elihoole/asrs-aviation-reports · Datasets at Hugging Face

1032585

201208

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

50000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

DA40 Diamond Star

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Takeoff / Launch

Exterior Pax/Crew Door

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 28; Flight Crew Total 175.4; Flight Crew Type 31.8

Confusion; Distraction; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1032585

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

Other Takeoff Roll

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During takeoff roll; the rear hatch of the aircraft opened and blew off the aircraft. I heard a loud noise at that time; but was unaware as to the source of the noise. I immediately aborted takeoff; and notified the Tower of my intentions. I then noticed the rear hatch was no longer on the plane; and notified the Tower that there was FOD on the runway. I exited the active Runway (18L) at first chance and taxied back to the ramp. The plane was put in the hangar along with the hatch that was retrieved. The aircraft never left the ground. A pilot (me) and one passenger were on board. No one was injured; and there was no apparent structural damage to the aircraft.

A DA40's rear hatch opened and blew off on to the runway during the takeoff roll. The takeoff was rejected and aircraft returned to the FBO for maintenance.

1206549

201409

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

B737-700

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

High

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Boarding

1206549

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I was placing my luggage in the overhead bin; turned around and saw passengers boarding the aircraft. I was not notified boarding had begun; nor had ops checked to make sure we were ready. Ops should always check with the crew to ensure they are ready before boarding.

B737 Flight Attendant reports passengers boarding before she was ready and without any communication from the gate agent or operations.

1255676

201504

0601-1200

SDL.Airport

AZ

Daylight

TRACON P50; Tower SDL

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

IFR

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class D SDL

Tower SDL

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Final Approach

Class D SDL

Facility SDL.TOWER

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.6

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1255676

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic

Procedure

During this situation; the Biltmore Sector at P50 did not initiate the flash to hand an aircraft off until the aircraft on the edge of SDL Tower Class D airspace. While this was happening; I had Aircraft Y on final and Aircraft Z turning approximately a 3 mile base turn for a touch and go. I did not observe the inbound Aircraft X on the STARS display because the alfa numerics were not visible; and I did not observe the 'B' tag; which is designated to the Biltmore Sector; until the controller at P50 called to initiate a manual handoff. At the time he called he apologized for the late flash; I said I could not take that because of pattern traffic; and gave my operating initials and came off the line. A few seconds later Aircraft X came over to my frequency stating he was cleared for the visual approach. I gave the aircraft the sequence to follow Aircraft Z on final. Subsequently Aircraft X closure rate on the Aircraft Z resulted in me having to send Aircraft X around. I called back to the P50 controller and asked if he had just switched the aircraft and he said he did against my decision stating that I could not accept the aircraft. This is becoming a recurrent problem facing SDL Tower and puts us in a severely disabling position while dealing with our heightened seasonal traffic that is taking place now. A new Letter of Agreement was just put into effect. This LOA mandates that SDL tower must accept the data transfer for an IFR inbound aircraft regardless of current traffic volume whether it be IFR/VFR. This is not feasible with the traffic volume we can have during the winter months. If we do not accept the data transfer as management requires; P50 will make a quick shout over the shout line and switch the aircraft. At SDL we are a training facility and have numerous 'green' controllers who are susceptible to adverse situations by this mandate. It must be retracted. Additionally it is very misunderstood at SDL how this is only called a data transfer and not a handoff; and how another facility can get away with one aircraft entering another controllers airspace if they do not accept the handoff.

SDL Local Controller reports of a attempted handoff late from P50. SDL Controller advises he's unable handoff due to other traffic. Minutes later the aircraft is on his frequency cleared for a visual approach. SDL Controller had to send an aircraft around due to the overtake from the un-handed off aircraft. A new LOA went into place 3 days prior.

1813401

202106

0001-0600

ZZZ.TRACON

US

VMC

Wind

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B757-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Descent

Class B ZZZ

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1813401

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Troubleshooting

1813678.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

On descent; we received a L hydraulic system pressure message The First Officer continued to fly and i worked through the QRH. After running the QRH we decided to [advise] with ZZZ Approach. We also had a jumpseater in the back who had just transitioned from the B757 to the [aircraft] so I asked if he would join us in the cockpit as an extra set of eyes. At this time the left hydraulic fluid was so low that alternate means had to be used to extend LE and TE flaps and the landing gear. After an extended down wind to configure we advised the Tower that we would need [to be] towed off of the runway and would be making a full stop on Runway XXL. Captain's landing was smooth and light braking was used and the airplane was brought to a stop at [taxiway] 1X and shut down. After arriving at the gate; the First Officer; jumpseater and I went inside to go over it as I was curious to see what things i could have done better. I had full intention of immediately calling the [Chief Pilot] right after this; but in the mix; I forgot and didn't speak to him for almost an hour and a half. I also did not put that [we advised ATC] in the write up. Being my first [priority event] with the maintenance software I selected the '[advised ATC]' switch to yes and made the wrong assumption that this would suffice. Lesson learned.

On descent into ZZZ; a Left Hydraulic System Pressure malfunction illuminated. I was Flying Pilot and continued to fly while the Captain commenced QRH procedures for the associated malfunction. Once the QRH procedures were completed; we [advised] ZZZ Approach. We elected to get our one jumpseater who is typed in the B757 and [aircraft] to assist as needed in the cockpit. With loss of left hydraulic fluid; we needed to lower flaps/slats and landing gear via alternate means. Both procedures were properly completed as per the QRH. We notified ATC that we would need assistance upon landing and that we would be a full stop on the runway. Landing was uneventful and shutdown was per QRH and normal procedures while on Runway XXL. Normal communications were established with ZZZ rescue. Company maintenance personnel arrived to the aircraft and towed the jet to Gate XX without incident. Fire/Rescue escorted jet to gate; no services required. Suspected hydraulic system pressure/fluid loss on left hydraulic system.

B757 flight crew reported loss of a hydraulic system resulted in a precautionary landing and a tow off the runway to the gate.

1566379

201808

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

500.0

VMC

Thunderstorm

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class C ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 1541

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1566379

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Type 4390

Situational Awareness; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1566395.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors

Cleared for visual approach to Runway XXL at ZZZ; we were turned towards the marker and were high and fast. We were able to get configured and slowed by 500 feet; but below 500 we received a GPWS Terrain Warning. This prompted us to execute a go-around. We entered right traffic and did a visual approach to Runway XXL with an uneventful landing. After shut down at the gate; we received an Advisory Crew Message Report below 500 of vertical speed max -1456; vertical speed average -513. This is no doubt what caused the warning. As my eyes were outside at the time of the occurrence; I was not aware of the excessive vertical speed.

At 500 feet on final to Runway XXL; terrain warning went off. [We] went around and did another visual approach. After landing; [we] received a print out that we were 1400 FPM at 500 feet. We were slightly high and fast passing 1000 feet but was correcting. Neither one of us saw an excessive rate; but it was late; after being delayed.

B737 flight crew reported an unstable approach accompanied by a GPWS Terrain Warning.

1053870

201212

0601-1200

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

20000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Powerplant Fuel Control Unit

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

1053870

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency

Aircraft

The flight crew reported for duty at about sunrise and performed their appropriate duties to prepare for passenger boarding. Neither the pilots nor flight attendants reported any abnormalities. I called Maintenance Operational Control (MOC) to clarify a date on an MEL item listed on the Flight Release to confirm it was correct; and was advised it was. Upon completion of the cockpit setup and preflight walk around by the First Officer; we completed the Preflight Checklist; I briefed the flight attendants; and then waited for the completion of boarding. Completion of boarding; pushback; engine start and taxi to the assigned departure Runway 28 was uneventful. Our position in the takeoff line up was number 3 behind two air carrier aircraft. After both departed; Tower cleared us for takeoff; I transferred control to the First Officer; who was the Pilot Flying (PF); he powered up as appropriate with a pause at 1.05 to allow the engines to spool; then proceeded to apply power to the Flex Thrust setting. No abnormalities were noted during this phase until; in retrospect; the aircraft reached the speed of 80 KIAS and the '80 Knots - Power Set' callout. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and made the callout but noticed that the right engine (Engine 2) was slightly hunting for the correct power setting of approximately 1.35 EPR while the left engine had locked onto the appropriate setting. The fluctuation in the right engine was minimal; around 0.005 EPR and seemed to stabilize by 90-95 KIAS. This appeared insignificant at the time. The rest of the takeoff throughout the initial climb to 10;000 MSL was uneventful. Upon climbing past 10;000 MSL to an assigned altitude of Flight Level 230 (FL230) the aircraft was about to enter possible icing conditions therefore Engine Anti-Ice was turned ON in preparation. No abnormalities were noted and climb-out continued uneventfully until approximately 20;000 MSL where icing conditions no longer existed and the Engine Anti-Ice was turned OFF. Shortly thereafter; we were alerted by a single chime to the ECAM display indicating the following message: 'ENG 2 FUEL CTL FAULT' and subsequent action items below the title line. ATC directed us to climb to FL300; to which I responded our need to maintain this altitude because we were working a problem and would advise when able. The First Officer remained as PF; maintaining control of the aircraft and assuming communications. I began executing the ECAM actions the first of which; if I remember correctly; commanded the Thrust Lever on the affected engine be reduced to idle for 30 seconds. As we confirmed and slowly reduced the ENG 2 thrust lever; I noticed the trend arrows on the EPR gauge displayed the commanded power reduction to the new EPR TLA position (idle). I further noticed the engine initially had not spooled down completely on its own but was at a reduced power setting as compared to ENG 1. The engine then proceeded to match the idle thrust lever setting; after the 30 seconds had expired; the next ECAM Action Line commanded to return the thrust lever to the Climb Detent to presumably check the ability to control the engine. This action had no effect and ENG 2 remained at IDLE thrust. Subsequent ECAM Action command lines included placing the Engine Mode Selector to IGN/START and then shutting down the affected engine. I continued performing subsequent additional ECAM Actions of 'ENG 2 FAIL' thereby securing the engine; and confirming failed systems on the ECAM display. It was at this time the APU was started. A plan of action was devised to return to the departure airport since it was both the closest airport and closest Company airport. I re-assumed control of communications and declared an emergency to ATC and requested vectors to return to the departure airport. ATC immediately complied as did we with a turn back to the departure airport. I sent an ACARS message to Dispatch stating our condition and returning. I notified the Lead Flight Attendant ofthe aircraft status; time remaining to landing; my intent not to evacuate unless other indications led to an evacuation decision and finally that I would be making an announcement to the passengers. I then calmly made the PA announcement to the passengers informing them of what had occurred; emphasizing that the aircraft was still very safe to continue flight; and that we would be landing in 15 minutes. I finally added that the flight attendants would be giving them further instructions. After completion of all the immediate action items; the First Officer and I reviewed and completed the appropriate COM items while continuing to the airport. Descending through 10;000 MSL; I informed the flight attendants over the PA then shortly thereafter called the Lead Flight Attendant via the intercom to confirm they were indeed ready for landing and obtained an update as to the status of the passenger cabin. The lead informed me they were ready; the cabin was prepared and the passengers were calm. We finished our duties and prepared for the landing; selected Flaps 3 on the MCDU and GPWS Mode Panel on the overhead; then performed a quick review of what we had accomplished to this point. The remainder of the approach and landing occurred without incident. The landing was 'on target/on speed' and under MGLW. Fire trucks followed us down the runway as we decelerated toward the exit. We queried Ground Control regarding any other signs of damage; smoke or fire to which the reply was negative; this was also confirmed by the Fire Marshall. I announced 'Flight Attendants Stations' to keep the crew informed of my decision not to evacuate the aircraft. We continued to the gate uneventfully. Once parked and all checklist were completed.

An A320 ECAM alerted ENG 2 FUEL CTL FAULT; so as the ECAM checklist was accomplished; the engine shutdown as directed; an emergency declared and the flight returned to the departure airport.

1780029

202012

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

328.0

10.0

3200.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 9

Daylight

6000

Personal

Small Aircraft

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

None

Class B ZZZ

Tablet

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 3.1; Flight Crew Total 690; Flight Crew Type 300

Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Distraction

1780029

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace

Aircraft; Human Factors; Airspace Structure; Software and Automation

Software and Automation

VFR flight from ZZZ1 towards ZZZ2 and return with no specific route. Tablet GPS lost connection with autopilot and I lost situational awareness trying to get the GPS reconnected (using AVARE app). When I finally abandoned the effort and looked at the GPS I realized I was in ZZZ Class B airspace at approximately 3;200 MSL instead of below the 3;000 MSL floor as I usually am. Corrected altitude immediately and left the Class B; went home and landed.I should have had the GPS completely set up before departure and should also have stayed at my usual altitude of 2;500 MSL for local flights. I really don't have an excuse for losing situational awareness. Problem was exacerbated by opening a 2nd app (Naviator) at which point I didn't know which app might have been trying to control the autopilot. I will certainly not make that mistake again! Had not flown at all from 5 months so I am admittedly not as proficient as I would like to be. Will be correcting that situation shortly also!

GA pilot reported losing GPS connection on tablet resulting in a Class B airspace incursion.

1241013

201502

1201-1800

CZQX.ARTCC

NF

39000.0

VMC

Center CZQX

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Oceanic

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Relief Pilot; First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 6900; Flight Crew Type 500

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Human-Machine Interface

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1241013

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 15000; Flight Crew Type 8000

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Workload; Distraction

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1240425.0

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

We departed at XA15 Zulu bound for Europe. There are no NavTracks at this time of day east bound so we were on a random route. I was the IRO (Relief pilot) and on break when the oceanic clearance was received. The clearance was a reroute.I returned to the flight deck at XC35 Zulu and was getting settled in when we crossed N50W050. Minutes after crossing 50W Gander messaged us to call on HF. When we checked in with Gander he asked for our north coordinate at 30W. We both checked the FMS and then decided to verify against the printed clearance. The FMS was incorrect. We verified with Gander that our reroute clearance and coordinates were correct and changed the FMS to reflect the correct clearance. Our 40W coordinate were the same (original route and reroute) so we never turned off course.All three crew members then silently verified the clearance (the 3rd was recalled to the flight deck). Then the pilot monitoring (PM) read the coordinates out loud to the pilot flying and the FMS coordinates were confirmed. No further action was needed. We never turned off course and landed safely at destination.

We received our random route oceanic clearance at about the same time that the ride deteriorated at our flight-planned crossing altitude. We climbed to FL390 and asked Moncton to forward a request for Gander to re-clear us to cross at the higher altitude. He complied and we received that clearance. We followed SOP in the route confirmation process and everything looked normal. We were given direct to 50N050W and proceeded accordingly. Following the crew change and soon after passing 50N050W and now navigating to 51N040W; we received a CPDLC message from Gander Radio to contact them on 8831; which we did. He told us he couldn't read our north coordinate at 30W on the position report and to please confirm what our clearance showed. We checked and found that we still had our originally filed points of 50N030W and 50N020W in the FMC and not the cleared points issued to us of 51N030W and 51N020W. We changed the points and sent the info to dispatch. The leg we were on (to 51N040W) was correct so a Gross Navigation Error didn't happen but we unintentionally set ourselves up for one. I don't know if the Gander Radio operator couldn't actually read the report or if that was a tactful way of saying 'Check your planned flight route because what I see doesn't match.' The most ironic thing about this almost-incident was that the Captain and I had quite literally just finished re-reading the Atlantic oceanic route clearance procedures in the FOM. In spite of that; we still managed to miss digit changes on two points! We apparently saw-and/or-read what we expected to see instead of what was actually there.As a side note; we did not receive the normal required message from ATC stating that the clearance we received was different from the filed route. We think this might have happened because the Moncton controller relayed the message concerning our ALTITUDE change and he had no knowledge of the oceanic ROUTE change so he didn't say anything. We think the Gander controller probably believed that we were verbally informed of the route change at the same time that we received the altitude change. Even though we didn't receive the verbal; we still had a piece of paper in the cockpit that did have the changes and we missed them.

An air crew received a revised random route clearance prior to entering oceanic airspace. They did not revise the route in the FMS. Fortunately they checked their routing after Gander Radio asked them to confirm the waypoint after the one toward which they were navigating. They revised the routing in the FMS and were never off course.

1864088

202112

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Parking Brake

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1864088

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Event / Encounter Vehicle

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

My crew and I reported for duty at XA:54L in ZZZ. Our aircraft; was coming in from ZZZZ and we met the crew at gate at approximately XB:00L. Upon deplaning; the Captain informed me that the parking brake was very difficult to set and that he had written it up. Maintenance showed up to the aircraft before my crew was allowed onto the plane; as it had to be searched first since it came from Canada. By the time we were allowed onto the plane; the maintenance crew was already working on it. I was able to get into the cockpit to begin my preflight preparations for our flight to ZZZ1. I noticed that the Maintenance workers were continuously pumping the parking/emergency brake up and down many times in an attempt to lubricate the lever. This apparently bled all of the pressure out of the parking brake accumulator; as evidenced by the illumination of the 'EMRG BRK LO PRES' caution light. I referred to the QRH regarding this caution light and it only said that the emergency/parking brake performance may be degraded and to use wheel chocks when parking the airplane. However; I knew to accumulator would recharge once the engines were started.Upon pushback from the gate; we were given the signal to start the engines. I instructed my First Officer to start the number 1 engine; which is standard operating procedure. Shortly after the engine started; and while the ground crew was still pushing us back; the 'EMRG BRK LO PRES' caution light extinguished; as I knew it would. Once the pushback was completed; I received the signal to set the parking brake; which I did (the parking brake light illuminated as well). However; once the ground crew disconnected the tug from the nose gear; the aircraft started slowing moving forward. I was unable to stop the aircraft in time before it made contact with the aircraft tug. Why the aircraft moved forward with the parking brake set is something I am unable to explain. My guess is that even though the caution light extinguished; there wasn't enough brake pressure in the accumulator to keep the aircraft from moving. There is also no indication in the cockpit regarding parking brake pressure.After contact with the tug occurred; maintenance was called to the aircraft and we were then towed back to the gate. Passengers were deplaned and the aircraft was shut down. A write-up was entered into the aircraft logbook and the crew was given another aircraft to continue the flight to ZZZ1.

EMB-145 Captain reported after maintenance action; parking brake failed after gate pushback; resulted in collision with tug.

1008786

201205

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

Part 121

Passenger

Parked

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Repair; Installation; Inspection; Testing; Work Cards

Electrical Wiring & Connectors

X

Malfunctioning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Airframe; Maintenance Powerplant; Maintenance Avionics

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1008786

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Brake Release

General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft; Procedure

Human Factors

May 2012; at XA:00 am at our Air Carrier Hangar at ZZZ airport. I was working an EMB-145 aircraft for a repeat discrepancy of a Parking Brake 'On' light remaining 'On'; after disengaging the brake. I ended up finding wire # W504 had about 2k Ohms resistance with no [voltage indication] connections on either side. I flexed the wire while sending 50v (Volts) through it to Ground; to try to find the short and it spiked and dropped about 12' inches back from the Connector P0528 near some friction tape from an old repair. I removed the friction tape exposing about 6' inches of the harness and found excessive moisture in the harness. The water ran out and formed a small puddle on the ground. I showed the finding to a fellow Mechanic working with me. I determined that the best course of action would be to replace the entire harness rather than just dry the water since I was unable to determine how far the water had wicked into the harness and the possibility of internal corrosion to the wires.The Harness (W504) runs most of the length of the left-hand (L/H) wing and connects to every system along the way; including spoilers; fuel; hydraulics; brakes; et cetera (etc.). Since the moisture caused a fault in the Parking Brake System; I decided that the options available were to dry the harness and verify the integrity of all of the wires in the harness; or to replace the harness entirely. At this time; my Shift was almost over (XB:45 am); so I made a Write-up of my finding and stated that the harness requires replacement. I returned to work that night and checked to see the status of the EMB-145 aircraft; [only] to find that the harness had not been changed. The harness had been dried and Connector P0528 had been replaced. The only Operational Check performed was on the Brake light to clear the fault without addressing any other wires in the harness. The event occurred due to urgency of getting the plane out quickly rather than taking the time to either replace the harness of to determine the impact the other affected wires in the harness and the systems tied to them. An occurrence of this event could be avoided if more emphasis was placed on keeping the planes in optimal airworthy condition rather than fixing a discrepancy as quickly as possible. Routine Overnight (RON) maintenance.

Reporter stated he works as an Avionics Mechanic a lot and the electrical harness he was referring to also included six to seven position indication wires involving spoilers; fuel; hydraulics and brake systems. There was a heavy amount of accumulated water in the harness. Reporter stated the event he was referring to; had to do with his Maintenance department drying out one area of the electrical harness instead of replacing the entire water saturated harness. He would not be surprised if phantom faults showed as a result of water that still permeated the harness assembly. He has replaced the same electrical harness in the past for chafed wires in the wheel well.

A Technician reports he found an electrical harness that had become water saturated at a previous wire repair on an EMB-145 aircraft. The water saturation appeared to be one of the causes of a repeat discrepancy for a Parking Brake light that remained 'On' after the Parking Brakes were released.

1777558

202012

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

23900.0

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class A ZZZ

Facility ZZZ.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 5

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1777558

ATC Issue All Types; Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Environment - Non Weather Related

The aircraft listed entered my airspace without coordination.I previously reported dozens of airspace violations directly to management. Management has recently changed its stance; and they now view a violation of my airspace as a performance issue on my part. It is their stance I am to watch all surrounding sectors and prevent other controllers from failing to do their job. I will now be reporting these airspace violations here instead to preserve my career.Also worth noting; the Controller that violated my airspace was working their first session after XX days off of COVID leave; and was working a higher volume of traffic than they could handle with the rust of being off so long. Controller did not have a D-side or any other support. The supervisor was apparently unaware of the traffic volume; and I walked over to ask him to monitor Controller.Bring back the safety and reporting culture. A controller should not have to choose between complying with a mandatory reporting requirement or losing their job; especially when it isn't that controller failed to comply with regulations.

Center Controller reported multiple airspace violations resulting from hand-off issues with adjacent sector controllers.

1190330

201407

0001-0600

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

9000.0

Center ZAB

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Cruise

Class E ZAB

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1

Human-Machine Interface

1190330

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Aircraft was below terrain and MSAW [Minimum Safe Altitude Warning] never went off. If it had; I probably would have caught it.A ticket has been submitted [to maintenance].

ZAB Controller reports of an aircraft that was below the terrain and the MSAW [Minimum Safe Altitude Warning] doesn't alarm.

1665901

201907

0601-1200

SCT.TRACON

CA

600.0

TRACON SCT

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C LGB

Tower LGB

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

None

Final Approach

Class C LGB

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Supervisor / CIC

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1665901

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Airspace Structure

Aircraft X released off LGB airport by Manhattan/Laker combined sector; training in progress. I was working the Controller in Charge position; when the trainer working position advised me of a possible situation in progress. I observed the trainee/trainer issuing a safety/traffic alert to the departing IFR aircraft and observed opposite direction traffic at co-altitude. Once the situation had been resolved I felt the situation appeared to be a near midair collision and was unaware of traffic being issued by the tower. I contacted LGB Tower to figure out if they had issued traffic and were doing anything to ensure separation. The LGB Controller didn't seem to be aware there was even a situation and didn't seem to care that we and pilots in control of both aircraft had to take evasive action; after further communication with the departing aircraft we determined no traffic was issued to the IFR aircraft prior to transfer of communication despite the unsafe situation. I have still not been made aware of any traffic issued to the other aircraft that LGB Tower was in communication with but it did appear that aircraft also took evasive action and turned hard south to avoid collision while our departing IFR aircraft turned north west.LGB Tower Control needs to maintain communication with both aircraft and issue and resolve any conflicts prior to transferring communications. I feel the Tower Controller needs immediate remedial training and be explained duty priority; then be able to demonstrate this ability before being returned to active duty.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an unsafe situation with traffic off of LGB and traffic inbound to LGB.

1002650

201204

0601-1200

ZDV.ARTCC

CO

13000.0

IMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Class E ZDV

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1002650

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Procedure; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Ambiguous

We were assigned a descent to 10;000 FT. The First Officer dialed 10;000 FT in the altitude selector; and I verified the altitude while is finger was on the knob. I then read back the clearance to 10;000 FT to ATC. While descending through approximately 13;000 FT; ATC asked us to verify we were cleared to 14;500 FT. I said we were assigned 10;000. He issued a low altitude alert and instructed an immediate climb to 14;500 FT. The First Officer disengaged the autopilot and climbed to 14;500. We then re-engaged the autopilot and continued the descent and approach without incident. The GPWS never detected anything; and neither of us saw any amber terrain on the map; so I don't believe we were close to impacting any terrain. I have no way of knowing why the incorrect altitude was assigned. We knew we were still over somewhat mountainous terrain; so we could have asked him to verify that was a safe altitude.

