FO more at ease or clued me in that she still had some concerns about the decision to depart.

B737-700 Captain reported First Officer made an early turn; prior to altitude limit; on departure.

1150371

201402

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1150371

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Company Policy; Weather

Company Policy

After an arduous day of rapidly changing weather and after waiting for a broken deice truck; we had to deplane the passengers so as not to get too close to the tarmac delay program fines and wait for the visibility and heavy snow that moved in to clear. While waiting; my First Officer and I looked up our flight duty period limitation and decided it was 12 hours. We were supposed to fly to ORD and then continue on [two hours] for the night. We did not leave in time to make this leg happen within the 12 hour FDP limitation. I called Crew Scheduling to inform them of this and was told we had been approved for a FDP extension. I informed [them] that I;as PIC; did not approve this. They insisted that was not necessary and had me talk to the Manager on Duty. He informed me quite bluntly that PIC approval is not necessary for a FDP extension and I insisted it was and quoted part 117 which states 117.19 Flight duty period extensions. (a) For augmented and unaugmented operations; if unforeseen operational circumstances arise prior to takeoff: (1) The pilot in command and the certificate holder may extend the maximum flight duty period permitted in Tables B or C of this part up to 2 hours. This is a fairly black and white statement that shows both parties should agree to the extension. He insisted this is not the case nor within the 'spirit of the regulation.' He ultimately told me I either fly the extension or call in fatigued. I did not feel it proper to do either of these but felt intimidated and wondered what repercussions would come of my being adamant in my stance. I was unwilling to break a regulation and decided that calling in fatigued was my only option yet not a desired outcome. My understanding of part 117; I thought was fairly solid. Company management has bent some sentences to use part 117 as a coercion tool to add 2 hours of flight duty period to every single day of flying with no recourse for the crew members. It is now recorded as a fatigue event which it really is not. The Company now does not have to report the FDP extension to the FAA nor do they have to financially cover me for the trip because I was forced to call in fatigued or suffer the consequences. There is no way to avoid another event such as this until the Company stops intimidating crews into extending their day.

CRJ200 Captain reports being intimidated by his duty Manager into accepting a two hour extension to his duty day under FAR 117 without the Captain's consent; necessitating a fatigue call.

1218811

201411

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aileron

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1218811

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1218819.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

While performing the flight control check; noted binding when ailerons were deflected 1/2 way to the right. Asked the captain if he was restricting movement; he was not. Pushed to full deflection. Ailerons initially stuck at full deflection; then when pushed back left froze at 1/2 deflection. Reported the malfunction to ground and taxied back to parking. NOTE: I also noticed this on the ground during flight control check at ZZZ; but it was a temporary 'hitch' when moved right with no recurrence. After the initial sluggish feeling; which was very transient; there was no more odd feeling in the controls. I assumed a burble in the hydraulic line from sitting in depot or something of that nature that worked itself out and did not require further attention. It appears from the maintenance log that the left aileron was binding; interfering with a panel on the wing. It was supposedly flight checked before we got it. Since the FCF (Functional Check Flight) crew didn't notice anything; I can only assume it happened after they left and before we got to the plane. It is impossible in my opinion to damage that area without running something into the aircraft from behind; and since we did not back the plane or push back at all; I don't see how aircrew could prevent this damage.

