elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1242105

201502

1201-1800

LAX.Airport

CA

3000.0

VMC

Daylight

CLR

TRACON SCT; Tower LAX

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B LAX

UAV - Unpiloted Aerial Vehicle

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 540

Distraction

1242105

Conflict NMAC; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Inflight Event / Encounter Object

Horizontal 150; Vertical 100

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

We were on the ILS 25L coming into LAX on an unusually clear day with excellent visibility and none of the usual LA haze. The Captain (CA) was pilot flying (PF) and I was pilot monitoring (PM). We had just passed HUNDA by approximately 1 to 1.5 miles and were about to descend through an altitude of approximately 3;000 feet. I was just about to contact tower after being handed off by approach when something caught my eye slightly ahead and to the right of the aircraft. At first I thought it was a large bird soaring towards us; but as it passed outside of the right forward First Officer's (FO) window; I very clearly saw a large square-shaped bright red drone with black accents and black propellers. I had it in sight for approximately 3 seconds as it approached and passed. It appeared to be heading opposite our direction and I would estimate it was only about 50 to 100 feet higher than us when we were passing abeam it and it was probably only between 100 and 200 feet right of us. It was definitely close enough for me to very clearly see it and recognize what it was; but not close enough that I feared it would strike our right wing; engine; or stabilizer. Immediately after we passed it; I checked in with tower and reported that we had just passed a drone inside of HUNDA. The tower controller asked if an estimate of about 3;200 feet altitude for the drone was accurate and I agreed. A few seconds later he asked approximately how far away from us I thought it had passed and what color it was; and I gave a conservative estimate of approximately 200 feet away from us and red with black for the color.I'm not sure there is anything we as pilots or the tower controller could have done to prevent this uncomfortably close encounter between a drone and a large passenger airplane unless these objects are made to be detectable on radar and/or TCAS and traceable to their extraordinarily irresponsible owners/operators.

A B757 flight crew encountered a UAV on final approach to LAX as they descended through 3;000 feet MSL.

1688983

201910

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

10

Daylight

5500

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Baron 58/58TC

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Takeoff / Launch

Direct

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110; Flight Crew Total 3900; Flight Crew Type 128

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1688983

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Horizontal 1500; Vertical 800

N

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

I was cleared by Tower to depart Runway XX runway heading. As I rolled onto the runway I noticed an aircraft on final and I told Tower I would expedite. At this time they told me to hold short; I was already on the runway and rolling for departure and I relayed this to Tower. I heard them tell a regional jet to go-around and canceled landing clearance. I was already airborne; 75-100 feet on runway heading when they came back to me and told me to continue ground roll and exit the runway when able. I again relayed that I was already airborne and could not comply.I watched on G1000 ADS-B as the regional jet approached me from behind and left. I remained at a low altitude and watched them visually as it passed me high and to the left. Once it was well clear I continued my climb and was handed off to Departure. From there I was given on course and continued the short flight. I was the sole occupant of the aircraft. I use this airport frequently and have been instructed to depart with varied aircraft on final on many occasions.

Baron single pilot reported a communication breakdown and ATC error that resulted in a NMAC.

1343835

201603

0001-0600

ZMP.ARTCC

MN

37000.0

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Center ZMP

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZMP

Facility ZMP.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 24

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1343835

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Airspace Structure

Denver Special! Denver attempted to hand two aircraft off on collision courses within 30 miles inside our airspace at the same altitude. When the sector 42 side called the Denver 8 sector to arrange some sort of separation the Denver 'controller' asked; 'What do you want us to do?' After some consideration the Denver 'controller' suggested taking Aircraft Y up to FL380 (wrong altitude for direction of flight). Even though 42 had opposite direction traffic we approved it for safety.Perhaps Denver center needs to be less complacent in their separation responsibilities.

One facility handed two aircraft on converging courses at the same altitude off to another facility without initiating any action to ensure separation.

1792162

202103

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Wind

Poor Lighting

Night

Air Carrier

B737 MAX Series Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards; Installation

Oil Scavenge Pump

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Workload; Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1792162

Aircraft X

Other Exterior

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1792872.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure

Procedure

I was working on my Aircraft X on [Date]; when I started my work the day was windy above 40 knots so my screen inspection was postponed. I was then helping my partner on the service check inspection assigned to him. Later on in the night around the wind slowed down. I had already picked up my job packings (seals) and a tire pressure gauge. When I started to set up to do my job card my partner went to stores to get me a torque wrench. I completed the TGB (Transfer Gear Box) inspection screens for both Engine 1 and Engine 2. Two coworkers [Name] and [Name1] preformed both 1 and 2 engine run. I preformed leak check inspections on both engines; I found no leaks. I heard that the aircraft I was working on had an oil leak. I don't know if the oil leak had anything to do with the work I preformed on the engines. I don't believe I properly documented the inspection for Engine 1 scavenge screen. This is my first time doing this job; I believe my work was preformed good; although my paper work was not documented properly; at the time it seamed that I needed to preform both engine inspections.

Assigned chip detector card for #2 Engine. Later that night AMT (Aviation Maintenance Technician) came to me for leak check of both engines. I question as to why are we leak checking both engines when only #2 Engine was assigned. AMT inform me he also did the #1 Engine. He leaked check both engines and I informed him of documenting #1 Engine's work. Work card changed to work card and does not indicate on the card left or right engine; making it confusing for the AMT. I did not follow up with the AMT to verified #1 Engine's chip detector was done.On paperwork specifically state which engine requires the work to be accomplished.

Technicians reported an oil leak after routine engine service and determined that both engines had work done when only one engine had documentation for the work.

1053869

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Y

N

Unscheduled Maintenance

Inspection; Work Cards; Repair

Turbine Engine

Rolls Royce

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Maintenance

1053869

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Other Post flight inspection

General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

The rental company I operate under had asked myself and another flight instructor to return the crew car back to ZZZ and in the process of doing so; fly back the Cessna 182 that had stayed there over night. A few days ago; that C182 had a runway excursion under a renter and instructor that had resulted in the aircraft going off the end of the runway in to the dirt; stopping short of the fence at the end. This was due to a failure in the left brake. The mechanic in ZZZ had worked on the airplane over X days to inspect the condition and replace the left side brakes. Myself and another instructor were asked to fly the C182 back home to ZZZ1. Upon arriving to ZZZ; the mechanic had informed us that the C182 is good to go with no damage to the firewall and engine and had us do a static check on the ground before taxiing. This resulted in us using full brakes and full power to make sure the airplane wasn't going anywhere. After our preflight inspection and the 'OK' from the mechanic; we deemed it safe to fly back to ZZZ1. I had no issues upon landing and made the safe 20 minute maintenance flight home. Upon us returning the keys of the C182 to the office; we had asked for the airplane to be grounded regardless; for our own maintenance personnel to inspect the airplane. Our maintenance had let us know that the bottom of the fuselage appeared slightly bent and that the left brake that had been replaced still needed some work. Seeing as that we had flown an aircraft that had the potential to be unairworthy; I will be much more careful next time I take a maintenance flight and see if I can get a double check on aircraft that need to flown; with other mechanics. I do not do many maintenance flights for this reason and will be much more thorough about what airplanes I fly.

Pilot conducting a ferry flight of a C182 that may have been in unairworthy condition.

1328205

201601

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding; Safety Related Duties

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Flight Attendant

1328205

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Attendant

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors

Company Policy

All flight attendants were in forward cabin with the Captain while he was providing us with his safety briefing. Gate agents sent passengers down 2 minutes early. Crew noticed passengers were boarding the aircraft at Door 2L with no FAs at the door. This is a violation of FAR 121.394 flight attendant requirements during passenger boarding. It states: 'the flight attendants must be evenly distributed throughout the airplane cabin; in the vicinity of the floor-level exits to provide the most effective assistance in the event of an emergency.' This seems to be happening quite frequently. Evidently customer service agents have been given a directive to 'board 2 minutes early' regardless if the flight attendants are ready or agree with it (which we do not).

Passengers started boarding before the flight attendants were ready for them.

1858587

202111

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

99999

FBO

Travelair 95

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Landing

Visual Approach

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 299; Flight Crew Total 1262; Flight Crew Type 308

1858587

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Gear Up Landing; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

Horizontal 0; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On the afternoon of Date; I was on a routine training flight with one student training for their multi-engine add on.The entire flight was without any abnormalities; on our final approach all the normal pre-landing checks were made; gear was put down and I could feel the landing gear go down; I saw the green indicator light; and saw the red flag for the nose gear in the down position.A normal and smooth touchdown was made by the student; both mains touched down and he held the nose wheel off nicely. When the airspeed had decayed and the nose was let down it proceeded to fall all the way to the asphalt. I felt and heard the props striking the asphalt and pulled full elevator to take as much weight off the nose as I could. We pulled the mixtures on both engines.I knew there was nothing else to do but hold on and maintain centerline of the runway using rudder inputs.We came to a complete stop on the centerline of Runway XX and shut off both mags for each engine; shut off masters and generators; and made sure the mixtures were completely closed.We then exited the aircraft without any injuries.After further examination part number 002-820017-1 had [broken] causing the push/pull rod for the nose gear to not lock the nose gear into place.What I had learned from this was a more in depth inspection of the landing gear on preflight to potentially avoid this from happening again.

Flight Instructor on training flight in a BE-95 aircraft reported the Nose Landing Gear collapsed on landing.

1059542

201301

1201-1800

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

Daylight

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1059542

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Climbing out on the departure; we had the Tail Comp High Temp light come on. The QRH memory items were done and an emergency was declared with Departure Control. I requested to level at 18;000 FT and return to the departure station. Departure Control cleared us to turn to an arrival fix; descend to 12;000 FT and cleared ILS DME. The landing was normal at 134;400 LBS. Airfield Rescue and fire fighters inspected the aircraft and followed us to the hard stand.

During climb out an MD-80's TAIL COMP HIGH TEMP light alerted so the QRH was completed; an emergency declared; and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1786962

202102

0601-1200

ZME.ARTCC

TN

23000.0

Daylight

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZAU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Type 10000

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1786962

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Procedure; Company Policy

Procedure

This narrative highlights two incorrect published crossing altitudes on two different arrivals that can lead to altitude deviations and aircraft overspeeds. The first is the PASLY 4 (10-2C) arrival to BNA at GROAT intersection. The crossing is depicted to cross GROAT at or below FL 230. It is always 1000 out of 1000 times given to cross GROAT at FL 220 usually by Memphis Center and has been for at least five years. Sometimes this occurs very late. This can lead to a situation where the aircraft was on the path; is now high; and the aircraft then pitches down at the last minute to meet the unpublished altitude of 22;000 ft. This pitchdown can lead to an overspeed and a situation that still does not meet the crossing. The second instance is on the ENDEE 6 Arrival into MDW (10-2). The fix in particular is KAMBL and the published crossing is between FL 270-FL 240. The unpublished crossing that is given; very late; is to cross KAMBL at 24;000 ft. Now the aircraft is in the same situation as the PASLY 4 Arrival; only you may have a 100 plus kt. tailwind to deal with as well. Both these situations persist but are preventable by simply changing the published altitude. Finally; there are several Pilots who are rusty from not flying; due to low utilization; whose situational awareness and lack of currency make this situation even more grave. Please fix these easy to remedy issues and trap the known errors. Thank you. We did not have a deviation. I am only reporting to highlight these issues.

Air Carrier pilot reported ATC consistently issues a crossing restriction at a specific fix different than what is published and programmed causing difficulty complying with the clearance.

1023516

201207

0601-1200

CLT.Airport

NC

Turbulence

Daylight

Tower CLT

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Takeoff / Launch

Class B CLT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Other / Unknown

1023516

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure

The first instance I was made aware of our close proximity to the ERJ-145 was an utterly unintelligible and faint radio call from the 18C Tower Controller. What I remember hearing was; 'Air Carrier flight number; there is conflicting traffic on the go around for Runway 23'. It was later learned that the ERJ aircraft was executing a balked landing on Runway 23. This departure path placed the ERJ aircraft on a converging course with our aircraft. At the time we were made aware of the ERJ in question; we were beyond V1 and were beginning to rotate the aircraft. I caught a glimpse of the ERJ-145 as the nose was smoothly pitched up into the takeoff command bars. As a rough approximation; there was about 200 - 400 FT separation from our aircraft and the ERJ and our paths nearly converged exactly at the same point. We queried the Controller as to whether it was SOP to have simultaneous operations on 23 and 18C to which the reply was something to the effect of; 'we do this all the time'. What makes this event particularly troubling is that; had we not been at an approximate TOW of 51;300 LBS; the upshot of this event could have included loss to life and property. It is of the opinion of both my Captain and me that there was only one action that; within the limitations of the ATC system in CLT; could have prevented our egregiously close encounter; monitoring the ATC Tower frequency for Runway 23. The risk factors were: 1) Simultaneous departures on 18C and arrivals on 23; 2) Differing Tower frequencies for Runway 23 and 18C; 3) An unstabilized approach performed by 'Air Carrier'; which resulted in a balked landing. Change: 1) Not allowing simultaneous departures on 18C and arrivals on 23; 2) Have the same Tower frequencies for Runway 23 and 18C or find an alternate means to keep pilots in the communications loop.

Air Carrier departure from Runway 18C at CLT described a conflict with traffic executing a go around on Runway 23; the reporter suggesting these simultaneous operations be terminated.

1067397

201302

1201-1800

DFW.Airport

TX

12000.0

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class B DFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Workload; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1067397

ATC Issue All Types

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Procedure; Human Factors; Airport

Procedure

While on the CEDAR CREEK STAR; ATC assigned a speed of 300 KTS for traffic with a clearance to cross 'HOWDY' at 11;000 and 250 KTS. At approximately FL180 ATC vectored us off the arrival and; approximately 90 seconds later; cleared us back direct HOWDY. I instructed the First Officer to ask if ATC still wanted 300 KTS. ATC then said 'no comply with the speed restrictions on the arrival.' Approximately 10 seconds later the Controller asked if we were going to be able to make the restriction [at HOWDY]. Initially we responded yes; and then in the interest of passenger comfort and safety said no. The Controller then gave us a 40 degree vector off course and upon roll out re-cleared us back to HOWDY; descend and maintain 12;000 FT and to contact Approach. No altitudes or speed restrictions were violated; however this narrative is an example of what seems to be becoming commonplace on arrival. ATC is using speed and vectoring to obtain optimum spacing; once their spacing is optimized; the aircrew is then expected to make speed and altitude restrictions. While on the vector the aircrew has no idea how long the vector will be or if the duration of assigned airspeed. Trying to plan a reasonable and comfortable descent becomes almost impossible. This example is one of at least two on this pairing and two on my last four day trip. It appears to me that ATC is assigning high speeds and then relying on the crew to remind them that there is a speed restriction over the fix. Please advise DFW ATC that if they assign a speed and a vector they are responsible for insuring that THEY specify that the restrictions over a fix will still be expected. It's becoming common once a speed is assigned that the aircrew has to ask if the fix crossing restrictions are still in place....and then as an after thought 'yes comply with the speed and altitude restrictions' This phenomenon seems unique to DFW.

An air carrier Captain took exception to DFW TRACON's habit of assigning speeds for spacing and/or vectors off of STARs and failing to specify their expectation with respect to subsequent published airspeed/altitude constraints on the arrival when they are re-cleared to intercept and descend via the arrival.

1097139

201306

1201-1800

EDDF.Airport

FO

4000.0

Tower EDDF

Air Carrier

A330

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 25L

Initial Approach

Tower EDDF

Air Carrier

B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model

IFR

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1097139

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

At 4;000 FT MSL [we] encountered wake turbulence from a 747 five miles ahead on final approach Runway 25L EDDF. Climbed to 4;400 FT MSL and stayed above glideslope for a normal landing. Five miles is not enough space for 747.

A330 First Officer reported encountering wake turbulence in trail of a B747 on final to EDDF; stating that in his opinion five miles is not enough separation.

1671954

201908

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Cessna 402/402C/B379 Businessliner/Utiliner

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class D ZZZ

Fuel System

X

Malfunctioning

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting; Distraction; Time Pressure

1671954

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

During climb out at 1000 ft. AGL the left auxiliary fuel pump was selected to the off position. This resulted in an immediate loss of power in the left engine. The auxiliary pump was then selected back to the low position and the engine did not return to a normal power output. Engine failure after takeoff flow was performed and [Advised ATC]. ZZZ Tower cleared aircraft to land on Runway XX. After landing and during the roll out; the left engine stopped running. The aircraft taxied to the ramp under the power of the right engine.

A Cessna 402 Captain reported a loss of engine power when reconfiguring the fuel boost pumps; necessitating an immediate return to the departure airport.

1122388

201310

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

No Aircraft

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification; Distraction

1122388

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Procedure; Human Factors

Ambiguous

A ramper nearly had his foot severed off when his foot came in contact with a bag tug while backing up a belt loader. The steel from the boot was completely torn out of the boot.

A Ramp Operations worker backing a belt loader up nearly had his foot severed when it came in contact with a bag tug.

1162240

201404

1801-2400

MSP.Airport

MN

0.0

IMC

Air Carrier

MD-83

2.0

Part 121

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1162240

Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing roll

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; General Maintenance Action

Airport; Procedure; Weather

Ambiguous

Enroute flight was uneventful. Upon handoff to MSP Approach we were given vectors to an ILS [Runway] 12L approach as they were in the process of closing [Runway] 12R for snow removal. Weather was 03014G20KT 3/4SM -SN 006OVC. Approach was briefed and MED Auto-Brake selected. Landing weight was 129;500 and airspeed bug for 40 Flap landing with additive was 138. 3 previous flights landing reported braking action FAIR. Landing was on speed in the touchdown zone. Spoilers deployed; auto braking commenced and reverse thrust was initiated. Aircraft started drifting as we slowed and I came out of reverse to regain directional control. This was at midfield and the aircraft stopped decelerating. I started maximum manual braking but the runway was covered in more snow than what was noted in the first half of the runway and braking was ineffective. I then went to max reverse in an attempt to stop the aircraft. As we were headed for the end of the runway and a steep drop off to a highway below; I continued with reverse thrust and maximum manual braking. Several compressor stalls were noted and the aircraft stopped with literally only feet to spare. We cleared the runway and taxied to the gate with both engines running. We reported that braking action was POOR and the airport was subsequently closed for snow removal. The compressor stalls were written up and Maintenance was informed. Total Flight time for the day 8:50; duty time was 12:10. Get accurate braking action reports from previous aircraft and have airport be more aggressive with snow removal and runway condition reporting.

MD83 Captain reports poor braking action during landing roll out after being told to expect fair. Braking and reverse thrust are reduced during landing roll due to directional control issues. Maximum reverse thrust is applied and several compressor stalls are heard before stopping just feet from the end of the runway.

1679277

201905

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Parked

Company

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Other; Party2 Flight Crew

1679277

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Other Person

Other Off Duty

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I received an e-mail stating; 'During a recent internal audit; the Company discovered that a crew scheduling rule in the system which impacts three FAA regulations was inadvertently turned off. As a result; you may have exceeded the following crew scheduling regulation(s): 14 CFR 121.471(a) on [date]'.[Recommend] corrective action was taken by the company.