An Air Carrier crew over mountainous terrain understood they were cleared to 10;000 FT; but while descending through 13;000 FT; ATC commanded a LOW ALTITUDE ALERT with an immediate climb to 14;500 FT. No EGPWS warning alerted.

1668213

201907

1201-1800

AWM.Airport

TN

5.0

650.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Taxi

Jet/Long Ranger/206

1.0

Part 135

VFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class E AWM

Other Crop duster

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

Agriculture

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Rotorcraft; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3150; Flight Crew Type 3150

Situational Awareness

1668213

Conflict NMAC

Horizontal 250

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

While enroute to assigned base on a southwest heading; a crop duster popped up at my 12 o'clock. I was approximately 5 miles or so southwest of AWM. I don't know exactly the distance; but it was within 500 feet. At no time while enroute to base did myself or the nurse or paramedic see the crop-duster. Normally we will see them off to our left or right or in front of us. The way in which this one appear suddenly indicated to me that it must have come from behind our aircraft.When I saw the crop-duster; it was flying straight up in the air like they normally do after they have made a pass spraying chemicals. It appeared that it had come from either directly underneath us or perhaps to our left rear quarter area. Upon seeing the crop duster I turned to the south because the crop duster was drifting to the north. If the crop duster came from behind and/or underneath our aircraft; I don't know what I could have done to see him ahead of time. We always are on guard for crop dusters in our area because they frequent our flying areas. If this one was flying around during our pathway back to the base; we did not notice him like we normally notice the crop dusters. It is possible he could have taken off from behind us after we passed that area; or been behind some trees. We normally see the crop dusters well in advance. This is the first time in flying in crop dusting areas that this type incident has occurred. I think that even if I had been a few hundred feet higher we still would have encountered the crop duster as he was flying up; but I will make a point to fly even higher to lessen the chances of this occurring again. At the same time I think it is important for crop dusters to be more aware because if it had come from behind us he should have seen us; but at the same time I understand that they probably don't look up in the air as they are spraying. I believe that if I fly even higher and continue to be vigilant (as we always are to crop dusters in the area) I think this can reduce the chances of this occurring again.

Helicopter pilot reported an NMAC with a crop duster in the vicinity of AWM airport.

1116632

201309

1801-2400

BOS.Airport

MA

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Ground BOS; Tower BOS

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Taxi

Ground BOS; Tower BOS

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1116632

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Time Pressure; Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1116627.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

Boston Tower (128.8) cleared us to cross Runway 22R at E; then call Ground on 121.9. Clearing the runway on the west side; we had to stop because we were unsure if a taxiing B757 was going to give way or not. The B757 flight was in the turn from K onto B northbound. The B757 aircraft showed no indication they would stop. Their taxi light remained on the entire event. My Captain held position on E and turned off our taxi light. The rear of our plane was still well over the hold short line on the active runway side. I contacted Ground on 121.9 as B757 crossed E directly in front of us; as my attention previously was on the B757 aircraft. The Ground Controller then told us to give way to the B757. Ground then cleared us left on B; right on K to the gate. This is the path B757 had just come. The was not enough room for our aircraft to clear the hold short line for 22R and remain clear of Taxiway B for the B757. Possible coordination issue between Tower Controller for 22R (128.8); Ground Controller; the B757 flight; and us. We had no advisory from Tower or Ground regarding the B757.

As a result of the conflict with B757 we remained on an active runway until the B757 turned and passed quite quickly. When we crossed 22R we were cleared to taxi by Ground on 121.9 via B and K taxiways.The B757 was in a hurry. They later said on the radio that they were running out of duty day. I don't know what clearance the B757 was given but I felt that they should have give way to an aircraft exiting an active runway and taxiing straight ahead.

An air carrier crew reported clearance to cross BOS Runway 22R but before clearing the Runway on Taxiway E stopped because a B757 turning from K onto B did not yield.

1066784

201302

ZZZ.Airport

US

35000.0

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked; Cruise; Taxi

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Training / Qualification; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1066784

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Attendant; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I would like to begin by praising my crew who performed flawlessly; efficiently and safely throughout the events of the day. My First Officer was awesome; as he flew the airplane and kept ATC advised with updates as we progressed through the event; and asserted his thoughts on where we should go and do; as I worked the problem with Maintenance and Dispatch. ALL of my flight attendants communicated clearly and gave updates as our event progressed. My crew members should all be recognized for their excellent work today! During cruise at FL350; the center autopilot malfunctioned. Annunciations were: Red Autopilot Disconnect Annunciator; Amber Autopilot Annunciator; Master Warning/Caution Lights and sirens. I held the yoke and to my surprise; the autopilot was still engaged with all of the warnings; so I used the thumb switch to disconnect the autopilot and selected the Left/Right Autopilots to check their operations. They both worked fine; so I tried to re-engage the center Autopilot and it failed immediately; just as initially. I selected the right autopilot for the remainder of the flight. I used ACARS to have a phone patch to Maintenance. I briefed both Maintenance and Dispatch. During this briefing the purser called up and told me that there were fumes throughout the cabin. My First Officer told me so I relayed this to Maintenance and Dispatch. I told Dispatch/Maintenance to standby. My First Officer got out the QRH and began running the list with me. We turned off the Utility Busses and recirculating fans which allowed greater airflow which caused the fumes to dissipate. The flight attendants had preemptively turned off the In Flight Entertainment (IFE); lighting; and oven switches to reduce electrical loads and to stop the sources of fumes. This was excellent work by my flight attendants as this showed initiative/understanding of how serious the situation was and what actions to perform without being told to do so. I finally got back to Maintenance/ Dispatch; and relayed the above. I asked for WX for several enroute airports. After conferring with my First Officer; we decided that short of smoke or fire; that we would divert to a major Maintenance station; otherwise we would divert to a nearby smaller airport. I advised Dispatch of this and she concurred. We terminated the patch and then my First Officer pulled out the diversion checklist. We increased Mach to M.83; I had my First Officer declare the emergency; turned directly for the divert airport and set up for the approach. We made a normal landing. The trucks were waiting for us. As we turned off of the runway we received another EICAS message; EQPT OVHT and the fumes returned and were increasing. My First Officer spoke with Ramp as I spoke with Ground and Operations. OPS asked me: 'Do you want us to image the airplane?' I did not know what this meant; so I told him no and that we wanted to get to the gate ASAP; because we were going to loose instrumentation and communications very quickly. Both my First Officer and I relayed to Ramp and Ground that if we do not respond that we would be heading directly to the gate. We arrived at the gate and everyone was waiting for us. CFR Personnel came inboard and scanned the airplane for hot spots; and found none. CFR left the airplane. I debriefed CS/Inflight and Flight Ops personnel. CS deplaned the passengers and sent them to our new gate or rerouted the passengers. Maintenance was debriefed my First Officer and me. I filled out the Fire; Smoke; and Fumes form and gave it to Maintenance. The Assistant Chief Pilot asked us if we were OK to continue. We both wanted to continue to our next station; but expressed how tired we were going to be if we had to continue on the third leg later; so he had Scheduling re-crew the last leg. My First Officer also picked us up some food as we had not eaten on the diversionary leg. We were both thankful for his kindness. An available First Officer was able to secure our outbound flight papers with great difficulty; since we were so far from flight ops. On the day after; I called Tower and spoke with the Chief and another Controller and explained what happened; and asked what his statement meant? He told me that it was OPS who asked me the question about the 'Imaging.' I explained that we have never heard of this and that for future reference; that they should use phrases with an explanation because; I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE KNOWN WHAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT!!! They understood and told me that memos would be forwarded to appropriate people. I also called the Firehouse and spoke with CHIEF. I explained everything to him as well and he understood the terminology issue and said that he would also forward this to appropriate people because; COMMUNICATIONS ARE THAT IMPORTANT! I called Dispatch/ Maintenance and was briefed that the right Re-circulation fan had seized and was the culprit in our problem. What made this problem difficult was the timing of both failures and being to separate the problems which we were not able to do! This would make a great loft! During recurrent training it would be nice if the Training Center would 'educate' both Pilots and Flight Attendants about these 'Secret Words from CFR' and perhaps have a chat with CFR to find out any other phrases that might be useful to us if we might be.....ON FIRE! OTHER ISSUES: The QRH remains a problem for locating and using checklists. It would be nice if the party responsible for the verbiage on the QRH to annotate the EICAS MESSAGE FIRST; THEN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE!!! During recurrent training we must be made aware of new and useful verbiage/information from other agencies like CFR/Tower/Operations. I would have used these services had we understood their communications! My worst fear is having a scenario like this at night over water near the mid flight point! It would be great to reiterate how important it is to turn directly for your alternate and increase speed to get to a runway! Lastly; it would be so nice if we could access the Flight Plans more easily! I understand the; 'Fit For Life Program' at work; but it really bugs me that I have to run to Flight Operations to pull up the papers for the next leg. If you don't believe me then speak with the First Officer who retrieved our flight plan. I do not want to cause a delay due to the flight plan system; so please help all of us out here!

A B757 Center Autopilot malfunctioned at cruise when it indicated disconnected while still engaged. Then the flight attendants called with smoke and fumes in the cabin. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted where Maintenance discovered a failed recirculation fan.

1478359

201709

1801-2400

MNMG.Airport

FO

0.0

Night

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Landing Light

X

Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1478359

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Aircraft

The LED landing lights chosen to replace older incandescent models are wholly unsuitable in intensity and field of illumination. It is extremely difficult to land at many Central American destinations which often have lighting and markings not up to domestic US standards. I note an uptick in maintenance originated write-ups of cracked podding; rotating shims; and other gripes on these aircraft. I'd suggest maintenance look for a correlation; these aircraft are difficult to land well at night. The miserable illumination provided by the chosen retrofit LED landing lights is a clear detriment to safety.

B737NG Captain reported the new LED landing lights do not provide the level of illumination found in the older incandescent bulbs.

1192528

201408

1201-1800

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

IMC

Daylight

Center ZAB

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 900 (CRJ900)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Climb

Class A ZAB

Rudder Control System

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface

1192528

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While enroute and climbing to FL330 the First Officer (pilot flying) reported a PIT flag on his Attitude indicator. Flight information was quickly cross checked with my side and with the standby instruments which indicated discrepancies on the First Officer's flight information. All of his information was unreliable including attitude; heading; and altitude. At that time I assumed control of the aircraft and became the flying pilot. ATC was informed of the loss of the First Officer's instruments and the autopilot. The problem was also complicated with incorrect flight director information on both sides of the aircraft. The flight director was cancelled and I flew the aircraft in raw data. We requested lower to vacate RSVM altitudes. Approximately 10 minutes into hand flying the aircraft we received an uncommanded rudder deflection full left; which then returned back to normal trim on its own. The autopilot was still off. At this time we declared an emergency as a precaution and asked for a lower altitude. At this time we had approximately 25 remaining to our destination. A second uncommanded rudder deflection occurred on descent 15 minutes after the initial one. It was less pronounced and was to the right. All checklist and company procedures were followed as outlined in the flight manual and the QRH. The company was notified via ACARS. The flight attendants were [briefed regarding the anomalies. The flight was completed without further incident. Maintenance and dispatch were contacted via telephone upon arrival at the gate. Two maintenance write-ups were completed at the gate. [I suspect they may need to] replace the IRS.

Following the loss of the First Officer's flight instruments and the autoflight systems the flight crew of a CRJ-900 later experienced uncommanded full or near full rudder deflections to both the left and right. They descended and landed without further incident at their destination.

1340988

201603

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

25000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class A ZZZ

Fuel Quantity-Pressure Indication

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1340988

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1340991.0

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Ambiguous

This was the third leg of the day for us. The fuel status at the before start checklist was either 4.5 or 4.6 on board and 4.7 was required so we were within our +/- 300 lbs. limits and over the 3.8 required for takeoff fuel. We pushed back 2 minutes early. We had been given a wheels up time from ground control so we single engine taxied to the hold short line. We waited to start the second engine; which was perfect timing because we were given the takeoff clearance almost right away after it was started. The before takeoff checklist fuel was about 4.2 or 4.3 on board and 3.8 was required. The takeoff and climb were routine and we were not vectored unusually long on the initial climb out. The captain was flying this leg. I think there was some speed restrictions during cruise that may have put us slightly behind schedule and I noticed the captain flying around 300 knots to try to get us back on time. I did notice he was updating the FMS with the speed changes and keeping a good watch on the fuel status (as he had done on the other legs we had flown together so far). We were also stopped at FL250 for a final altitude instead of the FL270 that was planned; which would have a small effect on the fuel consumption. During our arrival ATC directed us to a heading of 180 and told us to expect holding. The frequency was busy and no reason or time frame was given initially. A few minutes later we were told to expect holding for about 10 minutes. Captain told me to declare Min Fuel with ATC and also told ATC that we had no alternate/hold fuel. ATC then asked us where we would like to go. I saw that we were at about 1500 lbs EFOA (Expected Fuel On Arrival) but heading away from our destination. Captain then sent dispatch messages asking about diversion. The first thing suggested was ZZZ1; which was no good because it was even further away. We suggested ZZZ2 because it would be in front of us on the 180 heading. Dispatcher just sent us weather for ZZZ2 with no real yes or no advising. During those communications; ATC then advised us that we could be cleared to our destination via the arrival at 210 knots. We accepted that and captain updated the FMS again and it showed about 1300 lbs EFOA by the time we were established on the arrival again. This was well below our reserves.ATC asked us what we wanted and we advised ATC that we wanted direct to the airport. ATC cleared us direct to the airport and captain delayed configuring a little longer than usual to reduce any extra fuel spent due to the extra drag. We landed safely and taxied to the parking spot. We were clocked in with 1210 lbs. of fuel on board. I felt the captain handled the situation well and was never uncomfortable with the way the situation unfolded. I did notice on the next flight in this aircraft that the fuel was also 100 to 200 lbs. less than ramp fuel by the time of the before start checklist. I do not remember the fuel on the first two legs; but might be related to some sort of possible fuel sensor problem on the aircraft.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier flight crew reported experiencing delays to their destination resulting in a low fuel state.

1781139

202101

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

1126.0

VMC

Night; 10

200

Air Taxi

PC-12

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach

Propeller

X

Malfunctioning

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 70; Flight Crew Total 10000; Flight Crew Type 300

1781139

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft

At touchdown; aircraft started to pull right and right wing started to drop. I heard a noise and thought I had blown a tire. Next I flew back to centerline and in doing so I may have added slight power. I slapped the gear handle. I never heard a Gear Warning tone. When the Crew was asked; they said they didn't either.Settling down again; I kept the wings level and anticipated what I thought might be the inevitable right tendency.The aircraft however remained level; but I informed tower I had an issue and would roll out to the end. I appeared to have good control; and the noise was gone. I elected to taxi the short distance to the FBO with an escort of Airport Operations vehicles.By shutdown; all indications appeared to be normal again until post-flight inspection. At post-flight; damage was observed to the prop; the flap cowlings (subsequently the flap linkages); and rear avionics antennas.The approach to landing felt normal. I was sequenced between two aircraft and behind another Pilatus. Flaps were extended 7-8 miles from the airport and gear was extended on a final vector to the FAF approximately abeam the FAF. Landing checklist was completed via the IPAD; and a 'Last Finals' check was performed by myself at 500 foot call. (Last Finals: gear down-three green; flaps 15- final setting; lights on; landing clearance; go-around altitude set). Yaw Damper (YD) was disconnected at DH announcement.On GP for the ILS; Torque was normal at 6-7 inches with the AOA indicating middle or slightly lower. Idle power was set between 70-50 AGL. Initial touchdown was at TDZ or slightly beyond.ATC was typical for the airport and time of day.Maintenance and company management are investigating. And I have been reviewing my actions and performance in this event.

Pilot reported that at touchdown the aircraft pulled to the right and the right wing started to drop; however; the wings remained level during rollout. At postflight; damage was found to parts of the aircraft.

1666416

201907

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Horizontal Stabilizer Trim

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Total 5

Distraction; Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1666416

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Commercial

Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1666936.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff

Company Policy; Procedure; Human Factors; Aircraft

Aircraft

After push back; while starting second engine; I noticed all of the push crew walking away from the aircraft back to the gate. I did not get a salute; and I could not see anyone carrying the gear pin. I verbalized this to the First Officer directed him to call [Company] Operations and inform them of the situation; and that I needed a salute and a visual of the pin from the push crew. After several minutes someone came back out; retrieved the pin from the floor of the tug and walked toward the aircraft. Once I got a visual; I flashed the nose light and got a salute. Prior to that; we waited. In the meantime; I called for a review of the instrument data and bugs items; but before that was completed; we got the salute; so we continued with the control checks; however; I may have missed the flaps call. Cannot recall; never-the-less; we continued and taxied out as usual; and went through all the checklist items. When it came to flaps; I remember putting my hand on the lever and called 1 green light; but failed to look long enough at the actual lever position or flap indicator and notice the flaps were not in the correct position. Once on the runway and cleared for takeoff; after 40% N1; I pressed the TOGA switch; and immediately heard the configuration warning horn. I retarded the throttles. We both quickly recognized the problem; and the First Officer positioned the flaps to the correct position; all the while; I continued to hold throttles back to Idle until I disengaged the auto throttles. Rather than continuing the takeoff from that point; I elected to taxi forward to the next runway exit and exit the runway. I treated the situation as a rejected take-off below 80 KIAS; all the while informing ZZZ Tower of our intentions. Once clear; we discussed the error; ran a complete before take-off checklist for a second time got ourselves back in the green and were soon back on the runway and cleared for an uneventful takeoff bound for ZZZ1. We simply got distracted; by the non-standard push crew actions consequent delay and didn't trap the error. We moved unexpectedly out of the green. Expectation bias played a hand. The normal sequenced flow got interrupted. I expected that once the ground crew was clear of the aircraft; and I had a salute; I would call for appropriate flaps and control check. Instead; of the usual; we (I) got focused on getting the crew back out to see the pin and a confirmation salute. After I got what I wanted; I failed to initiate a definitive restart and allowed an unequivocal continuation - sort of just picking up where we left off - leading to an error. An abundance of non-standard events happen on the line. We should remind ourselves often that things won't be perfect; regardless of effort; so we must remain vigilant and dedicated to trapping errors as they come. A tool may help. A mindset should be that after any non-standard event occurs...such should cause us to go back to the point just prior to the non-standard event; collect ourselves and start again. However; beyond just saying 'we should' and then forgetting; give it a name like; 'SNAP BACK.' Like a mandatory call out for anyone who observes. The procedure after a 'SNAP BACK CALL' would be to re-accomplish the appropriate check list; no questions asked; just do it!

Captain advanced thrust levers and got takeoff configuration warning. Captain immediately brought thrust levers to idle and cleared runway with call to ATC. Set flaps to 1 and completed Takeoff Checklist in its entirety. Proceed back to runway for takeoff with fuel above min takeoff. Human error/distraction. Whenever distraction occurs; redo entire checklist procedure.

B737 flight crew reported being distracted; resulting in rejected takeoff since flaps were not configured properly.

1368320

201606

1801-2400

GEG.TRACON

WA

3500.0

VMC

Daylight

TRACON GEG

Air Taxi

Small Transport

2.0

Part 135

VFR

Ambulance

Climb

Vectors

Class D SFF

Tower GEG

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Other RNAV Z RWY 21

Class C GEG

Facility GEG.TRACON

Government

Trainee; Departure

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1368320

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Procedure; Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Procedure

I am currently a CPC-IT (Controller In Training) and was training on radar. I had just taken the position from a previous controller and saw that Aircraft X was departing off SFF on a heading of 300 restricted at or below 3500 feet(this is a built in procedure for VFR aircraft coming off SFF). I was briefed that Aircraft Y was cleared on the RNAV Z RWY 21 approach and had been switched to the tower. I recognized that the two aircraft were going to be a conflict and was trying to formulate a solution. Aircraft Y was descending out of approximately 4500 feet when Aircraft X checked on level at 3500 feet. At this point the two aircraft were pointed right at each other approximately 3 miles apart. I knew aircraft on the RNAV Z RWY 21 approach were allowed to descend to 3500 which is the exact altitude that Aircraft X was restricted at. When Aircraft X checked on I told him altitude your discretion and to proceed on course; followed by a traffic call. My initial plan was to have Aircraft X climb above the descending Aircraft Y; then issue a northerly heading if necessary. My instructor keyed over me at that point; gave a traffic alert and told Aircraft X to fly northbound. The tower then called saying Aircraft Y was responding to a TCAS alert and was coming back to radar for resequencing. Aircraft X continued on course below Aircraft Y and the session continued without further incident. Foremost; it was poor control judgment on my part to not issue an immediate turn to Aircraft X and to think that an altitude swap alone was going to resolve the situation. I was slow to see how quickly the situation was developing and should have been quicker to react. However; I do think that the letter of agreement (LOA) pertaining to automatic VFR releases between SFF and GEG is flawed. The procedure calls for all VFR aircraft whose departure routes will take them towards GEG Class C surface area to either fly heading 300 at or below 3500 feet or remain south of the interstate at or below 3500 feet. My two main concerns with this procedure relate to aircraft separation and vectors below the minimum vectoring altitude. VFR aircraft departing SFF on a heading of 300 at or below 3500 points them directly at GEG's final. Typically aircraft on the visual approach to RWY 21 and other approach procedures pass over these VFR aircraft at 4000. However; outside of issuing an immediate control instruction to avoid a conflict; there is no ensured separation with this procedure. This lack of separation can also happen with VFR aircraft departing south of the interstate at or below 3500 feet. It is especially concerning to me that aircraft on the RNAV Z RWY 21 approach can descend to 3500 feet on the base turn; the exact altitude that a VFR aircraft coming off of SFF can be at.I also think the LOA is contradictory to the 7110.65 relating to vectors below the MVA (Minimum Vectoring Altitude). In the 7110.65 per 5-6-1 it makes it very clear that a VFR aircraft cannot be assigned a heading and altitude below the MVA (with certain exceptions that either don't apply in this case or have not been made clear to me). All of our MVAs in the area are above 3500 ft MSL which make me unsure of how this LOA is meeting the 7110.65 requirement. This incident definitely drove home the point that imminent traffic situations can develop very quickly and at any time. In future situations I will take more evasive action and be more vigilant to avoid making a similar mistake. I think departing VFR aircraft either to the NE or SE would be a better procedure for SFF. However; I know there is higher terrain east of SFF so this might not be possible. The other idea would be for SFF to call for VFR releases. I definitely think this procedure should be revisited to avoid conflicts with future aircraft.

An Air Traffic Controller Trainee reported failing to take sufficient action to keep a VFR aircraft away from an IFR aircraft executing an approach to an airport. The Trainee Controller mistakenly believed he could not vector the VFR aircraft below the MVA.

1296660

201509

0001-0600

SEA.Airport

WA

Mixed

Rain

Tower SEA

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC; Localizer/Glideslope/ILS Runway 16L

Landing

Class B SEA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction

1296660

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1296662.0

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Human Factors

After changing Runways from 16R to 16L; we executed the LOC 16L approach. First Officer (FO) was the flying pilot. At MDA; FO left MDA early to accommodate the landing; only to trigger a response from SEA tower that there was a 'low altitude alert'. I advised tower that we had the airport in sight. Due to lack of maintaining 'LOC Only' MDA experience that appeared to be manifesting itself at that moment; I elected to assume aircraft control from FO but stating 'My Airplane'. The FO transferred control to me; and I executed an uneventful landing in the touch down zone of Runway 16L.