During taxi out when First Officer (FO) did his control check the yoke and ailerons stuck approximately 5 to 6 degrees deflection to the right. Taxied aircraft back to gate and shutdown. I did not feel anything hit the aircraft during loading; we pushed back out of gate with a wing walker tail South on to B and did not hit anything during push back. FO did not see any damage to aircraft during his walk around. I actually looked at the aileron after we blocked in to confirm that it was in fact stuck in an up position and did not see any damage from the ground. The aircraft was coming out of C check and was flown by myself and FO empty a couple hours prior to the ground turn back. The aircraft was parked on the ramp in front of the maintenance hangar at ZZZ. We started and powered out with a marshaller and a wing walker making an approximately 45 degree turn before wave off. During the flight control check FO thought he felt resistance when moving the aileron to the right. He asked me if the yoke was hitting my leg and I told him no. He re-accomplished the check and did not feel resistance that time. We completed the before take-off checklist and flew uneventfully with myself as the pilot flying. The controls did not feel unusual during the flight. Landing and taxi in were normal. We were later told there was damage to aileron causing the flight controls to stick. Obviously it was human error if someone struck the aileron and damaged it. I suspect the aircraft was already damaged when we picked it up in ZZZ. I can't prove that though.

After pushback; B757 flight crew reports detecting aileron binding during a flight control check and returns to the gate. Damage to an aileron is discovered and it is suspected that it occurred prior to the previous flight; but was not detected by the crew.

1044017

201210

0.0

Air Carrier

Dash 8-300

Part 121

Parked

DC Generation

X

Malfunctioning

Captain

1044017

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Procedure; Equipment / Tooling

Equipment / Tooling

Upon arriving at the aircraft [for the]first flight of the day; there was no GPU [Ground Power Unit] present. I heard several explanations as to why but I was assured that when a GPU became available; it would be brought over for our use. In an effort to keep the flight on schedule I applied battery power to the aircraft in order for the Flight Attendant to begin preflight of the cabin. Once battery voltage reached 22 Volts; I powered the aircraft down and we continued to wait for a GPU. Ramp personnel brought over what appeared to be an AC GPU with a rectifier device to convert the power to 28V DC. This device was plugged into the External DC receptacle on the nose of the aircraft (the rear External AC receptacle was at no point utilized). Voltage on the Right Main DC Bus was observed to be approximately 25.5V with External Power applied. Following two normal engine starts using GPU power; I signaled for the GPU to be disconnected. The First Officer and myself then observed the '#1 DC GEN HOT' light illuminate. At this point we had not yet begun push back and were still at the gate with the propellers in feather. After following the checklist procedure and discussion with maintenance control we turned the #1 DC generator off allowing it to cool and then turned it back on. Although this initially appeared to correct the problem; the '#1 DC GEN HOT' caution re-illuminated and after discussion with Maintenance Control and contract maintenance; we determined it was safe to ferry the aircraft for repair.

For an unknown reason; the aircraft experienced a DC generator overheat fault following the use of an AC Ground power unit with a DC rectifier to provide aircraft power at the gate.

1792085

202103

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1792085

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1792095.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Other takeoff

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

We setup pre-flight like normal for Runway XX. No takeoff data for Runway YY. After push off the gate we were assigned Runway YY for departure. Before starting we got the data from ACARS for Runway YY. We took our time and entered it in the box. Then briefed the engine out for Runway YY. Since not flying much in the last year I tried to be helpful by entering data on the performance page since I was PF. I took extra caution to confirm the flap setting going to flaps 2 for Runway YY from flaps 1 for Runway XX which was setup in pre-flight and briefed. After starting engines we did flight controls prior to moving since it was a short taxi. Then we completed the before takeoff checklist to the line. Upon reaching Runway YY we were running the before takeoff checklist below the line when I saw we still had Runway XX selected. After noticing that the tower cleared us for takeoff. The First officer changed the runway and we finished the checklist. After taking the runway when I selected flex there was a pause then an ECAM for thrust not being in the detent. I looked down trying to adjust thinking it was set and only just slightly out of the detent. Upon realizing something wasn't right by not getting set power went TOGA as FO also called TOGA and continued as per training and AOM.Not flying much during the pandemic. Even taking our time when things got out of sequence trapping one error not realizing there was more to do. I have been through the training on this exact scenario and thought how could this happen. Well it was incredibly humbling getting lead down the path and once you realize it it's already happened. We literally caught the error during the before takeoff checklist and thinking since we trapped the error during the checklist and completed it that we were ready.Flying more. Any interrupt in the checklist EVEN if you literally trap the error during the checklist start over. Once you trap one error stop and take a minute to regroup then rerun the checklist. Don't think since you fixed it while running the checklist you are done.