B747 First Officer reported that Company email informed him that the Company schedule tracking software was turned off causing possible violations of FAR 121.

1354887

201605

1201-1800

JFK.Airport

NY

60.0

10.0

7000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

25000

TRACON N90

Personal

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Cruise

Vectors

Class B JFK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 57; Flight Crew Total 622; Flight Crew Type 330

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1354887

Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 100; Vertical 50

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

Flying in level cruise flight at 7000 feet; on a heading of 060; at 155 Kts IAS; 10 miles NE of JFK; we spot a small white object ahead; slightly below; and to the right of our plane. We are closing fast yet clearly saw that it was a drone/white quadcopter with a white light. When we passed the drone (approximately 5-10 seconds later); it was 100 feet horizontally from our right wing and 50 feet below us. We were unable to tell the direction it was flying. It was clearly a close call. We notified JFK Approach; he warned other aircraft in the area; and gave us a number to call upon landing.

A small aircraft pilot in cruise at 7;000 ft 10 miles northeast of JFK reported a near miss with a UAV.

1241730

201502

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Snow

Fractional

Falcon 2000

2.0

Part 135

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1241730

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Work Refused

Company Policy

Assigned [an aircraft] for a ferry then passenger leg. Weather at both destinations was marginal with snow and 1 mile visibility being forecast at our final stop. Spoke to 2 (TWO) other crews who both refused this tail due to the MELs listed. One of the crews was the crew that brought the plane in the night before and was assigned it this morning (who subsequently refused). The plane in question had the autopilot; yaw damper; right side flight director; mach trim and several other MELs listed. After speaking to both crews and to each other about this situation; both the PIC and I decided it was unsafe to fly this plane with a majority of the automation missing. The PIC contacted the [Chief Pilot] and informed him of our decision and concerns. We were then given another tail to sit standby on. The fact that the company tried to get 3 crews to fly a plane that was quite unsafe is astonishing. Every recurrent we talk about altitude and navigation deviations being the big 2 issues we have; and yet the company tried to push THREE crews to fly a plane several legs a day for numerous days with the autopilot deferred AND no flight director on the right side with no yaw damper or mach trim. This increases the workload on the crew exponentially and unnecessarily. More so; the plane was at a maintenance base at the maintenance facility! This event never should have happened and further events can be avoided by standing by [our company's] SMS level 4 safety status and fixing a plane that has this many MELs that compromise safety. Sadly had we or another crew taken this plane and had a nav/alt deviation I'm sure the company would have said the plane should have been refused by the crews?!?!

Fractional First Officer (FO) reported he and his Captain; as well as two other flight crews; refused to fly an aircraft into a marginal weather situation with several autoflight systems inoperative and deferred. Reporter stated he was concerned with his employer's attitude and pressure.

1673886

201908

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Embraer Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Class B ZZZ

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1673886

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Dispatch

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Company Policy

Operations delayed flight without Dispatcher contact. Delayed to a 37 minute turn. Swap was available.

Dispatcher reported that a flight was delayed without notification of the Dispatcher.

1109133

201308

0001-0600

EGLL.TRACON

FO

TRACON EGLL

Air Carrier

B777-200

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Pneumatic Valve/Bleed Valve

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1109133

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Shortly after takeoff PACK R EICAS message appeared on upper screen. Pack R procedure accomplished with no reinstatement of right pack. review of Air synoptic page showed right engine bleed valve; pack valve; and right isolation valve all closed. ENG BLD LOSS R EICAS message also noted at this time. Established communication with Dispatch and Maintenance. Because of loss of wing anit-ice as a result of the above proceedure the decision to return was concurred with by all parties. Emeregency was declared with ATC on hand off. Coordinated with ATC for fuel jettison. 43;000 lbs of fuel was jettisoned at FL300; for approximately 14 mins. Recovered with uneventful landing below max landing weight.

B777 Captain reports loss of the right pack shortly after takeoff. Pack reinstatement is attempted before noting that the right engine bleed valve and right isolation valve are also closed. Fuel is dumped and the flight returns to the departure airport.

1201214

201409

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

2700.0

Daylight

CLR

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Vectors; Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Engine

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 1450; Flight Crew Type 1000

1201214

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

I was on a training flight with a student. We had been flying for around 45 minutes. The student was under the hood. Minutes after reaching 3500 MSL approximately 2800 AGL our engine cut off (complete loss of power). I took the controls from the student and asked him to do the restart procedures while I found a place to land. I attempted to restart; but it did not. I found a runway and began to glide there. We made it to the Runway safely with a soft landing. Nobody was hurt and the airplane was in great [albeit dead engine] condition. We were happy to have made it to the Runway. The mechanic from my school confirmed that it was not our fault and we couldn't have prevented the engine failure.

While conducting flight training in a Piper Cherokee PA28 this reporter experienced a complete engine failure and successfully landed power-off at a nearby airport.

1835939

202108

1201-1800

500.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Corporate

Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG

2.0

Part 91

None

Training; Other Flight Evaluation

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

CTAF ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Check Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 300; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1835939

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Horizontal 500; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While conducting a power-off 180 precision landing on Runway XX; an aircraft that had initially indicated they were entering the pattern for the opposite Runway XY crossed in front of my aircraft as I was beginning my base to final turn. I did not hear this aircraft specify they were on final straight-in; nor see them as I was clearing final prior to my turn. My co-pilot also did not hear or see them.This aircraft had earlier stated they were going to enter on the downwind left traffic for Runway XY; the opposite direction of Runway XX; which was in use by myself and two other aircraft. Estimated distance is easily at or less than 500 ft. horizontal separation when they crossed in-front. I aborted the maneuver and elected to remain in slow flight configuration to gain separation. The aircraft landed 2/3 down Runway XX and took back off again; departing to the south of the field.

C182 pilot reported a near midair collision as another aircraft was landing on the opposite runway and took evasive action to avoid a collision.

1793943

202103

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Ramp ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1793943

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

[This is] the same aircraft we took in to ZZZ and landed with MAIN PITCH TRIM INOP. Upon landing; the FO thought he smelled an odor. During taxi; we both started to smell a roasting burning smell. We turned off pack 1 and it dissipated. When we arrived at the ramp; I smelled another burning smell. We turned off pack 2 and it went away again. After troubleshooting with maintenance; we could not get it to reproduce. Captain recommended replacement all packs and ductwork or investigate more into why a burning smell is such a common issue.

EMB-145 LR flight crew reported a burning smell event upon landing and taxi-in; which dissipated when the Pack 1 was turned off. Maintenance action was assigned.

1020158

201206

0601-1200

CDW.Airport

NJ

220.0

10.0

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

6000

Tower CDW

Personal

M-20 J (201) / Allegro

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D CDW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 1195; Flight Crew Type 1195

Situational Awareness

1020158

Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

I was on an IFR flight plan to Caldwell; NJ (CDW). The airport was in sight and I had received clearance for the visual approach to Runway 4. I was handed off to Caldwell Tower and was instructed to fly straight in to Runway 4 and report 4 mile final. I was descending to pattern altitude at a relatively slow rate of descent (around 300 FPM) and inside 10 miles from the field. Pattern altitude is 1;200 FT MSL. At around 2;000 FT MSL I received a low altitude alert from the Tower Controller. I was constantly in visual contact with the terrain which did not appear to be unsafe. I am aware that the terrain southwest of the field is somewhat higher than field elevation but I was in visual contact with the approach end of the runway and with the ground below me. I then arrested my descent and continued my approach. Distracted by the Tower's communication and by my wife asking what that was all about; I remained high and then had to make a greater than average final descent to land. The Mooney is somewhat hard to slow down especially in a descent so I try to get to pattern altitude by 3 to 4 miles from the field. In the future I will probably load the GPS approach so as to get safe glide slope information even on a visual approach.

A Mooney M20J pilot reported getting a low altitude alert from the CDW Tower on visual approach to Runway 4.

1118847

201309

1801-2400

ZAN.ARTCC

AK

40000.0

Center ZAN

Air Carrier

Boeing Company Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise

Class A ZAN

Aero Charts

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 120; Flight Crew Total 16500; Flight Crew Type 1000

Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Distraction; Confusion

1118847

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Chart Or Publication

Procedure

Each aircraft has a flight kit for the Captain and one for the First Officer containing our company manuals; Aircraft manuals and Charts. As per our procedure part of our preflight is to check the revision card in each flight kit against those printed on our release to verify each kit is current. This was accomplished and both kits were up to date. For departure I took out my departure airport charts as well as all appropriate en-route charts. Two hours into the flight the Captain asked what charts I had for Alaska. I did not have our destination airport and neither did he. After combing through all charts to see if Anchorage was misplaced we then realized we did not have a single plate for our destination airport even though our other Alaskan charts had been updated just as recently as August 13. I went into the FMC and retrieved all the information available for the three ILS's as well as VOR information and runway length. I also used my Alaska/Canada high chart as well as my Alaska Low chart for all communication information. The Captain used the SAT phone to call the company and verify that our destination current and forecast weather was to remain VFR. He also had the Dispatcher read all pertinent information for each ILS; confirming frequencies; inbound course; missed approach procedure; MSA's etc. As the weather at our destination was VFR and forecast to stay so we decided to continue. The flight was completed without incident.

A flight crew discovered enroute that all ZAN approach and airport charts were removed from their respective flight kits even though preflight checks indicated both kits onboard were current.

1206777

201409

0001-0600

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

Marginal

Thunderstorm; Turbulence; Windshear; Rain

Dusk

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1206777

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

1207008.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Declared Emergency

Procedure; Weather

Weather

We were given a series of re-routes along with radar vectors. In addition to the ATC re-routes; we the flight crew also needed to deviate to avoid thunderstorms and make our way through a line of weather en-route to ZZZ. The last few ATC re-routes put us in a situation that would have resulted in landing at our alternate with approximately 300 lbs of fuel. This would have been an unacceptable situation; and a risk I was not willing to accept. As a result I [advised] Min fuel. Neither [advising] helped our situation as ATC was still issuing us re-routes for arrivals further west of ZZZ; for which we did not have the fuel for. I then [advised ATC] a fuel emergency and told ZZZ center that we would not be flying the arrival and at that point I needed to go direct to ZZZZZ intersection on the arrival and would be doing so within a 2 min time frame. The ATC gave us direct ZZZ VOR; Direct ZZZ1 VOR; Direct ZZZ Airport. This new clearance provided us the fuel to continue to ZZZ safely and then go to our alternate with plenty of fuel. The weather at this point in ZZZ was heavy rain with thunderstorms. Due to now having a favorable plan to land with plenty of fuel we continued to ZZZ and landed with no further issue. The threat was that we would not have enough fuel to continue to our alternate of ZZZ1 if we had not changed the flight plan. Due to ATC not allowing us to continue on our planned route and further issuances of re-routes making the situation progressively worse; we (the flight crew) were forced to exercise our emergency authority to fix the fuel situation. Another threat was what seemed to be our Dispatcher's inability to keep up with the pace of ACARS messages we sent to her. At one point she also sent us a message saying we could drop our alternate; and at the same point we were getting ATIS updates at the field that indicated gusty winds with Thunderstorms and Heavy Rain. Dropping the alternate was NOT something I was willing to Risk. I think I should have [advised] min-fuel sooner; however it is tough to determine how much sooner as the pace of the re-routes prior to [advising ATC] was fairly quick. Other than that I felt our decision to [advise ATC]; sealed the deal to have plenty of fuel to continue to ZZZ and then land at our alternate with plenty of fuel was a good one. With the significant amount of storms around ZZZ that night we needed to have the extra fuel just in case something happened and the only way we felt at the time to do that was to not fly the full arrival which would have used too much of our alternate fuel. Also I think it is worth mentioning that as soon as we realized the dispatcher could not keep up with the flight we relied heavily on our experience and the Performance data on the FMS to determine that we needed to take the measures of declaring Min fuel.

[Report narrative contained no additional information].

EMB-145 flight crew reports receiving reroutes and vectors along their route for weather; leading to a declaration of minimum fuel with ATC. With no perceived change in the way they are being handled by ATC. They advised ATC of a low fuel urgency situation. This achieves the desired results and the flight lands safely.

1076831

201303

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

34700.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 7300

1076831

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Total 13000; Flight Crew Type 6500

1076834.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

Flight suffered a Number 2 Engine compressor stall and a subsequent engine failure. The seat belt sign was on. The flight was descending to FL340 due to chop at FL350. We had initially started a climb to FL370 but had reversed and started a descent after ATC informed us that the next sector had mod chop at that altitude. In the descent; in smooth air; open descent; Mach .78; managed speed. We heard a thump. Not the loud banging we had in training; just enough to wonder 'what was that'. Our attention went to the engine instruments and everything was normal; then the Purser called to say he had heard a loud bang from the right side of the aircraft. I told him we were aware of the odd noise and I would get back to him. We scanned the engine instruments and saw a momentary flash of amber stall on the upper screen; but it lasted only a second or so. Then the Engine 2 oil filter clog amber annunciation came on. I immediately grabbed the Flight Manual to start looking for the correct procedure. The Purser called us again to say he heard another loud bang. I told the First Officer (pilot not flying) to fly and handle the communications and I would work the problem. We requested a lower altitude from ATC; and ATC asked us if we could stay at FL340; for another minute. We said yes. I continued to try and find the Oil Clog procedure when the pilot flying said the Number 2 Engine had failed; I declared an emergency and requested lower FL250; from the engine out data on the FMC. That was issued by ATC and I began to complete the engine failure ECAM that had just popped up on the screen. I sent Dispatch a message to CALL ME and continued the running and completing the ECAM. Dispatch responded with a frequency; which I put into the VHF #2 and passed along our current condition; and divert information to [nearest suitable airport]. We had continued our descent to 12;000 FT and subsequently got a descent to 6;000 FT navigating with ATC vectors to the airfield. I called the Purser to inform him of the time remaining; destination; weather and landing conditions.Fortunately all the back up systems were working perfectly and the weather was better than CAT 1 minimums; with the runway clear and dry. I decided not to prep as the aircraft was flying well with all systems backed up. It was about 15 minutes before touchdown. We completed all the checklists and continued down to 4;000 FT at 15 NM south of the airfield. Immediately after checklist completion we notified ATC and they gave us a vector to the localizer for the ILS to the field. Approach and landing were normal; we rolled out straight ahead and stopped on the runway to allow the emergency vehicles and crew to checkout our engine. Everything was reported to look normal from the chief of the firefighters so we taxied clear of the runway and to the gate. The flight taxied to the gate and shut down normally. Once at the gate my phone was ringing constantly; even before we were out of the seats. I forgot to place a write-up into the ACARS; partly due to the phone calls from Operations and others who I relayed our flight problems to. I subsequently called [Maintenance] later that night to check if I had indeed forgot to enter it. The technician I talked to said yes but that all the information was inputted from transmitted data and some others I had talked to.

[Narrative 2 had no additional information.]

A320 flight crew reported compressor stall and subsequent failure of #2 engine at FL340. Flight declared an emergency and diverted to nearest suitable airport.

1491827

201710

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

VMC

Daylight

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 10734; Flight Crew Type 6729

1491827

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Type 408

1491844.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Conflict NMAC

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors

Cleared from ARCHI to PONKE to intercept 28L final approach course. ATC said there was a 737 at 3 o'clock for 28R. Did not see that airplane. ATC said the 737 has us in sight. We continued. I saw the TCAS of the 737 coming towards us; but did not see the airplane visually; I thought from looking at TCAS he was behind our right wing. The TCAS rapidly went from 500 ft difference to 400; 300; 200 we initiated the RA as soon as we heard it. I saw the TCAS as low as a 100 foot differential but did not see the airplane until they were banking away from us and we were on the Go around. First Officer said that he could make out the pilot! Thank you TCAS for getting me out of there before they hit us.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier Crew reported a NMAC on approach to SFO runway 28L with an airliner on visual approach to runway 28R.

1792375

202103

0601-1200

HOU.Airport

TX

Daylight

Tower HOU

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1792375

ATC Issue All Types; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Environment - Non Weather Related

This is a General Safety concern. No faults were committed by myself or the Captain. HOU ATC is constantly running 1 frequency to work Tower and Ground Control. This is causing an unsafe level of radio congestion. We could not get a push call in without blocking other aircraft or being blocked ourselves. Finally; once pushed; we had difficulty obtaining a taxi clearance. We finally were told to taxi and hold short of 13L. As we were holding short; we noted several aircraft attempting to push; taxi to and from runways; and obtain landing clearances. We noticed one corporate aircraft that could not obtain a landing clearance until short final; despite multiple attempts on their part; with no answer from Tower.HOU is a complex airport with multiple crossing runways; multiple taxi routes utilized; while also crossing runways. HOU ATC has been utilizing a single Controller for Ground and Tower Ops for most of the last 12 months; since the start of the slow down in air traffic. While this may have worked in the early days of this pandemic; it has turned into its own form of danger as air traffic has steadily increased; especially with the onset of Spring Break travel.I believe I am not alone in my concern that this could cause a serious incident at HOU; as there is no way a single Controller can safely manage traffic on the ground and in the air. I have been to far less complex; and less busy airports that utilize designated Ground and Tower Controllers. Please see to it; that this is not allowed to continue any longer. It poses a danger to our aircraft and our customers.

Air carrier First Officer reported not being able to communicate with ATC due to Controller working Tower and Ground Control combined at HOU airport.

1669385

201907

0.0

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Repair Facility

Air Carrier

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1669385

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Observer

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I observed a mechanic possibly install wrong parts in order to save time on a live flight that maintenance was being performed on. The mechanic was [Mechanic]. The log page is xxxxxxx. After an hour of trying to find the correct fasteners with a team of three mechanics; I find it hard to believe [Mechanic] was able to just bring and install the correct fasteners in a matter of minutes. I suspect [Mechanic] just installed what most likely would fit.

Reporter observed a mechanic possibly install incorrect parts on airplane.