This was the third and final leg of a scheduled 11-hr duty day. ATIS reported VFR conditions (10sm; BKN038); no report of rain in the vicinity; although TAF did forecast -RA. ATIS reported windshear. I reviewed windshear procedures. I also used a personal app and requested landing runway data to compute/assess crosswind. This was only my second arrival to SEA in 30 days; so I also spent time plotting various taxiway closures due to construction. We were cleared to descend via HAWKZ landing south to expect 16R. I had briefed a visual approach backed up by ILS for 16R. Controller later said we would be vectored east of field for left downwind to 16R for sequencing. We were handed off to final controller on heading 040 at 220 knots. We confirmed intentions for 16R with final controller. Just prior to base turn controller said 16L was released for non-heavy aircraft. We agreed to accept 16L; Captain (CA) reprogrammed the FMC for 16L ILS; while I pulled up the chart and dialed in the localizer freq. we quickly reviewed frequencies and final approach course and set a course for the FAF in the FMC. I still expected a visual approach; and did not brief minimums. We were given a dog leg and cleared to intercept the localizer for 16L at 4000 feet. I had slowed to 180 and dropped the gear while tracking the localizer outside of a 10 mile final. Controller asked us to maintain 200 knots; and asked if we could accept RNAV. We replied negative due to time/range to the airport. The Controller said he would have to step us down for the localizer. This was first time that we became aware of Glide Slope Out of Service (it was NOTAM'd out; and we missed it in the ATIS between taxiway closures and windshear advisories). I could now see rain showers but assumed that it would be good visibility underneath a layer that appeared to be around 1500 feet. Controller cleared us down to 3200; but did not specify speed restriction. We passed inside of KARFO at 3200 feet and 200 knots; and I began to verbalize my concern over the energy state. The Captain started to coach me; saying I could start slowing. We were then cleared the Localizer approach for 16L at about 7-8 DME and 3200 feet. The Captain then briefed the MDA to me; and I set my Baro bug; and rapidly reduced power to continue configuring. I had to level off to slow enough for flaps 25-30. There was now steady rain; and I asked for wipers. I started a steep descent to recapture the path. The CA reported that I was now on path; and stated he could see approach lights. I then got behind my cross check; and did not arrest my descent to capture the MDA on speed. CA stated he had VASI in sight; I did not. He was now more positively coaching me on power and attitude to recapture MDA. The Controller gave us a 700 feet call and the Captain replied field in sight. I then saw the VASI and approach end; I was not stable however. CA took the aircraft for an uneventful landing.

The crew accepted a late runway change; unaware that the glideslope was out of service. They received a low altitude alert from the Tower although the Captain had the field in sight. The Captain took the aircraft from the First Officer and landed uneventfully.

1418491

201701

1801-2400

SCT.TRACON

CA

Night

Tower PSP

Air Taxi

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Vectors

Class E SCT

CTAF UDD; TRACON SCT

Fractional

Small Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class E SCT

Facility SCT.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1418491

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Procedure; Human Factors

Procedure

Released Aircraft X off PSP RWY 13R. A few minutes later I released Aircraft Y off of UDD. Aircraft X departed and [needed to return to the airport] with PSP tower. The tower called and said Aircraft X was going to stay with them and go back to the airport and land. Aircraft X continued on the 100 degree heading and never climbed out of 2;000 or entered the traffic pattern. That heading kept Aircraft X aimed right at the UDD airport where the other aircraft was released for departure. I had to call the PSP tower and tell them to climb Aircraft X who was well below the MVA in the area. The two aircraft never had a loss of separation. The tower should have given me the aircraft if it was not going to stay in the tower pattern. I should have tried to reach out to Aircraft Y on the ground to attempt to cancel the release if it hadn't already switched to advisories for departure. Better communication between myself and the tower would have made the situation clearer and maybe easier to solve.

SCT TRACON Controller reported an aircraft departed PSP and needed to return to the airport. They stayed on PSP Tower's frequency; but left the airport environment. This lead to a conflict with an aircraft departing UDD.

1073107

201303

0001-0600

SFO.Airport

CA

500.0

Tower SFO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Check Pilot; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1073107

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Weather; Human Factors

Ambiguous

FMS bridge visual [Runway] 28. Scattered low clouds. The pilot flying went below visual glide slope with four red showing on the PAPI. The pilot not flying mentioned we were low and the pilot flying slowed the rate of descent.We needed to pay closer attention to visual indications and should have refused a visual in marginal conditions. The crew was debriefed following the incident.

A Check Airman reported the pilot flying had descended well below the visual glide slope on the Runway 28 charted Visual BRIJJ approach to SFO before being alerted by the pilot not flying. The descent was arrested and the landing completed.

1278005

201507

0001-0600

OTH.Airport

OR

2400.0

IMC

Fog; 1

Night

200

Air Taxi

Small Transport

1.0

Part 135

IFR

Localizer/Glideslope/ILS ILS RWY 4

Final Approach

Class D OTH

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 50; Flight Crew Total 11300; Flight Crew Type 210

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1278005

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

I was PIC on a flight going to OTH. When I first checked weather in OTH it was at 8 miles vis.; but it started deteriorating rapidly. But due to the nature of the coastal weather; I had planned for this and took on extra fuel. Our original destination had been ZZZ1; but we had to file for OTH because ZZZ1 was below minimums. Seattle Center cleared me for the ILS Runway 4 via the 16 DME Arc from LUPCI. Things were going smoothly until I realized as I was approaching LUPCI for the approach that I hadn't heard from Seattle Center for a while and I was still high. I realized that I was still on CTAF to activate the approach lights and hadn't switched back. I contacted Seattle Center and; frustrated; he cleared me down to 2400 feet for the approach. I was able to get down to 2400 feet and stabilized in order to make the ILS intercept.The DME ARC and ILS Intercept went fine; and I continued down to minimums. My autopilot clicked off; but I reset it through the mode control panel with no problem. With no runway environment in sight; I executed the published missed approach INITIALLY; with a climb to 600 feet and then a climbing left turn back to EMIRE LOM. It was here that I got confused on the Controllers 'state your intentions' remark that I started on the wrong path. I don't know why I thought that I could do this; but somehow I thought that I could re-intercept the 167 radial off of OTH VOR and start another DME Arc to have a better amount of time for the weather to clear. Again; looking back; I knew that I was in a non-radar environment; so I don't know why I thought that I could be off the published missed approach but I was. The Controller expressed concern and instructed me to climb immediately to 4000 feet because of terrain. I wasn't indicating any terrain conflict on my TCAS or Garmin 650/750 combo; but the Controller advised me of terrain in that area. The Controller advised me to proceed back to EMIRE and execute the published missed approach the way I should have done it initially; with the procedure turn; etc. I was a little turned around by this point; but got back on course to EMIRE. This time; because of my obvious newfound stupidity and ineptitude; he read me the entire missed approach instructions verbally so I wouldn't screw up another missed approach.At one point; my autopilot clicked off again; but I don't remember how high I got; 200 feet above charted I think; but I thought that it was maybe something I did or the surprising amount of turbulence for the low coastal visibility. This time; I hand flew the procedure turn inbound and the ILS 4 and broke out just above minimums with a 12 knot crosswind. I landed uneventfully and cancelled my flight plan. I thanked the Controller and I think that I apologized; but if I didn't I should have. From OTH; we flew uneventfully. On a side note; on our return flight; my autopilot clicked off again in smooth air; so I wrote it upon arrival. While I haven't done very many DME Arcs in my career; my DME Arc wasn't the problem; it was my home made missed approach procedure. Since then; I have been brushing up on my non-radar procedures; especially missed approaches to LOM's with a procedure turn outbound.

The charter pilot did not fly the complete missed approach procedure at OTH and was corrected by ATC; even though it was a non-radar environment.

1641477

201904

1201-1800

ZSE.ARTCC

WA

10400.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZSE

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class E ZSE

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Part 91

VFR

Cruise

Class E ZSE

Facility ZSE.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6

Situational Awareness

1641477

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

Took a handoff on [Aircraft X] from S46. Traffic volume was steady but normal. In my scan I saw conflicting VFR traffic for [Aircraft X] at 11;500 feet (unverified). I expected S46 to stop [Aircraft X] under the VFR traffic and wait for them to pass before shipping them to me; they did not. [Aircraft X] checked on around 10;000 and my first transmission was to stop their climb immediately and I gave them traffic. I did not use proper phraseology in fear of time constraints. I gave [Aircraft X] traffic again and he reported them in sight. I cleared [Aircraft X] to climb at pilot discretion once I saw targets pass. In my career this is the closest I've seen two airplanes come nose to nose in an uncontrolled manner. The likelihood of collision in my opinion was severe.Raise the top of the bravo airspace to 150. There is no reason a VFR [aircraft] should fly uncontrolled through the top of highly congested airspace and not talk to a controller.

ZSE ARTCC Controller reported Approach handed off an aircraft into a traffic conflict with a nonparticipant aircraft within Center's airspace.

1081896

201304

0001-0600

ZZZZ.TRACON

FO

3000.0

VMC

5

Night

5000

TRACON ZZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Cruise; Climb; Descent; Initial Climb

Vectors

Class C ZZZZ

DC Rectifier

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32; Flight Crew Total 9250; Flight Crew Type 1432

Troubleshooting; Training / Qualification; Confusion

1081896

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 46; Flight Crew Total 12348; Flight Crew Type 220

Distraction; Confusion; Training / Qualification; Troubleshooting

1081898.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Procedure

Aircraft

I operated as the Captain and Pilot Monitoring on the flight. Prior to leaving the hotel; we were contacted by Crew Scheduling. Crew Scheduling notified us about the flight being delayed from its original scheduled departure time due to maintenance. The anticipated delay was six hours. We arrived at the aircraft and started our normal preflight duties. Several items were deferred: MEL 28-22-1-2-1 #2 left aft main tank pumps (tank 2 aft auto mode) and MEL 31-65-1 multifunction control display unit (DCU) #3. During preflight; we received a Level 1 'TR 3 Fail' alert and a subsequent FMC #2 fail. I entered the items into the logbook in accordance with FOM flight crew handling of aircraft discrepancies and notified Local Maintenance. Three Maintenance personnel arrived at the aircraft and we left the flight deck in order for Maintenance to work on the problems. Maintenance cleared the Level 1 'TR 3 Fail' and deferred FMC #2. I requested and received amended release #1 adding MEL 34-63-1; #2 FMC INOP - No RNP 4 operations. The crew reviewed MEL 34-63-1 operations procedures and operational limitations. Furthermore; we discussed the ramifications of one FMC operation and two (of three) MCDU's. The flight blocked out and shortly after departure; we received a Level 1 'TR 3 Fail' alert. DU 4; 5; 6 and MCDU #2 lost brief power approximately every seven to 10 minutes causing all three display units and MCDU #2 to blink off and then on. This event required the First Officer to reselect FMC #1 on MCDU #2. We cross checked all displays and no errors were noted between the First Officer's displays and my side. We discussed the problem and determined the First Officer would continue to be the Pilot Flying unless we had a longer display failure. I continued to monitor the situation as Pilot Monitoring and discussed that we would contact Maintenance Control at the top of the climb. We selected and utilized autopilot 1 (AP1) for climb out and cruise. Upon leveling at FL310; we continued to observe a Level 1 'TR 3 Fail' alert. DU 4; 5; 6 and MCDU #2 lost power with increased frequency. TR 3 showed a load of 0.03-0.04. We also; received Level 1 'FIRE DET 2 FAULT' alert. I asked the First Officer to continue to fly and monitor ATC along with the IRO. I contacted our Dispatcher; Maintenance; and requested to speak with a Systems Maintenance Expert via SAT phone. Up until this point; we felt there were no flight safety concerns to operating the aircraft on the intended flight. We did not feel that a complete failure of MCDU #2 was imminent. Also; we believed the power interruptions to DU 4; 5; 6; and MCDU#2 were due to the opening and closing of the TR #3 relay. After discussing the situation with Dispatch; the Maintenance expert; and the crew; we elected to perform an Air Turn Back to Dispatch requested departure airport. I requested and received amended release #2 to change our destination to the Dispatch requested destination. We were given a nearby airport as the alternate. Later; we received an amended release #3 changing destination alternate due to changing weather conditions at the destination. In consultation with Dispatch; the crew did not feel the need to declare an emergency. We coordinated with ATC and dumped approximately 15;000 pounds of fuel to reduce to below max landing weight. Fuel dump was completed. DU 4; 5; 6 and MCDU #2 continued to blink off and on more frequently. During the descent; DU 4 began to intermittently display a RED X during the power cycle. We discussed the increased frequency of cycle times; and landing weather and I decided it would be best for me to assume the Pilot Flying duties. A positive transfer of aircraft control was performed and the First Officer assumed the Pilot Monitoring duties for the remainder of the flight. During descent; DU 4; 5; 6 and MCDU #2 continued to briefly lose power (blink off/on) approximately every 30 seconds. On final approach; MCDU #2 failed. A normal landing was made. Again; in consultation with Dispatch; the crew did not feel the need to declare an emergency. The crew did not feel the safety of the flight was ever compromised nor did we need to deviate from an ATC clearance to safely complete the Air Turn Back.

[This Report contains no additional information].

An MD-11 departed with several MEL's and shortly after takeoff a Level 1 TR 3 FAIL alerted which resulted in DU's 4; 5; 6 and MCDU #2 power loss. The flight returned to land at an alternate airport without declaring an emergency.

1419491

201701

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

20000.0

VMC

Night

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class A ZZZ

Air Conditioning and Pressurization Pack

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 21000

1419491

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1419497.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

During climb out (low 20;000s) received call from cabin that the temperature in cabin was very hot and getting worse. Was not able to control heat from air-conditioning pack; returned to [departure airport]; landed overweight but uneventfully.Was told by mechanics there was an air cycle machine failure.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-800 flight crew reported returning to the departure airport after they experienced an air cycle machine failure that resulted in high cabin temperatures.

1871938

202201

1201-1800

ZZZ.Tower

US

600.0

Dusk

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Vectors

Class B ZZZ

Autopilot

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Confusion; Human-Machine Interface; Troubleshooting

1871938

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface; Confusion

1871945.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

While on final approach to Runway XXL approximately at 700 feet; the First Officer disconnected the autopilot to perform the landing. I heard the autopilot disconnect sound follow by a strong noise. The First Officer told me that the control column got 'stuck' momentarily and he pushed it forward and it got free (I was looking outside when it happened). We looked into the problem [and] everything was working normal. No CAS (Crew Alert System) indications; hydraulics were looking good and flight control page was good. The flight controls were moving correct and free. We continued with the landing.

I was PF (Pilot Flying) on the ILS XXL into ZZZ. At about 600 feet AGL I pressed the AP (Autopilot) disconnect and the AP disconnect warning sound came on as it always does for about 1-2 seconds. I had full roll control; however; I needed to force the control column forward to get pitch control. The control column was somewhat stuck in position. It made a light snapping noise that was loud enough to also grab the Captain's attention. I had full control after it and landed the plane safely. Neither I nor the Captain have experienced a similar issue before. On the ground we performed another flight control check before shutting down the engines and the EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System) Flight Control Page showed no malfunction. We called MX (Maintenance) and Dispatch to take care of the issue.

Flight crew reported the First Officer's control column stuck after auto pilot disconnect during landing. It became free after 1 to 2 seconds of force applied and the landing was continued.

1422591

201602

1201-1800

JAC.Airport

WY

0.0

IMC

Icing; Snow

Daylight

Ramp JAC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

1422591

Ground Event / Encounter Object

Person Ground Personnel

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged

Airport; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

During an ongoing snow event; airport operations failed to maintain and or assess and properly NOTAM apron conditions. A Part 121 air carrier taxied onto the apron and skidded approximately 20 ft past its intended stopping point striking a GPU damaging the cowl and ingesting a chock that was sitting on top of the GPU. Pilot in command issued a PIREP of NIL braking on the apron to JAC ATCT. Airport authority immediately upgraded braking condition to POOR. Airport authority has no functioning certified friction measuring equipment to ascertain braking action on any surfaces. Airport authority reported contaminates as 1 inch dry snow over packed snow. Conditions were more than 1 inch dry snow over ice.

JAC Ramp Agent reported aircraft damage due to contact with a GPU during gate arrival when the flight crew could not stop due to snow and ice on the ramp. Conditions on the ramp were not NOTAM'ed.

1432793

201703

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Dawn

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Parked

Escape Slide

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload; Time Pressure; Distraction; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1432793

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1432493.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We got to do a ferry flight. After stowing our bags; the FO did a walk around; we both did a check of the interior to ensure the carts/lavs were secure; did our preflight flows; ensured our ferry permit was correct; then we thought we were ready to go. I walked into the jetway and told the gate agent and supervisor we were ready to close and have the jetway pulled. The agent and supervisor were the only 2 people the FO or I had seen in the jetway or on the plane. I closed and armed the main cabin door. I then went back into the cockpit to get ready to fly. After about a minute we heard a strange sound coming from the main cabin door and went back to take a look. A ramper; which I had not seen before; had attempted to open the 1L door. The ramper; agent; and supervisor were all standing in the jetway. The door was approximately 1/4-1/3 open with the slide beginning to deploy; but not yet inflated. We told them to stand back because there was a chance of the slide deploying into the jetway. We notified ops and called dispatch and maintenance control.Just before leaving a manager came to tell us the rampers side of the story. According to him; the ramper had come on the plane and was still on the plane when we closed the main cabin door. He then realized the plane was being closed up and needed to get off; so he walked from wherever he had been hiding and opened the 1L door which I had armed. According to the manager; this long time employee has a history of some non-compliant behavior and seems to be where he has no business being; on a regular basis.Shortly after the door was opened; the first time I saw the ramper; was in the jetway messing with the door and had no reason to expect that he was ever on the airplane at any time. If he was; the cockpit door was open the entire time; and he never stopped to talk to us; or question if it was safe to open the door. Regardless of if he opened the door from the inside or outside; he had no authority to do so.On a ferry flight; the rampers should have no authority to be anywhere other than the front galley in direct communication with the pilots.On a ferry flight; doing one final check to ensure the pilots are indeed the only ones on the airplane prior to closing the main cabin door.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

An ERJ-175 crew preparing to ferry an aircraft described their confusing interaction with the ground crew while preparing for departure. When finally ready; the main cabin door was closed and the slide armed. Unfortunately; an agent had remained in aircraft and activated the slide while attempting to sneak out.

1484181

201709

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

15

Daylight

CLR

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

None

Training

Taxi

Tower ZZZ

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

Final Approach

Class D ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Pilot Not Flying; Instructor

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1100; Flight Crew Type 800

Situational Awareness

1484181

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical

Horizontal 100; Vertical 100

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Procedure

My student and I were initiating a training flight. We had just completed our takeoff checklist; and pulled up to the hold short lines on Alpha for Runway XXL. We made the radio call to Tower that we were holding short and ready for takeoff. We received the clearance '(Our call sign); cleared for takeoff runway XXL; on course.' I took the readback for the student. We cleared visually base and final legs for the approach side of Runway XXL; and proceeded into position on the runway. Just short of the runway pavement; my student puts the brakes on hard and brings the plane to a full stop. A Piper Warrior was on approximately a 1/8 mi final at approximately 50 ft in altitude. The plane on final had been obscured by our wing and we did not see it. We did not have the time or the space to maneuver back behind the hold short line before the Piper Warrior landed.

C172 flight instructor reported stopping just past the hold short lines when an aircraft was observed on short final.

1295884

201509

0001-0600

NCT.TRACON

CA

3000.0

VMC

TRACON NCT

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class B SFO

TRACON NCT

Personal

Small Aircraft

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Cruise

VFR Route

Class B SFO

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1295884

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Procedure

Aircraft Y requested to transition SFO Bravo airspace from the north to south at 3;500 feet which would involve crossing the runway departure corridor. The pilot stated it looked like a departure was on takeoff roll and questioned whether or not it was a problem for them. I then noticed the radar target off the departure end and informed the pilot that the departure would be restricted to 3;000 feet. Aircraft X checked in and I believe he said he was climbing to 3;000 feet. I issued traffic to Aircraft X; but don't recall if he said he had it in sight. For informational purpose I told the pilot of Aircraft Y that it is standard procedure that runway departures are restricted to 3;000 feet as a safety measure for transitioning aircraft. The pilot of Aircraft X overheard the conversation and said he was not issued a 3;000 feet restriction. Although I'm not sure; he may have said he stopped at 3;000 feet because of the traffic I issued. There was no TCAS event nor did the conflict alert sound.With the mix of departure procedures and the new airspace procedures in use it is possible the tower did not issue the 3;000 feet restriction via PDC. The new airspace procedures have the restriction built-in. I would recommend; if possible; the 3;000 foot restriction is added to the departures when sent via PDC.

New departure procedures at SFO have a 3;000 foot published restriction for departures. Previous departure procedures are still issued to some aircraft due to aircraft capabilities. The previous departure procedures do not have the 3;000 foot restriction. The Controller had 3;500 foot Class B airspace crossing traffic. The Controller thought departing jet traffic was restricted to 3;000 feet; but it was not because it was still flying the old departure procedure.

1283384

201507

1801-2400

ZME.ARTCC

TN

34000.0

Night

Center ZME

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Class A ZME

Center ZME

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

1.0

IFR

Cruise

Class A ZME

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Government

Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew

1283384

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was riding jumpseat out of BNA. We had switched to ZME and were climbing out assigned FL230. We switched frequencies and I'm somewhat uncertain what altitude we were assigned but I believe I recall FL340. I do recall the two pilots via the intercom/headsets reading back FL340 and putting it in the FMS.I believe we switched frequencies again and checked on with the next sector. The controller told us to expect higher soon. The pilots were puzzled and got into their flight plan paperwork and saw that the company had requested 260 as a final.Shortly thereafter the TCAS turned yellow and another aircraft went by opposite direction around 3 miles lateral and 600 vertical. Center urgently asked say altitude assigned; First Officer (FO) read back FL340. They asked who assigned it and FO said the previous controller. I confirmed with the crew my recollection of the events and it matched up.I'm unsure if the FO checked on with the next sector and said what altitude they were climbing to. If he didn't it should be required. I may have missed some of this because I could hear the pilots much louder on the intercom/headset than I could hear the frequencies. Also there were a lot of aircraft blocking each other and the center out on this trip.

A BNA Controller; while riding jumpseat hears and confirms with pilots an altitude assignment. Minutes later an aircraft passes with less than standard separation. A working Controller asks the pilot to say altitude and pilot reports altitude. The Controller asks who gave you that altitude and pilot reports that the last Controller did. The flight plan of aircraft was only up to FL260.

1454784

201705

0601-1200

DFW.Airport

TX

1600.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower DFW

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DFW

Tower DFW

Air Carrier

Regional Jet CL65; Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Final Approach

Visual Approach

Class B DFW

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 11000

1454784

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1454766.0

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC

Vertical 300

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Captain flying. Normal flight. During descent; we were held at 4000 ft until turning a dogleg to final for Runway 35C. We had ILS frequency dialed in; and were on localizer when we were cleared to slow from 220 to 170; and cleared the approach. I immediately disconnected the autopilot; lowered the nose and continued configuring (we were at flaps 1 or 5). When we left 4000 ft; we were slightly above glideslope (about 1 dot) and centered on the localizer. At or near JOBBS; the final approach fix; with the aircraft configured with gear down and flaps 15 and the aircraft on both glideslope and localizer; we had a TA. I was busy flying the aircraft; but peaked at the TCAS and noticed an aircraft near our aircraft. It quickly became a RA and I was given the command 'Descend; descend' with the accompanying symbology. I was approximately 1500-1800 feet at the time and immediately pushed the nose over and looked at the TCAS. I saw the other aircraft exactly above our aircraft and only 300 feet separation. I descended to approximately 1200 feet AGL; as the symbology was moving up. Also; at the time of my level off; the non-flying pilot said he visually acquired the other aircraft and stated that we were clear. I then called for final flaps (flaps 25; flaps 30) as we approached the glideslope from below. I re-intercepted the glideslope and continued down. The landing was uneventful. On rollout; the Tower controller stated that he did not have a TA or RA; but that he had 'logged the event' or some wording similar to that.I am unsure of the cause of this event. It seems to me that Tower was not paying enough attention to traffic separation. I find it very hard to believe that ATC did not have a TA or RA. We had 300 feet separation. I also speculate that tower cleared the regional jet (RJ) for a visual approach even though the RJ was west of our localizer and cleared to land on 35R (to the east of our localizer); creating a situation in which the RJ either had to extend their downwind leg past our flight path; or cutting across our flight path. The FO told me that the RJ was in a steep descent and landed ahead of us on 35R. I cannot verify this as I didn't see the aircraft. Another question is what was the reaction in the other aircraft? If they received a RA; which they should have; why didn't they begin an immediate climb? If they did initiate a climb; how were they able to continue to land on 36R?Clearing an aircraft for a visual approach removes separation responsibilities from ATC; but clearing the aircraft for visual approaches when they were located as stated above is very poor judgement.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737 flight crew reported receiving an RA on approach to DFW from another aircraft that was going over the top of them for a parallel runway.