We entered Runway XX into the FMS since we had no takeoff data information about Runway YY. Upon push back; ATC suggested Runway YY was preferred for the winds. I sent a request for data through ACARS. As a crew we entered the new data into the performance page and reviewed the engine out departure for Runway YY. The Captain decided to start both engines and preform the before takeoff checklist to the line prior to taxi so that I would not be task saturated on the short taxi out. As we proceeded to taxi and complete the checklist below the line; the Captain saw that the correct runway was not in the FMS. I corrected the runway and we continued to finish the checklist. When cleared for takeoff the Captain set the thrust levers in the flex detent; we received an ECAM stating the thrust was not in the detent. The Captain; as well as I thought that possibly the levers were not properly placed in the detent. When I realized something was not quite right I called for TOGA and the Captain immediately pushed the thrust to TOGA.After being off for almost a year myself and the Captain not flying much on reserve as well as taking leaves was a large factor. Though we caught one error with the checklist we did not follow through and catch the other. I have had this very scenario in my first simulator about 2 years ago and still fell down the path. We should have restarted the checklist from the top once we saw that there was any incorrect information in the FMS.Follow our training! Try to stay current as best as possible. We worked as a crew and had a good outcome; it would've been an even better one had we just redone the checklist.

Air Carrier flight crew reported they did not follow SOP's for an existing aircraft condition and continued the takeoff.

1089915

201305

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

INS / IRS / IRU

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1089915

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Declared Emergency

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

During cruise flight; we received a warning on the FMC; 'VERIFY POS: IRS-IRS.' We noted that the left IRS was showing a very large error; over 25 miles at the time and growing. We consulted the QRC; FOM; Flight Handbook and Systems Manual for guidance as to specifically what the error meant and how to handle it. We cross checked our remaining navigation information and determined the right IRS was working properly. We notified Dispatch via ACARS; and contacted Commercial Radio to let them know of our navigation failure as per guidance in our manuals. We continued to carefully monitor and cross check our position and performed several extra plots on our plotting chart to ensure our position was correct. Our position was indeed correct operating on the good IRS. We also began monitoring a coastline VOR as soon as it was in range and used it as an additional check to continuously verify our position. After radar contact with Center; and after beginning our descent the left IRS generated a FAULT annunciation and apparently failed as the Captain's flight instruments failed. The First Officer then became the pilot flying. We then declared an emergency and got radar vectors to the airport. The checklist was consulted and that restored adequate instrumentation for the Captain to continue flying. We then landed uneventfully and wrote the discrepancy in the aircraft logbook.

An air carrier flight; eastbound over the Pacific Ocean; suffered a single IRS failure and eventual loss of the Captain's flight instruments. The flight continued utilizing the First Officer's instruments and IRS data.

1672458

201908

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

600.0

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Premier 1

1.0

IFR

Descent

Class D LGB

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3.0

1672458

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Weather; Human Factors

Weather

Aircraft X was an LGB arrival. The ILS was out of service and Runway 30 closed. The aircraft was unable to do an RNV (RNP) approach to 26R. He opted for the VOR Circle to 26R approach. Once on the approach and switched to the advisory frequency he began a descent for the airport. The Low Altitude Alert went off. I gave the pilot the low altitude alert just in case he was still on frequency. He came back on frequency saying that he was executing a missed approach. The ceilings were too low for them to get the airport safely. The pilot decided to divert safely to [another nearby airport].We've had this issue in the past were a Low Altitude Alert goes off on Runway 26 approaches. In this scenario I'm not sure if the pilot was trying to get under the layer by bypassing the approach restrictions or if it was the usual Low Altitude Alert we have gotten in the past.