1791270

202103

1801-2400

LGA.Airport

NY

0.0

Poor Lighting

Night

Tower LGA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Workload; Situational Awareness; Fatigue; Distraction; Confusion

1791270

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Distraction

1791271.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Event / Encounter FOD; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airport; Human Factors

Airport

I; the First Officer; executed the charted Visual Approach. Landing was uneventful and rolled to taxiway Tango before passing controls to the Captain to taxi to gate. As we exited the runway Tower gave taxi instructions to the gate. and to '... stay with me'. I read back the taxi instructions and the Captain repeated them as he commenced taxi from the runway and stated 'flaps up'. I then commenced my after landing flow; raised the flaps; checked speed brakes stowed; autobrakes off; flight directors off; wing lights off; steady and strobe to steady; trimmed to 5 units; check weather radar off; cycled ramp (though not needed) to active in VHF2; and started removing flight pertinent printer strips. By this time we were somewhere near the Bravo; Golf; Sierra taxiway junction. I briefly looked up as Captain stated; 'There's Golf'. I don't remember what I heard exactly that caused me to look up again; some reference to Golf taxiway perhaps. But when I looked up I did not recognize where we were. I saw lighted taxi signs for Sierra; Golf; and Bravo in the distance to the left. I could see blue taxiway edge lights all around but nothing in front of us. The blue taxi edge lights were very disorienting especially without a lit taxi center line. Our taxi and turnoff lights were so dim that they were essentially useless. The moon was providing more light than they were. On my IPAD I could see our own ship; we were on Golf but heading the wrong way. The Captain had turned right instead of left. At that point he turned left in an attempt to get back to Alpha taxiway; I assume. He did make me aware that he was concerned about accidentally crossing on to the runway. Due to the very poor lighting and the sea of blue taxi edge lights; taxiway was difficult to discern from anything else. All you could see was directional taxi signs in the darkness and blue taxi lights scattered about. The Captain turned left until there was a break in the blue lights with the Bravo sign visible just a little further away so it did appear as though we were turning on taxiway Bravo though I could see no yellow line. I told him I didn't see the taxiway; I think we're going in to no man's land; and Captain said; no; we're on Golf; there's the sign for Bravo. I was confused about the blue lights; they didn't seem to be oriented right and the our ship was sort of on Golf but pivoting so I allowed the events to progress thinking maybe I was just disoriented. When we proceeded ahead the ground before us was just dark. Really no discernible features except for blue taxi lights up ahead that seemed to mark the edge of Bravo. I said I think we're off the taxiway. Captain stopped. We exchanged thoughts on the best way to proceed from that point. We called tower to confess. Tower took a look; said we were just near Bravo; or Golf; I can't remember exactly but he was not concerned which taxiway we ended up needing to get to the gate. I thought we might not be on prepared surface but the Captain was sure we were still on the taxiway just facing the wrong direction. So I told him clear to the right; let's turn all the way back around and take Bravo. The Captain turned tight right and proceeded back the way we came. The jet stopped and thinking it was an incline the Captain added power and we rolled back on taxiway center; turned left on Bravo; took Foxtrot then Alpha to the gate; tower then stated; 'Not a problem guys; the snow plows do more damage than you'. No other occurrences from then on. We did discuss the possibility that we may have left the taxiway. The Captain was confident we had not and I was inclined to believe him since I could not see the ground beneath us; we were just avoiding taxi edge lights. I told him I would check and do an external walk around once we shut down. During deplaning maintenance met me before walking out. She asked me if the landing was rough and I said; actually; no; the landing was great... WHY? She showed me a shot on her cell phone of our nose strut and this is your nose gear. It was covered with dirt. I went down to look at it and it was dirty but both tires were still intact at that point and I saw no evidence of anything else on the mains or the engines. The mains were spotless; engines were clean. I came back up; told the Captain the mains were covered in dirt on the tires and on the lowermost part of the strut. I then stepped out of the cockpit while he talked to maintenance. We turned the plane over to maintenance; they said they would check out the gear and clean it off and we left; still not sure we actually left the taxiway. The wind was blowing in excess of 30 knots and dirt was blowing all over. We chalked it up to that.It was dark; really dark on that end of the airport. The taxiways are a conglomeration that looks more like spaghetti. The whole area is labeled HS1; for good reason. They are difficult enough to navigate in daylight; much less at night with no centerline lighting; a plethora of edge lights all outlining various 'islands' on the field; taxiway ID and directional signs for every taxiway that intersects in HS1 and a useless taxi light. That is a lot of scattered lights with no reliable taxi light to help gauge distance. The Captain was disoriented. Golf taxiway is constructed right on the curve at a 45 degree angle. The directional sign at night can make the left turn on Golf easy to miss especially with the opposite direction of Golf being directly in front of you. I; the First Officer was task distracted. I was performing after landing flow and cockpit cleanup. The Captain had told me during this trip that he was once based in [the area] and was very familiar with this airport; not to mention he was a check airman. My guard was down and I was not as diligent as I normally am during the taxi operation. Being tired and expectation bias. It was night; the end of the day in serious winds. The Captain and I were exhausted most of our mental energy on planning the approach and landing given the conditions that night. The approach was not exactly a standard one we do all the time; and we were not landing on the usual runway you get at this airport. A better taxi light would have alleviated much of the confusion. The lights are not adequate. Neither of us was really sure that we ever left the taxiway. Taxiway centerline lights. There are many islands outlined in blue and no green center lights to actually show the trail through the maze of them. Distance judging is difficult in the dark and it was dark for us. Those lights would have helped. I should have stayed more engaged in the taxi phase to back up my Captain. Getting lost is going to happen and there are two of us for a reason. I allowed myself to get disoriented as well.

Landed Runway 31 LGA. Cleared at taxiway T. ATC gave us T;B;G;A to gate. Turned right on Taxiway G instead of left. Area was extremely dark; appeared to taxi over some Foreign Object and Debris (FOD) on taxiway G. After arriving at gate was informed one nose tire was flat. The area around taxiway G is confusing; especially at night. The area is not marked well and very dark making it extremely hard to find correct taxiway. Light up the area better. Better taxiway designations. Area should be redesigned.

Air carrier flight crew reported turning the wrong way on a taxiway at night and when turning around exited the taxiway surface due to poor taxiway lighting and markings at LGA airport.

998415

201203

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

8.0

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap Control (Trailing & Leading Edge)

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 338; Flight Crew Type 7000

Human-Machine Interface

998415

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 121

Human-Machine Interface

998417.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was flying the visual approach in a distracting sunset while trying to keep visual spacing from the heavy aircraft we were following to the field. As we configured and slowed to flaps 15; we got a stick shaker alert. As I increased thrust; the shaker immediately ceased; but the Captain stated the flaps never tracked from the up position to match the flap lever. I immediately executed a go-around and the Captain coordinated for straight ahead climbing vectors to further access the situation. After checking circuit breakers and reviewing the QRH; I informed the Captain that a Check Airman was riding on duty in the back and suggested he come forward as he might have more insight into what caused this problem. We then informed the flight attendants of our issue and asked them to have the Check Airman enter the flight deck and take the jumpseat. Together the three of us discussed the situation and decided to run the Alternate Flap Extension Checklist. This attempt was unsuccessful as the leading edge flaps extended; but the trailing edge flaps only moved a few degrees. We then decided to declare an emergency as it became evident we would be flying a flaps up approach and landing. We informed the flight attendants of the emergency; and we expected a safe landing and taxi back to the gate. I ran the QRH checklist and spoke to the passengers explaining the situation. The Captain flew the approach and landing to a full stop. Upon landing; we terminated further fire truck assistance after we verified brake energy limits. Maintenance met us at the gate and informed us the airplane was grounded after they too could not get the flaps extended. We coordinated with Dispatch and Scheduling; informed them of our situation; and coordinated our flight home.

The First Officer was flying during a normal visual approach landing west into a setting sun. We experienced a momentary stick shaker when slowing from 180 KTS to the flap 15 selection speed. We immediately executed a go-around and noticed the flaps leading edge or trailing edge had not moved at all after being selected. We received radar vectors during the go-around to give us time to troubleshoot the flaps. At this time; I became the pilot flying. The First Officer checked the circuit breakers and pulled out the QRH to look for some guidance. There was a Check Airman on board riding in the back. We advised the flight attendants and the passengers of the reason for our go-around. We asked the deadheading Check Airman to come to the cockpit and assist us. I thought he might have some insight into what caused our situation as I had known there were several other similar incidents. We began to run the non-normal checklist expecting to use alternate flap extension. We requested radar vectors for a long final to give time for the alternate flap extension and a flaps 15 landing. On downwind; we began to slow to flap extension speeds and alternate extension to flaps 5 was attempted. The leading edges extended; but the trailing edge flaps stopped at about 1/2 degree of flaps. At this point; we declared an emergency and asked the fire trucks be sent out. The non-normal checklist was run for no trailing edge flaps. The Check Airman in the jumpseat was very helpful with the landing calculations as well as backing up our use of the QRH. The flight attendants were advised we had declared an emergency; the fire trucks would be by the runway; and we expected a normal landing and taxi into the gate. The remainder of the non-normal checklist was completed and a recheck of the V speeds was done. A no trailing edge flap landing was done; touching down about 1;500 FT from the threshold and maximum auto brakes brought the aircraft to a normal taxi speed quickly. A check of the break energy limits for taxiing to the gate was done. We taxied to the gate and disembarked our passengers. After all passengers were taken care of; we secured the aircraft. We called Dispatch and told them the above narrative. A logbook entry was made regarding the failure of the flaps to extend. Aircraft Maintenance personal came out and began troubleshooting the problem. The crew did an outstanding and professional job and the Check Airman on the jumpseat was very helpful in getting the aircraft and passengers safely on the ground.

B737-300 flight crew experiences a stick shaker during approach which alerts them to the fact that the trailing edge flaps have not moved to the selected position of 15 degrees. A go around is initiated and an emergency is declared when it is determined that the trailing edge flaps cannot be moved by the alternate flap switches. A landing with full leading edge flaps and zero trailing edge flaps ensues.

1696537

201910

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Flap/Slat Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 226

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Workload

1696537

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem

Aircraft

Enroute; the First Officer noticed that the flap gauge show a slight split. The left indicator showed up while the right showed not quite up. We talked about how this was strange; but we showed no other indication that the flaps were other that fully retracted. On approach; the First Officer asked for flaps 5. I moved the handle to 5 and the indicator did not move nor was there any transition lights on the overhead panel. We called Approach and asked for a box vector to work through the QRH. I made a PA announcement stating the reason we broke off the approach and then got into the QRH. I called operations on the radio and told them the situation to pass on to Dispatch. ATC asked if we needed anything and we requested the fire trucks to check the brakes after landing. Once we were all setup and down to the Before Landing Checklist I made another PA stating we were set to land but at a higher speed and there was no need to panic. I failed to talk to the Flight Attendants directly to get them in the loop and to hear their concerns. I did not have the Flight Attendants prepare the cabin as I thought this would get passengers more nervous. I should have discussed this with the flight attendant; however; there was plenty of time to do so. I took the controls from the First Officer and did the landing. The fire trucks looked us over and checked the brake temps. During this time we ran the brake cooling [checklist]; which told us not to approach the gate for 30 minutes. Fire Crew measured the temps at 500 on the left; and 570 on the right. They offered to put fans on the brakes and we accepted. We called Dispatch and Maintenance Control and discussed what happened. While going through the brake cooling checklist; we could not find what temperature was safe to proceed to the gate. Since we had the fire crews and fans we figured our time should be reduced; but we could not find what temperature was safe. Maintenance Control came up with a time of one hour before going to the gate which contradicted our [checklist] time. The fire crews continued to give us updates on the temps. Maintenance eventually sent out a mechanic to check the fuse plugs and they confirmed we were good to head to the gate. By this time we had been on the ground for about 55 minutes. We stared the engines back up and proceeded to the gate. Later that evening I did find the max brake temperature for ground turnaround of 425 degrees in the AOM Chapter 3. Once I was there I remember the number; but it would have been nice to have had the number somewhere in the brake cooling procedures as a reminder.

B737 Captain reported a trailing edge flap malfunction that resulted in a flaps up landing.

1050067

201211

1801-2400

BOS.Airport

MA

8000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON A90

Fractional

Citation X (C750)

2.0

Part 91

Passenger

Descent

Class B BOS

TRACON A90

Air Carrier

Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

Descent

Class B BOS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1050067

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Fractional

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1050068.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

During descent into BOS; numerous delay vectors and speed reductions were assigned by ATC. We were sequenced behind an Airbus with approximately 8 - 10 miles separation during the arrival. While descending through approximately 8;000 FT MSL; autopilot engaged; airspeed below 250 KTS; we experienced wake turbulence presumably from the Airbus ahead of us. We experienced an arrested descent; sudden abrupt roll to the right and left; followed by an increased descent; sudden abrupt roll to the right and left; followed by several abrupt bumps. The entire event was approximately 5 seconds. One passenger reported their neck and back was injured after parking on general aviation ramp. Medical attention was offered but passenger refused the offer. Passengers were not wearing seat belts during this event though the seat belt sign was on prior to the incident. There should be some legal enforcement for a Part 91 flight requiring passenger to comply with signs; and crew member instruction like a Part 135/121 flight operation.

As we descended through approximately 8;000 FT; autopilot engaged; our airspeed began to slow below 250 KTS. I began to make an adjustment and we entered an area of turbulence. We experienced an arrested descent; followed by an increased descent and a bank to the right of approximately 15 degrees. This was followed by 3 short 'vertical bumps' and a bank to the left of approximately 10 degrees. The entire encounter lasted between 3 and 5 seconds. The turbulence was never more than what I would characterize as moderate. I think it was probably wake turbulence from the Airbus.

CE-750 flight crew reported wake vortex encounter on arrival into BOS in trail of an Airbus. Aircraft rolled in response and one passenger; not wearing a seatbelt; reported back and neck pain.

1310712

201511

1801-2400

CRQ.Airport

CA

1500.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower CRQ

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Class D CRQ

Tower CRQ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Landing

None; VFR Route

Class D CRQ

Facility CRQ.TWR

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 18.0

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1310712

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was working on local control with moderate traffic and a fair amount of frequency congestion. Aircraft Y was number one and cleared to land on a 2 mile final. An aircraft called for departure. I told Aircraft Y 'cancel landing clearance; traffic holding in position' Aircraft Y responded 'you want us to cancel landing clearance' I said affirmative and then immediately told my other aircraft to line up and wait; traffic on two mile final. I then observed Aircraft Y breaking off the final northbound. Aircraft X was in the right traffic pattern approximately midfield downwind with Aircraft Y about a mile ahead of him northbound. Observing the aircraft out the window it appeared that they were separated and diverging. I called the traffic for Aircraft X letting him know traffic was ahead northbound. He said looking and then I have him in sight. I informed the pilot of Aircraft Y that cancel landing clearance does not mean to break off the final; only that we cannot issue a landing clearance with traffic in position and that he should expect his landing clearance on short final. He apologized; and then without instruction or clearance made an immediate southbound turn back into the north downwind coming in close proximity to Aircraft X who said 'that was close'. Aircraft Y was given further instruction and landed without further incident and was given a brasher warning by ground control. He called on the phone and apologized saying he didn't know why he broke off the approach and later turned into the downwind. He stated he could not give us his license number since it is a temporary license he's only had for a week.I have never seen this occur before after cancelling an aircraft's landing clearance. I think it's obvious that pilot inexperience added confusion to a sometimes already confusing procedure using lineup and wait. Perhaps more pilot education as to why a landing clearance must sometimes be withheld or cancelled when using the procedure would be appropriate.

An aircraft on final approach was informed its landing clearance was cancelled. The aircraft misunderstood this transmission as to be an instruction to go-around. The aircraft initiated a go-around on their own and entered right downwind for the runway without receiving any instructions to do so from the Controller. There was another aircraft in the pattern on a right downwind. The Controller issued traffic to the aircraft. The aircraft established on the right downwind saw the go-around traffic and stated it was close to them.

1317320

201512

1201-1800

MIA.Airport

FL

2200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower MIA

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR SSCOT3

Class B MIA

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1317320

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 27000

Workload; Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1317088.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury

Y

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

We were on the SSCOT THREE RNAV arrival inside of WALIP leveled off at 3;000. I was the Pilot Flying (PF) using LNAV and VNAV when given the RNAV GPS [Runway] 8L at MIA. The Captain (CA) was attempting to clean up the FMC as it had the next waypoint behind us instead of in front of us (incorrect routing and mileage was showing) which was due to my reselecting both the runway and SSCOT arrival. (I should have only selected the new change of runway.) Approximately 15-18 miles from the runway the controller said he showed us at 2;300 feet. While we had 3;000 feet showing in the MCP window; we had in fact descended. I was unclear as to why the aircraft left 3;000 feet as I had been in VNAV path along with LNAV. I disconnected the AP so as to try to regain the 3000 as smoothly as I could without being abrupt. Once we recaptured the altitude; I reengaged the AP and immediately lowered the gear thinking we were over VICUV which slowed up the airspeed. (We were in and out of IMC buildups but had visual with the field about 5 -7miles from the runway.) Once we were actually at VICUV; I had regained airspeed and called for rest of flaps so as to be fully configured and stable by 1;000 feet. I made my 'stable' call out at 1000 while CA made his at 500 feet and landed uneventfully runway 8L. In our scenario; I do not need to reselect the arrival along with the runway as this caused the CA to be heads down cleaning up the legs page. I had lost my Situational Awareness between WALIP and VICUV due to the mileage reading incorrectly. I should have KEPT verifying on the FMA that we were in VNAV PTH so as not to start an early descent. In the future; I will more carefully reselect the new rwy approach when given a change of runway. I will also ensure on the FMA that I am continuously in either VNAV PTH or ALT HOLD.

Entire flight proceeded normally. We briefed the Runway 9 ILS shortly before leaving cruise. Typically; ATC assigns 9 to aircraft coming over the Gulf of Mexico. I was the pilot monitoring and contacted MIA Approach as we were crossing SSCOT Waypoint at 10;000 feet; 250 knots. The controller cleared us to descend to 8000 ft and assigned us the RNAV (GPS) 8L approach. This was where everything turned into a mess; I don't recall a heading assignment; but later saw 121 heading on the MCP. When we received the approach assignment; the First Officer (FO) proceeded to change the FMS to the new approach. I said to the FO; 'You got it?' The FO said yes. I said I'll pull up the chart. My iPad was blanked out; so I pushed the button to bring it up again. Login Page! Typed in the code. Damn! In the descent from cruise; the Fight Attendants had called to report a passenger had vomited all over the right mid lav. I had left the Jepp pages to send in the maintenance code. I would write it up at the gate. Ok. Now back to Jepps pages. There's ILS 9. Touch to pull up charts. Favorites! RNAV 8L is not a favorite. Touch to pull all charts. Scroll down. Scroll down. Scroll down. Touch. No! Not that runway! Back. Touch. Got it! '[Aircraft X] descend and maintain 3000.' 'Descend an maintain 3000; [Aircraft X].' I don't remember; but I think I was on the 20 mile scale of the ND. WALIP; LECIT; VICUV; and KACDE were displayed. The FMS is still on the legs page; now showing WALIP; LECIT; vectors VICUV; KACDE. 8L on the next page. Back one page. I tell the FO it's in there and I'll extend it out of VICUV. [Aircraft X] join the final approach to 8L. Roger [Aircraft X] join the final to 8L. I look at our heading selection and it says 121 and; as I said earlier; I didn't recall getting a heading clearance and we weren't tracking anything. Approach we're having some trouble setting up the approach; do you have a heading you want [Aircraft X] to fly to join? Fly heading 110. I return to the box to extend from VICUV. This is the FMS that does not use a Direct Intercept key. I put VICUV at the top of the page; but it wouldn't get an intercept course. The FMS said DISCONTINUITY. The FO pointed it out as well. '[Aircraft X] you are south of course. Turn left to 060 heading to join the 8L final approach course. Maintain 3000 feet.' 'Roger [Aircraft X] come left to 060 to join the localizer uh final approach course.' I asked the FO to pull up the localizer and join it while I kept working the magic. The FO said I'm going to start slowing down. Below 250 flaps one. Verified. Flaps going to one. Flight attendants prepare for landing. The FO said Gear down. OK. Gear down. Somewhere in the middle of; I thought to push the legs key again; the first time since before passing SSCOT. There were a whole load of waypoints all the way back into the Gulf. From the FO's training for preflight route upload; the FO entered the RNAV 8L approach; SSCOT 3 arrival and transition. Although my LEGS page in the FMS was still where I was using it; it was no longer the FIRST LEGS page. [Aircraft X] you are now north of course. Turn right to 110 heading to join the 8L final approach course. Roger right to 110 heading to join the 8L localizer; uh 8L final approach course.[Aircraft X]. The FO said I'm turning the autopilot off. OK Flaps to 5. OK Verified below 230. Flaps 5. OK I've got you extended out of VICUV. How's it look? [Aircraft X] I show you at 2400 feet; your clearance is to cross VICUV at 3000 feet. Well; isn't that special. I showed 2200 feet; but we weren't really climbing yet. I said; Come on; Let's get back up to three. And let's get the autopilot back on. We're supposed to use the autopilot on VNAV approaches; right? I'm sure there was more confusion in there; but my ASAP might time-out. Read it fast. That's how it was going.Well; I could have simplified my life if I had requested the Localizer 8L. It wasn't OTS. Tuning a localizer is much quicker and simpler than programming a computer. Years ago; in the beginning of these RNAV approaches at LAX; controllers would change runways closer in on the arrival and things were getting messed up all over Riverside. After lots of ASAP reports; controllers policies only allowed them to change up the runway much further out; unless it was a visual to join the other localizer. Basically; they won't change your runway assignment if you're inside the runway transition. Of course; I could have requested direct to VICUV and we could have at least pointed to it; then figured out the problem with the FMS without S turning all over the Everglades. Frankly; if controllers have a working localizer to a runway; I think they ought to use it.

