elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1652395

201906

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

2400.0

TRACON SCT

Chancellor 414A / C414

1.0

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class B LAX

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.7

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1652395

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Airspace Structure

Human Factors

I assigned a vector to Aircraft X to intercept the HHR localizer Runway 25. Aircraft X was assigned 3000 feet from the last sector (POMR). After looking at the MVA I assigned Aircraft X to 'descend and maintain 2600'. I made a few other transmissions and then looked back at Aircraft X and saw that the altitude now showed 2400 in a 2600 MVA. I gave a low altitude alert (incorrectly though; call sign first; then low altitude alert); and advised Aircraft X that the MVA was 2600. The pilot than said; 'I thought we were assigned 2000.' I told Aircraft X to climb and maintain 2600 and expedite (should have said immediately).Installing an actual arrival to HHR from the east that has the aircraft inbound descending via would help with workload at DYNR and keep issues like this from arising. Also; slamming arrivals under the LAX final to get in to HHR is becoming outdated and bound to be an issue as traffic increases at both LAX and HHR. Procedures should be updated and reviewed accordingly. I also believe that having TMU put the HHR arrivals on the timeline and meter them with LAX traffic would be a possible solution.

SCT Controller reported they missed an aircraft reading back the wrong altitude and the aircraft flew below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1795172

202103

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

2600.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Part 129

IFR

Personal

Descent

Vectors

UAV: Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Airport / Aerodrome / Heliport; Aircraft / UAS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 5; Flight Crew Total 4800; Flight Crew Type 30

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1795172

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS); Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Software and Automation

Human Factors

On the above mentioned date and time; I was the designated Pilot Flying. Descending through the Los Angeles area on vectors I was instructed to descend from 4;000 feet to 2;600 feet. I was overflying the city of Los Angeles on vectors to HHR. Autopilot was engaged; 2;600 feet was set in the altitude pre-selector and I began my descent. Another pilot reported to ATC that they flew past a drone off their right wing around 4;000 feet on approach into LAX. That would put the drone in our proximity off our right wing as well. Both the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and I were looking for that drone. I had mentioned to the PM that I have never been this low over the city of Los Angeles and we need to pay close attention to our surroundings. Through the distraction of trying to identify the drone; I descended through 2;600 feet to 2;400 feet before being advised of my altitude by ATC. I immediately disconnected the autopilot and corrected to the assigned altitude of 2;600 feet. No further issues occurred and no near misses were experienced to my knowledge. I was not informed by ATC of any possible pilot deviation nor given a contact number to call. Corrective action was taken to resolve the altitude discrepancy; and I have discussed with my crew and maintenance facility the possible reason why altitude was not captured by the autopilot. As Pilot in Command; I fully take responsibility for the actions on this day; both negative and corrective; and have discussed our safety procedures with my crew. I am filling out this report as I feel aviation is founded on safety and I strive to improve on every aspect of my piloting safety; skills and knowledge. Thank you for your time and consideration.

GA pilot reported overhearing a report of a UAS sighting in the area. The pilot focused on locating the UAS in relation to their aircraft and overshot their assigned altitude.

1783426

202101

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection

Compressor

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 144; Flight Crew Total 13533; Flight Crew Type 11537

Troubleshooting

1783426

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1783427.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Ops normal from pushback to takeoff roll. I was flying pilot; [the] Captain non-flying pilot. Power was set and autothrottles and FMAs all had normal indications. At approximately 60 knots there was a loud bang and the jet swerved to the right. I steered the jet back to centerline with rudder and the Captain initiated the abort. We stopped quickly on the runway and told ATC we'd aborted and instructed the passengers to remain seated. After quickly assessing the risk; and talking with the Lead Flight Attendant; Captain determined it was safe to taxi clear of Runway XX and we stopped on the parallel taxiway. We requested assistance from [the] Fire Department to look at the landing gear to ensure we hadn't blown a tire or had smoke/fire coming off the brakes. After getting the all-clear; we coordinated with Operations/Tech Ops to return to Gate X. We closely monitored brake temp indications during the taxi back and saw that they were all decreasing in normal fashion as expected. We were met by many company personnel at the gate and Maintenance was able to quickly determine we had an Engine Number 2 compressor stall during takeoff roll. Passengers deplaned in normal fashion through Door 1L; and the flight crew was then escorted up to ZZZ Flight Ops to discuss our readiness and ability to continue flying the trip. Captain and I then proceeded to fly as scheduled.

During takeoff roll; heard a loud bang and aircraft swerved to the right. Executed rejected takeoff procedure. Exited runway. Personnel inspected aircraft externally. No visible damage and no fires were detected. Returned to gate. Maintenance data showed engine stall on Number 2 Engine. My compliments to the First Officer and Flight Attendants for their professionalism during this unexpected event.

Air carrier flight crew reported that an engine compressor stall occurred during takeoff roll; causing the aircraft to swerve and the crew to reject the takeoff.

1142371

201401

0001-0600

SBAZ.ARTCC

FO

32000.0

VMC

Night

Center SBAZ

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 25000; Flight Crew Type 1500

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

1142371

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 1300

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Dispatch

1142371.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We were told by Amazonica Control that we were not flying the routing filed in our filed flight plan. We were flying the routing in the flight plan provided to us by Dispatch. During the initial flight planning process; Dispatch had filed a flight plan that was rejected by ATC. We were told the flight plan was not in compliance with the NOTAM regarding preferred routings out of SBGR. The NOTAM was for aircraft entering Brazilian airspace between XA:00Z and XD:00Z. We were scheduled to enter Brazilian airspace before the XA:00Z. As per ATC request; a new flight plan was accomplished that fully complied with the NOTAM routing. We left SBGR Operations with an Operational Flight Plan showing Release 2. We did not see Release 1. After passing BOMAL; Amazonica Control advised us that we were deviating from our flight plan. They had on file a different routing that did not comply with the NOTAM routing. It may have been the routing originally filed by our Dispatcher in Release 1.This is the second time in 30 days that our Company's flight planning system has failed to provide me with an acceptable; legal flight plan. It appears that the flight planning system does not take into account NOTAMs; and does not comply with various countries flight planning restrictions.

There appears to be confusion on the preferred routing and correct filing out of SBGR. When we arrived at SBGR Operations; there was no flight plan; and the Dispatcher said there had been a computer outage. The first flight plan he filed was rejected by ATC per the Operations Staff. The second flight plan was filed and was issued to us as release 2. When we received the verbal clearance we were cleared via the SID and then 'as filed.'

An Air Carrier departed SBGR with a revised flight plan; the first plan rejected by ATC; and after passing BOMAL were notified by Amazonica Control that they had deviated from the flight plan. There may been NOTAMs not complied with.

1847492

202110

0001-0600

VNY.Airport

CA

1000.0

Marginal

Cloudy

2000

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Final Approach

Class D VNY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Situational Awareness

1847492

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

Landing in VNY; pilot flying was the PIC which was very quiet and tired had a difficult time to do a VOR-B approach in Van Nuys since we had 2;000 BKN we end up too high short final and no ground contact. 119.3 advise him to do the published miss and PF asked the guy to circle over the airport opposite direction of the MAP turn. Finally after loosing 1;000 feet from 2;000 we saw the ground over top of the airport and he just pretended that we were doing a visual approach with full landing configuration Flap 30+ landing gear for 10 minutes from the beginning of the first VOR-B approach to overhead and wrong turn to join the beginning of the downwind leg Runway 16R at 1;000 feet to finally turn to land while in and out of clouds even though so dangerously close to ground.

Pilot reported a CFTT event during a visual approach in marginal weather conditions when the co-pilot turned the wrong way on a published missed approach procedure; lost 1;000 feet of altitude; and joined the traffic pattern while flying in and out of clouds.

1083541

201304

0601-1200

APA.Airport

CO

0.0

Air Taxi

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 135

Taxi

Fan Blade

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Commercial

Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1083541

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Release Refused / Aircraft Not Accepted

Company Policy; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Upon arriving the previous night; crew had unsuccessfully tried to obtain a hangar for the night. Upon arrival at the airport the next morning; crew observed that the engine inlets had snow in them. Crew elected to ensure that the engine fan blades were not frozen into place from the snow that had accumulated over night. Upon startup; the right engine fan blades started without incident. The left engine fan blades did not spool up and we discontinued the startup. Crew called the Acting Chief Pilot to keep operations informed on our progress; and that we were looking to get the airplane into the hangar. ACP indicated that he has had success with other crews with throwing a bucket of warm water into the engine and starting it right away; freeing up the blades; and blowing residual water out of the back of the engine. I indicated that I was not comfortable climbing up on a snow and ice covered wing. Although not discussed; I am unaware that this is an approved procedure with the manufacturer. I also feel like I was being pressured to do such a procedure to get the trip completed.If such a procedure is approved by the manufacturer; it would be beneficial for the company to distribute such information. It [would have been an] unsafe operation to climb onto the wing with snow and ice on it.

The Captain of a CE-750 refused his assigned aircraft when the left engine fan blades; frozen in place after an outdoor overnight; wouldn't turn during start. He subsequently also refused to attempt a start technique advocated by a Chief Pilot but for which there was no approved documentation approving or describing the associated methodology.

1684159

201909

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Cowling

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1684159

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

Day 3 of a 4 day trip with same CA (Captain). We were rerouted after leg 1 to DH (Dead Head) to ZZZ and pick up and reposition to [the next airport] an airplane that had been repaired at ZZZ the night prior. When we arrived at ZZZ airplane was parked at remote parking and we had to wait nearly 2 hours for Ops personnel to get us to the aircraft. I did a thorough pre-flight external inspection of the airplane knowing it had just been returned to service and we were the first flight after that event. I did not see anything abnormal on the pre-flight inspection. We did not require a push crew from the remote parking but did have ramp personnel present to pull the chocks and marshal our engine start. Start up and taxi normal. I was pilot flying and on the initial climb after takeoff I notice that the airplane was significantly out of trim; especially in yaw. Knowing our airplane was very light and many of the airplanes are a bit crooked; I trimmed it out and continued flying the RNAV departure by hand. All flight controls felt normal. No indications present. As we accelerated the airplane began to have a definitive vibration. It was not particularly violent but definite and felt like it was coming from the forward floor area. CA agreed that we had a vibration and we began checking all EICAS indications and pages for any annunciation. None found. Above 10k I accelerated to 270 kts and the vibration became much more pronounced and concerning. After engaging the a/p I briefly commanded a climb speed of 280 kts and this made the vibration worse and the airplane did not accelerate or climb normally (it was barely doing either). Knowing that 250 kts produced the best vibration/climb characteristic; I slowed the a/c back to 250 kts. No vibration indications on either engine and all engine parameters normal. Fuel flow at 250 kts within normal range but high for an empty light airplane. I then slowly backed out the aileron and rudder trims towards neutral to see if that may help the vibration or change what we were seeing. It did not so I reset the trims to square the airplane. At this point climb characteristics were noticeably poor even at 250 knots (approx 17k MSL) so we agreed that requesting to level off at a lower altitude and ask ATC to provide us with 250 kts was the best course of action while we considered our situation. The vibrations were not bad or getting worse and the airplane handled fine at this airspeed/alt combination so we decided we had time to investigate. We looked through the maintenance logs for any vibration history (some a/c have them); talked through various scenarios with the nose door and asked dispatch for any additional maintenance history they could provide over ACARS. One possibility we considered was that perhaps the diversion from the warning message the previous day (land nearest suitable airport QRH for 14th stage warning) resulted in a hard landing that had caused something wrong in the nose gear bay. We briefed how this could cause landing gear problems on approach. We did not declare an emergency but did inform dispatch of our speed/altitude requests. We decided on initial approach there was no reason to request the longer runway unless we had difficulty configuring the airplane on approach. I configured the airplane early coming in to [the destination airport] to make sure that all was set with plenty of time prior to landing. I noticed that at low power setting the large trim needs (especially yaw) decreased. Landing and taxi normal. On my post-flight walk-around I noticed the RH aft upper engine cowl was unlatched and hinged upward. Maintenance was called. Outstation maintenance supervisor and compliance to ensure that cowls/doors/access points are properly attached and secured. While the cowling appeared secure during the walk-around; perhaps a more thorough pre-flight check after a maintenance event could have caught this problem. More information in the corrective action of theaircraft log to inform the crew what pieces of the airplane maintenance actually had to take apart to alert the crew to make double sure to dig deeper into those places on preflight after return to service. Some training on performance loss associated with the missing cowl piece -- it made perfect sense to us after we saw it on preflight but it wasn't where our minds were going when we troubleshot the vibration in-flight.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported vibrations due to an unlatched upper engine cowling.

1181406

201406

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

3200.0

Daylight

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

TRACON A80

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

Facility A80.TRACON

Government

Other / Unknown

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

1181406

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X (a CRJ); a Runway 26L departure; advised that he was deviating left of course for wake turbulence. This conflicted with Aircraft Y (a B717); a Runway 27R departure. I told Aircraft X unable left deviation due to traffic and approved a deviation right of course. I informed Aircraft X that he was 6 miles behind a B757. Aircraft X stated he wanted to try to get out of the wake turbulence and said he got a 90 degree roll. I issued a 3-1-0 heading to Aircraft X to ensure separation with Aircraft Y and provide diverging course from the wake turbulence from Aircraft Z (the 757). The pilot of Aircraft Z inquired on the frequency if that wake turbulence was from him and wanted to verify the 90 degree aspect also. I alerted the Watch Supervisor.This may be connected with RECAT; however without analyzing the data; I am not sure that wake turbulence separation wasn't even provided under the old standard.

Support Specialist at A80 reports of aircraft entering wake turbulence and asking for a vector to the left. Controller cannot issue a left heading due to traffic; and issues a right turn.

1672649

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Clear

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1672649

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Shortly after rotation; we noticed a smell that seemed to be electrical in nature. Shortly after the smell [was noticed] and a turn to assigned heading; we noticed a light colored smoke filling the cockpit. Before the turn that allowed sunlight into the cockpit; the smoke was not noticeable. We completed memory items and notified Tower that we would need to land. We were handed off to Departure who started to vector us toward [Runway] XXR for an immediate landing. Once leveling off we noticed that the smoke seemed to dissipate. After speaking with the Flight Attendant; we learned that there was smoke in the cabin as well. After learning this the Captain and I both agreed that we would land overweight. After landing and clearing the runway; Fire and Rescue advised that there was no visible smoke or fire coming from the aircraft. The Flight Attendant said that the passengers were not in need of assistance either. We elected to taxi back to the terminal.

EMB-145 First Officer reported smoke detected in cockpit and passenger cabin shortly after takeoff resulting in an uneventful return to departure airport.

1249901

201503

0001-0600

SDF.Airport

KY

6.0

2000.0

VMC

5

Night

5000

Tower SDF

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

4.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Other RNAV 35L; STAR DLAMP3

Class C SDF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Instructor; Pilot Flying; Check Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80

Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1249901

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 116; Flight Crew Total 14097; Flight Crew Type 4878

1249902.0

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

This flight was an IOE trip with myself; a PIC conducting OE [Operating Experience] for an upgrade captain. I was the PF [Pilot Flying] as the upgrade captain had numerous previous legs and requested a leg as PM [Pilot Monitoring]. The crew was augmented with an additional FO [First Officer] and IRO [International Relief Officer]. The flight progressed normally until the arrival into SDF. A visual approach was planned to 35R backed up by an RNAV approach. I used the RNAV approach for backup because the upgrade captain had only seen one non-precision approach during OE. We were cleared for the arrival and expected to land on 35R. The arrival was normal until approaching DLAMP when we were cleared to 4000 ft. DLAMP has a published altitude of +6000 and 210 kts. I called for 4000 ft. in the altitude window and asked the PM to clear the /+6000 restriction at DLAMP. On clearing the restriction; I observed the 210 kt profile was also cleared and FMS speed intervened (speed select 210) to comply with the speed. I actually had to select 230 since we had not extended slats and out min clean speed was about 230. After rolling out on downwind I called for slats and re-selected 210. I observed oncoming traffic for the north runways and elected stay on profile to 4000. We were subsequently cleared to 3000 ft but I stayed on profile for fuel efficiency believing that we would have an extended downwind. After passing GETTA I expected the aircraft to descend to 3000 ft. but since GETTA is the exit fix for the arrival the FMS leveled the aircraft at 4000 ft. I selected level change to descend to 3000 ft. ATC turned us to base leg shortly after passing GETTA. I accepted the turn and then realized we were going to be too high to descend on profile and called for flaps 15. We then accepted a clearance for a visual approach to 35R and I called for direct PARCL with a 348 intercept to comply with note 4 on the published approach. Once that intercept was in the FMS I selected NAV to get at least one magenta field in the FMS (We were still in speed select and level change in the other fields). I asked the PM to set MDA in the ALT window but realized we were not going to reach profile prior to PARCL. I called for gear down and flaps 28 but we were still above flaps 35 speed. I disconnected the AP in an effort to level the aircraft to slow but that effort was futile. At 1700 AGL I announced to the PM that this wasn't going to work and he agreed. At 1500 ft AGL I called for missed approach. Since we only had about 1000 ft to climb; I wanted to select level change rather than hit the TOGA button which would give us go-around thrust but MDA was still set in the altitude window so I hit the TOGA button (probably should have just used VS but it didn't occur to me until too late). We executed the missed approach but I was still hand flying and overshot the 3000 ft clearance by about 200 ft. We notified ATC of the deviation. I also over sped the flaps in the process of trying to maintain level flight and documented this overspeed in the aircraft logbook and event report.Once leveled off I re-established autoflight and we were vectored for a second approach. I briefed the same approach and it progressed normally until base leg. When cleared for the approach; I initiated a turn to intercept final. I intended to call for direct PARCL with a 348 intercept as we had done previously but I apparently called for direct PGSUS instead. The PM gave me what I asked for. PGSUS was behind us so the aircraft began a left turn across final rather than a right turn to intercept. I disconnected the autopilot to correct the aircraft flight path but could not avoid overshooting the final approach course. The PM notified ATC of this deviation. I gave up on automation and hand flew a visual approach to 35R; landing uneventfully. We did have both augmented crewmembers in the cockpit observing this approach and landing. I would like to emphasize that all other crewmembers were instrumental in calling deviations and helping me to mitigate the errors. I am humiliated by my performance and take full responsibility for any consequences. I had ample opportunity for crew rest prior to the flight but found myself not mentally alert per my normal standard and after the initial error; struggling to get back ahead of the aircraft. I am submitting this report to hopefully aid in data collection and help those that follow to learn from my mistakes.

This flight had a crew of 4 due to Captain Upgrade IOE and flight leg over 8 hours. OE [Operating Experience] instructor was PF [Pilot Flying] and student in left seat was PM [Pilot Monitoring]. There was a Captain and an FO [First Officer] acting as relief officers and they were both in the cockpit observer seats for the descent; approach; missed approach and subsequent landing. PF got behind on the approach (RNAV 35R) and initiated G/A [Go-around] at approx. 1;500 feet AGL. The TOGA button was pressed; PM announced GA to tower and tower issued instruction to climb to 3;000 feet on RWY HDG. Somewhere during all of this PF turned off the autopilot and PM dialed 3;000 feet into the altitude select window. Due to the application of GA Thrust the airplane was climbing at a great rate and PF overshot the selected altitude by approx. 200 feet. The tower was notified and they indicated that there was no problem and to descend and maintain 3;000 feet.

Air Carrier flight crew describes an unstabilized approach with the Check Captain flying from the right seat that results in a go-around. On the go around the assigned altitude is exceeded and the flap speed may have been exceeded. The second approach is stabilized but has an initial overshoot into the adjacent approach path. Fatigue was cited as a possible factor.

1569236

201808

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

A300

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1569236

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Procedure

Crew departed with hazardous material on board; but our paperwork showed no Hazmat. We received our DG Manifest very early; before any freight was loaded top-side; which we found a little odd; but since it did say there was no Hazmat aboard; I did not think to question it. Enroute to ZZZ1; Operations Control sent ACARS message: '[…] update: agent advising that in 9L there is Hazmat unknown to the crew (toxic; radioactive; & dry ice) 3848 lb Hazmat; but not showing up on the weight and balance...being advised that there is something wrong in the auto DG system.' I do not know how or why this happened.

A300 Captain reported Hazmat was loaded prior to departure without crew notification.

1644965

201905

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1.0

300.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Sport 19

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 450; Flight Crew Type 20

Situational Awareness

1644965

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Horizontal 4000; Vertical 500

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

On approach to landing; I was cleared to land. On a 2 mile final; I attempted to reduce power and the throttle had no effect. I attempted to adjust mixture; which dropped engine RPMs. I had enabled carb heat during my approach checklist and did not have any large power reduction with it enabled; so I disabled carb heat. I attempted to put in flaps at about 1 mile final; but power was still near full and I was at about 90 knots. I requested a go around from the Tower; which they cleared me for the go around. Near the end of the runway at about 300' AGL; I started losing power and speed dropped quickly. I [requested priority handling] and started my turn for [a different runway; and] informed the Tower of my intentions to land [immediately]. They diverted [another aircraft] that was doing touch and goes. I saw the [other] aircraft about 1/4 down the runway opposite direction start its ascent as I was crossing the numbers. I floated down the runway as I didn't have any flaps and bounced the landing 3 times until I was able to finally land. Upon landing the engine stopped completely and I was not able to clear the runway. I pulled the aircraft off the runway. The aircraft had a recent engine overhaul in the last 3 hours of flight.

Beech B19 pilot reported a successful landing following a loss of engine power on approach.

1597926

201811

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

PA-32 Cherokee Six/Lance/Saratoga/6X

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 1530; Flight Crew Type 700

Situational Awareness

1597926

Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

I conducted a flight ending at a private airfield. Prior to the initiation of the flight; I visited the airfield and evaluated the condition of the weather; airport; and its environment as it pertained to the safety of flight. I immediately returned to the [originating] airport and relocated a Piper PA-32-300 to the private grass strip approximately 6 miles east. The closest reporting weather was [the originating airport]; where field conditions were reported as 100% wet. Due to its proximity; it was interpolated that the conditions of the private field; which had no weather reporting station; would have comparable runway conditions. The landing distance available at the airstrip was greater than the landing distance required for the flight given the aircraft weight and conditions. I made a normal approach to landing. After touchdown; I used appropriate braking procedures. The aircraft did not respond as expected and subsequently overran the end of the runway.