SCT Controller reported a low altitude on an aircraft into LGB runway 26R and wondered if it was an actual low altitude alert or one that might have been in error.

1242903

201502

0601-1200

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 21000; Flight Crew Type 8400

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

1242903

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Just after we parked at gate in DEN; the lead flight attendant called us and advised us the seat belt sign was still on; I looked up and saw the switch was in auto and not off and corrected it. After running our checklist I emerged from the cockpit and heard a hissing sound that I recognized from our EVAC simulator; the sound of a slide deploying. I peered around the corner of my doorway and saw door 1R open; with the red tape still across the viewport and the slide pack flopped out onto the deck of a catering truck. The slide luckily had not inflated. I immediately told the caterer; who had stepped into the cabin over the slide into the galley and the flight attendants in the area; to get away from the area in case the slide was still able to inflate. On debriefing; it turned out the caterer had opened the door without getting the ok; with the red tape still across the viewport; indicating the door was still armed.When the mechanics arrived and secured the slide; we discussed how the door; when opened from outside; is supposed to disarm. It had not. Also; that the position of the slide as it landed; it should have deployed and inflated; it also had not. On further investigation; the mechanic found that the slide had a date on it of 1994. I don't know what the required inspection intervals for the slides are; but 21 years seems excessive. Today; we were in fact very lucky these failures occurred.

A flight crew on arrival at the gate noted that a caterer opened up an armed door with the red tape still across the viewport and the slide pack flopped out onto the deck of a catering truck. The slide did not inflate. Mechanics were called. The slide was long overdue for inspection.

1776038

202012

0601-1200

EHF.VORTAC

CA

10000.0

VMC

Center ZLA

Air Taxi

Small Transport

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E ZLA

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

1776038

Conflict NMAC

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Aircraft

During cruise at 10;000 feet MSL; on a revenue flight enroute to Bakersfield California; I flew underneath a small unidentifiable object. Weather conditions at the time were VFR but hazy; I was just crossing the mountain tops into the flat land around Bakersfield when the event happened; I was located on the 141 degree radial from the Shafter (EHF) VOR at approximately 35 DME. While looking ahead and piloting; a small light from outside and above me caught my eye. When I looked up I was flying 25 to 50 feet below a small round object with what looked like a light on the bottom side of it. I initially reported this to Bakersfield Approach as a drone; but I flew by it so quickly and the range at which I spotted it; I can't say with 100% certainty what it was. I would say it's possible it could've been a balloon with the sun reflecting off of it as well. Fortunately; nothing happened and I proceeded to Bakersfield for a normal landing.Being as I don't know 100% what the object was it's hard to say what 'caused' it. If it was in fact a drone and not a balloon then it was most likely being illegally operated.Unfortunately due to the haze preventing me from seeing it sooner; and the rate of closure with the object there wasn't any time to react. I reported the event to Bakersfield Approach.Not much to suggest other than asking pilots to remain vigilant in their scans outside as best they can with the given weather conditions.

Pilot reported an encounter with either a drone or a balloon during cruise near Bakersfield; CA.