1280864

201507

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Turbine Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 200; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 4000

Distraction; Confusion

1280864

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Other Person

Taxi

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

We pushed back and taxied out normally to the runway. When we were about five minutes from departure we started the #1 engine. It started normally. As we took the runway to line up and wait; an aircraft behind us reported over the radio that there were flames coming out of the left engine. About 15 seconds later they said it was getting worse and the tower could now see it so we shut down the left engine and cleared the runway. Preliminary reports were that the fire went out when engine was shut down. The tower controller took it upon himself to roll the trucks before I could even think about...which is a good thing. We ran our checklists and briefed the cabin crew and passengers. The CFR personnel showed up to do a visual inspection. They did a visual inspection on foot and reported absolutely no fire. So we finished up checklists and briefing passengers and crew and returned to the gate. CFR followed us to gate as a safety precaution. Anomaly was written up and we went to the hotel.Never during this event did the engine indications show anything other than completely normal stable operation.

While awaiting takeoff clearance the flight crew was advised that flames appeared to be coming from one of the aircraft's engines. As the flight crew accomplished the appropriate emergency checklists; the Tower initiated an emergency vehicle response. After the fire was confirmed to be extinguished the aircraft returned to the gate.

1562805

201807

1201-1800

TLH.TRACON

FL

2400.0

TRACON TLH

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Final Approach

Class C TLH

Facility TLH.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 4

Human-Machine Interface

1562805

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert

Human Factors

We have an MVA defined northeast of the field (026 feet) for a group of antennas. Aircraft X was just approaching the depicted antennas at 3000 and was given an approach clearance to maintain 3000 until established. I observed Aircraft X pass the antenna below the MVA at 2400; but past the obstruction. The surrounding MVA being 018; I repeated the clearance. Ref: 7110.65 5-5-9. The skill level of pilots in the ATC system is drastically declining. I have saves every week. Examiners need to stop handing out certificates like bubble gum in a pack of baseball cards.

TLH TRACON Controller reported an aircraft descending below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude (MVA).

1586296

201810

0001-0600

ZAN.ARTCC

AK

35000.0

Center ZAN

Air Carrier

Widebody; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZAN

Facility ZAN.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 11.0

Situational Awareness

1586296

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

Routine Inspection

Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Airspace Structure; Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy

Procedure

This was a near identical problem as my previous dozen or so reports. The flight progress strip was flat in a radar bay with zero indication that it would enter the sector non radar. A strip scan caught the mistake and I made needed corrections. There were multiple aircraft on the airway that is 50 miles north and parallel to the Center boundaries. Luckily (again) there was inadvertent separation standards (vertical and longitudinal). Nothing positive. When ATOP's (Advance Technology and Oceanic Procedures) receives a flight plan entering Anchorage Center; Oakland Center ATOP could be programed to immediately send a message to Anchorage Center of a revised altitude at the aircraft's current altitude; creating an update in FDP (Flight Data Processing) that Oakland Center revised the altitude. Use this or any of the other suggestions I or anyone else has made to improve the safety of this operation. The round of crew briefings Anchorage Center leadership decided might mitigate this situation has not from my observations been effective as evidence from conversations I have had with other operational personnel.

Oceanic Center Controller reported they did not receive updates for a flight entering their airspace non-radar.

1753561

202007

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

180.0

3.0

5000.0

IMC

10

Daylight

3000

TRACON ZZZ

FBO

SR20

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Cruise

Other Block altitude

Class E ZZZ

Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

VFR

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Commercial

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 62; Flight Crew Total 550; Flight Crew Type 350

Human-Machine Interface

1753561

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC

Horizontal 500; Vertical 0

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

We were conducting a dual training flight in a Cirrus SR-20 aircraft; and with ceilings overcast at 3;000 feet. We filed an IFR flight plan and requested a block altitude with Approach so that the student could experience actual IMC. Approach granted us a block from 4 to 6 thousand feet. We were performing basic instrument flying maneuvers within this block at 5000 feet and were in IMC when we received a traffic alert (same altitude; less than a mile). The Cirrus is equipped with the L3 Skywatch Traffic Advisory System; which means that the other aircraft had to have been equipped with at least a Mode C transponder in order for the system to detect it. The student had been flying but I took controls and banked to the right while we were still in the cloud. As we exited the other side of the cloud we could clearly see a high wing aircraft exactly where Skywatch had indicated. We queried ATC; and the controllers response was that 'someone was probably VFR and had decided to get a little too close to you'; and that he was not talking to anyone in that area at the time. We notified ATC of the flight conditions and had no other conflict. During the incident the other aircraft also properly banked right to avoid us.I have no doubt that had we not banked right inside the cloud the outcome could have been much different. We were operating on an IFR flight plan and well within the limits of our block altitude that had been granted by approach; which means that the other aircraft was also inside our block. I would also like to stress that the other aircraft had to have been equipped with at least a Mode C transponder in order for Skywatch to report it as a target and display its altitude relative to us. Flight conditions were mixed inside the block but I do not think it would have been possible to have been operating within the legal VFR weather minimums.

A Flight Instructor conducting training in IMC reported a near miss with an aircraft not identified or in contact with ATC.

1303981

201510

1201-1800

ZHU.ARTCC

TX

VMC

Daylight

Center ZHU

Corporate

Gulfstream Jet Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Descent

STAR SKNRD4

Class A ZHU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 3700; Flight Crew Type 115

Confusion

1303981

ATC Issue All Types

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Between the AEX VOR and JERNY intersection on the SKNRD4 arrival into IAH; we were given a 'Descend Via' clearance from our cruise altitude of FL430. After we had initiated the descent; we were assigned a heading of 180 for spacing. We inquired as to what our new altitude clearance was; but were again told to 'descend via' the arrival. The controller was saturated; so we did not press the issue that a descend via clearance was invalid now that we were not on the lateral track of the STAR. We opted to reset the altitude preselector to FL240 so as to not go below the crossing restriction over the BEATL intersection (between FL240 and FL280). We were subsequently recleared direct to DOOBI and continued with the descend via clearance.This is another case of controller's not correctly utilizing 'climb via' and 'descend via' clearances.

G280 Captain is cleared to descend via the SKNRD4 to IAH. Once the descent is initiated; ATC issues a heading for spacing. When the crew asks for a new altitude assignment; they are told to descend via the arrival although they are no longer on the arrival.

1265851

201505

ZZZ.Airport

US

4.0

400.0

VMC

12

Daylight

9000

TRACON ZZZ

Corporate

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

Part 91

None

Skydiving

Initial Climb

None

Class C ZZZ; Class E ZZZ; Class G ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Contracted Service

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 250; Flight Crew Total 4200; Flight Crew Type 200

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1265851

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Human Factors

Aircraft

I was flying as the first officer of Aircraft X being used on contract by the US Military to conduct parachute operations inside of Restricted airspace. We had 14 military free fall jumpers on board and were taking off from a 3;000 feet unimproved landing strip. We had full inboard fuel tanks. Upon rotation; we experienced a power-plant failure of the left engine at approximately 200 feet. We performed emergency action procedures for a power-plant failure after V1 and attempted to climb to a safe altitude to release jumpers. The aircraft would not climb above 1;000 feet AGL so we diverted to the closest airstrip; ZZZ; which has a 3;200 feet paved runway and was three miles away. Upon landing; braking action was extremely poor and it was extremely difficult to maintain directional control. On taxi back; we experienced a right brake fire that was most likely caused by a leaking hydraulic line dripping fluid onto hot brakes. Passengers were evacuated on the ramp and fire was extinguished with on site fire fighting equipment by myself and the captain. The most likely cause of the engine failure was a Flight Control Unit (FCU) failure and the brake fire because of heavy braking with poorly maintained brakes and a shorter than desired runway available. In a post event debrief; the captain and I reworked the numbers on our useful load for conditions and determined that we had not added enough safety factor into our runway analysis. If we had properly accounted for density altitudes and current conditions; the aircraft would have had better single engine performance and we could have diverted to a longer and more appropriate runway for the situation. There were no injuries to any personnel. We did not declare an emergency during the event because of the the speed at which events happened and the attention needed to safely fly the airplane to landing.

Twin engine; high wing turboprop First Officer reported losing an engine shortly after takeoff. Flight diverted to a nearby airfield where a safe landing was made.

1129225

201310

0601-1200

SSC.TRACON

SC

6500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

12000

TRACON SSC

Corporate

Bonanza 36

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E SSC

GPS & Other Satellite Navigation

X

Improperly Operated; Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Single Pilot; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 2000; Flight Crew Type 800

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1129225

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Chart Or Publication; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Chart Or Publication

I departed that morning after checking weather/TFR's on the internet. I was either direct CHS or TYBEE Intersection on my route. I saw R5311 on the GPS and touched the outline and pressed the info button for R5311. I saw the image (photo taken after ATC notified me on Guard) below and confirmed that I was below the minimum altitude of 12;000 FT. So; instead of deviating right a couple of miles I continued through R5311. About 10 miles south of my exit of R5311 I heard a call on Guard (121.5) of an unknown flyer at my position so I called Fayetteville Approach as I was told. They told me to contact them after landing. They told me about R5311A/B/C and I quickly realized what happened. They also picked me up for flight following. When I landed I contacted Fayetteville Approach and they explained what had happened and I described the above. I was told I might get a call from the R5311 people about the incident. I did get that call and told them the same thing and discussed the issue. I looked at a 'paper' chart (VFR Sectional) and it clearly showed R5311A; R5311B and R5311C. This is unusual for restricted areas (in my experience) but I'm sure not unique. In retrospect I should have noticed the 'C' on the GPS screen and inquired as to where 'A' and 'B' might be but I did not because I had never seen a restricted area like this with three designations for the exact same area. I am an experienced; careful pilot; and yet I was not able to see the difference in the paper charts and GPS charts. I think this deserves some attention and could probably save a life someday. It is not that difficult for the chart makers to denote areas like this such that it is more obvious that there are three different 'criteria' for the R-Area. The paper charts do this very clearly as an example. To me this is a very serious matter and I don't take it lightly. I now know to look closer at what the GPS display is telling me won't make this mistake again; but what about the thousands of other pilots out there that might make the same mistake for the same reason. We really should try to fix this one.

A pilot entered R5311C at 6;500 FT below the GTN 750 GPS depicted 12;000 FT floor but that GPS did not depict the lower R5311 A/B areas along with their respective restricted altitudes.

1876279

202202

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi; Climb

Vectors

Class D ZZZ

Pressurization Control System

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1876279

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

1876284.0

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Taxiway

N

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft X from ZZZ to ZZZ1. I was the FO (First Officer) and the pilot monitoring and the Captain was the Pilot Flying. The time was approximately XA:25-XA:30 at ZZZ when we picked up the ASOS (Automated Surface Observing Systems). At the end of the ASOS there was a message from the Tower from last night stating that the Tower is closed after XQ00 local time and for IFR services to contact ZZZ Center. As we pulled out from the gate I announced on CTAF Frequency our intentions to taxi to Runway XX via Taxiway XX. We got a response from Tower saying the Tower is open and to contact Ground. We contacted Ground and they said to taxi to XX via 1. Once back on with the Tower Controller we asked her when the Tower had opened and she said at XA:00 and we mentioned the ASOS stated that they were closed and she said they had forgotten to flip the switch for the ATIS. The cause was the Tower forgetting to flip the switch to broadcast the ATIS when they opened so the ASOS was still broadcasting and it stated the Tower was closed. The Tower needs to make sure they are broadcasting the ATIS when they open.

Aircraft X. ZZZ-ZZZ1. Captain was the PF (Pilot Flying) and the PM (Pilot Monitoring) was FO (First Officer) NAME. After receiving the ASOS at XF:20z (XA:20 local time) the remarks said the Tower closed at XQ:00 local time. With this being said; there was no Tower resume operations time said and the Jeppsen charts has very little information about the closed/open times for Tower operations. All the field conditions report in the release says FAA TOWER OPEN XC00-XL00 HRS. After de-icing we left the gate and contacted CTAF to mention our intentions for taxi and departure approximately XA:55 local time. After we told CTAF we were taxiing to Runway XX. The Tower Controller told us to contact Ground and that the Tower was open. Both myself and the FO did not hear that the Tower resumed operations and quarried the Controllers. We explained that the ASOS was still reporting the Tower was closed at XQ:00 and was under the impression that CTAF was in effect. The Tower apologized and said they opened at XA:00 local time and forgot to flip the switch. We asked if there was any issues and the reply was no. We taxied to the runway with ground and Tower with no issues.Failure of ATC not stating the airport was open for operations and no accurate Tower operations times.Having a form of or having an updated Airport Facilities Directory of all online as well as off line airports we have listed in the ops specs.

Flight crew reported an erroneous message over the ASOS stated the tower was closed and that the tower had forgot to switch to ATIS when they opened for the day.

1609390

201812

0001-0600

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

Turbulence

Night

CLR

Tower ZZZZ

Air Carrier

B777-200

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Direct

Low

288.0

13.0

Aircraft X

Galley

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Flight Attendant Airline Total 30; Flight Attendant Number Of Acft Qualified On 5; Flight Attendant Total 30; Flight Attendant Type 95

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Distraction

1609390

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Y

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General Physical Injury / Incapacitation

Weather; Environment - Non Weather Related; Company Policy; Aircraft

Weather

As the Galley Flight Attendant; I was in the aft galley with other Main Cabin Flight Attendants setting up for breakfast service when we hit severe turbulence. The plane fell about three times. Both beverage carts fell over as well as inserts; garbage and other galley items. Debris came down on us. We had a full flight with no passenger seats available. There were 6 flight attendants in the galley. We only have 5 available jumpseats in the galley. That meant one flight attendant did not have a seat to go to and thus was thrown around throughout this ordeal. This is totally unacceptable. There should be enough seats in a cabin for all the flight attendants working that cabin or else an available passenger seat for us. I ended up with bruised rib and thigh. We were told by pilots that it was clear air turbulence. Unaware if any passengers ended up declaring any injuries. None did at the time of landing.

B777 Flight Attendant reported being injured when the aircraft encountered unexpected turbulence and there were not enough jump seats in the aft galley for Flight Attendants to occupy.

1419447

201701

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

2400.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 135 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Turbine Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Workload

1419447

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1419448.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

Approximately 5 miles from the fix ZZZZZ on an intercept for the runway ILS localizer; engine #2 involuntarily quit producing power. The Captain immediately stated that we had lost our number 2 engine. I disconnected the autopilot; leveled the aircraft at about 2;400 feet MSL; and maintained control of the aircraft. We had been cleared to descend to 2;000 feet MSL. Approach told us to descend to 2;000 feet. The Captain responded that we had lost our number 2 engine and that we [want priority handling].The Captain (pilot monitoring) called for the immediate action checklist. We ran the checklist and secured the engine. We noted that there did not appear to be a catastrophic event with the engine and we did not rotate the fire handle. I continued the intercept of the localizer. We quickly discussed that we should land immediately rather than accept a delay vector to troubleshoot the issue. I asked the Captain if we should increase the speeds by 5 knots and perform a flaps 22 landing. He increased the speeds and prepared for a flaps 22 landing. The Captain asked if I were comfortable landing the aircraft in its current condition. I stated that I felt prepared. At 1;000 feet; we were unstable in that I was carrying an additional 15 knots of airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet. We had an uneventful landing.During this time; we did not contact the flight attendant. We both felt that it would have created a further distraction on a segment of the flight that was essentially operating normally from a passenger's perspective. The Captain did make an announcement once we landed and we were safely off the runway.We accepted this aircraft earlier in the day. This was the last leg of a five leg day at the end of a three day pairing for me and a four day pairing for the Captain. All five legs on this day were flown in the same aircraft.On our first start of the day; we noted that the Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) was running about 100 degrees hotter than the other side. After the engine warm up; it normalized. I was pilot flying on this leg and made a mental note during the climb that the high pressure vibration indicator for #2 was about one third of the way into the green ribbon. We were climbing to FL330. After we leveled off at FL330; the high pressure vibration indicator normalized; but slightly higher than the other engine.The Captain was pilot flying on the next leg. In the climb he noted that the high pressure vibration indicator was just below the top of the green ribbon. Once again; it showed seemingly normal indications during cruise and descent. The Captain did remark that the pressure and temperature on that engine was slightly higher than the other engine.In preparing for departure; the Captain included the engine parameters in his brief. He told me to keep an eye on the high pressure spool vibes as well as the pressures and temperatures. They were indicating fairly normally on [climb out].On the [next] turn; I also included the slightly higher engine indications in my departure briefs as well. On both flights; all indications were well within normal limits during all phases of flight. The engine failure slightly surprised me during the approach phase of the flight.I had excess speed on the approach. I was not stable at 1;000 feet due to 15 knots of excess airspeed. We were stable by 500 feet within the 10 knot airspeed threshold.I was very impressed with the professionalism; maturity; and experience of the Captain/Line Check Pilot. We had flown a lot of legs together in some horrible weather over the past several days. Fatigue had begun to set in on me and possibly him as well. I think he could have taken the airplane from me and landed just so he could be more comfortable. I also surmise that this could have created a further distraction in a high workload environment. He kept a cool head the whole time. Keep the standards of training high!I do not know that this event could have been prevented based on my knowledge.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

EMB135 flight crew reported a number 2 engine loss during an intercept to final approach. Crew reported running checklist to secure engine and accomplished an uneventful landing.

1274468

201506

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Embraer Phenom 300

2.0

Part 135

Other Maintenance

Parked

N

Scheduled Maintenance

Testing

Hydraulic Main System

Embraer

X

Improperly Operated; Malfunctioning

Repair Facility

Air Taxi

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1274468

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural FAR; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Maintenance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

June 2015. [Aircraft X]; an EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft was due for its 15-day Hydraulic Accumulator Check. Per AOM 5.21; we performed it; twice; and it failed both times. [Check that] the drop rate does not increase to approximately 1;000 psi/sec (above 1;200 psi); but continues decreasing at a rate of approximately 100 psi/sec. We completed AOM 5.21 and noted the accumulator fluid level was overfilled (Yellow range).Company Maintenance Controller was contacted and he coordinated for an Embraer ZZZ Maintenance Technician to proceed to the aircraft. We conducted this third test with the Technician in the left seat. The test failed again. The Embraer maintenance Technician discussed with three other Embraer maintenance technicians and we all agreed to perform the check on another EMB-505; Aircraft Y. The test was completed by Embraer and upon completion it failed and [the accumulator fluid] was overfilled. We completed Company [Logbook] Maintenance form with the discrepancy for Aircraft X.The following day; upon reviewing Aircraft X's company Logbook it was determined that a Technician fraudulently completed the Corrective Action section of the Logbook for the Hydraulic Accumulator Check. We completed the Hydraulic Accumulator Check; per AOM 5.21; and it passed with the accumulator fluid level in the middle of the Green band. Technician's Corrective Action states that they did not drain the fluid level. However; this is blatantly false as I have provided a picture of it overfilled (Yellow) and it was in the middle of the Green band the next day. Not only is this an ethical conundrum; it has serious safety ramifications. As a human; professional pilot and FAA Mechanic with Airframe and Powerplant ratings I am appalled by the actions of Embraer.

A Captain challenges the accuracy of a Maintenance Corrective Action sign-off in a logbook after several Hydraulic Accumulator Checks had failed on one of their EMB-505 (Phenom-300) aircraft due to overservicing of the hydraulic accumulator. No reference to hydraulic fluid being drained to correct the discrepancy.

1502289

201712

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

10

Daylight

CLR

CTAF ZZZ

FBO

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Training

Takeoff / Launch

None

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Student

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 40; Flight Crew Type 40

Training / Qualification

1502289

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Procedure

Went to practice a soft field takeoff and when the nose wheel came off the ground I didn't have enough right rudder in and the plane was pulled to the left. The plane went off the runway and down into the grass so I just took it back onto the taxiway and taxied back to the ramp area. I then did a walk around and nothing seemed to be broken on the plane.

PA28 student pilot reported a loss of control during takeoff that resulted in a runway excursion.

1228215

201412

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

No Aircraft

Part 121

Taxi

Air/Ground Communication

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Ramp

Distraction; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 ATC

1228215

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

N

Person Ground Personnel

Other During Tow

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors

Equipment / Tooling

In tow with aircraft at Spot XX. Call was made to Ground tower for Super Tug XX; Spot XX for Gate XXa. No response. This was repeated several times; unable to hear response from Ground tower. Turned off all lights (beacons; headlights; cradle lights) and still unable to hear Ground response for instruction. We contacted Super 13 to ask for them to communicate to Tower and to communicate their instruction for tow. Super Tug XA was able to communicate to Ground and relay instructions to us for tow. Radio issues continue to be primary safety concern for those of us on [the aircraft] move team. Several requests have been made to upgrade our system with continued ignored requests. This issue needs to be resolved to give us the proper tools and equipment necessary to do our job safely. We are aware that these issues are ignored in favor of budget concerns; hopefully an accident will not occur before these issues are actually addressed.

A ramp employee reports about continuing radio malfunctions in their Super Tugs (STs) that prevent drivers from hearing Ground Control Tower instructions when towing aircraft. Requests to upgrade their communication radios due to safety concerns have been ignored.

1755751

202008

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

5500.0

VMC

Cloudy; Haze / Smoke; 10

Daylight

CTAF ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 140

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Private

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40; Flight Crew Total 2200; Flight Crew Type 700

Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Flight Crew

1755751

Conflict NMAC; Inflight Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Horizontal 150

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Airspace Structure; Human Factors

Human Factors

I had departed ZZZ1 VFR en route to ZZZ2. There was a band of clouds on the route and as it was bumpy down low I wanted to climb up above the clouds and take advantage of the smooth air and hopefully a tailwind. I maneuvered a little to maintain VFR while climbing and eventually leveled out at 5;500 ft. MSL. I noted the lack of any distinct horizon to the north and northeast while to the south and southeast there was a horizon. It looked like the air to the north and northeast was trying to decide if it wanted to be a cloud or not. Since I could not determine distance and did not want to run into IMC I turned more eastward. About this time I caught a sudden movement out of the corner of my right eye. I first thought that it was extremely strange for a bird. I quickly turned and saw a skydiver; pilot chute deployed dragging the bag and risers out. I quickly turned my head to the left and noted a white square canopy fully deployed on my left side about 8 o'clock and lower. This scared me and I scanned rapidly for other canopies; not seeing any others. I have a Stratux for ADS-B in and I looked for traffic. I noted a contact about 2;600 ft. below and descending rapidly. I had not noticed him before and I guessed this was likely the jump plane. I had also immediately tuned into the CTAF to listen. I didn't hear any radio traffic. I am a USPA licensed sport parachutist with XXX jumps logged; though I haven't jumped in XX years or so. I fly very often by airports with jump activity and listen in for activity and give them a wide berth so as to avoid any unannounced activity. I have flown by ZZZ quite a few times; in fact I had flown by on the way to ZZZ1 from ZZZ3 earlier. I had listened to the CTAF and there had been no activity in the 15 minutes or so I listened while I passed well to the east and southeast en route to ZZZ1. I wasn't thinking about that on my return trip. I believe I was pre-occupied with evaluating the clouds and clearance when I lost situational awareness and found myself over ZZZ. I'm not so sure that the conditions were good enough for skydiving given I could not see the airport. I continued on to ZZZ2 descending after passing by the band of clouds. My normal flying is all low in my Cessna 140 and I am rarely above 3000 ft. MSL. I am normally quite conscious of my position in relation to the airports I am near. I think it likely the distraction of getting above the clouds; loss of visual ground cues for my position and the unusual visibility contributed to loss of focus on remaining clear of ZZZ. I'm going to have to make a concerted effort to maintain situational awareness at all times.

C140 pilot reported an NMAC with a skydiver.

1627917

201903

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Daylight

Ground ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Company

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Communication Breakdown

Party1 Other; Party2 Flight Crew

1627917

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Maintenance

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Procedure; Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

On engine start; the #1 ENG began spilling a large amount of fuel. The aircraft spilled approximately 300 gal over a 1 mile stretch of taxiing. On throttle up for T/O (Take-Off); the leak stopped and allowed the flight to continue without interruption. When the crew got on the ground; the PIC (Pilot in Command) called and reported a 2300lb overburn. I looked at the winds aloft and saw a reported 150kt wind at FL340. With a large internal overburn and the winds aloft; and no other info regarding the previous leak; I assessed that the fuel burn; while excessively large; was still within the realm of possibility given the circumstances. I told the crew to monitor their fuel burn for the return leg; as there would be a tail wind to help. When the flight arrived in ZZZ; ARFF (Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting) was waiting for the flight. Crew was instructed to taxi to the end of the RWY and shutdown. When the aircraft eventually made it back to a gate; the [Fire] Chief reported the fuel leak; and sent the PIC the pic; who then forwarded it on to [Maintenance Control]; where I was finally able to see it. At no point was the fact that an aircraft was leaking fuel in such fashion; reported to either Dispatch; or ATC to relay to the crew; even though ZZZ Ops had to have known; as ARFF knew that specific tail would be returning to ZZZ; and the approximate time they would arrive.Ensure all ground personnel know to report to flight crew if a fuel leak is suspected on push back/engine start. If unable to notify crew; or suspected after out of communication with flight crew; relay to OPS if a fuel leak is suspected. Furthermore; ensure Dispatch or [Operations Control] is made aware of the issue in order to establish communication with the Flight Crew to better assess the issue. If unable to contact Dispatch or [Operations Control]; contact Station TWR/Cab to relay message to flight crew about possible fuel leaks.