PA-32 pilot reported a runway excursion during landing at a private airport.

1282245

201507

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 91

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1282245

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

While operating a reposition flight to ZZZ an unstable approach and EGPWS sink rate event occurred. We were cleared for the visual approach for runway 14. As we were approaching from the south on a right base the captain said he was going to execute a close in approach and flaps 22 landing. We were inside the final approach fix when we intercepted the final approach course. The captain continued the approach as we were configured by 1000 feet AGL. I made the 1000 feet call and I received no stable call from the captain. He continued the approach and we turned final at about 500 feet. We were above the normal glide path to the runway. The EGPWS sink rate sounded 2 times as the captain descended and we also got the 'pull up' message. We touched down in the touchdown zone and landed about 15-20 knots fast. No damage or any other event took place. After we taxied off the runway I felt uncomfortable with that approach and landing. I know that I should have been more questionable to the captain on continuing the approach. While I was the pilot monitoring I followed company procedures up until the 1000 feet call. I should have made a go around call to the captain.The threat was that we were slightly high and close in to the runway. This caused the captain to become unstable toward the end of the visual approach. The errors by me were that I did not make the Go Around call to the captain since we were unstable. The errors by captain were to continue the approach even though it was in the procedures to make a go around in this case. The undesired aircraft states were unstable approach and EGPWS event.In the future as a First Officer and Pilot Monitoring I will be more assertive in the event that I am not comfortable with the state of the aircraft or any other threat to safety. Also I will be more assertive even though it is a ferry flight and there are no passengers on the plane.

EMB-145 First Officer reported the Captain flew an unstabilized approach that featured EGPWS alerts for 'sink rate' and 'pull up' that were ignored by the Captain who continued the approach and landing.

1062629

201301

1801-2400

ELP.Airport

TX

5300.0

TRACON ELP

Air Carrier

B737-500

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C ELP

TRACON ELP

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ELP

Facility ELP.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1062629

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Tower called Approach and asked for an opposite direction release on Air Carrier X departing Runway 4 on the Nevue1 Departure. I advised Tower released and Tower read back 'released; runway heading.' The SOP dictates all opposite direction releases will be issued runway heading unless the departure will not be in conflict with arrivals to other runways. Air Carrier Y was cleared for a visual approach to Runway 26 and was on Tower frequency. Air Carrier X departure roll was indicated by the strip dropped from the Tower and the strip marking indicated runway heading. When Air Carrier X 'tagged up' and contacted radar it was observed Air Carrier X was not flying runway heading but instead was flying the Nevue1 Departure; at which time I turned Air Carrier X left to heading 040 and issued traffic on Air Carrier Y. After the conflict had been resolved and Air Carrier X was turned away from Air Carrier Y and out climbed the CRJ; Air Carrier X was turned direct NEVUE and advised to resume the departure. Air Carrier X was asked after traffic was no factor if they had been issued runway heading and if they were aware of the aircraft on final for Runway 26 and the pilot advised that he was not aware of the aircraft and was not given runway heading. Tower advised they were maintaining visual separation as they had Air Carrier Y on frequency. Departing traffic should have their clearances amended to take them off of departures that are in conflict with arriving traffic to other runways prior to the departures taking the runway.

ELP Approach Controller describes a conflict between a B737 departing Runway 4 and a CRJ200 landing Runway 26L. The B737 should have been advised of the traffic and given runway heading; but was not; and turned into the traffic on the previously assigned SID.

1805189

202105

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Vectors

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing; Inspection; Work Cards

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1805189

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Staffing

Procedure

Was assigned to perform the multiple tasks for aircraft return to service after extended parking. During accomplishment of the tasks had to open the engine cowls and more specifically the thrust reverser cowls. The station currently has hydraulic cowl pumps using XXXX oil. The AMM procedure gives the tool number of a cowl pump which was correct for equipment on hand and also gives the different mil-specs of oil that can be used. The oil from my understanding is consistent with X specifications however the opening actuator for the cowl state on a placard to 'use engine oil'. The engines on that particular airplane are serviced with YYYY oil which also falls under the X specification. There was some confusion about which oil was appropriate to use for this situation since the engines use YYYY oil but cowl pumps on hand had XXXX oil and the specs were the same for both oils. We ended up taking a XXXX oil cowl pump to the tooling department at ZZZ; draining it; cleaning/flushing it; replacing the filter; relabeling it with YYYY oil and servicing it with that oil for use on the aircraft. There was just some confusion about the proper oil.

Technician reported confusion in reference data during return to service maintenance on B737 MAX stored aircraft.

1834792

202108

0001-0600

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZAB

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1834792

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1834795.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

Received intermittent ATC Fault and right GPS EICAS message when crossing the military range of New Mexico. Notified ATC and complied with QRH. After exiting the military airspace; both messages disappeared and system worked fine.

Apparent GPS jamming near military airspace over New Mexico. Received ATC Fault and right GPS EICAS messages. Selected radio updating for FMS. Indications went away after clearing the airspace. System then worked as designed. No human performance issues present as causal.

Air carrier flight crew reported possible GPS jamming over New Mexico and near military airspace. After leaving the area the GPS returned to normal operation.

1314676

201512

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1314676

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airport

Landing aircraft was clearing [the runway]. We were holding in position and subsequently cleared for takeoff as the landing aircraft was clearing. Landing aircraft failed to clear the hold short line before stopping after exiting. The aircraft was clear of the white runway edge lines. At more than 100 kts we recognized the possibility of a runway incursion. Per standard brief; it was prudent and SAFE to continue since we were above 80 kts in the high speed reject phase of takeoff. We rotated about 1000 ft prior to the intersection.

ERJ-190 First Officer reported continuing takeoff during a potential runway incursion event.

1167318

201404

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1167318

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

1167319.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Ground Personnel; Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Company Policy; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were taxiing into the gate and were basically on an extended center line as we approached the sterile area and noticed the access road on the left with the catering truck parked in the center of the road outside of our red line and sterile area. We both commented on the closeness of the access road and that the truck was safely on the other side of the red line. I was diverting my attention to the docking system as the catering truck disappeared from my view to the left; still across [behind] the red line. As we were continuing slowly inbound on center line; according to the DGS; I noticed some commotion below and to my left of the DGS [Visual Docking Guidance System]. I looked down and saw a ramp person running out and giving me the stop signal. I immediately applied brakes and almost simultaneously felt the impact with the catering truck. I stopped the aircraft completely and set the parking brake and told the passengers to remain seated. The catering truck proceeded forward away from the impact site and the ramp personnel gave me the OK to continue our taxi. I then proceeded to park via the DGS. The brakes were parked at the gate and a call to maintenance was given with an appropriate Logbook write-up after the check list. Don't rely on automation and the trust of humans always doing the safe and correct thing. Marshallers at critical gates could have prevented this incident and prevent future incidents.

As we turned into the lead line; we saw on our left; at the airplane's 10 position; a catering truck. He was parallel to our aircraft; was stopped; and his position was outside the red line; outside of our gate's sterile/clear area. The Captain and I both confirmed that he was on the other side of the red line; again reassuring ourselves that he was clear of our sterile area. With that in mind; we continued the inbound taxi. Following the DGS commands; we passed the truck; continuing to the gate. Approximately 50 to 75 feet from the gate; we felt a thud/tug on the left side of the plane; but we were not sure what it was. We stopped. By this time; ground personnel had come out; giving us a stop signal. They were pointing to the left side of the plane. We did have contact with the truck. Once the truck was moved; parked the airplane and called MX. How we had contact with him; I don't know. As we passed and then lost sight of him; the truck was outside of the sterile area. I felt we were on our centerline; safely inside our area; not an issue. If I had had any doubts; I would have said so and suggested we get marshalers. I'm not sure how this contact occurred. But I do feel confident in saying if we had physical marshalers out there; guiding the aircraft; incidents like this would not happen. I would much rather have three physical human beings bringing us in rather than the electronic DGS.

Air Carrier flight crew reports contact with a catering truck by the left wing during parking using an automatic parking guidance system. The catering truck had been noticed to be parked clear of the safety zone as the aircraft passed but the wing did not clear the truck.

995345

201202

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 213; Flight Crew Type 12000

995345

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 256; Flight Crew Type 7000

995346.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Shortly after leveling off at FL350 for our planned cruise altitude; we heard the Cabin Altitude Warning horn without any other warning light indications. Both pilots immediately donned our oxygen masks and established communications with each other. We noticed the Cabin Pressure gauge read 10;000 FT; the cabin rate indicator was climbing; both packs were in auto and both engine bleeds were on; and the Outflow Valve gauge was reading full closed. With the cabin altitude at 10;000 FT and climbing; the Captain (pilot not flying) declared an emergency with ATC and asked for a descent. ATC initially gave us FL330 then shortly after the First Officer (pilot flying) started the emergency descent; they gave us FL240 then down to 10;000 FT. The First Officer (pilot flying) continued the emergency descent on autopilot while the Captain (pilot not flying) read through the Cabin Altitude Warning/Abnormal Pressurization Checklist and Emergency Descent Checklist. After reading the checklist; the Captain (pilot not flying) informed the flight attendants to take their seats; and advised them of our pressurization problem; emergency descent; and the possibility of the masks deploying. During our emergency descent; we went to manual/AC on the pressure controller to ensure the outflow value was full closed. This had no effect at controlling the cabin pressure. Passing between FL200 to FL180; the cabin altitude reached 14;000 FT and the oxygen light on the overhead panel illuminated. We confirmed with the flight attendants that the masks dropped and everyone was on oxygen. The cabin altitude reached 15;000 FT and then descended with the aircraft altitude until it stabilized at 10;000 FT. A diversion was considered; but fuel; weather; and no medical requirements allowed us to agree with Dispatch for a continued flight to destination.

[Narrative #2 had no additional information.]

B737-300 flight crew experiences a cabin altitude warning horn shortly after leveling off at FL350. An emergency is declared; oxygen masks are donned; and the flight descends to 10;000 FT. During the descent the cabin altitude exceeds 14;000 FT and the passenger oxygen masks drop. The crew is able to continue to destination at 10;000 FT.

1018108

201206

1801-2400

SFB.Airport

FL

1700.0

Tower SFB

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C SFB

Tower SFB

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Climb

Class C SFB

Facility SFB.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1018108

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

A Sky Hawk called me on Ground Control requesting VFR ILS Approach into SFB. I asked the pilot if he would like an ILS to 9L or 9R. The pilot advised that he could accept 9R since he wanted closed traffic after the approach. I put in the scratch pad entry J I Z which stands for 9R; ILS; Closed Traffic. I put on the strip a 110 heading which is given to our South departures considering that this aircraft is going to be vectored to our South ILS. I was also taxiing the heavy B767 to Runway 9L. I took the Sky Hawk to 9C in order to get them out in front of the Heavy and avoid wake turbulence. Local Controller was able to depart the Sky Hawk on his 110 heading and established RADAR confirmation and flying the 110 heading which is required by the LOA. He transferred control of the aircraft to Orlando Approach North Sector. After switching the Sky Hawk; Orlando Approach North Sector accepts the release for the Heavy B767 off Runway 9L. Local Control cleared the heavy for take off on a 080 heading. When the heavy tagged up on our RADAR we notice that the Approach Controller turned the Sky Hawk northbound into the flight path of the Heavy B767. The Local Controller at this point had already transferred radio communications. The Approach Controller turned both planes; the heavy to a north and the Sky Hawk to the east to provide separation. There are many flaws in the LOA between our facility and F11. It says that if a plane is going to have an approach into 9L that it should be given a 050 heading. It also states that if the aircraft flight is south of SFB it should have a 110 heading. This creates much confusion as to which heading these aircraft are to be given. I would recommend that our LOA identify which heading Approach would like these aircraft on.

A SFB Controller is concerned the ambiguity of the LOA requirements between their facility and MCO TRACON contributed to a conflict when MCO turned a VFR aircraft into the path of an IFR departure.

1742497

202005

0601-1200

NCT.TRACON

CA

8000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON NCT

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Descent

TRACON NCT

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 990

Situational Awareness

1742497

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 50; Vertical 5

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

While beginning my descent for landing at CXP about CHIME intersection my passenger said 'What is that?' I saw a drone pass directly off my left wing at less than 50 feet away. I was descending through 8;000' MSL. The operator of the drone is unknown and what it was doing at that altitude is also unknown; but it was where it should not be. This very dangerous situation [that] could have caused a total aircraft loss and or loss of life. I continued the flight without incident. I could not see this drone until I was so close that any evasive action would have been futile.

C182 pilot reported an NMAC with a UAV at 8000' in the vicinity of CXP airport.

1223113

201411

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

B717 (Formerly MD-95)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 9500; Flight Crew Type 5000

1223113

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure

I am deeply concerned by the new procedures in place at ATL that allow for immediate takeoff behind a B757. Tower controllers are pressuring crews to takeoff immediately behind B757s in all visual conditions; including the most hazardous - light quartering tailwinds. A few weeks back; I heard a controller admonish a crew that balked at the immediate clearance with a 'that's our new procedure' when they expressed concern about the wisdom of the departure. Recently; we were cleared to go behind a 767 (not 757) without a 'caution wake turbulence' warning; or with adequate separation. We refused the clearance. Would this have happened if the 757 was still properly classified? I don't think so - controllers are human; and a 767 looks like a 757 from a distance. On multiple occasions; we have had wake encounters with 757s on departure following this new procedure - minor deviations; but deviations nonetheless.I wonder what about ATL makes it immune from the physics that govern wake turbulence behavior everywhere else on the planet earth. Cynically; I am thinking that someone in Washington needed to show an increase in runway capacity; and putting crews and passengers in harm's way by ignoring wake turbulence was an easy way to do it.If we were limiting this idiocy to periods of moderate crosswind; I would be less concerned; but it is not. Furthermore; field conditions are often markedly different from those at a few hundred feet. It is not uncommon to takeoff in calm winds and immediately enter into a quartering tailwind.....and right into a lingering and powerful vortex.I urge the FAA to abandon this unsafe practice before it hurts someone.

B717 First Officer expressed concern that the new in-trail procedures in place in ATL could lead to unsafe wake vortex encounters for departing aircraft.

1323300

201601

1801-2400

SCT.TRACON

CA

Marginal

Cloudy; Rain; 2

Dusk

1000

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach; Initial Approach

Class B SAN

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 124; Flight Crew Type 124

Communication Breakdown; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1323300

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft; Weather; Human Factors; Airport

Weather

We were scheduled with straight wing; with unavailable intercom feature; fully loaded; landing limited with only 12 minutes of contingency fuel due to heavy loading; TAF TEMPO weather conditions at arrival time just above approach minimums (actual weather upon arrival was even worse and ended up going missed and diverting); #1 fuel gauge MEL'd requiring dripsticking prior to departure. First leg flying together as Crew; flown by F/O (First Officer) due to SNA scheduled later in the day and trying to preserve normal alternating leg schedule. Upon check-in with SoCal approaching SAN; the first radio transmission heard was a Company aircraft diverting. ATC described heavy bands of precip in vicinity of the airport; with clear gaps between; with obvious recent missed approaches/diversions. We checked weather again at our alternate; LAX as well as ONT. LAX weather was better; due to early descent by ATC; limited contingency fuel; and additional uncertainty due to an MEL'd fuel gauge we knew that we had one shot at SAN; if unsuccessful we would divert. Without too much detail; radar picture; and reports from SAN ATC and SoCal indicated that we would have a window of opportunity. We commenced the approach. ATC kept us high and fast as long as they could. Workload was extremely high; flying a non-precision vertical speed approach near mins with the energy issues thrown in. Preceding aircraft went missed as we approached the marker. This aircraft is extremely loud to begin with. After the marker and in the FA (Final Approach) segment; we encountered heavy precipitation; and the noise on the windscreen; when combined with no intercom feature resulted in us practically yelling at each other for Pilot-to-Pilot communication. Of course ATC is still in the matrix. About 300 feet above DDA (Derived Decision Altitude); as the PM (Pilot Monitoring); I turned the wipers on high. Other than one other issue I have had in my career while there was a pressure leak producing a deafening high-pitched whine; this now became probably the loudest cockpit I have ever been in again; a very loud; old aircraft as a baseline; no feature for the intercom; heavy precip; and wipers screaming. My window was approaching Niagara Falls status with a constant near stream of water. We went missed. After diverting; we reviewed the sequence mentally; and on the missed approach. We could recall no procedural errors in either callouts or sequence of events. But aircraft control and Pilot-to-Pilot communication in what ensued in the subsequent 20 or so seconds was full yellow if not red. We had to literally yell at each other; and we simply misunderstood/miscommunicated with each other. In that short period there were several miscommunications that occurred. One example; upon telling Tower we were missed; they issued a heading and altitude. As the PM I read it back; set up the MCP; etc.; but almost immediately; the PF (Pilot Flying) started asking a question which I thought related to the missed approach instructions. I literally could not understand him; his question was due to confusion with the Flight Director. It took me probably 10 seconds to turn off the wipers; which helped; but in the ensuing confusion for example the PF's confusion resulted in shallowing out our climb. I directed 'climb' and started to put up the flaps uncommanded beyond the 15 detent which had properly been called for on the go-around in an attempt to prevent overspeed. Bottom line; we had a slight flap 15 overspeed; shortly thereafter; the FMC locked; and we were in the midst of a divert; with an inop fuel gauge and so on. I've never had so much difficulty simply communicating within the cockpit.Crew actions could simply be summed up by better basic aircraft control by PF and 'quicker' intervention by PM; but the communication difficulty literally slowed the pace of all activity as we tried to coordinate. Again; procedurally (callouts; aircraft ground track; etc.) all occurred as they should; but if any additional stressors had been there; this probably would not have been the case. The real issue is twofold: The specific aircraft should not have been dispatched; given weather; MEL; loading status; and not having an intercom feature. If we had been in a newer aircraft; communication would not have been difficult; and in the end; 9 times out of 10; a diversion would not have been necessary either. However; the greatest simple fix; the older model aircraft NEED to be modified to reduce the workload of simple intra-cockpit communication. This aircraft was so loud inherently; when added to heavy precip; wipers at high speed and no ability to use the intercom easily that it essentially became a one Pilot aircraft. This is a situation easily avoided at many levels; and in my opinion is borderline unsafe.

Aircraft on a non-precision approach executed a go around due to heavy rain at the missed approach point. The flight crew then decided to divert to a more suitable airport.

1597745

201811

1801-2400

ZZZ.Tower

US

284.0

6.0

100.0

IMC

6

Night

2000

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Climb

Other On SID/STAR

Class B ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

1597745

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

1597758.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft

De-iced with the 1 & typ 4 fluid. Taxi out to XXR (full length). TO (Takeoff) delay approximately 20 minutes due to ATC and passenger traffic. Initially; normal takeoff. At 'positive rate/gear up' call; landing gear handle would only retract 1/2 way to the 'off' detent. Leveled off at 5;000 feet; 230 kts. Ran ECAM L/G RETRACTION FAULT procedure. Left landing gear handle down. Ran fuel consumption procedure. Determined we would land with approximately 11;100 lbs of fuel. Arrival weather was good with -SN (Light Snow). Attempted to contact Flight Operations to share this plan. This was a problem as this frequency was shared with some other air operations center north of ZZZ1. Finally able to verbally (and via ACARS) confirm our plan with Dispatch to continue to ZZZ and land with less fuel than scheduled. Dispatch said they would inform Approach Control of our situation and coordinate priority handling due to our lower fuel state. This never happened and we informed Approach ourselves. Approach and landing were uneventful. During taxi in to ramp; we were informed by Ramp Control to hold our position on the center line until marshallers arrived. Initial (lead-in) marshaller attempted to direct us to turn into a lone tug on our right side that was driving behind the white line; but was NOT clear for the turn. The rest of the parking was uneventful.

Landing gear did not retract after takeoff. Leveled at 5000 feet and ran appropriate checklists. Gear selector was placed to down position and flight continued with gear down. Fuel consumption increase procedure determined landing at ZZZ with 11100 lbs. of fuel. Advised flight control of situation and asked for guidance on return to [departure] or continue to [destination]. Flight control concurred with continuation to [destination] and landing with less fuel than originally planned. Climbed to FL200 and advised enroute ATC of reduced speed capability. Landed uneventfully.

A300 flight crew reported the landing gear failed to retract after takeoff.

1022567

201207

1201-1800

ZZZ.TRACON

US

3000.0

CLR

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 18500; Flight Crew Type 9800

1022567

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 2900

1022691.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight; Pre-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

This flight began with an aborted start of the LH engine. The EGT exceeded the start limit to 523C. The 'Aborted Start' checklist was accomplished. We were towed back into the gate and a call was placed to Dispatch/[Maintenance]. An AMT arrived at the aircraft and after some discussion with [Maintenance]; it was decided that the exceedance was within limits for continued operations. The subsequent engine starts were normal and we proceeded for takeoff. Shortly after becoming airborne; the RH engine EGT advanced into the red and peaked at 650C before we retarded the throttle. The First Officer was flying and continued to follow the departure as I located and performed the 'Engine Limit; Surge; Stall' checklist. While accomplishing this checklist; the EGT again exceeded red line limits. Several attempts were then made to use the 'Call Me' prompt in ACARS. Each time an error message was received. The message indicated that this function was not available. A text message was then sent to Dispatch requesting them to call. Radio contact with our Dispatcher was accomplished through ARINC. We asked that [Maintenance] be added to the conversation. Unfortunately; [Maintenance] could not hear or understand our transmissions. They asked that we repeat each transmission several times. This became quite a distraction/threat and after several frustrating minutes we asked that they be dropped from the call. We continued the analysis of our situation with only Dispatch on the line. We concluded; that we did in fact have a degraded engine and the appropriate course of action was to divert to [a nearby airport]. We informed ATC that we would be diverting and an emergency was declared. At this point; the Flight Attendants were brought up to speed about the condition of our aircraft and that we would be landing. This was followed by an announcement to our passengers explaining where and why we were going to land. We then learned from our Purser that we had a [company] 757 crew in the cabin and they were willing to come to the cockpit if we needed assistance. We decided that an extra set of eyes and ears could be helpful. The deadheading First Officer came to the cockpit and backed us up with our checklists and subsequent approach and landing. While this transpired; my First officer prepared the aircraft for arrival. We were then advised that due to VIP operation; holding was in progress. We re-emphasized the emergency status of our aircraft and were given approach priority. While descending; another non-essential distraction occurred when we received several messages from [Maintenance] asking for specifics about our engine. We responded later on the ground. Since the overtemp only occurred at higher power settings; a normal two engine approach and landing was made.