1756094

202008

1201-1800

C90.TRACON

IL

3600.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON C90

Personal

Small Aircraft; High Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Climb

Direct

Class B ORD

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 297; Flight Crew Type 89

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1756094

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was in my initial climb to 7;500 ft. out of ZZZ and was utilizing flight following with Chicago Approach. Not soon after I climbed past 3;600 ft. I received a call from Chicago Approach that said '[Aircraft X] reminder that you are not authorized for Bravo entry;' or words very similar. I checked my position on my sectional on ForeFlight; seeing that I was clear of the Class Bravo airspace; at least that's what I thought at the time; and responded with 'Roger; we will remain clear of the Class Bravo; [Aircraft X]'. Approximately one minute passed and Chicago Approach called again with '[Aircraft X]; you are still in the Bravo airspace without authorization;' or similar words. This was the first moment that I realized that the controller was telling me that I was already in the Bravo airspace. I looked at my sectional and realized my mistake; which I will explain below; and immediately descended below 3;600 ft. By reviewing my track log in ForeFlight; it appears that I was in Bravo airspace; unauthorized; for approximately 1 minute 40 seconds.After having time to review the situation after my flight; I now realize how this error occurred; and what I can do in the future to ensure that it doesn't happen again. I had flown into ZZZ earlier in the day. I had previewed my planned flight; including all airspace enroute; thoroughly before my flight. I landed at ZZZ without event and went to a brief business meeting nearby. When I returned to the airport to prepare for my flight back; I did a preflight on my aircraft and prepared for my return route. I was not in a hurry and took ample time to prepare for the flight. What I now realize; but didn't at the time; was that I was simply zoomed in too far when I was looking at the Chicago area portion of my flight on the sectional. This caused me to focus on the ORD 3;000-10;000 ft. tier to my north and MDW's Class C airspace to my northeast. What I failed to realize was that I would be taking-off under a 3;600-10;000 ft. shelf of ORD's Class B airspace. I am still surprised; and embarrassed; that I missed what should have been a major consideration for my flight. To compound the situation; I mistakenly interpreted ATC's first call to me about the Bravo airspace as a 'reminder' that I was near the Bravo airspace; and I had not been given permission to enter. When I looked at my position during this first call from ATC; I now realize that I was looking at the 3;000-10;000 ft. shelf to my north and the MDW Class C airspace to my northeast; and ensuring that I was staying clear of that airspace.It is obvious that I am at fault for breaching the Class B airspace; and have learned a valuable lesson. I must ensure that I am looking at the 'big picture' of my flight; along with the details. Additionally; if I would have looked at the profile feature of my flight on ForeFlight; which I did for my initial flight earlier in the day; I would have clearly seen that my flight path would have taken me through the Class B airspace.There is also one additional action that I believe would have helped to resolve this situation more quickly: if ATC would have used language in their first call telling me that I had already breached the Bravo airspace; I would have realized at that time that there was an issue that needed to be resolved immediately. As it happened; I simply took ATC's first call as a 'courtesy' reminder that I was close to Bravo airspace and that I did not have permission to enter. While I should not have assumed that the call was just precautionary; being told directly that I was in violation would have helped resolve the issue much sooner.

C182 pilot reported entering Class B airspace without a clearance.

1562718

201807

0601-1200

A321

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

1562718

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Aircraft

I was deadheading; 30 minutes [prior] to landing the cabin filled with the same fumes we had the night before on the same aircraft. I got a headache and burning eyes. After deplaning and getting into fresh air I felt better.

A321 Flight Attendant reported experiencing a headache and burning eyes when the cabin filled with fumes.

1042048

201210

1801-2400

SFO.Tower

CA

1300.0

VMC

Night

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1042048

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure

We were on the Tip-Toe charted visual approach to 28L SFO; 5 miles behind a Heavy B767. ATC had slowed us to 160 KTS approximately 10 miles from the runway to keep our spacing from the B767. Inbound from the San Mateo Bridge; we slowed to our final approach speed (approximately 130 KIAS); and we were on the localizer and glide slope. We were fully stabilized approximately 1;300 feet AGL; due to our slow speed crossing the outer marker. A B737 was approaching behind us on the Quiet Bridge visual approach to the parallel 28R. It is intended that aircraft stay staggered on these close parallel approaches. When we were around 1;000 feet AGL we got a TCAS Resolution Advisory which said 'descend'; and displayed command bars. I followed the command bars while my First Officer looked for the aircraft. He immediately saw it; and said it appeared he was going around. I was slightly below the glide slope and began to correct; now that we had the intruding aircraft visually. I also moved slightly left of my localizer to increase lateral separation. Then that aircraft lowered his nose rapidly to recapture his glide slope at which point he overtook us rapidly. I just made sure we maintained lateral separation while he passed us. He touched down well in front of us on the parallel Runway 28R. We landed normally on 28L. I have never had another aircraft overtake and pass me on this or any other close parallel approach. It was shocking to say the least. Any passengers looking out the window must have been stunned to see how close the other aircraft was to us. I can't control what other aircraft are going to do in any given situation. In this case I cannot go-around with a descend command from TCAS. Even when we had him visually going around would have been more dangerous in terms of collision. Any lateral movement during the go-around procedure could have been disastrous. I felt it best to just maintain position and let him pass us. Once he was clear; we were still well within the parameters of a stabilized approach; so we continued for a normal landing.