Maintenance Control reported an aircraft experienced a fuel leak causing fuel quantity to drop below flight plan limit.

1025442

201207

1201-1800

DEN.Airport

CO

40.0

20000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZDV

Air Carrier

B737-300

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Direct

Class A ZDV

FMS/FMC

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40

Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1025442

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

While on the departure; we were initially given a 275 heading after departure from Runway 25. Sometime around FL200; we were given direct ZIMMR; on course. I punched ZIMMR into the FMC Page 1 Route page; executed it; and thought I hit LNAV. First Officer was making a PA at the time and I did not verify with him as I usually do. A few minutes later; ATC called and asked us if we were on a different arrival since we were about ten miles north of course. We said we were not and Controller cleared us direct MEEKER and we resumed the arrival. Controller stated that there was no problem and no conflict. [We had a] routine flight after that. I did not verify pressing LNAV because the First Officer was on the radio. I should have done it immediately after he got off the radio.

B737-300 Captain attributed a track deviation to his failure to engage LNAV on the FMS after loading a 'direct to' fix.

1424265

201702

0601-1200

MAF.Airport

TX

5000.0

Marginal

Rain; Thunderstorm; 5

Night

3000

TRACON MAF

Corporate

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach; Landing

Visual Approach

Class C MAF

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 55; Flight Crew Total 12500; Flight Crew Type 1020

Situational Awareness

1424265

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Corporate

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 100; Flight Crew Total 3400; Flight Crew Type 180

Situational Awareness

1424513.0

Airspace Violation All Types; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Landing Without Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Incursion Runway

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Human Factors; Weather

Human Factors

Cleared by Midland approach for a visual approach to the ODO airport. Controller advised crew that the runway requested there was closed. He advised crew that an additional runway at ODO was closed also. Crew discussed landing at the alternate airport due to the unreported runway closures. Weather was deteriorating when aircraft broke out below the overcast. Rain showers moving through the area at the time obscured visibility to the west of MAF. First Officer reported the airport in sight and was instructed to cancel IFR in air or on the ground. Upon turning on final; crew cancelled the flight plan and a normal landing was accomplished on runway 10 at MAF. Controller acknowledged cancellation; advised crew to squawk 1200. He made no comment concerning our lineup at MAF. Crew realized mistake on landing and immediately advised tower.Crew believes that the deteriorating weather; coupled with nearly identical runway orientation at our alternate; and no controller advisory of the deviation; caused the crew to assume that the only lit runway at MAF was indeed the active runway at ODO. This occurrence could have been avoided by closer monitoring by ATC; or by the crew electing to shoot the instrument approach to the ODO airport in light of the changing weather conditions.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Corporate jet flight crew reported landing at the wrong airport citing weather and runway lighting as contributing.

1761248

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

7.0

5500.0

VMC

Haze / Smoke; 10

12000

Tower ZZZ

Government

Kodiak 100

Part 91

VFR

Final Approach

Direct

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

Part 121

Initial Approach

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25; Flight Crew Total 5200; Flight Crew Type 25

Communication Breakdown; Physiological - Other

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1761248

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 500

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; ATC Equipment / Nav Facility / Buildings

Human Factors

The pilot; 'Pilot 1' of a single-engine turboprop aircraft was on approach to a Class C airport from the north. Pilot 1 was operating under Part 91 VFR rules in day VMC conditions. Per ATIS; visibility was 10 miles and ceiling clear below 12;000 ft. Pilot 1 was handed off from Approach Control to Tower and was instructed by Tower to 'continue' to Runway XXR. A landing clearance had not yet been issued. While descending through approximately 6;000 ft. MSL (3;000 ft. AGL) Pilot 1 experienced a rapid onset of severe pain in his sinus. When reaching approximately 5;000 ft. MSL; Pilot 1 leveled off and initiated a slow climb back to 6;000 ft. MSL. Tower frequency was busy as Tower appeared to be giving lengthy instruction to a flight of aircraft while also managing other aircraft within the airspace. Pilot 1 was unable to 'break in' and talk with Tower. Without being able to coordinate with Tower; Pilot 1 elected to discontinue approach and turn away from the airport (after crossing through the final approach corridor) and maintain approximately 6;000 ft. MSL on a heading which was 20-30 degrees divergent from inbound runway traffic in an effort to maintain separation from other aircraft; and also manage the physiological issue (equalize pressure in the sinus). After approximately 1-2 minutes of flying away from the airfield; Tower queried Pilot 1 as to his intentions. Pilot 1 stated that he did not require assistance at the time but did need and altitude of 6;000 ft. MSL and a heading to clear airspace. Pilot 1 was then given a heading of 190 degrees (this would have been a safe heading). Within seconds of receiving the 190 heading; Pilot 1 was told by Tower 'Traffic alert. Turn left heading 360 immediately!' As Pilot 1 was executing this turn; he and his passenger visually spotted a Part 121 B737. The assigned 360-degree heading had position Pilot 1 directly in front of and slightly below the 737's flight path. Pilot 1 was forced to take evasive action and aggressively maneuver away from; and below the 737. The crew of the 737 received and reported (to Tower) a resolution advisory. The crew of the 737 stated (over Tower frequency) that they had visual contact with Pilot 1's aircraft as it was maneuvering away from them.After the traffic conflict was resolved; Pilot 1 again requested 6;000 ft. MSL and a vector to clear airspace which was accommodated by Tower. Pilot 1 ultimately made a safe landing. Pilot 1 did not [request priority handling] during this incident. The near mid-air collision took place approximately 7 miles east of the airfield runway approach end. No aircraft damage or injury resulted from this incident.Contributing factors [include] lengthy communication between Tower and aircraft on the ground while simultaneously managing several airborne aircraft. Per the Tower Supervisor; Tower's radar has a 6-second sweep. Thus; in this scenario radar provided delayed information to the controller resulting in instruction of a turn of Pilot 1 in an unsafe direction. [Also contributing was] single pilot operation in which pilot was managing [their] own physiological emergency while simultaneously managing safety of the flight.At 7 miles; the two incident aircraft were likely beyond visual range of the Tower controller(s). This airfield can be a busy Class C with a mix of General Aviation; Military; and Air Carrier operations. [I] recommend upgrading Tower radar to one with a faster refresh rate; assigning an alternate tower frequency where lengthy discussion (preferably with an alternate controller) can be had; [and] that flight crew members carry fast acting decongestant.

Kodiak 100 Pilot reported a NMAC event while attempting to maneuver away from approach course via an assigned heading.

1467075

201707

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

A321

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1467075

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Human Factors

Upon door closure clearance was received for push back. I contacted the push back crew and stated 'ready for push back; brakes released'. When they did not answer; I looked down to make sure I was on interphone. When I looked up; the aircraft was moving backward. The First Officer stated 'They want you to step on the bakes'. The aircraft had rolled back around 20 feet; and I eased on the brakes to stop the aircraft. The ground crew stated that the parking brake on the tug was inoperative; and they had left the tug in gear; so the aircraft parking brake was the only thing holding the aircraft still after they pulled the chocks. They changed to a tug with an operative brake and continued the push back.I thought the ground crew was on interphone; when they were not. I did not wait for a verbal acknowledgment from the ground crew before releasing the parking brake.Do not leave the tug in gear if the park brake on it is broken.

A321 Captain reported when he released the brakes ready for push back the aircraft started moving backwards. The Captain reported he stepped on the brakes and was told the tug parking brake was inoperative and they had left the tug in gear.

1751181

202007

1801-2400

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

33000.0

VMC

Turbulence

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B747-400

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Direct

Class A ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1751181

Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Aircraft; Weather

Weather

During cruise; we encountered severe turbulence. This resulted in VNAV and LNAV disengaging and the aircraft unable to maintain altitude. After the loss of VNAV; the vertical mode reverted to Vertical Speed and was holding about a 1200 to 1400 foot per minute climb. We got an overspeed warning that lasted about one second while the aircraft was in this climb. The altitude deviation was about 500 to 600 feet off the assigned altitude. The automation was disengaged and we returned to the assigned altitude. ATC queried us about our altitude via CPDLC and we notified them about our turbulence encounter. As we exited the area of turbulence; automation was reengaged successfully. About 45 minutes prior to our turbulence encounter; we received SIGMET CHARLIE 1 for frequent thunderstorms. Most of the area plotted was west of our route; however; we tried to maintain situational awareness with the weather radar. Prior to our encounter; we saw no radar returns; or other visual cues of cells ahead such as lightning. Therefore the encounter came as somewhat of a shock. Upon realizing we were entering turbulence I looked up to engage the continuous ignition. In hindsight; as pilot flying I should have requested the continuous ignition and stayed on the instruments. The level of turbulence made it difficult to even read the instruments. Temporarily looking away only compounded the challenge.

Air Carrier pilot reported encountering unexpected severe turbulence which caused an uncontrolled altitude deviation.

1015485

201206

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

10.0

1500.0

VMC

Rain; 10

Daylight

12000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Passenger

Cruise

Class B ZZZ; Class D ZZZ

Electrical Power

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Instructor

Flight Crew Commercial; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 60; Flight Crew Total 1015; Flight Crew Type 700

Workload; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1015485

ATC Issue All Types; Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; General Maintenance Action

Procedure; Aircraft; Airport

Aircraft

Immediately after entering Class B airspace southbound at 1;500 FT; lost communications. Turned north and exited Class B airspace and squawked VFR. Began a return trip to my destination and while doing so; trouble shot for lost communications. During this time; also lost all electrical - fuel quantity gauges; oil temperature gauge; radios; lights; flaps. [I] circled over my destination at 2;500 FT twice; no light gun from Tower. Continued circle at 2;000 FT; no signals. [I] continued at 1;500 FT; observed no traffic; no signals. After 20 minutes of circling without notice from the Tower; entered right pattern for the runway and performed a no flap landing. Called Tower after landing and was told they did not notice me until short final.

A C172 lost all electrical during night flight and after circling the destination airport from 2;500 FT down to 1;500 FT the pilot landed without ATC clearance.

988900

201201

0.0

CLR

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Taxi

Y

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 150; Flight Crew Total 19000; Flight Crew Type 800

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

988900

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Equipment / Tooling; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Our push back crew failed to secure the tow bar to the pushback vehicle; resulting in the aircraft being pushed back without control. I applied brakes gently after recognizing the problem; but the brakes did not respond immediately due to the generator coming on line after engine start. Shortly thereafter; the brakes did respond resulting in an abrupt stop. There were no injuries or damage to airplane.

When pushback of the A320 was initiated without the tow bar securely attached to the tug; the aircraft rolled backwards without restraint and had to be braked abruptly to a halt by the flight crew.

1744548

202005

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 170/175 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Training / Qualification; Situational Awareness

1744548

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Ground Personnel

Aircraft In Service At Gate

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; General Maintenance Action; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Human Factors

When we arrived at the aircraft; the interior was extremely warm due to the external air having not yet been connected. As soon as we arrived at the aircraft; the Captain had the First Officer tell the ramp agents to connect the external air as soon as possible; so that the cabin could be supplied with cool air to create a comfortable cabin temperature appropriate for boarding. Additionally; since this flight was scheduled to depart after XA00 local; it was not considered a STAR flight so we could save some fuel by not starting the APU as soon as possible (as is the procedure with STAR flights); and instead start the APU by D-12. The ramp agents promptly connected external air to the aircraft within about 4 minutes of the request; and the cabin was at an appropriate temperature by about D-35. However; as the passengers boarded; the internal cabin temperature once again began to creep up; so we started the APU at about D-20. After the APU was up and running; intending to signal to them to disconnect both the GPU and external air; we looked out the window for any ramp agents and pressed the horn to get their attention; but no one was available in front of the aircraft; since they were probably all occupied below the aircraft; loading bags.Finally; after the load closeout report was received from CLP; we communicated to the flight attendants that we were ready for door closure and were also able to get the attention of a ramp agent; and we exchanged hand signals to disconnect both the GPU and external air. Once the aircraft was all closed up; we had our headsets on and all checklists were complete; we attempted to call the ramp agents over the ramp interphone system; but we received no response as there was no one on the ramp headset. We observed the jetway move away from the aircraft; then inexplicably move back towards the aircraft. We signaled to the ramp agents to put their headset on so that we could get some perspective about what was going on; but the ramp agents signaled that they were having trouble with their headset. We then called the Station to ask what was going on; and they indicated something went wrong with ramp procedures; there may be some damage; and we should prepare for the jetway agent to open the aircraft up again. We then called the flight attendants and told them to prepare to open the aircraft up again. We ran the Parking Checklist and opened the flightdeck door; then made a PA to the pax about what was happening.We soon heard that the PCA hose had still been connected between the jetway and aircraft while the jetway was moved rearward; which caused the aircraft's external air intake manifold (which accepts air from a hose connected to the jetway) to be ripped from the aircraft by the rearward movement of the jetway. This dislocated manifold component had fallen out from the bottom of the aircraft. We did not hear or feel anything (no 'pop' or jolt) while this was happening.After door opening procedures were complete and we made all appropriate communications; we went out and saw the fallen manifold component laying forlornly on the tarmac below the PCA intake hatch. We then called maintenance for aircraft inspection.After the APU was up and running; but we could not get anyone's attention to connect the power and the air; we should have been more proactive to go outside and track someone down to disconnect the power or to call Station to get someone to disconnect the ground power cord and external air hose. However; we were occupied at this time; being engaged in our preflight briefing procedures and before-start checklist.Since ramp Ops are so important to a successful; safe and on-time departure of an aircraft; we should ALWAYS have at least one ramp agent with 'eyes on' the flight deck at ALL TIMES. This is important because external accessories such as GPU and/or external air/PCA need to be connected and/or disconnected in a timely fashion. In this case; if the external air hosehad been disconnected in a timely fashion; it would have eliminated the risk of the incident which occurred. We can accomplish 'eyes on' in one or more of the following ways:1. Physically position a ramp agent at the nose of the aircraft throughout the turn to supervise ramp procedures and watch for hand signals from the flight deck.2. Install mirrors at each and every gate in the system; angled in such a way so that signals from the flight deck can be seen by ramp agents working underneath the right-hand side of the aircraft.3. Emphasize during ramp agent training that when the E175 horn sounds; that means the pilots in the flight deck need to get the attention of a ramp agent; and they should immediately walk over to the nose of the aircraft to look for hand signals from the flight deck. In this incident; we sounded the horn several times with no one walking to the front of the aircraft... they just kept working.It is important that the jetway driver positively confirm- both visually and by hand signals from rampers- that ALL jetway-connected external accessory hoses/cords are disconnected from the aircraft PRIOR to jetway movement. It is also important that ramp agents give the jetway driver and other rampers correct hand signals which can be clearly interpreted.It would also be nice if ramp agents were provided with reliable headsets at all stations. While we do have hand signals we use to communicate visually with ramp agents; and while this may not have prevented this particular incident; the inability to accomplish effectively communication with ramp agents in a timely fashion is a continuing frustration.

E175 Captain reported the aircraft was damaged when the jetway was pulled away with the external air conditioning hose still attached.

1107074

201308

1801-2400

VPS.Airport

FL

500.0

Mixed

Rain; Thunderstorm; scattered at 2300; 4

Daylight

TRACON VPS

Air Taxi

Light Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 135

IFR

Ferry / Re-Positioning

Initial Approach

Other approach

Class D VPS; Class E ZJX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 101; Flight Crew Total 5300; Flight Crew Type 300

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1107074

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Taxi

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 108; Flight Crew Total 2045; Flight Crew Type 43

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1107075.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Exited Penetrated Airspace; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Weather; Chart Or Publication; Environment - Non Weather Related

Ambiguous

We were on approach to DTS for the GPS 14 approach in light rain. The weather was changing at DTS due to the fact there was a thunderstorm just to the south and west of DTS. We saw VPS and thought it was DTS so we told [the] Controller we had a visual and began to maneuver for landing; we descended to approximately 500 to 600 AGL when we noticed the crossing runway and saw runway numbers of 12 Not 14. So we went around and continued to DTS. We saw DTS when approximately 1 to 2 mile past VPS. I think it would enhance safety to add a note on the planned view GPS 14 to DTS regarding the fact that you cross over VPS and in low Visibility it can be mistaken for DTS due similar runways; i.e. Runway 12 versus Runway 14.

[Narrative #2 contains no additional information]

An air taxi crew executed a go-around while on final to VPS Runway 12 in light rain with four miles visibility after realizing that they were not on final approach for DTS GPS Runway 14 about six miles beyond VPS.

1308476

201511

1201-1800

OAK.Airport

CA

120.0

7.0

1300.0

VMC

Dusk

Tower OAK

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Visual Approach

Class C OAK

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159

Situational Awareness

1308476

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 247; Flight Crew Type 6400

Situational Awareness

1308449.0

Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude

Automation Aircraft RA

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

At about seven mile final to Runway 30 in Oakland; we received an 'ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED; ADJUST' RA. The traffic was a VFR traffic that had departed from Hayward Executive. The aircraft was configured for a flaps 40 landing and the 'Before Landing Checklist' was complete. I was the Pilot Flying; autopilot and autothrottles were both disengaged prior to the TA and RA. The traffic was reported to us by OAK Tower. The First Officer and I did not visually acquire the aircraft so FO responded with a 'negative contact'. Upon receiving the 'ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED; ADJUST' I smoothly applied additional thrust and reduced the descent rate of the aircraft in compliance with the displayed RA commands. FO made a radio call to OAK Tower stating that [we were] responding to an RA. Upon receiving the 'CLEAR OF CONFLICT' call from the TCAS; I ensured that I was still comfortable; and stable to continue the approach. We were less than one dot displacement high on the electronic glideslope; and I still had about 300 ft to ensure aircraft stability. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful. Tower gave us a phone number to call on the taxi in. Upon engine shutdown and completion of checklist; I called ATC and sent an ACARS message to Dispatch with a brief explanation of the event and informing him that the passengers seemed unaware of the event.We followed our protocol perfectly. The traffic at Hayward needs to be more careful to follow traffic pattern altitudes.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B737-700 flight crew reported responding to an RA on a visual approach to OAK that appeared to be from a small aircraft in the HWD area.

1003633

201204

1201-1800

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

21000.0

Center ZAB

Military

Fighting Falcon F16

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Cruise

None

Class A ZAB

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Confusion; Workload

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC; Party2 Flight Crew; Party2 Other

1003633

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Other / Unknown

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working Sector 90 (FL240B330) and 47 (000B230) combined. I had quite a bit of activity going on; particularly military activity. I had a Heavy C135 in AR613 refueling multiple F16s; who were then requesting to go into Outlaw/Jackal MOAs and one into RUBY. I had several inbounds and outbounds from TUS that required a lot of work. I had several departures from PHX and arrivals from PHX that also required a lot of work; as well as multiple VFRs. I also had two departures from FHU that required a lot of work because the GCA has no automation. In TOMBSTONE; I had a pair of A10s (was in there when I took over the sector); then subsequently a second pair of A10s departed DMA requesting TOMBSTONE FL350 and below. These two are (from DMA) and are both MARSA with each other. Right about the same time; Libby (FHU) GCA called for a hand off on a single F16 VFR requesting TOMBSTONE. I told them he couldn't get an IFR clearance because he probably wasn't MARSA; to which the GCA controller said he was VFR. I didn't want to try to explain to him that they require an IFR clearance to climb into Class A airspace; so I just took RADAR. Once the single F16 called me; I asked him if he was MARSA with the first A10s and the second pair of A10s; he replied he was MARSA with a pair of F16s. I wasn't talking to the two F16s (they were on a VFR low level; though I had a flight plan in URET). I asked him again; he replied the same. The third attempt to get the information out; he told me he was not MARSA with the A10s. I told him I would not be able to issue an IFR clearance into TOMBSTONE since he was not MARSA; gave him the local altimeter and a frequency change. They were working in the TOMBSTONE East portion VFR; the A10s were in the North portion. Although TOMBSTONE is divided into three different areas; we do not have authority to clear them into the disparate areas. Right after this; the two F16s called me for a clearance into TOMBSTONE; I RADAR identified him; told him the same thing as what I had told the single F16; told him to maintain VFR; and gave them a frequency change. He told me he was MARSA with the single F16 to which I replied roger. Some time later; I had a C130 off of DMA requesting to go into the Cochise Orbit. The orbit entailed a big block of airspace south of SSO; encompassing the entire TOMBSTONE MOA plus other areas outside the ATCAA. The C130 was not MARSA with anyone in TOMBSTONE; so I had to vector them outside the area in the TUS arrival corridor; greatly increasingly my already high workload. I called both the first A10 pair and the second pair of A10s on Guard to see if I could cap them in TOMBSTONE at or below FL200; the second pair of A10s said they were already beginning to climb above it to do their maintenance check. The C130 offered to stay in the orbit but outside TOMBSTONE; though I didn't think that would be a legal clearance since I couldn't ensure three miles from the ATCAA boundary. The first A10 pair never came on frequency. As I was done talking to the C130; I saw the single F16 heading westbound towards the general direction of CIE (the normal recovery point out of TOMBSTONE); but I wasn't receiving a Mode C; it was triple X'ed. I assumed they were leaving VFR. I saw the two F16s about ten miles behind with a Mode C of 185. Since they hadn't received a clearance; I went to DARC and saw that the single F16 was at FL210. Luckily; I had at least one A10 on frequency; so I started calling traffic. I called the single F16 and the two F16s on Guard and admonished them; saying they didn't have a clearance; there were A10s in the area; and started telling them both where the A10s were. Apparently; the single F16 had called the A10s (I'm not sure if both flights were contacted) and had worked out to stay above FL195 to stay clear of them. Not wanting to exacerbate a safety issue by forcing the F16s down out of airspace and into the A10s; I let it go; and continued to call traffic. I was at a bit of a loss for what to do. I basically had three different military units requesting the same airspace at the same time; none of whom were MARSA with each other. First; the scheduling by the military unit for TOMBSTONE was absolutely atrocious. It would appear that none of the units requesting this airspace knew about each other; though the C130 mentioned something about it. I'm not even sure the three different units knew about the scheduling. The scheduling must improve; this seems to happen with regularly. Second; when this kind of complex military flying is going on; the low sector must absolutely be split off. I was way to busy by the time it got into the core of this mess to request it. I got a D-Side something I should have asked for much earlier. At one point; I think I had 24 aircraft in my ACL; but I was to busy to look at URET much.

ZAB Controller described a very busy and complex control period involving multiple military aircraft all apparently scheduled in the same airspace at the same time without prior coordination.

1059958

201210

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Rain

Night

Air Carrier

B747-400

Part 121

Parked

Y

N

Y

Scheduled Maintenance

Installation; Work Cards

Electrical Distribution Relay

X

Malfunctioning

Gate / Ramp / Line

Air Carrier

Technician

Maintenance Avionics

Situational Awareness; Confusion; Communication Breakdown

Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Maintenance

1059958

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical

N

Person Maintenance

Other During Paperwork Review

General Maintenance Action

Human Factors; Chart Or Publication; Manuals; Aircraft

Manuals

Given an assignment with parts ordered and on hold to replace the R48 [Relay]. Deferral was updated with parts needed. It [Relay] looks different than the other three [relays] installed; but match R48. Upon checking the online Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) 28-22-51-006a under Item-25 with company Part Numbers (P/N) and Sub-section-25 with Manufacturer's (MFG) Parts Number that do not cross to company Part Numbers; [I] was not aware that replacement relay is a non-stock part. Since Pre and Post-Service Bulletin (S/B) Part Numbers (P/N) are both under the same company Part Number item at the moment; I believed I was installing the correct part.