As I was flying the aircraft and communicating with ATC; I was not completely aware of the issues the Captain was having with communication but it was distracting to both of us and it appeared as if [Maintenance] could not hear any of the Captain's transmissions.

B757-200 Captain reported high EGT in the engines both at start and shortly after takeoff. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted to a nearby airport.

1664104

201907

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

A319

Part 121

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Installation; Repair

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Time Pressure; Workload

1664104

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft; Company Policy; Human Factors; Staffing

Company Policy

Aircraft X had TDI Terminate drop dead on date of occurrence for #2 Engine rear spinner cone seal damage. It is my understanding that the new seal did not arrive until after midnight on date of occurrence. After the time it took to be received; the seal was not available until approximately XA:30. Aircraft X had a XD:00 departure. I was assigned the task to change the seal at XA:45. After consulting with the Lead; I was given the AMM (Aircraft Maintenance Manual) reference to remove and reinstall the front and rear spinner cones. We had difficulty finding a reference for replacing the seal and before it was found and I was instructed to start the task. I removed the front and rear spinner cones as well as the damaged seal on the rear spinner cone. I then cleaned the surface in preparation for new seal installation. At this point I made clear to the Lead that I was not going to reinstall the spinner until the sealant had the required time to cure. I was given black RTV (Room Temperature Vulcanizing) to use for installation and so I also made clear that the sealant previously used looked to be clear and so I would not use black RTV if I did not have documentation that it may be used. Then the Supervisor decided to have the aircraft moved to the gate. During the period of aircraft movement; I consulted with the Supervisor regarding the status of the task. He then he told me; 'The aircraft has got to go on its scheduled flight. Just put it on and I (he) will sign it off.' Still; there is no documentation available for seal replacement. As I approached my vehicle to proceed to the aircraft; the Lead pulled up in his vehicle and asked for the spinners and the new seal. I told him I did not have the sealant to use and he said they were just going to use white RTV. He proceeded to the aircraft where [two] mechanics were instructed to assist in the seal installation and reinstallation of the spinners. The rear spinner was installed immediately after the new seal was installed and no time was given to cure. The Lead signed off the seal replacement.Lack of part availability. Lack of planning. Lack of concern for proper procedure. On Time Performance Pressure. Lack of training regarding reference search of engine manuals. Supervision instruction to disregard having proper documentation during task accomplishment. Lack of staffing.[Recommend] Supervision that cares about doing the job correctly. Management/Supervision that does not pressure to the point that Leads and mechanics are intimidated into improper procedure and sign off. RON (Routine Overnight Check) planning so that part is available for repair at the beginning of the shift. RON planning so that the task is scheduled before the very day that the deferral drops dead. Staffing that allows for enough mechanics to accomplish task immediately following aircraft RON arrival.

Maintenance Technician reported that aircraft repair was accomplished in violation of proper procedure to avoid affecting aircraft schedule.

1800037

202104

1201-1800

GEG.TRACON

WA

6700.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON GEG

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class C GEG

Aircraft X; Facility GEG.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1800037

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Equipment Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Software and Automation; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Aircraft X checked on from the East and requested the RNAV Approach. I cleared them for the approach over HILIE at 8;000 feet and they read the instructions back correctly. I had the approach plate pulled up initially on the Information Display System (IDS) to verify that 8;000 feet was an appropriate crossing altitude but then toggled back to the normal IDS screen; to keep an eye on the weather. As they got further along on the approach; I noticed the aircraft was at 6;400 feet inside of the 6;500 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA). Unfortunately; I didn't review that section of the approach during their check on and it didn't set an alarm bell off in my head because we do have approaches in our airspace that have published altitudes below our MVAs. I quickly pulled up the approach plate on the IDS to double check.When I started comparing the approach plate and the radar overlay of the approach; I initially thought they were between NAXAF and CUGEV; not outside of CUGEV. If you look at the approach plate on the IDS; going from the runway out the fixes are: WIVUP; NAXAF; CUGEV; and OZOLA. However; the RNAV Y 26 approach that is available on the radar display is missing the fix 'WIVUP;' so going from the runway out on the radar displayed map you have: NAXAF; CUGEV; and OZOLA). I then asked the pilot if they were outside of CUGEV and they responded 'Yes'. I realized they were descending way too early and I issued a safety alert to climb to 6;700 feet. After they climbed; I asked what their intentions were and they wanted the Visual Approach. I cleared them for the Visual Approach.I was not pleased with my recovery time and felt like I should have reacted quicker. We are very rarely on a Runway XX flow and I should have reviewed the radar display map; approach plates; and appropriate altitudes in more detail before and while on position. I should have just gone with my gut feeling and immediately issued the Low Altitude Alert and asked questions afterwards. The Low Altitude Alert never triggered which seems like a common theme in these situations. It would be really nice if we could somehow make that thing more accurate. I think that the fix 'WIVUP' should be added to the radar displayed map so that is correlates exactly with the approach plate. I think it would have helped me recognize more quickly where the aircraft was on the approach and that they were low.My phraseology was not perfect with the low altitude alert but I really think the phraseology needs to rewritten. By the time I got to the 'advise you climb and maintain part' it seemed like they had descended almost another 200.' That small amount of time could be the difference between impacting terrain and not. Maybe something like 'Aircraft X advise you climb and maintain 6;700 immediately; Low Altitude Alert the appropriate altitude for your area of flight is 6;700' I think getting the aircraft climbing quickly should be the absolute priority and in a situation like this.

GEG TRACON Controller reported they issued a clearance that placed an aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. The Controller's radar map was inaccurate and the Low Altitude Alert did not function.

1435299

201703

0601-1200

N90.TRACON

NY

3000.0

Night

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 4R

Initial Approach

Class B EWR

FMS/FMC

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Confusion

1435299

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

We were on NY Approach being vectored for ILS 4R to EWR. I noticed FMS 2 screen went dark. I called it out. As we were on final vector to intercept the ILS 4R we both noted that we were not yet receiving the LOC. We continued and began to receive indication. The approach was armed and continued. At this point we were still at 3000 ft. Then we lost LOC indication again. We advised ATC we needed to go missed due to loss of LOC signal. We had noted that no one else was having difficulty getting in. At this point we had plenty of fuel to perform another approach and continue to our ALT if we needed. We came back around to perform the second ILS attempt. The FMS 2 box would flash on for a couple of seconds and then went dark again. We were lined back up to intercept the LOC again and the same thing happened again. We went missed and advised we needed to go to our ALT. Halfway to [our alternate] we noted that we were starting to get low on fuel. ATC cleared us for the RNAV 4. As we were approaching the intercept for final ATC advised us that the previous aircraft experienced strong tailwinds down to; I think they said 100 ft. As we were approaching the final course I was waiting for the turn in and we never got it. So we turned the aircraft in and were working on rejoining the course and getting lower to begin the approach. At 2 miles out we were too high and went missed. At this point we were now fuel critical and advised ATC we needed vectors to 22 to avoid the strong tailwinds. Winds at the surface were only 4 knots. They vectored us around we loaded the RNAV 22 approach and started down. We broke out to the right of course but on the glideslope as indicated by the VASI and landed. When we parked the aircraft we had just over 900 lbs of fuel on board. The loss of FMS 2; the LOC; the weather conditions at both EWR and [our alternate]; as well as the winds on final at were definitely all threats. Well; looking back; given the chance again; I would have gone to our alternate immediately after our first missed at EWR. We had FMS 2 down; LOC out and poor weather conditions. None of these items work in our favor.

First Officer reported an FMS and localizer failure resulting in two missed approaches and a diversion to the alternate. Fuel became an issue and the third approach resulted in another go-around due to an unstabilized approach caused by tailwinds. The fourth attempt was successful; arriving at the gate with 900 pounds of fuel.

1099596

201307

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

37000.0

VMC

Dawn

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 10670; Flight Crew Type 3027

Situational Awareness

1099596

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 190; Flight Crew Total 21500; Flight Crew Type 320

Situational Awareness

1099580.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Soon after reaching cruise altitude of 37;000 FT; we received an ECAM: HYD B SYS LO PR. We complied with the ECAM and turned off the Blue Electric Hydraulic Pump. At this point; we ran the checklist per SOP for a Non-normal Laning and completed the landing distance procedure. We called Dispatch and Maintenance for a conference. While talking with Maintenance; we received a HYD B RSVR LO LVL. The only difference from the previous ECAM was not to turn the Blue Electric Pump on during approach. Otherwise; all protocol remained the same. Maintenance entered the failure into the maintenance history and informed arrival station Maintenance. We discussed the issue with the flight attendants. We declared an emergency with ATC and asked for 34L and direct our destination VOR. Once we checked on with ATC; they assured us that airport authorities had been notified and emergency equipment was ready. We continued and landed on 16R without further incident.

[No additional information from Narrative #2]

An A320 ECAM alerted HYD B SYS LO PR followed shortly thereafter by HYD B RSVR LO LVL so an emergency was declared; the QRH completed and an uneventful landing followed at the destination airport.

1168838

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1700.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Descent

Direct

Fuel System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 6; Flight Crew Total 120; Flight Crew Type 17

1168838

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

Before takeoff [on my return flight from a short cross country] I did a full preflight; checking fuel and for water in both the tanks and gascolator. When I reached the north side of a [frequent VFR Reporting Point] I called Tower and started my descent to traffic pattern altitude. The engine began to run rough so I applied carb heat with no change. I switched the fuel tank selector from both to right and after no change; returned to both. I advised Tower I had to land the airplane; picked a nice grass field and landed safely. Upon landing; I checked the gascolator and tanks. I found water in both. I secured the plane; consulted an A & P; purged the fuel system of water and ran the engine to verify the aircraft was airworthy. I then measured and prepared the field to ensure a safe takeoff and flew the plane back to base without incident.

The pilot of a C172 returning to base suffered a rough running engine which forced a safely conducted off airport landing. When he sumped the tanks and gascolator he discovered water in both. After appropriate ameliorative; testing and planning measures the flight back to base was conducted without further incident.

1251862

201504

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Personal

Embraer Phenom 300

2.0

Part 91

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1251862

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Ambiguous

After our arrival at ZZZ1 we were scheduled for 3-hours of standby duty at the FBO. During that time someone; presumably the line crew; installed gear pins with narrow white ID-style neck lanyards used as flags in all 3 landing gear. The flag (lanyard) on the nose-gear pin was especially problematic because it was only about an inch or 2 longer than the gear door and the white color made it extremely difficult to see. The lightweight construction of the lanyards could also make them susceptible to being blown up into the gear wells rendering them invisible to the flight crew.Line service must notify the flight crew when they're installing gear pins and the flags used must be replaced with standard large red 'Remove Before Flight' flags so that they are more visible to the crew should they not be notified that the pins are installed.

An EMB-505 Captain reported that the line crew at the FBO he was parked at used gear pins that were non-standard and difficult to spot on a walk-around.

1763404

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Other

1763404

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Misconduct

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

Passenger X was wearing a face shield without a mask. I noticed during boarding process. I informed him policy is to wear a face mask over his nose and mouth as well. He said for me to stop talking to him and go away. He said he had a condition. He repeated; that he wanted me to go away and stop talking to [him]. I asked him if he had talked to an agent? He said there was no one to talk to at the gate. I offered for him to talk to a gate agent. He again said for me to go away and did not want to talk to me. He appeared to be pulling a mask out of his bag; as I was offering to go get one for him. The FA C came and [offered] some masks. He told her to go away. Next time I was in the aisle about 10 minutes later; he had the mask on but below his nose and mouth. I asked him to make sure he had his mask pulled up; he was hostile and said he was not going to speak to me. Told me to 'Go away; I'm not talking to you.' I informed the A FA; she informed the CA. They decided to remove the passenger. An employee flying in Row XX witnessed the exchange. He was not in compliance and a safety hazard to other passengers and crew for COVID-19.

Flight Attendant reported a passenger was removed from the flight due to non-compliance with face mask policy.

1303795

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

32000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Cruise

Oceanic

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 191; Flight Crew Total 16324; Flight Crew Type 12694

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party1 Other; Party2 Flight Crew

1303795

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Total 7242; Flight Crew Type 3850

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1303799.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Dispatch; Person Other Person

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Procedure

Procedure

Flight was a charter flight. The flight taxied and took off twenty minutes later. Final weights were sent nearly an hour before taxi with a Zero Fuel Weight (ZFW) of 525;586 LBS. One hour 17 minutes after takeoff; our Dispatcher sent us an ACARS message informing us 'YOUR FINAL WEIGHTS WERE WRONG. ACTUAL ZFW IS 534;726. I SENT A NEW REVAL DOC TO THE PRINTER. SABRE CRASHED WHEN I SENT IT. DID IT ARRIVE? I PLAN ON FILING A REPORT OVER THIS. THANKS.' We the crew started doing our calculations with the new ZFW (that was 9140 LBS over the final ZFW message of 526586) and added it to our boarded fuel 344;100 LBS and concluded that we taxied out at 878;826 LBS (max weight is 878;000 LBS) without knowing it. The liftoff fuel from the ACARS HOWGOESIT message was 342;100 LBS and we concluded (after we were notified of the error) that we lifted off at 876;686 LBS (max takeoff is 875;000 LBS) without our knowledge. We assumed we weighted 867;686 LBS using the original final weight. Our V-speeds were calculated based on that weight. The aircraft takeoff roll and rotation was uneventful but felt heavy. From push back; during taxi and until takeoff our cockpit was not contacted thru ACARS; SATCOM; or TOWER or any other means to inform us of the error. Inflight we called the duty manager thru SATCOM to inform him of our findings.

We took off at XA:54z. Our lifted fuel was 344100 lbs. Our reported final weights were: ZFW 525.586; TOW 866.986. We received an ACARS message at XC:05Z from Dispatch that our final weights were wrong. The actual ZFW was 534.726 vs 525.586 a difference of 9140 lbs. Without our knowledge; we were over weight for taxi at 878.826 LBS and our takeoff weight was 876.900. The Dispatcher comments were that at the time of the error discovery way before our take off time; SABRE had to fix something in the background.

B747 flight crew and Load Planner reported the Dispatch software system crashed which prevented the final weight and balance numbers to be delivered prior to takeoff. During cruise; the flight crew was notified their max taxi weight was exceeded and max takeoff weight of 875;000 LBS was exceeded at 876;686 LBS.

1047656

201211

1801-2400

ZZZ.TRACON

US

Air Carrier

Dash 8-100

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb; Initial Climb

Vectors

Electrical Distribution Busbar

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

1047656

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

On the climb out; received a Master Caution light and associated caution lights; R AC Bus; R TRU; R Stall Warn. We had just entered the bottom of the cloud layer so asked ATC to descend to get out of the icing conditions. We were approved to descend and ran the R AC Bus Checklist. On completion; asked ATC to return. Vectors were given for our return and flight returned uneventfully.

DHC8-100 crew received a Master Caution light and associated caution lights for; R AC Bus; R TRU; R Stall Warning. The right AC Bus emergency checklist was complied with and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1085470

201305

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

Mixed

2

700

Tower ZZZ

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Descent

Class C ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Other / Unknown

1085470

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

A C172 was in VFR conditions approximately 5-6 NM northwest of the airport when the field went IFR. I advised him the field was IFR and asked his intentions. He stated he wanted to come in for landing. I told him the field visibility was 2 miles and ceiling 700 FT broken and again asked his intentions. He said he wanted to land and he had a GPS he could use. I told him I couldn't authorize him to come in VFR. He also asked if I had him on RADAR. I told him I did and his position. I told him to maintain VFR and remain clear of Class C airspace. He said he couldn't maintain VFR. I told him Special VFR was available but he did not know what that was. Given that information; in my best judgment I decided to declare an emergency for him. I issued a heading of 180 with the intent to bring him towards the airport. I did not want to issue any instructions that would cause him to become spatially disoriented. Once he was about a mile offshore I told him of his position and asked if he had the shoreline in sight and he did. I told him to follow the shoreline to either Runway 20 or 23. I told him we turned on the runway lights to maximum intensity and asked if he could see either runway. Once he had the runways in sight; I cleared him to land on either Runway 20 or 23. He landed safely without incident. I recognize I should not have solicited Special VFR and should have issued a suggested heading instead of an assigned heading. Although the FLM advised me to issue the MOCA I did not because I did not want the pilot to think he had to climb and potentially become disoriented. I used my best judgment to help the pilot get to the airport as safely as I could. Brushing up on the 7110.65 prior to taking position on a day when the weather is questionable.

Tower Controller described an ATC declared emergency event when a VFR aircraft encountered IMC conditions; was unfamiliar with SVFR procedures and required controller assistance to locate the airport.

1343167

201603

1201-1800

SFO.Airport

CA

5.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737-900

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

A380

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270

1343167

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 76; Flight Crew Total 8000

1343662.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

On visual approach to Runway 28R; slightly behind and left of heavy Airbus. Winds 260/20. Smooth approach. I planned to land slightly beyond the Airbus' touchdown. Just as my left wheel touched down; the aircraft was thrown back up into the air and the right wing rose very quickly and the nose pitched up. I slowly added power and had to apply full rudder; left aileron; and forward pitch to right the airplane. The airplane righted and I chose to finish the landing. The rest was uneventful. I had Maintenance meet me at the gate and did an after flight inspection with them. No damage noted.

On a visual approach to 28R into SFO we experienced severe/extreme wake turbulence in the flare from a [heavy airbus] preceding us by about 15/20 seconds for the adjacent 28L. The conditions at the field were CAVU and wind 260@20G25. This provided a quartering headwind emanating from our left; which must have provided ideal conditions we experienced on touchdown. The Captain was flying this leg and I the pilot monitoring. There were mild bumps coming down final; but appeared to be strictly wind related. Upon commencing the flare at approximately 800ft from the threshold and maybe 10 feet above the runway; the aircraft began to roll and pitch excessively. As the Captain was doing a textbook job of attempting to keep the aircraft upright; we experienced a severe roll to the right. The right wing was in extreme danger of making contact with the runway (737-900ER scimitar aircraft) and I instinctively assisted with the ailerons and applied what felt like full left aileron; and the force required to do so was immense. The Captain applied the rudder required to keep us lined up with the centerline and together we wrestled the aircraft onto the runway. There was no transfer of controls as this was a necessary team effort to keep the aircraft under control. Once the aircraft was safely on the runway; the Captain completed the rollout and we exited with no further incident. I told tower what we had experienced on short final (which the Controller seemed to not find very interesting) while the Captain made a PA to let the passengers know what we experienced. Maintenance was called to meet the aircraft; but no damage was noted. In the 8;000+ hours of flight time I have enjoyed over the last 11 years flying for the airlines; [I] have never had an experience that could have just as easily resulted in bent metal; or worse. Yes; we are trained to avoid wake turbulence; and we did plan our touchdown point to be further down the runway; however the conditions (wind direction/speed and relative positions of us and the preceding heavy Airbus) provided conditions of a severity that we did not anticipate.

B737-900 flight crew reported encountering 'severe/extreme' wake turbulence while in the flare on Runway 28R in trail of an A380 landing on Runway 28L at SFO.

992946

201202

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

270.0

0.5

270.0

VMC

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

FBO

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

None

Class D ZZZ

Tower ZZZ

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

Training

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 2400; Flight Crew Type 1500

Situational Awareness

992946

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict

Horizontal 0.5; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

I was practicing touch and goes with a PA28 ahead of me doing the same detail. After the second touch and go the Controller told me that I was turning final too far away from the runway; I told him that I was just maintaining a safe distance with the preceding aircraft and he replied saying that my separation with the other airplane was too much; that I should have been turning base sooner; and that is what I did afterward; but obviously did not work; I ended up going around as I was too close to the PA28 on final. As I did not feel safe; requested a full stop landing and had a conversation with the controller afterwards. He tried to convince me on the phone that I should fly my airplane slower when following a Piper Warrior on final; but seemed not to understand that if I maintain the same airspeed as a C152 or PA28 I would be flying my airplane against the Pilot Operating Handbook and probably have control issues. Another fact that stated was that if I am turning base with a tailwind component; I should also reduce my airspeed; probably not being aware of that lift depends on True Air Speed (TAS) and not on Ground Speed (GS). It is obvious for me that this ATC in particular has very little understanding of basic airplane aerodynamics and could result in a safety issue.

A PA44 conducting practice pattern maneuvers was instructed by ATC to reduce the spacing between himself and preceding traffic that resulted in a required go around; the reporter questioning ATC's knowledge of aircraft performance characteristics.

1789972

202102

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

2284.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower ZZZ

FBO

DA40 Diamond Star

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 39; Flight Crew Total 1299; Flight Crew Type 1185

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1789972

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was conducting a stage check for my student and we were practicing engine out approaches. On the first attempt a slip was attempted but the nose was too high and the airspeed dropped dangerously low. I took over and attempted to initiate a go around but the aircraft landed on all 3 gear to bounce sharply. I proceeded back to our base and the student and I attempted to get his power off approaches cleaned up and we did multiple touch and goes. After several landings we decided to end the lesson but I noticed that the left brake lost all authority when trying to stop. I took over and prevented a [runway] excursion and tried to slow down in a controlled manner. When I tried to exit [the] taxiway the wind pushed my tail around faster than expected and the plane skidded to a stop just before the hold short line with the nose gear and left main in the grass and snow. No damage to the plane or taxiway lights occurred. No injuries occurred.

DA40 Instructor Pilot reported loss of directional control during landing roll.