A widebody crew on approach to MIA Runway 9 described the confusion and work overload after ATC assigned the RNAV GPS 8L from the previously briefed Runway 9 ILS. The close in approach change required iPad activation; FMS programming and heavy crew activity resulting in track deviations and an eight hundred foot altitude excursion.

1284082

201507

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

36000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

Center ZZZ

Personal

Jetstar 1329 (C140)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 15; Flight Crew Total 20000; Flight Crew Type 2000

Other / Unknown; Situational Awareness

1284082

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

The Captain leaves flight station to go the lavatory. FO flying. For unknown reason; autopilot disconnects when captain is in the back of the cabin. FO does recover from unusual attitude when he receives airplane attitude nose low and left bank 45 degrees. Captain back to flight station; FO calls Center and advises of situation. Airplane is then hand-flown to resume altitude and route. AP is checked and reengaged and monitored closely until the end of the flight. No other discrepancies or autopilot problem were encountered thereafter. Aircraft lost approximately 3;000 feet in the process. During and prior to the event; the Captain had left the flight deck and FO was flying (monitoring Autopilot coupled flight at FL360) and programming the FMS when the autopilot disconnected and the aircraft rolled off into a diving left banked descend; losing 3;000 feet before the FO could recover. In retrospect; FO should have delayed diverting attention to the FMS until both pilots were at the flight station. A normal recovery from the unusual attitude was made and reported to ATC.

Jetstar First Officer experienced an unnoticed autopilot disconnect at FL360 with the Captain in the lavatory. The aircraft is recovered from a 45 degree bank at FL330 and ATC is advised. The autopilot is reengaged and functions normally for the remainder of the flight.

1710722

201912

0601-1200

PAE.Airport

WA

0.0

Ramp PAE

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Class D PAE

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1710722

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Person / Animal / Bird

Person Flight Crew; Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We landed in PAE and taxied to parking uneventfully. After we had parked a member of the ground crew came on the headset and welcomed us as we were waiting for ground power to be plugged into the aircraft. After the ground power was plugged in the CA (Captain) shut down the number X engine and the ground crew member who was on the headset confirmed we had a good shutdown on the engine. At no time did either myself or the CA hear the ground crew say anything about not releasing the parking brake. The CA did not release the parking brake at this point because we had not yet received confirmation that the chocks were in place. We completed the shutdown checklist; and after the R1 door was open we sent the postflight report and performed the secure checklist. After this I got up; packed my bag; and went to the bathroom. While I was in the lavatory; I heard a member of the ground crew come up and talk with the Captain. Because of the location of the lavatory I was able to hear the conversation between the CA and the ground crew member. I heard the CA ask if the chocks were in place and heard the ground crew member confirm that the chocks were in; I did not hear the ground crew member say anything about not releasing the brakes. I heard the CA release the brakes; it felt like the aircraft moved slightly; but not much. Although that was just my perception; since I couldn't see outside. After I came out of the lavatory; I continued getting ready to leave the aircraft while the CA went into the lavatory. While I was in the flight deck; I heard a member of the ground crew on the headset asking us if we meant to release the brakes. I grabbed the hand mic and told him that yes; we were told the chocks were in so we released brakes in accordance to standard procedures. He told me that we were not supposed to release the brakes at this parking spot and that a member of the ground crew had been near the gear when the brakes were released. I informed him that there was nothing in our manuals about leaving the brakes set. He seemed to think there was something in our manuals about not releasing the brakes. I told him that I would alert the CA to the issue. When the CA came out of the lavatory I told him what was going on and we decided that we would just talk to the ground crew when we got downstairs. I got down to the ramp after the CA; when I arrived at the bottom of the stairs a member of the ground crew was there and was quite upset. He told us we had nearly run him over by releasing the parking brakes and kept saying that we should have known not to release the brakes. He was clearly quite upset with us. Members of the ground crew kept mentioning a manual that I think they called the [name] ramp manual; or something similar to that. We calmly informed the ground crew that we didn't have that manual and that our company information pages contained no information about leaving the parking brake set. We were also asked by the ground crew if we were told on the initial headset contact to leave the parking brake set. We told the ground crew that no one told us that; although they didn't seem to believe us. After a couple of minutes another member of the ground crew escorted us out to the limo and we left. As a side note; neither myself or the CA are based in PAE and we don't fly Aircraft X very often. We did review the company pages prior to arrival and we checked them again after our arrival. Nowhere in the company pages could we find instructions regarding leaving the parking brake set. We would never have released the parking brake if we had been told not to. The company pages in our Jepp manuals should be updated to warn crews not to release the parking brake unless specifically cleared to. The local ground crew should be reminded to verbally warn crews not to release the parking brake as this differs from our standard procedure.

Air carrier First Officer reported the aircraft possibly moved after the Captain released brakes and the ensuing ramp safety issues this created.

1062808

201301

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

100.0

IMC

Fog; 1

Night

100

1600

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Citation II S2/Bravo (C550)

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 8500; Flight Crew Type 1500

1062808

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During our taxi from the south ramp to [Runway] 16R; all checklist items were performed and all indications were normal. The takeoff roll and rotation were all normal. Moments after the gear came up; we lost our right engine indicated by a yaw sensation. With what seemed like 10-15 seconds; we started to get annunciators indicating the loss of the right engine. Soon after completing the emergency checklist procedures; we declared an emergency and requested to continue to our destination where the weather was better. We attempted a restart on the failed engine to no avail.Our landing was uneventful; with the exception of all the emergency vehicles. After shutdown and exiting the airplane; we noticed fuel leaking out of the right engine cowling. The next morning the right lower cowl was removed by Maintenance who found two bolt heads; safety wired together; that had sheared off from the fuel transmitter housing.ATC performed with the highest level of professionalism and were greatly appreciated by this flight crew.

A C550 flight crew suffered a right engine failure shortly after takeoff. After securing the engine and declaring an emergency they elected to continue to their destination a short distance away due to better weather and facilities.

1665388

201907

0601-1200

LTAA.ARTCC

FO

VMC

Center LTAA

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1665388

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Ambiguous

Briefed by on duty pilots with following information: XA18Z ADS-B OUT L; XA33Z NAV UNABLE RNP; XA35Z VOR UPDATE ON; XA49Z GPS normal. Event (GPS jamming) began at location N37 58.9 E042 24.3 near OTKEP FL330 (near Turkey/Iraq border). Event ended at 35nm north of SOBIL. Recommend avoiding this airspace.

Air carrier Captain reported experiencing GPS signal disruption flying near the Iraq/Turkey border.

1000917

201203

0001-0600

ATL.Airport

GA

1000.0

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class B ATL

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class B ATL

Facility ATL.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1000917

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

While working Local 3; I instructed Air Carrier X to line up and wait on Runway 27R than issued take-off clearance to an SLAWW RNAV. At the same time; Local 2 issued a take-off clearance to Air Carrier Y off Runway 26L on a heading of 280 degrees both controllers observed the aircraft's close proximity off the departure end; Local 2 issued a heading of 290 to Air Carrier Y at the same time Local 3 issued traffic to Air Carrier X and received a response that the pilot of Air Carrier X had the 26L departure in sight and would maintain visual separation before transferring radio communication. I understand the LOA for noise abatement and its procedures completely; but for all practicable purposes these procedures; in reference to the; so called midnight headings are executed differently by different supervisors according to the traffic volume we have. These procedures have also been changed numerous times over the past months for one reason or another leaving the controllers; that I have spoken with; confused on what heading or action we are taking today. Controllers; as well as; some Management Personnel have made their concerns known that the current procedures do not allow for a heading off the north runway that would make an incident; such as this; most likely never occur. Currently these procedures do not allow for minimum separation of 15 degrees if a situation such as this happens. My recommendations to fix this problem would be that the Supervisor shall state to both controllers that we are now using headings; and no longer using the RNAV; and to coordinate with ATL departure; both controllers putting it on the recorded line that headings are in effect to avoid any confusion. In the event; a Supervisor is not present at the time the Local 2 (North) Local 3 (South) will coordinate via the recorded line before changing to a heading; and also advise ATL departure before implementing this procedure. I also recommend that a heading off the north runway; regardless of noise abatement; should always be at least 15 degrees north of the south runway's magnetic heading of 273 degrees.

ATL Controller voiced concern regarding the confusion that exists when transitioning from normal operations to mid shift procedures to accommodate noise concerns; the reporter noted differences between supervisors and lack of clarity during coordination are contributing factors.

1797204

202103

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Dawn

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant In Charge; Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Attendant; Party2 Flight Crew

1797204

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

During cruise; 3 hours in the flight; I heard a loud noise that sounded like a stall/chug. I was near L1 door. I asked the A FA (Flight Attendant); he heard it but he didn't. Later on; I went to the back of the plane. Aft galley & told the C FA what I felt and she told me she felt something 'unusual' on the floor of the aft galley; probably about the same time I was in the fwd galley. We decided to call the pilots (called them twice) but they didn't pick up. We would try again a few minutes later; figured they were busy with the sound but just then; they called for a lavatory break. We ended up forgetting to notify them. During decent; wheels down; the C FA & I felt the aft of the aircraft chug a few times and make the strange popping sounds. We both looked at each other and decided to talk about it upon landing. When we landed; we both agreed it was 'abnormal' so we called the pilots when we were disarmed and at the gate. After calling the pilots and explaining to them; the Captain told us to go to the flight deck and close the flight deck door. He ended up explaining to us that they did feel the abnormal chugs and thought it was a bird strike and didn't know until we were on the ground that the engine had failed (showed us on the monitor a red icon on the engine) but didn't really explain other wise. Myself and the rest of the crew didn't feel that great about the debrief. The A & C were able to go but the D and I had to continue on to ZZZ. That night; going to bed; I realized how serious the situation was and made me feel uneasy. On date; after landing in ZZZ1; a different Captain was talking about the incident because earlier in the day; there was an emergency landing by another airline and the [type aircraft]. Anyhow; when he realized I was on the ETOPS flight; he mentioned that we were lucky to be alive. He did an amazing job explaining that our situation was a 'compressor failure' and many things can cause that but the biggest concern was that after leaving ZZZ2 ; the engine was sending pings to maintenance notifying of the engine overheating...the pilots decided to continue on to ZZZ3. Knowing that bit of information; and then to experience the compressor failure and no good CRM; I am frustrated; annoyed and somewhat uneasy flying to ZZZ2 now after hearing unfamiliar sounds about three hours into flight (the C FA heard these sounds as well); I called the pilots at about 3 hours into flight but didn't get a hold of them. I then forgot until the next set of sounds were heard at gear down. Upon parking at the gate; I called the pilots and I was instructed to talk to them with the door shut when I go to the front. After all guests were off the plane; I explained to the pilots again what sounds we heard and the Captain told me (then the rest of the crew) that the sounds heard were those in line of what is heard of a 'bird strike'. He then mention something to the fact that the engine went off line (he said this because I pointed out that the engine symbol on the instrument panel had a red square on it) about two times and we all were then confused and he said we shouldn't worry about it. Better CRM and think about the whole ready; safe; go action plan. There should have been a way better debrief by the pilots. After an event like this; I shouldn't be the one pushing for answers when I felt uneasy.

Flight Attendant reported misgivings over Crew Coordination and Communication over compressor stalls during this and other flights; including ETOPS.

1472990

201708

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

28000.0

VMC

Dusk

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Oceanic

Class A ZZZ

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Engine Fuel Filter

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1472990

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Y

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft

Aircraft

Passing FL280 on departure we received a 'ENG 4 Fuel Filter' EICAS message. We ran the appropriate QRH checklist which ends with the statement 'Only one ENG FUEL FILTER message has shown during the flight: Note: Erratic engine operation and flameout may occur on the affected engine due to fuel contamination.' We elected to proceed. Later shortly the 'ENG 3 Fuel Filter' EICAS message illuminated momentarily. Once again we ran the QRH checklist and in this instance the following statement applied: 'ENG FUEL FILTER messages for more than one engine shown or have shown at any time during the flight (either separately or at the same time): Plan to land at the nearest suitable airport.' Our SATCOM was inoperable in the voice mode so we used the HF radio to set up a phone patch with Dispatch. In a three-way phone conversation with Dispatch and Maintenance Control we discussed a divert to ZZZZ. ZZZZ; at this point was roughly 860 miles away while ZZZ was 1650 miles. Also discussed was whether ZZZZ was able to handle 416 passengers with families as well as what maintenance assets were available and therefore qualified as 'suitable'. During this conversation; both the ENG 4 and ENG 3 Fuel Filter EICAS messages reilluminated and that sealed the deal. We headed for ZZZZ and would take care of the other considerations later. We received a diversion flight plan over the ACARS from Dispatch and coordinated with ARTCC for the change. The flight to ZZZZ was uneventful other than having the ENG 3 Fuel Filter ECAS remaining on for the rest of the flight. We landed and after shutdown; our on-board mechanic called Maintenance control to coordinate the repairs. We were told that we should be fixed and on our way in an hour or two. This seemed optimistic; and we considered options to care for the passengers should the process become protracted. As time passed and it became apparent that this would take much longer; we coordinated for transportation and deplaned our passengers to be taken to a holding area where they would be much more comfortable. Meanwhile; our mechanic had secured the engines; opened both cowlings and removed the fuel filters. No obvious contamination was found in the filters or the fuel however he did discover that both filters were old and had been in place for some time. These filters are to be changed as part of an 'A' check and in his opinion these particular filters had not been for a least one cycle of checks. Two new filters from our on-board kit were installed and after the engines were closed back up and an engine run leak check was performed the repairs were complete. By this time; the fueler had left the aircraft. We were informed that he was now working the afternoon's airline flights and it would be another two hours before he could get back to us. Later; once we received word that our fuel was on the way we called for the passengers to be recalled to the aircraft. After a ground time of 4+18 we departed.

B747 Captain reported receiving two 'ENGINE FUEL FILTER' EICAS messages in flight and diverting.

1127208

201311

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

16000.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Dash 8-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Cargo Compartment Fire/Overheat Warning

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1127208

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During cruise flight at 16;000 FT; the flight crew noticed the SMOKE Warning flickering. This occurred for about 10 seconds. During this time we initiated the necessary memory action items; declared an emergency with ATC and began the diversion to the nearest suitable airport. We ran the appropriate emergency checklist and were notified by the Flight Attendant that there was no smoke or fire in the cargo compartment. We continued the diversion; contacted operations and landed without incident. The Contract Mechanic who came to inspect the issue said the Number 1 baggage smoke sensor cannon plug had become loose which caused the flickering of the smoke warning.

DHC 8-200 Captain experiences a flickering smoke warning at 16;000 FT. The crew elects to divert to the nearest suitable airport after declaring an emergency. During descent the Flight Attendant reports that there is no smoke in the baggage compartment; but the diversion is continued. A loose smoke detector cannon plug is found to be the cause.

1573792

201808

0601-1200

SAT.TRACON

TX

3500.0

TRACON SAT

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

IFR

Descent

Vectors

Class C SAT

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Climb

None

Facility SAT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Time Pressure

1573792

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure; Aircraft; Airspace Structure

Aircraft

Aircraft X was being vectored for the ILS Runway 13R approach at SAT airport. Aircraft X was 10 NW of SAT on a modified downwind given a pilot's discretion to 3;000 feet. At this point I saw a target depart 5C1 airport climbing low-level southbound initially away from Aircraft X. The unknown target aircraft then made a turn to the northeast heading about 050 degrees climbing out of 2;800 feet converging with Aircraft X who was approximately descending out of 4;000 feet heading 260 degrees. As soon as I noticed something had to be done to avoid the conflict someone else called and delayed my transmission. I then based Aircraft X a little early heading 220 to parallel the target to pass off Aircraft X right. Maybe 3 seconds later Aircraft X said he was turning to a 200 heading to further avoid the target so I told him to turn even further left heading 180 to ensure separation. The last control instruction resolved the conflict.This is a systemic problem with aircraft departing 5C1. This airport is located directly on the approach course to SAT to our most used runway. This airport is also on the base turn which makes it even worse. SAT controllers have gone to 5C1 to educate the pilots about climbing off 5C1 into the downwind/base turn without talking to Approach Control but nothing has changed. This situation happens every day. SAT has had countless RA'S (Resolution Alerts) due to this. This airport is often used by gliders that are most of the time not talking to us nor have a working transponder. It's a matter of time before a crash happens.To fix this problem the Class C at SAT needs to extend further out to cover 5C1.

SAT TRACON Controller reported an airborne conflict between an IFR and VFR aircraft along with a possible related airspace problem.

1849554

202110

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2600.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS XX

Initial Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Time Pressure

1849554

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Situational Awareness

1849553.0

Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors

When setting up for visual backed up by the ILS XX into ZZZ we couldn't get the LOC/GS identified and decided to break off and back up our visual using the RNAV XX. Once set up we came back around and upon crossing ZZZZZ I mistakenly set 2600 ft. instead of the DDA; I didn't realize ZZZZZ was the final approach fix and continued to 'dive and drive' with a 1500fpm descent rate; at 2600 ft. we received a low altitude alert from ATC and realized my mistake and that I was 20 ft. below the required altitude of 2620 ft. at ZZZZZ1. I immediately initiated a go around where we came back in uneventfully. Did not set DDA at FAF and initiated a descent well beyond the proper 700fpm descent rate resulting in getting low.