Reporter stated there are four relays; each identified with an 'R' and a two digit number; such as R-46; R47; R48. The relays are located in the 414 Power Panel in the Main Equipment Center (MEC) on B747-400 aircraft. One relay for each Main wing tank boost pump. The deferral involved a right wing Main fuel tank boost pump and the associated R48 Relay. The R48 Relay had been upgraded to a Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) design as a result of a Service Bulletin (S/B); but was still listed under their company's Parts Numbering System with the same P/N as the older Non-GFI Relay. Reporter stated the Aircraft Wiring Diagram Manual still refers to the upgraded relays as R46; R47; R48; but their Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) and IPC item Sub-section did not have a new company P/N to identify the upgraded R48 GFI-type Relays. They were both listed under one Part Number even though the Manufacturer's part numbers were different. His company has since revised their IPC Manual to reflect the Pre and Post Service Bulletin Relays.

Inadequate information in the Illustrated Parts Catalog (IPC) led to installing a Pre-Service Bulletin R48 Relay in the 414 Power Panel of a B747-400 aircraft. A Ground Fault Interrupter (GFI) type R48 Relay associated with the right wing Main fuel tank boost pump was required.

1692306

201910

0601-1200

1000.0

VMC

Daylight

Air Carrier

B767-200

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Climb

Direct

Hydraulic Main System

X

Malfunctioning

Company

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 170; Flight Crew Total 5700; Flight Crew Type 2000

1692306

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural MEL / CDL; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft

Immediately after takeoff from ZZZ we received this ICAS message 'C HYD PRESS'. Initially we thought that the APU may not have been providing enough air for the ADP to work properly since we were operating with a deferred maintenance item on the right-side bleed system which required the right side to be off. We waited until flaps were retracted to see if message and light would go off. It did not and in addition to the ICAS and ADP Pressure lights we got the System light and both the Left and Right main pump low pressure lights on.We proceeded to execute the QRH procedure and stopped the climb at 15;000 ft. to work the checklist. After completing the checklist; we were faced with operating the aircraft without a center hydraulic system which will call for a flaps 20 landing using the alternate method of extension for the flaps and gear.After receiving weather for ZZZ1; we elected to divert to ZZZ1 because it offered an instrument approach; a longer runway and less mountainous terrain than ZZZ. We were going to land overweight; may need assistance getting off the runway and elected to [request priority handling] and have equipment standing by.

B767 Captain reported a hydraulic system failure that resulted in a diversion.

1246070

201503

1201-1800

BWI.Airport

MD

1200.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower BWI

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Takeoff / Launch

SID TERPZ FOUR

Class B BWI

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 165; Flight Crew Type 30

Situational Awareness; Other / Unknown

1246070

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 126; Flight Crew Type 30

Other / Unknown

1246091.0

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors

This was the first time either of us would fly the TERPZ4 Departure. We briefed the new TERPZ4 departure. We even emphasized the new waypoint; PIRCH. We were in a -300; so we could not arm LNAV on the ground. We were cleared for takeoff from 15R with the simple phrase 'cleared for takeoff.'At 400 Feet AGL; we continued on runway heading. This was the old TERPZ procedure. At approximately 1;200 Feet AGL; we realized we needed to begin our turn to PIRCH. This turn should have been started at 667 Feet MSL (524 Feet AGL). We engaged LNAV to begin the turn. At this time Tower 'reminded' us to turn to PIRCH. We acknowledged their call and continued our turn to follow the departure. The rest of the flight was uneventful. The new departure procedure is significantly different from the old SID; which was in place for many years.

The TERPZ Departure had just changed from 3 to 4. We briefed up the new departure highlighting all the new points and verified them in the FMC. We failed to notice that it was no longer a; 'fly heading 155 and expect vectors.' I saw the 155 heading and the line but didn't pick up on the fact that it was an RNAV track requiring a turn at 667 Feet. As we were passing 1;200 Feet MSL; Tower came up and mentioned that we were turning towards PIRCH (a friendly reminder). We began the turn and the rest of the departure and flight were uneventful.We have been flying runway heading for so long; I just assumed the departure was asking for the same thing. Obviously; read the whole thing in detail; especially after a change. What I'd recommend to fix this has already taken place; and that would be to put a note on the weather release about this change. I suspect a lot of flights did the same thing and when we came back to BWI later in the trip; this note was there.

B737 flight crew reports a track deviation flying the new TERPZ4 departure from Runway 15R at BWI. The TERPZ3 had required runway heading after takeoff while the TERPZ4 requires a turn direct PIRCH. ATC issues a reminder.

1014959

201206

0601-1200

NCT.TRACON

CA

No Aircraft

Facility NCT.TRACON

Government

Approach; Departure

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1014959

ATC Issue All Types

Person Air Traffic Control

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was leaving the building and noticed the Castle Sector position was not being manned/worked by anyone. I noted the person shown working the position was in the center of the control room outside of hearing range of the position. No one in the area knew the Controller stepped away; so they weren't even monitoring the position while he was away. I went and called him back to the position and asked why he left; he stated the Supervisor required him to leave position even though he said he indicated he was working. Recommendation; Don't leave a position unattended without someone monitoring the traffic and frequencies; especially during a point in time when there is still traffic in the airspace and surrounding airspace.

NCT Controller voiced concern regarding the absence of a Castle Sector Controller present at the position even though one was assigned. The reporter noted positions should never be left unattended.

1854208

202111

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

320.0

7.0

2200.0

Marginal

10

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

FBO

Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172

2.0

Other Part 141

None

Training

Descent

Visual Approach

Class D ZZZ; Class E ZZZ

Military Trainer

2.0

Part 91

None

Training

Final Approach

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

FBO

Instructor

Flight Crew Flight Instructor

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1854208

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Horizontal 200; Vertical 200

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Toward the end of my hour and a half flight block at ZZZ; my student and I were transitioning back to ZZZ from a local airport (ZZZ1) where we conducted practice landings and maneuvers in our designated practice area in which we were ramped out by dispatch to. We called 10 NM northwest and told ATC our intentions. They instructed us to report back 4 NM northwest; we complied. Upon reaching approximately 7 NM northwest; after several broken radio calls that my student and I were unable to distinguish; we were instructed to fly NE in order to provide separation for a flight of military T6's that were on a long straight in final.I confirmed that ATC wanted us to fly northeast in order to avoid an aircraft that was on a straight in; they confirmed. Making a judgment call; I decided to instruct my student to fly straight north due to not wanting to cross over; under; or in front of the approaching aircraft that were seemingly on a straight in long final. Being out of the class D airspace; I was free to do as I pleased to ensure safety of flight. We called ATC and informed them we were doing so; unsure of what they wanted us to do; as we saw on our Multi-Function Display (MFD); the indication of an aircraft -2 (200 ft. below) moving toward us at a fast rate. ATC informed us that there was no traffic to the northwest; and that they were on a straight in. To which I responded they are incorrect because I have two military T6's in sight (visual; and on my MFD) and they were passing below us approximately 200 ft. below. We then turned to the left (west trending south/southeast) in order to keep the T'6s in sight and continue in to the airport.

Cessna 172 Flight Instructor reported an NMAC event that was caused by an ATC assigned heading. Flight Instructor executed an evasive maneuver to prevent a collision.

1763615

202009

ZZZ.ARTCC

US

VMC

Center ZZZ

Air Carrier

B787 Dreamliner Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 159; Flight Crew Total 3266; Flight Crew Type 361

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Workload

1763615

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 215.73; Flight Crew Total 16900; Flight Crew Type 3926.87

Time Pressure; Situational Awareness; Distraction; Workload

1763619.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC complied w / Automation / Advisory

Aircraft

While descending on the RNAV ARRIVAL within a mile or two of waypoint ZZZZZ the autopilot; for unknown reasons; went into a degraded mode. While in the degraded mode the aircraft continued straight ahead at ZZZZZ not staying on the LNAV course. By the time we recognized the situation and got the autopilot out of the degraded mode the controller informed us we had missed the turn and he gave us a heading. Flight continued normally from there.

I was the flying pilot. We were arriving on the RNAV STAR into ZZZ. At the time of the incident we were between the ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1 waypoints; very close to the ZZZZZ waypoint. ATC instructed us to descend. The autopilot was engaged. I pushed the MCP FLCH button to start the decent. Immediately afterward I expected the aircraft to pull the power back and start a descent via the FLCH mode. Immediately the aircraft showed an 'autopilot mode' caution message on the ECAIS. Both the captain and I then realized that the aircraft was not descending as per the selected mode. We did not get a horn or a red autopilot warning message. Also the PFD showed that the autopilot was still engaged via the A/P FMA but the aircraft was not descending. We weren't sure if the aircraft was connected to the autopilot or not as per the conflicting information the aircraft was indicating. We then noticed that the aircraft airspeed was slowing and wasn't descending. I disconnected the autopilot and pushed the throttles forward to correct the low airspeed and pushed the yoke forward to start the aircraft descent. We also disconnected and reengaged the flight directors. We then noticed that the yellow 'autopilot mode' caution message had disappeared. Since we believed that the problem had been resolved I reengaged the autopilot. At that time the aircraft continued to descend and fly at the correct assigned airspeed. We didn't however notice that LNAV had not reengaged since we had just reengaged the autopilot and believed that all the modes had been reengaged correctly via the autopilot. At this time; only about 10 seconds later; we noticed that the aircraft was not tracking the arrival course correctly and immediately turned to the left towards the FMC arrival course to intercept. About 5 seconds later ATC said 'it appears that you missed your turn'; and the gave us a 090 heading. The captain told ATC that we were having autopilot issues and were already correcting back to the STAR arrival course. We were then given two more heading changes. We followed ATC directions for the remainder of the approach and landing to a safe landing with no further incident. I'm not certain; but I may have accidentally pushed the autopilot disengage bar while I was reaching for the FLCH button to start the descent.

B787 flight crew reported an autopilot malfunction that caused a track deviation.

1249825

201503

0001-0600

CLT.Airport

NC

4000.0

Night

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Medium Large Transport

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Visual Approach

Class B CLT

TRACON CLT

Air Carrier

Airbus 318/319/320/321 Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Vectors

Class B CLT

Facility CLT.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Developmental

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (mon) 5; Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 0

Confusion; Communication Breakdown; Distraction; Situational Awareness

Party1 ATC; Party2 ATC

1249825

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance

Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

I was working the 'A' Final position with normal traffic and visual approach weather conditions. I am turning my aircraft onto the final at 4000 Ft. MSL in my airspace and the adjacent final controller brings their aircraft through my airspace without a point out or any coordination to let me know they would be in close proximity with my aircraft. I was never informed if visual separation was being applied or even if traffic had been called. I was under the impression by the rule 7110.65 7-4-4 two aircraft intercepting two different final approach courses could not join from the same side without standard separation being applied. The other controller allowed the aircraft to come within about 600 Ft MSL vertically and 2.1 - 2.5 miles laterally. This has been an ongoing issue with this particular controller and it creates an environment of distrust and animosity. If visual separation was applied I should have been informed so I could inform my adjacent aircraft of the situation and everything was in control. I was in my airspace doing the necessary tasks to insure my aircraft were getting onto the final and to the tower at the appropriate time for safe landing. Make sure you let the other person know what you are doing in their airspace prior to doing whatever you want. Retraining or skill enhancement maybe necessary on the final positions to insure appropriate control instructions; airspace procedures; and communication skills are met. Something as simple as saying 'maintain 5000 feet until established' would have prevented the entire issue as this person was turning at our outside the 5000 Ft fix on the ILS for a visual approach anyway.

CLT Controller reports of a loss of separation due to another controller turning an aircraft next to the reporter's aircraft with less than 1;000 feet and less than 3 miles.

1181666

201406

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

VMC

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

EMB ERJ 145 ER/LR

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Nosewheel Steering

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Distraction; Confusion; Time Pressure; Troubleshooting

1181666

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew Rejected Takeoff; Flight Crew Returned To Gate; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Aircraft

Prior to takeoff; everything was normal. Once on the runway and cleared for takeoff; the controls were passed to me; I advanced the thrust levers and said 'set thrust.' Around 60 KTS; the aircraft distinctly jerked to the left; taking a significant amount of right rudder input to try to correct. At this time; my attention was entirely on trying to keep the aircraft on the centerline. At almost the exact same time; we got a triple chime and I saw the Master Warning and Master Caution lights flashing. The Captain took the controls and aborted the takeoff; at which time I was trying to split my attention between the runway (due to a possible steering malfunction) and the EICAS.I saw at least three messages on the EICAS (1 warning and 2 cautions); but I only read the first which was an SPS 2 INOP; and before I could even advise Tower of the abort; they were giving us instructions on where to clear. I responded to Tower; made he required passenger PA; and when I looked back down at the EICAS; all the messages were gone. I never had the chance to read the caution messages; but I assume one was a steer inop. After clearing the runway; we did the required checklists. After discussing the occurrence and with two seemingly unrelated malfunctions; we opted to contact Maintenance and Ops; and then returned to the gate. After arriving at the gate; the Captain spoke with the mechanics while I did the walk around. I didn't see any anomalies. We then walked to the gate next door; boarded the passengers; and departed. I never had a clear idea of exactly what happened; but under the circumstances; I felt the best thing for me to do initially (during the transfer of controls back to the Captain and immediately after) was stay focused outside in case we were having a steering malfunction. For me; the main threat during the abort was trying to figure out how to split my attention between the EICAS and the position of the aircraft on the runway. Knowing exactly what is presented on the EICAS is important; but I felt that since we had a possible steering malfunction; my attention outside while we were above a taxi speed was more important so that I could help monitor the aircraft's position and call out any deviations from the centerline if they occurred again.

An EMB-145 EICAS alerted during takeoff as the aircraft jerked left at about 60 KTS; so the Captain rejected and the flight returned to the gate for a replacement aircraft. The First Officer noted EICAS SPS 2; a Master Warning and Caution; but all messages self-cleared.

1760269

202009

1201-1800

ZZZ.Airport

US

200.0

14.0

1500.0

Clear; 40

25000

Tower ZZZ

Personal

Travelair 95

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class D ZZZ

Engine

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Engineer; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 20; Flight Crew Total 24000; Flight Crew Type 600

Situational Awareness

1760269

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Inflight Shutdown

Aircraft; Human Factors

Human Factors

Upon entering a right turn to return to airport the left engine lost power and shut down. I feathered the engine and proceeded towards [the airport]. Landing was uneventful. No injuries or damage to the aircraft. The reason of the engine failure is probably fuel starvation due to me thinking fuel in the aux tank as part of main tank fuel; total fuel showed 6 gallons (40-45 minutes at cruise power) Had I changed tanks the engine probably would have restarted. I wasn't sure that that was absolutely the problem so I feathered and proceeded to [the airport].

Beech B95 pilot reported a safe landing followed an inflight engine failure related to fuel mismanagement.

1780317

202101

ZZZ.Airport

US

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Other Load Planning

Hangar / Base

Air Carrier

Other / Unknown

Human-Machine Interface; Communication Breakdown; Troubleshooting

Party1 Ground Personnel; Party2 Ground Personnel

1780317

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Other Person

In-flight; Routine Inspection; Pre-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Human Factors

I received 3 alerts the ramp was attempting to finalize the DSTG with unsecured Hazmat. [I received an error message in the load planning software.]The flight was already off the gate when the ramp lead attempted to finalize I then pulled up the DSTG and witnesses both the second and third attempt at finalization. It was then that the ramp lead noticed the DG was not secured. I called ZZZ operations to request a phone call from the ramp and while on the phone the lead moved the DG from pit 5 to pit 4 which had 40 bags and proceeded to finalize the flight. Around 8 minutes later the lead called and I inquired as to which pit the DG was actually loaded in and I told him I saw it was planned in pit 5 and a witness him try to finalize the flight 2 [times] then saw the DG move to pit 4 after the flight had departed. The lead responded he was told the DG had been loaded into pit 4. After that conversation I told my shift manager and released the final weights.

Load Planning personnel reported a communication breakdown between Load Planning and Ramp personnel regarding the Hazmat requirement to secure Hazmat cargo in cargo compartment with cargo pax bags. Flight completed an uneventful flight before error corrected.

1000969

201203

0.0

CLR

Air Carrier

B777 Undifferentiated or Other Model

4.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

ACARS

X

Malfunctioning; Design

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Total 22700; Flight Crew Type 5000

Distraction; Troubleshooting; Communication Breakdown; Confusion

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Dispatch

1000969

Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Procedure; Chart Or Publication; Company Policy

Ambiguous

I believe there is an error in our Company's ACARS Runway Data message system. The 4 of us have about 18 years experience on the 777 and have never seen T/O (takeoff) NOT POSSIBLE; let alone 10 or more times. We all checked that every single entry was correct with the FM page. We asked Dispatch for help and to get a 777 Flight Duty Manager involved. Dispatch sent nine different RWY DATA messages to us. The first was 38;400 LBS below actual final TOGW. I ACARS'ed back the large discrepancy error. He sent another for TOG of 627.6 and I had to inform him again that our real final weights were 9;300 LBS HIGHER!!!!! Then we got 3 more at 638.4 even though final weights were 636.9. BUT the big problem I told him is we are still getting T/O NOT POSSIBLE on our RWY DATA message and all of us agreed we needed to have ACARS RWY DATA agree with dispatch calculations so could he please find out why ACARS is still showing us for the 10th time T/O NOT POSSIBLE. Several minutes later ACARS RWY DATA finally came up and we were able to takeoff legally but after so many different GW numbers all claiming to be correct it's hard to believe they were but the plane handled normal and fuel burn was right on. IF THIS CARRIER HAS CHANGED SOME COMPUTER SYSTEM RECENTLY IN RELATION TO ACARS OR Dispatch RWY DATA THEN AN AUDIT NEEDS TO BE DONE because that many gross weight changes for no apparent reason is not right. I think I have most of the ACARS and Dispatch messages printed although I could not print our outgoing messages to Dispatch.

A B777 received nine T/O NOT POSSIBLE FMC messages because the gross weight takeoff data from Dispatch was incorrect and the Captain questioned whether a Company computer program had been modified.

1753632

202007

1201-1800

BOS.Airport

MA

1000.0

TRACON A90

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Initial Approach

Class B BOS

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

1753632

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

1753622.0

Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Weather

Ambiguous

After configuring for a flaps 30 landing on my hand flown; visual approach to Runway 22L at BOS; we experienced what I believe was a strong gust. This occurred just inside the final approach fix. The indicated airspeed rapidly increased and exceeded the flaps 30 placard speed of 175 kts. (The approach report from ACARS; retrieved upon arrival at the gate; indicated we reached 176 kts). The flap load relief system activated and automatically retracted the flaps to 25. This is the first time I've experienced this aspect of the flap protection system and my first reaction was that I'd failed to properly configure the flaps. The First Officer was quick to analyze what had just happened and when we had slowed sufficiently; we were able to reset the flaps to 30. The final flap setting; however; occurred just below 1;000 ft. The First Officer stated that we were not stable and I initiated a go-around. The First Officer backed me up on ensuring all the steps for the go-around were conducted in the proper sequence. We notified Tower and we were vectored around for another visual approach and landed without incident. The First Officer and I discussed the experience when we got to the gate. Though we don't like to do go-arounds; we were both satisfied that we did the right thing. I wrote up the flap over-speed in the AML and spoke with maintenance. A contributing factor may have been a very light landing weight; approximately 121;000 lbs. I can't praise the First Officer's situational awareness and professionalism enough. He made sure that all procedures were followed correctly and that all checklists were completed. As for me; I'll need to be more vigilant about airspeed control. I'll also reinforce the necessity to be prepared for a go-around on every approach--not just talk about it.

Visual 22L BOS at approximately 1;300 ft. AFL; autopilot off; we encountered an abrupt pocket that altered the pitch of the aircraft; possibly a wake from the preceding A321. As PM I noticed an increase in speed and initially noted 175 kts. (flap 30 limit is 175 kts). My attention was drawn to the airspeed and ensuring the proper attitude and path were maintained. The PF called for flaps 30 which had been previously set and confirmed leading me to believe we had exceeded 176 kts causing the flap load relief. (The Before Landing Checklist had been completed and flaps 30 had been confirmed set.) The flap handle was again verified set to 30. Aircraft was slowed and flaps returned to 30 passing 1;000 ft. AFL. Due to the flap movement and airspeed the approach was not stable and a go-around was performed. The flap report indicated that an overspeed of 176 kts. occurred. Maintenance was informed verbally and with an appropriate AML entry.The decision to execute the Go-Around stems from the culture and training that stress the importance of stabilized approaches.

B737-800 flight crew reported executing a go-around from their approach to BOS after a wind gust or wake encounter caused a momentary overspeed.

1112165

201308

1801-2400

ZAU.ARTCC

IL

14000.0

Center ZAU

Corporate

PC-12

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Descent

Class E ZAU

Center ZAU

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700)

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Descent

Class E ZAU

Facility ZAU.ARTCC

Government

Enroute

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Distraction; Situational Awareness; Workload

1112165

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Person Air Traffic Control

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure; Airspace Structure

Procedure

I was working several aircraft inbound to ORD; including one routed from the north over the SHIKY arrival (a CRJ7) that needed to be sequenced with the aircraft inbound from the west. There was a fair amount of other traffic in the airspace at the time; several aircraft on frequency need to descend through the arrival traffic to destination airports in the vicinity. Also at the same time; parachute jumping was going on over the Beloit airport; [the jump plane] was circling up to 14;500 FT directly underneath the ORD arrival stream. A PC-12; an RYV arrival from the south; requested lower; I issued 14;000; attempting to keep that aircraft underneath the ORD arrivals. I thought The PC-12 would be laterally separated from the CRJ7; however; I must have misjudged the distance and standard separation was lost. The CRJ7 reported responding to an RA. I do not know if the RA was with [the jump plane] or the PC-12. I believe the parachute jump operation at the Beloit; WI airport is a safety risk at FARMM Sector. The jump aircraft are constantly in conflict with IFR traffic; particularly ORD arrivals; as the BULLZ and JVL STARs route arrivals right through the airspace the jump aircraft circle. Constantly issuing traffic advisories about the jump aircraft to IFR traffic during a rush distracts from other tasks at hand and adds significantly to what can be an already heavy workload. During the time period in question; I spent a fair amount of time/effort on the jump aircraft; attempting to plan for their climb; issuing traffic; etc. Without such a large distraction in play; it would've been significantly easier to realize and correct the error I made in regards to misjudging how much separation I had between the CRJ7 and the PC-12.

ZAU Controller experienced a loss of separation event listing parachute activity in the vicinity as work intensive and distracting from duties required of ORD arrivals.

1297809

201509

1201-1800

WSJC.ARTCC

FO

14000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center WSJC

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Descent

Military

Fighter

1.0

Tactical

Cruise

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness

1297809

Conflict NMAC; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Automation Aircraft RA; Automation Aircraft TA; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

In the descent at Toman intersection; we received a TA (traffic advisory). Our clearance was to cross 45 nautical miles prior to Hosba intersection at FL140. Airspeed was 290 Kts; with the speed brakes fully deployed to meet the restriction. Shortly after that we received an RA (resolution alert); which started as basically flying level flight to a 2000 fpm climb; followed by a 2000 fpm descent. We advised Singapore ATC of the TA and the RA. We also advised ATC that we were following the TCAS RA instructions and that we were unable to comply with the ATC altitude clearance. Visual contact was established with an Indonesian fighter; just off to the right of our aircraft; at the same altitude and close enough to see the pilot clearly. We had been intercepted by at least 2 Indonesian fighters (at least one behind us also). The fighter that we had visual contact with; appeared to be an SU-27. We established radio contact on 121.5 with the fighter. He advised us that we did not have permission to fly in Indonesian airspace. I told him that we were operating on a filed flight plan; with diplomatic clearance to fly in Indonesian airspace. He kept repeating that we did not have permission. I replied that we did and repeated what I said before. I think my exact words at that point were; back off; we are proceeding to Singapore. Shortly after that the fighters left and we proceeded to Singapore and landed. We need to find out what is going on with Indonesia. We heard another N registered US military flight get intercepted with a very similar dialogue that took place. That flight was going from WSAP to the Philippines. I spoke with Singapore ATC on the telephone. They said there is a big increase in unidentified traffic; which I'm assuming is Indonesian fighter traffic. We were on our flight plan and did have a current Indonesian over-fly number.

Air carrier pilot descending into WASP reported a TCAS RA caused by two Indonesian fighter aircraft that ordered the flight to leave Indonesian Airspace. The reporter stated that he is on a filed flight plan; has an Indonesian overfly number; and is proceeding to WASP. The fighters broke away.