Air carrier landing SFO during side by visual approaches to Runway 28L/R described a passing event; expressing concern regarding the procedure.

1778510

202012

0601-1200

SNA.Airport

CA

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT; Tower SNA

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach; Final Approach

STAR DSNEE FOUR

Class C SNA

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Class E ZLA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Fatigue; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1778510

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Descending on the DSNEE 4 arrival from EMLLD; we became aware of congested airport environment with two different TCAS traffic alerts very close by. Approach had us at 190 knots departing DSNEE; and we were expecting the visual to runway 20R. We had gone to flaps 2 configuration. We were handed off late to the final controller; and when we switched over we heard a company call sign with nearly identical numeric as ours; cleared for the RNAV (RNP) Z runway 20R. We heard the other aircraft read back the clearance; we knew a VERY similar call sign was on frequency. We thought we might be cleared for the same approach. We checked in and asked if we were going to get the RNAV approach; and the controller said no; we were going to get a visual unless we asked for the approach. Shortly after; the controller cleared an aircraft to descend to 3000'; but neither of us were sure that it was our call sign. The First Officer (FO) attempted to clarify; but the controller was very busy and talking nonstop. We flew a few more miles; and before we could clarify he repeated the clearance to descend to 3000' and asked if we had the airport in sight. We called the airport; and said we were high. He cleared us to fly through final approach course and intercept from the right. FO read back the clearance; and we both agreed it was going to be tight. I immediately called for gear down and got the flaps to full; I also used the speed brakes as long as safely practical. We switched over to tower control; and I made the glideslope at approx. 1400' AGL; but we were still 40kts fast. I told the FO we were going to do a 'Soft Go'. At 1000' AGL I called for 'Go Around; Takeoff/around (TOGA)' and advanced the thrust levers to TOGA. I then called 'climb' as I brought the thrust levers back to what I thought was the climb position; but was actually the Maximum Continuous Thrust (MCT) detent. The tower initially held us to 2000'; so I reduced our climb rate - we were accelerating rapidly. As we cleaned up and were cleared to 3000'; the FO recognized that we were in MCT detent and brought it to my attention. By then we were clean and rapidly approaching 250 KIAS. I brought the thrust levers back to idle as we passed 260; and we saw a maximum speed of about 280 before we began to slow down again. I selected speed mode and set 220 KIAS; positioned the thrust levers in the climb detent and re-engaged auto thrust. We slowed and turned back into a right downwind for an uneventful visual approach and landing at SNA.Causes(1) Late clearance to descend. SNA is challenging even when on a normal profile; and a few miles made all the difference.(2) Task saturation. The L.A basin is one of the busiest airspaces in the world. Two Traffic Alerts and nonstop chatter from the approach controller indicated that he was task saturated; as well.(3) Call sign confusion. The scheduling shop should never have had two call signs separated by one digit arriving at the same airport at the same time.(4) Approach expectations. We were going to do a visual; and changed our setup and expectations when we heard preceding traffic approach clearance.(5) Fatigue. Our FAR 117 duty day limit was 10 hours. We had been awake since 3.5 hours earlier to make sign-in; and were at 9:00 of our 10:00 limit when we arrived at SNA. When we knew we were too high to likely make a successful approach; we could have asked for a vector and more time/distance to descend. Flight scheduling needs to de-conflict call signs so very similar ones are not scheduled to arrive at the same airport at the same time. The ATC controllers seemed very busy; perhaps a few more controllers on-shift would help divide the workload better. Crew scheduling could alleviate fatigue factors by avoiding sequence builds that have crews flying into airports at the back end of their duty periods that are known to present unusual challenges (even if they aren't officially 'special qualification' airports).