Upon vectors for the ILS we noticed no blue/ghost needles. We selected the nav source to the ILS frequency; still no ghost needles. I recalled the NOTAM for the ILS being out but it was only for XA00-XG00 local. We inquired with approach they said it was working. We elected to be pulled off the approach and set up for the RNAV. When coming in for the RNAV we thought we were brought out much further beyond the FAF. We began to descend with 2600 ft. set the next fix was 2620. We got an altitude alert and elected to go around at 2600 ft. as soon as we knew we were low by 20 ft. We [had] both mistaken the FAF. we realized we were beyond the FAF after the go around. We then came back and did the ILS by turning the course knob and listening to the nav frequency to identify it. Being rushed on a short flight and being rushed to set up for an RNAV during a line check had us misidentify the FAF for the RNAV approach.

CRJ-700 flight crew reported a CFTT event when they set up the approach using the wrong Final Approach Fix and descended below a required crossing altitude. ATC alerted the crew who conducted a go around to a landing.

1094284

201305

1801-2400

DFW.Airport

TX

2300.0

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 17C

Final Approach

Class B DFW

TRACON D10

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B DFW

Facility D10.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Confusion

1094284

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings; Human Factors; Procedure

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

DFW TRACON was running dual ILS approaches into DFW and I was monitoring the Runway 17C final and DFW Tower's Local East 1 frequency. The Arrival Position (AR2) was being manned by a trainee and his trainer. I had to slow several aircraft near the Final Approach Fix and I believe that Air Carrier Y was 1 of them. This causes an accordion effect and instead of aircraft gradually slowing down; it's a kind of sudden slow down that you don't want to repeat over and over again due to the jerkiness of it; but 'there was training going on the Arrival 2 position'. Also we have a new 'STARS' program instead of 'ARTS' and data tags are different and we were getting some false targets due to different RADAR sites getting different readings and misreading transponder codes. I'll explain more later. VFR Guard Helicopter reported on the frequency and Tower gave him some advisories about Air Carrier Y (which was 2 miles away from him and pulling away plus about 2;000 FT above him). Then the VFR Guard Helicopter's data tag overlapped with Air Carrier X's so that I couldn't see Air Carrier X's speed and right then Tower started to give the VFR Guard Helicopter advisories about Air Carrier X while I noticed that Air Carrier Y had slowed down to 100 KTS less than 3 miles in front of Air Carrier X. Minimum separation at this point is 2.5 NM. I instructed Air Carrier X to slow down; I don't know if I said to 150 KTS or minimum approach speed but he was 60 KTS faster than Air Carrier Y and probably 2.7 miles in trail coming to the Final Approach Fix. I knew that Air Carrier Y wouldn't go any slower and his speed would pick up a little while Air Carrier X would now probably drop down to 110-100 KTS and that sending him around would be more dangerous than letting him continue so I let him continue. He landed but they were less than 2.5 NM apart pretty much from the FAF in. There are several things that can be fixed to make sure that this never happens again. I could have said 'screw it' and started slowing all of the planes earlier and let the arrival trainee 'deal with it' as this would have pushed his final out further. By doing that I would basically have to take over the DFW Tower's frequency and due to weather delays he was getting lots of 'what's my sequence' questions which of course tied up his frequency. STARS are definitely a work in progress and in many ways ARTS was/is better. Green data tags are of other aircraft that are not yours; which are white. ARTS had a better font and brightness settings than what STARS currently has! ARTS allowed different brightness settings for your white tags; other full data block green tags and limited data block green tags. STARS only allows different settings for white and green and the difference doesn't seem like much plus the STARS font is harder to read! In the 15 minutes before this incident we had no less that 3 'ghost' targets abeam aircraft on final for DFW. The display would all of a sudden show a transponder target beside an airliner on final. The 'ghost' would be at the same speed and altitude and usually his transponder code was off by 1 digit. This was explained to us as 'what another RADAR site was seeing' which is screwed up because when you work final monitor you have to check that all final monitors are on the same RADAR site! We were all on the West ASR9 at this time. We will get better acquainted with STARS as the years go by but I hope that the FAA doesn't think 'Mission Accomplished.'

D10 Controller described a loss of separation during dual ILS approaches. The reporter listed STARS equipment as contributing to the event.

1669500

201907

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

8000.0

Night

TRACON ZZZ; Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

SID ZZZZZ

Class B ZZZ

ACARS

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 333

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

1669500

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 394; Flight Crew Type 2500

Communication Breakdown; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch; Party2 ATC

1669507.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We received a CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) clearance indicating we were cleared via the ZZZZZ Departure climb via to 5;000 ft. with our squawk. Before departure; CPDLC aborted. We were not able to accept the clearance so we contacted Clearance Delivery. Upon communicating with Clearance Delivery; we told them our squawk and he said; squawk read-back correct with no correction to the ZZZZZ Departure. We were cleared for takeoff by the Tower; and handed off to Departure. After receiving a clearance to contact the next Departure Controller; we were told to 'climb via the departure' not what departure. If we were told to climb via the ZZZZZ1 Departure; we would have immediately realized there was a discrepancy in our clearance. Upon reaching 8;000 ft.; the Departure Controller told us to immediately turn to heading of 220 and maintain our current altitude which was 8;000 ft. He asked us what departure we were on because we should not be turning north. I told him we were on the ZZZZZ Departure; which we had received from the CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) Clearance and confirmed with Clearance Delivery. He indicated there was a note on the ZZZZZ Departure that it was not to be used after XA:00 local. Although the note was read; because we had received that clearance; we did not think of questioning it because we had already talked to Clearance Delivery. I did not understand the communication breakdown between ATC and our final clearance; but we were flying the clearance that we were given and filed on our flight plan. ZZZ is obviously a high density airport and they routinely have clearances read back with the squawk only. This could have easily been corrected if we would have been required to read back the route they expected us to fly.

On the ground in ZZZ we received our clearance via CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications); which cleared us via ZZZZZ; ZZZZZ2; then as filed; climb via except maintain 5;000 ft. However after receiving that; we lost ACARS COMM; which resulted in us losing our CPDLC connection. I attempted to log back into CPDLC but it wouldn't let me accept the clearance anymore; so I called Clearance; who asked if we were looking for our clearance; and I explained we received it on CPDLC but lost our connection and then read back just our squawk code; which is ZZZ's [procedure] on reading back clearances. We were told squawk read-back correct; and then asked our gate; we gave that and continued on our way. On departure; everything went normal; the Captain checked in with Departure and said our altitude and climbing via the ZZZZZ except to maintain 5;000 ft. [Departure] read back radar contact; climb via the SID. We set in the top altitude of 8;000 ft. and had VNAV set. As we were about to level off we were told to turn immediately to a 220 heading and maintain our current altitude; which was already about 8;000 ft. Both the Captain and I were expecting a traffic conflict because of how it was stated. The Controller; however; said he wasn't sure what departure we were flying but we shouldn't be heading north. He explained the ZZZZZ isn't used after XA:00 local time and we shouldn't be on it. We explained what our CPDLC had said; and he said no problem and provided us with radar vectors eventually to ZZZZZ3. The rest of the flight was uneventful.

B737 Flight Crew reported ACARS failure and accepted bad clearance by Dispatch which was resolved by ATC during climb.

1446299

201705

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Dusk

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Main Gear

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 1800; Flight Crew Type 200

1446299

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate; Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Aircraft; Procedure

Procedure

I arrived at the gate at XA:15 at my appropriate show time. Captain and myself boarded and began our preflight duties.During the walk around; I noticed that the left main landing gear shimmy damper sight gauge did not have an indicator band inside the max/min lines inside the sight glass. I informed the Captain; who came out with me to look at both landing gear sight glasses in order to confirm that the left did not look acceptable. Maintenance arrived promptly after arriving; and I showed them the sight gauge and how there was no indicator band. After getting the glass cleaned up; the consensus was that the damper was either over serviced or not serviced at all. These mechanics were polite professional and a pleasure to work with.They began to work on servicing it and completing it; when the Supervisor arrived and informed me at XB:00 that the damper was serviceable and good to go.I informed the Maintenance Supervisor that I did not agree and did not feel safe with it in that position; and requested that he show me in the book where it needs to be (referring to the maintenance manual regarding the indicator gauge and where it needs to go). I was polite; tactful; and professional in my approach to the mechanic. He began to look for the serviceability limits inside the manual; and pointed to the diagrams and showing me that it was good to go. I again informed him that according to the book; there is no indicator band even showing on the gauge itself.I spoke with the Captain again and informed him of what my personal thoughts were; and that the damper was over serviced; out of limits; and needed to be fixed; and that the book was supporting my position. Captain went down to talk to the Supervisor and point blank asked him what would happen if we took the airplane in its current condition; to which he responded with 'I don't know'. The Captain said to the mechanic that the airplane was not going anywhere until it was fixed.Five minutes later they had drained some fluid out of the damper; and the indicator band was right where it needed to go. The book was signed off correctly; and no further delay was incurred. This completes my report.1. If there is any sort of disagreement between the pilots and mechanics; who becomes the deciding factor if it's right or not? Our preflight guide; IOE training; and other references say one thing; but the mechanics say another; who is the deciding factor on if it's a safe operation? There seems to be some ambiguity to it; and maybe needs some clarification. Particularly; where there are some areas of operation that are gray; such as intake fan blade blending/repair; as well as these dampers; maybe have a spot or explanation that will be clear and concise so there is no doubt.2. Where my issue is that the Supervisor was insisting that the airplane was safe to fly and airworthy; when there were a few other mechanics as well as myself (I was a mechanic in the military for almost 7 years); that all said something did not look right. The fact that there was pressure to fly and just take it and that it's serviceable; did not sit well with me. All of our guidance said that it was not serviced correctly; and therefore needed maintenance action. How can we go about eliminating the conflict from happening again? I felt bad having to challenge the mechanic and ask to see the book on the limit indicators; but had I not done so; we might have taken a particularly unsafe airplane airborne.

Embraer EMB-175 First Officer reported a discrepancy on the main landing gear that maintenance felt was airworthy. Eventually the issue was addressed and the flight departed.

1415610

201701

0601-1200

VNY.Airport

CA

160.0

3.0

2000.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower VNY

Corporate

Gulfstream V / G500 / G550

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D VNY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 3100; Flight Crew Type 350

Situational Awareness

1415610

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi; In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airport; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

The first 'event' was during the day; after being handed off to VNY Tower. We were on vectors for a Visual Approach to Runway 34L that day (unusual for VNY; as they almost always land Runway 16). We were following a Falcon Jet for the Visual Approach; and cleared for the approach following him on a left base to Runway 34L. A little background info: VNY Visual Approaches to Runway 34L in a jet can be a bit tricky; especially at night; since there is terrain to the South by only about 3.5 miles; and generally speaking; jets should be lined up on final; established and stable at LEAST 3 miles out. That said; as the Falcon turned final (that we were following; on a left base); VNY tower asked us to extend 1/2 mile through final and then re-intercept to make room for an immediate departure after the Falcon landed. So we did. However; after doing the maneuver; which I had never done before; I realized it was unsafe. We are close in to the runway; low and slow; in a jet. That's not good. I figured the directions they gave me was uncommon; and he must have a flow window he's trying to make for the other guy on the ground; ready to depart. In retrospect; I should have turned down the clearance. My maneuvering was safe and fine; but in general; it's not a good idea to do that. Our landing was uneventful; and ATC thanked us for the help. Later that night as we were holding short of Runway 34L there happened to be another jet on approach on about a 3 mile left base. ATC asked the airplane to extend 1 mile through final and then re-intercept final; which the pilot accepted. Then the Tower Controller asked us if we could accept an immediate departure; which having been through what I had done that morning; I declined.This seems to be a regular practice when landing Runway 34L at VNY even at night! To me; that's unacceptably dangerous to request jets; while low and slow and close in to the runway and terrain; to perform maneuvers like that - especially at night. I will no longer accept those types of clearances unless I have plenty of room and clearance from terrain. At other airports; that would be OK - you'd most like be 5 or more miles out; at a higher altitude/speed; and have more terrain clearance. I highly recommend someone with some authority call VNY Tower and work out a different procedure to aid in their traffic flow. I did call the tower a couple days later to tell them my concerns. I asked for a supervisor; but instead I was given the controller who issued the clearances to me. It was an amicable conversation; however his response to me was; 'well; you don't have to accept the clearance. You can turn it down and then we'll work it out.' True; but you should not be issuing unsafe clearances in the first place.

GV First Officer was asked by VNY Tower to fly through the final approach course and then turn back to the airport for departing traffic. The pilot complied; but felt this was an unsafe maneuver.

1763191

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

5000.0

Tower ZZZ

Small Aircraft; Low Wing; 1 Eng; Fixed Gear

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Instructor; Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1763191

Facility ZZZ.Tower

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1763205.0

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related

Human Factors

I was watching a trainee in the Local Control position when ground/flight data/clearance delivery passed inbound information from ZZZ ARTCC of Aircraft X two miles south east of the airport for a visual approach to Runway XX. This was an extremely late inbound as our LOA reads center will inbound aircraft at least 10 miles out. We had several VFR aircraft in the rectangular pattern to Runway XX with aircraft on final to Runway XX with almost no time to build a hole. We coordinated with center to not descend Aircraft X below 4;000 and requested control which he was at 5;000. Center descended Aircraft X to 4;000 and cleared the aircraft for the visual approach to Runway XX and switched the aircraft to us. We had to move at least two aircraft out of Aircraft X way with little to no notice to accommodate the IFR arrival. Because we were advertising Runway XX/XY in use and Aircraft X was so high (5;000); I thought since we didn't get an inbound that center was vectoring the aircraft around potentially for spacing. Never did I think Aircraft X was going to be cleared a visual approach to Runway XX at the altitude the aircraft was at. Common practice is center inbound aircraft outside of 10 miles for the IFR approach and descends them to 3;000 feet before switching them to us. This created a dangerous situation with very little time to react or plan; especially with a trainee who was on day 4 of re-entering training after six months plus of not working local due to COVID and me not training anyone for just as long if not longer due to COVID.Follow the LOA between ZZZ ARTCC and ZZZ Tower.

I was training on local; which I had not worked local in about 6 months due to the COVID pandemic; it was my fourth day back into training. I had numerous aircraft in the local pattern and on final for Runway XX. ZZZ Center called flight data (FD) / Ground Control (GC) and in bounded Aircraft X; who was two miles south east of the field at five thousand feet. I coordinated with FD/GC and ZZZ Center to stop Aircraft X's descent at four thousand because I had several VFR aircraft in the pattern and lining up on final. Shortly thereafter Aircraft X calls me about one to two miles northeast of the field saying he is on a visual approach to Runway XX. I asked Aircraft X how long he would need to continue north before he would turn base in which he told me about another mile and then he would turn his base. I acknowledged him and told him to report turning base. I then started moving aircraft out of the way and sequencing aircraft behind him in order to make it work. I had very little time to plan and build a gap for Aircraft X to fit into. Per our LOA with ZZZ Center; ZZZ Center is supposed to inbound aircraft at least 10 miles out. This aircraft was not inbounded until two miles southeast of the field. Being that I had not got a position on Aircraft X when I noticed him so close to the airport on the STARS; I was under the impression that center was vectoring the aircraft for an RNAV XX approach only to find out last minute that the aircraft was going to be doing a visual approach to XX and then I was not given any time to build a gap to fit the aircraft into.In accordance with the LOA between ZZZ Tower and ZZZ Center; the Center is supposed to call with a position on inbound aircraft with a type of approach to expect. My recommendation is for center to follow the LOA and inbound the aircraft sooner; allowing tower time to build gaps for IFR aircraft.

Tower Instructor and Developmental reported overlying Center not complying with the two facilities' LOA.

1612606

201901

1201-1800

SAT.Airport

TX

6000.0

Mixed

Daylight

TRACON SAT

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

STAR BRAUN2

Class C SAT

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200

Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1612606

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Phase of flight was the descent to SAT on the BRAUN 2 RNAV Arrival. Initial check-in with approach was uneventful. ATIS stated 13R in use. The brief and plan was for the RNAV (RNP) Z 13R from CRISS. I was Pilot Monitoring (PM) and requested the approach upon check-in with SAT Approach. I retrieved the [new] ATIS via ACARS. The runway in use was now 31L. The Pilot Flying (PF) began loading the approach in the FMS and changing approach plates. I revised the approach request for the RNAV (RNP) Z Runway 31L from TROOP. SAT Approach cleared us for the approach to cross TROOP at or above 6000 ft. I read back the clearance. I do not recall exactly the readback if I included the restriction. The PF asked if we were cleared the approach; I stated 'yes.' The PF was verbalizing something about the vertical path. The PF put 5000 ft. in the altitude window initially and then 2200 ft. when cleared for the approach. The waypoint altitude in the FMS shows TROOP as an at or below altitude. The ATC clearance was for at or above. ATC restated the restriction when we descended below 6000 ft. prior to TROOP. A climb was initiated back to 6000 ft. to cross TROOP. The remaining part of the approach and flight were uneventful. TROOP is an IF on both the RNP Z 13R and on RNP Z 31L; but the altitude requirements are different. On the 13R Approach; TROOP is at or above 6000 ft. On the 31L approach; TROOP is at or below 6000 ft. Since the airport had just switched runways; I suspect that the controller was expecting us to cross TROOP at or above 6000 ft. yet once he cleared us for the 31R Approach without any altitude instructions; we continued our VNAV descent below 6000 ft. I suspect he was surprised to see our aircraft below 6000 ft. prior to TROOP.

B737-700 Captain reported an altitude excursion occurred on the BRAUN2 RNAV Arrival into SAT when TRACON issued a late runway change.

1244216

201503

0001-0600

CAE.Airport

SC

2500.0

IMC

Night

Ground CAE; Tower CAE

Air Carrier

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 11

Final Approach

None

Class C CAE

Tower CAE

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

None

Class C CAE

Facility CAE.Tower

Government

Ground

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 2.7

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness; Distraction

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1244216

Facility CAE.Tower

Government

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1244221.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was working ground control and a runway change was initiated to runway 11 and 5. Previously we were on Runway 29 and 23 for the shift I was working. Maybe ten minutes after the runway change was initiated and I made the ATIS broadcasting the appropriate ATIS; I taxied Aircraft Y to runway 29 (the previous runway in use) marked the strip for runway 29 and switched the pilot to the tower. I then was made aware of the situation when the local controller began giving traffic alerts to Aircraft Y and Aircraft X on final for runway 11. Aircraft Y departed opposite direction into Aircraft X and became a direct conflict.I believe a visual reminder of what runways are in use immediately after a runway change on the console would serve as a memory jogger. Muscle memory of repeating the same actions all day over and over again; only to change to the complete opposite can cause confusion and I believe a runway in use sign would help.