1663730

201907

1801-2400

ZZZZ.ARTCC

FO

IMC

Turbulence

Night

Center ZZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-11

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

FMS Or FMC

Cruise

Class A ZZZZ

APU

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Confusion; Troubleshooting

1663730

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1663735.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

N

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution; Flight Crew Diverted

Weather; Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft; Human Factors; Procedure

Ambiguous

I had run the APU on the ground; about 41-45 C ambient temperature; for air conditioning for about 45 minutes because the ground air cart was introducing noxious fumes into the aircraft. We started #3 engine in the blocks at Maintenance request; then pushed back and started #1. As #1 engine came on speed; received 'APU FAULT' and 'APU AUTO SHUTDOWN' messages. When APU de-energized; the alerts went away. We called on SATCOM and received a Maintenance [Deferral] for APU INOP. No attempt was made to restart APU since it was no longer needed for delayed engine start of #2 engine. Departed and received clearance to FL370 with Control. Approaching Waypoint ZZZZZ; entered cloud and selected Engine A/I (Anti-Ice) on. This checked with our route plot that clouds began just prior to ZZZZZ; but the limited amount of lightning shown was to the south of our track. Not too long after passing ZZZZZ with no presentation on weather radar of any rain or convective activity; we encountered severe turbulence lasting about a minute. The autopilot was unable to maintain altitude and we pitched down and were descending rapidly. The First Officer (Pilot Flying) disconnected the autopilot and did a very nice job minimizing altitude loss to about 400 ft. He stabilized the aircraft and put the autopilot back on. I notified [Center] via CPDLC (Controller-Pilot Datalink Communication) of a PIREP (Pilot Report) for severe turbulence; notified [Dispatcher] of the same; and broadcast on guard the turbulence report to other aircraft nearby. We were both puzzled that the weather radar had shown nothing. While in the turbulence; we had a lot of St. Elmo's fire on the windscreen and heard moderate rain on the fuselage. We suspected we had inadvertently entered convective activity. The weather radar tested properly during preflight and in flight it had widely scattered green dots; but no indication of weather. I varied the tilt and tried the other weather radar and nothing changed in the presentation to indicate any weather. We continued flight uneventfully for about another 15-20 minutes when the same thing happened and we entered moderate turbulence with occasional severe turbulence. At no time since selecting engine anti-ice on; had we received any 'ICE DETECTED' alert. At this point; I elected to descend to find smoother altitude first FL350; then continued to FL310. In this descent; we received IAS comparator alerts on our PFDs (Primary Flight Displays). [Requested priority handling] with ATC due to degraded aircraft handing and unreliable airspeed; turbulence; and the need to keep other aircraft away from us and to obtain assistance. We asked for ground speed readouts; weather avoidance information [as] we thought our weather radars were inoperative; and vectors while we sorted the situation out. Also selected EMG on ADS (Air Data Source) and advised [Dispatcher] of the emergency; our problem; and intentions. Captain's PFD was showing about 293 IAS; standby about 285-290; and First Officer's PFD approximately 278 knots IAS. I thought we might have encountered severe icing that impacted a pitot-static system; with no icing alert (because of the St. Elmo's on our windscreen once again and the sound of precipitation on the aircraft) and selected anti-ice all on as a precaution. We had a lot of alerts flashing on our displays; but the ones that seemed to be the most prevalent (that I could read in the turbulence) and remained the longest were level 2 alerts for 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN' and 'SEL FLAP LIM OVRD' and level 1 alert 'WSHEAR DET FAIL'. Ran the QRH for unreliable airspeed. We suspected Captain's airspeed was correct; but couldn't conclusively determine that; so we followed the 'NO--able to identify unreliable Air Data Source?' path in the QRH as we established pitch and power settings and continued our descent to FL230. Didn't want to make a flyable situation worse by guessing the bad system when it wasn't conclusive and we had a flyable jet if either airspeed were correct. Once down at FL230 conditions improved considerably. The alerts on the display went away; so I put the AFS (Automatic Flight System) switches back up and both autopilot and auto throttles were available. ATC asked us if we wanted a full [priority handling]. I was unsure what that wording meant to the [local] authorities; but it seemed like a good idea because we still had odd indications in the aircraft and it was best to get the plane on the ground expeditiously. We were able to once again navigate; and proceeded direct to a RNAV point on the arrival and received priority handling for our arrival. The approach had been briefed up; and I informed the First Officer I would do the landing because of our situation and that I would keep a crosscheck of our Alpha and use the [instrument] information to do a visual landing in VMC conditions. I asked him to keep up with the pitch and power settings and if we had a recurrence of IAS miscompare we would continue using pitch and power and my HUD information. We elected to proceed to ZZZ1 for landing because it was VMC; we were already briefed for it; I was familiar with terrain and airfield; and it was on normal descent profile from our present position. I did not want to do an auto-land because we still had some questions about the jet. We received vectors to final; and were captured on the ILS with everything normal. We configured early in case of problems and I flew manually in case of problems with the automation. Even though I confirmed the FMAs (Flight Mode Annunciators) showed captured; our flight director and PFD guidance took us below glideslope with no correction. I corrected and transitioned to visual and cross checked with ILS raw data and disregarded the incorrect guidance information. Landing uneventfully; taxied to parking with fire trucks following. After debrief with Maintenance; called Duty Officer; Dispatcher; and Regional Director of Operations (at duty officer request). Local safety authorities request synopsis of events too.Unanticipated severe turbulence with no Pireps; Airmets; weather radar returns; etc. was the primary cause. Unknown if our equipment / instrument malfunctions were due to power interruptions; un-annunciated icing; or other cause. On the ground; I wrote up all the malfunctions and debriefed with Maintenance. They interrogated the systems and found faults in IRU (Inertial Reference Units) 1; IRU 2; IRU 3; ADC (Air Data Computers) 1; ADC 2; FCC (Flight Control Computers) 1; FCC 2; auto-land; and several other systems. APU shutdown history was for high oil temp. They also found numerous power interruption codes. I can't think of what I would have done differently given the same information. The weather conditions were unanticipated and weather radar didn't provide any returns of significance. We had a lot of instrument and equipment anomalies with no alerts besides the IAS miscompare and some other indications of unreliable airspeed. On landing; Maintenance found faults in all 3 IRUs; both ADCs; and both FCCs. Root cause of the lack of weather radar returns; icing detection system appearing not to work; and anomalies between ILS raw data; FMA displays; and flight director are unknown; but numerous power interruptions were recorded in fault lists --possibly due to the turbulence or affected by the APU auto shutdown on preflight? Or did we have severe icing which compromised a pitot static system and the lower altitude of FL230 help clear the anomalies? Local maintenance checked all systems; and the jet flew the following morning. The thing that still concerns me is the lack of alerting information for multiple systems that; to us; weren't working.

We were at cruise at FL370 just passing point ZZZZZ. It was night and we were IMC with no significant weather returns on the weather radar. Without warning; we experienced severe turbulence for approximately one minute. Due to the turbulence; we lost approximately 400 ft. of altitude. I disengaged the autopilot and immediately began a climb back to our cleared altitude. Once back at cruise altitude; I reengaged the autopilot and we continued to experience light to moderate turbulence and then more severe turbulence. We informed [Center] of the severe turbulence and received clearance to descend in an effort to get out of the turbulence. We descended to FL350 as cleared. At FL350; the turbulence was occasional moderate but after a few minutes; we experienced an 'IAS Miscompare'. I continued flying and the Captain got into the QRH and executed the procedures. At this point; we also began receiving Level 2 'SEL ELEV FEEL MAN' and 'SEL FLAP LIM OVRD'. Along with Level 1 'WSHEAR DET FAIL' and 'NO ICE DETECTED'. At this point; we thought icing was causing our issues. The captain began running the appropriate QRH procedures and we asked for FL310 in an effort to leave the continued moderate turbulence and icing conditions. At this point I was hand flying as the QRH directed the AFS (Auto Flight System) shut off (IAS miscompare). As we approached FL310 with no relief from supposed icing conditions and unreliable airspeed; the Captain [requested priority handling] and requested lower in an effort to remove any icing from the aircraft. We had engine; wing; and windshield anti-ice on and but had a 'No Ice Detected' indication. We elected to land at ZZZ1 due to good weather and it was already loaded and briefed. After a few minutes at FL230; the IAS miscompare went away and we were able to reengage the flight director and autopilot. Captain; FO (First Officer); and standby airspeed indicators were consistent. Because we had [requested priority handling]; we had priority to land. We continued on vectors and executed an ILS to an uneventful landing. We then taxied to our gate. There are many possible combinations of causes of these events but the actual cause is unknown. It is unknown at this point if the weather radar was functioning properly and could have given us a warning of the impending area of convective activity. Later; the [Maintenance Technician] said there were faults on the ADCs (Air Data Computers); FCCs (Flight Control Computers); and the IRUs (Inertial Reference Units). There were also possible power transfer issues when we had an APU auto shutdown at ZZZ that may have resulted in electrical issues.

Flight Crew reported experiencing APU problems during preflight; and indicated IAS miscompare; several instrument and equipment anomalies as well as severe turbulence in cruise flight.

1603281

201812

0601-1200

HOU.Airport

TX

Daylight

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

B737-700

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR KIDDZ3

Class B HOU

TRACON I90

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR KIDDZ3

Class B HOU

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 421

Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification

1603281

Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

I was Pilot Flying on flight to HOU. We were cleared to descend via the KIDDZ 3 Arrival; landing Runway 31. I believe around the KIDDZ intersection; we started to encounter mild wake turbulence from Company aircraft approximately 10 miles in front of us. I went into the FMC and programmed a .1L offset to stay out of his wake. I did not enter a start or end waypoint for the offset. Sometime later; we received a message stating end of offset. At GLUVR intersection; we received a route discontinuity and the aircraft went into the roll mode I believe. My First Officer immediately re-entered the arrival with the next intersection; CRSTY. By that time; ATC gave us a 090 heading and mentioned that we were just south of the course. We informed him we were turning back and we were given direct to VILLI intersection and resume the arrival. Rest of flight proceeded normally.I failed to enter an end of offset waypoint which led to the aircraft deviating from the assigned route. I've used the offset function many times in the past and honestly don't remember having this ever happening. My First Officer was fairly new and had never used the offset function; so he was relying on my entries to be accurate; which they were not. I'll be sure to take my time and understand what I am selecting and executing the next time when making entries into the FMC.

B737-700 Captain reported a track deviation occurred during a route offset to avoid wake turbulence.

1738821

202003

1201-1800

BTV.TRACON

VT

3500.0

TRACON BTV

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Vectors

Facility BTV.TRACON

Government

Approach

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3

Distraction; Troubleshooting

1738821

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Aircraft was instructed to climb because they were not comfortable accepting a visual approach. After giving a vector to take them out towards final; the rate of climb was slower than expected and the aircraft entered a higher MVA at a lower altitude. Was thinking of a rule that applied to departures.

BTV TRACON Controller reported issuing a climb to an aircraft; the aircraft didn't climb as well as the Controller thought it would and ended up in a lower MVA.

1710944

201912

0601-1200

LGA.Airport

NY

11000.0

TRACON N90

Air Carrier

B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

FMS Or FMC; GPS

Descent

STAR KORRY FOUR

Class E ZNY

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Communication Breakdown; Time Pressure; Workload

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC

1710944

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Speed All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Procedure

Procedure

While on the KORRY 4 Arrival into LGA; the aircraft crossed 1000' high (at 11;000' MSL) passing KORRY (published altitude is 10;000' MSL). This was due to an un-executable clearance change given by ATC to cross BRAND (fix 5.3 NM prior to KORRY) at 250 knots. The Crew attempted to comply; but this was an un-executable clearance change due to speed; altitude; and distance limitations. Prior to being given said speed restriction at BRAND; the aircraft was established on the proper vertical path while complying with the previous ATC directed speed of 300+ knots (aircraft was established at 310 knots). The new clearance/speed restriction for BRAND was given approximately 10 miles prior to BRAND. Immediately after updating the FMC with the new speed and beginning execution to comply; the Crew recognized the aircraft going well above the required vertical path to cross BRAND at 250 knots; then cross KORRY at the required 10;000' MSL. The Pilot Flying made every reasonable attempt to slow the aircraft to meet the 250 knots restriction at BRAND and then cross KORRY at the published altitude. Due to ATC radio congestion; the Pilot Monitoring was unable to request for relief to either restriction. ATC needs to give clearance changes such as these well prior to the applicable fix and consider including relief to subsequent altitude restrictions is clearances are given late.

Pilot reported receiving clearance too late to comply with the speed and altitude restrictions given and unable to request relief because of radio congestion.

1242337

201502

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch; Landing; Taxi

Aircraft X

Cabin Jumpseat

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Situational Awareness

1242337

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Passenger Electronic Device

Person Flight Attendant

Pre-flight; Taxi; In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy

Passengers sitting directly across from my jumpseat had electronic tablets out during taxi; takeoff and landing. I was uncomfortable with this and afraid for my own safety should we have had an event such as an unplanned evacuation or even an aborted takeoff and these unsecured objects came flying at my head. I also feel that the use of electronic devices by those in the exit row could delay their ability to assist in an emergency due to distraction. During taxi; one of the customers across from me had reclined his seat as we had been on the tarmac for a while. I had to physically get up from my jumpseat and tap him on the shoulder to remind him to put his seatback up; as he was so engrossed in his tablet that he didn't hear or see me try to get his attention. I was sitting literally two feet away from him-directly in front of his seat; and he didn't notice me for about 2 minutes. Our announcement book addresses electronics only by saying that they can be used in airplane safe mode; but must be 'secured or held during taxi; takeoff and landing'; therefore I could not require these customers to stow the tablets in a seat pocket (on sidewall of aircraft) or in an overhead (OH) bin; as they were complying with [Airline's] policy of being 'held.' Also; since use of the devices is allowed; even in exit rows where people are supposed to be 'ready; willing and able' to assist; I cannot ask a customer in an exit row to turn off their device. However; our requirement has always been (and still remains) that ALL items must go in OH bin if one is seated at a bulkhead--which the seats across from 2L/2R as well as 3L/3R are. Therefore; customers are being 'allowed' to have potentially dangerous items out during critical phases of flight; with the potential to harm the crewmembers sitting directly in front of them- I believe in violation of our own and possibly FAA policies. The safety training that I have received from my company has always emphasized that no carry-on items can be out and 'un' stowed during taxi/takeoff/landing due to the potential harm they could cause if the aircraft should stop suddenly. Yet since the implementation of the new electronics policy; these devices; made of metal and glass; cease to be 'carry-on items' and seem to have been made exempt from all safety concerns; regardless of their potential ability to harm their owners or others. Customers using electronic devices at exit rows and who are required to be 'ready willing and able' to assist in case of emergency; are also distracted by their own electronic devices during critical phases of flight. I am very uncomfortable with the way the electronics policies have been rushed into implementation with seemingly no regard to the safety of other people who could be harmed by flying tablets and phones; as well as the implications of a 'plugged in and switched off' person at an exit row who is too distracted to perform their exit row emergency duties in a thorough or timely fashion.

Flight Attendant reported concern that she could be injured by unsecured tablets or other electronic devices used by passengers sitting across from her jumpseat if those passengers lost control of the device during a rejected takeoff or other unusual event.

1004586

201204

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

3550.0

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

MD-82

2.0

Part 121

Initial Approach

Class B ZZZ

Antiskid System

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness

1004586

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

1005444.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Air Traffic Control; Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Executed Go Around / Missed Approach; General Declared Emergency; General Maintenance Action

Aircraft; Human Factors

Ambiguous

After go around for anti skid failure caution an emergency was declared. On an intercept but not yet cleared for approach ATC had kept us high to go over traffic. I selected ILS with autopilot engaged. We were cleared to descend to 4;000 however glideslope captured and descended to 3;550. Both pilots were looking for the traffic that ATC was calling. We then noticed altitude deviation and ATC called at the same time. We were then simultaneously cleared for the approach.

While on radar vectors for a visual approach the ILS mode was selected prior to approach clearance. The aircraft captured the glide slope and deviated from the clearance altitude. Pilot flying and pilot not flying were both looking outside for traffic called by ATC and missed the altitude change until the aircraft had deviated as much as 400 FT.I will make a better effort to monitor mode control panel selections when acting as pilot not flying. When acting as pilot flying I will verbalize my MCP selections to the pilot not flying; at least during high workload situations; to facilitate his/her monitoring duties.

An MD80 flight crew; during an approach following a go around for an antiskid failure caution; armed the ILS for approach before receiving clearance. An altitude excursion was the result.

1659257

201906

1201-1800

VNY.Airport

CA

200.0

4.0

2500.0

VMC

10

Daylight

TRACON SCT

Personal

SR20

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Climb

Other BURP39; SID CANOG2.IPIHO

Class B LAX

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 350; Flight Crew Total 4100; Flight Crew Type 2500

Confusion; Situational Awareness

1659257

ATC Issue All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Airport; Airspace Structure; Chart Or Publication; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We departed on the Canoga 2 departure from VNY; and were on the initial climb on heading 213. At this time; typically we are vectored toward the west on course away from the higher terrain. However; this controller continued to fly us on the 213 heading. There was an abnormally small amount of traffic on the radios; so we were having a hard time understanding why he continued to drive us toward the water and away from our course and lower terrain; but continued on. At this phase; we were in day VMC conditions and had a visual on the terrain. The Controller at one point; told us we had higher terrain coming up and to expedite our climb. We transitioned to Vx; and continued. He then came back on; and announced we had a low altitude alert; and continued our vector toward the higher terrain. He asked us if we were expediting; and we responded in the affirmative. We at this point announced we had the terrain in site; and were VMC. He continued us on course until reach 4;000 feet; at which point he turned us on course. This was a very strange encounter with ATC. Although we met the book minimums for the departure; we were extremely tight as we calculated on the climb gradient. Again; we knew we were VMC; and we met the gradient; and being extremely familiar with this departure; assumed we would be turned well before any upcoming terrain regardless.My concern; was that it seemed almost as though the controller was testing us and seeing if we would deviate from the departure. He did not seem to be trying to work us on course; or turn us away from the terrain. Further; he continued to keep us on course; even after we announced we were giving him our best climb rate. I was concerned about what his intentions were. Perhaps he wanted to allow us to not meet the minimums; or he wanted us to turn without a vector. This was part of my debrief with the student and allowed the discussion of making sure to review all climb gradient data; maintain our own terrain avoidance; and double check vectors. I think in the future; the best course of action will be to announce Vy/Vx to ATC; try to make sure we have larger margins on the climb gradients; and request alternate vectors if it seems like we are getting too close to terrain while on a vector.

A pilot reported ATC advised them of a low altitude alert even though they were complying with the SID requirements and ATC took no action to clear them on course or to assist them as expected.

1234344

201501

0001-0600

ZOB.ARTCC

OH

30650.0

VMC

Night

Center ZOB

Air Carrier

A319

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

Class A ZOB

Altimeter

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 225; Flight Crew Total 30000; Flight Crew Type 13000

Human-Machine Interface

1234344

Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance

Human Factors; Aircraft

Human Factors

Failed to level off at FL310 and caught error at about 30;650. First Officer failed to reset alt to standard after putting in field altimeter. Advised ATC we were about 350 feet low. Cleared us for descent via at that time.

A319 Captain describes an altitude deviation caused by the First Officer pulling the baro set knob to set QNH and forgetting to push it back in for QNE. This results in a 350 foot overshoot while descending to FL310.

1560572

201807

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

16000.0

VMC

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

A320

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Climb

Class E ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine

Physiological - Other; Situational Awareness; Troubleshooting

1560572

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness; Physiological - Other; Troubleshooting

1560568.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Weight And Balance; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Illness / Injury; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Smoke / Fire / Fumes / Odor

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem; Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition; General Flight Cancelled / Delayed

Aircraft

Within moments of turning on the PACKS after takeoff both crew noticed a strong smell I would characterize as musty/moldy/body odor. As I pondered my next move the First Officer asked if I smelled that; followed shortly by I think that is the dirty sock smell. Her next comment of 'I'm already feeling nauseated' broke my reverie and both crew members as well as our jump seat occupant donned O2 masks immediately. We attempted to perform the 'Elimination of odor in the flight deck/cabin' procedure. We were hindered in our efforts by the fact that the binder of the first QRH employed broke in half when the First Officer attempted to retrieve it leaving her with nearly 200 loose pages of former QRH. I provided my QRH but the procedure is missing from the back; or anywhere; in this particular aircraft's QRH. Volume 2 was referenced for the procedure which was challenging to find given the constraints of the mask.We leveled the aircraft at 16;000 feet and as the First Officer was already experiencing symptoms I elected to return the aircraft to [the departure airport] without further delay. ATC was notified of our intentions and I terminated the previously mentioned checklist that involved troubleshooting the air packs due to the difficulty in following a procedure through the mask on the Ipad and our need to prepare the aircraft for an air turn back. I never did feel I was able to get a real idea of which pack might be causing the odor. As we descended through 10;000 feet I turned off BOTH packs since I had been unable to determine the source of the odor and opened the ram air valve in an effort to provide as much fresh air to the cabin as possible. The First Officer ran the overweight landing checklist as we were approximately 3000 pounds above max landing weight. ATC vectored us for an ILS Approach which terminated in a successful landing. The aircraft was met by Fire and EMS as well as representatives from flight operations; inflight and local [authorities].The aircraft was deplaned without further incident. The odor event; crew usage of O2 and overweight landing were documented in the logbook post flight. The flight and cabin crew debriefed with the aforementioned parties prior to departing the scene. Both the Airbus and [company] odor/fume reporting sheets were completed and delivered to maintenance. Both pilots and I believe all flight attendants reported to company provided medical care for evaluation afterwards. On further communication with flight attendants it appears at least some of them showed elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the blood tests their doctors performed. Even though the doctor was familiar with these ongoing odor events in the industry and was provided with [union] and IATA guidance for examination no blood testing of the pilots was completed. Perhaps the company [and other parties involved] can work towards a common strategy for post incident comprehensive physical examination of crew members to ensure all bases are covered.Ensure that the Elimination of Odor in Flight Deck/Cabin checklist is added to EVERY QRH in the fleet ASAP. I believe our fleet manager has been working very hard to see this happen. Trying to use an Ipad to find critical checklists while wearing a mask is very difficult even without the presence of visibility restricting particulates in the air. Continue working on resolution to this seemingly complex issue as it appears to affect a large portion of the fleet including both Boeing and Airbus aircraft.

After takeoff; as we turned on the packs; I smelled an odor. I said; 'it smells like device fluid.' Then; within seconds; it got very strong and smelled to me like oil. I turned to the Captain and said; 'I think this might be that dirty socks smell. Do you smell that?' I started feeling nauseated and told my Captain. We both immediately donned our oxygen masks. Our jumpseater did as well. I went to my QRH to verify the memory item was complete then to start the Elimination of odor in the flight deck checklist. The QRH binder busted open and I had pages everywhere. Then; I used Captain's to find out the procedure; which was not in this QRH. So; we went to Vol. 2 and decided to level off at 16;000 feet and return to [the departure airport].I advised ATC we had fumes in the aircraft and we needed to return to [the airport]. The Captain gave me control of the aircraft and continued the checklist. We could not determine which pack the fumes were coming from. We turned off both packs through 10;000 feet and opened the Ram Air Valve. I then gave control back to the Captain and contacted company and ran the overweight checklist. We were vectored to land and landed. The fire department and EMS met the aircraft. We successfully deplaned aircraft. All paperwork was filled out and logbook entries made. Maintenance was there and received the odor reporting sheets. The entire flight crew went to get medical treatment evaluations. I personally felt very dizzy and nauseated for the first hour and it lessened as I got fresh air. This fume issue seems to be occurring to often and needs to be resolved. I think Maintenance is having a hard time duplicating the issues we are experiencing.

A320 flight crew reported odors in the cockpit requiring a return to the airport.

1779934

202012

0601-1200

MEM.Airport

TN

Wind

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Cargo / Freight / Delivery

Initial Approach

Class B MEM

Tower MEM

Air Carrier

B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Final Approach

Class B MEM

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1779934

Deviation - Speed All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure

Ambiguous

We were established on final a few miles outside of the FAF. All was as it should be. We were stable on the localizer at 170 knots with flaps 15 autopilot on. Winds were 210 at 50 knots; steady. In a split second we went from straight and level to a left hand bank I'm guessing 20 degrees maybe more and the hook came up and we got a momentary stick shaker. As it happened I added power as we rolled wings level. We were about 20 degrees off heading; but the autopilot recovered to intercept the localizer; and we never lost any altitude. Like I said; it happened so quickly and recovered that I saw no need to disconnect the autopilot. We re-intercepted the localizer followed by the glide slope and shot the approach with no other concerns. I'm not sure if the winds were the reason or we hit someone's wake turbulence. I'm guessing it was wake turbulence. [Cause:] not sure - perhaps wake turbulence. The winds were strong but steady. 210 at 50 knots at 3000 ft. Perhaps ATC had us too close; but as I recall my traffic was a 757; 7 miles ahead; maybe it was wake from a plane on the parallel runway.