1784356

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

3.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF ZZZ1

Personal

Robinson R22

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

None

Class G ZZZ1

Personal

PA-38 Tomahawk

1.0

Part 91

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G ZZZ1

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 300

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1784356

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 0; Vertical 20

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Human Factors

I departed ZZZ East ramp in [a] R22 with a private pilot student for pre-solo training at ZZZ1. We practiced emergency procedures en-route. After listening to ZZZ1 ASOS we determined to set up to enter the traffic pattern for Runway XX. 8 miles west from ZZZ1 we announced our location on CTAF and identified there were two airplanes in the pattern. We entered a 45 degree left downwind for Runway XX at ZZZ1 at 1;100 ft. and 75 kts. We announced and turned left base for Runway XX at 900 ft. and 60 kts. during which I could see Aircraft Y in a close left downwind. We announced turning final and turned final on Runway XX rolling out at 300 ft. AGL (900 ft. MSL) and 60 kts. I instructed the student to perform a normal approach to the approach end of Runway XX and terminate to a 3 ft. hover directly over the numbers (just as would be required during solo or a check ride). The student initiated his normal approach at the normal 10 degree angle required. I then heard Aircraft Y announce he was on final for Runway XX and had the helicopter in sight. I assumed the airplane had misjudged his spacing in the traffic pattern would either adjust his airspeed; perform turns for spacing; or go around. This is not uncommon and simple courtesy to the lower aircraft. On short final for Runway XX I looked out the left rear of the helicopter and could see Aircraft Y on short final right behind us. Aircraft Y asked me my intentions on CTAF. I replied that I intended to complete a landing to a hover at the approach end of Runway XX and then conduct a normal takeoff. Three things were on my mind. First; an aircraft on final and at a lower altitude always has the right of way. Second; I wanted the student to have the opportunity to conduct a normal approach to a hover just as he will be required to do during upcoming solo flight and his PPL checkride. Third; I need to access the student's ability to terminate the landing to a stationary hover. I asked Aircraft Y if he intended to 'go around' as it was clear either we would have to rush off the runaway; before completing the landing; or Aircraft Y could go-around. Aircraft X immediately replied with a complaint over CTAF stating that 'you little black helicopters are hogging the runways here and as a local pilot I can tell you that we are sick of you'. Just as I decelerated to a 3 ft. hover over the numbers for Runway XX I heard the sound of an airplane at high rpm overhead. I looked up to see Aircraft X directly over my helicopter about 20-30 ft. As he overflew me; he stated; 'he intended to report me to the FAA' and requested my name. I provided my tail number for his use as I did not want to provide my name over CTAF. I then contacted Aircraft Y over CTAF and requested that he not over fly my aircraft (for fear of collision) and that I will work with him to gain proper spacing in the pattern. Aircraft Y insulted me over CTAF and challenged me to a physical altercation. I instructed the student hover taxi to the parallel taxiway for Runway XX. I then noticed a pickup truck [surveying] our helicopter. I instructed the student to land on a nearby taxiway intersection near parking and go to idle. I exited the helicopter and approach the truck. I greeted the driver of the white truck with a handshake; introduced myself; and asked if there was an issue. I was told by the driver that they are reporting me to the FAA and they are just 'sick of our little helicopters that are difficult to see and tie up the runways for airplanes.' I sympathized with the driver but told him this is a public airport and that we have a right to conduct flight training here just as much as anyone; provided we all adhere to the rules. Furthermore; I told him that the airplane made an error in spacing by turning downwind; base; and final too quickly and essentially attempted to push me off the runway while conducting a landing. I told the driver that I am sorry this happened; but I feel the airplane did not adhere to Part 91 Right of Way rules to a lower aircraft on final. I gave the driver my number and told him I'd be more than happy to work with him on any future issues. We shook hands and went separate ways. I returned to the helicopter and returned directly to ZZZ. My chief concern with this incident is that the airplane should not have rushed or crowded another aircraft on final approach. A change in speed; turns for spacing; or a go-around were all options for the airplane pilot. Furthermore; executed a go around directly over and in close proximity to another aircraft is dangerous. What if I had directed the student to execute a go around or immediate takeoff (because we were being rushed on final and had climbed up into the airplane. As a military aviator and civilian helicopter and airplane pilot of over XX years I had always striven to fly with the utmost safety and friendliness. I preach this to my students; and I hope that all Aviators practice this as well. My goal is simply to encourage friendly; smart; and safe flying by all pilots at both ZZZ and ZZZ1.

R22 Instructor reported that during a training flight while hovering over the runway numbers an aircraft in the pattern flew directly overhead them and made threatening comments over CTAF.

1010087

201205

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

1200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 417; Flight Crew Type 9300

Training / Qualification; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Workload

1010087

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 377

1010089.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals

Aircraft

On final approach and configuring for a 30 degree flap landing we were slowing with flaps 25 when I called for flaps 30 and 'Before Landing Checklist'. The First Officer moved the flap handle from 25 to 30 but the indicator stayed at 25. All other flap indications were normal. We quickly confirmed the flaps 30 position on the flap handle and tried 15 and 40 positions to fix/confirm the problem. We had a Company pilot in the jump seat and handed him the QRH and he started the 'FLAPS; TRAILING EDGE: SYMMETRICAL NON-NORMAL/NO FLAPS' Checklist. We were discussing a go-around when we got the warning; 'TOO LOW FLAPS' and executed a normal go-around. Tower was informed of the go-around but we did not declare an emergency nor did we receive traffic priority as we did a box pattern back to the landing runway. During the subsequent pattern and QRH review we realized we had moved the flap handle out of the 25 position when the QRH states; 'Flap Position ... Do Not Change'. We returned the flap handle to the 25 position; completed the QRH actions; and landed without further problems. We made a logbook entry; contacted Maintenance; they corrected the flap issue; and the aircraft was returned to service.Things happen pretty quickly during the landing phase and I was unaware that this flap problem states that the flap handle NOT be changed. There is not time to complete the QRH while on short final. I will review the QRH again to see if there are any more landing issues that have steps in them that need to be done/not done prior to the go-around and then have time to complete the QRH.

[No substantive additional information was gleaned from the secondary narrative.]

When the flaps refused to extend to the selected landing position as they were configuring for landing; the flight crew of a B737-700 initiated a go around and; in violation of the associated abnormal checklist; inadvertently operated the flap handle in response to the go around commands proper for an aircraft with properly responding flaps. They reconfigured the handle to conform to the position of the flaps and made an uneventful landing.

1616172

201901

0601-1200

0.0

Air Taxi

Bell Helicopter 407

Ambulance

N

Inspection; Repair

Company

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 11

1616172

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

[We] received aircraft from another [Aircraft Operator] company and had a Vinyl Wrap installed in [Aircraft Operator Name] paint scheme/colors instead of it getting painted. My involvement in this acceptance inspection/repair of [the aircraft] was to assist with a structural repair on the aft RH fuselage skin at an estimated FS [Number]. I removed the Vinyl wrap in the repair area to perform/install approved repair by [Company Name] Product Support Engineering.Our FAA Certification Management Team (CMT) cannot say that it is a violation of the regulations to have vinyl wrap on an aircraft; but also can't say it's not either. My upper management in [Aircraft Operator Name] decided to remove all the Vinyl Wrap on [the aircraft] and have all mechanics associated with the inspection/repair of [the aircraft] to submit a NASA report.

Maintenance reported they removed vinyl wrap to accomplish fuselage skin repair.

1204051

201409

0001-0600

SJC.Airport

CA

5000.0

TRACON NCT; Tower SJC

Corporate

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class E NCT

Facility SJC.Tower

Government

Flight Data / Clearance Delivery

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.5

Human-Machine Interface

1204051

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft X received his clearance via PDC from me as I was working clearance. I accidentally pressed the down arrow one too many times while I was sending his clearance; and the pilot received the clearance 'Climb via the SID; except maintain 12;000' as opposed to what he was supposed to receive; 'Climb via SID except maintain 5;000.' Once cleared for takeoff; he climbed as per the clearance that he received. The pilot checked on to Norcal departure saying he was climbing to 12;000 as opposed to 5;000; but the controller didn't catch it and the aircraft deviated into another sector's airspace. 'Climb via the SID' in the PDC clearances that we send out should be changed to 'Climb via (the actual name of the SID); ex; 'Climb via the Loupe2 departure; except maintain 5000.' This gives and extra layer of redundancy; and if the Pilot sees that his route says the Loupe2; but he is cleared to climb via a different departure procedure; then something is wrong and questions would be raised. This would also act as a double check for the controller; as he or she now has to select not only the altitude; but the correct and matching departure procedure. Right now; the difference between receiving the correct altitude and receiving the incorrect altitude such as what happened in this case is the matter of one accidental button touch; and forcing the controller to add in the name of the departure procedure would help mitigate any errors.

SJC Controller working CD/FD issues the wrong altitude to an aircraft via PDC. NCT Controller expects aircraft to climb to 5;000; but aircraft is climbing to 12;000 and deviates into another controller's airspace.

1350507

201604

1201-1800

SAN.Airport

CA

1600.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower SAN

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SAN

Personal

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Part 91

Climb

Class B SAN

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction

1350507

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Aircraft

While on final approximately 1;600 feet MSL/4.0 NM from the airport; I pointed out what at first appeared to be a black balloon rapidly climbing and approaching us. The object flew above us; so no evasive action was required. As we got closer to the object; I realized it was not a balloon; but a large sized; black in color; remote controlled drone. I could see the angular shape of the frame. It was approximately 200 feet above us on final. We were on the visual approach; using the RNAV approach for guidance. We reported the sighting to tower; and when on the ground; clarified the position with ground control to pass it along to other aircraft. As with lasers; drones need to be regulated strictly; swiftly and quickly. Unfortunately; it will take a fatal accident to change the view of how deadly drones can be to any aircraft; especially passenger carrying aircraft. It is clear to me that current regulations in place are not strong enough to prevent people from flying drones. Something needs to change before there is a loss of life.

EMB-175 Captain reported a close UAS encounter at 1;600 feet on a four mile final to Runway 27 at SAN.

1836299

202109

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

3100.0

Rain; Thunderstorm; Windshear; Turbulence

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Autoflight System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Fatigue; Workload

1836299

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Fatigue; Troubleshooting; Workload

1836313.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Software and Automation; Human Factors; Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

I was the First Officer and pilot monitoring on our flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. This was the last leg of a three-day trip. We taxied out on time and parked to wait out a ground stop. ZZZ was just starting to get the worst of a tropical storm. Convective SIGMETs for embedded thunderstorms covered much of the mid-Atlantic states. The ground stop lifted and we were able to depart 2 hours and 2 minutes after pushback.The first part of the flight went fine; and we were clear of weather until contacting Approach Control. The controller gave us good vectors; but we still had to penetrate some moderate rain showers. Our aircraft was an older 321 with CRT screens and the old radar display; and it was night by this point. This made it difficult to know the intensity until we were very close to the depicted weather. We were able to keep clear of magenta turbulence indications on the display; yet we still encountered moderate to severe turbulence with speed indications +/- 20 kt. below 8;000 ft. Upon turning base; we were in a clear area and could see one more cell crossing the final approach course. Traffic ahead that had just flown through the same cell reported moderate rain and smooth ride. Our ride was worse than that; and after configuring we got an aural predictive windshear warning; 'GO AROUND; WINDSHEAR AHEAD.' We initiated a go-around. The ride was moderate and there were big airspeed fluctuations; but we didn't get a reactive windshear alert. Approach vectored us back for another ILS. The downwind took us around more moderate intensity rain and turbulence. Approach informed us that traffic behind us had landed; and that we were the only one to go around so far. I believe two aircraft landed between our first approach and our second attempt.Our second approach also resulted in a go-around. When we encountered the heaviest part of the rain; airspeed loss was unacceptable and we initiated the go-around. We did not get a predictive windshear alert. I don't recall if we had a reactive windshear warning; but almost instantly we had multiple ECAM warnings and cautions. The autopilot disconnected and Captain assumed manual control - he was pilot-flying throughout the event. The ride felt very similar to how the simulator presents a windshear event. Recovery felt like it took forever. With no autopilot and multiple F/CTRL ECAM messages; we were fully caught up in recovering to a normal state. We climbed up to 3000; which was [the] missed approach altitude. Flight director guidance was fluctuating a lot; and we turned off FD 1 and 2.Re-configuring the aircraft after the approach was delayed; the airspeed trend arrow indicated a very imminent flap over-speed condition. I asked the Captain if he wanted flaps up; and then raised them when he indicated in the affirmative. My perception here was that we were in level flight and accelerating rapidly. In retrospect; I misjudged our energy state and failed to follow the prescribed schedule for flap retraction; retracting them too quickly. As the flaps were retracting; we were somewhere around 3;100 ft. correcting for 3;000; in moderate turbulence. These factors all compounded; resulting in a low-energy state and stall warning indication. I'm not sure what the auto thrust was commanding at this point; or if it had reduced thrust for us to descend back to 3000. I believe I yelled; 'Nose down!' and Captain responded that he was full forward stick. I momentarily pushed my flight stick forward and was corrected by the aural 'dual input' alert. Captain recovered the aircraft. I gave ATC a quick description of our flight control computer problems and they climbed us to 5000 on vectors. We began the process of going through the ECAM malfunctions; with me working the ECAM. The autopilot was inoperative for the rest of the flight. F/CTRL ALTN LAW was next. There is no follow-up for this. I believe the next was F/CTRL ELAC 1 PITCH FAULT and F/CTRL ELAC 2 PITCH FAULT. I know that's the checklist I went to; but after the fact I can't say whether it was the ELAC PITCH FAULT or a generic ELAC FAULT. The pitch fault follow-up prohibits resetting an ELAC in flight; and so we did not attempt a computer reset. The ELAC FAULT reset procedure does allow a reset in flight if you do it one at a time and there are no uncommanded maneuvers happening.After follow-ups; I called Dispatch to see if we could go to ZZZ2 or ZZZ3 or ZZZ4. We had around 12;000 lb. of fuel. ZZZ4 appeared to have storm cells at the field but ZZZ2 and ZZZ3 were clear. I expressed that we were hand-flying with degraded flight controls and needed a clear airport. Dispatch gave us a minimum fuel of 8.0 to go to ZZZ4 if we could not get into ZZZ. Ultimately; ZZZ updated us that winds were shifting straight out of the north; and they could turn the airport around for us. The non-normal section of the Land App confirmed we had enough runway landing distance. The final for XXR was clear of storms; and we were able to shoot the ILS and land.So many factors were at play here. At the time we entered ZZZ airspace we had been on duty for 10 hours. We were navigating around severe weather in a tropical storm with the old-style radar. It was working well; but overall; it just doesn't provide the clarity that the new radar presents. We were in continuous turbulence of varying intensities; occasionally severe; before our first approach. Our picture of what the weather was doing was not as clear as the situational awareness that can be achieved in cruise flight. We were relying on ATC vectors through areas that other aircraft had just previously flown. Reports from other aircraft indicated acceptable conditions; or conditions that we could plan for by following severe weather avoidance guidance. The predictive windshear system did its job the first time and we had a clean go-around. Other aircraft landed after our missed approach and conditions were ok. Startle factor played a huge role on the second attempt. Windshear plus multiple ECAMs and autopilot failure created a complex and dynamic situation. We were getting bounced all over the place. We were struggling to get the airplane under control. The monitoring challenge was huge because of the turbulence and the degraded flight controls. I was making FCU inputs in between running checklist items. I had sent an ACARS to Dispatch asking where we should go and listing our system failures; and got no response. The crew phone app worked well enough; but I was frustrated that the feedback we got was that it would be preferred that we hold for ZZZ or go to our listed alternate. I'm sure the Dispatcher could hear my frustration. I am glad that we were able to safely continue to ZZZ; but I wanted to get the plane on the ground without dealing with any more threats to the flight. Holding between thunderstorms with no autopilot in alternate law is an unnecessary risk. I'm not sure why the ground stop for ZZZ was lifted. After the flight; we learned that there had been 7 confirmed tornadoes in the area right around ZZZ. These storms were moving very quickly. It looked like it was possible that ZZZ would clear up before we got there; but there was a good chance it would not. Our decision to go was based on having a lot of fuel; and two alternates. Our second alternate was ZZZ3; which remained clear. This meant that if at any point the path ahead looked bad; we could turn around and have an escape plan. The weather moving in from the south across the final ended up being the worst that we would encounter. If we had delayed this flight by another hour; I think we would have been better off.

On first approach; got a windshear warning and went around. On second approach with moderate to almost severe turbulence; we hit a heavy rain shower. From what I remember we were configured for landing when we hit turbulence. Right then from what I can remember; the autopilot kicked off with the nose pitching up and the speed tape coming up. I pushed the power to climb and tried pushing the nose down. At first; nothing was happening. We did get a low-energy warning too. The plane did recover and started to respond to control inputs. On the ECAM we had F/CTRL ALTN LAW [and] ELAC 1&2 PITCH FAULT. I was flying; the FO (First Officer) did the ECAM and follow-ups and communication. No resets in the air so we looked at going somewhere I could shoot a visual approach. ZZZ Approach had us flying a box pattern until we figured out what we wanted to do. ZZZ Approach then gave us the option to land on XXR and visibility was adequate for a visual. We made an uneventful landing in normal law and gusty crosswinds. I'm guessing we hit the rain at the wrong time.ATC did a good job vectoring us between. The aircraft in front of us just had heavy rain and a smooth ride. Cells were building very fast. I'm thinking that one of the probes froze up momentarily; giving us the speed tape fluctuations. One thing that bothered me was that we couldn't get a hold of Dispatch right away; even after sending the 7700 over ACARS. The FO did a great job with all the ECAM and checklist procedures.

A321 flight crew reported windshear; heavy rain; and severe turbulence on approach along with the loss of autopilot systems that resulted in multiple go-arounds before finally safely landing at the destination airport.

1183821

201406

0601-1200

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

37500.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class A ZMP

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Class A ZMP

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 207; Flight Crew Total 9000; Flight Crew Type 2225

1183821

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Environment - Non Weather Related

I was the pilot not flying for this flight. In cruise at FL360 with the seatbelt sign off; we started getting some occasional light chop. Shortly thereafter; around 80 miles southeast of DSM; the Captain requested that I check with ATC about getting FL380. I asked Center how the rides were at FL380 and the Controller responded that she had just handed [a B747] off at FL380 and he hadn't said a word; so she assumed it was smooth. Much earlier in the flight we had seen the B747 overhead and I noticed that it was now a little over 10 miles ahead of us on the TCAS display. I then requested FL380 and received clearance to climb to FL380.As soon as the climb was initiated; the ride smoothed out. While passing FL374 we started getting light chop again. The Captain commented that it was unfortunate we were getting the chop again now that we were getting near our altitude. Passing FL375; the aircraft began to quickly roll to the right and the control wheel displaced to the left as the autopilot tried to correct. The aircraft continued to roll to the right and passing about 25 degrees of bank; the Captain turned off the autopilot and increased the roll correction to the left. The aircraft continued to roll right beyond 35 degrees of bank before the Captain was able to stop the roll at which time we heard a loud thud in from the forward galley. The Captain was then able to return the aircraft to wings level. We were now at FL376 and the Captain asked to go back to FL360. I called Center; indicated that we believed we had gotten in someone's wake and would like to return to FL360. The Controller cleared us to return to FL360 and indicated that the [aircraft] a little over 10 miles ahead of us at FL380 was a B747. The autopilot was reengaged and we returned to FL360. The Captain then called the Purser on the interphone and she informed him that a galley cart had overturned in the forward galley and had hit a Flight Attendant in the thigh as it was falling. The Purser informed us that the affected Flight Attendant was indicating that she was OK and did not believe she was injured at that time. The purser relayed to us that the aft flight attendants had reported that they were all OK and the passengers all appeared to be OK. Also; the purser reported that some male passengers in first class had come up to the front galley and stood the galley cart back up and that nothing appeared to be damaged. The Captain then made a PA to the passengers while I flew the aircraft and monitored ATC. After his PA; he resumed the flying duties and I returned to pilot not flying duties. I reassured the passengers that everything was OK with the aircraft and updated them on our anticipated arrival time. After discussion with the Captain; since we did not encounter any load on the aircraft during the roll or severe turbulence; no logbook entry was made. The remainder of the flight was uneventful.

B767 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence in climb at FL375 from a nearby B747 at FL380 that resulted in a 35 degree bank; causing a galley cart to overturn in the cabin.

1426558

201702

ZZZ.Airport

US

800.0

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1426558

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1427935.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Procedure; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

The published missed approach is a left turn. We had previously asked Approach if we could plan on that. They said if we went missed; Tower would assign a heading. We did not break out and started the missed approach. I was Pilot Flying; and after hitting TOGA and calling for flaps 15; landing gear up; my Flight Director guidance went away. Not sure what happened there. I was distracted by that and Tower gave us a right turn heading. The First Officer (FO) acknowledged it. I did not hear it and was trying to get my guidance back. It came back and; of course; directed a left turn. The FO did not state clearly enough that a turn had been given; and the Tower said we needed to turn right. I directed the FO to dial in the turn and hit Heading Select. The Controller then was too impatient with that correction and gave us a turn back left. We eventually leveled off at 3000' and contacted Departure. I believe Tower should have given us a heads up that a right turn was going to be our amended missed approach upon check-in. Also; the FO could have been more direct when it was obvious I had missed the call. On a side note; Approach tried to hurry us in on the approach to start (maintain 210 knots while base leg to final at eight miles!) with weather right at mins at 3000 RVR. The Crew behind us overshot final trying that; and Approach questioned them! Overall; when weather is at minimums; let's slow down the operation a bit and give Crews time to be stable. Also; Tower needs to advise Aircrews that there will be amended missed approach instructions if the turn occurs below 1000'. Slow down and keep Crews aware! We executed a second unsuccessful approach; and the Crew in front of us were slightly harassed for not turning right quicker on their missed approach. ZZZ is Yellow on a clear day. Tell them not to put Crews in the Red on a very marginal visibility day.

I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). Weather was poor RVR down to 1600 while we held for it to rise back to RVR 3000. After about 30 min of holding RVR increased and we proceeded in for the approach. The Flying Pilot asked me to inquire about missed approach instructions. Approach stated Tower would give us other instructions. We were cleared for the approach with no alternate instructions and entered dense IFR fog at about 2600 ft MSL. At decision height nothing was insight so the First Officer called for go around and began a left turn for the published missed approach. I announced to Tower we were missed approach and at that point the Tower gave us a turn in the opposite direction to the right to a heading of 110 degrees. We were still in dense fog and began the turn slowly but clearly not to speed the Controller wanted.Tower should have given us the alternate missed approach instructions before clearing us for the approach. The weather was at the minimum and a go around was to be expected; especially in this dense fog. The Controller was asking us to perform essentially at 270 degree turn in the fog at low airspeed while changing configuration and accelerating. This is our most difficult and disorienting maneuver. To the Controller it was just another approach. The weather conditions did not play in his demeanor. This was entirely avoidable.

B737 flight crew reported ATC assigned a late missed approach heading that was opposite to the published turn direction. The crew was slow to react initially and ATC then assigned a turn reversal.