Ground Control (GC) taxied Aircraft Y to runway 29. The active runway was 11. The runways had been switched and this was the first aircraft to depart the airport. Aircraft X was vectored for the ILS 11. I had stood up to look at the lighting panel and Aircraft Y calls ready for takeoff runway 29. I was using a hand set because I had left my headset in the tracon. I missed Aircraft Y saying he was at runway 29. Aircraft X calls after Aircraft Y and is on final runway 11. I clear Aircraft X to land Runway 11. I go straight to Aircraft Y and clear them for takeoff Runway 11 Heading 050. Aircraft Y questions the Heading and I said 'Affirmative heading 050 for Aircraft Y.' I told Aircraft Y of the traffic on 7 mile final runway 11. I scanned the runway and saw flashing lights at the approach end of runway 11 and did the scan of the rest of the runway. I did not see the aircraft at the approach end of runway 29. The flashing lights I saw where the barrier lights that separate A1 and A2. After clearing Aircraft Y for takeoff I looked up at the Dbrite to see where Aircraft X was and then I looked down to my notepad to write Aircraft X on the arrival column. I then went to the Aircraft Y strip to write the heading down and then looked back up to see where Aircraft Y was. Out of the corner of my eye I see flashing lights and it is Aircraft Y going the wrong way. I looked back at the strip and it had runway 29 on it. I looked back up at the Dbrite and see Aircraft X and I told Aircraft X to go around climb maintain 4000. I then go back to Aircraft Y and tell them to turn right heading 050 immediately. I go back to Aircraft X and issue a traffic alert and tell him to turn right heading 180 then to Aircraft Y I issued a traffic alert and the aircraft passed to the north and south.I had earlier in the day thought about going home sick because I was tired. I didn't for several reasons. We are at minimal staff; I was the late person; and I have been counseled on taking sick leave. The event happened because Aircraft Y was taxied to the wrong runway. The second problem happened when I missed the call saying Aircraft Y was at runway 29; possibly due to having the hand set and not the head set; the pilot did not question the clearance for takeoff on a different runway. Better communication; seeing the red flag when a pilot questions anything. Not using a Hand set. Don't send and aircraft to the wrong runway. A visual aid of some sort to indicate the runway in use would help when switching runways. It happens frequently; sending an aircraft to the wrong runway after a runway change.

CAE Ground Controller taxis aircraft to Runway 29. Previously the airport was departing Runway 29; and ten minutes ago changed to using Runways 11 and 5. Ground Control later hears Local Control issuing traffic alerts to the aircraft he taxied to Runway 29 and another aircraft on final for Runway 11.

1586442

201810

1201-1800

BRO.Airport

TX

15000.0

Marginal

Dusk

TRACON HRL

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Other VOR-A

Class D BRO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Training / Qualification; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1586442

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Procedure; Company Policy

Company Policy

Descent through 15;000 flight crew knew that RWY 31 would be in use. This is the first time arriving to BRO in RWY 31 configuration. Restricted airspace (Mexico) is nearby. Crew briefed many strategies to mitigate the airspace issue and expected visual approach. We briefed specifically where and when we will configure and to what extent we will configure when. Aircraft descending through 7;000. We expected the visual approach. They expected us to fly the LOC B/C approach to 31. Of course we cannot do B/C approaches so there was a bit of a scramble to determine an acceptable approach. Aircrew and ATC decided on the VOR only Alpha approach circle to 31. Direct clearance was given to CHICO - of note; not an IAF. Final approach altitude inbound was 900 until after the FAF then it dropped down to 540.Aircraft was not fully configured prior to CHICO which is neither an IAF nor FAF and aircraft not fully configured 100 prior to the final approach altitude of 900 (which we cannot fly). The 1;000 ft gear horn went off and we configured 7nm from the field at that time. We continued the approach - in hind sight we should have discontinued the approach and either re-fly the approach no lower than 1;022 AGL or flown the ILS 13 circle 31.[Contributing factors]1) First real circling approach ever2) Recall of the lowest allowable altitude on circling approach did not happen 3) The location of CHICO and the final approach altitude of 900 (which we cannot fly) require a significant change to the configuration game plan. Configuration was emphatically addressed in the brief but the new VOR-A approach and just finding the CHICO intersection in the FMS (it's in the ARC initial) made connecting the dots difficult.Well- there was a beautiful LOC B/C approach in use at the time which [another aircraft] was using right behind us. We decided to not allow shooting B/C approaches. The published altitude minimums on nearly every portion of the VOR-A we cannot fly - I have discussed all of this with our flight ops supervisor and have been debriefed (counseled) with him. He agrees this was a very difficult position to be in with 1;600 ft overcast CIG.

Air Carrier Captain reported company restrictions to approaches at BRO airport offer no options when weather is present.

1345100

201604

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

2900.0

VMC

Rain; 10

Dusk

7700

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

CV 580

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class E ZZZ

Main Gear

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 85; Flight Crew Total 2500; Flight Crew Type 250

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness

1345100

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Aircraft

Captain called for gear down; upon moving the lever only 2 of the 3 landing gear lights illuminated. We proceeded to execute a fly by to have the tower visually verify all 3 landing gear were down. It appeared that only one of the two main landing gear were down. We then went northeast of the field to troubleshoot the issue and complete the QRH checklists. We successfully managed to get the remaining gear down and executed a second flyby. Landed without incident.

Convair 580 First Officer reported only one of the main landing gear dropped when selected down. The crew was able to successfully troubleshoot the problem and make an uneventful landing.

1480636

201709

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2000.0

VMC

10

Daylight

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 342; Flight Crew Type 290

Situational Awareness

1480636

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 300

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While performing ground reference maneuvers with a student we had a close call with a crop-duster. Not sure the make/model of the aircraft. The student was looking for reference points to perform maneuvers while I looking for traffic. We had already performed a clearing turn. I looked up and a crop-duster was flying from right to left overtop of us close enough to make me jump and push forward on the yoke to ensure we avoided him.

C172 flight instructor reported a near-mid-air-collision with a crop duster while performing ground reference maneuvers.

1613119

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1613119

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Chart Or Publication; Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure; Airport

Procedure

Upon crossing Runway 22L the Ground Controller issued us K hold short of K5. As we turned onto K; the First Officer switched to COMM 2 and called Ramp Control. Ramp Control cleared us to the gate so before reaching K5 I turned the aircraft off the taxiway and proceeded directly to the gate. As we were pulling in the Ground Controller got a hold of us and said we possibly have a pilot deviation and instructed us to give them a call. I parked and secured the aircraft and called the Ground Controller on the phone. They informed me that there is some confusion as to who has control of that area and since they did not give me direct instruction to switch frequencies I was in the wrong. They said that the aircraft on gate [x] had a pushback clearance and I possibly prevented them from pushing. I thought this was a bit curious because they were surrounded by deice trucks and were in the beginning process of getting deiced. In fact they weren't ready to push in until we had deplaned; boarded back up and also called for push approximately 25 minutes later. So there needs to be some uniformity as to when we can and should switch frequencies. It seems that each airport does things a little different. ZZZ1 never tells you to switch to Ramp they just assume you will approaching the ramp area. I'm very familiar with ZZZ and never had an issue where I'm abeam the gate and the Ground Controller hasn't assumed that I've switched to ramp. I always continue to monitor Ground even once I've established communications with the Ramp just in case they need to relay something to me. That's how I became aware of this situation. Never once did I pass K5 as I was instructed to hold short of. The Ramp Controller had cleared us in; and I was very vigilant to make sure we proceeded to the gate safely. Deice operations were happening in the pad; aircraft were parked at other gates with no beacons on and [another aircraft] was in the beginning process of getting deiced. So I felt it was safe to continue to the gate and follow [the] Marshaller's instructions until setting the brake. I think the North Ramp area needs to either be controlled solely by Ramp Control or completely by Ground Controllers. It creates confusion as to who to call and when; it seems one day it's ok to do something and the next its wrong. Clarification on this will be much appreciated.

EMB-175 Captain reported contacting Ramp Control for clearance into the ramp without receiving communication transfer from Tower Ground Control.

1116433

201309

1201-1800

GYY.Airport

IN

VMC

Daylight

CTAF GYY

Corporate

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 91

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Landing

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion

1116433

No Specific Anomaly Occurred All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Human Factors

Ambiguous

On the ground I briefed for the arrival at GYY planning to land Runway 12. Displaced threshold and landing distance was discussed. Runway 12 was anticipated due to light winds favoring that runway. I had not landed on 12 for several months. On base; for a brief moment I thought I picked out the end of Runway 12; but immediately realized I had spotted the newly constructed end of the future extension of Runway 12. The extension stands out distinctly from the surroundings because it is new white concrete. The new extension is not connected to the original runway and is still blocked off by an active high railroad embankment between the new extension and the useable current runway. We noted the distinct nature of the new construction and how the normal runway blended into the background as usual. My concern is that under high workload or reduced visibility operations a pilot may mistake the new construction for the end of the useable runway with disastrous consequences. The airport authority should issue a Notam about the new construction and the new construction should be marked with an X such as used to indicate closed runways.

Captain reports the Runway 12 extension at GYY; which is under construction and not connected to the old runway; can be mistaken for the active runway. The new and old segments are still separated by a high railroad berm.

1630878

201903

0601-1200

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

33000.0

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class A ZOB

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZOB

Facility ZOB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 12

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1630878

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Human Factors

Aircraft X FL330 first on frequency assigned present heading for EWR spacing. +/- 060 heading. Aircraft Y FL350 next on frequency direct SLT still in adjacent sector 59 airspace. Aircraft Z FL320 request FL360 CYYZ departure southbound. When spacing was achieved for Aircraft X; I cleared Aircraft Y direct SLT by mistake. Thinking separation will be maintained Aircraft Z was cleared to FL340. Aircraft X did not turn. Aircraft Z was given two turns eventually a 270 heading to maintain separation from Aircraft Y. During this event I descended Aircraft Y to FL320 and assigned a 120 heading to proceed direct SLT to maintain separation from Aircraft Z intended for Aircraft X. Aircraft Y left FL350 and turned in adjacent airspace. When the error was noticed Aircraft Y left Sector 59 (FL330-unlimited) and entered 57 airspace (FL240-FL320). Aircraft Y was climbed to FL330 and turned back on course. Sector volume was 10-12 aircraft. Identify similar sounding call signs sooner.

ZOB Center Controller reported problems associated with similar call signs.

1238426

201502

0601-1200

FLY.Airport

CO

3.0

7700.0

VMC

Daylight

CTAF FLY

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class E FLY

CTAF FLY

Bonanza 35

Takeoff / Launch

Class E FLY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Private; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 12; Flight Crew Total 803; Flight Crew Type 35.6

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1238426

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 0; Vertical 100

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was on a 45 degree entry for landing on Runway 15 at FLY. I announced my position on CTAF south and east of the airport at 5 NM and then again as I entered the 45 degree entry to a left downwind for landing. A bonanza reported on CTAF that he was departing runway 15 and then announced turning eastbound. I took evasive action to quickly descend 200 - 300 feet as we were head on. The bonanza was climbing and passed directly over me and we missed by no more than 100 ft. I attempted to contact the bonanza after the near miss on CTAF but he did not respond. FLY is very near to COS Class C airspace; a notch is cutout so that aircraft arriving and departing do not have to contact Springs Approach. Most aircraft departing the FLY traffic pattern do contact Springs Approach for flight following; pick up clearances; etc. I suspect what happened was the Bonanza switched frequencies immediately upon departure and contacted Springs Approach for a clearance. In doing so he was not on CTAF when I made my announcement of a 45 degree entry to downwind.FLY can be very busy and I believe aircraft arriving or departing; not remaining in the pattern; should be required to contact Springs Approach. Basically put the Class C floor over FLY and install a procedure to resolve potential conflicts.

PA28 pilot entering the traffic pattern for Runway 15 at FLY experiences a NMAC with a Bonanza departing Runway 15 and turning east. A head on situation develops with the PA28 pilot diving under the Bonanza to avoid collision.

1695410

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

9000.0

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Beechjet 400

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Vectors

Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 9

Distraction; Situational Awareness

1695410

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Procedure

Airspace Structure

I was working an approach sector. I had a BE40 inbound on vectors to final. I had delay vectored him to get two slow Cessna aircraft in to the airport. At that time I also had a military aircraft inbound with minimum fuel that wouldn't take a speed reduction and also stated he couldn't take a very long downwind for fuel. I vectored the BE40 through final and then to a crosswind heading to delay for the military aircraft. Another aircraft was behind the BE40 that was kept inbound to follow the military aircraft. I went to coordinate the minimum fuel and no delay with Tower and realized that the BE40 hadn't been turned back to downwind and was about to enter a higher 9;600 ft. MVA while being at 9;000 ft. I hung up with Tower and instructed the BE40 to turn left to a heading of 300 and climb immediately to 9;600 ft. He entered the MVA block at 9;100 ft. climbing to 9;600 ft within 1 mile of the MVA boundary. I would recommend looking over my traffic next time before coordinating with Tower to make sure everything was separated to not be distracted while in communication with them.

Approach Controller reported vectoring an aircraft off the final approach course for sequencing placing it below the MVA.

1158989

201403

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Air Carrier

B787-800

2.0

Part 121

Company

Air Carrier

Dispatcher

Dispatch Dispatcher

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Dispatch; Party2 Other

1158989

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Dispatch

Company Policy; Human Factors

Ambiguous

Another Dispatcher asked for my assistance on how to work up and send an update request to the crew for CI500 for a flight to NRT. [We] sent an email to our lone FPSA/Senior Manager but no answer. As we don't expect him to be available to us 24/7; this can be a safety issue not having SME's to assist the 4 Sabre desks operating 24 hours a day. We were able to get an answer from a SME from [a different facility]. It is alarming that the company considers this situation safe. Let us not wait for time critical safety issues to happen and we cannot get an expert to assist us.

Air Carrier Dispatcher questions how to work up and send an update report to the crew for a CI500 [Cost Index] and where to get help after hours.

1026424

201207

1801-2400

FFZ.Airport

AZ

3000.0

TRACON P50

Corporate

Eclipse 500

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

SID MESA ONE

Class D FFZ

Facility P50.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

1026424

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Falcon Tower requested a release on an EA50. The aircraft departed on the Mesa One Departure but turned northbound to join his flight plan instead of remaining on the SID and flying southwest bound. The aircraft was level at 3;000 FT and only a mile from a 4;500 FT MVA by the time I established radio communication. I climbed the aircraft to 6;000 FT but it still entered the 4;500 FT MVA while it was at 3;000 FT. I asked the pilot if it could maintain its own terrain clearance. The pilot responded affirmative so I instructed the aircraft to do that then coordinated with the adjacent sectors for a hand off. There seems to be a lot of problems with pilots understanding the Mesa One SID; maybe some education or a better description on the SID itself to help with confusion.

P50 Controller described a below MVA event involving a FFZ departure assigned a MESA1.MESA SID. The Controller claimed that the aircraft turned in the wrong direction; adding that pilots seem to misunderstand the published procedure.

1675030

201908

1201-1800

Turbulence

Daylight

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Medium

140.0

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 33; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 5; Flight Attendant Total 33; Flight Attendant Type 75

Safety Related Duties; Service

Situational Awareness

1675030

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

N

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

Upon descent; the Flight Attendant in the forward galley called the rear galley to report an unusual odor and asked if we smelled it. We did not and when turbulence subsided; we went forward and noticed the odor. It was not easy to describe but was easily noticeably. The forward Flight Attendant's clothes also contained this odor due to her need to stay forward. After deplaning; she complained of feeling ill and requested to be removed from the remainder of the trip. Myself and the other Flight Attendant felt no effects and remained on the trip.

A319 Flight Attendant reported a fume event in the cabin that was experienced by all flight attendants.

1768255

202010

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Parked

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

1768255

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1768573.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was doing my rounds of the aircraft here in ZZZ. As I drove by our pre-flighted Aircraft X; I could hear an APU running and stairs were up to the aircraft. As I walked up to the aircraft and entered; I noticed the aircraft was sealed from the pre-flight; I broke the seal and confirmed via EICAS indication that the APU was running. The pre-flight crew typically completes the pre-flight between XA-XA:30L. The aircraft was pre-flighted and sealed and left with the APU running for 2.75 hours with no one to monitor for fire events and EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature) temps; this is a severe hazard and had there been a fire event there would have been no one to activate the fire bottle or follow proper procedures. [Recommend] following proper procedures and if no one is left in the cockpit to monitor the APU; please shut it down.

[I] was told that maintenance filed a report saying they found the APU running on Aircraft X after we performed a pre-flight on [date]. To the best of my recollection I completed a full shutdown checklist which includes turning off the battery switch.

Maintenance Supervisor and a Captain reported an aircraft was left unattended with the Auxiliary Power Unit running.

1261027

201505

1201-1800

IAD.Airport

DC

VMC

TRACON PCT

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

Class B PCT

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Distraction

1261027

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors

We were taxiing out for takeoff on Runway 1C. This is an unusual setup for IAD. They normally use the east runway; 1R; for takeoff but it was closed this day. As we were taxing out for takeoff; we started the taxi checklist. ATC interrupted that by telling us to switch to Tower and they actually gave us the wrong one and then called us back to give us the right frequency. After that we completed the taxi checklist. We were the only ones out there but neither of us felt rushed. After takeoff; we turned to a heading of 340 per Tower instructions and after contacting Potomac Dep.; they told us to proceed direct to ZEHRN but we didn't show that in the FMS - we showed HEFLN. After giving us direct to JERES; they told us that HEFLN was used for Runway 30 departures. I double checked the fuel page and sure enough we had Runway 30 selected. While there was no deviation; it could have been serious if this was a true RNAV departure - they use headings off all runways at IAD.Whenever a checklist is interrupted; especially more than once as this one was by the two different ATC calls because of the wrong Tower frequency given to us; it is imperative that the checklist is restarted from the beginning; not picked up from where we left off - because you may pick up at the wrong point as we did. Also; we must verify the runway in the FMS with the heading and the runway number as we line up on that runway.

Distracted during the Taxi checklist; an air carrier flight crew failed to set the proper takeoff runway in the FMC. The error was caught when ATC issued clearance to a fix that was not in the FMC.

1505700

201712

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

6300.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class C SNA

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6.0

Situational Awareness

1505700

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

Aircraft X checked on descending to 6300 feet. I turned the aircraft heading 280 and descended them to 5200 feet. They violated the 6300 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA) by 100 feet; and the 5800 foot MVA by 200 feet. My instruction to descend the aircraft to 5200 feet was too soon and resulted in a loss.We previously had a 'step down procedure' for aircraft landing from the east. This allowed us to descend into the MVA between heading 220 clockwise to 320. The first step was 5000 feet; then 4000 feet; then 3000 feet. This was a great tool that allowed us to easily descend aircraft from the east. In the area that I violated by 100 and 200 feet; we were previously authorized to descend to 5000 feet. This tool was taken away from us and it is my recommendation that we bring it back. Bring back the step down procedure for arrivals into from the east.

ATC TRACON Controller reported using a procedure no longer authorized which resulted in vectoring an arriving aircraft below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1827504

202107

1201-1800

BOI.TRACON

ID

9000.0

TRACON BOI

Corporate

Premier 1

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Vectors

Class E BOI

Aircraft X; Facility BOI.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1827504

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X was given a descent to the Minimum Vectoring Altitude of 9;000 feet which he read back correctly. I observed him starting the descent and responded to another aircraft checking onto the frequency. The other aircraft failed check on properly so I had to query the check on information; issue a heading and an altitude to descend to. The other aircraft did not read back altitude or give a complete read back so I was in the process of getting him squared away. I then noticed Aircraft X was exiting the edge of the 9;000 foot Minimum Vectoring Altitude and descending through 8-something. He had obviously descended through the assigned altitude. He was already in the 7;000 foot (next) Minimum Vectoring Altitude so I issued a new altitude to maintain of 7;000 feet which he read back and complied with. [I recommend] proper staffing levels; [and a] standalone Supervisor in the TRACON. Had there been another set of eyes scanning as well this may have been avoided.