B767 Captain reported encountering probable wake turbulence on approach to MEM.

1421022

201701

1201-1800

LAX.Tower

CA

Daylight

Tower LAX

Air Carrier

Large Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

GPS; FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

SID FIXIT4

Class B LAX

Tower SMO

Medium Transport; Low Wing; 2 Turbojet Eng

2.0

Part 91

IFR

Passenger

Initial Climb

Class D SMO

Facility LAX.Tower

Government

Handoff / Assist; Local

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 1.9

Confusion; Distraction; Workload; Time Pressure; Situational Awareness

1421022

ATC Issue All Types; Conflict Airborne Conflict; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Airspace Structure; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

Was working LA2 (Local Assist) during a very busy time. FIXIT departures were on; requiring additional in trail spacing; which was adding complexity to the already busy traffic. I had a sequence set for Aircraft Y off of SMO but when I requested release from Malibu sector they were overwhelmed and needed to call me back. Meanwhile the FIXIT departures were canceled and we went back to regular spacing; which changed the sequence again. Instead of giving SMO a '1 min heads up' for departure I told them it would be a while because I was waiting for Malibu to call me back. SMO holds all departures back from the runway due to noise and pollution restrictions at their airport; we give them the 1 min warning so they can taxi the aircraft out to be ready to go. We had one last departure rolling when Malibu called and released Aircraft Y. I released Aircraft Y off of SMO thinking the aircraft would still need to taxi out for departure. But both aircraft ended up airborne at the same time. Just under 4 miles apart. In the future I will verify with SMO where there aircraft is to ensure separation.

LAX Tower Local Assist reported releasing an aircraft off SMO. There was a loss of separation between it and a LAX departure.

1287858

201508

0601-1200

ZZZ.TRACON

US

10500.0

Rain; Thunderstorm; 6

8000

TRACON ZZZ

Personal

Cessna 310/T310C

1.0

Part 91

VFR

Personal

Cruise

Direct

Class E ZZZ

Engine

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Flight Instructor; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 30; Flight Crew Total 1600; Flight Crew Type 25

1287858

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Landed As Precaution

Aircraft; Weather

Aircraft

Departed [a] regional airport and was vectored around areas of thunderstorms and precipitation. Step-climbed up to requested altitude of 8;500 while passing through occasional rain showers. As cloud tops began to build; I requested a climb to 10;500 feet. Upon reaching 10;500 feet; I noticed my airspeed start to decay; indicating [the engine] was not producing enough power. I advanced the throttle to full power which helped the situation. In order to expedite the climb; I also attempted to adjust the props. It was during this time that the airplane lost power to the right engine.I went through my emergency procedures; but opted not to shut down the right engine since I had plenty of altitude to attempt a re-start and look for reasons why this occurred.I told ATC that I had lost my right engine; and initiated a descent.... During the descent; power came back to the right engine.I landed with no further issues.I had a mechanic examine the aircraft the next day; and it was determined that water infiltrated into the fuel tanks. The mechanic suggested replacement of the fuel tank gaskets at the next opportunity.The mechanic also performed some ground run-up tests and downloaded the engine performance data from the JPI-760 which further supported normal engine operations.

C310 pilot experienced loss of power in the right engine after climbing through rain showers. Power returned to normal during descent and was subsequently attributed to water contamination of the fuel due to faulty tank gaskets.

1781313

202101

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Cruise

Aircraft X

General Seating Area

Air Carrier

Flight Attendant (On Duty)

Flight Attendant Current

Service

Distraction

1781313

Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Attendant

In-flight

General None Reported / Taken

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

After going to the bathroom to clean my teeth; for a split moment; I forgot to put my mask back on. I realized it quickly and put it back. I don't think anybody realized it as most passengers were resting. It was a human mistake and I corrected it right away. It was a moment of forgetfulness.

Flight Attendant reported briefly forgetting to put the face mask back on after departing the lavatory.

1491841

201710

0601-1200

SFO.Airport

CA

25000.0

VMC

Daylight

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR DYAMD3

Class A ZOA

Center ZOA

Air Carrier

Widebody Transport

2.0

Part 129

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Descent

STAR DYAMD3

Class A ZOA

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Type 2976

Distraction; Fatigue; Situational Awareness

1491841

Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented

Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors; Procedure

Human Factors

Arrival DYAMD3 briefed and ILS 28R briefed. Verified all altitudes and speed constraints prior to brief. Speed assignment of 250 kts given for traffic. Speed entered into FMC and a discussion of the speed constraints on arrival because the initial two are 280. We opted to leave FMC with input values of 280 instead of changing. Cruise altitude FL360 and given a descent clearance to FL320 and executed by DES NOW prompt in VNAV PATH. A descend via clearance was given and 8000 set in window. Another discussion on setting of airspeed ensued as the FMC would not accept 250 kts over the hard coded 280 kts at LAANE. However; 250 kts was entered at FLOWZ and therefore allowed the FO to enter 250 kts at LAANE. I visually saw the input from the FO on the FMC. During descent on DYAMD3 encountered wake from a heavy which turned the autopilot off. FO re-engaged autopilot shortly afterwards. We were also given the Quiet Bridge routing to RWY 28R. I visually noted the change on the DEP/ARR page that the FO had input; only the approach was changed with transition of ARCHI. I did not check the legs page as I normally do; fatigue; and reverify the route/speed/altitude. NORCAL approach 128.32 queried when we were going to descend from FL250. I visually checked FMC and saw 250/FL250 over FLOWZ and referenced the chart which is FL190 to 14000. Then radar vectors in a box pattern to get to correct altitude. No further problems. We debriefed and could not identify the exact cause of the error to prevent future errors.

B737 Captain reported they failed to make a crossing restriction on arrival into SFO. Fatigue and distraction from a wake turbulence encounter were cited as contributing factors.

1121162

201310

0001-0600

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Marginal

Air Carrier

DC-9 30

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Taxi

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Situational Awareness; Distraction; Human-Machine Interface

1121162

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1121414.0

Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown; Ground Excursion Taxiway

N

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Airport; Environment - Non Weather Related; Human Factors

Human Factors

While [we were] taxiing for takeoff the Captain taxied off of the taxiway. [The event occurred at] an uncontrolled field; and on this particular day an event was being held which resulted in increased air and ground traffic. Both the Captain and I were monitoring our respective sides of the aircraft for traffic as we were approaching an active runway. I felt a drag on the aircraft; at which point I told the Captain to stop; as I believed that left main gear was in the grass. He said it was not; and then added power; which resulted in the aircraft sinking into the ground. He then shut down the left engine; got out of his seat; walked to the door; looked out; and verified that we were; in fact; stuck. He then returned to the cockpit; shut the aircraft down; and made the appropriate calls.

We were taxing out fully loaded with freight; weighing about 90;000 LBS. We were planning...to back taxi on Runway 12 and take a left turn on the parallel taxiway north to Runway 21. This was the preferred route for us mostly due to the fact that many smaller GA aircraft were parked on the south part of the ramp (a Cessna 177 'fly-in' event was occurring that weekend and GA aircraft and traffic was much more prevalent). While making the turn at the approach end of Runway 12 I was especially concerned with looking for approaching traffic for Runway 12 or Runway 30 (since we would be taxiing down this runway). The First Officer called clear of traffic on his side (Runway 30) which I; too; could easily see and verify but I could not see the approach end of Runway 12 until I turned the aircraft. While I was conducting this turn I was looking mostly to the left and over my left shoulder; I believe that this distracted me from the quality of my turn. I either initiated the turn too soon or I inadvertently turn too sharply. As I rolled out from this turn the aircraft appeared to be; from my view; in an acceptable position on the taxiway. After taxing forward for a few more feet I felt a pulling or a sense of drag on the aircraft. I really did not believe at this time that I was in the grass. I powered up the aircraft to see if the aircraft would begin moving. It did not. At this time the aircraft was past the hold short line for Runway 12 - putting us on this active runway. The wheels were significantly entrenched in the ground. The ground was especially wet-it had been raining all night and the ground was very soft. The aircraft was positioned in such a way that there was just enough pavement under the cargo door to allow a forklift to maneuver and off load the freight. At the time of the turn the First Officer was busy getting a clearance (through a remote communication frequency) and; as it seemed to me; out of visual attention of the turn. At the time I didn't think his 'heads up' attention was necessary because it was not a low visibility situation; I was not making an extraordinary taxi maneuver; and the traffic I was concerned about would only be visible to me (looking over my left shoulder). I was upset when he told me after the fact that he knew I would hit the grass because he was noting the poor execution of this turn. This; I believe; was a lack of crucial communication between the crew.

A DC9-30; departing a busy uncontrolled airport during a 'fly in' event; inadvertently exited the paved taxiway while attempting a turn to back taxi down a runway for takeoff and got bogged down in the rain softened grass. The aircraft had to be unloaded before it could be returned to the hard surface.

1415250

201701

1801-2400

BOI.Airport

ID

Marginal

Icing; Snow

Night

Air Carrier

Medium Transport; High Wing; 2 Turboprop Eng

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Landing

Visual Approach; STAR KYAAN 2

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1415250

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

1415257.0

Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Ground Incursion Taxiway

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification

Human Factors; Weather; Airport; Procedure

Ambiguous

On arrival to BOI; I the flying pilot briefed the approach. The current ATIS was then cross referenced with NOTAMS on the release and the information stated that runway 10L had a Field Condition (FICON) score of 3/3/3 100 PCT 1/4IN WET SN. The Captain suggested that AUTO UPDATES be turned on due the fact that we were sending for ATIS updates since reaching cruise and it was observed that the conditions were changing frequently; but were improving. We ran landing numbers for 5/5/5 and 3/3/3 with Stall Protection Stall Speeds and had numbers that indicated we had sufficient runway to land safely with Autobrakes low and Thrust Reverse credit. The speeds were 136; 136; 151; 182 and 7;256FT FACTORED and 6;309 UNFACTORED (3/3/3); 136;136;151;182 6096FT FACTORED; 5301FT UNFACTORED (5/5/5); so Autobrakes Low were decided which indicated 9038FT (3/3/3); and 9269FT (5/5/5). Autobrakes LOW was also selected to prevent any skidding or loss of control the aircraft and it was decided to mitigate the runway conditions to not disengage the autobrakes until a low and safe speed was obtained. The Captain also pointed out that the end of runways are often more slippery and that braking should be accomplished to slow the aircraft to a safe taxi speed prior to last quarter of the runway. The KYAAN 2 Arrival was briefed and runway 28R was also briefed for an ILS Landing due to current conditions. Threats were identified to be the visibility; we mitigated by deciding to keep autopilot on till the runway environment was in site Once on the arrival a flight was in front of us had landed on runway 28R approximately 5 minutes before us and reported the runway conditions to be medium. Were in IMC conditions intercepting the localizer and was VMC at ZIXIP; which was at 6000 feet; 5 miles out and the runway was visible. On short final; the tower gave wind speeds to be 120 at 4 knots. ATIS information was also updated; but due to the phase of flight; positive visual of the runway the ATIS updates were not checked. Autopilot was disengaged 200 feet above minimums; which is approximately 500 feet; 3300 feet indicated. The runway environment was clearly visible and the touchdown area was visible and power was removed at 30 feet and flare initiated. Touchdown occurred within the touchdown zone and the thrust reversers were applied to max. The thrust reversers were continued to be used since they were not causing white out conditions. Due to the number of taxiway closures; the only two options to exit the runway were taxiway D and taxiway W. Near taxiway Gulf the centerline was very difficult to see and the captain took over the controls because the aircraft was at 80 knots. At taxiway Gulf there was approximately 2;000 left of usable runway. The Captain stowed the thrust reverses at 60 knots just past taxiway Gulf due to good braking and the aircraft was slowing safety and the aircraft was going to stop far short of taxiway whiskey so the autobrakes were overridden and thrust reversers stowed. As we approached taxiway W; the aircraft was slowed to a slow taxi speed. No speed was not noted on the tape. The captain applied brakes to slow even more; which was approximately 200 feet before taxiway Whiskey. Anti-skid braking was engaged and working; but did not slow the aircraft due to conditions on the runway near taxiway Whiskey; which was not 5;5;5 as reported. Runway markings were not visual. The aircraft did not slow due to brake applications and the speed at this time was no more than 10 knots. Once again; no visual runway markings were noted past taxi way Gulf. The conditions made stopping and turning difficult at any speed. With brakes still being applied; the aircraft continued into the closed taxiway Zulu; which was not plowed and had approximately 6 to 8 inches of snow on it. The aircraft gently went in to the unplowed snow and stopped softly and gently. There was no jerking or sudden stopping. The aft flight attendant noted that she was hardly aware the aircraft stopped. After the aircraft came to a stop; we noted that the thrust reversers deployed caution messages were deployed and that the safest action was to request a tow from the taxiway. The Captain did redeploy the thrust reversers prior to enter the closed taxiway while still on the runway at the last minute; but restowed them when it was clear it was not going to help. There was a cargo plane behind us and I think that caused the Captain to rush to get off the runway. After the aircraft arrived at the gate I performed a very slow and careful walk around to assure the aircraft was not damaged. I did not notice any damage and was sure to check under the engine cowlings. The main contributing factor to this event was poor weather and record snow fall. The weather made the end of runway 28R; approximately last 1;000 feet; contaminated with poor braking conditions. The last 500 feet of the runway had braking conditions that were NILL. I also feel that Big Sky Arrival put the plane too close behind us in sequence and did not consider runway conditions and the extra time it takes for planes to exit a runway with only two taxi ways cleared for exit. The fact the airport was experiencing record snow fall the night of the incident and ground operations were working as fast and as hard as they could; the only way to avoid this is to keep the runway free of contaminates allowing for better braking. Due to the fact snow is falling faster than the ground equipment could keep up; maybe operating one runway in poor conditions that would have an ILS from either direction would allow for equipment and ground operation crews to keep up with the weather and avoid having runways going such long period of times between cleaning. Maybe the purchase of more snow removal equipment; but due to the fact this is a record snow fall year; and is this not a common occurrence; this would result in a costly expenditure that may not be feasible for the City of Boise.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air Carrier flight crew reported being unable to stop before the end of Runway 28R at BOI due to nil braking action in the last 200 feet of the runway.

1096555

201306

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Personal

Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 6

1.0

Part 91

None

Personal

Landing

Visual Approach

Nose Gear

X

Improperly Operated

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Personal

Pilot Flying; Single Pilot

Flight Crew Instrument

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 22; Flight Crew Total 600; Flight Crew Type 550

Situational Awareness; Fatigue

1096555

Ground Event / Encounter Ground Strike - Aircraft; Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Aircraft Aircraft Damaged; Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control

Weather; Human Factors

Human Factors

As I was landing; I experienced a strong gust of wind that caused me to momentarily lose control of the aircraft resulting in a hard landing. Moments after touchdown; while still in a nose up 'landing flare' configuration; a strong gust of wind hit my aircraft causing an extreme upward pitch and lift back off the runway surface. As I nosed over to prevent a stall; I over-corrected resulting in a hard nose wheel strike; and an ensuing 'porpoise' bounce. I bounced a second time before fully re-gaining control of the aircraft. Fortunately there were no injuries though I did sustain damage to the nose gear. As I've considered the events leading up to this hard landing; I believe the important lessons to learn are that there can be personal performance degradation after a long day of flying. While the gust of wind struck at an unwelcome phase of flight; the reality is that my imperfect reaction was possibly compounded by a long day of flying around weather and fighting strong headwinds that increased the flight time beyond what was originally planned. In the future; I will stick to 'personal maximum' hours of flying so that I will be fresh even in the last minutes of a flight.

The pilot of a Cessna 206 experienced a strong wind gust during landing resulting in a bounce and subsequent nose gear damage.

1255830

201504

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

Daylight

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Regional Jet 200 ER/LR (CRJ200)

2.0

Part 121

Landing

Visual Approach

Aileron

X

Malfunctioning

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Confusion

1255830

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Landed in Emergency Condition

Aircraft

We were on the LOC BC approach; at approximately 12 miles from the airport we had the airport in sight and continued it as a visual approach. Around 5 miles from the airport; the Captain; who was pilot flying; disconnected the autopilot. Soon after disconnecting the autopilot; he stated that the ailerons were extremely stiff and difficult to manipulate. Shortly after that we continued to land. I advised ATC and we landed without incident.

CRJ200 First Officer is informed by his Captain; when the autopilot is disconnected during approach; that the ailerons are very stiff. The approach is continued to a normal landing.

1473961

201708

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

1000.0

VMC

Night

TRACON ZZZ

Air Carrier

B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model

3.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Initial Climb

Class B ZZZ

Gear Extend/Retract Mechanism

X

Failed

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Captain; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Total 11368; Flight Crew Type 917

1473961

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Flying

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 212; Flight Crew Total 13855; Flight Crew Type 2941

1473951.0

Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Aircraft

Received EICAS message 'Gear Disagree' followed by 'Gear Doors' message for the left gear during gear retraction. We ran the 'Gear Disagree' checklist; which had us dropping the gear. We had a normal gear down indication. Flight attendant called us and said the flight attendant at 3L heard a very loud grinding sound during gear retraction. We discussed the situation and decided we may have damage to the gear and or the tires. I was talking to dispatch over ACARS; then dispatch tried to call us on Radio; we had intermittent communication; but were not able to have clear communication because we were so low (5;000 feet). I told them to use Sat Com; but we were unable to get Sat Com established. I called them on my cell phone; and got through to dispatch and [maintenance]. We discussed fuel dumping and a return to ZZZ. I [advised ATC]. We decided; instead of flying box patterns with a lot of vectors; to hold over the ZZZ VOR at 5;000 feet. We informed approach of our intention to dump fuel. We dumped 48;000 LBS to get below max landing weight and to get us as light as possible for landing in case we had damage to the left gear and or tires. After fuel dumping; we made an uneventful landing back at ZZZ; at 348;000 LBS. Once on the runway; I wanted the fire department to check the left main landing gear area for damage. I had the APU on; and we shut down the left engine. The Fire Department informed us of no damage. I then taxied to the gate and shut down. Once at the gate; a mechanic came to the cockpit and told us we sheared off a gear actuator rod at one end.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

B767 flight crew reported a GEAR DISAGREE and GEAR DOORS EICAS message after takeoff; dumped fuel and returned to departure airport. Post flight inspection revealed a sheared left main gear actuator rod.

1637549

201904

1201-1800

ZAB.ARTCC

NM

7000.0

Daylight

Center ZAB

Personal

PA-28 Cherokee/Archer/Dakota/Pillan/Warrior

1.0

Part 91

IFR

Training

Initial Climb

Other Instrument Approach

Facility ZAB.ARTCC

Government

Air Traffic Control Fully Certified

Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 13

Situational Awareness

1637549

ATC Issue All Types; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Clearance; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT

Person Air Traffic Control

In-flight

Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance

Human Factors

Aircraft X was a pilot in training and doing multiple practice approaches to a few of our airports in our airspace. At the time of the incident; he was doing a missed approach off of the DMN airport. On the departure; I had him ident and radar identified him and gave him a turn towards EWM that was a fix down the road on is flight plan. His initial filing was to go missed at DMN; then back to the DMN VOR and join V94 to EWM. Without giving it much thought; I just gave him EWM in a climb to 090. Well; the MIA in that area is 095. I tried to climb him; but realized his rate of climb wasn't going to cut it and then I turned him north to get him out of that area sooner. I should've been more aware of the airspace MIA before turning him early off of his flight plan. I will be more aware in the future of the MIA on an aircraft doing a missed approach. I don't believe I have any other recommendations.

ZAB ARTCC Controller reported issuing an altitude below the Minimum IFR Altitude to an aircraft; realizing the mistake later reporter turned aircraft before entering the higher MIA.

1657051

201906

0001-0600

SFO.Airport

CA

0.0

Night

Ramp SFO

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

FMS Or FMC

Taxi

Class B SFO

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer; Pilot Not Flying

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument

Situational Awareness

1657051

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

First Officer

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine

Situational Awareness

1657057.0

Conflict Ground Conflict; Critical; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown

Person Flight Crew

Taxi

Flight Crew Took Evasive Action

Human Factors

Pulling into [the] gate; I noticed a tug driving perpendicular on a collision course; not stopping. I told the Captain to stop and the tug proceeded to cut us off; veering right towards the gate in front of our intended path. The tug driver had no intention of stopping for the aircraft; even after he finally noticed the aircraft.Inform ramp crew of hazards associated with driving dangerously around the airport.

[Report narrative contained no additional information.]

Air carrier First Officer reported telling the Captain to stop when a tug drove in front of them as they taxied into the gate at SFO.

1507561

201712

1801-2400

ZZZ.Airport

US

0.0

Night

Ramp ZZZ

Air Carrier

B737-800

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Parked

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 270; Flight Crew Type 8800

Time Pressure; Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness

Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 Ground Personnel

1507561

Conflict Ground Conflict; Less Severe; Deviation / Discrepancy - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Person Flight Crew

Aircraft In Service At Gate

General None Reported / Taken

Company Policy; Human Factors; Procedure

Procedure

We pulled into the gate in a normal fashion. I set the parking brake and in the time it took me to turn off the engine; anti-ice and the ignition; the Marshaler gave the all clear sign; chocks in and walked away prior to me shutting off the engines. I had barely had my hand on the start lever by the time this all happened. The ramp was wet and had compacted snow. By giving the all clear prior to shut down the Marshaler was putting the other Ground Crew at risk of injury; especially with the slippery ramp. The Ramp needs to slow down; await our cut signal before performing their duties. The Marshaling Agent was not following Company procedures and policies designed to keep them safe and exposed them to unnecessary risk by not awaiting my signal that it was clear. The Ramp needs to stop rushing and slow down and follow established procedures before someone is seriously injured or killed.

A B737 Captain reported that the Ground Crew gave all clear and chocks in before they even had engines shut down or gave cut signal.

1759404

202009

0601-1200

ZZZ.Airport

US

100.0

Dawn

Tower ZZZ

Air Carrier

Commercial Fixed Wing

2.0

Part 121

IFR

Passenger

Takeoff / Launch

Class B ZZZ

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Flying; Captain

Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 11000

Situational Awareness

1759404

Aircraft X

Flight Deck

Air Carrier

Pilot Not Flying; First Officer

Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Flight Crew Last 90 Days 175; Flight Crew Type 1600

Situational Awareness

1759406.0

Inflight Event / Encounter Bird / Animal

Person Flight Crew

In-flight

Flight Crew Returned To Departure Airport

Human Factors; Environment - Non Weather Related

Environment - Non Weather Related

On rotation noticed that the departure end on runway was covered with enough birds to cover 100 feet of the runway all the way across and off the sides. We were past V1 and before the call for Landing Gear Up; we applied Emergency Trust to try and out climb the flock; but hit at approximately 30 birds. We smelled the birds through the bleed air system and elected to return to ZZZ. There were no abnormal engine or system indications. We ran the appropriate checklists and safety returned to the gate we departed from. Upon inspection of the aircraft discovered multiple strikes in the engines and leading edges as well as the landing gear.Tower could have a procedure where they scan the runway with binoculars before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. If the birds were bigger; we could have lost both engines on takeoff and the result would be much more severe. As it was there was damage to both engines. There is no way to see the departure end of the runway from the flight deck on Runway XX at ZZZ from the flight deck.

On rotation on Runway X noticed that the departure end on Runway X was covered with enough birds to cover 100 feet of the runway all the way across and off the sides. We past V1 and before the call for Landing Gear Up; we applied Emergency Thrust to try and out climb the flock; but hit approximately 30 birds. We smelled the birds through the bleed air system and elected to return to ZZZ on Runway Y Right. There were no abnormal engine or system indications. We ran the appropriate checklists and safely returned to the gate we departed from. Upon inspection of the aircraft discovered multiple strikes in the engines and leading edges as well as the landing gear.Tower could have a procedure were they scan the runway with binoculars before clearing an aircraft for takeoff. If the birds; which were verified as Starlings by ZZZ Airfield Operations; were bigger we could have lost both engines on takeoff and the result would be much more severe. As it was there was damage to both engines. There is no way to see the departure end of the runway from the flight deck on Runway X at ZZZ from the flight deck because of the crest in the Runway.

Air carrier Captain reported hitting a flock of birds during takeoff resulting in a return to land.