1838469

202109

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

180.0

4.0

3000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Descent

None

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Personal

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 1518; Flight Crew Type 300

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1838469

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 300; Vertical 0

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was on descent from 3;500 feet; preparing to land at ZZZ. Was on CTAF freq; announced intentions; location; etc. Another aircraft was leaving the area in the direction I was flying in from; so I was very carefully scanning the sky in the direction of the airport; dedicating most of my scan time on that area (my 9-12 o'clock); since i knew someone from there was headed at the precise location I was at.Looked down at my checklist (on iPad) and saw it was on the wrong page. Flipped it to the right page. This took approx 10 sec. When i looked back up; a plane was crossing ahead of me; right to left; same altitude; climbing; approx 300 feet away. Seems that as I was descending on about a 060 heading; it was climbing and turning left slowly; causing it to be out of my sight until it got close to my altitude (visibility down and right is rather bad in a C-182 since the door obscures the view). It was not the plane I was looking from from ZZZ; just some other plane that happened to be in the area and not on the CTAF freq.We passed each other around 300 feet away. I turned right to accelerate this. The other plane did not change course and I suspect they never saw me. I do not remember the full tail number of the aircraft. It was a Cessna single-engine with struts. 172 or 182; I suspect.My main issues here: I concentrated too much of my scan on an area of the sky where I expected to see a plane; and i took my eyes off the sky for ten seconds to fumble with an iPad.Other aircraft main issues: visibility UP in a Cessna is much better than DOWN (plexiglass windshield vs aluminum floor/doors). They should have also been looking - my plane should have been in their view for a long time.Corrective actions: switch back to paper checklists - they cannot flip to the wrong page and thus waste valuable eye-time.

Pilot reported a near miss with another aircraft and took evasive action.

1420220

201701

1801-2400

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Normal Brake System

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Situational Awareness

1420220

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Received an ACARS from the captain of the flight asking me to call him. I tried and was finally able to get a phone to radio patch on a different frequency via phone patch. Captain had stated he had a Brake Sys 2 fault. The captain requested a patch with Maintenance Control and also advised he had gone over the QRH and thought it was safer for him to not follow the QRH. Once I made the phone patch with Maintenance Control and after the conference; myself; the captain and Maintenance Control also agreed for the captain to not follow the QRH procedure as described because following the reset procedure would make the aircraft's anti-skid system inoperative. Since the flight was going to an airport with short runways; I agreed with the captain that in the interest of safety the best possible thing was to not reset the circuit breaker and to continue on to destination with his antiskid operative for landing. The flight continued on without further incident. The wording of the QRH says 'resetting the BSCU in flight may cause the brake system to revert to alternate braking without antiskid at touchdown.' Perhaps if the wording was different or the QRH was changed to give the option to the captain of doing this; things would be clearer. Two days later after talking with the Maintenance Director; he said he had spoken with the Chief Pilot and they both concurred with the decision myself and the captain made. If this flight had be going to an airport with much longer runways I would have objected to not following the QRH and suggested the captain follow the reset; however with the short runways I agreed this was the best option so the crew still had antiskid as an option.

Air carrier Dispatcher reported he and the Captain agreed to deviate from the QRH given the specifics of the brake problem and the short runways at the destination airport.

1043421

201210

0001-0600

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

4000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

Part 121

Passenger

Climb

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Total 14120; Flight Crew Type 2654

1043421

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft

After takeoff climbing through 4;000 MSL; EICAS message Engine 1 Low Oil Pressure. Accomplished Flight Manual procedure; consulted Dispatch; Maintenance Control; ATC; dumped fuel to maximum landing weight; uneventful 3 engine approach and landing. I and the entire crew felt we did an acceptable job. This report is being filed in the event we missed something.

B747-400 Captain reported loss of #1 engine oil pressure. Engine was shut down in accordance with procedure and a normal landing ensued.

1853990

202111

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Ramp ZZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 13105.97; Flight Crew Type 3914

1853990

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Human Factors

Just before pushback we thought we had the Dangerous Goods Form; but after pushback we realized it was the Preliminary DG. It arrived shortly after we pushed back.

Air Carrier Captain reported pushing back without the required Final Dangerous Goods form.

1748164

202006

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

22000.0

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Landing Gear

X

Malfunctioning; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Situational Awareness

1748164

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Situational Awareness

1748517.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Climbing through approximately FL 220; brakes hot ECAM. Leveled at FL 260; per ECAM slowed below 250 kts. Extended gear; cooled brakes below 300 degrees; slowed below 220 kts; retracted gear. Continued to filed altitude and realized that we had exceeded maximum operating altitude for gear extension.Contacted maintenance to advise.While focusing on slowing for speed limitations I did not recall the altitude limitation for gear extension. Recall limitation for gear extension.

During climb going through approximately FL220 we got a hot wheel warning ECAM. Number 4 wheel was indicating 300 degrees Celsius. We asked ATC to stop our climb and needed to slow the aircraft for our hot wheel procedure; and was given FL260 since we were on a westerly heading and already had climbed through FL240. We followed the ECAM procedure and slowed to 240 knots and lowered the gear. The wheel temperature dropped quickly; and we slowed down to 215 knots and retracted the gear. We requested to continue the climb and return to normal cruise speed. We got clearance to FL360 and normal speed. Shortly thereafter; we realized that we had done the procedure at FL260 and max gear altitude is FL250. Captain contacted maintenance control and wrote up the discrepancy in the aircraft's logbook.Some task loading with obtaining ATC clearance and notifying flight attendants and passengers regarding the procedure. Better monitoring and verifying of procedure.Pay better attention to all the factors. Although the ECAM does specify maximum speeds; it doesn't remind you of maximum altitude.

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a hot wheel warning during climb. The crew inadvertently exceeded the maximum operating altitude when extending the landing gear for cooling.

1866178

202112

0601-1200

ZZZ.Tower

US

99.0

VMC

Cloudy; 6.0

Daylight

3000

Personal

DJI Mavic 3

1.0

Recreational Operations / Section 44809 (UAS)

None

Photo Shoot / Video

Takeoff / Launch

None

TFR ZZZ

Authorized Third Party

N

Standard

Small

Multi-Rotor

VLOS

N

Manual Control

Natural Disaster

Purchased

Number of UAS 1

Outdoor / Field Station (UAS)

Personal

Person Manipulating Controls (UAS)

Flight Crew Remote Pilot (UAS)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days (UAS) 1; Flight Crew Total 0; Flight Crew Total (UAS) 1; Flight Crew Type (UAS) 1

Confusion; Training / Qualification

1866178

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Unauthorized Flight Operations (UAS)

Person UAS Crew

Other post-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure; Software and Automation

Ambiguous

This morning; I hoped to fly my DJI Mavic 3 and check on some houses [in a] development. I used the Aloft app to check for TFR's and NOTAM's and noticed the restriction due to the fire. I was a bit confused by the wording in the Operating Restriction and Requirements section where it stated; 'except as described'. The app allowed me to apply for LAANC authorization which was granted. My drone will not fly without approval; and it was not until permission was granted that my drone would even take off.I came back to my office and asked a colleague about the incident and he educated me that even though the app granted me permission it was inadequate in providing a waiver of the TFR.

UAS pilot indicated the ALOFT LAANC app provided approval to fly in an area within the TFR. After further review there was small fine print towards the bottom of the approval which indicated a need to confirm and not fly in TFRs.

UAS pilot reported flying into an active TFR due to misunderstanding of LAANC authorization.

1728817

202002

0.0

Air Carrier

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1728817

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Equipment / Tooling

There is a new bag that needs to be added to the double check for lithium ion batteries. The power bank is located on the inside of the suitcase and has a power port hidden in the cup holder on the back of the bag.

Airline ground personnel reported a 'new bag needs to be added' to aircraft equipment for Lithium Ion batteries handling.

1323023

201601

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

400.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Nose Gear Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 51

Confusion; Distraction

1323023

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 12000

Distraction; Confusion

1323032.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Following gear retraction on climb out from ZZZZ; we experience unusual vibration and excessive noise coming from the nose wheel well. The Captain (CA) directed a level off at 10000 feet. Following a discussion the decision was made to cycle the gear. With gear extended; the issue subsided; only to return as the gear was retracted. We notified ATC of our issue and following a discussion and crew inputs; the decision was made to return to ZZZZ. The CA assigned/delegated duties and while established in holding informed Dispatch; accomplished applicable checklists and advised the Flight Attendants (FA) and passengers of our situation. The CA then flew an ILS and executed an uneventful landing. Upon clearing; we requested an inspection from Crash Fire Rescue Equipment (CFR) and were advised that there appeared to be no damage. We monitored brake temps and returned to the gate where Maintenance very quickly ascertained that the rod connecting the gear to the gear door had failed and was no longer attached.

Just after takeoff with landing gear being retracted high pitch loud noise and vibration was felt we continue to climb to 10;000 feet It was very difficult to hear and her stand ATC communications due to the noise leaving 7000 feet we put the gear down and that helped with the noise situation. [Advised ATC] and Requested to go on a holding pattern to burn some fuel due to the aircraft wait. We run all the checklist briefed the subsequent approach into ZZZZ including the overweight landing checklist because we decided to go back and landed 13;000 pounds overweight. The landing was normal and uneventful. It was verified by the Fire fighters that there was no damage to the airplane and only then we decided to proceed to the gate. The mechanics informed us that the left forward nose landing gear door rod was broken and it was hanging there for creating a lot of vibration due to the unsecured door.

B767 flight crew experienced an unusual vibration and excessive noise coming from the nosewheel area after gear retraction. They returned to departure airport where Maintenance determined that the connecting rod from nose landing gear to the nose gear door was disconnected.

1366242

201606

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Dash 8-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1366242

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Evacuated

Aircraft

After engine start; the aircraft flight deck filled with smoke. The pilots ran the appropriate originating and before start checklists at the gate. The paperwork was handed out and the main cabin door and flight deck door were closed. The before start check was finished below the line. Engine 2 was cleared and started successfully. The First Officer waited for 75% NH on engine 2 then began to slowly turn on the bleeds. Engine 1 was cleared and started successfully. The Captain called 'good start' after the starter disengaged. The First Officer then turned on bleed 1. Three to five seconds later the First Officer noted smoke coming from the Captain's gasper vent. The Captain called 'smoke;' and shut down engines 1 and 2 using the memory action items. The flight deck door was opened and the Captain commanded the flight attendants to evacuate the aircraft due to smoke in the flight deck. The Captain then quickly notified Operations; saying 'smoke in the flight deck; we are evacuating onto the ramp' and then immediately shutting down the batteries. The Captain then exited the main cabin door and directed the passengers away from the aircraft; under a covered walkway. Once the passengers were safely off the aircraft; the Captain notified dispatch of the situation and requested fire rescue to check the airplane for hot spots or fire. No injuries occurred.

Dash 8-200 First Officer reported evacuating the aircraft on the ramp when smoke filled the cockpit after engine start.

1120225

201310

1201-1800

NCT.TRACON

CA

3000.0

VMC

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 3000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1120225

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1120834.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were flying the Tip Toe visual to Runway 28L; San Francisco. About the time we were intercepting the localizer; ATC asked us to slow to final approach speed. I think we were at Flaps 5 and about 210 knots. The Captain asked for gear down and additional flaps as we slowed. After selecting Flaps 30 and slowing to extend Flaps 40 (our briefed final configuration); the Captain noticed that the flaps were still at 25; but the handle was at 30. I'm not sure if they just got stuck at 25 or if they blew back up to 25 from 30...I had fixated on the airspeed indicator and hadn't checked the flap indicator for the selected movement. We concluded that the most likely cause was a blow back due to an overspeed because we were extending flaps right as we slowed past the limit speeds. I asked the Captain if I could reselect the flaps...he agreed; so I moved the flap lever to 25 and back to 30. I've since learned that the flaps will re-extend below 171 knots; but I was unaware of that at the time. They initially didn't move and we began to discuss going around (we were both keenly aware of what a hot training topic this is of late)...but then the flaps started moving and we thought we would meet stabilized criteria. As we approached 1;000 feet the flaps were not yet to 40; but there was a 747 on take-off roll from our same Runway 28L. In my mind it looked like there was the potential for a midair conflict if we went missed as it was lifting off; so I didn't call for a go-around. At the time it seemed like a tough call; but now as I write this it seems pretty clear that we should have gone around at 1;000 feet and turned away from the traffic as per the approach plate go-around instructions...and SOP.

Visual approach to 28L at SFO. ATC left us high over MENLO intersection for traffic landing on 28R. Put gear down around 4;500 feet so I could descend faster to get back on path and then I could start configuring flaps. Passing 3;500; ATC requested to slow to final approach speed so they could launch an aircraft. We told ATC it is not easy to slow down and go down. They said do the best you can. They cleared a B747 for takeoff. We continued to slow. I called for Flaps 25...30 ...and at 162 knots I called for Flaps 40. At that instant; the speed increased about 5 knots to 167. I tried to get the speed back below 162. I looked at the flap indicator and they were at 25. Continued to slow passing 1;000 feet was able to get flaps to 30; then somewhere around 500 feet we got the flaps to 40. The B747 was just starting to lift off and we both agreed to continue the landing. It seemed safer to land instead of going around behind the 747. Taxied to the gate and wrote in the maintenance log possible flap overspeed from flaps 30 to 25.

B737 flight crew experiences a flap overspeed and blow up from 30 to 25 during approach. Flaps 25 are selected then 30 (successfully); then 40 but not until 500 feet on the approach. A normal landing ensues behind a departing B747.

1272324

201506

1201-1800

D01.TRACON

CO

8500.0

VMC

Daylight

Fractional

Citationjet (C525/C526) - CJ I / II / III / IV

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors; SID EPKEE THREE

Class D APA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 4400; Flight Crew Type 650

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1272324

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

On initial climb out of APA; we checked in with Denver departure and stated that we were at 8;500 feet climbing via the EPKEE SID. Top altitude for this departure is FL230 and that is the altitude we had set in the altitude preselect. We were on an ATC assigned heading of 330 degrees. The controller informed us that we were supposed to level-off at 8;000 feet per our clearance. He then immediately cleared us to continue the climb to maintain FL230. He asked what our clearance was and we stated that there was no altitude restriction given in the clearance. The SIC was the pilot that received the clearance from clearance delivery at APA and he was certain that 8;000 feet was not given for a top of climb limit. I verified that the TOLD card (where the SIC copied the clearance) only stated the EPKEE departure then climb via the SID so I am confident that was what the SIC read back to the CD controller. The remainder of the flight continued without incident. I believe that a contributing factor may have been the CD controller working multiple frequencies and either not issuing the 8;000 feet restriction or not catching that the SIC failed to read back the clearance correctly. It seems counterproductive to publish a SID with a top altitude of FL230 only to issue a lower altitude in the clearance. Telling aircraft to climb via a SID except to maintain a lower altitude doesn't even make sense for most SIDS unless there are hard altitudes to make along the route of the procedure. My suggestion to correct this would be to make it mandatory for tower controllers to say the initial altitude to departing aircraft if they are expected to level off at an altitude that is different from what is published on the chart.

C525 Captain reported climbing above his cleared altitude of 8;000 feet on the EPKEE SID out of APA when he misunderstood the 'climb via' clearance.

1057537

201212

1801-2400

SEA.Airport

WA

3200.0

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

Dash 8 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SEA

TRACON S46

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B SEA

Facility S46.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness

1057537

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

I had just taken the Final position. The briefing stated that Dash 8 was cleared for a Bay visual approach Runway 16C to maintain 3200 until established on the localizer from the west side and that the B737 was established on a 250 heading to 4;000 from the east. The briefing also included that visuals were working. It appeared that the Dash 8 was starting his turn for the bay visual approach and the ground speed indicated 220 KTS. I turned the B737 to a dogleg heading of 190 and cleared him for the ILS approach to Runway 16C with a speed reduction to 170 KTS for spacing. I then noticed that the Dash 8 was still northeast bound over the north shore of Elliot Bay; I instructed the Dash 8 to start his turn to SEATAC. I then called traffic to the B737 to get the Dash 8 in sight. The B737 was leaving 4;300 FT and instructed me that he was in the haze and unable to see the Dash 8. I instructed the B737 to cancel his approach clearance; maintain 4;000; and continue inbound on the localizer. The B737 then acquired the Dash 8 and was issued a visual approach clearance to follow the Dash 8 to Runway 16C. Assumptions made by myself were that the Dash 8 would turn through the middle of Elliot Bay as detailed in the published charted visual approach procedure and that visuals were not a problem so the B737 would be able to get the Dash 8 in sight. If you need to assign a heading on a charted visual approach procedure that is higher than the altitudes on the plate you should consider controlled vectors to a straight in final. I believe that that altitude restriction made the pilot feel that he could proceed north of the charted routing to provide himself a stabilized approach. Briefings that suggest visuals are working should contain detail as to the plane to plane visibility conditions.

S46 Controller working charted visual approach procedures was forced to cancel an approach clearance when traffic failed to see preceding traffic; the reporter indicating visibility changes were taking place.

1359784

201605

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

2900

Air Taxi

Bell Helicopter Textron Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Ambulance

Descent; Parked

Tablet

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Rotorcraft

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1359784

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure; Weather

Aircraft

I put my risk [assessment] in and went about preparing for flight; I went up to the aircraft; did my walk around; came in to the cockpit; the iPad dinged like it does with every flight when OCC (Operations Control Center) approves it. I looked quickly at the screen and with the glare thought it was approved; it turned out OCC had not approved the mission but pinged me back to discuss the weather front to my west. I was aware of the front but in the time I had gone up to the helipad it had made a significant update on radar and moved closer. I took off with what I thought was an approved brief instead it was a call from OCC. I let dispatch know I was landing assured and they said call from OCC. When I did we discussed that the tone for approval and every notification is the same and the IT department was working on a change so it would be different. Flight was completed with no problems.I discussed it with the OCC personnel and a change to the approval ding on the IPad and other notifications is already in the works. Additionally I will discuss this with my base pilots and at the upcoming safety meeting to help make other pilots aware of the possible results of submitting a risk and specifically looking and ensuring the mission is approved not call OCC.

An EMS helicopter pilot reported hearing an iPad notification sound which he thought indicated Dispatch's mission approval after his risk assessment. In fact; Dispatch wanted to discuss weather. A distinctive Dispatch approval notification 'ding' was discussed as a solution.

1680783

201909

0601-1200

BTL.Airport

MI

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower BTL

Cessna Citation Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Takeoff / Launch

Tower BTL

Personal

SR20

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Class D BTL

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1680783

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Procedure

Procedure

[We were] holding short of Runway 31 at Taxiway Lima at BTL. We gave Tower a call and informed them that we were ready for departure. Tower replied 'Aircraft X; climb and maintain 10;000 feet turn to a heading of 270 after departure Runway 31 cleared for takeoff.' We read back the clearance; verified that final was clear and crossed the hold short line to position the airplane on Runway 31 for takeoff. Just as we started moving; we saw Aircraft Y fly over us and land on the same runway; Runway 31. Pilot Flying had already stopped our airplane and we were around 20 feet short of the runway. I told Tower that we were stopping at current position and Aircraft Y landed right in front of us. The Tower Supervisor came online. Tower acknowledged and told us to line up and wait on Runway 31; we complied. Aircraft Y must have been to our right; behind and low (right behind our tail) and therefore we didn't see him. Aircraft Y vacated the runway; we got our takeoff clearance and complied. No further action was needed and the event terminated.

CE560 First Officer reported while taxiing onto the runway; another aircraft flew over them and landed on the same runway.

1022909

201207

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Other / Unknown

1022909

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I assisted agent in closing aircraft door. [I] pushed down on door handle and after 2nd attempt; it locked into place. Door was then properly armed. Upon take off roll; I could see light coming from back of door and extreme air noise. I could see door was not completely closed. Upon rotation I attempted to call cockpit but when they answered they could not hear what I was saying due to the extreme wind noise. We continued to climb and I then had the Number 3 Flight Attendant go to the back of the aircraft to phone the Captain and let him know what was happening. Due to weight of fuel we had to circle for nearly an hour before being able to land. Landed and went to gate. Maintenance came and opened door and after several attempts we able replicate the door not closing completely on the side of the frame of the door towards the rear of the aircraft. Flight attendant should not assist agent close door.

B737 Flight Attendant discovers during takeoff the the forward entry door has not been properly latched due visible light and extreme wind noise. Flight returns to departure airport.

1003110

201204

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Tower ZZZ

HS 125 Series

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Commercial

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1003110

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1003112.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Other Takeoff roll

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Human Factors

Tower issued the clearance 'LINE UP AND WAIT Runway 5' Hawker jet traffic landing 32.' The Captain called for the takeoff checklist which we completed as we were rolling into position. After lining up on the runway the thrust levers were advanced and we began our takeoff roll. Very shortly after we began rolling and just as I saw the Runway 32 landing traffic ATC called and said; 'CANCEL TAKEOFF CLEARANCE.' I knew immediately we had messed up because I remember ATC telling us there was landing traffic Runway 32 after his Line up and Wait command. We immediately aborted the takeoff; kept the aircraft below 80 KTS and came to a stop on Runway 5. We then taxied off the runway; made appropriate announcements; contacted Dispatch for a release revalidation; and then continued to destination without further incident. This event shook me up. As we were stopped the landing traffic crossed down field in front of us. It was truly a sobering event that could have ended much worse. I think often when flying the line we fear FAR's more than loss of life. I know I can fall into the trap of worry whether or not I'm legal rather than whether or not I am safe. This incident has renewed my awareness of how quickly this job can turn catastrophic. This incident involved complacency; perhaps a bit of 'get home fever;' and other serious distractions in my personal life that are currently consuming my mind. I have been paired with the same Captain for the last 4 trips including 2 days of recurrent. There is a certain comfort level that can develop in working that much with the same person; unfortunately that comfort level can be negative as well leading to the degradation of the professional environment. This flight was the last leg of the trip and we were both ready to be off for a few days. I honestly can't say why she decided to start a takeoff roll without clearance; or why I wasn't immediately aware of our deviation. This has made me realize how a momentary lapse of memory or a short loss of focus can lead to dangerous situations. I plan to internally process this event as a wake up call. Because of the alertness of the Tower a potentially serious event was avoided; but I need to take it upon myself to break down the walls of complacency and make sure that my mind is focused on the task at hand rather than on other life situations.