TRACON Controller reported they did not notice an aircraft descending below its assigned altitude and below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude.

1071830

201303

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Snow; 1.25

Night

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

A300

2.0

Part 121

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1071830

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1071833.0

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action

Airport; Weather

Weather

ZZZ weather was reported light snow. Runway XX was in use due to winds. On approach; I requested updated braking action reports and Tower reported fair with taxiways reported as slippery by aircraft that landed in front of us.We selected MED Autobrakes and the aircraft slowed with no problems. We were not able to make [our target] taxiway and continued to taxi to the end of the runway for turnoff. Tower cleared us to turn left on [a taxiway]; left on [another] and to contact Ground and advise when clear.Upon turning onto [the taxiway] the aircraft started to skid to the right. The Captain was able to steer the aircraft back toward centerline but then the aircraft started to skid to the left. The Captain did everything to try and regain control; but was unable. We both tried braking with no response. The aircraft came to a stop on the left side of the taxiway. It appeared we may have been over the taxi lights although we could not confirm that due to the snow cover.We made no attempts to move the aircraft at this point. I reported our position and intentions to the Tower and then contacted Company Maintenance for a tow. Maintenance and the ZZZ airport authority worked to tow us to the ramp. They determined we were still on the taxiway and had not hit any taxi lights. One taxiway light was removed by the airport authority during the tow process.No aircraft damage was suspected or found that I am aware of. The CVR circuit breaker was pulled per Maintenance Control. We remained with the aircraft until it was towed to the gate and we were released. The airport was reporting runway braking action but it would have helped to have taxiway reports that used a recognized scale of braking action.

ATIS winds were 330 at 18 KTS with gusts to 22 KTS with 1 1/4 mile visibility in light snow and mist. As I approached the taxiway; I slowed the aircraft to 8 KTS. Upon entering the turn; the aircraft started a skid to the right. I used full tiller and differential braking to get the aircraft tracking towards centerline. As the aircraft approached centerline; I put in right tiller. At this time the aircraft started skidding left. I applied more right tiller; differential braking; and differential thrust to get the aircraft to correct back towards centerline. The First Officer advised the Tower that we had come to a stop off the surface and to notify aircraft landing behind us. During the straightening process; it took a load of sand and two tugs to move the aircraft.

While attempting to turn off the end of the slippery runway in a strong crosswind the flight crew of an A300 was unable to stop the aircraft nose from sliding to the left. The crew believed they had left the hard surface and called for a tow.

1609111

201901

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1609111

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Weather; Human Factors; Company Policy

Company Policy

[We were] on day three of a five day pairing. We had completed three of our four scheduled legs in challenging weather conditions. Our next leg was to ZZZ to overnight. The weather there was poor and Operations told us that we would likely cancel. I called Dispatch; my Dispatcher was also leaning towards cancellation. They reported weather at ZZZ was 200 feet overcast and 2 sm on a wet runway. He told me to standby and they would make a decision. He called me back to say it was a go and the alternate was ZZZ1. I immediate noticed the poor conditions at ZZZ1 as well. I was sure we needed a 2nd alternate. ZZZ1 reported at the time of our arrival we would be at 500 feet and 3 sm. It was better than that currently but deteriorating. I called back and requested the 2nd alternate. The Dispatcher I could tell was new and he didn't agree with the Supervisor's decision to dispatch to ZZZ and I could tell they were also not excited about my request for a 2nd alternate. They told me we would have to kick off more passengers to accommodate the alternate. I told them it's unfortunate but a must. We received more fuel and they eventually got enough volunteers to go on a later flight. We reviewed the paperwork and decided that our 2nd alternate was a must and ZZZ2 [departure station] was a good one. We took off and headed to ZZZ. We briefed the RNAV and the weather had gone down slightly to 200 feet and 1 sm. We set up the approach [and] while prepping for the approach; Dispatch had sent some confusing messages to us. The first said if you can't make it in to ZZZ1 just return to ZZZ2. I was thinking we didn't have enough fuel for a ZZZ attempt; go missed; shoot ZZZ1 approach; go missed and then go to ZZZ2. During this time; another Dispatcher came on; we were starting the approach into ZZZ and had intercepted course and were about to cross the final approach fix when Tower made a call to us saying that the approach light system shorted out. He did not think they would be available but he said the weather was breaking and he thought we could get in. We went missed [and] climbed to the publish hold. ZZZ1 was dropping; it was around 500 and 3sm; I sent ACARS to Dispatch and she was leaning towards ZZZ1; just like I. However; she was directed to tell us to return to ZZZ2 for Operational concerns. We looked tight on fuel but had enough per their request. We turned 2 turns in the hold; climbed to 10;000 [feet] to save fuel and I immediately asked for ZZZ2. ZZZ1 Center told us that we could expect EFC (Expect Further Clearance) 25 minutes later. We told him it was unacceptable and we were declaring min fuel. He gave us routing; and we told him we could not accept published speeds for fuel economy. Long range cruise was pretty low; but we were in constant rough air so we sped up to give us a margin. I immediately started sending numbers to Dispatch about every fix; (miles out) and FOB (Fuel On Board) to keep her in the loop; and we knew we would be close. ATC was very busy and many aircraft were diverting to ZZZ2; including aircraft inbound to ZZZ1 we were told.By the time we were on final; we had amber gauges; the weather worsened at ZZZ2 and we saw the runway approach lights right at minimums. They had heavy rain at the time. I feel like we should have never been dispatched to an airport that we knew we could not get into. It was suggested that we make ZZZ1 the destination and find another suitable Alternate. My request for that was denied.

E175 Captain reported declaring minimum fuel to expedite ATC handling during a divert due to weather at destination.

1724376

202002

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Parked

Aileron Trim System

X

Failed

Gate / Ramp / Line

Other Exterior

Personal

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Private

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1724376

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Company Policy

Company Policy

On a planned IFR training flight during my preflight I noticed a crack including 2 ribs near the trim tab; causing it to move around I would expect it to cause flutter; possibly losing the horizontal. So I reported it to the flight school owner. His response was 'I know it's been like that' then told us we needed to jump start the aircraft. At this point we called the flight and he preceded to argue about the aircraft being airworthy ended up doing the training flight in another aircraft. I am concerned about the lack of safety culture teaching primary students it's okay to fly a broken airplane. That type of mentality I feel will cause serious problems in the future.

Pilot reported being pressured by a flight school owner to fly an unairworthy aircraft.

1842809

202109

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

285.0

12.0

3000.0

VMC

10

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

Gulfstream IV / G350 / G450

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Vectors

Class B ZZZ1; Class D ZZZ

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 66; Flight Crew Total 7600; Flight Crew Type 3600

Troubleshooting

1842809

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Diverted; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

The aircraft was slowing from 250 kts. to 220 kts. approaching the ZZZZZ fix (Initial Approach Fix) for the RNAV XX approach. As the Flying Pilot; I asked the FO (First Officer) for Flaps 10 at which point he moved the flap handle from zero to ten and advised me the flaps were not moving. I asked him to bring the flap handle back to zero and try again. The FO attempted the second attempt but the flaps did not move. I advised the FO to let ATC know that we would need to break off the approach due to a flight control problem. We were given headings and I took over the radios and flew while the FO ran the Partial flaps/Jammed flaps checklist. I advised ATC that I needed the longest runway available at ZZZ1 and needed some headings and or an orbit to delay the approach until we ran the checklists and loaded the approach into the FMS and set up our navigation system. The Controller was very helpful and provided excellent air traffic control services while we accomplished the things we needed to do to set up and brief the no flap approach into Runway XYR using the ILS. The approach and landing went without incident and the aircraft was safely landed and taxied off the runway. After landing checklists were accomplished and the aircraft was taxied to FBO where we parked and deplaned our one passenger. Aircraft was shut down and the flaps were written up and Maintenance and Company were advised.

Gulfstream IV Captain reported trailing edge flaps failed to extend for landing and elected to divert. Aircraft landed safely.

1227401

201412

1201-1800

DAL.Airport

TX

200.0

IMC

Daylight

Tower DAL

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Other Instrument Approach

Tower DAL

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Landing; Final Approach

Facility DAL.Tower

Government

Coordinator

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5.3

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1227401

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working Coordinator Cab East. I was monitoring the arrivals and departures and coordinating for the Local Control East controller. I noticed aircraft had been taxied out to the Runway 31R from the terminal. The weather was hard IFR and we were protecting for the ILS Critical Areas. Earlier; with no one on final; the Ground Controller taxied an airplane out and did not issue instructions to hold short of the ILS Critical Area. I made a comment to the Ground Controller that they were lucky no one was on final. Several more aircraft were taxied out; and the hold short for the critical are was not given; though no one was on final. Then there was an aircraft on final; and I had not been actively listening to Ground Controller (within 6 feet of my position); when the local controller and I both noticed at the same time Aircraft X had crossed the ILS Hold Line. He issued the instruction to hold his position. I estimate the entire aircraft had crossed the hold line. At the time of the hold instruction; I looked up to see Aircraft Y's lights on short final (about 1/2NM); and then looked again at Aircraft X to verify that he stopped. I had the approach plate book in my hand and threw it down loudly to make a point to the ground controller.After that; the Ground Controller still did not issue hold short of the ILS Critical Area instructions to every aircraft that taxied out; but only to those when they saw an aircraft on final. I believe this is a poor work ethic; called 'Shooting for the minimums and still failing.' The Ground Controller did the minimum amount of work; and then failed to do the job correctly when absolutely required. It also does not represent the professionalism the FAA and NATCA are trying to instill on our younger controllers. Weather lines: KDAL XX 07007KT 2 1/2SM BR OVC004 09/08 A3042 RMK AO2 SLP300 T00890078KDAL XX 06006KT 2 1/2SM BR OVC004 09/08 A3041 RMK AO2 SLP295 T00890078 I would recommend an SOP change to state that the Local Controller owns the taxiways and pavement in the ILS Critical Areas when they are in effect. This would insure that all aircraft are required to be told to hold short and any aircraft or vehicle needing to be in the critical area would be coordinated with local control regardless of any aircraft on final. This would tighten the standards in the 7110.65V that only requires the area to be protected when an aircraft is inside the final approach fix; and the local SOP that states to protect the areas when required. This would give the judgment and control of the protected areas back to Local Control; and not someone else who is not working airborne traffic.

DAL Cab Coordinator describes a situation where the Ground Controller does not issue correct clearances to taxiing aircraft to protect the ILS Critical area.

1223263

201412

0.0

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Other Training

Company

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty); Other / Unknown

Flight Attendant Current

Safety Related Duties

Training / Qualification; Confusion; Distraction

1223263

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Attendant

Other Training

Company Policy; Procedure

Company Policy

Flight Attendants in the Recurrent Training program for 2015 are conducting an aircraft validation drill using sandblasted safety/sunglasses. This is supposed to represent a smoke filled environment; however the condition is so dark flight attendants can barely see based on the aircraft mock-up lighting. When the flight attendant goes to assess conditions they can't accurately figure out which condition is posted outside their door (flight attendants think the poster is a nighttime condition when they assess); however they open the door anyway. This training is concerning as they are not responding to opening the scenario by seeing a daytime photograph of a clear unobstructed path. They are responding based on watching a video; and not to how they were trained to evacuate an airplane. They are not responding based on seeing an unobstructed path to evacuate or none of the other aircraft exits are usable.

During annual recurrent training; a smoke filled cabin environment is simulated by flight attendants wearing sandblasted glasses which causes incorrect assessments of outside evacuation conditions.

1462160

201707

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

20.0

10

Night

12000

CTAF ZZZ

Corporate

Helicopter

1.0

Part 91

Passenger

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Hangar / Base

Observer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 2; Flight Crew Total 300

Situational Awareness

1462160

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR

Person Observer

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

Tonight a helicopter went over the top of one of my hangars at roughly 20 feet above the roof. I consider this very unsafe especially when there is room in all directions to enter and exit the airport safely without endangering hangars or people. This happens frequently and the pilots do not seem to care. I am worried that one of these helicopter is going to drop through my roof; destroying airplanes and possibly killing people in the hangar. I think most of the problems with helicopters at this airport could be eliminated if they had a set pattern to enter and exit the airport.

A ground observer reported that helicopters frequently fly very close to the hangars and may be a hazard to persons on the ground.

1656472

201906

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Takeoff / Launch

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1656472

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff roll

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

I was the First Officer and Pilot Flying on Aircraft X from ZZZ-ZZZ1. The aircraft was leaving a maintenance facility and heading back to resume normal line flying. After both the Captain and I conducted thorough preflight; we started the jet and began to taxi to Runway XX. The taxi was uneventful. The takeoff roll began at approximately XA:15 pm and yielded nothing out of the ordinary till a few knots below V1. Approaching V1 I began to smell a very pungent order and shortly after began to see a haze like smoke forming in the cockpit. I called 'reject; reject; reject' to which the Captain and I performed the Rejected Takeoff procedure. We taxied off the runway and had airport operations follow us back to the maintenance facility. The taxi back to the maintenance facility yielded no additional smoke or fumes.

EMB-135LR First Officer reported pungent odor and haze occurred during takeoff roll. Crew executed a rejected takeoff and return to maintenance.

1753381

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Tower ZZZ

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

X

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Distraction

1753381

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

Other takeoff

Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Upon takeoff flight crew noticed heavy burning rubber odor present in flight deck. Not being able to rule out the possibility of an onboard fire; I elected to abort the takeoff. The takeoff was aborted at 95 knots. We stopped on the runway; assessed the condition of the aircraft and elected to return to the gate to have maintenance come.

EMB145 Captain reported aborting takeoff due to burning odor in the cockpit.

1418487

201701

1201-1800

SCT.TRACON

CA

2000.0

Daylight

Tower PSP

Fractional

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

VOR / VORTAC TRM

Final Approach

Other VOR B

Class D PSP

TRACON SCT

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Initial Approach

Class E SCT

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Departure; Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 7

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1418487

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Aircraft X had been cleared for the VOR B into PSP. When the aircraft was short final the PSP tower called and told the approach controller that Aircraft X was going to execute a 360 on final. The controller working position was very confused about what the aircraft was going to do. She had an aircraft on final behind Aircraft X that she had to maneuver to maintain spacing. I think there is a big misconception on what exactly an aircraft is allowed to do when cleared for the VOR B approach. The tower was not clear about what the aircraft was doing. The tower tried to argue with the TRACON controller over the landline. We need to develop training for the controllers who work PSP tower and approach so that they are aware what an aircraft can do on a VOR B approach so that we can provide positive separation.

SCT TRACON Controller reported of confusion when PSP Tower advised SCT that the aircraft on final was going to do a 360. SCT had traffic following the initial aircraft and wanted the rules clarified on what the Tower and Approach can do.

1705292

201911

1801-2400

DEN.Airport

CO

0.0

Night

Ground DEN

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Ice Detection System

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting

1705292

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Blocked out on time. The ATIS temp was M12; with no visible moisture expected on climb. I failed to include the anticipated use of anti-ice for contaminants in my briefing. Following the #1 engine start; we were cleared for taxi. I had instructed the FO (First Officer) to start the #2 engine during the initial taxi movement. While making a sharp 180 degree turn from the gate; I noticed the ramp outside of the gate area was contaminated; and selected the anti-ice selector to ON. After the #2 engine was started; we had an ENG REF A-I DISAGREE; with ENG TDS (Temperature Detection System) REF A-I ENG EICAS messages. I had suspected it was due to the A-I mode selector being turned ON and no anti-ice selection in the TDS.When we got to an area of the taxiway without contaminants; the mode selector was moved back to AUTO; but the fault did not clear. We ran the QRH; resending and resetting the takeoff data with ENG anti-ice selected; this time; with no help. Maintenance Control was contacted; and we shut down the engines. The messages cleared during shutdown; but returned when the engines were re-started and configured the same way. Discussed situation with on-duty CP (Chief Pilot) and coordinated with Maintenance Control to return to gate for a power reset. While waiting for Maintenance; [I] researched the AOM to find the ENG REF A-I DISAG message will be present when the REF A/I is set to ENG in the TDS and the OAT is below 5 degrees Celsius. At this point; it was evident why the messages were there; as the OAT was -12; and the A-I TDS should have been set to ALL. Maintenance came out to the aircraft; ran the FIM (Fault Isolation Manual Procedure); and cleared the log page item.Anytime contaminants are reported/suspected; this should be briefed; and the appropriate anti-ice settings should be confirmed in the TRS. Before leaving the gate; I should have recognized the TDS anti-ice needed to be selected to ALL; for the corresponding OAT and conditions.

Captain reported EICAS anti-ice malfunction message annunciation during taxi for takeoff.

1417406

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

Dash 8-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1417406

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft had a maintenance open write up for the main cabin air stair door and maintenance was just completing their work. Also; at the same time; the weather at the destination was below dispatch minimums and the dispatcher did not publish the release until it improved. I noticed a stream of passengers walking out to our aircraft unsupervised. I walked out to direct them back into the terminal and noticed the gate agent to stop boarding. Never was our crew asked whether we were ready to board; nor was there a flight release up; and maintenance was in progress. The propeller was not tied and the sure step wasn't in place either. The passengers were in disarray on the busy ramp.The gate agent began an auto-board without checking with the crew; even though there was active maintenance and the dispatcher even put a delay on the flight due to weather. I walked with the passengers back to the terminal and then notified the gate agent.These types of scenarios occur frequently ever since auto-boarding was instituted. There must be some type of exchange between the crew and gate agents before boarding; on every flight. Frequently we are surprised by passengers boarding and this puts undue pressure on the crew to rush through tasks; sometimes before we can even verify whether an aircraft is airworthy and ready for passengers.

DHC 8-300 flight crew reported witnessing unsupervised passengers walking out to the aircraft for boarding. The agent had not alerted the crew of the boarding process.

1703215

201911

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Improperly Operated

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 139; Flight Crew Total 14500; Flight Crew Type 3600

1703215

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

During the exterior walk around; the exterior door handle for door 1R was not in the proper closed position. After the walk around; I asked the flight attendants if they were catered in ZZZ; and they replied that they were not. I told them that the exterior door handle was not in the closed position. They replied that they did hear an unusual noise coming from door 1R shortly after the sterile cockpit chime sounded during climbout. I asked if there was any loud squeal or an air rushing noise coming from the door during the flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. They said they did not hear either. I had the ramp crew re-secure the door latch in the proper position. At no point while at the gate did the FWD SERVICE door light illuminate while the door was closed. During the initial climb out from ZZZ; the pressurization was normal and no door lights were illuminated. Upon arriving at ZZZ1; I had the ramp personnel check the door handle on door 1R and it was still in the proper closed position.

B737 Captain reported an exterior door handle was not properly secured during pre-flight checks.