Airbus First officer reported a go-around caused by late clearance to descend and confusion caused by a similar call sign for an aircraft preceding them.

1083148

201304

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

39000.0

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1083148

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 199

1083441.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I was working Sector X combined. A Gulfstream was on the [SID] departure out of the terminal area. He was issued the climb to FL410. Sector Y had traffic and suggested he go direct [to the fix]. I issued the clearance. Later on after the hand off was taken by Sector Y; the Controller said 'you may want to stop him.' I was in the process of switching him when he put an interim altitude of FL390 in the data block. I said; 'Oh; I'm sorry; I see he didn't get the altitude.' The other Controller said no worries; I got it. In the meantime the Gulfstream is out of FL360 still climbing. The Gulfstream checked on to [Sector] Y's frequency climbing to FL410; and the Controller 'rogered' him. The Controller on Sector Y then gave a briefing. Within about 1 minute of the new Controller sitting down; the Gulfstream and the B737 start flashing. FL390 was in the data block; but the Gulfstream was out of FL391. He was never stopped at the appropriate altitude. The new Controller immediately descended him and the B737 responded to an RA. They never got within the 5 miles and 1;000 FT because of the quick action of the new Controller and the RA. Basically; it was a communication break down. I assumed the Controller understood what I was saying; and he thought I had stopped him. He did not catch it on the initial check on of the Gulfstream; which lead to potentially terrible situation. I should have made sure the aircraft was stopped.

This report is from a TCAS RA which required us to climb from our cruise altitude. We were at cruise at FL400. We got a TCAS Alert that went immediately to an RA from an aircraft climbing from below. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and selected emergency thrust and started a climb using TCAS guidance. I notified ATC we were responding to an RA and were climbing. We climbed to FL410 before we got a clear of conflict. The Gulfstream came within 300 FT of us before we started to get separation. During the maneuver; it was the closest I ever came to another aircraft not in a formation flight! ATC started inquiring to the Gulfstream when they continued to climb through FL390. The Gulfstream said they were clear to FL410. ATC said he was 'sorry;' that he had just sat down. TCAS saved this flight!

Enroute Controller described a loss of separation event when coordination during the ATC position relief briefing was confused reference the climb clearance resulting in the TCAS RA.

1700250

201911

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Rain; Fog

Night

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Y

Main Gear Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Fatigue

1700250

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; MEL; Procedure

Aircraft

Many factors played a part in the exceedance. 5 mel's and 1 cdl. We also had a limitation of FL250. Cleared 1 MEL before leaving gate. We were delayed and I switched aircraft in a hurry. I was doing IOE and he had never had restrictions like this. Weather was foggy and misty and icing conditions once airborne. Also light to moderate turbulence most of flight. It was night time and couldn't really see the sticker to remind us of limitation. It was late at night and we were both tired from being on duty for more than 9 hours at time.Plane had a CDL for right hand main landing gear door being removed. We were restricted to 250 kts. or .63 mach whichever less. We also had a pack deferred and 4 other MELs. So limited to FL250 as well. I was doing IOE and we were 3 hours delay when got to plane. Weather was low visibility and night time. By the time we were in cruise we realized that we had forgotten about the speed limitation for the landing gear. Arriving at gate in MLI; called Maintenance; and wrote up the exceedance. Don't be tired; or more focused on weather and fixated on other MEL of FL250.

ERJ First Officer reported that distraction related to aircraft MEL and CDL caused him to exceed a speed restriction.