We received what I believed at the time to be a take off clearance. We took the runway; ran the checklist and began the takeoff roll. At around 40-50 KTS ATC said; 'Cancel your takeoff clearance.' We aborted the takeoff and came to a full stop. ATC asked us to continue down the runway and exit at Taxiway F and taxi back to Runway 5. During all of this we realized; in hindsight; that we had not been cleared for takeoff; but instead were cleared to 'line up and wait' on Runway 5. There was traffic utilizing Runway 23 at the time; and in hindsight we feel that we may have been in an unsafe situation in proximity with this traffic. We contacted Dispatch; got revalidated and explained the situation. We then continued with our flight.This is absolutely human error. I heard what I 'expected' to hear instead of what was actually spoken. When the First Officer received the takeoff clearance I could not see the end of Runway 23; or the traffic on it; due to terrain and I was expecting to hear and see no traffic. I expected to hear 'clear for takeoff'; I was tired and ready to finish this trip and so I heard 'clear for takeoff.' Also; it was our last leg of our fourth day of many weeks paired together as a crew. At this point; we had grown comfortable; familiar and; sadly; complacent with each other. The best way to prevent this dangerous situation from recurring is simply to verify clearances with each other and with ATC. It is absolutely imperative to make sure that I understand what ATC is not saying; and not just what I expect them to be saying. Also; I need to ensure that all ATC clearances are echoed to the flying pilot. If we had confirmed the clearance with each other; as a crew; prior to initiating the takeoff roll; it is much more likely that I would have heard the clearance as it was issued; instead of what I expected. Also; I need to diligently and actively fight the 'get-there-itis' I inevitably feel on the last day of the last leg of a long trip. I know that it exists; and I need to be more active at taking my time and not feeling rushed or exhausted at the end of a trip. Every leg needs to be planned and executed the same as every other leg. The last leg of the last day of the last trip together as a crew is just as important as the first leg. Verifying and repeating a clearance within the crew and with ATC more than once is much better than misunderstanding a clearance and making a huge mistake like this.

CRJ200 flight crew reports being cleared to line up and wait for traffic landing on an intersecting runway. The First Officer reads back the clearance then reads the takeoff checklist at the Captain's request and the Captain begins the takeoff roll. The Tower notes the takeoff commencing and calls for the reject as the landing traffic rolls through the intersection.

1144101

201401

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

Parked

Y

N

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Testing

Fuel Booster Pump

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1144101

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure; MEL; Human Factors

Procedure

An incorrect deferral was issued for a malfunctioning Tank-4 Forward (Fwd) Fuel Boost Pump. During cockpit prep; the Tank-4 Fwd Fuel Boost Pump switch light was not illuminated; as it should be with the pump 'Off'; indicating that there was pump pressure with the switch 'Off.' There was EICAS confirmation [of fuel pressure] with the lack of an Engine # 4 EICAS Fuel pressure message; as there should be and like there was for Engine/Tank-1. The Mechanic said it was a faulty Pressure switch on the Tank-4 Fwd Pump System. But there was an Engine-4 Fwd Pump 'On;' when commanded 'Off' error in the Central Maintenance Computer (CMC). The Mechanic erased it; recycled the System; Circuit Breakers (C/B); and switches. The message came back to the CMC; and the light indications returned; indicating that the pump was running when it [the fuel pump] should be 'Off.' He said he was going to defer the Pressure switch; so we could leave. The Captain agreed; but I continued to advocate that he needs [Maintenance to] troubleshoot the malfunctioning [fuel] pump; not the pressure switch. A faulty pressure switch would not extinguish the Engine-4 Fuel Pressure EICAS message because it is on the other side of a one way valve in the fuel system and would not cause a fuel pump 'On' when commanded to the 'Off' position. CMC message. Errors: Procedural; problem with other Company Policy/ Procedures.

Reporter stated he was quite upset with Maintenance Control for deferring the Pressure Switch for the Tank-4 Forward Fuel Pump pressure light indication. The light would not illuminate (show low fuel pressure indication) when the pump switch was positioned to 'Off'. Since the APU was running at the gate; Maintenance suspected fuel manifold backpressure was not allowing the Tank-4 pressure light to illuminate normally. The Horizontal Stab fuel tanks were empty. There was a lack of adequate troubleshooting to determine if; in fact; the Tank-4 Forward Fuel Pump would shut-off with the 'On-Off' switch. The Pressure switch could be deferred; but the Fuel pump was a 'No-Go' item if the pump could not be shut-off with the switch. Reporter stated that was the second time on their B747-400 aircraft that he has experienced a similar problem where the Fuel Boost Pump Pressure switch would not shut-off the fuel pump. On that aircraft; the flight was canceled and the fuel pump replaced; which corrected the discrepancy.

A First Officer explains why he believes an incorrect deferral was applied to a B747-400 aircraft for a malfunctioning Tank-4 Forward Fuel Boost Pump Pressure indication light not illuminating; when the pump switch was positioned to 'Off.'

1746189

202006

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

340.0

16.0

4000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Direct; Vectors

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 1512; Flight Crew Type 300

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1746189

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

I was flying the following route under IFR: ZZZ [route] ZZZ1. I requested RNAV XX and after ZZZ2 was instructed to fly heading 070 and later 'Direct ZZZZZ' (intermediate fix). Another aircraft with similar callsign responded to the instruction 'fly a 360' mistaking the instruction for them. The Approach Controller; who was extremely busy; repeated the instruction to me and due to the urgency in Controller's voice I also mistook the command also as a '360' (assuming imminent traffic conflict). Once the miscommunication issue was resolved I changed the autopilot mode from Heading to GPSS mode on the PFD. The approach was loaded but not activated and started to sequence to the next waypoint; ZZZ3. While I was troubleshooting I disabled the autopilot to roll the wings level and while selecting ZZZZZ Direct due to task saturation an altitude deviation occurred and the Approach Controller terminated the approach. Once composed I was instructed Direct ZZZZZ once more and cleared for the approach which was executed without further issue.Contributing Factors: This was the first instrument approach conducted using new avionic equipment; which was installed a few days prior to this flight. I had familiarized myself with the unit on the ground and with the vendor's simulator app and pilot manual; but not in combination with the PFD and autopilot. I was not sufficiently familiar with the new unit. Flying practice approaches with an instructor would have been appropriate. While I have received recent instruction with an instructor (prior to equipment upgrade however) this activity is contrary to the CDC social distancing requirements and I have been limiting my training while the pandemic is ongoing as a consequence. In consideration to the above it would have been appropriate to conduct several practice approaches VFR on a less busy day to properly familiarize myself with the unit. The deviation would likely have been avoided had I configured the unit to fly direct ZZZZZ prior to changing autopilot mode from Heading to GPSS. Disabling the autopilot exacerbated task saturation. The Approach Controller was a little difficult to understand due to the intensity of communication and workload. ZZZZZ is phonetically similar to 'Three Sixty'. The ZZZZZ waypoint is located in City X north east practice area. Student pilots and non-instrument rated pilots using flight following mistaking the instruction and mistakenly responding to a call made to another aircraft may negatively impact Approach Controller workload.

Pilot reported a track heading deviation when executing a 360 turn resulting from confusing a fix name which sounds like the number 360.

1221734

201411

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2.0

1000.0

VMC

10

Night

7000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

1.0

Part 91

None

Landing

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Electrical Power

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 605; Flight Crew Type 605

1221734

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Maintenance Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

Returning VFR into home airport ZZZ. Plane had been jump-started earlier in the day departing ZZZ; starting engine had been difficult even with jump; and had lost and rebooted avionics once while enroute from ZZZ but everything checked out on the ground before returning. Experienced repeated failure of avionics equipment. Performed repeated reboots. Forced to fly north of/under Class B while avoiding ZZZ1 using only old onboard Narco DME as the Garmin GMX200 blinked out multiple times en route; along with Garmin GNS 430 at one point; leaving me no situational awareness other than ground reference in the dark and the DME to maintain distance from ZZZ2. Upon arriving at X River; checked in with tower for VFR landing. Did not notify tower of avionics problems; as I had gotten system rebooted and it was online at the time. I was given transponder code; notified of radar contact; and given straight in for RWY XX. Was told there was a jet on final for RWY XY that would be landing ahead of me. Notified tower that I had the jet traffic in site and would slow my pace to the field. Stayed slightly high since I was slowing speed to the field. About two miles out the big screen went dark again. Took away my situational awareness as I was just left of the runway and still slightly high; and the disappearance of the big main screen was playing havoc with my vision. As I tried to reboot again; I asked for a go-around; and side stepped to the left of XX. Tower granted the go around; and asked how long I would need aloft. At that point I noticed that I also had a low voltage warning light glowing. Engine had been running somewhat loudly/roughly toward end of flight as I passed ZZZ2; had been flying with carb heat on; and the question of 'how long will you need on the go around' combined with the low voltage light and the night conditions led me to decision to try to put plane on the ground immediately. I observed empty taxiway Quebec; which runs the full length of RWY XX; with no traffic or obstructions and the fully-lighted centerline and other lights at the far end; past Taxiways Charlie and Golf; and asked the tower; 'can I put it on the ground? I want to just put it on the ground?' The tower replied yes; although I did not specifically declare an emergency. And although I did not say where I was setting the plane down; the tower saw where I was and kept Taxiway Quebec clear at the far end; where it runs out the full length of Runway XX; and I pulled the throttle and set the plane down at the far end of Taxiway Quebec with a very short landing roll and pulled into [a nearby FBO]. [My] mechanic wants to look at the carburetor and foam filter box for damage during [the] jump [start]; in addition to electrical system. In retrospect; my desire to avoid being a source of any trouble to the tower when I first made radio contact was a mistake. I should not have hesitated to tell tower upon initial radio contact at the X River that I was experiencing some difficulty with systems; and simply asked for vectors straight to the field for immediate landing. Desire to not cause any alarm led to my causing far greater alarm and an escalated situation when the system failures again dominoed on final.

The pilot of a C-182; after experiencing difficulty starting and utilizing a jump start to begin his days round trip; experienced multiple electrical and nav system malfunctions and failures during his night return to departure airport. Anxiety about going around with increasing failures triggered a decision to land on a taxiway.

1169993

201405

1201-1800

ANB.Airport

AL

0.0

VMC

Daylight

FSS ANB; TRACON BHM

Corporate

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 125

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Glider; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 1000

Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel; Party2 ATC

1169993

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Procedure; Airport

Procedure

The special event procedures used at the Anniston airport for departures after the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series Race were not implemented as they had been published in the NTAP and they caused confusion. The Notice to Airmen Publication indicated that during the time after the NASCAR race aircraft departing ANB under IFR should contact Birmingham Approach while on the ground to obtain clearance and release. At the FBO papers were given to the flight crews instructing us to use a different frequency to contact what they called 'Anniston Tower' for our clearance; sequence; and release. That was the start of the confusion with conflicting instructions to pilots. Anniston is a non-towered airport with an FSS located on the field; there is no ATC Tower in operation. The radio call sign of 'Tower' is very inappropriate in this case because when pilots hear a facility using the word tower in their call sign the pilots expect to be given clearances to taxi; takeoff; land; etc. All this 'Tower' was doing was giving IFR clearances; requesting aircraft to advise beginning taxi so they could set the departure sequence; and giving us releases. I believe that the proper call sign for this should have been 'Anniston Clearance.' During my time there I heard multiple aircraft that were confused. Several were requesting taxi clearance from the Tower instead of announcing their taxi on CTAF. Some aircraft didn't seem to know that the CTAF was in use and were not making any announcements at all.

Pilot reports of confusion due to a non-towered airport using a frequency to issue IFR Clearances; while pilots thought this was an actual Tower and not using the airport CTAF for position reports.

1683150

201909

1201-1800

GSO.Tower

NC

400.0

Clear

TRACON GSO; Tower GSO

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class C GSO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1683150

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

First flight of the day on day 4 of our trip. We started off in GSO departing off of Runway 23L; we were cleared for takeoff and as we rotated and began to climb through 200-300 ft. AGL; we got a Traffic Advisory alert and at that moment; the First Officer started leveling the aircraft and slowing down at about 400 ft. AGL; the target on radar was directly above us; 100 ft. above us. Looking outside and inside the whole time I was never able to get a visual on the traffic. After the TA was over I asked Tower if there were any aircraft around us in close proximity; Tower proceeded to say no he had no one on radar around us. We were switched to Departure frequency and ATC asked if we had a TA or RA; I said TA and asked if there was in fact an aircraft around us. After that question there was silence; he never answered; after a few minutes ATC told us to contact Atlanta Center. I replied back and asked again was there another aircraft that close to us? He replied there was a VFR aircraft on vectors; and nothing else.Better communication between departure frequency and Tower frequency.

CRJ700 Captain reported a traffic conflict on departure; resulting in a TA.

1208013

201409

0601-1200

MVY.Airport

MA

1.0

1100.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

Tower MVY

Personal

PA-28R Cherokee Arrow All Series

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Descent

Direct

Class D MVY

Tower MVY

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Descent

Class D MVY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 1700; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1208013

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was working Cape Approach while enroute to MVY from the southwest. Cape handed me off to the tower who advised me to report a right downwind entry. From my direction of flight a right base would have been a better line up. I requested a right base and was granted same. There were multiple aircraft in the area to both land and takeoff. It became clear as I approached that a right base would put me in conflict with another aircraft on a right base further out to my left. I advised the tower that I thought a right downwind would in fact be better and he concurred and I altered course for the right downwind. While on approach and established parallel to the runway on the right downwind at or near pattern altitude the tower controller requested I extend my downwind for other aircraft. I acknowledged same. In a split second out of the corner of my eye I saw another aircraft to my left (Aircraft Y) on a right base. Aircraft Y passed underneath me by a very slim margin; less than 200 feet; perhaps less than 100 feet. It was very quick. If we had been at the same altitude we would have collided. I advised the tower controller of the event and the only response was 'that's why I told you to extend the downwind' The airport went from quiet to extremely busy in a very short period of time. I am not sure if the controller did not know of Aircraft Y's position or if I misinterpreted my instructions but if the latter I did repeat everything and I believe the controller acknowledged same. I was expecting Aircraft Y to be inside my position and not outside my position. My attention was focused towards the airport with only occasional glances to my left. I was asked once again to extend the downwind and continued the downwind to fall in behind a PC-12 on final; the rest of the flight was uneventful. I don't know how the pilot of Aircraft Y could have missed me; I was right in front of him. My only explanation is that he may have been looking to his right for me; thinking I was more abeam the tower area on the right downwind.

PA28 pilot on a right dowinwind reports a NMAC in the pattern at MVY with an aircraft crossing on a right base. The Tower did not advise either pilot of the impending conflict.

1056549

201212

1201-1800

PHX.Airport

AZ

14200.0

VMC

Night

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E ZAB

FMS/FMC

X

Design; Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 115; Flight Crew Type 7000

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1056549

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1056888.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation

Aircraft; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While descending toward MNSTR on GEELA6 into PHX; we were told to disregard the speed restrictions (i.e. not necessary to slow from 280 to 250). I deleted the speed restriction from MNSTR; which also removed the altitude restriction to cross between 15;000 and 16;000. I then selected Speed Intervention 280 KIAS. The CDU showed that we would cross MNSTR at about 15;500; so I didn't bother reentering the restriction. The increased speed; however; caused us to descend faster and we actually crossed MNSTR at about 14;200. There was no traffic conflict; nor did ATC mention the deviation.I should have entered an altitude at MNSTR after deleting the speed. Also; I think returning to VNAV PATH would have had us crossing MNSTR at a correct altitude. A limitation of the FMC is that one cannot remove a speed without also deleting the associated altitude.

We discussed the best way to delete the speed [at MNSTR] while keeping the altitude restriction (I don't think there is one!). We selected delete without executing and it showed us crossing fix at 15;600 (small font [which identifies a predicted altitude; not a hard one]) if we were on profile for subsequent fixes.I'm still not sure of the best way to delete a speed restriction on a fix that also has a crossing altitude 'window' (below and above altitudes). But we know that we shouldn't have selected Speed Intervention and we should have stayed in [VNAV] PATH. At the very least; if we had entered the 'floor' altitude of the fix in the page; we wouldn't have descended below it. Obviously better coordination and monitoring also would've prevented this error.

When ATC deleted their speed restriction at MNSTR on the GEELA RNAV STAR to PHX the flight crew of a B737-700 was uncertain of how to do so in the FMC while retaining the crossing window above 15;000 and below 16;000. They opted to exit VNAV PATH and continue their descent in speed intervene mode in anticipation the FMC predicted crossing would comply with the restriction. It didn't and they crossed the waypoint 800 FT low.

1141752

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

22000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 190/195 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Control

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Troubleshooting; Workload

1141752

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Troubleshooting; Workload

1142168.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On climbout around FL220 we received an amber 'Stab Lock Fault' amber message and the pitch trim indication was replaced by amber dashes. We ran the QRC procedure which stated to 'Land at the nearest suitable airport'. Weather had been close to minimums when we left and I knew a nearby major airport had longer runways and better weather; as well as maintenance and better services available. We asked to level off and told ATC we would need to divert for a maintenance issue. We sent a message to Dispatch informing them and I informed the flight attendants we would be diverting. ATC declared an emergency and we decided to have the emergency vehicles sent out. On descent into the divert airport the message extinguished; however the amber dashes remained. The First Officer and I decided to continue with the diversion. We were given the longest runway and made a normal approach and landing. Upon rollout the Stab Lock Fault returned and we had an associated 'FLT Control no DSPTCH' message. We were able to taxi to the gate without assistance or further issue.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information.]

An ERJ-190 STAB LOCK FAULT amber annunciator alerted during climb; so after completing the QRH which included the command; LAND AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT; the crew declared an emergency and diverted to a nearby major airport.

1848735

202110

1201-1800

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1848735

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

I was Pilot Flying this leg; the Captain was Pilot Monitoring. We were en-route and given an ATC frequency change. The Captain changed frequencies and checked in with the center controller with our altitude; and the controller replied 'roger'. About 10 minutes later; we received an ACARS message from our dispatcher saying that ATC was looking for us; and gave us the frequency. We noticed that it was one digit off of the frequency we were speaking with; and changed it to the correct one to check in with ATC. The cause of this event was misreading the ATC frequency.This could have been avoided if the controller that we checked on with told us the frequency was incorrect; which is what typically happens in this case. We would have been able to go back to the prior frequency and get the proper one. Another way would be if we had heard the controllers if they were trying to reach us on guard. Guard was particularly busy with meowing and nonsense that morning (as it typically is) so we had the volume set low. I have said it time and time again; guard has become so ridiculous with chatter as of late; and it has been making it difficult to monitor. This is an issue that needs to be resolved.

Air carrier First Officer reported missing a frequency change due to misreading the frequency numbers. Reporter stated that although they were monitoring guard frequency so ATC could contact them; they had the volume turned down due to the excessive amount of chatter.

1783271

202101

0601-1200

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp; Safety Analyst

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1783271

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Ground Personnel

Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors

Dry ice check list missing.Shipment has not been checked or ZZZ forgot to send the checklist with [Airways Bill].

Air Carrier Ramp personnel at destination reported missing required Hazmat documents for Hazmat Dangerous Goods shipment.

1570562

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

100.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Other

1.0

Part 103

None

Training

Initial Climb

None

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 33; Flight Crew Total 1606; Flight Crew Type 0.4

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1570562

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft; Human Factors; Equipment / Tooling

Aircraft

I was taking my second training flight in a powered paraglider (PPG) and on initial climb out; I could not get into my seat for the pre-established 4 laps around the pattern. My instructor kept asking me if I was in my seat; however; the leg straps had become loose and I 'slid down' lower; making it harder to get into my seat. I was too low to even hook the seat strap with my boots; which is a common way of getting into the seat. So; I had no choice other than to let go of the left brake and try to push myself up into the seat using my left arm. I was so low that this was not working either. I simply could not get into my seat whatever I did because of the design of the harness/seat.I decided to fly the PPG around the pattern once and land to fix the issue; but because I was so low in the harness; I could not reach up and grab my left brake line handle. I had assumed that I would need both of my brake lines so that I could flare in the landing; so I did all that I could physically do to get to that left handle; which was blowing back in the wind. I then tried lifting myself with my right hand and reached one of the 'D' lines with my left hand to try to coax the brake line to within reach. By focusing on this problem; I had drifted over some nearby apartments; unfortunately.When I pulled the D lines towards me; a gust of wind came up suddenly and the left side of the wing deflated/collapsed and placed me into a spin/stall to the left in a surprisingly short amount of time. I let go of all the lines hoping to recover; but because I was only about 60 feet above the top of an apartment roof; a full recovery was only partially complete. As a result; I landed on top of the roof with some substantial vertical velocity. I was not hurt and was able to get off the roof with the help of some neighbors.The main problem that caused this hard landing onto a building was the seat design; which did not allow me to get into the seat no matter what I did; even with substantial effort. I also felt there was some pressure by the instructor to get into the seat; which caused me to fixate on this issue for some time. Finally; I felt that if I had known that I could have controlled the flare just before landing without the use of the brake handles; then I would not have made the effort to get to the left brake handle; which caused me to pull the D lines. Substandard equipment and lack of information were really the core causes.

A powered paraglider pilot reported a faulty seat caused them to lose control of the aircraft and land on a roof.

1325636

201601

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

Personal

Cessna Single Piston Undifferentiated or Other Model

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 148; Flight Crew Type 64

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1325636

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 14; Flight Crew Total 529; Flight Crew Type 108

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1329535.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

While flying VFR back to my home airport; I landed on runway 35L (perfect weather; no clouds; excellent visibility). On completing the landing; the tower informed me that I was cleared on 35R (small runway); not 35L (long and wide parallel runway); and therefore landed on the wrong runway. Although tower may have cleared me on 35R and I may have misunderstood; I cannot categorically confirm it as I have not been provided with a recording of the calls. I accept I may have misunderstood the tower's instructions as the airport was quiet and 35L is the runway usually given (I usually requested 35L when given 35R if possible). I was requested to call tower which I duly did within 30 minutes of landing. It was explained that the incident had been reported to the FAA and I should expect a call and potential further action. Tower explained that my actions did not cause any risk to any other aircraft as none were landing or taking off from 35L at the time of landing.Although it does not excuse my mistake by any means (providing I was indeed cleared on 35R; not 35L); my two sons were in the plane at the time of landing and one was being air sick. Although my wife was dealing with my sick son; I may have been distracted by the event and wrongly assumed I was cleared on 35L. In the eventuality that I was indeed cleared on 35R; I take full responsibility for the mistake.