1003689

201204

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

35000.0

VMC

Dusk

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1003689

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Aircraft

In cruise flight at FL350 we lost fuel quantity indications on the left; center; and total fuel quantities. We also received an AUTO XFLOWINHIBIT message. The fuel synoptic page also indicated an AUTO XFLOW INHIBIT message and showed amber dashed lines for the left; center; and total quantities and approximately 1;700 LBS of fuel in the right wing tank. We tried to get Maintenance Control through the company frequency and could not. We [contacted] Dispatch [via] ACARS that we were going to divert and stated the fuel conditions along with out estimate of FOB. We received an ACARS from the Dispatch saying to continue to [destination] and call when we got there.We referenced the QRH and there is no procedure for no quantity (amber dashed lines) indication. We decided that not knowing the true fuel quantity and the possibility that we were creating a fuel imbalance that could exceed the 800 LBS limitation; and that the current indicated fuel onboard was within 200 LBS of our reserve fuel that the best idea was to divert to [a nearby airport]. We then declared an emergency with ATC and were vectored to the ILS; accomplishing a normal approach and landing below maximum landing weight. After arrival Maintenance Control MEL'd the quantity indicators; refueled the aircraft per the MEL and we continued to [original destination]. I feel we handled this situation well as a crew to best serve the needs of safety; our passengers; and the company.

CRJ-200 First Officer reported loss of all fuel quantity indicators. They elected to divert to a nearby airport even as Dispatch recommended continuing to destination.

1085690

201303

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Variable Wind; 10

Daylight

10000

Personal

J3 Cub

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Taxi

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3000; Flight Crew Type 125

Human-Machine Interface

1085690

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Object; Ground Excursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

Other Landing

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

I was landing a Piper Cub J3 the aircraft had touched down and was transitioning to the three point attitude when it started to yaw to the right. Due to a fluctuating winds that had produced a quartering tail wind; the aircraft yawed to the right. I [applied] full Left rudder and Left brake with little or no effect. I then rolled the aircraft to the left the aircraft then started to correct when the right wing tip impacted a building causing the aircraft to turn into the building. Then the spinner impacted the building stopping all residual motion at this point the aircraft came to rest in front of the building.

Piper Cub pilot reports loosing control during landing resulting a runway excursion and impact with a building.

1601688

201812

1201-1800

S46.ARTCC

WA

6200.0

TRACON S46

Military

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Climb

Class E S46

Facility S46.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1601688

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

I had been working Arrival E and Arrival W combined during the beginning of an arrival rush. Aircraft were beginning to step on each other over 2 frequencies as the workload increased. Multiple aircraft also started to report icing in the weather which added to the frequency congestion. Another controller finally came back to split the Arrival West frequency. As that briefing was happening; I accepted a handoff from the P sector of Aircraft X. The controller verbally coordinated to me that the aircraft was direct the SEA065050 fix climbing to 3;000 feet. This is an abnormal route for our airspace which requires coordination with departure a; as well as sector 31. I was stepping Aircraft X up underneath arrivals on the GLASR arrival as soon as I could. At some point; I became preoccupied with the multiple Seattle arrivals and when I looked to climb Aircraft X further; he was already about to enter the 7;000 foot MVA area only climbing out of 6;200. I asked if he could maintain his own terrain/obstruction clearance through 8;000 and he replied negative. I gave him an immediate right turn to a 180 heading to get him out of the area and issued a climb to 15;000. Aircraft X was in the 7;000 MVA for a couple miles. Once above the MVA; I turned him back on course and gave the frequency change to sector 31.First and foremost; traffic management came over to me and said they tried to get me help to split the sector but that there wasn't the staffing. So I continued to work both sectors until relief was brought back in. Just because the board doesn't look like the volume of traffic is too difficult for one controller to work both sectors combined; doesn't mean the complexity of our airspace won't warrant the sector to be split.Stepping up aircraft from Paine field underneath arrivals on the GLASR arrival to SeaTac is cumbersome and takes attention away from other things that need to be done. This will be amplified once commercial service begins flying daily flights out of that airport. There are no procedures in place to handle the influx of this traffic and there will be more events like the one that just happened.

S46 TRACON Controller reported working a combined position; having to climb an aircraft underneath other aircraft and it entered a higher MVA.

1422896

201701

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Snow

Night

Air Taxi

Brasilia EMB-120 All Series

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 22000; Flight Crew Type 9000

1422896

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft; Procedure

Ambiguous

This was an incident where we lost several panels during flight. We had no indication of when the panels came off. The aircraft had gone through maintenance the day before due to the aircraft not producing heat to the passengers or pilots. The following day the aircraft was working good and putting out heat; making the flights that day tolerable. My first officer made the preflight for the day but saw nothing unusual in the walk around. We were originally scheduled to fly one more leg but due to the time and the condition of the airport; both runway and ramp had areas of ice; making taxiing and possible takeoff unsafe. I informed my Company that we needed to end the trip there and go to the hotel. The next day when we reported to the airport is when we discovered that the aircraft was missing the panels.

EMB-120 Captain reported discovering that their aircraft had lost several exterior panels in flight.

1689732

201910

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

400.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Class C ZZZ

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1689732

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

Assigned to operate [a] ferry flight from ZZZ to PHL. The aircraft being ferried [requested priority handling with ATC] the day prior and returned to ZZZ after takeoff. After takeoff; a smell of an electrical burn and LAV SMOKE master warning [was] encountered. Returned to ZZZ.After takeoff; around 200 feet; both the Captain and I noticed the smell of an electrical burn. Passing through 400 feet the aircraft produced a LAV SMOKE master warning. No other warnings; cautions; or advisories were present. Cause unknown. MEL was signed off from the day prior by Maintenance in the logbook.Once the aircraft was cleaned up; we ran the LAV SMOKE QRH procedure. Once that was complete I ran normal checklist; sent an ACARS message; and set up for the approach while the Captain flew the aircraft and handled ATC. We wanted an immediate return to ZZZ and vectors to final for the LDA Runway XX.No suggestions at this time. Since the Captain was flying it was easy for him to take control of the radios while I ran the checklists. It is my belief that in any emergency situation; no matter who is the Pilot Flying; the cockpit should be divided such that the Captain is the one communicating with ATC throughout most of the emergency. That way the Captain doesn't have to listen to an ATC request; make an informed decision; tell his First Officer what to say; and then [pass it] off to ATC or the Flight Attendant. I am reviewing our publications currently to see if this is SOP.

EMB-145 First Officer reported smelling an electrical burn and receiving a LAV SMOKE master warning after takeoff.

1162657

201404

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

140.0

35000.0

Mixed

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Window

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 3600

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion; Troubleshooting

1162657

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 332; Flight Crew Type 332

1162693.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; General Declared Emergency

I was pilot monitoring in cruise flight at FL 350 headed when the Captain pointed out that my R1 windshield was arcing. He instructed me to don my mask and get the checklist out. I was in the process of opening the Window Damage Checklist when I heard a loud bang and my windshield shattered/cracked in at least five places with numerous fingers from each. The Captain ordered me to declare an emergency and started slowing the airplane for a descent. I declared the emergency and told the Controller I needed a clearance to the nearest suitable airfield and an immediate descent. He cleared us direct to ZZZ and FL 290. We monitored the pressurization and had normal readings. We initiated the descent and as I was getting into the checklist; I loaded FMS landing data; and the Captain flew in that direction. I turned the seatbelt sign back on. The pilot flying communicated with the flight attendants and flew the airplane as I [restarted] the Window Damage Checklist. In the descent; I evaluated the window as possible outer pane cracks only. The Captain thought they were too severe to tell; but due to the severity of them and the fact he saw them arcing; we proceeded with our plan to divert. We lowered the landing gear and left the speedbrakes out to burn fuel for landing. I lowered my seat and put on sunglasses to help avoid debris in case the rest of the window gave way.We ran the QRH Checklist; the Descent Checklist; the Divert Checklist; loaded the box; ran the landing numbers; and flew to an overweight landing on Runway XXR and taxied to a gate. Touchdown fuel was 11.5; ZFW was 104943 giving us an overweight landing at 116.4 thousand pounds; performed with Captain's emergency authority

Directed the First Officer to don O2 mask and goggles as did I.

A B737 flight crew opted to descend and divert to a nearby airport when the First Officer's windshield first arced and then shattered. They were unable to determine with certainty whether the shattering was limited to the outer pane; a situation that would not have required such immediate action.

1073054

201303

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

2600.0

VMC

Daylight

3000

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ

Trailing Edge Flap

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1073054

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Training / Qualification

1073056.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Company Policy; Aircraft

Aircraft

On the right downwind for Runway 23 we were given a descent down to 2;600 from 5;000 FT. During the descent the Captain asked for flaps 9 degrees. When I selected the flap position the Caution light and ding went off signaling on the EICAS that we had 'FLAP FAIL.' I checked the backup RMU page for the aircraft systems and saw the flaps were still in the 0 position. We cycled the flaps back to 0 and back to 9 then back to 0 to no avail. Approach gave us a vector to base. We then began the Flap Fail QRH. At this point we were given a vector to join final and contact Tower. Once with Tower we advised Tower that we were experiencing a problem and needed delay vectors to finish the QRH. Tower advised us to maintain 2;600 FT and circle as necessary to handle the situation. We then completely ran the Flap Fail QRH. We determined that per the QRH; we had enough runway available to safely completely a flap 0 landing on Runway 23 and that a diversion was unnecessary. After completing the in range portion of the QRH; the Captain instructed me to declare an emergency with the Tower so that emergency personnel would be standing by the runway as a precaution. The Captain then informed the Flight Attendant of the situation and then made a PA to the passengers informing them of the situation and to not worry. Once on final we finished the QRH once the gear came down. We landed safely with no abnormal occurrence other than landing with the flaps 0. We departed with around 300 LBS over release fuel but discovered the problem on downwind with about 2;300 LBS. This made options such as diverting to an airport with longer runways such as IAD more difficult.

We had a flap low speed MEL for the aircraft (27-53-00-02). On approach we selected flaps 9 and the EICAS flap fail message appeared. The weather was good with no alternate. Fuel planned on arrival for release was about 2;400 LBS. The fact we had only about 1 hours worth of fuel was a threat. It took away time and options that might had been available had we had more fuel. Without the extra time; and the fact we were on the approach; the process moved along pretty quick. We were trying to make sure all necessary checklists and communications were accomplished before the approach was continued. Try to take your time as much as you can. Given that not much time/options are available; prioritize what is important.

An EMB-145 EICAS alerted FLAP FAIL as flaps 9 were selected for landing so the crew completed the QRH; declared an emergency; and landed without incident.

1471141

201708

1201-1800

ATL.Airport

GA

0.0

VMC

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Tower ATL

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 160; Flight Crew Total 23820; Flight Crew Type 7900

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1471141

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Air Traffic Control

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Airport; Procedure; Human Factors

Human Factors

We were cleared to leave the ramp and taxi to the runway. We were told our sequence was to follow the MD88 ahead and monitor the tower which we did. Approaching the taxiway the MD88 started taxiing to cross the left runway which was being used as a taxiway as there was a tug pulling an aircraft stopped on the runway. So as previously cleared we continued to follow the aircraft ahead.Approaching the runway Tower called our flight number so I stopped with nose slightly on the runway. My co-pilot then told Tower our clearance was to follow the MD88 and monitor the tower which we were doing. The controller then said he has a phone number to call for possible runway violation. We continued on with no further incident. There was no threat to safety in anyway. The clearance to sequence and follow the MD88 superseded the one given to us on the ramp. We were never told to hold short of a taxiway or the left runway with the second clearance. There was a definite communication failure on both parties; ATC and us. With the tug and aircraft stopped on the left runway the runway was obviously not active. In the future with this type of communication I will clarify the intent.

A320 Captain reported being issued taxi instructions to follow another aircraft and following the aircraft onto a runway to cross; but that was not ATC's intention.

1355607

201510

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Citation V/Ultra/Encore (C560)

2.0

IFR

Parked

Unscheduled Maintenance

Repair

Aileron Trim System

Cessna

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Inspector; Technician

Maintenance Inspection Authority

1355607

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Maintenance

Routine Inspection

General Maintenance Action

Procedure

Technician working an aileron trim freezing in flight discrepancy called MCC (Maintenance Control Center) and asked if SB27-3840 had been accomplished on the aircraft. Technician reported there is a warning note in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) to not mix different types of grease in the trim actuators. SB27-3840 changes the type of grease used in the trim actuators and cannot be mixed with other types of grease. The technician needed to grease the aileron trim actuators to repair the discrepancy.I searched [our maintenance software] for the status of SB27-3840 on this aircraft. No status could be determined. A search of all aircraft affected by the Service Bulletin (SB) revealed only one aircraft had the SB signed off on it. All others neither showed complete nor open. According to the aircraft maintenance records the SB had not been accomplished on this aircraft and I instructed the technician to us the pre-SB type of grease. After I ended the phone call with the technician another maintenance controller commented he overheard my conversation with the technician about the grease and he was pretty sure all the aircraft affected by SB27-3840 had the SB complied with. Another search in the aircraft maintenance records [with our maintenance software] did not uncover any different information. I also tried to use [our older maintenance software] which is a valuable resource for this type of situation; but discovered it had been locked down again and access was denied. [Our older maintenance software] would have easily identified whether or not the SB had been accomplished prior to introduction of [current maintenance software]. There are many SBs and other critical information available in [our older maintenance software] that cannot be identified in [our current maintenance software] because much of the [older maintenance software] aircraft information and modifications or SB level status was not deemed worthy to transfer to [our current maintenance software] which has quickly and routinely proved a mistake.After researching SB27-3840 it was found that special markings were to be added to the aircraft near the trim actuators identifying the type of grease to be used when changed during the SB. The technician was then called and notified to look for the special marks applied during compliance of SB. The technician found the marks indicating the SB was complied with and he used the appropriate grease.Having access to limited and incomplete aircraft information and SB compliance loaded into [our current maintenance software] has been a source of frustration only [Maintenance] controllers experience.Provide a system with easy access to all [Maintenance] controllers with complete SB; Service Letters (SL) and other modifications status as [our older maintenance software] provided. [This software] is not a practical answer for accessing this information. It is not an easy or intuitive program and [Maintenance] controllers do not know of its existence nor would they use it enough to become proficient with it. MOD level status of avionics components is also a sore subject and leaves [Maintenance Control] guessing because that is another identification not tracked in [our current maintenance software] yet [our current maintenance software] has the capabilities to record such information.

While working a trim freezing problem on a Cessna CE-560E; Maintenance could not determine if a Service Bulletin was accomplished on this aircraft to determine which type of grease to use on the trim actuator.

1834556

202108

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Rain; 8

Daylight

4000

Tower ZZZ

Corporate

Light Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Taxi

Visual Approach; Direct

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 25

Workload; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Confusion

1834556

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Taxiway

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

I was PIC (Pilot in Command) and Pilot Flying. We were cleared to land and to expect to exit at Taxiway XX; approach and landing were normal; as I was approaching the high speed left turn onto Taxiway XX; the wind; which was out of the south and gusty; caused the aircraft to veer left; I attempted to correct with full right rudder and right brake; which was ineffective. I realized we were committed to going through the lights; went through/around them; then just as quickly back thru them onto XX taxiway. We taxied to the ramp and parked.While not minimizing my full responsibility for this event; I believe it's important to consider how this happened in order to mitigate any future occurrence. Contributing factors: 1. The gusty crosswind2. My inexperience with Aircraft X3. Excessive speed for the conditionsMitigation Strategies:1. Slow down; get to taxi speed more quickly.2. Understand the only connection to the nose wheel is the tiller and to guard/utilize it appropriately.

Captain reported loss of control while exiting runway at the high speed turnoff.

1607637

201901

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

1300.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

None

Class E ZZZ

UNICOM ZZZ

Personal

PA-44 Seminole/Turbo Seminole

Part 91

Personal

Initial Climb

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 107; Flight Crew Total 630; Flight Crew Type 493

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1607637

Conflict NMAC

Vertical 400

Automation Aircraft TA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

My student and I were practicing the Localizer DME RWY XX Approach into ZZZ. I had made 3 position reports on the CTAF frequency notifying airport traffic of our position on the approach; and what our intentions were. The winds were favoring Runway XY and that's what runway was in use at the time. I had planned to do a low approach over the top at circling approach minimum which [was] 1260 ft; and then enter the downwind for Runway XY; and I made that clear over the CTAF. The goal was to practice circling to land off an approach with my instrument student. A Piper Seminole had just departed the runway and I had that traffic in sight; and I was aware there was another aircraft that was behind the Seminole on final. Believing I had enough time; I had my student take off the hood; at which point the aircraft was under my control. As we passed over the top of the field in preparation to circle; I realized that there was only about 400 feet between me and the other aircraft which had been behind the Seminole (as noted via the Traffic information Service and visual observation). Rather than continue; my student and I departed the pattern and re-entered on the 45 for Runway XY without incident. ZZZ is among the top 4 busiest airports within the state; but is un-towered. The field is currently attempting to fund a control tower; which many people believe is much needed and critical to maintaining the safety at the airport. However; in order to prevent future occurrences; and until a tower is implemented; breaking off approaches and re-entering on the 45 when there are multiple aircraft in the pattern is probably safest.

Instructor pilot decided to break off approach due to close proximity of traffic at a non-towered airport airport.

1307058

201510

1201-1800

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

28000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)

X

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1307058

Aircraft Y

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 210; Flight Crew Total 15500; Flight Crew Type 9840

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1306712.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

We were climbing enroute. We were given FL280 as an altitude to climb to. Autopilot was on. ATC called traffic about 10 o'clock above us at FL290. As the aircraft climbed through about 27;700 the TCAS gave us an RA to adjust vertical climb. The FO took off the auto-pilot; not unusual when receiving an RA. I scanned the outside for the traffic and saw them; alerting the FO I had the traffic in sight. I glanced down and saw we were at 28;150 feet and climbing. I told him to 'Stop the Climb!' We leveled at 28;200 and reversed down to 28;000 feet. Then the FO told me for an unknown reason he got the meaning of the red and green arcs confused and was thinking he needed to keep the VSI needle in the Red arc. When I told him to stop the climb he said he immediately realized what he was doing wrong.Perhaps if the FO would have left the autopilot on the capture of 28;000 would have been better; however I see that the autopilot routinely will capture and climb 100 feet high; then come back down to the correct altitude. The RA came on before he took off the autopilot; so the RA was not a result of our altitude getting to 28;200.

We were in cruise at FL290. We saw traffic on the TCAS; no advisory from ATC was ever received; and watched it climb through FL280 (1;000 below us) and approach our flight path. The TCAS RA activated and stated Climb; Climb. We immediately climbed & turned away from the offender aircraft. During our climb the FO stated; 'He's coming right at us.' During our climb the aircraft remained 800 feet below us. We climbed to FL300 and advised ATC at once. When the offender aircraft had passed below us we asked ATC to advise what altitude they wanted us to maintain. They responded FL290 so we descended to FL290.

An air carrier First Officer climbing to FL280 with FL290 traffic ahead; misinterpreted his TCAS RA red/green visual cues and continued climbing with the VSI needle in the red band. The FL290 aircraft crew took evasive action to the climbing traffic RA.