We were on the return leg of a short flight back; where we had taken our two sons for lunch. Weather was VFR; Sky clear and 10sm visibility. My husband was PIC in left seat and I was right seat; dealing with our children in the back seats and occasionally doing the radios.We were given a squawk code and upon arrival at the airport we were instructed to enter right downwind for the runway (I believed runway 35L; but it is possible it was 35R - the smaller of the 2 parallel runways. I repeated the instruction and we entered the pattern. At this point our youngest son told us he was feeling unwell. I responded to him; trying to settle him and explaining that his dad needed to focus on the approach and we would be landing shortly. Tower then cleared us to land. I am not sure which one of us - my husband or me -responded to the call. We turned base; looked for traffic before turning final; and came into land. I believe Tower called us just as we were turning base to ask what type aircraft we were. The tower frequency and pattern were not particularly busy at the time.As soon as we landed Tower radioed to say we had landed on the wrong runway. I was very surprised and apologized (I did not remember having been cleared for 35R; but accepted that if they were telling me we were then they were probably correct). I believe the incident was the result of the following factors:Complacency due to the fact that [this] is our home airport. My husband is used to being cleared for the larger runway except when there is a high level of traffic in the vicinity. At our time of arrival the airport was fairly quiet. We assumed that we would be cleared for the big runway - our anticipation of that clearance meant that neither of us paid sufficient attention to the actual clearance given.The fact that each of us took radio calls whilst in the pattern may have caused some confusion in the acceptance of the clearance - there was a lack of continuity.The added distraction of our son feeling ill may have contributed to us not absorbing the runway information we were given by Tower. The timing of him needing our attention was unfortunate.My husband actually said in our post flight conversations that he almost called tower to double check the clearance. He hesitated and reassured himself that he had received clearance for 35L. We have agreed it is always worth double checking; which we will do in future.Parallel runways can cause confusion in clearances. We have discussed adding or substituting the phrase 'cleared for the big / small runway' in future. We will discuss this with other pilots and perhaps Tower staff to see if this would be in any way helpful.

The pilot flying and the non pilot flying described the circumstances that led to landing on the incorrect parallel runway at their home airport.

1088604

201305

1201-1800

SOP.Airport

NC

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

UNICOM SOP

Personal

Bonanza 35

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 16; Flight Crew Total 4325; Flight Crew Type 2000

Other / Unknown; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1088604

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Aircraft

Horizontal 40

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

About 12 miles out I picked up the ATIS information: wind calm; visibility greater than 10; few at 4;600 FT; 6;000 FT scattered; temperatures 29 and 15; altimeter 30.14; density altitude 2;000 FT. Ten miles out; I transmitted on UNICOM; that I was 10 miles out and going to make an extended left base entry for Runway 5 by flying the RNAV (GPS) 5 approach visually. I intercepted the final approach course and made a 7.5 mile 'on final' report on UNICOM. Intercepted the glide slope and proceeded inbound. Made further reports at 5 miles and 2.5 miles out on final always specifying the Runway 5 GPS approach. My rotating beacon and strobes were on and operational. Made a normal landing. As I flew the nosewheel onto the runway I saw a Cessna 172; pass me in the opposite direction. I was on the runway centerline; he was to my far left; his far right at the edge of the runway. I cleared Runway 5 at the Delta intersection; called clear; [and] then began to taxi in. I called UNICOM and told the attendant what had happened. Obviously my Comm was transmitting and receiving because I got an immediate response on Unicom. Immediately thereafter the pilot of the Cessna 172 stated on frequency 'We'll deal with it inside' so his Comm was operating as well. Neither my wife; who holds a private ticket; nor I ever heard any position report from the Cessna 172 prior to our landing nor did we hear any acknowledgment of our 4 position reports. The pilot of the Cessna 172 is the chief instructor of the flight school operated by the FBO. Communication issues have occurred previously with instructors and students in this airplane; I don't know if the Comm radios need to be fixed or the instructors and students need to be fixed. Even though visibility was 10; it was slightly hazy; the Cessna 172 is dirty white and presents a small target head on. If I had been able to spot it earlier I could have taken defensive action but obviously he spotted me because he was hugging the right side of the runway from his perspective rather than the centerline. If he hadn't we would have collided almost perfectly midfield on the centerline. It doesn't do any good to make position reports and have two pilots; my wife and myself; both monitoring the frequency for traffic; if the traffic doesn't announce it's position or listen to position reports from other aircraft.

BE35 pilot landing reports a critical ground conflict with a C172 taking off in the opposite direction. The C172 pilot was hugging the runway edge allowing the two aircraft to pass unscathed. Numerous position reports had been made by the BE35 pilot on the CTAF with no response.

1841980

202109

1201-1800

SAT.TRACON

TX

3100.0

VMC

TRACON SAT

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E SAT

TRACON SAT

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Initial Climb

None

Class E SAT

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Time Pressure

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1841980

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Airspace Structure

At approximately XA:40Z; Aircraft X; an Air Carrier; was being vectored for the ILS RWY 13R at SAT. He was fourth in the sequence to the airport so I had to bring him out to roughly a 15 mile final. This takes the aircraft over 5C1; a satellite airport in our airspace. At the time I turned Aircraft X base; there was no traffic in the vicinity of the airport. However; once the aircraft was established on the base and descended him to the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (3100 feet); I noticed a VFR target departing south/southwest off of 5C1. As this aircraft was headed southbound and was much lower than my aircraft I cleared Aircraft X for the ILS approach to go behind and above the VFR aircraft. I issued traffic to Aircraft X and I thought he said 'Not in sight'; however; the language barrier makes it difficult to tell. As Aircraft X became established on his intercept vector; the VFR aircraft continued to climb into conflict with Aircraft X so I cancelled the approach clearance and climbed Aircraft X to 4000 feet.Unfortunately; the VFR aircraft continued to climb as well. I then instructed Aircraft X to turn Right Heading 180 immediately to avoid the VFR traffic. The first transmission was blocked so I repeated it. I also called in the blind to the VFR aircraft and issued traffic hoping they were at least listening to our frequency. At this point the VFR aircraft turned directly into Aircraft X. Aircraft X then responded to a TCAS advisory and descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude. I advised him to let me know when was able to take an intercept vector back to the ILS. Aircraft X asked for information on the VFR aircraft; but the aircraft was not equipped with ADSB-out (Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) so no information was available. The closest the aircraft came to each was .42 miles and 200 feet.This is one of many reports on the dangers of the proximity of 5C1 and their operations to SAT. We have asked for 'C' extension to encompass the airport/aircraft that operate there. Unfortunately; the pilots there don't want to be restricted and even with multiple attempts at outreach with them to show and explain the situation we're dealing with here there are still many there who simply do not care of the dangers they can pose to aircraft landing at SAT. Additionally; even though the pilot of the VFR aircraft turned directly at the airliner we have no way of identifying or correcting his/her poor decision. The core tenet of VFR is 'see and avoid' and this pilot did not do one or the other. Either he/she didn't see the aircraft and turned into Aircraft X or saw him and did not adequately avoid them. Either way; there is no way to report this to anyone nor can we make contact with this individual to educate them on the seriousness of what happened.We have discussed the possibility of a departure procedure that would keep aircraft lower or at least at a fixed altitude so we can ensure separation; however; this wouldn't be compulsory and the same issue explained above would most likely take place. At this point unless there is a catastrophic disaster nothing will change. I understand the airspace change is happening; but it has been happening for 2 years now and there has been very little movement to actually fixing the issue. It is a macabre outlook; but this is the situation we're dealing with every day to our primary runway and the agency that is tasked with preventing these sorts of disasters; has thus far been unable to affect any meaningful change to prevent this awful scenario.

SAT TRACON Controller reported an unidentified aircraft departed 5C1 airport underneath the SAT ILS final approach course and climbed into confliction with an Air Carrier. The Controller climbed and vectored the Air Carrier to avoid the traffic but the Air Carrier responded to a TCAS/RA and descended below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1297536

201509

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; VOR / VORTAC CRI

Initial Approach

Class B NYC

Air Carrier

A380

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Class B NYC

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1297536

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1297538.0

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Procedure

During our approach into JFK we were being vectored behind an A380 approx. 7 miles ahead of us...we encountered a sudden and abrupt wake turbulence event which rocked our aircraft pretty good...we told ATC what happened and asked for extended vectors...approach control sounded irritated about our report of wake turbulence and told us to let him know when we were ready to turn to intercept the approach course to VOR GPS 13R into JFK....after receiving a heading to join the inbound course and cleared for the approach we proceeded to join....we were told by approach control we were showing about a half mile off course when our instruments showed we were on course.....we were told to maintain 3;000 feet and contact tower.....looking at the FMS I noticed ASALT fix was behind us and started to descend to 1;500 feet to cross CRI.....after handed off to JFK tower the controller said that approach controller wanted to know why we started our descent early...we noticed we had deviated by about 300 feet below the assigned 3;000 feet....... we stopped the descent and crossed ASALT at approx. 2;700 feet and continued the approach on profile......the wake turbulence and the query of ATC about our course offset had the crew frustrated and the attitude of the approach controller was somewhat irritated in nature causing us to deviate briefly in altitude during the approach........the approach was completed normally as expected.I believe that after experiencing this type of wake turbulence that ATC should review the guidelines regarding separation of aircraft behind heavy airframes generating wake turbulence....especially with regards to an A380........and also ATC should be more understanding of situations that flight crews are reporting instead of displaying a defensive attitude.

I think there needs to be more awareness about the Super A380 to better prepare pilots and controllers to avoid the wake turbulence. This event was started with the wake turbulence that led into other minor mishaps on the approach. I think this is where the problem is.

A CRJ-900 flight crew reported encountering 'sudden and abrupt' wake turbulence in trail of a Super A380 on approach to JFK that led to track and altitude deviations. The flight crew stated they sensed some irritation on the part of ATC when they asked for more spacing.

1572889

201808

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

10000

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Class G ZZZ

UNICOM ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

Landing

Class G ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1572889

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I had been flying nonstop [for about 4 hours] until the incident on runway XX at ZZZ airport. WX was beautiful. All traffic was using runway XX all that morning as the winds were favoring that runway. When I approached the runway I made a radio call on Unicom that I was taking active for takeoff; I saw and heard nothing. During my takeoff roll at about liftoff I heard someone on the radio say something about a conflict. It was too late to abort in a tailwheel airplane with a high pressure altitude so I took off as my best option. A few seconds later I went over the top of Aircraft Y. It was so small so I guess that is why I never saw it on short final head on. I apologized to the pilot but heard nothing back. I really felt bad but I never heard a radio call nor saw an airplane. From now on I will ask if anyone is in the pattern at an uncontrolled field before takeoff.

GA pilot reported a near NMAC while departing with opposite-direction landing traffic at non-towered field.

1779080

202012

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 2600

Confusion; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1779080

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

We started out vectored off our arrival by ZZZ Center to the southwest with several step down altitudes. 30 miles from the airport we found ourselves at 20;000 MSL which is about 10;000 feet higher than usual for a normal descent. ATC; specifically ZZZ Center; was overloaded with aircraft going into south State X. The Controller brought us around and eventually around 10;000 MSL he told us to go direct to the ZZZ airport. At that time; we were about 15-18 miles away at just under 10;000 MSL. A few minutes later the Controller asked if we had the field in sight to which we replied that we did; but we needed a vector because we were too high to safely attempt the visual approach. We were given a left 360 degree turn and cleared down to 3;000 MSL also while given direct to the ZZZ airport. Upon leveling off at 3;000 MSL we were in a cloud layer and couldn't see the field. We requested lower and were given 1;500 MSL. Once we reach that altitude; we could see the field and was cleared the visual approach to Runway X and to switch to Tower.On final; after fully configuring the aircraft; Tower told us to turn right to a heading of 180. Very confused; we asked him to repeat the instructions at which point we executed a missed approach for a disabled aircraft on the runway. Tower never actually told us to go-around. We were given heading 180 and a climb to 4;000 MSL. Following the level off we were instructed to hold present position however the aircraft will not hold present position on HDG mode. It can only PPOS HOLD while on and active FMS leg with less than .25 NM cross track. Knowing this; we told the Controller we needed a fix to hold and we were given the ZZZ2 NDB which doesn't exist in the database. We instead requested the missed approach fix for the RNAV X approach.We weren't sure or told how long the runway was going to be shut down so the crew started to discuss diverting options which ZZZ1 was the only real viable option. The FMS indicated it would take about 3;500 lbs of fuel and we had about 2;300lbs of reserve fuel on board. From my quick calculation; I had to make a decision fairly soon considering the following: we had about 5;700lbs on fuel on board; unknown runway closure; time; FMS calculation of 3;500 lbs of fuel required to ZZZ1; high volume of ZZZ Center traffic and high controller work load. I sent a message to Dispatch informing them we would attempt one more approach and if unable to make it in we would divert to ZZZ1.We notified ZZZ Center Controller we needed to attempt another approach or we would soon have need to divert. We were given vectors around and cleared for the visual to Runway X once again. As the pilot flying; I opted to proceed direct to the FAF of the RNAV X and continue the visual approach. At about the base leg portion I turned off the autopilot and turned towards the runway. I believe that a slight turn inside of the FAF did not sequence the approach nor the glide path information which led to a position above the glide path. I flew down to correct the glide path all while in and out of 1;000 FPM VVI. I acknowledged the momentary deviations of descent and quickly corrected as I was now on the visual indications from the PAPI's. On short final; a thermal briefly interrupted our descent and with a quick correction back to glide path I corrected the path for a safe landing.I believe the accumulation of all factors above could have led to a critically low fuel situation much quicker than expected. I believe the saturation of airspace on a very busy travel day could have been underestimated in the current climate of understaffed controllers. ZZZ Center controllers were so saturated with aircraft that any chance to hand an aircraft off to a visual approach whether it was really safe to do so or not was attempted. Unsure about divert fuel and runway state created a high-importance; high stress moment of deciding when a divert should occur without having proper data supporting it. Lastly; in a heightened sense of urgency with a tight turn inbound to the runway and sub-sequence 'Cutting the corner' led to the aircraft being in a position higher than the glide path.I would suggest the following for operations into ZZZ Captain only approach and landing. I believe most captains take it upon themselves to make the approach and landing due to the short runway as it is. There should be more 'hip pocket' information whether in the form of a bulletin or some other format that provides rough numbers of divert options; fuel required; routing; etc when a formal alternate is not filed. I also suggest fuel planning take into account busy travel days and add as much fuel as practical for contingencies even on days with VMC conditions that does not preclude landing due to being over max landing weight. I also believe during all forms of training (initial; recurrent; etc) special authorization airports and airports such as ZZZ are discussed. It is my suggestion that ZZZ be a mandatory training event. I can tell you everything you need to know about flying to ZZZ2 yet we don't actually go there in the aircraft. However; airports such as ZZZ are rarely mentioned when we fly there every week. I suggest more 'hangar flying' where scenarios are discussed (such as this one) in a classroom/training environment to get captains to start thinking about scenarios such as these. I'd also like to recommend that one or two approaches from ZZZ3 be included in our Jeppesen charts or company pages. Should ZZZ be shut down for any reason and there is not enough divert fuel to safely make it back to the mainland there will be a 10;000 foot runway available; especially in IMC conditions. Lastly; I suggest that pilots refrain from attempting to cut corners while approaching the runway from greater than 90 degrees. Instead; they should fly the published approach in its entirety including glide slopes or glide paths so that they maintain a safe; stable approach to the runway.

Air carrier Captain reported a disabled aircraft on intended landing runway resulted in their flight being vectored away from their approach path. The additional vectoring caused them to be concerned with their fuel state and made a request to be cleared as soon as possible. The crew was cleared for another approach and landing and reported being unstable/high before safely landing the aircraft.

1335383

201602

1201-1800

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

32000.0

Daylight

Center ZOB

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Climb

Class A ZOB

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 10

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1335383

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was climbing out of IAD. Requesting FL380. Per Letter of Agreement (LOA) Washington area departures are climbed to FL320 or lower requested altitude. A shelf on the shared ZOB/ZDC boundary facilitates aircraft climb without coordination. Aircraft X was climbing well and we had converging traffic at FL320; so we tried to initiate Point out to W04 (Pinion sector) to keep Aircraft X climbing outside of the shelf. Aircraft X began to slow climb rate as it approached FL320. Now we had about 3 minutes till traffic was merging. D-side tried at least 7-8 to call W04 and no response. Finally W04 controller picks up the line but instead of approving point out she proceeds to berate my D-side; which happens to be a D-side only rated controller; about unnecessary point outs and the shelf. She basically admitted that she was intentionally ignoring the call because she 'didn't think that Aircraft X was going to hit my airspace'. Our supervisor called to try and figure out what happened; but was rebuffed by the Controller in Charge (CIC)/ Front Line Manager (FLM) and was told something to the effect of; keep the airplanes out of our airspace and no more point outs! Turns out that Aircraft X did in fact come within 2.5 miles of the sector and did require a point out; but this fact is not needed in the overall view of this event. Apparently this has been occurring with W04 for years. If a controller is knowingly neglecting his/her duties while on position I cannot advise anything other than management intervention with employee.

ZOB Controller reported an issue with another controller berating a D-Side; stating that the aircraft in question did not need to be pointed out; when in fact the aircraft did require a point out.

1750831

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

25.0

6500.0

VMC

Daylight

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

None

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 490; Flight Crew Type 460

1750831

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Engine power surging; ATC suggested ZZZ; started heading towards a field. Partial power restored. Was able to land at ZZZ. ATC called to verify landing.

C172 pilot reported diverting to an alternate airport after experiencing partial power loss.

1619597

201902

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Airframe

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1619597

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was assigned to a gate call on Aircraft X (A321). I went to the aircraft and talked to the Captain; I was told of an ECAM fault; 'FCU 2' and after verifying documentation in the E-6 logbook; began troubleshooting the fault. I used the Troubleshooting Manual to ascertain the proper way to handle correction of the fault/failure. I then called Tech Services and spoke with [personnel 1] to discuss the best avenue to handle this PIREP. During my conversation with [personnel 1] I was repeatedly interrupted by [personnel 2]; which is in stark contrast to our Human Factors Training. [Personnel 2] shoved MEL paperwork in front of me while I was conversing with [personnel 1]. I asked [personnel 1] to hold on a moment and that is when; much to my shock and dismay; [personnel 2] addressed me in a very hostile manner. [Personnel 2]; with clenched jaw and anger in his face; told me that if I did not MEL this fault right now; he would (pointing sternly to the door) send me home! Caught between troubleshooting and a direct threat to my employment; I stayed the course knowing that we must 'check and approve' an item when we use an MEL deferral. After I confirmed the cause of the ECAM fault; I then utilized [personnel 1]'s guidance; I reset the FCU 2 computer using the proper procedure. Aircraft X was then dispatched properly. I would also like to add that there seems to be a double standard as to how [Company] expects an AMT to comply with all the maintenance manual and GPM requirements but when time becomes the issue that seems to be ignored or not applicable to [Company]. Finally; [with] the issues here in ZZZ and while I am more than willing to be patient; it seems that the Management here just doesn't care about the rules unless we the AMT's fail to follow them and it is convenient for them to put discipline on us.In my 36 years in aviation; I have NEVER been bullied or coerced into making an aircraft unsafe; but ZZZ Maintenance is another story. Here in ZZZ; there is a toxic culture in place that uses draconian tactics to 'push tin' in the hopes of being on-time for schedules that are ill conceived. Constant interruptions of maintenance tasks (Human Factors) by departments that ask; 'How long is it going to take'? I think to myself; if I screw up and something happens to the aircraft; passengers and crew; the answer might be 'forever' because you can't take back an air disaster. If you are not receiving many ASAP reports; it may be because mechanics here in ZZZ might have been bullied; beaten down and are scared.Suggestions: 1) Retrain ALL mechanics AND Nanagement in ZZZ with IAW program (certificates and coin after class).2) Fire [personnel 2] so employees know that threatening people will not be tolerated and they may have a non-hostile work environment to work IAW.3) More FAA oversight in ZZZ.4) Devise a training video explaining to everyone that the MEL does NOT exist to defer items solely for our convenience; we must know WHY. The video would be viewed by Management and mechanics alike.

Maintenance Technician reported being pressured by a Supervisor to defer an aircraft write up rather than troubleshoot.

1692501

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

2.0

X

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Attendant

1692501

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Y

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General Evacuated

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was the Captain and Pilot Flying. We had a partial crew swap and got a new FO (First Officer) and 1 new FA (Flight Attendant). We pushed back on time and during pushback; we were cleared to start engine 2. After the start; the ground crew disconnected and we ran the after start checklist. Before starting the taxi checklist the FA used the emergency call button and contacted us saying there was smoke in the cabin. She said she wanted to open the door. I inquired how much smoke or what she thought was going on. She seemed a bit panicked so I asked the FO to look in the back and see what he thought. He opened the door; looked back and said 'Yes there is a lot of smoke back there.' I asked the FA what she wanted to do and she said she wanted to evacuate. I said; 'OK; take them out the front.' The FO and I ran the evacuation checklist and I informed ATC that we would like the firetrucks and we would be evacuating on the ramp. After running the checklist and powering down the airplane the FO went outside to help gather passengers. I then noticed that passengers were exiting the aircraft through the over wing exits. After all the passengers were off the aircraft I went through the cabin to ensure no other passengers were in the aircraft. I then exited the aircraft and had the FA take the passengers inside with a person from Operations that showed up. FA1 went inside with the passengers and then FA2 said he would get a count of the passengers and make sure everyone was accounted for. After talking with the fire department we went inside the terminal and the aircraft was towed away by Maintenance presumably.I am unsure of the cause of the smoke. The FAs said it was an electrical smell but they couldn't find the source. I did not hear the PA announcement from the forward FA but I can assume she didn't have them come to the forward door and didn't tell the aft FA to have everyone come forward. The Aft FA2 told me that once he heard the forward FA1 mention evacuation that the passengers just grabbed the window exits and started leaving through the windows. Although everything happened very quickly I didn't feel like a mass evacuation was in order where it was possible for injuries to occur. The evacuation checklist doesn't allow for an orderly evacuation although I tried to make that happen. A deplaning process could be a beneficial discussion verse a full evacuation per the book.

CRJ-700 Captain reported the aircraft was evacuated after engine start and prior to taxi due to smoke in the cabin.

1325845

201601

1801-2400

HOU.Airport

TX

900.0

VMC

Night

Tower HOU

Fractional

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Class B HOU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Other / Unknown

1325845

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Company Policy; Human Factors

Human Factors

Houston Approach was vectoring us for an approach to runway 12R; and we were in Class B airspace at 4000 ft MSL and 240 KIAS. Houston Approach then instructed us to descend to 3000 ft MSL and then slow to 210 KIAS. We realized this would put us under Class B airspace so we elected to slow to 200 KIAS. During the approach to runway 12R; we were told to intercept the localizer course and later cleared for the visual approach. We held our speed higher than normal prior to the ROYCE FAF to aid spacing; but then we fully configured and slowed to 118 KIAS (REF+10). At a 3 NM final (approximately 900 ft AGL) Hobby Tower asked us to increase our speed '20-30 knots' because there was a jet behind us with 70 knots of overtake. I told tower we could increase our speed by 10 knots; but any more than that would make our approach unstable. Tower then told us to do our best. We landed normally and applied fairly aggressive braking to exit the runway expeditiously.

On approach to HOU; the pilot was unable to increase his speed to accommodate faster traffic behind while remaining within stabilized approach parameters.

1143054

201401

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Pressurization Control System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172; Flight Crew Total 7058; Flight Crew Type 1513

1143054

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 80; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2400

1143677.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

We just leveled off at FL380 in route; when an aural warning went off and an ECIAS message was on the ECIAS screen; 'CABIN ALTITUDE' Master warning. The Captain and I completed our memory items; O2 masks - Don and established communication. We evaluated the cabin pressure gauge and saw that the cabin was at 11;000 FT and climbing. We talked to ATC and requested lower. I started the descent. Next we evaluated where to go. With the destination weather 2 miles visibility and snow and having a MELed thrust reverser and being 20 minutes from the departure airport; we decided to go there. The Captain informed ATC of our return and declared an emergency. He also ran the checklists; talked to the flight attendants and passengers; and contacted operations. I continued descending the aircraft to a safe altitude in case we had a rapid decompression. The cabin never got above 14;000 FT and the passenger O2 masks never dropped. I do believe the highest the cabin got was 12;000 FT. Getting down to 11;000 FT we removed our masks. ATC handled our flight wonderfully and had us go direct to the outer marker and from that point forward the flight was routine and standard. I shot the visual approach and landed safely.

Lost cabin pressurization in cruise at FL380. Commenced descent and return to departure airport. Landed uneventfully.

B757 flight crew experiences a loss of cabin pressurization at FL380 and initiates an emergency descent and return to departure airport.

1272664

201506

1201-1800

JYO.Airport

VA

1200.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CTAF JYO

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

Visual Approach

Class G JYO

CTAF JYO

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class G JYO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 500; Flight Crew Type 200

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1272664

Conflict Airborne Conflict

Vertical 500

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Heard traffic make '8 mile call' when holding short. Thinking that 8 miles was more than enough time to safely turn cross-wind and allow traffic to enter downwind with spacing behind me. ADSB installed; no traffic warning and negative visual on the traffic. Other aircraft didn't provide any additional position updates after the 8NM call. Also loss of Situational Awareness (SA) on my part. I assumed he was listening; would make visual contact and enter the down-wind behind me. Turned crosswind at 900 MSL (TPH of 1200) and quickly received call asking if I saw incoming traffic. My reply was 'negative' Other aircraft reported passing behind and 500 above my altitude. After that the other aircraft (Unknown type) which was mistake number 1 when I was holding short; slowed and entered downwind behind me.Lack of SA on both pilots part caused near miss. I failed to determine aircraft type (I'm guessing it was a multi) and with that speed to cover the 8 NM. I wrongly assumed I had enough time and depart and turn crosswind. I also wrongly assumed traffic would enter the downwind behind me. I decided to solo as I needed to regain day landing currency. Having not flown in a while I should have taken an instructor or second pilot as safety observer and second set of eyes and ears.

C172 pilot hears traffic make an '8 mile call' on CTAF at JYO while they prepare to take the runway. Thinking 8 miles was plenty to takeoff and make a crosswind turn the C172 takes off and on turn to crosswind is told by pilot of the other traffic they were cut off by their crosswind turn. The aircraft entering the pattern slows and maneuvers behind the C172.

1131579

201311

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Y

Unscheduled Maintenance

Air/Ground Communication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 105; Flight Crew Total 11000; Flight Crew Type 2600

Human-Machine Interface

1131579

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 17000; Flight Crew Type 10000

Human-Machine Interface

1131582.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

All three Radio Management Panels (RMPs) [radio] frequency windows went blank and we were unable to change radio frequencies. However; we were still able to communicate with ATC on last assigned radio frequency before windows went blank; then [did communicate] on Guard frequency; and also through relay with other aircraft. We were able to send and receive ACARS messages with Dispatch and Maintenance. Per Maintenance; we attempted a reset of all three RMPs and were able to use VHF-3 for radio frequency changes and communication. We were able to continue and land at ZZZ1.

Reporter stated the reset procedure for the Radio Management Unit RMPs suggested by Maintenance was to cycle the 'On-Off' power switch and wait five seconds between position selection; before returning to the 'On' position. Only # 3 RMP was functional for frequency and communications after that on the A320. The 'on guard' reference was the phrase they use when they monitor 121.5 on Comm # 2 and not meant as a reference to the 'guarded' NAV selection on the RMPs. Maintenance later replaced the Audio Management Unit (AMU) and # 1 RMP.

We lost the ability to change frequencies on our radios. The [radio frequency] windows were blank. We were able to speak with ATC on Guard [frequency]. Through our ACARS data link we could communicate with Dispatch. After nearly exhausting all of our options to recover the ability to change frequencies; VHF-3 came back to life and the Captain was able to communicate normally. System malfunction.

Two pilots report all three Radio Management Panel (RMP) frequency display windows went blank in flight and they were unable to change radio frequencies on their A320 aircraft.

1842975

202109

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Fractional

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

EICAS/EAD/ECAM

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Workload; Troubleshooting

1842975

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

Other Take Off

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

As aircraft accelerated; prior to 50 kts.; a red CAS msg (acft configuration) required Pilot Flying to reject the takeoff. After Rejected Takeoff; Pilot Monitoring (SIC/RT SEAT) advised Tower; and taxied clear of Runway. Requested taxi to XXL holding point to consult with Maintenance. The problem corrected itself while discussing with Maintenance. Scheduled flight continued with no further incidents. Always consult with Maintenance with any mechanical issues. Trust and verify.

Pilot reported a rejected takeoff due to an aircraft configuration error message.

1252586

201503

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Fractional

Citation Excel (C560XL)

2.0

Part 135

Parked

DC Battery

SAFT

X

Malfunctioning

Repair Facility

Fractional

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Maintenance Technician 40

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1252586

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance

N

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Incorrect / Not Installed / Unavailable Part; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Battery not assembled properly; installed [inner liner] blocking vent; causing no air flow. Battery deep cycled at [alternate] Repair Facility January 2015. Evidence of electrolyte leakage. Potassium carbonates (white deposits) on top of all cells; down the inside of case and wedges (spacers). [Recommend] Quality Checks and check work over [again]. Testing. During general overhaul in Shop. General overhaul [of battery] I.A.W. Battery Manufacturer's Operating Maintenance Manual (OMM) 24.30.99 Revision January 2015.

Reporter stated he works for a Fractional operator that also repairs aircraft batteries. He was asked to remove an aircraft battery from the tail section of a Cessna Citation 560XL that was written up for being very warm. In their Repair Shop; the top of the Ni-Cad battery was removed and the plastic type inner liner on the inside of the battery's outer case was found to have extended all the way up to the lower side of the battery case top. During normal build of the battery; the plastic liner does not extend all the way to the top and provides a necessary gap for venting of the battery. The plastic liner separates the battery cells from the metal outer case. Not all batteries have a liner that completely surrounds the battery cells inside the outer case. Some batteries have spacers under the cells to separate them from the bottom of the battery.Reporter stated a sticker on the battery indicated the Ni-Cad battery had been through a Deep-Cycle Check where the battery is subjected to a 12 to 16 hour draw-down of power. Batteries do retain some heat during the draw down and the average six to eight hours that it takes to charge them back up to normal. But; since the gap inside the battery at the top did not exists and proper heat venting was not occurring; questions were raised as to whether the other Repair Station did actually perform the draw-down test properly; shortened the test; or if the battery was subjected to high thermal heat. The question of who actually built-up the battery has not been answered yet. Not all battery build-ups require a 'Second Set of Eyes' inspection prior to closing the top of batteries.

An Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) removed a Ni-Cad battery from the tail section of a Cessna Citation 560XL that had been written-up for being very warm. A plastic inner liner installed during battery build-up; which separates the cells from the battery outer case; had improperly extended all the way to the top of the battery and closed off a normal gap required for venting.

1064154

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

5000.0

VMC

20

Daylight

TRACON ZZZ

Air Taxi

Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C; 210D

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Descent

Class E ZZZ

Fuel

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 6000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface

1064154

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

I ended my normal [week] run at in the early morning and had to wake up early the next morning for a flight. I did my normal pre-flight and a visual check of the fuel tanks showed full tanks on both sides; approximately 1/2 gallon short of over flowing on the left tank and full to the point of over flowing on the wing on the right tank. I made sure that the gas caps were secure on both tanks and continued my pre-flight inspection. Takeoff and en route were normal with no indications of a rough running engine or abnormal full flow. The C210 with full tanks has 90 gallon capacity with 89 gallons usable; or 534 LBS of fuel. I conducted the flight at 7;000 FT and had the fuel leaned out to 102-103 LBS per hour. I was descended to 5;000 FT about this time I began my decent/arrival checks and noticed the I had a critical fuel situation and asked ATC for the nearest airport; very soon after this my engine quit running and I saw an airfield to my southwest and told ATC that I needed that one and that I was declaring a fuel emergency. After the engine quit I performed my emergency flows and backed them up with the emergency checklist. Due to the distance to the airfield and the time it takes for the C210 main landing gear to deploy I only had time for the nose gear to fully deploy and the main to partially extend before landing. The only damage to the aircraft was a few scrapped rivets and the left horizontal stabilizer that was bent the plane rested on its left side due to being a high wing aircraft. The horizontal stabilizer was not damaged during landing; only after coming to a stop. My Maintenance Department is looking into why the aircraft had 5 hours of fuel and ran out at a little over 4 hour into the flight; but at this time they have not completed the full inspection.

Three months after the incident no determination has been made as to why the aircraft ran out of fuel prematurely.

C210 pilot reports departing on a four hour flight with five hours of fuel on board (full tanks). During descent the engine quits due to fuel exhaustion and a diversion to the nearest airport is initiated. Unfortunately the landing gear cannot be fully extended prior to landing.

1679205

201908

ORD.Airport

IL

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 254; Flight Crew Total 2035; Flight Crew Type 398

1679205

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Departing Gate XX clear on right; clear left with vehicle distant left approaching with plenty time to stop. I started to taxi and vehicle sped up and passed me forcing me to stop to prevent my wingtip hitting his vehicle. After I stopped with taxi light on; several vehicles from right did not stop. I had to call Operations to send out a wing walker to stop vehicles so I could taxi out as I had to start moving from a stop several ft. closer to gates. The absolute ignoring of right of way is out of control at ZZZ.

B-737 Captain reported critical ground conflict shortly after beginning taxi for departure.

1009189

201205

1201-1800

ZZZZ.Airport

FO

300.0

VMC

Turbulence; 10

Daylight

3000

Tower ZZZZ

Air Taxi

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Part 135

None

Passenger

Initial Climb

Fuel Selector

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 660; Flight Crew Type 120

Human-Machine Interface

1009189

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

The airplane had been sitting for about 3 hours before I initiated the flight. The passengers were boarded and I started the engine; and began to taxi. I proceeded to do my normal run up and taxied to the approach end of the runway. I noticed the fuel gauge for the right tip tank (the one that I had selected) was reading low however I filled the two tip tanks within 0.6 Hobbs time and there should have been enough fuel to continue the flight. I began my roll out onto the runway and pushed the throttle to the full position; gained airspeed and took off. Upon reaching about 300-400 FT AGL as I was adjusting the mixture throttle and prop to the climb performance setting; the engine began to sputter; I added full power and the engine power came back briefly. Then the engine gave out completely. I noticed the airspeed decrease dramatically so I pitched down to regain my airspeed and I switched from the left tip tank to the right tip tank; and tried to engage the starter as I was pitching down. Once in a nose low pitch attitude I saw that I only had about a 1;000 FT of runway left so I aimed for a landing point and with my airspeed still slow I pulled back to flare over the runway which resulted in a hard landing.

Single engine Part 135 pilot experiences engine failure shortly after takeoff and lands straight ahead on the 8;600 FT departure runway. Takeoff was initiated with the fuel selector to the right wingtip tank which indicated low but should have contained sufficient fuel; a hard landing results.

1069880

201302

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

26000.0

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1069880

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1070063.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

During climbout through FL260 we got a Master Caution and HYD Lights. Number 1 HYD engine driven pump Low Pressure light was illuminated and System A HYD quantity was decreasing. QRH procedure was followed and we turned off the Number 1 Engine driven HYD pump. This was a repeat event from the previous aircraft flight and had been down for the last 2 days for maintenance. The previous crew experienced a loss of HYD quantity down to 20% remaining. We decided not to continue the flight over water and diverted back to the departure airport. ATC was very helpful while we dealt with the checklist and company communications. On post flight I noted hydraulic fluid on the bottom of the engine cowling.

During climbout through FL260 got the Master Caution and HYD 6 pack light. Found Number 1 Engine driven hydraulic pump 'pressure low' light on. QRH procedure was complied with and Engine Pump turned to OFF. This was a repeat write-up and the plane had been in maintenance for 2 days to be fixed. Previous crew had a loss of A quantity down to 20% so I elected to return rather than continue over water to destination.

B737-800 flight crew experiences loss of 'A' System Hydraulic pressure during climb out. The QRH is consulted and the crew elects to return to the departure airport due to the flight having an over water segment. The aircraft had just been released by Maintenance after a similar incident two days prior.

1154142

201403

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Autothrottle/Speed Control

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 261; Flight Crew Type 9000

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1154142

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

I initiated a rolling takeoff in the displaced threshold section and on the extended center line of the runway. As the engines were spooling through 40% N1; I pressed the TO/GA buttons and the aircraft instantly veered to the right of centerline while accelerating forward. I depressed left rudder to correct and applied increased input to the tiller. With full left tiller applied and no directional correction happening; I rejected the takeoff without further delay. The aircraft came to rest on the right side of the concrete close to the runway edge line. Once stopped; the First Officer called Tower and I informed the cabin to remain seated. We asked Tower to send someone out to see if the aircraft departed any portion of the runway and to check to see if we hit any lights. We then asked the Tower observer to observe proper movement of the nose wheel steering. Once it was determined that all was clear and no damage was incurred; I informed the cabin that we'd need to return to the gate and we taxied back in. I'm not selecting TO/GA anymore until I've run the thrust levers up closer to the actual takeoff N1 setting. From selecting TO/GA to no directional control took less than a second. That happened WAY too fast for my comfort zone!

B737 Captain experienced loss of directional control as the TOGA buttons are pushed during a rolling takeoff. The takeoff is quickly rejected when control cannot be regained with the tiller or rudder input.

1105303

201307

1201-1800

ZJX.ARTCC

FL

7000.0

IMC

Rain; Turbulence; 5

Daylight

3000

Center ZJX

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Retractable Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZJX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 4000; Flight Crew Type 100

Distraction; Workload

1105303

Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Weather

Weather

We were on a trip to Florida. [I] had done [a] more intensive weather briefing before leaving. At fuel stop [in] Georgia; did another weather briefing and filed an additional flight plan for the remainder of the trip. Weather briefing was quite detailed and a change of routing was done with helpful suggestion of weather Briefer going to a southeastern flight instead of direct south. For the whole trip south we were able to dodge any major buildups until approximately central Florida. We were advised deviations were OK left and right 20 degrees. Ran into an embedded severe rainstorm with a momentary loss of control due to turbulence (hardest ever encountered in many hours of flying). As soon as control returned ATC gave new clearance and remainder of flight was normal.

An IFR single engine aircraft pilot encountered an embedded thunderstorm over central Florida; momentarily lost control of his aircraft; recovered and continued a normal flight.

1097591

201306

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Galley Furnishing

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew

1097591

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Aircraft

Shortly after the shift turnover as I just finished signing into the computer and bringing up all of the applications I received an ACARS from this flight stating 'Emergency declared smoke in cabin' and I responded 'Rogr...Thnx; Are you continuing.' I never received any other messages from the flight as they were probably busy. To try and get more information I called ATC Flow and the phone was busy. I called Tower and asked if they knew if the flight was headed to their airport; they said yes and they were about to call for the equipment. Turns out there was smoke in the forward galley coming from a galley oven. I write this report because an hour or so after the flight landed I received a call from one of the divert airport chief pilots who during our conversation said that the crew sent some ACARS to me and that I never responded; I only received the ACARS mentioned above. I would like an answer as to why I never received any additional ACARS messages from the flight; dispatchers are here for safety and when it was time to do that I wasn't able to and the crew is out there on their own with no support.

A Dispatcher reported that one of his flight's crew ACARSed him about a galley smoke event and diverted as a result; then he was unable to communicate with the aircraft the remainder of the flight.

1288954

201508

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 7

Daylight

10000

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

2.0

Part 91

None

Other pipeline patrol

Cruise

None

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 184; Flight Crew Total 5799; Flight Crew Type 4056

Situational Awareness; Workload

1288954

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Chart Or Publication

Airspace Structure

The days mission would be pipeline patrol of a route that would bring me back home in 3.0 hours flight time which was opposite my normal week schedule due to aircraft maintenance [the next day]. I started my morning checking weather; NOTAMs; and TFRs as usual. The weather indicated reduced visibility over the entire area due to smoke from the 30+ fires burning in our area. I checked the FAA website for TFRs and noted that there were more on the screen than I had ever seen before. I immediately noticed a TFR on my southern route that would need planning to get around [2 days later]. I checked my route for the day and thought the fires were burning in the same places. I had been watching these TFRs over the weekend to get glimpses of how my week would go. The fire indicated SE of ZZZ had been in the same spot as days before. (what I failed to realize is that the fire I had been tracking had disappeared and a new fire had taken its place further North).The flight was routine until I entered my first airspace of the day. My route goes from a class C right into a class D. Due to intense fire tanker operations at ZZZ they had set up a temporary tower on the field a week prior. I contacted the tower about a minute from leaving my last class D airspace. This airspace hadn't been defined very well (I queried the tower the previous week and they said they were treating it like a class D; but they were mainly concerned with airport operations) and I could hear other pilots figuring out the quirks of this new airspace. As I transition a busy area; I try to visualize each aircraft's intention and future path and determine if I should change my flight profile in any way to accommodate or change spacing in the VFR environment. The traffic here was very heavy with fire tankers landing refueling and departing. Local traffic was doing its best to blend in with all the changes. From the moment I entered the second class C; I spotted numerous reportable issues with the pipeline. When we see an issue; we circle; take photos and take down all relevant information to the sighting such as description; milepost information; GPS; road names; and landmarks. There were six such occurrences through the four airspace areas.With the constant radio communications; traffic spotting; pipeline observation; and information gathering the workload was very high. I headed east and conferred with my observer on completion of our work related tasks. We have XM Satellite service on our hand held Garmin; and these depict TFRs. This GPS was being used as a work tool to catch up on pipeline sighting locations and flight navigation was visual and off the panel mounted GPS. There was no visible smoke off the ground ahead and we proceeded with our patrol. Upon landing; I checked on the fires for the next day. I looked at a website that gives data on burning fires and their containment status. When I looked at the photos of the fire I thought I had passed North of; I saw that it was closer to the highway than I had thought and realized that this had to be a new fire and I had possibly penetrated the North side of the TFR.As a professional pilot I try to stay humble and learn from every flight. I have a desire to get better and realize that I can always take more steps to become a safer and more capable pilot. When analyzing this flight; I recognize a chain of events that are atypical to a normal flight.1. Off normal schedule due to maintenance.2. 30+ fires burning in area with reduced visibility3. Complex airspace4. High traffic volume5. High pilot workloadRecognizing these events piling up earlier in the flight would have prevented this incident from happening. On top of acquiring more thorough TFR briefings; I will increase airspace awareness by initiating TFR route checks when I encounter any of the events above. I can utilize my observer to take more workload in these situations and check and balance my new procedures adopted since this event.

A pilot of a light aircraft; performing pipeline patrol duty; reported inadvertently penetrating a wildfire TFR due to the rapidly changing restricted airspace environment.

993562

201202

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

38000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Corporate

Learjet 25

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Utility / Infrastructure

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Contracted Service

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 10; Flight Crew Total 14000; Flight Crew Type 100

Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting; Distraction

993562

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

After initial level off at FL380; observed a right Engine Fire light indication for several seconds. Warning then ceased. [We] performed fire system test. Left engine checked OK; but right engine would not fire test. All other engine parameters appeared normal; but reduced right engine to idle as a precaution. [We] declared emergency and requested clearance back to departure airport. [We] requested fire equipment. Landed; shut down right engine and exited runway. Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighters performed a visual check of right engine and said it looked normal. [We] taxied to ramp for maintenance. Found broken fire detection loop.

A LR25 right engine fire warning momentarily alerted at cruise but was found to be inoperative after a fire system test so an emergency was declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1869416

202201

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

Ground DEN

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Other / Unknown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1869416

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General None Reported / Taken

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

I don't fly in and out of DEN frequently; but when I do I increasingly hear Ground Controllers getting quite agitated when we call at the spots for taxi. One time a Controller even stated; 'this must be your first time here because you're not supposed to call at the spot; I'll call you'. I've looked through our company pages and 10-9 pages and can't find any reference as to whether or not we are expected to call at the spots. If we are; in fact; not supposed to call; it would be appreciated if a note could be added to the pages.

Air Carrier First Officer reported inadequate DEN hold spot communications procedure charting.